201806220231970722018/C 240/171582018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180222151621Case C-158/18 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2018 by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2017 in Case T-123/16: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN1510120180222EN0017151162Appeal brought on 22 February 2018 by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2017 in Case T-123/16: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office
   (Case C-158/18 P)2018/C 240/17Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd (represented by: A. Norris, Barrister)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Burlington Fashion GmbH

      Form of order sought

   The appellant(s) claim(s) that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court dismissing Tulliallan Burlington Ltd’s (TBL) appeal from the Board of Appeal;

            —

            set aside the decision of the Board of Appeal [or alternatively refer the case back to the General Court to be decided in accordance with the Court of Justice’s decision];

            —

            order the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Burlington Fashion GmbH (BFG) to pay the costs incurred by TBL in connection with this appeal.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The appellant (‘TBL’) appeals from the General Court's judgment on the basis that the General Court made the following errors of law:

            1)

            Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(5)EUTMR (
                  1
               )

                     a)

                     The General Court erred in failing to make any findings in relation to ‘link’.

                     b)

                     Further, the General Court erred in holding that TBL had not provided the proof necessary to establish detriment to distinctive character or unfair advantage.

                     c)

                     In concluding as it did that the necessary proof had not been provided, the General Court erred by (i) setting the legal bar too high, and (ii) failing to take into account the relevant evidence.

                     d)

                     In fact, the only conclusion available to the General Court was that there was detriment to distinctive character or further or alternatively unfair advantage.

                     e)

                     The General Court wrongly rejected TBL's submissions that the Board of Appeal's decision was vitiated by its evident failure to take into account the submissions made to it.

            2)

            Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(4) EUTMR

                     a)

                     The General Court declined to find that the Board of Appeal should have requested additional submissions on Article 8(4) in circumstances where the only way to ensure procedural justice would have been for the Board of Appeal to invite those submissions or decide the issue on Article 8(5) only and remit the issue of Article 8(4) back to the Opposition Division. The Board of Appeal's decision should have been set aside by the General Court.

                     b)

                     The General Court was wrong to uphold the Board of Appeal's conclusion that TBL had not demonstrated the prerequisites for making out Article 8(4). The General Court ought to have found that the Board of Appeal was in error, set aside the Board of Appeal's findings on Article 8(4) and substituted its own finding that Article 8(4) had been infringed.

      Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1) EUTMR

            a)

            The General Court erred in applying Praktiker because in the light of the decision of the Court of Justice in EUIPO v Cactus (C-501/15 P; EU:C:2017:750), Praktiker does not apply to the Earlier Marks here.

            b)

            Further or alternatively, the General Court erred in applying Praktiker because that judgment does not apply to shopping arcade services.

            c)

            Even if TBL's Earlier Marks fell within the scope of ‘retail services’ and therefore fell within the ambit of Praktiker, the General Court was wrong to interpret Praktiker as necessarily precluding a finding of confusing similarity.

            d)

            Because it erred in its findings on the application of Praktiker, the General Court failed to either (i) conduct an assessment of the likelihood of confusion or (ii) refer that exercise to the Board of Appeal. In the circumstances, it was obliged to take one of these steps.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017, L 154, p. 1).


201806220281970482018/C 240/045312016CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201805173422Case C-531/16: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas — Lithuania) — Šiaulių regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras, ‘Ecoservice projektai’ UAB, formerly ‘Specializuotas transportas’ UAB (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2004/18/EC — Procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts — Links between tenderers having submitted separate tenders in the same procedure — Obligations of the tenderers, of the contracting authority and of the national court)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN320120180517EN00043242Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas — Lithuania) — Šiaulių regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras, ‘Ecoservice projektai’ UAB, formerly ‘Specializuotas transportas’ UAB
   (Case C-531/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2004/18/EC — Procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts — Links between tenderers having submitted separate tenders in the same procedure — Obligations of the tenderers, of the contracting authority and of the national court)’2018/C 240/04Language of the case: Lithuanian
      Referring court

   Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Šiaulių regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras, ‘Ecoservice projektai’ UAB, formerly ‘Specializuotas transportas’ UAB

      Interveners:‘VSA Vilnius’ UAB, ‘Švarinta’ UAB, ‘Specialus autotransportas’ UAB, ‘Ecoservice’ UAB

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 2 of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts must be interpreted as meaning that:

            —

            failing any express legislative provision or specific condition in the call for tenders or in the tender specifications governing the conditions for the award of a public contract, related tenderers submitting separate offers in the same procedure are not obliged to disclose, on their own initiative, the links between them to the contracting authority;

            —

            the contracting authority, when it has evidence that calls into question the autonomous and independent character of the tenders submitted by certain tenderers, is obliged to verify, requesting, where appropriate, additional information from those tenderers, whether their offers are in fact autonomous and independent. If the offers prove not to be autonomous and independent, Article 2 of Directive 2004/18 precludes the award of the contract to the tenderers having submitted those tenders.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 6, 9.1.2017.


201806220101970522018/C 240/181992018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180319161721Case C-199/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Pollo del Campo S.c.a., Avi Coop Società Cooperativa Agricola v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN1610120180319EN0018161172Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Pollo del Campo S.c.a., Avi Coop Società Cooperativa Agricola v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others
   (Case C-199/18)2018/C 240/18Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Pollo del Campo S.c.a., Avi Coop Società Cooperativa Agricola

      Respondents: Regione Emilia-Romagna, Azienda Unità Sanitaria Locale 104 di Modena, A.U.S.L. Romagna

      Questions referred

            1.

            By providing that Member States must ensure the collection of fees for the activities referenced in Annex IV, Section A, and Annex V, Section A, must Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 be interpreted as placing an obligation to pay on all agricultural operators, even those which ‘carry out the activities of slaughtering and cutting of meat instrumental to and connected with the activity of rearing livestock’?

            2.

            Can a [Member] State make certain categories of undertaking exempt from payment of the veterinary fees in the case where it has set up a system for the collection of fees that, overall, guarantees coverage of the costs of the official controls, or may it apply charges that are lower than those provided for by Regulation (EC) No 8[8]2/2004? (
                  1
               )

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1).


201806220321970492018/C 240/055662016CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201805174411Case C-566/16: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nyíregyházi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság — Hungary) — Dávid Vámos v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Articles 282 to 292 — Special scheme for small enterprises — Exemption scheme — Obligation to opt for the application of the special scheme in the reference calendar year)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN410120180517EN00054141Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 17 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nyíregyházi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság — Hungary) — Dávid Vámos v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága
   (Case C-566/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax — Directive 2006/112/EC — Articles 282 to 292 — Special scheme for small enterprises — Exemption scheme — Obligation to opt for the application of the special scheme in the reference calendar year)’2018/C 240/05Language of the case: Hungarian
      Referring court

   Nyíregyházi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Dávid Vámos

      Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

      Operative part of the judgment

   EU law must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which excludes a special value added tax taxation scheme providing for an exemption for small enterprises — that scheme having been adopted in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of Chapter I of Title XII of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax — from being applied to a taxable person who fulfils all the material conditions but did not exercise the right to opt for the application of that scheme at the same time as he declared the commencement of his economic activities to the tax authority.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201806220491970222018/C 240/489012016TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180515434311Case T-901/16 R: Order of the President of the General Court of 15 May 2018 — Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission (Application for interim measures — State aid — Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs — Public guarantee provided by a public entity — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Application for suspension of operation of a measure — Prima facie case — Urgency — Balancing of interests)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN4310120180515EN0048431431Order of the President of the General Court of 15 May 2018 — Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission
   (Case T-901/16 R)
   ‛(Application for interim measures — State aid — Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs — Public guarantee provided by a public entity — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Application for suspension of operation of a measure — Prima facie case — Urgency — Balancing of interests)’2018/C 240/48Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: Elche Club de Fútbol, SAD (Elche, Spain) (represented by: M. Segura Catalán and M. Clayton, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B. Stromsky, G. Luengo and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

      Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: A. Gavela Llopis, acting as Agent)

      Re:

   Application based on Articles 278 and 279 TFEU seeking the suspension of operation of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) granted by Spain to Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol (OJ 2017 L 55, p. 12).

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            The operation of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) granted by Spain to Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol (OJ 2017 L 55, p. 12) is suspended in respect of the recovery of aid from Elche Club de Fútbol, identified as Measure 3 in Article 1 of that decision.

            2.

            The application for interim measures is dismissed as to the remainder.

            3.

            The order of 6 March 2017, Elche Club de Fútbol v Commission (T-901/16 R) is revoked.

            4.

            The costs are reserved.


201806220261970472018/C 240/192002018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180319171711Case C-200/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — C.A.F.A.R. — Società Agricola Cooperativa, Società Agricola Guidi di Roncofreddo di Guidi Giancarlo e Nicolini Fausta v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN1710120180319EN0019171171Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — C.A.F.A.R. — Società Agricola Cooperativa, Società Agricola Guidi di Roncofreddo di Guidi Giancarlo e Nicolini Fausta v Regione Emilia-Romagna and Others
   (Case C-200/18)2018/C 240/19Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: C.A.F.A.R. — Società Agricola Cooperativa, Società Agricola Guidi di Roncofreddo di Guidi Giancarlo e Nicolini Fausta

      Respondents: Regione Emilia-Romagna, Azienda Unità Sanitaria Locale 104 di Modena, A.U.S.L. Romagna

      Questions referred

            1.

            By providing that Member States must ensure the collection of fees for the activities referenced in Annex IV, Section A, and Annex V, Section A, must Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 be interpreted as placing an obligation to pay on all agricultural operators, even those which ‘carry out the activities of slaughtering and cutting of meat instrumental to and connected with the activity of rearing livestock’?

            2.

            Can a [Member] State make certain categories of undertaking exempt from payment of the veterinary fees in the case where it has set up a system for the collection of fees that, overall, guarantees coverage of the costs of the official controls, or may it apply charges that are lower than those provided for by Regulation (EC) No 8[8]2/2004? (
                  1
               )

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1).


201806220091970342018/C 240/323062018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180507292911Case C-306/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě — pobočka v Olomouci (Czech Republic) lodged on 7 May 2018 — KORADO, a.s. v Generální ředitelství cel
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2910120180507EN0032291291Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Ostravě — pobočka v Olomouci (Czech Republic) lodged on 7 May 2018 — KORADO, a.s. v Generální ředitelství cel
   (Case C-306/18)2018/C 240/32Language of the case: Czech
      Referring court

   Krajský soud v Ostravě — pobočka v Olomouci

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: KORADO, a.s.

      Defendant: Generální ředitelství cel

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/23 (
                  1
               ) of 5 January 2015, in which the goods described in column 1 of the table in the annex are classified under sub-heading 7 307 93 19 of the Combined Nomenclature, valid?

            2.

            If that Regulation is invalid, could the articles concerned be classified under sub-heading 7 322 19 00 of the Combined Nomenclature?

            3.

            If that Regulation is valid, must the articles concerned be classified under sub-heading 7 307 93 19 of the Combined Nomenclature?

      (
         1
      )	Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/23 of 5 January 2015 concerning the classification of certain goods in the Combined Nomenclature, OJ 2015 L 4, p. 15.


201806220641970442018/C 240/643072018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180516555511Case T-307/18: Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN5510120180516EN0064551551Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals v Commission
   (Case T-307/18)2018/C 240/64Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Zhejiang Jiuli Hi-Tech Metals Co. Ltd (Huzhou City, Chine) (represented by: K. Adamantopoulos and P. Billiet, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/330 of 5 March 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of stainless steel originating in the People’s Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council in so far as the applicant is concerned; and

            —

            order the European Commission to pay the applicant’s costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that Regulation 2018/330 was adopted by the Commission in a manner that materially violates the rights of defence of the applicant in breach of Articles 3(2), 16(1), 19(2), 19(4), 20(2), 20(4), 21(5) and 21(7) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the Protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union as well as Articles 3(1), 5(3), 6(1), 6(1)(2), 6(2), 6(4), 6(5)(1), 6(6) and 6(9) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission, in adopting Regulation 2018/330, committed manifest errors of assessment of the law and of facts by having recourse to the analogue country methodology for the calculation of the normal value for the applicant in breach of Articles 1(2), 1(3), 2(a)(1), 2(a)(7) and 11(9) of Regulation 2016/1036 as well as Articles 2.2 and 6.10.1 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Commission failed to provide any reasons whatsoever for the application, in the case of the applicant, of Article 2(7) of Regulation 2016/1036.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission, in adopting Regulation 2018/330, committed manifest errors of assessment of the law and of facts by adopting an erroneous PCN coding of the product concerned in breach of Articles 2(a)(2), 2(a)(5), 2(a)(6), 6(7),6(8) and 16(1) of Regulation 2016/1036 as well as Articles 2(2)(1)(1), 2(2)(2), 2(4) and 2(6) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission, in adopting Regulation 2018/330, committed manifest errors of assessment of the law and of facts since the applied methodology materially distorted the dumping margin of the applicant in breach of Articles 1(4), 2(a)(6), 2(c)(10), 2(d)(11), 17(1), 17(2) and 18(3) of Regulation 2016/1036 as well as Articles 2(2), 2(2)(2), 2(4), 2(4)(2), 2(6), 3(6) and 9(2) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission, in adopting Regulation 2018/330, committed manifest errors of assessment of the law and of facts in finding injury as well as likelihood of recurrence of injury and in not verifying causality in breach of Articles 1(1), 1(2), 1(3), 2(d)(12), 2(b)(9), 3(2), 3(3), 3(6), 3(7), 3(9) and 11(1) of Regulation 2016/1036 as well as Articles 1, 2(1), 2(4)(2), 3(1), 3(5), 3(7) and 9(3) of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.


201806290481986562018/C 249/373032017TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529303011Case T-303/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (4000) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 4000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3010120180529EN0037301301Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (4000)
   (Case T-303/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 4000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)’2018/C 249/37Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Sata GmbH & Co. KG (Kornwestheim, Germany) (represented by: M.-C. Simon, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools Co. Ltd (Pengjie Town, China) (represented by: S. Fröhlich and M. Hartmann, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2017 (Case R 654/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools and Sata.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sata GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201806290651986812018/C 249/251112016TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180605212111Case T-111/16: Judgment of the General Court of 5 June 2018 — Prada v EUIPO — The Rich Prada International (THE RICH PRADA) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark THE RICH PRADA — Earlier national and international word and figurative marks PRADA — Relative grounds for refusal — Article 8(5) of Regulation(EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark — Detriment to the distinctive character or repute — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Likelihood of confusion)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN2110120180605EN0025211211Judgment of the General Court of 5 June 2018 — Prada v EUIPO — The Rich Prada International (THE RICH PRADA)
   (Case T-111/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark THE RICH PRADA — Earlier national and international word and figurative marks PRADA — Relative grounds for refusal — Article 8(5) of Regulation(EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute of the earlier mark — Detriment to the distinctive character or repute — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Likelihood of confusion)’2018/C 249/25Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Prada SA (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: F. Jacobacci, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: The Rich Prada International PT (Surabaya, Indonesia) (represented by: Y. Zhou, Solicitor)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 January 2016 (Joined Cases R 3076/2014-2 and R 3186/2014-2), as rectified on 14 March 2017, relating to opposition proceedings between Prada and The Rich Prada International.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Prada SA to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 175, 17.5.2016.


201806290701986592018/C 249/492922018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180507393911Case T-292/18: Action brought on 7 May 2018 — Portugal v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3910120180507EN0049391391Action brought on 7 May 2018 — Portugal v Commission
   (Case T-292/18)2018/C 249/49Language of the case: Portuguese
      Parties

      Applicant: Portuguese Republic (represented by: L. Inez Fernandes, M. Figueiredo, P. Estevão and J. Saraiva de Almeida, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            annul Commission Implementing Decision C(2018) 955 of 27 February 2018, excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), in so far as it excludes from EU financing expenditure declared by Portugal in the sum of EUR 1052101,05 on the ground that it comes under ‘Debts wrongly reported in the Annex III tables, having escaped the application of the 50/50 rule’;

            —

            order the European Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on an infringement of Articles 32 and 33 of Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 (
         1
      ) and of Article 54 of Regulation (EC) No 1306/2013. (
         2
      )
   (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural policy (OJ 2005 L 209, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549).


201806290121986462018/C 249/026552017CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201711242211Case C-655/17 P: Appeal brought on 24 November 2017 by Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 20 September 2017 in Case T-719/16, Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN210120171124EN00022121Appeal brought on 24 November 2017 by Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 20 September 2017 in Case T-719/16, Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office
   (Case C-655/17 P)2018/C 249/02Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH (represented by: O. Spieker and A. Schönfleisch, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office
   By order of 31 May 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.


201806290771986732018/C 249/261602016TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531212222Case T-160/16: Judgment of the General Court of 31 May 2018 — Groningen Seaports and Others v Commission (State aid — Corporate tax exemption granted by the Netherlands to six Dutch public seaports — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Obligation to state reasons — Equal treatment)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN2120120180531EN0026212222Judgment of the General Court of 31 May 2018 — Groningen Seaports and Others v Commission
   (Case T-160/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(State aid — Corporate tax exemption granted by the Netherlands to six Dutch public seaports — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Obligation to state reasons — Equal treatment)’2018/C 249/26Language of the case: Dutch
      Parties

      Applicants: Groningen Seaports NV (Delfzijl, Netherlands) and the 5 other applicants whose names appear in the annex to the judgment (represented initially by E. Pijnacker Hordijk and I. Kieft, and subsequently by A. Kleinhout and C. Zois, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: initially by S. Noë, B. Stromsky and J.-F. Brakeland, and subsequently by S. Noë and B. Stromsky, acting as Agents)

      Intervener in support of the applicants: Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: J. Langer and M. Bulterman, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/634 of 21 January 2016 on aid measure SA.25338 (2014/C) (ex E 3/2008 and ex CP 115/2004) implemented by the Netherlands — Corporate tax exemption for public undertakings (OJ 2016 L 113, p. 148).

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Grants Havenbedrijf Moerdijk NV leave to replace Havenschap Moerdijk as applicant;

            2.

            Dismisses the action;

            3.

            Orders Groningen Seaports NV and the other applicants whose names appear in the annex to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Commission;

            4.

            Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands to bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 200, 6.6.2016.


201806290431986802018/C 249/393142017TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531313222Case T-314/17: Judgment of the General Court of 31 May 2018 — Nosio v EUIPO (MEZZA) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark MEZZA — Absolute grounds for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Restriction of goods — Article 43(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 49(1) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Right to be heard — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3120120180531EN0039312322Judgment of the General Court of 31 May 2018 — Nosio v EUIPO (MEZZA)
   (Case T-314/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark MEZZA — Absolute grounds for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Restriction of goods — Article 43(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 49(1) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Right to be heard — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 249/39Language of the case: Italian
      Parties

      Applicant: Nosio SpA (Mezzocorona, Italy) (represented by: A. Perani and J. Graffer, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Capostagno and A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 1 March 2017 (Case R 1518/2016-5) concerning an application for registration of the word sign MEZZA as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Nosio SpA to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201806290631986682018/C 249/502952018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607404121Case T-295/18: Action brought on 7 June 2018 — Greece v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN4010120180607EN0050401412Action brought on 7 June 2018 — Greece v Commission
   (Case T-295/18)2018/C 249/50Language of the case: Greek
      Parties

      Applicant: Hellenic Republic (represented by: G. Kanellopoulos, I. Pachi, A.-Ev. Vasilopoulou and Eug. Chroni)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision in so far as it excludes from European Union financing expenditure by the Hellenic Republic amounting in total to EUR 17869131,75 (gross) (budgetary impact EUR 14857076,98) incurred and declared within the framework of the EAFRD concerning measures 125A, 321 and 322 (gross amount EUR 15631043,52 and budgetary impact EUR 12618988,75) and measure 123A (in the amount of EUR 2238088,23) as well as an amount of EUR 588103,59 which was incurred under the EAGF following the control of transactions measure for the budgetary years 2011-2014 and

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs of the Hellenic Republic.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action for annulment, the applicant puts forward eight pleas in law. The first six concern the correction imposed under the EAFRD for measures 125A, 321, 322 and 123A, while the last two concern the correction imposed for weaknesses in the control of transactions under Title V Chapter III of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013. (
         1
      )

            1.

            The first plea alleges an incorrect interpretation and application of the case referred to in Article 52(4)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, exceeding the Commission’s competence ratione temporis to impose the financial corrections at issue and an error of fact on the part of the Commission in determining the basis for calculation of the correction at issue.

            2.

            The second plea alleges, in the alternative, infringement of the principles of ne bis in idem, legal certainty, sound administration, legitimate expectation on the part of a Member State and proportionality.

            3.

            The third plea for annulment is based on an infringement of Articles 71(2) and 75(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, (
                  2
               ) Article 43 of Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006, (
                  3
               ) the provisions of the Rural Development Programme approved by the Commission (RDP 2007-2013) and Article 24(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 (
                  4
               ), the lack of a legal basis and of a statement of reasons and on an error of assessment of the facts as regards the flat-rate financial correction of 10 % that was imposed, in light of the fact that the managing authority fully exercised its powers in accordance with the law.

            4.

            The fourth plea for annulment alleges, in the alternative to the third plea, infringement of the principles of proportionality, of the legitimate expectations of the Member State and of the guidelines set out in documents VI/5339/1997 and C(2015) 3675 of 8 June 2015, as well as an inadequate statement of reasons concerning the flat-rate correction of 10 % imposed.

            5.

            The fifth plea for annulment alleges infringement of the provisions of Article 24(2) of Regulation (EC) No 65/2011, an error of assessment of the facts and an inadequate statement of reasons concerning the alleged failure of the managing authority to assess the aid applications and the alleged absence of management control over the assessment work, as well as infringement of the principle of proportionality.

            6.

            The sixth plea for annulment alleges infringement of the provisions of Article 24(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 65/2011, of the principle of proportionality, an error in the assessment of the facts and an inadequate statement of reasons concerning the alleged failure to assess the reasonableness of the expenditure.

            7.

            According to the seventh plea for annulment, the financial correction imposed for the financial years 2011 to 2013 must be annulled in so far as it lacks a legal basis and a statement of reasons; in respect of 2013 in particular, it is contrary to the principle of sound administration.

            8.

            In the eighth plea for annulment, which is divided into five separate parts, it is alleged that the correction at issue was imposed following an error of assessment of the facts by the Commission, with a total failure to state reasons and in breach of the Hellenic Republic’s rights of defence.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549).
   (
         2
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2005 L 277, p. 1).
   (
         3
      )	Commission Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006 of 15 December 2006 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2006 L 368, p. 15).
   (
         4
      )	Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures (OJ 2011 L 25, p. 8).


201806290061986612018/C 249/132552018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804119911Case C-255/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2018 — State Street Bank International GmbH v Banca d’Italia
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN910120180411EN00139191Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2018 — State Street Bank International GmbH v Banca d’Italia
   (Case C-255/18)2018/C 249/13Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: State Street Bank International GmbH

      Defendant: Banca d’Italia

      Questions referred

            1.

            Should the ‘changes of status’ that do not have an effect on the contribution requirement under Article 12 of Regulation 2015/63 (
                  1
               ) include the merger by acquisition of an institution previously subject to supervision by a national resolution authority with its parent company in another Member State during the contribution period, and does this rule also apply where the merger and the resulting dissolution of the institution took place in 2015, at a time when the Member State had not yet formally established either the national resolution authority or the national resolution fund and the contributions had not yet been calculated?

            2.

            Is Article 12 of Regulation 2015/63, in conjunction with Article 14 of that regulation and Articles 103 and 104 of Directive 2014/59, (
                  2
               ) to be interpreted as meaning that also in the case of the merger of an institution by acquisition with a parent company in another Member State during the contribution period, the institution is required to pay the contribution for that period in full, not on a pro rata basis according to the months when the institution was subject to supervision by the resolution authority of the first Member State, by analogy with the rules laid down for ‘newly supervised’ institutions under Article 12(1) of the regulation?

            3.

            Are Directive 2014/59, Regulation 2015/63 and the principles governing the system of banking crisis resolution tools to be interpreted as meaning that the rules laid down for the ordinary contribution, in particular Article 12(2) of Regulation 2015/63, also apply, with regard to the timing of the identification of institutions required to contribute and the amount of the contribution, to the extraordinary contribution, bearing in mind the nature of that contribution and the conditions under which it may be imposed?

      (
         1
      )	Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).
   (
         2
      )	Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).


201806290541986662018/C 249/403522017TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531323321Case T-352/17: Judgment of the General Court of 31 May 2018 — Korwin-Mikke v Parliament (Law governing the institutions — European Parliament — Rules of Procedure of the Parliament — Statement adversely affecting the dignity of the Parliament and the smooth conduct of parliamentary business — Disciplinary sanctions of forfeiture of entitlement to the subsistence allowance and temporary suspension from participation in all activities of the Parliament — Freedom of expression — Obligation to state reasons — Error of law)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3210120180531EN0040321332Judgment of the General Court of 31 May 2018 — Korwin-Mikke v Parliament
   (Case T-352/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Law governing the institutions — European Parliament — Rules of Procedure of the Parliament — Statement adversely affecting the dignity of the Parliament and the smooth conduct of parliamentary business — Disciplinary sanctions of forfeiture of entitlement to the subsistence allowance and temporary suspension from participation in all activities of the Parliament — Freedom of expression — Obligation to state reasons — Error of law)’2018/C 249/40Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Janusz Korwin-Mikke (Józefów, Poland) (represented by: M. Cherchi, A. Daoût and M. Dekleermaker, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: N. Görlitz, S. Seyr and S. Alonso de León, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   First, action brought under Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of the decision of the President of the Parliament of 14 March 2017 and of the decision of the Bureau of the Parliament of 3 April 2017 imposing on the applicant the penalty of forfeiture of entitlement to the subsistence allowance for a period of 30 days, temporary suspension from participation in all activities of the Parliament for a period of 10 consecutive days and prohibition of representing the Parliament for a period of one year and, second, action brought under Article 268 TEU and seeking compensation for the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of those decisions.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 3 April 2017;

            2.

            Dismisses the claim for damages;

            3.

            Orders Mr Janusz Korwin-Mikke and the Parliament each to bear their own respective costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 239, 24.7.2017.


201806290441986552018/C 249/512982018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180507414221Case T-298/18: Action brought on 7 May 2018 — Banco Comercial Português and Others v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN4110120180507EN0051411422Action brought on 7 May 2018 — Banco Comercial Português and Others v Commission
   (Case T-298/18)2018/C 249/51Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Banco Comercial Português (Porto, Portugal), Banco ActivoBank S.A. (Lisbon) and Banco de Investimento Imobiliário S.A. (Lisbon) (represented by: C. Botelho Moniz, L. do Nascimento Ferreira, F.-C. Laprévote, A. Champsaur and D. Oda, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul Commission Decision C(2017/N) of 11 October 2017 (State aid SA.49275) insofar as it considered the contingent capital agreement (‘CCA’) agreed and entered into between the Portuguese Resolution Fund (‘Resolution Fund’) and the Lone Star group (‘Lone Star’) in the context of the sale of Novo Banco, S.A. (‘Novo Banco’) by the former to the latter, as State aid compatible with the internal market, and

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs in relation to this procedure, including those of the applicants.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on six pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in considering that the 2014 resolution of Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. (‘BES’) was taken solely under Portuguese law and prior to the entry into force of Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014, L 173, p. 190) (‘BRRD’);

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in considering that the BRRD applied only from 1 January 2015;

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in considering that, in order to preserve the unity and implementation of the initial resolution process of BES, the sale of Novo Banco should be governed by national law in force prior to the implementation of the BRRD;

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law when it wrongfully considered that there are no indissolubly linked provisions of the BRRD relevant for the assessment of the CCA;

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Articles 101 and 44 BRRD; and

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Article 108(2) TFEU and Article 4(4) of the Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 TFEU (‘Procedural Regulation’, OJ 2015, L 248, p. 9), by failing to open the formal procedure notwithstanding the serious doubts raised as to the compatibility of the CCA mechanism with EU law thereby depriving the applicants of their procedural rights.


201806290161986622018/C 249/036562017CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201711242212Case C-656/17 P: Appeal brought on 24 November 2017 by Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 20 September 2017 in Case T-402/16, Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN220120171124EN00032221Appeal brought on 24 November 2017 by Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) made on 20 September 2017 in Case T-402/16, Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office
   (Case C-656/17 P)2018/C 249/03Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Berliner Stadtwerke GmbH (represented by: O. Spieker and A. Schönfleisch, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office
   By order of 31 May 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly unfounded and ordered the appellant to bear its own costs.


201806290721986832018/C 249/523262018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180528424321Case T-326/18: Action brought on 28 May 2018 — Herrero Torres v EUIPO — DZ Licores (CARAJILLO LICOR 43 CUARENTA Y TRES)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN4210120180528EN0052421432Action brought on 28 May 2018 — Herrero Torres v EUIPO — DZ Licores (CARAJILLO LICOR 43 CUARENTA Y TRES)
   (Case T-326/18)2018/C 249/52Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: José-Ramón Herrero Torres (Castellón de la Plana, Spain) (represented by: J.V. Gil Martí, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: DZ Licores, SLU. (Cartagena, Spain)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: Application for EU figurative mark CARAJILLO LICOR 43 CUARENTA Y TRES — Application for registration No 14 444 855

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 March 2018 in Case R 2104/2017-5

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision on the ground that it is unlawful and order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Articles 8(1)(b), 8(5) and 59(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201806290571986502018/C 249/533342018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531434421Case T-334/18: Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Bodegas Altun v EUIPO — Codorníu (ANA DE ALTUN)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN4310120180531EN0053431442Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Bodegas Altun v EUIPO — Codorníu (ANA DE ALTUN)
   (Case T-334/18)2018/C 249/53Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: Bodegas Altun, SL (Baños de Ebro, Spain) (represented by: J. Oria Sousa-Montes, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Codorníu, SA (Esplugues de Llobregat, Spain)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant to the proceedings before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: Application for registration of the European Union figurative trade mark ANA DE ALTUN — Application No 11 860 913

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14/03/2018 in Case R 173/2018-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201806290661986582018/C 249/42652017TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180417333422Case T-65/17: Order of the General Court of 17 April 2018 — Westbrae Natural v EUIPO — Kaufland Warenhandel (COCONUT DREAM) (European Union trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark COCONUT DREAM — Withdrawal of the opposition — Action which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3320120180417EN0042332342Order of the General Court of 17 April 2018 — Westbrae Natural v EUIPO — Kaufland Warenhandel (COCONUT DREAM)
   (Case T-65/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(European Union trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark COCONUT DREAM — Withdrawal of the opposition — Action which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)’2018/C 249/42Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Westbrae Natural, Inc. (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: D. McFarland, Barrister)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Hanne, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Kaufland Warenhandel GmbH & Co. KG (Neckarsulm, Germany)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 November 2016 (Case R 182/2016-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Kaufland Warenhandel and Westbrae Natural.

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

            2.

            Westbrae Natural, Inc. shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


201806290171986382018/C 249/046712017CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201711273311Case C-671/17 P: Appeal brought on 27 November 2017 by Anastasia-Soultana Gaki against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) made on 27 September 2017 in Case T-366/16, Gaki v Europol
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN310120171127EN00043131Appeal brought on 27 November 2017 by Anastasia-Soultana Gaki against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) made on 27 September 2017 in Case T-366/16, Gaki v Europol
   (Case C-671/17 P)2018/C 249/04Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Anastasia-Soultana Gaki (represented by: G. Keisers, Rechtsanwalt)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)
   By order of 7 June 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Tenth Chamber) dismissed the appeal as being in part manifestly unfounded and in part manifestly inadmissible and ordered the appellant to bear her own costs.


201806290561986672018/C 249/272102016TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180606222321Case T-210/16: Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2018 — Lukash v Council (Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list — Obligation to state reasons — Failure to fulfil criteria for listing — Error of fact — Error of assessment — Rights of the defence — Right to an effective remedy — Right to property)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN2210120180606EN0027221232Judgment of the General Court of 6 June 2018 — Lukash v Council
   (Case T-210/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list — Obligation to state reasons — Failure to fulfil criteria for listing — Error of fact — Error of assessment — Rights of the defence — Right to an effective remedy — Right to property)’2018/C 249/27Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Olena Lukash (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: M. Cessieux, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: F. Naert and J.-P. Hix, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   APPLICATION pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of (i) Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 66, p. 26) and of Council Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 66, p. 1), (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119 (OJ 2015 L 62, p. 25) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 (JO 2015 L 62, p. 1) (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/876 of 5 June 2015 amending Decision 2014/119 (JO 2015 L 142, p. 30) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/869 of 5 June 2015 implementing Regulation No 208/2014 (OJ 2015 L 142, p. 1) (iv) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/318 of 4 March 2016 amending Decision 2014/119 (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 76) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/311 of 4 March 2016 implementing Regulation No 208/2014 (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 1), and (v) Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381 of 3 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/119 (OJ 2017 L 58, p. 34), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/374 of 3 March 2017 implementing Regulation No 208/2014 (OJ 2017 L 58, p. 1), in so far as the applicant’s name was included or maintained in the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to those restrictive measures.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Olena Lukash to bear the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 243, 4.7.2016.


201806290271986372018/C 249/142662018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180417101011Case C-266/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 17 April 2018 — Aqua med sp. z o.o., established in Opalenica v Irena Skóra
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN1010120180417EN0014101101Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 17 April 2018 — Aqua med sp. z o.o., established in Opalenica v Irena Skóra
   (Case C-266/18)2018/C 249/14Language of the case: Polish
      Referring court

   Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Aqua med sp. z o.o., established in Opalenica

      Defendant: Irena Skóra

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must a review, by a national court of its own motion, of the provisions of a contract concluded with a consumer determining which court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute, and which is based on Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (
                  1
               ) and on the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment in Case C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi), also cover those provisions of the contract which, although governing the matter of jurisdiction for settling disputes between the parties, confine themselves to referring to rules of national law?

            2.

            If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, must the review by that court lead to rules of jurisdiction being applied in such a way as to guarantee consumers protection under the Directive, that is to say, that the case can be dealt with by the court which is closest to the consumer’s place of domicile or habitual residence?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.


201806290141986762018/C 249/05152018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201801093312Case C-15/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 9 January 2018 — Finnair PLC v Igor Turtschin and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN320120180109EN00053231Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 9 January 2018 — Finnair PLC v Igor Turtschin and Others
   (Case C-15/18)2018/C 249/05Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Bundesgerichtshof

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Defendant and appellant on a point of law: Finnair PLC

      Applicants and respondents in the appeal on a point of law: Igor Turtschin, Evgeniya Turtschina, Leon Turtschin
   The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the Court of 6 June 2018.


201806290621986522018/C 249/543402018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531444411Case T-340/18: Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Gibson Brands v EUIPO — Wilfer (Shape of a guitar)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN4410120180531EN0054441441Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Gibson Brands v EUIPO — Wilfer
   (Shape of a guitar)
   (Case T-340/18)2018/C 249/54Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Gibson Brands, Inc. (Nashville, Tennessee, United States) (represented by: K. Hughes, Solicitor, A. Renck and C. Stöber, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Hans-Peter Wilfer (Markeneukirchen, Germany)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: European Union tridimensional mark (Shape of a guitar) — European Union trade mark No 9 179 953

      Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2018 in Case R 415/2017-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order that the costs of the proceedings be borne by the Defendant and the Other Party before the Board of Appeal in the event that it intervenes in the proceedings.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 52(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009;

            —

            Infringement of Article 52(2) in conjunction with Article 7(3) of Regulation No 207/2009.


201806290191986782018/C 249/152672018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180417101122Case C-267/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 17 April 2018 — Delta Antrepriză de Construcții și Montaj 93 SA v Compania Națională de Administrare a Infrastructurii Rutiere SA
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN1020120180417EN0015102112Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel București (Romania) lodged on 17 April 2018 — Delta Antrepriză de Construcții și Montaj 93 SA v Compania Națională de Administrare a Infrastructurii Rutiere SA
   (Case C-267/18)2018/C 249/15Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Curtea de Apel București

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Delta Antrepriză de Construcții și Montaj 93 SA

      Defendant: Compania Națională de Administrare a Infrastructurii Rutiere SA

      Question referred

   Can Article 57(4)(g) of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (
         1
      ) be interpreted as meaning that the termination of a public works contract on the ground that part of the works was subcontracted without the contracting authority’s authorisation constitutes a significant or persistent deficiency in the performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract leading to an economic operator being excluded from participation in a public procurement procedure?
   (
         1
      )	OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65.


201808030712050852018/C 294/653442018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180604515111Case T-344/18: Action brought on 04 June 2018 — Rubycon and Rubycon Holdings/Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN5110120180604EN0065511511Action brought on 04 June 2018 — Rubycon and Rubycon Holdings/Commission
   (Case T-344/18)2018/C 294/65Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Rubycon Corp. (Ina City, Japan) and Rubycon Holdings Co. Ltd (Ina City) (represented by: J. Rivas Andrés, A. Federle and M. Relange, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            annul Commission Decision C(2018) 1768 final of 21 March 2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in Case AT.40136 — Capacitors — as far as it relates to Rubycon, in particular Article 1(h), Article 2(k), Article 2(l) and Article 4;

            —

            order a substantial reduction in the fine imposed on Rubycon under Article 2 of the contested decision to a level that it is not discriminatory and Rubycon’s exceptional level of cooperation is rewarded;

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs incurred by the applicants.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by an error of law as regards the Commission’s refusal to grant Rubycon the benefit of ‘partial immunity’ under point 26 of the Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (
                  1
               ) for the increased gravity of the infringement.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is insufficiently motivated and vitiated by an error of law as regards the Commission’s conclusion not to depart from the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (
                  2
               ) and not to grant Rubycon an additional fine reduction, in breach of the EU law principles of proportionality and equal treatment, and the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and the offence.

      (
         1
      )	Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ 2006 C 298, p. 17).
   (
         2
      )	Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2).


201808030512050312018/C 294/333652018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180604252511Case C-365/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia (Italy) lodged on 4 June 2018 — Shell Italia E & P SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2510120180604EN0033251251Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia (Italy) lodged on 4 June 2018 — Shell Italia E & P SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico and Others
   (Case C-365/18)2018/C 294/33Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Shell Italia E & P SpA

      Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Autorità per l’energia elettrica, il Gas e il Sistema idrico

      Question referred

   Do Article 6(1) and the sixth recital of Directive 94/22/EC (
         1
      ) preclude national legislation, in particular Article 19(5-bis) of Legislative Decree No 625 of 1996, which, by reason of the interpretation provided by the Consiglio di Stato in judgment No 290/2018, allows the imposition, in the context of the payment of royalties, of the QE (energy share) parameter, based on the listed prices of oil and other fuels, rather than on the basis of the PFOR index, which is pegged to the price of gas on the short-term market?
   (
         1
      )	Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (OJ 1994 L 164, p. 3).


201808030172050452018/C 294/494012018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180618353622Case C-401/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Praze (Czech Republic) lodged on 18 June 2018 — Herst, s.r.o. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3520120180618EN0049352362Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský soud v Praze (Czech Republic) lodged on 18 June 2018 — Herst, s.r.o. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství
   (Case C-401/18)2018/C 294/49Language of the case: Czech
      Referring court

   Krajský soud v Praze

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Herst, s.r.o.

      Defendant: Odvolací finanční ředitelství

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must any taxable person be regarded as a taxable person within the meaning of Article 138(2)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (
                  1
               ) on the common system of value added tax (‘the VAT Directive’)? If not, to which taxable persons does that provision apply?

            2.

            If the Court of Justice’s answer is that Article 138(2)(b) of the VAT Directive applies to a situation such as that in the main proceedings (that is, the acquirer of the products is a taxable person registered for tax), must that provision be interpreted as meaning that, where the dispatch or transport of those products takes place in accordance with the relevant provisions of Council Directive 2008/118/EC (
                  2
               ) concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC (‘the Excise Duty Directive’), a supply connected with a procedure under the Excise Duty Directive must be regarded as a supply entitled to exemption under that provision, even though the conditions for exemption under Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive are not otherwise satisfied, having regard to the assignment of the transport of goods to another transaction?

            3.

            If the Court of Justice’s answer is that Article 138(2)(b) of the VAT Directive does not apply to a situation such as that in the main proceedings, is the fact that the goods are transported under an excise duty suspension arrangement decisive for deciding the question of which of several successive supplies a transport is to be ascribed to for the purposes of the right to exemption from VAT under Article 138(1) of the VAT Directive?

            4.

            Is ‘the right to dispose of the goods as owner’ within the meaning of the VAT Directive acquired by a taxable person who buys goods from another taxable person directly for a specific customer in order to fulfil an already existing order (identifying the type of goods, the quantity, place of origin and time of delivery) where he does not physically handle the goods himself since, in the context of concluding the contract of sale, his buyer agrees to arrange transport of the goods from their point of origin, so that he will only provide access to the requested goods via his suppliers and communicate the information necessary for acceptance of the goods (on his own behalf or on behalf of his sub-suppliers in the chain), and his profit from the transaction is the difference between the buying-in price and the selling price of such goods without the cost of transporting the goods being invoiced in the chain?

            5.

            Does the Excise Duty Directive establish (for example, in Article 4(1), Article 17 or Article 19), either directly or indirectly through a limit on the effective handling of such goods, sufficient conditions for the transfer of the ‘right to dispose of the goods (that are subject to excise duty) as the owner’ within the meaning of the VAT Directive, with the result that the taking over of the goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement by an authorised warehousekeeper or registered consignee in accordance with the conditions arising from the Excise Duty Directive should be treated as a supply of goods for VAT purposes?

            6.

            In this context, when considering the determination of a supply which is linked to transport within a chain of supply of goods under an excise duty suspension arrangement with a single transport, is it necessary to regard a transport in the sense of the VAT Directive as commencing and closing in accordance with Article 20 of the Excise Duty Directive?

            7.

            Does the principle of VAT neutrality or any other principle of EU law prevent application of the constitutional principle of in dubio mitius in national law, which obliges the public authorities, where legal rules are ambiguous and objectively offer a number of possible interpretations, to choose the interpretation that benefits the person subject to the legal rule (here the taxable person for VAT)? Would the application of this principle be compatible with EU law at least if it were limited to situations where the relevant facts of the case preceded a binding interpretation of a disputed legal question by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has determined that another interpretation less favourable to the taxable entity is correct?
            If it is possible to apply the principle of in dubio mitius:

            8.

            Was it possible, in terms of the limits set by EU law at the time when the taxable transactions took place in this case (November 2010 to May 2013), to consider the question whether the legal concept of supply of goods or transport of goods has (or does not have) the same content both for the purposes of the VAT Directive and for the purposes of the Excise Duty Directive objectively as legally uncertain and offering two interpretations?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.
   (
         2
      )	OJ 2009 L 9, p. 12.


201808030232050132018/C 294/233482018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529171711Case C-348/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 29 May 2018 — Azienda Agricola Barausse Antonio e Gabriele — Società semplice v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1710120180529EN0023171171Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 29 May 2018 — Azienda Agricola Barausse Antonio e Gabriele — Società semplice v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA)
   (Case C-348/18)2018/C 294/23Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Azienda Agricola Barausse Antonio e Gabriele — Società semplice

      Respondent: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA)

      Question referred

   Must Article 2(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (
         1
      ) be interpreted — also in the light of the grounds already set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgment of 5 May 2011 in Joined Cases C-230/09 and C-231/09 in relation to Article 10(3) of Regulation (EC) No 17[8]8/2003 (
         2
      ) — as meaning that any unused portion of the national reference quantity allocated to deliveries can be re-allocated according to objective priority criteria determined by the Member States, or must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the equalling-out stage must be governed exclusively by the criterion of proportionality?
   (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 1992 L 405, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing a levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 2003 L 270, p. 123).


201808030482050202018/C 294/052192016CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806285511Case C-219/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Lowell Financial Services GmbH, formerly GFKL Financial Services AG v European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany (Appeal — State aid — German tax legislation concerning the possibility of carrying certain losses forward to future tax years (‘restructuring clause’) — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU — Person individually concerned — Article 107(1) TFEU — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Condition relating to selectivity — Determination of the reference framework — Legal classification of the facts)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN510120180628EN00055151Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Lowell Financial Services GmbH, formerly GFKL Financial Services AG v European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany
   (Case C-219/16 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — State aid — German tax legislation concerning the possibility of carrying certain losses forward to future tax years (‘restructuring clause’) — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU — Person individually concerned — Article 107(1) TFEU — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Condition relating to selectivity — Determination of the reference framework — Legal classification of the facts)’2018/C 294/05Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Lowell Financial Services GmbH, formerly GFKL Financial Services AG (represented by: M. Schweda, J. Eggers, M. Knebelsberger and F. Loose, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal, T. Maxian Rusche and K. Blanck-Putz, acting as Agents), Federal Republic of Germany

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the cross-appeal;

            2.

            Sets aside points 2 and 3 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 February 2016, GFKL Financial Services v Commission (T-620/11, EU:T:2016:59);

            3.

            Annuls Commission Decision 2011/527/EU of 26 January 2011 on State aid C 7/10 (ex CP 250/09 and NN 5/10) implemented by Germany — Scheme for the carry-forward of tax losses in the case of restructuring of companies in difficulty (Sanierungsklausel);

            4.

            Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Lowell Financial Services GmbH in relation to the proceedings both at first instance and on appeal.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 222, 20.6.2016.


201808030042049972018/C 294/243492018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530181811Case C-349/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vredegerecht te Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 30 May 2018 — Nationale Maatschappij der Belgische Spoorwegen (NMBS) v Mbutuku Kanyeba
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1810120180530EN0024181181Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vredegerecht te Antwerpen (Belgium) lodged on 30 May 2018 — Nationale Maatschappij der Belgische Spoorwegen (NMBS) v Mbutuku Kanyeba
   (Case C-349/18)2018/C 294/24Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Vredegerecht te Antwerpen

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Nationale Maatschappij der Belgische Spoorwegen (NMBS)

      Defendant: Mbutuku Kanyeba

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 9(4) of [Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007] (
                  1
               ) of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations, read in conjunction with Article 2(a) and Article 3 of Directive 93/13, (
                  2
               ) be interpreted as meaning that a contractual legal relationship is always created between the transport company and the passenger, even when the latter makes use of the services provided by the transport company without purchasing a ticket?

            2.

            If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, does the protection offered by the doctrine of unfair terms also extend to a passenger who makes use of public transport without having acquired a ticket and who, by that action, under the general terms and conditions of the transport company, which are considered to be generally binding on the basis of their regulatory nature or, alternatively, by virtue of their publication in an official State publication, is obliged to pay a surcharge in addition to the fare?

            3.

            Does Article 6 of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, which provides that ‘Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms’, preclude a court in all cases from moderating the term deemed to be unfair or from applying ordinary law instead?

            4.

            If the answer to the previous question is in the negative, what then are the circumstances in which a national court may proceed to moderate the term found to be unfair or to replace it by the ordinary law?

            5.

            If the aforementioned questions cannot be answered in abstracto, the question then arises as to whether, if the national railway company, having apprehended a fare-dodger, imposes a civil penalty in the form of a surcharge, whether or not in addition to the fare, and the court were to find that the surcharge imposed is unfair within the meaning of Article 2(a), read in conjunction with Article 3, of Directive 93/13, Article 6 of Directive 93/13 precludes the court from declaring the term void and applying ordinary liability law to compensate the national railway company for the damage suffered.

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2007 L 315, p. 14.
   (
         2
      )	Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


201808030552050322018/C 294/122302017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL2018062791022Case C-230/17: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — Erdem Deha Altiner, Isabel Hanna Ravn v Udlændingestyrelsen (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the Union — Article 21(1) TFEU — Directive 2004/38/EC — Right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States — Right of residence of a third-country national who is a family member of a Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a national — Entry by that family member into the territory of the Member State in question subsequent to the return of the Union citizen to that Member State)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN920120180627EN001292102Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — Erdem Deha Altiner, Isabel Hanna Ravn v Udlændingestyrelsen
   (Case C-230/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizenship of the Union — Article 21(1) TFEU — Directive 2004/38/EC — Right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States — Right of residence of a third-country national who is a family member of a Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen is a national — Entry by that family member into the territory of the Member State in question subsequent to the return of the Union citizen to that Member State)’2018/C 294/12Language of the case: Danish
      Referring court

   Østre Landsret

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Erdem Deha Altiner, Isabel Hanna Ravn

      Defendant: Udlændingestyrelsen

      Operative part of the judgment

   In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred is that Article 21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State which does not provide for the grant of a derived right of residence in another Member State, under Union law, to a third-country national family member of a Union citizen who is a national of that Member State and who returns there after having resided, pursuant to and in conformity with Union law, in another Member State, when the family member of the Union citizen concerned has not entered the territory of the Member State of origin of the Union citizen or has not applied for a residence permit as a ‘natural consequence’ of the return to that Member State of the Union citizen in question, provided that such rules require, in the context of an overall assessment, that other relevant factors also be taken into account, in particular factors capable of showing that, in spite of the time which elapsed between the return of the Union citizen to that Member State and the entry of the family member who is a third-country national, in the same Member State, the family life created and strengthened in the host Member State has not ended, so as to justify the granting to the family member in question of a derived right of residence; it is for the referring court to verify whether this is the case.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 213, 3.7.2017.


201808030462050182018/C 294/132462017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180627101121Case C-246/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — Ibrahima Diallo v État belge (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizens of the European Union — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 10(1) — Application for a residence card as a family member — Issuance — Time limit — Adoption and notification of the decision — Consequences of non-compliance with the period — Procedural autonomy of Member States — Principle of effectiveness)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1010120180627EN0013101112Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — Belgium) — Ibrahima Diallo v État belge
   (Case C-246/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Citizens of the European Union — Directive 2004/38/EC — Article 10(1) — Application for a residence card as a family member — Issuance — Time limit — Adoption and notification of the decision — Consequences of non-compliance with the period — Procedural autonomy of Member States — Principle of effectiveness)’2018/C 294/13Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Conseil d’État

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Ibrahima Diallo

      Defendant: État belge

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, must be interpreted as meaning that the decision on the application for a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen must be adopted and notified within the period of six months laid down in that provision.

            2.

            Directive 2004/38 must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which requires competent national authorities to issue automatically a residence card of a family member of a European Union citizen to the person concerned, where the period of six months, referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38, is exceeded, without finding, beforehand, that the person concerned actually meets the conditions for residing in the host Member State in accordance with EU law.

            3.

            EU law must be interpreted as precluding national case-law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, following the judicial annulment of a decision refusing to issue a residence card of a family member of a Union citizen, the competent national authority automatically regains the full period of six months referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2004/38.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


title: Case C-422/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 28 June 2018 — FR v Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano

text:
               3.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 311/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Milano (Italy) lodged on 28 June 2018 — FR v Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della Protezione Internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano
      (Case C-422/18)
      (2018/C 311/10)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale di Milano

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: FR

         Defendant: Ministero dell’interno — Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale presso la Prefettura U.T.G. di Milano

         Question referred

      Are the principles of sincere cooperation and of the equivalence and effectiveness of judicial protection, referred to in Articles 4(3) TEU and 19(1) TEU, Article 47, first and second paragraphs, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Directive 2013/32/EU (1) (in particular, Articles 22 and 46), to be interpreted in the sense that (a) European Union law requires that, where national law provides for a right of appeal in proceedings concerning the rejection of an application for the grant of international protection, such an appeal should automatically have suspensory effect, and that (b) those principles preclude a procedure, such as that under Italian law (Article 35a(13) of Legislative Decree 25/2008, as amended by Legislative Decree 13/17, converted into Law No 46/17), under which the court seised by an asylum applicant — one whose application for asylum has been rejected by the competent administrative authority and by a court of first instance — is permitted to dismiss an application for the suspension of the adverse decision solely on the basis of the validity of the grounds of the appeal brought against that decision, where that decision has been given by the same court as is asked to rule on the suspension thereof, without any consideration of the risk of serious and irreparable harm?

         (1)  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60).


title: Case C-424/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto (Italy) lodged on 27 June 2018 — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’ v Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

text:
               3.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 311/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto (Italy) lodged on 27 June 2018 — Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’ v Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto
      (Case C-424/18)
      (2018/C 311/11)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Veneto

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Italy Emergenza Cooperativa Sociale, Associazione Volontaria di Pubblica Assistenza ‘Croce Verde’

         Defendants: Ulss 5 Polesana Rovigo, Regione del Veneto

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 10(h) and recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) be interpreted as meaning that:

                              (a)

                              ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and

                              (b)

                              transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles
                              are covered by the exclusion laid down in the above-mentioned Article 10(h), or must they be among the services referred to in Articles 74 to 77 of Directive 2014/24/EU?

                  2.

                  Must Directive 2014/24/EU be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that, even in the absence of an actual emergency,

                              (a)

                              ambulance services that require the presence on board of a driver with emergency response training and at least one emergency responder with the qualifications and skills obtained from completing a course and passing an examination in emergency response, and

                              (b)

                              transport services provided with basic levels of care using emergency vehicles
                              are awarded as a priority to voluntary associations by means of direct contracting?

         (1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).


title: Case T-377/18: Action brought on 20 June 2018 — Intercept Pharma and Intercept Pharmaceuticals v EMA

text:
               3.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 311/13

      Action brought on 20 June 2018 — Intercept Pharma and Intercept Pharmaceuticals v EMA
      (Case T-377/18)
      (2018/C 311/14)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Intercept Pharma Ltd (Bristol, United Kingdom) and Intercept Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (New York, New York, Unites States) (represented by: L. Tsang, J. Mulryne, E. Amos and H. Kerr-Peterson, Solicitors and F. Campbell, Barrister)

         Defendants: European Medicines Agency

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  annul the decision ASK-40399 communicated by the defendant to the applicants on 15 May 2018, to release some documentation under Regulation 1049/2001/EC; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the applicants legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the defendant erred in law by concluding that the ‘court proceedings’ indent of Article 4.2 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC was not engaged in the present case, on the basis that the documentation was not a document ‘prepared for the purpose of court proceedings’. As a matter of law, the defendant should have concluded that the exemption was engaged.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging further or in the alternative that the only legally permissible outcome of a proper balancing exercise, under the ‘commercial interests’ indent of Article 4.2 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC, would have been a decision not to release the documentation, in light of: (i) the compelling weight of the applicants’ private interest in avoiding disclosure; and (ii) the merely vague and generic public interest in disclosure.