title: Case C-637/17: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Lisboa — Portugal) — Cogeco Communications Inc. v Sport TV Portugal SA, Controlinveste-SGPS SA, NOS-SGPS SA (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 102 TFEU — Principles of equivalence and effectiveness — Directive 2014/104/EU — Article 9(1) — Article 10(2) to (4) — Articles 21 and 22 — Actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union — Effects of national decisions — Limitation periods — Transposition — Temporal application)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/21

      Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Lisboa — Portugal) — Cogeco Communications Inc. v Sport TV Portugal SA, Controlinveste-SGPS SA, NOS-SGPS SA
      (Case C-637/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 102 TFEU - Principles of equivalence and effectiveness - Directive 2014/104/EU - Article 9(1) - Article 10(2) to (4) - Articles 21 and 22 - Actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union - Effects of national decisions - Limitation periods - Transposition - Temporal application)
      (2019/C 187/24)
      Language of the case: Portuguese

         Referring court

      Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Lisboa

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Cogeco Communications Inc.

         Defendants: Sport TV Portugal SA, Controlinveste-SGPS SA, NOS-SGPS SA

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Article 22 of Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that that directive is not applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings.

                  2.

                  Article 102 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, first, provides that the limitation period in respect of actions for damages is three years and starts to run from the date on which the injured party was aware of its right to compensation, even if unaware of the identity of the person liable and, secondly, does not include any possibility of suspending or interrupting that period during proceedings before the national competition authority.

         (1)  OJ C 32, 29.1.2018.


title: Case C-681/17: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — slewo — schlafen leben wohnen GmbH v Sascha Ledowski (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Directive 2011/83/EU — Article 6(1)(k) and Article 16(e) — Distance contract — Right of withdrawal — Exceptions — Concept of ‘sealed goods which are not suitable for return due to health protection or hygiene reasons and which have been unsealed by the consumer after delivery’ — Mattress whose protective seal has been removed by the consumer after delivery)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/22

      Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — slewo — schlafen leben wohnen GmbH v Sascha Ledowski
      (Case C-681/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Directive 2011/83/EU - Article 6(1)(k) and Article 16(e) - Distance contract - Right of withdrawal - Exceptions - Concept of ‘sealed goods which are not suitable for return due to health protection or hygiene reasons and which have been unsealed by the consumer after delivery’ - Mattress whose protective seal has been removed by the consumer after delivery)
      (2019/C 187/25)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Bundesgerichtshof

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: slewo — schlafen leben wohnen GmbH

         Respondent: Sascha Ledowski

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 16(e) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as meaning that goods such as a mattress, from which the protective film has been removed by the consumer after delivery, do not come within the scope of the concept of ‘sealed goods which are not suitable for return due to health protection or hygiene reasons and which have been unsealed by the consumer after delivery’ within the meaning of that provision.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 26.3.2018.


title: Case C-702/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 21 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Unareti SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Others (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Internal market in natural gas — Public service distribution concessions — Early cessation of concessions at the end of a transitional period — Reimbursement by the incoming concessionaire to the outgoing concessionaire — Principle of legal certainty)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/23

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 21 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Unareti SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Others
      (Case C-702/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Internal market in natural gas - Public service distribution concessions - Early cessation of concessions at the end of a transitional period - Reimbursement by the incoming concessionaire to the outgoing concessionaire - Principle of legal certainty)
      (2019/C 187/26)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Consiglio di Stato

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Unareti SpA

         Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri — Dipartimento per gli Affari Regionali, Autorità Garante per l’Energia Elettrica il Gas e il Sistema Idrico — Sede di Milano, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri — Conferenza Stato Regioni ed Unificata — Ministero per gli affari regionali — Dipartimento per gli affari regionali e le autonomie, Conferenza Unificata Stato Regioni e Enti Locali

         Operative part of the judgment

      EU law on public service concessions, read in the light of the principle of legal certainty, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which amends the basic criteria for the calculation of the reimbursement to which holders of natural gas distribution concessions award without be put out for tender on account of the early termination of those concessions in order to award them again after being put out for tender.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 26.3.2018.


title: Case C-60/18: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tallinna Ringkonnakohus — Estonia) — Tallinna Vesi AS v Keskkonnaamet (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Waste — Directive 2008/98/EC — Re-use and recovery of waste — Specific end-of-waste criteria for sewage sludge which has undergone recovery treatment — No defined criteria at European Union or national level)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/24

      Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tallinna Ringkonnakohus — Estonia) — Tallinna Vesi AS v Keskkonnaamet
      (Case C-60/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Waste - Directive 2008/98/EC - Re-use and recovery of waste - Specific end-of-waste criteria for sewage sludge which has undergone recovery treatment - No defined criteria at European Union or national level)
      (2019/C 187/27)
      Language of the case: Estonian

         Referring court

      Tallinna Ringkonnakohus

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Tallinna Vesi AS

         Defendant: Keskkonnaamet

         intervener: Keskkonnaministeerium

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 6(4) of Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives must be interpreted as meaning that:

                  —

                  it does not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, where criteria have not been set at European Union level for determining end-of-waste status as regards a specific type of waste, such end status depends on the existence of criteria laid down in a generally applicable national legal act concerning that type of waste, and

                  —

                  it does not allow a waste holder, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, to demand the recognition of end of waste status by the competent authority of the Member State or by a court of that Member State.

         (1)  OJ C 142, 23.4.2018.


title: Case C-101/18: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Idi Srl v Arcadis Agenzia Regionale Campana Difesa Suolo (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts — Directive 2004/18/EC — Article 45(2), first subparagraph, point (b) — Personal situation of the candidate or tenderer — Possibility for the Member States to exclude from participation in a public contract any operator subject to a procedure for an arrangement with creditors — National legislation providing for the exclusion of persons subject to an ‘ongoing’ procedure for a declaration of admission to an arrangement with creditors, except where the insolvency plan provides for the continuation of the business — Operator having filed an application for an arrangement with creditors, reserving the possibility to submit a plan providing for the continuation of the business)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/25

      Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato — Italy) — Idi Srl v Arcadis Agenzia Regionale Campana Difesa Suolo
      (Case C-101/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts - Directive 2004/18/EC - Article 45(2), first subparagraph, point (b) - Personal situation of the candidate or tenderer - Possibility for the Member States to exclude from participation in a public contract any operator subject to a procedure for an arrangement with creditors - National legislation providing for the exclusion of persons subject to an ‘ongoing’ procedure for a declaration of admission to an arrangement with creditors, except where the insolvency plan provides for the continuation of the business - Operator having filed an application for an arrangement with creditors, reserving the possibility to submit a plan providing for the continuation of the business)
      (2019/C 187/28)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Consiglio di Stato

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Idi Srl

         Defendant: Arcadis — Agenzia Regionale Campana Difesa Suolo

         intervening parties: Regione Campania

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 45(2), first subparagraph, point (b) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which allows the exclusion from a public procurement procedure of an economic operator who, at the date of the exclusion decision, has filed an application for an arrangement with creditors, while reserving the right to present a plan which provides for the continuation of the business

         (1)  OJ C 166, 14.5.2018.


title: Case C-129/18: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom — United Kingdom) — SM v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the European Union — Right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States — Directive 2004/38/EC — Family members of a citizen of the Union — Article 2(2)(c) — ‘Direct descendant’ — Child in permanent legal guardianship under the Algerian kafala (provision of care) system — Article 3(2)(a) — Other family members — Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Family life — Best interests of the child)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/26

      Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom — United Kingdom) — SM v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section
      (Case C-129/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Citizenship of the European Union - Right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States - Directive 2004/38/EC - Family members of a citizen of the Union - Article 2(2)(c) - ‘Direct descendant’ - Child in permanent legal guardianship under the Algerian kafala (provision of care) system - Article 3(2)(a) - Other family members - Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Family life - Best interests of the child)
      (2019/C 187/29)
      Language of the case: English

         Referring court

      Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: SM

         Respondents: Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section

         in the presence of: Coram Children’s Legal Centre (CCLC), AIRE Centre

         Operative part of the judgment

      The concept of a ‘direct descendant’ of a citizen of the Union referred to in Article 2(2)(c) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC must be interpreted as not including a child who has been placed in the permanent legal guardianship of a citizen of the Union under the Algerian kafala system, because that placement does not create any parent-child relationship between them.
      However, it is for the competent national authorities to facilitate the entry and residence of such a child as one of the other family members of a citizen of the Union pursuant to Article 3(2)(a) of that directive, read in the light of Article 7 and Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by carrying out a balanced and reasonable assessment of all the current and relevant circumstances of the case which takes account of the various interests in play and, in particular, of the best interests of the child concerned. In the event that it is established, following that assessment, that the child and its guardian, who is a citizen of the Union, are called to lead a genuine family life and that that child is dependent on its guardian, the requirements relating to the fundamental right to respect for family life, combined with the obligation to take account of the best interests of the child, demand, in principle, that that child be granted a right of entry and residence in order to enable it to live with its guardian in his or her host Member State.

         (1)  OJ C 134, 16.4.2018.


title: Case C-144/18 P: Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 28 March 2019 — River Kwai International Food Industry Co. Ltd v Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD), Council of the European Union, European Commission (Appeal — Dumping — Definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand — Interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/27

      Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 28 March 2019 — River Kwai International Food Industry Co. Ltd v Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD), Council of the European Union, European Commission
      (Case C-144/18 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Dumping - Definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved sweetcorn in kernels originating in Thailand - Interim review pursuant to Article 11(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009)
      (2019/C 187/30)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: River Kwai International Food Industry Co. Ltd (represented by: F. Graafsma and J. Cornelis, advocaten)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD) (represented by: A. Willems and C. Zimmermann, avocats, and by S. De Knop, advocaat), Council of the European Union (represented by: S. Boelaert, acting as Agent), European Commission (represented by: J.-F. Brakeland and A. Demeneix, acting as Agents)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the appeal;

                  2.

                  Orders River Kwai International Food Industry Co. Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Association européenne des transformateurs de maïs doux (AETMD) and by the Council of the European Union;

                  3.

                  Orders the Commission to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 142, 23.4.2018.


title: Case C-201/18: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 27 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the cour d’appel de Mons — Belgium) — Mydibel SA v État belge (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Harmonisation of fiscal legislation — Deduction of input tax — Immovable property acquired as capital goods — Sale and lease back — Adjustment of deductions of VAT — Principle of VAT neutrality — Principle of equal treatment)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/27

      Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 27 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the cour d’appel de Mons — Belgium) — Mydibel SA v État belge
      (Case C-201/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Harmonisation of fiscal legislation - Deduction of input tax - Immovable property acquired as capital goods - Sale and lease back - Adjustment of deductions of VAT - Principle of VAT neutrality - Principle of equal treatment)
      (2019/C 187/31)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Cour d’appel de Mons

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Mydibel SA

         Defendant: État belge

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Subject to verification of the relevant matters of fact and national law by the referring court, Articles 184, 185, 187 and 188 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2009/162/EU of 22 December 2009, must be interpreted as not imposing an obligation to adjust value added tax (VAT) on a building which was initially deducted correctly, where that property was the subject of a sale and lease back transaction not subject to VAT in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

                  2.

                  An interpretation of Articles 184, 185, 187 and 188 of Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2009/162, as imposing an obligation to adjust the value added tax (VAT) initially deducted in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings complies with the principles of VAT neutrality and equal treatment.

         (1)  OJ C 182, 28.5.2018.


title: Case C-245/18: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 21 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Ordinario di Udine — Italy) — Tecnoservice Int. Srl, in liquidation v Poste Italiane SpA (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Payment services in the internal market — Directive 2007/64/EC — Article 74(2) — Payment order by credit transfer — Incorrect unique identifier provided by the payer — Execution of the payment transaction on the basis of the unique identifier — Liability of the payee’s payment service provider)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/28

      Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 21 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Ordinario di Udine — Italy) — Tecnoservice Int. Srl, in liquidation v Poste Italiane SpA
      (Case C-245/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Payment services in the internal market - Directive 2007/64/EC - Article 74(2) - Payment order by credit transfer - Incorrect unique identifier provided by the payer - Execution of the payment transaction on the basis of the unique identifier - Liability of the payee’s payment service provider)
      (2019/C 187/32)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale Ordinario di Udine

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Tecnoservice Int. Srl, in liquidation

         Defendant: Poste Italiane SpA

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 74(2) of Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC must be interpreted as meaning that, when a payment order is executed in accordance with the unique identifier provided by the payment service user, which does not correspond to the payee name indicated by that user, the limitation of payment service provider liability, provided for by that article, applies to both the payer’s and the payee’s payment service provider.

         (1)  OJ C 249, 16.7.2018.


title: Case C-275/18: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud — Czech Republic) — Milan Vinš v Odvolací finanční ředitelství (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 131 and Article 146(1)(a) — Exemption for supplies of goods dispatched or transported to a destination outside the European Union — Condition of exemption laid down by national law — Placing of goods under a particular customs procedure — Proof of placing of goods under the export procedure)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/29

      Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 28 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud — Czech Republic) — Milan Vinš v Odvolací finanční ředitelství
      (Case C-275/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common system of value added tax - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 131 and Article 146(1)(a) - Exemption for supplies of goods dispatched or transported to a destination outside the European Union - Condition of exemption laid down by national law - Placing of goods under a particular customs procedure - Proof of placing of goods under the export procedure)
      (2019/C 187/33)
      Language of the case: Czech

         Referring court

      Nejvyšší správní soud

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Milan Vinš

         Defendant: Odvolací finanční ředitelství

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 146(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 131 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as precluding a national legislative provision from making the exemption from value added tax for goods intended to be exported outside the European Union conditional on the goods being placed under the export customs procedure, in a situation in which it is established that the substantive conditions of exemption, in particular the condition that the goods concerned actually leave the territory of the European Union, are satisfied

         (1)  OJ C 221, 25.6.2018.


title: Case C-312/18 P: Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 21 March 2019 — Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux v European Commission (Appeal — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market for car battery recycling — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and imposing fines — Correcting decision adding the value of purchases of the addressees which were not included in the initial decision — Time limit for bringing an action — Point from which time starts to run — Delay — Inadmissibility)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/30

      Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 21 March 2019 — Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux v European Commission
      (Case C-312/18 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Market for car battery recycling - Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and imposing fines - Correcting decision adding the value of purchases of the addressees which were not included in the initial decision - Time limit for bringing an action - Point from which time starts to run - Delay - Inadmissibility)
      (2019/C 187/34)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH, Société traitements chimiques des métaux (represented by: M. Brealey QC, I. Vandenborre, advocaat, and S. Dionnet, avocat)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: G. Conte, I. Rogalski, J. Szczodrowski and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the appeal;

                  2.

                  Orders Eco-Bat Technologies Ltd, Berzelius Metall GmbH and Société de traitements chimiques des métaux (STCM) to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.


title: Case C-81/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Romania) lodged on 1 February 2019 — NG, OH v SC Banca Transilvania SA

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/30

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj (Romania) lodged on 1 February 2019 — NG, OH v SC Banca Transilvania SA
      (Case C-81/19)
      (2019/C 187/35)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel Cluj

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: NG, OH

         Defendant: SC Banca Transilvania SA

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 1 [paragraph 2] of Directive 93/13/EEC (1) be interpreted as not precluding any analysis, with regard to unfairness, of a contractual term that reproduces a supplementary rule from which the parties could have derogated, but did not in fact do so as there was no negotiation in that regard, as in the present case analysed here with regard to the clause requiring repayment of the loan in the same foreign currency as that in which it was granted?

                  2.

                  In a context where, when being granted a loan in a foreign currency, the consumer was not given calculations/estimates relating to the economic impact that any exchange rate fluctuation would have as regards the overall payment obligations arising under the agreement, can it reasonably be maintained that such a term, under which the exchange risk is borne entirely by the consumer (in accordance with the nominalist principle) is clear and intelligible and that the seller or supplier/bank has complied in good faith with the obligation to provide information to the other party to the agreement, in circumstances in which the maximum degree of indebtedness of consumers established by the Banca Națională a României (National Bank of Romania) has been calculated by reference to the exchange rate prevailing on the date when the loan was granted?

                  3.

                  Do Directive 93/13/EEC and the case-law based on it and the principle of effectiveness preclude a contract from continuing unchanged after a term relating to the party that bears the exchange rate risk has been declared unfair? What change would make it possible to disapply the unfair term and comply with the principle of effectiveness?

         (1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29, Special edition Chapter 15 Vol. 2 p. 273)


title: Case C-127/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Pitești (Romania) lodged on 18 February 2019 — Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, Asociația ‘Mișcarea pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor’ v Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/32

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Pitești (Romania) lodged on 18 February 2019 — Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, Asociația ‘Mișcarea pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor’ v Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii
      (Case C-127/19)
      (2019/C 187/37)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel Pitești

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, Asociația ‘Mișcarea pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor’

         Defendant: Consiliul Superior al Magistraturii

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 (1) be regarded as an act of an institution of the Union, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, and therefore amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

                  2.

                  Do the terms, nature and duration of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, fall within the scope of the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, signed by Romania in Luxembourg on 25 April 2005? Are the requirements laid down in the reports prepared in accordance with that mechanism binding on Romania?

                  3.

                  Must Article 2, in conjunction with Article 4(3), TEU be interpreted as meaning that the obligation on Romania to comply with the requirements laid down in the reports prepared in accordance with the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, forms part of the Member State’s obligation to comply with the principles of the rule of law?

                  4.

                  Does Article 2 TEU, and more specifically the obligation to comply with the values of the rule of law, preclude legislation which establishes and organises the section for the investigation of offences committed within the Judiciary, within the prosecutors office attached to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), because of the possibility of indirect pressure being exerted on members of the judiciary?

                  5.

                  Does the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117), preclude the establishment of the section for the investigation of offences committed within the Judiciary, within the prosecutors office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, in the light of the rules governing the appointment/removal of prosecutors as members of that section, the rules governing the exercise of functions within that section and the way in which jurisdiction is established, in connection with the limited number of positions in that section?

         (1)  Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (OJ 2006 L 354, p. 56, Special edition: Chapter 11 Vol. 51 p. 55).


title: Case C-139/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 20 February 2019 — DY

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/34

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 20 February 2019 — DY
      (Case C-139/19)
      (2019/C 187/39)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: DY

         Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld

         Interested party: Finanzpolizei

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (1) and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC (2) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour, such as a failure to make available documents relating to pay or a failure to report to the Central Coordination Office (ZKO notifications), provides for very high fines, in particular high minimum penalties, which are imposed cumulatively in respect of each worker concerned?

                  2.

                  If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative:
                  Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU be interpreted as precluding the imposition of cumulative fines for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour which have no absolute upper limits?

                  3.

                  Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that requires a declaration of amendment to be provided to the Central Coordination Office in the event that the temporary activity in the host country is concluded prematurely and/or interrupted?

                  4.

                  If the answer to Question 3 is in the negative:
                  Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not grant a reasonable period of time for the submission of a declaration of amendment?

                  5.

                  Are Article 56 TFEU and Article 9 of Directive 2014/67/EU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that provides that, for the purposes of the requirement to make available certain documents, it is not sufficient subsequently to submit appropriate and relevant documents within a reasonable period of time?

                  6.

                  Are Article 56 TFEU and Article 9 of Directive 2014/67/EU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that provides that foreign service providers are to submit documents that go beyond those specified in Article 9 of Directive 2014/67/EU, are neither relevant nor appropriate and are not clearly defined under national law (such as, for example, pay statements, payslips, pay lists, tax statements, registrations and deregistrations, health insurance, schedules of notification and allocation of surcharges, documents relating to pay grades, certificates)?

         (1)  OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1.

         (2)  Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (OJ 2014 L 159, p. 11).


title: Case C-140/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 20 February 2019 — EX

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/36

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 20 February 2019 — EX
      (Case C-140/19)
      (2019/C 187/40)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: EX

         Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Hartberg-Fürstenfeld

         Interested party: Finanzpolizei

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (1) and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC (2) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour, such as a failure to make available documents relating to pay or a failure to report to the Central Coordination Office (ZKO notifications), provides for very high fines, in particular high minimum penalties, which are imposed cumulatively in respect of each worker concerned?

                  2.

                  If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative:
                  Must Article 56 TFEU, Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU be interpreted as precluding the imposition of cumulative fines for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour which have no absolute upper limits?

                  3.

                  Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that requires a declaration of amendment to be provided to the Central Coordination Office in the event that the temporary activity in the host country is concluded prematurely and/or interrupted?

                  4.

                  If the answer to Question 3 is in the negative:
                  Is Article 56 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not grant a reasonable period of time for the submission of a declaration of amendment?

                  5.

                  Are Article 56 TFEU and Article 9 of Directive 2014/67/EU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that provides that, for the purposes of the requirement to make available certain documents, it is not sufficient subsequently to submit appropriate and relevant documents within a reasonable period of time?

                  6.

                  Are Article 56 TFEU and Article 9 of Directive 2014/67/EU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation that provides that foreign service providers are to submit documents that go beyond those specified in Article 9 of Directive 2014/67/EU, are neither relevant nor appropriate and are not clearly defined under national law (such as, for example, pay statements, payslips, pay lists, tax statements, registrations and deregistrations, health insurance, schedules of notification and allocation of surcharges, documents relating to pay grades, certificates)?

         (1)  OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1.

         (2)  Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (OJ 2014 L 159, p. 11).


title: Case C-184/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 26 February 2019 — Hecta Viticol SRL v Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală (ANAF) — Direcția Generală de Soluționare a Contestațiilor, Biroul Vamal de Interior Buzău and Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Galați

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/38

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 26 February 2019 — Hecta Viticol SRL v Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală (ANAF) — Direcția Generală de Soluționare a Contestațiilor, Biroul Vamal de Interior Buzău and Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Galați
      (Case C-184/19)
      (2019/C 187/42)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel București

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Hecta Viticol SRL

         Respondents: Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală (ANAF) — Direcția Generală de Soluționare a Contestațiilor, Biroul Vamal de Interior Buzău and Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Galați

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Do Articles 7, 11 [and] 15 of Council Directive 92/83/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the harmonization of the structures of excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (1) and Article 5 of Council Directive 92/84/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of excise duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (2) preclude the provisions of Article I(21) and Article IV(1) of Ordonanța de urgență [a Guvernului] nr. 54 din 23 iunie 2010 privind unele măsuri pentru combaterea evaziunii fiscale (Government Emergency Order No 54 of 23 June 2010 laying down certain measures to address tax evasion)?

                  2.

                  Do the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate [expectations] preclude the rule laid down in Article I(21) and Article IV(1) of Ordonanța de urgență [a Guvernului] nr. 54 din 23 iunie 2010 privind unele măsuri pentru combaterea evaziunii fiscale, inasmuch as it alters the rate of excise duty on still fermented beverages other than beer and wines?

         (1)  OJ 1992 L 316, p. 21.

         (2)  OJ 1992 L 316, p. 29.


title: Case C-187/19 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by the European External Action Service against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-537/17 De Loecker v EEAS

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/39

      Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by the European External Action Service against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-537/17 De Loecker v EEAS
      (Case C-187/19 P)
      (2019/C 187/43)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: European External Action Service (represented by: S. Marquardt, R. Spac, Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings: Stéphane De Loecker

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  Set aside the judgment under appeal;

                  —

                  Dismiss the originating application as unfounded as regards the application for annulment of the decision of 10 October 2016 to reject the complaint for psychological harassment lodged against the Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS at the time;

                  —

                  Order the applicant at first instance to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appeal is directed against paragraphs 57, 58 and 65 of the judgment under appeal. According to the EEAS, the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 65 of its judgment, that the EEAS had not properly complied with the judgment of 16 December 2015, De Loecker v EEAS (F-34/15) and infringed the applicant’s right to be heard in not hearing him in the context of the analysis prior to the opening of an administrative investigation.
      In that context, the EEAS submits that the General Court erred in law in the assessment of the facts of the case, in distorting the procedure followed and in disregarding the fact that the EEAS had heard the applicant in giving him the opportunity to submit any evidence additional to his initial complaint, before submitting the file to the Commission’s services for the purposes of the preliminary investigation.
      In addition, the judgment De Loecker v EEAS (F-34/15) was misinterpreted as imposing an obligation on the EEA to hear the applicant already at the preliminary procedure stage (paragraphs 55 to 57 of the judgment under appeal).
      Lastly, the EEAS submits that the General Court made an error of assessment as regards the procedure, in applying the conclusions of the judgment of 14 February 2017, Kerstens v Commission (T-270/16 P, cited in paragraph 58 of the judgment under appeal) to the present case. The General Court fails to have regard to the fact that, in the present case, it was a question only of a preliminary analysis, not an administrative investigation.


title: Case C-195/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 28 February 2019 — PJ v QK

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/40

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 28 February 2019 — PJ v QK
      (Case C-195/19)
      (2019/C 187/44)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel București

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: PJ

         Defendant: QK

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Are the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, (1) and the requirements laid down in the reports prepared in the context of that mechanism binding on Romania?

                  2.

                  Do Article 67(1) TFEU and both the first sentence of Article 2 TEU and the first sentence of Article 9 TEU preclude national legislation establishing a section of the prosecution office which has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate any type of offence committed by judges or prosecutors?

                  3.

                  Does the principle of the primacy of European law, as enshrined in the judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa, 6/64, EU:C:1964:66, and by subsequent settled case-law of the Court of Justice, preclude national legislation which allows a politico-judicial institution, such as the Curtea Constituțională a României (Romanian Constitutional Court), to infringe the aforementioned principle by means of decisions which are not open to appeal?

         (1)  Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (OJ 2006 L 354, p. 56).


title: Case C-211/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Miskolci Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 6 March 2019 — UO v Készenléti Rendőrség

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/41

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Miskolci Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 6 March 2019 — UO v Készenléti Rendőrség
      (Case C-211/19)
      (2019/C 187/45)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Miskolci Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: UO

         Defendant: Készenléti Rendőrség

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 1(3) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (1) be interpreted as meaning that the scope ratione personae of that directive is determined by Article 2 of Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work? (2)

                  2.

                  If so, must Article 2(2) of Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work be interpreted as meaning that Article 2(1) and (2) of [Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time] is not to be applied to police officers who are members of the professional staff of the Rapid Intervention Police?

         (1)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).

         (2)  OJ 1989 L 183, p. 1.


title: Case C-223/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Wiener Neustadt (Austria) lodged on 13 March 2019 — YS v NK

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/42

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Wiener Neustadt (Austria) lodged on 13 March 2019 — YS v NK
      (Case C-223/19)
      (2019/C 187/46)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Landesgericht Wiener Neustadt

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: YS

         Defendant: NK

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Does the scope of Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, (1) and/or of Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, (2) include legislation of a Member State if the effect of that legislation is that the former employer is to withhold sums of money from a considerably higher proportion of men entitled to an occupational pension than from women entitled to an occupational pension when those occupational pensions are paid out and those sums may be freely used by the former employer, and are such provisions discriminatory within the meaning of those directives?

                  2.

                  Does the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (3) include legislation of a Member State that discriminates on the ground of age because the financial burden is borne exclusively by older people who are entitled under private law to the benefits of an occupational pension that was agreed as a direct defined benefit pension, whereas young and relatively young people who have entered into occupational pension contracts are not financially burdened?

                  3.

                  Are the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’), in particular the prohibitions of discrimination laid down in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, to be applied to occupational pensions even if the Member State’s legislation does not cover forms of discrimination as prohibited pursuant to Directive 79/7/EEC, Directive 2000/78/EC and Directive 2006/54/EC?

                  4.

                  Is Article 20 et seq. of the Charter to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that implements Union law within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter and that discriminates, on grounds of sex, age, property or on other grounds, such as, for example, on the basis of the former employer’s current ownership, against persons entitled under private law to an occupational pension as compared with other persons entitled to an occupational pension, and does the Charter prohibit such forms of discrimination?

                  5.

                  Are national rules that place only a small group of people who are contractually entitled to an occupational pension in the form of a direct defined benefit pension under an obligation to make financial payments to their former employer also discriminatory on the basis of property within the meaning of Article 21 of the Charter if they cover only people with relatively large occupational pensions?

                  6.

                  Is Article 17 of the Charter to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that provides for expropriatory intervention, directly by law and without compensation, in an agreement relating to an occupational pension in the form of a direct defined benefit pension entered into between two private parties to the detriment of a former employee of a company that has made provision for the payment of the occupational pension and is not experiencing financial difficulties?

                  7.

                  Does a statutory obligation on the part of the former employer of a person entitled to an occupational pension not to pay out parts of the agreed remuneration (of the agreed occupational pension) represent, as an infringement of freedom of contract, an interference with the employer’s right to property?

                  8.

                  Is Article 47 of the Charter to be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that expropriates directly by law and makes no provision for any challenge to the expropriation other than by way of a claim against the beneficiary of the expropriation (the former employer and the debtor under the pension contract) for damages and reimbursement of the expropriated sum of money?

         (1)  OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.

         (2)  OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23.

         (3)  OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.


title: Case C-225/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Haarlem (Netherlands) lodged on 14 March 2019 — R.N.N.S. v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/43

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Haarlem (Netherlands) lodged on 14 March 2019 — R.N.N.S. v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken
      (Case C-225/19)
      (2019/C 187/47)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Rechtbank Den Haag, zittingsplaats Haarlem

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: R.N.N.S.

         Defendant: Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  In the case of an appeal as referred to in Article 32(3) of the Visa Code (1) against a final decision refusing a visa on the ground referred to in Article 32(1)(a)(vi) of the Visa Code, can it be said that there is an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the EU Charter under the following circumstances:

                              —

                              where, in its reasons for the decision, the Member State merely stated: ‘you are regarded by one or more Member States as a threat to public policy, internal security, public health as defined in Article 2.19 or 2.21 of the Schengen Borders Code, or to the international relations of one or more Member States’;

                              —

                              where, in the decision or in the appeal, the Member State does not state which specific ground or grounds of those four grounds set out in Article 32(1)(a)(vi) of the Visa Code is being invoked;

                              —

                              where, in the appeal, the Member State does not provide any further substantive information or substantiation of the ground or grounds on which the objection of the other Member State (or Member States) is based?

                  2.

                  In the circumstances outlined in Question 1, can there be said to be good administration within the meaning of Article 41 of the EU Charter, in particular, because of the duty of the services concerned to give reasons for their decisions?

                  3.

                              (a)

                              Should Questions 1 and 2 be answered differently if, in the final decision on the visa, the Member State refers to an actual and sufficiently clearly specified possibility of appeal in the other Member State against the specifically named authority responsible in that other Member State (or Member States) that has (or have) raised the objection referred to in Article 32(1)(a)(vi) of the Visa Code, in which that ground for refusal can be examined?

                              (b)

                              Does an affirmative answer to Question 1 in connection with Question 3(a) require that the decision in the appeal in and against the Member State that made the final decision be suspended until the applicant has had the opportunity to make use of the option of appealing in the other Member State (or Member States) and, if the applicant does make use of that option, until the (final) decision on that appeal has been obtained?

                  4.

                  For the purpose of answering the questions, does it matter whether (the authority in) the Member State (or Member States) that has (or have) objected to the issuing of the visa can be given the opportunity, in the appeal against the final decision on the visa, to act as second defendant and on that basis to be given the opportunity to introduce a substantiation of the ground or grounds on which its objection is based?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1).


title: Case C-229/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 14 March 2019 — Dexia Nederland BV v XXX

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/46

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 14 March 2019 — Dexia Nederland BV v XXX
      (Case C-229/19)
      (2019/C 187/49)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Dexia Nederland BV

         Defendant: XXX

         Question referred

      Should Directive 93/13 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a contractual term, from the point of view of the criteria laid down in that directive, should already be regarded as unfair if that contractual term, assessed in the light of all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract, contains the mere possibility of causing a significant imbalance depending on the circumstances that materialise during the course of the contract, in particular because that contractual term fixes in advance a potential advantage that arises for the seller at the time of the premature termination of the contract, at a certain percentage of the remaining lease sum, thereby derogating from the applicable rules of national law under which such an advantage is not fixed in advance but must be determined on the basis of the circumstances attending the termination of the contract, in particular, the level of the interest rate that should be applied for the remaining duration of the contract to an amount received prematurely?

         (1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


title: Case C-237/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 19 March 2019 — Gömböc Kutató, Szolgáltato és Kerreskedelmi Kft. v Szellemi Tulajdon Nemzeti Hivatala

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/46

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 19 March 2019 — Gömböc Kutató, Szolgáltato és Kerreskedelmi Kft. v Szellemi Tulajdon Nemzeti Hivatala
      (Case C-237/19)
      (2019/C 187/50)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Kúria

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Gömböc Kutató, Szolgáltato és Kerreskedelmi Kft.

         Defendant: Szellemi Tulajdon Nemzeti Hivatala

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 3(1)(e)(ii) of Directive 2008/95/EC (1) of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks to be interpreted as meaning that, for signs which consist exclusively of the shape of goods,

                              (a)

                              it can only be examined if the shape is necessary to obtain the technical result sought on the basis of the graphic representation contained in the register, or

                              (b)

                              can the perception of the relevant public also be taken into account?
                              In other words, can it be taken into account that the relevant public is aware that the shape for which registration is sought is necessary in order to obtain the technical result sought?

                  2.

                  Is Article 3(1)(e)(iii) of Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks to be interpreted as meaning that the ground for refusal is applicable to those signs which consist exclusively of the shape of goods and in respect of which it can be determined whether the shape gives substantial value to the goods, bearing in mind the perception or knowledge that the buyer has of the goods represented graphically?

                  3.

                  Is Article 3(1)(e)(iii) of Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks to be interpreted as meaning that the ground for refusal is applicable to signs which consist exclusively of a shape

                              (a)

                              that, by virtue of its individual character, already enjoys the protection conferred on designs, or

                              (b)

                              whose aesthetic appearance alone gives the goods any kind of value?

         (1)  OJ 2008 L 299, p. 25.


title: Case C-241/19 P: Appeal brought on 18 March 2019 by George Haswani against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2019 in Case T-477/17 Haswani v Council

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/47

      Appeal brought on 18 March 2019 by George Haswani against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2019 in Case T-477/17 Haswani v Council
      (Case C-241/19 P)
      (2019/C 187/51)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: George Haswani (represented by: G. Karouni, avocat)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellant submits that the Court should:

                  —

                  Set aside the judgment of 16 January 2019, T-477/17, in its entirety;

                  —

                  Order the removal of Mr George Haswani’s name from the annexes to the acts contested before the General Court;

                  —

                  Dispose of the case and:

                              —

                              Annul Decision 2015/1836 and Regulation 2015/1828;

                              —

                              Order the Council to pay the sum of EUR 100 000 in respect of the non-pecuniary harm suffered by Mr Haswani;

                  —

                  Order the Council to bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the appellant before both the General Court and the Court of Justice.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law, infringement of Decisions 2015/1836 (recital 6) and 2013/255 (recital 5) as amended by Decision 2015/1836, as well as the reversal of the burden of proof and breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence.
      The second ground of appeal alleges breach of the obligation to state reasons and failure to state reasons.
      The third ground of appeal alleges breach of the principle of proportionality and failure to state reasons.


title: Case C-258/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 27 March 2019 — EUROVIA Ipari, Kerskedelmi, Szállítmányozási és Idegenforgalmi Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/48

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Kúria (Hungary) lodged on 27 March 2019 — EUROVIA Ipari, Kerskedelmi, Szállítmányozási és Idegenforgalmi Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága
      (Case C-258/19)
      (2019/C 187/52)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Kúria

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: EUROVIA Ipari, Kereskedelmi, Szállítmányozási és Idegenforgalmi Kft.

         Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Does the practice of a Member State infringe the principle of fiscal neutrality and the formal requirements of the right to deduct VAT where, for the purposes of exercising the right to deduct the tax, it has regard solely to the time the chargeable event occurred, and does not take into account the fact that there was a civil dispute between the parties concerning performance of the contract, which was determined in judicial proceedings, and that the invoice was only issued once a final judgment was delivered?

                  2.

                  If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, is it possible to exceed the limitation period for exercising the right to deduct VAT, set by the legislation of the Member State at five years from the time when the services were supplied?

                  3.

                  If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, is the exercise of the right to deduct VAT affected by the conduct of the recipient of the invoice in the present case, which did not pay the contractor’s remuneration determined by a final judgment until the contractor had brought enforcement proceedings, for which reason the invoice was not issued until after the limitation period had expired?


title: Case C-260/19 P: Appeal brought on 26 March 2019 by Bena Properties Co. SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2019 in Case T-412/16 Bena Properties v Council

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/49

      Appeal brought on 26 March 2019 by Bena Properties Co. SA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2019 in Case T-412/16 Bena Properties v Council
      (Case C-260/19 P)
      (2019/C 187/53)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: Bena Properties Co. SA (represented by: E. Ruchat, avocat)

         Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellant submits that the Court should:

                  —

                  Declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

                  —

                  Accordingly, set aside the judgment of 16 January 2019, Bena Properties v Council, T-412/16;

            And, giving judgment itself,

                  —

                  Annul Decision (CFSP) 2016/850 of 27 May 2016 and its subsequent implementing acts, in so far as they concern the appellant;

                  —

                  Order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in that the General Court disregarded the applicant’s right, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, to be heard prior to the adoption of new restrictive measures.
      The second ground of appeal alleges an error of law and distortion of the facts in that the General Court disregarded the items submitted by the applicant in support of its action for annulment to demonstrate that it did not support the Syrian regime.
      The third ground of appeal alleges an error of law in so far as the General Court did not hold that Articles 27 and 28 of Decision 2013/255/CFSP, according to which membership of the Al-Assad or Makhlouf families constitutes an autonomous criterion justifying the imposition of sanctions, were illegal and in so far as it, on the same occasion, reversed the burden of proof.


title: Case C-272/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Germany) lodged on 1 April 2019 — VQ v Land Hesse

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/52

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Germany) lodged on 1 April 2019 — VQ v Land Hesse
      (Case C-272/19)
      (2019/C 187/56)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: VQ

         Defendant: Land Hesse

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (1) — in particular Article 15 on ‘Right of access by the data subject’ thereof — applicable to the committee of a parliament of a constituent state of a Member State that is responsible for processing the petitions of citizens — namely the Petitions Committee of the Hesse Land Parliament — and is that committee to be regarded in that connection as a public authority within the meaning of Article 4(7) of the Regulation No 2016/679?

                  2.

                  Is the referring court an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

         (1)  OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1.


title: Case C-277/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Općinski sud u Zadru (Croatia) lodged on 2 April 2019 — R. D., A. D. v Raiffeisenbank St. Stefan-Jagerberg-Wolfsberg eGen

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/53

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Općinski sud u Zadru (Croatia) lodged on 2 April 2019 — R. D., A. D. v Raiffeisenbank St. Stefan-Jagerberg-Wolfsberg eGen
      (Case C-277/19)
      (2019/C 187/57)
      Language of the case: Croatian

         Referring court

      Općinski sud u Zadru

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: R.D., A.D.

         Defendant: Raiffeisenbank St. Stefan-Jagerberg-Wolfsberg eGen

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  What is the scope and extent of the consumer protection granted by Directive 2[0]11/83/[EU] (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2[5] October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council], and by Directive 2[0]14/17/EU (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC (3) and 2013/36/EU (4) and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010? (5)

                  2.

                  Are the applicants consumers within the meaning of the provisions of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 [on consumer rights], amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC [of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council], and Directive 2[0]14/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, account being taken of the fact that the defendant denies the applicants the status of consumer?

                  3.

                  Are the national provisions contained in Article 3(1)(a) of the Law on consumer credit […] at odds with the provisions contained in Article 4 of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 [on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010], and Article 3 of Directive 2008/48/EC, and with the remaining consumer protection objectives and purposes established in the preamble to Directive 2014/17/EU, in so far as they fix the maximum limit for consumer protection at a certain amount, namely Kuna 1000 000?

                  4.

                  [Must] Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 [on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010] be interpreted […] as meaning that a situation in which the defendant is a credit cooperative registered in the Republic of Austria which held no authorisation from the Central Bank of Croatia to grant consumer credit in 2007 and 2008, nor any special authorisation from the Ministry of Finance in accordance with Article 22 of the ZPP, and does not have a registered representative or a subsidiary in the Republic of Croatia, constitutes a ground for a declaration as to the nullity of the credit agreement and an infringement of the provisions of that directive because that situation has the (potential) effect of directly jeopardising the rights of consumers who are natural persons in the territory of the Republic of Croatia, in so far as the defendant was not subject to the supervision provided for in law for the purpose of protecting consumers and establishing uniform rules and criteria for the grant of consumer credit in the case of mortgage credits, as mentioned in the preamble to Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014?

                  5.

                  May the view be taken that this is a situation in which there is an infringement of Articles 18, 19 and 20 of Directive 2014/17/EU, account being taken of the fact that the principles of good faith and loyalty constitute a legal standard, which is to say that, at the time when the credit agreement was concluded, an infringement of the aforementioned directive occurred, given that the credit was granted at an actual interest rate of 9.4%, while the defendant grants domestic consumers of Austrian nationality an interest rate of 4 % — Article 1000 of the ABGB (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Austrian Civil Code) —, and given, moreover, that that this is a variable rate, meaning that the defendant, as a credit institution, changes it unilaterally, and that the defendant grants credit only on the basis of a mortgage?

                  6.

                  May the view be taken that there has been an infringement of the provisions of Directive 2014/17/EU in conjunction with Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, account being taken of the provisions of Articles 2 and 5(1), point 2, of the Law on credit institutions, if the defendant, as a credit institution, is allowed to grant consumer credit to Croatian citizens in the territory of the Republic of Croatia without authorisation from or supervision by the national authorities, and may the view be taken that, in such a situation, the aforementioned national provisions do not afford adequate protection to natural persons who are consumers in the manner prescribed in Article 5 of Directive 2014/17/EU — competent authorities —, and that the defendant did not act in accordance with the principles of good faith and loyalty provided for in Article 4 of the ZOO, meaning that the provisions of the credit agreement are therefore void?

                  7.

                  [Was there] a formal defect in the conclusion of the credit agreement, which is to say that, in the main proceedings, there was an infringement of Articles 13, 14 and 16 of Directive 2014/17/EU, inasmuch as clause A of the single-repayment credit agreement stipulates — on page 2—: ‘Actual annual interest rate of 9,4%. For the notional annual interest in the event of late repayment, see the counter notice’?

                  8.

                  May the view be taken that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, there is an infringement of Articles 13, 14 and 16 of Directive 2014/17/EU, account being taken of the fact that the credit agreements at issue are pre-formulated standard contracts which are drafted by the defendant, printed in German and not fully translated into the applicants’ mother tongue, and the fact that the conclusion of the agreement is preceded by advertising via the defendant’s network of intermediaries (cooperative) in the Republic of Croatia, who, like the defendant, did not, in accordance with Croatian law, hold any authorisation from the Central Bank of Croatia to conclude credit transactions, nor any authorisation from the Ministry of Finance to grant consumer credit in the territory of the Republic of Croatia?

                  9.

                  May the view be taken that, in a situation [such as] that in the main proceedings, there is an infringement of the provisions of Directive 2014/17/EU in conjunction with Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU (6) and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (7), where the national provisions, that is to say Article 2(1), (2) and (3) and Article 5(1), points 1 and 2, of the Law on credit institutions allow the defendant, as a credit institution under Austrian law, to conclude consumer credit transactions for Croatian citizens in the territory of the Republic of Croatia without authorisation from the Croatian national supervisory authority, and may the view be taken that, in such a situation, those national provisions do not afford adequate protection to natural persons who are consumers in the manner prescribed in Article 5 of Directive 2014/17/EU — competent authorities —, and that the defendant did not act in accordance with the principles of good faith and loyalty provided for in Article 4 of the ZOO, meaning that the provisions of the credit agreement are therefore void?

                  10.

                  Has the fact that, at the time when the 2007 and 2008 credit agreements were concluded, the Croatian legal system lacked any adequate implementing provisions laying down detailed rules governing the right, and the conditions applicable to the right, of Croatian citizens to incur debt abroad caused a significant imbalance in the position of borrowers, on the one hand, and banks, on the other, which is contrary to the provisions of Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014, in particular Article 13 thereof?

         (1)  Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64).

         (2)  Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 60, p. 34).

         (3)  Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66).

         (4)  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338).

         (5)  Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ 2010 L 331, p. 12).

         (6)  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 338).

         (7)  Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ 2010 L 331, p. 12).


title: Case C-281/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal administratif de Paris (France) lodged on 3 April 2019 — XS v Recteur de l’académie de Paris

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/55

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal administratif de Paris (France) lodged on 3 April 2019 — XS v Recteur de l’académie de Paris
      (Case C-281/19)
      (2019/C 187/58)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Tribunal administratif de Paris

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: XS

         Defendant: Recteur de l’académie de Paris

         Question referred

      Does French law, which does not take into account for the purposes of regrading within the school-teaching professional body the previous service of an official with the European Commission, or more broadly, with an EU institution, whereas it does provide for previous professional activities carried out within the authorities of an EU Member State to be taken into account, infringe the obligations and scope of Article 45 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union?


title: Case C-316/19: Action brought on 16 April 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/55

      Action brought on 16 April 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Slovenia
      (Case C-316/19)
      (2019/C 187/59)
      Language of the case: Slovenian

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn and B. Rous Demiri)

         Defendant: Republic of Slovenia

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  Pursuant to Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Commission asks the Court of Justice to declare that, by unilaterally seizing from the premises of the Bank of Slovenia documents connected to the performance of the ESCB’s and the Eurosystem’s tasks and by unfairly cooperating with the ECB on that subject, the Republic of Slovenia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 343 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 39 of Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Articles 2, 18 and 22 of Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union and Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union.

                  —

                  The Commission also asks the Court to order the Republic of Slovenia to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The search and seizure at the premises of the Bank of Slovenia on 6 July 2016 undermined the privileges attaching to the archives of the Union, as provided for in Article 343 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 39 of Protocol No 4 and Articles 2 and 22 of Protocol No 7, in conjunction with Article 18 of the latter protocol, and as provided for in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. The search and seizure were carried out unilaterally, without the ECB’s consent, and, on the assumption of a disagreement between the ECB and the Slovene bodies, without a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Despite repeated warnings, the Slovene bodies responsible for the seizure did not attempt to separate documents forming part of the archives of the Union and did not constructively discuss the matter with the ECB.


title: Case T-388/11: Judgment of the General Court of 10 April 2019 — Deutsche Post v Commission (State aid — Postal services — Funding of additional salary and social costs relating to some of the staff of Deutsche Post by means of subsidies and revenue generated by remuneration for price-regulated services — Decision to extend the formal investigation procedure — Decision finding that there was new aid at the end of the preliminary investigation phase — Action for annulment — Challengeable act — Interest in bringing proceedings — Admissibility — Consequences of the annulment of the final decision — Obligation to state reasons)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/57

      Judgment of the General Court of 10 April 2019 — Deutsche Post v Commission
      (Case T-388/11) (1)

      (State aid - Postal services - Funding of additional salary and social costs relating to some of the staff of Deutsche Post by means of subsidies and revenue generated by remuneration for price-regulated services - Decision to extend the formal investigation procedure - Decision finding that there was new aid at the end of the preliminary investigation phase - Action for annulment - Challengeable act - Interest in bringing proceedings - Admissibility - Consequences of the annulment of the final decision - Obligation to state reasons)
      (2019/C 187/60)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Deutsche Post AG (Bonn, Germany) (represented by: J. Sedemund, T. Lübbig and M. Klasse, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: D. Grespan, T. Maxian Rusche and R. Sauer, acting as Agents)

         Interveners in support of the defendant: UPS Europe SPRL/BVBA, formerly UPS Europe NV/SA (Brussels, Belgium); and United Parcel Service Deutschland Sàrl & Co. OHG, formerly UPS Deutschland Inc. & Co. OHG (Neuss, Germany) (represented initially by T. Ottervanger and E. Henny, and subsequently by T. Ottervanger and R. Wojtek, lawyers)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2011) 3081 final of 10 May 2011 extending the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU on State aid C 36/07 (ex NN 25/07) granted by the Federal Republic of Germany in favour of Deutsche Post, a summary of which has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ 2011 C 263, p. 4).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1)

                     Dismisses the plea of inadmissibility;

                  2)

                     Annuls Commission Decision C(2011) 3081 final of 10 May 2011 extending the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU on State aid C 36/07 (ex NN 25/07) granted by the Federal Republic of Germany in favour of Deutsche Post;

                  3)

                     Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and those incurred by Deutsche Post AG;

                  4)

                     Orders UPS Europe SPRL/BVBA and United Parcel Service Deutschland Sàrl & Co. OHG each to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 282, 24.9.2011.


title: Case T-182/15: Judgment of the General Court of 9 April 2019 — Sopra Steria Group v Parliament (Public service contracts — Tendering procedure — Supply of IT services to the Parliament and other EU institutions and bodies — Exclusion from tendering procedures — Potential conflict of interests — Failure to provide information required by the contracting authority — Article 107(1)(b) of the Financial Regulation — Transparency — Proportionality — Equal treatment — Article 102(1) of the Financial Regulation)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/58

      Judgment of the General Court of 9 April 2019 — Sopra Steria Group v Parliament
      (Case T-182/15) (1)

      (Public service contracts - Tendering procedure - Supply of IT services to the Parliament and other EU institutions and bodies - Exclusion from tendering procedures - Potential conflict of interests - Failure to provide information required by the contracting authority - Article 107(1)(b) of the Financial Regulation - Transparency - Proportionality - Equal treatment - Article 102(1) of the Financial Regulation)
      (2019/C 187/61)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Sopra Steria Group SA (Annecy-le-Vieux, France) (represented by: A. Verlinden, R. Martens and J. Joossen, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: B. Simon and L. Tapper Brandberg, acting as Agents)

         Interveners in support of the defendants: CGI Luxembourg SA (Bertrange, Luxembourg) and Intrasoft International SA (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: N. Korogiannakis, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of the European Parliament’s decisions, taken in the context of tendering procedure PE/ITEC-ITS14, concerning the provision of IT services to the European Parliament and other EU institutions and bodies, to exclude the tenders submitted for Lots 2 and 3 by the IBI IUS and STEEL consortia, of which the applicant was a member.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     orders Sopra Steria Group SA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament;

                  3.

                     orders CGI Luxembourg SA and Intrasoft International SA to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 262, 10.8.2015.


title: Case T-259/15: Judgment of the General Court of 9 April 2019 — Close and Cegelec v Parliament (Public works contracts — Tender procedure — Construction of an energy unit — Extension and refurbishment of the Konrad Adenauer building in Luxembourg — Rejection of tender submitted by a tenderer — Award of the contract to another tenderer — Selection criteria — Financial and economic capacity — Technical and professional capacity — Obligation to state reasons — Manifest error of assessment)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/58

      Judgment of the General Court of 9 April 2019 — Close and Cegelec v Parliament
      (Case T-259/15) (1)

      (Public works contracts - Tender procedure - Construction of an energy unit - Extension and refurbishment of the Konrad Adenauer building in Luxembourg - Rejection of tender submitted by a tenderer - Award of the contract to another tenderer - Selection criteria - Financial and economic capacity - Technical and professional capacity - Obligation to state reasons - Manifest error of assessment)
      (2019/C 187/62)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicants: SA Close (Harzé-Aywaille, Belgium), Cegelec (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: J.-M. Rikkers and J.-L. Teheux, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Parliament (represented initially by M. Rantala and M. Mraz, and subsequently by J.-M. Stenier, B. Schäfer and M. Mraz, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of the Parliament’s decision of 19 March 2015 rejecting the tender submitted by the applicants in the context of the call for tenders INLO-D-UPIL-T-14-AO 4, relating to public works contracts in respect of Lot No 73 (energy unit) for the project to extend and refurbish the Konrad Adenauer building in Luxembourg and awarding that lot to another tenderer.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1)

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2)

                     Orders SA Close and Cegelec, on the one hand, and the European Parliament, on the other, each to bear their own costs, including the costs relating to the application for interim measures.

         (1)  OJ C 236, 20.7.2015.


title: Case T-492/15: Judgment of the General Court of 12 April 2019 — Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission (Action for annulment — State aid — Measures implemented by Germany in favour of Frankfurt Hahn airport and airlines using that airport — Decision regarding the measures in favour of Frankfurt Hahn airport as State aid compatible with the internal market and finding no State aid in favour of airlines using that airport — Lack of individual concern — Lack of direct concern — Inadmissibility)

text:
               3.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 187/59

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 April 2019 — Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission
      (Case T-492/15) (1)

      (Action for annulment - State aid - Measures implemented by Germany in favour of Frankfurt Hahn airport and airlines using that airport - Decision regarding the measures in favour of Frankfurt Hahn airport as State aid compatible with the internal market and finding no State aid in favour of airlines using that airport - Lack of individual concern - Lack of direct concern - Inadmissibility)
      (2019/C 187/63)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG (Cologne, Germany) (represented by: A. Martin-Ehlers, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann, T. Maxian Rusche and S. Noë, acting as Agents)

         Interveners in support of the defendant: Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany) (represented by: Professor C. Koenig) and Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd (Dublin, Ireland) (represented by: G. Berrisch, lawyer, and B. Byrne, Solicitor)

         Objet

      Action under Article 263 TFEU for the annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/789 of 1 October 2014 on the State aid SA.21121 (C29/08) (ex NN 54/07) implemented by Germany concerning the financing of Frankfurt Hahn airport and the financial relations between the airport and Ryanair (OJ 2016 L 134, p. 46).

         Order

                  1)

                     The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

                  2)

                     Deutsche Lufthansa AG is ordered to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 363, 3.11.2015.