title: Case T-85/16: Judgment of the General Court of 1 March 2018 — Shoe Branding Europe v EUIPO — adidas (Device of two parallel stripes on a shoe) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark consisting of two parallel stripes on a shoe — Earlier EU figurative mark representing three parallel stripes on a shoe — Relative ground for refusal — Damage to reputation — Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/42

         Judgment of the General Court of 1 March 2018 — Shoe Branding Europe v EUIPO — adidas (Device of two parallel stripes on a shoe)
   (Case T-85/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark consisting of two parallel stripes on a shoe - Earlier EU figurative mark representing three parallel stripes on a shoe - Relative ground for refusal - Damage to reputation - Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 142/54)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Shoe Branding Europe BVBA (Oudenaarde, Belgium) (represented by: J. Løje, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Lukošiūtė, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: adidas AG (Herzogenaurach, Germany) (represented by: I. Fowler and I. Junkar, Solicitors)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 26 November 2015 (Case R 3106/2014-2), relating to opposition proceedings between adidas and Shoe Branding Europe.

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Shoe Branding Europe BVBA to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 136, 18.4.2016.


title: Case T-438/16: Judgment of the General Court of 1 March 2018 — Altunis v EUIPO — Hotel Cipriani (CIPRIANI) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Word mark CIPRIANI — Earlier EU word mark HOTEL CIPRIANI — Genuine use of the earlier mark — Article 42(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of the goods and services — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001))

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/43

         Judgment of the General Court of 1 March 2018 — Altunis v EUIPO — Hotel Cipriani (CIPRIANI)
   (Case T-438/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Word mark CIPRIANI - Earlier EU word mark HOTEL CIPRIANI - Genuine use of the earlier mark - Article 42(2) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the goods and services - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 142/56)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Altunis-Trading, Gestão e Serviços, Lda (Funchal, Portugal) (represented by: A. Vanzetti, S. Bergia and G. Sironi, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Hotel Cipriani Srl (Venice, Italy) (represented initially by P. Cantrill, Solicitor, and B. Brandreth, Barrister, and subsequently by B. Brandreth, A. Poulter and P. Brownlow, Solicitors)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 7 June 2016 (Case R 1889/2015-4), relating to opposition proceedings between Hotel Cipriani and Altunis-Trading, Gestão e Serviços.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Altunis-Trading, Gestão e Serviços, Lda to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 343, 19.9.2016.


title: Case C-301/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 February 2018 — European Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings Ltd (Appeal — Commercial policy — Dumping — Imports of solar glass originating in China — Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 — Article 2(7)(b) and (c) — Market Economy Treatment (MET) — Concept of ‘significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system’, within the meaning of the third indent of Article 2(7)(c) — Tax incentives)

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/4

         Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 February 2018 — European Commission v Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings Ltd
   (Case C-301/16 P) (1)

   ((Appeal - Commercial policy - Dumping - Imports of solar glass originating in China - Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 - Article 2(7)(b) and (c) - Market Economy Treatment (MET) - Concept of ‘significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy system’, within the meaning of the third indent of Article 2(7)(c) - Tax incentives))
   (2018/C 142/05)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Appellant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn and T. Maxian Rusche, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings: Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings Ltd (represented by: Y. Melin and V. Akritidis, avocats)

      Intervener in support of the appellant: GMB Glasmanufaktur Brandenburg GmbH, (represented by: A. Bochon, avocat, and R. MacLean, Solicitor)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 16 March 2016, Xinyi PV Products (Anhui) Holdings v Commission (T 586/14, EU:T:2016:154);

               2.

               Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

               3.

               Reserves the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 270, 25.7.2016.


title: Case C-47/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 26 January 2018 — Skarb Pánstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej — Generalny Dyrektor Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad v Stephan Riel, acting as administrator in the insolvency proceedings concerning the assets of Alpine Bau GmbH

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/29

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Austria) lodged on 26 January 2018 — Skarb Pánstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej — Generalny Dyrektor Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad v Stephan Riel, acting as administrator in the insolvency proceedings concerning the assets of Alpine Bau GmbH
   (Case C-47/18)
   (2018/C 142/39)
   Language of the case: German

      Referring court

   Oberlandesgericht Wien

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Skarb Pánstwa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej — Generalny Dyrektor Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad

      Defendant: Stephan Riel, acting as administrator in the insolvency proceedings concerning the assets of Alpine Bau GmbH

      Questions referred

      Question 1

   Is Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Jurisdiction Regulation 2012) (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an action for a specific declaration in insolvency proceedings (Prüfungsklage) under Austrian law concerns insolvency for the purposes of Article 1(2)(b) of the Jurisdiction Regulation 2012 and is, therefore, excluded from the material scope of that regulation?

      Question 2a (only in the event that Question 1 is answered in the affirmative):

   Is Article 29(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Jurisdiction Regulation 2012) to be applied analogously to related actions falling within the scope of the Insolvency Regulation?

      Question 2b (only in the event that Question 1 is answered in the negative or Question 2a is answered in the affirmative):

   Is Article 29(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Jurisdiction Regulation 2012) to be interpreted as meaning that proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties exist when a creditor (the applicant) who has lodged a (largely) identical claim in the main proceedings in Austria and in the secondary proceedings in Poland, which (in the main) was contested by the respective administrator, brings actions for a declaration of the existence of insolvency claims of a certain amount first in Poland against the administrator acting in the secondary proceedings in that country and then in Austria against the administrator acting in the main proceedings (the defendant)?

      Question 3a:

   Is Article 41 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (the Insolvency Regulation) (2) to be interpreted as meaning that the requirement to indicate the ‘nature of the claim, the date on which it arose and its amount’ is satisfied where, in the lodgement of his claim in the main insolvency, as is the case here, the creditor established in a Member State other than the State of the opening of proceedings (the applicant):

               a)

               describes the claim simply by assigning a specific amount to it without stating the date on which that claim arose (for example, as a ‘claim by the subcontractor JSV Slawomir Kubica in respect of the carrying out of roadworks’);

               b)

               does not state the date on which the claim arose in the claims form itself, but such a date may be inferred from the annexes submitted with that form (for example, on the basis of the date stated on the invoice submitted)?

      Question 3b:

   Is Article 41 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings (the Insolvency Regulation) to be interpreted as not precluding the application of national provisions — for example those relating to the requirement to state the day on which a claim arose — which are more favourable in the particular case to the creditor lodging the claim, who is established in a Member State other than the State of the opening of proceedings?

      (1)  OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1.

      (2)  OJ 2000 L 160, p. 1.


title: Case T-93/18: Action brought on 19 February 2018 — International Skating Union v Commission

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/55

         Action brought on 19 February 2018 — International Skating Union v Commission
   (Case T-93/18)
   (2018/C 142/72)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: International Skating Union (Lausanne, Switzerland) (represented by: J.-F. Bellis, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

               —

               annul the Commission Decision of 8 December 2017 in Case AT.40208 — International Skating Union’s Eligibility rules, and

               —

               order the Commission to bear the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on eight pleas in law.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging that the reasoning on which the Contested Decision rests is vitiated by a fundamental contradiction.

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging that the Applicant’s eligibility rules do not have as their object to restrict competition.

               3.

               Third plea in law, alleging that the Applicant’s eligibility rules do not have as their effect to restrict competition.

               4.

               Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Applicant’s decision not to approve the 2014 Dubai Icederby event falls outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU because this decision pursued a legitimate objective in line with the Applicant’s Code of Ethics which prohibits all forms of support for betting.

               5.

               Fifth plea in law, alleging that in any event, the Applicant’s decision not to approve the 2014 Dubai Icederby event falls outside the territorial scope of Article 101 TFEU.

               6.

               Sixth plea in law, alleging that the claim that the rules of the Court of Arbitration for Sport reinforce the alleged restrictions of competition is groundless.

               7.

               Seventh plea in law, alleging that the Commission exceeded its powers by imposing on the Applicant remedies which bear no relation to a finding of infringement.

               8.

               Eighth plea in law, alleging that the imposition of periodic penalty payments lacks any valid legal basis.


title: Case T-95/18: Action brought on 12 February 2018 — Gollnisch v Parliament

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/55

         Action brought on 12 February 2018 — Gollnisch v Parliament
   (Case T-95/18)
   (2018/C 142/73)
   Language of the case: French

      Parties

      Applicant: Bruno Gollnisch (Villiers-le-Mahieu, France) (represented by: B. Bonnefoy-Claudet, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Parliament

      Forms of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should:

               —

               annul European Parliament Bureau Decision dated 23 October 2017, with the reference PE 610.437/BUR/Decision, as notified by the letter of the President of the European Parliament of 1 December with reference D 318700 and rejecting Mr Gollnisch’s complaint in appeal to the Quaestors against the decision of the Secretary-General;

               —

               annul simultaneously the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament of 1 July 2016, notified on 6 July, that ‘an amount of EUR 275 984,23 was wrongly paid to Mr Bruno Gollnisch’ and ordering the authorising officer responsible and the accounting officer of the institution to recover that amount;

               —

               annul simultaneously the notification and the implementing measures of the aforementioned decision contained in the letter of the Director-General of Finance of 6 July 2016, ref. D 201920;

               —

               annul simultaneously debit note No 2016-914 signed by that Director-General of Finance on 5 July 2016;

               —

               award the applicant the sum of EUR 50 000 in compensation for the non-material damage resulting both from the unfounded accusations made before any conclusion of the investigation, from the harm to his reputation, from the very significant disruption to his personal and political life caused by the contested decision and the considerable amount of work he was forced to devote to those proceedings;

               —

               also award him also the sum of EUR 28 000 by way of costs respect of expenses incurred for fees for the provision of legal advice, the preparation of the present action, photocopying costs and lodging this action and the annexed documents;

               —

               order the European Parliament to pay the full costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas directed specifically against the Bureau’s decision.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging several infringements of essential procedural requirements by the defendant at the time of the adoption of the contested decision. According to the applicant, the procedure leading to the adoption of the contested decision infringes the right of the applicant to have his case heard by an impartial body. The defendant also allegedly infringed his rights of defence. The contested decision is thus based on an incorrect statement by the representative of the Quaestors and its statement of reasons is insufficient in so far as it fails to answer several of the complaints raised by the applicant.

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging distortion of the facts leading to the adoption of the contested decision.

         The applicant also raises the pleas which it has made against the Secretary-General’s decision complained of before the Bureau of the Parliament, in that the latter maintained the contested decision without taking proper account of the arguments put forward by the applicant.

               1.

               First plea, alleging defects in the procedure which led to the adoption of the Secretary-General’s decision, relating to the Secretary-General’s lack of competence, to an infringement of the rights of the defence, to a reversal of the burden of proof, to an inadequate statement of reasons, as well as failure to observe the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.

               2.

               Second plea, alleging an infringement of the civil rights of parliamentary assistants, of the discriminatory treatment of the applicant, of misuse of powers, of infringement of the independence of Members and failure to understand the role of local parliamentary assistants, as well as a failure to observe the principle of proportionality.


title: Case T-104/18: Action brought on 22 February 2018 — Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation v REA

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/57

         Action brought on 22 February 2018 — Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation v REA
   (Case T-104/18)
   (2018/C 142/74)
   Language of the case: Spanish

      Parties

      Applicant: Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation (Donostia-San Sebastián, Spain) (representatives: P. Palacios Pesquera and M. Rius Coma, lawyers)

      Defendant: Research Executive Agency (REA)

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should:

               —

               Declare the application, and the pleas in law contained therein, admissible;

               —

               Uphold the pleas in law put forward in that application and, accordingly, annul the contested decision stating that the repayment of the amounts corresponding to the tasks performed by TECNALIA is not required;

               —

               Order the REA to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The present application has been brought against the outcome of the inter partes financial recovery procedure in respect of the project FP7-SME-2013-605879-FOODWATCH grant agreement. The decision to terminate the FoodWatch grant agreement has its origin in the alleged failure to inform the defendant of the existence of the BreadGuard Project which, in the REA’s view, bore strong similarities to the FoodWatch project in terms of objectives, working methods and expected results.
   In support of its action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

               1.

               The first plea in law, alleging a failure to give reasons for the contested decision because of the failure to take into account the exculpatory evidence highlighted by TECNALIA during the inter partes investigation procedure.

               2.

               The second plea in law, alleging infringement of the content of Annex II to the FoodWatch grant agreement, on account of the defendant’s failure to disclose the identity of the independent experts who endorsed the expert reports on which the contested decision was founded, thereby preventing TECNALIA from challenging those reports.

               3.

               The third plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of fault, on account of the defendant’s failure to take into account the degree of TECNALIA’s involvement in the commission of the facts alleged.

               4.

               The fourth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of legality, given the correct implementation of the projects and the absence, on TECNALIA’s part, of infringement of, or failure to fulfil, the commitments contracted.

               5.

               The fifth plea in law, alleging breach of the principle of proportionality, on account of the failure to take into account the degree of fault on the part of each of the participants in the conduct alleged.


title: Case C-558/16: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 1 March 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin — Germany) — proceedings brought by Doris Margret Lisette Mahnkopf (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Area of freedom, security and justice — Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 — Succession and European Certificate of Succession — Scope — Ability to include the surviving spouse’s share in the European Certificate of Succession)

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/9

         Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 1 March 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Kammergericht Berlin — Germany) — proceedings brought by Doris Margret Lisette Mahnkopf
   (Case C-558/16) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Area of freedom, security and justice - Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 - Succession and European Certificate of Succession - Scope - Ability to include the surviving spouse’s share in the European Certificate of Succession))
   (2018/C 142/12)
   Language of the case: German

      Referring court

   Kammergericht Berlin

      Parties to the main proceedings

   Doris Margret Lisette Mahnkopf

      Other party: Sven Mahnkopf

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prescribes, on the death of one of the spouses, a fixed allocation of the accrued gains by increasing the surviving spouse’s share of the estate falls within the scope of that regulation.

      (1)  OJ C 30, 30.1.2017.


title: Case T-6/17: Judgment of the General Court of 7 March 2018 — Equivalenza Manufactory v EUIPO — ITM Entreprises (BLACK LABEL BY EQUIVALENZA) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark BLACK LABEL BY EQUIVALENZA — Earlier international figurative mark LABELL — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Similarity of signs — Article 8(1)(b), of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/48

         Judgment of the General Court of 7 March 2018 — Equivalenza Manufactory v EUIPO — ITM Entreprises (BLACK LABEL BY EQUIVALENZA)
   (Case T-6/17) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the EU figurative mark BLACK LABEL BY EQUIVALENZA - Earlier international figurative mark LABELL - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of signs - Article 8(1)(b), of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 142/64)
   Language of the case: Spanish

      Parties

      Applicant: Equivalenza Manufactory, SL (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: G. Macías Bonilla, G. Marín Raigal and E. Armero Lavie, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Crespo Carrillo and M. del Mar Baldares, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: ITM Entreprises SAS (Paris, France)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 October 2016 (Case R 690/2016-2) relating to opposition proceedings between ITM Entreprises and Equivalenza Manufactory

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 October 2016 (Case R 690/2016-2);

               2.

               Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by, Equivalenza Manufactory, SL in the proceedings before the General Court.

      (1)  OJ C 63, 27.2.2017.


title: Case C-89/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 8 February 2018 — A v Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/33

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 8 February 2018 — A v Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet
   (Case C-89/18)
   (2018/C 142/44)
   Language of the case: Danish

      Referring court

   Østre Landsret

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: A

      Defendant: Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet

      Questions referred

               1.

               In a case where ‘new restrictions’ have been introduced for family reunification between spouses which prima facie infringe the standstill clause in Article 13 of Decision No 1/80 (Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the development of the Association relating to the Agreement of 12 September 1963 between the European Economic Community and Turkey establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey), and those restrictions are justified on the basis of the considerations of ‘successful integration’ recognised by the EU Court of Justice in its judgment of 12 April 2016 in Case C-561/14, Genc, (1) see also the judgment of 10 July 2014 in Case C-138/13, Dogan, EU:C:2014:2066, (2) can a rule such as Paragraph 9(7) of the Danish Law on aliens (Udlændingeloven) — under which inter alia it is a general condition for family reunification between a person who is a third country national and has a residence permit in Denmark and that person’s spouse that the couple’s attachment to Denmark be greater than to Turkey — be deemed to be ‘justified by an overriding reason in the public interest, … suitable to achieve the legitimate objective pursued and … not [going] beyond what is necessary in order to attain it’?

               2.

               If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, with the result that the attachment requirement is generally deemed to be suitable for ensuring attainment of the integration objective, is it then possible, without infringing the restriction test and the requirement of proportionality:

                           (i)

                           to apply a practice under which, when the spouse with the residence permit in the Member State (the reference person) first came to Denmark at the age of 12-13 or later, in the assessment of the reference person’s attachment to the Member State significant weight is attached to the following: whether the person either has had a long-term lawful period of residence of around 12 years in the Member State or has had a period of residence and stable employment in the Member State involving a significant degree of contact and communication with colleagues and any customers in the Member State’s language, and which has continued without significant interruptions for at least four to five years, or has had a period of residence and stable employment not involving a significant degree of contact and communication with colleagues and customers in the Member State’s language, which has continued without significant interruptions for at least seven to eight years;

                           (ii)

                           to apply a practice under which it will weigh against fulfilment of the attachment requirement where the reference person has maintained a significant attachment to their home country by making frequent or long-term visits to the home country, whilst short-term holiday or educational stays will not weigh against granting a permit;

                           (iii)

                           to apply a practice under which it will weigh heavily against fulfilment of the attachment requirement where there is a so-called ‘married, divorced and remarried’ situation?

      (1)  Judgment of the Court of 12th April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:247.

      (2)  Judgment of the Court of 10th July 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2066.


title: Case C-3/17: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 28 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary)) — Sporting Odds Ltd v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Irányítása (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Freedom to provide services — Article 56 TFEU — Article 4(3) TEU — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Restrictions — Games of chance — National legislation — Operation of certain kinds of games of chance by the State — Exclusivity — Licensing system for other kinds of games of chance — Requirement of a licence — Administrative penalty)

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/11

         Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 28 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary)) — Sporting Odds Ltd v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Irányítása
   (Case C-3/17) (1)

   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Freedom to provide services - Article 56 TFEU - Article 4(3) TEU - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Restrictions - Games of chance - National legislation - Operation of certain kinds of games of chance by the State - Exclusivity - Licensing system for other kinds of games of chance - Requirement of a licence - Administrative penalty))
   (2018/C 142/15)
   Language of the case: Hungarian

      Referring court

   Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Sporting Odds Ltd

      Defendant: Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Központi Irányítása

      Operative part of the judgment

               1.

               Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it does not, in principle, preclude a dual system of organisation of the market for games of chance under which certain types of those games fall with the State monopoly system, while others fall within the system of concessions and licences for the organisation of games of chance, if the referring court establishes that the rules restricting the freedom to provide services do, in fact, pursue the objectives relied on by the Member State concerned in a consistent and systematic manner;

               2.

               Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a national measure, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which the grant of a licence to organise online games of chance is reserved exclusively to operators of games of chance holding a concession for a casino situated on national territory, since that rule does not constitute a condition indispensable to the achievement of the desired objectives, and that there are less restrictive measures which are capable of attaining them;

               3.

               Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which introduces a system of concessions and licences for the organisation of online games of chance, if it contains discriminatory rules with regard to operators established in other Member States or if it lays down rules which are not discriminatory but which are applied in a manner which is not transparent or are implemented in such a way as to prevent or hinder an application from certain tenderers established in other Member States;

               4.

               Article 56 TFEU and Article 4(3) TEU, read in conjunction with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that they do not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which does not provide for the ex officio examination of the proportionality of measures restricting the freedom to provide serves within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU and which puts the burden of proof on the parties to the proceedings;

               5.

               Article 56 TFEU, read in conjunction with Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as meaning that it is for a Member State which has put in place restrictive legislation to provide evidence to prove the existence of objectives capable of justifying a restriction on a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the FEU Treaty and its proportionality, in the absence of which the national court must draw all the inferences which result from such a failure;

               6.

               Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot be held that a Member State has failed to satisfy its obligation to justify a restrictive measure because it has failed to provide an analysis of the effects of that measure on the date on which that measure was introduced into national law or the date of the examination of such a measure by the national court;

               7.

               Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding a penalty, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, imposed for the infringement of national rules introducing a system of concessions and licences for the organisation of games of chance, if such national legislation proves to be contrary to that article.

      (1)  OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.


title: Case T-126/18: Action brought on 27 February 2018 — Van Haren Schoenen v Commission

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/65

         Action brought on 27 February 2018 — Van Haren Schoenen v Commission
   (Case T-126/18)
   (2018/C 142/83)
   Language of the case: Dutch

      Parties

      Applicant: Van Haren Schoenen BV (Waalwijk, Netherlands) (represented by: S. De Knop, B. Natens, A. Willems and M. Meulenbelt, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should:

               —

               declare the application admissible;

               —

               annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2232 of 4 December 2017 reimposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People's Republic of China and Vietnam and produced by certain exporting producers in the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam and implementing the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14; and

               —

               order the Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 5(1) and (2) TEU on account of absence of legal basis of the contested regulation and, in the alternative, infringement of the principle of institutional balance laid down in Article 13(2) TEU.

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU for failure to take the necessary measures to implement the judgment of 4 February 2016, C & J Clark International (C-659/13 and C-34/14, EU:C:2016:74).

               3.

               Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 1(1) and 10(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 (1) and of the principle of legal certainty for imposing anti-dumping duties on goods that are in free circulation.

               4.

               Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 21 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 in so far as the anti-dumping duties were imposed without a fresh assessment of the EU interest. According to the applicant, it was, in any event, manifestly incorrect to conclude that the Union had an interest in the anti-dumping duties being imposed.

               5.

               Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 5(1) and (4) TFEU for adopting an act which goes further than is necessary to attain the objective being pursued.

      (1)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ 2016 L 176, p. 21).


title: Case T-139/18: Action brought on 21 February 2018 — Avio v European Commission

text:
               23.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 142/68

         Action brought on 21 February 2018 — Avio v European Commission
   (Case T-139/18)
   (2018/C 142/87)
   Language of the case: Italian

      Parties

      Applicant: Avio SpA (Rome, Italy) (represented by: G. Roberti, G. Bellitti and I. Perego, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should:

               —

               regarding the substance, annul Commission Decision C(2016) 4621 final of 20 July 2016 concerning the authorisation, under Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, of the concentration ‘ASL/Arianespace’, Case COMP/M.7724;

               —

               by way of a measure of inquiry, order the Commission, pursuant to Articles 88, 89 and 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure, to submit the documents referred to in Section III of the present application;

               —

               order the Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   This action is brought against Commission Decision C(2016) 4621 final of 20 July 2016 concerning the authorisation, under Article 8(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, of the concentration ‘ASL/Arianespace’, Case COMP/M.7724, as published in its non-confidential version on 11 December 2017.
   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment, failure to conduct a proper investigation and failure to state adequate reasons

                           —

                           The Commission made a manifest error of assessment, failed to conduct a proper investigation and failed to state adequate reasons by not correctly analysing the risk of foreclosure in the market for launchers operated by Arianespace, in particular with regard to capacity, inducements and anti-competitive effects;

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment

                           —

                           The Commission made a manifest error of assessment by not requiring undertakings to be given with respect to the market for launchers operated by Arianespace, particularly with regard to the risks to competition connected to the conflict of interests within Arianespace and the risk of exchange of sensitive information between Arianespace and ASL.


title: Case T-124/17: Order of the General Court of 5 March 2018 — Estamede v ECB (Non-contractual liability — Economic and Monetary Policy — ECB — Restructuring of Greek Government debt — Involvement of a Greek public law body managing a pension fund for engineers and contractors carrying out public works — Absence of interest or assignment of the right to compensation — Disregard of the procedural requirements — Manifest inadmissibility)

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/35

         Order of the General Court of 5 March 2018 — Estamede v ECB
   (Case T-124/17) (1)

   ((Non-contractual liability - Economic and Monetary Policy - ECB - Restructuring of Greek Government debt - Involvement of a Greek public law body managing a pension fund for engineers and contractors carrying out public works - Absence of interest or assignment of the right to compensation - Disregard of the procedural requirements - Manifest inadmissibility))
   (2018/C 152/44)
   Language of the case: Greek

      Parties

      Applicant: Enosi Syntaxiouchon Tameiou Asfaliseon Michanikon kai Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon (Estamede) (Athens, Greece) (represented by: P. Miliarakis, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Central Bank (ECB) (represented by: A. Koutsoukou and K. Laurinavičius, acting as Agents, and by H.-G. Kamann, lawyer)

      Re:

   Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered by the Eniaios Foreas Koinonikis Asfalisis (EFKA) and, more particularly, its professional branch of engineers and contractors carrying out public works, the Tameio Syntaxeon Michanikon kai Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon (TSMEDE) (Tomeis Michanikon Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon), and its affiliates who retired following, in particular, the adoption by the ECB of Decision 2012/153/EU of 5 March 2012 on the eligibility of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic in the context of the Hellenic Republic’s debt exchange offer (OJ 2012 L 77, p. 19), and other measures of the ECB connected with the restructuring of Greek Government debt.

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               The action is dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible;

               2.

               The Enosi Syntaxiouchon Tameiou Asfaliseon Michanikon kai Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon (Estamede) is ordered to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 151, 15.5.2017.


title: Case T-196/17: Order of the General Court of 9 March 2018 — Naftogaz of Ukraine v Commission (Action for annulment — Internal market in natural gas — Directive 2009/73/EC — Commission Decision on review of the exemption of the OPAL pipeline from the requirements on third-party access and tariff regulation — Lack of direct concern — Inadmissibility)

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/36

         Order of the General Court of 9 March 2018 — Naftogaz of Ukraine v Commission
   (Case T-196/17) (1)

   ((Action for annulment - Internal market in natural gas - Directive 2009/73/EC - Commission Decision on review of the exemption of the OPAL pipeline from the requirements on third-party access and tariff regulation - Lack of direct concern - Inadmissibility))
   (2018/C 152/45)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: D. Mjaaland, A. Haga, M. Krakowiak and P. Grzejszczak, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: Y. G. Marinova, O. Beynet and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Action based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 6950 final of 28 October 2016 on the review of the conditions for exemption of the OPAL pipeline, granted under Directive 2003/55/EC, from the rules on third-party access and tariff regulation.

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

               2.

               There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene.

               3.

               NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine shall bear its own costs and the costs of the European Commission.

               4.

               Naftogaz of Ukraine, the Commission, OPAL Gastransport GmbH & Co. KG, Gazprom Eksport LLC and Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A. shall each bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

      (1)  OJ C 151, 15.5.2017.


title: Case C-8/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vilniaus apygardos teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 3 January 2018 — TE, UD, YB, ZC v Luminor Bank AB

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/2

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Vilniaus apygardos teismas (Lithuania) lodged on 3 January 2018 — TE, UD, YB, ZC v Luminor Bank AB
   (Case C-8/18)
   (2018/C 152/03)
   Language of the case: Lithuanian

      Referring court

   Vilniaus apygardos teismas

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: TE, UD, YB, ZC

      Defendant: Luminor Bank AB

      Questions referred

               1.

               Is a natural person who, prior to the date of 1 November 2007 specified in Article 70 of Directive 2004/39/EC, (1) acquired a derivate financial instrument from a bank using funds borrowed from that bank on the basis of collateral in favour of that bank to be regarded as a consumer under EU law on the ground that Article 3(3)(d) of Directive 2011/83/EU (2) on consumer rights provides that that directive is not to apply to contracts ‘for financial services’?

               2.

               Is a natural person who, prior to the date of 1 November 2007 specified in Article 70 of Directive 2004/39/EC, acquired a derivate financial instrument from a bank using funds borrowed from that bank on the basis of collateral in favour of that bank to be regarded as a retail client and a non-professional investor in financial instruments under EU law, and, if that is the case, must the provisions of EU law establishing consumer information obligations and prohibiting conflicts of interest when a bank offers and sells a financial instrument, such as the provisions laid down in Directive 2003/6, (3) Directive 2003/71/EC, (4) Directive 2001/34/EC, (5) Regulation (EC) No 809/2004, (6) the MiFID II Directive (7) and other rules of EU legislation protecting the rights of financial services consumers, be applied in the present case?

               3.

               Is Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) to be interpreted as meaning that failure to disclose the fact that the financial instrument provider is not authorised to provide that financial service, failure to disclose essential information in a prospectus and in the supplement to a prospectus, as well as a potential conflict of interest on the part of the financial instrument provider, may, during the conclusion of contracts relating to a financial instrument, have a direct effect (in a particular direction) on the price of the financial instruments concerned, and that the other party to the contract thus has the right to request that those contracts be annulled or modified, or that compensation be paid for the losses incurred?

      (1)  Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 2004 L 145, p. 1).

      (2)  Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64).

      (3)  Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (OJ 2003 L 96, p. 16).

      (4)  Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (OJ 2003 L 345, p. 64).

      (5)  Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2001 on the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing and on information to be published on those securities (OJ 2001 L 184, p. 1).

      (6)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards information contained in prospectuses as well as the format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements (OJ 2004 L 149, p. 1).

      (7)  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 349).


title: Case C-26/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hessisches Finanzgericht (Germany) lodged on 16 January 2018 — Federal Express Corporation, German branch v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/3

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hessisches Finanzgericht (Germany) lodged on 16 January 2018 — Federal Express Corporation, German branch v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main
   (Case C-26/18)
   (2018/C 152/04)
   Language of the case: German

      Referring court

   Hessisches Finanzgericht

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Federal Express Corporation, German branch

      Defendant: Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main

      Questions referred

               1.

               Is importation within the meaning of Articles 2(1)(d) and 30 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) subject to the condition that goods which have been introduced into the territory of the European Union must enter the economic network of the European Union, or is the mere risk that the goods introduced may enter the economic network of the European Union sufficient?
               If importation is subject to the condition that goods must enter the economic network of the European Union:

               2.

               Do goods which have been introduced into the territory of the European Union automatically enter the economic network of the European Union in the case where, contrary to customs law, those goods are not placed under an arrangement within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Directive or, although initially placed under such an arrangement, they later cease to be covered by that arrangement on account of conduct contrary to customs law, or is it the case that, in the event of conduct contrary to customs law, entry into the economic network of the European Union is subject to the condition that it may be presumed that, on account of the conduct contrary to customs law, the goods entered the economic network of the European Union in the fiscal territory of the Member State in which the unlawful conduct was committed and may have been consumed or used?

      (1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.


title: Case C-93/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) made on 9 February 2018 — Ermira Bajratari v Secretary of State for the Home Department

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/14

         Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) made on 9 February 2018 — Ermira Bajratari v Secretary of State for the Home Department
   (Case C-93/18)
   (2018/C 152/16)
   Language of the case: English

      Referring court

   Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Ermira Bajratari

      Defendant: Secretary of State for the Home Department

      Questions referred

               1.

               Can income from employment that is unlawful under national law establish, in whole or in part, the availability of sufficient resources under Article 7(1)(b) of the Citizens Directive (1)?

               2.

               If ‘yes’, can Article 7(1) (b) be satisfied where the employment is deemed precarious solely by reason of its unlawful character?

      (1)  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004, L 158, p. 77).


title: Case C-98/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 12 February 2018 — T. Boer & Zonen BV v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/15

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 12 February 2018 — T. Boer & Zonen BV v Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken
   (Case C-98/18)
   (2018/C 152/18)
   Language of the case: Dutch

      Referring court

   College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: T. Boer & Zonen BV

      Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken

      Question referred

   Should the provisions of Annex III, Section I, Chapter VII, points 1 and 3, to Regulation No 853/2004 (1) be interpreted as meaning that the cooling of meat must take place in the slaughterhouse itself — such that the loading of the meat into a refrigerated truck may commence once that meat has attained a maximum temperature of 7 degrees Celsius — or may the cooling of the meat also take place in the refrigerated truck, provided that the truck does not leave the premises of the slaughterhouse?

      (1)  Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (OJ 2004 L 139, p. 55).


title: Case T-390/16: Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2018 — Grupo Osborne v EUIPO — Ostermann (DONTORO dog friendship) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark DONTORO dog friendship — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Complementarity of the goods and services — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/29

         Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2018 — Grupo Osborne v EUIPO — Ostermann (DONTORO dog friendship)
   (Case T-390/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark DONTORO dog friendship - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Complementarity of the goods and services - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
   (2018/C 152/34)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Grupo Osborne, SA (El Puerto de Santa María, Spain) (represented by: J.M. Iglesias Monravá, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Daniel Ostermann (Leipzig, Germany)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 April 2016 (Case R 2002/2015-1), relating to opposition proceedings between Grupo Osborne and Mr Ostermann.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

               1.

               Dismisses the action;

               2.

               Orders Grupo Osborne, SA to pay the costs.

      (1)  OJ C 364, 3.10.2016.


title: Case C-49/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña (Spain) lodged on 26 January 2018 — Carlos Escribano Vindel v Ministerio de Justicia

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/6

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña (Spain) lodged on 26 January 2018 — Carlos Escribano Vindel v Ministerio de Justicia
   (Case C-49/18)
   (2018/C 152/08)
   Language of the case: Spanish

      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Carlos Escribano Vindel

      Defendant: Ministerio de Justicia

      Questions referred

               1.

               Must the general principle of EU law prohibiting all discrimination be interpreted as not precluding a national rule enshrined in Article 31(One) of Law 39/2010 of 22 December 2010 on the National Budget for 2011, which established different percentage reductions that were more burdensome on the section of the judiciary which earned the least, thus requiring a greater sacrifice from that section in order to preserve public expenditure? (non-discrimination principle)

               2.

               Must the general principle of EU law of preserving judicial independence through fair and stable remuneration commensurate with the duties performed by the members of the judiciary be interpreted as precluding a national rule such as that in Article 31(One) of Law 39/2010 of 22 December 2010 on the National Budget, which does not have regard to the nature of their duties, their length of service or the importance of their tasks, and which requires a greater sacrifice in order to preserve public expenditure solely from those members of the judiciary who earn the least? (principle of judicial independence)


title: Case C-115/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal correctionnel de Saint-Brieuc — Chambre détachée de Guingamp (France) lodged on 12 February 2018 — Procureur de la République v Tugdual Carluer and Others

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/17

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal correctionnel de Saint-Brieuc — Chambre détachée de Guingamp (France) lodged on 12 February 2018 — Procureur de la République v Tugdual Carluer and Others
   (Case C-115/18)
   (2018/C 152/21)
   Language of the case: French

      Referring court

   Tribunal correctionnel de Saint-Brieuc — Chambre détachée de Guingamp

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Procureur de la République

      Defendants: Tugdual Carluer, Yann Latouche, Dominique Legeard, Thierry Leleu, Dimitri Pinschof, Brigitte Plunian, Rozenn Marechal

      Questions referred

               1.

               Is Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 (1) compatible with the precautionary principle when it provides no specific definition of an active substance, leaving it to the applicant to determine what it designates as the active substance in its product and granting it scope to focus its whole application dossier on a single substance, while its end product placed on the market is made up of several substances?

               2.

               Is the precautionary principle observed and impartiality of the authorisation to place products on the market maintained when the tests, analyses and evaluations necessary for compilation of the dossier are conducted by the applicants alone, who may be biased in their presentation, without any independent counter-analysis?

               3.

               Is the precautionary principle observed and impartiality of the authorisation to place products on the market maintained without publication of the application reports on the pretext of protecting industrial secrecy?

               4.

               Is Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 compatible with the precautionary principle when it takes no account of there being multiple active substances or of their cumulative use, in particular when it makes no provision for any comprehensive specific analysis at European level of cumulation of active substances within a single product?

               5.

               Is Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 compatible with the precautionary principle when, in Chapters III and IV, it exempts from toxicity tests (genotoxicity, carcinogenicity assessment, assessment of endocrine disruptors, etc.) pesticide products in the commercial formulations in which they are placed on the market and in which consumers and the environment are exposed to them, requiring only summary testing, which is always performed by the applicant itself?

      (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).


title: Case T-688/13: Order of the General Court of 26 February 2018 — Deloitte Consulting v Commission

text:
               30.4.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 152/59

         Order of the General Court of 26 February 2018 — Deloitte Consulting v Commission
   (Case T-688/13) (1)

   (2018/C 152/69)
   Language of the case: English
   The President of the Fourth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 93, 29.3.2014.


201805250221897452018/C 200/115502016CJC20020180611EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL2018041291022Case C-550/16: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 12 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag — Netherlands) — A, S v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Right to family reunification — Directive 2003/86/EC — Article 2(f) — Definition of ‘unaccompanied minor’ — Article 10(3)(a) — Right of a refugee to family reunification with his parents — Refugee below the age of 18 at the time of entry into the Member State and at the time of application for asylum, but over 18 at the time of the decision granting asylum and of his application for family reunification — Relevant date for assessing ‘minor’ status of the person concerned)
 ---documentbreak--- C2002018EN920120180412EN001192102Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 12 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag — Netherlands) — A, S v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie
   (Case C-550/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Right to family reunification — Directive 2003/86/EC — Article 2(f) — Definition of ‘unaccompanied minor’ — Article 10(3)(a) — Right of a refugee to family reunification with his parents — Refugee below the age of 18 at the time of entry into the Member State and at the time of application for asylum, but over 18 at the time of the decision granting asylum and of his application for family reunification — Relevant date for assessing ‘minor’ status of the person concerned)’2018/C 200/11Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Rechtbank Den Haag

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: A, S

      Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 2(f) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, read in conjunction with Article 10(3)(a) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that a third-country national or stateless person who is below the age of 18 at the time of his or her entry into the territory of a Member State and of the introduction of his or her asylum application in that State, but who, in the course of the asylum procedure, attains the age of majority and is thereafter granted refugee status must be regarded as a ‘minor’ for the purposes of that provision.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 38, 6.2.2017.


201805250631897112018/C 200/457562016TC20020180611EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180425363611Case T-756/16: Judgment of the General Court of 25 April 2018 — Euro Castor Green v EUIPO — Netlon France (Concealed trellis) (Community design — Invalidity proceedings — Registered Community design representing a trellis — Earlier Community design — Ground for invalidity — Disclosure of earlier design — Lack of novelty — No individual character — Articles 5, 6 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002)
 ---documentbreak--- C2002018EN3610120180425EN0045361361Judgment of the General Court of 25 April 2018 — Euro Castor Green v EUIPO — Netlon France (Concealed trellis)
   (Case T-756/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Community design — Invalidity proceedings — Registered Community design representing a trellis — Earlier Community design — Ground for invalidity — Disclosure of earlier design — Lack of novelty — No individual character — Articles 5, 6 and Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002)’2018/C 200/45Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Euro Castor Green (Bagnolet, France) (represented by: B. Lafont, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Netlon France (Saint-Saulve, France) (represented by: C. Berto, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 August 2016 (Case R 754/2014-3), relating to invalidity proceedings between Netlon France and Euro Castor Green.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Euro Castor Green to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 6, 9.1.2017.


201805250301897032018/C 200/232272017CJC20020180611EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180412181811Case C-227/17: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 12 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf — Germany) — Medtronic GmbH v Finanzamt Neuss (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 — Customs Union and Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Subheadings 9021 10 10, 9021 10 90 and 9021 90 90 — Spinal fixation systems — Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1214/2014)
 ---documentbreak--- C2002018EN1810120180412EN0023181181Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 12 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf — Germany) — Medtronic GmbH v Finanzamt Neuss
   (Case C-227/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 — Customs Union and Common Customs Tariff — Tariff classification — Combined Nomenclature — Subheadings 9021 10 10, 9021 10 90 and 9021 90 90 — Spinal fixation systems — Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1214/2014)’2018/C 200/23Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Finanzgericht Düsseldorf

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Medtronic GmbH

      Defendant: Finanzamt Neuss

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Combined Nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1754 of 6 October 2015, must be interpreted as meaning that spinal fixation systems such as those at issue in the main proceedings may not be classified under subheading 9021 90 90 of the Combined Nomenclature if they are covered by another subheading of heading 9021 of the Combined Nomenclature. Whether those systems may be classified under subheading 9021 10 10 or subheading 9021 10 90 of the Combined Nomenclature will depend on the principal function they perform, which is a matter for the referring court to determine by having regard to the objective characteristics and properties of such systems as well as to their intended and actual use.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 249, 31.7.2017.


201806150741955322018/C 231/382422018TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180418303121Case T-242/18: Action brought on 18 April 2018 — VV v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN3010120180418EN0038301312Action brought on 18 April 2018 — VV v Commission
   (Case T-242/18)2018/C 231/38Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: VV (represented by: F. Moyse, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            Annul the decision of 19 June 2017 and, in so far as necessary, the rejection of the applicant’s claim of 18 January 2018;

            —

            Order the defendant to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   By the present action, the applicant seeks the annulment of the decision of the selection board of Open Competition EPSO/AD/322/16 — Administrators in the field of audit (AD 5/AD 7) (OJ 2016 C 171A, p. 1) not to admit her to that competition since she does not hold a university diploma attesting to completed studies of at least 3 years in the fields set out in the notice of that competition.
   In support of her action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging an insufficient statement of reasons of the contested decision.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging errors of assessment committed by the selection board in the evaluation of the information in the applicant’s application. The selection board disregarded the notice of competition in finding that the applicant did not have a level of education which corresponds to completed university studies of at least 3 years attested by a final diploma, required for admission to the competition.


201806150711955172018/C 231/276762016TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180515232311Case T-676/16: Judgment of the General Court of 15 May 2018 — Wirecard v EUIPO (mycard2go) (EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark mycard2go — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN2310120180515EN0027231231Judgment of the General Court of 15 May 2018 — Wirecard v EUIPO (mycard2go)
   (Case T-676/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Application for EU figurative mark mycard2go — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))’2018/C 231/27Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Wirecard AG (Aschheim, Germany) (represented by: A. Bayer, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 July 2016 (Case R 280/2016-4) concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign mycard2go as an EU trade mark.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Wirecard AG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 410, 7.11.2016.


201806150291954902018/C 231/076852017CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201712067711Case C-685/17 P: Appeal brought on 6 December 2017 by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Wise Dialog Bank SpA (Banca Widiba SpA) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 26 September 2017 in Case T-84/16: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA and Banca Widiba SpA v EUIPO
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN710120171206EN00077171Appeal brought on 6 December 2017 by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Wise Dialog Bank SpA (Banca Widiba SpA) against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 26 September 2017 in Case T-84/16: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA and Banca Widiba SpA v EUIPO
   (Case C-685/17 P)2018/C 231/07Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellants: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Wise Dialog Bank SpA (Banca Widiba SpA) (represented by: L. Trevisan, D. Contini, avvocati)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office
   By order of 17 May 2018 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.


201806150861955342018/C 231/593002018TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180513464831Case T-300/18: Action brought on 13 May 2018 — Yanukovych v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN4610120180513EN0059461483Action brought on 13 May 2018 — Yanukovych v Council
   (Case T-300/18)2018/C 231/59Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Viktor Feodorovych Yanukovych (Rostov on Don, Russia) (represented by: T. Beazley, QC)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018 (
                  1
               ) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/326 of 5 March 2018 (
                  2
               ), insofar as they concern the Applicant; and

            —

            order the Council to bear the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Applicant does not fulfil the stated criteria for a person to be listed at the relevant time. The Council of the European Union has failed to properly take into account and consider all of the material provided to it while also being highly selective in the material that it has taken into account. Arguments in support of this plea include that: the Applicant is merely the subject of pre-trial investigations which have stagnated and are clearly not sufficient to satisfy the relevant criterion; and the materials upon which the Council has based its decision to maintain the Applicant’s name on the list are wholly inadequate, inconsistent, false and are not supported by any evidence.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Council made manifest errors of assessment in including the Applicant in the contested measures. In re-designating the Applicant, notwithstanding the clear disconnect between the ‘statement of reasons’ and the relevant designation criteria, the Council has made a manifest error. Moreover the reasons given in relation to the first plea apply equally to the second plea.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the Council failed to state reasons. The Council has failed to identify the actual and specific reasons for the Applicant’s designation. The ‘statement of reasons’ adopted in the Sixth Amending Decision and Sixth Amending Regulation for including the Applicant (in addition to being wrong) are formulaic, inappropriate and inadequately particularised.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Applicant’s defence rights have been breached and/or that he has been denied effective judicial protection. Amongst other things, the Council has failed adequately to consult with the Applicant prior to the re-designation, and the Applicant has not been afforded a proper or fair opportunity either to correct errors or produce information relating to his personal circumstances. At not stage has the Council/Applicant been provided with serious, credible or concrete evidence to justify the imposition of restrictive measures.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that the Council lacked a proper legal basis for the Sixth Amending Instruments. Arguments in support of the plea include the following: (a) The conditions for the Council relying on Article 29 TEU were not fulfilled by the Sixth Amending Decision. Amongst other things: (i) The Council’s expressly invoked objectives are merely vague assertions; (ii) The basis lacks any sufficient connection to the proper standard of judicial review required in the present circumstances; and (iii) the imposition of restrictive supports and legitimises the conduct of the new regime in Ukraine that is itself undermining due process and the rule of law and is systematically violating human rights; (b) The conditions for relying on Article 215 TFEU were not fulfilled because there was no valid decision under Chapter 2 of Title V of TEU; (c) There was no sufficient link for Article 215 TFEU to be relied on against the Applicant.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Council misused its powers. The Council’s actual purpose in implementing the Sixth Amending Instruments was essentially to try to curry favour with the current regime in Ukraine (so that Ukraine proceeds with closer ties with the European Union), and not the purposes/rationales stated on the face of the Sixth Amending Instruments. The designation criteria represent an extraordinary and wholesale delegation of power consistent with the Council’s purpose.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging that the Applicant’s rights to property under Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, have been breached in that, amongst other things, the restrictive measures are an unjustified and disproportionate restriction on those rights, because inter alia: (i) there is no suggestion that any funds allegedly misappropriated by the Applicant are considered to have been transferred outside Ukraine; and (ii) it is neither necessary nor appropriate to freeze all the Applicant’s assets since the Ukraine authorities have now quantified the value of the losses allegedly being pursued in underlying criminal cases against the Applicant.

      (
         1
      )	Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/333 of 5 March 2018 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2018 L 63, p. 48).
   (
         2
      )	Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/326 of 5 March 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2018 L 63, p. 5).


201806150561955272018/C 231/442612018TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180426353511Case T-261/18: Action brought on 26 April 2018 — Roxtec v EUIPO — Wallmax (Representation of a black square containing seven concentric blue circles)
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN3510120180426EN0044351351Action brought on 26 April 2018 — Roxtec v EUIPO — Wallmax (Representation of a black square containing seven concentric blue circles)
   (Case T-261/18)2018/C 231/44Language in which the application was lodged: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Roxtec AB (Karlskrona, Sweden) (represented by: J. Olsson and J. Adamsson, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Wallmax Srl (Milano, Italy)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

      Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark representing a black square containing seven concentric blue circles — EU trade mark No 14 338 735

      Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 January 2018 in Case R 940/2017-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred both in these proceedings and in the proceedings before EUIPO.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 7(1)(e)(ii) of Regulation No 2017/1001.


201806150471954952018/C 231/192802018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424161721Case C-280/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Greece) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Alain Flausch, Andrea Bosco, Estienne Roger Jean Pierre Albrespy, Association registered as Syndesmos Iiton, Association registered as Elliniko Diktyo — Filoi tis Fysis, Association registered as Syllogos Prostasias kai Perithalpsis Agias Zois (SPPAZ) v Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias, Ypourgos Oikonomikon, Ypourgos Tourismou, Ypourgos Naftilias kai Nisiotikis Politikis
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN1610120180424EN0019161172Request for a preliminary ruling from the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias (Greece) lodged on 24 April 2018 — Alain Flausch, Andrea Bosco, Estienne Roger Jean Pierre Albrespy, Association registered as Syndesmos Iiton, Association registered as Elliniko Diktyo — Filoi tis Fysis, Association registered as Syllogos Prostasias kai Perithalpsis Agias Zois (SPPAZ) v Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias, Ypourgos Oikonomikon, Ypourgos Tourismou, Ypourgos Naftilias kai Nisiotikis Politikis
   (Case C-280/18)2018/C 231/19Language of the case: Greek
      Referring court

   Symvoulio tis Epikrateias

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants:

   Alain Flausch,
   Andrea Bosco,
   Estienne Roger Jean Pierre Albrespy,
   Association registered as Syndesmos Iiton,
   Association registered as Elliniko Diktyo — Filoi tis Fysis,
   Association registered as Syllogos Prostasias kai Perithalpsis Agias Zois (SPPAZ)

      Defendants:

   Ypourgos Perivallontos kai Energeias,
   Ypourgos Oikonomikon,
   Ypourgos Tourismou,
   Ypourgos Naftilias kai Nisiotikis Politikis

      Intervening party:

   105 Anonymi Touristiki kai Techniki Etaireia Ekmetallefsis Akiniton

      Questions referred

            1.

            Can Articles 6 and 11 of Directive 2011/92/EU, (
                  1
               ) read in combination with the provisions of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that provisions of national law as set out in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 [of the order for reference], in which it is laid down that procedures preceding the adoption of decisions approving environmental conditions for projects and activities with a significant environmental impact (publication of environmental impact studies, public information and participation in the consultation process) are to be initiated and conducted primarily by the wider administrative unit (region) and not by the municipality concerned, are compatible with those articles?

            2.

            Can Articles 6 and 11 of Directive 2011/92/EU, read in combination with the provisions of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that a system of provisions of national law as set out in the abovementioned paragraphs, which ultimately provides that publication of decisions approving the environmental conditions of projects and activities with a significant environmental impact, by means of posting them on a special website, creates a presumption of full knowledge on the part of every interested party for the purpose of exercising the legal remedy available under current legislation (application for annulment before the Symvoulio tis Epikrateias [Council of State]) within a period of sixty (60) days, is compatible with those articles, bearing in mind the legislative provisions governing publication of environmental impact studies and public information and participation during the procedure to approve the environmental conditions of those projects and activities, which provisions place the wider administrative unit (region), rather than the municipality concerned, at the centre of those procedures?

      (
         1
      )	Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (OJ 2012 L 26, p. 1).


201806150461954922018/C 231/101782018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201803079911Case C-178/18 P: Appeal brought on 7 March 2018 by MSD Animal Health Innovation GmbH, Intervet international BV against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-729/15: MSD Animal Health Innovation GmbH and Intervet international BV v European Medicines Agency
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN910120180307EN00109191Appeal brought on 7 March 2018 by MSD Animal Health Innovation GmbH, Intervet international BV against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-729/15: MSD Animal Health Innovation GmbH and Intervet international BV v European Medicines Agency
   (Case C-178/18 P)2018/C 231/10Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellants: MSD Animal Health Innovation GmbH, Intervet international BV (represented by: P. Bogaert, advocaat, B. Kelly, Solicitor, J. Stratford QC, C. Thomas, Barrister)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Medicines Agency

      Form of order sought

   The appellants claim that the Court should:

            —

            grant the appellants’ appeal and set aside the judgment of the General Court;

            —

            annul the decision communicated by the EMA to the appellants on 3 December 2015 to release certain information under the Transparency Regulation (
                  1
               ); and

            —

            order the EMA to pay the appellants’ legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The judgment should be annulled for the following reasons:

            —

            the General Court failed to find that the documents in issue were protected by a general presumption of confidentiality;

            —

            the General Court failed to find that the documents in issue in their entirety constitute commercially confidential information that is protected by Article 4(2) of the Transparency Regulation;

            —

            the General Court failed to find that the documents in issue should be protected by Article 4(3) of the Transparency Regulation; and

            —

            the EMA failed to carry out a balancing exercise as required by law.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001, L 145, p. 43).


201806150821955332018/C 231/232832015TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180508202121Case T-283/15: Judgment of the General Court of 8 May 2018 — Esso Raffinage v ECHA (REACH — Dossier evaluation — Compliance check of registrations — Check of information submitted and follow-up to dossier evaluation — Statement of non-compliance — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Actions for annulment — Challengeable act — Direct and individual concern — Admissibility — Legal basis — Articles 41, 42 and 126 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN2010120180508EN0023201212Judgment of the General Court of 8 May 2018 — Esso Raffinage v ECHA
   (Case T-283/15) (
         1
      )
   ‛(REACH — Dossier evaluation — Compliance check of registrations — Check of information submitted and follow-up to dossier evaluation — Statement of non-compliance — Jurisdiction of the General Court — Actions for annulment — Challengeable act — Direct and individual concern — Admissibility — Legal basis — Articles 41, 42 and 126 of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)’2018/C 231/23Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Esso Raffinage (Courbevoie (France)) (represented by: M. Navin-Jones, solicitor)

      Defendants: European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) (represented by: C. Jacquet, C. Schultheiss, W. Broere and M. Heikkilä, acting as Agents)

      Interveners in support of the defendant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: T. Henze, acting as Agent), French Republic (represented by: D. Colas and J. Traband, acting as Agents), and Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by M. de Ree, M. Bulterman and M. Noort, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of the letter from ECHA of 1 April 2015 addressed to the French Ministère de l’ecologie du developement durable, des transports et du logement (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing) and entitled ‘Statement of Non-Compliance following a Dossier Evaluation Decision under Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006’.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls the letter of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) of 1 April 2015 addressed to the French Ministère de l’ecologie du developement durable, des transports et du logement (Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing) and entitled ‘Statement of Non-Compliance following a Dossier Evaluation Decision under Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006’ and the annex thereto;

            2.

            Orders Esso Raffinage and ECHA each to bear their own costs;

            3.

            Orders the Federal Republic of Germany, The French Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands each to bear their own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 320, 28.9.2015.


201806150371954942018/C 231/112032018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180320101011Case C-203/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) lodged on 20 March 2018 — Deutsche Post AG, Klaus Leymann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN1010120180320EN0011101101Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany) lodged on 20 March 2018 — Deutsche Post AG, Klaus Leymann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
   (Case C-203/18)2018/C 231/11Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Deutsche Post AG, Klaus Leymann

      Defendant: Land Nordrhein-Westfalen

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is the exception set out in Article 13(1)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 (
                  1
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 as amended by Article 45(2) of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (
                  2
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 to be interpreted as covering only vehicles or combinations of vehicles that are used exclusively for the purpose of delivering packages in the context of the universal service, or can it additionally be applied where the vehicles or combinations of vehicles are used, predominantly or to a degree determined in some other way, also for the purpose of delivering packages in the context of the universal service?

            2.

            In the context of the exception referred to in the first question, for the purposes of assessing whether vehicles or combinations of vehicles are used exclusively or, as the case may be, predominantly or to a degree determined in some other way, also for the purpose of delivering packages in the context of the universal service, is the general use of a vehicle or combination of vehicles to be used as a basis for that assessment, or the specific use of a vehicle or combination of vehicles for a single journey?

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (OJ 2006 L 102, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ 2014 L 60, p. 1).


201806150761955042018/C 231/242052016TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517212111Case T-205/16: Judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2018 — Lithuania v Commission (Cohesion Fund — Expenditure excluded from financing — Technical support for Cohesion Fund management in Lithuania — VAT — Article 11(1) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 16/2003 — Reduction of financial assistance)
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN2110120180517EN0024211211Judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2018 — Lithuania v Commission
   (Case T-205/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Cohesion Fund — Expenditure excluded from financing — Technical support for Cohesion Fund management in Lithuania — VAT — Article 11(1) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 16/2003 — Reduction of financial assistance)’2018/C 231/24Language of the case: Lithuanian
      Parties

      Applicant: Republic of Lithuania (represented by: D. Kriaučiūnas, R. Krasuckaitė and D. Stepanienė, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: B.-R. Killmann and J. Jokubauskaitė, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application based on Article 263 TFEU and seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 969 final of 23 February 2016, concerning the reduction in support from the Cohesion Fund for the project ‘Technical assistance for Cohesion Fund management in the Republic of Lithuania’, in so far as that decision provides for a reduction in support in the amount of EUR 137864,61 corresponding to VAT expenses.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Annuls Commission Decision C(2016) 969 final of 23 February 2016, concerning the reduction in support from the Cohesion Fund for the project ‘Technical assistance for Cohesion Fund management in the Republic of Lithuania’, in so far as that decision provides for a reduction in support in the amount of EUR 137864,61 corresponding to VAT expenses;

            2.

            Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Republic of Lithuania.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 251, 11.7.2016.


201806150451954832018/C 231/122102018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180323101122Case C-210/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Schienen-Control Kommission (Austria) lodged on 23 March 2018 — WESTbahn Management GmbH v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN1020120180323EN0012102112Request for a preliminary ruling from the Schienen-Control Kommission (Austria) lodged on 23 March 2018 — WESTbahn Management GmbH v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG
   (Case C-210/18)2018/C 231/12Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Schienen-Control Kommission

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: WESTbahn Management GmbH

      Defendant: ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is Paragraph 2(a) of Annex II to Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, (
                  1
               ) to be interpreted as meaning that the notion of ‘passenger stations, their buildings and other facilities’ referred to therein covers the railway infrastructure ‘passenger … platforms’ listed in the second indent of Annex I to that directive?

            2.

            If Question 1 is answered in the negative:
            Is Paragraph 1(c) of Annex II to Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, to be interpreted as including the use of passenger platforms provided for in the second indent of Annex I to that directive within the notion of ‘use of the railway infrastructure’ referred to therein?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2012 L 343, p. 32.


201806150751955192018/C 231/331992018TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180316262722Case T-199/18: Action brought on 16 March 2018 — SCF Terminal (Cyprus) and S H B v Council and Others
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN2620120180316EN0033262272Action brought on 16 March 2018 — SCF Terminal (Cyprus) and S H B v Council and Others
   (Case T-199/18)2018/C 231/33Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: SCF Terminal (Cyprus) LTD (Limassol, Cyprus) and S H B, Inc. (Monrovia, Liberia) (represented by: P. Tridimas, Barrister, K. Kakoulli, P. Panayides and C. Pericleous, lawyers)

      Defendants: Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Central Bank, Eurogroup and European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            order the defendants to pay the applicants the sums shown in the schedule annexed to this application plus interest accruing from 26 March 2013 until the judgment of the Court;

            —

            order the defendants to pay the costs.

      In the alternative, by way of subsidiary claim, the applicants request the Court to:

            —

            find that the European Union and/or the defendant institutions have incurred non-contractual liability;

            —

            determine the procedure to be followed in order to establish the recoverable loss actually suffered by the applicants; and

            —

            order the defendants to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law which are in essence identical or similar to those relied on in Case T-197/18, JV Voscf and Others v Council and Others.