201806290091986432018/C 249/092402018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804046721Case C-240/18 P: Appeal brought on 4 April 2018 by Constantin Film Produktion GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 24 January 2018 in Case T-69/17, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN610120180404EN00096172Appeal brought on 4 April 2018 by Constantin Film Produktion GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 24 January 2018 in Case T-69/17, Constantin Film Produktion GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office
   (Case C-240/18 P)2018/C 249/09Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Constantin Film Produktion GmbH (represented by: E. Saarmann and P. Baronikians, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of 24 January 2018 in Case T-69/17;

            —

            order the respondent to pay the costs.

      Grounds of appeal and main arguments

   In support of its appeal the appellant submits three grounds.
   1. Infringement of Article 7(1)(f) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR)

   The General Court of the European Union erred in refusing the EU trade mark application at issue on the basis of the absolute ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(f) of the EUTMR. (
         1
      ) The sign applied for is not, it is submitted, contrary to accepted principles of morality.
   The General Court of the European Union committed the following errors in its examination of the findings made by the Board of Appeal:
   The General Court of the European Union examined the sign ‘Fuck you, Goethe’, instead of the specific sign applied for, namely ‘Fack Ju Göhte’.
   The General Court of the European Union erred in assuming that the sign applied for was marked by an inherent vulgarity, thereby overlooking the fact that the multi-word sign ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ is an original and distinctive artistic term which, on account of its misspelling, appears humorous and harmless.
   The General Court of the European Union erred in law by confirming the Board of Appeal’s determination of the relevant German-speaking public’s perception. The appellant has proved the broad success of the film ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ in the German-speaking part of the European Union and the fact that the relevant public associates the sign applied for with amusement and entertainment. Even the (few) members of the public who have not yet heard of the film cannot possibly feel offended by the sign applied for in respect of the goods and services covered, as the phonetic spelling of the sign by itself deprives it of any seriousness. Furthermore, the sign applied for does not require any action on behalf of the general public, nor does it directly address or insult it.
   2. Infringement of the principle of equal treatment

   By not applying to the present case the findings of the European Union Intellectual Property Office concerning the application for the sign ‘DIE WANDERHURE’ (OHIM decision of 28 May 2015 — R 2889/2014-4 Die Wanderhure), the General Court of the European Union arbitrarily treated substantially similar situations in different ways.
   3. Infringement of the principles of legal certainty and sound administration

   By examining the sign ‘Fuck you, Goethe’ instead of ‘Fack Ju Göhte’ and by not applying the findings of the WANDERHURE decision, the General Court of the European Union took a decision which was unforeseeable and not verifiable.
   (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1)).


201806290501986632018/C 249/434652017TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180518343411Case T-465/17: Order of the General Court of 18 May 2018 — VKR Holding v EUIPO (VELUX) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark VELUX — Claiming the seniority of the earlier national word mark VELUX — Revocation of the decision of the Board of Appeal — Article 103 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Action which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3410120180518EN0043341341Order of the General Court of 18 May 2018 — VKR Holding v EUIPO (VELUX)
   (Case T-465/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark VELUX — Claiming the seniority of the earlier national word mark VELUX — Revocation of the decision of the Board of Appeal — Article 103 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Action which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)’2018/C 249/43Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: VKR Holding A/S (Søborg, Denmark) (represented by: J. Heebøll, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája, acting as Agent)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 May 2017 (Case R 1927/2016-2) relating to an application claiming seniority of the identical national (Estonian) trade mark for the word mark VELUX, registered as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            There is no need to adjudicate on the action.

            2.

            The European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) shall pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 309, 18.9.2017.


201806290251986362018/C 249/102432018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804037821Case C-243/18 P: Appeal brought on 3 April 2018 by the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 25 January 2018 in Case T-561/16, Galocha v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN710120180403EN00107182Appeal brought on 3 April 2018 by the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 25 January 2018 in Case T-561/16, Galocha v Fusion for Energy Joint Undertaking
   (Case C-243/18 P)2018/C 249/10Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Appellant: European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (represented by: G. Poszler and R. Hanak, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings: Yosu Galocha

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2018 in Case T-561/16 by which it annulled the reserve lists for selection procedure F4E/CA/ST/FGIV/2015/001 and the decisions of Fusion for Energy to appoint the successful candidates;

            —

            if the Court of Justice upholds the appeal, order the applicant at first instance to bear the costs incurred at first instance and the costs of the present appeal.

      Sole ground of appeal

   Infringement of the principle of proportionality and, consequently, imposition of an excessive disadvantage on third parties who are beneficiaries of a decision which has been held to be unlawful.


201806290511986642018/C 249/442282018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517353511Case T-228/18 R: Order of the President of the General Court of 17 May 2018 — Transtec v Commission (Interim measures — Public procurement — Framework contract for the provision of services to third countries benefiting from external aid — Application for interim measures — No urgency)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3510120180517EN0044351351Order of the President of the General Court of 17 May 2018 — Transtec v Commission
   (Case T-228/18 R)
   ‛(Interim measures — Public procurement — Framework contract for the provision of services to third countries benefiting from external aid — Application for interim measures — No urgency)’2018/C 249/44Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Transtec (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: L. Levi and N. Flandin, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Aresu and J. Estrada de Solà, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application on the basis of Articles 278 TFEU and 279 TFEU seeking, on the one hand, a suspension of the application of the decision of the European Commission of 26 March 2018 rejecting the tender of the applicant and awarding ten tenderers the contract relating to Lot No 3 of the ‘Framework contract for the implementation of external aid 2018 (FWC SIEA 2018) 2017/S 128-260026’, with reference EuropeAid/138778/DH/SER/Multi and, on the other, an order that the Commission provisionally include the applicant among the selected tenderers.

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            The application for interim measures is dismissed.

            2.

            The costs are reserved.


201806290611986322018/C 249/363022017TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529293021Case T-302/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (6000) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 6000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN2910120180529EN0036291302Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (6000)
   (Case T-302/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 6000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)’2018/C 249/36Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Sata GmbH & Co. KG (Kornwestheim, Germany) (represented by: M.-C. Simon, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools Co. Ltd (Pengjie Town, China) (represented by: S. Fröhlich and M. Hartmann, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2017 (Case R 656/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools and Sata.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sata GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201806290071986412018/C 249/112452018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804098811Case C-245/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Udine (Italy) lodged on 9 April 2018 — Fallimento Tecnoservice Int. Srl v Poste Italiane SpA
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN810120180409EN00118181Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Udine (Italy) lodged on 9 April 2018 — Fallimento Tecnoservice Int. Srl v Poste Italiane SpA
   (Case C-245/18)2018/C 249/11Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale ordinario di Udine

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Fallimento Tecnoservice Int. Srl

      Defendant: Poste Italiane SpA

      Question referred

   Must Articles 74 and 75 of Directive 2007/64/EC, (
         1
      ) in the version applicable on 3 August 2015, concerning a payment service provider’s obligations and the limitations of such a provider’s liability, as transposed into Italian law by Articles 24 and 25 of Decreto Legislativo No 1[1]/201[0], be interpreted as being applicable only to the payment service provider of the person who ordered the payment, or as being applicable also to the payee’s payment service provider?
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ 2007 L 319, p. 1).


201806290751986712018/C 249/462842018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503363721Case T-284/18: Action brought on 3 May 2018 — Arbuzov v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3610120180503EN0046361372Action brought on 3 May 2018 — Arbuzov v Council
   (Case T-284/18)2018/C 249/46Language of the case: Czech
      Parties

      Applicant: Sergej Arbuzov (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: M. Mleziva, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine in so far as it relates to Sergej Arbuzov.

            —

            Declare that the Council of the European Union is to bear its own costs and order it to pay the costs incurred by Sergej Arbuzov.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging an infringement of the right to sound administration.
            The applicant claims in support of his action, inter alia, that the Council of the European Union did not exercise due care and attention in the adoption of Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018, since before the adoption of the contested decision it did not address the applicant’s arguments and the evidence he had adduced, which supports his case, and it primarily based that decision on the brief summary by the Prosecutor-General’s Office of Ukraine and did not request any supplementary information on the course of the investigations in the Ukraine.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the applicant’s right to property.
            The applicant claims in this connection that the restrictive measures which have been taken against him are disproportionate, go beyond what is necessary and amount to an infringement of guarantees under international law of protection of the applicant’s right to property.


201806290131986472018/C 249/122532018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804128922Case C-253/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 12 April 2018 — Stadt Euskirchen v Rhenus Veniro GmbH & Co. KG
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN820120180412EN00128292Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 12 April 2018 — Stadt Euskirchen v Rhenus Veniro GmbH & Co. KG
   (Case C-253/18)2018/C 249/12Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Stadt Euskirchen

      Respondent: Rhenus Veniro GmbH & Co. KG

      Other parties: SVE Stadtverkehr Euskirchen GmbH, RVK Regionalverkehr Köln GmbH

      Question referred

   Does Article 5(2)(e) of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, (
         1
      ) which lays down the requirement to perform the major part of the public passenger transport service itself, prevent the internal operator from having that major part of the services performed by a company in which it has a 2,5 % holding and the remaining shares are held directly or indirectly by other competent authorities?
   (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 (OJ 2007 L 315, p. 1).


201806290641986392018/C 249/472852018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180504373821Case T-285/18: Action brought on 4 May 2018 — Pšonka v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3710120180504EN0047371382Action brought on 4 May 2018 — Pšonka v Council
   (Case T-285/18)2018/C 249/47Language of the case: Czech
      Parties

      Applicant: Viktor Pavlovič Pšonka (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: M. Mleziva, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/326 of 5 March 2018, in so far as that Decision and that Regulation relate to the applicant.

            —

            Declare that the Council of the European Union is to bear its own costs and order it to pay the costs incurred by the applicant.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging an infringement of the right to sound administration.

                     —

                     The applicant claims in support of his action, inter alia, that the Council of the European Union did not exercise due care and attention in the adoption of Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018, since before the adoption of the contested decision it did not address the applicant’s arguments and the evidence he had adduced, which supports his case, and it relied primarily on the brief summary by the Prosecutor-General’s Office of Ukraine and did not request any supplementary information on the course of the investigations in the Ukraine.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the applicant’s right to property.

                     —

                     The applicant claims in this connection that the restrictive measures which have been taken against him are disproportionate, go beyond what is necessary and amount to an infringement of guarantees under international law of protection of the applicant’s right to property.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging an infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

                     —

                     The applicant claims in this connection that in the adoption of the restrictive measures his rights to a fair trial and to the presumption of innocence were infringed, as was his right to the protection of private property.


201806290051986602018/C 249/213112018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180509151731Case C-311/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 9 May 2018 — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN1510120180509EN0021151173Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 9 May 2018 — Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems
   (Case C-311/18)2018/C 249/21Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   High Court (Ireland)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Data Protection Commissioner

      Defendants: Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems

      Questions referred

            1.

            In circumstances in which personal data is transferred by a private company from a European Union (EU) member state to a private company in a third country for a commercial purpose pursuant to Decision 2010/87/EU (
                  1
               ) as amended by Commission Decision 2016/2297 (
                  2
               ) (‘the SCC Decision’) and may be further processed in the third country by its authorities for purposes of national security but also for purposes of law enforcement and the conduct of the foreign affairs of the third country, does EU law (including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’)) apply to the transfer of the data notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4(2) of TEU in relation to nationalsecurity and the provisions of the first indent of Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC (
                  3
               ) (‘the Directive’) in relation to public security, defence and State security?

            2.

                        (1)

                        In determining whether there is a violation of the rights of an individual through the transfer of data from the EU to a third country under the SCC Decision where it may be further processed for national security purposes, is the relevant comparator for the purposes of the Directive:

                                 a)

                                 The Charter, TEU, TFEU, the Directive, ECHR (or any other provision of EU law); or

                                 b)

                                 The national laws of one or more member states?

                        (2)

                        If the relevant comparator is b), are the practices in the context of national security in one or more member states also to be included in the comparator?

            3.

            When assessing whether a third country ensures the level of protection required by EU law to personal data transferred to that country for the purposes of Article 26 of the Directive, ought the level of protection in the third country be assessed by reference to:

                     a)

                     The applicable rules in the third country resulting from its domestic law or international commitments, and the practice designed to ensure compliance with those rules, to include the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in the third country;
                     or

                     b)

                     The rules referred to in a) together with such administrative, regulatory and compliance practices and policy safeguards, procedures, protocols, oversight mechanisms and non judicial remedies as are in place in the third country?

            4.

            Given the facts found by the High Court in relation to US law, if personal data is transferred from the EU to the US under the SCC Decision does this violate the rights of individuals under Articles 7 and/or 8 of the Charter?

            5.

            Given the facts found by the High Court in relation to US law, if personal data is transferred from the EU to the US under the SCC Decision:

                     a)

                     Does the level of protection afforded by the US respect the essence of an individual’s right to a judicial remedy for breach of his or her data privacy rights guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter?
                     If the answer to a) is yes,

                     b)

                     Are the limitations imposed by US law on an individual’s right to a judicial remedy in the context of US national security proportionate within the meaning of Article 52 of the Charter and do not exceed what is necessary in a democratic society for national security purposes?

            6.

                        (1)

                        What is the level of protection required to be afforded to personal data transferred to a third country pursuant to standard contractual clauses adopted in accordance with a decision of the Commission under Article 26(4) in light of the provisions of the Directive and in particular Articles 25 and 26 read in the light of the Charter?

                        (2)

                        What are the matters to be taken into account in assessing whether the level of protection afforded to data transferred to a third country under the SCC Decision satisfies the requirements of the Directive and the Charter?

            7.

            Does the fact that the standard contractual clauses apply as between the data exporter and the data importer and do not bind the national authorities of a third country who may require the data importer to make available to its security services for further processing the personal data transferred pursuant to the clauses provided for in the SCC Decision preclude the clauses from adducing adequate safeguards as envisaged by Article 26(2) of the Directive?

            8.

            If a third country data importer is subject to surveillance laws that in the view of a data protection authority conflict with the clauses of the Annex to the SCC Decision or Article 25 and 26 of the Directive and/or the Charter, is a data protection authority required to use its enforcement powers under Article 28(3) of the Directive to suspend data flows or is the exercise of those powers limited to exceptional cases only, in light of Recital 11 of the Directive, or can a data protection authority use its discretion not to suspend data flows?

            9.

                        (1)

                        For the purposes of Article 25(6) of the Directive, does Decision (EU) 2016/1250 (
                              4
                           ) (‘the Privacy Shield Decision’) constitute a finding of general application binding on data protection authorities and the courts of the member states to the effect that the US ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25(2) of the Directive by reason of its domestic law or of the international commitments it has entered into?

                        (2)

                        If it does not, what relevance, if any, does the Privacy Shield Decision have in the assessment conducted into the adequacy of the safeguards provided to data transferred to the United States which is transferred pursuant to the SCC Decision?

            10.

            Given the findings of the High Court in relation to US law, does the provision of the Privacy Shield ombudsperson under Annex A to Annex III of the Privacy Shield Decision when taken in conjunction with the existing regime in the United States ensure that the US provides a remedy to data subjects whose personal data is transferred to the US under the SCC Decision that is compatible with Article 47 of the Charter?

            11.

            Does the SCC Decision violate Articles 7, 8 and/or 47 of the Charter?

      (
         1
      )	Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2010, L 39, p. 5).
   (
         2
      )	Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16 December 2016 amending Decisions 2001/497/EC and 2010/87/EU on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries and to processors established in such countries, under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2016, L 344, p. 100).
   (
         3
      )	Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995, L 281, p. 31).
   (
         4
      )	Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (OJ 2016, L 207, p. 1).


201806290601986312018/C 249/482892018TC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180504383921Case T-289/18: Action brought on 4 May 2018 — Pšonka v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN3810120180504EN0048381392Action brought on 4 May 2018 — Pšonka v Council
   (Case T-289/18)2018/C 249/48Language of the case: Czech
      Parties

      Applicant: Artem Viktorovič Psonka (Kramatorsk, Ukraine) (represented by: M. Mleziva, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            Annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/326 of 5 March 2018, in so far as that Decision and that Regulation relate to the applicant.

            —

            Declare that the Council of the European Union is to bear its own costs and order it to pay the costs incurred by the applicant.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging an infringement of the right to sound administration.

                     —

                     The applicant claims in support of his action, inter alia, that the Council of the European Union did not exercise due care and attention in the adoption of Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018, since before the adoption of the contested decision it did not address the applicant’s arguments and the evidence he had adduced, which supports his case, and it relied primarily on the brief summary by the Prosecutor-General’s Office of Ukraine and did not request any supplementary information on the course of the investigations in the Ukraine.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the applicant’s right to property.

                     —

                     The applicant claims in this connection that the restrictive measures which have been taken against him are disproportionate, go beyond what is necessary and amount to an infringement of guarantees under international law of protection of the applicant’s right to property.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging an infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

                     —

                     The applicant claims in this connection that in the adoption of the restrictive measures his rights to a fair trial and to the presumption of innocence were infringed, as was his right to the protection of private property.


201807060281993572018/C 259/152512017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531111222Case C-251/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 31 May 2018 — European Commission v Italian Republic (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Collection and treatment of urban waste water — Directive 91/271/EEC — Articles 3, 4 and 10 — Judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil obligations — Non-compliance — Article 260(2) TFEU — Financial penalties — Fine and lump sum)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1120120180531EN0015112122Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 31 May 2018 — European Commission v Italian Republic
   (Case C-251/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Collection and treatment of urban waste water — Directive 91/271/EEC — Articles 3, 4 and 10 — Judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil obligations — Non-compliance — Article 260(2) TFEU — Financial penalties — Fine and lump sum)’2018/C 259/15Language of the case: Italian
      Parties

      Applicant: European Commission (represented by: E. Manhaeve and L. Cimaglia, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, M. Russo and F. De Luca, avvocati dello Stato)

      Operative part of the judgment

            1)

            By failing to adopt all the measures necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment of 19 July 2012, Commission v Italy (C-565/10, not published, EU:C:2012:476), the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU.

            2)

            If the failure to fulfil obligations established in point 1 has continued until the day of delivery of the present judgment, the Italian Republic is ordered to pay to the European Commission a fine of EUR 30112500 for every six months of delay in implementing the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 19 July 2012, Commission v Italy (C-565/10, not published, EU:C:2012:476), from the date of delivery of the present judgment until the full compliance with the judgment of 19 July 2012, Commission v Italy (C-565/10, not published, EU:C:2012:476), the actual amount of which must be calculated at the end of each six-month period by reducing the total amount relating to each of those periods by a percentage corresponding to the proportion of population equivalents of the agglomerations whose urban waste water collection and treatment systems have been rendered compliant with the judgment of 19 July 2012, Commission v Italy (C-565/10, not published, EU:C:2012:476), at the end of the period in question, compared with the number of population equivalents of the agglomerations not having such systems on the day of delivery of the present judgment.

            3)

            The Italian Republic is ordered to pay to the European Commission a lump sum of EUR 25 million.

            4)

            The Italian Republic is ordered to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 221, 10.7.2017.


201807060201993652018/C 259/292712018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180419202121Case C-271/18 P: Appeal brought on 19 April 2018 by the Slovak Republic against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-216/15 Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2010120180419EN0029201212Appeal brought on 19 April 2018 by the Slovak Republic against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-216/15 Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa v Commission
   (Case C-271/18 P)2018/C 259/29Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová)

      Other parties to the proceedings: Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s., Union zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s., European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of 5 February 2018 in Case T-261/15 Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa a.s. v European Commission, whereby the General Court allowed the action brought by Dôvera;

            —

            dismiss the action brought by Dôvera as unfounded; and

            —

            order Dôvera and Union to pay the costs.

      However, if the Court of Justice should conclude that it does not have before it sufficient information to give final judgment in the dispute, the Slovak Republic submits, in the alternative, that the Court of Justice should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of 5 February 2018 in Case T-261/15 Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa a.s. v European Commission, whereby the General Court allowed the action brought by Dôvera;

            —

            refer the case back to the General Court for judgment; and

            —

            reserve the decision on costs.

      Grounds of appeal and main arguments

   In support of its appeal, the Slovak Republic puts forward four grounds of appeal to justify setting aside the judgment under appeal of the General Court:

            1.

            By the first ground of appeal, the Slovak Republic complains that in the judgment under appeal the General Court exceeded its power of review in respect of decisions of the European Commission in the field of State aid. The relevant settled case-law of the Court of Justice is clear and, according to the Slovak Republic, it was not observed in the present case. The Slovak Republic submits that in the judgment under appeal the General Court did not respect the broad discretion of the European Commission in relation to complex economic assessments, and did not demonstrate the existence of a manifest error of assessment by the European Commission, but simply substituted its own assessment for that of the European Commission, a precisely contrary assessment, and in doing so it exceeded its power of review.

            2.

            By the second ground of appeal, the Slovak Republic complains that in the judgment under appeal the General Court in two respects distorted the evidence adduced before it, as it made materially incorrect findings of fact, the incorrectness being clear from the documents in the case-file. The distortion of evidence complained of relates both to the profit factor and to the competition factor in the Slovakian system of compulsory health insurance.

            3.

            By the third ground of appeal, the Slovak Republic complains that the General Court erred in law in its classification of the Slovakian system of compulsory health insurance, thereby infringing both Article 107(1) TFEU and the principle of legal certainty. The judgment under appeal is incompatible with the previous case-law of the Court of Justice on social insurance systems. Specifically, the General Court (i) decided in opposite fashion to the Court of Justice’s previous case-law in similar cases, (ii) decided in the same way as the Court of Justice’s previous case-law in different cases and (ii) did not respect the basic approach taken in the previous case-law of the Court of Justice, namely that the classification of a specific social security system is based on its dominant aspects.

            4.

            Finally, the Slovak Republic submits, by the fourth ground of appeal, that the reasoning of the judgment under appeal shows several defects which justify the setting aside of the judgment under appeal by the Court of Justice. Specifically, (i) the General Court wholly failed to explain certain of its findings and approaches (which, moreover, were decisive), (ii) the reasoning in the judgment under appeal is inconsistent in several respects and the General Court contradicts itself in the judgment under appeal and (iii) the General Court did not, in the reasoning in the judgment under appeal, take account of relevant arguments of the Commission and the Slovak Republic. The General Court thereby infringed the requirement to state reasons resulting from Article 36 in conjunction with Article 53(1) of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.


201807060601994532018/C 259/573042018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180508424321Case T-304/18: Action brought on 8 May 2018 — MLPS v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4210120180508EN0057421432Action brought on 8 May 2018 — MLPS v Commission
   (Case T-304/18)2018/C 259/57Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Mouvement pour la liberté de la protection sociale (MLPS) (Paris, France) (represented by: M. Gibaud, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should:

            —

            declare that the European Commission failed to act in so far as it unlawfully refrained from dealing with the complaint of the association Mouvement pour la liberté de la protection sociale (MLPS) of 21 December 2017;

            —

            annul in full the decision of the European Commission of 7 March 2018 refusing to continue dealing with the complaint of the association Mouvement pour la liberté de la protection sociale (MLPS) of 21 December 2017;

            —

            make an appropriate order as to costs in accordance with the law.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging, inter alia, an error of assessment in so far as the contested decision categorised French social security schemes as a ‘statutory social security schemes’ even though they are by no means schemes intended for the whole population, or even for all of those in employment, but rather schemes grouping workers according to their professional status which should, accordingly, come within the scope of Directives 92/49/EEC and 92/96/EEC.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legal uniformity, in so far as France is in a situation that is strictly similar to that of Slovakia, in relation to which the General Court held that ‘in view of the profit pursued by health insurance companies and the existence of intense competition as to quality and the services offered, the activity of providing compulsory health insurance in Slovakia is economic in nature’ (judgment of 5 February 2018, Dôvera zdravotná poist’ovňa v Commission, T-216/15, not published, EU:T:2018:64, paragraph 68). According to the applicant, the situation therefore cannot be held to be otherwise in relation to France.


201807060561993542018/C 259/438822016TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607313222Case T-882/16: Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — Sipral World v EUIPO — La Dolfina (DOLFINA) (EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — EU word mark DOLFINA — No genuine use of the mark — Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3120120180607EN0043312322Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — Sipral World v EUIPO — La Dolfina (DOLFINA)
   (Case T-882/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — EU word mark DOLFINA — No genuine use of the mark — Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 259/43Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Sipral World, SL (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: R. Almaraz Palmero and A. Ruo, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: La Dolfina, SA (Buenos Aires, Argentina) (represented by: J.Carbonell Callicó, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 September 2016 (Case R 1897/2015-2), relating to revocation proceedings between La Dolfina and Sipral World.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sipral World, SL, to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 46, 13.2.2017.


201807060611993552018/C 259/583082018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517434421Case T-308/18: Action brought on 17 May 2018 — Hamas v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4310120180517EN0058431442Action brought on 17 May 2018 — Hamas v Council
   (Case T-308/18)2018/C 259/58Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Hamas (Doha, Qatar) (represented by: L. Glock, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/475 of 21 March 2018 updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2017/1426 (OJ 2018 L 79, p. 26);

            —

            annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/468 of 21 March 2018 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1420 (OJ 2018 L 79, p. 7);
            in so far as those measures apply to Hamas, including Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem;

            —

            order the Council to pay all of the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law:

            1.

            First plea in law: infringement of Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931.

            2.

            Second plea in law: errors committed by the Council as to the accuracy of the factual allegations made against the applicant.

            3.

            Third plea in law: mistaken characterisation by the Council of Hamas as a terrorist group.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law: infringement of the principle of non-interference.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law: failure to take sufficient account of the development of the situation owing to the passage of time.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law: infringement of the obligation to state reasons.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law: infringement of the rights of defence and of the right to effective judicial protection.


201807060231994512018/C 259/163062017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531121321Case C-306/17: Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tatabányai Törvényszék — Hungary) — Éva Nothartová v Sámson József Boldizsár (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 — Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Article 8(3) — Counterclaim arising or not arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1210120180531EN0016121132Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tatabányai Törvényszék — Hungary) — Éva Nothartová v Sámson József Boldizsár
   (Case C-306/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 — Jurisdiction — Special jurisdiction — Article 8(3) — Counterclaim arising or not arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based)’2018/C 259/16Language of the case: Hungarian
      Referring court

   Tatabányai Törvényszék

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Éva Nothartová

      Defendant: Sámson József Boldizsár

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be interpreted as applying, not exclusively, in a situation in which the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim alleging infringement of the applicant’s personality rights, on the ground that photographs were taken and videos recorded without his knowledge, is seised by the defendant bringing a counterclaim for compensation on the ground that the applicant is liable in tort, delict or quasi-delict for, inter alia, restrictions on his intellectual creations, which are the subject of the original application, where, when examining the counterclaim, that court is required to assess the lawfulness of the actions on which the applicant bases its own claims.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 269, 14.8.2017.


201807060701993902018/C 259/44722017TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607323211Case T-72/17: Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — Schmid v EUIPO — Landeskammer für Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (Steirisches Kürbiskernöl) (EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark Steirisches Kürbiskernöl — Protected geographical indication — Article 15, Article 51(1)(a) and Article 55(1) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 18, Article 58(1)(a) and Article 62(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Genuine use of the mark — Use as a trade mark)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3210120180607EN0044321321Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — Schmid v EUIPO — Landeskammer für Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (Steirisches Kürbiskernöl)
   (Case T-72/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark Steirisches Kürbiskernöl — Protected geographical indication — Article 15, Article 51(1)(a) and Article 55(1) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 18, Article 58(1)(a) and Article 62(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Genuine use of the mark — Use as a trade mark)’2018/C 259/44Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Gabriele Schmid (Halbenrain, Austria) (represented by: B. Kuchar, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Landeskammer für Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark (Graz, Austria) (represented by: I. Hödl and S. Schoeller, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 December 2016 (Case R 1768/2015-4), relating to revocation proceedings between Ms Schmid and Landeskammer für Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 7 December 2016 (Case R 1768/2015-4);

            2.

            Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

            3.

            Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and also to pay the costs incurred by Ms Gabriele Schmid;

            4.

            Orders Landeskammer für Land- und Forstwirtschaft in Steiermark to bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201807060661994302018/C 259/593102018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180515444521Case T-310/18: Action brought on 15 May 2018 — EPSU and Willem Goudriaan v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4410120180515EN0059441452Action brought on 15 May 2018 — EPSU and Willem Goudriaan v Commission
   (Case T-310/18)2018/C 259/59Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) (Brussels, Belgium) and Jan Willem Goudriaan (Brussels) (represented by: R. Arthur, Solicitor, and R. Palmer, Barrister)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul the defendant’s decision of 5 March 2018 not to propose to the Council that an EU Social Partners’ Agreement of 21 December 2015 on rights of information and consultation for civil servants and employees of central government administrations, entered into under Article 155(1) TFEU, be implemented by a directive by means of a Council decision under Article 155(2) TFEU;

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision was an act adopted in breach of Article 155(2) TFEU. The Commission lacked power to refuse to propose that the Council implement the Agreement by Council decision, in the absence of any objection either to the representative status of the parties to the Agreement, or to the legality of the Agreement.

                     —

                     The applicants argue that the Commission’s decision not to propose to the Council that the Agreement be implemented by Council decision is in breach of Article 155(2) TFEU, and contrary to the requirement for respect for the autonomy of the social partners, as enshrined in Article 152 TFEU.

                     —

                     The applicants also argue that the Commission was under a duty to make a proposal to the Council, unless it produced a reasoned basis for finding that the social partners who were party to the Agreement were not sufficiently representative, or the agreement was not lawful.

                     —

                     The applicants further maintain that the Commission entered into an assessment of the appropriateness of the Agreement, which does not fall within its powers.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is flawed by reasons which are manifestly mistaken and ill-grounded.

                     —

                     It is argued by the applicants that the grounds invoked by the Commission in its contested decision were not capable of justifying the refusal to make a proposal to the Council that it adopt the Agreement.

                     —

                     The applicants also argue that the only reasons which could have been capable of justifying a refusal would have been a justified objection to the representativeness of the social partners, or to the lawfulness of a Council decision implementing the Agreement as a directive.

                     —

                     Furthermore the applicants maintain that the Commission failed in any event to undertake any impact assessment, and so could not have justified on grounds of proportionality or subsidiarity any conclusion to refuse to propose that the Agreement be implemented as a directive by a Council decision, even if it had been permissible in principle to do so.


201807060731993322018/C 259/451362017TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180612333311Case T-136/17: Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2018 — Cotécnica v EUIPO — Mignini & Petrini (cotecnica MAXIMA) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for registration of the EU figurative mark cotecnica MAXIMA — Earlier national figurative mark MAXIM Alimento Superpremium — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3310120180612EN0045331331Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2018 — Cotécnica v EUIPO — Mignini & Petrini (cotecnica MAXIMA)
   (Case T-136/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for registration of the EU figurative mark cotecnica MAXIMA — Earlier national figurative mark MAXIM Alimento Superpremium — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 259/45Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Cotécnica, SCCL (established in Bellpuig, Spain) (represented by: initially, J. C. Erdozain López, J. Galán López and J.-B. Devaureix, and, subsequently, J. C. Erdozain López, J. Galán López and L. Montoya Terán, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Mignini & Petrini SpA (established in Petrignano di Assisi, Italy) (represented by: F. Celluprica, F. Fischetti and F. De Bono, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 November 2016 (Case R 853/2016-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Mignini & Petrini and Cotécnica.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal.

            2.

            Orders Cotécnica, SCCL to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Mignini & Petrini SpA.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


201807060241993512018/C 259/302732018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180420222211Case C-273/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 20 April 2018 — SIA ‘Kuršu zeme’
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2210120180420EN0030221221Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 20 April 2018 — SIA ‘Kuršu zeme’
   (Case C-273/18)2018/C 259/30Language of the case: Latvian
      Referring court

   Augstākā tiesa

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: SIA ‘Kuršu zeme’

      Respondent: Valsts ieņēmumu dienests

      Question referred

   Must Article 168(a) of Directive 2006/112/EC (
         1
      ) be interpreted as precluding a refusal of the deduction of input value added tax (VAT) where the refusal is based solely on the fact that the taxpayer is knowingly involved in the arrangement of sham transactions, but it is not indicated how the outcome of those specific transactions is detrimental to the Treasury because of failure to pay VAT or an unjustified claim for repayment of VAT, as compared with the situation that would have obtained had the transactions been arranged to reflect the actual circumstances?
   (
         1
      )	Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).


201807060291994022018/C 259/173352017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531131311Case C-335/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Bulgaria) — Bulgaria) — Neli Valcheva v Georgios Babanarakis (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Scope — Concept of ‘rights of access’ — Article 1(2)(a) and Article 2.7 and 2.10 — Rights of access of grandparents)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1310120180531EN0017131131Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Bulgaria) — Bulgaria) — Neli Valcheva v Georgios Babanarakis
   (Case C-335/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Scope — Concept of ‘rights of access’ — Article 1(2)(a) and Article 2.7 and 2.10 — Rights of access of grandparents)’2018/C 259/17Language of the case: Bulgarian
      Referring court

   Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Bulgaria)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Neli Valcheva

      Respondent: Georgios Babanarakis

      Operative part of the judgment

   The concept of ‘rights of access’ referred to in Article 1(2)(a) and in Article 2.7 and 2.10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, must be interpreted as including rights of access of grandparents to their grandchildren.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 269, 14.8.2017.


201807060681994312018/C 259/603202018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180522454621Case T-320/18: Action brought on 22 May 2018 — WD v EFSA
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4510120180522EN0060451462Action brought on 22 May 2018 — WD v EFSA
   (Case T-320/18)2018/C 259/60Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: WD (represented by: L. Levi and A. Blot, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare the present action admissible and well founded;

      consequently,

            —

            annul the decision of 14 July 2017, taken by the Executive Director of EFSA in his capacity as AACC, according to which the applicant was not among the staff members promoted during the 2017 reclassification round;

            —

            annul the decision of the AACC of 9 February 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 10 October 2017 directed against the decision of 14 July 2017;

            —

            annul the decision of 9 August 2017 (and notified on 10 August 2017), taken by the Executive Director of EFSA in his capacity as AACC, not to renew the applicant’s employment contract;

            —

            annul the decision of the AACC of 12 March 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint of 10 November 2017 directed against that decision of 9 August 2017;

            —

            award damages for the harm suffered;

            —

            order the defendant to pay all of the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law as regards the decision not to renew her contract.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of the decision of 8 December 2012 concerning employment contract management adopted by EFSA.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence and in particular the right to be heard.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty of care and of the Work instruction relating to the contract of employment renewal process adopted by EFSA.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment and misuse of power.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the Work instructions and the duty of care.

      The applicant relies on a single plea in law as regards the decision not to promote her, alleging infringement of the decision of 22 April 2008 concerning the career of temporary staff and assignment to a post carrying a higher grade than that at which they were engaged, a manifest error of assessment and infringement of the principle of non-discrimination.


201807060191993642018/C 259/183902017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530131422Case C-390/17 P: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 May 2018 — Irit Azoulay and Others v European Parliament (Appeal — Civil service — Remuneration — Family allowances — Education allowance — Refusal to reimburse education costs — Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1320120180530EN0018132142Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 May 2018 — Irit Azoulay and Others v European Parliament
   (Case C-390/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — Civil service — Remuneration — Family allowances — Education allowance — Refusal to reimburse education costs — Article 3(1) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of officials of the European Union)’2018/C 259/18Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Appellants: Irit Azoulay, Andrew Boreham, Mirja Bouchard, Darren Neville (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, avocate)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament (represented by: L. Deneys and E. Taneva, Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal;

            2.

            Orders Ms Irit Azoulay, Mr Andrew Boreham, Ms Mirja Bouchard and Mr Darren Neville to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 412, 4.12.2017.


201807060311994062018/C 259/312772018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424222322Case C-277/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Administrativo de Círculo de Lisboa (Lisbon, Portugal) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Henkel Ibérica Portugal, Unipessoal Lda v Comissão de Segurança de Serviços e Bens de Consumo
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2220120180424EN0031222232Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Administrativo de Círculo de Lisboa (Lisbon, Portugal) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Henkel Ibérica Portugal, Unipessoal Lda v Comissão de Segurança de Serviços e Bens de Consumo
   (Case C-277/18)2018/C 259/31Language of the case: Portuguese
      Referring court

   Tribunal Administrativo de Círculo de Lisboa

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Henkel Ibérica Portugal, Unipessoal Lda

      Defendant: Comissão de Segurança de Serviços e Bens de Consumo

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is national legislation, established in Portugal in Decree-law No 69/2005 of 17 March and in Decree-law No 150/90 of 10 May, which, as well as prohibiting the placing on the market of products that could endanger the health and safety of consumers because they can be confused with foods, also prohibits the placing on the market of products that, since they can be confused with other products (toys, in particular) due to their appearance, can, through normal or reasonably foreseeable use, endanger the health and safety of consumers, especially children, compatible with Community law — in particular with Council Directive 2001/95/EC (
                  1
               ) [of the European Parliament and of the Council] of 3 December 2001 on general product safety, with Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty (as referred to in that directive) and with Council Directive 87/357/EEC (
                  2
               ) of 25 June 198[7]?

            2.

            Do Articles 34 and 36 of the Treaty preclude the application of national legislation which prohibits within the national territory not only the placing on the market of products that can be confused with food products, in accordance with Article 1(2) of the abovementioned Community Directive, but also other products whose appearance can cause consumers to use them for purposes other than those for which they are intended, even when they are not dangerous preparations within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 1999/45/EC (
                  3
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2002 L 11, p. 4.
   (
         2
      )	Council Directive 87/357/EEC of 25 June 1987 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning products which, appearing to be other than they are, endanger the health or safety of consumers (OJ 1987 L 192, p. 49).
   (
         3
      )	Directive 1999/45/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 1999 concerning the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous preparations (OJ 1999 L 200, p. 1).


201807060321993932018/C 259/195192017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530141411Joined Cases C-519/17 P and C-522/17 P to C-525/17 P: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 May 2018 — L’Oréal v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Guinot SAS (Appeal — EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Applications for registration of the word marks MASTER PRECISE, MASTER SMOKY, MASTER SHAPE, MASTER DUO and MASTER DRAMA — Earlier national figurative mark MASTERS COLORS PARIS — Rejection of the applications for registration — Inadequate statement of reasons — To be considered of the Court’s own motion)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1410120180530EN0019141141Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 30 May 2018 — L’Oréal v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Guinot SAS
   (Joined Cases C-519/17 P and C-522/17 P to C-525/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Applications for registration of the word marks MASTER PRECISE, MASTER SMOKY, MASTER SHAPE, MASTER DUO and MASTER DRAMA — Earlier national figurative mark MASTERS COLORS PARIS — Rejection of the applications for registration — Inadequate statement of reasons — To be considered of the Court’s own motion)’2018/C 259/19Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Appellant: L’Oréal (represented by: T. de Haan, avocat, P. Péters, advocaat)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: D. Botis and D. Hanf, acting as Agents), Guinot (represented by: A. Sion, avocate)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Sets aside the orders of the General Court of the European Union of 26 June 2017, L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot (MASTER PRECISE) (T-181/16, not published, EU:T:2017:447), L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot (MASTER SMOKY) (T-179/16, not published, EU:T:2017:445), L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot (MASTER SHAPE) (T-180/16, not published, EU:T:2017:451), L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot (MASTER DUO) (T-182/16, not published, EU:T:2017:448), and L’Oréal v EUIPO — Guinot (MASTER DRAMA) (T-183/16, not published, EU:T:2017:449);

            2.

            Refers Cases T-181/16, T-179/16, T-180/16, T-182/16 and T-183/16 back to the General Court of the European Union;

            3.

            Reserves the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 424, 11.12.2017.


201807060301994032018/C 259/322782018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424232311Case C-278/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Manuel Jorge Sequeira Mesquita v Fazenda Pública
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2310120180424EN0032231231Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Manuel Jorge Sequeira Mesquita v Fazenda Pública
   (Case C-278/18)2018/C 259/32Language of the case: Portuguese
      Referring court

   Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Manuel Jorge Sequeira Mesquita

      Defendant: Fazenda Pública

      Question referred

   Must Article 135(1)(l) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (
         1
      ) of 28 November 2006 relating to the exemption of transactions involving the leasing of immovable property be interpreted as meaning that such an exemption is applicable to a contract for the transfer of the use of rural properties comprising vineyards for agricultural purposes to a company whose corporate purpose is the activity of agricultural exploitation, entered into for a period of one year, automatically renewable for further periods of the same length and under which rent is paid at the end of each year?
   (
         1
      )	Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).


201807060161994372018/C 259/02852016CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201805302211Joined Cases C-85/16 P and C-86/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 30 May 2018 — Kenzo Tsujimoto v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Kenzo (Appeal — EU trade mark — Applications for registration of the word mark KENZO ESTATE — Earlier EU word mark KENZO — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(5) — Relative ground for refusal of registration — Reputation — Due cause)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN210120180530EN00022121Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 30 May 2018 — Kenzo Tsujimoto v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Kenzo
   (Joined Cases C-85/16 P and C-86/16 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — EU trade mark — Applications for registration of the word mark KENZO ESTATE — Earlier EU word mark KENZO — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(5) — Relative ground for refusal of registration — Reputation — Due cause)’2018/C 259/02Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Kenzo Tsujimoto (represented by: A. Wenninger-Lenz, M. Ring and W. von der Osten-Sacken, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent), Kenzo (represented by: P. Roncaglia, G. Lazzaretti, F. Rossi and N. Parotta, avvocati)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeals;

            2.

            Orders Mr Kenzo Tsujimoto to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 335, 12.9.2016.


201807060551993972018/C 259/613242018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180528464611Case T-324/18: Action brought on 28 May 2018 — VI.TO. v EUIPO — Bottega (Shape of a golden bottle)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4610120180528EN0061461461Action brought on 28 May 2018 — VI.TO. v EUIPO — Bottega (Shape of a golden bottle)
   (Case T-324/18)2018/C 259/61Language in which the application was lodged: Italian
      Parties

      Applicant: Vinicola Tombacco (VI.TO.) Srl (Trebaseleghe, Italy) (represented by: L. Giove, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Sandro Bottega (Colle Umberto, Italy)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: European Union three-dimensional mark (Shape of a golden bottle) – European Union trade mark No 11 531 381

      Procedure before EUIPO: Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 March 2018 in Case R 1036/2017-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Incorrect assessment of the ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Incorrect assessment of the ground for refusal under Article 7(1)(e)(i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807060401993692018/C 259/205372017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531151511Case C-537/17: Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Berlin — Germany) — Claudia Wegener v Royal Air Maroc SA (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Air transport — Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 — Article 3(1) — Scope — Definition of ‘connecting flight’ — Flight departing from an airport situated in the territory of a Member State, including a transfer at an airport situated in the territory of a third State and destined for another airport of that third State)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1510120180531EN0020151151Judgment of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Berlin — Germany) — Claudia Wegener v Royal Air Maroc SA
   (Case C-537/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Air transport — Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 — Article 3(1) — Scope — Definition of ‘connecting flight’ — Flight departing from an airport situated in the territory of a Member State, including a transfer at an airport situated in the territory of a third State and destined for another airport of that third State)’2018/C 259/20Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landgericht Berlin

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Claudia Wegener

      Defendant: Royal Air Maroc SA

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that the regulation applies to a passenger transport effected under a single booking and comprising, between its departure from an airport situated in the territory of a Member State and its arrival at an airport situated in the territory of a third State, a scheduled stopover outside the European Union with a change of aircraft.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 424, 11.12.2017.


201807060421993872018/C 259/332792018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424232422Case C-279/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Magdalena Molina Rodríguez v Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (SEPE)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2320120180424EN0033232242Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Magdalena Molina Rodríguez v Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (SEPE)
   (Case C-279/18)2018/C 259/33Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Juzgado de lo Social No 33 de Barcelona

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Magdalena Molina Rodríguez

      Defendant: Servicio Público de Empleo Estatal (SEPE)

      Question referred

   Must the prohibition of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (
         1
      ) be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as Article 215(1)(3) of the Ley General de la Seguridad Social (General Law on Social Security) (approved by [Real Decreto Legislativo] 1/94 (Royal Legislative Decree 1/94)), which, as amended by Real Decreto Ley 5/2013 de 15 de marzo (Royal Decree-Law 5/2013 of 15 March), lays down a new condition — that household income may not exceed a certain amount — for entitlement to the non-contributory unemployment benefit for workers aged 55 and over, when this restricts entitlement to that benefit significantly more for female (as compared with male) potential beneficiaries, as is demonstrated by the statistics provided?
   (
         1
      )	OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24.


201807060371993592018/C 259/21502018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180129151622Case C-50/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 29 January 2018 — Mijo Mestrovic
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1520120180129EN0021152162Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark (Austria) lodged on 29 January 2018 — Mijo Mestrovic
   (Case C-50/18)2018/C 259/21Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landesverwaltungsgericht Steiermark

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Mijo Mestrovic

      Respondent authority: Bezirkshauptmannschaft Murtal

      Interested party: Finanzpolizei

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 56 TFEU and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (
                  1
               ) and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC (
                  2
               ) be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour, such as the failure to keep available documents relating to pay, provides for very high fines, in particular high minimum penalties, which are imposed cumulatively in respect of each worker concerned?

            2.

            If Question 1 itself is not answered in the affirmative:
            Must Article 56 TFEU and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC be interpreted as precluding the imposition of cumulative fines for infringements of formal obligations in connection with the cross-border deployment of labour which have no absolute upper limits?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 1997 L 18, p. 1.
   (
         2
      )	OJ 2014 L 159, p. 11.


201807060481994122018/C 259/461652017TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180614333422Case T-165/17: Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Emcur v EUIPO — Emcure Pharmaceuticals (EMCURE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark EMCURE — Earlier EU and national word marks EMCUR — Relative ground for refusal — Similarity of the goods and services — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3320120180614EN0046332342Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Emcur v EUIPO — Emcure Pharmaceuticals (EMCURE)
   (Case T-165/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark EMCURE — Earlier EU and national word marks EMCUR — Relative ground for refusal — Similarity of the goods and services — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 259/46Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Emcur Gesundheitsmittel aus Bad Ems GmbH (Bad Ems, Germany) (represented by: K. Bröcker, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Rajh, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Emcure Pharmaceuticals Ltd (Bhosari, India)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 December 2016 (Case R 790/2016-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Emcur Gesundheitsmittel aus Bad Ems and Emcure Pharmaceuticals.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office of 13 December 2016 (Case R 790/2016-2) in so far as it concerns the services in Classes 42 and 44 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended;

            2.

            Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

            3.

            Orders EUIPO and Emcur Gesundheitsmittel aus Bad Ems GmbH to bear their own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


201807060101994362018/C 259/342812018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424242521Case C-281/18 P: Appeal brought on 24 April 2018 by Repower AG against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 21 February 2018 in Case T-727/16, Repower v EUIPO

 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2410120180424EN0034241252Appeal brought on 24 April 2018 by Repower AG against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 21 February 2018 in Case T-727/16, Repower v EUIPO

   (Case C-281/18 P)2018/C 259/34Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Appellant: Repower AG (represented by: R. Kunz-Hallstein, H.P. Kunz-Hallstein and V. Kling, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, repowermap.org

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the first paragraph of the operative part of the General Court’s judgment of 21 February 2018 in Case T-727/16, in so far as the action was dismissed;

            —

            annul the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 3 August 2016 (Case R 2311/2014-5 (REV));

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

            1.

            EUIPO was not authorised to substitute the reasoning for the revocation in the proceedings before the General Court. EUIPO altered the subject matter of the dispute and infringed the right to be heard and the obligation to exercise its discretion.

            2.

            The general principle of law authorising the withdrawal of an unlawful administrative measure did not apply in the present case. There is no legal gap in the legislation. The provisions of Articles 80 and 83 of Regulation No 207/2009 constitute a lex specialis.

            3.

            Under Article 83 of Regulation No 207/2009, the onus was not on the appellant to prove that a principle of withdrawal of unlawful administrative measures does not exist in the Member States.

            4.

            Even assuming that such a general principle applies in the field of trade mark law, the conditions for revocation in full were not fulfilled by reason of the protection of legitimate expectations.

            5.

            There is a failure to state proper reasons in the Board of Appeal’s decision.


201807060671993982018/C 259/472942017TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180614343411Case T-294/17: Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO — Lion Capital (Lion’s Head) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark Lion’s Head — Earlier EU word mark LION CAPITAL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3410120180614EN0047341341Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Lion’s Head Global Partners v EUIPO — Lion Capital (Lion’s Head)
   (Case T-294/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark Lion’s Head — Earlier EU word mark LION CAPITAL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 259/47Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Lion’s Head Global Partners LLP (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: R. Nöske, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Lion Capital LLP (London) (represented by: D. Rose and J. Warner, Solicitors)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 February 2017 (Case R 1478/2016-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Lion Capital and Lion’s Head Global Partners.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Lion’s Head Global Partners LLP to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201807060061994352018/C 259/352832018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180425252511Case C-283/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Almería (Spain) lodged on 25 April 2018 — Liliana Beatriz Moya Privitello, Sergio Daniel Martín Durán v Cajas Rurales Unidas, Sociedad Cooperativa de Crédito
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2510120180425EN0035251251Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Almería (Spain) lodged on 25 April 2018 — Liliana Beatriz Moya Privitello, Sergio Daniel Martín Durán v Cajas Rurales Unidas, Sociedad Cooperativa de Crédito
   (Case C-283/18)2018/C 259/35Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Audiencia Provincial de Almería

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Liliana Beatriz Moya Privitello, Sergio Daniel Martín Durán

      Respondents: Cajas Rurales Unidas, Sociedad Cooperativa de Crédito

      Questions referred

            1.

            Does the use in contracts for long-term mortgage loans at a variable interest rate of one of the reference indices existing on the market, which has been officially published by the Banco de España (Bank of Spain), preclude the examination of the use of that index from the perspective of transparency, including where an index expressly permitted under the specific legislation has been used, if that legislation allows the parties to choose the index and that Bank used one of those indices without informing the customer of the existence of other applicable indices which are more favourable to consumers?

            2.

            In so far as that legislation permits the applicable reference index to be chosen from those provided for, can national legislation like that applicable in the main proceedings (namely, inter alia and primarily, the Orden de 5 de mayo de 1994 sobre transparencia de las condiciones financieras de los préstamos hipotecarios (Order of 5 May 1994 on transparency of the financial terms of mortgage loans), Orden EHA/2899/2011, de 28 de octubre, de transparencia y protección del cliente de servicios bancarios (Order EHA/2899/2011 of 28 October on transparency and the protection of banking services customers), Circular 5/2012, de 27 de junio, del Banco de España, a entidades de crédito y proveedores de servicios de pago, sobre transparencia de los servicios bancarios y responsabilidad en la concesión de préstamos (Bank of Spain Notice 5/2012 of 27 June to credit institutions and payment services providers on the transparency of banking services and responsible lending, implementing [Ley] 10/2014, de 26 de junio, de ordenación, supervisión y solvencia de entidades de crédito (Law 10/2014 of 26 June on the organisation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions) or its predecessor, Article 48 of Ley 26/1988, de 29 de julio, sobre Disciplina e Intervención de las Entidades de Crédito (Law 26/1988 of 29 July on supervision and control of credit institutions)) be regarded as ‘mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions’ for the purpose of contracts for long-term mortgage loans at a variable interest rate, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13/EEC? (
                  1
               )

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


201807060641994552018/C 259/483692017TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607353511Case T-369/17: Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — Winkler v Commission (Civil service — Officials — Transfer of national pension rights — Decision establishing the number of pensionable years of service — Reasonable period — Right to be heard — Legal certainty — Equal treatment — Legitimate expectations — Liability — Material damage)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3510120180607EN0048351351Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — Winkler v Commission
   (Case T-369/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil service — Officials — Transfer of national pension rights — Decision establishing the number of pensionable years of service — Reasonable period — Right to be heard — Legal certainty — Equal treatment — Legitimate expectations — Liability — Material damage)’2018/C 259/48Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Bernd Winkler (Grange, Ireland) (represented by: A. Kässens, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: T. Bohr and L. Radu Bouyon, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought under Article 270 TFEU seeking, first, annulment of the decision of the Office for the Administration and Payment of Individual Entitlements (PMO) of the Commission of 26 September 2016, establishing the number of pensionable years of service to be taken into account in the pension scheme of the EU institutions following the applicant’s request to transfer pension rights acquired before he entered the service of the European Union, and, second, compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of the Commission’s unlawful conduct in processing his transfer request.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders each party to bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 249, 31.7.2017.


201807060711993912018/C 259/623312018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531464722Case T-331/18: Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Szécsi and Somossy v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4620120180531EN0062462472Action brought on 31 May 2018 — Szécsi and Somossy v Commission
   (Case T-331/18)2018/C 259/62Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicants: István Szécsi (Szeged, Hungary) and Nóra Somossy (Szeged) (represented by: D. Lazar, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            order the defendant to pay to the applicants HUF 38330542,83in compensation;

            —

            order the defendant to pay to the applicants interest on the principal claim from 20 April 2016 at the rate of 11,95 % per annum;

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The action is based on the following plea.
   The applicants claim that the Commission wrongfully breached its duty of supervision under Article 17 TEU, in so far as it failed to take any appropriate measures to ensure that Article 13 of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (
         1
      ) and the relevant Hungarian implementing legislation were applied by the Hungarian courts.
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).


201808030492050212018/C 294/143642017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180627111111Case C-364/17: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad — Varna — Bulgaria) — ‘Varna Holideis’ EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’– Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Supply of immovable property effected prior to the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union — Nullity of the contract of sale coming to light after the accession — Obligation to adjust the initial deduction — Interpretation — Jurisdiction of the Court)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1110120180627EN0014111111Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad — Varna — Bulgaria) — ‘Varna Holideis’ EOOD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’– Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite
   (Case C-364/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Supply of immovable property effected prior to the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union — Nullity of the contract of sale coming to light after the accession — Obligation to adjust the initial deduction — Interpretation — Jurisdiction of the Court)’2018/C 294/14Language of the case: Bulgarian
      Referring court

   Administrativen sad — Varna

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant:‘Varna Holideis’ EOOD

      Defendant: Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’– Varna pri Tsentralno upravlenie na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court of Justice of the European Union has no jurisdiction to answer the questions referred by the Administrativen sad — Varna (Administrative Court, Varna, Bulgaria).
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 269, 14.8.2017.


201808030292049802018/C 294/154592017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180627111222Joined Cases C-459/17 and C-460/17: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — France) — SGI (C-459/17), Valériane SNC (C-460/17) v Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics (References for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Right to deduct input tax — Material conditions governing the right to deduct — Actual delivery of the goods)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1120120180627EN0015112122Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — France) — SGI (C-459/17), Valériane SNC (C-460/17) v Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics
   (Joined Cases C-459/17 and C-460/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(References for a preliminary ruling — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Right to deduct input tax — Material conditions governing the right to deduct — Actual delivery of the goods)’2018/C 294/15Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Conseil d’État

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: SGI (C-459/17), Valériane SNC (C-460/17)

      Respondent: Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value-added tax: uniform basis of assessment, as amended by Council Directive 91/680/EEC of 16 December 1991, must be interpreted as meaning that, in order to deny a taxable person in receipt of an invoice the right to deduct the VAT appearing on that invoice, it is sufficient that the authorities establish that the transactions covered by that invoice have not actually been carried out.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 347, 16.10.2017.