title: Case C-217/16: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Efeteio Athinon (Greece)) — European Commission v Dimos Zagoriou (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Enforceable decision of the European Commission ordering the recovery of sums paid — Article 299 TFEU — Enforcement — Implementing measures — Identification of the competent national court to hear disputes regarding enforcement — Identification of the person on whom the pecuniary obligation rests — Conditions for application of the national procedural rules — Procedural autonomy of the Member States — Principles of equivalence and effectiveness)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/8

         Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Efeteio Athinon (Greece)) — European Commission v Dimos Zagoriou
   (Case C-217/16) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Enforceable decision of the European Commission ordering the recovery of sums paid - Article 299 TFEU - Enforcement - Implementing measures - Identification of the competent national court to hear disputes regarding enforcement - Identification of the person on whom the pecuniary obligation rests - Conditions for application of the national procedural rules - Procedural autonomy of the Member States - Principles of equivalence and effectiveness))
   (2018/C 005/10)
   Language of the case: Greek

      Referring court

   Efeteio Athinon (Greece)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: European Commission

      Defendant: Dimos Zagoriou

      Operative part of the judgment

               1.

               Article 299 TFEU must be interpreted as not determining the choice of the national competent court to hear actions connected with the enforcement of enforceable European Commission acts which impose a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States, in accordance with that article, that determination being a matter for national law by virtue of the principle of procedural autonomy, provided that that determination does not undermine the application and effectiveness of EU law.
               It is for the national court to determine whether the application of the national procedural rules to actions concerning the enforcement of acts covered by Article 299 TFEU is made in a non-discriminatory manner compared to the procedures for deciding national disputes of the same type and in accordance with procedural rules which do not make the recovery of the sums referred to in those acts more difficult than in comparable cases involving the application of the corresponding national provisions.

               2.

               Article 299 TFEU and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments, Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4256/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section must be interpreted as meaning that they do not define, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the persons against whom enforcement may be pursued by virtue of an enforceable decision of the Commission ordering the recovery of sums paid.
               It is for the national court to define those persons, in compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.

      (1)  OJ C 222, 20.6.2016.


title: Case C-227/16: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwaarden — Netherlands) — Jan Theodorus Arts v Veevoederbedrijf Alpuro BV (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agriculture — Common agricultural policy — Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 — Single payment scheme — Veal farmer who concluded an integration contract — Contractual term under which the single payment is payable to the integration undertaking — Whether permissible)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/9

         Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwaarden — Netherlands) — Jan Theodorus Arts v Veevoederbedrijf Alpuro BV
   (Case C-227/16) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Agriculture - Common agricultural policy - Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 - Single payment scheme - Veal farmer who concluded an integration contract - Contractual term under which the single payment is payable to the integration undertaking - Whether permissible))
   (2018/C 005/11)
   Language of the case: Dutch

      Referring court

   Gerechtshof Arnhem-Leeuwaarden

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Jan Theodorus Arts

      Defendant: Veevoederbedrijf Alpuro BV

      Operative part of the judgment

   Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, must be interpreted as not precluding a contractual term under which the amount of aid which a veal farmer is entitled to claim under the single payment scheme is payable to an integration undertaking in the case where the transfer of that aid takes place within the context of reciprocal benefits and obligations negotiated between the parties to the contract.

      (1)  OJ C 279, 01.08.2016.


title: Case T-706/17: Action brought on 11 October 2017 — UP v Commission

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/49

         Action brought on 11 October 2017 — UP v Commission
   (Case T-706/17)
   (2018/C 005/67)
   Language of the case: French

      Parties

      Applicant: UP (represented by: M. Casado García-Hirschfeld, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

               —

               Declare the present application admissible and well-founded;

         Consequently:

               —

               Annul the decision of 26 April in which DG HR opposed the applicant’s application for part-time work for medical reasons;

               —

               Annul, if necessary, the decision of 12 July 2017 rejecting the appeal;

               —

               Order the compensation of the applicant’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss following from those decisions, estimated, subject to re-assessment, at the sum of EUR 8 800;

               —

               Order the defendant to pay all the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, divided into two parts.
   The first part alleges infringement of the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination and infringement of the right to be heard, in that the Appointing Authority based its decision on rules showing cases different from the applicant’s without having heard her or allowed her to put forward her observations to influence the content of the proposed decision and, in consequence, infringed her rights of the defence.
   The second part alleges infringement of the principle of sound administration and the duty of care, and a manifest error of assessment of the facts committed by the Appointing Authority, in that it could have considered the allowances for incapacity for work in the light of the general rules of reimbursement of the Joint Rules. The applicant is of the opinion that there is no statutory provision which prevents those allowances from being accumulated with the income drawn from her professional activity, on the ground that her medical situation and her degree of incapacity do not correspond to the medical invalidity criteria provided for in the Staff Regulations of Officials.


title: Case C-561/17 P: Appeal brought on 22 September 2017 by the Republic of Poland against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 June 2017 in Case T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v Research Executive Agency (REA)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/18

         Appeal brought on 22 September 2017 by the Republic of Poland against the order of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) of 13 June 2017 in Case T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v Research Executive Agency (REA)
   (Case C-561/17 P)
   (2018/C 005/26)
   Language of the case: Polish

      Parties

      Appellant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, acting as Agent)

      Other parties to the proceedings: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Research Executive Agency (REA)

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

               —

               set aside in its entirety the order of the General Court of the European Union (Eighth Chamber) of 13 June 2017 in Case T-137/16, Uniwersytet Wrocławski v Research Executive Agency (REA);

               —

               refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;

               —

               order that each party is to bear its own costs;

               —

               assign the case to the Grand Chamber, in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

      Grounds of appeal and main arguments

   First, the Republic of Poland alleges that the order under appeal infringes the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute by reason of an incorrect interpretation of that article. The order under appeal, it submits, is based on case-law of the Courts of the European Union according to which the requirement for an independent lawyer, derived from Article 19 of the Statute, is necessarily connected with the absence of any employment relationship whatsoever between that lawyer and his client. In the Republic of Poland’s view, that case-law is fundamentally flawed and should be amended.
   Moreover, the order under appeal, while being based on the existing case-law of the Courts of the European Union, at the same time goes beyond the limits established by that case-law. Thus, in the order under appeal the requirement of independence has been linked not only to the absence of any employment relationship, but also to the absence of any civil-law relationship and to the absence of any risk that the lawyer’s professional environment might influence the legal opinion which he expresses.
   The result of such an approach is a far-reaching restriction of the right of parties to defend themselves before the Courts of the European Union. Moreover, that restriction is based on extremely vague and discretionary criteria which lack any clear basis in EU law and do not serve any conceivable purpose.
   Second, the Republic of Poland argues that the order under appeal infringes the principle of legal certainty. The order under appeal introduces a new, indeterminate condition for the independence of legal representatives, namely that there must be no risk of influence from a legal representative’s professional environment; however, it provides no guidance as to how that risk might be assessed. As a result, the party concerned is not in a position to determine whether the legal representative whom it has selected satisfies the condition relating to independence and whether its action will be deemed admissible.
   Third, the Republic of Poland alleges that the order under appeal lacks sufficient grounds for making it possible to understand why the General Court found that the legal representative does not meet the requirement for independence and why it dismissed the application signed by him.
   In particular, the General Court failed to explain why a relationship such as that between the Uniwersytet Wrocławski and its legal representative had to be treated as equivalent to an employment relationship notwithstanding the absence of subordination. Furthermore, the General Court failed to explain on what general grounds it took into consideration circumstances other than those relating to the legal assistance provided by that legal representative. The General Court also failed to explain how the concept of professional environment should be understood in the case of a civil-law contract and what type of influence that environment might exert on that legal representative. Moreover, it is not apparent from the order under appeal what type of risk is involved with that type of contract and what constitutes the limitation of independence by reason of which it was necessary to exclude the legal representative.


title: Case T-245/15: Order of the General Court of 8 November 2017 — Klymenko v Council (Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list — Duty to state reasons — Legal basis — Manifest error of assessment — Rights of defence — Right to property — Right to reputation — Proportionality — Protection of fundamental rights equivalent to that guaranteed in the European Union — Plea of illegality)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/28

         Order of the General Court of 8 November 2017 — Klymenko v Council
   (Case T-245/15) (1)

   ((Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine - Freezing of funds - List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources - Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list - Duty to state reasons - Legal basis - Manifest error of assessment - Rights of defence - Right to property - Right to reputation - Proportionality - Protection of fundamental rights equivalent to that guaranteed in the European Union - Plea of illegality))
   (2018/C 005/37)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Oleksandr Viktorovych Klymenko (Moscow, Russia) (represented initially by B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, and R. Gherson, Solicitor, subsequently by B. Kennelly, J. Pobjoy, R. Gherson and T. Garner, Solicitor, and lastly by M. Phelippeau, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: A. Vitro and J.-P. Hix, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015, L 62, p. 25) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015, L 62, p. 1); (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/318 of 4 March 2016 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 76) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/311 of 4 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 1), and (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381 of 3 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2017 L 58, p. 34) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/374 of 3 March 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2017 L 58, p. 1), in so far as the applicant’s name was retained on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to those restrictive measures.

      Operative part of the order

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Mr Oleksandr Viktorovych Klymenko to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 302, 14.9.2015.


title: Case T-722/16: Judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2017 — Mapei v EUIPO — Steenfabrieken Vandersanden (zerø) (EU trademark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark zerø — Earlier EU word mark ZERO — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/38

         Judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2017 — Mapei v EUIPO — Steenfabrieken Vandersanden (zerø)
   (Case T-722/16) (1)

   ((EU trademark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark zerø - Earlier EU word mark ZERO - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 005/51)
   Language of the case: French

      Parties

      Applicant: Mapei SpA (Milan, Italy) (represented by: F. Caricato, then M. Fazzini, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Steenfabrieken Vandersanden NV (Bilzen, Belgium) (represented by: J. Muyldermans and P. Maeyaert, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 July 2016 (Case R 2371/2015-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Steenfabrieken Vandersanden and Mapei.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               dismisses the action;

               2.

               orders Mapei SpA to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 462, 12.12.2016


title: Case C-298/16: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj — Romania) — Teodor Ispas, Anduţa Ispas v Direcţia Generală a Finanţelor Publice Cluj (Reference for a preliminary ruling — General principles of EU law — Right to good administration and rights of the defence — National tax rules providing for the right to be heard and the right to be informed during an administrative tax procedure — Decision to levy value added tax issued by the national tax authorities without giving the taxpayer access to the information and the documents upon which that decision was based)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/10

         Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Cluj — Romania) — Teodor Ispas, Anduţa Ispas v Direcţia Generală a Finanţelor Publice Cluj
   (Case C-298/16) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - General principles of EU law - Right to good administration and rights of the defence - National tax rules providing for the right to be heard and the right to be informed during an administrative tax procedure - Decision to levy value added tax issued by the national tax authorities without giving the taxpayer access to the information and the documents upon which that decision was based))
   (2018/C 005/12)
   Language of the case: Romanian

      Referring court

   Curtea de Apel Cluj

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Teodor Ispas, Anduţa Ispas

      Defendant: Direcţia Generală a Finanţelor Publice Cluj

      Operative part of the judgment

   The general principle of EU law of respect for the rights of the defence must be interpreted as a requirement that, in national administrative procedures of inspection and establishment of the basis for the assessment of value added tax, an individual is to have the opportunity to have communicated to him, at his request, the information and documents in the administrative file and considered by the public authority when it adopted its decision, unless objectives of public interest warrant restricting access to that information and those documents.

      (1)  OJ C 314, 29.08.2016.


title: Case C-584/17 P: Appeal brought on 4 October 2017 by ADR Center SpA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 20 July 2017 in Case T-644/14: ADR Center SpA v European Commission

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/20

         Appeal brought on 4 October 2017 by ADR Center SpA against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 20 July 2017 in Case T-644/14: ADR Center SpA v European Commission
   (Case C-584/17 P)
   (2018/C 005/27)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Appellant: ADR Center SpA (represented by: A. Guillerme, avocate, T. Bontinck, avocat)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

               —

               set aside the judgment of the General Court of 20 July 2017, ADR v Commission (T-644/14);

               —

               annul Commission Decision C(2014) 4485 final of 27 June 2014 concerning the recovery of part of the financial contribution paid to the applicant;

               —

               pass final judgment on the dispute, allowing the claims submitted by the applicant at first instance;

               —

               order the Commission to pay the costs of the present proceedings, including the costs of the applicants before this Court and before the General Court.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

               1)

               The General Court erred in law in interpreting the EU principle governing European Union financial aid, according to which the Union can subsidise only expenses which have actually been incurred.
               The applicant considers that the EU General Court applied a particularly strict interpretation of this principle which is inconsistent with previous case law of the Court and with the European legislator’s will.

               2)

               The General Court committed an error of law in interpreting article 299 TFEU, article 79 of the EU Financial Regulation (1), article 47 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights and the ECJ’s case law.
               The applicant considers that the General Court wrongly interpreted articles 299 TFEU and article 79 § 2 of the Financial Regulation as conferring power on the Commission to adopt an enforceable recovery order in contractual matters. Moreover, the contested judgment is inconsistent with the Court of Justice’s Lito Maieftiko Gynaikologiko kai Cheirourgiko Kentro AE / Commission case law. Finally, the effectiveness of the action based on article 272 TFEU is drastically reduced for the grant beneficiary, as the European Commission can decide to take action for enforced recovery before the final judgment of the competent Court.

      (1)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012, L 298, p. 1).


title: Case T-246/15: Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2017 — Ivanyushchenko v Council (Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list — Manifest error of assessment)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/29

         Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2017 — Ivanyushchenko v Council
   (Case T-246/15) (1)

   ((Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine - Freezing of funds - List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources - Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list - Manifest error of assessment))
   (2018/C 005/38)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Yuriy Volodymyrovych Ivanyushchenko (Yenakievo, Ukraine), (represented by: B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, R. Gherson and T. Garner, Solicitors)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented initially by J.-P. Hix and N. Rouam, and subsequently by J.-P. Hix and P. Mahnič Bruni, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   APPLICATION under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015 L 62, p. 25) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015 L 62, p. 1), and (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/318 of 4 March 2016 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 76) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/311 of 4 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 1), in so far as the applicant’s name was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to those restrictive measures.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine in so far as they apply to the applicant;

               2.

               Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/318 of 4 March 2016 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/311 of 4 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine in so far as they apply to the applicant;

               3.

               Orders the Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 236, 20.7.2015.


title: Case C-586/17: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 6 October 2017 — Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, I., D.

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/21

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 6 October 2017 — Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, I., D.
   (Case C-586/17)
   (2018/C 005/28)
   Language of the case: Dutch

      Referring court

   Raad van State

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, I.

      Other party: D.

      Questions referred

               1.

                           (a)

                           Does Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) …, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a system under which the administrative court of first instance in asylum cases may not, in principle, take into account a ground for asylum first put forward by a foreign national in the judicial proceedings before it when assessing that action?

                           (b)

                           Does it matter in this regard whether a de facto new ground for asylum is put forward, that is to say, a ground for applying for international protection based on facts and circumstances which arose after the decision of the determining authority on the application for international protection, or whether it is a ground for asylum which was initially withheld, that is to say, a ground for applying for international protection which is based on facts and circumstances which arose before the decision of the determining authority on the application for international protection and which the foreign national knew about but was at fault for not disclosing in the administrative phase?

                           (c)

                           Does it matter in this regard whether the ground for asylum is put forward in the framework of judicial proceedings before the administrative court of first instance in asylum cases challenging a decision of the determining authority on a first application or on a subsequent application for international protection?

               2.

               If Question 1(a) is answered in the affirmative, does EU law then also preclude an administrative court of first instance in asylum cases from choosing to refer the examination of a ground for asylum first put forward in the judicial proceedings before it for a fresh procedure before the determining authority, in order thereby to safeguard the due process of law in the judicial proceedings or to prevent those proceedings from being unduly delayed?

      (1)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60.


title: Case T-263/15: Judgment of the General Court of of 17 November 2017 — Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo v Commission (State aid — Airport infrastructure — Public finance granted by the municipalities of Gdynia and Kosakowo in favour of the Gdynia-Kosakowo airport — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery — Withdrawal of a decision — Failure to re-open the formal investigation procedure — Change in the legal regime — Procedural rights of interested parties — Infringement of essential procedural requirements)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/30

         Judgment of the General Court of of 17 November 2017 — Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo v Commission
   (Case T-263/15) (1)

   ((State aid - Airport infrastructure - Public finance granted by the municipalities of Gdynia and Kosakowo in favour of the Gdynia-Kosakowo airport - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and ordering its recovery - Withdrawal of a decision - Failure to re-open the formal investigation procedure - Change in the legal regime - Procedural rights of interested parties - Infringement of essential procedural requirements))
   (2018/C 005/39)
   Language of the case: Polish

      Parties

      Applicants: Gmina Miasto Gdynia (Gdynia, Poland) (represented by: T. Koncewicz, K. Gruszecka-Spychała and M. Le Berre, lawyers), Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo sp. z o.o., (Gdynia) (represented by P. K. Rosiak, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann and S. Noë, Agents)

      Intervener in support of the applicant: Republic of Poland (represented by B. Majczyna, M. Rzotkiewicz and E. Gromnicka, Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought under Article 263 TFEU and seeking the annulment of Articles 2 to 5 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1586 of 26 February 2015 on measure SA.35388 (13/C) (ex 13/NN and ex 12/N) — Poland — Setting up the Gdynia-Kosakowo Airport (OJ 2015 L 250, p. 165)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Annuls Articles 2 to 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1586 of 26 February 2015 on the measure SA.35388 (13/C) (ex 13/NN and ex 12/N) — Poland — Setting up the Gdynia-Kosakowo airport;

               2.

               Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and those incurred by Gmina Miasto Gdynia and Port Lotniczy Gdynia Kosakowo sp. zo.o.

               3.

               Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs.

      (1)  OJ C 254, 3.8.2015.


title: Case C-306/16: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação do Porto — Portugal) — António Fernando Maio Marques da Rosa v Varzim Sol — Turismo, Jogo e Animação, SA (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Protection of the safety and health of workers — Directive 2003/88/EC — Article 5 — Weekly rest period — National legislation providing for at least one rest day per seven-day period — Periods of more than six consecutive working days)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/10

         Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 9 November 2017 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal da Relação do Porto — Portugal) — António Fernando Maio Marques da Rosa v Varzim Sol — Turismo, Jogo e Animação, SA
   (Case C-306/16) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Protection of the safety and health of workers - Directive 2003/88/EC - Article 5 - Weekly rest period - National legislation providing for at least one rest day per seven-day period - Periods of more than six consecutive working days))
   (2018/C 005/13)
   Language of the case: Portuguese

      Referring court

   Tribunal da Relação do Porto

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: António Fernando Maio Marques da Rosa

      Defendant: Varzim Sol — Turismo, Jogo e Animação, SA

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 5 of Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, as amended by Directive 2000/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 2000 and the first paragraph of Article 5 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as not requiring the minimum uninterrupted weekly rest period of 24 hours to which a worker is entitled to be provided no later than the day following a period of six consecutive working days, but requires that rest period to be provided within each seven-day period.

      (1)  OJ C 326, 5.9.2016.


title: Case T-668/15: Judgment of the General Court of 10 November 2017 — Jema Energy v Joint Undertaking Fusion for Energy (Public supply contracts — Call for tenders — Supply of the Acceleration Grid Power Supply Conversion System — Rejection of a submitted tender — Transparency — Legal certainty — Equal treatment — Proportionality)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/31

         Judgment of the General Court of 10 November 2017 — Jema Energy v Joint Undertaking Fusion for Energy
   (Case T-668/15) (1)

   ((Public supply contracts - Call for tenders - Supply of the Acceleration Grid Power Supply Conversion System - Rejection of a submitted tender - Transparency - Legal certainty - Equal treatment - Proportionality))
   (2018/C 005/40)
   Language of the case: Spanish

      Parties

      Applicant: Jema Energy, SA (Lasarte-Oria, Spain) (represented by: N. Rey Rey, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy (represented by: R. Hanak, G. Poszler and S. Bernal Blanco, acting as Agents, and by P. Wytinck and B. Hoorelbeke, lawyers)

      Re:

   Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking, inter alia, annulment of the decision of the European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the Development of Fusion Energy of 21 September 2015, taken in the context of the tendering procedure F4E-OPE-278, rejecting the applicant’s tender for Lot No 1 concerning the Acceleration Grid Power Supply Conversion System (AGPS-CS).

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Jema Energy, SA to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 27, 25.1.2016.


title: Case T-739/17: Action brought on 7 November 2017 — Euracoal and Others v Commission

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/50

         Action brought on 7 November 2017 — Euracoal and Others v Commission
   (Case T-739/17)
   (2018/C 005/68)
   Language of the case: German

      Parties

      Applicants: Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) (Woluwe-Saint-Pierre, Belgium), Deutscher Braunkohlen-Industrie-Verein e.V. (Cologne, Germany), Lausitz Energie Kraftwerke AG (Cottbus, Germany), Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH (Zeitz, Germany), eins energie in sachsen GmbH & Co. KG (Chemnitz, Germany) (represented by: W. Spieth and N. Hellermann, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

               —

               annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 of 31 July 2017 establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions under Directive 2010/75/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (OJ 2017 L 212, p. 1), to the extent to which, by that decision, BAT associated emissions levels (BAT-AELs) were accepted and set for NOx emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.3 of the Annex, Table 3) and mercury emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.6 of the Annex, Table 7) which result from the combustion of coal and/or lignite;

               —

               in the alternative, annul Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 in its entirety; and

               —

               order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law:

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements, breach of superior law and disregard for the limits on conferred powers in connection with the vote in the Article 75 Committee,
               The Commission disregarded mandatory time limits under Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (2) by introducing an amendment, without setting any deadline, to the draft decision and by bringing about an immediate vote, thereby infringing its obligation under Article 3(4) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 to work towards gathering maximum support within the Committee in an objective manner. In addition, the Commission deprived the representatives of the Member States of the possibility properly to adopt a position on the amended draft decision and thereby infringed Article 291(3) TFEU, under which effective supervision of the Commission by the Member States must be ensured. In addition, the Commission, through what was clearly a tactically-motivated approach, abusively and erroneously exercised its position as the chair of the Committee.

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements, breach of superior law and disregard for the limits on conferred powers on the basis of procedurally-flawed drafting in the context of the so-called Seville Process
               In accordance with the requirements laid down in Directive 2010/75/EU and Commission Implementing Decision 2012/119/EU (BAT Guidelines) (3), BAT conclusions can be derived solely in accordance with technical standards. That derivation must follow a requirement as to technical content, which excludes political considerations from being taken into account when those conclusions are being determined. In the present case, those requirements were disregarded.

               3.

               Third plea in law, alleging a breach of superior law and disregard for the limits on conferred powers by reason of the content of the disputed BAT conclusions
               The substantive determinations, in particular the BAT-AELs for NOx and mercury, fundamentally disregard the requirement of technical-economic availability which derives directly from Directive 2010/75/EU, and thereby disproportionately burden the installation operators affected by the rules.
               That situation inevitably creates the impression that the content of the contested rules was based on political considerations, which are impermissible when BAT conclusions are being drafted. By acting in this way, the Commission once again abused its position and exceeded its powers.

      (1)  Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ 2010 L 334, p. 17).

      (2)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers (OJ 2011 L 55, p. 13).

      (3)  Commission Implementing Decision of 10 February 2012 laying down rules concerning guidance on the collection of data and on the drawing up of BAT reference documents and on their quality assurance referred to in Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on industrial emissions (notified under document C(2012) 613) (OJ 2012 L 63, p. 1).


title: Case T-723/16: Judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2017 — Mapei v EUIPO — Steenfabrieken Vandersanden (RE-CONzerø) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark RE-CONzerø — Earlier EU word mark ZERO — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/39

         Judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2017 — Mapei v EUIPO — Steenfabrieken Vandersanden (RE-CONzerø)
   (Case T-723/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark RE-CONzerø - Earlier EU word mark ZERO - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Obligation to state reasons - Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 005/52)
   Language of the case: French

      Parties

      Applicant: Mapei SpA (Milan, Italy) (represented by: initially, F. Caricato and, subsequently, M. Fazzini, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Steenfabrieken Vandersanden NV (Bilzen, Belgium) (represented by: J. Muyldermans and P. Maeyaert, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 July 2016 (Case R 2374/2015-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Steenfabrieken Vandersanden and Mapei.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Mapei SpA to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 462, 12.12.2016.


title: Case T-307/15: Order of the General Court of 23 October 2017 — 1&1 Telecom v Commission

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/51

         Order of the General Court of 23 October 2017 — 1&1 Telecom v Commission
   (Case T-307/15) (1)

   (2018/C 005/69)
   Language of the case: English
   The President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 270, 17.8.2015.


title: Case T-595/16: Order of the General Court of 7 November 2017 — HO v EEAS

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/52

         Order of the General Court of 7 November 2017 — HO v EEAS
   (Case T-595/16) (1)

   (2018/C 005/70)
   Language of the case: French
   The President of the Seventh Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  C 251, 11.7.2016 (case initially registered before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal under Case No F-25/16 and transferred to the General Court of the European Union on 1.9.2016).


title: Case T-129/16: Judgment of the General Court of 14 November 2017 — Claranet Europe v EUIPO — Claro (claranet) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark claranet — Earlier Benelux word mark CLARO — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/31

         Judgment of the General Court of 14 November 2017 — Claranet Europe v EUIPO — Claro (claranet)
   (Case T-129/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark claranet - Earlier Benelux word mark CLARO - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 005/41)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Claranet Europe Ltd (St Helier, Jersey) (represented by: G. Crown, D. Farnsworth and O. Fairhurst, Solicitors, and A. Bryson, Barrister)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Bonne, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Claro SA (São Paulo, Brazil)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 January 2016 (Case R 803/2015-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Claro and Claranet Europe.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Claranet Europe Ltd to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

      (1)  OJ C 175, 17.5.2016.


title: Corrigendum to the notice to the Official Journal in Case C-448/17 (OJ C 382, 13.11.2017)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/53

         Corrigendum to the notice to the Official Journal in Case C-448/17
   (
         Official Journal of the European Union C 382 of 13 November 2017
      )
   (2018/C 005/71)
   The notice to the OJ in Case C-448/17 EOS KSI Slovensko, s.r.o. v Ján Danko, Margita Jalčová is to be read as follows:

         ‘Request for a preliminary ruling from the Krajský súd v Prešove (Slovakia) lodged on 25 July 2017 — EOS KSI Slovensko, s.r.o. v Ján Danko, Margita Danková
         (Case C-448/17)
         (2017/C 382/35)
         Language of the case: Slovakian

            Referring court

         Krajský súd v Prešove

            Parties to the main proceedings

            Applicant: EOS KSI Slovensko, s.r.o.

            Defendants: Ján Danko, Margita Danková

            Questions referred

                     1.

                     In the light of the judgment in Case C-470/12 Pohotovosť, and the considerations set out by the Court of Justice of the European Union at paragraph 46 of the grounds too, is a legal provision incompatible with the principle of equivalence under EU law when — in the context of the equivalence of the interests protected by law and the protection of consumer rights against unfair contractual terms — it does not permit, without the defendant consumer’s consent, a legal person whose activity involves the collective protection of consumers against unfair contractual terms and is designed to achieve the objective set out in Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, (1) as transposed by Article 53a(1) and (3) of the Civil Code, to participate as another party (intervener) in legal proceedings from the outset and to make effective use, for the consumer’s benefit, of the means of action and defence in court proceedings, in order to secure, in the context of such proceedings, protection from the systematic use of unfair contractual terms; whereas, in other circumstances, another party (intervener), intervening in court proceedings in support of the defendant and having an interest in the definition of the substantive (commercial) law that is the object of the proceedings, does not in fact, unlike a consumer protection association, require the consent of the consumer, on whose behalf it is intervening, in order to take part in the proceedings from the outset and effectively exercise the means of defence and action for the defendant’s benefit?

                     2.

                     In the light also of the findings of the Court of Justice in its judgments in Case C-26/13 and Case C-96/14, must the expression “in plain intelligible language” appearing in Article 4(2) of Directive 93/13 be interpreted to the effect that a contractual term may be regarded as not being in plain and intelligible language — with the legal consequence that it is [automatically] subject to judicial review of unfairness — even when the legal institute [body of legal rules governing a specific area of civil law (instrument) which it governs is in itself complicated, it is hard for the average consumer to foresee its legal consequences and in order to understand it professional legal advice is generally necessary, the costs of which are disproportionate to the value of the service which the consumer receives under the agreement?

                     3.

                     When a court takes a decision on the rights deriving from an agreement concluded with a consumer, asserted against a consumer as defendant, on the sole basis of the applicant’s claims, by way of an order for payment [issued] in summary proceedings, and the provision in Article 172(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure precluding the issue of an order for payment if a contract concluded with a consumer contains unfair contractual terms is in no way applied in the proceedings, is it not incompatible with EU law for legislation of a Member State, given the brief period allowed for the lodging of an appeal and the possibility that the consumer may be impossible to find or be inactive, not to make it possible for a consumer protection association, qualified and authorised to pursue the objective under Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, as transposed by Article 53a(1) and (2) of the Civil Code, effectively to make use, without the consumer’s consent (unless the consumer specifically dissents), of the only opportunity of protecting the consumer, in the form of opposition to the order for payment, in circumstances in which the court fails to fulfil its obligation under Article 172(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure?

                     4.

                     May it be considered relevant, for the purpose of the answers to the second and third questions, that the [national] legal order does not accord the consumer the right to mandatory legal assistance and that, failing legal representation, his lack of knowledge in that area gives rise to a significant risk that he will fail to perceive the unfairness of the contractual terms and will not even act to enable the intervention on his behalf, in court proceedings, of a consumer protection association, qualified and authorised to pursue the objective under Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, as transposed by Article 53a(1) and (2) of the Civil Code?

                     5.

                     Is it not incompatible with EU law, and the requirement that all the circumstances of the case be assessed, in accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, for legislation, such as that on summary proceedings for the issue of an order for payment (Article 172(1) et seq. of the Slovak Code of Civil Procedure), to permit: (1) the seller or supplier to be given the right to a pecuniary benefit with the effects of a judgment, (2) in the context of summary proceedings, (3) before an administrative officer of the court, (4) solely on the basis of the trader’s claims, and (5) without evidence being taken and in circumstances in which (6) the consumer is not represented by a legal professional, (7) and his defence may not be effectively mounted, without his consent, by a consumer protection association, qualified and authorised to pursue the objective under Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13/EEC, as transposed by Article 53a(1) and (2) of the Civil Code?’

      (1)  OJ L 1993, L 95 p. 29.


title: Case T-767/16: Judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2017 — Nanogate v EUIPO (metals) (European Union trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark metals — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/39

         Judgment of the General Court of 16 November 2017 — Nanogate v EUIPO (metals)
   (Case T-767/16) (1)

   ((European Union trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark metals - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 005/53)
   Language of the case: German

      Parties

      Applicant: Nanogate AG (Quierschied, Germany) (represented by: A. Theis, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Fischer and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 August 2016 (Case R 2361/2015-5) concerning an application for registration of figurative sign metals as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Nanogate AG to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 475, 19.12.2016.


title: Case T-802/16: Judgment of the General Court of 17 November 2017 — Endoceutics v EUIPO — Merck (FEMIBION) (EU trade mark — Revocation proceedings — EU word mark FEMIBION — Partial revocation — Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Proof of genuine use of the mark — Classification of the goods in respect of which genuine use has been shown)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/40

         Judgment of the General Court of 17 November 2017 — Endoceutics v EUIPO — Merck (FEMIBION)
   (Case T-802/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Revocation proceedings - EU word mark FEMIBION - Partial revocation - Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Proof of genuine use of the mark - Classification of the goods in respect of which genuine use has been shown))
   (2018/C 005/54)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Endoceutics, Inc. (Quebec, Canada) (represented by: M. Wahlin, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: M. Vuijst and A. Folliard-Monguiral, Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Merck KGaA (Darmstadt, Germany) (represented by: M. Best, U. Pfleghar and S. Schäffner, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 July 2016 (Case R 1608/2015-1), concerning revocation proceedings between Endoceutics and Merck.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Annuls the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 14 July 2016 (Case R 1608/2015-1), in so far as it maintained registration of the EU trade mark for ‘pharmaceutical preparations for immune system support, for menopause, for menstruation, for treatment and management of pregnancy, for the prevention, treatment and management of stress, for the prevention, treatment and management of stress [caused by] ill-balanced or deficient nutrition’;

               2.

               Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

               3.

               Orders Merck KGaA to pay, in addition to its own costs, half of the costs incurred by Endoceutics Inc. before the General Court and the costs incurred by Endoceutics before the Board of Appeal;

               4.

               Orders Endoceutics to bear half of its own costs;

               5.

               Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs.

      (1)  OJ C 22, 23.1.2017.


title: Case T-271/16: Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2017 — Pempe v EUIPO — Marshall Amplification (THOMAS MARSHALL GARMENTS OF LEGENDS) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark THOMAS MARSHALL GARMENTS OF LEGENDS — Earlier EU word and figurative marks MARSHALL and Marshall AMPLIFICATION — Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Admissibility of the request for proof of the earlier marks’ genuine use — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/32

         Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2017 — Pempe v EUIPO — Marshall Amplification (THOMAS MARSHALL GARMENTS OF LEGENDS)
   (Case T-271/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark THOMAS MARSHALL GARMENTS OF LEGENDS - Earlier EU word and figurative marks MARSHALL and Marshall AMPLIFICATION - Article 42(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 47(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Admissibility of the request for proof of the earlier marks’ genuine use - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 005/42)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Yusuf Pempe (Créteil, France) (represented by: A. Vivès-Albertini, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Marshall Amplification plc (Milton Keynes, United Kingdom)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 March 2016 (Case R 376/2015-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Marshall Amplification and Mr Pempe.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Yusuf Pempe to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 251, 11.07.2016.


title: Case T-511/14: Order of the General Court of 25 October 2017 — Novartis Europharm v Commission (Medicinal products for human use — Marketing authorisation for the medicinal product Zoledronic acid Teva Generics — Zoledronic acid — Period of protection of the medicinal product Aclasta containing the active substance zoledronic acid — Withdrawal of the contested measure — No need to adjudicate)

text:
               8.1.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 5/42

         Order of the General Court of 25 October 2017 — Novartis Europharm v Commission
   (Case T-511/14) (1)

   ((Medicinal products for human use - Marketing authorisation for the medicinal product Zoledronic acid Teva Generics - Zoledronic acid - Period of protection of the medicinal product Aclasta containing the active substance zoledronic acid - Withdrawal of the contested measure - No need to adjudicate))
   (2018/C 005/56)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Novartis Europharm Ltd (Camberley, United Kingdom) (represented by: C. Schoonderbeek, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Sipos and M. Wilderspin, Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Implementing Decision C(2014) 2155 final of 27 March 2014 granting a marketing authorisation to Teva Generics BV for the medicinal product for human use Zoledronic acid Teva Generics — Zoledronic Acid under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency (OJ 2004 L 136, p. 1).

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

               2.

               There is no longer any need to adjudicate on Teva BV’s application for leave to intervene.

               3.

               Each party shall bear its own costs.

      (1)  OJ C 388, 3.11.2014.


title: Case C-132/17: Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 21 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof, Germany) — Peugeot Deutschland GmbH v Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Freedom to provide services — Directive 2010/13/EU — Definitions — Concept of ‘audiovisual media service’ — Scope — Channel available on YouTube for videos promoting new passenger car models)

text:
               16.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 134/10

         Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 21 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof, Germany) — Peugeot Deutschland GmbH v Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV
   (Case C-132/17) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom to provide services - Directive 2010/13/EU - Definitions - Concept of ‘audiovisual media service’ - Scope - Channel available on YouTube for videos promoting new passenger car models))
   (2018/C 134/13)
   Language of the case: German

      Referring court

   Bundesgerichtshof

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Peugeot Deutschland GmbH

      Respondent: Deutsche Umwelthilfe eV

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 1(1)(a) of Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (the Audiovisual Media Services Directive) must be interpreted as meaning that the definition of ‘audiovisual media service’ covers neither a video channel, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, on which internet users can view short promotional videos for new passenger car models, nor a single video of that kind considered in isolation.

      (1)  OJ C 213, 3.7.2017.


201806080341931382018/C 221/293542015TC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180419242521Case T-354/15: Order of the General Court of 19 April 2018 — Allergopharma v Commission (Action for annulment — State aid — Aid scheme providing for the grant of an exemption from the mandatory rebate on certain pharmaceutical products — Decision declaring the aid scheme compatible with the internal market — No individual concern — Act entailing implementing measures — Inadmissibility)
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN2410120180419EN0029241252Order of the General Court of 19 April 2018 — Allergopharma v Commission
   (Case T-354/15) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Action for annulment — State aid — Aid scheme providing for the grant of an exemption from the mandatory rebate on certain pharmaceutical products — Decision declaring the aid scheme compatible with the internal market — No individual concern — Act entailing implementing measures — Inadmissibility)’2018/C 221/29Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Allergopharma GmbH & Co. KG (Reinbek, Germany) (represented by: T. Müller-Ibold, and F.-C. Laprévote, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Herrmann and T. Maxian Rusche, acting as Agents)

      Intervener in support of the defendant: Bencard Allergie GmbH (Munich, Germany) (represented by: J. Fiegler, lawyer)

      Re:

   Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1300 of 27 March 2015 on the aid scheme — aid to German pharmaceutical companies in financial difficulties through the exemptions from mandatory rebates SA.34881 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2012/CP) (OJ 2015 L 199, p. 27).

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            The action is dismissed as being inadmissible.

            2.

            Allergopharma GmbH & Co. KG shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.

            3.

            Bencard Allergie GmbH shall bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 328, 5.10.2015.


201806080111931412018/C 221/392512018TC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180423333311Case T-251/18: Action brought on 23 April 2018 — IFSUA v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN3310120180423EN0039331331Action brought on 23 April 2018 — IFSUA v Council
   (Case T-251/18)2018/C 221/39Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: International Forum for Sustainable Underwater Activities (IFSUA) (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: T. Gui Mori, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   On the basis of Article 263(4) in fine TFEU, the applicant, IFSUA, which is directly concerned, claims that the Court should annul, on account of those provisions being clearly severable, Articles 2(2) and 9(4) and (5) of Council Regulation (EU) of 23 January 2018 (OJ 2018 L 27, p. 1), which must be regarded as a ‘regulatory act’ implementing restrictive measures and a total allowable catch (TAC) in relation to recreational fishing.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The present application seeks the partial annulment of Council Regulation (EU) 2018/120 (
         1
      ).
   In that regard, the applicant seeks annulment of the abovementioned provisions on the basis that, given that they apply to the various forms of recreational fishing, which are activities falling outside the scope of the common fisheries policy, those provisions entail a total ban on fishing European sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) that is directed only at underwater fishermen and is accordingly threatening the continuation of that activity, the sport itself and its related industry.
   In support of the application, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 2(5), 3(1)(d), 4(2)(d) and 6(d) and (e) TFEU in so far as the contested provisions constitute prohibitive measures directed at the underwater recreational and sport fishing of European sea bass, even though the Council has no competence, not even shared competence, in that regard.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that Articles 2(2) and 9(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2018/120 infringe the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations since they clearly go beyond the scope of competence of the Council and the historical development of that competence.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that Articles 2(2) and 9(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2018/120 infringe the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union since that single implementing act regulating fishing opportunities in relation to European sea bass, albeit with different criteria, lays down provisions covering both commercial and recreational fishing. However, the applicant claims that those two categories are not strictly comparable and therefore should not be targeted by the same restrictive measures.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that Articles 2(2) and 9(4) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2018/120 infringe the principle of proportionality in relation to the implementation of Article 43(3) TFEU. In that regard, the applicant submits that the fixing, in the contested regulation, of fishing opportunities in relation to European sea bass, for both commercial and recreational fishing, is intended to significantly reduce the mortality of the northern population in order to bring about a small increase in biomass. However, the applicant maintains that that objective could be attained by means of less restrictive measures than an outright ban on the underwater fishing of European sea bass. As part of this plea in law, the applicant also alleges infringement of Articles 12, 16, 37 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EU) 2018/120 of 23 January 2018 fixing for 2018 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union waters, and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/127 (OJ 2018 L 27, p. 1).


201806080271931312018/C 221/312342017TC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503252622Case T-234/17: Order of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Siberian Vodka v EUIPO — Schwarze und Schlichte (DIAMOND ICE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark DIAMOND ICE — Earlier EU word mark DIAMOND CUT — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN2520120180503EN0031252262Order of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Siberian Vodka v EUIPO — Schwarze und Schlichte (DIAMOND ICE)
   (Case T-234/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark DIAMOND ICE — Earlier EU word mark DIAMOND CUT — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the signs — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)’2018/C 221/31Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Siberian Vodka AG (Herisau, Switzerland) (represented by: O. Bischof, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Schwarze und Schlichte Markenvertrieb GmbH & Co. KG (Oelde, Germany) (represented by: A. Zafar, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 February 2017 (Case R 1171/2016-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Schwarze und Schlichte Markenvertrieb and Siberian Vodka.

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            The action is dismissed.

            2.

            Siberian Vodka AG shall pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 195, 19.6.2017.


201806150331954932018/C 231/03822016CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201805083421Case C-82/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen — Belgium) — K.A. and Others v Belgische Staat (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Border control, asylum, immigration — Article 20 TFEU — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Articles 7 and 24 — Directive 2008/115/EC — Articles 5 and 11 — Third-country national subject to an entry ban — Application for residence for the purposes of family reunification with a Union citizen who has not exercised freedom of movement — Refusal to examine the application)
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN310120180508EN00033142Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen — Belgium) — K.A. and Others v Belgische Staat
   (Case C-82/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Border control, asylum, immigration — Article 20 TFEU — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Articles 7 and 24 — Directive 2008/115/EC — Articles 5 and 11 — Third-country national subject to an entry ban — Application for residence for the purposes of family reunification with a Union citizen who has not exercised freedom of movement — Refusal to examine the application)’2018/C 231/03Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: K.A., M.Z., M.J., N.N.N., O.I.O., R.I., B.A.

      Defendant: Belgische Staat

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, in particular Articles 5 and 11 thereof, must be interpreted as not precluding a practice of a Member State that consists in not examining an application for residence for the purposes of family reunification, submitted on its territory by a third-country national family member of a Union citizen who is a national of that Member State and who has never exercised his or her right to freedom of movement, solely on the ground that that third-country national is the subject of a ban on entering the territory of that Member State.

            2.

            Article 20 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that:-

                     —

                     a practice of a Member State that consists in not examining such an application solely on the ground stated above, without any examination of whether there exists a relationship of dependency between that Union citizen and that third-country national of such a nature that, in the event of a refusal to grant a derived right of residence to the third-country national, the Union citizen would, in practice, be compelled to leave the territory of the European Union as a whole and thereby be deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by that status, is precluded;

                     —

                     where the Union citizen is an adult, a relationship of dependency, capable of justifying the grant, to the third-country national concerned, of a derived right of residence under Article 20 TFEU, is conceivable only in exceptional cases, where, in the light of all the relevant circumstances, any form of separation of the individual concerned from the member of his family on whom he is dependent is not possible;

                     —

                     where the Union citizen is a minor, the assessment of the existence of such a relationship of dependency must be based on consideration, in the best interests of the child, of all the specific circumstances, including the age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional development, the extent of his emotional ties to each of his parents, and the risks which separation from the third-country national parent might entail for that child’s equilibrium; the existence of a family link with that third-country national, whether natural or legal, is not sufficient, and cohabitation with that third-country national is not necessary in order to establish such a relationship of dependency;

                     —

                     it is immaterial that the relationship of dependency relied on by a third-country national in support of his application for residence for the purposes of family reunification comes into being after the imposition on him of an entry ban;

                     —

                     it is immaterial that the entry ban imposed on the third-country national has become final at the time when he submits his application for residence for the purposes of family reunification; and

                     —

                     it is immaterial that an entry ban, imposed on a third-country national who has submitted an application for residence for the purposes of family reunification, may be justified by non-compliance with an obligation to return; where such a ban is justified on public policy grounds, such grounds may permit a refusal to grant that third-country national a derived right of residence under Article 20 TFEU only if it is apparent from a specific assessment of all the circumstances of the individual case, in the light of the principle of proportionality, the best interests of any child or children concerned and fundamental rights, that the person concerned represents a genuine, present, and sufficiently serious threat to public policy.

            3.

            Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as precluding a national practice pursuant to which a return decision is adopted with respect to a third-country national, who has previously been the subject of a return decision, accompanied by an entry ban that remains in force, without any account being taken of the details of his or her family life, and in particular the interests of a minor child of that third-country national, referred to in an application for residence for the purposes of family reunification submitted after the adoption of such an entry ban, unless such details could have been provided earlier by the person concerned.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 145, 25.4.2016.


201806150301954912018/C 231/081682018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201803057822Case C-168/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 5 March 2018 — Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein VVaG v Günther Bauer
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN720120180305EN00087282Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 5 March 2018 — Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein VVaG v Günther Bauer
   (Case C-168/18)2018/C 231/08Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Bundesarbeitsgericht

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant on a point of law: Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein VVaG

      Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Günther Bauer

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is Article 8 of Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (
                  1
               ) applicable if occupational old-age pension benefits are provided via an inter-occupational pension institution subject to State supervision of financial services, and, for financial reasons, that institution legitimately reduces its benefits with the consent of the supervisory authority, and, although the employer must assume liability for the reductions vis-à-vis the former employees under national law, its insolvency means that it is unable to discharge its obligation to offset those benefit reductions?

            2.

            If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative:
            Under what circumstances can a former employee’s losses suffered in respect of occupational old-age pension benefits as a result of the insolvency of the employee be regarded as manifestly disproportionate and therefore oblige the Member States to ensure a minimum degree of protection against such losses, even though the former employee receives at least half of the benefits arising from his acquired pension rights?

            3.

            If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative:
            Does Article 8 of Directive 2008/94/EC have direct effect and, if a Member State has failed to transpose the Directive into national law or has failed to transpose it correctly, does that provision confer rights on the individual that he can assert against the Member State before a national court?

            4.

            If the third question referred is answered in the affirmative:
            Is an institution organised under private law that the Member State has designated — in a manner that is binding on employers — as an insolvency insurance institution for occupational pensions that is subject to State supervision of financial services and levies the contributions required for insolvency insurance from employers under public law, and, like an authority, can establish the conditions for enforcement by way of an administrative act, a public body of the Member State?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2008 L 283, p. 36.


201808030412050342018/C 294/273542018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530202121Case C-354/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Bacău (Romania) lodged on 30 May 2018 — Radu-Lucian Rusu and Oana-Maria Rusu v SC Blue Air — Airline Management Solutions SRL
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2010120180530EN0027201212Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Bacău (Romania) lodged on 30 May 2018 — Radu-Lucian Rusu and Oana-Maria Rusu v SC Blue Air — Airline Management Solutions SRL
   (Case C-354/18)2018/C 294/27Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Tribunalul Bacău

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants, applicants at first instance: Radu-Lucian Rusu and Oana-Maria Rusu

      Appellant, defendant at first instance: SC Blue Air — Airline Management Solutions SRL

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is the amount of EUR 400 provided for in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 261/2004 (
                  1
               ) intended to compensate primarily for the material damage, with the non-material damage being assessed pursuant to Article 12 thereof, or does Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation primarily cover the non-material damage, with the material damage being subject to Article 12 thereof?

            2.

            Does an amount corresponding to a loss of salary which exceeds the amount of EUR 400 established by Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation fall within the concept of further compensation referred to in Article 12 thereof?

            3.

            Under the second sentence of Article 12(1) of Regulation No 261/2004, ‘the compensation granted under this Regulation may be deducted from such compensation’. Should that provision be interpreted as leaving it to the national court’s discretion to deduct the amount awarded under Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation from the further compensation, or is that deduction compulsory?

            4.

            In the event that the deduction of that amount is not compulsory, what are the elements on the basis of which the national court is to decide whether to deduct the amount referred to in Article 7(1)(b) from the further compensation?

            5.

            Should the damage caused as a result of the non-payment of salary, owing to the fact that an employee was unable to be present at work by reason of his delayed arrival at his destination as a result of re-routing, be analysed from the perspective of fulfilment of the obligations provided for in Article 8 [of Regulation No 261/2004], or Article 12 [of that regulation], read in conjunction with Article 4 [thereof]?

            6.

            Does an airline operator’s fulfilment of the obligation to provide assistance under Article 4(3) and Article 8 of Regulation No 261/2004 mean presenting a passenger with comprehensive information regarding all that passenger’s re-routing options as provided for in Article 8(1)(a), (b) and (c) of that regulation?

            7.

            With whom does the burden of proving that passengers were re-routed at the earliest opportunity under Article 8 of Regulation No 261/2004 rest?

            8.

            Does [Regulation No 261/2004] impose an obligation on passengers to make inquiries in order to identify other routes to their destination and to ask a company to find seats on those routes, or is the airline obliged to look, of its own motion, for the most advantageous option whereby a passenger may be transported to his destination?

            9.

            Is the fact that passengers accepted an airline’s proposal offering them a flight on 11 September 2016, although they could assume that they would not be paid for the period during which they were absent from work, relevant for determining the damage suffered by those passengers?

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).


201808030602050782018/C 294/58982017TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530444411Case T-98/17: Judgment of the General Court of 30 May 2018 — RT v Parliament (Civil service — Officials — Sick leave — Article 59(1) of the Staff Regulations — Internal rules on medical examinations in connection with absence from work on medical grounds and periodic medical examinations of persons claiming the invalidity allowance — Medical certificate — No doctor’s stamp or signature — Long-distance medical consultation via the internet — Refusal to accept)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN4410120180530EN0058441441Judgment of the General Court of 30 May 2018 — RT v Parliament
   (Case T-98/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil service — Officials — Sick leave — Article 59(1) of the Staff Regulations — Internal rules on medical examinations in connection with absence from work on medical grounds and periodic medical examinations of persons claiming the invalidity allowance — Medical certificate — No doctor’s stamp or signature — Long-distance medical consultation via the internet — Refusal to accept)’2018/C 294/58Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: RT (represented by: C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: J. Steele and E. Taneva, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application under Article 270 TFEU seeking annulment of the decision of the Parliament of 30 June 2016 rejecting a document submitted by the applicant on 27 June 2016 as inadmissible as a medical certificate prescribing sick leave

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the decision of the European Parliament of 30 June 2016 rejecting the document submitted by RT on 27 June 2016 as inadmissible as a medical certificate prescribing sick leave;

            2.

            Orders the Parliament to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


201808030502050222018/C 294/413832018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180611303011Case C-383/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Lublin-Wschód w Lublinie z siedzibą w Świdniku (Poland) lodged on 11 June 2018 — Lexitor Sp. z o.o. v Spółdzielcza Kasa Oszczędnościowo-Kredytowa im. Franciszka Stefczyka, having its registered office in Gdynia, Santander Consumer Bank S.A., having its registered office in Wrocław, mBank S.A., having its registered office in Warsaw
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3010120180611EN0041301301Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Lublin-Wschód w Lublinie z siedzibą w Świdniku (Poland) lodged on 11 June 2018 — Lexitor Sp. z o.o. v Spółdzielcza Kasa Oszczędnościowo-Kredytowa im. Franciszka Stefczyka, having its registered office in Gdynia, Santander Consumer Bank S.A., having its registered office in Wrocław, mBank S.A., having its registered office in Warsaw
   (Case C-383/18)2018/C 294/41Language of the case: Polish
      Referring court

   Sąd Rejonowy Lublin-Wschód w Lublinie z siedzibą w Świdniku

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Lexitor Sp. z o.o.

      Defendants: Spółdzielcza Kasa Oszczędnościowo — Kredytowa im. Franciszka Stefczyka, having its registered office in Gdynia, Santander Consumer Bank S.A., having its registered office in Wrocław, mBank S.A., having its registered office in Warsaw

      Question referred

   Is Article 16(1), in conjunction with Article 3(g), of Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC (
         1
      ) to be interpreted as meaning that a consumer, in the event of early repayment of his obligations under a credit agreement, is entitled to a reduction in the total costs of the credit, including those costs the amount of which does not depend on the duration of that credit agreement?
   (
         1
      )	OJ 2008 L 133, p. 660.


201808030682050932018/C 294/754122018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180702606121Case T-412/18: Action brought on 2 July 2018 — mobile.de v EUIPO — Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ (mobile.ro)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN6010120180702EN0075601612Action brought on 2 July 2018 — mobile.de v EUIPO — Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ (mobile.ro)
   (Case T-412/18)2018/C 294/75Language in which the application was lodged: German
      Parties

      Applicant: mobile.de GmbH (Dreilinden, Germany) (represented by: T. Lührig, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Droujestvo S Ogranichena Otgovornost ‘Rezon’ (Sofia, Bulgaria)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

      Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark mobile.ro — EU trade mark No 8 838 542

      Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 March 2018 in Case R 111/2015-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 18(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 64(2) and (3), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 19(2) and Article 10(3) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625, in conjunction with Article 64(2) and (3) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 60(1)(a), in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) and 8(2)(a)(ii), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 4(3) TEU, in conjunction with the legal principle laid down in Article 59(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 and Article 61(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201808030382049942018/C 294/423852018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180611303122Case C-385/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 11 June 2018 — Arriva Italia Srl and Others v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3020120180611EN0042302312Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 11 June 2018 — Arriva Italia Srl and Others v Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti
   (Case C-385/18)2018/C 294/42Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Arriva Italia Srl, Ferrotramviairia SpA, Consorzio Trasporti Aziende Pugliesi (CO.TRA.P)

      Defendant: Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti

      Questions referred

   In the factual and legal circumstances set out above, does a measure involving the statutory allocation of EUR 70 million for the benefit of an operator in the rail transport sector, in accordance with the conditions laid down by Law No 208 of 28 December 2015 (Article 1(867)), as amended by Decree-Law No 50 of 24 April 2017, and the subsequent transfer of that operator to another economic operator, without a competitive tender procedure and for no consideration, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union?
   If so, is it necessary to establish whether the aid in question is, in any event, compatible with EU law, and what are the consequences of failure to give notification of the aid for the purposes of Article 10[8](3) TFEU?


201808030542050252018/C 294/283552018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531212221Case C-355/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 May 2018 — Barbara Rust-Hackner v Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2110120180531EN0028211222Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 May 2018 — Barbara Rust-Hackner v Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich
   (Case C-355/18)2018/C 294/28Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landesgericht Salzburg

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Barbara Rust-Hackner

      Defendant: Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 15(1) of Directive 90/619/EEC (Second Life Assurance Directive), (
                  1
               ) as amended by Directive 92/96/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), (
                  2
               ) in conjunction with Article 31 of Directive 92/96/EEC, be interpreted as meaning that information regarding the right of cancellation must also contain the notice that the cancellation does not have to be communicated in any specific form?

            2.

            In the event that the information issued to the policy-holder regarding the right of cancellation was incorrect, is it still possible for the life assurance contract to be cancelled after it has been terminated by the policy-holder by giving notice of termination (and repurchase)?

      (
         1
      )	Second Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50).
   (
         2
      )	Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive) (OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1).


201808030612050802018/C 294/592182017TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180629454511Case T-218/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2018 — HF v Parliament (Civil Service — Contractual staff — Article 24 of the Staff Regulations — Request for assistance — Article 12a of the Staff Regulations — Psychological harassment — Advisory Committee dealing with harassment complaints — Decision rejecting the request for assistance — Right to be heard — Audi alteram partem rule — Refusal to disclose the opinion of the Advisory Committee and the minutes of the hearing of witnesses — Length of the administrative procedure — Reasonable time)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN4510120180629EN0059451451Judgment of the General Court of 29 June 2018 — HF v Parliament
   (Case T-218/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil Service — Contractual staff — Article 24 of the Staff Regulations — Request for assistance — Article 12a of the Staff Regulations — Psychological harassment — Advisory Committee dealing with harassment complaints — Decision rejecting the request for assistance — Right to be heard — Audi alteram partem rule — Refusal to disclose the opinion of the Advisory Committee and the minutes of the hearing of witnesses — Length of the administrative procedure — Reasonable time)’2018/C 294/59Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: HF (represented by: A. Tymen, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: E. Taneva and M. Ecker, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application on the basis of Article 270 TFEU seeking, firstly, the annulment of the decision of the Parliament of 3 June 2016 by which that institution’s authority empowered to conclude contracts of employment rejected the applicant’s request for assistance made on 11 December 2014 and, secondly, compensation for the loss which she allegedly suffered as a result of the illegalities in the handling of that request for assistance by the authority.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders the European Parliament to pay its own costs and to bear a quarter of the costs incurred by HF;

            3.

            Order HF to bear three-quarters of her own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 178, 6.6.2017.