201807200352013422018/C 276/343582018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180601252731Case C-358/18 P: Appeal brought on 1 June 2018 by the Republic of Poland against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-507/15, Republic of Poland v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN2510120180601EN0034251273Appeal brought on 1 June 2018 by the Republic of Poland against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-507/15, Republic of Poland v Commission
   (Case C-358/18 P)2018/C 276/34Language of the case: Polish
      Parties

      Appellant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 15 March 2018 in Case T-507/15, Republic of Poland v Commission, in so far as the following pleas in law, raised in the action seeking annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1119 of 22 June 2015 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (notified under document C(2015) 4076), (
                  1
               ) were rejected in that judgment:

                     (a)

                     the second part of the first plea in law, relating to the effectiveness of on-the-spot controls in regard to pre-recognised producer groups, and

                     (b)

                     the second part of the second plea in law, relating to the assessment of the risk of loss to the Fund and the level of the flat-rate correction applied in relation to expenditure incurred in the context of the measure ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Pre-recognised Producer Groups’;

            —

            annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1119 of 22 June 2015 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (notified under document C(2015) 4076), in so far as it excludes from European Union financing the amount of EUR 55375053,74 in expenditure incurred by the payment agency accredited by the Republic of Poland;

            —

            order the European Commission to pay the costs, both at first instance and on appeal.

      Grounds of appeal and main arguments

   In the judgment under appeal the General Court dismissed the Republic of Poland’s action for annulment of the European Commission’s decision excluding from European Union financing the amounts of EUR 142446,05 and EUR 55375053,74 in expenditure incurred by the payment agency accredited by the Republic of Poland in the context of the measures ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Operational Programmes’, and ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Pre-recognised Producer Groups’, respectively.
   The Commission accused the Republic of Poland of three infringements in connection with its spending on the measures referred to above. Those infringements concerned, first, on-the-spot controls regarding the fulfilment by producer organisations of the criteria for recognition (in terms of the number of controls), second, on-the-spot controls preceding the grant of pre-recognition to producer groups or recognition to producer organisations, and, third, support paid to producer organisations towards seed costs in the context of operational programmes.
   The second of the infringements referred to above was based on the fact that, according to the Commission, the Polish authorities did not verify, before granting pre-recognition to producer groups and before granting recognition to producer organisations, the minimum required value of marketed production, namely the fundamental criterion for recognition. In the Commission’s view, the on-the-spot controls carried out by the Polish authorities in that regard were ineffective. The Commission considered those controls to be key controls, and the finding by the Commission of infringement was the basis for its imposition of a flat-rate correction of 10 % on expenditure in connection with both the measure ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Operational Programmes’ and the measure ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Pre-recognised Producer Groups’.
   The Republic of Poland raises the following grounds against the judgment under appeal:

            1.

            Manifest distortion of the facts through:

                     —

                     relating findings pertaining to irregularities in controls of producer organisations preceding their recognition to controls of producer groups preceding pre-recognition;

                     —

                     finding that the controls of producer groups preceding pre-recognition were ineffective, despite the Commission’s position of 1 March 2011 confirming the effectiveness of those controls.

               In this ground of appeal, the Republic of Poland submits, first, that the General Court improperly related findings pertaining to irregularities in controls of producer organisations — namely Vegapol and Zrzeszenie Plantatorów Owoców i Warzyw in Łowicz — preceding their recognition to the assessment of the effectiveness of controls of producer groups preceding their pre-recognition. Furthermore, the Republic of Poland submits that the General Court manifestly distorted the facts relating to the contradictions alleged by the Republic of Poland between the Commission’s letter of 1 March 2011, confirming the effectiveness of the controls carried out by the Polish authorities preceding the grant of pre-recognition to producer groups, and the letter of 24 February 2014, in which the Commission accuses the Republic of Poland of infringement in that regard. Those distortions led the General Court to draw wholly incorrect conclusions regarding the ineffectiveness of the controls of producer groups preceding the grant of pre-recognition to those groups.

            2.

            Breach of the right to effective judicial review regarding the level of the flat-rate correction applied by the Commission.
            In connection with this ground of appeal, the Republic of Poland submits that the General Court failed to carry out a judicial review as to the correctness of the determination by the Commission of the level of the flat-rate correction for the measure ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Pre-recognised Producer Groups’. In particular, the Republic of Poland submits that the General Court restricted its review exclusively to ascertaining whether the controls at issue were key controls within the meaning of the Guidelines of 23 December 1997 for the calculation of financial consequences when preparing the decision regarding the clearance of the accounts of the EAGGF Guarantee (document VI/5330/97). However, the General Court did not examine all of the other elements which the Commission should have taken into consideration when calculating the risk of loss to the EU budget and setting the level of the flat-rate correction.

            3.

            Insufficient statement of reasons for the judgment under appeal, in so far as the General Court found that the Commission:

                     —

                     had provided prima facie evidence of the existence of irregularities in the controls of producer groups preceding pre-recognition; and

                     —

                     had applied the correct level of flat-rate correction.

               In the context of this ground of appeal, the Republic of Poland submits that there was a failure to state reasons in the judgment under appeal in so far as the General Court found, first, that the controls of producer groups preceding the grant of pre-recognition to those groups were ineffective and, second, that the flat-rate financial correction of 10 % in relation to the measure ‘Fruit and Vegetables — Pre-recognised Producer Groups’ was applied correctly.

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2015 L 182, p. 39.


201807201162013082018/C 276/776912017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180629464722Case T-691/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2018 — hoechstmass Balzer v EUIPO (Shape of a tape measure case) (EU trade mark — Application for a three-dimensional EU trade mark — Shape of a tape measure case — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4620120180629EN0077462472Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2018 — hoechstmass Balzer v EUIPO (Shape of a tape measure case)
   (Case T-691/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Application for a three-dimensional EU trade mark — Shape of a tape measure case — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 276/77Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: hoechstmass Balzer GmbH (Sulzbach, Germany) (represented by: K. Zapfe, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Fischer, acting as Agent)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 July 2017 (Case R 2331/2016-4), concerning an application for registration of a three-dimensional sign consisting of the shape of a tape measure case as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders hoechstmass Balzer GmbH to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 402, 27.11.2017.


201807201132013562018/C 276/72782017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180626434422Case T-78/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2018 — Jumbo Africa v EUIPO — ProSiebenSat.1 Licensing (JUMBO) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark JUMBO — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptiveness — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Article 52(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4320120180626EN0072432442Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2018 — Jumbo Africa v EUIPO — ProSiebenSat.1 Licensing (JUMBO)
   (Case T-78/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark JUMBO — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptiveness — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Article 52(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (2) of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 276/72Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: Jumbo Africa, SL (L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Spain) (represented by: M.C. Buganza González and E. Torner Lasalle, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: J. García Murillo and A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: ProSiebenSat.1 Licensing GmbH (Unterföhring, Germany)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 October 2016 (Case R 227/2016-1), relating to invalidity proceedings between ProSiebenSat.1 Licensing and Jumbo Africa.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Jumbo Africa, SL to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201807200482012822018/C 276/537112017CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517333313Case C-711/17: Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — Anke Hartog v British Airways plc
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3330120180517EN0053333331Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — Anke Hartog v British Airways plc
   (Case C-711/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/53Language of the case: GermanThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 134, 16.4.2018.


201807200292012952018/C 276/353632018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180604272711Case C-363/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 4 June 2018 — Association Organisation juive européenne, Société Vignoble PSAGOT Ltd v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN2710120180604EN0035271271Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 4 June 2018 — Association Organisation juive européenne, Société Vignoble PSAGOT Ltd v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances
   (Case C-363/18)2018/C 276/35Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Conseil d’État

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Association Organisation juive européenne, Société Vignoble PSAGOT Ltd

      Defendant: Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances

      Question referred

   Does EU law and in particular Regulation No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, (
         1
      ) where indication of the origin of a product falling within the scope of that regulation is mandatory, require, for a product from a territory occupied by Israel since 1967, indication of that territory and an indication that the product comes from an Israeli settlement if that is the case? If not, do the provisions of the regulation, in particular those in Chapter VI thereof, allow a Member State to require those indications?
   (
         1
      )	Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 18).


201807200932012892018/C 276/732112017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180628444411Case T-211/17: Judgment of the General Court of 28 June 2018 — Amplexor Luxembourg v Commission (Public service contracts — Tendering procedure — Ranking of a tenderer in the cascade procedure — Processing of opinions with a view to their publication in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union — Equal treatment of tenderers — Neutralisation of the advantage of the incumbent contractor — Misuse of powers)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4410120180628EN0073441441Judgment of the General Court of 28 June 2018 — Amplexor Luxembourg v Commission
   (Case T-211/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Public service contracts — Tendering procedure — Ranking of a tenderer in the cascade procedure — Processing of opinions with a view to their publication in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union — Equal treatment of tenderers — Neutralisation of the advantage of the incumbent contractor — Misuse of powers)’2018/C 276/73Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Amplexor Luxembourg Sàrl (Bertrange, Luxembourg) (represented by: J.-F. Steichen, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Estrada de Solà and O. Verheecke, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of the decision of the Publications Office of the European Union (PO) of 13 February 2017 to classify the applicant in second place in the context of call for tenders No 10651 for the conclusion of a framework contract in cascade for the processing of opinions with a view to their publication in the Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Amplexor Luxembourg Sàrl to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 213, 3.7.2017.


201807200082013502018/C 276/363712018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180606272822Case C-371/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) (United Kingdom) made on 6 June 2018 — Sky plc, Sky International AG, Sky UK Limited v Skykick UK Limited, Skykick Inc
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN2720120180606EN0036272282Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) (United Kingdom) made on 6 June 2018 — Sky plc, Sky International AG, Sky UK Limited v Skykick UK Limited, Skykick Inc
   (Case C-371/18)2018/C 276/36Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   High Court of Justice (Chancery Division)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Sky plc, Sky International AG, Sky UK Limited

      Defendants: Skykick UK Limited, Skykick Inc

      Questions referred

            1.

            Can an EU trade mark or a national trade mark registered in a Member State be declared wholly or partially invalid on the ground that some or all of the terms in the specification of goods and services are lacking in sufficient clarity and precision to enable the competent authorities and third parties to determine on the basis of those terms alone the extent of the protection conferred by the trade mark?

            2.

            If the answer to question (1) is yes, is a term such as ‘computer software’ too general and covers goods which are too variable to be compatible with the trade mark's function as an indication of origin for that term to be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the competent authorities and third parties to determine on the basis of that term alone the extent of the protection conferred by the trade mark?

            3.

            Can it constitute bad faith simply to apply to register a trade mark without any intention to use it in relation to the specified goods or services?

            4.

            If the answer to question (3) is yes, is it possible to conclude that the applicant made the application partly in good faith and partly in bad faith if and to the extent that the applicant had an intention to use the trade mark in relation to some of the specified goods or services, but no intention to use the trade mark in relation to other specified goods or services?

            5.

            Is section 32(3) of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 compatible with Parliament and Council Directive 2015/2436/EU (
                  1
               ) and its predecessors?

      (
         1
      )	Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks (OJ 2015, L 336, p. 1).


201807200982013612018/C 276/781562017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180620474711Case T-156/17: Order of the General Court of 20 June 2018 — L v Parliament (Civil Service — Accredited Parliamentary assistant — Termination of contract — Litispendence — Inadmissibility)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4710120180620EN0078471471Order of the General Court of 20 June 2018 — L v Parliament
   (Case T-156/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil Service — Accredited Parliamentary assistant — Termination of contract — Litispendence — Inadmissibility)’2018/C 276/78Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: L (represented by: I. Coutant Peyre, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: Í. Ní Riagáin Düro and M. Windisch, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application on the basis of Article 270 TFEU seeking the annulment of the decision of the Parliament of 24 June 2016 to terminate the applicant’s contract of employment as an accredited Parliamentary assistant.

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

            2.

            Each party shall bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 402, 27.11.2017.


201807200502013462018/C 276/547212017CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517333314Case C-721/17: Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover — Germany) — Sebastian Vollmer, Vera Sagalov v Swiss Global Air Lines AG
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3340120180517EN0054334331Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hannover — Germany) — Sebastian Vollmer, Vera Sagalov v Swiss Global Air Lines AG
   (Case C-721/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/54Language of the case: GermanThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 123, 9.4.2018.


201807200892013592018/C 276/743622017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180627454511Case T-362/17: Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2018 — NCL v EUIPO (FEEL FREE) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark FEEL FREE — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4510120180627EN0074451451Judgment of the General Court of 27 June 2018 — NCL v EUIPO (FEEL FREE)
   (Case T-362/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark FEEL FREE — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 276/74Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: NCL Corporation Ltd (Miami, Florida, United States) (represented by: J. Bühling and D. Graetsch, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: W. Schramek, A. Söder and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 March 2017 (Case R 2094/2016-4), concerning an application for registration of the word sign FEEL FREE as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders NCL Corporation Ltd to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 249, 31.7.2017.


201807200182012742018/C 276/5572018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180426343411Case C-7/18: Order of the President of the Court of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Modesto Jardón Lama v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3410120180426EN0055341341Order of the President of the Court of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Modesto Jardón Lama v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social
   (Case C-7/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/55Language of the case: SpanishThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 142, 23.4.2018.


201807200922013352018/C 276/755562017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180626454622Case T-556/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2018 — Staropilsen v EUIPO — Pivovary Staropramen (STAROPILSEN; STAROPLZEN) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark STAROPILSEN; STAROPLZEN — Earlier EU and national word marks STAROPRAMEN — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4520120180626EN0075452462Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2018 — Staropilsen v EUIPO — Pivovary Staropramen (STAROPILSEN; STAROPLZEN)
   (Case T-556/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark STAROPILSEN; STAROPLZEN — Earlier EU and national word marks STAROPRAMEN — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) and Article 53(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 276/75Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Staropilsen s. r. o. (Plzeň, Czech Republic) (represented by: A. Kodrasová, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Pivovary Staropramen s. r. o. (Prague, Czech Republic) (represented by: M. Vojáček, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 June 2017 (Case R 236/2017-4), relating to cancellation proceedings between Pivovary Staropramen and Staropilsen.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Staropilsen s. r. o. to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 347, 16.10.2017.


201807200122012722018/C 276/56272018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180601343412Case C-27/18: Order of the President of the Court of 1 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, supported by the Republic of France
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3420120180601EN0056342341Order of the President of the Court of 1 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria, supported by the Republic of France
   (Case C-27/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/56Language of the case: BulgarianThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 83, 5.3.2018.


201807200992013622018/C 276/766572017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180620464611Case T-657/17: Judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2018 – Anabi Blanga v EUIPO — Polo/Lauren (HPC POLO) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for registration of the EU word mark HPC POLO — Earlier EU word mark POLO — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Distinctive character — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4610120180620EN0076461461Judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2018 – Anabi Blanga v EUIPO — Polo/Lauren (HPC POLO)
   (Case T-657/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for registration of the EU word mark HPC POLO — Earlier EU word mark POLO — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Distinctive character — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 276/76Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Gidon Anabi Blanga (Mexico, Mexico) (represented by: M. Sanmartín Sanmartín, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: K. Zajfert, D. Walicka and A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: The Polo/Lauren Company LP (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: R. Black, Solicitor, and S. Baran, Barrister)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 June 2017 (Case R 2368/2016-1), relating to opposition proceedings between The Polo/Lauren Company and Mr Anabi Blanga.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Mr Gidon Anabi Blanga to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 437, 18.12.2017.


201807200432012792018/C 276/373792018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180608282921Case C-379/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 8 June 2018 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Land Berlin
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN2810120180608EN0037281292Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 8 June 2018 — Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Land Berlin
   (Case C-379/18)2018/C 276/37Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Bundesverwaltungsgericht

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Deutsche Lufthansa AG

      Defendant: Land Berlin

      Other parties: Berliner Flughafen Gesellschaft mbH; Der Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is a national provision which provides that the system of airport charges decided upon by the airport managing body must be submitted to the independent supervisory authority for approval, without prohibiting the airport managing body and the airport user from setting charges different from those approved by the supervisory authority, compatible with Directive 2009/12/EC (
                  1
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on airport charges (OJ 2009 L 70 p. 11), in particular Article 3, Article 6(3) to (5) and Article 11(1) and (7) thereof?

            2.

            Is an interpretation of national law whereby an airport user is prevented from challenging the approval of the charging scheme by the independent supervisory authority, but can bring an action against the airport managing body and can plead in that action that the charges determined in the charging scheme are inequitable, compatible with the aforementioned Directive?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2009 L 70, p. 11.


201807200822012872018/C 276/795872017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180620484811Case T-587/17: Order of the General Court of 20 June 2018 — Unigroup v EUIPO — Pronova Laboratories (nailicin) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark nailicin — Earlier Benelux word mark NAILCLIN — Relative ground for refusal — Copy of the certificate of registration of the earlier mark — Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 7(2)(a)(ii) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430) — Taking into account of a document submitted in conjunction with the notice of opposition — Rule 19(4) Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7(5) of Delegated Regulation 2017/1430) — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4810120180620EN0079481481Order of the General Court of 20 June 2018 — Unigroup v EUIPO — Pronova Laboratories (nailicin)
   (Case T-587/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark nailicin — Earlier Benelux word mark NAILCLIN — Relative ground for refusal — Copy of the certificate of registration of the earlier mark — Rule 19(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 7(2)(a)(ii) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430) — Taking into account of a document submitted in conjunction with the notice of opposition — Rule 19(4) Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7(5) of Delegated Regulation 2017/1430) — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)’2018/C 276/79Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Unigroup ApS (Lyngby, Denmark) (represented by: M. Rijsdijk, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Rajh, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Pronova Laboratories BV (Muiden, Netherlands) (represented by: S. Wertwijn, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 June 2017 (Case R 2359/2016-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Pronova Laboratories and Unigroup.

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            The action is dismissed.

            2.

            Unigroup ApS is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Pronova Laboratories BV.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 347, 16.10.2017.


201807200232013242018/C 276/57572018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517343413Case C-57/18: Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht — Germany) — AX v BW
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3430120180517EN0057343341Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht — Germany) — AX v BW
   (Case C-57/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/57Language of the case: GermanThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 152, 30.4.2018.


201807200652013292018/C 276/383932018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180614292911Case C-393/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice, Family Division (England and Wales) (United Kingdom) made on 14 June 2018 — UD v XB
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN2910120180614EN0038291291Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice, Family Division (England and Wales) (United Kingdom) made on 14 June 2018 — UD v XB
   (Case C-393/18)2018/C 276/38Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   High Court of Justice, Family Division (England and Wales)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: UD

      Defendant: XB

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is the physical presence of a child in a state an essential ingredient of habitual residence, within the meaning of article 8 of Brussels II Revised Regulation 2003 (
                  1
               )?

            2.

            In circumstances where both parents are holders of Parental Responsibility, does the fact that a mother has been tricked to go to another state and then unlawfully detained by coercion or other unlawful act in that state by the father, leading to the mother being forced to give birth to a child in that state, have any impact on the answer to question (1) in circumstances where there may have been a violation of the mother and / or child's human rights, pursuant to articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, or otherwise?

      (
         1
      )	Council regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003, L 338, p. 1).


201807200882012882018/C 276/802582018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180423484922Case T-258/18: Action brought on 23 April 2018 — Brunke v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4820120180423EN0080482492Action brought on 23 April 2018 — Brunke v Commission
   (Case T-258/18)2018/C 276/80Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Lothar Brunke (Berlin, Germany) (represented by: A. Schniebel, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Forms of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            establish the discriminatory effect of Directive 2005/36/EC as regards the possibilities of practising as a doctor without a specialist medical qualification;

            —

            in the alternative, oblige the defendant, by a decision in favour of the applicant, having regard to the interpretation of the law given by the General Court, to allow him, within a reasonable period, to be admitted to the specialist medical profession as a specialist doctor for natural therapy in recognition of his many years of medical experience in private practice in that area and his parallel occupational training;

            —

            in the alternative, declare that the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under the FEU Treaty by not adopting a decision on the basis of the applicant’s complaints of 6 June 2017 and of 27 December 2017.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant claims that Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (
         1
      ) prevents him from pursuing a medical profession in Europe, since, for the applicant, the absence of an exemption for non-specialist doctors has the result that the applicant is de facto prohibited from carrying on his profession. In that regard, the applicant alleges that the Commission has failed to examine the existence of that discrimination.
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications (OJ 2005 L 255, p. 22).


201807201072013382018/C 276/813162018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180522495021Case T-316/18: Action brought on 22 May 2018 — Mediaservis v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN4910120180522EN0081491502Action brought on 22 May 2018 — Mediaservis v Commission
   (Case T-316/18)2018/C 276/81Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Mediaservis s. r. o. (Prague, Czech Republic) (represented by: D. Vosol and C. Schneider, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul Commission decision C(2018) 753 final of 19 February 2018 not to raise objections against State aid for Czech Post for the provision of the universal postal service over the period 2013-2017;

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging the infringement of Article 108(2) and (3) TFEU.

                     —

                     The Commission decided not to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU, even though it experienced serious difficulties in its assessment of the compatibility of the State aid with the common market.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging an insufficient and incomplete examination of the case and failure of the Commission to examine all the facts and points of law brought to its notice by persons, undertakings and associations whose interests may be affected by the granting of the aid and a violation of the duty to state reasons.

                     —

                     The Commission did not examine all issues raised in the applicant’s complaint. Instead, the Commission superficially held that the calculation of net cost was based on an appropriate accounting separation between the cost for the universal service and other costs.

                     —

                     The Commission violated its duty to state reasons in that regard.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment regarding the calculation of the net cost and the verification of the absence of over-compensation.

                     —

                     The Commission came to the wrongful conclusion that the costs Česká pošta incurred inside and outside the scope of the universal service had been allocated in line with paragraph 31 of the 2012 SGEI Framework. (
                           1
                        )

                     —

                     The Commission based its decision insofar on a manifestly unrealistic counterfactual scenario.

                     —

                     The counterfactual scenario accepted by the Commission did not take into account that the Czech Postal Act requires that prices should include all costs incurred.

                     —

                     The calculation of the net cost occurred in violation of paragraph 32 of the 2012 SGEI Framework, since it did not take into account relevant sources of income, even if linked to other activities than SGEI.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging a manifest error in law regarding the application of paragraph 25 of the 2012 SGEI Framework in conjunction with Annex I Part B of the Postal Directive. (
                  2
               )

                     —

                     Although paragraph 25 of the 2012 SGEI Framework and Annex I Part B of the Postal Directive require the net cost calculation to assess the benefits, including intangible benefits as far as possible, to the SGEI provider (to take into account any intangible and market benefits which accrue to the universal service provider), the Commission decision, Annex A.1, dealt only with intangible benefits.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging a violation of paragraph 51 et seq. of the 2012 SGEI Framework and a violation of the duty to state reasons.

                     —

                     Due to the market behaviour of Česká pošta which aims at driving competitors from the market, the Commission would have been obliged to impose additional requirements necessary to ensure that the development of trade is not affected to an extent contrary to the interests of the Union within the meaning of paragraph 51 et seq. of the 2012 SGEI Framework, but failed to do so.

                     —

                     Even if not under such an obligation, the Commission would have been obliged, against the background of the market share and the market behaviour of Česká pošta, to state concrete reasons why such additional requirements had not been necessary, but it failed to do so.

      (
         1
      )	Commission Communication, European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (2011) (OJ 2012 C 8, p. 15).
   (
         2
      )	Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ 1998, L 15, p. 14), as last amended by Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 amending Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services (OJ 2008 L 52, p. 3).


201807200962013342018/C 276/823182018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180522515221Case T-318/18: Action brought on 22 May 2018 — Amazon EU and Amazon.com v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5110120180522EN0082511522Action brought on 22 May 2018 — Amazon EU and Amazon.com v Commission
   (Case T-318/18)2018/C 276/82Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Amazon EU Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) and Amazon.com, Inc. (Seattle, Washington, United States) (represented by: D. Paemen, M. Petite and A. Tombiński, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul Articles 1 to 4 of the European Commission’s decision of 4 October 2017 on State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Luxembourg to Amazon, which finds that Luxembourg granted LuxOpCo illegal State aid over the period of May 2006 — June 2014 by virtue of a tax ruling granted in 2003 (
                  1
               );

            —

            in the alternative, annul Articles 2 to 4 of the decision; and

            —

            in any event, order the Commission to bear the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on nine pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 107(1) TFEU because the decision fails to establish the existence of an advantage benefitting the applicants in view of the comparables adduced by the applicants

                     —

                     the decision improperly ignores direct evidence showing that the royalty LuxOpCo actually paid for the Intangibles over the relevant period was at arm’s length, and that therefore the 2003 ATC did not confer an actual advantage on LuxOpCo in the form of a reduced tax base.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 107(1) TFEU because the decision’s finding of an advantage is based on an erroneous analysis of the functions of LuxOpCo and Amazon European Holding Technologies S.C.S.

                     —

                     the decision’s analysis of the functions performed by Amazon European Holding Technologies S.C.S. (‘LuxSCS’) and LuxOpCo is vitiated by a series of fundamental errors of law and fact. These errors invalidate the decision’s application of the transactional net margin method and the resulting primary finding of advantage.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the principle of sound administration because the decision’s finding of an advantage fails to consider all of the evidence.

                     —

                     the decision does not examine the evidence on file with the required level of care and impartiality.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 107(1) TFEU and the duty to state reasons because the decision’s finding of an advantage is premised on a royalty that violates the arm’s length principle.

                     —

                     the decision’s finding of an advantage implies that LuxOpCo should have paid a transfer price that manifestly deviates from the arm’s length principle and is therefore unfounded.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 107(1) TFEU because the decision fails to show an advantage under the subsidiary line of reasoning.

                     —

                     The decision’s subsidiary finding that the 2003 ATC conferred an economic advantage on LuxOpCo because it was based on three inappropriate methodological choices relies on a mischaracterisation of LuxOpCo’s and LuxSCS’ respective roles and is unfounded.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 107(1) TFEU because the decision mischaracterises the 2003 ATC as an ad hoc individual measure and as a result wrongly relies on a presumption of selectivity.

                     —

                     based on a mischaracterisation of the 2003 ATC as an ad hoc individual measure, the decision under its primary finding of selectivity erroneously applies a presumption of selectivity to find that the 2003 ATC is selective in nature.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 107(1) TFEU and the principle of legal certainty because the decision’s selectivity analysis relies on a flawed reference framework.

                     —

                     under its subsidiary findings of selectivity, the decision improperly excludes Luxembourg’s general administrative practice concerning transfer pricing from the reference framework, in violation of the applicable case law.

            8.

            Eighth plea in law, alleging that the decision violates the principles of legal certainty, retroactivity, and non-discrimination, and an essential procedural requirement because it assesses the validity of the 2003 ATC by reference to post-dating OECD Guidelines.

                     —

                     the decision retroactively and discriminatorily applies, and improperly holds the applicants and Luxembourg to, standards in the 2017 OECD Guidelines on transfer pricing first issued after the Commission opened the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU, and long after the adoption of the 2003 ATC.

            9.

            Ninth plea in law, alleging that the decision violates Article 17 of Regulation 2015/1589 (
                  2
               ) because the decision orders the recovery of aid even though the applicable limitation period had already expired.

                     —

                     the decision’s recovery order is unlawful because the ten-year limitation period provided for in Article 17 of Regulation 2015/1589 has expired.

      (
         1
      )	Commission Decision (EU) 2018/859 of 4 October 2017 on State aid SA.38944 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented by Luxembourg to Amazon (notified under document C(2017) 6740) (OJ 2018 L 153, p. 1)
   (
         2
      )	Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015, L 248, p. 9)


201807201002013632018/C 276/833582018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180609525321Case T-358/18: Action brought on 9 June 2018 — J. García Carrión v EUIPO — Codorníu (JAUME CODORNÍU)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5210120180609EN0083521532Action brought on 9 June 2018 — J. García Carrión v EUIPO — Codorníu (JAUME CODORNÍU)
   (Case T-358/18)2018/C 276/83Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: J. García Carrión, SA (Jumilla, Spain) (represented by: E. Arsuaga Santos, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Codorníu, SA (Esplugues de Llobregat, Spain)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark JAUME CORDORNÍU — Application for registration No 14 543 599

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 April 2018 in Case R 451/2017-4

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision and refuse mark no 14 543 599 in Class 33;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Plea in law

   Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807201102013052018/C 276/843592018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180611535421Case T-359/18: Action brought on 11 June 2018 — Unifarco v EUIPO — GD Tecnologie Interdisciplinari Farmaceutiche (TRICOPID)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5310120180611EN0084531542Action brought on 11 June 2018 — Unifarco v EUIPO — GD Tecnologie Interdisciplinari Farmaceutiche (TRICOPID)
   (Case T-359/18)2018/C 276/84Language in which the application was lodged: Italian
      Parties

      Applicant: Unifarco SpA (Santa Giustina, Italy) (represented by: A. Perani and J. Graffer, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: GD Tecnologie Interdisciplinari Farmaceutiche Srl (Rome, Italy)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ‘TRICOPID’ – Application for registration No 14 287 056

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 March 2018 in Case R 2150/2017-5

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO and the other party to pay the costs of the present proceedings as well as of those of the proceedings before the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement and misapplication of Article 47(2)(3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement and misapplication of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the Parliament and of the Council.


201807201172012772018/C 276/853612018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180608545521Case T-361/18: Action brought on 8 June 2018 — APEDA v EUIPO — Burraq Travel & Tours General Tourism Office (SIR BASMATI RICE)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5410120180608EN0085541552Action brought on 8 June 2018 — APEDA v EUIPO — Burraq Travel & Tours General Tourism Office (SIR BASMATI RICE)
   (Case T-361/18)2018/C 276/85Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) (New Delhi, India) (represented by: N. Dontas, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Burraq Travel & Tours General Tourism Office SA (Athens, Greece)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark SIR BASMATI RICE — EU trade mark No 13 102 454

      Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 March 2018 in Case R 90/2017-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision, except insofar as it concerns ‘sago’ and ‘artificial rice [uncooked]’ covered by the contested EUTM in Class 30;

            —

            declare the European Union Trade Mark invalid in its entirety;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in the course of the proceedings before the General Court, the Board of Appeal and the Cancellation Division of the EUIPO.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 59(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 7(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the absolute ground of invalidity/refusal regarding deceptiveness;

            —

            Infringement of Article 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the absolute ground of invalidity regarding filing of an EUTM in bad faith;

            —

            Infringement of Article 59(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the absolute ground of invalidity/refusal regarding descriptiveness;

            —

            Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the sufficient reasoning of EUIPO’s decisions.


201807201082013392018/C 276/863662018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180608555511Case T-366/18: Action brought on 8 June 2018 — Pet King Brands v EUIPO — Virbac (SUIMOX)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5510120180608EN0086551551Action brought on 8 June 2018 — Pet King Brands v EUIPO — Virbac (SUIMOX)
   (Case T-366/18)2018/C 276/86Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Pet King Brands, Inc. (Bartlett, Illinois, United States) (represented by: T. Schmidpeter, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Virbac SA (Carros, France)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark SUIMOX — Application for registration No 15 039 993

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 March 2018 in Case R 1835/2017-5

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807201042013042018/C 276/873672018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180615565611Case T-367/18: Action brought on 15 June 2018 — Sixsigma Networks Mexico/EUIPO — Marijn van Oosten Holding (UKIO)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5610120180615EN0087561561Action brought on 15 June 2018 — Sixsigma Networks Mexico/EUIPO — Marijn van Oosten Holding (UKIO)
   (Case T-367/18)2018/C 276/87Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Sixsigma Networks Mexico, SA de CV (Mexico, Mexico) (represented by: C. Casas Feu and J. Dorado Lopez-Lozano, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Marijn van Oosten Holding BV (Amsterdam, Netherlands)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant/Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark UKIO/European Union trade mark No 15 079 023

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 March 2018 in Case R 1536/2017-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO and the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal to pay the costs.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807201022013022018/C 276/883682018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180615565722Case T-368/18: Action brought on 15 June 2018 — ETA Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO — Grupo Bimbo (ETI Bumbo)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5620120180615EN0088562572Action brought on 15 June 2018 — ETA Gıda Sanayi ve Ticaret v EUIPO — Grupo Bimbo (ETI Bumbo)
   (Case T-368/18)2018/C 276/88Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: ETA Gida Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ (Eskişehir, Turkey) (represented by: D. Canadas Arcas, P. Merino Baylos, D. Gómez Sánchez and N. Martínez de las Rivas Malagón, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Grupo Bimbo, SAB de CV (Mexico, Mexico)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant in the action before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ETI Bumbo — Application for registration No 14 895 585

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 April 2018 in Case R 1459/2017-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) and (5) and Article 76 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807201092012912018/C 276/893692018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180618575821Case T-369/18: Action brought on 18 June 2018 — Napolitano v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5710120180618EN0089571582Action brought on 18 June 2018 — Napolitano v Commission
   (Case T-369/18)2018/C 276/89Language of the case: Italian
      Parties

      Applicant: John Napolitano (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Velardo, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decisions;

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The contested decisions in the present action are the decision of 27 September 2017 not to include the applicant on the reserve list for the competition EPSO/AD/324/16, the decision dated 25 October 2017 by which the request for review of the decision not to include him on the reserve list was refused, and the decision of the appointing authority of 7 March 2018 dismissing the administrative appeal brought under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations. The competition notice that is the subject of these proceedings concerned the selection of 10 senior investigators at level AD 9 to include on the reserve list on which the European Commission (principally the European Anti-fraud Office — OLAF) was to draw for the recruitment of new administrative officials to manage a group of investigators in the fields of EU expenditure, the fight against corruption, serious irregularities of EU staff, customs and trade, tobacco and counterfeit goods.
   In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of the provisions governing the languages to be used by the European Institutions, particularly Articles 1, 2 and 6 of Regulation No 1/58, of the prohibition of discrimination with regards to language, of the principle of proportionality under Article 5 TFEU, and of Article 27 of the Staff Regulations.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty of impartiality by the Chairman of the Examining Board and of Article 3 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the competition notice by the Examining Board, in so far as, first, in counting the points obtained in the multiple choice test and in the test on general competencies, that Board acted unlawfully by conflating two separate concepts (namely ‘minimum score required’ and ‘eliminatory’) and, second, when assigning the case-study relating to the general test, it chose subjects that were too specific and gave an advantage to those who already had experience at the European Anti-fraud Office.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equality between candidates, as well as a lack of objectivity in the evaluations owing to the instability of the Examining Board.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging an error of assessment, in the light of the large discrepancy between the individual discretionary appraisals of the Examining Board. Moreover, it is not clear from reading the general provisions that the tests were to be considered entirely separately.


201807201062013372018/C 276/903712018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180618585921Case T-371/18: Action brought on 18 June 2018 — Reiner Stemme Utility Air Systems/EASA
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5810120180618EN0090581592Action brought on 18 June 2018 — Reiner Stemme Utility Air Systems/EASA
   (Case T-371/18)2018/C 276/90Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Reiner Stemme Utility Air Systems GmbH (Wildau, Germany) (represented by: O. Alexander and P. Stompfe, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare the notification of charges — invoice No 90091554 dated 28 April 2017 issued by the defendant — in the form of the Decision of the EASA Board of Appeal dated 19 April 2018 to be null and void;

            —

            declare Commission Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 (
                  1
               ) of 27 March 2014 on the fees and charges levied by the European Aviation Safety Agency to be inapplicable in the present case;

            —

            suspend the application of invoice No 90091554 dated 28 April 2017 until the Court has rendered its decision; and

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Commission exceeded its competence in levying taxes in the area of air safety
            The applicant puts forward that ‘fees’ for airplanes in the category of 2000 — 5700 kg would elevate to be taxes, due to the ‘dramatic jump’ of the ‘flat fee’ of more than 1700 percent. In this particular case, the defendant’s service for the citizen in return for the ‘fees’ would be so negligible (minimal), that one could not consider the defendant’s service as a return, but it would constitute taxation.
            However, the Commission would have no competence to levy taxes in the field of air safety. Therefore, Commission Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 prescribing a flat fee in the amount of EUR 263800 for certification tasks for airplanes such as the applicant’s, which is allegedly largely unrelated to the actual tasks performed by the defendant and, thus, would not constitute consideration for the defendant’s services rendered, would violate the principle of conferral.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the contested invoice as confirmed by the contested decision, constitutes a violation of Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
            Pursuant to the applicant, the fees it charged based on Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 for the given certification task would be out of proportion to the objective pursued and, thus, in violation with the applicant’s freedom to conduct business in accordance with Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the contested invoice as confirmed by the contested decision, constitutes a discriminatory treatment and hence, is in violation of Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
            The contested invoice issued by the defendant pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 would not meet the requirements of Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, since the applicant would be treated differently compared to other aircraft manufactures seeking a type certification, although the situation requires the same treatment.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 13(2) TEU
            Finally, the applicant claims that Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 would not leave any discretion to the defendant concerning the payment of fees for the certification task. Rather, it would determine when the fee to be paid shall be a flat fee or a variable fee. By that, the Commission would have exceeded its authorisation to adopt the regulation, and thus violated the institutional balance of the Union set out in Article 13(2) TEU.

      (
         1
      )	Commission Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 of 27 March 2014 on the fees and charges levied by the European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 593/2007 (OJ 2014 L 93, p. 58).


201807201012012862018/C 276/913782018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180622596021Case T-378/18: Action brought on 22 June 2018 — NHS v EUIPO — HLC SB Distribution (CRUZADE)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN5910120180622EN0091591602Action brought on 22 June 2018 — NHS v EUIPO — HLC SB Distribution (CRUZADE)
   (Case T-378/18)2018/C 276/91Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: NHS, Inc. (Santa Cruz, California, United States) (represented by: P. Olson, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: HLC SB Distribution, SL (Irún, Spain)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark CRUZADE — Application for registration No 13 528 112

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 April 2018 in Case R 1217/2017-5

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            reject EUTMA 013 528 112 for ‘skateboards and their parts’;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8 (1)(b) and 8 (5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807201052013362018/C 276/923812018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180625606121Case T-381/18: Action brought on 25 June 2018 — Engel v EUIPO — F. Engel (ENGEL)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN6010120180625EN0092601612Action brought on 25 June 2018 — Engel v EUIPO — F. Engel (ENGEL)
   (Case T-381/18)2018/C 276/92Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Engel GmbH (Pfullingen, Germany) (represented by: C. Pfitzer, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: F. Engel K/S (Haderslev, Denmark)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the figurative mark ENGEL — International registration designating the European Union No 1 178 629

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 March 2018 in Case R 1423/2017-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs;

            —

            to stay the proceedings until decisions have been made upon request for invalidation of F.ENGEL’s trademarks.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 20(7)(c) of the Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95;

            —

            Violation of due process.


201807200812013302018/C 276/934872017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619616111Case T-487/17: Order of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — UE v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN6110120180619EN0093611611Order of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — UE v Commission
   (Case T-487/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/93Language of the case: EnglishThe President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 357, 23.10.2017.


201807200862013322018/C 276/946202017TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180620616112Case T-620/17: Order of the General Court of 20 June 2018 — Teollisuuden Voima v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN6120120180620EN0094612611Order of the General Court of 20 June 2018 — Teollisuuden Voima v Commission
   (Case T-620/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/94Language of the case: EnglishThe President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 402, 27.11.2017.


201807200872013582018/C 276/951482018TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619616113Case T-148/18: Order of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — UE v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN6130120180619EN0095613611Order of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — UE v Commission
   (Case T-148/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/95Language of the case: EnglishThe President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 166, 14.5.2018.


201808030332049842018/C 294/193182018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180511141411Case C-318/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 11 May 2018 — Oracle Belgium BVBA v Belgische Staat
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1410120180511EN0019141141Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 11 May 2018 — Oracle Belgium BVBA v Belgische Staat
   (Case C-318/18)2018/C 294/19Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Nederlandstalige rechtbank van eerste aanleg Brussel

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Oracle Belgium BVBA

      Defendant: Belgische Staat

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 2(2) of the Decision of 11 January 2016 of the European Commission (SA.37667) according to which ‘any sums (of the aid measure, deemed to be unlawful, of Belgium to Tekelec International BVBA, consisting of a tax exemption for so-called “excess profit” for the financial years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, granted by the Ruling Commission of the Belgian tax administration by decision of 1 July 2008) that remain unrecoverable from the recipients of the aid, following the recovery described in the paragraph 1, shall be recovered from the corporate group to which the recipient belongs’, be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of the acquisition of the recipient of the aid measure (Tekelec International BVBA) by a new corporate group (the Oracle Group) after the end of the aid measure (the aid measure applicable to the financial years 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, and the acquisition dated 10 June 2013) and before the start of the European Commission's investigation into the lawfulness of the aid measure (launched by letter of 19 December 2013), ‘the corporate group to which the recipient belongs’ becomes the corporate group of the buyer, or does it remain the corporate group of the seller?

            2.

            If the answer to the first question, irrespective of the nature of the aid measure deemed to be unlawful (economic or tax-related), is dependent on whether or not the acquisition price is market-based, namely, that the corporate group of the seller remains the beneficiary if the acquisition price is market-based, more specifically, if the value of the aid measure concerned is included in the acquisition price, and that the corporate group of the buyer becomes the beneficiary if the acquisition price is below the market price, more specifically, if the value of the aid measure concerned is not or is not fully included in the acquisition price, who then bears the burden of proof, when the aid measure deemed unlawful is recovered from the corporate group of the buyer, or a member thereof: must the new corporate group or the member thereof being held liable, prove that the acquisition price is market-based or must the recovering body, the Belgian State, prove that the acquisition price is below the market price?

            3.

            If, on the other hand, the answer to the first question, due to the tax nature of the contested aid measure, is not dependent on whether or not the acquisition price is market-based, what is the basis for determining which corporate group, as a result of the acquisition, is the ‘the corporate group to which the recipient belongs’?


201808030362050152018/C 294/032082016CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806283311Case C-208/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Federal Republic of Germany v Dirk Andres (liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH), European Commission Appeal — State aid — German tax legislation concerning the possibility of carrying certain losses forward to future tax years (‘restructuring clause’) — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU — Person individually concerned — Article 107(1) TFEU — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Condition relating to selectivity — Determination of the reference framework — Legal classification of the facts
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN310120180628EN00033131Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Federal Republic of Germany v Dirk Andres (liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH), European Commission
   (Case C-208/16 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛Appeal — State aid — German tax legislation concerning the possibility of carrying certain losses forward to future tax years (‘restructuring clause’) — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU — Person individually concerned — Article 107(1) TFEU — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Condition relating to selectivity — Determination of the reference framework — Legal classification of the facts’2018/C 294/03Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: T. Henze and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents)

      Other parties to the proceedings: Dirk Andres (liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH) (represented by: W. Niemann, S. Geringhoff, and P. Dodos, Rechtsanwälte), European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal, T. Maxian Rusche and K. Blanck-Putz, acting as Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            dismisses the cross-appeal;

            2.

            annuls paragraphs 2 and 3 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 February 2016, Heitkamp BauHolding v Commission (T-287/11, EU:T:2016:60);

            3.

            annuls Commission Decision 2011/527/EU of 26 January 2011 on State aid C 7/10 (ex CP 250/09 and NN 5/10) implemented by Germany — Scheme for the carry-forward of tax losses in the case of restructuring of companies in difficulty (Sanierungsklausel);

            4.

            orders the European Commission to pay, in addition to its own costs relating both to the proceedings at first instance and to the appeal proceedings, the costs incurred by the Federal Republic of Germany relating to appeal proceedings and the costs incurred by Mr Dirk Andres, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH, relating to both the proceedings at first instance and to the appeal proceedings.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 211, 13.6.2016.


201808030082050412018/C 294/343662018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180605252622Case C-366/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 5 June 2018 — José Manuel Ortiz Mesonero v Unión Temporal de Empresas Luz Madrid Centro (comprising the commercial companies SICE, S.A., URBALUX, S.A., IMES.A.PI, S.A., EXTRALUX, S.A., and CITELUM IBÉRICA, S.A.)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2520120180605EN0034252262Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 5 June 2018 — José Manuel Ortiz Mesonero v Unión Temporal de Empresas Luz Madrid Centro (comprising the commercial companies SICE, S.A., URBALUX, S.A., IMES.A.PI, S.A., EXTRALUX, S.A., and CITELUM IBÉRICA, S.A.)
   (Case C-366/18)2018/C 294/34Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Juzgado de lo Social de Madrid

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: José Manuel Ortiz Mesonero

      Defendant: Unión Temporal de Empresas Luz Madrid Centro (comprising the commercial companies SICE, S.A., URBALUX, S.A., IMES.A.PI, S.A., EXTRALUX, S.A., and CITELUM IBÉRICA, S.A.)

      Question referred

   Do Articles 8, 10 and 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, Article 23 and Article 33(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Article 1 and Article 14(1) of Directive 2006/54, (
         1
      ) all taken in conjunction with Directive 2010/18 (
         2
      ) implementing the Framework Agreement on parental leave, preclude a rule of national law such as Article 37(6) of the Workers’ Statute, which makes it a requirement that in order to exercise the right to reconcile family life and working life so as to be able to care directly for children or family members for whom they are responsible, workers must in all cases reduce their ordinary working hours, with a consequent proportional reduction in salary?
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).
   (
         2
      )	Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC (OJ 2010 L 68, p. 13).


201808030092050422018/C 294/203312018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180522151621Case C-331/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský sud v Prešove (Slovakia) lodged on 22 May 2018 — TE v Pohotovost’ s.r.o.
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1510120180522EN0020151162Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský sud v Prešove (Slovakia) lodged on 22 May 2018 — TE v Pohotovost’ s.r.o.
   (Case C-331/18)2018/C 294/20Language of the case: Slovak
      Referring court

   Krajský sud v Prešove

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: TE

      Defendant: Pohotovost’ s.r.o.

      Questions referred

            1.

                        A.

                        The Slovak legislature, in response to the judgment in Case C-42/15 (
                              1
                           ) has deleted with effect as of 1 May 2018 the words ‘capital, interest and other charges’ from Paragraph 9, on credit repayments and contractual terms, of Zákon č. 129/2010 Z.z. o spotrebiteľských úveroch a o iných úveroch a pôžičkách pre spotrebiteľov a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov (Law No 129/2010 on consumer credit and other credits and loans for consumers and amending and supplementing certain laws), thereby ending the legal right of consumers to any explanation in a consumer credit agreement (not just by means of an amortisation table) of the breakdown of payment of the credit in terms of the capital, interest and other charges, as well as the penalties for infringement of that law.

                        B.

                        Although, from 1 May 2018, the amendment of the law has enabled a better execution of the judgment of the Court of Justice, the fact remains that in disputes concerning consumer contracts concluded prior to 1 May 2018, the [Slovak] courts have also reacted in practice by, inter alia, seeking, by means of an interpretation ‘in conformity with EU law’ to achieve in essence the same result as that pursued by the legislature.

                        C.

                        In this connection, the question referred to the Court of Justice concerns the interpretation of EU law by application of the doctrine of the indirect effect of directives. Taking into account the huge amount of decisions in which the courts in the past have conceded that consumers were granted, under Law No 129/2010, the right to a breakdown of repayments in terms of the capital, interest and other charges, the following question is referred:
                        In applying the doctrine of the indirect effect of a directive with regard to horizontal relationships between individuals with the aim of rendering the directive fully effective using all interpretative methods and the national legal order in its entirety, does the principle of legal certainty enable the court to adopt, in a dispute concerning a consumer credit contract concluded prior to 1 May 2018, a decision which is equivalent as to its effects to the amendments, effective as of 1 May 2018, made to the Law by the legislature for the purposes of executing the judgment in Case C-42/15?

      The other questions are referred by the national court only if the answer to Question 1 C is that in applying the doctrine of the indirect effect of a directive with regard to horizontal relationships between individuals with the aim of rendering the directive fully effective, the principle of legal certainty enables a court to adopt a decision which is equivalent as to its effects to the amendments, effective as of 1 May 2018, made to the Law by the legislature for the purposes of executing the judgment in Case C-42/15. In such circumstances:

            2.

            Must the judgment of 9 November 2016 delivered by the Court in Case C-42/15 Home Credit Slovakia, and Directive 2008/48/EC (
                  2
               ) of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (
                  3
               ) be interpreted as meaning that the Court of Justice has held that Directive 2008/48 precludes national legislation concerning the breakdown of credit repayments not only in the form of an amortisation table, but also in any other legal expression of the amount, the number and the frequency of the repayments of the capital of consumer credit.

            3.

            Must the abovementioned judgment of the Court be interpreted as meaning that it governs the issue of whether legislation of a Member State under which consumers have a right to terms in a consumer credit contract on the amount, the number and the deadlines for the payment of interest and charges, as opposed the capital, also goes beyond Directive 2008/48? If the judgment also concerns interest and charges, then does a legislative expression of the method of payment of interest and charges in a form other than an amortisation table also exceed Directive 2008/48/EC, in particular Article 10(2)(j) thereof.

      (
         1
      )	Judgment of 9 November 2016, Home Credit Slovakia (EU:C:2016:842).
   (
         2
      )	OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.
   (
         3
      )	Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit (OJ 1987 L 42, p. 48).


201808030182050462018/C 294/353672018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180604262721Case C-367/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 4 June 2018 — María Teresa Aragón Carrasco, María Eugenia Cotano Montero, María Gloria Ferratges Castellanos, Raquel García Ferratges, Elena Muñoz Mora, Ángela Navas Chillón, Mercedes Noriega Bosch, Susana Rizo Santaella, Desamparados Sánchez Ramos, Lucía Santana Ruiz and Luis Salas Fernández (heir of Lucía Sánchez de la Peña) v Administración del Estado
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2610120180604EN0035261272Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 4 June 2018 — María Teresa Aragón Carrasco, María Eugenia Cotano Montero, María Gloria Ferratges Castellanos, Raquel García Ferratges, Elena Muñoz Mora, Ángela Navas Chillón, Mercedes Noriega Bosch, Susana Rizo Santaella, Desamparados Sánchez Ramos, Lucía Santana Ruiz and Luis Salas Fernández (heir of Lucía Sánchez de la Peña) v Administración del Estado
   (Case C-367/18)2018/C 294/35Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Supremo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: María Teresa Aragón Carrasco, María Eugenia Cotano Montero, María Gloria Ferratges Castellanos, Raquel García Ferratges, Elena Muñoz Mora, Ángela Navas Chillón, Mercedes Noriega Bosch, Susana Rizo Santaella, Desamparados Sánchez Ramos, Lucía Santana Ruiz and Luis Salas Fernández (heir of Lucía Sánchez de la Peña),

      Defendant: Administración del Estado

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Clause 4 of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work, set out in the Annex to Directive 1999/70, (
                  1
               ) be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the Spanish legislation which, in Article 12(3) of the Texto refundido del Estatuto [Básico] del Empleado Público (Real Decreto Legislativo [5]/2015, de 30 de octubre) (Consolidated text of the [Basic] Regulations governing public employees (Royal Legislative Decree [5]/2015 of 30 October)), provides for termination of appointment, at the discretion of the employer, without compensation and, conversely, in Article 49(1)(c) of the Texto refundido del Estatuto los Trabajadores (Real Decreto Legislativo 2/2015, de 23 de octubre) (Consolidated text of the Workers’ Statute (Royal Legislative Decree 2/2015 of 23 October)), provides for compensation when a contract of employment is terminated on account of certain legally specified reason(s)?

            2.

            If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, does Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement cover a measure such as that introduced by the Spanish legislature, consisting in fixing compensation of 12 days’ salary for every year of service, to be received by the worker at the end of a temporary contract even if the temporary employment has been limited to a single contract?

            3.

            If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, is it contrary to Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement where a legal provision grants fixed-term workers compensation of 12 days’ salary for every year of service at the end of the contract, but excludes from that compensation […] certain non-permanent staff (‘personal eventual’) upon the termination of their appointment at the employer’s discretion?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).


title: Case T-54/17: Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2018 — CLF v Parliament (Institutional law — European Parliament — Decision awarding a grant to a political party — Pre-financing set at 33 % of the maximum amount of the grant awarded — Obligation to provide a bank pre-financing guarantee — Financial Regulation — Rules of Application of the Financial Regulation — Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding — Proportionality — Equal treatment)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/29

      Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2018 — CLF v Parliament
      (Case T-54/17) (1)

      ((Institutional law - European Parliament - Decision awarding a grant to a political party - Pre-financing set at 33 % of the maximum amount of the grant awarded - Obligation to provide a bank pre-financing guarantee - Financial Regulation - Rules of Application of the Financial Regulation - Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding - Proportionality - Equal treatment))
      (2018/C 301/38)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Coalition for Life and Family (CLF) (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: P. Richter, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: N. Görlitz, C. Burgos and S. Alves, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application on the basis of Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment in part of Decision FINS-2017-16 of the European Parliament of 12 December 2016 concerning the award of a grant to the applicant, in so far as that decision restricts the pre-financing to 33 % of the maximum amount of the grant and makes its payment subject to the provision of a bank guarantee.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders Coalition for Life and Family (CLF) to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.


title: Case C-544/16: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 5 July 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) — United Kingdom) — Marcandi Ltd, trading as ‘Madbid’ v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 2(1)(c) — Issuing of ‘credits’ that can be used to place bids in online auctions — Supply of services for consideration — Preliminary transaction — Article 73 — Taxable amount)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/3

      Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 5 July 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) — United Kingdom) — Marcandi Ltd, trading as ‘Madbid’ v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
      (Case C-544/16) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common system of value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Article 2(1)(c) - Issuing of ‘credits’ that can be used to place bids in online auctions - Supply of services for consideration - Preliminary transaction - Article 73 - Taxable amount))
      (2018/C 301/03)
      Language of the case: English

         Referring court

      First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Marcandi Ltd, trading as ‘Madbid’

         Defendant: Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Article 2(1)(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the issue of ‘credits’, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which allow an operator’s clients to bid in the auctions that it organises, are a supply of services for consideration, for which the consideration is the amount paid in return for those ‘credits’.

                  2.

                  Article 73 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, the value of ‘credits’ used in order to bid is not included in the consideration received by the taxable person in return for the supplies of goods that it makes for the benefit of users who won an auction organised by it, or users who purchased a product using the ‘buy now’ or ‘earned discount’ features.

                  3.

                  When interpreting the relevant provisions of EU and national law, courts of a Member State that find that the same transaction has been the object of a different tax treatment for the purposes of VAT in another Member State have the power, or even — depending on whether there is a judicial remedy under national law against its decisions — an obligation, to refer a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court.

         (1)  OJ C 14, 16.1.2017.


title: Case T-244/18 R: Order of the President of the General Court of 10 July 2018 — Synergy Hellas v Commission (Application for interim measures — Grant agreement concluded under the Sixth Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) — Recovery of the sums paid — Application for suspension of operation — Lack of urgency)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/38

      Order of the President of the General Court of 10 July 2018 — Synergy Hellas v Commission
      (Case T-244/18 R)
      ((Application for interim measures - Grant agreement concluded under the Sixth Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) - Recovery of the sums paid - Application for suspension of operation - Lack of urgency))
      (2018/C 301/51)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicant: d.d. Synergy Hellas Anonymi Empokiri Etaireia Parochis Ypiresion Pliroforikis (Athens, Greece) (represented by: K. Damis, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Katsimerou and A. Kyratsou, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking the suspension of operation of Commission Decision C(2018) 1115 final of 19 February 2018 relating the recovery from the applicant of the sum of EUR 76 282,08 plus default interest.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                  The application for interim measures is dismissed.

                  2.

                  The costs are reserved.