title: Case C-112/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Aachen (Germany) lodged on 12 February 2019 — Marvin M. v Kreis Heinsberg

text:
               20.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 172/11

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Aachen (Germany) lodged on 12 February 2019 — Marvin M. v Kreis Heinsberg
      (Case C-112/19)
      (2019/C 172/14)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Verwaltungsgericht Aachen

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Marvin M.

         Defendant: Kreis Heinsberg

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/126/EC (1) to be interpreted as meaning that a driving licence document, including, specifically, the driving authorisations documented therein, must be strictly recognised by the Member States also in the case where the issuing of that document is based on an exchange of driving licence documents pursuant to Article 11(1) of this directive?

                  2.

                  If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: May a Member State refuse to recognise the exchanged driving licence document pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 11(4) of Directive 2006/126 if the exchange by the issuing State was carried out at a time when the Member State from which the material entitlement to drive originates had already withdrawn that entitlement?

                  3.

                  If Question 2 is to be answered in the negative and an obligation of recognition does exist: May a Member State refuse to recognise the exchanged driving licence document in any event if the Member State in the territory of which the question of recognition of the driving licence document arises can establish, on the basis of ‘indisputable information’, that the material entitlement to drive no longer existed at the time when the driving licence document was exchanged?

         (1)  Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (Recast) (OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18).


title: Case T-285/19: Action brought on 2 May 2019 — SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/76

      Action brought on 2 May 2019 — SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria v Commission
      (Case T-285/19)
      (2019/C 213/73)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: SGI Studio Galli Ingegneria Srl (Rome, Italy) (represented by: F. Marini, V. Catenacci and R. Viglietta, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  Find and declare that the applicant is not required to pay the sums claimed by the European Commission in Debit Note No 3241902288 received on 22 February 2019 and, most recently, in the note (Ref. Ares(2019)2858540) received on 29 April 2019, which are claimed in respect of recovery of aid and liquidated damages for Studio Galli Ingegneria’s alleged failure to fulfil obligations under Grant Agreement No 619120 concerning the ‘MARSOL’ project.

                  —

                  Find and declare that the shortcomings alleged by the Commission are non-existent.

                  —

                  Find and declare that the pre-information letter of 19 December 2018, the OLAF investigation report, the debit note of 22 February 2019, the subsequent reminder of 2 April 2019 and the final note (Ref. Ares(2019)2858540) of 29 April 2019 re-determining the amount claimed and rejecting SGI’s further requests are unlawful, invalid, and in any event unfounded.

                  —

                  Find and declare that the debt claimed by the Commission is non-existent.

                  —

                  Find and declare that the applicant is entitled to the aid that was paid by the Commission in accordance with Grant Agreement No 619120 concerning the ‘MARSOL’ project.

                  —

                  In the alternative, find and declare that the amount to be recovered by the Commission may not exceed EUR 100 044.99.

                  —

                  In the further alternative, order the Commission to pay SGI the costs it incurred in executing the ‘MARSOL’ project, in accordance with the provisions on unjust enrichment.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging (i) failure to observe the principle of contractual good faith, (ii) infringement of the rights of defence during the phase following the close of the investigation, (iii) infringement of the right to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), (iv) infringement of the right to good administration within the meaning of Article 41 of the Charter, (v) infringement of the right of access to documents within the meaning of Article 42 of the Charter, (vi) infringement of Article II.22 of the Grant Agreement and (vii) infringement of Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this regard that the Commission did not take account of its request for a stay of proceedings and for access to OLAF’s investigation file, but instead issued the [initial] debit note and subsequent reminders, despite the fact that the company was not in a position to comment on OLAF’s final report on account of continuing internal problems. Accordingly, the Commission failed to observe the principle of contractual good faith and infringed the [applicant’s] right to an effective defence both during the administrative procedure and before the General Court.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging (i) non-existence of the alleged failure to fulfil obligations, (ii) non-existence of the debt claimed by the Commission, (iii) the unlawful and unfounded nature of OLAF’s investigation report and, consequently, of the Commission’s pre-information letter and debit notes, (iv) failure to observe the principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and fairness as set out in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013, and (v) an error of assessment as regards the evidence and infringement of Article 1315 of the Belgian Civil Code.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this regard that all the shortcomings on the basis of which the Commission made the request for recovery are unfounded, as per the documentation presented to the Court. Working time and personnel costs were properly accounted for as regards all the resources assigned to the project and correspond to what was requested of the Commission. There are no overlaps between resources and other funded projects. None of the other alleged shortcomings exist. OLAF’s criticisms on which the Commission bases its request for recovery always refer to other projects. As a result the burden of proof has not been met.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging failure to observe the principles of proportionality, fairness and contractual good faith, and infringement of Article II.22 of the Grant Agreement.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this regard that the Commission failed to observe the principle of proportionality by claiming all of the aid granted to the applicant, despite the fact that the investigation procedure had identified inconsistencies concerning only two professionals assigned to the project. The Commission also claimed all further direct costs other than personnel costs, as well as all indirect costs.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging, in the alternative, the right to compensation for the unjust enrichment of the European Commission.

                              —

                              According to the applicant, the conditions for bringing a claim — namely the enrichment of one of the parties to the contract and the impoverishment of the other, and a causal link between that enrichment and impoverishment — are satisfied.


title: Case T-287/19: Action brought on 3 May 2019 — BigBen Interactive v EUIPO — natcon7 (nacon)

text:
               1.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 220/43

      Action brought on 3 May 2019 — BigBen Interactive v EUIPO — natcon7 (nacon)
      (Case T-287/19)
      (2019/C 220/53)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: BigBen Interactive (Fretin, France) (represented by: M. Chaminade, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: natcon7 GmbH (Hamburg, Germany)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark nacon — Application for registration No 13 036 728

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 January 2019 in Case R 1745/2017-2

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those of the opposition and appeal proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

         Plea in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-300/19: Action brought on 13 May 2019 — Achema and Lifosa v Commission

text:
               15.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 238/25

      Action brought on 13 May 2019 — Achema and Lifosa v Commission
      (Case T-300/19)
      (2019/C 238/29)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Achema AB (Jonava, Lithuania) and Lifosa AB (Kedainiai, Lithuania) (represented by: E. Righini and N. Solárová, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Commission decision C(2018) 9209 final of 8 January 2019 in State aid case SA.45765 (2018/NN) — Lithuania — Support to power plants producing electricity from renewable energy sources;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on a single plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to initiate a formal investigation procedure, thereby depriving the applicants of the procedural rights provided for by Article 108(2) TFEU.

                  —

                  The applicants maintain that all the evidence indicates that the Commission should have had doubts about the compatibility of the State aid and its financing method with the internal market and EU law. Therefore, it should have opened a formal investigation.

                  —

                  The applicants refer to an ample body of evidence ranging from the length of the pre-notification phase and the disproportionate time allocation between that phase and the preliminary examination procedure, other circumstances under which the contested decision was adopted and the alleged flaws reflected in the content of that decision, which, they argue, is insufficiently reasoned and vitiated by serious errors of assessment or the lack of assessment. These factors are said to show that the Commission made an insufficient analysis of the relevant aspects and did not have all the information needed before declaring the State aid and its financing method compatible with the internal market and EU law.

                  —

                  In particular, it is alleged that (i) the Commission erred in its assessment of an allegedly stand-alone Renewable Energy Sources (RES) scheme and RES levy, while misinterpreting the Lithuanian legislative framework and the applicants’ complaints; (ii) the Commission failed to assess investment aid granted to RES generators and therefore its substantive analysis is incomplete and insufficient; (iii) the Commission erred in its assessment of the exemptions from the levy under Article 107(1) TFEU; (iv) the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of the RES scheme with the internal market was inadequate and erroneous; and (v) the assessment of the financing method’s compliance with EU law is flawed and insufficient.


title: Case C-321/18: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 12 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — Terre wallonne ASBL v Région wallonne (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Directive 2001/42/EC — Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment — Decree — Establishment of conservation objectives for the Natura 2000 network, in accordance with Directive 92/43/EEC — Definition of ‘plans and programmes’ — Obligation to undertake an environmental assessment)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/17

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 12 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — Terre wallonne ASBL v Région wallonne
      (Case C-321/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 2001/42/EC - Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment - Decree - Establishment of conservation objectives for the Natura 2000 network, in accordance with Directive 92/43/EEC - Definition of ‘plans and programmes’ - Obligation to undertake an environmental assessment)
      (2019/C 263/21)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Terre wallonne ASBL

         Defendant: Région wallonne

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 3(2) and (4) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, must be interpreted as meaning that a decree, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, by which a body of a Member State establishes, at regional level for its Natura 2000 network, conservation objectives which have an indicative value, whereas the conservation objectives at site level have a statutory value, is not one of the ‘plans and programmes’, within the meaning of that directive, for which an environmental impact assessment is mandatory.

         (1)  OJ C 259, 23.7.2018.


title: Case C-361/18: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Szekszárdi Járásbíróság — Hungary) — Ágnes Weil v Géza Gulácsi (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 — Article 66 — Temporal scope — Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 — Material scope — Civil and commercial matters — Article 1(1) and (2)(a) — Matters excluded — Rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship — Article 54 — Application for the certificate certifying that the judgment given by the court of origin is enforceable — Judgment given concerning a debt stemming from the settlement of rights in property arising out of an unregistered non-marital partnership)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/18

      Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Szekszárdi Járásbíróság — Hungary) — Ágnes Weil v Géza Gulácsi
      (Case C-361/18) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in civil matters - Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 - Article 66 - Temporal scope - Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 - Material scope - Civil and commercial matters - Article 1(1) and (2)(a) - Matters excluded - Rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship - Article 54 - Application for the certificate certifying that the judgment given by the court of origin is enforceable - Judgment given concerning a debt stemming from the settlement of rights in property arising out of an unregistered non-marital partnership)
      (2019/C 263/22)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Szekszárdi Járásbíróság

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Ágnes Weil

         Defendant: Géza Gulácsi

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Article 54 of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State’s court hearing an application for a certificate certifying that a judgment given by the court of origin is enforceable must, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where the court which gave the judgment to be enforced did not adjudicate, when giving that judgment, on whether that regulation was applicable, ascertain whether the dispute falls within the scope of that regulation.

                  2.

                  Article 1(1) and (2)(a) of Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as meaning that an action, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, concerning an application for dissolution of the property relationships arising out a de facto (unregistered) partnership, comes within the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ within the meaning of Article 1(1) of that regulation and falls, therefore, within the material scope of that regulation.

         (1)  OJ C 311, 3.9.2018.


title: Case T-167/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — RV v Commission (Civil service — Officials — Article 42c of the Staff Regulations — Leave in the interests of the service — Automatic retirement — Measure not open to challenge — Partial inadmissibility — Scope of the law — Court acting of its own motion — Literal, contextual and teleological interpretation)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/39

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — RV v Commission
      (Case T-167/17) (1)

      (Civil service - Officials - Article 42c of the Staff Regulations - Leave in the interests of the service - Automatic retirement - Measure not open to challenge - Partial inadmissibility - Scope of the law - Court acting of its own motion - Literal, contextual and teleological interpretation)
      (2019/C 263/43)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: RV (represented by: initially, J.-N. Louis and N. de Montigny, subsequently, J.-N. Louis, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Berscheid and D. Martin, acting as Agents)

         Intervener(s) in support of the defendant(s): European Parliament (represented by: initially, J. Steele and D. Nessaf, subsequently, J. Steele and M. Rantala, and finally, J. Steele and C. González Argüelles, acting as Agents) and Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer and R. Meyer, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application pursuant to Article 270 TFEU seeking annulment of the Commission’s decision of 21 December 2016 to place the applicant on leave in the interests of the service pursuant to Article 42c of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and simultaneously to retire the applicant automatically pursuant to the fifth paragraph thereof.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the European Commission of 21 December 2016 to place RV on leave in the interests of the service and simultaneously to retire RV automatically;

                  2.

                     Dismisses the remainder of the action;

                  3.

                     Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by RV, including those incidental to the proceedings for interim measures;

                  4.

                     Orders the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 144 of 8.5.2017.


title: Case T-248/17 RENV: Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — CC v Parliament (Liability — Civil service — Recruitment — Open Competition EUR/A/151/98 — Errors committed by the European Parliament in the management of the reserve list — Material loss)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/40

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — CC v Parliament
      (Case T-248/17 RENV) (1)

      (Liability - Civil service - Recruitment - Open Competition EUR/A/151/98 - Errors committed by the European Parliament in the management of the reserve list - Material loss)
      (2019/C 263/44)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: CC (represented by: G. Maximini and C. Hölzer, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: M. Ecker and E. Despotopoulou, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 270 TFEU seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of various errors committed by the Parliament in the management of the reserve list of Open Competition EUR/A/151/98.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Orders the European Parliament to pay CC the sum of EUR 6 000;

                  2.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  3.

                     Orders the Parliament to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 133, 5.5.2012 (case initially registered before the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union under number F-9/12 and transferred to the General Court of the European Union on 1.9.2016).


title: Case T-462/17: Judgment of the General Court of 11 June 2019 — TO v EEA (Civil service — Contract staff — Contract for a fixed period — Dismissal during sick leave — Article 16 of the CEOS — Article 48(b) of the CEOS — Article 26 of the Staff Regulations — Processing of personal data — Article 84 of the CEOS — Psychological harassment)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/40

      Judgment of the General Court of 11 June 2019 — TO v EEA
      (Case T-462/17) (1)

      (Civil service - Contract staff - Contract for a fixed period - Dismissal during sick leave - Article 16 of the CEOS - Article 48(b) of the CEOS - Article 26 of the Staff Regulations - Processing of personal data - Article 84 of the CEOS - Psychological harassment)
      (2019/C 263/45)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: TO (represented by: N. Lhoëst, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Environment Agency (represented by: O. Cornu, acting as Agent, assisted by B. Wägenbaur, lawyer)

         Intervener in support of the defendant: European Parliament (represented by: initially, D. Nessaf and J. Van Pottelberge, and subsequently, J. Van Pottelberge and J. Steele, acting as Agents) and the Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer and R. Meyer, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application pursuant to Article 270 TFEU seeking, on the one hand, annulment, first, of the decision of the Executive Director of the EEA of 22 September 2016 terminating the applicant’s employment as a member of the contract staff and, secondly, that director’s decision of 20 April 2017 rejecting the complaint brought by the applicant against the decision of 22 September 2016 and, on the other hand, compensation for the damage allegedly sustained by the applicant.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Executive Director of the European Environmental Agency (EEA) of 22 September 2016 terminating TO’s employment as a member of the contract staff;

                  2.

                     Orders the EEA to pay to TO a sum equal to one month’s salary in lieu of notice and to one third of TO’s basic salary per month of probation completed, less the dismissal allowance already received by TO;

                  3.

                     Orders EEA to pay to TO an amount of EUR 6 000;

                  4.

                     Dismisses the remainder of the action

                  5.

                     Orders the EEA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by TO;

                  6.

                     Orders the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 347 of 16.10.2017.


title: Case T-583/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst v EUIPO — IOS Finance EFC (IOS FINANCE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark IOS FINANCE — Earlier national figurative mark EOS — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/41

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst v EUIPO — IOS Finance EFC (IOS FINANCE)
      (Case T-583/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark IOS FINANCE - Earlier national figurative mark EOS - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 263/46)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: B. Sorg, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Söder, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: IOS Finance EFC, SA (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 June 2017 (Case R 2262/2016-2), relating to opposition proceedings between EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst and IOS Finance EFC.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders EOS Deutscher Inkasso-Dienst GmbH to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 338, 9.10.2017.


title: Case T-74/18: Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Visi/one v EUIPO — EasyFix (Door hanger for vehicles) (Community design — Invalidity proceedings — Registered Community design representing a door hanger for vehicles — Earlier design — Proof of the disclosure — Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 — Ground for invalidity — Lack of individual character — Informed user — Degree of freedom of the designer — No different overall impression — Article 6 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/42

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Visi/one v EUIPO — EasyFix (Door hanger for vehicles)
      (Case T-74/18) (1)

      (Community design - Invalidity proceedings - Registered Community design representing a door hanger for vehicles - Earlier design - Proof of the disclosure - Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 - Ground for invalidity - Lack of individual character - Informed user - Degree of freedom of the designer - No different overall impression - Article 6 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002)
      (2019/C 263/47)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Visi/one GmbH (Remscheid, Germany) (represented by: H. Bourree and M. Bartz, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Hanne and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: EasyFix GmbH (Vienna, Austria)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 December 2017 (Case R 1424/2016-3) relating to invalidity proceedings between EasyFix and Visi/one.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Visi/one GmbH and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 26.3.2018.


title: Case T-75/18: Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — MPM-Quality v EUIPO — Elton Hodinářská (MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949) (EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — EU figurative mark MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949 — Genuine use of the mark — Obligation to state reasons)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/43

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — MPM-Quality v EUIPO — Elton Hodinářská (MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949)
      (Case T-75/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Revocation proceedings - EU figurative mark MANUFACTURE PRIM 1949 - Genuine use of the mark - Obligation to state reasons)
      (2019/C 263/48)
      Language of the case: Czech

         Parties

         Applicant: MPM-Quality v.o.s. (Frýdek-Místek, Czech Republic) (represented by: M. Kyjovský, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Elton Hodinářská a.s. (Nové Město nad Metují, Czech Republic) (represented by: T. Matoušek, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 December 2017 (Case R 556/2017-4) relating to revocation proceedings between MPM-QUALITY and ELTON hodinářská.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders MPM-QUALITY v.o.s. to bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO);

                  3.

                     Orders ELTON hodinářská, a.s. to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 122, 26.3.2018.


title: Case T-138/18: Judgment of the General Court of 11 June 2019 — De Esteban Alonso v Commission (Civil Service — Former officials — OLAF investigation — ‘Eurostat’ case — Forwarding to the national judicial authorities of information relating to matters liable to result in criminal proceedings — Failure to notify potentially concerned officials beforehand — Harm allegedly suffered on account of the conduct of OLAF and the Commission during the proceedings — Material, non-material and physical harm — Causal link)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/44

      Judgment of the General Court of 11 June 2019 — De Esteban Alonso v Commission
      (Case T-138/18) (1)

      (Civil Service - Former officials - OLAF investigation - ‘Eurostat’ case - Forwarding to the national judicial authorities of information relating to matters liable to result in criminal proceedings - Failure to notify potentially concerned officials beforehand - Harm allegedly suffered on account of the conduct of OLAF and the Commission during the proceedings - Material, non-material and physical harm - Causal link)
      (2019/C 263/49)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Fernando De Esteban Alonso (Saint-Martin-de-Seignanx, France) (represented by: C. Huglo, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: R. Striani and J. Baquero Cruz, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 270 TFEU for compensation for the material, non-material and physical harm which the applicant claims to have suffered.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Orders the European Commission to pay Mr Fernando De Esteban Alonso EUR 62 000 by way of compensation for the non-material harm suffered;

                  2.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  3.

                     Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr De Esteban Alonso.

         (1)  OJ C 190, 4.6.2018.


title: Case T-291/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — Biedermann Technologies v EUIPO (Compliant Constructs) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark Compliant Constructs — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/44

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — Biedermann Technologies v EUIPO (Compliant Constructs)
      (Case T-291/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark Compliant Constructs - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 263/50)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Biedermann Technologies GmbH & Co. KG (Donaueschingen, Germany) (represented by: A. Jacob, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: W. Schramek and M. Fischer, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 March 2018 (Case R 1626/2017-4) relating to an application for registration of the word sign Compliant Constructs as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Biedermann Technologies GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.


title: Case T-346/18: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — Advance Magazine Publishers v EUIPO — Enovation Brands (VOGUE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark VOGUE — Earlier EU word mark VOGA — Suspension of the administrative procedure — Rule 20(7)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 71(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) — Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/45

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2019 — Advance Magazine Publishers v EUIPO — Enovation Brands (VOGUE)
      (Case T-346/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark VOGUE - Earlier EU word mark VOGA - Suspension of the administrative procedure - Rule 20(7)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 71(1) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) - Rule 50(1) of Regulation No 2868/95)
      (2019/C 263/51)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: T. Alkin, Barrister, and N. Hine, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája and H. O’Neill, Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Enovation Brands, Inc. (Aventura, Florida, United States) (represented by: R. Almaraz Palmero, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 March 2018 (Case R 259/2017-4) concerning opposition proceedings between Enovation Brands and Advance Magazine Publishers.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 March 2018 (Case R 259/2017-4).

                  2.

                     Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.

                  3.

                     Orders Enovation Brands, Inc. to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 268, 30.7.2018.


title: Case T-357/18: Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Luz Saúde v EUIPO — Clínica La Luz (HOSPITAL DA LUZ) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for registration of EU figurative mark HOSPITAL DA LUZ — Earlier national figurative mark clínica LALUZ — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/46

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Luz Saúde v EUIPO — Clínica La Luz (HOSPITAL DA LUZ)
      (Case T-357/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for registration of EU figurative mark HOSPITAL DA LUZ - Earlier national figurative mark clínica LALUZ - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 263/52)
      Language of the case: Portuguese

         Parties

         Applicant: Luz Saúde, SA (Lisbon, Portugal) (represented by: G. Gentil Anastácio, P. Guerra e Andrade, M. Barros Silva and G. Moreira Rato, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, I. Ribeiro da Cunha and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Clínica La Luz, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: I. Temiño Ceniceros, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 April 2018 (Case R 2084/2017-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Clínica La Luz and Luz Saúde.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Luz Saúde, SA to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 268, 30.7.2018.


title: Case T-392/18: Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Innocenti v EUIPO —Gemelli (Innocenti) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU work mark Innocenti — Earlier national figurative mark i INNOCENTI — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/47

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 June 2019 — Innocenti v EUIPO —Gemelli (Innocenti)
      (Case T-392/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU work mark Innocenti - Earlier national figurative mark i INNOCENTI - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 263/53)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Innocenti SA (Lugano, Switzerland) (represented by: N. Ferretti, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Filippo Gemelli (Turin, Italy) (initially represent by: C. Renna, and subsequently by F. Canu, lawyers)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 19 April 2018 (Case R 2336/2010-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Mr Gemelli and Innocenti.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Innocenti SA to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred in the present proceedings by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Mr Filippo Gemelli.

         (1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.


title: Case T-359/19: Action brought on 14 June 2019 — Daimler v Commission

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/58

      Action brought on 14 June 2019 — Daimler v Commission
      (Case T-359/19)
      (2019/C 263/65)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Daimler AG (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: N. Wimmer, C. Arhold and G. Ollinger, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision of the defendant of 3 April 2019 — C(2019) 2359 — (‘the contested decision’) pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (1) in particular pursuant to Article 8(5)(2) thereof, in so far as in Article 1(1) of the decision, in conjunction with tables 1 and 2 of Annex I, average specific emissions of CO2 were entered in column D and CO2 savings and eco-innovation were entered in column I; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 12(1)(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 (2) in conjunction with Article 1(3) of Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 (3)

                  Within the context of the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant infringed Article 12(1)(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 in conjunction with Article 1(3) of Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158, since in the context of the verification of CO2 savings it diverged from the authorised procedure in so far as it applied an inaccurate Willans’ factor.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 12(1)(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 in conjunction with Article 1(3) of Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 in conjunction with Article 6(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011
                  Within the context of the second plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant infringed Article 12(1)(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 in conjunction with Article 1(3) of Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 in conjunction with Article 6(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011, since in the context of the verification procedure adopted by it for the ad-hoc review it disregarded the essential specific preconditions.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 12(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011
                  Within the context of the third plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant infringed Article 12(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011, in so far as it ordered the exclusion of eco-innovation with respect to the previous year (2017), although the regulations expressly permits a decision on exclusion only with respect to the subsequent year.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging an infringement of the right to be heard
                  Within the context of the fourth plea in law, it is claimed that the applicant’s right to be heard in accordance with the requirements of the general legal principle of observance of the rights of the defence and those of Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights was infringed. The defendant authorised an exchange of legal positions, but thereby adopted the contested decision.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging a breach of the obligation to state reasons
                  Within the context of the fifth plea in law, it is claimed that the decision is not duly justified in accordance with the requirements of Article 296(2) TFEU and Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the contested decision, the defendant merely vaguely referred to discrepancies in the testing methodology, but failed to take a position on the decisive question whether and to what extent the testing methodology required a specific preconditioning and whether the defendant approved such a testing methodology in Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158.

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community's integrated approach to reduce CO 2 emissions from light-duty vehicles (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 1).

         (2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 725/2011 of 25 July 2011 establishing a procedure for the approval and certification of innovative technologies for reducing CO 2 emissions from passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 194, p. 19).

         (3)  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/158 of 30 January 2015 on the approval of two Robert Bosch GmbH high efficient alternators as the innovative technologies for reducing CO 2 emissions from passenger cars pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2015 L 26, p. 31).


title: Case T-374/19: Action brought on 20 June 2019 — Wuhrer v Parliament

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/71

      Action brought on 20 June 2019 — Wuhrer v Parliament
      (Case T-374/19)
      (2019/C 263/76)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Lina Wuhrer (Brescia, Italy) (represented by: M. Paniz, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Parliament

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the communiqué of the European Parliament Directorate-General for Finance implementing Resolution No 14/2018 of 12 July 2018 of the Office of the President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and/or Resolution No 6/2018 of the Presidential Council of the Senate of the Italian Republic, and, in any event,

                  —

                  annul the redetermination and recalculation of the life annuity disbursed by the European Parliament;

                  —

                  accordingly, declare that the applicant is entitled to the maintenance of the life annuity in question in so far as it was accrued and is being accrued on the basis of the legislation in force prior to Resolution No 14/2018 of the Office of the President of the Italian Chamber [of Deputies] and/or Resolution No 6/2018 of the Presidential Council of the Senate of the Italian Republic, and order the European Parliament to pay her all the sums unduly withheld, adjusted for inflation, together with statutory interest from the date of withholding until the date of payment;

                  —

                  order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and immediately to restore in full the original amount of the life annuity, and to pay compensation for all damages if and to the extent that damages are payable to the applicant; and

                  —

                  in any event, order the Parliament to pay all costs, lawyers’ fees, plus VAT, taxes, duties and flat-rate charges.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-345/19, Santini v Parliament.


title: Case T-367/19: Action brought on 19 June 2019 — Camerin v Commission

text:
               12.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 270/36

      Action brought on 19 June 2019 — Camerin v Commission
      (Case T-367/19)
      (2019/C 270/38)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Laure Camerin (Bastia, France) (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible and well-founded;

                  —

                  consequently, annul the contested decision in part;

                  —

                  order compensation for non-material damage caused by a series of measures and actions of the PMO which must be the subject of a global assessment and which the applicant estimates at the sum ex aequo et bono of EUR 50 000;

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay all of the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action against the decision of the ‘Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements’ Office’ (‘the PMO’) – relating to the implementation of a garnishee order issued by a Belgian court, in that the PMO still reserves the right to deduct the sum of EUR 3 839,60 from the pension payments that the applicant is yet to receive – the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 1 and 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and of Article 6 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) and alleging an error of assessment. In that connection, the applicant claims that there is neither any reason nor legal basis which justifies the decision of the PMO to continue to seize more than two thirds of her pension.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legality and legal certainty. According to the applicant, the Staff Regulations are a ‘lex specialis’ which has primacy over any other national law: as regards the minimum subsistence figure there are thus substantive provisions of the Staff Regulations that derogate both from general EU employment law and national employment law.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration and duty of care in that no statement of reasons has been provided in relation to the facts or evidence which could justify the decision adopted by the PMO by which it still reserves the right to deduct the sum of EUR 3 839,60 from the pension payments that the applicant is yet to receive.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, in particular in so far as, if the interpretation of PMO were to be followed, the minimum subsistence figure would depend on the country where the public official resided.
                  The applicant also seeks compensation for the non-material damage that she claims to have suffered as a result of irregularities allegedly committed by the PMO which make it impossible for her to live in dignity.


title: Case T-590/17: Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2019 — EIB v Syria (Arbitration clause — Water Supply Sweida Region Loan Agreement No 80212 — Non-performance of the agreement — Repayment of the sums advanced — Default interest — Procedure by default)

text:
               19.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 280/38

      Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2019 — EIB v Syria
      (Case T-590/17) (1)

      (Arbitration clause - Water Supply Sweida Region Loan Agreement No 80212 - Non-performance of the agreement - Repayment of the sums advanced - Default interest - Procedure by default)
      (2019/C 280/53)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: European Investment Bank (represented by: initially by P. Chamberlain, T. Gilliams, F. Oxangoiti Briones and J. Shirran, and subsequently by F. Oxangoiti Briones, J. Klein and J. Shirran, acting as Agents, and D. Arts, lawyer, and T. Cusworth, Solicitor)

         Defendant: Syrian Arab Republic

         Re:

      Action pursuant to Article 272 TFEU, seeking an order that the Syrian Arab Republic repay sums due under Water Supply Sweida Region Loan Agreement No 80212, plus default interest.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Orders the Syrian Arab Republic to repay the European Union, represented by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the sum of EUR 726 942,81;

                  2.

                     Declares that that sum is to bear default interest, on the principle amounts and on the contractual interest, at the annual rate of 3.5%, from 25 August 2017 until the date that payment is made;

                  3.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  4.

                     Orders the Syrian Arab Republic to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 369, 30.10.2017.


title: Case T-591/17: Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2019 — EIB v Syria (Arbitration clause — Water Supply Deir Ez Zor Region Loan Agreement No 80310 — Non-performance of the agreement — Repayment of the sums advanced — Default interest — Procedure by default)

text:
               19.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 280/39

      Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2019 — EIB v Syria
      (Case T-591/17) (1)

      (Arbitration clause - Water Supply Deir Ez Zor Region Loan Agreement No 80310 - Non-performance of the agreement - Repayment of the sums advanced - Default interest - Procedure by default)
      (2019/C 280/54)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: European Investment Bank (represented by: initially by P. Chamberlain, T. Gilliams, F. Oxangoiti Briones and J. Shirran, and subsequently by F. Oxangoiti Briones, J. Klein and J. Shirran, acting as Agents, and D. Arts, lawyer, and T. Cusworth, Solicitor)

         Defendant: Syrian Arab Republic

         Re:

      Action pursuant to Article 272 TFEU, seeking an order that the Syrian Arab Republic repay sums due under Water Supply Deir Ez Zor Region Loan Agreement No 80310, plus default interest.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Orders the Syrian Arab Republic to repay the European Union, represented by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the sum of EUR 404 425,58;

                  2.

                     Declares that that sum is to bear default interest, on the principle amounts and on the contractual interest, at the annual rate of 3.5%, from 25 August 2017 until the date that payment is made;

                  3.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  4.

                     Orders the Syrian Arab Republic to pay the costs

         (1)  OJ C 369, 30.10.2017.


title: Case C-78/19 P: Appeal brought on 31 January 2019 by WL against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Ninth Chamber) on 29 November 2018 in Case T-493/17, WL v ERCEA

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/11

      Appeal brought on 31 January 2019 by WL against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Ninth Chamber) on 29 November 2018 in Case T-493/17, WL v ERCEA
      (Case C-78/19 P)
      (2019/C 288/14)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Appellant: WL (represented by: F. Elia, avvocato)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA)
      By order of 11 July 2019, the Court (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded, and ordered WL to bear its own costs.


title: Case C-121/19 P: Appeal brought on 15 February 2019 by Edison SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 7 December 2018 in Case T-471/17, Edison v EUIPO (EDISON)

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/12

      Appeal brought on 15 February 2019 by Edison SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 7 December 2018 in Case T-471/17, Edison v EUIPO (EDISON)
      (Case C-121/19 P)
      (2019/C 288/15)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Appellant: Edison SpA (represented by: D. Martucci, F. Boscariol de Roberto, avvocati)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal, give final judgment on the matter and uphold the action, holding that ‘electricity’ comes under Class 4 of the Eighth Edition of the Nice Classification and consequently find that trade mark No 3 315 991 owned by Edison S.p.A. covers, inter alia, ‘electricity’;

                  —

                  in the alternative, set aside the judgment under appeal and refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  in any event, order EUIPO to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

                  1.

                  The General Court erred in stating that the mention of the product ‘electricity’ in the non-exhaustive list drawn up by EUIPO for the submission of declarations for the purposes of Article 28(8) EUTMR (paragraphs 41, 46 and 54) proves that electricity, in its everyday and usual meaning, is not included in Class 4 of the Eighth Edition of the Nice Classification. In the first place, the error in law arises from the fact that the appellant’s application to restrict the list of goods designated was submitted on 15 June 2015, while the document to which EUIPO refers was established with Communication No 1/2016 of 8 February 2016. In the second place, it is also an error in law to assume that the exclusion of a term from the list constitutes evidence, when it is no more than a set of non-binding interpretations.

                  2.

                  The General Court wrongly held that only tangible goods that spontaneously produce light of themselves may be considered ‘illuminants’. The error in law lies in the fact that it is the competent authorities and economic operators that classify goods in respect of their ability to provide illumination, classifying electricity as a commodity which generates light and profit, and the tangibility of that commodity in the purely physical sense is irrelevant.

                  3.

                  The General Court erred in law since, in so far as if it is accepted that ‘fuel’ includes fuel for motors, it is clear that the term ‘fuel’ is to be understood in such a broad manner as to include goods, such as electricity, which by their nature do not cause motors to start by means of combustion.

                  4.

                  The General Court made an error of interpretation by considering that electricity is not covered by the term ‘motor fuel’, completely overlooking its functional characteristics.

                  5.

                  The General Court manifestly erred in law by holding that the evidence provided by the appellant was insufficient to demonstrate that electricity is included in Class 4.

                  6.

                  In addition, the General Court also based its decision on Document 1 submitted by EUIPO, holding that the document was from August 2003, despite the fact that it was clearly dated June 2003.

                  7.

                  The General Court merely endorsed a legal situation and decisions for which insufficient grounds were given, despite the admission of evidence submitted by the appellant and EUIPO. To assert that there are electronic vehicles commercially available and then claim that economic operators (the same producers of those vehicles) do not consider electricity to be a fuel, even an alternative fuel, goes against all logic and means that the decisions of EUIPO and the General Court are not substantiated.


title: Case C-304/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Constanța (Romania) lodged on 12 April 2019 — Ira Invest SRL v Agenția de Plăți și Intervenție pentru Agricultură — Centrul Județean Tulcea

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/15

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Constanța (Romania) lodged on 12 April 2019 — Ira Invest SRL v Agenția de Plăți și Intervenție pentru Agricultură — Centrul Județean Tulcea
      (Case C-304/19)
      (2019/C 288/19)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel Constanța

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant/applicant at first instance: Ira Invest SRL

         Respondent/defendant at first instance: Agenția de Plăți și Intervenție pentru Agricultură — Centrul Județean Tulcea

         Question referred

      Must Article 4(1)(b), (c), (e) and (f), Article 10, Article 21(1) and Article 32(1) to (5) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, in the circumstances of the main proceedings, excludes a farmer from payment of entitlements on the ground that land with aquaculture facilities used as arable land does not constitute an ‘agricultural area’ within the meaning of Article 4 of the regulation?

         (1)  Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 608).


title: Case C-329/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 23 April 2019 — Condominio di Milano v Eurothermo SpA

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/16

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 23 April 2019 — Condominio di Milano v Eurothermo SpA
      (Case C-329/19)
      (2019/C 288/21)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale di Milano

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Condominio di Milano

         Defendant: Eurothermo SpA

         Question referred

      Does the concept of consumer, as adopted by Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) preclude classification as a consumer of an entity (such as the entity comprising owners of apartments in a building (condominio) in Italian law), which does not come within the concept of ‘natural person’ or ‘legal person’, in cases where that entity concludes a contract for purposes which are outside its trade, business or profession and where it is in a position of weakness vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both its bargaining power and its level of knowledge?

         (1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


title: Case C-334/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Stuttgart (Germany) lodged on 24 April 2019 — Eurowings GmbH v GD, HE, IF

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/17

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Stuttgart (Germany) lodged on 24 April 2019 — Eurowings GmbH v GD, HE, IF
      (Case C-334/19)
      (2019/C 288/22)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Landgericht Stuttgart

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Eurowings GmbH

         Respondents: GD, HE, IF

         Question referred

      Are the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (1) in particular Article 5(3) thereof, to be interpreted as meaning that the spontaneous absence of a significant portion of the flight crew staff — occasioned by their placing themselves on sick leave (‘a wildcat strike’) — of an air carrier that is leasing out an aircraft and crew under a ‘wet lease’ to the ‘operating air carrier’, within the meaning of Article 2(b) of that regulation, but which does not bear operational responsibility for the flights, has as an effect that the ‘operating air carrier’ is also not able to rely on ‘extraordinary circumstances’ within the meaning of Article 5(3) of that regulation, in accordance with the judgment of 17 April 2018, Krüsemann and Others, C-195/17, C-197/17 to C-203/17, C-226/17, C-228/17, C-254/17, C-274/17, C-275/17, C-278/17 to C-286/17 and C-290/17 to C-292/17? (2)

         (1)  OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.

         (2)  EU:C:2018:258.


title: Case C-355/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Pitești (Romania) lodged on 6 May 2019 — Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, Asociația ‘Mișcarea pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor’ and OL v Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție — Procurorul General al României

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/18

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Pitești (Romania) lodged on 6 May 2019 — Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, Asociația ‘Mișcarea pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor’ and OL v Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție — Procurorul General al României
      (Case C-355/19)
      (2019/C 288/23)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel Pitești

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Asociația ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’, Asociația ‘Mișcarea pentru Apărarea Statutului Procurorilor’ and OL

         Defendant: Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție — Procurorul General al României

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 (1) be regarded as an act of an institution of the Union, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, which is amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

                  2.

                  Do the terms, nature and duration of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 fall within the scope of the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, signed by Romania in Luxembourg on 25 April 2005? Are the requirements set out in the reports drawn up in the context of that mechanism binding on the Romanian State?

                  3.

                  Must Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are obliged to comply with the criteria of the rule of law, also requested in the reports drawn up in the context of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, in the event of the creation, as a matter of urgency, of a section of the prosecutor’s office charged with the exclusive investigation of offences committed by members of the judiciary, which gives rise to particular concerns as regards the fight against corruption and may be used as an additional means of intimidating members of the judiciary and putting pressure on them?

                  4.

                  Must the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union be interpreted as meaning that the Member States are obliged to adopt the necessary measures to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law through the removal of any risk of political influence on criminal proceedings before certain judges, [in] the event of the creation, as a matter of urgency, of a section of the prosecutor’s office charged with the exclusive investigation of offences committed by members of the judiciary, which gives rise to particular concerns as regards the fight against corruption and may be used as an additional means of intimidating members of the judiciary and putting pressure on them?

         (1)  Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (OJ 2006 L 354, p. 56).


title: Case C-357/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 6 May 2019 — Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție — Direcția Națională Anticorupție, PM, RO, SP, TQ v QN, UR, VS, WT, Autoritatea Națională pentru Turism, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală, SC Euro Box Promotion SRL

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/19

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 6 May 2019 — Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție — Direcția Națională Anticorupție, PM, RO, SP, TQ v QN, UR, VS, WT, Autoritatea Națională pentru Turism, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală, SC Euro Box Promotion SRL
      (Case C-357/19)
      (2019/C 288/24)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Parchetul de pe lângă Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție — Direcția Națională Anticorupție, PM, RO, SP, TQ

         Defendants: QN, UR, VS, WT, Autoritatea Națională pentru Turism, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală, SC Euro Box Promotion SRL

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, Article 325(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 1(1)(a) and (b) and Article 2(1) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, and the principle of legal certainty be interpreted as precluding the adoption of a decision by a body outside the judicial system, the Curtea Constituțională a României (Constitutional Court of Romania), which adjudicates on the lawfulness of the composition of Chambers hearing the case, in that way creating the conditions for allowing extraordinary actions brought against final judgments delivered in a given period?

                  2.

                  Must Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union be interpreted as precluding a finding by a body outside the judicial system — binding under national law — of the lack of independence and impartiality of a Chamber which includes a judge responsible for judicial administration who has not been randomly appointed, but on the basis of a transparent rule known to the parties and unchallenged by them, applicable to all the cases dealt with by that same chamber?

                  3.

                  Must the primacy of EU law be interpreted as allowing the national court to disapply a decision of the constitutional court, handed down in a case concerning a constitutional dispute, binding under national law?


title: Case T-698/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — MAN Truck & Bus v EUIPO — Halla Holdings (MANDO) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark MANDO — Earlier international and national figurative marks MAN — Earlier national word mark Man — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/41

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2019 — MAN Truck & Bus v EUIPO — Halla Holdings (MANDO)
      (Case T-698/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark MANDO - Earlier international and national figurative marks MAN - Earlier national word mark Man - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 305/49)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: MAN Truck & Bus AG (Munich, Germany) (represented by: C. Röhl, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented initially by: J. Ivanauskas and D. Walicka, and subsequently by J. Ivanauskas and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Halla Holdings Corp. (Yongin-si, South Korea) (represented by: M.-R. Hirsch and C. de Haas, lawyers)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 July 2017 (Case R 1919/2016-1), relating to opposition proceedings between MAN Truck & Bus and Halla Holdings.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 July 2017 (Case R 1919/2016-1) to the extent that it concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion between the word mark MANDO and the earlier international registration No 863 418 of the figurative mark MAN.

                  2.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder.

                  3.

                     Orders each party to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 437, 18.12.2017.


title: Case C-382/19 P: Appeal brought on 15 May 2019 by Ralph Pethke against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 5 March 2019 in Case T-169/17 Ralph Pethke v European Union Intellectual Property Office

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/2

      Appeal brought on 15 May 2019 by Ralph Pethke against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 5 March 2019 in Case T-169/17 Ralph Pethke v European Union Intellectual Property Office
      (Case C-382/19 P)
      (2019/C 337/02)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Ralph Pethke (represented by: H. Tettenborn, Rechtsanwalt)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 5 March 2019 in Case T-169/17;

                  —

                  annul Transfer Decision PERS-AFFECT-16-134 of the Executive Director of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and award compensation for the material and non-material damage caused by the unlawful transfer;

                  —

                  in the alternative, set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The subject of the present appeal is the judgment of the General Court by which that court dismissed the appellant’s action against Transfer Decision PERS-AFFECT-16-134 of the Executive Director of the European Union Intellectual Property Office.
      The appellant bases his appeal on the following three grounds:

                  1.

                  Infringement of Article 7 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) (1) and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union
                  The appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in its application of Article 7 of the Staff Regulations. Downgrading from the post of Director of the Operations Department to that of Senior Expert without any career prospects and without any evaluation or disciplinary procedure protecting the appellant’s rights does not constitute lawful redeployment, but is unlawful demotion. The 2014 amendment of the Staff Regulations developed the prospect of promotion for Directors above Grade AD 12 into a right to be enjoyed by such officials. The appointing authority cannot unilaterally withdraw that right without a proper evaluation or disciplinary procedure. Since 2014, according to the law, it has no longer been possible to consider a post as a Director to be equivalent to a post as a Senior Expert without promotion prospects.
                  Further, the General Court makes reference to case-law on redeployment under Article 7 of the Staff Regulations and the equivalence of posts, but goes on to draw the wrong conclusions from it.
                  Finally, the General Court made an error in law and an administrative error by failing to come to a comprehensive decision on the second plea in law, namely on the unlawful demotion of the appellant on 10 October 2016 without simultaneous transfer to a new post, which occurred only on 17 October 2016. For that very reason, this does not come within the meaning of a transfer under Article 7 of the Staff Regulations (paragraphs 49-106 of the judgment).

                  2.

                  Distortion of facts
                  Not only did the General Court base the judgment under appeal on facts that were not set out in the case file, but it also based its decision on facts that were different from those set out in that file.
                  Additionally, in the present case, it is evident that the General Court carried out no assessment of the evidence. Had it done so, it would have had to assess the credibility of the statements of the present respondent.
                  Furthermore, the assessment carried out by the General Court of the appellant’s actions in relation to his duty to report manifestly unlawful measures deprives Articles 21a(1) and 22 of the Staff Regulations of all practical effect.

                  3.

                  Unlawful assessment of the allegations of psychological harassment and breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials, and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union
                  The General Court rejected the allegation that the measures of the Executive Director between 10 October 2016 and 17 October 2016 constituted psychological harassment on the basis that they were an infringement of the law currently in force. The breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials and the allegation of psychological harassment are inextricably linked to the unlawful decisions to demote and redeploy taken between 10 October 2016 and 17 October 2016. Contrary to the assertions of the General Court, a ‘pattern of behaviour’ is not a prerequisite for the existence of psychological harassment under Article 12a(3) of the Staff Regulations. Further, the General Court did not comment on the breach of the duty to have regard for the welfare of officials in the form of the public defamation of the appellant’s professional achievements which occurred when he was redeployed.

         (1)  The Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union are established by Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 of 29 February 1968 laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Communities and instituting special measures temporarily applicable to officials of the Commission (OJ, English Special Edition II, 1968(I), p. 30), as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 15).


title: Case C-446/19 P: Appeal brought on 12 June 2019 by Stephan Fleig against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 April 2019 in Case T-492/17 Stephan Fleig v European External Action Service

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/3

      Appeal brought on 12 June 2019 by Stephan Fleig against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 April 2019 in Case T-492/17 Stephan Fleig v European External Action Service
      (Case C-446/19 P)
      (2019/C 337/03)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Stephan Fleig (represented by: H. Tettenborn, Rechtsanwalt)

         Other party to the proceedings: European External Action Service (EEAS)

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside in full the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (First Chamber) of 2 April 2019 in Case T-492/17;

                  —

                  annul the decision of 19 September 2016 by which the Director of the ‘Human Resources’ Directorate of the European External Action Service (EEAS), acting in his capacity as the authority authorised to conclude contracts of employment, decided to terminate the appellant’s employment contract of indefinite duration with effect from 19 June 2017, and order the EEAS to pay compensation for the non-material damage caused by the unlawful termination;

                  —

                  in the alternative, set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  order the EEAS to pay the costs in both sets of proceedings.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The appellant bases his appeal on the following six grounds of appeal.
      First, the appellant complains of an infringement of his right to a fair hearing under the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and a breach of the principle of equality of arms. Contrary to his application, the General Court did not require the EEAS to submit relevant emails, which severely limited his capacity to defend himself.
      Second, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in its application of the principle of the administration’s duty to have regard for the welfare of officials. The General Court failed to recognise that, prior to the termination of the appellant’s employment contract, the EEAS had already contributed to the deterioration of the appellant’s mental health through its conduct and, by doing so, to the reduction of his capacity to operate in a manner commensurate with his duties.
      Third, the appellant alleges that the General Court erred in law when it assumed that it did not need to examine whether and to what extent the appellant was prevented by his state of health from complying with his duties under the Staff Regulations to disclose the place where he was staying. Further, the General Court erred in law in so far as it ignored the medical opinions submitted by the appellant, despite not having specialist knowledge itself or obtaining a medical expert’s report. In addition, the General Court erred in law in so far as it failed to find that the EEAS had taken into account the effects of the appellant’s mental illness to the detriment of the latter.
      Fourth, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in law when it alleged that he had breached the duty under Article 7 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations and the fundamental duty of loyalty and cooperation in so far as he had ‘refused to nominate his doctor himself for the Invalidity Commission’. By doing so, the General Court erred in its substantiation of its judgment by making reference to a circumstance that the EEAS itself had not alleged in any way against the appellant in the statement of reasons in its decision.
      Fifth, the appellant claims that the General Court was wrong to conclude from a series of unsuccessful extra-judicial applications and complaints made by the appellant that the appointing authority of the EEAS was entitled to impute to him a lack of cooperation and loyalty. From the General Court’s perspective, any application by a member of staff that is refused by the administration is ultimately to be viewed as an abuse of rights.
      Sixth, the appellant alleges that the General Court committed a series of distortions of the facts on which its judgment is based, which relate, in particular, to his duty to inform the administration of the place where he was staying.


title: Case C-495/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 26 June 2019 – Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków v RN

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 26 June 2019 – Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków v RN
      (Case C-495/19)
      (2019/C 337/06)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Kancelaria Medius SA, established in Kraków

         Defendant: RN

         Question referred

      Should Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (1) be interpreted as precluding procedural rules under which a court may issue a default judgment on the basis merely of an applicant’s statements contained in the application, and which the court is obliged to accept as true, in a case where the defendant (a consumer), who has been duly notified of the date of the hearing, does not appear when summoned and does not mount a defence?

         (1)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.


title: Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Norges Høyesterett dated 28 June 2019 in the case of Melissa Colleen Campbell v The Norwegian Government (Case E-4/19)2019/C 351/12

text:
               17.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 351/15

      Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Norges Høyesterett dated 28 June 2019 in the case of Melissa Colleen Campbell v The Norwegian Government
      (Case E-4/19)
      (2019/C 351/12)
      A request has been made to the EFTA Court dated 28 June 2019 from Norges Høyesterett (the Supreme Court of Norway), which was received at the Court Registry on 28 June 2019, for an Advisory Opinion in the case of Melissa Colleen Campbell v The Norwegian Government on the following questions:

                  1.

                  In the light of the EU Court of Justice’s recent case law in which the view of the Grand Chamber in its judgment of 12 March 2014 in Case C-456/12 O. and B. concerning the derived right of residence has been maintained, and on the basis of the homogeneity principle, is Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 2004/38/EC, read in conjunction with its Article 7(2), applicable by analogy to a situation where an EEA citizen returns to the home State together with a family member?

                  2.

                  What does the requirement of ‘continuous’ residence under the Directive as expressed in paragraph 80 of the EFTA Court’s judgment of 26 July 2016 in Case E-28/15 Jabbi entail? It would be especially useful if the EFTA Court could comment on:

                              a)

                              whether and, if so, to what extent there can be interruptions in residence, and

                              b)

                              whether the cause of a possible interruption — such as its being for work-related reasons — may be of import for the assessment of whether the residence is continuous within the meaning of the Directive.

                  3.

                  What is required by the condition that the EEA citizen’s residence in the host State must have been ‘genuine such as to enable family life in that State’, as expressed in, inter alia, paragraph 80 of the EFTA Court’s judgment of 26 July 2016 in Case E-28/15, Jabbi; paragraph 51 of the judgment of the EU Court of Justice of 12 March 2014 in Case C-456/12, O. and B., read in conjunction with paragraphs 56 and 57 thereof; and paragraphs 24 and 26 of the latter Court’s judgment of 5 June 2018 in Case C 673/16, Coman, and read also in the light of the abuse of rights provision in Article 35 of the Directive?


title: Case C-230/19 P: Appeal brought on 14 March 2019 by Petr Fryč against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 15 January 2019 in Case T-513/18, Fryč v Commission

text:
               21.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 357/4

      Appeal brought on 14 March 2019 by Petr Fryč against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 15 January 2019 in Case T-513/18, Fryč v Commission
      (Case C-230/19 P)
      (2019/C 357/05)
      Language of the case: Czech

         Parties

         Appellant: Petr Fryč (represented by: Š. Oharková, lawyer)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission
      By order of 5 September 2019, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that this appeal is manifestly unfounded.


title: Case C-433/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 6 June 2019 — Ellmes Property Services Limited v SP

text:
               21.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 357/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) lodged on 6 June 2019 — Ellmes Property Services Limited v SP
      (Case C-433/19)
      (2019/C 357/07)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Oberster Gerichtshof

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Ellmes Property Services Limited

         Defendant: SP

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is the first alternative in the first subparagraph of Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (1)(‘Brussels Ia Regulation’) to be interpreted as meaning that actions brought by a co-owner seeking to prohibit another co-owner from carrying out changes to his property subject to co-ownership, in particular to its designated use, arbitrarily and without the consent of the other co-owners, concern the assertion of a right in rem?

                  2.

                  If the first question should be answered in the negative:
                  Is Article 7(1)(a) of the Brussels Ia Regulation to be interpreted as meaning that the actions referred to in paragraph 1 concern contractual obligations to be performed at the location of the property?

         (1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.


title: Case C-442/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 12 June 2019 — Stichting Brein v News-Service Europe BV

text:
               21.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 357/5

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Netherlands) lodged on 12 June 2019 — Stichting Brein v News-Service Europe BV
      (Case C-442/19)
      (2019/C 357/08)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Hoge Raad der Nederlanden

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Stichting Brein

         Respondent: News-Service Europe BV

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Has an operator of a platform for Usenet services (as NSE has been) […] made a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p.10; ‘the Copyright Directive’)?

                  2.

                  If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative (and there is thus a communication to the public):
                  Does the finding that the operator of a platform for Usenet services has made a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive preclude the application of Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1; ‘Directive on electronic commerce’)?

                  3.

                  If the answer to question 1 or 2 is in the negative (and recourse to the exemption under Article 14(1) of the Directive on electronic commerce is therefore possible in principle):
                  Has the operator of a platform for Usenet services, who provides services […], played an active role that would in some other way preclude reliance on Article 14(1) of the Directive on electronic commerce?

                  4.

                  Can the operator of a platform for Usenet services who has made a communication to the public and who is entitled to rely on Article 14(1) of the Directive on electronic commerce be prohibited from continuing the infringement, or can an injunction be imposed on it that goes beyond what is stated in Article 14(3) of the Directive on electronic commerce, or is that contrary to Article 15(1) of the Directive on electronic commerce?


title: Case C-479/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 19 June 2019 — UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH v Agenzia delle Entrate

text:
               21.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 357/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 19 June 2019 — UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH v Agenzia delle Entrate
      (Case C-479/19)
      (2019/C 357/13)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Corte suprema di cassazione

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: UBS Real Estate Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH

         Respondent: Agenzia delle Entrate

         Question referred

      Does EU law — in particular the provisions of the Treaty concerning freedom of establishment and free movement of capital, as interpreted by the Court — preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as Article 35(10-ter) of Decree Law No 223/2006 (in so far as it grants relief on mortgage registration tax and the Land Registry fee only in respect of closed-end real estate investment funds)?