title: Case T-182/19: Order of the General Court of 12 September 2019 — Puma v EUIPO (SOFTFOAM) (EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark SOFTFOAM — Absolute grounds for refusal — No distinctive character — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/69

      Order of the General Court of 12 September 2019 — Puma v EUIPO (SOFTFOAM)
      (Case T-182/19) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark SOFTFOAM - Absolute grounds for refusal - No distinctive character - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
      (2019/C 399/87)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Puma SE (Herzogenaurach, Germany) (represented by: M. Schunke, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 January 2019 (Case R 1399/2018-2), relating to the application for registration of the figurative sign SOFTFOAM as a European Union trade mark.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The action is dismissed.

                  2.

                     Puma SE shall pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 172, 20.5.2019.


title: Case T-547/19: Action brought on 31 July 2019 — Sarantos and Others v Parliament and Commission

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/70

      Action brought on 31 July 2019 — Sarantos and Others v Parliament and Commission
      (Case T-547/19)
      (2019/C 399/88)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicants: Archimandrite Sarantis Sarantos (Marousi, Greece) and six other applicants (represented by: C. Papasotiriou, lawyer)

         Defendants: European Commission and European Parliament

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the General Court should:

                  —

                  annul the regulation of the European Parliament and the Commission of the European Union of 20 June 2019 (2018/0104/COD, Lex 1939/PE-CONS 70/19) on strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement; (1)

                  —

                  order the defendants to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea, alleging that the contested regulation adversely affects human dignity, private life and personal freedom, as well as the right to protection of personal data and to express consent for any processing of such data.

                  2.

                  Second plea, alleging that the contested regulation adversely affects the applicants’ religious conscience, in breach, inter alia, of Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

                  3.

                  Third plea, alleging that, by making electronic identity mandatory without citizens’ prior consent, the contested regulation infringes the applicants’ right to object on the particular aforementioned grounds of religious conscience, in breach of Article 10(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea, alleging that, by adversely affecting the applicants’ religious conscience, the contested regulation at the same time also adversely affects their human dignity since religious conscience is a fundamental expression thereof, in breach of Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

         (1)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1157 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on strengthening the security of identity cards of Union citizens and of residence documents issued to Union citizens and their family members exercising their right of free movement (OJ 2019 L 188, p. 67).


title: Case T-609/19: Action brought on 9 September 2019 – Canon v Commission

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/71

      Action brought on 9 September 2019 – Canon v Commission
      (Case T-609/19)
      (2019/C 399/89)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Canon Inc. (Tokyo, Japan) (represented by: U. Soltész, W. Bosch, C. von Köckritz, K. Winkelmann, J. Schindler, D. Arts, W. Devroe, lawyers and M. Reynolds, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul European Commission decision C(2019) 4559 final of 27 June 2019 imposing fines for failing to notify a concentration in breach of Article 4(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) and for implementing a concentration in breach of Article 7(1) Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Case M.8179 - Canon/Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation, Article 14(2) procedure), as notified to the applicant on 1 July 2019;

                  —

                  in the alternative, annul or substantially reduce the fines imposed on it;

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission committed a manifest error of law by misapplying the legal test for the assessment of Article 4(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.

                              —

                              It is argued that the Commission ignores the existing case-law by relying on an unprecedented and unsupported concept of ‘partial implementation of a single concentration’. In particular, the Commission’s assessment does not establish that the interim transaction in question contributed to a lasting change of control over the target in the way required by the case-law.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that, although no intent or negligence on the part of the applicant was demonstrated, the Commission imposed a fine on the applicant in violation of Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, the principle of nulla poena sine lege and legitimate expectations, the principle of proportionality and the principle of concurrent offences. The applicant therefore requests the Court to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction under Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and Article 261 TFEU to annul the decision regarding the fines entirely or reduce them significantly.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission has violated essential procedural requirements. By denying the applicant the opportunity to comment on new arguments and facts/evidence in a formal reply to an additional supplementary statement of objections or letter of facts and during another oral hearing, it is argued that the Commission violated Article 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and the applicant’s right of defence.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ 2004 L 24, p. 1).


title: Case T-612/19: Action brought on 10 September 2019 – UPL Europe and Aceto Agricultural Chemical v Commission

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/72

      Action brought on 10 September 2019 – UPL Europe and Aceto Agricultural Chemical v Commission
      (Case T-612/19)
      (2019/C 399/90)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: UPL Europe Ltd (Warrington Cheshire, United Kingdom) and Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp. Ltd (Port Washington, United States) (represented by: C. Mereu and P. Sellar, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/989 of 17 June 2019; (1)

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted further to manifest errors of assessment.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation results from a procedure during which the applicants’ rights of defence have not been respected.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the principle of proportionality.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the precautionary principle.

         (1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/989 of 17 June 2019 concerning the non-renewal of the approval of the active substance chlorpropham, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, and amending the Annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 (OJ 2019 L 160, p. 11).


title: Case T-619/19: Action brought on 17 September 2019 – KF v SatCen

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/73

      Action brought on 17 September 2019 – KF v SatCen
      (Case T-619/19)
      (2019/C 399/91)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: KF (represented by: A. Kunst, lawyer, and N. Macaulay, Barrister)

         Defendant: European Union Satellite Centre

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decision of the Director of the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) of 3 July 2019, notified to the applicant on 8 July 2019, to restart the administrative investigation in relation to her conduct and find that SatCen has failed to comply with the judgment of 25 October 2018 of the General Court in KF v The European Union Satellite Centre (Case T-286/15, EU:T:2018:718), infringing Article 266 TFEU;

                  —

                  annul the decision of the Director of SatCen rejecting the applicant’s administrative complaint to the Director of SatCen of 2 August 2019 against the decision of 3 July 2019, notified to her on 9 August 2019;

                  —

                  order SatCen to pay the applicant full and fair compensation arising from the said judgment in Case T-286/15 in respect of the material harm suffered;

                  —

                  order SatCen to compensate the applicant for the material and immaterial harm suffered as a result of the decision to restart the administrative investigation, assessed provisionally on an ex aequo et bono basis at EUR 30 000;

                  —

                  order SatCen to pay interest on the unjustified late payment of damages in respect of non-material harm of EUR 10 000 as ordered in the said judgment in Case T-286/15;

                  —

                  declare Article 28 and Annex X of the SatCen Staff Regulations, the provisions on the Appeals Board, inapplicable pursuant to Article 277 TFEU;

                  —

                  order SatCen to pay the applicant’s costs, together with interest of 8 %.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging an infringement of the authority of judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 266 TFEU and the right to sound administration and the duty of care.


title: Case T-620/19: Action brought on 16 September 2019 – Ace of spades v EUIPO – Krupp and Borrmann (Shape of Champagne rosé bottle)

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/74

      Action brought on 16 September 2019 – Ace of spades v EUIPO – Krupp and Borrmann (Shape of Champagne rosé bottle)
      (Case T-620/19)
      (2019/C 399/92)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Ace of spades Holdings LLC (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: A. Gómez López, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Gerhard Ernst Krupp (Munich, Germany) and Elmar Borrmann (Reith, Austria)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicants of the trade mark at issue: Other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union tridimensional mark (Shape of Champagne rosé bottle) – Application for registration No 16 252 629

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 June 2019 in Case R 1/2019-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  upheld the present Appeal;

                  —

                  annul the contested decision, and/or set aside the contested decision due to erroneous application of Articles 8(1) (b) EUTMR and 8(5) EUTMR and enter a finding to the effect that there does exist likelihood of confusion between the confronted trademarks;

                  —

                  order the defendant (and intervener, if he enters an appearance in proceedings) to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(1) (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-629/19: Action brought on 20 September 2019 — L. Oliva Torras v EUIPO — Mecánica del Frío (Vehicle couplings)

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/77

      Action brought on 20 September 2019 — L. Oliva Torras v EUIPO — Mecánica del Frío (Vehicle couplings)
      (Case T-629/19)
      (2019/C 399/96)
      Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicant: L. Oliva Torras, SA (Manresa, Spain) (represented by: E. Sugrañes Coca, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Mecánica del Frío, SL (Cornellá de Llobregat, Spain)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Holder of the design at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

         Design at issue: Community design (Vehicle couplings) — Community design No 2 217 588-0004

         Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10 July 2019 in Case R 1399/2017-3

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the General Court should:

                  —

                  With regard to the ground of invalidity: uphold the findings of the Board of Appeal on this point and allow the proceedings seeking invalidity of a Community design in respect of each of Articles 4 to 9 of the Regulation on Community designs, under ‘Requirements for protection’.

                  —

                  With regard to the precedence on which the claims of lack of novelty and individual character are based: the applicant submits that the comparison conducted by the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal, based solely on image A (a render from the catalogue), is incorrect, and requests that the comparison be conducted taking into account all the evidence submitted and the specific circumstances of the present case.

                  —

                  The substance: lack of novelty of the Community design sought. The applicant requests that the contested design be declared invalid since it is almost identical to and therefore consists in an unauthorised, practically identical imitation of the design used in trade by the applicant. Consequently, the contested design lacks the novelty required to acquire protection by means of the registration of a Community design.

                  —

                  The substance: lack of individual character of the Community design sought. The applicant requests that the contested design be declared invalid on the ground of lack of individual character with respect to the designs disclosed earlier by L. Oliva Torras, S.A., bearing in mind the low degree of creative freedom allowed by the technical functionality of the part which must be mounted on a specific vehicle engine, the characteristics of an informed user and the similarities between the parts compared.

                  —

                  The substance: existence of exclusions to the protection of a Community design under Article 8 of the Regulation on Community designs. The applicant requests that the contested design be declared invalid on the ground that it is subject to the prohibition laid down in Article 8(1) and (2), as the appearance of the design is dictated solely by its technical function, and that it be declared invalid on the ground that it is subject to the absolute prohibition under Article 4 of the Regulation on Community designs since it constitutes a component part of a complex product.

                  —

                  The substance: conflict of the Community design with Article 9 of the Regulation on Community designs. The applicant requests that the decision of the Board of Appeal be upheld on that point.

                  —

                  In accordance with Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, under ‘General rules as to allocation of costs’, the applicant requests that the unsuccessful party be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

                  —

                  In accordance with Article 68 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicant requests that the case is joined with Case T-100/19, the oral part of which has been requested by the applicant and is awaiting decision. In accordance with Article 68, two or more cases concerning the same subject matter may at any time, either of the General Court’s own motion or on application by a main party, be joined, on account of the connection between them, for the purposes, alternatively or cumulatively, of the written or oral part of the procedure or of the decision which closes the proceedings.

         Plea in law

      Infringement of Articles 4 to 9 and 61 of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.


title: Case C-278/19 P: Appeal brought on 3 April 2019 by Mas Que Vinos Global, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 17 January 2019 in Case T-576/17, Mas Que Vinos Global, S.L. v EUIPO — JESA (EL SEÑORITO)

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/7

      Appeal brought on 3 April 2019 by Mas Que Vinos Global, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 17 January 2019 in Case T-576/17, Mas Que Vinos Global, S.L. v EUIPO — JESA (EL SEÑORITO)
      (Case C-278/19 P)
      (2019/C 406/11)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Appellant: Mas Que Vinos Global, S.L. (represented by: M. J. Sanmartín Sanmartín, abogada)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and José Estévez, S.A. (JESA)
      By order of 25 September 2019, the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Mas Que Vinos Global, S.L. to pay its own costs.


title: Case C-295/19 P: Appeal brought on 10 April 2019 by Apple Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 31 January 2019 in Case T-215/17: Pear Technologies v EUIPO - Apple (PEAR)

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/8

      Appeal brought on 10 April 2019 by Apple Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 31 January 2019 in Case T-215/17: Pear Technologies v EUIPO - Apple (PEAR)
      (Case C-295/19 P)
      (2019/C 406/12)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Apple Inc. (represented by: G. Tritton and J. Muir Wood, Barristers, instructed by J. Olsen and P. Andreottola, Solicitors)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Pear Technologies Ltd, European Union Intellectual Property Office
      By order of 1 October 2019 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded and that Apple Inc. shall bear its own costs.


title: Case C-585/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 2 August 2019 — Academia de Studii Economice din București v Organismul Intermediar pentru Programul Operațional Capital Uman — Ministerul Educației Naționale

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/8

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 2 August 2019 — Academia de Studii Economice din București v Organismul Intermediar pentru Programul Operațional Capital Uman — Ministerul Educației Naționale
      (Case C-585/19)
      (2019/C 406/13)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Tribunalul București

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Academia de Studii Economice din București

         Defendant: Organismul Intermediar pentru Programul Operațional Capital Uman — Ministerul Educației Naționale

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should ‘working time’, as defined in Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC, (1) be understood as meaning ‘any period during which the worker is working, at the employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties’ under a single (full-time) contract or under all (employment) contracts concluded by that worker?

                  2.

                  Should the requirements imposed on Member States by Article 3 of Directive 2003/88/EC (obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure that each worker enjoys at least 11 consecutive hours’ rest per 24-hour period) and by Article 6(b) of that directive (establishing a maximum weekly working time limit of 48 hours, on average, including overtime) be interpreted as introducing limits with regard to one single contract or with regard to all the contracts concluded with the same employer or with different employers?

                  3.

                  In the event that the answers to Questions 1 and 2 involve an interpretation which is such as to exclude the possibility of the Member States being able to regulate, at national level, the application per contract of Article 3 and Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88/EC, where there are no provisions of national legislation governing the fact that the minimum daily rest and the maximum weekly working time are to relate to the worker (regardless of how many employment contracts are concluded with the same employer or with different employers), is a public institution of a Member State, which acts on behalf of the State, in a position to rely on the direct application of Article 3 and Article 6(b) of Directive 2003/88/EC and to penalise the employer for failure to observe the limits laid down by that directive as regards daily rest and/or the maximum weekly working time?

         (1)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).


title: Case C-619/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 19 August 2019 — Land Baden-Württemberg v D.R.

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 19 August 2019 — Land Baden-Württemberg v D.R.
      (Case C-619/19)
      (2019/C 406/14)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Bundesverwaltungsgericht

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Land Baden-Württemberg

         Defendant: D.R.

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/4/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC (the Environmental Information Directive) to be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘internal communications’ covers all communications which do not leave the internal sphere of an authority which is required to provide information?

                  2.

                  Is the temporal scope of the protection of ‘internal communications’ under point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Environmental Information Directive unlimited?

                  3.

                  If Question 2 is answered in the negative: Does the protection of ‘internal communications’ under point (e) of the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Environmental Information Directive apply only until the authority required to provide information has taken a decision or completed any other administrative process?

         (1)  OJ 2003, L 41, p. 26.


title: Case C-635/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Órgano Administrativo de Recursos Contractuales de la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi (Spain) lodged on 26 August 2019 — Confederación Sindical Comisiones Obreras de Euskadi v Ayuntamiento de Arrigorriaga

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Órgano Administrativo de Recursos Contractuales de la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi (Spain) lodged on 26 August 2019 — Confederación Sindical Comisiones Obreras de Euskadi v Ayuntamiento de Arrigorriaga
      (Case C-635/19)
      (2019/C 406/15)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Órgano Administrativo de Recursos Contractuales de la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Confederación Sindical Comisiones Obreras de Euskadi

         Defendant: Ayuntamiento de Arrigorriaga

         Question referred

      Does Directive 2014/24/EU (1) preclude national legislation, such as Article 122(2) of the LCSP, (2) which compels contracting authorities to include in the procurement documents governing a public contract a special condition of performance imposing on the successful tenderer an obligation to guarantee that the pay conditions applicable to workers under the relevant sectoral collective agreement will at least be honoured, even if that sectoral collective agreement is not binding on the undertaking to which the contract is awarded under the rules governing collective bargaining and collective agreements, which establish the primacy of the company agreement on pay and provide for the possibility of not applying a collective agreement in force for economic, technical, organisational or production reasons?

         (1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

         (2)  Law 9/2017 of 8 November 2017 on Public Sector Contracts.


title: Case C-644/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia (Romania) lodged on 28 August 2019 — FT v Universitatea ‘Lucian Blaga’ Sibiu, GS and Others, and Ministerul Educației Naționale

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia (Romania) lodged on 28 August 2019 — FT v Universitatea ‘Lucian Blaga’ Sibiu, GS and Others, and Ministerul Educației Naționale
      (Case C-644/19)
      (2019/C 406/16)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel Alba Iulia

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: FT

         Respondents: Universitatea ‘Lucian Blaga’ Sibiu, GS and Others, and Ministerul Educației Naționale

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Are Article 1, Article 2(2)(b) and Article 3 of Directive 2000/78/EC (1) and Clause 4 of the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, implemented by Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, (2) to be interpreted as meaning that a measure, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is discriminatory, within the meaning of those provisions, where it enables an employer to decide that individuals who have reached the age of 65 may continue to perform their duties as tenured members of staff and retain the rights which they enjoyed prior to retirement only if they have doctoral supervisor status, thereby placing at a disadvantage other individuals in a similar situation who may do the same only if there are vacant posts and they meet certain requirements relating to professional performance, and to require individuals who do not have doctoral supervisor status to perform similar academic duties under successive fixed-term employment contracts under which they receive remuneration on an ‘hourly basis’ at a level below that paid to tenured members of a university’s staff?

                  2.

                  Can the precedence in the application of EU law (the principle of the primacy of EU law) be interpreted as permitting a national court to disapply a final ruling of another national court in which it has been held that, in the factual situation described, Directive 2000/78/EC has been complied with and there has been no discrimination?

         (1)  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).

         (2)  Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).


title: Case C-645/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 30 August 2019 — Facebook Ireland Limited, Facebook Inc., Facebook Belgium BVBA v Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit

text:
               2.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 406/11

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van beroep te Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 30 August 2019 — Facebook Ireland Limited, Facebook Inc., Facebook Belgium BVBA v Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit
      (Case C-645/19)
      (2019/C 406/17)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Hof van beroep te Brussel

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Facebook Ireland Limited, Facebook Inc., Facebook Belgium BVBA

         Defendant: Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should Articles [55(1)], 56 to 58 and 60 to 66 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, read in conjunction with Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a supervisory authority which, pursuant to national law adopted in implementation of Article [58(5)] of that regulation, has the power to commence legal proceedings before a court in its Member State against infringements of that regulation cannot exercise that power in connection with cross-border processing if it is not the lead supervisory authority for that cross-border processing?

                  2.

                  Does it make a difference if the controller of that cross-border processing does not have its main establishment in that Member State but does have another establishment there?

                  3.

                  Does it make a difference whether the national supervisory authority commences the legal proceedings against the controller’s main establishment or against the establishment in its own Member State?

                  4.

                  Does it make a difference if the national supervisory authority had already commenced the legal proceedings before the date on which the regulation entered into force (25 May 2018)?

                  5.

                  If the first question is answered in the affirmative, does Article [58(5)] of the GDPR have direct effect, such that a national supervisory authority can rely on the aforementioned article to commence or continue legal proceedings against private parties even if Article [58(5)] of the GDPR has not been specifically transposed into the legislation of the Member States, notwithstanding the requirement to do so?

                  6.

                  If the previous questions are answered in the affirmative, could the outcome of such proceedings prevent the lead supervisory authority from reaching a conclusion to the contrary, in the event that the lead supervisory authority investigates the same or similar cross-border processing activities in accordance with the mechanism laid down in Articles 56 and 60 of the GDPR?

         (1)  OJ 2016, L 119, p. 1.