title: Case T-493/19: Action brought on 5 July 2019 — International Personal Finance Investments v Commission

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/35

      Action brought on 5 July 2019 — International Personal Finance Investments v Commission
      (Case T-493/19)
      (2019/C 312/29)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: International Personal Finance Investments Ltd (Leeds, United Kingdom) (represented by: M. Anderson, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Commission Decision C(2019) 2526 final of 2 April 2019 on the State aid SA.44896 implemented by the United Kingdom concerning CFC Group Financing Exemption its entirety in insofar as it concerns the applicant;

                  —

                  if the contested decision is not annulled in its entirety, (a) annul it insofar as it applies to the matched interest exemption within Chapter 9 of Part 9A of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 and (b) order that in determining the amount of aid to be recovered, losses, reliefs or exemptions which were available to the applicant at the time when it claimed the group financing exemption (GFE), or which would have been available to the applicant at that time had it not claimed the GFE, should in either case be taken into account even if access to those losses, reliefs or exemptions is now time barred under UK law;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the applicant’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on nine pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the defendant has failed to establish that the GFE constitutes an advantage in each case where the GFE has been claimed. Further, the applicant argues that it chose to claim the GFE, initially contemplating a 75 % exemption, without considering whether its liability could have been lower if it had done an analysis under the significant people functions (SPF) test in section 371EB of Chapter 5 of Part 9A of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that there was no intervention by the State or through State resources. The applicant argues that the defendant has failed to prove that claiming the GFE has certainly led to a reduction in the UK corporate tax liability.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the GFE does not favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods. The applicant argues that the defendant has erred by (i) defining the reference system too narrowly as the rules in the said Part 9A instead of the wider UK corporate tax system; (ii) failing to understand that Chapter 9 of Part 9A of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010 is not a derogation from Chapter 5 thereof; and (iii) failing to recognise that, even if the said Chapter 9 is a derogation from that Chapter 5, it is justified by the nature or general scheme of Part 9A of the legislation.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the GFE does not affect trade between Member States. The applicant argues that the defendant has erred by concluding that the GFE is liable to influence choices made by multinational groups as to the location of their group finance functions and their head office within the EU, particularly in view of the lack of a level playing field and absence of CFC rules in 15 other Member States before 2016.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that the GFE does not distort or threaten to distort competition. The applicant argues that the defendant has failed to prove that claiming the GFE has certainly led to a reduction in the UK corporate tax liability and that the GFE does not distort competition having regard to arguments made at the fourth plea above.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that recovery of the alleged aid would be contrary to general principles of EU law. The applicant argues that the SPF test lacks legal certainty, the UK had a margin of appreciation to address that uncertainty and that the defendant has breached its duty to carry out a complete analysis of all relevant factors. By ordering the recovery of aid, the defendant has acted contrary to Article 16(1) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589, (1) which prohibits the recovery of aid where recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EU law.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging that the selective advantage would be eliminated, and no recovery would be required, if the UK were retrospectively to extend the GFE to upstream lending and third-party lending. The applicant argues that the defendant has failed to acknowledge that taking such action would eliminate any selective advantage (assuming for the moment that there is one) and in such case there would be no unlawful state aid to be recovered under EU law.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging that, in determining the amount of the aid to be recovered, losses, reliefs or exemptions which were available to the applicant at the time when it claimed the GFE, or which would have been available at that time had the applicant not claimed the GFE, should be taken into account even if access to those losses, reliefs or exemptions is now time barred under UK law. The applicant argues that that is the correct interpretation of recital 203 of the contested decision but, insofar as that is not the case, the contested decision is incorrect because failing to take such losses, reliefs or exemptions into account would lead to over-calculation of the amount of the aid which would introduce a distortion into the internal market.

                  9.

                  Ninth plea in law, alleging that the defendant has failed to substantiate its reasons in relation to the matched interest exemption (MIE) and to carry out a complete analysis of all relevant factors. The applicant argues that the defendant has failed to distinguish between three separate exemptions under the said Chapter 9 which function independently and to understand that the MIE is not a proxy for the SPF test and that the existence of the MIE (which is inextricably linked to rules restricting the deductibility of interest expenses) in the said Chapter 9 demonstrates that the defendant has erred by defining the reference system narrowly as the rules in Part 9A of the legislation instead of the wider UK corporate tax system.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9).


title: Case T-498/19: Action brought on 9 July 2019 — Banco Cooperativo Español v SRB

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/37

      Action brought on 9 July 2019 — Banco Cooperativo Español v SRB
      (Case T-498/19)
      (2019/C 312/30)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicant: Banco Cooperativo Español (Madrid, Spain) (represented by D. Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero and J. Beltrán de Lubiano Sáez de Urabain, lawyers)

         Defendant: Single Resolution Board

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the General Court should:

                  —

                  Principally, annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  In the alternative,

                              a.

                              Declare, as set out in the application, that Articles 12 and 14 of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 are inapplicable; and

                              b.

                              Annul the contested decision; and

                  —

                  In any event, order the Single Resolution Board to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The present action is brought against the decision of the Single Resolution Board of 16 April 2019 on the calculation of ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for the 2019 contribution period (SRB/ES/SRF/2019/10).
      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 12(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 (1)

                              —

                              In that regard, the applicant claims that Articles 12 and 14 of the delegated regulation should be interpreted as meaning that an institutional protection scheme established in 2018 is to be recognised for the purposes of calculating ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for the 2019 contribution period.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, in the alternative, based, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, on a plea of illegality, and seeking that the General Court declare inapplicable Articles 12 and 14 of the delegated regulation on the ground of infringement of Article 103(2) and (7) of Directive 2014/59/EU (2)

                              —

                              In that regard, the applicant claims that, if Articles 12 and 14 of the delegated regulation are to be interpreted as meaning that an institutional protection scheme established in 2018 is not to be recognised for the purposes of calculating ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for the 2019 contribution period, then the aforementioned articles of the delegated regulation infringe Article 103(2) and (7) of Directive 2014/59/EU, in that they disregard the conditions for delegating power to the Commission, which require that (i) contributions to the Fund be in line with the risk profile of the contributing institution and (ii) contributions to the Fund take into account participation in an institutional protection scheme.

         (1)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2016 L 233, p. 1).

         (2)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 170).


title: Case T-501/19: Action brought on 12 July 2019 — Corneli v ECB

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/38

      Action brought on 12 July 2019 — Corneli v ECB
      (Case T-501/19)
      (2019/C 312/31)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Francesca Corneli (Velletri, Italy) (represented by: F. Ferraro, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Central Bank

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the ECB Executive Board’s decision of 29 May 2019, ref L/LDG/19/182, refusing access to the ECB’s decision to place Banca Carige S.p.A., having its registered office in Genoa, Italy, under special administration and to the relevant case file, and order the defendant to produce and submit to the Court the abovementioned decision and all prior, preparatory, related and consequent acts; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      This action has been brought for the annulment of the ECB Executive Board’s decision of 29 May 2019, ref L/LDG/19/182, refusing access to the ECB’s decision to place Banca Carige S.p.A., having its registered office in Genoa, Italy, under special administration and to the relevant case file, and for an order that the defendant produce and submit to the Court the abovementioned decision and all prior, preparatory, related and consequent acts.
      In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 4 of ECB Decision 2004/3 and misapplication of the exception relating to the confidentiality of information that is protected as such under EU law.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this respect that the contested decision is unlawful in so far as it lacks actual evidence indicating the confidential parts of the document at issue, their function and their purpose within the ECB and the risks attached to their disclosure. It claims that, in weighing up the various interests, there is no doubt that savers’ specific interest in protecting their shareholding as well as the efficiency and transparency of the governance of the company prevails over the general requirement — in respect of which no reasons are given — to protect supervision procedures.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons for the confidential nature of the document requested.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this respect that the ECB fails to offer any reasons for its claim that the contested act is confidential, merely stating, as if it were obvious, that protecting its supervision procedures justifies the refusal of access.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 7(1) and 8(1) of ECB Decision 2004/3 and failure to state reasons.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this respect serious infringement of Articles 7(1) and 8(1) of Decision 2004/3 and failure to state reasons, since the conditions for a general presumption of confidentiality are not satisfied and in any event the ECB failed to carry out a specific assessment of the documents to which access was requested.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and of Articles 7(3) and 8(2) of ECB Decision 2004/3.

                              —

                              The applicant claims in this respect that the ECB cannot completely thwart the interests of the parties to whom the measure is addressed, including the bank’s shareholders, who have the right to effective protection under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union against the ‘poor’ exercise of official authority. The ECB also infringed Articles 7(3) and 8(2) of ECB Decision 2004/3 since on a number of occasions it has referred to an exceptionally high workload without providing any proof in that regard, in order to extend, by a further 20 days, the time limit laid down for replying to the applicant’s request for access.


title: Case T-504/19: Action brought on 12 July 2019 — Crédit Lyonnais v ECB

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/41

      Action brought on 12 July 2019 — Crédit Lyonnais v ECB
      (Case T-504/19)
      (2019/C 312/33)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Crédit Lyonnais (Lyon, France) (represented by: A. Champsaur and A. Delors, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Central Bank

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul, on the basis of Articles 256 and 263 TFEU, Decision ECB-SSM-2019-FRCAG-39 adopted by the ECB on 3 May 2019, in so far as it refuses to authorise the applicant to exclude from the calculation of the leverage ratio 34 % of its exposures to the Caisse des dépôts et consignations (‘the CDC’);

                  —

                  order the ECB to pay all the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU and of the force of res judicata of the General Court’s judgment. The applicant submits that, by basing its decision on grounds which have already been examined and dismissed by the General Court in the judgment of 13 July 2018, Crédit agricole v ECB (T-758/16, EU:T:2018:472) and by continuing to highlight a theoretical risk of default by the French State and a risk of catastrophic sale of assets without demonstrating the cogency of those allegations, the European Central Bank infringed Article 266 TFEU and res judicata.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 429(14) and of Article 400(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ 2013 L 176, p. 1) and, second, the misuse of powers by the ECB. The applicant considers that, by basing its decision on the existence of a concentration risk on the Caisse des dépôts et consignations (‘the CDC’) to entirely refuse to exclude the Crédit Lyonnais (‘LCL’) exposures to CDC from its leverage ratio, the ECB imposes a prudential requirement on LCL in respect of the concentration on sovereign exposures which Article 400(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 does not allow it to impose and uses its powers under Article 429(14) of the that regulation for purposes other than those provided for in that Article.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment by the ECB by persisting in failing to take into account the specific characteristics of regulated savings, thereby breaching its obligation to examine, with care and impartiality, all the relevant elements of the case at hand and to draw the necessary conclusions from it. The applicant considers that in so doing the ECB also makes a manifest error of assessment of the prudential risks relating to regulated savings.


title: Case T-520/19: Action brought on 22 July 2019 — Heitec v EUIPO — Hetec Datensysteme (HEITEC)

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/43

      Action brought on 22 July 2019 — Heitec v EUIPO — Hetec Datensysteme (HEITEC)
      (Case T-520/19)
      (2019/C 312/35)
      Language in which the application was lodged: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Heitec AG (Erlangen, Germany) (represented by: G. Wagner, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Hetec Datensysteme GmbH (Germering, Germany)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

         Trade mark at issue: EU word mark HEITEC — EU trade mark No 774 331

         Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 April 2019 in Case R 1171/2018-2

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  order EUIPO to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 95(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, in conjunction with Rule 22(3) and (4) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95.


title: Case T-527/19: Action brought on 26 July 2019 — Sánchez Cano v EUIPO — Grupo Osborne (EL TORO BALLS Fini)

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/44

      Action brought on 26 July 2019 — Sánchez Cano v EUIPO — Grupo Osborne (EL TORO BALLS Fini)
      (Case T-527/19)
      (2019/C 312/36)
      Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicant: Sánchez Cano, SA (Molina del Segura, Spain) (represented by C. Giner Mas and M. González Aleixandre, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Grupo Osborne, SA (El Puerto de Santa María, Spain)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark EL TORO BALLS Fini — Application for registration No 15 648 595

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 March 2019 in Case R 2690/2017-2

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision in its entirety;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay to the applicant the costs relating to and occasioned by the present application, as well as the costs incurred by the applicant before the Board of Appeal; or, in the event that the other party in the contested decision appears as an intervener, order that the defendant and the other party in the contested decision be held jointly and severally liable to pay to the applicant the costs relating to and occasioned by the present application, as well as the costs incurred by the applicant before the Board of Appeal.

         Plea in law

      Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-530/19: Action brought on 26 July 2019 — Nord Stream v Parliament and Council

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/45

      Action brought on 26 July 2019 — Nord Stream v Parliament and Council
      (Case T-530/19)
      (2019/C 312/37)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Nord Stream AG (Zug, Suisse) (represented by: M. Raible, C. von Köckritz and J. von Andreae, lawyers)

         Defendants: European Parliament and Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 17 April 2019 amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, insofar as Article 1 (9) of this Directive introduced Article 49a (3) first sentence of Directive 2009/73 stipulating that ‘[d]ecisions pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be adopted by 24 May 2020’;

                  —

                  order the European Parliament and/or the Council of the European Union to pay the Applicant’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the deadline for obtaining potential derogation decisions under the newly inserted Article 49a of Directive 2009/73 is excessively short and thereby violates the general legal principle of proportionality as laid down in article 5(4) TEU.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the amending Directive must be partially annulled for violation of Article 296 TFEU since it is vitiated by a failure to state reasons for the introduction of the excessively short deadline in the contested provision.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the contested provision violates the principle of legitimate expectations as it unjustly limits the possibility to obtain derogations under the newly introduced Article 49a of Directive 2009/73. The possibility of obtaining such derogations is legally required in order to protect the legitimate expectations of operators of offshore third country pipelines which were completed and in operation when the amending directive entered into force.


title: Case T-532/19: Action brought on 29 July 2019 — EC Brand Comércio, Importação e Exportação de Vestuário em Geral v EUIPO (pantys)

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/46

      Action brought on 29 July 2019 — EC Brand Comércio, Importação e Exportação de Vestuário em Geral v EUIPO (pantys)
      (Case T-532/19)
      (2019/C 312/38)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: EC Brand Comércio, Importação e Exportação de Vestuário em Geral LTDA (Sorocaba, Brazil) (represented by: B. Bittner and U. Heinrich, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark pantys– Application for registration No 17 869 310

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 May 2019 in Case R 314/2019-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision in so far as it dismissed the appeal regarding the following goods and services:

                              —

                              class 05: hygienic absorbents, sanitary napkins, sanitary towels, incontinence pads;

                              —

                              class 35: online retail trade services of women’s sanitary products;

                  —

                  order EUIPO to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Widely use in the European Union.


title: Case T-533/19: Action brought on 29 July 2019 — Artur Florêncio & Filhos, Affsports v EUIPO — Anadeco Gestion (sflooring)

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/47

      Action brought on 29 July 2019 — Artur Florêncio & Filhos, Affsports v EUIPO — Anadeco Gestion (sflooring)
      (Case T-533/19)
      (2019/C 312/39)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Artur Florêncio & Filhos, Affsports Lda (Sintra, Portugal) (represented by: D. Martins Pereira Soares, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Anadeco Gestion, SA (Cartagena, Spain)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark sflooring in colours black, white and grey — Application for registration No 11 943 586

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 May 2019 in Case R 1870/2018-4

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  totally admit this appeal

                  —

                  completely revoke the contested decision;

                  —

                  amend the contested decision, based on the grounding in this appeal and declare the granting of European Union trademark No 11 943 588 sflooring;

                  —

                  condemn the EUIPO in the costs incurred by the appellant, including in the costs made in the case that run before EUIPO;

                  —

                  condemn the other party to bear the appellant’s costs in the EUIPO proceedings.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Insufficiency of the proofs of genuine use of earlier trademark T-FLOORING

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-535/19: Action brought on 30 July 2019 — H.R. Participations v EUIPO — Hottinger Investment Management (JCE HOTTINGUER)

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/48

      Action brought on 30 July 2019 — H.R. Participations v EUIPO — Hottinger Investment Management (JCE HOTTINGUER)
      (Case T-535/19)
      (2019/C 312/40)
      Language in which the application was lodged: French

         Parties

         Applicant: H.R. Participations SA (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: P. Wilhelm and J. Rossi, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Hottinger Investment Management Ltd (London, United Kingdom)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: EU word mark JCE HOTTINGUER — EU trade mark No 10 093 391

         Procedure before EUIPO: Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity

         Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 3 May 2019 in Case R 2078/2018-2

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible and well-founded;

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  order EUIPO to bear all the costs incurred by the applicant.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of essential procedural requirements, in so far as the application for a declaration of invalidity before the Cancellation Division was flawed.

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 60(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Article 8(4) of that regulation.


title: Case T-546/19: Action brought on 7 August 2019 — Isigny-Sainte Mère v EUIPO (Shape of a golden container with a type of wave)

text:
               16.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 312/49

      Action brought on 7 August 2019 — Isigny-Sainte Mère v EUIPO (Shape of a golden container with a type of wave)
      (Case T-546/19)
      (2019/C 312/41)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Isigny-Sainte Mère (Isigny-sur-Mer, France) (represented by: D. Mallo Saint-Jalmes, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Trade mark at issue: Application for a three-dimensional EU trade mark (Shape of a golden container with a type of wave) — Application for registration No 17 871 521

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 May 2019 in Case R 1513/2018-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should annul the contested decision.

         Plea in law

      Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case C-411/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 27 May 2019 — WWF Italia o.n.l.u.s. and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Azienda Nazionale Autonoma Strade SpA (ANAS)

text:
               30.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/2

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 27 May 2019 — WWF Italia o.n.l.u.s. and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Azienda Nazionale Autonoma Strade SpA (ANAS)
      (Case C-411/19)
      (2019/C 328/02)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: WWF Italia o.n.l.u.s., Lega Italiana Protezione Uccelli o.n.l.u.s., Gruppo di Intervento Giuridico o.n.l.u.s., Italia Nostra o.n.l.u.s., Forum Ambientalista, FC and Others

         Defendants: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Azienda Nazionale Autonoma Strade SpA (ANAS)

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Does Article 6 of Directive 1992/43/EEC, (1) in conjunction with Directive [2009/147/EC] (2) where applicable to the present case, preclude national primary legislation and the related secondary implementing legislation … which allow the body ‘with final responsibility’ — competent to adopt the environmental compatibility measure for the preliminary project for works in the event of the reasoned objection of the Italian Ministry for the Environment and Protection of Land and Sea [(‘MATTM’)] — to provide approval, thereby allowing the procedure to continue, relying on the existence of an overriding public interest, whereas the State body responsible for environmental protection has stated that it is impossible to prepare any mitigation requirements and measures for the version of the project under approval, in respect of which a negative opinion regarding environmental impact assessment [(‘EIA’)] had already been expressed?

                  2.

                  Do the abovementioned directives preclude a solution such as that adopted which, for the purposes of approving the preliminary project for works subject to the EIA procedure, has the ‘overriding public interest’ referred to take precedence over the environmental interest — even though that overriding interest is based exclusively on the more economical nature of the works, their compliance additionally with landscaping, historical, cultural and socio-economic protection and the need to complete a trans-European road network, in the present case the TEN-[T] network defined as ‘Comprehensive’, as by Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 (3) — despite the fact that there is an existing alternative solution already approved from an environmental perspective?

                  3.

                  Is a solution such as that adopted, whereby it was considered possible to postpone to the stage of the definitive project further assessment and studies of the environmental significance of the route not approved in terms of EIA — including the Assessment of Environmental Implications — instead of requiring the proponent of the works to carry out further assessment and studies to mitigate the economic and landscaping effects on the alternative route already approved, on the other hand, from an environmental perspective, compatible with the abovementioned Community legislation?

                  4.

                  In such circumstances and if the answer to the first, second and third questions is that there is compatibility [with EU law], do the abovementioned directives preclude a solution such as that adopted, which does not consider binding a negative opinion indicating environmental incompatibility, issued by the competent body in the course of the approval procedure for the preliminary project for the works, postponing to the stage of the definitive project more in-depth assessment of the impact thereof on the territory’s landscaping and environmental aspects, with specific reference to the assessment of environmental implications and the consequent provision of sufficient measures for the compensation and mitigation of impacts?

                  5.

                  Do the abovementioned directives preclude a solution such as that adopted, where the proponent of the works is requested at the stage of drafting the definitive project for the works to take into account the requirements, observations and recommendations in relation to landscaping and the environment set out in the course of the interdepartmental conference held with regard to the preliminary project, even if in that regard the body responsible for environmental protection has found that it is impossible to develop any mitigation requirements and measures for the project under approval?

                  6.

                  Do the abovementioned directives preclude a solution such as that adopted where the proponent has also been requested to develop the environmental impact study for the works, including the so-called ‘appropriate assessment’, duly drafted in accordance with the legal requirements in force, which would serve as the basis for the assessment of implications in question?

                  7.

                  Do the abovementioned directives preclude a solution such as that adopted, where a third party (the Lazio Region) has been identified, different from the body ordinarily responsible (the [Environmental Impact Assessment — Strategic Environmental Assessment] EIA-SEA Committee of the MATTM), to verify the environmental impact study annexed to the definitive project for the works, in order also to identify any subsequent mitigation and compensation measures necessary to protect and safeguard the environmental and landscaping aspects of the territory concerned, leaving to the MATTM’s EIA-SEA Committee, in accordance with and for the purposes of Article 185(4) and (5) of Legislative Decree No 163/06, only the ex post formulation of its own opinion as to whether the definitive project for the construction of the route in question complies with the landscaping and environmental requirements, after the abovementioned verification?

         (1)  Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7).

         (2)  Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ 2010 L 20, p. 7).

         (3)  Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network and repealing Decision No 661/2010/EU (OJ 2013 L 348, p. 1).


title: Case C-415/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) lodged on 28 May 2019 — Blumar SpA v Agenzia delle Entrate

text:
               30.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/3

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) lodged on 28 May 2019 — Blumar SpA v Agenzia delle Entrate
      (Case C-415/19)
      (2019/C 328/03)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Corte Suprema di Cassazione

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Blumar SpA

         Respondent: Agenzia delle Entrate

         Question referred

      Are Article 1(1223) of Law No 296 of 27 December 2006 (now Article 16a(11) of Law No 11 of 4 February 2005) and the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 23 May 2007 compatible with EU law, with reference to Article 108(3) TFEU as interpreted in Deggendorf, Commission Decision C(2008) 380, and the Community-law principle of proportionality?


title: Joined Case T-244/16 and T-285/17: Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2019 — Yanukovych v Council (Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine — Freezing of funds — List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list — Council’s obligation to verify that the decision of an authority of a third State was taken in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection)

text:
               30.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/38

      Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2019 — Yanukovych v Council
      (Joined Case T-244/16 and T-285/17) (1)

      (Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine - Freezing of funds - List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources - Maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list - Council’s obligation to verify that the decision of an authority of a third State was taken in accordance with the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection)
      (2019/C 328/41)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: T. Beazley QC, E. Dean and J. Marjason-Stamp, Barristers)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: P. Mahnič and J.-P. Hix, Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment, first, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/318 of 4 March 2016 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 76), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/311 of 4 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2016 L 60, p. 1) and, second, of Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381 of 3 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2017 L 58, p. 34), and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/374 of 3 March 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2017 L 58, p. 1), in so far as the applicant’s name was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to those restrictive measures.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Annuls Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/318 of 4 March 2016 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/311 of 4 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, as well as Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/381 of 3 March 2017 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/374 of 3 March 2017 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine, in so far as the name of Mr Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to those restrictive measures;

                  2.

                     Orders the Council of the European Union to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Mr Yanukovych.

         (1)  OJ C 243, 4.7.2016.


title: Case T-805/16: Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2019 — IPPT PAN v Commission and REA (Arbitration clause — Sixth and Seventh Framework Programmes for research, technological development and demonstration activities — Decision to recover by offsetting claims of the European Union arising from the performance of a contract — Effective judicial protection — Right to refer to the Ombudsman — Financial regulation — Debts which are certain — Legitimate expectations — Principle of non-discrimination — Principle of sound administration — Misuse of powers — Contractual liability — Audit report — Eligible costs)

text:
               30.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/39

      Judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2019 — IPPT PAN v Commission and REA
      (Case T-805/16) (1)

      (Arbitration clause - Sixth and Seventh Framework Programmes for research, technological development and demonstration activities - Decision to recover by offsetting claims of the European Union arising from the performance of a contract - Effective judicial protection - Right to refer to the Ombudsman - Financial regulation - Debts which are certain - Legitimate expectations - Principle of non-discrimination - Principle of sound administration - Misuse of powers - Contractual liability - Audit report - Eligible costs)
      (2019/C 328/42)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk (IPPT PAN) (Warsaw, Poland) (represented by: M. Le Berre, lawyer)

         Defendants: European Commission (represented: initially by M. Siekierzyńska and P. Rosa Plaza, and subsequently by M. Siekierzyńska and F. van den Berghe, Agents), Research Executive Agency (REA), represented by S. Payan-Lagrou and V. Canetti, acting as Agents, and D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers)

         Intervener in support of the applicant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna, Agent)

         Re:

      Action, first, under Article 263 TFEU, seeking annulment of the Commission Decision of 6 September 2016 to recover alleged claims against the applicant under two contracts concluded in the context of the Sixth Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities, by offsetting them against sums owing to the applicant by the Research Executive Agency (REA) under a grant agreement concluded in the context of the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community for research, technological development and demonstration activities and, second, under Article 272 TFEU, seeking a declaration that the alleged claims of the Commission under the two contracts concluded in the context of the Sixth Framework Programme referred to above are invalid and an order directing the Commission and REA to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 69 623.94 in relation to the grant agreement concluded in the context of the Seventh Framework Programme referred to above plus default interest.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                     Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                     Orders the Instytut Podstawowych Problemów Techniki Polskiej Akademii Nauk (IPPT PAN) to bear two thirds of its own costs and pay those incurred by the Research Executive Agency (REA);

                  3.

                     Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and pay one third of the costs incurred by IPPT PAN;

                  4.

                     Orders the Republic of Poland to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 22, 23.1.2017.


title: Case T-578/19 R: Order of the President of the General Court of 11 September 2019 — Sophia Group v Parliament (Interim measures – Public service contracts – Application for interim measures – Lack of urgency)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/17

      Order of the President of the General Court of 11 September 2019 — Sophia Group v Parliament
      (Case T-578/19 R)
      (Interim measures - Public service contracts - Application for interim measures - Lack of urgency)
      (2019/C 363/25)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Sophia Group (Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, Belgium) (represented by: Y. Schneider and C.-H. de la Vallée Poussin, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: L. Tapper Brandberg and S. Toliušis, Agents)

         Re:

      Application on the basis of Articles 278 and 279 TFEU for the grant of interim measures seeking, first, the suspension of operation of the Parliament’s decision dated 30 July 2019 to award Lot No 1 of the tender for the ‘Provision of Buildings HelpDesk services’ (Call for tenders 06A0010/2019/M011) to another tenderer, and, secondly, the suspension of the contract concluded with that other tenderer.

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The application for interim measures is dismissed.

                  2.

                     Costs are reserved.


title: Case T-424/18: Order of the General Court of 3 September 2019 — Puma v EUIPO — Carrefour (Representation of crossed lines)

text:
               28.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 363/36

      Order of the General Court of 3 September 2019 — Puma v EUIPO — Carrefour (Representation of crossed lines)
      (Case T-424/18) (1)

      (2019/C 363/46)
      Language of the case: English
      The President of the Seventh Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 301, 27.8.2018.


title: Case C-730/19: Action brought on 3 October 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria

text:
               25.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/34

      Action brought on 3 October 2019 — European Commission v Republic of Bulgaria
      (Case C-730/19)
      (2019/C 399/40)
      Language of the case: Bulgarian

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: Y. Marinova and E. Manhaeve)

         Defendant: Republic of Bulgaria

         Form of order sought

      The European Commission claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare that the Republic of Bulgaria has failed to fulfil its obligations in accordance with Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC, (1) in conjunction with Annex XI to that directive, by systematically and continuously exceeding in zone BG0006 (South-East):

                              (i)

                              the hourly limit values for SO2 as from 2007;

                              (ii)

                              the daily limit values for SO2 as from 2007, with the exception of 2010 and 2012;

                  —

                  declare that, as from 11 June 2010, the Republic of Bulgaria has failed to fulfil its obligations in accordance with Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC, in conjunction with Section A of Annex XV to that directive, and in particular its obligation in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 23(1) to ensure as short as possible a period in which the abovementioned limit values for SO2 in zone BG0006 (South-East) are exceeded;

                  —

                  order the Republic of Bulgaria to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      First, the Commission claims that Bulgaria has infringed the provisions of Article 13(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC, in conjunction with Annex XI to that directive, in so far as it has systematically and continuously exceeded, in zone BG0006 (South-East), the hourly and daily limit values for SO2.
      Secondly, the Commission maintains that Bulgaria has infringed the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 23(1) of Directive 2008/50/EC, in conjunction with Section A of Annex XV to that directive, in so far as, as from 11 June 2010, it has not included in its air quality plans any appropriate measures intended to ensure that the period during which the limit values are exceeded is as short as possible.

         (1)  Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (OJ 2008 L 152, p. 1)


title: Case C-538/18 P: Appeal brought on 16 August 2018 by České dráhy a.s. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 20 June 2018 in Case T-325/16 České dráhy v Commission

text:
               29.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 392/9

      Appeal brought on 16 August 2018 by České dráhy a.s. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 20 June 2018 in Case T-325/16 České dráhy v Commission
      (Case C-538/18 P)
      (2018/C 392/14)
      Language of the case: Czech

         Parties

         Appellant: České dráhy a.s. (represented by: K. Muzikář and J. Kindl, advokáti)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Subject matter

      Appeal against the judgment of the General Court of 20 June 2018 in Case T-325/16 České dráhy v Commission.
      By that judgment the General Court allowed in part the action brought under Article 263 TFEU in which České dráhy sought the annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 2417 final of 18 April 2016 in Case AT.40156 — Falcon. The General Court annulled the contested decision of the Commission ‘in so far as it concerns routes other than the Prague-Ostrava route and conduct other than the alleged predatory pricing practices’. The General Court dismissed the action as to the remainder. It also ordered each party to bear its own costs.

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 20 June 2018 in Case T-325/16 České dráhy v European Commission, EU:T:2018:368, in so far as the General Court dismissed the action and in so far as the General Court decided on costs;

                  —

                  annul in its entirety Commission Decision C(2016) 2417 final of 18 April 2016 in Case AT.40156 — Falcon;

                  —

                  order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings in Case T-325/16 and those in connection with the appeal proceedings.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

                  1.

                  First ground of appeal: the General Court incorrectly concluded that the contested decision of the Commission had a sufficient statement of reasons.
                  České dráhy contends that the European Commission did not give sufficiently precise and detailed reasons for the contested decision, and thus did not comply with the requirements following from the case-law of the Court of Justice. The General Court decided wrongly, in that it none the less did not annul — in its entirety — the contested decision of the Commission.

                  2.

                  Second ground of appeal: the General Court failed to take into account that before adopting the contested decision the Commission disregarded a large amount of evidence that České dráhy was not acting unlawfully.
                  České dráhy contends that the Commission did not, before adopting the contested decision, address the facts showing that the conduct of České dráhy was not unlawful, and adopted the contested decision (contrary to the principle of proportionality) solely on the basis of certain isolated items of evidence taken out of context. The General Court decided wrongly, in that it none the less did not annul — in its entirety — the contested decision of the Commission.

                  3.

                  Third ground of appeal: the General Court incorrectly assessed the conditions of application of Article 102 TFEU.
                  České dráhy contends that on the basis of Regulation No 1/2003 the Commission may only investigate conduct which could be an infringement of Article 101 and/or Article 102 TFEU. The Commission ordered the inspection at the seat of České dráhy because it suspected an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. That provision can only apply where (a) an undertaking may have abused a dominant position in the whole or a substantial part of the internal market and (b) the alleged abusive conduct could substantially affect trade between Member States. České dráhy considers that the General Court incorrectly concluded that those conditions were satisfied in the present case.

                  4.

                  Fourth ground of appeal: the General Court’s decision on costs is wrong.
                  České dráhy contends that the General Court had to allow the application in full and thus also order the Commission to reimburse České dráhy the costs of the proceedings.


title: Case T-515/15: Judgment of the General Court of 13 September 2018 — Almaz-Antey v Council (Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine — Retention of the applicant’s name on the list of entities to which the restrictive measures apply — Proportionality — Error of assessment — Obligation to state reasons — Fundamental rights)

text:
               29.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 392/21

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 September 2018 — Almaz-Antey v Council
      (Case T-515/15) (1)

      ((Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures adopted in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine - Retention of the applicant’s name on the list of entities to which the restrictive measures apply - Proportionality - Error of assessment - Obligation to state reasons - Fundamental rights))
      (2018/C 392/24)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Joint-Stock Company ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp., formerly OAO Concern PVO Almaz-Antey (Moscow, Russia) (represented by: A. Haak, C. Stumpf and M. Brüggemann, lawyers)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: J.-P. Hix and P. Mahnič, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/971 of 22 June 2015 amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015 L 157, p. 50); (ii) the letter from the Council dated 31 July 2015 by which the Council stated that the applicant should remain subject to the measures in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 13) and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 229, p. 1); (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2431 of 21 December 2015 amending Decision 2014/512 (OJ 2015 L 334, p. 22); and (iv) Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1071 of 1 July 2016 amending Decision 2014/512 (OJ 2016 L 178, p. 21), in so far as those acts concern the applicant.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders Joint-Stock Company ‘Almaz-Antey’ Air and Space Defence Corp. to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 371, 9.11.2015.


title: Case C-474/18 P: Appeal brought on 19 July 2018 by J.M.-E.V. e hijos, S.R.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14 Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO — J.M.-E.V. e hijos

text:
               29.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 392/5

      Appeal brought on 19 July 2018 by J.M.-E.V. e hijos, S.R.L. against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14 Messi Cuccittini v EUIPO — J.M.-E.V. e hijos
      (Case C-474/18 P)
      (2018/C 392/08)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Appellant: J.M.-E.V. e hijos, S.R.L. (represented by: J. Guëll Serra and R. Gimeno-Bayón Cobos, abogados)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and Lionel Andrés Messi Cuccittini

         Form of order sought

      The appellant submits that the Court should:

                  —

                  Set aside, in whole, the judgment under appeal of 26 April 2018 in Case T-554/14; (1) and, accordingly

                  —

                  Give final judgment in the matter, if the state of the proceedings so permits; or

                  —

                  Refer the case back to the General Court for judgment in accordance with the binding criteria of the Court of Justice; and

                  —

                  Order Mr Lionel Andrés Messi Cuccittini to pay the costs.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      In the judgment under appeal, the General Court annulled the decision of the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, which had refused the mark ‘MESSI’ on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark ‘MASSI’, holding that, despite the marks ‘MASSI’ and ‘MESSI’ being visually and phonetically similar and referring to the same category of goods, the Board of Appeal had committed an error given that the conceptual differences between the marks prevent any likelihood of confusion.
      The judgment of the General Court is vitiated by four errors of law, for which reason the appeal is brought on four grounds:

                  1.

                  In the judgment under appeal, the General Court states that had the Board of Appeal taken into account the appellant’s reputation, it ought to have found that the word ‘messi’ was clearly different conceptually from the word ‘massi’. Contrary to what is stated in the judgment under appeal, the case-law of the Court of Justice and of the General Court has repeatedly held that the possible reputation of the mark applied for is irrelevant for the purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion with an earlier mark for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of the European Union Trade Mark Regulation.

                  2.

                  The General Court also erred in finding that the reputation of the applicant’s surname was a well-known fact which ought to have been taken into account by the Board of Appeal, despite it not having been established or even claimed by Mr Lionel Messi himself before the Board of Appeal, since it was a fact that any person may know or which may be checked through generally accessible sources. The level of awareness of the applicant’s surname in Europe at the time of the decision in the opposition proceedings (12/06/2013) is not a matter which can be presumed in 2018, particularly as this had been neither relied upon before the Board of Appeal nor supported by any evidence.

                  3.

                  In the present case, there was a new application (mutatio libelli), which prevented the appellant from properly defending itself, since the General Court allowed a new and separate plea in law which had not been relied upon before the Board of Appeal: the ‘distinctive conceptual MESSI effect’.

                  4.

                  The judgment incorrectly applies the PICARO/PICASSO judgment given that (i) in the PICASSO/PICARO case the well-known mark was the opponent’s mark ‘PICASSO’ whereas, in the present case, the allegedly well-known mark is the mark applied for; and (ii) that judgment dealt with goods in respect of which the level of attention of the average consumer, at the time of purchase, is particularly high whereas the present case concerns goods intended for the reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect average consumer in the European Union.

         (1)  ECLI:EU:T:2018:230


title: Judgment of the Court of 14 June 2018 in Case E-13/17 — EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland (Failure by an EFTA State to fulfil its obligations — Failure to implement — Regulation (EU) 2015/514)

text:
               15.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 414/8

      JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
      of 14 June 2018
      in Case E-13/17
      EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland

         (Failure by an EFTA State to fulfil its obligations — Failure to implement — Regulation (EU) 2015/514)

      (2018/C 414/10)
      In Case E-13/17, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland – APPLICATION for a declaration that Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area by failing to make the Act referred to at point 31bbe of Annex IX to that Agreement (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/514 of 18 December 2014 on the information to be provided by competent authorities to the European Securities and Markets Authority pursuant to Article 67(3) of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council), as adapted by Protocol 1 to the Agreement, part of its internal legal order, the Court, composed of Páll Hreinsson, President, Per Christiansen and Bernd Hammermann (Judge-Rapporteur), Judges, gave judgment on 14 June 2018, the operative part of which is as follows:
      The Court hereby:

                  1.

                  Declares that Iceland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the Agreement on the European Economic Area by failing to make the Act referred to at point 31bbe of Annex IX to that Agreement (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/514 of 18 December 2014 on the information to be provided by competent authorities to the European Securities and Markets Authority pursuant to Article 67(3) of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council), as adapted to the Agreement under its Protocol 1, part of its internal legal order.

                  2.

                  Orders Iceland to bear the costs of the proceedings.


title: Case C-601/18 P: Appeal brought on 24 September 2018 by Prysmian SpA, Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2018 in Case T-475/14: Prysmian and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi v Commission

text:
               26.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 427/25

      Appeal brought on 24 September 2018 by Prysmian SpA, Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 12 July 2018 in Case T-475/14: Prysmian and Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi v Commission
      (Case C-601/18 P)
      (2018/C 427/34)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: Prysmian SpA, Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi Srl (represented by: C. Tesauro, F. Russo, L. Armati, avvocati)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Pirelli & C. SpA

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal;

                  —

                  grant the forms of order sought at first instance;

                  —

                  order the Commission to bear the costs.

            In the alternative the appellants respectfully request that the Court:

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

                  1.

                  The General Court erred in finding that Article 20 of Regulation No. 1/2003 (1) does not prevent the Commission from taking the forensic images of entire hard drives of its employees without having examined their contents and from continuing their review at the Commission Brussels premises. The correct interpretation of the provision is that inspections can only be conducted at the undertaking’s premises and the Commission can only take copies of records of which it has examined the relevance. Given its interference with fundamental rights of the companies and their employees, a practice such as the taking of forensic images of entire hard drives should not be relegated to an explanatory note that grants full discretion to the Commission but should be governed by the law, in accordance with the principle of legality.

                  2.

                  The General Court committed a breach of the principle of personal liability, legal certainty and the principle of equal treatment, in addition to infringing its duty to state reasons, by failing to consider that the attribution of liability to Prysmian Cavi e Sistemi based on economic continuity is an exception to the rule whereby liability follows the legal person managing the undertaking at the time of the infringement. As all exceptions, it is subject to strict application and can only be justified where the effectiveness of competition rules is at risk. Moreover, the General Court erred in ruling out discrimination in the present case on the grounds that there cannot be equality in illegality, as the attribution of liability based on economic continuity is a faculty granted to the Commission.

                  3.

                  The General Court fails to address the Company’s main submission in the first instance that, any ‘home territory’ principle, assuming it existed — quod non -, could not credibly apply to all the disparate instances referred to in the decision and proving to the required legal standard the single and continuous infringement.

                  4.

                  The General Court acted ultra petita and breached the Company’s rights of defence under Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6 ECHR in its examination of the appellants’ seventh plea in first instance, relating to the start date of the cartel. The General Court manifestly misunderstood the evidence before it and applied an incorrect legal standard in its examination. Such a manifest distortion of the evidence resulted in it drawing erroneous inferences and reaching the mistaken legal conclusion that, on 18 February 1999, the Commission could establish the start date of an infringement affecting trade between Member States under Article 101 TFEU.

                  5.

                  The General Court breached the principle of equal treatment in as far as it validated the assessment of the Commission that the allocation of projects among European producers in the context of the ‘European only — (R)’ configuration warranted a 2 % increase in the gravity factor (and, consequently, the ‘entry fee’) for the European manufacturers, whereas no such increase was applied to the Asian producers. It is not possible, on the one hand, to accept that the Commission Decision could find a single and continuous infringement based on a home territory rule consisting of interdependent configurations, and at the same time accept that the active involvement in one or the other justifies a different degree of gravity for the participants. Even if Asian producers were not actively involved in the alleged European allocation, they contributed to that allocation on a comparable degree as European producers.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1).


title: Case C-437/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Gliwicach (Poland) lodged on 3 July 2018 — Lebopoll Logistics Sp. z o.o. w Sośnicowicach v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Zabrzu

text:
               26.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 427/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Gliwicach (Poland) lodged on 3 July 2018 — Lebopoll Logistics Sp. z o.o. w Sośnicowicach v Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Zabrzu
      (Case C-437/18)
      (2018/C 427/06)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Okręgowy w Gliwicach

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Lebopoll Logistics Sp. z o.o. w Sośnicowicach

         Defendant: Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych Oddział w Zabrzu

         Question referred

      Should the term ‘residence’ be interpreted in accordance with Article 1(j) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council and with Article 11 of Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council, or does the term ‘residence’ also mean temporary residence within the meaning of Article 1(k) of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2004 L 166, p. 1).

         (2)  Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems (OJ 2009 L 284, p. 1).


title: Case T-554/18: Action brought on 19 September 2018 — Hernández Hernández/Council

text:
               26.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 427/89

      Action brought on 19 September 2018 — Hernández Hernández/Council
      (Case T-554/18)
      (2018/C 427/117)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Socorro Elizabeth Hernández Hernández (Caracas, Venezuela) (represented by: F. Di Gianni and L. Giuliano, lawyers)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/901 of 25 June 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela (1) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/899 of 25 June 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela (2), in so far as their provisions concern the applicant; and

                  —

                  order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the contested acts are vitiated by a manifest error of assessment and lack of precise and consistent evidence.

                              —

                              In this regard, the applicant submits that the Council committed a manifest error of assessment concerning the applicant’s functions and roles and did not disclose a body of precise and consistent evidence in support of its claims. The applicant further claims that the Council failed to conduct a proper assessment of the evidence or, at the very least, that such assessment was manifestly erroneous.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the restrictive measures imposed by the contested acts constitute an unjustified and disproportionate restriction of the applicant’s fundamental right to property.

         (1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/901 of 25 June 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela (OJ L 160I, 25.6.2018, p. 12).

         (2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/899 of 25 June 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela (OJ L 160I, 25.6.2018, p. 5).


title: Case C-469/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van Cassatie (Belgium) lodged on 19 July 2018 — IN v Belgische Staat

text:
               26.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 427/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Hof van Cassatie (Belgium) lodged on 19 July 2018 — IN v Belgische Staat
      (Case C-469/18)
      (2018/C 427/07)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Hof van Cassatie

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: IN

         Defendant: Belgische Staat

         Question referred

      Should Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union, in cases of value added tax, be interpreted as precluding in all circumstances the use of evidence obtained in violation of the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter, or does it leave room for a national regulation under which the court which has to decide whether such a piece of evidence can be used as the basis for a VAT assessment has to make an evaluation such as the one set out above under paragraph 4 of this judgment.


title: Case T-699/18: Action brought on 26 November 2018 — Apera Capital Master v EUIPO — Altera Capital (APERA CAPITAL)

text:
               4.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 44/76

      Action brought on 26 November 2018 — Apera Capital Master v EUIPO — Altera Capital (APERA CAPITAL)
      (Case T-699/18)
      (2019/C 44/101)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Apera Capital Master Ltd. (St Peter Port, Guernsey) (represented by: C. Schröder and A. von Alten, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Altera Capital (Luxembourg, Luxembourg)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark APERA CAPITAL — Application for registration No 15 640 436

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 September 2018 in Case R 1091/2018-5

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  refer the case back to EUIPO for reconsideration;

                  —

                  order EUIPO to bear the costs.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 104(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Infringement of the applicant’s right to good administration and a fair trial.


title: Case T-712/18: Action brought on 3 December 2018 — Umweltinstitut München v Commission

text:
               4.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 44/77

      Action brought on 3 December 2018 — Umweltinstitut München v Commission
      (Case T-712/18)
      (2019/C 44/103)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Umweltinstitut München — Verein zur Erforschung und Verminderung der Umweltbelastung eV (Munich, Germany) (represented by: M. John, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the defendant’s negative decision of 2 October 2018 (C(2018) 6539 final).

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      By means of the present action, the applicant seeks annulment of the Commission’s negative decision of 2 October 2018 definitively refusing the applicant access to the documents pertaining to the first meeting of the CETA Joint Committee, which took place on 26 and 27 March 2018.
      In support of the action, the applicant relies on the following plea in law:
      Infringement of Article 15(3) TFEU in conjunction with Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, (1) since the defendant was not entitled, pursuant to Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001, to refuse (partial) access to the requested documents.

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).


title: Case C-756/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d’instance d’Aulnay-Sous-Bois (France) lodged on 3 December 2018 — LC, MD v easyJet Airline Co. Ltd

text:
               11.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 54/12

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal d’instance d’Aulnay-Sous-Bois (France) lodged on 3 December 2018 — LC, MD v easyJet Airline Co. Ltd
      (Case C-756/18)
      (2019/C 54/15)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Tribunal d’instance d’Aulnay-Sous-Bois

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: LC, MD

         Defendant: easyJet Airline Co. Ltd

         Question referred

      Is Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (1) (‘Regulation No 261/2004’), to be interpreted as meaning that, in order to rely on the provisions of the regulation, passengers must prove that they presented themselves for check-in?
      If so, does Article 3(2)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004 preclude a rule of simple presumption that the requirement that a passenger present himself for check-in may be regarded as satisfied if the passenger has a reservation that has been accepted and registered by the operating air carrier within the meaning of Article 2(g)?

         (1)  OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1.


title: Case C-762/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rayonen sad Haskovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 December 2018 — QH v Varhoven kasatsionen sad of the Republic of Bulgaria

text:
               11.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 54/12

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rayonen sad Haskovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 4 December 2018 — QH v Varhoven kasatsionen sad of the Republic of Bulgaria
      (Case C-762/18)
      (2019/C 54/16)
      Language of the case: Bulgarian

         Referring court

      Rayonen sad Haskovo

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: QH

         Defendant: Varhoven kasatsionen sad of the Republic of Bulgaria

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time be interpreted as precluding national legislation and/or case-law, according to which a worker who has been unfairly dismissed and subsequently reinstated by a court decision, is not entitled to paid annual leave for the period from the date of dismissal until the date of his reinstatement?

                  2.

                  In the event that the first question is answered in the affirmative, must Article 7(2) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time be interpreted as precluding national legislation and/or case-law, according to which in the event that the employment relationship is terminated once again the worker in question is not entitled to financial compensation for unused paid annual leave for the period from the date of his previous dismissal until the date of his reinstatement

         (1)  OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9.


title: Joined Cases C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union v Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, formerly Sachsa Verpackung GmbH, Gascogne SA, European Commission (C-138/17), Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, Gascogne SA v European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Commission (C-146/17) (Appeal — Actions for damages — Second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU — Excessive duration of the proceedings in two cases before the General Court of the European Union — Damage allegedly suffered by the applicants — Material damage — Bank guarantee charges — Causal link — Default interest — Non material damage)

text:
               18.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 65/2

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union v Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, formerly Sachsa Verpackung GmbH, Gascogne SA, European Commission (C-138/17), Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, Gascogne SA v European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Commission (C-146/17)
      (Joined Cases C-138/17 P and C-146/17 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - Actions for damages - Second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU - Excessive duration of the proceedings in two cases before the General Court of the European Union - Damage allegedly suffered by the applicants - Material damage - Bank guarantee charges - Causal link - Default interest - Non material damage))
      (2019/C 65/02)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         (Case C-138/17 P)

         Appellant: European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union (represented by: J. Inghelram and Á.M. Almendros Manzano, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, formerly Sachsa Verpackung GmbH, Gascogne SA (represented by: F. Puel and E. Durand, avocats), European Commission (represented by: C. Urraca Caviedes, S. Noë and F. Erlbacher, acting as Agents)

         (Case C-146/17 P)

         Appellants: Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, Gascogne SA (represented by: F. Puel and E. Durand, avocats)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union (represented by: J. Inghelram and Á.M. Almendros Manzano, acting as Agents), European Commission

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside point 1 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 January 2017, Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v European Union (T-577/14, EU:T:2017:1);

                  2.

                  Dismisses the appeal in Case C-146/17 P brought by Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Gascogne SA;

                  3.

                  Dismisses the claim for damages brought by Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Gascogne SA inasmuch as it seeks to obtain compensation in the amount of EUR 187 571 for the alleged material damage consisting in the payment of bank guarantee charges beyond a reasonable time for adjudicating in the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 16 November 2011, Groupe Gascogne v Commission (T-72/06, not published, EU:T:2011:671), and of 16 November 2011, Sachsa Verpackung v Commission (T-79/06, not published, EU:T:2011:674);

                  4.

                  Orders Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Gascogne SA to bear their own costs and to pay all the costs incurred by the European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in relation to the present appeals, and to bear their own costs at first instance;

                  5.

                  Orders the European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, to bear its own costs incurred at first instance;

                  6.

                  Orders the Commission to bear its own costs of both the proceedings at first instance and of the appeal in Case C-138/17 P.

         (1)  OJ C 151, 15.5.2017.


title: Case C-150/17 P: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union v Kendrion NV, European Commission (Appeal — Actions for damages — Second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU — Excessive duration of the proceedings in a case before the General Court of the European Union — Compensation for damage allegedly suffered by the applicant — Material damage — Bank guarantee charges — Causal link — Default interest — Non-material damage)

text:
               18.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 65/3

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union v Kendrion NV, European Commission
      (Case C-150/17 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - Actions for damages - Second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU - Excessive duration of the proceedings in a case before the General Court of the European Union - Compensation for damage allegedly suffered by the applicant - Material damage - Bank guarantee charges - Causal link - Default interest - Non-material damage))
      (2019/C 65/03)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Parties

         Appellant: European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union (represented by: J. Inghelram and E. Beysen, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Kendrion NV (represented by: Y. de Vries, T. Ottervanger and E. Besselink, advocaten), European Commission (represented by: C. Urraca Caviedes, S. Noë and F. Erlbacher, acting as Agents)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside point 1 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 1 February 2017, Kendrion v European Union (T-479/14, EU:T:2017:48);

                  2.

                  Dismisses the cross-appeal brought by Kendrion NV;

                  3.

                  Dismisses the claim for damages brought by Kendrion NV, inasmuch as it seeks to obtain compensation for the material damage consisting in the payment of bank guarantee charges beyond a reasonable time for adjudicating in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 16 November 2011, Kendrion v Commission (T-54/06, not published, EU:T:2011:667);

                  4.

                  Orders Kendrion NV to bear its own costs and to pay all the costs incurred by the European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in relation to the present appeal, and to bear its own costs at first instance;

                  5.

                  Orders the European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, to bear its own costs incurred at first instance;

                  6.

                  Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs of both the proceedings at first instance and of the present appeal.

         (1)  OJ C 161, 22.5.2017.


title: Joined Cases C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union v Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA), Armando Álvarez, SA, European Commission (C-174/17 P), Plásticos Españoles, SA (ASPLA), Armando Álvarez, SA v European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Commission (C-222/17 P) (Appeal — Actions for damages — Second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU — Excessive duration of the proceedings in two cases before the General Court of the European Union — Compensation for damage allegedly suffered by the applicants — Material damage — Bank guarantee charges — Causal link — Default interest)

text:
               18.2.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 65/4

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 December 2018 — European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union v Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA), Armando Álvarez, SA, European Commission (C-174/17 P), Plásticos Españoles, SA (ASPLA), Armando Álvarez, SA v European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Commission (C-222/17 P)
      (Joined Cases C-174/17 P and C-222/17 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - Actions for damages - Second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU - Excessive duration of the proceedings in two cases before the General Court of the European Union - Compensation for damage allegedly suffered by the applicants - Material damage - Bank guarantee charges - Causal link - Default interest))
      (2019/C 65/04)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         (Case C-174/17 P)

         Appellant: European Union represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union (represented initially by J. Inghelram, Á.M. Almendros Manzano and P. Giusta, acting as Agents, and subsequently by J. Inghelram and Á.M. Almendros Manzano, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA), Armando Álvarez, SA (represented by: M. Troncoso Ferrer, C. Ruixó Claramunt and S. Moya Izquierdo, abogados), European Commission (represented by: C. Urraca Caviedes, S. Noë, F. Erlbacher and F. Castilla Contreras, acting as Agents)

         (Case C-222/17 P)

         Appellants: Plásticos Españoles, SA (ASPLA), Armando Álvarez, SA (represented by: S. Moya Izquierdo and M. Troncoso Ferrer, abogados)

         Other parties to the proceedings being: European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union (represented initially by J. Inghelram, Á.M. Almendros Manzano and P. Giusta, acting as Agents, and subsequently by J. Inghelram and Á.M. Almendros Manzano, acting as Agents), European Commission

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside point 1 of the operative part of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 17 February 2017, ASPLA and Armando Álvarez v European Union (T-40/15, EU:T:2017:105);

                  2.

                  Dismisses the appeal in Case C-222/17 P brought by Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA) and Armando Álvarez SA;

                  3.

                  Dismisses the claim for damages brought by Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA) and Armando Álvarez SA inasmuch as it seeks to obtain compensation in the amount of EUR 3 495 038,66 for the material damage suffered as a result of the fact that the reasonable time for adjudicating was exceeded in the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 16 November 2011, ASPLA v Commission (T-76/06, not published, EU:T:2011:672), and of 16 November 2011, Álvarez v Commission (T-78/06, not published, EU:T:2011:673);

                  4.

                  Orders Plásticos Españoles SA (ASPLA) and Armando Álvarez SA to bear their own costs and to pay all the costs incurred by the European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, in relation to the present appeals, and to bear their own costs at first instance;

                  5.

                  Orders the European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, to bear its own costs incurred at first instance;

                  6.

                  Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs of both the proceedings at first instance and of the appeal in Case C-174/17 P.

         (1)  OJ C 161, 22.5.2017.

         OJ C 213, 3.7.2017.