title: Case C-480/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 23 July 2018 — AS ‘PrivatBank’

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/5

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa (Latvia) lodged on 23 July 2018 — AS ‘PrivatBank’
      (Case C-480/18)
      (2018/C 381/07)
      Language of the case: Latvian

         Referring court

      Augstākā tiesa

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: AS ‘PrivatBank’

         Other party to the proceedings: Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is national legislation that empowers the [Latvian Financial and Capital Markets] Commission to examine complaints by payment service users even where the payment services have not been executed in euros or in the national currency of a Member State, and thus to find there to be infringements of the Law [on payment services and electronic money] and to impose penalties, compatible with Article 2(2) of Directive [2007/64/EC]? (1)

                  2.

                  Must Article 20(1) and (5) and Article 21(2) of the Directive be interpreted as allowing for the competent authority to supervise and impose penalties also in respect of payment services not executed in euros or the currency of a Member State outside the euro area?

                  3.

                  For the purposes of the supervisory functions laid down in Articles 20 and 21 of the Directive, or of the complaint procedures established in Articles 80 to 82 of the Directive, does the competent authority have the power to resolve disputes between a payer and a payment service provider arising from the legal relationships referred to in Article 75 of the Directive, determining who is liable for non-execution or defective execution of a transaction?

                  4.

                  In carrying out the supervisory functions laid down in Articles 20 and 21 of the Directive or the complaint procedures established in Articles 80 to 82 of the Directive, must the competent authority take account of an arbitral award made in settlement of a dispute between a payment service provider and a payment service user?

         (1)  Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC (OJ 2007 L 319, p. 1).


title: Case C-496/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 30 July 2018 — HUNGEOD Közlekedésfejlesztési, Földmérési, Út- és Vasúttervezési Kft. and Others v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 30 July 2018 — HUNGEOD Közlekedésfejlesztési, Földmérési, Út- és Vasúttervezési Kft. and Others v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság
      (Case C-496/18)
      (2018/C 381/11)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Fővárosi Törvényszék

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: HUNGEOD Közlekedésfejlesztési, Földmérési, Út- és Vasúttervezési Kft., SIXENSE Soldata, Budapesti Közlekedési Zrt.

         Defendant: Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság

         Other party: Közbeszerzési Hatóság Elnöke

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 41(1) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recitals 2, 25, 27 and 36 of Directive 2007/66/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, Article 1(1) and (3) of Council Directive 92/13/EEC (2) of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, and, in this context, the principle of legal certainty, as a general principle of EU law, and the requirement for effective and rapid remedies against decisions by contracting authorities in public procurement cases, be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which, in relation to public procurement contracts entered into before that legislation came into force, provides a general authorisation that enables the competent (monitoring) authority created by that legislation, after the periods established in the Member State’s previous legislation for bringing an action for review of public procurement infringements committed prior to the entry into force of the new legislation have expired but within the time period established in the new legislation, to commence proceedings to investigate a specific public procurement infringement and to rule on the substance, leading to a ruling that the infringement did take place, the imposition of a public procurement penalty, and the application of the consequences of the voiding of the contract?

                  2.

                  Can the legal rules and principles referred to in question 1 — and also the effective exercise of the (subjective and personal) right of review enjoyed by parties with an interest in the award of a public contract — be applied to the right to commence and conduct review proceedings conferred on the (monitoring) authorities created by the law of the Member State, which have the power to identify and investigate public procurement infringements of their own motion, and which are under a duty to defend the public interest?

                  3.

                  Does Article 99(1) and (2) of Directive 2014/25/EU (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC (4) mean that in order to defend EU financial interests in the field of public procurement, the law of the Member State may, through the adoption of new legislation, confer on the (monitoring) authorities which have power under the law of the Member State to identify and investigate public procurement infringements of their own motion, and which are under a duty to defend the public interest, a general power to investigate public procurement infringements committed before the entry into force of the legislation in question and to commence and conduct proceedings, even where the time periods established under the previous legislation have expired?

                  4.

                  If — having regard to the legal rules and principles referred to in question 1 — the (monitoring) authorities’ power of investigation described in questions 1 and 3 is held to be compatible with EU law, is any relevance to be ascribed to the legal, regulatory, technical or organisational deficiencies or other obstacles that prevented the public procurement infringement from being investigated at the time when the infringement took place?

                  5.

                  Even if, in the light of the above principles, the (monitoring) authorities which are authorised by the law of the Member State to identify and investigate public procurement infringements of their own motion, and which are under a duty to defend the public interest may be granted the power referred to in questions 1 to 4, must Article 41(1) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recitals 2, 25, 27 and 36 of Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, Article 1(1) and (3) of Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors and, in this context, the principle of legal certainty, as a general principle of EU law, and the requirement for effective and rapid remedies against decisions by contracting authorities in public procurement cases, and the proportionality principle, be interpreted as meaning that the national courts may assess whether the period of time that has elapsed between the occurrence of the infringement, the expiry of the period previously established for bringing an action for review, and the commencement of the proceedings to investigate the infringement, is reasonable and proportionate, and may use this as a basis for determining the legal consequences of the nullity of the contested decision or other consequences established by the law of the Member State?

         (1)  OJ 2007 L 335, p. 31.

         (2)  OJ 1992 L 76, p. 14.

         (3)  Directive of 26 February 2014 (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 243).

         (4)  Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 1).


title: Case C-489/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budapest Környéki Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 26 July 2018 — Farmland Kft. v Földművelésügyi Miniszter

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Budapest Környéki Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Hungary) lodged on 26 July 2018 — Farmland Kft. v Földművelésügyi Miniszter
      (Case C-489/18)
      (2018/C 381/08)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Budapest Környéki Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Farmland Kft.

         Defendant: Földművelésügyi Miniszter

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is the rule established by the Order of the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development No 22/2010 of 16 March, the Order of the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development No 34/2010 of 9 April, the Order of the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development No 25/2011 of 7 April, and the Order of the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development No 22/2011 of 25 March — in accordance with which a farmer’s application for support is to be rejected based solely on the set of criteria relating to the ‘lawful user of the land’, laid down by national law, and the absence of the ‘certificate of land use’ as a result of those criteria, even though the farmer meets the other criteria relating to the application for support and, in particular, is able to prove that the parcels declared are at his disposal, that is to say, that he manages and exploits those parcels — compatible with EU law?

                  2.

                  If the first question is answered in the negative: does EU law require the paying agency of a Member State to take into account, in evaluating the application for support, other evidence that the ‘at the farmer’s disposal’ requirement referred to in Article 124 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 is satisfied? (1)

                  3.

                  If the first question is answered in the negative: from the perspective of EU law, what are the legal consequences of the statement by the farmer in the single application ‘that he is aware of the conditions pertaining to the aid schemes in question’, required by Article 12(e) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009, (2) that is to say how should that statement be interpreted or assessed with regard to a particular restrictive provision of the Member State, such as the set of criteria relating to the ‘lawful user of the land’?

                  4.

                  If the first question is answered in the negative: from the perspective of EU law, what are the legal consequences of an obligation imposed by the Member State to make a declaration that the set of criteria relating to the ‘lawful user of the land’ have been met or that administrative requirements relating to that particular restrictive provision of the Member State have been satisfied, that is to say how should that obligation be interpreted or assessed?

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 (OJ 2009 L 30, p. 16).

         (2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1122/2009 of 30 November 2009 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 as regards cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control system, under the direct support schemes for farmers provided for that Regulation, as well as for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards cross-compliance under the support scheme provided for the wine sector (OJ 2009 L 316, p. 65).


title: Case C-497/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 30 July 2018 — Budapesti Közlekedési Zrt. v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 30 July 2018 — Budapesti Közlekedési Zrt. v Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság
      (Case C-497/18)
      (2018/C 381/12)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Fővárosi Törvényszék

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Budapesti Közlekedési Zrt.

         Defendant: Közbeszerzési Hatóság Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság

         Other party: Közbeszerzési Hatóság Elnöke

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 41(1) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recitals 2, 25, 27 and 36 of Directive 2007/66/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, Article 1(1) and (3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC (2) of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts and, in this context, the principle of legal certainty, as a general principle of EU law, and the requirement for effective and rapid remedies against decisions by contracting authorities in public procurement cases, be interpreted as precluding legislation by a Member State which, in relation to public procurement contracts entered into before that legislation came into force, provides a general authorisation that enables the competent (monitoring) authority created by that legislation, after the periods established in the Member State’s previous legislation for bringing an action for review of public procurement infringements committed prior to the entry into force of the new legislation have expired but within the time period established in the new legislation, to commence proceedings to investigate a specific public procurement infringement, leading to a ruling that the infringement did take place, the imposition of a public procurement penalty, and the application of the consequences of the voiding of the public contract?

                  2.

                  Can the legal rules and principles referred to in question 1 — and also the effective exercise of the (subjective and personal) right of review enjoyed by parties with an interest in the award of a public contract — be applied to the right to commence and conduct review proceedings conferred on the (monitoring) authorities created by the law of the Member State, which have the power to identify and investigate public procurement infringements of their own motion, and which are under a duty to defend the public interest?

                  3.

                  Does Article 83(1) and (2) of Directive 2014/24/EU (3) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (4) mean that in order to defend EU financial interests in the field of public procurement, the law of the Member State may, through the adoption of new legislation, confer on the (monitoring) authorities which have power under the law of the Member State to identify and investigate public procurement infringements of their own motion, and which are under a duty to defend the public interest, a general power to investigate public procurement infringements committed before the entry into force of the legislation in question and to commence and conduct proceedings, even where the time periods established under the previous legislation have expired?

                  4.

                  If — having regard to the legal rules and principles referred to in question 1 — the (monitoring) authorities’ power of investigation described in questions 1 and 3 is held to be compatible with EU law, is any relevance to be ascribed to the legal, regulatory, technical or organisational deficiencies or other obstacles that prevented the public procurement infringement from being investigated at the time when the infringement took place?

                  5.

                  Even if, in the light of the above principles, the (monitoring) authorities which are authorised by the law of the Member State to identify and investigate public procurement infringements of their own motion, and which are under a duty to defend the public interest may be granted the power referred to in questions 1 to 4, must Article 41(1) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, recitals 2, 25, 27 and 36 of Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts, Article 1(1) and (3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts and, in this context, the principle of legal certainty, as a general principle of EU law, and the requirement for effective and rapid remedies against decisions by contracting authorities in public procurement cases, and the proportionality principle, be interpreted as meaning that the national courts may assess whether the period of time that has elapsed between the occurrence of the infringement, the expiry of the period previously established for bringing an action for review, and the commencement of the proceedings to investigate the infringement, is reasonable and proportionate, and may use this as a basis for determining the legal consequences of the nullity of the contested decision or other consequences established by the law of the Member State?

         (1)  OJ 2007 L 335, p. 31.

         (2)  OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33.

         (3)  Directive of 26 February 2014 (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

         (4)  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114).


title: Case C-499/18 P: Appeal brought on 27 July 2018 by Bayer CropScience AG against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 17 May 2018 in Case T-429/13: Bayer CropScience AG v European Commission

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/12

      Appeal brought on 27 July 2018 by Bayer CropScience AG against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 17 May 2018 in Case T-429/13: Bayer CropScience AG v European Commission
      (Case C-499/18 P)
      (2018/C 381/13)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Bayer CropScience AG (represented by: K. Nordlander, advokat, C. Zimmermann, avocat, A. Robert, advocate, M. Zdzieborska, Solicitor)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Association générale des producteurs de maïs et autres céréales cultivées de la sous-famille des panicoïdées (AGPM), The National Farmers' Union (NFU), Association européenne pour la protection des cultures (ECPA), Rapool-Ring GmbH Qualitätsraps deutscher Züchter, European Seed Association (ESA), Agricultural Industries Confederation Ltd, Kingdom of Sweden, Union nationale de l'apiculture française (UNAF), Deutscher Berufs- und Erwerbsimkerbund eV, Österreichischer Erwerbsimkerbund, Pesticide Action Network Europe (PAN Europe), Bee Life European Beekeeping Coordination (Bee Life), Buglife — The Invertebrate Conservation Trust, Stichting Greenpeace Council

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  Quash the judgment of the General Court in case T-429/13.

                  —

                  Uphold the application at first instance and annul Regulation 485/2013 in so far as it concerns appellant. (1)

                  —

                  Order respondent to pay appellant’s costs, and its own costs, both at first instance and on appeal.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellant submits that the General Court erred in law as follows:
      First ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law in finding that an increase in the degree of certainty of previous scientific knowledge can be considered ‘new’ scientific know ledge under Article 21 (I) of Regulation 1107/2009. (2)

      Second ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 21 (3) of Regulation 1107/2009 in holding that EFSA was not required to base its risk assessment on the official guidance applicable at the time of the review.
      Third ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law in its application of Article 21(3) of the PPP Regulation.
      Fourth ground or appeal: the General Court erred in law in failing to determine an appropriate level of scientific certainty as to the materialization of the alleged risk required for the application of precautionary measures.
      Fifth ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law in failing to apply the standards of a thorough and accurate risk assessment which needs to be carried out prior to the adoption of precautionary measures.
      Sixth ground of appeal: the General Court erred in law in wrongly defining the scope and ignoring the requirements of the impact assessment which needs to be carried out prior to the adoption of precautionary measures.

         (1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 485/2013 of 24 May 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011, as regards the conditions of approval of the active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid, and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with plant protection products containing those active substances (OJ 2013, L 139, p. 12.).

         (2)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009, L 309, p. 1.).


title: Case C-500/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Cluj (Romania) lodged on 30 July 2018 — AU v Reliantco Investments LTD, Reliantco Investments LTD Limassol Sucursala București

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/13

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Cluj (Romania) lodged on 30 July 2018 — AU v Reliantco Investments LTD, Reliantco Investments LTD Limassol Sucursala București
      (Case C-500/18)
      (2018/C 381/14)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Tribunalul Specializat Cluj

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: AU

         Defendants: Reliantco Investments LTD, Reliantco Investments LTD Limassol Sucursala București

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  When interpreting the concept of ‘retail client’ in Article 4(1).12 of Directive 2004/39/[EC], (1) can or must the national court use the same interpretive criteria as those which define the concept of ‘consumer’ within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Directive 93/13/EEC? (2)

                  2.

                  If the answer to the first question is in the negative, under what conditions may a ‘retail client’ within the meaning of Directive 2004/[39/EC] claim consumer status in a dispute such as that in the main proceedings?

                  3.

                  In particular, do the facts that a ‘retail client’, within the meaning of Directive 2004/[39/EC], carries out a high volume of transactions within a relatively short period of time and that he invests very large sums of money in financial instruments such as those defined in Article 4[(1)].17 of Directive 2004/39/[EC], constitute relevant criteria for the purpose of assessing whether a ‘retail client’ has consumer status under that directive?

                  4.

                  When attempting to establish its own jurisdiction, since it has the obligation to determine the impact of Article 17(1)(c) or Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, (3) whichever is applicable, can and/or must the national court take into consideration the legal basis relied on by the applicant (namely non-contractual liability alone) as a remedy for the conclusion of terms alleged to be unfair within the meaning of Directive 93/13/EEC, for which the substantive law applicable has been established pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 (Rome II), (4) or does the possible consumer status of the applicant make the substantive legal basis of his request irrelevant?

         (1)  Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC (OJ 2004 L 145, p. 1).

         (2)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

         (3)  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

         (4)  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 40).


title: Case C-503/18 P: Appeal brought on 26 July 2018 by Inge Barnett against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 16 May 2018 in Case T-23/17 Barnett v European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/14

      Appeal brought on 26 July 2018 by Inge Barnett against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 16 May 2018 in Case T-23/17 Barnett v European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
      (Case C-503/18 P)
      (2018/C 381/15)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: Inge Barnett (represented by: S. Orlandi, T. Martin, lawyers)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)

         Form of order sought

      Primarily:

                  —

                  Annul the judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2018, Barnett v EESC, T-23/17, EU:T:2018:271;

                  —

                  Annul the decision of the EESC of 21 March 2016, taken with a view to complying with the judgment of 22 September 2015, Barnett v EESC, F-20/14, EU:F:2015:107;

                  —

                  Order the EESC to pay the costs.

            In the alternative:

                  —

                  Annul the judgment of the General Court of 16 May 2018, Barnett v EESC, T-23/17, EU:T:2018:271;

                  —

                  Annul the decision of the EESC of 21 March 2016, taken with a view to complying with the judgment of 22 September 2015, Barnett v EESC, F-20/14, EU:F:2015:107;

                  —

                  Order the European Economic and Social Committee to pay to the appellant a sum of EUR 207 994,14 in respect of the material damage suffered, together with default interest calculated from the due date of the sums payable, at the rate fixed by the European Central bank (ECB) for main refinancing operations, increased by 3.5 points and a lump sum of EUR 25 000 in respect of the non-material harm suffered;

                  —

                  Order the EESC to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appellant claims that the General Court made several errors in law by considering that the EESC could, in order to give effect to the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal, merely review the appellant’s application in the light of an alleged interest of the service which was supposedly identified three years after the adoption of the first decision refusing her application and of which the parties were unaware until 21 March 2016. That alleged interest of the service, which causes the appellant to be struck off the list of beneficiaries because she is indispensable for the proper functioning of the service, is unrelated to the applicable GIP of the EESC. Furthermore, that alleged interest of the service was relied on without consultation of the Joint Committee. That committee had nevertheless pointed out in 2013 that in the event of the withdrawal of one of the beneficiaries of the measure, a proposal would be made to award the appellant that privilege, taking into account the interest of the service.
      The appellant also maintains that the General Court failed to have regard to the force res judicata of a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal.
      Finally, the contested judgment is vitiated by an error of law in that the General Court considered that, despite the repeal of the legal basis necessary for the adoption of the contested decision, the EESC had retained the competence to adopt a decision in response to the appellant’s application. In answering that plea, the Court also misinterpreted the arguments relied on in support of the objection of lack of competence raised by the appellant.


title: Case C-525/18 P: Appeal brought on 9 August 2018 by Marion Le Pen against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 19 June 2018 in Case T-86/17, Le Pen v European Parliament

text:
               22.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 381/15

      Appeal brought on 9 August 2018 by Marion Le Pen against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) delivered on 19 June 2018 in Case T-86/17, Le Pen v European Parliament

      (Case C-525/18 P)
      (2018/C 381/16)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: Marion Le Pen (represented by: R. Bosselut, avocat)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Parliament, Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment delivered on 19 June 2018 by the Sixth Chamber of the General Court in Case T-86/17.

            Accordingly:

                  —

                  annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the Parliament of 5 December 2016, taken pursuant to Article 68 of Decision 2009/C 159/01 of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 19 May and 9 July 2008‘concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament’(‘the Implementing Measures’), as amended, establishing a sum owed in the amount of EUR 298 497,87;

                  —

                  annul Debit Note No 2016-1560 notified on 6 December 2016, informing the appellant that a debt had been established against her pursuant to the decision of the Secretary General of 5 December 2016, relating to recovery of sums unduly paid for parliamentary assistance, application of Article 68 of the Implementing Measures and of Articles 78, 79 and 80 of the Financial Regulation;

                  —

                  make an appropriate order as to the amount to be awarded to the appellant by way of compensation for the non-pecuniary damage which she has suffered as a result of the unfounded accusations made before the investigation was concluded, the harm to her reputation, and the very significant disruption to her personal and political life occasioned by the contested decision;

                  —

                  make an order as to the amount to be awarded to the appellant in relation to the costs of the proceedings;

                  —

                  order the Parliament to pay all of the costs;

                  —

                  before ruling in this case: request the Parliament to produce Ms CG’s administrative file, a record of the movements of Ms CG entering and leaving the Parliament’s seats in Strasbourg and Brussels, the anonymous letter which led to the opening of the proceedings and the OLAF file relating to the appellant and her assistant.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The first ground of appeal is based on infringement of EU law by the General Court, errors in law and infringement of essential procedural requirements. The appellant fully justified the filing of new documents in the course of the proceedings by reason of new facts. Those documents constitute the amplification of those which had been submitted to the Secretary-General of the Parliament. The General Court had unlimited jurisdiction which required that those documents be taken into account in order to establish whether or not parliamentary assistant work had been carried out and, consequently, whether or not the recovery of undue payments was well founded. Moreover, some of that evidence was in the Parliament’s possession, but had been hidden from the appellant.
      The second ground of appeal is based on infringement by the General Court of the rights of the defence and essential procedural requirements. The absence of a hearing of the appellant by the Secretary-General of the Parliament and the failure to transmit the file amount to an infringement of the appellant’s rights of defence, of the right to be heard in person before any decision, even an administrative decision, is taken, of the principles of equality of arms and procedural fairness, of the right to be head by an impartial forum and of the prohibition of denial of justice stemming from the Implementing Measures, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the general principles of law. Nor did the General Court note the failure to state reasons which vitiates the decision of the Secretary-General.
      The third ground of appeal is based on infringement of EU law by the General Court, errors in law and an error of legal characterisation of the facts, distortion of the facts and evidence, discrimination and fumus persecutionis, and infringement of the principles of legitimate expectations and legality.
      The fourth ground of appeal is based on misuse of power, as the judgment under appeal endorses the conduct of the Secretary-General of the Parliament, whose real objective and ultimate aim were to harm the appellant and her party.


title: Case T-525/18: Action brought on 4 September 2018 — ENGIE Global LNG Holding and Others v Commission

text:
               5.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 399/44

      Action brought on 4 September 2018 — ENGIE Global LNG Holding and Others v Commission
      (Case T-525/18)
      (2018/C 399/59)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicants: ENGIE Global LNG Holding Sàrl (Luxembourg, Luxembourg), Engie Invest International SA (Luxembourg), ENGIE (Courbevoie, France) (represented by: B. Le Bret and M. Struys, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the present action admissible and well founded;

                  —

                  principally, annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  in the alternative, annul Article 2 of that decision in so far as it orders recovery of the aid;

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action brought against the Commission decision of 20 June 2018 on State aid SA.44888 (2016/C) (ex 2016/NN) implemented by Luxembourg in favour of ENGIE, the applicants rely on nine pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in the application of the first criterion of the concept of State aid concerning the existence of State intervention.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging infringement by the Commission of the notion of advantage, in that it mistakes the concept of advantage for that of selectivity, finds that there is an economic advantage on the basis of the combined effect of measures which individually comply with general law, and analyses that effect on the basis of a distortion of the facts and several errors in law and assessment.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, based on errors in law and assessment allegedly made by the Commission when defining the two reference frameworks relied on alternatively (general and narrow) to demonstrate the existence of a discriminatory derogation in favour of, first, the holding companies (LNG Holding and CEF) and, second, the ENGIE group.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, based on errors in law and appraisal that the Commission allegedly made in its assessment of the existence of derogations and discriminatory treatment in favour of, first, the holding companies and, second, the ENGIE group.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, based on errors in law and appraisal allegedly made by the Commission in its classification of a selective advantage resulting from the non-application of the Luxembourg rule relating to abuse of rights.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging that the Commission erred in law in its classification of the measures at issue as individual aid.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging infringement by the Commission of the distribution of powers between Member States and the European Union, as well as misuse of the power conferred upon it in respect of State aid for the purpose of intervening in measures of a general nature which come within the scope of national policies in the field of direct taxation.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging infringement by the Commission of the procedural rights of the applicants and its failure to comply with the duty to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU.

                  9.

                  Ninth plea in law, relied on in the alternative and alleging infringement of Article 16 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2015 L 248, p. 9) inasmuch as the Commission ordered recovery of the alleged aid at issue in breach of general principles of EU law.


title: Case T-574/18: Action brought on 28 September 2018 — Agrochem-Maks v Commission

text:
               26.11.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 427/93

      Action brought on 28 September 2018 — Agrochem-Maks v Commission
      (Case T-574/18)
      (2018/C 427/122)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Agrochem-Maks d.o.o. (Zagreb, Croatia) (represented by: S. Pappas, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1019; (1)

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay its own costs and to bear applicant’s costs in the present proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging violation of the administration’s obligation to give reasons pursuant to Article 41(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging violation of Article 6(f) of or point 2.2. of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 (2) and of the proportionality principle, in relation to the alleged data gaps concerning the active substance for which approval is sought.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging the erroneous application of the precautionary principle with regard to the said alleged data gaps/issues that could not be finalised for the purposes of the risk assessment.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging violation of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 with regard to the identification of high risk with regard to aquatic organisms.

         (1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1019 of 18 July 2018 concerning the non-renewal of approval of the active substance oxasulfuron, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 (OJ 2018 L 183, p. 14).

         (2)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1).


title: Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht — Germany) — Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16), Volker Willmeroth, in his capacity as owner of TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e.K. v Martina Broßonn (C-570/16) (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Social policy — Organisation of working time — Directive 2003/88/EC — Article 7 — Right to paid annual leave — Employment relationship terminated by the death of the worker — National legislation preventing the payment of an allowance to the legal heirs of a worker in lieu of paid annual leave not taken by him — Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 31(2) — Whether it may be relied upon in a dispute between individuals)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/2

      Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesarbeitsgericht — Germany) — Stadt Wuppertal v Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16), Volker Willmeroth, in his capacity as owner of TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e.K. v Martina Broßonn (C-570/16)
      (Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social policy - Organisation of working time - Directive 2003/88/EC - Article 7 - Right to paid annual leave - Employment relationship terminated by the death of the worker - National legislation preventing the payment of an allowance to the legal heirs of a worker in lieu of paid annual leave not taken by him - Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Article 31(2) - Whether it may be relied upon in a dispute between individuals))
      (2019/C 16/02)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Bundesarbeitsgericht

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Stadt Wuppertal (C-569/16), Volker Willmeroth, in his capacity as owner of TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e.K. (C-570/16)

         Defendants: Maria Elisabeth Bauer (C-569/16), Martina Broßonn (C-570/16)

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, where the employment relationship is terminated by the death of the worker, the right to paid annual leave acquired under those provisions and not taken by the worker before his death lapses without being able to give rise to a right to an allowance in lieu of that leave which is transferable to the employee’s legal heirs by inheritance.

                  2.

                  Where it is impossible to interpret a national rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings in a manner consistent with Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the national court, before which a dispute between the legal heir of a deceased worker and the former employer of that worker has been brought, must disapply that national legislation and ensure that the legal heir receives payment from the employer of an allowance in lieu of paid annual leave acquired under those provisions and not taken by the worker before his death. That obligation on the national court is dictated by Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights where the dispute is between the legal heir and an employer which has the status of a public authority, and under the second of those provisions where the dispute is between the legal heir and an employer who is a private individual.

         (1)  OJ C 53, 20.2.2017.


title: Case C-592/17: Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Vestre Landsret — Denmark) — Skatteministeriet v Baby Dan A/S (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Common Customs Tariff — Combined Nomenclature — Tariff classification — Headings and subheadings 4421, 7326, 7318 15 90, 7318 19 00 and 9403 90 10 — Article specially designed to mount child safety gates — Dumping — Validity of Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 — Imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China — World Trade Organisation (WTO) Anti-Dumping Agreement — Regulation (EC) No 384/96 — Article 3(2) and Article 4(1) — Definition of Community industry)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/24

      Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 15 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Vestre Landsret — Denmark) — Skatteministeriet v Baby Dan A/S
      (Case C-592/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Common Customs Tariff - Combined Nomenclature - Tariff classification - Headings and subheadings 4421, 7326, 7318 15 90, 7318 19 00 and 9403 90 10 - Article specially designed to mount child safety gates - Dumping - Validity of Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 - Imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in China - World Trade Organisation (WTO) Anti-Dumping Agreement - Regulation (EC) No 384/96 - Article 3(2) and Article 4(1) - Definition of Community industry))
      (2019/C 16/30)
      Language of the case: Danish

         Referring court

      Vestre Landsret

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Skatteministeriet

         Defendant: Baby Dan A/S

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  The Combined Nomenclature listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, in the versions resulting, successively, from Commission Regulation (EC) No 1214/2007 of 20 September 2007, and from Commission Regulation (EC) No 1031/2008 of 19 September 2008, must be interpreted as meaning that an article, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which allows a movable child safety gate to be mounted to a wall or a door frame, does not constitute part of those gates and must be classified under subheading 7318 15 90 of the Combined Nomenclature.

                  2.

                  Examination of the fourth question referred has not revealed any factors of such a kind as to affect the validity of Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China.

         (1)  OJ C 424, 11.12.2017.


title: Case T-793/14: Judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018 — Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology v Commission (State aid — United Kingdom capacity market — Aid scheme — Article 108(2) and (3) TFEU — Concept of doubts within the meaning of Article 4(3) or (4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 — Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 — Decision not to raise any objections — No initiation of the formal investigation procedure — Procedural rights of interested parties)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/35

      Judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018 — Tempus Energy and Tempus Energy Technology v Commission
      (Case T-793/14) (1)

      ((State aid - United Kingdom capacity market - Aid scheme - Article 108(2) and (3) TFEU - Concept of doubts within the meaning of Article 4(3) or (4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 - Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 - Decision not to raise any objections - No initiation of the formal investigation procedure - Procedural rights of interested parties))
      (2019/C 16/43)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Tempus Energy Ltd (Worcester, United Kingdom) and Tempus Energy Technology Ltd (Cheltenham, United Kingdom) (represented by: initially J. Derenne, J. Blockx, C. Ziegler and M. Kinsella, subsequently J. Derenne, J. Blockx and C. Ziegler, and finally J. Derenne and C. Ziegler, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: É. Gippini Fournier, R. Sauer, K. Herrmann and P. Němečková, acting as Agents)

         Intervener in support of the defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (represented by: initially C. Brodie and L. Christie, acting as Agents, and G. Facenna QC, subsequently S. Simmons, M. Holt, C. Brodie and S. Brandon, acting as Agents, and G. Facenna QC, subsequently M. Holt, C. Brodie, S. Brandon and D. Robertson, acting as Agents, and G. Facenna QC, and finally S. Brandon, acting as Agent)

         Re:

      Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2014) 5083 final of 23 July 2014 not to raise objections to the aid scheme for the capacity market in the United Kingdom, on the ground that that scheme is compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU (State aid 2014/N-2) (OJ 2014 C 348, p. 5).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Annuls Commission Decision C(2014) 5083 final of 23 July 2014 not to raise objections to the aid scheme for the capacity market in the United Kingdom, on the ground that that scheme is compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU (State aid 2014/N-2);

                  2.

                  Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Tempus Energy Ltd and Tempus Energy Technology Ltd;

                  3.

                  Orders the United Kingdom to bear its own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 81, 9.3.2015.


title: Case C-648/17: Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa — Latvia) — ‘BTA Baltic Insurance Company’ AS, formerly ‘Balcia Insurance’ SE v ‘Baltijas Apdrošināšanas Nams’ AS (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles — Directive 72/166/EEC — Article 3(1) — Concept of ‘use of vehicles’ — Accident involving two vehicles parked in a car park — Material damage to a vehicle caused by a passenger from a neighbouring vehicle opening the vehicle door)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/25

      Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 15 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Augstākā tiesa — Latvia) — ‘BTA Baltic Insurance Company’ AS, formerly ‘Balcia Insurance’ SE v ‘Baltijas Apdrošināšanas Nams’ AS
      (Case C-648/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Compulsory insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles - Directive 72/166/EEC - Article 3(1) - Concept of ‘use of vehicles’ - Accident involving two vehicles parked in a car park - Material damage to a vehicle caused by a passenger from a neighbouring vehicle opening the vehicle door))
      (2019/C 16/31)
      Language of the case: Latvian

         Referring court

      Augstākā tiesa

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant:‘BTA Baltic Insurance Company’ AS, formerly ‘Balcia Insurance’ SE

         Defendant:‘Baltijas Apdrošināšanas Nams’ AS

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 3(1) of Council Directive 72/166/EEC of 24 April 1972 on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and to the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘use of vehicles’, set out in that provision, covers a situation in which the passenger of a vehicle parked in a car park, in opening the door of that vehicle, scraped against and damaged the vehicle parked next to it.

         (1)  OJ C 72, 26.2.2017.


title: Joined Cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 November 2018 — Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl v European Commission, Italian Republic (C-622/16 P), European Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl, Italian Republic (C-623/16 P), European Commission v Pietro Ferracci, Italian Republic (C-624/16 P) (Appeal — State aid — Decision declaring the recovery of State aid incompatible with the internal market to be impossible — Decision finding that there is no State aid — Actions for annulment brought by competitors of beneficiaries of State aid — Admissibility — Regulatory act not entailing implementing measures — Direct concern — Concept of ‘absolute impossibility’ of recovery of State aid incompatible with the internal market — Concept of ‘State aid’ — Concepts of ‘undertaking’ and ‘economic activity’)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/4

      Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 November 2018 — Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl v European Commission, Italian Republic (C-622/16 P), European Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl, Italian Republic (C-623/16 P), European Commission v Pietro Ferracci, Italian Republic (C-624/16 P)
      (Joined Cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - State aid - Decision declaring the recovery of State aid incompatible with the internal market to be impossible - Decision finding that there is no State aid - Actions for annulment brought by competitors of beneficiaries of State aid - Admissibility - Regulatory act not entailing implementing measures - Direct concern - Concept of ‘absolute impossibility’ of recovery of State aid incompatible with the internal market - Concept of ‘State aid’ - Concepts of ‘undertaking’ and ‘economic activity’))
      (2019/C 16/04)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

      (C-622/16 P)

         Appellant: Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl (represented by: E. Gambaro and F. Mazzocchi, avvocati)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: D. Grespan, P. Stancanelli and F. Tomat, acting as Agents), Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and G. De Bellis and S. Fiorentino, avvocati dello Stato)
      (C-623/16 P)

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: D. Grespan, P. Stancanelli and F. Tomat, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl (represented by: E. Gambaro and F. Mazzocchi, avvocati), Italian Republic (represented by: G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and G. De Bellis and S. Fiorentino, avvocati dello Stato)
      (C-624/16 P)

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: D. Grespan, P. Stancanelli and F. Tomat, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Pietro Ferracci, Italian Republic (represented by G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and G. De Bellis and S. Fiorentino, avvocati dello Stato)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 15 September 2016, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission (T-220/13, not published, EU:T:2016:484), in so far as it dismissed the action brought by Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori for the annulment of Commission Decision 2013/284/EU of 19 December 2012 on State aid SA.20829 (C 26/2010, ex NN 43/2010 (ex CP 71/2006)) Scheme concerning the municipal real estate tax exemption granted to real estate used by non-commercial entities for specific purposes implemented by Italy, to the extent that the European Commission did not order recovery of the unlawful aid granted by means of the exemption from the Imposta communale sugli immobili (municipal tax on real property);

                  2.

                  Dismisses the appeal in Case C-622/16 P as to the remainder;

                  3.

                  Annuls Decision 2013/284 to the extent that the European Commission did not order recovery of the unlawful aid granted by means of the exemption from the Imposta communale sugli immobili (municipal tax on real property);

                  4.

                  Dismisses the appeals in Cases C-623/16 P and C-624/16 P;

                  5.

                  Orders Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl to bear half of its own costs incurred in connection with the appeal in Case C-622/16 P and to pay two-thirds of the European Commission’s costs and bear two-thirds of its own costs in connection with the action before the General Court of the European Union in Case T-220/13;

                  6.

                  Orders the European Commission, as regards its own costs, to bear one-third of the costs in connection with the action before the General Court of the European Union in Case T-220/13 and to bear the costs in connection with the appeals in Cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P and, as regards the costs of Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori Srl, to pay one-third of the costs in connection with the action before the General Court of the European Union in Case T-220/13, to pay half the costs in connection with the appeal in Case C-622/16 P, and to pay the costs incurred in Case C-623/16 P;

                  7.

                  Orders the Italian Republic to bear its own costs in Cases C-622/16 P to C-624/16 P.

         (1)  OJ C 38, 6.2.2017.


title: Case C-534/18 P: Appeal brought on 15 August 2018 by Xabier Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 29 May 2018 in Case T-577/15, Xabier Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez v EUIPO — Núcleo de comunicaciones y control, S.L.

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/27

      Appeal brought on 15 August 2018 by Xabier Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 29 May 2018 in Case T-577/15, Xabier Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez v EUIPO — Núcleo de comunicaciones y control, S.L.

      (Case C-534/18 P)
      (2019/C 16/34)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Appellant: Xabier Uribe-Etxebarría Jiménez (represented by: M. Esteve Sanz, abogada)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office and Núcleo de comunicaciones y control, S.L.

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as it dismisses the first plea in law of the appellant’s action before the General Court and in so far as it dismisses in part the third plea in law of that action;

                  —

                  grant the form of order sought under the first plea in law of the appellant’s action before the General Court or, in the alternative, grant the form of order sought under the third plea in law of that action;

                  —

                  order EUIPO and the intervener to pay all of the appellant’s costs incurred before the General Court and in the context of this appeal.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The
            first ground of appeal
         , which is divided into six sub-grounds, is brought against the grounds of the judgment under appeal which, having found that the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to disregard the supplementary written pleading submitted within the time limit by the appellant before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, dismissed the appellant’s first plea in law before the General Court alleging that the decision of the Board of Appeal of EUIPO infringed Articles 63(1), 64(1) and 76(1) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009. (1)

      The first sub-ground alleges infringement of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and of Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on the ground that there was a failure by the General Court to state reasons when, in the judgment under appeal, there was no ruling on the argument, developed by the appellant at the hearing, that the line of argument developed by EUIPO in its response is inadmissible.
      The second sub-ground alleges: (i) infringement of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and of Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on the ground that the General Court failed to fulfil its obligation to find of its own motion that the contested decision had failed to state reasons regarding the grounds on which the appellant’s request to have reanalysed the proof of use submitted before the Cancellation Division was not taken into account; (ii) infringement of the appellant’s rights of defence in that the judgment under appeal accepted the ex novo reasoning developed by EUIPO in its response, instead of the Court finding of its own motion that the decision of the Board of Appeal failed to state reasons; (iii) distortion of the facts when the judgment under appeal found that the Board of Appeal was fully entitled to disregard the appellant’s written pleading, in spite of the fact that the Board of Appeal did not disregard that pleading.
      The third sub-ground alleges distortion of the facts and, specifically, distortion of the arguments in the statement of grounds of appeal (initial and supplementary) submitted by the appellant before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.
      The fourth sub-ground alleges infringement of Articles 63(1), 64(1), 76(1) and 57(2) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009, in that the judgment under appeal misinterpreted those articles, thereby validating the Board of Appeal’s non-adjudication on a claim of the appellant which was debated before the Board of Appeal.
      The fifth sub-ground alleges infringement of Article 64 of Regulation (EC) 207/2009, in so far as the judgment under appeal found that, whilst the issue of the actual use of the earlier mark was not specifically raised before the Board of Appeal, that issue does not constitute a point of law which must necessarily be examined by that Board of Appeal in order to reach a decision in the case before it.
      The sixth sub-ground alleges infringement of Articles 64 and 60 of Regulation (EC) 207/2009 and Rule 49(1) of Regulation 2868/95 (2) in that the General Court applied to the present case the case-law relating to those two articles, which govern the admissibility of appeals before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, when, in the present case, the appeal had not been declared inadmissible by the Board of Appeal and, even if it had been, that finding would have infringed those articles, since the written pleadings submitted by the appellant were not declared inadmissible.
      The
            second ground of appeal
          is brought against the ground of the judgment under appeal dismissing in part the third plea in law before the General Court alleging that the decision of the Board of Appeal of EUIPO infringed Article 8 of Regulation (EC) 207/2009, and is divided into two sub-grounds.
      The first sub-ground alleges infringement of Article 36 of Statute of the Court of Justice and of Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on the ground that the judgment under appeal failed to state reasons by not explaining the significance which it decided to attach to the findings in the decisions of the Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal of EUIPO on the goods in respect of which the earlier trade mark was to be considered registered. It is also alleged that those findings were distorted when the significance which the judgment under appeal attached to the findings in those decisions is contrasted with the arguments of the parties and the organisation of procedure.
      The second sub-ground alleges infringement of Article 8 of Regulation 207/2009 in so far as the judgment under appeal finds that the services in Class 42 of the trade mark at issue and the goods in respect of which the earlier trade mark has been considered registered are similar.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1).

         (2)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 of 13 December 1995 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1995 L 303, p. 1).


title: Case C-342/17: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto — Italy) — Memoria Srl, Antonia Dall’Antonia v Comune di Padova (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Restrictions on freedom of establishment — Jurisdiction of the Court — Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling — Purely domestic situation — National legislation prohibiting any profit-making activity relating to the safekeeping of cinerary urns — Proportionality test — Coherence of national rules)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/18

      Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto — Italy) — Memoria Srl, Antonia Dall’Antonia v Comune di Padova
      (Case C-342/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Restrictions on freedom of establishment - Jurisdiction of the Court - Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling - Purely domestic situation - National legislation prohibiting any profit-making activity relating to the safekeeping of cinerary urns - Proportionality test - Coherence of national rules))
      (2019/C 16/21)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Memoria Srl, Antonia Dall’Antonia

         Defendant: Comune di Padova

         Intervener: Alessandra Calore

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits, even despite the express wishes of the deceased, the recipient of a cinerary urn from entrusting its safekeeping to a third party, and requires him to store the urn in his home, unless it is entrusted to a municipal cemetery, and furthermore prohibits any activity carried out for profit relating, even non-exclusively, to the safekeeping of cinerary urns, on whatever basis and for whatever period.

         (1)  OJ C 309, 18.9.2017.


title: Case T-636/18: Action brought on 23 October 2018 — Tokai erftcarbon v Commission

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/48

      Action brought on 23 October 2018 — Tokai erftcarbon v Commission
      (Case T-636/18)
      (2019/C 16/59)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Tokai erftcarbon GmbH (Grevenbroich, Germany) (represented by: K. Van Maldegem, M. Grunchard, R. Crespi and S. Saez Moreno, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible and well-founded;

                  —

                  compensate the applicant for the damage caused to it by the defendant;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay to the applicant damages suffered by the applicant as a direct consequence of adoption of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, of 2 October 2013, amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2013 L 261, p. 5), insofar as it classified pitch, coal tar, high temp as Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410), evaluated at a total amount of 66 236,74 EUR, or any other amount as further established by the applicant in the course of the proceedings or by the Court;

                  —

                  in the alternative, rule on interlocutory judgment that the defendant is obliged to make reparation for the loss suffered and order the parties to produce to the Court, within a reasonable period from the date of the judgment, figures as to the amount of the compensation agreed between the parties or, failing the agreement, order the parties to produce within the same period their submissions with detailed figures in support;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay to the applicant compensatory interest at the default rate from the date of the losses suffered (i.e. either from the date of entry into force of the unlawful classification or from the date when the damage materialised);

                  —

                  order defendant to pay default interest of 8 %, or any other appropriate rate to be determined by the Court, calculated on the amount payable as from the date of the judgment until actual payment; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on one plea in law alleging that the defendant caused damage to the applicant by the adoption and entry into force of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, (1) classifying the substance pitch, coal tar, high temp as Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance. On 22 November 2017, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal of the European Commission against the decision of the General Court to partially annul Regulation No 944/2013 insofar as it classified the substance pitch, coal tar, high temp. as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance due to a manifest error of assessment. The applicant incurred in costs to apply the unlawful classification. The defendant would have been responsible for those costs pursuant to Articles 268 and 340 TFEU since the conduct of the defendant is unlawful in that it amounts to a sufficiently serious breach of law, the damage caused is actual and certain and there is a direct causal link between the conduct and the damage relied upon.

         (1)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, of 2 October 2013, amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ L 261, 3.10.2013, p. 5).


title: Case C-18/17: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche SpA and Others v Regionale Geschäftsstelle Leoben des Arbeitsmarktservice (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Accession of new Member States — Republic of Croatia — Transitional measures — Freedom to provide services — Directive 96/71/EC — Posting of workers — Posting of Croatian and third-country nationals to Austria through the intermediary of an undertaking established in Italy)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/6

      Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgerichtshof — Austria) — Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche SpA and Others v Regionale Geschäftsstelle Leoben des Arbeitsmarktservice
      (Case C-18/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Accession of new Member States - Republic of Croatia - Transitional measures - Freedom to provide services - Directive 96/71/EC - Posting of workers - Posting of Croatian and third-country nationals to Austria through the intermediary of an undertaking established in Italy))
      (2019/C 16/06)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Verwaltungsgerichtshof

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellants: Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche SpA, Dragan Panic, Ivan Arnautov, Jakov Mandic, Miroslav Brnjac, Nicolai Dorassevitch, Alen Mihovic

         Respondent: Regionale Geschäftsstelle Leoben des Arbeitsmarktservice

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, together with Chapter 2, paragraph 2, of Annex V to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is entitled to restrict, by the requirement of a work permit, the posting of Croatian workers who are employed by an undertaking which has its registered office in Croatia, when the posting of those workers takes place through their hiring-out, within the meaning of Article 1(3)(c) of Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, to an undertaking established in another Member State for the purposes of the provision of services in the first of those Member States by the latter undertaking.

                  2.

                  Articles 56 and 57 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is not entitled to require that third-country nationals, hired out to an undertaking established in another Member State, by another undertaking which is also established in that other Member State, for the purposes of providing a service in the first of those Member States, must have a work permit.

         (1)  OJ C 144, 8.5.2017.


title: Case C-568/18 P: Appeal brought on 11 September 2018 by Rogesa Roheisengesellschaft Saar mbH against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2018 in Case T-643/13, Rogesa Roheisengesellschaft Saar mbH v European Commission

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/29

      Appeal brought on 11 September 2018 by Rogesa Roheisengesellschaft Saar mbH against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2018 in Case T-643/13, Rogesa Roheisengesellschaft Saar mbH v European Commission
      (Case C-568/18 P)
      (2019/C 16/36)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Rogesa Roheisengesellschaft Saar mbH (represented by: S. Altenschmidt and D. Jacob, Rechtsanwälte)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 11 July 2018 in Case T-643/13;

                  —

                  annul the Commission’s decision of 15 September 2013 with reference GestDem 2013/1504;

                  —

                  in the alternative, set aside the General Court’s judgment and refer the matter back to the General Court.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The applicant relies on the following grounds of appeal:

                  1.

                  The General Court misconstrued the requirements set out in Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 (1) for a refusal to grant free access to environmental information. It interpreted too broadly the ground for refusal set out in the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, (2) in conjunction with Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006, in the light of the Aarhus Convention guidelines. The General Court erred in law in assuming that information on the CO2 efficiency of an industrial plant was commercially sensitive information.

                  2.

                  The General Court infringed Article 6(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 and Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 by failing to recognise the existence of environmental information on emissions.

                  3.

                  Furthermore, the General Court also failed to take sufficient account of the overwhelming public interest in access to the environmental information at issue, as demonstrated by the appellant.

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies, OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13.

         (2)  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43.


title: Case C-33/17: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Bleiburg/Okrajno Sodišče Pliberk — Austria) — Čepelnik d.o.o. v Michael Vavti (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 56 TFEU — Freedom to provide services — Restrictions — Services in the internal market — Directive 2006/123/EC — Labour law — Posting of workers in order to carry out construction works — Reporting of workers — Retention and translation of payslips — Suspension of payments — Payment of a security by the recipient of the services — Surety for a possible fine to be imposed on the service provider)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/7

      Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bezirksgericht Bleiburg/Okrajno Sodišče Pliberk — Austria) — Čepelnik d.o.o. v Michael Vavti
      (Case C-33/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 56 TFEU - Freedom to provide services - Restrictions - Services in the internal market - Directive 2006/123/EC - Labour law - Posting of workers in order to carry out construction works - Reporting of workers - Retention and translation of payslips - Suspension of payments - Payment of a security by the recipient of the services - Surety for a possible fine to be imposed on the service provider))
      (2019/C 16/07)
      Languages of the case: German and Slovenian

         Referring court

      Bezirksgericht Bleiburg/Okrajno Sodišče Pliberk

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Čepelnik d.o.o.

         Defendant: Michael Vavti

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the competent authorities can order a commissioning party established in that Member State to suspend payments to his contractor established in another Member State, or even to pay a security in an amount equivalent to the price still owed for the works in order to guarantee payment of the fine which might be imposed on that contractor in the event of a proven infringement of the labour law of the first Member State.

         (1)  OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


title: Case C-93/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 November 2018 — European Commission v Hellenic Republic (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — State aid — Aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the internal market — Recovery requirement — Judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil its obligations — Undertaking which engages in both civil and military activities — Non-implementation — Essential interests of the security of a Member State — Article 346(1)(b) TFEU — Financial penalties — Periodic penalty payment — Lump sum — Ability to pay — ‘N’ Factor — Factors which are the basis for the assessment of the ability to pay — Gross domestic product — Weighting of votes of the Member State in the Council of the European Union — New voting rules in the Council)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/8

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 November 2018 — European Commission v Hellenic Republic
      (Case C-93/17) (1)

      ((Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - State aid - Aid declared unlawful and incompatible with the internal market - Recovery requirement - Judgment of the Court establishing a failure to fulfil its obligations - Undertaking which engages in both civil and military activities - Non-implementation - Essential interests of the security of a Member State - Article 346(1)(b) TFEU - Financial penalties - Periodic penalty payment - Lump sum - Ability to pay - ‘N’ Factor - Factors which are the basis for the assessment of the ability to pay - Gross domestic product - Weighting of votes of the Member State in the Council of the European Union - New voting rules in the Council))
      (2019/C 16/09)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Bouchagiar and B. Stromsky, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: Hellenic Republic (represented by: K. Boskovits and A. Samoni-Rantou, acting as Agents)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Declares that, by failing to take, on the date on which the period prescribed in the letter of formal notice issued on 27 November 2014 by the European Commission, all the measures all the measures necessary to comply with the judgment of 28 June 2012, Commission v Greece (C-485/10, EU:C:2012:395), the Hellenic Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 260(1) TFUE.

                  2.

                  Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the European Commission a periodic penalty payment of EUR 7 294 000 for each six month period from the date of delivery of the present judgement until the date of compliance with the judgment of 28 June 2012, Commission v Greece (C-485/10, EU:C:2012:395).

                  3.

                  Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay to the European Commission a lump sum EUR 10 000 000.

                  4.

                  Orders the Hellenic Republic to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


title: Case T-645/18: Action brought on 23 October 2018 — Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/53

      Action brought on 23 October 2018 — Bilbaína de Alquitranes v Commission
      (Case T-645/18)
      (2019/C 16/64)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA (Luchana-Baracaldo, Vizcaya, Spain) (represented by: K. Van Maldegem, M. Grunchard, R. Crespi and S. Saez Moreno, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible and well-founded;

                  —

                  compensate the applicant for the damage caused to it by the defendant;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the applicant damages suffered by the applicant as a direct consequence of adoption of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, of 2 October 2013, amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2013 L 261, p. 5), insofar as it classified pitch, coal tar, high temp as Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410), evaluated at a total amount of 488 871,30 EUR or any other amount as further established by the applicant in the course of the proceedings or by the Court;

                  —

                  in the alternative, rule on interlocutory judgment that the defendant is obliged to make reparation for the loss suffered and order the parties to produce to the Court, within a reasonable period from the date of the judgment, figures as to the amount of the compensation agreed between the parties or, failing the agreement, order the parties to produce to the Court within the same period their submission with detailed figures in support;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay to the applicant compensatory interest at the default rate from the date of the losses suffered (i.e. either from the date of entry into force of the unlawful classification or from the date when the damage materialised);

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay default interest of 8 %, or any other appropriate rate to be determined by the Court, calculated on the amount payable as from the date of the Court’s judgment until actual payment; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay all costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on one plea in law, alleging that the defendant caused damage to the applicant by the adoption and entry into force of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, (1) classifying the substance pitch, coal tar, high temp. as Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance. On 22 November 2017, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal of the European Commission against the decision of the General Court to partially annul Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 insofar as it classified the substance pitch, coal tar, high temp. as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) due to a manifest error of assessment. The applicant incurred in costs to apply the unlawful classification. The defendant would be responsible for those costs pursuant to Articles 268 and 340 TFEU since the conduct of the defendant is unlawful in that it amounts to a sufficiently serious breach of law, the damage caused is actual and certain and there is a direct causal link between the conduct of the defendant and the damage relied upon.

         (1)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, of 2 October 2013, amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ L 261, 3.10.2013, p. 5).


title: Case T-486/17: Judgment of the General Court of 14 November 2018 — Foodterapia v EUIPO — Sperlari (DIETOX) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark DIETOX — Earlier EU figurative mark Dietor — Relative ground for refusal — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/43

      Judgment of the General Court of 14 November 2018 — Foodterapia v EUIPO — Sperlari (DIETOX)
      (Case T-486/17) (1)

      ((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark DIETOX - Earlier EU figurative mark Dietor - Relative ground for refusal - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
      (2019/C 16/52)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Foodterapia, SL (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: J.C. Erdozain López, J. Galán López and H. Tellez Robledo, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Sperlari Srl, formerly Cloetta Italia Srl (Cremona, Italy) (represented by: P. Pozzi and G. Ghisletti, lawyers)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 May 2017 (Case R 1611/2016-5), concerning opposition proceedings between Cloetta Italia and Foodterapia.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders Foodterapia, SL, to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and by Sperlari Srl, including the costs necessarily incurred by the latter’s legal predecessor before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO.

         (1)  OJ C 318, 25.9.2017.


title: Case C-484/17: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 7 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Netherlands) — K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 2003/86/EC — Right to family reunification — Article 15 — Refusal to grant an autonomous residence permit — National legislation providing for a requirement to pass a civic integration examination)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/22

      Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 7 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State — Netherlands) — K v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie
      (Case C-484/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 2003/86/EC - Right to family reunification - Article 15 - Refusal to grant an autonomous residence permit - National legislation providing for a requirement to pass a civic integration examination))
      (2019/C 16/26)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Raad van State

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: K

         Respondent: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 15(1) and (4) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification does not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which permits an application for an autonomous residence permit, lodged by a third country national who has resided over five years in a Member State by virtue of family reunification, to be rejected on the ground that he has not shown that he has passed a civic integration test on the language and society of that Member State provided that the detailed rules for the requirement to pass that examination do not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective of facilitating the integration of those third country nationals, which is for the referring court to ascertain.

         (1)  OJ C 374, 6.11.2017.


title: Case C-171/17: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 November 2018 — Commission v Hungary (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Directive 2006/123/EC — Articles 15 to 17 — Article 49 TFEU — Freedom of establishment — Article 56 TFEU — Freedom to provide services — National mobile payment system — Monopoly)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/9

      Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 7 November 2018 — Commission v Hungary
      (Case C-171/17) (1)

      ((Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Directive 2006/123/EC - Articles 15 to 17 - Article 49 TFEU - Freedom of establishment - Article 56 TFEU - Freedom to provide services - National mobile payment system - Monopoly))
      (2019/C 16/10)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Parties

         Applicant: European Commission (represented by: V. Bottka and H. Tserepa-Lacombe, acting as Agents)

         Defendant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér and G. Koós, acting as Agents)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Declares that, by instituting and maintaining in force the national mobile payment system governed by a nemzeti mobil fizetési rendszerről szóló 2011. évi CC. törvény (Law CC of 2011 on the national mobile payment system) and by 356/2012. (XII. 13.) Korm. rendelet a nemzeti mobil fizetési rendszerről szóló törvény végrehajtásáról (Governmental Decree No 356/2012 implementing the mobile payment system law), Hungary has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 15(2)(d) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market and Article 56 TFEU;

                  2.

                  Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

                  3.

                  Orders the European Commission and Hungary to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


title: Case T-140/18: Judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018 — LMP Lichttechnik v EUIPO (LITECRAFT) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark LITECRAFT — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/44

      Judgment of the General Court of 15 November 2018 — LMP Lichttechnik v EUIPO (LITECRAFT)
      (Case T-140/18) (1)

      ((EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark LITECRAFT - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)))
      (2019/C 16/54)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: LMP Lichttechnik Vertriebs GmbH (Ibbenbüren, Germany) (represented by: R. Plegge, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: W. Schramek and D. Hanf, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 January 2018 (Case R 699/2017-2) relating to an application for registration of the word sign LITECRAFT as an EU trade mark.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders LMP Lichttechnik Vertriebs GmbH to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 161, 7.5.2018.