title: Case C-216/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 27 March 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v LM

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/13

         Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 27 March 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v LM
   (Case C-216/18)
   (2018/C 190/18)
   Language of the case: English

      Referring court

   High Court (Ireland)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Minister for Justice and Equality

      Defendant: LM

      Questions referred

               1.

               Notwithstanding the conclusions of the Court of Justice in Aranyosi and Caldararu, where a national court determines there is cogent evidence that conditions in the issuing Member State are incompatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial because the system of justice itself in the issuing Member State is no longer operating under the rule of law, is it necessary for the executing judicial authority to make any further assessment, specific and precise, as to the exposure of the individual concerned to the risk of unfair trial where his trial will take place within a system no longer operating within the rule of law?

               2.

               If the test to be applied requires a specific assessment of the requested person’s real risk of a flagrant denial of justice and where the national court has concluded that there is a systemic breach of the rule of law, is the national court as executing judicial authority obliged to revert to the issuing judicial authority for any further necessary information that could enable the national court discount the existence of the risk to an unfair trial and if so, what guarantees as to fair trial would be required?


title: Case T-227/18: Action brought on 3 April 2018 — Microsemi Europe and Microsemi v Commission

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/39

         Action brought on 3 April 2018 — Microsemi Europe and Microsemi v Commission
   (Case T-227/18)
   (2018/C 190/64)
   Language of the case: German

      Parties

      Applicants: Microsemi Europe Ltd (Reading, United Kingdom) and Microsemi Corp. (Aliso Viejo, California, United States) (represented by: D. Aulfes and J. Lenz, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

               —

               annul the decision of the Commission of 23 January 2018 (in respect of Case AT.40529 — TSMC) based on Article 18(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003;

               —

               order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on twelve pleas in law.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements, as the decision neither names the addressee nor allows the addressee to be identified with sufficient clarity.

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging a lack of authority, in so far as the second applicant is to be regarded as the addressee of the contested decision.
               The applicants submit that the Commission does not have the authority to issue acts with legal effects beyond the territory of the European Union and that it cannot require an undertaking with its seat in the United States of America to submit information.

               3.

               Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties and of the legal provisions to be applied in their implementation, in so far as the second applicant is to be regarded as the addressee of the contested decision.
               In this respect it is submitted that the Commission cannot require an undertaking with its seat in the United States of America to submit information and that it is not permitted to give incorrect information to that undertaking with regard to the possibility of the imposition of pecuniary penalties.

               4.

               Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties and of the legal provisions to be applied in their implementation.
               Further, the applicants submit that the Commission is not permitted to require the submission of information in respect of all the undertakings of a group on a global level pursuant to recital 23 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, but rather can require such information only in respect of the European market.

               5.

               Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties and of the legal provisions to be applied in their implementation.
               Moreover, the applicants claim that the Commission also breaches the principle of proportionality when it requests information about markets outside of the European Union.

               6.

               Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties and of the legal provisions to be applied in their implementation, in so far as the first applicant is to be regarded as the addressee of the contested decision.
               In this respect it is submitted that requiring information about a parent company in the United States of America and other associated undertakings in Europe from a subsidiary in the European Union amounts to a breach of the principle of proportionality.

               7.

               Seventh plea in law, alleging a misuse of powers.
               The applicants claim that requesting information about associated undertakings in the European Union constitutes a misuse of powers, as those undertakings could be obliged to provide such information directly.

               8.

               Eighth plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to insufficient reasons being provided in the contested decision.

               9.

               Ninth plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements due to insufficient information on the purpose of the requests for information.

               10.

               Tenth plea in law, alleging infringement of essential procedural requirements, as the questions asked in the contested decision are not permissible.

               11.

               Eleventh plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties and of the legal provisions to be applied in their implementation, as the questions asked in the contested decision are imprecise.

               12.

               Twelfth plea in law, alleging infringement of the Treaties and of the legal provisions to be applied in their implementation.


title: Case C-236/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 29 March 2018 — GRDF SA v Eni Gas & Power France SA, Direct énergie, Commission de régulation de l’énergie, Procureur général près la Cour d’appel de Paris

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/14

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de cassation (France) lodged on 29 March 2018 — GRDF SA v Eni Gas & Power France SA, Direct énergie, Commission de régulation de l’énergie, Procureur général près la Cour d’appel de Paris
   (Case C-236/18)
   (2018/C 190/19)
   Language of the case: French

      Referring court

   Cour de cassation

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: GRDF SA

      Respondents: Eni Gas & Power France SA, Direct énergie, Commission de régulation de l’énergie, Procureur général près la Cour d’appel de Paris

      Question referred

   Is Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009, (1) and in particular Article 41(11) thereof, to be interpreted as requiring that a regulatory authority, when settling a dispute, must have power to issue a decision which applies to the whole of the period to which that dispute relates, regardless of the date on which that dispute arose between the parties, in particular by drawing the consequences of the non-conformity of a contract with the provisions of the directive by means of a decision taking effect as regards the whole of the contractual period?

      (1)  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 94).


title: Case T-229/18: Action brought on 04 April 2018 — Biolatte v EUIPO (Biolatte)

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/41

         Action brought on 04 April 2018 — Biolatte v EUIPO (Biolatte)
   (Case T-229/18)
   (2018/C 190/65)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Biolatte Oy (Turku, Finland) (represented by: J. Ikonen, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Trade mark at issue: EU word mark ‘Biolatte’ — Application for registration No 15 759 319

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 February 2018 in Case R 351/2017-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

               —

               set aside the contested decision in its entirety;

               —

               order that the word mark registration should be granted in accordance with Biolatte Oy’s application filed on 17 August 2016 (as amended on 28 October 2016).

      Plea in law

               —

               Infringement of article 7 (1)(b) of Regulation No 2017/1001.


title: Case T-185/16: Order of the General Court of 9 April 2018 — Make up for ever v EUIPO — L’Oréal (MAKE UP FOR EVER PROFESSIONAL) (EU trade mark — Application for a declaration of invalidity — Withdrawal of the application for a declaration of invalidity — No need to adjudicate)

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/28

         Order of the General Court of 9 April 2018 — Make up for ever v EUIPO — L’Oréal (MAKE UP FOR EVER PROFESSIONAL)
   (Case T-185/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Application for a declaration of invalidity - Withdrawal of the application for a declaration of invalidity - No need to adjudicate))
   (2018/C 190/49)
   Language of the case: French

      Parties

      Applicant: Make up for ever (Paris, France) (represented by: C. Caron, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Bonne and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: L’Oréal SA (Paris) (represented by: S. Micallef, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 5 February 2016 (Case R 3222/2014-5) relating to invalidity proceedings between L’Oréal and Make up for ever.

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

               2.

               Make up for ever and L’Oréal SA shall bear their own costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

      (1)  OJ C 243, 4.7.2016.


title: Case C-636/17: Order of the President of the Court of 28 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Korneuburg — Austria) — Germanwings GmbH v Emina Pedić

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/21

         Order of the President of the Court of 28 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Korneuburg — Austria) — Germanwings GmbH v Emina Pedić
   (Case C-636/17) (1)

   (2018/C 190/38)
   Language of the case: German
   The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 63, 19.2.2018.


title: Case C-237/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Pauline Stiernon, Marion Goraguer, Muriel Buccarello, Clémentine Vasseur, Manon Pirotton, Anissa Quotb v Etat belge, SPF Santé publique, Communauté française de Belgique

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/15

         Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Pauline Stiernon, Marion Goraguer, Muriel Buccarello, Clémentine Vasseur, Manon Pirotton, Anissa Quotb v Etat belge, SPF Santé publique, Communauté française de Belgique
   (Case C-237/18)
   (2018/C 190/20)
   Language of the case: French

      Referring court

   Tribunal de première instance de Liège

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Pauline Stiernon, Marion Goraguer, Muriel Buccarello, Clémentine Vasseur, Manon Pirotton, Anissa Quotb

      Defendants: Etat belge, SPF Santé publique, Communauté française de Belgique

      Question referred

   Inasmuch as Royal Order of 02/07/2009 establishing the list of allied health professions does not list psychomotor therapy as an allied health profession, although an undergraduate degree in psychomotor therapy has been established in Belgium, thereby restricting the freedom of movement of persons, the freedom to choose an occupation and the right to engage in work, does [that Royal Order] infringe Articles 20, 21 and 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights?


title: Case T-320/16: Order of the General Court of 9 April 2018 — Make up for ever v EUIPO — L’Oréal (MAKE UP FOR EVER) (EU trade mark — Application for a declaration of invalidity — Withdrawal of the application for a declaration of invalidity — No need to adjudicate)

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/28

         Order of the General Court of 9 April 2018 — Make up for ever v EUIPO — L’Oréal (MAKE UP FOR EVER)
   (Case T-320/16) (1)

   ((EU trade mark - Application for a declaration of invalidity - Withdrawal of the application for a declaration of invalidity - No need to adjudicate))
   (2018/C 190/50)
   Language of the case: French

      Parties

      Applicant: Make up for ever (Paris, France) (represented by: C. Caron, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Bonne and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: L’Oréal SA (Paris) (represented by: S. Micallef, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 21 March 2016 (Case R 985/2015-5) relating to invalidity proceedings between L’Oréal and Make up for ever.

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

               2.

               Make up for ever and L’Oréal SA shall bear their own costs and shall each pay half of the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

      (1)  OJ C 296, 16.8.2016.


title: Case C-244/18 PP: Appeal brought on 4 April 2018 by Larko Geniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki AE against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 1 February 2018 in Case T-423/14, Larko v Commission

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/15

         Appeal brought on 4 April 2018 by Larko Geniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki AE against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 1 February 2018 in Case T-423/14, Larko v Commission
   (Case C-244/18 PP)
   (2018/C 190/21)
   Language of the case: Greek

      Parties

      Appellant: Larko Geniki Metalleftiki kai Metallourgiki AE (represented by: I. Dryllerakis, I. Soufleros, E. Triantafyllou, G. Psaroudakis, E. Rantos and N. Korogiannakis, lawyers)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

      Form of order sought

               —

               Grant the appeal.

               —

               Refer the case back to the General Court for reassessment, reserving the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of its appeal, the appellant relies on the following four grounds of appeal:

               1.

                  First ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU in respect of the conclusion that Measure No 3 conferred an advantage on the appellant, misapplying the private investor principle.

               2.

                  Second ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU and Article 296(2) TFEU in respect of the conclusion that Measures No 2 and 4 conferred an advantage on the appellant. With regard to Measure No 2 (2008 guarantee): misinterpretation of the temporal criterion in the concept of undertaking in difficulty. Misinterpretation of the criterion of remuneration of the guarantee. With regard to Measure No 4 (2010 guarantee): (a) failure to state reasons regarding the granting of the guarantee as a current practice; (b) failure to state reasons regarding the irreparable harm that the appellant claims to have suffered; (c) failure to state reasons and infringement of Article 107(1) TFEU and of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations as regards the conditions of the guarantee and the amount of the commission; (d) failure to state reasons regarding the particular position of the National Bank of Greece SA (ETE) as private shareholder.

               3.

                  Third ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 107(3)(b) and Article 296(2) TFUE in respect of the conclusion that Measure No 6 was incompatible with the common market. (a) As regards the application of the 2011 Temporary Framework; (b) as regards the application of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.

               4.

                  Fourth ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 108(2) TFEU, Article 14(1) of Regulation No 659/1999 (1)
                  and Article 296(2) TFEU regarding the quantification of the aid amount to be recovered by Measures 2, 4 and 6. As regards the points accepted in the judgment under appeal concerning the specificities of the State aid in the form of guarantees.

      (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ 1999 L 83, p. 1).


title: Case T-235/18: Action brought on 6 April 2018 — Qualcomm/Commission

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/41

         Action brought on 6 April 2018 — Qualcomm/Commission
   (Case T-235/18)
   (2018/C 190/66)
   Language of the case: English

      Parties

      Applicant: Qualcomm, Inc. (San Diego, California, United States) (represented by: M. Pinto de Lemos Fermiano Rato, M. Davilla and M. English, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

               —

               Annul the contested decision;

               —

               Annul, or in the alternative, reduce substantially the amount of the fine;

               —

               Order the measures of organisation or inquiry referred to in the application; and

               —

               Order the European Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

               1.

               First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is vitiated by manifest procedural errors;

               2.

               Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision commits manifest errors of assessment, fails to state reasons and distorts evidence in dismissing Qualcomm’s efficiency defence;

               3.

               Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision commits manifest errors of law and of assessment in finding that the impugned agreements were capable of producing potential anticompetitive effects;

               4.

               Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision commits manifest errors of assessment regarding the definition of the relevant product market and the finding of dominance;

               5.

               Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision commits manifest errors of law and of assessment and fails to state reasons with regard to the duration of the alleged infringement;

               6.

               Sixth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision commits manifest errors of assessment in applying the fining guidelines and infringes the principle of proportionality; and

               7.

               Seventh plea in law, alleging that the contested decision commits manifest errors of assessment in establishing the Commission’s jurisdiction and effect on trade between Member States.


title: Case C-252/18 PP: Appeal brought on 6 April 2018 by the Hellenic Republic against the judgment delivered on 1 February 2018 in Case T-506/15 Hellenic Republic v European Commission

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/16

         Appeal brought on 6 April 2018 by the Hellenic Republic against the judgment delivered on 1 February 2018 in Case T-506/15 Hellenic Republic v European Commission
   (Case C-252/18 PP)
   (2018/C 190/22)
   Language of the case: Greek

      Parties

      Appellant: Hellenic Republic (represented by: G. Kanellopoulos, E. Leftheriotou, A. Vasilopoulou and E. Chroni)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellant asks the Court to grant its appeal, set aside the judgment under appeal of the General Court of 1 February 2018 in Case T-506/15, in accordance with the maters specifically set out in its appeal, uphold the action brought by the Hellenic Republic on 29 August 2015 in accordance with the form of order set out in its application, annul Commission Decision 2015/1119/EU of 22 June 2015 in so far as it imposes (a) one-off and flat-rate financial corrections of EUR 313 483 531,71 for the 2009, 2010 and 2011 claim years in the sector of area-related direct aid, and (b) a flat-rate financial correction of 2 %, with regard to cross-compliance, in the 2011 claim year, and order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceeding.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on five grounds:

               A.

               In so far as the judgment under appeal examines the first and second grounds of appeal, concerning the correction of 25 % of area aid (paragraphs 48-140 of the judgment under appeal).
               The first ground of appeal concerns the misinterpretation and application of Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 796/2004 of the Commission of 21 April 2004, regarding the definition of pasture, and the misapplication of Article 296 TFEU, as well as the insufficient and inadequate reasoning of the judgment under appeal.
               The second ground of appeal concerns the misinterpretation and misapplication of the Guidelines (document VI/5530/1997) with respect to whether the conditions for the imposition of a 25 % financial correction are met, misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 296 TFEU and of Articles 43, 44 and 137 of Regulation No 73/2009, insufficient and contradictory reasoning of the judgment under appeal, breach of the principle of equality of arms and alteration of the summary report.

               B.

               In so far as the judgment under appeal examines the third ground of appeal, concerning the imposition of a 5 % financial correction for weaknesses in the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) (paragraphs 141-162 of the judgment under appeal).
               The third ground of appeal concerns breach of the principle of legality, of good administration, of the rights of defence of the person concerned, breach of the principle of proportionality, misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 296 TFEU and insufficient reasoning.

               C.

               In so far as the judgment under appeal examines the fourth ground of appeal, concerning the imposition of a financial correction of 2 % (paragraphs 163-183 of the judgment under appeal).
               The fourth ground of appeal concerns the misinterpretation and misapplication of Article 31(2) of Regulation No 1122/2009 and Article 27 of Regulation No 796/2004, inadequate reasoning of the judgment under appeal, as well as a distortion of the content of the application.

               D.

               In so far as the judgment under appeal examines the fifth ground of appeal, relating to the cross-compliance system (paragraphs 184 to 268 of the judgment under appeal).
               The fifth ground of appeal concerns the erroneous interpretation and application of Article 11 of Regulation No 885/2006 and Article 31 of Regulation No 1290/2005, as well as insufficient reasoning of the judgment under appeal.


title: Case T-320/17: Order of the General Court of 10 April 2018 — European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIF

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/42

         Order of the General Court of 10 April 2018 — European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v EIF
   (Case T-320/17) (1)

   (2018/C 190/67)
   Language of the case: English
   The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 256, 7.8.2017.


title: Case T-813/16: Order of the General Court of 11 April 2018 — ABES v Commission (Action for annulment — State aid — Grants from the Portuguese authorities to an entity providing social services for the elderly — Preliminary examination procedure — Decision finding no State aid — Action challenging the merits of the contested measure — No substantial effect on the competitive position — Inadmissibility)

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/29

         Order of the General Court of 11 April 2018 — ABES v Commission
   (Case T-813/16) (1)

   ((Action for annulment - State aid - Grants from the Portuguese authorities to an entity providing social services for the elderly - Preliminary examination procedure - Decision finding no State aid - Action challenging the merits of the contested measure - No substantial effect on the competitive position - Inadmissibility))
   (2018/C 190/51)
   Language of the case: Portuguese

      Parties

      Applicant: ABES (São Pedro de Tomar, Portugal) (represented by: N. Mimoso Ruiz, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: M. França and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents)

      Intervener in support of the defendant: Portuguese Republic (represented by: L. Inez Fernandes, M. Figueiredo and M. J. Castanheira Neves, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 5054 final of 9 August 2016 on State Aid SA.38920 (2014/NN), declaring, after the preliminary examination stage, that the grant awarded to Santa Casa de Misericórdia de Tomar does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

      Operative part of the order

               1.

               The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

               2.

               Abes — companhia de assistência, bem-estar e serviços para seniores, Lda is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

               3.

               The Portuguese Republic is ordered to bear its own costs.

      (1)  OJ C 30, 30.1.2017.


title: Case C-344/16: Order of the President of the Court of 23 January 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — Die Länderbahn GmbH DLB v DB Station & Service AG

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/17

         Order of the President of the Court of 23 January 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — Die Länderbahn GmbH DLB v DB Station & Service AG
   (Case C-344/16) (1)

   (2018/C 190/23)
   Language of the case: German
   The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 428, 21.11.2016.


title: Case C-603/16 P: Order of the President of the Court of 16 February 2018 — Council of the European Union v PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia, PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia, European Commission, European Biodiesel Board (EBB)

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/17

         Order of the President of the Court of 16 February 2018 — Council of the European Union v PT Wilmar Bioenergi Indonesia, PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia, European Commission, European Biodiesel Board (EBB)
   (Case C-603/16 P) (1)

   (2018/C 190/24)
   Language of the case: English
   The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 30, 31.1.2017.


title: Case C-604/16 P: Order of the President of the Court of 16 February 2018 — Council of the European Union v PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri, European Commission, European Biodiesel Board (EBB)

text:
               4.6.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 190/18

         Order of the President of the Court of 16 February 2018 — Council of the European Union v PT Pelita Agung Agrindustri, European Commission, European Biodiesel Board (EBB)
   (Case C-604/16 P) (1)

   (2018/C 190/25)
   Language of the case: English
   The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

      (1)  OJ C 30, 30.1.2017.


201805250591897312018/C 200/481832017TC20020180611EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180424383811Case T-183/17: Judgment of the General Court of 24 April 2018 — Menta y Limón Decoración v EUIPO — Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de La Palma (Representation of a man in regional costume) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark representing a man in regional costume — Earlier national industrial designs — Relative ground for refusal — Article 53(2)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 60(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Use of the EU trade mark prohibited under national law — Application of national law by EUIPO)
 ---documentbreak--- C2002018EN3810120180424EN0048381381Judgment of the General Court of 24 April 2018 — Menta y Limón Decoración v EUIPO — Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de La Palma (Representation of a man in regional costume)
   (Case T-183/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark representing a man in regional costume — Earlier national industrial designs — Relative ground for refusal — Article 53(2)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 60(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Use of the EU trade mark prohibited under national law — Application of national law by EUIPO)’2018/C 200/48Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicant: Menta y Limón Decoración, SL (Argame, Spain) (represented by: E. Estella Garbayo, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented initially by S. Palmero Cabezas, and subsequently by J. Crespo Carrillo, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de La Palma (Santa Cruz de La Palma, Spain) (represented by: M.J. Sanmartín Sanmartín, lawyer)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 January 2017 (Case R 510/2015-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Menta y Limón Decoración and Ayuntamiento de Santa Cruz de La Palma.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Menta y Limón Decoración, SL to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 151, 15.5.2017.


201805250521897062018/C 200/642492018TC20020180611EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180416505011Case T-249/18: Action brought on 16 April 2018 — Saab Halabi v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2002018EN5010120180416EN0064501501Action brought on 16 April 2018 — Saab Halabi v Council
   (Case T-249/18)2018/C 200/64Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Tarek William Saab Halabi (Venezuela) (represented by: L. Giuliano and F. Di Gianni, lawyers)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/90 of 22 January 2018 amending Decision (CFSP) 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/88 of 22 January 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2063 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela, in so far as their provisions concern the applicant; and

            —

            order the Council to bear the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Council infringed the principle of sound administration and breached his rights of defense and to effective judicial protection by failing to provide access to the evidence allegedly supporting his listing within a reasonable period of time.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Council did not prove the existence of the conditions for his listing and committed a manifest error of assessment since it failed to demonstrate that, in his role as attorney general and previous roles as ombudsman and president of the Republican Moral Council, the applicant has undermined democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela.


201806080301931522018/C 221/372252018TC22120180625EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180401313221Case T-225/18: Action brought on 1 April 2018 — Manéa v CdT
 ---documentbreak--- C2212018EN3110120180401EN0037311322Action brought on 1 April 2018 — Manéa v CdT
   (Case T-225/18)2018/C 221/37Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Camelia Manéa (Echternach, Luxembourg) (represented by: M.-A. Lucas, lawyer)

      Defendant: Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT)

      Form of order sought

            —

            Annul the decision of 29 May 2017 of the Director of the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (‘CdT’) not to renew, with effect from 12 November 2015, the applicant’s fixed-term contract of employment as a temporary member of staff, which would actually have ended on 31 January 2016;

            —

            Order the re-employment of the applicant as a temporary member of staff of the CdT with effect from 1 January 2019 or, should that prove impossible, order the defendant to pay her compensation for the material and non-material harm which she has suffered as a result of losing an employment not limited in time, a sum corresponding to the remuneration which she would have earned had she remained in the service of the CdT for four years, net, if necessary, of remuneration or compensation which she may otherwise receive, and to pay the corresponding contributions to the Community pension scheme;

            —

            Order the CdT to pay her compensation for the non-material and material harm which she suffered as a result of the decision of 12 November 2015 in the sum of EUR 11136 in respect of non-material harm, the sum of EUR 12000 in respect of her loss of remuneration and the sum of EUR 9674 in respect of her representation costs;

            —

            Order the defendant to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to replace the applicant in the legal position in existence before the withdrawn act, factual errors, manifest errors of assessment or an insufficient statement of reasons, and disregard for the interest of the service, in that the new decision not to re-employ the applicant on 31 January 2016 was based on factors which, contrary to the view taken by the defendant, would not have existed when the question of her re-employment arose in November 2015.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging, firstly, a failure to have regard to the staff policy defined by the Management Board, in that the view was taken in the decision not to re-employ her that it was in the interests of the service to implement a policy of replacing the temporary members of staff by members of the contractual staff. Secondly, this plea alleges an error of assessment in that the view was taken that the replacement of the applicant by a member of the contractual staff was justified by the reorganisation of the Translation Support Department and, thirdly, a factual error in that the view was taken that that was the case.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging an error of law, a manifest error of assessment and/or an insufficient statement of reasons, in that it was decided, retroactively and on the sole ground of the interest of the service, not to re-employ the applicant rather than to compensate her, while, in her view, reinstatement of the withdrawn decision was impossible or particularly difficult. Moreover, that decision was not necessary to achieve the objectives of the measure, did not constitute a full re-examination of the facts of the case, ran counter to legitimate expectations and allowed an obligation to persist to remedy the harm resulting from the other irregularities by which the original decision was vitiated.


201806150681955372018/C 231/256262016TC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180516212222Case T-626/16: Judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2018 — Troszczynski v Parliament (Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of the European Parliament — Parliamentary assistance allowance — Recovery of sums unduly paid — Power of the Secretary-General — Electa una via — Rights of the defence — Burden of proof — Obligation to state reasons — Political rights — Equal treatment — Misuse of power — Independence of the Members — Error of fact — Proportionality)
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN2120120180516EN0025212222Judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2018 — Troszczynski v Parliament
   (Case T-626/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Rules governing the payment of expenses and allowances to Members of the European Parliament — Parliamentary assistance allowance — Recovery of sums unduly paid — Power of the Secretary-General — Electa una via — Rights of the defence — Burden of proof — Obligation to state reasons — Political rights — Equal treatment — Misuse of power — Independence of the Members — Error of fact — Proportionality)’2018/C 231/25Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Mylène Troszczynski (Noyon, France) (represented initially by: M. Ceccaldi, and subsequently by F. Wagner, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: G. Corstens and S. Seyr, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application on the basis of Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of the decision of the Secretary-General of the Parliament of 23 June 2016 concerning the recovery from the applicant of a sum of EUR 56554 wrongfully paid as parliamentary assistance allowance and the debit note relating thereto.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Ms Mylène Troszczynski to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament, including those related to the interlocutory proceedings.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 383, 17.10.2016.


201806150441954822018/C 231/182622018CJC23120180702EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180416141632Case C-262/18 P: Appeal brought on 16 April 2018 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-216/15: Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s. v European Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2312018EN1420120180416EN0018142163Appeal brought on 16 April 2018 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 5 February 2018 in Case T-216/15: Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa, a.s. v European Commission
   (Case C-262/18 P)2018/C 231/18Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: European Commission (represented by: P.J. Loewenthal, F. Tomat, Agents)

      Other parties to the proceedings: Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa a.s., Slovak Republic, Union zdravotná poisťovňa a.s.

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 5 February 2018 in Case T-216/15, Dôvera v Commission;

            —

            refer the case back to the General Court for consideration;

            —

            alternatively, make use of its power under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to give final judgment in the matter; and

            —

            reserve the costs of the present proceedings, if it refers the case back to the General Court, or order Dôvera zdravotná poisťovňa a.s. and Union zdravotná poisťovňa a.s. to pay the costs of the proceedings, if it gives final judgment in the matter.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   By the contested judgment, the General Court annulled Commission Decision (EU) 2015/248 of 15 October 2014 on the measures SA.23008 (2013/C) (ex2013/NN) granted by the Slovak Republic to Spoločná zdravotná poisťovňa a.s. (SZP) and Všeobecná zdravotná poist'ovňa a.s. (VZP) (OJ 2015, L 41, p. 25).
   The Commission puts forward three grounds in support of its appeal of the contested judgment.
   First, the Commission considers the General Court to have failed to fulfil its duty to state reasons under Article 36 and 53, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court of Justice. In the contested judgment, the General Court claims to annul the contested decision by upholding the applicant’s second plea at first instance, namely that the Commission was wrong to conclude that the Slovak compulsory health insurance scheme is predominantly solidarity-based. However, the legal standard it in fact applied to annul that decision is the one that the applicant proposed under its first plea at first instance, namely that the mere presence of any economic features transforms the provision of health insurance into an economic activity. Since the legal standard under the applicant’s first and second pleas were mutually exclusive, the Commission is not in a position to understand on what basis the contested decision was annulled.
   Second, the Commission considers the General Court to have committed an error of law by misinterpreting the notion of undertaking within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. In the contested judgment, the General Court upheld the Commission’s conclusion that the Slovak compulsory health insurance scheme was predominantly solidarity-based, as well as its explanation that its economic features were introduced to ensure that its social and solidarity objectives were attained. It nevertheless found that the Commission committed an error of assessment by concluding that the activity carried out by health insurers under the Slovak compulsory health insurance scheme is not economic in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by noting insurers’ ability to make, use and distribute part of their profits and the competition between insurers for customers and on quality of services. It then found that the mere presence of for-profit insurers in Slovakia transform SZP and VZP by contagion into undertakings within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. In so concluding, the General Court disregarded the case-law according to which a health insurance scheme that is predominantly solidarity-based and whose economic features were introduced to ensure the continuity of the scheme and the attainment of the social and solidarity objectives underpinning it is non-economic in nature, so that the health insurance providers operating under that scheme are not undertakings.
   Third, the Commission considers the General Court to have distorted the evidence submitted to it at first instance in concluding that there was ‘intense and complex competition’ between health insurance providers in Slovakia, when the case file only pointed to a very limited amount of competition for the provision of non-mandatory benefits free of charge.


201808030342049932018/C 294/181182018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180214131422Case C-118/18 P: Appeal brought on 14 February 2018 by Hochmann Marketing GmbH, formerly Bittorrent Marketing GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2017 in Case T-771/15: Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN1320120180214EN0018132142Appeal brought on 14 February 2018 by Hochmann Marketing GmbH, formerly Bittorrent Marketing GmbH against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2017 in Case T-771/15: Hochmann Marketing v EUIPO
   (Case C-118/18 P)2018/C 294/18Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Hochmann Marketing GmbH, formerly Bittorrent Marketing GmbH (represented by: C. Hoppe, Rechtsanwalt)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office
   By order of 28 June 2018 the Court of Justice (Ninth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.


201808030202050072018/C 294/514072018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180621373822Case C-407/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Slovenia) lodged on 21 June 2018 — Aleš Kuhar, Jožef Kuhar v Addiko Bank d.d.
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3720120180621EN0051372382Request for a preliminary ruling from the Višje sodišče v Mariboru (Slovenia) lodged on 21 June 2018 — Aleš Kuhar, Jožef Kuhar v Addiko Bank d.d.
   (Case C-407/18)2018/C 294/51Language of the case: Slovenian
      Referring court

   Višje sodišče v Mariboru

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Aleš Kuhar, Jožef Kuhar

      Defendant: Addiko Bank d.d.

      Question referred

   In the light of the principle of effectiveness of EU law, should Council Directive 93/13/EEC (
         1
      ) be interpreted as meaning that, in enforcement proceedings, the court responsible for enforcement is required of its own motion to refuse enforcement on the ground that a directly enforceable notarial instrument (enforceable measure) contains an unfair clause, in a case such as that under consideration, in which the procedural rules of the Member State do not allow the court responsible for enforcement to suspend or stay enforcement (upon application by the debtor or of its own motion) until a final substantive decision on whether the term is unfair is given at the end of proceedings for declaratory relief brought by the debtor as consumer?
   (
         1
      )	Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


201808030252049692018/C 294/075642016CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806286611Case C-564/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) v Puma SE (Appeal — EU trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(5) — Article 76 — Opposition proceedings — Relative grounds for refusal — Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 — Rule 19 — Rule 50(1) — Earlier decisions of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) recognising the reputation of the earlier trade mark — Principle of sound administration — Taking account of those decisions in subsequent opposition proceedings — Obligation to state reasons — Procedural obligations of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN610120180628EN00076161Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) v Puma SE
   (Case C-564/16 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — EU trade mark — Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 — Article 8(5) — Article 76 — Opposition proceedings — Relative grounds for refusal — Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 — Rule 19 — Rule 50(1) — Earlier decisions of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) recognising the reputation of the earlier trade mark — Principle of sound administration — Taking account of those decisions in subsequent opposition proceedings — Obligation to state reasons — Procedural obligations of the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO)’2018/C 294/07Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: D. Botis and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

      Other party to the proceedings: Puma SE (represented by: P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón, abogado)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal;

            2.

            Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


201808030052049982018/C 294/293562018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531222211Case C-356/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 May 2018 — Christian Gmoser v Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2210120180531EN0029221221Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 May 2018 — Christian Gmoser v Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich
   (Case C-356/18)2018/C 294/29Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landesgericht Salzburg

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Christian Gmoser

      Defendant: Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must Article 15(1) of Directive 90/619/EEC (Second Life Assurance Directive), (
                  1
               ) as amended by Directive 92/96/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), (
                  2
               ) in conjunction with Article 31 of Directive 92/96/EEC, be interpreted as meaning that information regarding the right of cancellation must also contain a notice that the cancellation does not have to be communicated in any specific form?

            2.

            In the event that the information issued to the policy-holder regarding the right of cancellation was incorrect, is it still possible for the life assurance contract to be cancelled after it has been terminated by the policy-holder by giving notice of termination (and repurchase)?

      (
         1
      )	Second Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50).
   (
         2
      )	Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive) (OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1).


201808030692050792018/C 294/604022017TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180703454622Cases T-402/17 and T-403/17: Judgment of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — Vienna International Hotelmanagement v EUIPO (Vienna House and VIENNA HOUSE) (EU trade mark — Applications for EU word mark Vienna House and figurative mark VIENNA HOUSE — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Not distinctive — Article 7(1(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001))
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN4520120180703EN0060452462Judgment of the General Court of 3 July 2018 — Vienna International Hotelmanagement v EUIPO (Vienna House and VIENNA HOUSE)
   (Cases T-402/17 and T-403/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Applications for EU word mark Vienna House and figurative mark VIENNA HOUSE — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Not distinctive — Article 7(1(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001))’2018/C 294/60Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Vienna International Hotelmanagement AG (Vienna, Austria) (represented by: E. Zrzavy, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 April 2017 (Cases R 333/2016-4 and R 332/2016-4) concerning applications for registration of, on the one hand, the word sign Vienna House and, on the other, the figurative sign VIENNA HOUSE as EU trade marks.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Orders the joinder of Cases T-402/17 and T-403/17 for the purposes of the present judgment;

            2.

            Dismisses the actions;

            3.

            Orders Vienna International Hotelmanagement AG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 277, 21.8.2017.


201808030752050992018/C 294/764132018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180704616111Case T-413/18: Action brought on 4 July 2018 — Portigon v SRB
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN6110120180704EN0076611611Action brought on 4 July 2018 — Portigon v SRB
   (Case T-413/18)2018/C 294/76Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Portigon AG (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: D. Bliesener and V. Jungkind, lawyers)

      Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the defendant’s decision of 12 April 2018 concerning the calculation of the ex-ante contributions to the Single Resolution Fund for 2018 (SRB/ES/SRF/2018/03) in so far as the decision concerns the applicant;

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law which are, in essence, identical or similar to the pleas in law relied on in Case T-420/17, Portigon v SRB. (
         1
      )
   (
         1
      )	OJ 2017 C 277, p. 56.


201808030632050822018/C 294/774152018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180704626321Case T-415/18: Action brought on 4 July 2018 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN6210120180704EN0077621632Action brought on 4 July 2018 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission
   (Case T-415/18)2018/C 294/77Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicants: Silgan Closures GmbH (Munich, Germany) and Silgan Holdings Inc. (Stamford, Connecticut, United States) (represented by: D. Seeliger, Y. Gürer, R. Grafunder and V. Weiss, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the Court should:

            —

            annul inspection decision C(2018) 2173 final of 6 April 2018, notified on 24 April 2018;

            —

            annul all measures taken on the basis of the inspection, which was conducted on the basis of that unlawful decision;

            —

            in particular order the Commission to return all copies of documents made and taken away during that inspection, on pain of annulment of the future Commission decision by the General Court; and

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The action is based on the following pleas in law.

            1.

            Infringement of fundamental rights of defence and principles of procedural law
            In the context of the first plea, the applicants claim in particular that the Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Competition Authority) disclosed information to the Commission which the applicants had made available to the Bundeskartellamt in the national proceedings ongoing since 2014 in the context of their cooperation and which should therefore not have been disclosed in the course of the exchange of information under Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003. (
                  1
               )

            2.

            Failure to state adequate reasons in the inspection decision and an unreasonably wide and non-specific description of the subject matter of the inspection (‘fishing expedition’), as well as a lack of sufficient evidence

            3.

            Infringement of the principle of proportionality
            In this regard, the applicants claim that the ordering of the inspection on the basis of the investigations and state of proceedings before the Bundeskartellamt was neither necessary nor appropriate.

            4.

            Misuse of powers
            In the context of the fourth plea, the applicants argue that the ordering of the inspection is based on irrelevant considerations. The case involves improper cooperation of the Bundeskartellamt and the Commission in order to enable the Commission to impose penalties on companies which might not have been possible at a national level as a result of legislative lacunae.

            5.

            Lack of competence of the Commission and infringement of the principle of subsidiarity
            In this regard, the applicants submit that it is not apparent either that it would have been inappropriate for the Bundeskartellamt to bring to a proper end the proceedings pending before it or why the proceedings, on account of their scope or effects, would be better conducted at EU level at such a late point in time.

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).


201808030242050482018/C 294/303572018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531232311Case C-357/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 May 2018 — Bettina Plackner v Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2310120180531EN0030231231Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesgericht Salzburg (Austria) lodged on 31 May 2018 — Bettina Plackner v Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich
   (Case C-357/18)2018/C 294/30Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Landesgericht Salzburg

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Bettina Plackner

      Defendant: Nürnberger Versicherung Aktiengesellschaft Österreich

      Question referred

   Must Article 15(1) of Directive 90/619/EEC (Second Life Assurance Directive), (
         1
      ) as amended by Directive 92/96/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), (
         2
      ) in conjunction with Article 31 of Directive 92/96/EEC, be interpreted as meaning that information regarding the right of cancellation must also contain the notice that the cancellation does not have to be communicated in any specific form?
   (
         1
      )	Second Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50).
   (
         2
      )	Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive) (OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1).


201808030162050392018/C 294/443872018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180612323211Case C-387/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 June 2018 — Delfarma Sp. z o.o. v Prezes Urzędu Rejestracji Produktów Leczniczych, Wyrobów Medycznych i Produktów Biobójczych
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3210120180612EN0044321321Request for a preliminary ruling from the Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 12 June 2018 — Delfarma Sp. z o.o. v Prezes Urzędu Rejestracji Produktów Leczniczych, Wyrobów Medycznych i Produktów Biobójczych
   (Case C-387/18)2018/C 294/44Language of the case: Polish
      Referring court

   Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Delfarma Sp. z o.o.

      Defendant: Prezes Urzędu Rejestracji Produktów Leczniczych, Wyrobów Medycznych i Produktów Biobójczych

      Question referred

   Does EU law, including without limitation Article 34 and Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, preclude national legislation whereby the marketing authorisation in a Member State for a medicinal product imported in parallel cannot be granted quite simply because the medicinal product imported in parallel has been authorised in the Member State of export as a generic medicinal product, namely on the basis of an abridged dossier, whereas in the Member State of import this medicinal product has been authorised as a reference medicinal product, namely on the basis of a full dossier, and the authorisation is refused without examining whether both products are essentially therapeutically identical and without the national authority applying — despite this being possible — for documentation to the appropriate authority in the Member State of export?


201808030432049872018/C 294/313592018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180601232422Case C-359/18 P: Appeal brought on 1 June 2018 by European Medicines Agency against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 22 March 2018 in Case T-80/16: Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland v EMA
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2320120180601EN0031232242Appeal brought on 1 June 2018 by European Medicines Agency against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 22 March 2018 in Case T-80/16: Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland v EMA
   (Case C-359/18 P)2018/C 294/31Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: European Medicines Agency (represented by: S. Marino, A. Spina, S. Drosos, T. Jabłoński, Agents)

      Other part to the proceedings: Shire Pharmaceuticals Ireland Ltd,
   European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            grant EMA’s appeal and set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-80/16;

            —

            reject the application of annulment as unfounded; and

            —

            order the applicant at first instance to pay all the costs of these proceedings (including the costs before the General Court).

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   EMA submits two grounds of appeal.

            1)

            The first ground of appeal comprises two limbs. Under the first limb of this first ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court erred in law when holding, at paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, that Article 5(1) of the Orphan Regulation (
                  1
               ) should be read separately from Article 5(2). Such interpretation stands in violation of Article 5(1), as it undermines the effectiveness of the provision.
            Under the second limb of the first ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court erred in law when holding, at paragraph 64 of the judgment under appeal, that the notion of medicinal product should be relied upon by the EMA when it establishes for the purpose of Article 5(1) whether an application for orphan designation and a previously submitted application for marketing authorisation overlap.

            2)

            Under the second ground of appeal, EMA submits that the General Court relied on an incorrect reading of the notion of medicinal products as set out in Article 1(2) of Directive (
                  2
               ) 2001/83/EC, insofar as it held that a difference in excipients and routes of administration between two products would render them different for the purpose of Article 5(1) of the Orphan Regulation.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan medicinal products (OJ 2000, L 18, p. 1)
   (
         2
      )	Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ 2001, L 311, p. 67)


201808030812050762018/C 294/784212018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180710636311Case T-421/18: Action brought on 10 July 2018 — Bauer Radio v EUIPO — Weinstein (MUSIKISS)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN6310120180710EN0078631631Action brought on 10 July 2018 — Bauer Radio v EUIPO — Weinstein (MUSIKISS)
   (Case T-421/18)2018/C 294/78Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Bauer Radio Ltd (Peterborough, United Kingdom) (represented by: G. Messenger, Barrister)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Simon Weinstein (Wien, Austria)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

      Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark MUSIKISS — Application for registration No 12 317 616

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 March 2018 in Case R 510/2017-1

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO and other party to bear their own costs and pay those of the Applicant.

      Plea in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201808030822050902018/C 294/623412018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531474821Case T-341/18: Action brought on 31 May 2018 — NEC Corporation/Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN4710120180531EN0062471482Action brought on 31 May 2018 — NEC Corporation/Commission
   (Case T-341/18)2018/C 294/62Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: NEC Corporation (Tokyo, Japan) (represented by: R. Bachour, Solicitor, O. Brouwer and A. Pliego Selie, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Commission Decision C(2018) 1768 final of 21 March 2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.40136 — Capacitors) insofar it finds that the applicant infringed Article 101 TFEU/Article 53 of the EEA Agreement,

            —

            in subsidiary order, annul the contested decision insofar as it imposes a fine on the applicant, and/or

            —

            in more subsidiary order, exercise its full jurisdiction to adjust the fine — in light of the arguments set out in grounds 1 and 2 — to a level which is in accordance with the law, the rationale of the legal concept of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance justifying an uplift of a fine and which is proportionate, and

            —

            order the Commission to bear the costs of the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision contains manifest errors in law and assessment, and lacks reasoning, when applying recidivism as an aggravating circumstance in fining NEC Corporation and that the fine imposed on NEC Corporation violates the principle of proportionality.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision violates the rights of defence of the applicant when suggesting in Article 1 that the applicant itself participated in the identified infringement whilst this was not set out or even suggested in the statement of objections. Moreover, this finding would be wrong in law and fact, and would contain an inconsistent finding and reasoning as it allegedly acknowledges at the same time (but qualifies as irrelevant) that NEC Corporation was not aware of the infringement and holds NEC Corporation explicitly liable as parent undertaking for (allegedly) having had control over Tokin Corporation during a certain period.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission omitted to apply the same reduction to the basic amount of the fine it imposed on Tokin Corporation as the reduction applied to the basic amount it used for the fine imposed on NEC Corporation, and should moreover have applied an average sales value for setting the fine instead of relying on a non-representative sales value of the last year of the identified infringement. These shortcomings would amount to errors in the fine calculation and/or lead to a disproportionate fine (and a lack of reasoning for the first item as it is not set out in the reasoning in the contested decision why the same reduction was apparently not applied to the basic amount used for the fine imposed on NEC Corporation).


201808030422049862018/C 294/323642018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180604242411Case C-364/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia (Italy) lodged on 4 June 2018 — Eni SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN2410120180604EN0032241241Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia (Italy) lodged on 4 June 2018 — Eni SpA v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze
   (Case C-364/18)2018/C 294/32Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Eni SpA

      Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze

      Question referred

   Do Article 6(1) and the sixth recital of Directive 94/22/EC (
         1
      ) preclude national legislation, in particular Article 19(5-bis) of Legislative Decree No 625 of 1996, which, by reason of the interpretation provided by the Consiglio di Stato in judgment No 290/2018, allows the imposition, in the context of the payment of royalties, of the QE (energy share) parameter, based on the listed prices of oil and other fuels, rather than on the basis of the PFOR index, which is pegged to the price of gas on the short-term market?
   (
         1
      )	Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons (OJ 1994 L 164, p. 3).


201808030772050862018/C 294/794232018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180706646411Case T-423/18: Action brought on 6 July 2018 — Fissler v EUIPO (vita)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN6410120180706EN0079641641Action brought on 6 July 2018 — Fissler v EUIPO (vita)
   (Case T-423/18)2018/C 294/79Language in which the application was lodged: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Fissler GmbH (Idar-Oberstein, Germany) (represented by: G. Hasselblatt and K. Middelhoff, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ‘vita’ — Application for registration No 15 857 188

      Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 28 March 2018 in Case R 1326/2017-5

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 7(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


201808030452050172018/C 294/086352016CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806287711Case C-635/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV v European Commission (Appeal — Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Determination of the subject-matter of the proceedings — Financial assistance in the field of Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Transport sector for the period 2014-2020 — Call for proposals — Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) — Email informing the appellant of the rejection of its proposal — Subsequent decision of the European Commission establishing the list of selected proposals — Effective judicial protection)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN710120180628EN00087171Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 June 2018 — Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV v European Commission
   (Case C-635/16 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Determination of the subject-matter of the proceedings — Financial assistance in the field of Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) — Transport sector for the period 2014-2020 — Call for proposals — Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA) — Email informing the appellant of the rejection of its proposal — Subsequent decision of the European Commission establishing the list of selected proposals — Effective judicial protection)’2018/C 294/08Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV (represented by: Y. de Vries, advocaat)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: J. Samnadda and J. Hottiaux, acting as Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Sets aside the order of the General Court of 11 October 2016, Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor v Commission (T-564/15, not published, EU:T:2016:611);

            2.

            Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

            3.

            Reserves the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 70, 6.3.2017.


201808030672050962018/C 294/633422018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180530484921Case T-342/18: Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Nichicon Corporation/Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN4810120180530EN0063481492Action brought on 30 May 2018 — Nichicon Corporation/Commission
   (Case T-342/18)2018/C 294/63Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Nichicon Corporation (Kyoto, Japan) (represented by: A. Ablasser-Neuhuber, F. Neumayr, G. Fussenegger and H. Kühnert, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Commission Decision C(2018) 1768 final of 21 March 2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.40136 — Capacitors) in its entirety in so far as it applies to the applicant;

            —

            in the alternative, partially annul:

                     a.

                     Article 1(f) of the contested decision, finding that the applicant participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement in the electrolytic capacitors sector covering the whole EEA, which consisted of agreements and/or concerted practices that had as their object the coordination of pricing behaviour from 26 June 1998 to 31 May 2010,

                     b.

                     Article 2(i) of the contested decision, imposing a fine of EUR 72901000 on the applicant, and

            —

            reduce the fine imposed on the applicant under Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (
                  1
               );

            —

            in any event, substitute its own appraisal for the Commission’s as regards the amount of the fine and reduce the fine imposed on the applicant under Article 261 TFEU and Article 31 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003; and

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs pursuant to Article 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging material errors of fact
            The alleged material errors of fact relate in particular to three time periods of contacts. The applicant claims that the Commission erroneously made findings of fact which are not sufficiently established. In consequence, the Commission would have wrongly assumed an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging errors of law regarding the qualification as a single and continuous infringement, and assumption of the applicant’s liability for participation
            The second plea concerns alleged errors made by the Commission both as regards the qualification of the contacts identified as a single and continuous infringement and as regards the applicant’s liability for such infringement. First, the Commission would have failed to establish to the requisite legal standard the scope of a single and continuous infringement. Secondly, the Commission would have erred in holding the applicant liable for contacts which it did not participate in. Thirdly, the Commission would have erroneously concluded that the infringement continued without interruption before 7 November 2003. Fourthly, the Commission would have erred in holding the applicant liable for continued participation in a single and continuous infringement after 10 November 2008. As a consequence, the Commission would be time-barred from imposing penalties on the applicant. Fifthly, the Commission would have erroneously considered that the applicant’s participation in a single and continuous infringement continued in spite of its explicit distancing.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging a lack of jurisdiction

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging a manifest error of assessment in setting the fine
            In its fourth plea, the applicant puts forward alleged manifest errors of assessment in setting the fine. First, the Commission would have violated the principle of proportionality and its guidelines on the method of setting fines by incorrectly taking the entire value of EEA sales as the basis for calculation of the fine. Secondly and thirdly, by erroneously determining both the gravity multiplier and the additional amount the Commission would have violated the principle of proportionality, the obligation to state reasons as well as the principle of ne bis in idem. Fourthly, the Commission would have breached the principle of proportionality, its obligation to state reasons and the principle of equal treatment, by allegedly failing to duly reflect in the fine the applicant’s limited participation. Further, the Commission would have violated the principle of proportionality and the guidelines on the method of setting fines by not taking into account as mitigating circumstances the applicant’s, if any, negligence and its substantially limited role and competitive conduct.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging an infringement of essential procedural requirements
            The fifth plea concerns the Commission’s alleged infringement of essential procedural requirements within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU by failing to provide Nichicon with a supplementary statement of objections, and by setting a too short period to defend itself.

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).


201808030272049782018/C 294/453892018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180613323322Case C-389/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 13 June 2018 — Brussels Securities SA v Belgian State
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3220120180613EN0045322332Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Belgium) lodged on 13 June 2018 — Brussels Securities SA v Belgian State
   (Case C-389/18)2018/C 294/45Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Brussels Securities SA

      Defendant: Belgian State

      Question referred

   Must Article 4 of Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (
         1
      ) (replaced, as from 18 January 2012, by Council Directive 2011/96/EU of November on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (
         2
      )), combined with other sources of Community law,
   be interpreted as precluding that regulations of a national authority, such as the 1992 Income Tax Code and the Royal Decree implementing the 1992 Income Tax Code, in the versions applicable in respect of tax year 2011,
   having opted for a system of exemption (refraining from taxing the distributed profits received by a parent company by virtue of its association with its subsidiary) under which, first, the dividend distributed by the subsidiary is included in the basis of assessment of the parent company and, secondly, 95 % of that dividend is deducted from that basis of assessment as definitively taxed income,
   by reason of the combined application, in order to determine the basis for assessing the corporation tax of the parent company, of that Belgian system of deducting definitively taxed income and of (1) rules relating to another deduction constituting a tax advantage provided for by those regulations (deduction for risk capital), (2) entitlement to deduct the balance of previous recoverable losses, (3) entitlement to carry forward to following tax years, where the relevant amount in respect of a tax year is higher than that of the taxable profits, imputation of the surplus definitively taxed income, of the deduction for risk capital and of the balance of the previous recoverable losses, and (4) the imputation order stipulating that, during those following tax years, imputation must cover, until the taxable profits are used up, first, the definitively taxed income carried forward, then the deduction for risk capital carried forward (which may only be carried forward for the ‘following seven tax periods’), and then the balance of the previous recoverable losses,
   lead to the reduction, in respect of part or all of the amounts of the dividends received from the subsidiary, of the losses that the parent company would have been able to deduct if the dividends had been simply excluded from the profits for the tax year during which they were received (with the effect of reducing the taxable result for that tax year and increasing, where appropriate, the tax losses that may be carried forward) rather than being retained within those profits and subsequently coming under rules for exemption and for carrying forward the exempt amount where there are insufficient profits,
   that is to say, reduction of the balance of the parent company’s previous recoverable losses that may occur during tax years following a tax year in respect of which the definitively taxed income, the deduction for risk capital and the balance of the previous recoverable losses exceed the amount of the taxable profits?
   (
         1
      )	OJ 1990 L 225, p. 6.
   (
         2
      )	OJ 2011 L 345, p. 8.


201808030062050292018/C 294/0922017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806287822Case C-2/17: Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social v Jesús Crespo Rey (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons — Social security for migrant workers — Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 — Paragraph 2 of the section ‘Spain’ in Annex XI — Retirement pension — Method of calculation — Theoretical amount — Relevant contribution basis — Special agreement — Choice of contribution basis — National legislation requiring the worker to make contributions in accordance with the minimum contribution basis)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN720120180628EN00097282Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 28 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia — Spain) — Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social v Jesús Crespo Rey
   (Case C-2/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons — Social security for migrant workers — Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 — Paragraph 2 of the section ‘Spain’ in Annex XI — Retirement pension — Method of calculation — Theoretical amount — Relevant contribution basis — Special agreement — Choice of contribution basis — National legislation requiring the worker to make contributions in accordance with the minimum contribution basis)’2018/C 294/09Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social

      Respondent: Jesús Crespo Rey

      Other party: Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons, signed at Luxembourg on 21 June 1999, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which obligates a migrant worker who concludes a special agreement with the social security system of that Member State to make contributions in accordance with the minimum contribution basis, with the result that, when the theoretical amount of that worker’s retirement pension is calculated, the competent body of that Member State treats the period covered by that agreement as a period completed in that Member State and will take into consideration, for the purposes of that calculation, only the contributions paid by the worker under that agreement, even though, before exercising his right to free movement, that worker made contributions in that Member State in accordance with contribution bases higher than the minimum, and a non-migrant worker who did not exercise his right to free movement and who concludes such an agreement has the option of making contributions in accordance with contribution bases higher than the minimum.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 104, 3.4.2017.


201808030152050062018/C 294/463972018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180615333421Case C-397/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 15 June 2018 — Ana María Páez Juárez v Nobel Plastiques Ibérica SA
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3310120180615EN0046331342Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Social de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 15 June 2018 — Ana María Páez Juárez v Nobel Plastiques Ibérica SA
   (Case C-397/18)2018/C 294/46Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Juzgado de lo Social de Barcelona

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Ana María Páez Juárez

      Defendant: Nobel Plastiques Ibérica SA

      Other parties: Fondo de Garantía Salarial (FOGASA), Ministerio Fiscal

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must workers who are categorised as ‘particularly susceptible to certain risks’ be regarded as persons with a disability for the purposes of the application of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, (
                  1
               ) as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, where, owing to their own personal characteristics or known biological condition, those workers are particularly susceptible to occupational risks and, for that reason, are unable to perform certain jobs on the ground that such jobs would entail a risk to their own health or to other individuals?
            If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, the following questions are referred:

            2.

            Does the decision to dismiss a worker on economic, technical, organisational and production grounds constitute an act of direct or indirect discrimination, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, if the person concerned has a recognised disability, in that she is particularly susceptible when it comes to performing certain jobs on account of her physical impairments, and therefore has difficulties achieving the productivity levels required in order to avoid being put forward for dismissal?

            3.

            Does the decision to dismiss a worker on economic, technical, organisational and production grounds constitute an act of direct or indirect discrimination, within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, if the person concerned has a recognised disability, in that she has been recognised as being particularly susceptible when it comes to performing certain jobs on account of her physical impairments, and the decision is taken, among other selection criteria, on the basis of multi-skilling in all jobs, including those which the disabled person is unable to perform?

            4.

            Does the decision to dismiss a worker on economic, technical, organisational and production grounds constitute an act of indirect discrimination, as defined in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, if the person concerned has a recognised disability and has therefore been recognised as being particularly susceptible when it comes to performing certain jobs on account of her physical impairments, which have resulted in long periods of absence or sick leave prior to the dismissal, and the decision is taken, among other selection criteria, on the basis of that worker’s absenteeism?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.


201808030762050752018/C 294/643432018TC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180603505011Case T-343/18: Action brought on 03 June 2018 — Tokin Corporation/Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN5010120180603EN0064501501Action brought on 03 June 2018 — Tokin Corporation/Commission
   (Case T-343/18)2018/C 294/64Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Tokin Corporation (Sendai City, Japan) (represented by: C. Thomas, T. Yuen and M. Perez, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul Article 2(f) of Commission Decision C(2018) 1768 of 21 March 2018 in so far as it imposes a fine of EUR 5036000 on TOKIN Corporation, jointly and severally with NEC Corporation;

            —

            set the amount of the fine imposed on TOKIN Corporation in Article 2(f) of that decision, jointly and severally with NEC Corporation, at a lower figure;

            —

            annul Article 2(g) of that decision in so far as it imposes a fine of EUR 8814000 on TOKIN Corporation;

            —

            set the amount of the fine imposed on TOKIN Corporation in Article 2(g) of that decision at a lower figure; and

            —

            order the Commission to pay the Applicant’s costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 (
                  1
               ) and the principle of equal treatment by relying on 2011/12 as the reference period for the determination of its value of sales.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission infringed Article 23(3) of Regulation No 1/2003 and the principle of personal liability by applying a reduction for mitigating circumstances to the basic amount of the fine, instead of reducing the gravity percentage used to calculate the basic amount, in relation to an aspect of the infringement for which the applicant was held liable.

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).


201808030142050442018/C 294/473982018CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180615343521Case C-398/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 15 June 2018 — Antonio Bocero Torrico v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN3410120180615EN0047341352Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 15 June 2018 — Antonio Bocero Torrico v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social
   (Case C-398/18)2018/C 294/47Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Antonio Bocero Torrico

      Respondents: Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social and Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social

      Question referred

   Must Article 48 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation which requires as a condition for access to an early retirement pension that the amount of the pension to be received must be higher than the minimum pension which would be due to the person concerned under that same national legislation, the term ‘pension to be received’ being interpreted as the actual pension from the competent Member State (in this case, Spain) alone, without also taking into account the actual pension which that person may receive through another benefit of the same kind from one or more other Member States?


201808030402049852018/C 294/10572017CJC29420180820EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806288811Case C-57/17: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 28 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana (Spain) — Eva Soraya Checa Honrado v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer — Directive 2008/94/EC — Article 3, first paragraph — Payment guaranteed by the guarantee institution — Severance pay on termination of employment relationships — Transfer of workplace obliging the worker to change residence — Change to a fundamental element of the contract of employment — Termination of the contract of employment by the worker — Principle of equality and non-discrimination)
 ---documentbreak--- C2942018EN810120180628EN00108181Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 28 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana (Spain) — Eva Soraya Checa Honrado v Fondo de Garantía Salarial
   (Case C-57/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer — Directive 2008/94/EC — Article 3, first paragraph — Payment guaranteed by the guarantee institution — Severance pay on termination of employment relationships — Transfer of workplace obliging the worker to change residence — Change to a fundamental element of the contract of employment — Termination of the contract of employment by the worker — Principle of equality and non-discrimination)’2018/C 294/10Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Eva Soraya Checa Honrado

      Defendant: Fondo de Garantía Salarial

      Operative part of the judgment

   The first paragraph of Article 3 of Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer must be interpreted as meaning that, where, according to the national legislation in question, some forms of statutory compensation payable on termination of a contract of employment at the worker’s request and those payable in the case of dismissals on objective grounds, such as those envisaged by the referring court, fall within the concept of ‘severance pay on termination of employment relationships’, within the meaning of that provision, statutory compensation payable on termination of a contract of employment at the worker’s request on account of a transfer of workplace by the employer, obliging the worker to change residence, must also fall within that concept.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 121, 18.4.2017.