title: Case C-644/16: Order of the President of the Fourth Chamber of the Court of 23 January 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden — Netherlands) — Synthon BV v Astellas Pharma Inc.

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/18

         Order of the President of the Fourth Chamber of the Court of 23 January 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden — Netherlands) — Synthon BV v Astellas Pharma Inc.
   (Case C-644/16) (1)

   (2018/C 190/28)
   Language of the case: Dutch
   The President of the Fourth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


201805250281897282018/C 200/135802016CJC20020180611EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180419111111Case C-580/16: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 19 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — Firma Hans Bühler KG v Finanzamt Graz-Stadt (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Place of intra-Community acquisition — Article 42 — Intra-Community acquisition of goods that are the object of a subsequent supply — Article 141 — Exemption — Triangular transaction — Simplification measures — Article 265 — Correction of recapitulative statement)
 ---documentbreak--- C2002018EN1110120180419EN0013111111Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 19 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — Firma Hans Bühler KG v Finanzamt Graz-Stadt
   (Case C-580/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Place of intra-Community acquisition — Article 42 — Intra-Community acquisition of goods that are the object of a subsequent supply — Article 141 — Exemption — Triangular transaction — Simplification measures — Article 265 — Correction of recapitulative statement)’2018/C 200/13Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Verwaltungsgerichtshof

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Firma Hans Bühler KG

      Defendant: Finanzamt Graz-Stadt

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Article 141(c) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2010/45/EU of 13 July 2010, must be interpreted as meaning that the requirement laid down in that provision is met where the taxable person is resident and identified for value added tax (VAT) purposes in the Member State from which the goods are dispatched or transported, but that that taxable person uses the VAT identification number of another Member State for that specific intra-Community acquisition.

            2.

            Articles 42 and 265 of Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2010/45, read in conjunction with Article 263 of Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2010/45, must be interpreted as precluding the tax authorities of a Member State from applying the first paragraph of Article 41 of Directive 2006/112 solely on the ground that, in the context of an intra-Community acquisition, made for the purposes of a subsequent supply in the territory of a Member State, the recapitulative statement, referred to in Article 265 of Directive 2006/112, as amended by Directive 2010/45, was not submitted in good time by the taxable person identified for value added tax (VAT) purposes in that Member State.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.


201806010221917442018/C 211/151772018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180307121321Case C-177/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 7 March 2018 — Almudena Baldonedo Martín v Ayuntamiento de Madrid
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1210120180307EN0015121132Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo de Madrid (Spain) lodged on 7 March 2018 — Almudena Baldonedo Martín v Ayuntamiento de Madrid
   (Case C-177/18)2018/C 211/15Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo de Madrid

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Almudena Baldonedo Martín

      Defendant: Ayuntamiento de Madrid

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is it correct to interpret Clause 4 of the framework agreement as meaning that a situation such as that described in the present case, in which an interim civil servant carries out the same work as a career civil servant (who is not entitled to an allowance because the situation that would warrant it does not exist under the legal regime applicable to him) is not consistent with the situation described in that clause?

            2.

            Given that the right to equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination constitute a general EU principle enshrined in a directive (in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the light of fundamental social rights [within the meaning of] Articles 151 and 153 TFEU, is it consistent with the framework agreement annexed to Directive 1999/70/EC (
                  1
               ) to interpret [Clause 4], in such a way as to achieve its objectives, as meaning that the right of an interim civil servant to receive an allowance may be established either by comparison with a temporary contract worker, since his status (as a civil servant or as a contract worker) is determined exclusively by the public-sector employer, or by the direct vertical application to which EU primary law is open?

            3.

            Taking into account the existence, if any, of improper use of temporary appointments to meet permanent staffing needs for no objective reason and in a manner inconsistent with the urgent and pressing need that warrants recourse to them, and for want of any effective penalties or limits in Spanish national law, would it be consistent with the objectives pursued by Directive 1999/70/EC to grant, as a means of preventing abuse and eliminating the consequence of infringing EU law, an allowance comparable to that for unfair dismissal, that is to say, one that serves as an adequate, proportional, effective and dissuasive penalty, in circumstances where an employer does not offer a worker a permanent post?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43).


201806010341917452018/C 211/222702018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180419181811Case C-270/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 19 April 2018 — UPM France v Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1810120180419EN0022181181Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 19 April 2018 — UPM France v Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics
   (Case C-270/18)2018/C 211/22Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Conseil d’État

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: UPM France

      Respondent: Premier ministre, Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes publics

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must […] Article 21[(5), third subparagraph] of Directive [2003/96] (
                  1
               ) be interpreted as meaning that the tax exemption which that provision allows Member States to grant to small producers of electricity, provided that they tax the energy products used for the production of that electricity, may apply in circumstances such as those described in paragraph 7 of the present decision for the period prior to 1 January 2011 during which France, as was permitted by the directive, had not yet introduced domestic tax on final consumption of electricity or, accordingly, the exemption of small producers from that tax?

            2.

            If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, how must […] Article 14[(1)(a)] and […] Article 21[(5), third subparagraph] of Directive 2003/96 be combined as regards small producers which consume the electricity that they produce for the purposes of their business? Specifically, do those Articles require that there be a minimal level of taxation resulting from either (i) the electricity produced being taxed and the natural gas used being exempted from tax, or (ii) the production of electricity being exempt from tax and the State then being required to tax the natural gas used?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ 2003 L 283, p. 51).


201806010391917342018/C 211/08912017CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804266722Joined Cases C-91/17 P and C-92/17 P: Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 April 2018 — Cellnex Telecom SA, formerly Abertis Telecom SA, Telecom Castilla-La Mancha SA v European Commission, SES Astra (Appeal — State Aid — Digital television — Aid for the extension of digital terrestrial television to the remote and less urbanised areas of the Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla-La Mancha (Autonomous Community of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain) — Grant in favour of operators of digital terrestrial television platforms — Decision declaring the aid measures to be partially incompatible with the internal market — Concept of ‘State Aid’ — Advantage — Service of general economic interest — Definition — Margin of discretion of the Member States)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN620120180426EN00086272Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 April 2018 — Cellnex Telecom SA, formerly Abertis Telecom SA, Telecom Castilla-La Mancha SA v European Commission, SES Astra
   (Joined Cases C-91/17 P and C-92/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — State Aid — Digital television — Aid for the extension of digital terrestrial television to the remote and less urbanised areas of the Comunidad Autónoma de Castilla-La Mancha (Autonomous Community of Castilla-La Mancha, Spain) — Grant in favour of operators of digital terrestrial television platforms — Decision declaring the aid measures to be partially incompatible with the internal market — Concept of ‘State Aid’ — Advantage — Service of general economic interest — Definition — Margin of discretion of the Member States)’2018/C 211/08Language of the cases: Spanish
      Parties

      Appellants: Cellnex Telecom SA, formerly Abertis Telecom SA, Telecom Castilla-La Mancha SA (represented by: J. Buendía Sierra and A. Lamadrid de Pablo, abogados)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: E. Gippini Fournier, B. Stromsky and P. Němečková, acting as Agents), SES Astra (represented by: F. González Díaz and V. Romero Algarra, abogados)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeals;

            2.

            Orders Cellnex Telecom SA and Telecom Castilla-La Mancha SA to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


201806010241917422018/C 211/161862018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180309131421Case C-186/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 9 March 2018 — José Cánovas Pardo, S.L. v Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1310120180309EN0016131142Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 9 March 2018 — José Cánovas Pardo, S.L. v Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas
   (Case C-186/18)2018/C 211/16Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Supremo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: José Cánovas Pardo, S.L.

      Respondent: Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is an interpretation according to which, provided that the period of three years has elapsed, since the holder, once Community protection of the plant variety right was granted, became aware of the infringing act and the identity of the infringer, the actions provided for under Articles 94 and 95 of the Regulation would be time-barred, although the infringing acts were continuing until the time the action was brought, contrary to Article 96 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94? (
                  1
               )

            2.

            If the first question is answered in the negative, is it to be considered that, in accordance with Article 96 of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, the limitation period operates only in respect of infringing acts committed outside the three-year period, but not in respect of those taking place within the last three years?

            3.

            If the answer to the second question is in the affirmative, in such a situation could the action for an injunction and also for damages succeed only in relation to those latter acts taking place within the last three years?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1).


201806010061915562018/C 211/292002018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180320232311Case T-200/18: Action brought on 20 March 2018 — Fersher Developments and Lisin v Commission and ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2310120180320EN0029231231Action brought on 20 March 2018 — Fersher Developments and Lisin v Commission and ECB
   (Case T-200/18)2018/C 211/29Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Fersher Developments LTD (Nicosia, Cyprus) and Vladimir Lisin (represented by: R. Nowinski, Barrister)

      Defendants: European Commission and European Central Bank

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            order the European Union to make good the damage suffered by the Applicants as a result of the adoption and application of the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality in the amounts as stated in the application or such amount as the Court finds to be due to the Applicants;

            —

            order the European Union to legal costs incurred in the bringing of this Application.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law which are in essence identical or similar to those relied on in Case T-161/15, Brinkmann (Steel Trading) and Others v Commission and ECB.


201806010401917412018/C 211/09972017CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804267711Case C-97/17: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 26 April 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Protection of nature — Directive 2009/147/EC — Conservation of wild birds — Special Protection Area (SPA) — Classification as SPAs of the most suitable territories in number and size for the conservation of the bird species listed in Annex I to Directive 2009/147 — Important Bird Area (IBA) — IBA Rila — Partial classification of IBA Rila as an SPA)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN710120180426EN00097171Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 26 April 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria
   (Case C-97/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Protection of nature — Directive 2009/147/EC — Conservation of wild birds — Special Protection Area (SPA) — Classification as SPAs of the most suitable territories in number and size for the conservation of the bird species listed in Annex I to Directive 2009/147 — Important Bird Area (IBA) — IBA Rila — Partial classification of IBA Rila as an SPA)’2018/C 211/09Language of the case: Bulgarian
      Parties

      Applicant: European Commission (represented by: P. Mihaylova and C. Hermes, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: Republic of Bulgaria (represented by: E. Petranova and L. Zaharieva, acting as Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Declares that, by failing to include the entire Important Bird Area covering the Rila Mountains as a Special Protection Area, the Republic of Bulgaria did not classify as SPAs the most suitable territories in number and size for the conservation of the species listed in Annex I to Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on wild birds, so that that Member State failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(1) of that directive.

            2.

            Orders the Republic of Bulgaria to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 121, 18.4.2017.


201806010371917332018/C 211/171932018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180319141521Case C-193/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Google LLC v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1410120180319EN0017141152Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) lodged on 19 March 2018 — Google LLC v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
   (Case C-193/18)2018/C 211/17Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Google LLC

      Defendant: Bundesrepublik Deutschland

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must the criterion of ‘a service … which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks’ in Article 2(c) of Framework Directive 2002/21/EC (
                  1
               ) be interpreted as meaning that it also includes, or may also include, web-based email services which are supplied over the open internet and do not themselves provide internet access?

                     (a)

                     Must that criterion be interpreted as meaning, in particular, that the electronic processing service which the provider of such an email service supplies via its email server, by assigning to the email addresses the IP addresses of the physical connections involved and uploading the emails, broken down into data packets, to the open internet, or — conversely — receiving them from there, on the basis of various protocols in the internet protocol suite, is itself to be regarded as a ‘conveyance of signals’, or is it only the transmission of those data packets over the internet by Internet (Access) Providers which constitutes a ‘conveyance of signals’?

                     (b)

                     Must that criterion be interpreted as meaning, in particular, that the transmission of the email, broken down into data packets, over the open internet by Internet (Access) Providers is attributable to the provider of such an email service, with the result that, to this extent, the provider in question also supplies a service consisting in the ‘conveyance of signals’? If so, under what conditions may such transmission be so attributed?

                     (c)

                     In the event that the provider of such an email service either conveys signals itself or the conveyance of signals by Internet (Access) Providers is in any event attributable to it, can that criterion be interpreted as meaning, in particular, that such an email service, irrespective of any additional functions of the service, such as the editing, storage and organisation of emails or the management of contact details, and irrespective of the technical effort expended by the provider in connection with individual functions, also consists ‘wholly or mainly’ in the conveyance of signals, given that, if that service is considered in functional terms from the point of view of users, it is its communication function which stands at the forefront?

            2.

            In the event that the criterion referred to in Question 1 is to be interpreted as meaning that it does not, in principle, include web-based email services which are supplied over the open internet and do not themselves provide internet access, is that criterion nonetheless capable, exceptionally, of being fulfilled where the provider of such an email service simultaneously operates a number of its own internet-connected electronic communications networks which can in any event be used, inter alia, for the purposes of the email service? If so, under which conditions is this possible?

            3.

            How is the criterion ‘normally provided for remuneration’, laid down in Article 2(c) of Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, to be interpreted?

                     (a)

                     In particular, does that criterion require the payment of a fee by users or can the remuneration also consist in the provision by users of another form of consideration in the financial interests of the service provider, as, for example, in the case where users actively make available personal or other data or where such data is otherwise captured by the service provider while the service is being used?

                     (b)

                     In particular, does that criterion necessarily require the remuneration to be paid by the person to whom the service is also provided or may it also be sufficient for the service to be financed in part or in full by third parties, such as, for example, through advertising on the service provider’s website?

                     (c)

                     In particular, does the word ‘normally’ refer in this context to the circumstances in which the provider of a specific service supplies that service or to the circumstances in which identical or comparable services are generally supplied?

      (
         1
      )	Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33).


201806010071915472018/C 211/302082018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180323232422Case T-208/18: Action brought on 23 March 2018 — Nessim Daoud and Others v Council and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2320120180323EN0030232242Action brought on 23 March 2018 — Nessim Daoud and Others v Council and Others
   (Case T-208/18)2018/C 211/30Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Magdy Milad Nessim Daoud (Blainville, Canada), Larsennar Ltd (Tortola, British Virgin Islands) and Maxim Zakharchenko (Nicosia, Cyprus) (represented by: A. Markides, M. Ioannides, C. Velaris and C. Velaris, lawyers, A. Robertson, QC and G. Rothschild, barrister)

      Defendants: Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Central Bank, Eurogroup (represented by the Council of the European Union) and European Union (represented by the European Commission)

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            order the defendants to pay the applicants the sums shown in the schedule annexed to the application plus interest accruing from 26 March 2013 until the judgment of the Court;

      or in the alternative:

            —

            declare that the defendants have incurred non-contractual liability and determine the procedure to be followed in order to establish the actual recoverable loss suffered by the applicants;

      and in any event:

            —

            order that the defendants pay the applicants’ costs of the application.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on two pleas in law which are in essence identical or similar to those relied on in Case T-147/18, APG Intercon and Others v Council and Others.


201806010261917492018/C 211/182052018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180320151511Case C-205/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Pitești (Romania) lodged on 20 March 2018 — Maria-Cristina Dospinescu, Filofteia-Camelia Ganea, Petre Sinca, Luminița-Maria Ioniță, Maria Burduv and Raluca-Marinela Trașcă v Spitalul Județean de Urgență Vâlcea
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1510120180320EN0018151151Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Pitești (Romania) lodged on 20 March 2018 — Maria-Cristina Dospinescu, Filofteia-Camelia Ganea, Petre Sinca, Luminița-Maria Ioniță, Maria Burduv and Raluca-Marinela Trașcă v Spitalul Județean de Urgență Vâlcea
   (Case C-205/18)2018/C 211/18Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Curtea de Apel Pitești

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Maria-Cristina Dospinescu, Filofteia-Camelia Ganea, Petre Sinca, Luminița-Maria Ioniță, Maria Burduv and Raluca-Marinela Trașcă

      Respondent: Spitalul Județean de Urgență Vâlcea

      Question referred

   Must Articles 114(3), 151 and 153 TFEU, read in conjunction with Framework Directive 89/391/EEC (
         1
      ) and the subsequent specific directives, be interpreted as precluding a Member State from introducing time limits and procedures which deny people access to justice for the purposes of having their workplaces classified as characterised by special conditions, with the result that newly-hired workers’ rights to safety and health at work, deriving from the assessment of those conditions in accordance with national legislation, are not recognised?
   (
         1
      )	Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work (OJ 1989 L 183, p. 1).


201806010131915522018/C 211/23472016TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503191911Case T-47/16: Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Sigma Orionis SA v REA (Arbitration clause — ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’ — Suspension of payments under a grant agreement following a financial audit — Action seeking to obtain payment of the amounts owed by the REA in the context of the implementation of a grant agreement)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1910120180503EN0023191191Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Sigma Orionis SA v REA
   (Case T-47/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Arbitration clause — ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’ — Suspension of payments under a grant agreement following a financial audit — Action seeking to obtain payment of the amounts owed by the REA in the context of the implementation of a grant agreement)’2018/C 211/23Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Sigma Orionis SA (Valbonne, France) (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

      Defendant: Research Executive Agency (REA) (represented by: S. Payan-Lagrou and V. Canetti, acting as Agents, assisted by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action under Article 272 TFEU seeking an order directing the REA to pay to the applicant amounts due under a grant agreement concluded in the context of ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sigma Orionis SA to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 98, 14.3.2016.


201806010301917522018/C 211/192332018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180329161611Case C-233/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidshof te Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Zubair Haqbin v Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1610120180329EN0019161161Request for a preliminary ruling from the Arbeidshof te Brussel (Belgium) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Zubair Haqbin v Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers
   (Case C-233/18)2018/C 211/19Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Arbeidshof te Brussel

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Zubair Haqbin

      Defendant: Federaal Agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 20(1) to (3) of [Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection] (
                  1
               ) be interpreted as enumerating exhaustively the cases in which material reception conditions may be reduced or withdrawn, or does it follow from Article 20(4) and (5) thereof that withdrawal of the right to material reception conditions may also occur by means of sanctions for serious breaches of the rules relating to reception centres and serious acts of violence?

            2.

            Must Article 20(5) and (6) [of Directive 2013/33] be interpreted as meaning that Member States, before taking a decision on the reduction or withdrawal of material reception conditions or on the imposition of sanctions, must, in the context of those decisions, lay down the measures necessary for guaranteeing the right to a dignified standard of living during the period of exclusion, or can those provisions be complied with by a system whereby, after the decision to reduce or withdraw the material reception conditions, an examination is carried out as to whether the person who is the subject of the decision enjoys a dignified living standard and, if necessary, remedial measures are taken at that point?

            3.

            Must Article 20(4) to (6) of Directive 2013/33, read in conjunction with Articles 14, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a measure or sanction of temporary (or definitive) exclusion from the right to material reception conditions is possible, or impossible, in respect of a minor, specifically in respect of an unaccompanied minor?

      (
         1
      )	Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 96).


201806010361917382018/C 211/10662018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201802017822Case C-66/18: Action brought on 1 February 2018 — European Commission v Hungary
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN720120180201EN00107282Action brought on 1 February 2018 — European Commission v Hungary
   (Case C-66/18)2018/C 211/10Language of the case: Hungarian
      Parties

      Applicant: European Commission (represented by: V. Di Bucci, L. Malferrari, B. De Meester and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: Hungary

      Form of order sought

   The Commission claims that the Court of Justice should declare that Hungary has failed to fulfil:

            —

            its obligations arising from Article XVII of the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) by requiring foreign higher education institutions situated outside the EEA to conclude an international agreement as a prerequisite for providing education services, pursuant to Article 76(1)(a) of Law CCIV of 2011, as amended;

            —

            its obligations arising from Article 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC (
                  1
               ) and, in any event, from Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU as well as from Article XVII of the GATS, by requiring foreign higher education institutions to offer higher education in their country of origin, pursuant to Article 76(1)(b) of Law CCIV of 2011, as amended;

            —

            its obligations arising from Articles 13, 14(3) and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in relation to the restrictions described above; and that the Court should

            —

            order Hungary to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The legal basis for the provision of higher education services in Hungary is Law CCIV of 2011 on national higher education, Article 76(1)(a) of which provides that a foreign higher education institution may carry out on the territory of Hungary an education activity leading to a degree only if the Hungarian Government and the Government of the State in which the foreign higher education institution is located have agreed to be bound by an international agreement relating to support in principle given to the institution to carry out an activity in Hungary, an agreement that, in the case of a federal State, is based on a previous agreement concluded with the central Government when it does not have competence to agree to be bound by an international agreement.
   Furthermore, Article 76(1)(b) of Law CCIV of 2011 provides that foreign higher education institutions which carry out an activity in Hungary not only must be higher education institutions recognised by the State in the country in which they are located, but also must genuinely offer higher education in the country concerned.
   On 27 April 2017, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Hungary in relation to Law CCIV of 2011, as amended.
   As it did not consider the response presented by Hungary to be satisfactory, the Commission, on 14 July 2017, sent to Hungary a reasoned opinion, thereby moving to the next phase of infringement proceedings.
   Taking the view that the response to the reasoned opinion was also unsatisfactory, the Commission decided to refer the case to the Court of Justice for a declaration that Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations arising from Article XVII of the GATS, Article 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC, Articles 49 TFEU and 56 TFEU, and Articles 13, 14(3) and 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).


201806010251917472018/C 211/202422018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180405161722Case C-242/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven administrativen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 5 April 2018 — ‘UniCredit Leasing’ EAD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’ — Sofia pri Tsentralno upravlenie na NAP
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1620120180405EN0020162172Request for a preliminary ruling from the Varhoven administrativen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 5 April 2018 — ‘UniCredit Leasing’ EAD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’ — Sofia pri Tsentralno upravlenie na NAP
   (Case C-242/18)2018/C 211/20Language of the case: Bulgarian
      Referring court

   Varhoven administrativen sad

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant in cassation:‘UniCredit Leasing’ EAD

      Respondent in cassation: Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’ — Sofia pri Tsentralno upravlenie na NAP

      Questions referred

            1.

            In the event of termination of a financial leasing agreement, does the provision contained in Article 90(1) of Directive 2006/112/EC (
                  1
               ) on the common system of VAT allow the taxable amount to be reduced and the VAT to be refunded where the VAT
                  has been established by way of a definitive tax assessment notice
                on the basis of a taxable amount consisting of the sum of the monthly leasing instalments due throughout the term of the agreement?

            2.

            If the first question is answered in the affirmative: in the event of termination of a leasing agreement on account of partial non-payment of the leasing instalments owed, on which of the situations referred to in Article 90(1) of the directive can the lessor rely as against a Member State in order to have the taxable amount for VAT purposes reduced to the extent of the instalments that were owed but not paid in respect of the period from the cessation of payments to the time of termination of the agreement, in the case where the termination is not retroactive and this is confirmed by a clause in the agreement itself?

            3.

            Does the interpretation of Article 90(2) of the VAT Directive permit the conclusion that a situation such as that at issue here involves a derogation from Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive?

            4.

            Does the interpretation of Article 90(1) of the VAT Directive permit the assumption that the term ‘refusal’ used in that provision includes the situation where, in the context of a financial leasing agreement with definite transfer of ownership, the lessor may no longer demand payment of the leasing instalments from the lessee because he has terminated the leasing agreement on account of non-fulfilment of that agreement by the lessee, but is entitled, under that agreement, to compensation in the amount of all the unpaid leasing instalments that would have fallen due up to the end of the term of the lease?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.


201806010411917392018/C 211/11782018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201802068921Case C-78/18: Action brought on 6 February 2018 — European Commission v Hungary
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN810120180206EN00118192Action brought on 6 February 2018 — European Commission v Hungary
   (Case C-78/18)2018/C 211/11Language of the case: Hungarian
      Parties

      Applicant: European Commission (represented by: V. Di Bucci, L. Malferrari and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: Hungary

      Form of order sought

   The Commission claims that the Court of Justice should:

            —

            Declare that Hungary, by introducing discriminatorily, unnecessarily and without justification restrictions on foreign grants to Hungarian civil organisations through the a külföldről támogatott szervezetek átláthatóságáról szóló 2017. évi LXXVI. törvény (Law LXXVI of 2017, on the transparency of organisations that receive financial support from abroad), the provisions of which impose obligations of registration, declaration and transparency on certain categories of civil organisations—those that receive direct or indirect foreign financial support exceeding a specified amount —and also make it possible for penalties to be imposed on organisations that do not fulfil such obligations, has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

            —

            Order Hungary to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   Law LXXVI of 2017, on the transparency of organisations that receive financial support from abroad, imposes new obligations of registration, declaration, transparency and publicity on certain categories of civil organisations—those that receive direct or indirect foreign financial support exceeding a specified amount—and also makes it possible for penalties to be imposed on organisations that do not fulfil such obligations.
   On 14 July 2017, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Hungary in relation to Law LXXVI of 2017.
   Finding that the response provided by Hungary was unsatisfactory, the Commission moved to the next phase of infringement proceedings and, on 5 October 2017, sent Hungary a reasoned opinion.
   Finding that the response to the reasoned opinion was not satisfactory either, the Commission decided to refer the case to Court of Justice for a declaration that Hungary had failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 63 TFEU and Articles 7, 8 and 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.


201806010291917512018/C 211/022332016CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804262321Case C-233/16: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Generalitat de Catalunya (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regional tax on large retail establishments — Freedom of establishment — Protection of the environment and town and country planning — State aid — Selective measure — Letter from the Commission stating that no further action will be taken on a complaint — Existing aid)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN210120180426EN00022132Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Generalitat de Catalunya
   (Case C-233/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regional tax on large retail establishments — Freedom of establishment — Protection of the environment and town and country planning — State aid — Selective measure — Letter from the Commission stating that no further action will be taken on a complaint — Existing aid)’2018/C 211/02Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Supremo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED)

      Respondent: Generalitat de Catalunya

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Articles 49 and 54 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a tax levied on large retail establishments, such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

            2.

            A tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings imposed on large retail establishments according, in essence, to their sales area does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU to the extent that it exempts establishments whose sales area is less than 2500 m2. Nor, in so far as that tax exempts establishments which pursue the business of a garden centre or of selling vehicles, construction materials, machinery or industrial supplies or reduces by 60 % the tax base of establishments selling furniture, sanitary ware and doors and windows and those that are do-it-yourself stores, does it constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, provided that those establishments do not have as significant an adverse effect on the environment and on town and country planning as the others, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.
            Such a tax does, however, constitute State aid within the meaning of that provision, to the extent that it exempts collective large retail establishments with a surface area equal to or greater than 2500 m2.

            3.

            In circumstances such as those described by the referring court, State aid resulting from a tax regime such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot constitute existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, the wording of which is reproduced in Article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 260, 18.7.2016.


201806010041915502018/C 211/24482016TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503192022Case T-48/16: Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Sigma Orionis v Commission (Arbitration clause — Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (2007-2013) and ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’ — Suspension of payments and termination of grant contracts following a financial audit — Action seeking to obtain payment of the amounts owed by the Commission in the context of the implementation of the grant contracts — Non-contractual liability)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1920120180503EN0024192202Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Sigma Orionis v Commission
   (Case T-48/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Arbitration clause — Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (2007-2013) and ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’ — Suspension of payments and termination of grant contracts following a financial audit — Action seeking to obtain payment of the amounts owed by the Commission in the context of the implementation of the grant contracts — Non-contractual liability)’2018/C 211/24Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Sigma Orionis SA (Valbonne, France) (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: F. Dintilhac and M. Siekierzyńska, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   First, an action under Article 272 TFEU seeking an order directing the Commission to pay to the applicant the amounts owed pursuant to contracts concluded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (2007-2013) and ‘Horizon 2020 — the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation’ and, second, an action under Article 268 TFEU seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the applicant as a result of the breach by the Commission of its obligations.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sigma Orionis SA to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 98, 14.3.2016.


201806010271917432018/C 211/212542018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180412171821Case C-254/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 12 April 2018 — Syndicat des cadres de la sécurité intérieure v Premier ministre, Ministre d’État, Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes public
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1710120180412EN0021171182Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 12 April 2018 — Syndicat des cadres de la sécurité intérieure v Premier ministre, Ministre d’État, Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes public
   (Case C-254/18)2018/C 211/21Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Conseil d’État

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Syndicat des cadres de la sécurité intérieure

      Defendants: Premier ministre, Ministre d’État, Ministre de l’Intérieur, Ministre de l’Action et des Comptes public

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Articles 6 and 16 of Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (
                  1
               ) be interpreted as imposing a reference period determined on a rolling basis or as allowing Member States to choose whether to employ a rolling or fixed reference period?

            2.

            If those provisions are to be interpreted as requiring a rolling reference period, may the possibility afforded by Article 17 to derogate from Article 16(b) relate not only to the duration of the reference period but also to the requirement for a rolling period?

      (
         1
      )	Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9).


201806010421917352018/C 211/121392018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL2018022191021Case C-139/18 P: Appeal brought on 21 February 2018 by CJ against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2017 in Case T-602/16: CJ v European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN910120180221EN001291102Appeal brought on 21 February 2018 by CJ against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2017 in Case T-602/16: CJ v European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)
   (Case C-139/18 P)2018/C 211/12Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: CJ (represented by: V. Kolias, Δικηγόρος)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2017 in Case T-602/16 CJ v ECDC (EU:T:2017:893) in whole;

            —

            consequently, in the event that the appeal is declared well founded, annul the contested appraisal report of 21 September 2015;

            —

            order the ECDC to pay all costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on four pleas in law:

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the General Court:

                     —

                     misinterpreted Article 3(1), read in conjunction with Article 3(3), of the ECDC Implementing Rule No 20 to determine that the appeal assessor need not be the Chairman of the Management Board in cases such as the instant case,

                     —

                     erred in legally classifying the facts when it held that the Chairman of the Management Board was in any case unlikely to find in favour of the appellant,

                     —

                     misinterpreted the argument according to which a subordinate to the reporting officer cannot be the appeal assessor, because he lacks the necessary independence from the reporting officer.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court:

                     —

                     misinterpreted Articles 7(1), 8(3) and (4) of the ECDC Implementing Rule No 20 to determine that objectives and performance indicators set for a servant during the previous appraisal period may be disregarded by the reporting officer,

                     —

                     subsidiarily, erred in legally classifying the facts when it found that objectives and performance indicators had been duly considered by the reporting officer.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the General Court:

                     —

                     misinterpreted the notion of ‘dialogue’ under Article 8(9) of the ECDC Implementing Rule,

                     —

                     subsidiarily erred in law in legally classifying an appraisal ‘dialogue’ as one that can be limited, on the part of ECDC, to the countersigning officer asking a servant for a document already available to her; addressing, from her mobile telephone, to the servant the question ‘Which aspects of the performance assessment do you consider as false?’; and not asking any further question, after a servant replies in substance and offers to give her any further, more specific information she may require.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the General Court:

                     —

                     misinterpreted Article 22a of the Staff Regulations when it found, essentially, that, even where a servant alleges, in tempore non suspecto, financial mismanagement, offers at least the beginning of proof thereof, and those allegations are true, an agency is right to have his yearly performance appraised by the very persons his allegations implicate,

                     —

                     subsidiarily, erred in law in legally classifying the appellant’s allegations as ones that were neither made in tempore non suspecto nor were true or supported by evidence and that the officers implicated by the allegations were still capable of neutrally assessing the appellant’s performance.


201806010161915582018/C 211/251682016TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503202011Case T-168/16: Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Grizzly Tools v Commission (Protection of the health and safety of consumers and workers — Directive 2006/42/EC — Safeguard clause — National measure of withdrawal from the market and prohibition of placing on the market of a pressure washer — Commission decision declaring the measure justified — Obligation to state reasons — Equal treatment)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2010120180503EN0025201201Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Grizzly Tools v Commission
   (Case T-168/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Protection of the health and safety of consumers and workers — Directive 2006/42/EC — Safeguard clause — National measure of withdrawal from the market and prohibition of placing on the market of a pressure washer — Commission decision declaring the measure justified — Obligation to state reasons — Equal treatment)’2018/C 211/25Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Grizzly Tools GmbH & Co.KG (Großostheim, Germany) (represented by: H. Fischer, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Zavvos and K. Petersen, subsequently by K. Petersen, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/175 of 8 February 2016 on a measure taken by Spain pursuant to Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, to prohibit the placing on the market of a type of pressure washer (OJ 2016 L 33, p. 12).

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Grizzly Tools GmbH & Co.KG is ordered to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 270, 25.7.2016.


201806010111915512018/C 211/312142018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180327242521Case T-214/18: Action brought on 27 March 2018 — Briois v Parliament
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2410120180327EN0031241252Action brought on 27 March 2018 — Briois v Parliament
   (Case T-214/18)2018/C 211/31Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Steeve Briois (Hénin-Beaumont, France) (represented by: F. Wagner, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Parliament

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the decision of the European Parliament of 6 February 2018 on the application for the waiver of immunity of Steeve Briois 2017/2221 (IMM) adopting the Report of the Legal Affairs Committee A8-0011/2018;

            —

            order the European Parliament to pay to Steeve Briois the sum of EUR 35000 as compensation for non-material damage suffered;

            —

            order the European Parliament to pay to Steeve Briois the sum of EUR 5000 in respect of recoverable expenses;

            —

            order the European Parliament to pay all costs in the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8 of Protocol (No 7) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union (‘the protocol’), inasmuch as the statement of Mr Briois that gave rise to criminal proceedings in his Member State of origin is an opinion expressed in the performance of his parliamentary duties within the meaning of that provision.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 9 of the protocol, in that the Parliament misconstrued both the spirit and the letter of that provision by adopting the decision to waive Mr Briois’s immunity and thus rendered that decision invalid.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration.
            In the first place, the applicant submits that the Parliament infringed the principle of equality by treating him differently from other Members of the European Parliament in situations that were at least comparable, if not identical, and consequently the Parliament also infringed the principle of sound administration, which establishes an obligation for the competent institution to assess carefully and impartially all the relevant considerations in the case in question.
            In the second place, the applicant claims that there is a body of evidence allowing a clear case of fumus persecutionis against him to be established.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence, inasmuch as the rights of the applicant and the principle that the parties should be heard were not sufficiently guaranteed by the exchange of arguments before the Legal Affairs Committee. The applicant therefore submits that the fact that he was not invited to set out his views at a plenary session on the waiver of his immunity was not only contrary to the general principles of law but also at variance with common sense and the majority of parliamentary practices.


201806010151915572018/C 211/264282017TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180502212111Case T-428/17: Judgment of the General Court of 2 May 2018 — Alpine Welten Die Bergführer v EUIPO (ALPINEWELTEN Die Bergführer) (EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark ALPINEWELTEN Die Bergführer — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2110120180502EN0026211211Judgment of the General Court of 2 May 2018 — Alpine Welten Die Bergführer v EUIPO (ALPINEWELTEN Die Bergführer)
   (Case T-428/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark ALPINEWELTEN Die Bergführer — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 211/26Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Alpine Welten Die Bergführer GmbH & Co. KG (Berghülen, Germany) (represented by: T.-C. Leisenberg, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: W. Schramek and A. Söder, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 April 2017 (Case R 1339/2016-1), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign ALPINEWELTEN Die Bergführer as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Alpine Welten Die Bergführer GmbH & Co.KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 277, 21.8.2017.


201806010141915532018/C 211/322152018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180327252621Case T-215/18: Action brought on 27 March 2018 — QB v ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2510120180327EN0032251262Action brought on 27 March 2018 — QB v ECB
   (Case T-215/18)2018/C 211/32Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: QB (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Central Bank

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare the present action admissible and well founded;

      and consequently,

            —

            annul the staff report for 2016 and the decision of 23 May 2017, notified on 28 June 2017, refusing the applicant the benefit of a salary progression;

            —

            in so far as necessary, annul the decision of September 2017 and the implicit decision rejecting, respectively, the applicant’s administrative appeal and claim;

            —

            order the defendant to pay damages in respect of the non-pecuniary harm valued ex aequo et bono at EUR 15000;

            —

            order the defendant to pay all the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of the appraisal procedure set out in the Annual Salary and Bonus Review guidelines (‘ASBR guidelines’), of the principle of legal certainty and of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff, committed by the defendant in adopting the staff report for 2016 (‘the contested staff report’). The applicant raises the following complaints in particular:

                     —

                     the contested staff report was drafted by a member of staff of DG-H rather than by the assessors;

                     —

                     the contested staff report was adopted even though the applicant’s appraisal exercise had already been definitively closed;

                     —

                     the appraisal period relating to the contested staff report was too short to form the basis of an annual appraisal;

                     —

                     the contested staff report does not constitute a performance tool.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging manifest error in the contested staff report since, first, the appraisal is in part based on a task which was not completed on account of sick leave and, secondly, positive appraisal from an extraneous manager was reduced in scope and was not correctly taken into account by the assessors, who also failed to take account of the relevant objectives.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the decision of 23 May 2017 refusing the applicant the benefit of a salary progression (‘the ASBR decision’) is based on an unlawful staff report.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the ASBR decision was adopted by a non-competent authority since it was adopted by a person who had been temporarily appointed for 6 months and did not have the status required to adopt that decision.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging a number of manifest errors in the ASBR decision since, at the time of its adoption, that decision was not able to establish underperformance.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the ASBR guidelines, the ASBR procedure and Article 41 of the Charter, in so far as the ASBR decision lacks any statement of reasons.


201806010331917482018/C 211/032342016CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804263311Joined Cases C-234/16 and C-235/16: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Consejería de Economía y Hacienda del Principado de Asturias (C-234/16), Consejo de Gobierno del Principado de Asturias (C-235/16) (References for a preliminary ruling — Regional tax on large retail establishments — Freedom of establishment — Protection of the environment and town and country planning — State aid — Selective measure)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN310120180426EN00033131Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Consejería de Economía y Hacienda del Principado de Asturias (C-234/16), Consejo de Gobierno del Principado de Asturias (C-235/16)
   (Joined Cases C-234/16 and C-235/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(References for a preliminary ruling — Regional tax on large retail establishments — Freedom of establishment — Protection of the environment and town and country planning — State aid — Selective measure)’2018/C 211/03Language of the cases: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Supremo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED)

      Respondents: Consejería de Economía y Hacienda del Principado de Asturias (C-234/16), Consejo de Gobierno del Principado de Asturias (C-235/16)

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Articles 49 and 54 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a tax levied on large retail establishments, such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

            2.

            A tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings imposed on large distribution establishments according, in essence, to their display and sales area does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU to the extent that it exempts establishments whose sales area is less than 4000 m2. Nor, in so far as that tax exempts establishments which pursue the business of a garden centre or of selling vehicles, construction materials, machinery or industrial supplies and whose sales area does not exceed 10000 m2, does it constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, provided that those establishments do not have as significant an adverse effect on the environment and on town and country planning as the others, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 260, 18.7.2016.


201806010231917402018/C 211/131672018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180302111111Case C-167/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Canarias (Spain) lodged on 2 March 2018 — Unión Insular de CC.OO. de Lanzarote v Swissport Spain Aviation Services Lanzarote, S.L.
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1110120180302EN0013111111Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Canarias (Spain) lodged on 2 March 2018 — Unión Insular de CC.OO. de Lanzarote v Swissport Spain Aviation Services Lanzarote, S.L.
   (Case C-167/18)2018/C 211/13Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Canarias

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant at first instance and appellant at second instance: Unión Insular de CC.OO. de Lanzarote

      Defendant at first instance and respondent at second instance: Swissport Spain Aviation Services Lanzarote, S.L.

      Questions referred

            1.

            Does Article 1(1) of Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses (
                  1
               ) apply when an undertaking ceases to hold the contract for the service it is engaged to provide for a client as a result of termination of the contract for the provision of the service, in a labour-intensive business (cleaning of facilities), and the new holder of the contract for the services takes over the majority of the employees assigned to the performance of that service, when those employment contracts are taken over in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement on employment in the cleaning sector?

            2.

            Is the interpretation of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain), to the effect that a transfer of staff pursuant to the terms of the collective agreement does not constitute a transfer of an undertaking, since it does not satisfy the requirement of voluntary transfer, and that, consequently, Directive 2001/23 does not apply, compatible with that directive (as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union)?

            3.

            May the rules laid down in Directive 2001/23 be considered to mean that, where, in cases involving undertakings in the services sector, the collective agreement for that sector lays down an obligation to take over the employees, this constitutes a transfer of staff and, therefore, a transfer of undertakings within the meaning of the aforementioned directive?

            4.

            Is Article 14 of the Convenio Colectivo de Limpieza de Edificios y Locales de la Provincia de Las Palmas 2012/2014 (Collective Agreement applicable to the Cleaning of Buildings and Premises in the Province of Las Palmas 2012/2014) –– which provides, in cases in which employees are taken over by another undertaking pursuant to the collective agreement, that the employees taken over do not retain either the rights and obligations which they held with the transferor undertaking or the working conditions established by collective agreement –– compatible with Article 3 of Directive 2001/23?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2001 L 82, p. 16.


201806010431917362018/C 211/042362016CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804264411Joined Cases C-236/16 and C-237/16: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Diputación General de Aragón (References for a preliminary ruling — Regional tax on large retail establishments — Freedom of establishment — Protection of the environment and town and country planning — State aid — Selective measure)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN410120180426EN00044141Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo — Spain) — Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED) v Diputación General de Aragón
   (Joined Cases C-236/16 and C-237/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(References for a preliminary ruling — Regional tax on large retail establishments — Freedom of establishment — Protection of the environment and town and country planning — State aid — Selective measure)’2018/C 211/04Language of the cases: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Supremo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Asociación Nacional de Grandes Empresas de Distribución (ANGED)

      Respondent: Diputación General de Aragón

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Articles 49 and 54 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding a tax levied on large retail establishments, such as that at issue in the main proceedings.

            2.

            A tax such as that at issue in the main proceedings imposed on large distribution establishments according, in essence, to their sales area, does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU to the extent that it exempts establishments whose sales area does not exceed 500 m2 and those whose sales area exceeds that threshold but whose basis of assessment does not exceed 2000 m2. Nor, in so far as that tax exempts establishments which pursue the business of selling machinery, vehicles, tools and industrial supplies, construction materials, plumbing materials and doors and windows, for sale only to professionals, fittings for individual, conventional and specialist establishments, and motor vehicles, as well as garden centres and service stations, does it constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, provided that those establishments do not have as significant an adverse effect on the environment and on town and country planning as the others, which it is for the referring court to ascertain.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 260, 18.7.2016.


201806010281917502018/C 211/141762018CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180307111222Case C-176/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 7 March 2018 — Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas v Adolfo Juan Martínez Sanchís
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN1120120180307EN0014112122Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Supremo (Spain) lodged on 7 March 2018 — Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas v Adolfo Juan Martínez Sanchís
   (Case C-176/18)2018/C 211/14Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Supremo

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Club de Variedades Vegetales Protegidas

      Respondent: Adolfo Juan Martínez Sanchís

      Questions referred

            1.

            When a farmer has purchased some plants belonging to a plant variety from a nursery (establishment owned by a third party) and planted them before the grant of the variety right has come into effect, in order for the subsequent activity of that farmer of collecting the successive harvests to be covered by the ius prohibendi in Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, (
                  1
               ) must the requirements under Article 13(3) be satisfied for Article 13(2) to be interpreted as relating to harvested material? Or must Article 13(2) be interpreted as meaning that the activity of harvesting is an act of production or reproduction of the variety which results in ‘harvested material’, whose prohibition by the holder of the plant variety does not require the conditions in Article 13(3) to be satisfied?

            2.

            Is an interpretation to the effect that the cumulative protection scheme covers all of the acts listed in Article 13(2) that refer to ‘harvested material’ and also the harvest itself, or that it covers only acts subsequent to the collection of that harvested material, whether the storage or marketing of that material, compatible with Article 13(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94?

            3.

            In applying the scheme for extending the cumulative protection to ‘harvested material’, provided for in Article 13(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2100/94, in order for the first condition to be satisfied, is it necessary for the purchase of the plants to have taken place after the holder obtained Community protection for the plant variety, or [Or.10] is it sufficient that at that time the plant variety enjoyed provisional protection, as the purchase took place in the period between publication of the application and the grant of the plant variety right coming into effect?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights (OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1).


201806010101915452018/C 211/274292017TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503212222Case T-429/17: Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Laboratoires Majorelle v EUIPO — Jardin Majorelle (LABORATOIRES MAJORELLE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark LABORATOIRES MAJORELLE — Earlier EU word mark MAJORELLE — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Earlier trade marks — Division of the trade mark application — Article 44(6) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 50(6) of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2120120180503EN0027212222Judgment of the General Court of 3 May 2018 — Laboratoires Majorelle v EUIPO — Jardin Majorelle (LABORATOIRES MAJORELLE)
   (Case T-429/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark LABORATOIRES MAJORELLE — Earlier EU word mark MAJORELLE — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Earlier trade marks — Division of the trade mark application — Article 44(6) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 50(6) of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 211/27Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Laboratoires Majorelle (Paris, France) (represented by: G. Odinot, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Jardin Majorelle (Marrakech, Morocco)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 May 2017 (Case R 1238/2016-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Jardin Majorelle and Laboratoires Majorelle.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Laboratoires Majorelle to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 309, 18.9.2017.


201806010351917372018/C 211/053532016CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804244522Case C-353/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) — MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Asylum policy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 4 — Directive 2004/83/EC — Article 2(e) — Eligibility for subsidiary protection — Article 15(b) — Risk of serious harm to the psychological health of the applicant if returned to the country of origin — Person who has been tortured in the country of origin)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN420120180424EN00054252Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 24 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom) — MP v Secretary of State for the Home Department
   (Case C-353/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Asylum policy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 4 — Directive 2004/83/EC — Article 2(e) — Eligibility for subsidiary protection — Article 15(b) — Risk of serious harm to the psychological health of the applicant if returned to the country of origin — Person who has been tortured in the country of origin)’2018/C 211/05Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   Supreme Court of the United Kingdom

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: MP

      Defendant: Secretary of State for the Home Department

      Operative part of the judgment

   Articles 2(e) and 15(b) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, read in the light of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that a third country national who in the past has been tortured by the authorities of his country of origin and no longer faces a risk of being tortured if returned to that country, but whose physical and psychological health could, if so returned, seriously deteriorate, leading to a serious risk of him committing suicide on account of trauma resulting from the torture he was subjected to, is eligible for subsidiary protection if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate care for the physical and mental after-effects of that torture, that being a matter for the national court to determine.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 326, 5.9.2016.


201806010311917532018/C 211/06342017CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804265511Case C-34/17: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) — Ireland) — Eamonn Donnellan v The Revenue Commissioners (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Mutual assistance for the recovery of claims — Directive 2010/24/EU — Article 14 — Right to an effective remedy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 47 — Possibility for the requested authority to refuse recovery assistance on the basis that the claim was not duly notified)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN510120180426EN00065151Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) — Ireland) — Eamonn Donnellan v The Revenue Commissioners
   (Case C-34/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Mutual assistance for the recovery of claims — Directive 2010/24/EU — Article 14 — Right to an effective remedy — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 47 — Possibility for the requested authority to refuse recovery assistance on the basis that the claim was not duly notified)’2018/C 211/06Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   High Court (Ireland)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Eamonn Donnellan

      Defendant: The Revenue Commissioners

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 14(1) and (2) of Council Directive 2010/24/EU of 16 March 2010 concerning mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to taxes, duties and other measures, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding an authority of a Member State from refusing to enforce a request for recovery concerning a claim relating to a fine imposed in another Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, on the ground that the decision imposing that fine was not properly notified to the person concerned before the request for recovery was made to that authority pursuant to that directive.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201806010051915552018/C 211/332162018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180328262721Case T-216/18: Action brought on 28 March 2018 — Pozza v Parliament
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2610120180328EN0033261272Action brought on 28 March 2018 — Pozza v Parliament
   (Case T-216/18)2018/C 211/33Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Geoffray Pozza (Waldbillig, Luxembourg) (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Parliament

      Form of order sought

            —

            Declare and rule:

                     —

                     That the decision not to pay him the expatriation allowance with effect from 1 May 2017 is annulled;

                     —

                     That the Parliament is ordered to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 4(1)(a) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, in that the Parliament made an incorrect interpretation of that provision by adopting the decision not to continue to pay expatriation allowance to the applicant.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging the lack of competence of the Parliament to adopt the contested decision, since the interinstitutional transfer of an official does not constitute a new recruitment and, in consequence, the Parliament cannot use the applicant’s transfer as a pretext to determine, for a second time, his right to the expatriation allowance.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of legitimate expectations and of the earlier decision of the Court of Auditors determining the applicant’s rights, since any administrative act adopted by an institution enjoys a presumption of legality and since, in the present case, the earlier decision of the Court of Auditors gave right to legitimate expectations on the part of the applicant that he would receive the expatriation allowance for as long as he continued to be posted to Luxembourg.


201806010381917462018/C 211/07812017CJC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804266611Case C-81/17: Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Suceava — Romania) — Zabrus Siret SRL v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Iași — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Suceava (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Directive 2006/112/EC — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Deduction of input tax — Right to a refund of VAT — Transactions relating to a tax period that has already been the subject of a tax inspection which has concluded — National legislation — Possibility for the taxable person to correct tax returns which have already been covered by a tax inspection — Precluded — Principle of effectiveness — Fiscal neutrality — Legal certainty)
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN610120180426EN00076161Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 26 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Suceava — Romania) — Zabrus Siret SRL v Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Iași — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Suceava
   (Case C-81/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Directive 2006/112/EC — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Deduction of input tax — Right to a refund of VAT — Transactions relating to a tax period that has already been the subject of a tax inspection which has concluded — National legislation — Possibility for the taxable person to correct tax returns which have already been covered by a tax inspection — Precluded — Principle of effectiveness — Fiscal neutrality — Legal certainty)’2018/C 211/07Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Curtea de Apel Suceava

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Zabrus Siret SRL

      Defendant: Direcția Generală Regională a Finanțelor Publice Iași — Administrația Județeană a Finanțelor Publice Suceava

      Operative part of the judgment

   Articles 167, 168, 179, 180 and 182 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Directive 2010/45/EU of 13 July 2010, and the principles of effectiveness, fiscal neutrality and proportionality must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, by way of derogation from the five-year limitation period imposed by national law for the correction of value added tax (VAT) returns, prevents, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, a taxable person from making such a correction in order to claim his right of deduction on the sole ground that that correction relates to a period that has already been the subject of a tax inspection.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 161, 22.5.2017.


201806010091915462018/C 211/342172018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180328272711Case T-217/18: Action brought on 28 March 2018 — DK v EEAS
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2710120180328EN0034271271Action brought on 28 March 2018 — DK v EEAS
   (Case T-217/18)2018/C 211/34Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: DK (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

      Defendant: European External Action Service

      Form of order sought

            —

            Declare and rule:

                     —

                     That the decision of 23 May 2017 imposing a disciplinary penalty on the applicant, by which the net amount of his old-age pension is reduced by 20 %, namely a retention of EUR 1015 per month, until 30 September 2025 under Article 9(2) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations is annulled;

                     —

                     In the alternative, that the EEAS is ordered to pay the applicant a sum set ex aequo et bono to make good the loss suffered;

                     —

                     That, in any event, the EEAS is ordered to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment vitiating the contested decision, in that, firstly, the Appointing Authority took account of damage to the integrity of the institutions caused by the applicant which had already been remedied and, secondly, the duration of the disciplinary penalty imposed is arbitrary as it has been set by reference to the legal retirement age of the applicant.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging an infringement of the principle of proportionality vitiating the contested decision by reason of the unlawful failure to take account of the amount of time that has elapsed since the facts occurred, of the infringement of Article 25 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations during the criminal proceedings and of the applicant’s family situation.


201806010121915542018/C 211/352542018TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180423282921Case T-254/18: Action brought on 23 April 2018 — China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2810120180423EN0035281292Action brought on 23 April 2018 — China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products and Others v Commission
   (Case T-254/18)2018/C 211/35Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (Beijing, China) and 9 others (represented by: R. Antonini, E. Monard and B. Maniatis, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 2018/140 of 29 January 2018 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in the People’s Republic of China and terminating the investigation on imports of certain cast iron articles originating in India (OJ 2018 L 25, p. 6), in so far as it relates to the CCCME, the individual companies and the members concerned; and

            —

            order the Commission to bear the costs of these proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on six pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the European Commission violated Articles 3(2), 3(3), 3(5), 3(6), 3(7) and 17(2) of the basic Regulation and the principle of good administration, inter alia by using unreliable import data, unreliable macroeconomic injury data and unreliable profitability data, and by not allowing other interested parties to comment on the final selection of the sample of Union producers.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated Articles 3(6) and 3(7) of the basic Regulation inter alia by failing to take account of the absence of a coincidence in time and by failing to ensure that injury caused by other factors is not attributed to the Chinese imports.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission violated the rights of defence of the applicants and Articles 6(7), 19(1)-(3), 20(2) and 20(4) of the basic Regulation inter alia by refusing to provide any access whatsoever to the injury calculations, the price effects and injury elimination level calculations and the normal value determination, by even refusing to provide the requested data in the form of an aggregated version, and by failing to disclose various relevant information, despite having been repeatedly requested to do so.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that by failing to take into account all the characteristics of the product control numbers in its price comparison, by failing to provide the necessary information with respect to the product characteristics other than those reflected in the original product control numbers, and by erroneously rejecting the request for adjustment to the normal value address the irregularities resulting from the low volume of production in India, the Commission violated Articles 2(10), 3(2)(a), 3(3) and 9(4) of the basic Regulation and the principle of good administration.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that by making an upward adjustment to the normal value for indirect taxes, the Commission violated Article 2(10)(b) and Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that by relying on data from only one Indian producer for the determination of the selling, general and administrative costs (‘SG&A’) and profit used for the constructed normal value, instead of using all relevant information available with respect to the analogue country, the Commission violated Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation.


201806010081915482018/C 211/366762017TC21120180618EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180416292911Case T-676/17: Order of the General Court of 16 April 2018 — UN v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2112018EN2910120180416EN0036291291Order of the General Court of 16 April 2018 — UN v Commission
   (Case T-676/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 211/36Language of the case: GermanThe President of the Fourth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 402, 27.11.2017.


title: Case C-626/16: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 July 2018 — European Commission v Slovak Republic (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Environment — Landfill of waste — Directive 1999/31/EC — Existing landfill sites — Article 14 — Definite decision on whether or not operations may continue — Article 13 — Closure procedures — Judgment of the Court declaring a failure to fulfil obligations — Non-compliance — Article 260(2) TFEU — Pecuniary penalties — Penalty payment and lump sum)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/4

      Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 July 2018 — European Commission v Slovak Republic
      (Case C-626/16) (1)

      ((Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Environment - Landfill of waste - Directive 1999/31/EC - Existing landfill sites - Article 14 - Definite decision on whether or not operations may continue - Article 13 - Closure procedures - Judgment of the Court declaring a failure to fulfil obligations - Non-compliance - Article 260(2) TFEU - Pecuniary penalties - Penalty payment and lump sum))
      (2018/C 301/04)
      Language of the case: Slovak

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: E. Sanfrutos Cano and A. Tokár, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: Slovak Republic (represented by: B. Ricziová, acting as Agent)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Declares that, by failing to take all the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 25 April 2013, Commission v Slovakia (C-331/11, not published, EU:C:2013:271), the Slovak Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU;

                  2.

                  Orders that if the failure to fulfil obligations established in point 1 has continued until the day of delivery of the present judgment the Slovak Republic must pay the European Commission a penalty payment of EUR 5 000 for each day of delay in implementing the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 25 April 2013, Commission v Slovakia (C-331/11, not published, EU:C:2013:271), from the date of delivery of the present judgment until the judgment of 25 April 2013, Commission v Slovakia (C-331/11, not published, EU:C:2013:271), has been complied with in full;

                  3.

                  Orders the Slovak Republic to pay the European Commission a lump sum of EUR 1 000 000;

                  4.

                  Orders the Slovak Republic to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 78, 13.3.2017.


title: Case C-130/18: Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Düsseldorf — Germany) — flightright GmbH v Eurowings GmbH (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Air transport — Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 — Article 5(1)(c) — Right to compensation in the event of flight cancellation — Re-routing not allowing a passenger to reach his final destination less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival of the cancelled flight — Delay of between two and three hours)

text:
               27.8.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 301/12

      Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 27 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Düsseldorf — Germany) — flightright GmbH v Eurowings GmbH
      (Case C-130/18) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court - Air transport - Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 - Article 5(1)(c) - Right to compensation in the event of flight cancellation - Re-routing not allowing a passenger to reach his final destination less than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival of the cancelled flight - Delay of between two and three hours))
      (2018/C 301/15)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Amtsgericht Düsseldorf

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: flightright GmbH

         Defendant: Eurowings GmbH

         Operative part of the order

      Article 5(1)(c)(iii) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that a passenger who was informed of the cancellation of his flight less than seven days before the scheduled time of departure of that flight has the right to the compensation provided for in that provision where the re-routing offered by the carrier allowed him to reach his final destination more than two hours after the scheduled time of arrival of the cancelled flight, but less than three hours after that scheduled time of arrival.

         (1)  OJ C 182, 28.5.2018.