201807060411993832018/C 259/032592016CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201805313421Joined Cases C-259/16 and C-260/16: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio — Italy) — Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Trasporti e della Logistica (Confetra) (C-259/16), Associazione Nazionale Imprese Trasporti Automobilistici (C-259/16), Fercam SpA(C-259/16), Associazione non Riconosciuta Alsea (C-259/16), Associazione Fedit (C-259/16), Carioni Spedizioni Internazionali Srl (C-259/16), Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Spedizioni Internazionali — Fedespedi (C-259/16), Tnt Global Express SpA (C-259/16), Associazione Italiana dei Corrieri Aerei Internazionali (AICAI) (C-260/16), DHL Express (Italy) Srl (C-260/16), Federal Express Europe Inc. (C-260/16), United Parcel Service Italia Ups Srl (C-260/16) v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Postal services in the European Union — Directive 97/67/EC — Articles 2, 7 and 9 — Directive 2008/6/EC — Definition of ‘postal service provider’ — Haulage, freight-forwarding and express mail undertakings providing services involving the clearance, sorting, transport and distribution of postal items — Authorisation required for the provision of postal services to the public — Contribution to the costs of providing universal service)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN310120180531EN00033142Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio — Italy) — Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Trasporti e della Logistica (Confetra) (C-259/16), Associazione Nazionale Imprese Trasporti Automobilistici (C-259/16), Fercam SpA(C-259/16), Associazione non Riconosciuta Alsea (C-259/16), Associazione Fedit (C-259/16), Carioni Spedizioni Internazionali Srl (C-259/16), Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Spedizioni Internazionali — Fedespedi (C-259/16), Tnt Global Express SpA (C-259/16), Associazione Italiana dei Corrieri Aerei Internazionali (AICAI) (C-260/16), DHL Express (Italy) Srl (C-260/16), Federal Express Europe Inc. (C-260/16), United Parcel Service Italia Ups Srl (C-260/16) v Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico
   (Joined Cases C-259/16 and C-260/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Postal services in the European Union — Directive 97/67/EC — Articles 2, 7 and 9 — Directive 2008/6/EC — Definition of ‘postal service provider’ — Haulage, freight-forwarding and express mail undertakings providing services involving the clearance, sorting, transport and distribution of postal items — Authorisation required for the provision of postal services to the public — Contribution to the costs of providing universal service)’2018/C 259/03Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Lazio

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Trasporti e della Logistica (Confetra) (C-259/16), Associazione Nazionale Imprese Trasporti Automobilistici (C-259/16), Fercam SpA (C-259/16), Associazione non Riconosciuta Alsea (C-259/16), Associazione Fedit (C-259/16), Carioni Spedizioni Internazionali Srl (C-259/16), Federazione Nazionale delle Imprese di Spedizioni Internazionali — Fedespedi (C-259/16), Tnt Global Express SpA (C-259/16), Associazione Italiana dei Corrieri Aerei Internazionali (AICAI) (C-260/16), DHL Express (Italy) Srl (C-260/16), Federal Express Europe Inc. (C-260/16), United Parcel Service Italia Ups Srl (C-260/16)

      Defendants: Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico

      Intervening party: Poste Italiane SpA (C-260/16)

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Article 2(1), (1a) and (6) of Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service, as amended by Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008, is to be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which haulage, freight-forwarding and express mail undertakings providing services involving the clearance, sorting, transport and distribution of postal items constitute, except where their business is limited to the transport of postal items, postal service providers within the meaning of Article 2(1a) of the directive.

            2.

            Articles 2(19) and 9(1) of Directive 97/67, as amended by Directive 2008/6, are to be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires all undertakings providing haulage, freight-forwarding and express mail services to hold a general authorisation for the provision of postal services, provided that such legislation is justified by one of the essential requirements set out in Article 2(19) of the directive and has due regard for the principle of proportionality, in that it is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring the attainment of the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it, which is a matter for the referring court to verify.

            3.

            Articles 7(4) and 9(2) of Directive 97/67, as amended by Directive 2008/6, are to be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires holders of a general authorisation for the provision of postal services to contribute to a compensation fund for universal service obligations, where, from a user’s perspective, those services may be regarded as falling within the scope of the universal service as they display inter-changeability to a sufficient degree with the universal service.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 343, 19.6.2016.


201807060331993582018/C 259/362912018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180426262611Case C-291/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 26 April 2018 — Grup Servicii Petroliere SA v Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală de Soluționare a Contestațiilor, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală de Administrare a Marilor Contribuabili
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2610120180426EN0036261261Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 26 April 2018 — Grup Servicii Petroliere SA v Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală de Soluționare a Contestațiilor, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală de Administrare a Marilor Contribuabili
   (Case C-291/18)2018/C 259/36Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Curtea de Apel București

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Grup Servicii Petroliere SA

      Defendants: Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală de Soluționare a Contestațiilor, Agenția Națională de Administrare Fiscală — Direcția Generală de Administrare a Marilor Contribuabili

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 148(c) of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, (
                  1
               ) in conjunction with Article 148(a) of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that the exemption from value added tax applies, in some circumstances, to the sale of offshore jackup drilling rigs, that is to say, are offshore jackup drilling rigs covered by the term ‘vessels’ within the meaning of that provision of EU law, given that, according to the title of Chapter 7 of that directive, that provision lays down rules governing ‘exemptions related to international transport’?

            2.

            If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must Article 148(c) of Directive 2006/112/EC, in conjunction with Article 148(a) of that regulation, be interpreted as meaning that an essential condition for applying the exemption from value added tax to an offshore jackup drilling rig, which has navigated into international waters, is that it must in fact be in a state of movement while it is being used (for commercial/industrial activities), floating or moving at sea from place to place, for a longer period than the period during which it is stationary or immobile, as a result of carrying out drilling activities at sea — that is to say, that navigation must in fact predominate via-à-vis drilling activities?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).


201807060491993942018/C 259/653352018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531484922Case T-335/18: Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Mubarak and Others/Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4820120180531EN0065482492Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Mubarak and Others/Council
   (Case T-335/18)2018/C 259/65Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Gamal Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak (Cairo, Egypt), Alaa Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak (Cairo), Heidy Mahmoud Magdy Hussein Rasekh (Cairo), Khadiga Mahmoud El Gammal (Cairo) (represented by B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, G. Martin and C. Enderby Smith, Solicitors)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/466 of 21 March 2018 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt and annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/465 of 21 March 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt insofar as they apply to the applicants;

            —

            declare that Article 1(1) of Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt and Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt are inapplicable, insofar as they apply to the applicants; and

            —

            order the Council to pay the applicants’ costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Council has made errors of assessment in considering that the criterion for listing the applicants in Article 1(1) of the Decision and Article 2(1) of the Regulation was satisfied.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that Article 1(1) of the Decision and Article 2(1) of the Regulation are illegal because (a) they lack a valid legal basis and/or (b) they breach the principle of proportionality.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 6, read with Articles 2 and 3, TEU and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union by the Council’s assumption that the judicial proceedings in Egypt complied with fundamental human rights.


201807130192004442018/C 268/373912018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180613313111Case C-391/18: Action brought on 13 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Croatia
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3110120180613EN0037311311Action brought on 13 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Croatia
   (Case C-391/18)2018/C 268/37Language of the case: Croatian
      Parties

      Applicant: European Commission (represented by: M. Mataija and M. Patakia, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: Republic of Croatia

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare that the Republic of Croatia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(4), read in conjunction with Article 13(1), of Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19 July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste (OJ 2011 L 199, p. 48) by failing to notify the Commission of its national programme for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste;

            —

            order the Republic of Croatia to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   Under Article 13(1) of Directive 2011/70/Euratom, Member States are required to notify the Commission of their national programmes for the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and of any subsequent significant changes, and, under Article 15(4) of that directive, Member States were required, for the first time, to notify the Commission of the content of their national programme as soon as possible, but not later than 23 August 2015.
   The Republic of Croatia has failed to adopt a national programme such as that referred to in the abovementioned provisions and, in any event, has failed to notify it to the Commission. Thus, the Republic of Croatia has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(4), read in conjunction with Article 13(1), of Directive 2011/70/Euratom.


201807130672004282018/C 268/408072016TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607333421Case T-807/16: Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — MIP Metro v EUIPO — AFNOR (N & NF TRADING) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark N & NF TRADING — Earlier EU figurative mark NF ENVIRONNEMENT — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Lack of enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3310120180607EN0040331342Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — MIP Metro v EUIPO — AFNOR (N & NF TRADING)
   (Case T-807/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark N & NF TRADING — Earlier EU figurative mark NF ENVIRONNEMENT — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Lack of enhanced distinctiveness of the earlier mark — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 268/40Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property GmbH & Co. KG (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: J.-C. Plate and R. Kaase, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Association française de normalisation (AFNOR) (La Plaine Saint-Denis, France) (represented by: B. Fontaine, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 July 2016 (Case R 1109/2015-1), relating to opposition proceedings between AFNOR and MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders MIP Metro Group Intellectual Property GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 22, 23.1.17.


201807130332003992018/C 268/262042018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180318202121Case C-204/18 P: Appeal brought on 18 March 2018 by Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2018 in Case T-715/16 Pebagua v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2010120180318EN0026201212Appeal brought on 18 March 2018 by Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 16 January 2018 in Case T-715/16 Pebagua v Commission
   (Case C-204/18 P)2018/C 268/26Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Appellant: Asociación de la pesca y acuicultura del entorno de Donana y del Bajo Guadalquivir (Pebagua) (represented by: A. J. Uceda Sosa, abogado)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellant submits that the Court of Justice should:

            —

            Set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court under appeal;

            —

            Give final judgment in the matter, upholding in its entirety the form of order sought at first instance by the appellant and, therefore, set aside and cancel the effect of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 (
                  1
               ) or, alternatively, set aside and cancel the effect of the inclusion of the species Procambarus clarkii on the Union list approved by that regulation;

            —

            Order the Commission to pay the costs of both actions.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The order under appeal does not go into the substance of the case raised in the appeal, but finds it inadmissible on the ground that the applicant lacks standing, resulting in an infringement of the second test for standing laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, given that the contested regulation directly affects the undertakings represented by the applicant, without the need for implementing measures.
   (
         1
      )	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1141 of 13 July 2016 adopting a list of invasive alien species of Union concern pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1143/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2016 L 189, p. 4).


201807130702004342018/C 268/418592016TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619343411Case T-859/16: Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Damm v EUIPO — Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz (EISKELLER) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark EISKELLER — Earlier national word marks KELER and KELER 18 — Relative ground for refusal — No similarity between the signs — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3410120180619EN0041341341Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Damm v EUIPO — Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz (EISKELLER)
   (Case T-859/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark EISKELLER — Earlier national word marks KELER and KELER 18 — Relative ground for refusal — No similarity between the signs — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 268/41Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Sociedad Anónima Damm (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón and C. Aguilera Montañez, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: I. Harrington, D. Hanf, V. Ruzek and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz GmbH & Co. KG (Au-Hallertau, Germany) (represented by: C. Thomas and V. Schwepler, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 September 2016 (Case R 2428/2015-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Sociedad Anónima Damm and Schlossbrauerei Au, Willibald Beck Freiherr von Peccoz.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sociedad Anónima Damm to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 38, 6.2.2017.


201807130372003952018/C 268/272262018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180329212221Case C-226/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Krohn & Schröder GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2110120180329EN0027211222Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Krohn & Schröder GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen
   (Case C-226/18)2018/C 268/27Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Finanzgericht Hamburg

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Krohn & Schröder GmbH

      Defendant: Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen

      Questions referred

            1.

            Does Article 212a of the Customs Code (
                  1
               ) encompass the exemption from an anti-dumping and countervailing duty pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation 1238/2013 (
                  2
               ) or Article 2(1) of Regulation 1239/2013? (
                  3
               )

            2.

            If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative: In the application of Article 212a of the Customs Code to the case of the incurrence of a customs debt pursuant to Article 204(1) of the Customs Code for exceeding the time limit under Article 49(1) of the Customs Code, are the conditions laid down in Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation 1239/2013 fulfilled when the company, which is affiliated with the company listed in the annex to Implementing Regulation 2013/707/EU, which manufactured, consigned and invoiced the goods concerned, but did not act as the importer of the goods concerned and also did not ensure the release of the goods into free circulation, but had the intention to do so and was the company to which the goods were actually delivered?

            3.

            If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative: When Article 212a of the Customs Code is applied to a case where a customs debt arises under Article 204(1) of the Customs Code, by failure to comply with the time limit pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Customs Code, may an undertaking invoice and an export undertaking certificate within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 1239/2013 also be submitted within a time limit set by the customs authorities pursuant to Article 53(1) of the Customs Code?

            4.

            If the answer to the third question is in the affirmative: Does an undertaking invoice pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(b) of Regulation 1239/2013, which refers to Decision 2013/423/EU instead of to Implementing Decision 2013/707/EU, under the conditions of the case in the main proceedings and in consideration of general legal principles, satisfy the conditions in paragraph 9 of Annex III to Regulation 1238/2013 and paragraph 9 of Annex 2 to Regulation 1239/2013?

            5.

            If the answer to the fourth question is in the negative: In the application of Article 212a of the Customs Code to the case when a customs debt arises under Article 204(1) of the Customs Code due to the failure to comply with the time limit pursuant to Article 49(1) of the Customs Code, may an undertaking invoice within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1238/2013 and Article 2(1)(b) of Regulation 1239/2013 also still be submitted in the appeal proceedings brought against the determination of customs debt?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ 1992 L 302, p. 1), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 82/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 (OJ 1997 L 17, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1238/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China (OJ 2013 L 325, p. 1).
   (
         3
      )	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1239/2013 of 2 December 2013 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic modules and key components (i.e. cells) originating in or consigned from the People's Republic of China (OJ 2013 L 325, p. 66).


201807130172004172018/C 268/13442017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607101121Case C-44/17: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hamburg — Germany) — Scotch Whisky Association v Michael Klotz (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks — Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 — Article 16(a) to (c) — Annex III — Registered geographical indication ‘Scotch Whisky’ — Whisky produced in Germany and marketed under the designation ‘Glen Buchenbach’)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1010120180607EN0013101112Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Hamburg — Germany) — Scotch Whisky Association v Michael Klotz
   (Case C-44/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks — Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 — Article 16(a) to (c) — Annex III — Registered geographical indication ‘Scotch Whisky’ — Whisky produced in Germany and marketed under the designation ‘Glen Buchenbach’)’2018/C 268/13Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landgericht Hamburg

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Scotch Whisky Association

      Defendant: Michael Klotz

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Article 16(a) of Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is ‘indirect commercial use’ of a registered geographical indication, the disputed element must be used in a form that is either identical to that indication or phonetically and/or visually similar to it. Accordingly, it is not sufficient that that element is liable to evoke in the relevant public some kind of association with the indication concerned or the geographical area relating thereto.

            2.

            Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is an ‘evocation’ of a registered geographical indication, the referring court is required to determine whether, when the average European consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect is confronted with the disputed designation, the image triggered directly in his mind is that of the product whose geographical indication is protected. In making that determination, the referring court, in the absence of (i) any phonetic and/or visual similarity between the disputed designation and the protected geographical indication and (ii) any partial incorporation of that indication in that designation, must take account of the conceptual proximity, if any, between the designation and the indication.
            Article 16(b) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is an ‘evocation’ of a registered geographical indication, account is not to be taken either of the context surrounding the disputed element, or, in particular, of the fact that that element is accompanied by an indication of the true origin of the product concerned.

            3.

            Article 16(c) of Regulation No 110/2008 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purpose of establishing that there is a ‘false or misleading indication’, as prohibited by that provision, account is not be taken of the context in which the disputed element is used.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 121, 18.4.2017.


201807130292004482018/C 268/032102016CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806053421Case C-210/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — Germany) — Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 95/46/EC — Personal data — Protection of natural persons with respect to the processing of that data — Order to deactivate a Facebook page (fan page) enabling the collection and processing of certain data of visitors to that page — Article 2(d) — Controller responsible for the processing of personal data — Article 4 — Applicable national law — Article 28 — National supervisory authorities — Powers of intervention of those authorities)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN310120180605EN00033142Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — Germany) — Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein v Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH
   (Case C-210/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 95/46/EC — Personal data — Protection of natural persons with respect to the processing of that data — Order to deactivate a Facebook page (fan page) enabling the collection and processing of certain data of visitors to that page — Article 2(d) — Controller responsible for the processing of personal data — Article 4 — Applicable national law — Article 28 — National supervisory authorities — Powers of intervention of those authorities)’2018/C 268/03Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Bundesverwaltungsgericht

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein

      Defendant: Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH

      Interveners: Facebook Ireland Ltd, Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Article 2(d) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘controller’ within the meaning of that provision encompasses the administrator of a fan page hosted on a social network.

            2.

            Articles 4 and 28 of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, where an undertaking established outside the European Union has several establishments in different Member States, the supervisory authority of a Member State is entitled to exercise the powers conferred on it by Article 28(3) of that directive with respect to an establishment of that undertaking situated in the territory of that Member State even if, as a result of the division of tasks within the group, first, that establishment is responsible solely for the sale of advertising space and other marketing activities in the territory of that Member State and, second, exclusive responsibility for collecting and processing personal data belongs, for the entire territory of the European Union, to an establishment situated in another Member State.

            3.

            Article 4(1)(a) and Article 28(3) and (6) of Directive 95/46 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the supervisory authority of a Member State intends to exercise with respect to an entity established in the territory of that Member State the powers of intervention referred to in Article 28(3) of that directive, on the ground of infringements of the rules on the protection of personal data committed by a third party responsible for the processing of that data whose seat is in another Member State, that supervisory authority is competent to assess, independently of the supervisory authority of the other Member State, the lawfulness of such data processing and may exercise its powers of intervention with respect to the entity established in its territory without first calling on the supervisory authority of the other Member State to intervene.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 260, 18.7.2016.


201807130342004012018/C 268/283052018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180504222321Case C-305/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 4 May 2018 — Associazione ‘Verdi Ambiente e Società — Aps Onlus’ and Others v Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2210120180504EN0028221232Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 4 May 2018 — Associazione ‘Verdi Ambiente e Società — Aps Onlus’ and Others v Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others
   (Case C-305/18)2018/C 268/28Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Associazione ‘Verdi Ambiente e Società — Aps Onlus’, VAS — Aps Onlus, Associazione di Promozione Sociale ‘Movimento Legge Rifiuti Zero per l’Economia Circolare’

      Defendants: Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio e del Mare, Regione Lazio, Regione Toscana, Regione Lombardia

      Questions referred

            1.

            Do Articles 4 and 13 of Directive 2008/98/EC, (
                  1
               ) in conjunction with recitals 6, 8, 28 and 31 thereof, preclude national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation — such as Article 35(1) of Decree-Law No 133/2014, as converted into law by Law No 164/2014, and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2016, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 233 of 5 October 2016 — in so far as only incineration facilities covered by that legislation, in accordance with the indications set out in the annexes and tables of that decree, are classified as strategic infrastructure and installations of major national importance which establish an integrated, modern system for the management of municipal and similar waste and which ensure self-sufficiency, in the interests of national safety, given that the national legislature did not classify installations for the treatment of waste for recycling and re-use purposes in the same way, even though they are two of the leading methods in the waste hierarchy set out in the directive?
            In the alternative, if that is not the case, do Articles 4 and 13 of Directive 2008/98/EC preclude national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation — such as Article 35(1) of Decree-Law No 133/2014, as converted into law by Law No 164/2014, and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2016, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 233 of 5 October 2016 — in so far as municipal waste incineration facilities are classified as strategic infrastructure and installations of major national importance in order to deal effectively with and avert further infringement proceedings for failure to implement the rules of EU law governing the waste sector, as well as for the purpose of limiting the amount of waste being deposited in landfill?

            2.

            Do Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Directive 2001/42/EC, (
                  2
               ) also read together, preclude the application of national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation — such as Article 35(1) of Decree-Law No 133/2014, as converted into law by Law No 164/2014, and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 10 August 2016, published in the Official Journal of the Italian Republic, No 233 of 5 October 2016 — which provides that the President of the Council of Ministers may, by decree, revise upwards the capacity of existing incineration facilities and also determine the number, capacity and regional location of incineration installations with the capacity to recover energy from municipal and similar waste to be constructed to meet the revised residual demand, for the purpose of gradually restoring the socio-economic balance between the various parts of the national territory, in compliance with separate collection and recycling objectives, without that national legislation providing that, at the preparation stage of that plan as described in the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, the rules on strategic environmental assessment laid down in Directive 2001/42/EC are to apply?

      (
         1
      )	Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ 2008 L 312, p. 3).
   (
         2
      )	Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30).


201807130412004252018/C 268/14492017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180606111111Case C-49/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — Koppers Denmark ApS v Skatteministeriet (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Article 21(3) — Chargeable event giving rise to taxation — Consumption of energy products produced within the curtilage of an establishment producing energy products — Energy products used for purposes other than as motor fuels or as heating fuels — Consumption of solvent as fuel at the coal tar distillation plant)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1110120180606EN0014111111Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — Koppers Denmark ApS v Skatteministeriet
   (Case C-49/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/96/EC — Taxation of energy products and electricity — Article 21(3) — Chargeable event giving rise to taxation — Consumption of energy products produced within the curtilage of an establishment producing energy products — Energy products used for purposes other than as motor fuels or as heating fuels — Consumption of solvent as fuel at the coal tar distillation plant)’2018/C 268/14Language of the case: Danish
      Referring court

   Østre Landsret

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Koppers Denmark ApS

      Defendant: Skatteministeriet

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 21(3) of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity must be interpreted as meaning that the consumption of energy products, within the curtilage of an establishment that has produced them, for the purpose of producing other energy products does not fall within the exception, laid down in that provision, concerning the chargeable event giving rise to taxation where, in a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the energy products produced by virtue of the main activity of that establishment are used for purposes other than as motor fuels or as heating fuels.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.


201807130222004182018/C 268/045542016CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806074411Case C-554/16: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — EP Agrarhandel GmbH v Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common agricultural policy — Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 — Support for farmers — Suckler-cow premium — Second paragraph of Article 117 — Transmission of information — Decision 2001/672/EC, as amended by Decision 2010/300/EU — Movements of bovine animals to summer grazing in mountain areas — Article 2(4) — Time limit for notification of the movement — Calculation — Notifications out of time — Eligibility for the payment of premiums — Condition — Taking account of the time limit for dispatch)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN410120180607EN00044141Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — EP Agrarhandel GmbH v Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft
   (Case C-554/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common agricultural policy — Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 — Support for farmers — Suckler-cow premium — Second paragraph of Article 117 — Transmission of information — Decision 2001/672/EC, as amended by Decision 2010/300/EU — Movements of bovine animals to summer grazing in mountain areas — Article 2(4) — Time limit for notification of the movement — Calculation — Notifications out of time — Eligibility for the payment of premiums — Condition — Taking account of the time limit for dispatch)’2018/C 268/04Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Verwaltungsgerichtshof

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: EP Agrarhandel GmbH

      Defendant: Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 2(4) of Commission Decision 2001/672/EC of 20 August 2001 laying down special rules applicable to movements of bovine animals when put out to summer grazing in mountain areas, as amended by Commission Decision 2010/300/EU of 25 May 2010, must be interpreted as precluding a national provision under which, for the purpose of compliance with the time limit for notification of movements to summer grazing, the date of receipt of the notification is regarded as the determining factor.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 46, 13.2.2017.


201807130082003542018/C 268/15832017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607121211Case C-83/17: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — KP v LO (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — 2007 Hague Protocol — Law applicable to maintenance obligations — Article 4(2) — Change in the habitual residence of the creditor — Possibility of the retroactive application of the law of the State of the creditor’s new habitual residence, that law coinciding with the law of the forum — Scope of the terms ‘if the creditor is unable … to obtain maintenance from the debtor’ — Situation where the creditor does not satisfy a formal legislative condition)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1210120180607EN0015121121Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — KP v LO
   (Case C-83/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — 2007 Hague Protocol — Law applicable to maintenance obligations — Article 4(2) — Change in the habitual residence of the creditor — Possibility of the retroactive application of the law of the State of the creditor’s new habitual residence, that law coinciding with the law of the forum — Scope of the terms ‘if the creditor is unable … to obtain maintenance from the debtor’ — Situation where the creditor does not satisfy a formal legislative condition)’2018/C 268/15Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Oberster Gerichtshof

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: KP

      Defendant: LO

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Article 4(2) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 2009/941/EC of 30 November 2009 must be interpreted as meaning that:

                     —

                     the fact that the State of the forum corresponds to the State of the creditor’s habitual residence does not preclude the application of that provision as long as the law designated by the ancillary connecting rule in that provision does not coincide with the one as the law designated by the main connecting rule in Article 3 of that Protocol;

                     —

                     in a situation in which the maintenance creditor, who has changed his usual residence, has brought before the courts of the State of his new habitual residence a maintenance claim against the debtor in respect of a period in the past during which the creditor resided in another Member State, the law of the forum, which is also the law of the State of the creditor’s new habitual residence, can apply provided the courts of the Member State of the forum had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the disputes concerning those parties as to the maintenance relating to that period.

            2.

            The phrase ‘is unable … to obtain maintenance’ in Article 4(2) of the Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 must be interpreted as also covering the situation in which the creditor is unable to obtain maintenance under the law of the State of his previous habitual residence on the ground that he does not meet certain conditions imposed by that law.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 168, 29.5.2017.


201807130572003612018/C 268/42862017TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619353511Case T-86/17: Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Le Pen v Parliament (Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances of Members of the European Parliament — Parliamentary assistance allowance — Recovery of sums unduly paid — Power of the Secretary-General — Rights of the defence — Burden of proof — Obligation to state reasons — Equal treatment — Misuse of powers — Independence of the Members — Error of fact — Proportionality)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3510120180619EN0042351351Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Le Pen v Parliament
   (Case T-86/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances of Members of the European Parliament — Parliamentary assistance allowance — Recovery of sums unduly paid — Power of the Secretary-General — Rights of the defence — Burden of proof — Obligation to state reasons — Equal treatment — Misuse of powers — Independence of the Members — Error of fact — Proportionality)’2018/C 268/42Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Marion Le Pen (Saint-Cloud, France) (represented by: initially, M. Ceccaldi and J.-P. Le Moigne, subsequently, M. Ceccaldi and, finally, R. Bosselut, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: G. Corstens and S. Seyr, acting as Agents)

      Intervener in support of the defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: A. Jensen, M. Bauer and R. Meyer, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the Parliament of 5 December 2016 concerning the recovery of a sum of EUR 298497,87 wrongfully paid as parliamentary assistance allowance and of the debit note of 6 December 2016 relating thereto.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Marion Le Pen to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings;

            3.

            Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201807130202003882018/C 268/055742016CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806055511Case C-574/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Grupo Norte Facility SA v Angel Manuel Moreira Gómez (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 1999/70/EC — Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP — Clause 4 — Principle of non-discrimination — Definition of ‘employment conditions’ — Comparability of situations — Justification — Definition of ‘objective grounds’ — Compensation in the event of termination of a permanent employment contract on objective grounds — Lesser amount of compensation paid on expiry of a fixed-term ‘relief’ employment contract)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN510120180605EN00055151Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Grupo Norte Facility SA v Angel Manuel Moreira Gómez
   (Case C-574/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 1999/70/EC — Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP — Clause 4 — Principle of non-discrimination — Definition of ‘employment conditions’ — Comparability of situations — Justification — Definition of ‘objective grounds’ — Compensation in the event of termination of a permanent employment contract on objective grounds — Lesser amount of compensation paid on expiry of a fixed-term ‘relief’ employment contract)’2018/C 268/05Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Grupo Norte Facility SA

      Respondent: Angel Manuel Moreira Gómez

      Operative part of the judgment

   Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the compensation paid to workers employed under fixed-term contracts entered into in order to cover working hours no longer covered as a result of a worker taking partial retirement, such as the relief contract at issue in the main proceedings, on expiry of the term for which those contracts were concluded, is less than the compensation awarded to permanent workers on termination of their employment contract on objective grounds.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 30, 30.1.2017.


201807130592004242018/C 268/43892017TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619353622Case T-89/17: Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Erwin Müller v EUIPO — Novus Tablet Technology Finland (NOVUS) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark NOVUS — Earlier EU word and figurative marks NOVUS and novus — Relative ground for refusal — Similarity of the goods — Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Evidence presented for the first time before the General Court)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3520120180619EN0043352362Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Erwin Müller v EUIPO — Novus Tablet Technology Finland (NOVUS)
   (Case T-89/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark NOVUS — Earlier EU word and figurative marks NOVUS and novus — Relative ground for refusal — Similarity of the goods — Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Evidence presented for the first time before the General Court)’2018/C 268/43Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Erwin Müller GmbH (Lingen, Germany) (represented by: N. Grüger, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: V. Mensing and M. Fischer, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Novus Tablet Technology Finland Oy (Turku, Finland)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 November 2016 (Case R 2413/2015-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Erwin Müller and Novus Tablet Technology Finland.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 28 November 2016 (Case R 2413/2015-4) in so far as it concerns the ‘special holders for mobile phones’ referred to in the trade mark application;

            2.

            Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

            3.

            Orders Erwin Müller GmbH and EUIPO to bear their own respective costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.


201807130692004332018/C 268/513362018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530424321Case T-336/18: Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4210120180530EN0051421432Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)
   (Case T-336/18)2018/C 268/51Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Eagle IP Ltd (Valletta, Malta) (represented by: M. Müller, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Consolidated Artists BV (Rotterdam, Netherlands)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark LILLY e VIOLETTA — Application for registration No 12 723 086

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 March 2018 in Case R 1489/2015-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order the other party to pay the costs incurred by the Applicant.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807130102004042018/C 268/293092018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180507232421Case C-309/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 7 May 2018 — Lavorgna Srl v Comune di Montelanico and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2310120180507EN0029231242Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 7 May 2018 — Lavorgna Srl v Comune di Montelanico and Others
   (Case C-309/18)2018/C 268/29Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Lavorgna Srl

      Defendants: Comune di Montelanico, Comune di Supino, Comune di Sgurgola, Comune di Trivigliano

      Question referred

   Do the Community principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, together with the principles of the free movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as well as the principles deriving therefrom, such as equality of treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency, referred to in Directive 2014/24/EU, (
         1
      ) preclude the application of national legislation, such as the Italian legislation founded on the combined provisions of Article 95(10) and Article 83(9) of Legislative Decree No 50/2016, according to which the failure to list the labour costs separately in the financial tender in a procedure for the award of public services inevitably results in the exclusion of the tendering undertaking concerned without the possibility of supplementing or amending its tendering documentation, even in the case where the obligation to list those costs separately was not set out in the tender documents, and even though, in substantive terms, the tender in question actually took into account the minimum labour costs, in accordance, moreover, with a declaration for that purpose made by the tenderer?
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).


201807130712004352018/C 268/443102017TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180614363611Case T-310/17: Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO — Lion Capital (LION’S HEAD global partners) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark LION’S HEAD global partners — Earlier EU word mark LION CAPITAL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3610120180614EN0044361361Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO — Lion Capital (LION’S HEAD global partners)
   (Case T-310/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark LION’S HEAD global partners — Earlier EU word mark LION CAPITAL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 268/44Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Lion’s Head Global Partners LLP (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: R. Nöske, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Lion Capital LLP (London) (represented by D. Rose and J. Warner, Solicitors)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 February 2017 (Case R 1477/2016 4), relating to opposition proceedings between Lion Capital and Lion’s Head Global Partners.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Lion’s Head Global Partners LLP to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201807130162004122018/C 268/303102018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180511242521Case C-310/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 11 May 2018 — Criminal proceedings against Еmil Milev
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2410120180511EN0030241252Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 11 May 2018 — Criminal proceedings against Еmil Milev
   (Case C-310/18)2018/C 268/30Language of the case: Bulgarian
      Referring court

   Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

      Party to the main proceedings

   Еmil Milev

      Questions referred

            (1)

            Is national case-law according to which the continuation of a coercive measure of ‘remand in custody’ (four months after the accused’s arrest) is subject to the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’, understood as a mere ‘prima facie’ finding that the accused may have committed the criminal offence in question, compatible with Article 3, the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/343 (
                  1
               ) and with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]?
            Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the term ‘reasonable suspicion’ means a strong likelihood that the accused committed the criminal offence in question compatible with the abovementioned provisions?

            (2)

            Is national case-law according to which the court determining an application to vary a coercive measure of ‘remand in custody’ that has already been adopted is required to state the reasons for its decision without comparing the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, even if the accused’s lawyer has submitted arguments to that effect — the only reason for that restriction being that the judge must preserve his impartiality in case that case should be assigned to him for the purposes of the substantive examination —, compatible with the second sentence of Article 4(1), Article 10, the fourth and fifth sentences of recital 16 and recital 48 of Directive 2016/43 and with Article 47 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]?
            Or, if it is not, is national case-law according to which the court is to carry out a more detailed and specific examination of the evidence and to give a clear answer to the arguments put forward by the accused’s lawyer, even if it thus takes the risk that it will be unable to examine the case or deliver a final decision on guilt if the case is assigned to it for the purposes of the substantive examination, — which implies that another judge will examine the substance of the case — compatible with the abovementioned provisions?

      (
         1
      )	Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ 2016 L 65, p. 1).


201807130312003942018/C 268/172502017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180606131422Case C-250/17: Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça — Portugal) — Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira v Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Insolvency proceedings — Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 — Article 15 — Effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested — Concept of ‘lawsuit pending’ — Substantive proceedings for the recognition of the existence of a debt)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1320120180606EN0017132142Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça — Portugal) — Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira v Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA
   (Case C-250/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Insolvency proceedings — Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 — Article 15 — Effects of insolvency proceedings on lawsuits pending concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested — Concept of ‘lawsuit pending’ — Substantive proceedings for the recognition of the existence of a debt)’2018/C 268/17Language of the case: Portuguese
      Referring court

   Supremo Tribunal de Justiça

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Virgílio Tarragó da Silveira

      Defendant: Massa Insolvente da Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as applying to a lawsuit pending before a court of a Member State seeking an order that a debtor pay a sum of money due under a contract for the provision of services and pay monetary damages for failure to comply with that contractual obligation, in the event that (i) the debtor was declared insolvent in insolvency proceedings opened in another Member State; and (ii) the declaration of insolvency applies to all of the debtor’s assets.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 239, 24.7.2017.


201807130132003832018/C 268/066672016CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806065622Case C-667/16: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven — Netherlands) — M.N.J.P.W. Nooren, J.M.F.D.C. Nooren, the heirs of M.N.F.M. Nooren v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common agricultural policy — EAFRD financing — Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 — Support for rural development — Non-compliance with cross-compliance rules — Reductions and exclusions — Aggregation of reductions)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN520120180606EN00065262Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 6 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven — Netherlands) — M.N.J.P.W. Nooren, J.M.F.D.C. Nooren, the heirs of M.N.F.M. Nooren v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken
   (Case C-667/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common agricultural policy — EAFRD financing — Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 — Support for rural development — Non-compliance with cross-compliance rules — Reductions and exclusions — Aggregation of reductions)’2018/C 268/06Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: M.N.J.P.W. Nooren, J.M.F.D.C. Nooren, the heirs of M.N.F.M. Nooren

      Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

      Operative part of the judgment

   Articles 70 to 72 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for by that Regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector, read in conjunction with Articles 23 and 24 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a situation such as that in the main proceedings, in which there have been found to be multiple instances of non-compliance within the same area, the reduction of the total amount of direct payments that have been, or are to be, granted that is applicable to instances of negligent non-compliance, on the one hand, and the reduction that is applicable to instances of intentional non-compliance, on the other hand, must be aggregated, with the total amount of reductions for one calendar year having to be fixed in compliance with the principle of proportionality and without exceeding the total amount referred to in Article 23(1) of Regulation No 73/2009.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.


201807130282004422018/C 268/313132018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180509252621Case C-313/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt (Sweden) lodged on 9 May 2018 — Dacom Limited v IPM Informed Portfolio Management AB
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2510120180509EN0031251262Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea hovrätt (Sweden) lodged on 9 May 2018 — Dacom Limited v IPM Informed Portfolio Management AB
   (Case C-313/18)2018/C 268/31Language of the case: Swedish
      Referring court

   Svea hovrätt

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Dacom Limited

      Respondent: IPM Informed Portfolio Management AB

      Questions referred

            1.1

            What criteria are to determine whether material constitutes such preparatory design material as is referred to in Article 1(1) of Directive 2009/24/EC (
                  1
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs? Can documents which set out the requirements as to the functions which are to be performed by a computer program and the result which the computer program must achieve, for example detailed descriptions of investment principles or risk models for asset management including mathematical formulae to be applied in the computer program, constitute such preparatory design material?

            1.2

            Must material, in order to constitute preparatory design material within the meaning of the directive, be so complete and detailed that in practice it requires no independent choices on the part of the person who actually writes the code of a computer program?

            1.3

            Does the exclusive right to preparatory design material within the meaning of the directive mean that the computer program in which the preparatory design material subsequently results is to be regarded as an adaptation of the preparatory design material and therefore a dependent work for the purpose of copyright (Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 2009/24/EC), or that the preparatory design material and software are to be regarded as different forms of expression of the same work, or that they are two independent works?

            2.1

            Can a consultant employed by another company, but who has been working for a number of years for the same client and, in the execution of his duties or following the instructions given by the client, has created a computer program, be deemed to be an employee [of the client company] for the purpose of Article 2(3) of Directive 2009/24/EC?

            2.2

            On the basis of which criteria should it be assessed whether someone is an employee for the purposes of that provision?

            3.1

            Does Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (
                  2
               ) mean that there must be a possibility of obtaining an injunction, even in a situation where the claimant holds the intellectual property right at issue jointly with the party against whom that injunction is directed?

            3.2

            If the answer to question 3.1 is in the affirmative, does that lead to any other conclusion if the exclusive right concerns a computer program and that computer program is not disseminated or made available to the public, but used only in a joint owner’s own business?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2009 L 111, p. 16.
   (
         2
      )	OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45.


201807130682004292018/C 268/523392018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530434311Case T-339/18: Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Enterprise Holdings v EUIPO (E PLUS)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4310120180530EN0052431431Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Enterprise Holdings v EUIPO (E PLUS)
   (Case T-339/18)2018/C 268/52Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Enterprise Holdings, Inc. (Saint Louis, Missouri, États-Unis) (represented by: D. Farnsworth, Solicitor)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark E PLUS — Application for registration No 16 377 079

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 March 2018 in Case R 2141/2017-4

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            accept the Application for publication;

            —

            order EUIPO to bear its own and pay the Applicant’s costs.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807130552004232018/C 268/454132017TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619373711Case T-413/17: Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Karl Storz v EUIPO (3D) (EU trade mark — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark 3D — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptive character — Absence of any distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3710120180619EN0045371371Judgment of the General Court of 19 June 2018 — Karl Storz v EUIPO (3D)
   (Case T-413/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark 3D — Absolute grounds for refusal — Descriptive character — Absence of any distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 268/45Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Karl Storz GmbH & Co. KG (Tuttlingen, Germany) (represented by: S. Gruber and N. Siebertz, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 April 2017 (Case R 1502/2016 2), relating to the international registration designating the European Union in respect of the figurative mark 3D.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 April 2017 (Case R 1502/2016-2) in respect of ‘stationery’ goods which fall within Class 16 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended;

            2.

            Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

            3.

            Orders each party to bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 277, 21.8.2017.


201807130532004262018/C 268/533452018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180601434422Case T-345/18: Action brought on 1 June 2018 — BNP Paribas v ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4320120180601EN0053432442Action brought on 1 June 2018 — BNP Paribas v ECB
   (Case T-345/18)2018/C 268/53Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: BNP Paribas (Paris, France) (represented by: A. Gosset-Grainville, M. Trabucchi and M. Dalon, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Central Bank

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul in part the decision of the ECB No ECB-SSM-2018-FRBNP-17 of 26 April 2018 in so far as it imposes a deduction of the irrevocable payment commitments (‘IPCs’) taken out with the Single Resolution Fund (‘SRF’), national resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes (‘DGS’) from Common Equity Tier 1 capital, on an individual, sub-consolidated or consolidated basis, and in particular paragraphs 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3;

            —

            order the ECB to pay all of the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging a lack of legal basis. In this regard, the applicant submits that the contested decision creates a new rule of general application which goes clearly beyond the legal framework governing the defendant’s exercise of its prudential supervision tasks.
            Furthermore, by adopting a decision taken without prior analysis of the solvency and liquidity risk and without regard for the applicant’s risk profile, the defendant exceeded the powers laid down in Articles 4(1)(f) and 16 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ 2013 L 287, p. 63) (‘the SSM Regulation’).
            Finally, the applicant submits that Article 16(1)(c) of the SSM Regulation does not authorise the ECB to act to ensure ‘better information on risks’ and that Articles 4(1)(f) and 16(2)(d) of the SSM Regulation do not authorise the adoption of prudential measures in respect of off-balance-sheet items.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging an error of law in so far as the defendant misinterpreted the EU legislation establishing the possibility for credit institutions to make use of IPCs to fulfil part of their obligations vis-à-vis resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes. The contested decision runs counter to the objectives and purpose of the applicable rules to the extent that it disregards the intention of the legislature manifested through the implementation of those instruments. By doing so, that decision renders the provisions at issue ineffective.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality, in so far as the imposition of a deduction of IPCs from its own funds is inappropriate and unnecessary in respect of a risk which is purely hypothetical and already covered. According to the applicant, that measure is disproportionate in the light of the objective set by the ECB itself, which is to ‘provide adequate information on financial risks’.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment and failure to observe the principle of sound administration. The applicant claims that, by choosing to use an instrument (deduction from own funds) which is clearly unsuited to the objective that it purports to pursue (to provide adequate information on risks), the defendant has failed to observe the principle of sound administration, in so far as it has failed to draw the appropriate conclusions from its own assessments.


201807130382004022018/C 268/086732016CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806057711Case C-673/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea Constituţională a României — Romania) — Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the Union — Article 21 TFEU — Right of Union citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 3 — Beneficiaries — Family members of the Union citizen — Article 2(2)(a) — Definition of ‘spouse’ — Marriage between persons of the same sex — Article 7 — Right of residence for more than three months — Fundamental rights)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN710120180605EN00087171Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea Constituţională a României — Romania) — Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne
   (Case C-673/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the Union — Article 21 TFEU — Right of Union citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 3 — Beneficiaries — Family members of the Union citizen — Article 2(2)(a) — Definition of ‘spouse’ — Marriage between persons of the same sex — Article 7 — Right of residence for more than three months — Fundamental rights)’2018/C 268/08Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Curtea Constituţională a României

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Relu Adrian Coman, Robert Clabourn Hamilton, Asociaţia Accept

      Defendants: Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne

      Intervener: Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            In a situation in which a Union citizen has made use of his freedom of movement by moving to and taking up genuine residence, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, in a Member State other than that of which he is a national, and, whilst there, has created or strengthened a family life with a third-country national of the same sex to whom he is joined by a marriage lawfully concluded in the host Member State, Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as precluding the competent authorities of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national from refusing to grant that third-country national a right of residence in the territory of that Member State on the ground that the law of that Member State does not recognise marriage between persons of the same sex.

            2.

            Article 21(1) TFEU is to be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, a third-country national of the same sex as a Union citizen whose marriage to that citizen was concluded in a Member State in accordance with the law of that state has the right to reside in the territory of the Member State of which the Union citizen is a national for more than three months. That derived right of residence cannot be made subject to stricter conditions than those laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201807130242004412018/C 268/323172018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180514262611Case C-317/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro (Portugal) lodged on 14 May 2018 — Cátia Correia Moreira v Município de Portimão
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2610120180514EN0032261261Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro (Portugal) lodged on 14 May 2018 — Cátia Correia Moreira v Município de Portimão
   (Case C-317/18)2018/C 268/32Language of the case: Portuguese
      Referring court

   Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Faro

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Cátia Correia Moreira

      Defendant: Município de Portimão

      Questions referred

            a.

            On the premiss that ‘worker’ must be taken to mean any person who, in the Member State in question, is protected as such by the national employment legislation, can a person who has a contract for a position of trust with the transferor be regarded as a ‘worker’ for the purposes of Article 2(1)(d) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC (
                  1
               ) of 12 March 2001 and can that person, accordingly, enjoy the protection which that legislation confers?

            b.

            Does EU legislation, in particular Directive 2001/23/EC, in conjunction with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, preclude a national rule which, even in the case of a transfer falling within the scope of that directive, requires that workers in all cases undergo a public selection procedure and become bound by a new relationship with the transferee where that transferee is a municipality?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16).


201807130142004052018/C 268/096772016CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806058811Case C-677/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid — Spain) — Lucía Montero Mateos v Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 1999/70/EC — Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP — Clause 4 — Principle of non-discrimination — Definition of ‘employment conditions’ — Comparability of situations — Justification — Definition of ‘objective grounds’ — Compensation in the event of termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration on objective grounds — No compensation on expiry of a fixed-term ‘interinidad’ contract)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN810120180605EN00098181Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid — Spain) — Lucía Montero Mateos v Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid
   (Case C-677/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Directive 1999/70/EC — Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP — Clause 4 — Principle of non-discrimination — Definition of ‘employment conditions’ — Comparability of situations — Justification — Definition of ‘objective grounds’ — Compensation in the event of termination of an employment contract of indefinite duration on objective grounds — No compensation on expiry of a fixed-term ‘interinidad’ contract)’2018/C 268/09Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Madrid

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Lucía Montero Mateos

      Defendant: Agencia Madrileña de Atención Social de la Consejería de Políticas Sociales y Familia de la Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid

      Operative part of the judgment

   Clause 4(1) of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not provide for any compensation to be paid to workers employed under a fixed-term contract entered into in order to cover a post temporarily while the selection or promotion procedure to fill the post permanently takes place, such as the temporary replacement contract at issue in the main proceedings, on expiry of the term for which that contract was concluded, whereas compensation is payable to permanent workers where their employment contract is terminated on objective grounds.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


201807130322003482018/C 268/183632017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607141521Case C-363/17 P: Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA, Novapet SA v Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME), Cepsa Química SA, Indorama Ventures Poland sp. z o.o., Lotte Chemical UK Ltd, Ottana Polimeri Srl, UAB Indorama Polymers Europe, UAB Neo Group, UAB Orion Global pet, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Federation of Bottled Waters (EFBW), Caiba SA, Coca-Cola Enterprises Belgium (CCEB), Danone, Nestlé Waters Management & Technology, Pepsico International Ltd, Refresco Gerber BV (Appeal — Dumping — Imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in India, Thailand and Taiwan — Implementing Decision 2013/226/EU — Decision to terminate the expiry review proceeding without imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty — Non-contractual liability — Causal link — Obligation to state reasons)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1410120180607EN0018141152Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA, Novapet SA v Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME), Cepsa Química SA, Indorama Ventures Poland sp. z o.o., Lotte Chemical UK Ltd, Ottana Polimeri Srl, UAB Indorama Polymers Europe, UAB Neo Group, UAB Orion Global pet, Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Federation of Bottled Waters (EFBW), Caiba SA, Coca-Cola Enterprises Belgium (CCEB), Danone, Nestlé Waters Management & Technology, Pepsico International Ltd, Refresco Gerber BV
   (Case C-363/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — Dumping — Imports of certain polyethylene terephthalate originating in India, Thailand and Taiwan — Implementing Decision 2013/226/EU — Decision to terminate the expiry review proceeding without imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty — Non-contractual liability — Causal link — Obligation to state reasons)’2018/C 268/18Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellants: Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA, Novapet SA (represented by: L. Ruessmann, avocat, and J. Beck, Solicitor)

      Other parties to the proceedings: Committee of Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Manufacturers in Europe (CPME), Cepsa Química SA, Indorama Ventures Poland sp. z o.o., Lotte Chemical UK Ltd, Ottana Polimeri Srl, UAB Indorama Polymers Europe, UAB Neo Group, UAB Orion Global pet, Council of the European Union (represented by H. Marcos Fraile, Agent, and B. O’Connor, Solicitor, and S. Gubel, avocat), European Commission, European Federation of Bottled Waters (EFBW), Caiba SA, Coca-Cola Enterprises Belgium (CCEB), Danone, Nestlé Waters Management & Technology, Pepsico International Ltd, Refresco Gerber BV

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal;

            2.

            Orders Equipolymers Srl, M&G Polimeri Italia SpA and Novapet SA to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 283, 28.8.2017.


201807130272004202018/C 268/333192018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180514272821Case C-319/18 P: Appeal brought on 14 May 2018 by Fred Olsen, S.A. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-108/16 Naviera Armas, S.A. v European Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2710120180514EN0033271282Appeal brought on 14 May 2018 by Fred Olsen, S.A. against the judgment of the General Court delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-108/16 Naviera Armas, S.A. v European Commission
   (Case C-319/18 P)2018/C 268/33Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Appellant: Fred Olsen, S.A. (represented by: J.M. Rodríguez Cárcamo and A.M. Rodríguez Conde, abogados)

      Other parties to the proceedings:

   Naviera Armas, S.A.
   European Commission

      Form of order sought

   Fred Olsen, S.A. respectfully requests the Court of Justice to:

            —

            Set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of 15 March 2018 in Case T-108/16, Naviera Armas, S.A. v European Commission, supported by Fred Olsen, S.A. (EU:T:2018:145);

            —

            Dismiss in its entirety the form of order sought by Naviera Armas, S.A. seeking annulment of Decision (2015) 8655 final of the European Commission of 8 December 2015 on State aid SA.36628 (2015/NN) (ex 2013/CP — Spain — Fred Olsen); and

            —

            Order the parties challenging the appeal to pay the costs incurred by Fred Olsen, S.A. for the purposes of these proceedings, and Naviera Armas, S.A. to pay the costs incurred by Fred Olsen, S.A. at first instance.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   1. First ground of appeal

            1.

            By its first ground of appeal, Fred Olsen, S.A. alleges failure to state reasons in the judgment under appeal so far as concerns the selectivity of the measure, within the meaning required by the judgment Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck (C-524/14 P). (
                  1
               )

            2.

            If the General Court had examined the selectivity of the measure in accordance with the criteria set out in that judgment, it would have had to examine (i) the general reference framework in which Fred Olsen pays port dues for using the infrastructure of the Puerto de la Nieves, which is to say, the dues applicable to all ports in the Canary Islands, as regulated under national law; (ii) whether the positions of Fred Olsen and other operators using that infrastructure, including Naviera Armas, are comparable with respect to the measure under examination; and (iii) possible discrimination in the payment of those port dues.

            3.

            The Commission considered, in the contested decision, that the fact that Fred Olsen is the sole user of the Puerto de las Nieves does not, as such, represent an advantage obtained with State resources, given that Fred Olsen pays the usual amount of the dues levied from all operators under the scheme applicable to all ports in the Canary Islands. The Commission was therefore not obliged to carry out an examination of the selectivity of the measure.

            4.

            On the contrary, in order to assess the existence of a difficulty for the purposes of Article 108(2) TFEU, the General Court should have carried out that examination, which would have allowed it to assess whether the port dues paid by Fred Olsen, in return for being the sole user of the port infrastructure of the Puerto de las Nieves, provided it with any type of advantage.

            5.

            Given that the reasons for the judgment are manifestly inadequate on this point, it is not possible to assess the existence of the alleged advantage, on which ground the judgment of the General Court should be set aside in its entirety.

      2. Second ground of appeal

            6.

            By its second ground of appeal, Fred Olsen alleges that sufficient reasons were stated for the Commission’s decision, which did not apply the private investor test.

            7.

            The General Court found the reasons stated for the decision to be insufficient because, in its judgment, the Commission must use the criterion of the private investor acting in a market economy.

            8.

            However, beyond the fact that Fred Olsen is the sole user of the Puerto de las Nieves, there is no indication in the judgment of the General Court that that position affords it any advantage with regard to the payment of port dues for the use of the infrastructure. In this particular case, there is no agreement or discount in the payment of dues by Fred Olsen, or a situation of discrimination towards other operators, such as Naviera Armas, with regard to the payment of dues.

            9.

            The judgments in Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sajonia-Anhalt v Commission (T-443/08 and T-455/08) (
                  2
               ), Ryanair v Commission (T-196/04) (
                  3
               ) and Aéroports de Paris v Commission (T-128/98) (
                  4
               ) are not applicable to this case.

            10.

            On that ground, the judgment of the General Court should be set aside in its entirety and the decision of the Commission maintained in its entirety.

      (
         1
      )	Judgment of 21 December 2016, Commission v Hansestadt Lübeck, C-524/14 P, EU:C:2016:971.
   (
         2
      )	Judgment of 24 March 2011, Freistaat Sachsen and Land Sajonia-Anhalt v Commission, T-443/08 and T-455/08, EU:T:2011:117.
   (
         3
      )	Judgment of 17 December 2008, Ryanair v Commission, T-196/04, EU:T:2008:585.
   (
         4
      )	Judgment of 12 December 2000, Aéroports de Paris v Commission, T-128/98, EU:T:2000:290.


201807130622003712018/C 268/465902016TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180608373822Case T-590/16: Order of the General Court of 8 June 2018 — Spychalski v Commission (Civil service — Recruitment — Notice of competition — Open Competition EPSO/AD 177/10-ECO2013 — Assessment of the main language — Decision not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list — Manifest lack of jurisdiction — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3720120180608EN0046372382Order of the General Court of 8 June 2018 — Spychalski v Commission
   (Case T-590/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil service — Recruitment — Notice of competition — Open Competition EPSO/AD 177/10-ECO2013 — Assessment of the main language — Decision not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list — Manifest lack of jurisdiction — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)’2018/C 268/46Language of the case: Polish
      Parties

      Applicant: Michał Spychalski (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: A. Żołyniak, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the selection board in Open Competition EPSO/AD 177/10-ECO2013, organised by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list and, secondly, that the appointing authority be required to add the applicant’s name to the reserve list established on the basis of the open competition in question, subject to the period of validity of the addition being equal to the period of validity of the list.

      Operative part of the order

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action on the basis that it is in part manifestly lacking any basis in law and in part on the ground that the General Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it;

            2.

            Orders Michał Spychalski to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 383, 17.10.2016 (case initially registered before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal under number F-20/16 and transferred to the General Court of the European Union on 1.9.2016).