201807130252004472018/C 268/1172017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806079911Case C-7/17 P: Judgment of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias v European Commission (Appeal — Arbitration clauses — Persona and Terregov contracts concluded in the context of the Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) — Eligible costs — Reimbursement of sums paid — Counter-claim)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN910120180607EN00119191Judgment of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias v European Commission
   (Case C-7/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — Arbitration clauses — Persona and Terregov contracts concluded in the context of the Sixth framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2002-2006) — Eligible costs — Reimbursement of sums paid — Counter-claim)’2018/C 268/11Language of the case: Greek
      Parties

      Appellant: ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias (represented by: S. Paliou, dikigoros)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal and A. Kyratsou, acting as Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal;

            2.

            Orders ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 63, 27.2.2017


201807130602004402018/C 268/553542018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180606454622Case T-354/18: Action brought on 6 June 2018 — KID-Systeme v EUIPO — Sky (SKYFi)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4520120180606EN0055452462Action brought on 6 June 2018 — KID-Systeme v EUIPO — Sky (SKYFi)
   (Case T-354/18)2018/C 268/55Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: KID-Systeme GmbH (Buxtehude, Germany) (represented by: R. Kunze, G. Würtenberger and T. Wittmann, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Sky plc (Isleworth, United Kingdom)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark SKYFi — Application for registration No 12 189 502

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 March 2018 in Case R 106/2017-4

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Articles 8(1), 46, 47, 67, 70, 71, 94 and 95 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament;

            —

            Infringement of Articles 2(2), 7(2), 8(2), 8(9), 27 and 71 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625.


201807130072003732018/C 268/12322017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL2018060691022Case C-32/17 P: Judgment of the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) of 6 June 2018 — Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (Appeal — EU trade mark — Application for registration of the figurative and word marks PARKWAY — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 7(1)(c))
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN920120180606EN001292102Judgment of the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) of 6 June 2018 — Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)
   (Case C-32/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — EU trade mark — Application for registration of the figurative and word marks PARKWAY — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 7(1)(c))’2018/C 268/12Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH (represented by: A. Lohmann, Rechtsanwalt)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: A. Söder, acting as Agent)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal;

            2.

            Orders Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 151, 15.5.2017


201807130732004372018/C 268/563562018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607464721Case T-356/18: Action brought on 7 June 2018 — Volvo Trademark v EUIPO — Paalupaikka (V V-wheels)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4610120180607EN0056461472Action brought on 7 June 2018 — Volvo Trademark v EUIPO — Paalupaikka (V V-wheels)
   (Case T-356/18)2018/C 268/56Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Volvo Trademark Holding AB (Göteborg, Sweden) (represented by: T. Dolde, lawyer and M. Hawkins, Solicitor)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Paalupaikka Oy (Iisalmi, Finland)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark V V-WHEELS — Application for registration No 14 439 053

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 2 March 2018 in Case R 1852/2017-4

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs incurred in the proceedings before the Opposition Division and the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 72(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807130402004032018/C 268/207142017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20171220151512Case C-714/17 P: Appeal brought on 20 December 2017 by Kevin Karp against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-833/16: Karp v Parliament
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1520120171220EN0020152151Appeal brought on 20 December 2017 by Kevin Karp against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2017 in Case T-833/16: Karp v Parliament
   (Case C-714/17 P)2018/C 268/20Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Kevin Karp (represented by: N. Lambers, avocat, R. Ben Ammar, avocate)
   Other party to the proceedings: European Parliament
   By order of 19 June 2018 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.


201807130262003932018/C 268/343432018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180319282921Case C-343/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — SAIGI Società Cooperativa Agricola a r.l., MA.GE.MA. Società Agricola Cooperativa v Regione Emilia-Romagna, A.U.S.L. Romagna
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2810120180319EN0034281292Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 19 March 2018 — SAIGI Società Cooperativa Agricola a r.l., MA.GE.MA. Società Agricola Cooperativa v Regione Emilia-Romagna, A.U.S.L. Romagna
   (Case C-343/18)2018/C 268/34Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: SAIGI Società Cooperativa Agricola a r.l., MA.GE.MA. Società Agricola Cooperativa

      Respondents: Regione Emilia-Romagna, A.U.S.L. Romagna

      Questions referred

            1.

            By providing that Member States must ensure the collection of fees for the activities referenced in Annex IV, Section A, and Annex V, Section A, must Article 27 of Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 be interpreted as placing an obligation to pay on all agricultural operators, even those which ‘carry out the activities of slaughtering and cutting of meat instrumental to and connected with the activity of rearing livestock’?

            2.

            Can a [Member] State make certain categories of undertaking exempt from payment of the veterinary fees in the case where it has set up a system for the collection of fees that, overall, guarantees coverage of the costs of the official controls, or may it apply charges that are lower than those provided for by Regulation (EC) No 8[8]2/2004? (
                  1
               )

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1).


201807130662003792018/C 268/573572018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180608474821Case T-357/18: Action brought on 8 June 2018 — Luz Saúde v EUIPO — Clínica La Luz (HOSPITAL DA LUZ)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4710120180608EN0057471482Action brought on 8 June 2018 — Luz Saúde v EUIPO — Clínica La Luz (HOSPITAL DA LUZ)
   (Case T-357/18)2018/C 268/57Language in which the application was lodged: Portuguese
      Parties

      Applicant: Luz Saúde (Lisbon, Portugal) (represented by: G. Gentil Anastácio and P. Guerra e Andrade, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Clínica La Luz, SL (Madrid, Spain)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

      Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ‘HOSPITAL DA LUZ’ — Application for registration No 14 791 495

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 April 2018 in Case R 2084/2017-4

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision refusing in part the registration of the applicant’s mark concerned by the procedure at issue, alter it and allow the registration;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay all the costs.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807130112003462018/C 268/217222017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20171127151623Case C-722/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Villach (Austria) lodged on 27 December 2017 — Norbert Reitbauer and Others v Enrico Casamassima
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1530120171127EN0021153162Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Villach (Austria) lodged on 27 December 2017 — Norbert Reitbauer and Others v Enrico Casamassima
   (Case C-722/17)2018/C 268/21Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Bezirksgericht Villach

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Norbert Reitbauer, Dolinschek GmbH, B.T.S. Trendfloor Raumausstattungs-GmbH, Elektrounternehmen K. Maschke GmbH, Klaus Egger, Architekt DI Klaus Egger Ziviltechniker GmbH

      Defendant: Enrico Casamassima

      Questions referred

            1.

            Question 1:
            Must Article 24(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (
                  1
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the recast Brussels Regulation 2012) be interpreted as meaning that the opposition proceedings provided for in Paragraph 232 of the Exekutionsordnung (Austrian Enforcement Code) in the event of a dispute regarding the distribution of proceeds from a judicially ordered auction come within the scope of application of that provision,
            even if the action brought by one pledgee against the other pledgee

                     (a)

                     is based on the objection that the latter’s claim arising from a loan agreement, which was secured by a pledge, no longer existed due to a counter-claim of the debtor for damages, and

                     (b)

                     is furthermore based on the objection — similar to an action for avoidance (Anfechtungsklage) — that the creation of the pledge for that claim under a loan agreement was invalid due to the preferential treatment of creditors?

            2.

            Question 2 (if Question 1 is answered in the negative):
            Must Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the recast Brussels Regulation 2012) be interpreted as meaning that the opposition proceedings provided for in Paragraph 232 of the Exekutionsordnung (Austrian Enforcement Code) in the event of a dispute regarding the distribution of proceeds from a judicially ordered auction come within the scope of application of that provision,
            even if the action brought by one pledgee against the other pledgee

                     (a)

                     is based on the objection that the latter’s claim arising from a loan agreement, which was secured by a pledge, no longer existed due to a counter-claim of the debtor for damages and

                     (b)

                     is furthermore based on the objection — similar to an action for avoidance — that the creation of the pledge for that claim under a loan agreement was invalid due to the preferential treatment of creditors?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.


201807130302003472018/C 268/353462018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180525293021Case C-346/18 P: Appeal brought on 25 May 2018 by Rose Vision, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 8 March 2018 in Cases T-45/13 RENV and T-587/15 Rose Vision v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN2910120180525EN0035291302Appeal brought on 25 May 2018 by Rose Vision, S.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 8 March 2018 in Cases T-45/13 RENV and T-587/15 Rose Vision v Commission
   (Case C-346/18 P)2018/C 268/35Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Appellant: Rose Vision, S.L. (represented by: J.J. Marín López, abogado)

      Other party: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 8 March 2018, Rose Vision v Commission, T-45/13 RENV and T-587/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:124;

            —

            award Rose Vision damages as claimed under the tenth and eleventh grounds of appeal.

      Grounds of appeal and main arguments

            1.

            Error of law in so far as the oral part of the procedure in Case T-587/15 was reopened by means of the Order of the General Court of 10 October 2017 stating, mistakenly, that the reopening had been requested by the appellant;

            2.

            Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal distorted the evidence submitted by stating that the Commission replaced the W2 warning with a W1 warning in July 2012;

            3.

            Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal dismissed, in Case T-45/13 RENV, the request for a declaration of invalidity of the registering of Rose Vision in the Early Warning System (EWS) on the basis that the W2 warning was activated without the appellant being notified, without it being informed of the grounds for that registration, without it being given the opportunity to present its arguments in that regard and without it being able to appeal against that registration;

            4.

            Error of law in so far as no statement of reasons was given in relation to the allegations contained in the fourth plea in law relied upon in Case T-587/15, which were not at all examined in the judgment under appeal;

            5.

            Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal, despite rightly finding that the Commission had failed to comply with the two month time limit laid down in paragraph 5 of Article II.22 of General Conditions FP7 (paragraph 99 of the judgment under appeal), that it had ‘greatly exceeded the time limit of two months’ and that the failure to comply with that time limit was ‘regrettable’ (paragraph 116 of the judgment under appeal), failed to declare, as sought by the appellant, that final audit report 11-INFS-025 and audit report 11-BA119-016 are contractually null and void and have no validity or legal effect;

            6.

            Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal distorted the evidence submitted by finding that the Commission had established that Rose Vision had been paid for its participation in the sISI, 4NEM and SFERA projects;

            7.

            Error of law in so far as the judgment under appeal, despite recognising that the Commission had breached the obligation of confidentiality laid down in paragraph 1 of Article II.22 of General Conditions FP7 by communicating to third parties information regarding audit 11-INFS-025 (paragraph 158 of the judgment under appeal), rejected, in paragraph 159 and 160 of the judgment under appeal, without providing a statement of reasons, the appellant’s form of order seeking a declaration that the Commission had breached the obligation of confidentiality in relation to audits 11-INFS-025 and 11-BA119-016 (paragraph 215 of the written observations of Rose Vision in Case T-45/13 RENV of 12 September 2016);

            8.

            Ground of appeal alleging breach of the contractual terms of General Conditions FP7 and the principle of contractual legal certainty by endorsing the application of new requirements contained in the 2011 Financial Guide to Rose Vision as regards audits 11-INFS-025 and 11-BA119-016, even though the relevant audit period in relation to audit 11-INFS-025 was between 1 November 2009 and 31 October 2010 for the FutureNEM project and between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2010 for the FIRST and sISI projects;

            9.

            Ground of appeal alleging distortion of the evidence, in particular as regards the Rose Vision document of 30 August 2012, which was not even mentioned in the judgment under appeal;

            10.

            Ground of appeal alleging that the judgment under appeal erroneously dismissed the appellant’s claim for compensation based on non-contractual liability;

            11.

            Ground of appeal alleging a failure to state reasons in relation to the claims contained in part XII of the application in Case T-587/15, under which, in paragraphs 112 to 117, the appellant claimed compensation based on contractual liability, which was not at all examined in the judgment under appeal.


201807130762003802018/C 268/472752018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424383921Case T-275/18: Action brought on 24 April 2018 — Front Polisario v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3810120180424EN0047381392Action brought on 24 April 2018 — Front Polisario v Council
   (Case T-275/18)2018/C 268/47Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Front populaire pour la libération de la Saguia el-Hamra et du Río de Oro (Front Polisario) (represented by: G. Devers, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare its action admissible;

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order the Council to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of its action against Council Decision (EU) 2018/146 of 22 January 2018 on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part (OJ 2018 L 26, p. 4), the applicant relies on ten pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Council does not have the power to adopt the contested decision, in that the European Union and Kingdom of Morocco lack competence to enter into international agreements that include Western Sahara, instead of the people of that territory, as represented by the Front Polisario.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging a failure to comply with the duty to consider all relevant aspects of the case at issue, in that the Council did not take into account the fact that the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision, applies on a provisional basis, for a period of 12 years, to the territory of Western Sahara, in breach of its separate and distinct status.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging a failure to comply with the duty to examine the question of respect for fundamental rights, in that, when it adopted the contested decision, the Council did not consider the question of respect for human rights in occupied Sahrawi territory.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of defence in that the Council did not initiate any discussion with the Front Polisario, sole representative of the people of the Western Sahara, before the adoption of the contested decision.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging, first, infringement of the core principles and values guiding the European Union’s action on the international scene, in that the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision, applies to the territory of Western Sahara, in the context of the Kingdom of Morocco’s policy of annexation, and, second, systematic breaches of fundamental rights required for the maintenance of that policy.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to self-determination, in that the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision, applies to the territory of Western Sahara, in breach of, first, the separate and distinct status of that territory and, second, the Sahrawi people’s right to respect for the territorial integrity of their territory.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of the relative effects of treaties, in that the people of Western Sahara, as represented by the Front Polisario, did not consent to the international agreement, entered into by means of the contested decision.

            8.

            Eighth plea in law, alleging violation of Western Sahara’s air space, in that the contested decision, by ratifying the illegal practice stemming from the provisional application of the international agreement entered into by means of that decision, results in the inclusion of Sahrawi airspace within the scope of application of that agreement.

            9.

            Ninth plea in law, alleging infringement of the law of international responsibility, in that, by the contested decision, the European Union fails to fulfil, first, its duty not to recognise the illegal occupation of Western Sahara and, second, renders aid and assistance to the maintenance of that situation.

            10.

            Tenth plea in law, alleging breach of the obligation to ensure compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in that compliance by the European Union with its international obligations towards the people of Western Sahara entails, as a minimum, that the Council should refrain from adopting the contested decision, inasmuch as it allows the entry into force of an international agreement applicable to the part of Western Sahara which is under Moroccan occupation.


201807130582003622018/C 268/583642018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180611484811Case T-364/18: Action brought on 11 June 2018 — Arçelik v EUIPO (MicroGarden)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4810120180611EN0058481481Action brought on 11 June 2018 — Arçelik v EUIPO (MicroGarden)
   (Case T-364/18)2018/C 268/58Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Arçelik AS (Istanbul, Turquie) (represented by: A. Franke, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark MicroGarden — Application for registration No 16 971 988

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 April 2018 in Case R 163/2018-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807130392004532018/C 268/363752018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607303121Case C-375/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 7 June 2018 — Hampshire County Council v C.E., N.E.
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3010120180607EN0036301312Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 7 June 2018 — Hampshire County Council v C.E., N.E.
   (Case C-375/18)2018/C 268/36Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   Court of Appeal

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Hampshire County Council

      Defendants: C.E., N.E.

      Question referred

   Is it compatible with EU law and, specifically, the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (
         1
      ), for the courts of one Member State to grant an interlocutory injunction (protective measures) directed in personam at the public body of another Member State preventing that body arranging for the adoption of children in the courts of that other Member State where the in personam injunction arises from the necessity to protect the rights of the parties in enforcement proceedings arising under Chapter III of the 2003 Regulation?
   (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003, L 338, p. 1).


201807130612003652018/C 268/593732018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180619484922Case T-373/18: Action brought on 19 June 2018 — ABB v EUIPO (FLEXLOADER)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4820120180619EN0059482492Action brought on 19 June 2018 — ABB v EUIPO (FLEXLOADER)
   (Case T-373/18)2018/C 268/59Language in which the application was brought: German
      Parties

      Applicant: ABB AB (Västerås, Sweden) (represented by: M. Hartmann and S. Fröhlich, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark FLEXLOADER — Application for registration No 17 099 474

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 March 2018 in Case R 93/2018-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings and the costs incurred by the applicant.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201807130722004362018/C 268/483062018TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180516394021Case T-306/18: Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Hungary v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN3910120180516EN0048391402Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Hungary v Commission
   (Case T-306/18)2018/C 268/48Language of the case: Hungarian
      Parties

      Applicant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér, G. Koós and G. Tornyai, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should:

            —

            Annul Commission Decision (EU) 2018/262 of 14 February 2018 on the proposed citizens’ initiative entitled: ‘We are a welcoming Europe, let us help!’. (
                  1
               )

            —

            Order the Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of its action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 4(2)(b), (c) and (d), and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (
                  2
               )
            The first and second parts of the European citizens’ initiative registered under the contested decision are manifestly outside the scope of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. For that reason, the registration of the initiative infringes Article 4(2)(b) and Article 4(3) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. Furthermore, the first part of the initiative is abusive and, consequently, is also contrary to Article 4(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. As regards the second part, it can be argued that it can lead to a result contrary to the values of the EU established in Article 2 TEU, and is therefore also contrary to Article 4(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 296 TFEU and Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
            The contested decision does not satisfy the requirements relating to the obligation to state reasons, and therefore infringes the obligation to state reasons established in Article 296 TFEU and the right to good administration provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In essence, the contested decision does not give any indication of the grounds on which the Commission found that, as regards the third part of the initiative, there is an appropriate legal basis and legislative power of the EU which meets the requirement established in Article 4(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 relating to the registration.

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2018 L 49, p. 64.
   (
         2
      )	OJ 2011 L 65, p. 1; corrigendum in OJ 2011 L 330, p. 47, and in OJ 2012 L 94, p. 49.


201807130352003532018/C 268/22622018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180130171711Case C-62/18 P: Appeal brought on 30 January 2018 by Merck KGaA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 17 November 2017 in Case T-802/16: Endoceutics v EUIPO — Merck
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1710120180130EN0022171171Appeal brought on 30 January 2018 by Merck KGaA against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 17 November 2017 in Case T-802/16: Endoceutics v EUIPO — Merck
   (Case C-62/18 P)2018/C 268/22Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Merck KGaA (represented by: M. Best, U. Pfleghar, S. Schäffner, Rechtsanwälte, M. Giannakoulis, advocate)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Endoceutics, Inc.
   By order of 31 May 2018 the Court of Justice (Eighth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.


201807130742004382018/C 268/604252017TC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180612494911Case T-425/17: Order of the General Court of 12 June 2018 — Capo d’Anzio v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN4910120180612EN0060491491Order of the General Court of 12 June 2018 — Capo d’Anzio v Commission
   (Case T-425/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 268/60Language of the case: ItalianThe President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 277, 21.8.2017.


201807130122003822018/C 268/231282018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180216171822Case C-128/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 16 February 2018 — Criminal proceedings against Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1720120180216EN0023172182Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 16 February 2018 — Criminal proceedings against Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu
   (Case C-128/18)2018/C 268/23Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg

      Parties to the main proceedings

   Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg
   v
   Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu

      Questions referred

            1.

            In the context of the FDEAW, (
                  1
               ) what are the minimum standards for custodial conditions required under Article 4 of the Charter?

                     a.

                     Specifically, is there, under EU law, an ‘absolute’ minimum limit for the size of custody cells, pursuant to which the use of cells under that limit will always constitute an infringement of Article 4 of the Charter?

                              i.

                              When determining an individual’s portion of a custody cell, should the fact that a given cell is being used for single or multiple occupancy be taken into account?

                              ii.

                              When calculating the size of the custody cell, should areas covered by furniture (beds, wardrobes, etc.) be discounted?

                              iii.

                              What infrastructural requirements, if any, are relevant for the purposes of compliance of custodial conditions with EU law? Does direct (or only indirect) open access from the custody cell to, for example, sanitary facilities or other rooms, or the provision of hot and cold water, heating, lighting, etc. have any significance?

                     b.

                     To what extent do the various ‘prison regimes’, such as differing unlock times and varying degrees of freedom of movement within a penal institution, play a role in the assessment?

                     c.

                     Can legal and organisational improvements in the issuing Member State (introduction of an ombudsman system, establishment of courts of enforcement of penalties, etc.) also be taken into account, as the present Chamber did in its decisions on the permissibility of the extradition?

            2.

            What standards are to be used to assess whether custodial conditions comply with EU law? To what extent do those standards influence the interpretation of the term ‘real risk’ within the meaning of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Aranyosi and Căldăraru?

                     a.

                     In that regard, are the judicial authorities of the executing Member State authorised to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the custodial conditions in the issuing Member State, or are they limited to an ‘examination as to manifest errors’?

                     b.

                     To the extent that, in the context of its reply to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice concludes that there are ‘absolute’ requirements under EU law for custodial conditions, would a failure to meet those minimum standards be, in a sense, ‘unquestionable’, so that, as a result, such a failure would always immediately constitute a ‘real risk’, thereby prohibiting extradition, or can the executing Member State nevertheless carry out its own assessment? In that regard, can factors such as the maintenance of mutual legal assistance between Member States, the functioning of European criminal justice or the principles of mutual trust and recognition be taken into account?

      (
         1
      )	Council Framework Decision 2002/584 of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1)


201807130092003812018/C 268/241372018CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180222181811Case C-137/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Dresden (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2018 — hapeg dresden gmbh v Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN1810120180222EN0024181181Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Dresden (Germany) lodged on 22 February 2018 — hapeg dresden gmbh v Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG
   (Case C-137/18)2018/C 268/24Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landgericht Dresden

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: hapeg dresden gmbh

      Defendant: Bayrische Straße 6-8 GmbH & Co. KG

      Question referred

   Is EU law, in particular Article 15(3)(b) and (c) and the first, second and third sentences of Article 16(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2006/123/EC (
         1
      ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 (‘the Services Directive’) to be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that applicable in the main proceedings, which prohibits the agreement in contracts with architects and/or engineers of a fee that is lower than the minimum fee resulting from the Honorarordnung für Architekten und Ingenieure (Rules on Fees and Emoluments for Architects and Engineers)?
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).


title: Case T-621/17: Action brought on 14 September 2017 — Taminco and Arysta LifeScience Great Britain/EFSA

text:
               6.11.2017

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 374/46

         Action brought on 14 September 2017 — Taminco and Arysta LifeScience Great Britain/EFSA
   (Case T-621/17)
   (2017/C 374/69)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicants: Taminco BVBA (Gent, Belgium), Arysta LifeScience Great Britain Ltd (Edinburgh, United Kingdom) (represented by: C. Mereu and M. Grunchard, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

               —

               Annul the decision of the European Food Safety Authority of 18 July 2017, notified to the applicants on 20 July 2017, on the assessment of the confidentiality claims made in relation to the application for renewal of the approval process for Thiram as an active substance;

               —

               order the defendant to bear the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging the absence of a legal basis for publication.

                           —

                           The applicants maintain that publication would be ultra vires given that there is no legal basis upon which the defendant could rely to justify publication, be it under Regulation 1107/2009, Regulation 178/2002 or Commission Implementing Regulation No 844/2012.

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant acted ultra vires in its proposed classification of Thiram since the European Chemicals Agency is the only authority legally responsible for classification or reclassification of substances, as set out in Regulation 1272/2008, and the defendant lacks powers in this regard.

               3.

               Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached fundamental rights of the defence by failing to guarantee the applicants a full, proper and effective opportunity to submit comments on a proposed reclassification of its substance.

               4.

               Fourth plea in law, alleging that the defendant infringed Article 63 of Regulation 1107/2009 by deciding to publish the information which the applicants sought to have sanitized, which might undermine their commercial interests.


title: Case T-23/18: Action brought on 19 January 2018 — Nova Brands v EUIPO — Natamil (Natamil)

text:
               12.3.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 94/31

         Action brought on 19 January 2018 — Nova Brands v EUIPO — Natamil (Natamil)
   (Case T-23/18)
   (2018/C 094/42)
   Language in which the application was lodged: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Nova Brands SA (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: V. Wellens, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Natamil GmbH (Munich, Germany)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: International registration designating the European Union in respect of the word mark ‘natamil’ — International registration designating the European Union No 1 235 069

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 October 2017 in Case R 1910/2016-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

               —

               annul the contested decision;

               —

               order EUIPO to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law

               —

               Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009;

               —

               Infringement of Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 and of Article 296 TFEU concerning the obligation to state reasons.


201806080101931272018/C 221/284632017TC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503232422Case T-463/17: Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Raise Conseil v EUIPO — Raizers (RAISE) (European Union trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark RAISE — Absolute ground for refusal — Distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Article 52(1) and (2) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1) and(2) of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN2320120180503EN0028232242Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Raise Conseil v EUIPO — Raizers (RAISE)
   (Case T-463/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(European Union trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark RAISE — Absolute ground for refusal — Distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Distinctive character acquired through use — Article 7(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Article 52(1) and (2) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1) and(2) of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 221/28Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Raise Conseil (Paris, France) (represented by: F. Fajgenbaum and T. Lachacinski, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the Court: Raizers (Paris) (represented by: E. Fortunet, lawyer)

      Re

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 24 May 2017 (Case R 1606/2016-5), relating to invalidity proceedings between Raizers and Raise Conseil.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1)

            Dismisses the action;

            2)

            Orders Raise Conseil to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 330, 2.10.2017.


201806080091931262018/C 221/196532016TC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503171821Case T-653/16: Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Malta v Commission (Access to documents — Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 — Documents held by the Commission — Documents originating from a Member State — Documents exchanged pursuant to the control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy — Article 113 of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 — Public access following a request made by a non-governmental organisation — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Obligation to state reasons — Sincere cooperation — Choice of legal basis)
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN1710120180503EN0019171182Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Malta v Commission
   (Case T-653/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Access to documents — Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 — Documents held by the Commission — Documents originating from a Member State — Documents exchanged pursuant to the control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy — Article 113 of Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 — Public access following a request made by a non-governmental organisation — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Obligation to state reasons — Sincere cooperation — Choice of legal basis)’2018/C 221/19Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Republic of Malta (represented by: A. Buhagiar, acting as Agent)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: J. Baquero Cruz and F. Clotuche-Duvieusart, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the Commission of 13 July 2016 on a confirmatory application by Greenpeace for access to documents relating to an allegedly irregular shipment of live bluefin tuna from Tunisia to a fish farm located in Malta, in so far as it grants Greenpeace access to documents originating from the Maltese authorities.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls Decision of the Secretary-General of the European Commission of 13 July 2016 on a confirmatory application by Greenpeace for access to documents relating to an allegedly irregular shipment of live bluefin tuna from Tunisia to Malta in so far as it grants Greenpeace access to the documents listed in Annex B to that decision under Nos 112 to 230;

            2.

            Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

            3.

            Orders each party to bear its own costs, including those relating to the interim measures.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 428, 21.11.2016.


201806080461931632018/C 221/03752018CJC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201802062322Case C-75/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 6 February 2018 — Vodafone Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN220120180206EN00032232Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 6 February 2018 — Vodafone Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Zrt. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága
   (Case C-75/18)2018/C 221/03Language of the case: Hungarian
      Referring court

   Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Vodafone Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Zrt.

      Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatósága

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must the provisions of Articles 49, 54, 107 and 108 TFEU be interpreted as precluding a national measure pursuant to which a Member State’s legislation (Law establishing liability to a special tax on telecommunications) has the effect that the actual tax burden falls on foreign-owned taxable persons? Is that effect indirectly discriminatory?

            2.

            Do Articles 107 and 108 TFEU preclude a Member State’s legislation imposing a tax liability on turnover calculated on the basis of a progressive tax rate? If the effect of that legislation is that the actual tax burden, for the highest tax band, falls mainly on foreign-owned taxable persons, is that legislation indirectly discriminatory? Does that effect amount to prohibited State aid?

            3.

            Must Article 401 of the VAT Directive (
                  1
               ) be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State that gives rise to a distinction between foreign-owned taxable persons and national taxable persons? Must the special tax be considered a tax on turnover? In other words, is this tax compatible or not with the VAT Directive?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1).


201806150411954962018/C 231/152272018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180403121321Case C-227/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 3 April 2018 — VE v WD
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN1210120180403EN0015121132Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 3 April 2018 — VE v WD
   (Case C-227/18)2018/C 231/15Language of the case: Hungarian
      Referring court

   Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: VE

      Defendant: WD

      Questions referred

            1.

            Taking into consideration the economic consequences, may it be considered that a contractual term is not unfair, that is to say, that it is in plain, intelligible language, where it places the exchange rate risk on the consumer –– the term being drawn up (as a standard contractual term used by the seller or supplier, and not negotiated individually) in fulfilment of an obligation to provide information, necessarily of general character, laid down by law –– but fails to state expressly that the amount of the repayment instalments to be paid in accordance with the loan agreement could be greater than the amount of the consumer’s income as noted in the examination of creditworthiness carried out by the seller or supplier, or that the amount could rise to a much greater proportion of that income [than that envisaged], also taking into account the fact that the relevant national legislation requires a specific description of the risk in writing rather than a mere statement as to the existence of a risk and its allocation, and, in addition, that the Court of Justice declared in paragraph 74 of its judgment in Case C-26/13 that the seller or supplier must not only make the consumer aware of the risk, but that it is also necessary that, on the basis of that information, the consumer be able to assess the potentially significant economic consequences for him resulting from the exchange-rate risks allocated to him and, therefore, the total cost of the sum borrowed?

            2.

            Taking into consideration the economic consequences, may it be considered that a contractual term is not unfair, that is to say, that it is in plain, intelligible language, where it places the exchange rate risk on the consumer –– the term being drafted (as a standard contractual term used by the seller or supplier, and not negotiated individually) in fulfilment of an obligation to provide information, necessarily of general character, laid down by law –– but fails to state expressly that the credit agreement does not set out any maximum limit for variations in the exchange rate, also taking into account the fact that the Court of Justice declared, in paragraph 74 of its judgment in Case-26/13, that the seller or supplier must not only make the consumer aware of the risk, but that it is also necessary that, on the basis of that information, the consumer be able to assess the potentially significant economic consequences for him resulting from the exchange-rate risks allocated to him and, therefore, the total cost of the sum borrowed?

            3.

            May Directive 93/13, (
                  1
               ) and in particular the last recital, point 1(o) of the Annex thereto, and Article 3(3) and Article 6(1), be interpreted as meaning that — taking account especially of the requirement laid down, inter alia, in the judgment in Case C-42/15, according to which effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties are necessary for consumer protection — the following are contrary to EU law: the case-law, legal interpretation or legislative measures of a Member State, pursuant to which the legal consequence (full invalidity on grounds of infringement of a legal rule, or compensation for damage or other consequence on any legal ground), deriving in that Member State from a credit check that is not thorough and exhaustive, fails to protect the consumer and is negligent (for example, by failing to examine the effect of the exchange-rate risk consisting in a significant increase in the repayment instalments and the principal sum due), is more disadvantageous for the consumer than the restitution of the initial situation (restitutio in integrum), whereby the debtor consumer is freed from liability for the exchange-rate risk, that is to say, from the increase in repayment instalments owing to exchange-rate variations and, where appropriate, is allowed to repay the loan principal in instalments?

            4.

            With regard to the interpretation of the opportunity to examine all the terms of a contract, referred to in the twentieth recital of Directive 93/13, and the requirement that the contract be drafted in plain, intelligible language, laid down in Articles 4(2) and 5 of the same directive, are the relevant contractual terms to be regarded as not being unfair, where the loan agreement communicates any essential element (for example, the subject matter of the contract, namely the loan amount, the repayment instalments and the interest on the transaction) simply for information purposes, without making it clear whether or not the part communicated for information purposes is legally binding on the parties to the contract?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


201806150881955092018/C 231/402442018TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180420313222Case T-244/18: Action brought on 20 April 2018 — Synergy Hellas v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN3120120180420EN0040312322Action brought on 20 April 2018 — Synergy Hellas v Commission
   (Case T-244/18)2018/C 231/40Language of the case: Greek
      Parties

      Applicant: d.d.Synergy Hellas Anonymi Emporiki Etairia Parochis Ypiresion Pliroforikis (Athens, Greece) (represented by: K. Damis, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare the action admissible;

            —

            annul Commission Decision C(2018) 1115 final of 19 February 2018 on the recovery of the sum of EUR 76282,08, together with interest, from ‘d.d.Synergy HELLAS ANONYMI EMPORIKI ETAIRIA PAROCHIS YPIRESION PLIROFORIKIS’;

            —

            order the European Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 85 of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 (
                  1
               ):

                     —

                     the refusal by the Commission to accept the legitimate request to grant an additional period within which to make payment, despite the fact that 73 % of the capital has already been repaid, including all interest, and even though the personal security requested by the Commission for the entire amount originally due, together with interest, has been constituted, is contrary to the provisions of that Article;

                     —

                     the Commission’s argument concerning the substantive legality of the contested measure is unfounded;

                     —

                     the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons for the contested decision.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of, and/or exceeding the limits of its discretion and infringement of the principle of ‘good administration’

                     —

                     the Commission exceeded the limits of its discretion when it adopted the contested decision by disregarding essential evidence submitted by the applicant and by adopting solutions likely to lead to the liquidation of the applicant.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality

                     —

                     the contested decision does not constitute a measure necessary to achieve the objective pursued, in so far as the applicant continues to pay and in so far as it imposes an excessive burden on the applicant and presents a substantive threat to its very existence.

      (
         1
      )	Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 of 23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 357, p. 1).


201808030832050912018/C 294/663512018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180605515222Case T-351/18: Action brought on 5 June 2018 — Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN5120120180605EN0066512522Action brought on 5 June 2018 — Ukrselhosprom PCF and Versobank v ECB
   (Case T-351/18)2018/C 294/66Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Ukrselhosprom PCF LLC (Solone, Ukraine) and Versobank AS (Talinn, Estonia) (represented by: O. Behrends, L. Feddern and M. Kirchner, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Central Bank (ECB)

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul the decision of the European Central Bank ECB/SSM/2018–EE-1 WHD-2017-0012 of 26 March 2018 withdrawing the banking licence of Versobank AS;

            —

            order the defendant to pay all the costs,

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on eleven pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the ECB lacks the competence for a decision with respect to the liquidation of Versobank AS.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to make its own assessment as regards the underlying anti-money laundering (AML) counter-terrorism financing (CFT) issues.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to investigate and to appraise carefully and impartially all relevant aspects of the case, in particular as regards AML/CFT risks and compliance with the precepts.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the ECB illegitimately denied other options, in particular to sell Versobank or to grant the opportunity for Versobank to opt for self-liquidation.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of equal treatment.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of proportionality.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

            8.

            Eighth plea in law, alleging that the ECB committed a détournement de pouvoir.

            9.

            Ninth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the right to be heard.

            10.

            Tenth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the right to defence.

            11.

            Eleventh plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to provide an adequately reasoned decision.


201808030302049812018/C 294/177312017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20171223131311Case C-731/17 P: Appeal brought on 23 December 2017 by Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L., against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 4 December 2017 in Case T-522/17 Nap Innova Hoteles v SRB
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1310120171223EN0017131131Appeal brought on 23 December 2017 by Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L., against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 4 December 2017 in Case T-522/17 Nap Innova Hoteles v SRB
   (Case C-731/17 P)2018/C 294/17Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Appellant: Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L. (represented by: L. Hernández Cabeza, abogado)

      Other party to the proceedings: Single Resolution Board
   By order of 5 July 2018, the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Nap Innova Hoteles, S.L., to pay its own costs.


201808030122050382018/C 294/504032018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180614373711Case C-403/18P: Appeal brought on 14 June 2018 by Alcogroup and Alcodis against the judgment delivered on 10 April 2018 in Case T-274/15 Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3710120180614EN0050371371Appeal brought on 14 June 2018 by Alcogroup and Alcodis against the judgment delivered on 10 April 2018 in Case T-274/15 Alcogroup and Alcodis v Commission
   (Case C-403/18P)2018/C 294/50Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Appellants: Alcogroup, Alcodis (represented by: P. de Bandt, J. Dewispelaere, J. Probst, avocats)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Orde van Vlaamse Balies, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Ordre français des avocats du barreau de Bruxelles

      Form of order sought

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of 10 April 2018 in Case T-274/15;

            —

            declare the action against the two contested decisions to be admissible;

            —

            refer the case back to the General Court for a decision on the merits concerning the action for annulment;

            —

            order the Commission to pay all of the costs of the present proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

            —

            First ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law and infringed the obligation to state reasons;

            —

            Second ground of appeal: the General Court infringed the appellants’ right to effective legal protection.


201808030222050122018/C 294/022032016CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806282321Case C-203/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Dirk Andres, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany (Appeal — State aid — German tax legislation concerning the possibility of carrying certain losses forward to future tax years (‘restructuring clause’) — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU — Person individually concerned — Article 107(1) TFEU — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Condition relating to selectivity — Determination of the reference framework — Legal classification of the facts)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN210120180628EN00022132Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Dirk Andres, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH v European Commission, Federal Republic of Germany
   (Case C-203/16 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — State aid — German tax legislation concerning the possibility of carrying certain losses forward to future tax years (‘restructuring clause’) — Decision declaring the aid scheme incompatible with the internal market — Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Article 263, fourth paragraph, TFEU — Person individually concerned — Article 107(1) TFEU — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Condition relating to selectivity — Determination of the reference framework — Legal classification of the facts)’2018/C 294/02Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Dirk Andres, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH (represented by: W. Niemann, S. Geringhoff and P. Dodos, Rechtsanwälte)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal, T. Maxian Rusche and K. Blanck-Putz, acting as Agents), Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: T. Henze and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the cross-appeal;

            2.

            Annuls points 2 and 3 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 February 2016, Heitkamp BauHolding v Commission (T-287/11, EU:T:2016:60);

            3.

            Annuls Commission Decision 2011/527/EU of 26 January 2011 on State aid C 7/10 (ex CP 250/09 and NN 5/10) implemented by Germany — Scheme for the carry-forward of tax losses in the case of restructuring of companies in difficulty (Sanierungsklausel);

            4.

            Orders the European Commission to pay, in addition to its own costs, the costs incurred by Dirk Andres, acting as liquidator in the insolvency of Heitkamp BauHolding GmbH, relating both to the proceedings at first instance and on appeal;

            5.

            Orders the Federal Republic of Germany to bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 211, 13.6.2016.


201808030722050972018/C 294/673632018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180605525431Case T-363/18: Action brought on 05 June 2018 — Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation/Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN5210120180605EN0067521543Action brought on 05 June 2018 — Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation/Commission
   (Case T-363/18)2018/C 294/67Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation (Tokyo, Japan) (represented by: H. Niemeyer, M. Röhrig, D. Schlichting and I. Stoicescu, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul in its entirety or in part the European Commission’s decision of 21 March 2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (AT.40136 — Capacitors);

            —

            in the alternative, annul Article 2(g) of the European Commission’s decision of 21 March 2018;

            —

            in the alternative, reduce the fine imposed on the applicant in Article 2(g) of the European Commission’s decision of 21 March 2018 by exercising its unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003;

            —

            order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging an infringement of the right to be heard and of Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
            The applicant claims that the Commission infringed its right to be heard by not granting access to all the case file documents to which it referred to in the contested decision, by not providing all potentially exculpatory evidence, by failing to issue a supplementary statement of objections to remedy the shortcomings of the initial statement of objections, instead of a letter of facts and by failing to provide adequate access to minutes of meetings with the other parties.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to provide precise and consistent evidence of an infringement with impact on the EEA for the entire duration of the alleged infringement
            The Commission would have further failed to provide precise and consistent evidence of an infringement with impact on the EEA for the entire duration of the alleged infringement, in particular for the ECC meetings (1998-2003) and for the tri- and multilateral meetings and their impact on the EEA between 2009 and 2012.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that there was no sufficient proof of a single continuous infringement
            Pursuant to the applicant, the Commission would have failed to prove the existence of a single continuous infringement comprising all types of alleged meetings with regard to all aluminium electrolytic capacitors and all tantalum electrolytic capacitors for a period of fourteen years and with an impact on the EEA, as it neither defined an overall plan pursuing a single anticompetitive economic aim to the required standard, nor proved that a complementary link existed between the different meetings.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that there was no infringement by object
            The Commission allegedly also failed to establish that the anti-competitive conduct was an infringement by object as the supposed exchanges about future price and supply information during the meetings and contacts with a relevance to EEA sales were sporadic and very limited in scope.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging a lack of jurisdiction of the Commission
            The Commission would further have wrongly claimed jurisdiction over the alleged infringement, because it did not provide sufficient evidence linking the alleged infringement to the EEA. The Commission would have ignored proof that, in essence, none of the bi- and trilateral contacts had any effect on sales to the EEA as the contacts focused on non-European customers. The Commission would not have proven its allegations that the Japanese capacitor manufacturers attended the meetings with the purpose to reduce competition in the EEA.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 23(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1/2003 (
                  1
               ), the Commission’s Fining Guidelines (
                  2
               ) and fundamental principles of the setting of fines, in particular the principles of equal treatment and proportionality
            Finally, the applicant claims that the Commission infringed Article 23(2) and (3) of Regulation No 1/2003, the Commission’s Fining Guidelines and fundamental principles of the setting of fines, in particular the principles of equal treatment and proportionality by considering a disproportionate value of sales and by disregarding the alleged infringement’s limited links to the EEA.

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2).


title: Case C-405/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 19 June 2018 — AURES Holdings, a.s. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/18

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech Republic) lodged on 19 June 2018 — AURES Holdings, a.s. v Odvolací finanční ředitelství
      (Case C-405/18)
      (2018/C 301/25)
      Language of the case: Czech

         Referring court

      Nejvyšší správní soud

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: AURES Holdings, a.s.

         Defendant: Odvolací finanční ředitelství

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Can the concept of freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 49 TFEU (1) be held to cover a simple transfer of the place of a company’s management from one Member State to another Member State?

                  2.

                  If so, is it contrary to Article 49, Article 52 and Article 54 TFEU for national law not to allow an entity from another Member State, when relocating its place of business or place of management to the Czech Republic, to claim a tax loss incurred in that other Member State?

         (1)  OJ 2012 C 326, p. 47.


title: Case T-29/18: Order of the General Court of 4 July 2018 — Planet v Commission (Access to documents — Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 — Documents relating to the contract ‘Technical Assistance to Ecowas for the implementation of the 10th EDF Transport Facilitation Project II (TFP II)’ — Implied refusal of access — Express decision adopted after the action had been brought — Withdrawal of the contested act — Action which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/37

      Order of the General Court of 4 July 2018 — Planet v Commission
      (Case T-29/18) (1)

      ((Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Documents relating to the contract ‘Technical Assistance to Ecowas for the implementation of the 10th EDF Transport Facilitation Project II (TFP II)’ - Implied refusal of access - Express decision adopted after the action had been brought - Withdrawal of the contested act - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate))
      (2018/C 301/49)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicant: Planet AE Parochis Symvouleftikon Ypiresion (Athens, Greece) (represented by: V. Christianos, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: C. Ehrbar and M. Konstantinidis, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of an implied decision of the Commission rejecting the applicant’s confirmatory application of 6 November 2017 requesting access to certain documents relating to the contract ‘Technical Assistance to Ecowas for the implementation of the 10th EDF Transport Facilitation Project II (TFP II)’.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                  There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the present action.

                  2.

                  The European Commission shall pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 26.3.2018.


title: Case C-325/17 P: Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 June 2018 — Windrush Aka LLP v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Jerry Dammers (Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — Word mark The Specials — Genuine use — Consent of the proprietor of the trade mark)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/11

      Order of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 June 2018 — Windrush Aka LLP v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), Jerry Dammers
      (Case C-325/17 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice - EU trade mark - Revocation proceedings - Word mark The Specials - Genuine use - Consent of the proprietor of the trade mark))
      (2018/C 301/13)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Windrush Aka LLP (represented by: S. Malynicz, QC, instructed by S. Britton, Solicitor)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: D. Botis and J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents), Jerry Dammers (represented by: B. Brandreth, Barrister, instructed by C. Fehler, Solicitor)

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                  The appeal is dismissed as being manifestly unfounded.

                  2.

                  Windrush Aka LLP shall pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 347, 16.10.2017.


title: Case T-446/14: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — Taihan Electric Wire v Commission (Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for power cables — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU — Single and continuous infringement — Insurmountable barriers to entry — Inapplicability of Article 101 — Duration of involvement — Equal treatment — Calculation of the fine — Value of sales — Gravity of the infringement — Mitigating circumstances — Unlimited jurisdiction)

text:
               17.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/36

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — Taihan Electric Wire v Commission
      (Case T-446/14) (1)

      ((Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European market for power cables - Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU - Single and continuous infringement - Insurmountable barriers to entry - Inapplicability of Article 101 - Duration of involvement - Equal treatment - Calculation of the fine - Value of sales - Gravity of the infringement - Mitigating circumstances - Unlimited jurisdiction))
      (2018/C 328/48)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Taihan Electric Wire Co. Ltd (Anyang-Si, South Korea) (represented by: R. Antonini and E. Monard, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Biolan, C. Giolito and H. van Vliet, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU for the annulment of Commission Decision C(2014) 2139 final of 2 April 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39610 — Power cables) in so far as it concerns the applicant, and, in the alternative, a reduction of the fine imposed on the applicant.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders Taihan Electric Wire Co. Ltd to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 282, 25.8.2014.


title: Case C-164/17: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 July 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court — Ireland) — Edel Grace, Peter Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Directive 92/43/EC — Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora — Article 6(3) and (4) — Assessment of the implications of a plan or project for a protected site — Plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site — Wind farm project — Directive 2009/147/EC — Conservation of wild birds — Article 4 — Special Protection Area (SPA) — Annex I — Hen harrier (Circus cyaneus) — Suitable habitat fluctuating over time — Temporary or permanent reduction of the amount of appropriate land — Measures included in the project to ensure that, during the lifetime of the project, the amount of land that is in fact suitable for hosting the natural habitat of the species will not be reduced and indeed may be enhanced)

text:
               17.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/16

      Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 July 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court — Ireland) — Edel Grace, Peter Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála
      (Case C-164/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 92/43/EC - Conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora - Article 6(3) and (4) - Assessment of the implications of a plan or project for a protected site - Plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site - Wind farm project - Directive 2009/147/EC - Conservation of wild birds - Article 4 - Special Protection Area (SPA) - Annex I - Hen harrier (Circus cyaneus) - Suitable habitat fluctuating over time - Temporary or permanent reduction of the amount of appropriate land - Measures included in the project to ensure that, during the lifetime of the project, the amount of land that is in fact suitable for hosting the natural habitat of the species will not be reduced and indeed may be enhanced))
      (2018/C 328/19)
      Language of the case: English

         Referring court

      Supreme Court

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Edel Grace, Peter Sweetman

         Defendant: An Bord Pleanála

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 6 of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora must be interpreted as meaning that, where it is intended to carry out a project on a site designated for the protection and conservation of certain species, of which the area suitable for providing for the needs of a protected species fluctuates over time, and the temporary or permanent effect of that project will be that some parts of the site will no longer be able to provide a suitable habitat for the species in question, the fact that the project includes measures to ensure that, after an appropriate assessment of the implications of the project has been carried out and throughout the lifetime of the project, the part of the site that is in fact likely to provide a suitable habitat will not be reduced and indeed may be enhanced may not be taken into account for the purpose of the assessment that must be carried out in accordance with Article 6(3) of the directive to ensure that the project in question will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned; that fact falls to be considered, if need be, under Article 6(4) of the directive.

         (1)  OJ C 178, 6.6.2017.


title: Case C-128/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 July 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain, Lico Leasing SA, Pequeños y Medianos Astilleros Sociedad de Reconversión SA (Appeal — State aid — Article 107(1) TFEU — Tax regime applicable to certain finance lease agreements for the purchase of ships (Spanish tax lease system) — Identification of the beneficiaries of the aid — Condition relating to selectivity — Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Member States — Obligation to state reasons)

text:
               17.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/3

      Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 25 July 2018 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain, Lico Leasing SA, Pequeños y Medianos Astilleros Sociedad de Reconversión SA
      (Case C-128/16 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - State aid - Article 107(1) TFEU - Tax regime applicable to certain finance lease agreements for the purchase of ships (Spanish tax lease system) - Identification of the beneficiaries of the aid - Condition relating to selectivity - Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Member States - Obligation to state reasons))
      (2018/C 328/03)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: V. Di Bucci, E. Gippini Fournier and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: M.A. Sampol Pucurull, (Agent), Lico Leasing SA, Pequeños y Medianos Astilleros Sociedad de Reconversión SA (represented by M. Merola, avvocato, and M. Sánchez, abogado)

         Interveners in support of the defendants: Bankia SA, Asociación Española de Banca, Unicaja Banco SA, Liberbank SA, Banco de Sabadell SA, Banco Gallego SA, Catalunya Banc SA, Caixabank SA, Banco Santander SA, Santander Investment SA, Naviera Bósforo AIE, Industria de Diseño Textil SA, Naviera Nebulosa de Omega AIE, Banco Mare Nostrum SA, Abanca Corporación Bancaria SA, Ibercaja Banco SA, Banco Grupo Cajatres SAU, Naviera Bósforo AIE, Joyería Tous SA, Corporación Alimentaria Guissona SA, Naviera Muriola AIE, Poal Investments XXI SL, Poal Investments XXII SL, Naviera Cabo Vilaboa C 1658 AIE, Naviera Cabo Domaio, C 1659 AIE, Caamaño Sistemas Metálicos SL, Blumaq SA, Grupo Ibérica de Congelados SA, RNB SL, Inversiones Antaviana SL, Banco de Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria SAU, Banco de Albacete SA, Bodegas Muga SL, (represented by J.L. Buendía Sierra, E. Abad Valdenebro, R. Calvo Salinero and A. Lamadrid de Pablo, abogados), Aluminios Cortizo SAU, (represented by A. Beiras Cal, abogado)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 17 December 2015, Spain and Others v Commission (T-515/13 and T-719/13, EU:T:2015:1004);

                  2.

                  Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

                  3.

                  Reserves costs;

                  4.

                  Orders Bankia SA, Asociación Española de Banca, Unicaja Banco SA, Liberbank SA, Banco de Sabadell SA, Banco Gallego SA, Catalunya Banc SA, Caixabank SA, Banco de Santander SA, Santander Investment SA, Naviera Séneca AIE, Industria de Diseño Textil SA, Naviera Nebulosa de Omega AIE, Banco Mare Nostrum SA, Abanca Corporación Bancaria SA, Ibercaja Banco SA, Banco Grupo Cajatres SAU, Naviera Bósforo AIE, Joyería Tous SA, Corporación Alimentaria Guissona SA, Naviera Muriola AIE, Poal Investments XXI SL, Poal Investments XXII SL, Naviera Cabo Vilaboa C-1658 AIE, Naviera Cabo Domaio, C-1659 AIE, Caamaño Sistemas Metálicos SL, Blumaq SA, Grupo Ibérica de Congelados SA, RNB SL, Inversiones Antaviana SL, Banco de Caja España de Inversiones, Salamanca y Soria SAU, Banco de Albacete SA, Bodegas Muga SL and Aluminios Cortizo SAU to bear their own respective costs.

         (1)  OJ C 156, 2.5.2016.


title: Case T-447/14: Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — NKT Verwaltungs and NKT v Commission (Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for power cables — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU — Single and continuous infringement — Evidence of the infringement — Duration of Involvement — Public Distancing — Calculation of the fine — Gravity of the infringement — Unlimited jurisdiction)

text:
               17.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/37

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 July 2018 — NKT Verwaltungs and NKT v Commission
      (Case T-447/14) (1)

      ((Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European market for power cables - Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU - Single and continuous infringement - Evidence of the infringement - Duration of Involvement - Public Distancing - Calculation of the fine - Gravity of the infringement - Unlimited jurisdiction))
      (2018/C 328/49)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: NKT Verwaltungs GmbH, formerly nkt cables GmbH (Cologne, Germany) and NKT A/S, formerly NKT Holding A/S (Brøndby, Denmark) (represented by: M. Kofmann and B. Creve, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: C. Giolito, H. van Vliet and C. Vollrath, acting as Agents, and by B. Doherty, Barrister)

         Re:

      Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU primarily for annulment of Commission Decision C(2014) 2139 final of 2 April 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 [TFEU] and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39610 — Power Cables) in so far as it concerns the applicants and, in the alternative, an application for a reduction in the amount of the fine imposed on the applicant.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders NKT Verwaltungs GmbH and NKT A/S to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 282, 25.8.2014.


title: Case C-374/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 7 June 2018 — UPS Deutschland Inc. & Co. OHG, DPD Dynamic Parcel Distribution GmbH & Co. KG, Bundesverband Paket & Expresslogistik e.V. v Deutsche Post AG

text:
               17.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/26

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Köln (Germany) lodged on 7 June 2018 — UPS Deutschland Inc. & Co. OHG, DPD Dynamic Parcel Distribution GmbH & Co. KG, Bundesverband Paket & Expresslogistik e.V. v Deutsche Post AG
      (Case C-374/18)
      (2018/C 328/34)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Landgericht Köln

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: UPS Deutschland Inc. & Co. OHG, DPD Dynamic Parcel Distribution GmbH & Co. KG, Bundesverband Paket & Expresslogistik e.V.

         Defendant: Deutsche Post AG

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that that provision permits exceptions from Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 only in the event that a vehicle of a universal service provider within the meaning of Article 2(13) of Directive 97/67/EC (2) transports solely and exclusively items forming part of the universal service, in accordance with Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, or are exceptions from Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 also permissible under that provision in the case where the vehicles concerned, in addition to transporting items forming part of the universal service, also carry items that do not come under the universal service?

                  2.

                  If the answer to Question 1 is that exceptions from Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 are also permissible in the case where the vehicles concerned, in addition to transporting items forming part of the universal service, also carry other items that do not come under the universal service:

                              a)

                              In that event, what proportion must the share of items which a vehicle carries as part of the universal service represent as a minimum?

                              b)

                              In that event, what proportion may the share of items which do not come under the universal service and which the vehicle carries at the same time as those forming part of the universal service represent as a maximum?

                              c)

                              How is such a proportion, as described in points a) and b), to be determined in each case?

                              d)

                              Must such a proportion, as described in points a) and b), be defined for each individual journey performed by the vehicle concerned or is an average proportion, based on all the journeys performed by the vehicle in question, sufficient?

                  3.

                              a)

                              Is a national provision of an EU State on driving times and rest periods for vehicles and combinations of vehicles for the carriage of goods with a maximum permissible mass in excess of 2,81 [tonnes] and not exceeding 3,51 [tonnes], which reproduces verbatim the provisions of Article 13(1) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006, to be interpreted exclusively on the basis of EU law?

                              b)

                              Can a national court, notwithstanding the verbatim reproduction of EU law, apply different criteria to interpret the provisions reproduced from EU law?

                  4.

                  Is an item’s classification as an item forming part of the universal service in accordance with Directive 97/67/EC precluded where, in connection with that item, add-on services such as:

                              —

                              collection (without a time slot);

                              —

                              collection (with a time slot);

                              —

                              minimum age check;

                              —

                              cash on delivery;

                              —

                              postage payment by recipient up to 31,5 kg;

                              —

                              redirection service;

                              —

                              sender’s instructions;

                              —

                              preferred delivery day;

                              —

                              preferred delivery time;

                        are offered?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (Text with EEA relevance) — Declaration (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).

         (2)  Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service (OJ 1998 L 15, p. 14).


title: Case C-478/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 23 July 2018 — Compaxo Vlees Zevenaar B.V., Ekro B.V., Vion Apeldoorn B.V., Vitelco B.V. v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

text:
               15.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 373/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 23 July 2018 — Compaxo Vlees Zevenaar B.V., Ekro B.V., Vion Apeldoorn B.V., Vitelco B.V. v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit
      (Case C-478/18)
      (2018/C 373/10)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellants: Compaxo Vlees Zevenaar B.V., Ekro B.V., Vion Apeldoorn B.V., Vitelco B.V.

         Respondent: Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should the phrases ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 1 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules (‘Regulation No 882/2004’) and ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 2 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that the (salary) costs that may be taken into account when calculating the fees for official controls, may only be the (salary) costs of official veterinarians and official auxiliaries who perform the official inspections, or can they also include the (salary) costs of other staff employed by the Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority; ‘NVWA’) or by the private company Kwaliteitskeuring Dierlijke Sector (‘KDS’)?

                  2.

                  If the answer to question 1 is that the phrases ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 1 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 and ‘the staff involved in the official controls’ in point 2 of Annex VI to Regulation No 882/2004 may also include the (salary) costs of other staff employed by the NVWA or KDS, under what circumstances and within which limits is there then still such a relationship between the costs incurred for that other staff and the official controls, that the reimbursement of those (salary) costs can be based on Article 27(4) and Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004?

                  3.

                  Should the provisions of Article 27(4)(a) and of Annex VI, points 1 and 2, of Regulation No 882/2004 be interpreted as meaning that the aforementioned Article 27(4)(a) and Annex VI, points 1 and 2, preclude slaughterhouses from being charged fees in relation to official controls for quarter-hours requested by those slaughterhouses from the competent authorities but not actually worked for the purposes of official controls?

         (1)  OJ 2004 L 165, p. 1.