title: Case T-772/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Café del Mar and Others v EUIPO — Guiral Broto (Café del Mar) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark Café del Mar — Absolute ground for refusal — Bad faith — Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/42

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Café del Mar and Others v EUIPO — Guiral Broto (Café del Mar)
      (Case T-772/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark Café del Mar - Absolute ground for refusal - Bad faith - Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 305/50)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicants: Café del Mar, SC (Sant Antoni de Portmany, Spain), José Les Viamonte (Sant Antoni de Portmany) and Carlos Andrea González (Sant Josep de sa Talaia, Spain) (represented by: F. Miazzetto and J. Gracia Albero, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Ramón Guiral Broto (Marbella, Spain) (represented by: J. de Castro Hermida, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 September 2017 (Case R 1540/2015-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between, on the one hand, Café del Mar, Mr Les Viamonte and Mr Andrea González and, on the other, Mr Guiral Broto.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 4 September 2017 (Case R 1540/2015-5).

                  2.

                     Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Café del Mar SC, Mr José Les Viamonte and Mr Carlos Andrea González in the proceedings before the General Court.

                  3.

                     Orders Mr Ramón Guiral Broto to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by Café del Mar, Mr Les Viamonte and Mr Andrea González in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

         (1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.


title: Case T-773/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Café del Mar and Others v EUIPO — Guiral Broto (Café del Mar) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark Café del Mar — Absolute ground for refusal — Bad faith — Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/43

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Café del Mar and Others v EUIPO — Guiral Broto (Café del Mar)
      (Case T-773/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark Café del Mar - Absolute ground for refusal - Bad faith - Article 52(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 305/51)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicants: Café del Mar, SC (Sant Antoni de Portmany, Spain), José Les Viamonte (Sant Antoni de Portmany) and Carlos Andrea González (Sant Josep de sa Talaia, Spain) (represented by: F. Miazzetto and J. Gracia Albero, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Ramón Guiral Broto (Marbella, Spain) (represented by: J. de Castro Hermida, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 September 2017 (Case R 1542/2015-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between, on the one hand, Café del Mar, Mr Les Viamonte and Mr Andrea González and, on the other, Mr Guiral Broto.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 4 September 2017 (Case R 1542/2015-5).

                  2.

                     Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Café del Mar SC, Mr José Les Viamonte and Mr Carlos Andrea González in the proceedings before the General Court.

                  3.

                     Orders Mr Ramón Guiral Broto to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by Café del Mar, Mr Les Viamonte and Mr Andrea González in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

         (1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.


title: Case T-792/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — MAN Truck & Bus v EUIPO — Halla Holdings (MANDO) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark MANDO — Earlier international and national figurative marks MAN — Earlier national word mark Man — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/45

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — MAN Truck & Bus v EUIPO — Halla Holdings (MANDO)
      (Case T-792/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark MANDO - Earlier international and national figurative marks MAN - Earlier national word mark Man - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 305/53)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: MAN Truck & Bus AG (Munich, Germany) (represented by: C. Röhl, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented initially by: J. Ivanauskas and D. Walicka, and subsequently by J. Ivanauskas and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Halla Holdings Corp. (Yongin-si, South Korea) (represented by: M.-R. Hirsch and C. de Haas, lawyers)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 September 2017 (Case R 1677/2016-1), relating to opposition proceedings between MAN Truck & Bus and Halla Holdings.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 September 2017 (Case R 1677/2016-1) to the extent that it concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion between the figurative mark MANDO and the earlier international registration No 863 418 of the figurative mark MAN.

                  2.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder.

                  3.

                     Orders each party to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 42, 5.2.2018.


title: Case T-54/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Fashion Energy v EUIPO — Retail Royalty (1st AMERICAN) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark 1st AMERICAN — Earlier EU figurative mark representing an eagle — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Audi alteram partem rule — Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 — Cross claim)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/46

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Fashion Energy v EUIPO — Retail Royalty (1st AMERICAN)
      (Case T-54/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark 1st AMERICAN - Earlier EU figurative mark representing an eagle - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Audi alteram partem rule - Article 95(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Cross claim)
      (2019/C 305/54)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Fashion Energy Srl (Milan, Italy) (represented by: T. Müller and F. Togo, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Retail Royalty Co. (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA) (represented by: M. Dick, Solicitor, and J. Bogatz, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 November 2017 (Case R 693/2017-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Retail Royalty and Fashion Energy.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 15 November 2017 (Case R 693/2017-2);

                  2.

                     Dismisses the cross-claim as inadmissible;

                  3.

                     In the main appeal, EUIPO and Retail Royalty Co. are ordered to bear their own costs and to each bear half of the costs incurred by Fashion Energy Srl.

                  4.

                     In the cross-claim, Retail Royalty is ordered to bear its own costs and those incurred by Fashion Energy and EUIPO.

         (1)  OJ C 123, 9.4.2018.


title: Case T-113/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Miles-Bramwell Executive Services v EUIPO (FREE) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark FREE — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/47

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Miles-Bramwell Executive Services v EUIPO (FREE)
      (Case T-113/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark FREE - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/55)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Miles-Bramwell Executive Services Ltd (Alfreton, United Kingdom) (represented initially by: J. Mellor QC, G. Parsons and A. Zapalowski, Solicitors, and subsequently by J. Mellor, G. Parsons and F. McConnell, Solicitors)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 November 2017 (Case R 2164/2016-1), relating to an application for registration of the word sign FREE as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Miles-Bramwell Executive Services Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

         (1)  OJ C 152, 30.4.2018.


title: Case T-114/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Miles-Bramwell Executive Services v EUIPO (FREE) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark FREE — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/47

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Miles-Bramwell Executive Services v EUIPO (FREE)
      (Case T-114/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark FREE - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/56)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Miles-Bramwell Executive Services Ltd (Alfreton, United Kingdom) (represented initially by: J. Mellor QC, G. Parsons and A. Zapalowski, Solicitors, and subsequently by J. Mellor, G. Parsons and F. McConnell, Solicitors)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 November 2017 (Case R 2166/2016-1), relating to an application for registration of the word sign FREE as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Miles-Bramwell Executive Services Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

         (1)  OJ C 152, 30.4.2018.


title: Joined Cases T-117/18 to T-121/18: Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2019 — Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v EUIPO (200 PANORAMICZNYCH) (EU trade mark — Applications for the EU word marks 200 PANORAMICZNYCH, 300 PANORAMICZNYCH, 400 PANORAMICZNYCH, 500 PANORAMICZNYCH and 1000 PANORAMICZNYCH — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptiveness — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 — No misuse of powers)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/48

      Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2019 — Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v EUIPO (200 PANORAMICZNYCH)
      (Joined Cases T-117/18 to T-121/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Applications for the EU word marks 200 PANORAMICZNYCH, 300 PANORAMICZNYCH, 400 PANORAMICZNYCH, 500 PANORAMICZNYCH and 1000 PANORAMICZNYCH - Absolute grounds for refusal - Descriptiveness - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - No distinctive character acquired through use - Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 - No misuse of powers)
      (2019/C 305/57)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Parties

         Applicant: Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o. (Częstochowa, Poland) (represented by: C. Rogula, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      Actions brought against five decisions of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 December 2017 (Cases R 2194/2016-5, R 2195/2016-5, R 2200/2016-5, R 2201/2016-5 and R 2208/2016-5), regarding applications for registration of the word signs 200 PANORAMICZNYCH, 300 PANORAMICZNYCH, 400 PANORAMICZNYCH, 500 PANORAMICZNYCH and 1000 PANORAMICZNYCH as EU trade marks.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the actions;

                  2.

                     Orders Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o. to pay the costs, including those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

         (1)  OJ C 142, 23.4.2018.


title: Case T-264/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Gruppo Armonie v EUIPO (mo·da) (EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark mo·da — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Absolute ground for refusal in part of the European Union — Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 — No distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/49

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Gruppo Armonie v EUIPO (mo·da)
      (Case T-264/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark mo·da - Absolute ground for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Absolute ground for refusal in part of the European Union - Article 7(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 - No distinctive character acquired through use - Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/58)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Gruppo Armonie SpA (Casalgrande, Italy) (represented by G. Medri, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 February 2018 (Case R 2065/2017-5) relating to an application for registration of the figurative sign mo·da as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Gruppo Armonie SpA to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 221, 25.6.2018.


title: Case T-268/18: Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2019 — Sandrone v EUIPO — J. Garcia Carrion (Luciano Sandrone) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark Luciano Sandrone — Earlier EU word mark DON LUCIANO — Genuine use of the earlier mark — Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 — Application for an EU word mark consisting of a first name and of a surname — Earlier mark consisting of an honorific title and a first name — Neutrality of the conceptual comparison — No likelihood of confusion)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/50

      Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2019 — Sandrone v EUIPO — J. Garcia Carrion (Luciano Sandrone)
      (Case T-268/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark Luciano Sandrone - Earlier EU word mark DON LUCIANO - Genuine use of the earlier mark - Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 - Application for an EU word mark consisting of a first name and of a surname - Earlier mark consisting of an honorific title and a first name - Neutrality of the conceptual comparison - No likelihood of confusion)
      (2019/C 305/59)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Luciano Sandrone (Barolo, Italy) (represented by: A. Borra, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: K. Kompari and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: J. García Carrión, SA (Jumilla, Spain)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 February 2018 (Case R 1207/2017-2), relating to opposition proceedings between J. García Carrión and Luciano Sandrone.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 February 2018 (Case R 1207/2017-2);

                  2.

                     Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr Luciano Sandrone.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.


title: Case T-385/18: Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2019 — Aldi v EUIPO — Crone (CRONE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark CRONE — Earlier EU figurative marks crane and earlier word mark CRANE — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/50

      Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2019 — Aldi v EUIPO — Crone (CRONE)
      (Case T-385/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark CRONE - Earlier EU figurative marks crane and earlier word mark CRANE - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/60)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Aldi GmbH & Co. KG (Mülheim an der Ruhr, Germany) (represented by: N. Lützenrath, U. Rademacher, C. Fürsen and M. Minkner, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Crawcour and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Christoph Michael Crone (Krefeld, Germany) (represented by: M. van Maele and H.-Y. Cho, lawyers)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 March 2018 (Case R 1100/2017-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Aldi and Mr Crone.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Aldi GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.


title: Case T-389/18: Judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2019 — Nonnemacher v EUIPO — Ingram (WKU) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark WKU — Earlier EU word marks WKA — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — No limitation in consequence of acquiescence — Article 61(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/51

      Judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2019 — Nonnemacher v EUIPO — Ingram (WKU)
      (Case T-389/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark WKU - Earlier EU word marks WKA - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - No limitation in consequence of acquiescence - Article 61(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/61)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Klaus Nonnemacher (Karlsruhe, Germany) (represented by: C. Zierhut, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Paul Ingram (Birmingham, United Kingdom) (represented by: A. Haberl, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 April 2018 (Case R 399/2017-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Mr Ingram and Mr Nonnemacher.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Mr Klaus Nonnemacher to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.


title: Case T-390/18: Judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2019 — Nonnemacher v EUIPO — Ingram (WKU WORLD KICKBOXING AND KARATE UNION) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark WKU WORLD KICKBOXING AND KARATE UNION — Earlier EU word marks WKA — Ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — No limitation in consequence of acquiescence — Article 61(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/52

      Judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2019 — Nonnemacher v EUIPO — Ingram (WKU WORLD KICKBOXING AND KARATE UNION)
      (Case T-390/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark WKU WORLD KICKBOXING AND KARATE UNION - Earlier EU word marks WKA - Ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - No limitation in consequence of acquiescence - Article 61(1) of Regulation 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/62)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Klaus Nonnemacher (Karlsruhe, Germany) (represented by: C. Zierhut, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Paul Ingram (Birmingham, United Kingdom) (represented by: A. Haberl, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 April 2018 (Case R 409/2017-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Ingram and Nonnemacher.

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                     The action is dismissed.

                  2.

                     Klaus Nonnemacher is ordered to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.


title: Case T-412/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — mobile.de v EUIPO — Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ (mobile.ro) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark mobile.ro — Earlier national figurative mark mobile — Genuine use of the earlier mark — Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/53

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — mobile.de v EUIPO — Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ (mobile.ro)
      (Case T-412/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark mobile.ro - Earlier national figurative mark mobile - Genuine use of the earlier mark - Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/63)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: mobile.de GmbH (Dreilinden, Germany) (represented by: T. Lührig, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ (Sofia, Bulgaria) (represented by: M. Yordanova-Harizanova and V. Grigorova, lawyers)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 March 2018 (Case R 111/2015-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ and mobile.de.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders mobile.de GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’.

         (1)  OJ C 294, 20.8.2018.


title: Case T-467/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Audimas v EUIPO — Audi (AUDIMAS) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark AUDIMAS — Earlier EU word mark AUDI — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/53

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — Audimas v EUIPO — Audi (AUDIMAS)
      (Case T-467/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark AUDIMAS - Earlier EU word mark AUDI - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 305/64)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Audimas AB (Kaunas, Lithuania) (represented by G. Domkutė-Lukauskienė, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 May 2018 (Case R 2425/2017-2) relating to opposition proceedings between Audi and Audimas.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Audimas AB to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 341, 24.9.2018.


title: Case T-472/19: Action brought on 9 July 2019 — BASF v Commission

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/56

      Action brought on 9 July 2019 — BASF v Commission
      (Case T-472/19)
      (2019/C 305/67)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: BASF AS (Oslo, Norway) (represented by: E. Wright, Barrister-at-law, A. Rusanov and H. Boland, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul, in its entirety, or insofar as it affects the applicant, Commission Implementing Decision C(2019) 4336 final of 6 June 2019 concerning, in the framework of Article 31 of Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, the marketing authorisations of medicinal products for human use containing ‘Omega-3 acid ethyl esters’ for oral use in secondary prevention after myocardial infarction;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision has no valid legal basis.

                              —

                              The applicant argues that, by adopting the contested decision, the European Commission failed to respect and fulfil the obligations imposed on the institution by Article 116 of Directive 2001/83/EC; (1)

                              —

                              More specifically, the applicant states that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the medicinal product Omacor is harmful, lacks therapeutic efficacy, that the risk-benefit balance is not favourable, or that its qualitative and quantitative composition is not as declared;

                              —

                              The contested decision, it is further argued, disregards the principle established by the case-law of the Court of Justice that the favourable risk-benefit balance and efficacy of Omacor are presumed and that it is for the European Commission to demonstrate that the available clinical data supports the reversal of this presumption.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that, by adopting the contested decision, the defendant disregarded the general principle of proportionality under EU law.

                              —

                              It is argued again, under this plea, that the defendant failed to demonstrate that Omacor lacks therapeutic efficacy or that the risk-benefit balance of Omacor is no longer favourable. Moreover, the applicant maintains that the contested decision manifestly fails to respect the principle of proportionality;

                              —

                              Even if, quod non, there had been substantiated concerns regarding the efficacy or risk-benefit balance of Omacor, the defendant would have been required to consider measures that could address these concerns and which are less restrictive than the contested decision.

         (1)  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001 L 311, p. 67).


title: Case T-481/19: Action brought on 8 July 2019 — Portigon v SRB

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/59

      Action brought on 8 July 2019 — Portigon v SRB
      (Case T-481/19)
      (2019/C 305/70)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Portigon AG (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: D. Bliesener, V. Jungkind and F. Geber, lawyers)

         Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the defendant’s decision of 16 April 2019 on the calculation of the ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for 2019 (ref: SRB/ES/SRF/2019/10), in so far as the decision concerns the applicant;

                  —

                  stay the present proceedings under Article 69(c) and (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court until a final decision is issued in Cases T-365/16, T-420/17 and T-413/18 or until those cases are otherwise brought to a conclusion;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on eight pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea, alleging infringement of the first, second and third subparagraphs of Article 70(2) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (1) in conjunction with Article 8(1)(d) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81, (2) Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU (3) and Article 114 TFEU

                              —

                              The applicant claims that the defendant was wrong to make the applicant subject to an obligation to pay a contribution, since a mandatory contribution for institutions under resolution is not provided for under Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and Directive 2014/59/EU. Article 114 TFEU prohibits the levying of contributions on institutions such as the applicant.

                              —

                              The legislature was not entitled to base the obligation to pay a contribution on Article 114 TFEU owing to the lack of relevance to the internal market. Harmonised rules governing contributions throughout the European Union neither facilitate the exercise of fundamental freedoms nor remedy appreciable distortions of competition in relation to institutions that withdraw from the market.

                              —

                              The applicant claims that the defendant was wrong to make the applicant subject to an obligation to pay a contribution, since the institution has no risk exposure, there is no prospect of the institution entering into resolution in accordance with the rules of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 and the institution is of no importance to the stability of the financial system.

                              —

                              The applicant has not engaged in any new business since 2012 and is under resolution as a result of an aid decision taken by the European Commission. It holds the majority of its remaining liabilities on trust for another entity.

                              —

                              Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 (4) infringes Article 114 TFEU and Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU as an essential element relating to the calculation of the contribution (second sentence of Article 290(1) TFEU).

                  2.

                  Second plea, alleging infringement of Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), on the ground that the calculation procedure does not allow for a complete statement of reasons for the contested decision. The calculation is inapplicable in so far as it is based on Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63.

                  3.

                  Third plea, alleging infringement of Articles 16 and 20 of the Charter, since, in view of the special situation of the applicant, the contested decision is at variance with the general principle of equality. Furthermore, the contested decision interferes disproportionately with the applicant’s freedom to conduct a business.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 70(2) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in conjunction with Article 103(7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, since the defendant, in calculating the amount of the contribution, should have excluded risk-free liabilities from the relevant liabilities

                  5.

                  Fifth plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 70(6) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in conjunction with Article 5(3) and (4) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63, since the defendant wrongly calculated the applicant’s contribution on the basis of a gross approach with regard to derivative contracts

                  6.

                  Sixth plea, alleging, in the alternative, infringement of Article 70(6) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, in conjunction with Article 6(8)(a) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63, since the defendant wrongly regarded the applicant as an institution undergoing reorganisation

                  7.

                  Seventh plea, alleging infringement of Article 41(1) and (2)(a) of the Charter, as the defendant should have heard the applicant prior to the adoption of the contested decision

                  8.

                  Eighth plea, alleging infringement of Article 41(1) and (2)(c) of the Charter and of the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU on the ground that the defendant failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons for the contested decision

         (1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).

         (2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 of 19 December 2014 specifying uniform conditions of application of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund (OJ 2015 L 15, p. 1).

         (3)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).

         (4)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).


title: Case T-510/19: Action brought on 17 July 2019 — Puma v EUIPO — Gemma Group (Device of a jumping animal)

text:
               30.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/61

      Action brought on 17 July 2019 — Puma v EUIPO — Gemma Group (Device of a jumping animal)
      (Case T-510/19)
      (2019/C 328/70)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Puma SE (Herzogenaurach, Germany) (represented by: P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Gemma Group Srl (Cerasolo Ausa, Italy)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark representing device of a jumping animal — Application for registration No 11 573 474

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 30 April 2019 in Case R 2057/2018-4

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  order EUIPO and GEMMA GROUP S.r.l. to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Plea in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;


title: Case C-487/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 26 June 2019 — W.Ż.

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 26 June 2019 — W.Ż.
      (Case C-487/19)
      (2019/C 337/04)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Najwyższy

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: W.Ż.

         Intervening party: Prokurator Prokuratury Krajowej Bożena Górecka

         Question referred

      Should Articles 2, 6(1) and (3) and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) [TEU], in conjunction with Article 47 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights] and Article 267 [TFEU], be interpreted as meaning that a court composed of a single person who has been appointed to the position of judge in flagrant breach of the laws of a Member State applicable to judicial appointments — which breach included, in particular, the appointment of that person to the position of judge despite a prior appeal to the competent national court (the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme Administrative Court, Poland)) against the resolution of a national body (the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National Council for the Judiciary, Poland)), which included a motion for the appointment of that person to the position of judge, notwithstanding the fact that the implementation of that resolution had been stayed in accordance with national law and that proceedings before the competent national court (Supreme Administrative Court) had not been concluded before the delivery of the appointment letter — is not an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law within the meaning of EU law?


title: Case C-508/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 3 July 2019 — M.F. v J.M.

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 3 July 2019 — M.F. v J.M.
      (Case C-508/19)
      (2019/C 337/07)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Najwyższy

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: M.F.

         Defendant: J.M.

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Articles 2, 4(3) and 6(3) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘CFR’) and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that the court of final instance of a Member State may, in proceedings seeking a declaration that a service relationship is non-existent, declare that a person who has received a document appointing him to the position of judge in that court is not a judge in the case where that document of appointment was issued on the basis of provisions which infringe the principle of effective judicial protection or under a procedure which is incompatible with that principle, in the case where a judicial review of these matters prior to the delivery of the document of appointment has intentionally been made impossible?

                  2.

                  Should the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Articles 2 and 4(3) TEU and Article 47 of the CFR, in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that the principle of effective judicial protection is infringed in the case where a document appointing a person to the position of judge is delivered after a national court has requested a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of EU law and where that preliminary ruling will determine the compatibility with EU law of the national provisions the application of which made it possible for the document of appointment to be delivered?

                  3.

                  Should the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Articles 2, 4(3) and 6(3) TEU, and Article 47 of the CFR, be interpreted as meaning that the principle of effective judicial protection is infringed by the failure to guarantee the right to effective judicial protection in the case where a document appointing a person to the position of judge of a court in a Member State is delivered following an appointment procedure carried out in flagrant breach of the laws of that Member State governing the appointment of judges?

                  4.

                  Should the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Articles 2 and 4(3) TEU and Article 47 of the CFR, in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that the principle of effective judicial protection is infringed through the establishment by the national legislature of an organisational unit within the court of final instance of a Member State which is not a court or tribunal within the meaning of EU law?

                  5.

                  Should the second subparagraph of Article 19(1), Articles 2 and 4(3) TEU and Article 47 of the CFR, in conjunction with the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that the existence of a service relationship and the status of judge of a person who received a document appointing him to the position of judge of the court of final instance in a Member State cannot be determined by the organisational unit of that court which is competent in that matter under national law, to which unit that person has been appointed, and which unit is composed exclusively of persons whose appointment documents suffer from the defects referred to in Questions 2 to 4 and which unit for those reasons is not a court or tribunal within the meaning of EU law, but must rather be determined by another organisational unit of that court which satisfies the requirements of EU law for a court or tribunal?


title: Case C-566/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel (Luxembourg) lodged on 25 July 2019 — Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg v JR

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/8

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel (Luxembourg) lodged on 25 July 2019 — Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg v JR
      (Case C-566/19)
      (2019/C 337/09)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Cour d’appel

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Parquet général du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg

         Defendant: JR

         Questions referred

      Can the French Public Prosecutor’s Office at the investigating court or trial court, which has jurisdiction in France, under the law of that State, to issue a European arrest warrant, be considered to be an issuing judicial authority, within the autonomous meaning of that term in Article 6(1) of Council Framework Decision No 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, (1) in circumstances where, deemed to monitor compliance with the conditions necessary for the issue of a European arrest warrant and to examine whether such a warrant is proportionate in relation to the details of the criminal file, it is, at the same time, the authority responsible for the criminal prosecution in the same case?

         (1)  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).


title: Case T-540/19: Action brought on 30 July 2019 — Sharif v Council

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/9

      Action brought on 30 July 2019 — Sharif v Council
      (Case T-540/19)
      (2019/C 337/10)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Ammar Sharif (Damascus, Syria) (represented by J.-P. Buyle and L. Cloquet, lawyers)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the General Court should:

                  —

                  annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/806 of 17 May 2019 amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Syria, in so far as it concerns the applicant;

                  —

                  annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/798 of 17 May 2019 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, in so far as it concerns the applicant;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay the entirety of the costs and expenses of the proceedings, including those incurred by the applicant.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging manifest error in the assessment of the facts. The applicant takes the view that the Council committed a manifest error of assessment by justifying the measures taken against him on the ground that he is allegedly ‘a leading businessman operating in Syria’ within the meaning of Article 27.2(a) and Article 28.2(a) of Decision 2013/255/CFSP. The applicant disputes that categorisation of ‘leading businessman’ and the rebuttable presumption of association with the Syrian regime which arises from the contested measures. The applicant maintains that he has not connection with the Syrian regime.
                  Furthermore, in accordance with Article 27.3 and Article 28.3 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, the applicant rebuts the rebuttable presumption laid down in Article 27.2(a) and Article 28.2(a) of that decision by voluntarily demonstrating that he (i) is not, or is no longer, associated with the Syrian regime, (ii) does not exercise any influence on it, and (iii) does not pose any real risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures taken by the Council in view of the situation in Syria.
                  In the applicant’s view, by failing to take into account the rebuttal of that presumption, the Council continues to commit a manifest error of assessment of the facts.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging disproportionate infringement of the right of ownership and of the right to carry out a professional activity. The applicant takes the view that, by the sanctions adopted, the Council has inevitably infringed the applicant’s right of ownership, as well as his right to carry out his professional activity, in breach of the first additional protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. According to the applicant, he cannot be prevented from peacefully enjoying his assets and economic freedom, for which reason the contested measures should be annulled in so far as they concern him.


title: Case C-68/19 P: Appeal brought on 29 January 2019 by Camomilla Srl against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 November 2018 in Case T-44/17 Camomilla v EUIPO — CMT (CAMOMILLA)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/3

      Appeal brought on 29 January 2019 by Camomilla Srl against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 November 2018 in Case T-44/17 Camomilla v EUIPO — CMT (CAMOMILLA)
      (Case C-68/19 P)
      (2019/C 363/05)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Appellant: Camomilla Srl (represented by: M. Mussi, H.G. Chiappetta, avvocati)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, CMT Compagnia manifatture tessili Srl
      By order of 11 September 2019, the Court (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded, and ordered Camomilla Srl to bear its own costs.


title: Case C-98/19 P: Appeal brought on 7 February 2019 by Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes, Lda, and Others against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-493/18 Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes and Others v Portugal

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/3

      Appeal brought on 7 February 2019 by Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes, Lda, and Others against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-493/18 Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes and Others v Portugal
      (Case C-98/19 P)
      (2019/C 363/06)
      Language of the case: Portuguese

         Parties

         Appellants: Comprojecto-Projectos e Construçoes, Lda, Paulo Eduardo Matos Gomes de Azevedo, Julião Maria Gomes de Azevedo, Isabel Maria Matos Gomes de Azevedo (represented by: M. A. Ribeiro, advogado)

         Other party to the proceedings: Portuguese Republic
      By order of 11 September 2019, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.


title: Case C-375/19 P: Appeal brought on 13 May 2019 by Wirecard Technologies GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 March 2019 in Case T-297/18: Wirecard Technologies GmbH v EUIPO – Striatum Ventures

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/4

      Appeal brought on 13 May 2019 by Wirecard Technologies GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 March 2019 in Case T-297/18: Wirecard Technologies GmbH v EUIPO – Striatum Ventures
      (Case C-375/19 P)
      (2019/C 363/07)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Wirecard Technologies GmbH (represented by: A. Bayer, Rechtsanwalt)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Striatum Ventures
      By order of 10 September 2019 the Court of Justice (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) held that the appeal is not allowed to proceed.


title: Case C-444/19 P: Appeal brought on 11 June 2019 by Kiku GmbH against the judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 April 2019 in Case T-765/17, Kiku GmbH v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/4

      Appeal brought on 11 June 2019 by Kiku GmbH against the judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 April 2019 in Case T-765/17, Kiku GmbH v Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO)
      (Case C-444/19 P)
      (2019/C 363/08)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Kiku GmbH (represented by: G. Würtenberger and R. Kunze, Rechtsanwälte)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Community Plant Variety Office, Sächsisches Landesamt für Umwelt, Landwirtschaft und Geologie
      By order of 16 September 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to pay its own costs.


title: Case C-503/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo No 17 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 2 July 2019 — UQ v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo No 17 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 2 July 2019 — UQ v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona
      (Case C-503/19)
      (2019/C 363/09)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo No 17 de Barcelona

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: UQ

         Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Whether an interpretation by the national courts under which the existence of any form of criminal record is sufficient grounds for refusing long-term resident status is compliant with Article 6(1) and Article 17 of Directive 2003/109. (1)

                  2.

                  Whether, in addition to the existence of a criminal record, the national courts should take account of other factors, such as the severity and length of the sentence, the danger the applicant represents to society, the duration of the applicant’s prior legal residence and the links he has formed with the country, and make an assessment that takes all these elements into account.

                  3.

                  Whether Article 6(1) of the directive should be interpreted as precluding a rule of national law that allows long-term resident status under Article 4 to be refused on public policy or public security grounds without establishing the assessment criteria included in Article 6(1) and Article 17.

                  4.

                  Whether Article 6(1) and Article 17 of Directive 2003/109 should be interpreted as meaning that, under the case-law established by the Court of Justice that directives have vertical direct effect, the national court has authority to apply the content of Article 6(1) and Article 17 directly, and may do so in order to assess a criminal record, having regard to the gravity of the offence, the length of the sentence, and the danger represented by the applicant.

                  5.

                  Whether EU law, in particular the right to obtain long-term resident status, and the principles of clarity, transparency and intelligibility, should be interpreted as precluding an interpretation by the Spanish courts of Articles 147 to 149 of Royal Decree 557/2011 and Article 32 of Organic Law 4/2000 under which long-term resident status may be refused on public policy and public security grounds, even though those provisions do not set out clearly and transparently that these shall be grounds for refusal.

                  6.

                  Whether a provision of national law and its interpretation by the courts that hinder access to long-term resident status and encourage temporary residence are compliant with the principle that Directive 2003/19 must have practical effect, and with Article 6(1) in particular.’

         (1)  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44).


title: Case C-504/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 2 July 2019 — Banco de Portugal, Fundo de Resolução, Novo Banco, S.A. v VR

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/5

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 2 July 2019 — Banco de Portugal, Fundo de Resolução, Novo Banco, S.A. v VR
      (Case C-504/19)
      (2019/C 363/10)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Tribunal Supremo

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Banco de Portugal, Fundo de Resolução, Novo Banco, S.A.

         Defendant: VR

         Question referred

      Is an interpretation of Article 3(2) of Directive 2001/24/EC (1) under which, in legal proceedings pending in other Member States, the courts must, without any further formalities, recognise the effects of a Decision by the competent administrative authority of the home Member State that is intended retrospectively to change the legal framework that existed at the time the proceedings were commenced and that renders ineffective any judgments that do not accord with the provisions of the new decision, compatible with the fundamental right to an effective remedy in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the principle of the rule of law in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, and the general principle of legal certainty?

         (1)  Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ 2001 L 125, p. 15).


title: Case C-521/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 8 July 2019 — CB v Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Galicia

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 8 July 2019 — CB v Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Galicia
      (Case C-521/19)
      (2019/C 363/11)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: CB

         Defendant: Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional de Galicia

         Questions referred

      Must Articles 73 and 78 of the VAT Directive, (1) in the light of the principles of neutrality, prohibition of tax evasion and abuse of rights, and prohibition of the illegal distortion of competition, be interpreted as precluding national legislation and the case-law interpreting it, pursuant to which, where the tax authorities discover concealed transactions subject to value added tax for which no invoice was issued, the price agreed by the parties for those transactions must be regarded as already including value added tax?
      Is it therefore possible, in cases of fraud in which the transaction was concealed from the tax authorities, to consider, as may be deduced from the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 28 July 2016 (Case C-332/15, Astone (2)), of 5 October 2016 (Case C-576/15, Marinova (3)) and of 7 March 2018 (C-159/17, Dobre (4)), that the amounts paid and received do not include value added tax in order to conduct the proper assessment and impose the appropriate penalty?

         (1)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).

         (2)  Judgment of 28 July 2016, Astone (C-332/15, EU:C:2016:614).

         (3)  Judgment of 5 October 2016, Marinova (C-576/15, EU:C:2016:740).

         (4)  Judgment of 7 March 2018, Dobre (C-159/17, EU:C:2018:161).


title: Case C-524/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Nules (Spain) lodged on 9 July 2019 — Investcapital Ltd v FE

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/7

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Nules (Spain) lodged on 9 July 2019 — Investcapital Ltd v FE
      (Case C-524/19)
      (2019/C 363/12)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 2 de Nules

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Investcapital Ltd

         Defendant: FE

         Question referred

      Must Article 7 of Regulation No 1896/2006 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 be interpreted as meaning that, in European order for payment proceedings brought thereunder, it does not preclude courts from reviewing of their own motion any unfair terms in the contract under which the debt has arisen in accordance with Article 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC (2) on unfair terms in consumer contracts, particularly if the national court needs to carry out a prior examination of the contract in order to conduct that review?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure (OJ 2006 L 399, p. 1).

         (2)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


title: Case C-568/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 25 July 2019 — MO v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/7

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha (Spain) lodged on 25 July 2019 — MO v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo
      (Case C-568/19)
      (2019/C 363/13)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Castilla-La Mancha

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: MO

         Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Toledo

         Question referred

      Whether an interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice of 23 April 2015 (Case C-38/14, Zaizoune) (1) as meaning the Spanish authorities and courts can directly apply Directive 2008/115/EC (2)
         to the detriment of the third-country national, thereby ignoring and disapplying more advantageous national penalty provisions, aggravating that national’s liability to a penalty and possibly disregarding the principle that criminal penalties must be defined by law, is compatible with the case-law of the Court of Justice on the limits on the direct effect of directives, and should the fact that the Spanish legislation is not in conformity with that directive be resolved not in that way but by legislative reform or by the remedies provided by EU law whereby a State can be required properly to transpose directives.

         (1)  Judgment of 23 April 2015, Zaizoune (C-38/14, EU:C:2015:260).

         (2)  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).


title: Case C-592/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo n.o 05 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 2 August 2019 — SI v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/8

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo n.o 05 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 2 August 2019 — SI v Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona
      (Case C-592/19)
      (2019/C 363/14)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo n.o 05 de Barcelona

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: SI

         Defendant: Subdelegación del Gobierno en Barcelona

         Question referred

      Must Article 4 and Article 6(1) of Directive 2003/109/EC (1) be interpreted as meaning that a criminal record, of any nature, is sufficient grounds for refusing access to long-term resident status, without any requirement to assess the duration of residence and the existence of links with the country of residence?

         (1)  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ 2004 L 16, p. 44).


title: Case C-598/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco (Spain) lodged on 6 August 2019 — Confederación Nacional de Centros Especiales de Empleo (CONACEE) v Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco (Spain) lodged on 6 August 2019 — Confederación Nacional de Centros Especiales de Empleo (CONACEE) v Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa
      (Case C-598/19)
      (2019/C 363/15)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Tribunal Superior de Justicia del País Vasco

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Confederación Nacional de Centros Especiales de Empleo (CONACEE)

         Defendant: Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa

         Question referred

      Must Article 20 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) on public procurement be interpreted as meaning that the scope ratione personae of the reservation laid down therein cannot be defined in terms which exclude from its scope undertakings or economic operators which satisfy the condition that at least 30 % of their employees must be persons with disabilities and which meet the aim or objective of the social and professional integration of those persons, by setting additional criteria related to the constitution, character and aims of those bodies, to their activities and investments, or to other matters

         (1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement (OJ 2014 L 94, p.65)


title: Case C-621/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Slovak Republic) lodged on 20 August 2019 – Weindel Logistik Service SR spol. s r.o. v Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Slovak Republic) lodged on 20 August 2019 – Weindel Logistik Service SR spol. s r.o. v Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky
      (Case C-621/19)
      (2019/C 363/16)
      Language of the case: Slovakian

         Referring court

      Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Weindel Logistik Service SR spol. s r.o.

         Defendant: Finančné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 167 and Article 168(e) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (1) [of 28 November 2006] on the common system of value added tax be interpreted as meaning that the right to deduct the value added tax which a taxable person is required to pay on imported goods is conditional on a right of ownership in respect of the imported goods or on the right to dispose of the imported goods as owner?

                  2.

                  Must Article 168(e) of Directive 2006/112/EC … be interpreted as meaning that the right to deduct the value added tax which a taxable person is required to pay on imported goods arises only if the imported goods are used for the purposes of the taxable person’s taxable transactions in the form of the sale of the goods in the national territory or the supply of the goods to another Member State or the export of the goods to a third country?

                  3.

                  In such circumstances, is the condition that there be a direct and immediate link between the goods purchased and the output transaction satisfied and, more specifically, is it permissible to apply, in the present case, the traditional interpretation of the right of deduction based on a direct and immediate link between the goods purchased and the output transactions with regard to cost components that have not arisen in relation to the goods and that cannot therefore be reflected in the price of the output supply?

         (1)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.


title: Case C-676/19 P: Appeal brought on 11 September 2019 by Bruno Gollnisch against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2019 in Case T-95/18, Gollnisch v Parliament

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/12

      Appeal brought on 11 September 2019 by Bruno Gollnisch against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2019 in Case T-95/18, Gollnisch v Parliament
      (Case C-676/19 P)
      (2019/C 363/18)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: Bruno Gollnisch (represented by: B. Bonnefoy-Claudet, avocat)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2019 (T-95/18);

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  award the appellant the sum of EUR 12 500 in respect of procedural costs;

                  —

                  order the Parliament to pay the costs.

            In the event of the appeal being upheld, the appellant also claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  if it considers that it has sufficient information, itself rule on the substance of the case;

                  —

                  annul the decision of the Bureau of the Parliament of 23 October 2017;

                  —

                  grant the form of order sought by the appellant at first instance;

                  —

                  order the Parliament to pay all the costs.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

                  1.

                  First ground of appeal, alleging retroactive application in defavorem of subsequent case-law in order to declare the action inadmissible
                  In order to dismiss the action, the judgment under appeal retroactively, unfavourably and unlawfully applied case-law of the Court from the period after the action was brought, even though the action was explicitly described as admissible under the previously existing situation.

                  2.

                  Second ground of appeal, alleging refusal to apply Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
                  The General Court held that those two articles did not apply to the case, even though it was clear from Article 52 of the Charter and the explanations of its articles recognised in the case-law of the Court that they were relevant.

                  3.

                  Third ground of appeal, alleging incorrect interpretation on the case-law relating to the right to be heard
                  The judgment under appeal incorrectly relied on a judgment of the Court in order to deny the appellant his right to an oral hearing, even though that judgment concerned only interveners in specific and marginal proceedings which, moreover, authorised an oral hearing.

                  4.

                  Fourth ground of appeal, alleging contradictory reasoning and infringement of the rights of the defence
                  In order to hold that it was lawful for a document not to have been disclosed to the applicant during the proceedings at issue, the General Court gave that document contradictory classifications, resulting in an infringement of the rights of the defence.


title: Case T-313/15 and T-317/15: Order of the General Court of 5 September 2019 — Italy v Commission (Rules on the use of languages – Notices of open competition for the recruitment of administrators – Choice of second language from three languages – Regulation No 1 – Article 1d(1), Article 27 and Article 28(f) of the Staff Regulations – Principle of non-discrimination – Proportionality – Manifestly well-founded action)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/13

      Order of the General Court of 5 September 2019 — Italy v Commission
      (Case T-313/15 and T-317/15) (1)

      (Rules on the use of languages - Notices of open competition for the recruitment of administrators - Choice of second language from three languages - Regulation No 1 - Article 1d(1), Article 27 and Article 28(f) of the Staff Regulations - Principle of non-discrimination - Proportionality - Manifestly well-founded action)
      (2019/C 363/19)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and P. Gentili, avvocato dello Stato)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by: J. Currall and G. Gattinara, and subsequently by G. Gattinara, F. Simonetti and D. Milanowska, acting as Agents)

         Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: J. García-Valdecasas Dorrego, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      In Case T-313/15, application based on Article 263 TFEU and asking for annulment of the notice of open competition EPSO/AD/301/15 to draw up a reserve list of administrators (AD 5) (OJ 2015 C 92 A, p.1), and, in Case T-317/15, application based on Article 263 TFEU and asking for annulment of the notice of open competition EPSO/AD/3012/15 to draw up a reserve list of administrators in the field of audit (AD 5) (OJ 2015 C 99 A, p.1).

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     Cases T-313/15 and T-317/15 are joined for the purpose of the present order.

                  2.

                     The notice of open competition EPSO/AD/301/15 to draw up a reserve list of administrators (AD 5) and the notice of open competition EPSO/AD/3012/15 to draw up a reserve list of administrators in the field of audit (AD 5) are annulled.

                  3.

                     The European Commission shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the Italian Republic.

                  4.

                     The Kingdom of Spain shall bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 262, 10.8.2015.


title: Case T-212/18: Order of the General Court of 6 September 2019 — Romańska v Frontex (Civil Service – Contract Staff – Contract for an indefinite period – Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS – Termination – Grounds for termination – Breakdown in the relationship of trust – Discrimination and psychological harassment – Compensation claim – Manifest inadmissibility)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/14

      Order of the General Court of 6 September 2019 — Romańska v Frontex
      (Case T-212/18) (1)

      (Civil Service - Contract Staff - Contract for an indefinite period - Article 47(c)(i) of the CEOS - Termination - Grounds for termination - Breakdown in the relationship of trust - Discrimination and psychological harassment - Compensation claim - Manifest inadmissibility)
      (2019/C 363/20)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Parties

         Applicant: Karolina Romańska (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: A. Tetkowska, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (represented by: H. Caniard and S. Drew, acting as Agents, assisted by J. Currall and G. Ostaszewski, lawyers)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 270 TFEU and seeking, first, annulment of the decision of 14 June 2017 by which the Executive Director of Frontex, acting as the authority authorised to conclude contracts of employment, terminated the applicant’s employment contract with effect at the end of an eight-month notice period and, secondly, compensation for the damage which the applicant claims to have suffered on account of discrimination and psychological harassment by Frontex which culminated in the decision to terminate her contract.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The action is dismissed.

                  2.

                     Ms Karolina Romańska shall pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 200, 11.6.2018.


title: Case T-575/18: Order of the General Court of 9 September 2019 — Shore Capital International v EUIPO — Circle Imperium (The Inner Circle) (EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Figurative mark The Inner Circle – Earlier EU word mark InnerCircle – Relative ground for refusal – No similarity between the services – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/14

      Order of the General Court of 9 September 2019 — Shore Capital International v EUIPO — Circle Imperium (The Inner Circle)
      (Case T-575/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark The Inner Circle - Earlier EU word mark InnerCircle - Relative ground for refusal - No similarity between the services - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
      (2019/C 363/21)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Shore Capital International Ltd (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: O. Spieker, A. Schönfleisch and N. Willich, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini and H. O’Neill, Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Circle Imperium BV (Amsterdam, Netherlands)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 June 2018 (Case R 1402/2017-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Shore Capital International and Circle Imperium.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The action is dismissed.

                  2.

                     Shore Capital International Ltd shall pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 427, 26.11.2018.


title: Case T-762/18 R: Order of the President of the General Court of 10 September 2019 — Athanasiadou and Soulantikas v Commission (Application for interim relief – Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own resources, combating fraud) – Enforcement – Application for suspension – Admissibility – No urgency)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/15

      Order of the President of the General Court of 10 September 2019 — Athanasiadou and Soulantikas v Commission
      (Case T-762/18 R)
      (Application for interim relief - Financial provisions (budget, financial framework, own resources, combating fraud) - Enforcement - Application for suspension - Admissibility - No urgency)
      (2019/C 363/22)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicants: Sofia Athanasiadou (Athens, Greece), Konstantinos Soulantikas (Athens) (represented by: M. Lappa, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Katsimerou and A. Kyratsou, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 299 TFEU for suspension of enforcement of Commission Decision C(2017) 5883 final of 22 August 2017, of the order to pay of 30 October 2018, affixed to the copy of the enforcement order issued on the basis of Commission Decision C(2017) 5883 final of 22 August 2017, and of any other related enforcement measure.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The application for interim relief is dismissed.

                  2.

                     Sofia Athanasiadou and Konstantinos Soulantikas shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.


title: Case T-209/19: Order of the General Court of 5 September 2019 — Giorgio Armani v EUIPO — Invicta Watch Company of America (GLYCINE) (European Union trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Withdrawal of the application for registration – No need to adjudicate)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/16

      Order of the General Court of 5 September 2019 — Giorgio Armani v EUIPO — Invicta Watch Company of America (GLYCINE)
      (Case T-209/19) (1)

      (European Union trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the application for registration - No need to adjudicate)
      (2019/C 363/23)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Giorgio Armani SpA (Milan, Italy) (represented by: J. Rether and M. Kinkeldey, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Invicta Watch Company of America, Inc. (Hollywood, Florida, United States)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 February 2019 (Case R 578/2018-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Giorgio Armani and Invicta Watch Company of America, Inc.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

                  2.

                     Giorgio Armani SpA shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

         (1)  OJ C 182, 27.5.2019.


title: Case T-388/19 R: Order of the President of the General Court of 1 July 2019 — Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament (Application for interim measures – European Parliament – Verification of the credentials – No prima facie case)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/16

      Order of the President of the General Court of 1 July 2019 — Puigdemont i Casamajó and Comín i Oliveres v Parliament
      (Case T-388/19 R)
      (Application for interim measures - European Parliament - Verification of the credentials - No prima facie case)
      (2019/C 363/24)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicants: Puigdemont i Casamajó (Waterloo, Belgium) and Comín i Oliveres (Waterlo) (represented by: B. Bekaert, B. Emmerson, G. Boye and S. Bekaert, avocats)

         Defendant: European Parliament

         Re:

      Application submitted under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking, first, to suspend the implementation of various decisions of the European Parliament ordered to prevent the applicants from sitting in Parliament as elected members and, second, to direct Parliament to take all necessary measures, including a declaration of the applicants’ privileges and immunities, to enable them to sit in Parliament as from 2 July 2019

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The application for interim measures is dismissed.

                  2.

                     The costs are reserved.


title: Case T-514/19: Action brought on 18 July 2019 – DI v ECB

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/18

      Action brought on 18 July 2019 – DI v ECB
      (Case T-514/19)
      (2019/C 363/26)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: DI (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Central Bank (ECB)

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decision of the ECB Executive Board of 7 May 2019 imposing the disciplinary dismissal without notice;

                  —

                  annul the decision of the ECB Executive Board of 25 June 2019 refusing to reopen the disciplinary proceedings further to the closure of criminal proceedings;

                  —

                  as a consequence, order the full reinstatement of the applicant as of 11 May 2019 with all related financial entitlements and with the appropriate publicity in order to restore his good name;

                  —

                  in any case, order the compensation of the non-material harm allegedly suffered by the applicant, evaluated ex aequo et bono at EUR 20 000:

                  —

                  order the defendant to reimburse all the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on nine pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging lack of competence of the author of the contested measures.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging breach of Article 8.3.2 of the ECB Staff Rules. It is alleged that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated while time-barred.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle that disciplinary proceedings arising out of a criminal offence must await the outcome of the criminal trial, together with breach of the principle of good administration and of the duty of care.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Disciplinary Committee exceeded its mission. It is alleged that Article 8.3.7 of the ECB Staff Rules was breached, along with the principle of impartiality as embodied in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging violation of the presumption of innocence. It is alleged that Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was breached.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging violation of the principle that disciplinary proceedings be conducted within a reasonable period and violation of the duty of care.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging violation of the duty to state reasons.

                  9.

                  Ninth plea in law, alleging, on a subsidiary basis, violation of the principle of proportionality.


title: Case T-534/19: Action brought on 26 July 2019 – TestBioTech v Commission

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/19

      Action brought on 26 July 2019 – TestBioTech v Commission
      (Case T-534/19)
      (2019/C 363/27)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: TestBioTech eV (Munich, Germany) (represented by: K. Smith QC)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the Commission’s decision of 20 May 2019, refusing to revoke or amend Commission Implementing Decision 2018/2046 of 19 December 2018; (1)

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging an error of law in that the Commission conducted its assessment of the maize in question in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 641/2004. (2)

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of scientific assessment.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission unlawfully failed to request an event-specific post-marketing monitoring plan.

         (1)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/2046 of 19 December 2018 authorising the placing on the market of products containing, consisting of or produced from genetically modified maize MON 87427 × MON 89034 × 1507 × MON 88017 × 59122, and genetically modified maize combining two, three or four of the single events MON 87427, MON 89034, 1507, MON 88017 and 59122 and repealing Decision 2011/366/EU (notified under document C (2018) 8238) (OJ 2018 L 327, p. 70).

         (2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 641/2004 of 6 April 2004 on detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the application for the authorisation of new genetically modified food and feed, the notification of existing products and adventitious or technically unavoidable presence of genetically modified material which has benefited from a favourable risk evaluation (OJ 2004 L 102, p. 14).


title: Case T-569/19: Action brought on 15 August 2019 – AlzChem Group v Commission

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/19

      Action brought on 15 August 2019 – AlzChem Group v Commission
      (Case T-569/19)
      (2019/C 363/28)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: AlzChem Group AG (Trostberg, Germany) (represented by: A. Borsos and J. Guerrero Pérez, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible and well founded;

                  —

                  annul the Decision C(2019)5602 of the Secretary General of the European Commission pursuant to Article 4 of the Implementing Rules to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (1), of 22 July 2019, in response to application No GESTDEM 2019/2311; and

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the applicant’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging error in law and manifest error of assessment regarding the application of certain exceptions to the general rule to grant access to documents, in light of the facts at issue:

                              —

                              the request does not concern any case-file or investigative document, and therefore does not concern or affect the purpose of investigations (Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001) or the Commission’s decision-making process (Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001);

                              —

                              the request should not be refused based on the protection of the purpose of investigations (Article 4(2), third indent, of Regulation No (EC) 1049/2001) or the Commission’s decision making process (Article 4(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001);

                              —

                              the request does not concern any information or data of commercial interest that needs to be protected (Article 4(2), first indent, of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001);

                              —

                              the contested decision applies exceptions for disclosure in a discriminatory fashion, as they are superseded by the Commission’s actions and conduct in other similar situations – this is prohibited by EU law;

                              —

                              the application of any exception for disclosure is superseded by an overriding public interest for disclosure in order to ensure an effective judicial review (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights).

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons regarding the refusal of access to a non-confidential version, partial access, or access to the documents from the Commission’s premises, pursuant to Articles 4(6) and 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001, L 145, p. 43)