title: Case C-145/19 P: Appeal brought on 20 February 2019 by Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-358/17: Mubarak v Council

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/26

      Appeal brought on 20 February 2019 by Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-358/17: Mubarak v Council
      (Case C-145/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/24)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Mohamed Hosni Elsayed Mubarak (represented by: D. Anderson QC, B. Kennelly QC, J. Pobjoy, Barrister, G. Martin, C. Enderby Smith, F. Holmey, Solicitors)

         Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  1.

                  set aside the decision under appeal;

                  2.

                  itself give final judgment in this case, annulling the contested acts in so far as they concern the appellant;

                  3.

                  in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for judgment, in line with the legal assessment of the Court of Justice; and

                  4.

                  order the Council to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings before the Court of Justice and the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      First plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the Egyptian authorities had respected the appellant’s fundamental EU rights.
      Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council was not required to verify that the judicial proceedings and investigations involving the appellant concern acts that are such as to undermine the rule of law in Egypt.
      Third plea of law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 8897 (Private Villa Refurbishment Case).
      Fourth plea of law, alleging that the General Court erred in finding that the Council had not made a manifest error of assessment in relying on Case No. 756 (Al-Ahram Establishment Gifts Allegation) and Case No. 53 (Dar El Tahrir Gifts Allegation).


title: Case C-146/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije (Slovenia) lodged on 21 February 2019 — SCT, d.d., in bankruptcy v Republic of Slovenia

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/27

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije (Slovenia) lodged on 21 February 2019 — SCT, d.d., in bankruptcy v Republic of Slovenia
      (Case C-146/19)
      (2019/C 148/25)
      Language of the case: Slovenian

         Referring court

      Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: SCT, d.d., in bankruptcy

         Respondent: Republic of Slovenia

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 90(2) of the VAT Directive to be interpreted as permitting derogation from the right to reduce the taxable amount for VAT purposes even with respect to cases of definitive non-payment, where such definitive non-payment is a consequence of a failure on the part of the taxable person liable for the VAT to take proper steps, such as lodging a claim in bankruptcy proceedings commenced against his debtor, as in the present case?

                  2.

                  If such derogation from the right to reduce the taxable amount for VAT purposes is permissible, must there nevertheless be a right to reduce the taxable amount for VAT purposes on the ground of non-payment where the taxable person is able to demonstrate that, even if he had lodged a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings, it would not have been satisfied, or is able to demonstrate that there were reasonable grounds for not lodging a claim?

                  3.

                  Does Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive have direct effect even if the legislature of a Member State has exceeded the scope of the possibilities for derogation established by Article 90(2)?


title: Case C-149/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Okresný súd Bratislava V (Slovakia) lodged on 22 February 2019 — Criminal proceedings against R.B.

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/28

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Okresný súd Bratislava V (Slovakia) lodged on 22 February 2019 — Criminal proceedings against R.B.
      (Case C-149/19)
      (2019/C 148/26)
      Language of the case: Slovak

         Referring court

      Okresný súd Bratislava V

         Party to the main proceedings

      R.B.

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is it compatible with Article 4 of Directive 2012/13/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings (‘Directive 2012/13/EU’), Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU, the right to liberty and security under Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the right of defence under Article 48(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to a fair trial under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union for the national authorities not to provide the detainee, throughout the period of detention, with the information referred to in Article 4(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU (in particular the right to access to the materials of the case), fully or completely, and not to permit the detainee to challenge that failure to provide information in accordance with Article 8(2) of Directive 2012/13/EU? If the reply to that question should be in the negative, does that infringement of the law of the European Union affect, at any stage in the criminal proceedings, the legality of the deprivation of personal liberty when the detainee has been placed in pre-trial detention, in addition to the continuation of such pre-trial detention?

                  2.

                  Is a provision of national law that does not permit the court to impose a term of imprisonment of less than 20 years, without any possibility of account being taken of the principle that the penalty should be specific to the offender and to the offence — such as Paragraph 172(4) of the Slovak Criminal Code, which punishes illicit drug trafficking — compatible with Article 4 of Council Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA (2) of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking, with the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, with Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with Articles 82 and 83 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the right to a fair trial laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with the principle of the proportionality of penalties under Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with the principles of proportionality, unity, effectiveness and the primacy of EU law? For the purposes of answering that question, is it relevant that the illicit drug trafficking was not committed by a criminal organisation within the meaning of EU law?

         (1)  OJ 2012 L 142, p. 1.

         (2)  OJ 2004 L 335, p. 8.


title: Case C-420/16 P: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 March 2019 — Balázs-Árpád Izsák, Attila Dabis v European Commission, Hungary, Hellenic Republic, Romania, Slovak Republic (Appeal — Law governing the institutions — Citizens’ initiative — Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 — Registration of the proposed citizens’ initiative — Article 4(2)(b) — Condition that the proposed initiative does not manifestly fall outside the framework of the European Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act for the purpose of implementing the Treaties — Burden of proof — Economic, social and territorial cohesion — Article 174 TFEU — Citizens’ initiative ‘Cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of the regional cultures’ — Application for registration — Refusal by the Commission)

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/2

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 March 2019 — Balázs-Árpád Izsák, Attila Dabis v European Commission, Hungary, Hellenic Republic, Romania, Slovak Republic
      (Case C-420/16 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Law governing the institutions - Citizens’ initiative - Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 - Registration of the proposed citizens’ initiative - Article 4(2)(b) - Condition that the proposed initiative does not manifestly fall outside the framework of the European Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act for the purpose of implementing the Treaties - Burden of proof - Economic, social and territorial cohesion - Article 174 TFEU - Citizens’ initiative ‘Cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of the regional cultures’ - Application for registration - Refusal by the Commission)
      (2019/C 148/02)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Parties

         Appellants: Balázs-Árpád Izsák, Attila Dabis (represented by: D. Sobor, ügyvéd)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: K. Banks, K. Talabér-Ritz, H. Krämer and B.-R. Killmann, acting as Agents), Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér, acting as Agent), Hellenic Republic, Romania (represented by: R.H. Radu, C.R. Canțăr, C.-M. Florescu, L. Lițu and E. Gane, acting as Agents), Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová, acting as Agent)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 May 2016, Iszák and Dabis v Commission (T-529/13, EU:T:2016:282);

                  2.

                  Annuls Decision C(2013) 4975 final of the Commission of 25 July 2013 concerning the application for registration of the European citizens’ initiative ‘Cohesion policy for the equality of the regions and sustainability of the regional cultures’;

                  3.

                  Orders the European Commission to pay the costs relating to the proceedings at first instance and on appeal;

                  4.

                  Orders Hungary, Romania and the Slovak Republic to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 392, 24.10.2016.


title: Case C-728/17 P: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 March 2019 — European Commission v Alain Laurent Brouillard (Appeal — Civil service — Recruitment — Competitions — Conditions for admission — Diplomas and level of education required — Open competition EPSO/AD/306/15 — Pre-selection of candidates on the basis of their applications — Level of education corresponding to full legal education completed in a Belgian, French, or Luxembourg higher-education institution — ‘Master 2’ diploma (master’s degree) in law, economics and management, private law, lawyer-linguist specialism — Issued following ‘accreditation of skills gained through experience’ — Rejection of the application)

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/6

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 7 March 2019 — European Commission v Alain Laurent Brouillard
      (Case C-728/17 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Civil service - Recruitment - Competitions - Conditions for admission - Diplomas and level of education required - Open competition EPSO/AD/306/15 - Pre-selection of candidates on the basis of their applications - Level of education corresponding to full legal education completed in a Belgian, French, or Luxembourg higher-education institution - ‘Master 2’ diploma (master’s degree) in law, economics and management, private law, lawyer-linguist specialism - Issued following ‘accreditation of skills gained through experience’ - Rejection of the application)
      (2019/C 148/06)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: P. Mihaylova and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings: Alain Laurent Brouillard (represented by: H. Brouillard, lawyer)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders the European Commission to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 26.3.2018.


title: Case C-392/18 P: Appeal brought on 13 June 2018 by Mauro Bettani against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 24 April 2018 in Case T-80/18, Bettani v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/6

      Appeal brought on 13 June 2018 by Mauro Bettani against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 24 April 2018 in Case T-80/18, Bettani v Commission
      (Case C-392/18 P)
      (2019/C 148/07)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Appellant: Mauro Bettani (represented by: Mauro Bettani, avvocato)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission
      By order of 7 March 2019, the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered Mr Mauro Bettani to bear his own costs.


title: Case C-757/18 P: Appeal brought on 3 December 2018 by M-Sansz Kereskedelmi, Termelő és Szolgáltató Kft. (M-Sansz Kft.) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 28 September 2018 in Case T-709/17 M-Sansz v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/7

      Appeal brought on 3 December 2018 by M-Sansz Kereskedelmi, Termelő és Szolgáltató Kft. (M-Sansz Kft.) against the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 28 September 2018 in Case T-709/17 M-Sansz v Commission
      (Case C-757/18 P)
      (2019/C 148/08)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Parties

         Appellant: M Sansz Kereskedelmi, Termelő és Szolgáltató Kft. (M Sansz Kft.) (represented by: L. Ravasz, ügyvéd)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      In its appeal, M-Sansz Kft. submits that the Court of Justice should:

                  —

                  Set aside the order of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 28 September 2018, M-Sansz v Commission, T-709/17, and in its judgment, reject the plea of inadmissibility raised by the defendant at first instance, and uphold the action brought by the applicant in the proceedings at first instance; find, in relation to Commission Decisions SA.29432 [CP 290/2009] and SA.45498 [FC/2016], principally, that those decisions declaring the compatibility of State aid failed to rely on Article 107(1) TFEU; and, in the alternative, that the contested decisions do not constitute acts which are legally binding on the appellant in the context of Case No 23.P.25.843/2016 pending before the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, Hungary), and that the appellant is therefore not directly and individually concerned, since it has brought its action for compensation on the basis of the fact that the State aid in question infringes Article 107(1) TFEU, not Article 107(3) TFEU. In the event that, on the contrary, the contested decisions are found to constitute acts which are legally binding on the appellant in relation to a procedure under Article 107(1) TFEU, the appellant also requests that the Court of Justice uphold the appeal brought by the applicant at first instance, and declare that the contested decisions are invalid owing to the fact that the aid granted by the Hungarian authorities infringes Article 107(1) TFEU (annulment).

                  —

                  In the event that the Court of Justice does not consider it possible to rule on the substance of the case, set aside the abovementioned order of the General Court and refer the case back to the General Court as court of first instance.

                  —

                  In the event that the Court of Justice gives judgment in accordance with the first paragraph of the form of order sought above, order the defendant to bear its own costs at first instance and on appeal.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      Infringement of Article 263 TFEU and the provisions and case-law in bold, as follows:
      The complaints lodged by the Hungarian applicant company gave rise to the procedures relating to Decisions SA.29432 and SA.45498. Those complaints concerned unlawful State aid and discriminatory treatment of a category of entities — which includes the applicant at first instance — since the recipient companies and those discriminated against are engaged in the same activity in Hungary, are situated in the same county in Hungary and employ disabled workers. The appellant also claims that the amount of the unlawful State aid is manifestly and unlawfully high. The appellant maintains that, in those procedures, the Commission failed to give decisions and certainly did not give decisions producing any legal effect in its regard. In the Hungarian proceedings mentioned in the appeal [Case No 23.P.25.843/2016, pending before the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, Hungary)], the appellant seeks compensation in respect of the harm suffered as a consequence of the unlawful State aid; as a result, the outcome of the present case will have an undeniable effect on the judgment to be given in the context of the national proceedings. It is important that acts which legally do not constitute Commission decisions do not determine the outcome of the national proceedings. Those decisions failed to find the State aid in question to be compatible, within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, and do not constitute legal acts intended to produce legal effects with regard to the appellant, since the wording of the latter’s application for compensation relies on the claim that the State aid at issue infringes Article 107(1) TFEU, and not on the allegation that it infringes Article 107(3) TFEU.
      The appellant maintains that, in this case, it satisfies the requirement established in the judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission (25/62, EU:C:1963:17). The appellant claims that it has demonstrated that it is a ‘party concerned’ for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, Article 108(2) TFEU, and Article 1(h) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589, (1) and that the Court of Justice declared in its judgment of 24 May 2011, Commission v Kronoplu and Kronotex (C-83/09P, EU:C:2011:341), that, in order for undertakings to regarded as competitors, their spheres of activity were not required to be identical.

         Infringement of procedural rights (breach of the provisions in bold), as follows:
      Thus, whilst the table submitted as evidence of standing as a party concerned and the additional explanations failed to satisfy the General Court, the latter ought to have applied Article 83(1) to (3), Article 88(1), Article 89(1), (2)(a) to (c), (3)(a) and (d) and (4), together with Article 92(1) of its own Rules of Procedure, and made use, vis-à-vis the appellant, of a request for information or an invitation to make submissions with regard to that question. The breach occurred when the General Court failed to act of its own motion. Moreover, the Sargentini Report — which also examines the time period in question — criticises Hungary in connection with the principle of the rule of law, including the rule of law in economic matters (see paragraphs 12, 13, 22 and 23).

         (1)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).


title: Case C-809/18 P: Appeal brought on 20 December 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 15 October 2018 in Case T-7/17: John Mills v EUIPO

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/8

      Appeal brought on 20 December 2018 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 15 October 2018 in Case T-7/17: John Mills v EUIPO
      (Case C-809/18 P)
      (2019/C 148/09)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Lukošiūtė, Agent)

         Other parties to the proceedings: John Mills Ltd, Jerome Alexander Consulting Corp.

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested judgment;

                  —

                  order John Mills Ltd to pay the costs incurred by the Office.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

         Violation of Articles 8(3) of Regulation 207/2009 (1)

                  —

                  The General Court misinterpreted the provisions of Article 8(3) of Regulation 207/2009 by limiting its scope to the notion of ‘identity’ of the signs and attributing it the meaning proper to Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation 207/2009.

                  —

                  The General Court did not take sufficient account of the purpose of Article 8(3) of Regulation 207/2009, i.e. to prevent the misuse of a mark by the trade mark proprietor’s agent as the agent may exploit the knowledge and experience acquired during its business relationship with the proprietor and therefore improperly benefit from the effort and investment which the trade mark proprietor himself made, giving preference to an arguable literal interpretation. While it is a teleological approach to the interpretation of the EU trade mark law that is consistently applied by the EU judicature.

                  —

                  A literal interpretation does not lead either to the conclusion that Article 8(3) of Regulation 207/2009 applies only to identical marks. It is therefore enough if the signs at issue coincide in elements in which the earlier mark’s distinctive character essentially consists. On this basis the proper test for examining the conflicting marks under the Article 8(3) of Regulation 207/2009 is whether the EUTM application reproduces the essential elements of the earlier mark in such a way as to make it evident that the applicant is misappropriating the legitimate proprietor’s rights on its mark. In fact, the disloyal agent would be in a position to prevent not only any subsequent registration of the earlier mark by the original proprietor within the EU — but indeed any use thereof by the principal within the EU.

         Violation of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice

                  —

                  The judgment under appeal is tainted by contradictory reasoning to the extent that it accepts, on the one hand, that signs are identical where one reproduces the other without any modification or addition and, on the other hand, that they are also identical where variations are made without altering the distinctive character (see paragraphs 38-40 of the Contested Judgment). Such reasoning is contradictory since the same notion of ‘identity’ is applied to distinct legal and factual situations and is erroneously given two different contents.

                  —

                  The General Court did not provide any reasons as to why the conflicting trade marks do not fall under the scope of Article 8(3) of Regulation 207/2009 following the test it introduced in paragraph 39 of the contested judgment.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009, L 78, p. 1).


title: Case C-818/18 P: Appeal brought on 21 December 2018 by The Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 October 2018 in Case T-447/16: Pirelli Tyre v EUIPO

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/9

      Appeal brought on 21 December 2018 by The Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 October 2018 in Case T-447/16: Pirelli Tyre v EUIPO
      (Case C-818/18 P)
      (2019/C 148/10)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: The Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd (represented by: D. Martucci, F. Boscariol de Roberto, avvocati)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Pirelli Tyre SpA

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal;

                  —

                  if necessary, refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  order Pirelli Tyre S.p.A. to pay the costs including the costs incurred in the course of the proceedings of General Court and the Board of Appeal.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

         First part of the first plea in law: does the mark constitute the shape of the goods within the meaning of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 (1)
         ?

      The General Court affirmed that, even though the graphic representation constituting the contested sign shows no contours and is not accompanied by any additional description, Pirelli did not contest that some of its tyre models contain, on the surface of the tyre, a groove in the shape represented by the contested sign. Also the possibility afforded to the competent authority to take into account material relevant to identifying the essential characteristics of a contested three-dimensional sign has been extended to the examination of two-dimensional signs. The General Court concluded its reasoning affirming that: ‘It must be stated that, when analysed objectively and specifically, the contested mark does not represent a tread pattern design. It represents, at most, an individual groove of a tyre tread’. The Court of Justice has reiterated that the case law, which was developed in relation to three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the appearance of the product or part of the product itself, also applies where, as in the present case, the trade mark applied for is a figurative mark consisting of the two-dimensional representation of that product or part of the product. In such a case, the trade mark likewise does not consist of a sign unrelated to the appearance of the products it covers. The graphic representation of the challenged trade mark exactly reproduces the shape of the product (i.e. pattern) which it is to designate or of the product to which relate for technical reasons. The explanation provided by the General Court, according to which the sign is not a significant part of the product, is arbitrary and contrary to the case law decided by the Court of Justice and by the same General Court. The question is not if the sign constitutes a significant part of the product but if the sign is a part of the product.

         Second part of the first plea in law: did the Board of Appeal add to the shape elements which did not form part of the sign and which were therefore external and foreign?

      The General Court affirms that the Board of Appeal departed from the shape represented by the contested sign and modified it. In other words, the Board of Appeal have modified the nature of the sign, alleging or supposing external and foreign features or characteristics. In truth, the Board of Appeal did not add elements to the sign but evaluated the shape of the actual goods and not an abstract shape. If the sign, as affirmed by the General Court, is a true to life representation of a part of the goods covered by the sign, it is necessary to analyze the characteristics of the shape arising from the graphic representation from the point of view of the function of the goods concerned. In our opinion, the General Court seems to affirm that the EUIPO tried to find hidden characteristics which are not visible in the shape represented. Although that assessment should undoubtedly be confined prima facie to an analysis of the shape as applied for, the relationship between that shape (groove) and the function of the goods (tyre) necessitates the consideration of additional information. In our view, the analysis of the sign as applied for is quite simple due to the fact that on the products the trade mark appears as a serial reproduction of the sign. Therefore the question is: ‘does the depiction amount unquestionably to a representation of a functional element of a part of the product?’ and not, contrary to the statement of the General Court, ‘does the depiction amount unquestionably to a representation of a significant part or a small portion of the product?’.

         Second plea in law: on distortion of the facts

      The General Court erred in evaluating all the facts and all the documents filed by Yokohama. In our case we have indicated precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and showed the errors of appraisal which, in our view, led to that distortion. Such distortion is obvious from the documents on the Court's file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and evidence.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994, L 11, p. 1).


title: Case C-825/18 P: Appeal brought on 28 December 2018 by Mamas and Papas Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2018 in Case T-672/17: Mamas and Papas v EUIPO

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/11

      Appeal brought on 28 December 2018 by Mamas and Papas Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 October 2018 in Case T-672/17: Mamas and Papas v EUIPO
      (Case C-825/18 P)
      (2019/C 148/11)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Mamas and Papas Ltd (represented by: S. Malynicz QC, B. Whitehead, J. Dainty, Solicitors)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-672/17, Mamas and Papas Ltd v EUIPO;

                  —

                  give judgment on the issue of prior disclosure;

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union on the remaining pleas in law that were brought before the General Court but not resolved by that Court;

                  —

                  order the Office and intervener to bear their own costs and pay those of the appellant.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      First the General Court erred in law regarding the powers of the EUIPO to examine the facts under Article 63(1) CDR (1) in relation to disclosure of the prior design. Where prior disclosure is positively averred by the design holder, it is not open to the EUIPO to come to a different conclusion on that issue.
      Secondly, in any event, as regards its assessment of the evidence of prior disclosure the General Court distorted the evidence and incorrectly assessed the facts, and its decision contains a substantive inaccuracy in the findings attributable to the documents submitted to it which is clear from the case file.

         (1)  11 Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community Designs (OJ 2002, L 3, p. 1).


title: Case C-6/19 P: Appeal brought on 04 January 2019 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 October 2018 in Case T-447/16: Pirelli Tyre v EUIPO

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/12

      Appeal brought on 04 January 2019 by the European Union Intellectual Property Office against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 24 October 2018 in Case T-447/16: Pirelli Tyre v EUIPO
      (Case C-6/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/12)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas, Agent)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Pirelli Tyre SpA, The Yokohama Rubber Co. Ltd

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested judgment;

                  —

                  order Pirelli Tyre SpA to pay the costs incurred by the Office.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The Office raises a single plea in law that is the infringement of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 (1).

                  —

                  By requiring that in order to be caught by Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 a sign depicting part of a product must represent, quantitatively and qualitatively, a significant part of that product, the General Court misinterpreted the conditions of this ground for refusal;

                  —

                  The General Court incorrectly considered that a single groove represented in the contested sign is not capable of performing a technical function for the purposes of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 because in a tyre tread it appears in combination with other elements. First, Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 requires to examine the technical result achieved by the feature of a product represented in the sign at issue, rather than the technical result achieved by the entire product. Secondly, for the purposes of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94 it is irrelevant if a single groove represented in the contested sign is combined with other elements of a tyre tread since it produces a technical result itself and contributes to the functioning of that tyre tread;

                  —

                  The General Court wrongly presumed that the registration of a single groove represented in the contested sign could not prevent Pirelli’s competitors from making and marketing tyres which incorporate identical or similar grooves. Although a tyre tread consists of the combination and the interaction of various elements, at least part of the public would be able to identify different types of grooves present on a tyre tread.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).


title: Case C-13/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza (Spain) lodged on 9 January 2019 — Ibercaja Banco, S.A. v TJ and UK

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/13

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza (Spain) lodged on 9 January 2019 — Ibercaja Banco, S.A. v TJ and UK
      (Case C-13/19)
      (2019/C 148/13)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Audiencia Provincial de Zaragoza

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Ibercaja Banco, S.A.

         Respondents: TJ and UK

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  In the light of Article 3 of Directive 93/13, (1) can the ‘floor clause’ amendment in the form established under the agreement, as described in the statement of facts, be classified as a standard condition of contract?

                  2.

                  In the same circumstances, can the waiver of the right to take legal action against the bank be classified as a standard condition of contract, that is to say, can a contractual condition which the seller or supplier draws up for general purposes and the content of which is not demonstrably explained to the consumer signing up to the contract be classified as a standard condition of contract?

                  3.

                  In such circumstances, are the requirements for clarity, transparency, true comprehensibility of the financial burden, pre-contractual information and individual negotiation laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 93/13 satisfied in the case where the consequences of that condition have a significant bearing on the consumer?

                  4.

                  Must the requirement for pre-contractual information as a criterion for determining whether a contractual term is unfair (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive [93/13]) apply to an equal or even greater extent in the case of an agreement for the relaxation of a term that is likely to be void (specific financial consequences of relaxation; reference to the relevant case-law and its specific effects, etc.)?

                  5.

                  For the purposes of relaxing a term that is likely to be void, is the consumer’s manuscript copy of the relaxation of the potentially void term sufficient to comply with the requirements for pre-contractual information and clarity laid down in Articles 4 and 5 of Directive [93/13]?

                  6.

                  Are (i) the fact that the initiative to effect a relaxation or settlement comes from the banking institution and (ii) the prohibition against removing the document from the branch unless it has been signed by the consumer particularly relevant when it comes to assessing whether the relaxation clause is unfair (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive [93/13])?

                  7.

                  Can a term that is likely to be void because it is unfair be relaxed (principle that unfair terms are non-binding)?

                  8.

                  Can a term that is likely to be void because it is unfair to the consumer be the subject of a waiver of the right to take legal action by the consumer (Article 3 of Directive [93/13] in conjunction with point 1(q) of the Annex to Directive 93/13 and the principle that unfair terms are not to be binding, laid down in Article 6 of the Directive)?

                  9.

                  In the event of a reply in the affirmative, must the requirement for pre-contractual information be equal to or greater than that applicable at the time of the original agreement?

                  10.

                  In the light of the requirement for pre-contractual information (Articles 4 and 5 of Directive [93/13]), is the term providing for a waiver of the right to take legal action not to be treated as a secondary and ancillary matter from the point of view of its documentation (Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Directive [93/13])?

                  11.

                  Do the validity of the relaxation of terms that are likely to be void and the waiver of the right to take legal action to obtain a declaration that those terms are void and ineffective run counter to the deterrent effect vis-à-vis the seller or supplier making the offer (Article 7 of Directive [93/13] and judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others, C-154/15 (2))?

                  12.

                  Can a contractual term that is likely to be void because it is unfair under Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 93/13 bind the consumer to whom it applies when the banking institution uses a procedure whereby it agrees with the customer, after the contract containing the term in question has been concluded, that the seller or supplier will refrain from applying the unfair term in return for some other consideration from the consumer? In other words, is the void term rendered effective by the agreement with the consumer to replace it with another term which is more favourable to him? Could an agreement of this kind be contrary to Article 6(1) of Directive [93/13]?

                  13.

                  Is conduct on the part of a banking institution such as that described in the statement of facts caught by the prohibition of unfair behaviour and unfair commercial practices in dealings with consumers which is contained in recital 14 and Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2005/29? (3)

         (1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

         (2)  Judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others, C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15, EU:C:2016:980.

         (3)  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).


title: Case C-151/19 P: Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-684/14: Krka v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/29

      Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-684/14: Krka v Commission
      (Case C-151/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/27)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Mongin, F. Castilla Contreras, C. Vollrath, Agents, D. Bailey, Barrister)

         Other party to the proceedings: Krka Tovarna Zdravil d.d.

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside points 1 to 4 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union in Case T-684/14;

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union pursuant to Article 61 of the Statute;

                  —

                  order Krka to pay the Commission’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The first plea alleges that the General Court erred in law in holding that Krka was not a source of competitive pressure on Servier at the time of the agreements in question.
      The second plea alleges errors of law by the General Court in assessing the content and objectives of the licence agreement as an incentive for Krka to accept the restrictions of the settlement agreement.
      The third plea alleges errors of law in the application of the concept of restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.
      The fourth plea alleges errors of law in the General Court’s analysis of the parties' intentions for the purposes of applying Article 101 TFEU.
      The fifth plea alleges that the General Court erred in law by taking into account the pro-competitive effects of the licence in markets that are not within the scope of the infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU found by the Decision.
      The sixth plea alleges that the General Court erred in law in assessing the object of the assignment agreement.
      The seventh plea alleges General Court erred in law in the application of the concept of the restriction of competition by effect within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.


title: Case C-164/19 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Niche Generics Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-701/14: Niche Generics v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/31

      Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Niche Generics Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-701/14: Niche Generics v Commission
      (Case C-164/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/29)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Niche Generics Ltd (represented by: F. Carlin, Barrister, M. Healy, Solicitor, B. Hoorelbeke, advocaat, S. Mobley, Solicitor, H. Sheraton, Solicitor, A. Robertson QC)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  Annul the Contested Judgment in its entirety;

                  —

                  Annul the Contested Decision in its entirety in so far its relates to Niche; and

                  —

                  Order the Commission to pay its own costs and Niche's costs in connection with these proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      Niche submits the General Court erred in law:

                  —

                  First, the General Court erred in law by not applying the objective necessity test in BAT.

                  —

                  Second, in the event that settlement agreements fall within Art. 101 TFEU, the General Court erred in law by mischaracterising Niche's settlement agreement as a ‘by object’ violation.

                  —

                  Third, the General Court infringed Art. 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice duty to state reasons when it rejected Niche's interpretation of the settlement agreement without addressing its legal arguments.

                  —

                  Fourth, the General Court erred in law by concluding Niche was a potential competitor to Servier.

                  —

                  Fifth, the General Court infringed the fundamental principle of equal treatment by treating Niche differently to similarly situated generics and erroneously characterising Niche's settlement agreement as an Art. 101(1) TFEU ‘by object’ violation.

                  —

                  Sixth, the General Court erred in law by not recognising that the settlement agreement satisfies the exemption criteria under Art.101(3) TFEU.

                  —

                  Seventh, the General Court erred in law by misapplying the legal test for determining a breach of Niche's rights of defence and/or the principle of sound administration.

                  —

                  Eighth, the General Court infringed the general EU law principle of proportionality by confirming a level of fine that was disproportionate to Niche's financial means.


title: Case C-166/19 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Unichem Laboratories Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-705/14: Unichem Laboratories v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/33

      Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Unichem Laboratories Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-705/14: Unichem Laboratories v Commission
      (Case C-166/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/31)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Unichem Laboratories Ltd (represented by: F. Carlin, Barrister, M. Healy, Solicitor, B. Hoorelbeke, advocaat, S. Mobley, Solicitor, H. Sheraton, Solicitor, A. Robertson QC)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  Annul the Contested Judgment in its entirety;

                  —

                  Annul the Contested Decision in its entirety in so far its relates to Unichem; and

                  —

                  Order the Commission to pay its own costs and Unichem's costs in connection with these proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      Unichem submits the General Court erred in law:

                  —

                  First, the General Court erred in law by concluding the Commission has jurisdiction to address a decision under Art. 101(1) TFEU to Unichem since:
                  The General Court misapplied the legal test for determining a single economic entity; and
                  The General Court wrongly held that Unichem was directly liable as co-signatory of the settlement agreement.

                  —

                  Second, the General Court erred in law by not applying the objective necessity test in BAT.

                  —

                  Third, in the event that settlement agreements fall within Art. 101 TFEU, the General Court erred in law by mischaracterising Niche's settlement agreement as a ‘by object’ violation.

                  —

                  Fourth, the General Court infringed Art. 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice duty to state reasons when it rejected Unichem's interpretation of the settlement agreement without addressing its legal arguments.

                  —

                  Fifth, the General Court erred in law by concluding Niche and Unichem were a potential competitor to Servier.

                  —

                  Sixth, the General Court infringed the fundamental principle of equal treatment by treating Unichem and Niche differently to similarly situated generics and erroneously characterising Niche's settlement agreement as an Art. 101(1) TFEU by object violation.

                  —

                  Seventh, the General Court erred in law by not recognising that the settlement agreement satisfied the exemption criteria under Art.101(3) TFEU.

                  —

                  Eighth, the General Court erred in law by misapplying the legal test for determining a breach of Unichem and Niche's rights of defence and/or the principle of sound administration.


title: Case C-173/19 P: Appeal brought on 25 February 2019 by Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-890/16: Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/34

      Appeal brought on 25 February 2019 by Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH against the order of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-890/16: Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission
      (Case C-173/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/32)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH (represented by: L. Sandberg-Mørch, advokat)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Denmark

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  Set aside the Order of 13 December 2018 of the General Court in Case T-890/16 to the extent that it contradicts the General Court’s judgment in Case T-630/15 as to the nature of the Commission Decision as a confirmatory measure regarding the additional construction measures.

                  —

                  Order the respondent to pay its own costs and the costs of the appellants.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the application, the applicants relie on two pleas in law:

                  —

                  First Plea: the General Court erred in law by adopting the contested order on the basis of a position which is entirely the opposite of that adopted in its judgment in Case T-630/15.

                  —

                  Second Plea: the General Court erred in law by adopting the contested order with a statement of reasons that suffers from internal contradictions.


title: Case C-174/19 P: Appeal brought on 25 February 2019 by Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-630/15: Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/35

      Appeal brought on 25 February 2019 by Scandlines Danmark ApS and Scandlines Deutschland GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-630/15: Scandlines Danmark and Scandlines Deutschland v Commission
      (Case C-174/19 P)
      (2019/C 148/33)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Scandlines Danmark ApS, Scandlines Deutschland GmbH (represented by: L. Sandberg-Mørch, advokat)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Kingdom of Denmark, Föreningen Svensk Sjöfart, Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) eV

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  Set aside the judgment of 13 December 2018 of the General Court in Case T-630/15 to the extent that it dismissed the appellant’s pleas that the measures granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg constitute aid; that the Hinterland Connections costs do not constitute eligible costs for the compatibility of the aid granted to Femern A/S; that the measures granted to Femern A/S do not have an incentive effect; that the counterfactual analysis is unlawful; that the measures granted to Femern A/S do not cause undue distortion of competition; and that the new pleas submitted by the appellant were inadmissible.

                  —

                  Order the respondent to pay its own costs and the costs of the appellant.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellants bring seven pleas in law against the contested judgment:

                  —

                  First, in violation of Articles 107(1) and 108(2) TFEU, the General Court erred by concluding that the Commission did not err in law and did not experience serious difficulties in holding that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg for the Danish rail Hinterland Connections were not liable to distort competition as the relevant market is not open to competition.
                  The appellants argue that this erroneous conclusion of the General Court is based on four errors in law, corresponding to four sub-pleas:

                              a)

                              The General Court erred in law by holding that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg are not liable to affect competition although the Fixed Link (operated by Femern A/S) and the Danish rail Hinterland Connections (operated by Femern Landanlæg) together constitute one integrated project and the State guarantees and State loans granted to Femern A/S have already been found to be liable to distort competition.

                              b)

                              The General Court erred in law by holding that the market for the management of railway infrastructure in Denmark is not ‘de lege’ open to competition.

                              c)

                              The General Court erred in law by holding that the market for the management of railway infrastructure in Denmark is not ‘de facto’ open to competition.

                              d)

                              The markets for the construction and maintenance of the railway infrastructure, which are open to competition, are separate from the market for the management and operation, in the strict sense, of the railway infrastructure

                  —

                  Second, in violation of Articles 107(1) and 108(2) TFEU, the General Court erred by concluding that the Commission did not err in law and did not face serious difficulties in determining that the State guarantees and State loans granted to A/S Femern Landanlæg for financing the Danish rail Hinterland Connections was not liable to affect trade between Member States.

                  —

                  Third, in violation of Article 107(3)(b) and 108(2) TFEU, the General Court erred by concluding that the costs of the Hinterland Connections may be included in the calculation of the maximum permissible aid intensity for the Fixed Link (in the context of the compatibility analysis) although, according to the General Court, the funding granted to the Hinterland Connections does not constitute State aid.

                  —

                  Fourth, in violation of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and Article 108(2) TFEU the General Court erred by concluding that the Commission did not err in law and did not face serious difficulties when deciding that the aid to Femern A/S had an incentive effect;

                  —

                  Fifth, in violation of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and Article 108(2) TFEU the General Court erred by concluding that the Commission did not err in law and did not face serious difficulties when it decided that the Danish authorities had submitted an appropriate counterfactual scenario for its assessment concerning the necessity of the aid.

                  —

                  Sixth, the General Court erred in law by holding that the aid granted to Femern A/S does not cause undue distortions of competition.

                  —

                  Seventh, the General Court erred in law by rejecting the appellant’s introduction of new pleas regarding the Additional Construction Measures on the grounds that they had not been authorized by the Commission Decision of 23 July 2015.


title: Case T-716/14: Judgment of the General Court of 7 March 2019 — Tweedale v EFSA (Access to documents — Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 — Documents relating to toxicity studies conducted in connection with the renewal of the approval of the active substance glyphosate — Partial refusal to grant access — Exception relating to the protection of commercial interests — Overriding public interest — Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 — Concept of information relating to emissions into the environment)

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/40

      Judgment of the General Court of 7 March 2019 — Tweedale v EFSA
      (Case T-716/14) (1)

      (Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Documents relating to toxicity studies conducted in connection with the renewal of the approval of the active substance glyphosate - Partial refusal to grant access - Exception relating to the protection of commercial interests - Overriding public interest - Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 - Concept of information relating to emissions into the environment)
      (2019/C 148/36)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Anthony C. Tweedale (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: B. Kloostra, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (represented by: by D. Detken, J. Tarazona, C. Pintado and B. Vagenende, acting as Agents, assisted initially by R. Van der Hout and A. Köhler, and subsequently by R. Van der Hout and C. Wagner, lawyers)

         Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Sweden (represented initially by A. Falk, C. Meyer-Seitz, U. Persson, N. Otte Widgren, E. Karlsson and L. Swedenborg, and subsequently by A. Falk, C. Meyer-Seitz, H. Shev, L. Swedenborg and F. Bergius, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU for the partial annulment of the EFSA decision of 16 October 2017 annulling and replacing the decision of 30 July 2014 and granting partial access to two toxicity studies on the active substance glyphosate, conducted in connection with the procedure to renew approval of that active substance in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls the decision of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) of 16 October 2017, annulling and replacing the decision of 30 July 2014 and granting partial access to two toxicity studies on the active substance glyphosate, conducted in connection with the procedure to renew approval of that active substance, in so far as EFSA refuses to disclose the whole of those studies, with the exception of the names and signatures of the persons mentioned therein;

                  2.

                     Orders EFSA to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Mr Anthony Tweedale;

                  3.

                     Orders the Kingdom of Sweden to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 448, 15.12.2014.


title: Case T-139/15: Judgment of the General Court of 12 March 2019 — Hungary v Commission (EAGGF — Guarantee Section — EAGF — Sugar — Temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the European Community — Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 — Regulation (EC) No 968/2006 — Expenditure excluded from financing — Expenditure incurred by Hungary — Conditions for the grant of aid for full dismantling and aid for partial dismantling — Concept of ‘production facilities’ — Assessment of the use of silos on the date of submission of the application for aid — Concept of ‘full dismantling’ — Annex 2 to document VI/5330/97 — Difficulties in the interpretation of EU legislation — Cooperation in good faith)

text:
               29.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 148/42

      Judgment of the General Court of 12 March 2019 — Hungary v Commission
      (Case T-139/15) (1)

      (EAGGF - Guarantee Section - EAGF - Sugar - Temporary scheme for the restructuring of the sugar industry in the European Community - Regulation (EC) No 320/2006 - Regulation (EC) No 968/2006 - Expenditure excluded from financing - Expenditure incurred by Hungary - Conditions for the grant of aid for full dismantling and aid for partial dismantling - Concept of ‘production facilities’ - Assessment of the use of silos on the date of submission of the application for aid - Concept of ‘full dismantling’ - Annex 2 to document VI/5330/97 - Difficulties in the interpretation of EU legislation - Cooperation in good faith)
      (2019/C 148/38)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Parties

         Applicant: Hungary (represented by: initially M. Fehér, G. Koós and A. Pálfy, and subsequently M. Fehér, G. Koós, Zs. Biró-Tóth and E. Tóth, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Ondrůšek and B. Béres, acting as Agents)

         Interveners in support of the applicant: French Republic (represented by: D. Colas, acting as Agent), Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, acting as Agent and C. Colelli, avvocato dello Stato)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking partial annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/103 of 16 January 2015 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2015 L 16, p. 33) in so far as it excluded an amount of EUR 11 709 400 from financing, by EAGF, in restructuring aid in the sugar sector granted by Hungary.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Hungary to bear its own costs and to pay half of the costs incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                     Orders the Commission to bear half of its own costs;

                  4.

                     Orders the French Republic and the Italian Republic to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 190, 8.6.2015.


title: Case T-197/19: Action brought on 4 April 2019 — Wiegand-Glashüttenwerke v Commission

text:
               17.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 206/51

      Action brought on 4 April 2019 — Wiegand-Glashüttenwerke v Commission
      (Case T-197/19)
      (2019/C 206/54)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Wiegand-Glashüttenwerke GmbH (Steinbach am Wald, Germany) (represented by: F. Wagner and N. Voß, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

                  —

                  in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use (Großbreitenbach and Schleusingen locations) repay more than 20 % of the published network charges and baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use (Steinbach am Wald location) repay more than 15 % of the published network charges;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders the repayment of more than 20 % of the published network charges for the Steinbach am Wald location; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The application is based on the following grounds.

                  1.

                  Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU
                  In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.
                  In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.
                  It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

                  2.

                  Infringement of the principle of equal treatment
                  In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.
                  In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

                  3.

                  Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
                  In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

         (1)  Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55).


title: Case C-115/19 P: Appeal brought on 14 February 2019 by China Construction Bank Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2018 in Case T-665/17: China Construction Bank v EUIPO

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/2

      Appeal brought on 14 February 2019 by China Construction Bank Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2018 in Case T-665/17: China Construction Bank v EUIPO
      (Case C-115/19 P)
      (2019/C 213/03)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: China Construction Bank Corp. (represented by: A. Carboni, J. Gibbs, Solicitors)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Groupement des cartes bancaires

         Form of order sought

      The Appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court dated 6 December 2018 in Case T-665/17;

                  —

                  give final judgment in respect of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (1) or alternatively that the case be remitted to the General Court, and

                  —

                  order the EUIPO and any intervening parties in this appeal to bear their own costs and pay the Appellant’s costs of these proceedings and those of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-665/17.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The Appellant has three grounds of appeal in respect of the contested decision, which are that the General Court:

                  1.

                  infringed Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR; and

                  2.

                  failed to state reasons for its finding that the intervener's earlier mark relied on (‘earlier mark’) had enhanced distinctive character in relation to ‘financial affairs, monetary affairs, banking’, and/or

                  3.

                  distorted the facts both in relation to its assessment of the earlier mark and the opposed mark and in reaching the said finding of enhanced distinctive character.

            The Appellant’s plea of infringement of Article 8(1)(b) can be further sub-divided into the following errors made by the General Court in its assessment of the case:

                  1.

                  the General Court took account of the reputation of the earlier mark at the first stage of assessing the similarity of the marks, as well as when conducting the global assessment of likelihood of confusion, which was an incorrect approach and resulted in impermissible ‘double counting’;

                  2.

                  the General Court wrongly treated both the earlier mark and opposed mark as if they were essentially word marks, paying insufficient regard to their figurative nature, which adversely affected the assessment of both the visual and the aural similarities of the marks in issue and the relative weight to be given to each;

                  3.

                  the General Court made a number of errors in relation to identifying the services in class 36 for which it held that the earlier mark had a reputation and thus distinctive character, and

                  4.

                  both as a result of the foregoing errors and as a result of ignoring additional important factors, the General Court failed to conduct a proper global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the earlier mark and the opposed mark.

         (1)  Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017, L 154, p. 1).


title: Case C-116/19 P: Appeal brought on 14 February 2019 by Gregor Schneider against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 4 December 2018 in Case T-560/16, Gregor Schneider v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/4

      Appeal brought on 14 February 2019 by Gregor Schneider against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 4 December 2018 in Case T-560/16, Gregor Schneider v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)
      (Case C-116/19 P)
      (2019/C 213/04)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Gregor Schneider (represented by: H. Tettenborn, Rechtsanwalt)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property office (EUIPO)

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  1.

                  set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Fourth Chamber) of 4 December 2018 in Case T-560/16;

                  2.

                  rule in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant in those proceedings, that is,
                  annul the decision of EUIPO (then: OHIM) of 2 October 2014, according to which the applicant was transferred from the International Cooperation and Legal Affairs Department to the Operations Department;
                  in the alternative: refer the case back to the General Court of the EU after setting aside the abovementioned judgment;

                  3.

                  order EUIPO to pay the costs of all of the proceedings — that is, the proceedings before the General Court of the EU and the appeal proceedings before the Court of Justice of the EU.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on nine grounds of appeal.
      First, in the judgment under appeal, the General Court misinterpreted the ‘rule of correspondence’ between the complaint within the meaning of Article 91(2) of the Staff Regulations and the subsequent action, since it rejected as inadmissible, by reference to the correspondence principle, a plea in law which the applicant, at the time of submitting the complaint, was not at all in a position to put forward in the absence of an allocation of tasks that has still not been made.
      Second, the General Court erred in law by misinterpreting the criteria for the assessment of whether there has been a misuse of powers, in so far as it set out the legal principle that, where a reassignment measure has not been deemed to be contrary to the interests of the service, there can be no question of a misuse of powers. That legal principle cannot be correct because it would, in principle, exclude from misuse of powers cases all situations in which the administration puts forward a plausible interest of the service, without actually pursuing that interest. It is precisely the cases of intelligently construed misuse of powers that should not generally be deprived of judicial review through a legal principle thus formulated.
      Third, the General Court erred in law in misinterpreting the requirements for a hearing that is guaranteed by the applicant’s right to be heard, which is also laid down in Article 41(1) in conjunction with Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in so far as it considers a hearing necessary only where a targeted individual measure could, in the authority’s view, adversely affect the person concerned. A hearing and the granting of the right to be heard should, however, serve precisely to bring to light points of view and effects of intended decisions that the authority itself has not yet considered.
      Fourth, the General Court repeatedly infringed the applicant’s right to be heard, in so far as it, inter alia, ignored the further evidence produced in the oral part of the procedure in accordance with Article 85(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court and failed to address the corresponding proposal of witnesses or take a decision under Article 85(4) of the Rules of Procedure. The General Court also infringed the applicant’s right to be heard because it did not hear the witnesses already proposed in the application and at the same time reproaches the applicant for failing to provide evidence.
      Fifth, the General Court thereby also fails to observe fundamental principles that ensure a fair hearing under the rule of law for the purposes of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and casts doubt on the effectiveness of judicial protection.
      Sixth, the General Court repeatedly distorted the facts before it.
      Seventh, the General Court failed to clarify the facts; eighth, failed to state reasons; and, ninth, disregarded the rules of logic.


title: Case C-299/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Torino (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2019 — Techbau SpA v Azienda Sanitaria Locale AL

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/16

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Torino (Italy) lodged on 11 April 2019 — Techbau SpA v Azienda Sanitaria Locale AL
      (Case C-299/19)
      (2019/C 213/15)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale ordinario di Torino

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Techbau SpA

         Defendant: Azienda Sanitaria Locale AL

         Question referred

      Does Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/35/EC (1) preclude a national provision, such as Article 2(1)(a) of Legislative Decree No 231 of 9 October 2002, which excludes works contracts, whether public or private, and specifically public works contracts within the meaning of Directive 93/37/EEC, (2) from the concept of ‘commercial transaction’ — defined as contracts that ‘lead, exclusively or primarily, to the delivery of goods or the provision of services in exchange for remuneration’ — and therefore from the scope of that directive?

         (1)  Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (OJ 2000 L 200, p. 35).

         (2)  Council Directive 93/37/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ 1993 L 199, p. 54).


title: Case C-305/19: Action brought on 12 April 2019 — European Commission v Czech Republic

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/17

      Action brought on 12 April 2019 — European Commission v Czech Republic
      (Case C-305/19)
      (2019/C 213/16)
      Language of the case: Czech

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: P. Ondrůšek, K. Talabér-Ritz, Agents)

         Defendant: Czech Republic

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare that, by failing to ensure that in buildings with a total useful floor area of over 500m2, for which an energy performance certificate has been issued under Article 12(1) of Directive 2010/31/EU (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings, and which are frequently visited by the public, the energy performance certificates must be displayed, the Czech Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13(2) of that directive;

                  —

                  order the Czech Republic to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

                  1.

                  Article 13(2) of Directive 2010/31/EU provides for the obligation to display the energy performance certificate, issued in accordance with Article 12(1) of the Directive, in cases where a building with a useful floor area of over 500m2 is frequently visited by the public.

                  2.

                  However, Czech law (§ 7a zákon č. 406/2000 Sb., o hospodaření energií, ve znění pozdějších předpisů (Paragraph 7a of Law No 406/2000 on the management of energy, as amended)) provides for the obligation to display an energy performance certificate, or energy performance passport, for those buildings only where they are occupied by public authorities. Czech law thus does not provide for the obligation to display an energy performance passport in situations where those buildings are occupied by bodies other than public authorities, and are frequently visited by the public. The legislation required is still merely at the preparatory stage.

                  3.

                  The Czech Republic has therefore not ensured that, in buildings with a total useful floor area of over 500m2 for which an energy performance certificate has been issued under Article 12(1) of the directive, and which are frequently visited by the public, the energy performance certificate must be displayed, and thus it has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 13(2) of the Directive.

         (1)  OJ 2010 L 153, p. 13.


title: Case C-704/17: Order of the President of the Court of 8 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud — Czech Republic) — D. H. v Ministerstvo vnitra

text:
               1.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 220/28

      Order of the President of the Court of 8 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud — Czech Republic) — D. H. v Ministerstvo vnitra
      (Case C-704/17) (1)

      (2019/C 220/34)
      Language of the case: Czech
      The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 83, 5.3.2018.


title: Case T-791/16: Judgment of the General Court of 22 May 2019 — Real Madrid Club de Fútbol v Commission (State aid — Aid granted by the Spanish authorities to a professional football club — Settlement aimed atcompensating for a failure to carry out a land transfer initially agreed between a city council and a football club — Football club overcompensated — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Advantage)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/27

      Judgment of the General Court of 22 May 2019 — Real Madrid Club de Fútbol v Commission
      (Case T-791/16) (1)

      (State aid - Aid granted by the Spanish authorities to a professional football club - Settlement aimed atcompensating for a failure to carry out a land transfer initially agreed between a city council and a football club - Football club overcompensated - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market - Advantage)
      (2019/C 230/33)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicant: Real Madrid Club de Fútbol (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J. Pérez-Bustamante Köster and F. Löwhagen, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P.-J. Loewenthal, G. Luengo and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2393 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.33754 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF (OJ 2016 L 358, p. 3).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2016/2393 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.33754 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) implemented by Spain for Real Madrid CF;

                  2.

                     Declares that the European Commission is to bear its own costs and orders it to pay the costs incurred by Real Madrid Club de Fútbol.

         (1)  OJ C 243, 4.7.2016.


title: Case T-37/17: Judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2019 — Bank Tejarat v Council (Non-contractual liability — Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds — Restriction on admission to the territory of the Member States — Compensation for the damage allegedly sustained by the applicant following its inclusion and re-inclusion in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue — Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/29

      Judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2019 — Bank Tejarat v Council
      (Case T-37/17) (1)

      (Non-contractual liability - Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures against Iran - Freezing of funds - Restriction on admission to the territory of the Member States - Compensation for the damage allegedly sustained by the applicant following its inclusion and re-inclusion in the list of persons and entities subject to the restrictive measures at issue - Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals)
      (2019/C 230/35)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Bank Tejarat (Tehran, Iran) (represented by: S. Zaiwalla, P. Reddy, K. Mittal, A. Meskarian, Solicitors, T. Otty QC, R. Blakeley, V. Zaiwalla, H. Leith, Barristers, and T. de la Mare QC)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bishop and A. Vitro, Agents)

         Intervener in support of the defendant: European Commission (represented by: L. Havas and J. Norris, Agents)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 268 TFEU for compensation for the damage allegedly sustained by the applicant as a result of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 54/2012 of 23 January 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 1), Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 (OJ 2012 L 208, p. 2).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Bank Tejarat to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;

                  3.

                     Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


title: Case T-107/17: Judgment of the General Court of 23 May 2019 — Steinhoff and Others v ECB (Non-contractual liability — Economic and monetary policy — ECB — National central banks — Restructuring of the Greek public debt — Involvement of the private sector — Collective action clauses — Mandatory exchange of Greek bonds — Private creditors — Opinion of the ECB — Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals — Principle of pacta sunt servanda — Article 17(1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights — Article 63(1) TFEU — Article 124 TFUE)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/30

      Judgment of the General Court of 23 May 2019 — Steinhoff and Others v ECB
      (Case T-107/17) (1)

      (Non-contractual liability - Economic and monetary policy - ECB - National central banks - Restructuring of the Greek public debt - Involvement of the private sector - Collective action clauses - Mandatory exchange of Greek bonds - Private creditors - Opinion of the ECB - Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals - Principle of pacta sunt servanda - Article 17(1) and (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - Article 63(1) TFEU - Article 124 TFUE)
      (2019/C 230/36)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicants: Frank Steinhoff (Hamburg, Germany), Ewald Filbry, (Dortmund, Germany), Vereinigte Raiffeisenbanken Gräfenberg-Forchheim-Eschenau-Heroldsberg eG (Gräfenberg, Germany), Werner Bäcker (Rodgau, Germany), EMB Consulting SE (Mühltal, Germany) (represented by: O. Hoepner and D. Unrau, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Central Bank (ECB) (represented by: O. Heinz and G. Várhelyi, acting as Agents, and H.-G. Kamann, lawyer)

         Re:

      Application on the basis of Article 268 TFEU seeking restitution of the loss allegedly suffered by the applicants due to the fact that the ECB failed, in its Opinion of 17 February 2012 (CON/2012/12), to draw the attention of the Republic of Greece to the unlawful nature of the proposed restructuring of the Greek public debt by a mandatory exchange of bonds.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Mr Frank Steinhoff, Mr Ewald Filbry, Vereinigte Raiffeisenbanken Gräfenberg-Forchheim-Eschenau-Heroldsberg eG, Mr Werner Bäcker and EMB Consulting SE to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


title: Case T-728/17: Judgment of the General Court of 14 May 2019 — Marinvest and Porting v Commission (State aid — Pleasure port infrastructure — Concession for the management of a port and the provision of infrastructures and services without economic consideration — Decision finding that there is no State aid — Effect on trade between Member States)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/30

      Judgment of the General Court of 14 May 2019 — Marinvest and Porting v Commission
      (Case T-728/17) (1)

      (State aid - Pleasure port infrastructure - Concession for the management of a port and the provision of infrastructures and services without economic consideration - Decision finding that there is no State aid - Effect on trade between Member States)
      (2019/C 230/37)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicants: Marinvest d.o.o. (Izola, Slovenia) and Porting d.o.o. (Izola) (represented by: G. Cecovini Amigoni and L. Daniele, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Stancanelli, S. Noë and D. Recchia, acting as Agents)

         Interveners in support of the defendant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: initially T. Henze and R. Kanitz, and subsequently R. Kanitz, acting as Agents), Javno podjetje komunala Izola d.o.o. (Izola, Slovenia) (represented by: A. Mužina, lawyer)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission decision C(2017) 5049 final of 20 July 2017 on State aid SA.45220 (2016/FC) — Slovenia — Alleged aid in favour of Komunala Izola d.o.o.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders Marinvest d.o.o. and Porting d.o.o. to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                     Orders the Federal Republic of Germany and Javno podjetje komunala Izola d.o.o. to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 22, 22.1.2018.


title: Case T-733/17: Judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2019 — GMPO v Commission (Medicinal products for human use — Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 — Definition of ‘significant benefit’ — Availability of orphan medicinal products — Article 5(12)(b) of Regulation No 141/2000 — Commission decision to remove a medicinal product from the Register of Orphan Medicinal Products — Error of assessment — Error of law — Legitimate expectations)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/31

      Judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2019 — GMPO v Commission
      (Case T-733/17) (1)

      (Medicinal products for human use - Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 - Definition of ‘significant benefit’ - Availability of orphan medicinal products - Article 5(12)(b) of Regulation No 141/2000 - Commission decision to remove a medicinal product from the Register of Orphan Medicinal Products - Error of assessment - Error of law - Legitimate expectations)
      (2019/C 230/38)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: GMP-Orphan (GMPO) (Paris, France) (represented by: M. Demetriou QC, E. Mackenzie, Barrister, L. Tsang and J. Mulryne, Solicitors)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: K. Petersen and A. Sipos, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking the partial annulment of Commission Implementing Decision C(2017) 6102 final of 5 September 2017 granting marketing authorisation under Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council for ‘Cuprior-trientine’, a medicinal product for human use, in so far as the Commission decided, in Article 5 of that decision, that that medicinal product no longer satisfied the criteria laid down in Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products (OJ 2000 L 18, p. 1) to be registered as an orphan medicinal product and that the European Union Register of Orphan Medicinal Products should be updated accordingly.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders GMP-Orphan (GMPO) to pay the costs, including those incurred in the proceedings for interim measures.

         (1)  OJ C 13, 15.1.2018.


title: Case T-751/17: Judgment of the General Court of 14 May 2019 — Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission (Access to documents — Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 — Letter sent by the Commission to the French authorities regarding the protocol for the compensation of the EDF Group in respect of the repeal of the permit to operate the Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant — Refusal of access — Exception relating to the protection of the commercial interests of a third party — Exception relating to the protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits — General presumption of confidentiality — Overriding public interest)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/32

      Judgment of the General Court of 14 May 2019 — Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission
      (Case T-751/17) (1)

      (Access to documents - Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 - Letter sent by the Commission to the French authorities regarding the protocol for the compensation of the EDF Group in respect of the repeal of the permit to operate the Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant - Refusal of access - Exception relating to the protection of the commercial interests of a third party - Exception relating to the protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits - General presumption of confidentiality - Overriding public interest)
      (2019/C 230/39)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicants: Commune de Fessenheim (France), Communauté de communes Pays Rhin-Brisach (Volgelsheim, France), Conseil départemental du Haut-Rhin (Colmar, France), Conseil régional Grand Est Alsace Champagne-Ardenne Lorraine (Strasbourg, France) (represented by: G. de Rubercy, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: A. Buchet and B. Stromsky, acting as Agents)

         Intervener in support of the defendant: French Republic (represented by: E. de Moustier, B. Fodda and J.-L. Carré, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the Commission Decision of 18 October 2017 refusing access to the letter which it sent to the French authorities on 22 March 2017 regarding the draft protocol for the compensation of the Électricité de France (EDF) Group in respect of the closure of the Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders the Commune de Fessenheim, the communauté de communes Pays Rhin-Brisach, the conseil départemental du Haut-Rhin and the conseil régional Grand Est Alsace Champagne-Ardenne Lorraine to bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                     Orders the French Republic to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 32, 29.1.2018.