title: Case C-194/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 28 February 2019 — H. A. v État belge

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/27

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 28 February 2019 — H. A. v État belge
      (Case C-194/19)
      (2019/C 164/30)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: H. A.

         Defendant: État belge

         Question referred

      Must Article 27 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (1) (recast), considered alone or in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as requiring a national court, in order to guarantee the right to an effective remedy, to take into consideration, where appropriate, circumstances arising subsequent to a ‘Dublin transfer’ decision?

         (1)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31.


title: Case C-197/19 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-682/14: Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/28

      Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-682/14: Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v Commission
      (Case C-197/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/31)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. (represented by: C. Firth, S. Kon, C. Humpe, Solicitors, V. Adamis, advocate)

         Other party: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-682/14 Mylan Laboratories Ltd and Mylan Inc. v European Commission insofar as it dismisses their application to annul the Decision of the Commission of 9 July 2014 (1) in Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier) insofar as it concerns the applicants; or

                  —

                  annul or substantially reduce the fine; and/or

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice; and

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the appellants’ legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter and any other measures that the Court of Justice considers appropriate.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the appellants rely on five grounds of appeal supported by the following pleas.

                  1.

                  First Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Matrix and Les Laboratoires Servier were potential competitors at the time of the settlement.
                  First plea: The General Court was wrong to conclude that the Commission was entitled to consider that Matrix and Niche could be classified as potential competitors on the basis of the Niche/Matrix Agreement.
                  Second plea: The General Court misapplied the legal test for potential competition in reaching the conclusion that Matrix and Servier were potential competitors at the time of entering into the Settlement.

                  2.

                  Second Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that the settlement had the object of restricting competition.
                  First plea: The General Court has erred in finding that a patent settlement can have the object of restricting competition even though the terms of that settlement are within the scope of the patent.
                  Second plea: The General Court has erred in deriving the existence of a restriction of competition by object from the alleged inducement represented by the payment made by Servier to Matrix.
                  Third plea: The General Court erred in the manner in which it inferred the existence of an inducement from the payment received by Matrix.

                  3.

                  Third Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in declining to rule on the Commission’s classification of the settlement as a restriction of competition by effect.

                  4.

                  Fourth Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Mylan Inc. exercised decisive influence over the conduct of Matrix during the relevant period.

                  5.

                  Fifth Ground of Appeal: The General Court has infringed Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 (2) and the principles of nullum crimen nula poena sine lege, and legal certainty in finding that a fine could be imposed on the appellants.

         (1)  Summary of Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 relating to a proceeding under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier)) (notified under document C(2014) 4955), OJ 2016, C 393, p. 7

         (2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1


title: Case C-198/19 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-679/14: Teva UK Ltd and Others v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/29

      Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-679/14: Teva UK Ltd and Others v Commission
      (Case C-198/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/32)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd (represented by: D. Tayar, avocat, A. Richard, avocate)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Generic medicines Association AISBL (EGA), European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  accept the appeal and declare the action admissible;

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2018 in case T-679/14;

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision to be taken, unless the Court considers that it is sufficiently well informed to annul Commission Decision COMP/AT.39612 (1)‘Perindopril (Servier)’ of 9 July 2014insofar as it finds that Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited infringed Article 101 of the TFEU and cancel the fine imposed Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, and

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings, including the costs incurred by the appellants before this Court and before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellants put forward three pleas in law to support their request:

                  1.

                  The General Court erred in law in the standard applied to assess whether Teva was a potential competitor to Servier.

                  2.

                  The General Court erred in law in finding that the agreement was restrictive of competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU.

                  3.

                  The General Court erred in law in its application of Article 101(3) TFEU.

         (1)  Summary of Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 relating to a proceeding under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier)) (notified under document C(2014) 4955) (JO 2016 C 393, p. 7).


title: Case C-199/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 27 February 2019 — RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł. v J.M.

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/30

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 27 February 2019 — RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł. v J.M.
      (Case C-199/19)
      (2019/C 164/33)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł.

         Defendant: J.M.

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, (1) as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 4(1) of the Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 2013 r. o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions) (consolidated text: Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2019, item 118), be interpreted as meaning that contracts the characteristic performance of which consists in providing a temporary right to use goods in exchange for rent (for instance, lease or rental agreements) must also be regarded as transactions which lead to the delivery of goods or the provision of services for remuneration (commercial transactions)?

                  2.

                  If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should Article 5 of Directive 2011/7/EU, as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 11(1) of the Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions, be interpreted as meaning that an agreement that the debtor is to make periodic payments, also in the case where the contract is concluded for an indefinite term, is tantamount to the parties to a commercial transaction agreeing on a payment schedule providing for instalments?

         (1)  OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1.


title: Case C-200/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Trgovački sud u Zagreb (Croatia) made on 1 March 2019 — INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d. and Others v LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d.

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/31

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Trgovački sud u Zagreb (Croatia) made on 1 March 2019 — INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d. and Others v LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d.
      (Case C-200/19)
      (2019/C 164/34)
      Language of the case: Croatian

         Referring court

      Trgovački sud u Zagreb

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d., CROATIA osiguranje d.d., REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA, Croatia Airlines d.d., GRAD ZAGREB, HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA d.d., HRVATSKE ŠUME d.o.o., KAPITAL d.o.o. u stečaju, PETROKEMIJA d.d., Đuro Đaković Holding d.d., ENERGOINVEST d.d., TELENERG d.o.o., ENERGOCONTROL d.o.o., UDRUGA POSLODAVACA U ZDRAVSTVU, HRVATSKI ZAVOD ZA MIROVINSKO OSIGURANJE, ZAGREBPČANKA-POSLOVNI OBJEKTI d.d., BRODOGRADILIŠTE VIKTOR LENAC d.d., INOVINE d.d., MARAT INŽENJERING d.o.o., GOYA — COMPANY d.o.o., METROPOLIS PLAN d.o.o., Dalekovod d.d., INFRATERRA d.o.o., Citat d.o.o., STAROSTA d.o.o., METALKA METALCOM d.o.o., I.Š, B.C., Z.N., D.G., M.R., A.T.

         Defendant: LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d.

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Bearing in mind that the defendant neither participated in the conclusion of the agreements with the other co-owners nor consented to that which was agreed, must Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the defendant’s obligation — which is established by law but which, as regards the amount, final date for payment and other details, is determined by common agreement by the owners who represent more than half of the shares in the joint ownership of the building — must be regarded as a contractual obligation?

                  2.

                  Must Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the failure to perform an obligation established by law with regard to the other co-owners of the building, who may seek performance of that obligation by judicial means, should be regarded as a tort, delict or quasi-delict, particularly having regard to the fact that the defendant’s failure to perform a legal obligation can give rise to additional harm (aside from the financial loss from the reserve fund) both for the other co-owners and for third parties?

                  3.

                  Taking into consideration that, in the present case, the obligation in question arises from the fact that the defendant is the owner of commercial premises in which it carries out activities, namely, premises in which a branch is situated, must Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that this is a dispute relating to the operation of branches, agencies or any other establishment?


title: Case C-202/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/32

      Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission
      (Case C-202/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/35)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15; and

                  —

                  annul Articles 1(2), 2(4), 3, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1226 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-111/15 before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following g rounds.
      First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.
      Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the appellants; and erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport.
      Third, the General Court erred in its assessment of imputability to the State by: affirming that there was no need to specify whether the joint operator of the airport ‘SMAC’ was a public undertaking; not applying the Stardust Marine indicators to distinguish between autonomy and imputation; and failing to provide a sufficient statement of reasons for doing so.

         (1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1226 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by France in favour of Angoulême Chamber of Commerce and Industry, SNC-Lavalin, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services (notified under document C(2014) 5080) (JO 2015, L 201, p. 48).


title: Case C-203/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/33

      Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission
      (Case C-203/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/36)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15; and

                  —

                  annul Article 1(1), 1(2) and (insofar as these concern Articles 1(1) and 1(2)) Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1227 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.22614 (C 53/07), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-165/15 before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds.
      First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.
      Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the appellants; and erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport.

         (1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1227 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.22614 (C 53/07) implemented by France in favour of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pau-Béarn, Ryanair, Airport Marketing Services and Transavia (notified under document C(2014) 5085) (JO 2015, L 201, p. 109).


title: Case C-204/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd,Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/34

      Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd,Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission
      (Case C-204/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/37)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16; and

                  —

                  annul Articles 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/633 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33961 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-53/16 before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds.
      First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.
      Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of
      advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the Appellants; erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental nonaeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport; and erred by finding that decreased profitability, rather than lack of profitability, is sufficient for a finding of aid.
      Third, the General Court erred in its assessment of imputability to the State by: considering that the operator of the airport — ‘SMAN’ — was an ‘organ of the State’; not applying the Stardust Marine indicators; and failing to provide a sufficient statement of reasons for doing so. The General Court also erred by wrongly affirming that the decisions of the private company VTAN were imputable to the State.

         (1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2016/633 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33961 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by France in favour of Nîmes-Uzès-Le Vigan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Veolia Transport Aéroport de Nîmes, Ryanair Limited and Airport Marketing Services Limited (notified under document C(2014) 5078) (JO 2016, L 113, p. 32).


title: Case C-205/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/36

      Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission
      (Case C-205/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/38)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16; and

                  —

                  annul Article 1(4), and 2 to 4 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/287 (1) of 15 October 2014 on State aid SA.26500 — 2012/C (ex 2011/NN, ex CP 227/2008), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-165/16 before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds.
      First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.
      Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the appellants; and erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport.

         (1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2016/287 of 15 October 2014 on State aid SA.26500 — 2012/C (ex 2011/NN, ex CP 227/2008) implemented by Germany for Flugplatz Altenburg-Nobitz GmbH and Ryanair Ltd (notified under document C(2014) 7369) (JO 2016, L 59, p. 22).


title: Case C-212/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 March 2019 — Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation v Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/37

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 March 2019 — Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation v Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo
      (Case C-212/19)
      (2019/C 164/39)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation

         Respondent: Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must the Commission’s decision of 14 July 2004 (1) be interpreted as declaring that only the reductions in employers’ contributions are incompatible with the common market, on the ground that the reduction in employees’ contributions do not benefit the undertakings and therefore cannot fall within the scope of Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible?

                  2.

                  In the event that the Court finds that the Commission’s decision is to be interpreted as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible, must the undertaking be regarded as having received the full amount of those reductions or only a part thereof? In the latter case, how is that part to be assessed? Is the Member State required to order recovery from the employees concerned of the part of the aid from which they benefited?

         (1)  Commission Decision of 14 July 2004 concerning certain aid measures applied by France to assist fish farmers and fishermen (2005/239/EC) (OJ 2005 L 74, p. 49).


title: Case C-215/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 8 March 2019 — Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/39

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 8 March 2019 — Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö
      (Case C-215/19)
      (2019/C 164/41)
      Language of the case: Finnish

         Referring court

      Korkein hallinto-oikeus

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

         Other party: A Oy

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Are Articles 13b and 31a of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 (1) of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC (2) on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1042/2013 (3) of 7 October 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards the place of supply of services, to be interpreted as meaning that computing centre services of the type at issue in the main proceedings, with which a trader provides its customers with equipment cabinets in a computing centre for holding customers’ servers together with ancillary services, are to be regarded as the leasing or letting of immovable property?

                  2.

                  If the first question is answered in the negative, are Article 47 of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC and Article 31a of the aforementioned Implementing Regulation nevertheless to be interpreted as meaning that a computing centre service of the type at issue in the main proceedings is to be regarded as a service connected with immovable property, the place of supply of which is the location of the property?

         (1)  OJ 2011 L 77, p. 1.

         (2)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

         (3)  OJ 2013 L 284, p. 1.


title: Case C-233/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 18 March 2019 — B v Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/40

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 18 March 2019 — B v Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)
      (Case C-233/19)
      (2019/C 164/42)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Cour du travail de Liège

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: B.

         Defendant: Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

         Question referred

      Must Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, (1) read in the light of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 14(1)(b) of that directive, read in the light of the judgment in Case C-562/13, delivered on 18 December 2014 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), be interpreted as endowing with suspensive effect an appeal brought against a decision ordering a third-country national suffering from a serious illness to leave the territory of a Member State, in the case where the appellant claims that the enforcement of that decision is liable to expose him to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health:

                  —

                  without it being necessary to examine the appeal, its mere introduction being sufficient to suspend the enforcement of the decision ordering the third-country national to leave the territory of that Member State; or

                  —

                  following a marginal review as to whether there is an arguable complaint, lack of grounds for inadmissibility or whether the action brought before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) is manifestly unfounded; or

                  —

                  following a full and comprehensive judicial review carried out by the labour courts in order to determine whether the enforcement of that decision is indeed liable to expose the appellant to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health?

         (1)  OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.


title: Case T-433/16: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Pometon v Commission (Competition — Agreements and concerted practices — European steel abrasives market — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Price coordination throughout the EEA — Chronologically staggered ‘hybrid’ procedure — Presumption of innocence — Principle of impartiality — Charter of Fundamental Rights — Evidence of the infringement — Single and continuous infringement — Restriction of competition ‘by object’ — Duration of the infringement — Fine — Exceptional adjustment of the basic amount — Obligation to state reasons — Proportionality — Equal treatment — Unlimited jurisdiction)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/42

      Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Pometon v Commission
      (Case T-433/16) (1)

      (Competition - Agreements and concerted practices - European steel abrasives market - Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement - Price coordination throughout the EEA - Chronologically staggered ‘hybrid’ procedure - Presumption of innocence - Principle of impartiality - Charter of Fundamental Rights - Evidence of the infringement - Single and continuous infringement - Restriction of competition ‘by object’ - Duration of the infringement - Fine - Exceptional adjustment of the basic amount - Obligation to state reasons - Proportionality - Equal treatment - Unlimited jurisdiction)
      (2019/C 164/43)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Pometon SpA (Maerne di Martellago, Italy) (represented by: E. Fabrizi, V. Veneziano and A. Molinaro, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Rossi and B. Mongin, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 3121 final of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls Article 2 of Commission Decision C(2016) 3121 final of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives);

                  2.

                     Sets the amount of the fine imposed on Pometon SpA at EUR 3 873 375;

                  3.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  4.

                     Orders each party to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 371, 10.10.2016.


title: Case T-766/16: Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (State aid — Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs — Guarantee — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Advantage — Obligation to state reasons)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/43

      Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission
      (Case T-766/16) (1)

      (State aid - Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs - Guarantee - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market - Advantage - Obligation to state reasons)
      (2019/C 164/44)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicant: Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD (Alicante, Spain) (represented by: S. Rating and Y. Martínez Mata, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Luengo, B. Stromsky and P. Němečková, Agents)

         Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: initially A. Gavela Llopis and M.J. García-Valdecasas Dorrego, subsequently by M.J. García-Valdecasas Dorrego, Agents)

         Re:

      Action under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol, SAD (OJ 2017 L 55, p. 12).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol, SAD, in so far as it concerns Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD;

                  2.

                     Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Hércules Club de Fútbol;

                  3.

                     Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 6, 9.1.2017.


title: Case T-582/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Boshab and Others v Council (Common Foreign and Security Policy — Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and to the prohibition of entry and transit — Inclusion of the names of the applicants on the list — Rights of defence — Right to be heard — Obligation to state reasons — Manifest error of assessment — Right to effective judicial protection)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/43

      Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Boshab and Others v Council
      (Case T-582/17) (1)

      (Common Foreign and Security Policy - Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and to the prohibition of entry and transit - Inclusion of the names of the applicants on the list - Rights of defence - Right to be heard - Obligation to state reasons - Manifest error of assessment - Right to effective judicial protection)
      (2019/C 164/45)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicants: Évariste Boshab (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the seven other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to the judgment (represented: initially by P. Chansay Wilmotte, A. Kalambay Ndaya and P. Okito Omole, and subsequently by T. Bontinck, M. Forgeois, P. De Wolf and A. Guillerme, lawyers)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented: initially by M. Veiga and B. Driessen, and subsequently by B. Driessen and J.-P. Hix, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application on the basis of Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/904 of 29 May 2017 implementing Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2017 L 138 I, p. 1), and of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/905 of 29 May 2017 implementing Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2017 L 138 I, p. 6), in so far as those acts concern the applicants.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Mr Évariste Boshab and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 374, 6.11.2017.


title: Case T-725/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Clestra Hauserman v Parliament (Public works contracts — Tendering procedure — Works relating to the ‘Removable partitioning — doors’ of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg — Rejection of a tenderer’s bid — Award of the contract to another tenderer — Obligation to state reasons — Abnormally low tender — Manifest error of assessment — Non-contractual liability)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/44

      Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Clestra Hauserman v Parliament
      (Case T-725/17) (1)

      (Public works contracts - Tendering procedure - Works relating to the ‘Removable partitioning - doors’ of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg - Rejection of a tenderer’s bid - Award of the contract to another tenderer - Obligation to state reasons - Abnormally low tender - Manifest error of assessment - Non-contractual liability)
      (2019/C 164/46)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Clestra Hauserman (Illkirch-Graffenstaden, France) (represented by: J. Gehin, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: V. Naglič and B. Schäfer, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      First, claim under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the Parliament’s decision of 24 August 2017 adopted in the context of tendering procedure INLO-D-UPIL-T-16-AO8 concerning Lot 55, entitled ‘Removable partitioning — doors’, of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg, rejecting the applicant’s bid and awarding the contract to another tenderer and, second, claim under Article 268 TFEU for compensation in respect of the loss allegedly suffered by the applicant.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Clestra Hauserman to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

         (1)  OJ C 13, 15.1.2018.


title: Case T-787/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Parfümerie Akzente v EUIPO (GlamHair) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark GlamHair — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/45

      Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Parfümerie Akzente v EUIPO (GlamHair)
      (Case T-787/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark GlamHair - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 164/47)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (Pfedelbach, Germany) (represented by: O. Spieker, A. Schönfleisch and M. Alber, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 September 2017 (Case R 82/2017-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign GlamHair as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Parfümerie Akzente GmbH to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 32, 29.1.2018.


title: Case T-829/17: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Coesia v EUIPO (Representation of two oblique red curves) (EU trade mark — Application for an EU figurative mark representing two oblique red curves — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/46

      Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Coesia v EUIPO (Representation of two oblique red curves)
      (Case T-829/17) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Application for an EU figurative mark representing two oblique red curves - Absolute ground for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Obligation to state reasons - Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 164/48)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Coesia SpA (Bologna, Italy) (represented by: S. Rizzo, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 September 2017 (Case R 1272/2017-5), regarding an application for registration of a figurative sign representing two oblique red curves as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Coesia SpA to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 63, 19.2.2018.


title: Case T-105/18: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 –Deray v EUIPO — Charles Claire (LILI LA TIGRESSE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark LILI LA TIGRESSE — Earlier EU word mark TIGRESS — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/46

      Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 –Deray v EUIPO — Charles Claire (LILI LA TIGRESSE)
      (Case T-105/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark LILI LA TIGRESSE - Earlier EU word mark TIGRESS - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 164/49)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: André Deray (Bry-sur-Marne, France) (represented by: S. Santos Rodríguez, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: P. Sipos and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Charles Claire LLP (Weybridge, Surrey, United Kingdom)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 December 2017 (Case R 1244/2017-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Charles Claire and Mr Deray.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Mr André Deray to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 134, 16.4.2018.


title: Case T-265/18: Judgment of the General Court of 27 March 2019 — Biernacka-Hoba v EUIPO — Formata Bogusław Hoba (Formata) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark Formata — Earlier international figurative mark Formata — Relative ground for invalidity — Article 60(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Rule 37 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) — Conditions governing the representation of the earlier mark — Rule 19 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7 of Delegated Regulation 2018/625) — Legitimate expectations — Reimbursement of the costs of representation — Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Rule 94 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001))

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/47

      Judgment of the General Court of 27 March 2019 — Biernacka-Hoba v EUIPO — Formata Bogusław Hoba (Formata)
      (Case T-265/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark Formata - Earlier international figurative mark Formata - Relative ground for invalidity - Article 60(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Rule 37 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) - Conditions governing the representation of the earlier mark - Rule 19 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7 of Delegated Regulation 2018/625) - Legitimate expectations - Reimbursement of the costs of representation - Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Rule 94 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 164/50)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Parties

         Applicant: Illona Biernacka-Hoba (Aleksandrów Łódzki, Poland) (represented by: R. Rumpel, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Formata Bogusław Hoba (Aleksandrów Łódzki, Poland)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 February 2018 (Case R 2032/2017-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Ms Biernacka-Hoba and Formata Bogusław Hoba

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 February 2018 (Case R 2032/2017-4), in so far as it ordered Ms Ilona Biernacka-Hoba to pay the costs incurred by Formata Bogusław Hoba for the purposes of the invalidity proceedings and the appeal and fixed the amount of the costs that Ms Biernacka-Hoba had to pay to Formata Bogusław Hoba at EUR 1000, and alters that decision to the effect that Ms Biernacka-Hoba must not be ordered to pay such a sum;

                  2.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  3.

                     Orders each party to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.


title: Case T-276/18: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Julius-K9 v EUIPO — El Corte Inglés (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark K9 UNIT — Earlier EU figurative mark unit — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/48

      Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Julius-K9 v EUIPO — El Corte Inglés
      (Case T-276/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark K9 UNIT - Earlier EU figurative mark unit - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)
      (2019/C 164/51)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Julius-K9 Zrt (Szigetszentmiklós, Hungary) (represented by: G. Jambrik, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Lukošiūtė and by H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: El Corte Inglés, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 February 2018 (Case R 1432/2017-2) relating to opposition proceedings between Hipercor, SA and Julius-K9.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 February 2018 (Case R 1432/2017-2);

                  2.

                     Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Julius-K9 Zrt;

                  3.

                     Orders El Corte Inglés, SA to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.


title: Case T-239/18: Order of the General Court of 18 March 2019 — SKS Import Export v Commission (Action for annulment — Free movement of capital — Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) — Directive (EU) 2015/849 — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 — Inclusion of Tunisia on the list of high-risk third countries — Inadmissibility)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/49

      Order of the General Court of 18 March 2019 — SKS Import Export v Commission
      (Case T-239/18) (1)

      (Action for annulment - Free movement of capital - Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) - Directive (EU) 2015/849 - Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 - Inclusion of Tunisia on the list of high-risk third countries - Inadmissibility)
      (2019/C 164/52)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Société Kammama Saber (SKS) Import Export (Sousse Jaouhara, Tunisia) (represented by: H. Chelly, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: V. Di Bucci, A. Bouquet and T. Scharf, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action based on Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 of 13 December 2017, amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards adding Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia to the table in point I of the Annex (OJ 2018 L 41, p. 4).

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

                  2.

                     Société Kammama Saber (SKS) Import Export shall pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.


title: Case T-410/18: Order of the General Court of 15 March 2019 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission (Action for annulment — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market in metal packaging — Decision to open an investigation — Act not open to challenge — Inadmissibility)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/50

      Order of the General Court of 15 March 2019 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission
      (Case T-410/18) (1)

      (Action for annulment - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Market in metal packaging - Decision to open an investigation - Act not open to challenge - Inadmissibility)
      (2019/C 164/53)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicants: Silgan Closures GmbH (Munich, Germany), Silgan Holdings, Inc. (Stamford, Connecticut, United States) (represented by: H. Wollmann, D. Seeliger, R. Grafunder and V. Weiss, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: T. Christoforou, B. Ernst, G. Meessen, C. Vollrath and L. Wildpanner, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2018) 2466 final of 19 April 2018, by which the Commission initiated a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU in case AT.40522 — Pandora.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The action is dismissed.

                  2.

                     There is no need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Council of the European Union.

                  3.

                     Silgan Closures GmbH and Silgan Holdings, Inc., shall bear their own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

                  4.

                     The Federal Republic of Germany and the Council shall bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

         (1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.


title: Case T-503/18: Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Haba Trading v EUIPO — Vida (vidaXL) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Withdrawal of the opposition — No need to adjudicate)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/50

      Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Haba Trading v EUIPO — Vida (vidaXL)
      (Case T-503/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the opposition - No need to adjudicate)
      (2019/C 164/54)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Haba Trading BV (Utrecht, Netherlands) (represented by: B. Schneiders and A. Brittner, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Vida AB (Alvesta, Sweden)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 June 2018 (Case R 190/2016-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Vida AB and Haba Trading BV.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

                  2.

                     Haba Trading BV is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

         (1)  OJ C 373, 15.10.2018.


title: Case T-75/19: Order of the General Court of 13 March 2019 — Comune di Milano v Parliament and Council (Declining of jurisdiction)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/51

      Order of the General Court of 13 March 2019 — Comune di Milano v Parliament and Council
      (Case T-75/19) (1)

      (Declining of jurisdiction)
      (2019/C 164/55)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Comune di Milano (represented by: F. Sciaudone, M. Condinanzi and A. Neri, lawyers)

         Defendants: European Parliament (represented by: L. Visaggio, I. Anagnostopoulou and A. Tamás, acting as Agents) and Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer, F. Florindo Gijón and E. Rebasti, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      First, claim under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Regulation (EU) 2018/1718 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 as regards the location of the seat of the European Medicines Agency (OJ 2018 L 291, p. 3), and, second, claim for a decision allegedly adopted by the Council on 20 November 2017 to be declared ineffective.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The General Court declines jurisdiction in Case T-75/19 in order to enable the Court of Justice to rule on the action.

                  2.

                     The decision on the Comune di Milano’s request that the present action be determined under an expedited procedure is reserved.

                  3.

                     The costs are reserved.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 25.3.2019.


title: Case T-1/19: Action brought on 7 January 2019 — CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/52

      Action brought on 7 January 2019 — CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union
      (Case T-1/19)
      (2019/C 164/56)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: CJ (represented by: V. Kolias, lawyer)

         Defendant: Court of Justice of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare contrary to the Treaties the failure of the defendant to anonymize procedural documents referring to him by name and published on the world wide web by the General Court and the former Civil Service Tribunal, subsidiarily its failure to make nominal versions of such documents inaccessible to world wide web search providers;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and arguing in particular:

                              —

                              that the applicant has brought actions against his former employer before the former Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court;

                              —

                              that procedural documents of those actions have been published referring to the applicant by name and are accessible to world wide web search providers like Google;

                              —

                              that accessibility to such search providers facilitates the profiling of the applicant by any Internet user in the world, including current and any prospective employers;

                              —

                              that from such profiling arises the risk of discrimination against the applicant;

                              —

                              that the Court of Justice of the European Union has decided to anonymize by default published procedural documents for all requests for a preliminary ruling relating to natural persons and received after 1 July 2018;

                              —

                              that the anonymization of published procedural documents for any other type of action under the Treaties remains at the absolute discretion of the judicature of the European Union,

                              —

                              that the natural persons involved in requests for a preliminary ruling brought before the Court of Justice after 1 July 2018 and the applicant are not treated equally.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court has breached Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and arguing in particular:

                              —

                              that the purpose of publishing procedural documents is, in the words of the Court of Justice, to ‘guarante[e] that citizens are informed and have the right to open courts’;

                              —

                              that to achieve that purpose it is unnecessary to publish versions of procedural documents referring to the applicant by name or, subsidiarily, to make such versions accessible to world wide web search providers like Google;

                              —

                              that the failure of the General Court to end such practice infringes Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(a) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), subsidiarily Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(a) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (2)

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1).

         (2)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).


title: Case T-136/19: Action brought on 1 March 2019 — Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/53

      Action brought on 1 March 2019 — Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission
      (Case T-136/19)
      (2019/C 164/57)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD (Sofia, Bulgaria), Bulgartransgaz EAD (Sofia), Bulgargaz EAD (Sofia) (represented by: K. Struckmann, lawyer, M. Powell and A. Kadri, Solicitors)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  adopt the measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry specified in section 3.6 of the application, or any other such measures as the Court deems necessary;

                  —

                  annul in whole or in part the Commission decision C(2018) 8806 final, of 17 December 2018, relating to proceedings under Article 102 of TFEU (AT.39849 — BEH Gas);

                  —

                  annul or reduce the level of the fine imposed;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on seven pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached essential procedural requirements, thus infringing the applicants’ rights of defence.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s definition of the relevant market is vitiated by errors of law and fact, and by a failure to conduct a market analysis and state adequate reasons.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s finding that Bulgargaz EAD, as one of the applicants, or the applicants together, held a dominant position on the market for capacity services, is vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision infringes the European Union treaties by failing to establish, to the requisite standard, that the conduct described in the contested decision amounts to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, in light of errors in its application of the law and in its appreciation of the facts.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s findings as to the duration of the alleged infringement are vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (1), the EU treaties were infringed, in the process.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging that the fine should be annulled or reduced in light of the contested decision’s failure to adhere to the defendant’s fining guidelines, or alternatively in the exercise of the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 261 TFEU on the basis that the fine is in all the circumstances disproportionate to the conduct being sanctioned.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).


title: Case T-148/19: Action brought on 7 March 2019 — PKK v Council

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/55

      Action brought on 7 March 2019 — PKK v Council
      (Case T-148/19)
      (2019/C 164/58)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (represented by: A. van Eik and T. Buruma, lawyers)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant (whereas the applicant disputes that Kadek and Kongra Gel are its aliases);

                  —

                  in the alternative, warrant a less onerous measure than continued listing on the European Union terrorist list;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs with interest.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the applicant could have not been qualified as a terrorist organisation as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001. (2)

                  The defendant would have failed to establish that the applicant is a structured group acting in concert to commit terrorist attacks. Moreover, the bulk of the acts mentioned in the statement of reasons cannot be attributed to the applicant, are not included in the limitative list of acts in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and/or cannot seriously damage a country. Finally, the aim of the applicant was not a ‘terrorist aim’ as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. In particular, this aim must be considered in light of the armed conflict for self-determination.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant because no decision by a competent authority, as required by Article 1(4) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, would have been taken.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the defendant would have not conducted any proper review as required by Article 1(6) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
                  The statement of reasons would have not shown that any proper review has taken place, both on the national level and by the defendant itself. No due regard is paid to the information provided by the applicant in previous procedures regarding the peace process, the fight against Daesh and the autocratic developments in Turkey.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as the decision would have not complied with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.
                  In particular, the diaspora of Kurds is disproportionally hurt by the listing.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as it does not comply with the obligation to state reasons in conformity with Article 296 TFEU.
                  The General Court in its judgment of 15 November 2018, PKK v Council (T-316/14, EU:T:2018:788), came to a similar conclusion based on the exact same statement of reasons.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant because it would have infringed the applicant’s right of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.
                  In particular, the defendant would have ignored the judgment of 15 November 2018, PKK v Council (T-316/14, EU:T:2018:788), and the proceedings leading up to it.

         (1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 amending and updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2018/1084 (OJ L 6, 9.1.2019, p. 6).

         (2)  Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93).


title: Case T-163/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Mersinis v ESMA

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/56

      Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Mersinis v ESMA
      (Case T-163/19)
      (2019/C 164/59)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Michail Mersinis (Athens, Greece) (represented by: P. Pafitis, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the defendant’s decision of 23 May 2018 not to select the applicant for the post of senior legal officer in respect of the vacancy ESMA/2017/VAC19/AD7.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging unlawful composition of the selection committee.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging the exercise of bias in favour of the candidate selected for the post in question.


title: Case T-164/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — AQ v eu-LISA

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/57

      Action brought on 14 March 2019 — AQ v eu-LISA
      (Case T-164/19)
      (2019/C 164/60)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: AQ (represented by: L. Levi and N. Flandin, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decision of eu-LISA of 8 May 2018 which terminates the applicant’s employment contract at eu-LISA without notice together with, in so far as necessary, the decision of eu-LISA of 4 December 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay compensation for the harm suffered by the applicant;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging a procedural irregularity and the violation of the rights of the defence and in particular the right to be heard.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging the breach of Articles 16 and 48 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty of care.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 31 and 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging an abuse of power.


title: Case T-166/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Bronckers v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/58

      Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Bronckers v Commission
      (Case T-166/19)
      (2019/C 164/61)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Marco Bronckers (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: P. Kreijger, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decision of the Commission of 10 January 2019 under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (1) rejecting the applicant’s confirmatory application for access to documents mentioned in the minutes of the Joint Committee on Spirit Drinks established under the Agreement between the European Community and the United Mexican States on the mutual recognition and protection of designations for spirit drinks; (2)

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs incurred by the applicant.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of the access request misapplies Article 4(1)(a), third indent, of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, and/or infringes Article 296 TFEU.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of the access request misapplies Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 and/or infringes Article 296 TFEU, as the Commission has not shown that access to all of the requested documents undermines commercial interests of the Consejo Regulador del Tequila (CRT) or its members.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission wrongly found that the applicant failed to show an overriding public interest in disclosure.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of partial access misapplies Article 4(6) and/or Article 4(7) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, and/or infringes Art. 296 TFEU.

         (1)  Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p.43).

         (2)  See Council Decision of 27 May 1997 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United Mexican States on the mutual recognition and protection of designations for spirit drinks (OJ 1997 L 152, p. 15).


title: Case T-175/19: Action brought on 18 March 2019 — Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft v EUIPO (eVoter)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/59

      Action brought on 18 March 2019 — Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft v EUIPO (eVoter)
      (Case T-175/19)
      (2019/C 164/62)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft eV (Munich, Germany) (represented by: L. Grenz, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Trade mark at issue: Registration of EU word mark eVoter — Registration No 17 900 152

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 January 2019 in Case R 1983/2018-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Breach of EUIPO’s administrative practice;

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-180/19: Action brought on 26 March 2019 — Bibita Group v EUIPO — Benkomers (Beverage bottles)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/60

      Action brought on 26 March 2019 — Bibita Group v EUIPO — Benkomers (Beverage bottles)
      (Case T-180/19)
      (2019/C 164/63)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Bibita Group SHPK (Tirana, Albania) (represented by: C. Seyfert, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Benkomers OOD (Sofia, Bulgaria)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Proprietor of the design at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

         Design at issue: Community design No 3797 091-0001 (Beverage bottles)

         Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 January 2019 in Case R 1070/2018-3

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  declare the contested Community design registered under No 3797 091-0001 invalid, on all the grounds set in the application;

                  —

                  order the defendant and the proprietor to pay the procedural costs relating to the proceedings before the Third Board of Appeal, pursuant to Article 190 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court;

                  —

                  order EUIPO and the potential other party to the present proceedings to pay the entirety of the costs of the proceedings.

         Plea in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Articles 6(1) and 25(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.


title: Case T-336/18: Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/61

      Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)
      (Case T-336/18) (1)

      (2019/C 164/64)
      Language of the case: English
      The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 268, 30.7.2018.


title: Case T-470/18: Order of the General Court of 21 March 2019 — Telenet v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/61

      Order of the General Court of 21 March 2019 — Telenet v Commission
      (Case T-470/18) (1)

      (2019/C 164/65)
      Language of the case: English
      The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 364, 8.10.2018.


title: Corrigendum to the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19 (OJ C 122, 1.4.2019)

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/62

      Corrigendum to the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19

         (
               Official Journal of the European Union C 122 of 1 April 2019
            )

      (2019/C 164/66)
      On page 20, the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19, Acron and Others/Commission should read as follows:

               ‘Action brought on 24 January 2019 — Acron and Others v Commission

                  (Case T-45/19)

               (2019/C 164/66)
               Language of the case: English

                  Parties

                  Applicants: Acron PAO (Veliky Novgorod, Russia), Dorogobuzh PAO (Dorogobuzh, Russia), Acron Switzerland AG (Baar, Switzerland) (represented by: T. De Meese, J. Stuyck and A. Nys, lawyers)

                  Defendant: European Commission

                  Form of order sought

               The applicants claim that the Court should:

                           —

                           annul the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1703 of 12 November 2018; and

                           —

                           order the defendant to pay the costs;

                  Pleas in law and main arguments

               In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                           1.

                           First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached its international obligations, which amounts to a breach of the Treaty and it failed to provide sufficient motivation by finding that the Russian Federation was not complying with its World Trade Organisation obligations.
                           The applicants submit that the defendant would have failed to take into account the Russian Federation’s accession to the World Trade Organisation as relevant to the change in the calculation of the dumping margin of the applicants. The defendant would be under the obligation to take into account the commitments made by the Russian Federation regarding the price of gas when investigating the interim review of the duties applicable to the import of ammonium nitrate. Since the defendant would have argued that the Russian Federation would not have been complying with its own Protocol of Accession, the defendant would have acted in breach of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Article II of World Trade Organisation Antidumping Agreement. In failing to do so, it would have breached its international obligations, which amounts to a breach of the Treaty.

                           2.

                           Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant made a manifest error of assessment and failed to provide sufficient motivation, resulting in the breach of the rights of defence of the applicants by finding that the change of circumstances invoked by the applicants was not of a lasting nature.

                                       —

                                       The applicants submit that, within the scope of the second plea, there would be two separate grounds for annulment of the contested decision. Both grounds relate to the erroneous conclusion that the change of circumstances was not of lasting nature.

                                       —

                                       In any case, the defendant would have breached its obligation of motivation under Article 296 TFEU by failing to motivate the contested decision in a clear and unequivocal fashion.

                           3.

                           Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant infringed Articles 19(2) and 20(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as well as the applicants’ rights of defence and provided for a lack of legal certainty by failing to provide its dumping calculation.

                                       —

                                       The defendant would have failed to disclose the final calculation of the dumping margin to the applicants, even though that calculation served as the basis for the findings relating to the continuation and existence of dumping, the lasting nature of the change of circumstances, and also the termination of the partial interim review. If the defendant would have communicated the calculation, it would have allowed the applicants to defend their rights more effectively with regard to the dumping calculation and the findings of dumping as a whole, including the argument relating to the calculation methodology used in the original investigation, which could have had a significant impact on their legal situation.

                                       —

                                       The applicants submit that the defendant would have infringed Article 19(2) and Article 20(2) of Regulation 2016/1036, the applicants’ rights of defence and the principle of legal certainty by failing to provide the applicants with a meaningful summary of the evidence collected during the investigation or the considerations on the basis of which the defendant proposed to amend the applicants’ anti-dumping margin. The applicants submit that by refusing to provide them with its dumping margin calculation, the defendant would have infringed the applicants’ rights of defence and would have breached the principle of legal certainty.’


title: Case T-135/15: Judgment of the General Court of 12 March 2019 — Italy v Commission (EAGF — Expenses excluded from financing — Expenditure incurred by Italy — Temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry — Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 — Regulation(EC) No 968/2006 — Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 — Time limit of 24 months — Concept of ‘multiannual measure’ — Conditions for granting restructuring aid — Concept of ‘production facility’ — Classification of silos — Concept of‘complete dismantling’ — Annex 2 to Document VI/5330/97 — Problems in interpreting EU legislation — Cooperation in good faith — Legitimate expectations — Ne bis in idem — Slaughter premiums — Information and promotion campaigns for agricultural products — Late payments — Evidence of the existence of specific management conditions — Equal treatment — Mistranslation in one of the language versions of an EU regulation — Whether the Member State is answerable for the financial correction)

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/41

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 March 2019 — Italy v Commission
      (Case T-135/15) (1)

      (EAGF - Expenses excluded from financing - Expenditure incurred by Italy - Temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry - Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 - Regulation(EC) No 968/2006 - Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 - Time limit of 24 months - Concept of ‘multiannual measure’ - Conditions for granting restructuring aid - Concept of ‘production facility’ - Classification of silos - Concept of‘complete dismantling’ - Annex 2 to Document VI/5330/97 - Problems in interpreting EU legislation - Cooperation in good faith - Legitimate expectations - Ne bis in idem - Slaughter premiums - Information and promotion campaigns for agricultural products - Late payments - Evidence of the existence of specific management conditions - Equal treatment - Mistranslation in one of the language versions of an EU regulation - Whether the Member State is answerable for the financial correction)
      (2019/C 148/37)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and C. Colelli, avvocato dello Stato)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: initially, D. Bianchi, P Ondrůšek and I. Galindo Martín, acting as Agents, and subsequently, D. Bianchi and P Ondrůšek, acting as Agents)

         Interveners in support of the applicant: French Republic (represented by: D. Colas and S Horrenberger, acting as Agents) and Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér and G. Koós, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU for the partial annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/103 of 16 January 2015 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2015 L 16, p.33), in so far as it relates to certain expenditure incurred by the Italian Republic.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders the Italian Republic to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                     Orders the French Republic and Hungary to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 155, 11.5.2015.