title: Case C-623/19P: Appeal brought on 21 August 2019 by Alfamicro — Sistemas de computadores, Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda. against the judgment delivered on 28 June 2019 in Case T-64/18 Alfamicro v Commission

text:
               14.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 348/13

      Appeal brought on 21 August 2019 by Alfamicro — Sistemas de computadores, Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda. against the judgment delivered on 28 June 2019 in Case T-64/18 Alfamicro v Commission
      (Case C-623/19P)
      (2019/C 348/14)
      Language of the case: Portuguese

         Parties

         Appellant: Alfamicro — Sistemas de computadores, Sociedade Unipessoal, Lda. (represented by: G. Gentil Anastácio and D. Pirra Xarepe, advogados, and M. Stock da Cunha, advogada estagiária)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  Set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-64/18, (1)

                  —

                  Annul Commission Decision C (2017) 8839 final, of 13 December 2017,

                  —

                  Order the European Commission to pay all of the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The applicant submits that the event giving rise to a contractual debt is the contract itself. Consequently, if the Commission, in the declarative action, can make its claims, but does not do so, it cannot, following the judgment, issue enforcement instruments for the amount of the overdraft.
      The Commission misused its powers.
      In the declarative judgment (T-831/14), (2) the General Court ruled on the Commission’s claim arising out of the grant agreement, and not on the ineligible costs relating to the period covered by the audit, as it erroneously does now.
      The operative part of the judgment handed down in the declarative action (T-831/14) does not lay down any limitation, either in relation to the debt, the period or the costs.
      A single enforcement instrument corresponds to a single obligation, being the debt under the grant agreement.
      It does not make any sense for the General Court to determine definitively a debt and then for the creditor ultimately to claim that not all of the amounts were calculated.
      The applicant submits that, from the moment there is a declarative action to determine a contractual debt owed to the European Union, it is forbidden for the Commission to issue enforcement instruments without taking the General Court’s judgment as its reference.
      If the declarative action concerns the contractual debt owed by the debtor to the Commission, the jurisdiction of the General Court to determine the debt precludes the Commission’s power to issue enforcement instruments which override the judgment.

         (1)  EU:T:2019:453

         (2)  See Case C-14/18 P


title: Case T-499/19: Action brought on 10 July 2019 – ZU v EEAS

text:
               14.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 348/16

      Action brought on 10 July 2019 – ZU v EEAS
      (Case T-499/19)
      (2019/C 348/16)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: ZU (represented by: C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyer)

         Defendant: European External Action Service (EEAS)

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decisions of the EEAS of 31 August 2018 and 10 January 2019, implementing the note of the Medical Service of 30 August 2018, by deducting sick leave;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of good administration and duty of care, inflating cost estimates leading to unjustified attribution to the applicant of responsibility for not appearing for a medical check in Brussels.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging misuse of powers with an indication of deliberate intent to undermine the applicant due to personal bias.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment with regard to the question whether the applicant’s legal situation had changed and a failure to analyse thoroughly why responsibility was attributed to the applicant for not appearing for a medical check.


title: Case T-566/19: Action brought on 17 August 2019 – Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission

text:
               14.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 348/17

      Action brought on 17 August 2019 – Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission
      (Case T-566/19)
      (2019/C 348/17)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Scandlines Danmark ApS (Copenhagen, Denmark), Scandlines Deutschland GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: L. Sandberg-Mørch, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decision of the European Commission of 22 July 2019 which partially rejected the applicants’ request for an extension – until 5 September 2019 or until the end of August 2019 – of the deadline for submitting comments in the context of the formal investigation procedure in case SA. 39078 (2019/C) (ex 2014/N) – Financing of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project;

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated its obligation to motivate its decision not to grant an extension of the deadline in question until 5 September 2019 or 31 August 2019, as the contested decision contains no reasoning supporting this rejection, or, in any case, entails insufficient reasoning.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Article 6(1) of the Procedural Regulation, (1) and thereby also the applicants’ right as interested parties to effectively participate in the formal investigation procedure regarding State aid case SA.39078, since the application was duly justified, well-founded and proportionate.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).


title: Case T-582/19: Action brought on 23 August 2019 – Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management v EUIPO – Lacoste (LOVE PINK)

text:
               14.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 348/17

      Action brought on 23 August 2019 – Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management v EUIPO – Lacoste (LOVE PINK)
      (Case T-582/19)
      (2019/C 348/18)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Management, Inc. (Reynoldsburg, Ohio, United States) (represented by: J. Dickerson, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Lacoste SA (Paris, France)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark LOVE PINK – Application for registration No 11 853 389

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 27 May 2019 in Case R 1078/2018-1

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  partially annul the contested decision, namely as far as it relates to the ground of opposition based on Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR;

                  —

                  authorize for the registration of European Union trade mark Application No 11 853 389;

                  —

                  order the Defendant to pay the costs of the action.

         Plea in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Art 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-583/19: Action brought on 23 August 2019 – Electrolux Home Products v EUIPO – D. Consult (FRIGIDAIRE)

text:
               14.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 348/18

      Action brought on 23 August 2019 – Electrolux Home Products v EUIPO – D. Consult (FRIGIDAIRE)
      (Case T-583/19)
      (2019/C 348/19)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Electrolux Home Products, Inc. (Charlotte, North Carolina, United States) (represented by: P. Brownlow, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: D. Consult (Wattignies, France)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark FRIGIDAIRE - European Union trade mark registration No 71 241

         Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 17 June 2019 in Case R 166/2018-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  annul the decision of the Cancellation Division of 23 November 2017 in Cancellation No 11921 C to revoke the European Union trade mark in relation to clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges;

                  —

                  maintain the European Union trade mark registered in respect of clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges;

                  —

                  order the defendant to bear its own costs and pay those of the applicant.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  The Board wrongly applied the law in finding that the use of the European Union trade mark as evidenced by sales of clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges by the applicant to US military bases in Germany and Belgium did not amount to use of the European Union trade mark for the purposes of Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  The Board wrongly applied Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to take account of the applicant's evidence of use in the form of sales to Johann Fouquet GmbH when considering the totality of the applicant's use of the European Union trade mark in relation to the clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges;

                  —

                  The Board wrongly applied Article 58 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council by failing to take account of the Applicant's evidence of use in the form of use on social media when considering the totality of the Applicant's use of the EUTM in relation to clothes dryers, washing machines, dishwashers and ranges.


title: Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Borgarting lagmannsrett dated 4 July 2019 in criminal proceedings against F and G (Case E-5/19)2019/C 378/04

text:
               7.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 378/4

      Request for an Advisory Opinion from the EFTA Court by Borgarting lagmannsrett dated 4 July 2019 in criminal proceedings against F and G
      (Case E-5/19)
      (2019/C 378/04)
      A request has been made to the EFTA Court dated 4 July 2019 from Borgarting lagmannsrett (Borgarting Court of Appeal), which was received at the Court Registry on 5 July 2019, for an Advisory Opinion in criminal proceedings against F and G on the following questions:
      1.   Application of the prohibition on market manipulation to real transactions

      Is it compatible with the first indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive that transactions that are real, that is to say, transactions that transfer expense and risk with full effect between independent parties, can be caught by the wording ‘give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals’?
      2.   Transactions contrary to a real interest in buying and selling

      Is it compatible with the first indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive for a trade order submitted, or a transaction that is executed and reported to the market, with correct price and volume, nevertheless to be held to be market manipulation, if it is deemed to convey a false impression of or misleading signals about the real interest in buying and selling the security in question?
      3.   Transaction at an abnormal or artificial level

      Is it compatible with the second indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive for the determination of whether a price is at an ‘abnormal’ or ‘artificial’ level to be made on the basis of the individual prerequisites for the investor(s) executing a trade order or transaction, including, for example, their strategy, valuation of the security in question and/or judgment of the market situation (supply and demand) and a general expectation that other investors sell and buy at the best prices consistently with their own real interest in buying and selling and thus, for example, do not sell at a lower price than what they are also willing to pay to buy?
      In the determination of whether a price is at an ‘abnormal’ or ‘artificial’ level, is it compatible with the second indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive for it to be assumed that an individual trade order or transaction can be deemed to establish such a level?
      To what extent and under which circumstances will a transaction involving a security that is not traded in an auction (mechanism), but that has come into being through direct negotiations between two of several brokerage houses, be capable of securing the price, see the second indent of Article 1(2)(a) MAD?
      4.   Legitimate reasons for the transaction or trade order

      Is it compatible with the second indent of Article 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive to consider as ‘legitimate reason’ for executing a transaction or trade order satisfying the criteria in the first and second indent, that the party who executed the transaction or the trade order wished to:

                  —

                  uncover other investors’ real interest in buying or selling,

                  —

                  take advantage of other investors’ uncertainty or lack of information about the real interest in buying and selling on the market, or

                  —

                  reveal whether there is false information about supply, demand or price in the market.

            5.   Dissemination of information

      Is it compatible with Article 1(2)(c) of the Market Abuse Directive to consider information to be ‘disseminated’ when:

                  —

                  an investor has given the information to a broker in order for it to be passed on to one or more other investors in the market, or

                  —

                  the broker actually has passed on the information to one or more other investors in the market, even though the information has not yet been announced or made publicly available?


title: ORDER OF THE COURT of 26 July 2019 in Case E-1/17 COSTS Nettbuss AS v Konkurrenten.no AS (Taxation of costs — Recoverable costs — Default interest)2019/C 378/05

text:
               7.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 378/6

      ORDER OF THE COURT
      of 26 July 2019
      in Case E-1/17 COSTS
      Nettbuss AS v Konkurrenten.no AS

         (Taxation of costs — Recoverable costs — Default interest)

      (2019/C 378/05)
      In Case E-1/17 COSTS, Nettbuss AS v Konkurrenten.no AS — APPLICATION for the taxation of costs awarded by the Court to Nettbuss AS in its order of 22 December 2017 in Case E-1/17 Konkurrenten.no v ESA [2017] EFTA Ct. Rep. 989, the Court, composed of Páll Hreinsson, President (Judge-Rapporteur), Bernd Hammermann and Ola Mestad (ad hoc), Judges, gave order of 26 July 2019, the operative part of which is as follows:

                  1.

                  The costs to be paid by Konkurrenten.no AS to Nettbuss AS are fixed at NOK 351 738.

                  2.

                  Default interest shall be due on the amount from the date of notification of the present order until the date of payment; the applicable interest rate shall be calculated on the basis of the Norwegian Central Bank’s policy rate in force on the first calendar day of the month in which payment is due, increased by three and a half percentage points.


title: JUDGMENT OF THE COURT of 1 August 2019 in Case E-7/18 Fosen-Linjen AS, supported by the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon) v AtB AS (Public procurement — Directive 89/665/EEC — Claim for compensation for the loss of profit — Gravity of the breach — Principles of equivalence and effectiveness)2019/C 378/07

text:
               7.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 378/8

      JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
      of 1 August 2019
      in Case E-7/18
      Fosen-Linjen AS, supported by the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon)
      v
      AtB AS

         (Public procurement — Directive 89/665/EEC — Claim for compensation for the loss of profit — Gravity of the breach — Principles of equivalence and effectiveness)

      (2019/C 378/07)
      In Case E-7/18, Fosen-Linjen AS, supported by the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon) v AtB AS — REQUEST to the Court under Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice by the Supreme Court of Norway (Norges Høyesterett) concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, and in particular Article 2(1)(c) thereof, the Court, composed of Páll Hreinsson, President and Judge-Rapporteur, Bernd Hammermann and Ola Mestad (ad hoc), Judges, gave judgment on 1 August 2019, the operative part of which is as follows:
      Article 2(1)(c) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts does not require that any breach of the rules governing public procurement in itself is sufficient to award damages for the loss of profit to persons harmed by an infringement.


title: Case T-622/19: Action brought on 16 September 2019 – Ace of spades v EUIPO – Krupp and Borrmann (Shape of Champagne prestige bottle)

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/76

      Action brought on 16 September 2019 – Ace of spades v EUIPO – Krupp and Borrmann (Shape of Champagne prestige bottle)
      (Case T-622/19)
      (2019/C 399/94)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Ace of spades Holdings LLC (New York, New York, United States) (represented by: A. Gómez López, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Gerhard Ernst Krupp (Munich, Germany) and Elmar Borrmann (Reith, Austria)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicants of the trade mark at issue: Other parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union tridimensional mark (Shape of Champagne prestige bottle) – Application for registration No 16 255 821

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 June 2019 in Case R 3/2019-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  upheld the present Appeal;

                  —

                  annul the contested decision, and/or set aside the contested decision due to erroneous application of Articles 8(1) (b) EUTMR and 8(5) EUTMR and enter a finding to the effect that there does exist likelihood of confusion between the confronted trademarks;

                  —

                  order the defendant (and intervener, if he enters an appearance in proceedings) to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(1) (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case C-704/19: Action brought on 20 September 2019 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/27

      Action brought on 20 September 2019 — European Commission v Kingdom of Spain
      (Case C-704/19)
      (2019/C 413/33)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: B. Stromsky and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: Kingdom of Spain

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare that, by failing to take, within the time limits prescribed, all the measures necessary to recover from the principal beneficiary, Telecom Castilla-La Mancha SA., the State aid declared illegal and incompatible with the internal market by Article 1 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/1385 of 1 October 2014 on State aid SA.27408 (C 24/10) (ex NN 37/10, ex CP 19/09) granted by the authorities of Castilla-La Mancha for the deployment of digital terrestrial television in remote and less urbanised areas of Castilla-La Mancha (1) (published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 222 of 17 August 2016, p. 52), by failing to establish the cancellation of all outstanding payments of that aid, and by failing to communicate to the Commission, within the time limit prescribed, the measures adopted to comply with that decision, the Kingdom of Spain has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 288(4) TFEU and Articles 3 and 4 of that decision;

                  —

                  order the Kingdom of Spain to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The Kingdom of Spain has not implemented the decision within the time limits prescribed in Article 4(2) and (3) of the decision.
      The Kingdom of Spain has failed to recover the total amount of aid from the principal beneficiary of the aid, Telecom Castilla-La Mancha, SA.. The Kingdom of Spain has failed to establish that all pending aid payments were cancelled following adoption of the decision. The failure to completely recover the amount of the aid to which the decision relates and which was granted to Telecom CLM, and the failure to submit reliable proof of the cancellation of all outstanding payments constitutes a breach on the part of the Kingdom of Spain of its obligation under Article 3 of the decision.
      In addition, the Kingdom of Spain has not communicated to the Commission, within the time limit prescribed, the information regarding implementation of the decision, as required under Article 4(3) and (4) thereof.

         (1)  OJ 2016 L 222, p. 52.


title: Case C-708/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 25 September 2019 — Von Aschenbach & Voss GmbH v Hauptzollamt Duisburg

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/28

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 25 September 2019 — Von Aschenbach & Voss GmbH v Hauptzollamt Duisburg
      (Case C-708/19)
      (2019/C 413/34)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Finanzgericht Düsseldorf

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Von Aschenbach & Voss GmbH

         Defendant: Hauptzollamt Duisburg

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 1(1) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/271 of 16 February 2017 extending the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 925/2009 on imports of certain aluminium foil originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports of slightly modified certain aluminium foil (1) invalid because it infringes Article 13(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union, (2) in that it extended to aluminium converter foil the definitive anti-dumping duty imposed in respect of aluminium household foil pursuant to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2384 of 17 December 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foils originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the proceeding for imports of certain aluminium foils originating in Brazil following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (3) and provides for exemption for aluminium converter foil from anti-dumping duty only under the conditions of Article 1(4) of Implementing Regulation 2017/271?

                  2.

                  Is Article 1(1) of Implementing Regulation 2017/271 invalid because the Commission made a manifest error of assessment when adopting that regulation as adequate reasons are not stated for its assumption that 80 % of the products under investigation were slightly modified products?

                  3.

                  Is Article 1(1) of Implementing Regulation 2017/271 invalid because the Commission made a manifest error of assessment when adopting that regulation as it did not check the end use of the imported aluminium foil in the European Union?

         (1)  OJ 2017 L 40, p. 51.

         (2)  OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21.

         (3)  OJ 2015 L 332, p. 63.


title: Case C-718/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium) lodged on 27 September 2019 — Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Association pour le droit des Étrangers ASBL, Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés and Étrangers ASBL, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme ASBL, Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen ASBL v Conseil des ministres

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/29

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour constitutionnelle (Belgium) lodged on 27 September 2019 — Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Association pour le droit des Étrangers ASBL, Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés and Étrangers ASBL, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme ASBL, Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen ASBL v Conseil des ministres
      (Case C-718/19)
      (2019/C 413/35)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Cour constitutionnelle

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone, Association pour le droit des Étrangers ASBL, Coordination et Initiatives pour et avec les Réfugiés and Étrangers ASBL, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme ASBL, Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen ASBL

         Defendant: Conseil des ministres

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must EU law, in particular Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (1) be interpreted as precluding national legislation according to which the provisions that apply to EU citizens and members of their families are similar to those which, in respect of third-country nationals, transpose Article 7(3) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, that is to say, provisions according to which EU citizens and members of their families can be obliged to comply with preventive measures designed to prevent any risk of absconding during the period given to those persons in which to leave the territory following adoption of a decision to terminate residence on grounds of public policy or during an extension of that period?

                  2.

                  Must EU law, in particular Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC be interpreted as precluding national legislation according to which a provision that applies to EU citizens and members of their families who have not complied with a decision terminating residence on grounds of public policy is identical to that applied to third-country nationals in the same situation in relation to the maximum period of detention for the purposes of removal, that is to say, eight months?

         (1)  OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77.


title: Case C-724/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 1 October 2019 — Criminal proceedings against HP

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/30

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 1 October 2019 — Criminal proceedings against HP
      (Case C-724/19)
      (2019/C 413/36)
      Language of the case: Bulgarian

         Referring court

      Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad

         Party to the main proceedings

      HP

         Question referred

      Is a national law (Article 5(1)(1) of the Zakon za Evropeyskata zapoved za razsledvane (Law on the European investigation order; ‘the ZEZR’)), according to which, during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings, the authority competent to issue a European investigation order for the provision of traffic and location data related to telecommunications is a public prosecutor, consistent with Article 2(c)(i) of Directive 2014/41 (1) and the principle of equivalence, provided that in an identical domestic case the competent authority is a judge?
      Does recognition of that European investigation order by the competent authority of the executing State (public prosecutor or an investigating judge) replace the court order required under the law of the issuing State?

         (1)  Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters.

         OJ 2014 L 130, p. 1.


title: Case C-735/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 7 October 2019 — Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) Limited v Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/31

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 7 October 2019 — Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) Limited v Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija
      (Case C-735/19)
      (2019/C 413/37)
      Language of the case: Latvian

         Referring court

      Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant at first instance and appellant in cassation: Euromin Holdings (Cyprus) Limited

         Defendant at first instance and appellant in cassation: Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is national legislation which provides that the share price for a mandatory buyback offer is to be calculated by dividing the net assets of the offeree company (including non-controlling (minor) interests) between the number of shares issued contrary to the correct application of Article 5 of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids? (1)

                  2.

                  If the first question is answered in the negative, that is to say, to the effect that the net assets of the offeree company do not have to include non-controlling or minority interests, may a method of determining the share price be regarded as clearly determined, within the meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, if it is necessary to apply a method of legal interpretation — teleological reduction — in order to understand it?

                  3.

                  Is legislation providing that the highest price out of the following three variants must be used compatible with Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, that is to say, compatible with the determination of an equitable price?

                              3.1.

                              the price at which the offeror or persons acting in concert with the latter acquired the shares of the offeree company in the preceding 12 months. In the event of the acquisition of shares at different prices, the buyback price is to be the highest price at which shares were purchased during the 12 months preceding the legal obligation to submit a buyback offer;

                              3.2.

                              the weighted average share price on the regulated market or on the multilateral trading facility via which the largest volume of the shares were traded during the last 12 months. The weighted average share price is to be calculated on the basis of the 12 months preceding the legal obligation to submit a buyback offer;

                              3.3.

                              the share value calculated by dividing the net assets of the offeree company by the number of shares issued. Net assets are to be calculated by deducting the offeree company’s own shares and liabilities from its total assets. If the offeree company has shares with different nominal values, in order to calculate the share value, the net assets are to be divided by the percentage of each nominal share value in the share capital.

                  4.

                  If the method of calculation laid down by national law, using the discretion granted [to Member States] by the second subparagraph of Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, results in a higher price than that resulting from the application of the first subparagraph of Article 5(4), is it consistent with the objective of the Directive to always choose the higher price?

                  5.

                  If damage is caused to an individual as a result of the incorrect application of EU law, may national law provide for the limitation of compensation for such damage if that limitation applies equally to damage suffered as a result of the incorrect application of national law and to damage suffered as a result of the incorrect application of EU law?

                  6.

                  Do the provisions of Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids that are applicable to the present case confer rights on individuals, that is to say, is the corresponding requirement for State liability met?

         (1)  OJ 2004 L 142, p. 12.


title: Case C-736/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 7 October 2019 — ZS Plaukti v Lauku atbalsta dienests

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/32

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Senāts) (Latvia) lodged on 7 October 2019 — ZS Plaukti v Lauku atbalsta dienests
      (Case C-736/19)
      (2019/C 413/38)
      Language of the case: Latvian

         Referring court

      Augstākā tiesa (Senāts)

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant on a point of law: ZS ‘Plaukti’

         Other party in the appeal on a point of law: Lauku atbalsta dienests

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Does the third subparagraph of Article 16(5) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, (1) as regards the implementation of control procedures as well as cross-compliance in respect of rural development support measures apply to a situation in which the applicant has failed to comply with the requirements relating to mowing the area for which the maintenance of pasture biodiversity payments were claimed (a requirement which goes beyond the mandatory minimum requirements under Article 39(3) of Regulation No 1698/2005 (2)) but where no change in the crop group has been found?

                  2.

                  Can both the penalty established in the third subparagraph of Article 16(5) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 65/2011 of 27 January 2011 and the penalty laid down in Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation No 65/2011 be imposed simultaneously for a single infringement?

                  3.

                  Do Articles 4 and 6 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (3) of 19 January 2009, in conjunction with Article 39(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 preclude national legislation according to which the same requirement can simultaneously be a mandatory minimum requirement and impose requirements greater than the minimum mandatory requirements (requirement for an agri-environment payment)?

         (1)  OJ 2011 L 25, p. 8.

         (2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2005 L 277, p. 1).

         (3)  Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (OJ 2009 L 30, p. 16).


title: Case C-737/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal administratrif de Montreuil (France) lodged on 7 October 2019 — Bank of China Limited v Ministre de l’Action and des Comptes publics

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/33

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the tribunal administratrif de Montreuil (France) lodged on 7 October 2019 — Bank of China Limited v Ministre de l’Action and des Comptes publics
      (Case C-737/19)
      (2019/C 413/39)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Tribunal administratrif de Montreuil

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Bank of China Limited

         Defendant: Ministre de l’Action and des Comptes publics

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Are the solutions adopted in the judgment of 24 January 2019, Morgan Stanley & Co International plc v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances (C-165/17) applicable where a branch, on the one hand, carries out, in a Member State, transactions subject to VAT, and, on the other, supplies services for the benefit of its principal establishment and branches established in a third country?

                  2.

                  Where a branch established in a Member State claims a right to deduct based on the expenditure incurred by it in connection with the supply of services for the benefit of its principal establishment in a third-country, that is exports of financial and banking services, may the taxable person deduct value added tax pursuant to Article 169(a) or Article 169(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ L 347, p. 1)?

                  3.

                  If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the branch may claim a deduction pursuant to Article 169(a), under what conditions may banking transactions carried out by the principal establishment established in a third country be regarded as giving rise to a right to deduct if they had been carried out in the Member State the expenditure subject to value added tax is incurred? If the first question is answered in the affirmative and the branch may claim a deduction pursuant to Article 169(c), under what conditions may the recipient of the services be regarded as being established outside the European Union where the branch is located in the European Union and forms part of one and the same legal entity as its principal establishment?


title: Case C-739/19: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 7 October 2019 – VK v An Bord Pleanála

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/34

      Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 7 October 2019 – VK v An Bord Pleanála
      (Case C-739/19)
      (2019/C 413/40)
      Language of the case: English

         Referring court

      Supreme Court

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: VK

         Defendant: An Bord Pleanála

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is a member state precluded from exercising the option to be found in Article 5 of Directive 77/249/EEC (1) of 22 March 1977, as amended, which permits a member state to impose a requirement on a lawyer who is engaged in the activity of representing a client in legal proceedings ‘to work in conjunction with a lawyer who practises before the judicial authority in question’, in all circumstances where the party whom the visiting lawyer wishes to represent in such proceedings would be entitled to self-represent?

                  2.

                  If the answer to question 1 is no, by reference to what factors should a national court assess whether it is permissible to impose a requirement to ‘practice in conjunction with’?

                  3.

                  In particular, would the imposition of a limited obligation to practice ‘in conjunction with’, in the manner described earlier in this order for reference, amount to a proportionate interference in the freedom of lawyers to provide services so as to be justified, having regard to the public interest involved being both the need to protect consumers of legal services and the need to secure the proper administration of justice?

                  4.

                  If the answer to question 3 is yes, does that position pertain in all circumstances and, if not, what factors should a national court take into account in determining whether such a requirement can be imposed in a particular case?

         (1)  Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22 March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services (OJ 1977, L 78, p. 17).


title: Case C-741/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris (France) lodged on 8 October 2019 — Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, a company the successor in law to the company Energoalians

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/34

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Paris (France) lodged on 8 October 2019 — Republic of Moldova v Komstroy, a company the successor in law to the company Energoalians
      (Case C-741/19)
      (2019/C 413/41)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Cour d’appel de Paris

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Republic of Moldova

         Respondent: Komstroy, a company the successor in law to the company Energoalians

         Questions referred

                  —

                  Must Article 1.6 of the Energy Charter Treaty be interpreted as meaning that a claim which arose from a contract for the sale of electricity and which did not involve any contribution on the part of the investor in the host State can constitute an ‘investment’ within the meaning of that article?

                  —

                  Must Article 26(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty be interpreted as meaning that the acquisition, by an investor of a Contracting Party, of a claim established by an economic operator which is not from one of the States that are Parties to that Treaty constitutes an investment?

                  —

                  Must Article 26(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty be interpreted as meaning that a claim held by an investor, which arose from a contract for the sale of electricity supplied at the border of the host State, can constitute an investment made in the area of another Contracting Party, in the case where the investor does not carry out any economic activity in the territory of that latter Contracting Party?


title: Case C-745/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski rayonen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 10 October 2019 — PH, OI v ‘Eurobank Bulgaria’ AD

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/35

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski rayonen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 10 October 2019 — PH, OI v ‘Eurobank Bulgaria’ AD
      (Case C-745/19)
      (2019/C 413/42)
      Language of the case: Bulgarian

         Referring court

      Sofiyski rayonen sad

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: PH, OI

         Defendant:‘Eurobank Bulgaria’ AD

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  If it is shown that a term allowing the creditor to unilaterally change the interest rate on a loan agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair, can the national court assume that the interest rate payable under the agreement is fixed (despite any provision to the contrary in the initial agreement) in the amount set as at the date the loan was granted?

                  2.

                  If the answer to the first question is in the negative, is the national court allowed to award any interest at all where there is an unfair term that fails to set the variable interest rate on the agreement in a fair manner?

                  3.

                  What effect does the fact that, in the course of repayment of the loan, the consumer has agreed to the application of a methodology for setting the interest rate that does not contain any unfair terms, have on the answer to the first two questions?


title: Case C-787/19: Action brought on 23 October 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Austria

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/36

      Action brought on 23 October 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Austria
      (Case C-787/19)
      (2019/C 413/43)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: J. Jokubauskaitė and M. Wasmeier, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: Republic of Austria

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare that, by excluding from the special value-added-tax scheme applicable to travel agents travel services that are provided to taxable persons who use those services for their business, and by allowing travel agents, in so far as they are subject to that scheme, to determine the taxable amount for value added tax on a flat-rate basis for groups of services or for all services provided during a taxable period, the Republic of Austria has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 73 and Articles 306 to 310 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1);
                  order the Republic of Austria to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The applicant submits that the scheme laid down in Austria for calculating the value added tax on travel services does not comply with Directive 2006/112. That directive lays down, in Articles 306 to 310, a special scheme pursuant to which travel services provided by a travel agent to a customer are to be regarded as a single service. Austrian law impermissibly departs from that scheme.
      First, it is not permissible to exclude from the application of that special scheme taxable persons who use travel services for their business. In its judgment of 26 September 2013, Commission v Spain (C-189/11, EU:C:2013:587), the Court of Justice already held that the special scheme in question is applicable not only to services provided to private end consumers, but also to services provided to taxable undertakings. It is not open to Member States to restrict the application of that scheme to the former category. This was confirmed once more by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 8 February 2018, Commission v Germany (C-380/16, EU:C:2018:76).
      Secondly, the calculation method provided for under the Austrian law on turnover tax is incompatible with Directive 2006/112. Under Article 73 and Articles 306 to 310 of that directive, the taxable amount is to be determined separately for each journey. Austrian law, by contrast, allows the profit margin for ‘groups of services’ or for all journeys in a specific time period to be calculated at a flat-rate. In the abovementioned judgments the Court of Justice also held that a flat-rate calculation of that kind is not consistent with the common system of value added tax.

         (1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.


title: Case T-586/14 RENV: Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings v Commission (Dumping — Imports of solar glass originating in China — Article 2(7)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (now Article 2(7)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036) — Market economy treatment — Concept of ‘significant distortion in the production costs and financial situation of firms’ — Tax incentives — Manifest error of assessment)

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/38

      Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings v Commission
      (Case T-586/14 RENV) (1)

      (Dumping - Imports of solar glass originating in China - Article 2(7)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (now Article 2(7)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036) - Market economy treatment - Concept of ‘significant distortion in the production costs and financial situation of firms’ - Tax incentives - Manifest error of assessment)
      (2019/C 413/45)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings Ltd (Anhui, China) (represented by: Y. Melin, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn and T. Maxian Rusche, acting as Agents)

         Interverner in support of the defendant: GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg GmbH (Tschernitz, Germany) (represented by: R. MacLean, Solicitor)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 470/2014 of 13 May 2014 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of solar glass originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2014 L 142, p. 1; corrigendum OJ 2014 L 253, p. 4).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 470/2014 of 13 May 2014 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of solar glass originating in the People’s Republic of China;

                  2.

                     Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay the costs of Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings Ltd, with the exception of those relating to the intervention;

                  3.

                     Orders GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay the costs of Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings relating to its intervention.

         (1)  OJ C 372, 20.10.2014.


title: Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15: Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission (State aid — Aid granted by Luxembourg — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and unlawful and ordering its recovery — Tax ruling — Advantage — Arm’s length principle — Selectivity — Presumption — Restriction of competition — Recovery)

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/39

      Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission
      (Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15) (1)

      (State aid - Aid granted by Luxembourg - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market and unlawful and ordering its recovery - Tax ruling - Advantage - Arm’s length principle - Selectivity - Presumption - Restriction of competition - Recovery)
      (2019/C 413/46)
      Languages of the case: French and English

         Parties

         Applicant in Case T-755/15: Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (represented initially by: D. Holderer and T. Uri, subsequently by T. Uri, acting as Agents, and initially by D. Waelbroeck, S. Naudin and A. Steichen, subsequently by D. Waelbroeck and A. Steichen, lawyers)

         Applicant in Case T-759/15: Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: J. Rodríguez, Solicitor, G. Maisto and M. Engel, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P.-J. Loewenthal and B. Stromsky, acting as Agents)

         Intervener in support of the applicants: Ireland (represented, in Case T-755/15, initially by: E. Creedon, G. Hodge and A. Joyce, subsequently by G. Hodge, M. Browne and A. Joyce, and finally by A. Joyce and J. Quaney, acting as Agents, and by P. Gallagher and M. Collins, Senior Counsel, B. Doherty and S. Kingston, Barristers, and, in Case T-759/15, initially by E. Creedon, G. Hodge, K. Duggan and A. Joyce, subsequently by G. Hodge, K. Duggan, M. Browne and A. Joyce, and finally by A. Joyce and J. Quaney, acting as Agents, and by M. Collins and P. Gallagher, Senior Counsel, S. Kingston and B. Doherty, Barristers)

         Re:

      Applications pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2326 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38375 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) which Luxembourg granted to Fiat (OJ 2016 L 351, p. 1).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Joins Cases T-755/15 and T-759/15 for the purposes of the judgment;

                  2.

                     Dismisses the actions;

                  3.

                     Orders the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission in Case T-755/15;

                  4.

                     Orders Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission in Case T-759/15;

                  5.

                     Orders Ireland to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 59, 15.2.2016.


title: Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16: Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — Netherlands and Others v Commission (State aid — Aid implemented by the Netherlands — Decision declaring the aid to be incompatible with the internal market and unlawful and ordering its recovery — Tax ruling — Transfer pricing — Calculation of the tax base — Arm’s length principle — Advantage — Reference system — Fiscal and procedural autonomy of the Member States)

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/40

      Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — Netherlands and Others v Commission
      (Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16) (1)

      (State aid - Aid implemented by the Netherlands - Decision declaring the aid to be incompatible with the internal market and unlawful and ordering its recovery - Tax ruling - Transfer pricing - Calculation of the tax base - Arm’s length principle - Advantage - Reference system - Fiscal and procedural autonomy of the Member States)
      (2019/C 413/47)
      Language of the case: Dutch and English

         Parties

         Applicant in Case T-760/15: Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented initially by M. Bulterman, B. Koopman, M. de Ree and M. Noort, subsequently by M. Bulterman)

         Applicants in Case T-636/16: Starbucks Corp. (Seattle, Washington, United States), Starbucks Manufacturing Emea BV (Amsterdam, Netherlands) (represented by: S. Verschuur, M. Petite and M. Stroungi, lawyers),

         Defendant: European Commission (in Case T-760/15 represented initially by P. J. Loewenthal and B. Stromsky, subsequently by P. J. Loewenthal and F. Tomat, acting as Agents, and in Case T-636/16, by P. J. Loewenthal and F. Tomat, acting as Agents)

         Intervener in support of the applicant in Case T-760/15: Ireland (represented initially by E. Creedon, G. Hodge, K. Duggan and A. Joyce, subsequently by G. Hodge, A. Joyce, K. Duggan, M. Browne and J. Quaney, acting as Agents, and by M. Collins, P. Gallagher, Senior Counsel, B. Doherty and S. Kingston, Barristers)

         Re:

      Applications based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks (OJ 2017 L 83, p. 38).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Joins Cases T-760/15 and T-636/16 for the purposes of the judgment;

                  2.

                     Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2017/502 of 21 October 2015 on State aid SA.38374 (2014/C ex 2014/NN) implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks;

                  3.

                     Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Starbucks Corp. and Starbucks Manufacturing Emea BV;

                  4.

                     Orders Ireland to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 59, 15.2.2016.


title: Case T-105/17: Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission (Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Euro Interest Rate Derivatives sector — Decision establishing an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Manipulation of the Euribor interbank reference rates — Exchange of confidential information — Restriction of competition by object — Single and continuous infringement — Fines — Basic amount — Value of sales — Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 — Obligation to state reasons)

text:
               9.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 413/41

      Judgment of the General Court of 24 September 2019 — HSBC Holdings and Others v Commission
      (Case T-105/17) (1)

      (Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Euro Interest Rate Derivatives sector - Decision establishing an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement - Manipulation of the Euribor interbank reference rates - Exchange of confidential information - Restriction of competition by object - Single and continuous infringement - Fines - Basic amount - Value of sales - Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Obligation to state reasons)
      (2019/C 413/48)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: HSBC Holdings plc (London, United Kingdom), HSBC Bank plc (London), HSBC France (Paris, France) (represented by: K. Bacon QC, D. Bailey, Barrister, M. Simpson, Solicitor, and Y. Anselin and C. Angeli, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. Farley, B. Mongin and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents, and B. Lask, Barrister)

         Re:

      Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking, first, annulment in part of Commission Decision C(2016) 8530 final of 7 December 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (AT.39914 — Euro Interest Rate Derivatives) and, second, a variation of the amount of the fine imposed on the applicants.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls Article 2(b) of Commission Decision C(2016) 8530 final of 7 December 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39914 — Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRD));

                  2.

                     Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  3.

                     Orders HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC Bank plc and HSBC France to bear their own costs;

                  4.

                     Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.


title: Case T-628/18: Judgment of the General Court of 17 October 2019 — E.I. Papadopoulos v EUIPO — Europastry (fripan VIENNOISERIE CAPRICE Pur Beurre) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for European Union figurative mark fripan VIENNOISERIE CAPRICE Pur Beurre — Earlier EU figurative mark Caprice — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               23.12.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 432/50

      Judgment of the General Court of 17 October 2019 — E.I. Papadopoulos v EUIPO — Europastry (fripan VIENNOISERIE CAPRICE Pur Beurre)
      (Case T-628/18) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for European Union figurative mark fripan VIENNOISERIE CAPRICE Pur Beurre - Earlier EU figurative mark Caprice - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
      (2019/C 432/58)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Viomichania mpiskoton kai eidon diatrofis E.I. Papadopoulos SA (Moschato-Tavros, Greece) (represented by: C. Chrysanthis, P.V. Chardalia and A. Vasilogamvrou, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Lapinskaite, S. Palmero Cabezas and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Europastry, SA (Sant Cugat del Vallès, Spain) (represented by: L. Estropá Navarro, lawyer)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 August 2018 (Case R 493/2018-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Viomichania mpiskoton kai eidon diatrofis E.I. Papadopoulos and Europastry.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Viomichania mpiskoton kai eidon diatrofis E.I. Papadopoulos SA to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 455, 17.12.2018.


title: Case T-764/19: Action brought on 8 November 2019 – Keller Holdings v Commission

text:
               10.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 45/40

      Action brought on 8 November 2019 – Keller Holdings v Commission
      (Case T-764/19)
      (2020/C 45/38)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Keller Holdings Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: M. Whitehouse and P. Halford, Solicitors)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Commission Decision (EU) 2019/1352 of 2 April 2019 on the State aid SA.44896 implemented by the United Kingdom concerning CFC Group Financing Exemption (OJ 2019 L 216, p. 1);

                  —

                  alternatively, annul Article 2 of the contested decision to the extent that it infringes the applicant’s freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU; and

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the applicant’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on eleven pleas in law:

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission made an error of law and/or a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the group financing exemption scheme (‘the contested measure’) gave rise to an economic advantage within the meaning and scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission made an error of law and/or a manifest error of assessment in the identification of the reference system for the purposes of the ‘selectivity’ analysis.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission made errors of law and manifest errors of assessment in wrongly or incompletely identifying, and in failing to understand correctly, the relevant objectives of its chosen reference system.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made errors of law and/or manifest errors of assessment in identifying the contested measure as entailing a derogation from its chosen reference system.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made errors of law and/or manifest errors of assessment in wrongly classifying the contested measure as prima facie selective, by incorrectly holding that it entailed different treatment of undertakings in a legally and factually comparable situation.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made an error of law in taking account of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (1) in its assessment of the selectivity of the contested measure, whereas that instrument did not come into force until after the end of the period in which the Commission ruled the contested measure to entail State aid.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging that the contested decision represents a misuse of power by the Commission contrary to the UK’s fiscal sovereignty.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made manifest errors of assessment in holding the alleged derogation to be not justified in relation to the taxation of non-trading finance profit(s) from qualifying loan relationships falling prima facie within section 371EB (‘UK activities’) of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. In relation to the ‘qualifying resources’ and ‘matched interest profits’ exemptions, the Commission’s decision is also vitiated by its failure to state any reasons in relation to their justification or lack thereof.

                  9.

                  Ninth plea in law, alleging that the Commission acted in breach of Article 108(2) TFEU and Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (2) and in breach of the duty of good administration under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, it failed to indicate in its opening decision that it had concerns regarding the justification of the “75% exemption” under section 371ID of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 to avoid the practical difficulty of carrying out a significant people functions analysis in relation to intra-group lending activity, such as to give interested parties adequate opportunity to comment on this; it failed, in the course of its investigation, to invite any comments in this regard from interested parties; and, in the contested decision, it chose to ignore such comments as had in fact been provided by interested parties in this regard. In consequence, the contested decision is void.

                  10.

                  Tenth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in ruling that taxing a UK company on profits of foreign subsidiaries “to the extent attributable to domestic assets and activities” does not pose a restriction to the freedom of establishment and that the contested measure is not needed to ensure compliance with the Treaty freedoms.
                  In support of its application (in the alternative) for annulment of Article 2 of the contested decision, the applicant relies on the following plea in law:

                  11.

                  Eleventh plea in law, alleging that even if (which is denied) the contested measure entailed a State aid scheme, the Commission made an error of law in holding that recovery of the aid would not infringe the fundamental principles of EU law, and in ordering recovery irrespective of whether the establishment of the CFCs and their making of loans to non-resident group companies in fact entailed an exercise of the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital. Specifically, in the present case, recovery would infringe the applicant’s freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU and free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU. To the extent of such infringement, the recovery order in Article 2 of the contested decision falls to be annulled.

         (1)  Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (OJ 2016 L 193, p. 1).

         (2)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).


title: Case T-778/19: Action brought on 12 November 2019 – RDI Reit v Commission

text:
               10.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 45/60

      Action brought on 12 November 2019 – RDI Reit v Commission
      (Case T-778/19)
      (2020/C 45/51)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: RDI Reit plc (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: C. McDonnell, Barrister, B. Goren, Solicitor, M. Peristeraki, lawyer, and K. Desai, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  hold that there has been no unlawful State Aid, annul Article 1 of the contested decision C(2019) 2526 Final of 2 April 2019 on the State aid SA.44896 implemented by the United Kingdom concerning CFC Group Financing Exemption, to the extent that it finds that there has been unlawful State Aid, and set aside the requirement for the UK to recover alleged unlawful State Aid received by the applicant in this context (Articles 2 and 3 of the contested decision);

                  —

                  in the alternative, annul Articles 2 and 3 of the contested decision, insofar as they require the UK to recover from the applicant the alleged State Aid; and

                  —

                  in any event, order the Commission to bear the costs incurred by the applicant for these proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on nine pleas in law:

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission misunderstands the context, aim and operation of the UK Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules, with respect to the treatment of non-trading finance profits. The Commission’s conclusions in the contested decision are based on cumulative manifest errors. In particular, the Commission has made manifest errors in its understanding of the overall UK tax system, in its understanding of the aims of the CFC system, in the specific scope of the Group Financing Exemption and in the definition of qualifying loan relationships.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission wrongly construes the Group Financing Exemption as a tax exemption and accordingly an advantage. In relation to non-trading finance profits, the Group Financing Exemption represents a charging provision and a part of the definition of the limits of the CFC rules, not a selective advantage. The Commission has provided no quantitative analysis to show that it is an advantage and, in the absence of cogent evidence that the measure in question results in an advantage, the contested decision cannot stand.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission misidentified the reference system for the assessment of the effects of the CFC rules and wrongly identified the CFC rules as a distinct set of rules from the overall UK corporation tax system. The Commission has not correctly understood the objective of the CFC rules and has failed to consider the UK’s margin for discretion.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission has shown manifest errors in its State aid analysis, and has applied the wrong tests when considering the question of comparability. The Commission failed to recognise the different level of risk to the UK tax base as between lending to a group entity which is taxable in the UK and lending to a group entity which is not taxable in the UK and irrationally concluded that intra-group lending is comparable to third-party lending.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that even assuming that the CFC measures in question prima facie constituted aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, the contested decision wrongly concluded that there was no justification that could apply to defend the compatibility of the measures in question with EU State aid rules. In addition, the contested decision is irrational and inconsistent, in that the Commission has correctly accepted that Chapter 9 of Part 9A of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 is justified in cases where the only reason for a CFC charge to apply under the counterfactual of Chapter 5 of the said Part 9A would be the ‘UK connected capital’ test, on the basis that that test may be excessively difficult to operate in practice, but at the same time, and without providing adequate reasoning, the Commission contends that the said Chapter 9 is never justified in cases where the significant people functions test would cause a CFC charge to apply under the said Chapter 5. In fact, the significant people functions test is excessively difficult to apply in practice, such that the Commission should have found the said Chapter 9 to be justified in the context of that test as well and, hence, it should have concluded that there is no State aid.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that, were the contested decision to be upheld, enforcement of it through recovery of the alleged State aid from the applicant would infringe fundamental principles of EU law, including the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, noting that, in the applicant’s case, the CFCs in question are situated in other Member States.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging that the recovery order resulting from the contested decision is unfounded and contrary to fundamental Union principles.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging that the Commission failed to provide adequate reasons for critical elements in the contested decision, such as the conclusion that the CFC charge under the said Chapter 5 could be applied using the significant people functions test without difficulty or disproportionate burden.

                  9.

                  Ninth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision also breaches the principle of good administration, which requires that the Commission allows transparency and predictability in its administrative procedures and renders its decisions within a reasonable time-frame. It is not reasonable for the Commission to take more than four years to issue its decision opening the investigation in the present case and to give a decision more than six years after the contested measure came into effect.


title: Case T-779/19: Action brought on 12 November 2019 – Ashtead Financing v Commission

text:
               10.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 45/62

      Action brought on 12 November 2019 – Ashtead Financing v Commission
      (Case T-779/19)
      (2020/C 45/52)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Ashtead Financing Ltd (London, United Kingdom) (represented by: M. Whitehouse and P. Halford, Solicitors)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision C(2019) 2019/1352 of 2 April 2019 on the State aid SA.44896 implemented by the United Kingdom concerning Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) Group Financing Exemption (OJ 2019 L 216, p. 1);

                  —

                  alternatively, annul Article 2 of the contested decision to the extent that it infringes the applicant’s freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU; and

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the applicant’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on eleven pleas in law:

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission made an error of law and/or a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the group financing exemption scheme (‘the contested measure’) gave rise to an economic advantage within the meaning and scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission made an error of law and/or a manifest error of assessment in the identification of the reference system for the purposes of the ‘selectivity’ analysis.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission made errors of law and manifest errors of assessment in wrongly or incompletely identifying, and in failing to understand correctly, the relevant objectives of its chosen reference system.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made errors of law and/or manifest errors of assessment in identifying the contested measure as entailing a derogation from its chosen reference system.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made errors of law and/or manifest errors of assessment in wrongly classifying the contested measure as prima facie selective, by incorrectly holding that it entailed different treatment of undertakings in a legally and factually comparable situation.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made an error of law in taking account of Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (1) in its assessment of the selectivity of the contested measure, whereas that instrument did not come into force until after the end of the period in which the Commission ruled the contested measure to entail State aid.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging that the contested decision represents a misuse of power by the Commission contrary to the UK’s fiscal sovereignty.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging that the Commission made manifest errors of assessment in holding the alleged derogation to be not justified in relation to the taxation of non-trading finance profit(s) from qualifying loan relationships falling prima facie within section 371EB (‘UK activities’) of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. In relation to the ‘qualifying resources’ and ‘matched interest profits’ exemptions, the Commission’s decision is also vitiated by its failure to state any reasons in relation to their justification or lack thereof.

                  9.

                  Ninth plea in law, alleging that the Commission acted in breach of Article 108(2) TFEU and Article 6 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (2) and in breach of the duty of good administration under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, it failed to indicate in its opening decision that it had concerns regarding the justification of the ‘75% exemption’ under section 371ID of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 to avoid the practical difficulty of carrying out a significant people functions analysis in relation to intra-group lending activity, such as to give interested parties adequate opportunity to comment on this; it failed, in the course of its investigation, to invite any comments in this regard from interested parties; and in the contested decision it chose to ignore such comments as had in fact been provided by interested parties in this regard. In consequence, the contested decision is void.

                  10.

                  Tenth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in ruling that taxing a UK company on profits of foreign subsidiaries ‘to the extent attributable to domestic assets and activities’ does not pose a restriction to the freedom of establishment and that the contested measure is not needed to ensure compliance with the Treaty freedoms.
                  In support of its application (in the alternative) for annulment of Article 2 of the contested decision, the applicant relies on the following plea in law:

                  11.

                  Eleventh plea in law, alleging that even if (which is denied) the contested measure entailed a State aid scheme, the Commission made an error of law in holding that recovery of the aid would not infringe the fundamental principles of EU law, and in ordering recovery irrespective of whether the establishment of the CFCs and their making of loans to non-resident group companies in fact entailed an exercise of the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital. Specifically, in the present case, recovery would infringe the applicant’s freedom of establishment under Article 49 TFEU and free movement of capital under Article 63 TFEU. To the extent of such infringement, the recovery order in Article 2 of the contested decision falls to be annulled.

         (1)  Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market, (OJ 2016 L 193, p. 1).

         (2)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).


title: Case C-582/18 P: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 19 December 2019 — Viscas Corp. v European Commission and Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd (Appeal — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for underground and submarine power cables — Market allocation in connection with projects — Fines — 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines — Determining the relative weight of the European and non-European members in the cartel — Participation of European undertakings in the cartel at several levels — Principle of equal treatment)

text:
               24.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 61/13

      Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 19 December 2019 — Viscas Corp. v European Commission and Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd
      (Case C-582/18 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European market for underground and submarine power cables - Market allocation in connection with projects - Fines - 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines - Determining the relative weight of the European and non-European members in the cartel - Participation of European undertakings in the cartel at several levels - Principle of equal treatment)
      (2020/C 61/15)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Viscas Corp. (represented by: J.-F. Bellis, avocat)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: H. van Vliet, A. Biolan and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents), Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd (represented by: initially, by A. Luke and C. Pouncey, Solicitors, and, subsequently, by A. Luke and K. Fountoukakos, Solicitors)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the appeal;

                  2.

                  Orders Viscas Corp. to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                  Orders Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 427, 26.11.2018.


title: Case C-589/18 P: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 19 December 2019 — Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd v European Commission, Viscas Corp. (Appeal — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — European market for underground and submarine power cables — Market allocation in connection with projects — Fines — 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines — Determination of the value of sales — Principle of equal treatment)

text:
               24.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 61/14

      Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 19 December 2019 — Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd v European Commission, Viscas Corp.
      (Case C-589/18 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - European market for underground and submarine power cables - Market allocation in connection with projects - Fines - 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines - Determination of the value of sales - Principle of equal treatment)
      (2020/C 61/16)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd (represented by: initially, A. Luke and C. Pouncey, Solicitors, then A. Luke and K. Fountoukakos-Kyriakakos, Solicitors)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: H. van Vliet, A. Biolan and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents), Viscas Corp. (represented by: J.-F. Bellis, avocat)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the appeal;

                  2.

                  Declares that Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd is to bear its own costs and orders it to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                  Declares that Viscas Corp. is to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 427, 26.11.2018.


title: Case C-696/19 P: Appeal brought on 20 September 2019 by Mr Andreas Hauzenberger against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2019 in Case T-349/18, Andreas Hauzenberger v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

text:
               24.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 61/17

      Appeal brought on 20 September 2019 by Mr Andreas Hauzenberger against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2019 in Case T-349/18, Andreas Hauzenberger v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)
      (Case C-696/19 P)
      (2020/C 61/21)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Andreas Hauzenberger (represented by: B. Bittner, Rechtsanwalt, U. Heinrich, Rechtsanwältin)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office
      By order of 19 December 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) did not allow the appeal to proceed and ordered the appellant to bear his own costs.


title: Case C-855/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 22 November 2019 — G. Sp. z o.o. v Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Bydgoszczy

text:
               24.2.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 61/18

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 22 November 2019 — G. Sp. z o.o. v Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Bydgoszczy
      (Case C-855/19)
      (2020/C 61/22)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: G. Sp. z o.o.

         Defendant: Dyrektor Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Bydgoszczy

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Do Article 110 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added (1) not preclude a provision such as Article 103(5a) of the Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (Law of 11 March 2004 on the tax on goods and services), (2) which stipulates that, in the case of an intra-Community acquisition of motor fuels, the taxable person is obliged, without being called upon to do so by the head of the customs office, to calculate and pay the amounts of tax to the account of the customs office competent for dealing with the payment of excise duty:

                              (a)

                              within 5 days of the date on which the goods in question enter the place of receipt of excise goods specified in the relevant permit — if the goods are the subject of intra-Community acquisition within the meaning of the Ustawa z dnia 6 grudnia 2008 r. o podatku akcyzowym (Law of 6 December 2008 on excise duty) by a registered consignee under the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty;

                              (b)

                              within 5 days of the date on which such goods enter a tax warehouse from the territory of a Member State other than Poland;

                              (c)

                              upon the movement of these goods within the territory of Poland — if the goods are moved outside of the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty?

                  2.

                  Does Article 69 of Directive 2006/112/EC preclude a provision such as Article 103(5a) of the VAT Law, which stipulates that, in the case of the intra-Community acquisition of motor fuels, the taxable person is obliged, without being called upon to do so by the head of a customs office, to calculate and pay the amounts of tax to the account of the customs office competent for dealing with the payment of excise duty:

                              (a)

                              within 5 days of the date on which the goods in question enter the place of receipt of excise goods specified in the relevant permit — if the goods are the subject of intra-Community acquisition within the meaning of the Law of 6 December 2008 on excise duty by a registered consignee under the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty;

                              (b)

                              within 5 days of the date on which such goods enter a tax warehouse from the territory of a Member State other than Poland;

                              (c)

                              upon the movement of these goods within the territory of Poland — if the goods are moved outside of the excise duty suspension procedure pursuant to the provisions on excise duty:
                              where the above amounts are interpreted as not constituting interim VAT payments within the meaning of Article 206 of Directive 2006/112/EC?

                  3.

                  Does an interim VAT payment within the meaning of Article 206 of Directive 2006/112/EC which is not paid on time lose its legal status at the end of the tax period for which it is to be paid?

         (1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

         (2)  Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2016, item 710, as amended; ‘the VAT Law’.


title: Case C-569/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Potenza (Italy) lodged on 26 July 2019 — OM v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca and Others

text:
               16.3.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 87/2

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Potenza (Italy) lodged on 26 July 2019 — OM v Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca and Others
      (Case C-569/19)
      (2020/C 87/02)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale di Potenza

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: OM

         Defendants: Ministero dell’Istruzione, dell’Università e della Ricerca, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, and Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
      By order of 7 November 2019, the Court (Ninth Chamber) declared the request for a preliminary ruling lodged by the Tribunale di Potenza manifestly inadmissible.


title: Case C-829/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 13 November 2019 — XY v KLM Cityhopper BV

text:
               16.3.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 87/2

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg (Germany) lodged on 13 November 2019 — XY v KLM Cityhopper BV
      (Case C-829/19)
      (2020/C 87/03)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Amtsgericht Hamburg

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: XY

         Defendant: KLM Cityhopper BV
      The case was removed from the Register of the Court of Justice by order of the Court of 17 January 2020.


title: Case C-836/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Gera (Germany) lodged on 18 November 2019 — Toropet Ltd. v Landkreis Greiz

text:
               16.3.2020

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 87/3

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Gera (Germany) lodged on 18 November 2019 — Toropet Ltd. v Landkreis Greiz
      (Case C-836/19)
      (2020/C 87/04)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Verwaltungsgericht Gera

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Toropet Ltd.

         Defendant: Landkreis Greiz

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 10(a) of Regulation No 1069/2009 (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the original classification as Category 3 material is lost if fitness for human consumption no longer applies due to decomposition and spoilage?

                  2.

                  Is Article 10(f) of Regulation No 1069/2009 to be interpreted as meaning that the original classification as Category 3 material for products of animal origin, or foodstuffs containing products of animal origin, is lost if a risk to public or animal health arises from the material as a result of later decomposition or spoilage processes?

                  3.

                  Is the provision of Article 9(d) of Regulation No 1069/2009 to be interpreted restrictively as meaning that material mixed with foreign bodies such as sawdust is only to be categorised as Category 2 material when the material is to be processed and is destined for feeding purposes?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (OJ 2009 L 300, p. 1).