title: Joined Cases C-47/17 and C-48/17: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 November 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag — Netherlands) — X (C-47/17), X (C-48/17) v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 — Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 — Determination of the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection — Criteria and mechanisms for determination — Request to take charge of or take back an asylum seeker — Negative reply from the requested Member State — Re-examination request — Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1560/2003 — Time limit for replying — Expiry — Effects)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/7

      Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 November 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag — Netherlands) — X (C-47/17), X (C-48/17) v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie
      (Joined Cases C-47/17 and C-48/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 - Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 - Determination of the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection - Criteria and mechanisms for determination - Request to take charge of or take back an asylum seeker - Negative reply from the requested Member State - Re-examination request - Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1560/2003 - Time limit for replying - Expiry - Effects))
      (2019/C 16/08)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Rechtbank Den Haag zittingsplaats Haarlem

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: X (C-47/17), X (C-48/17)

         Defendant: Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 5(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003 of 2 September 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, as amended by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 118/2014 of 30 January 2014, must be interpreted as meaning that, in the course of the procedure for determining the Member State that is responsible for processing an application for international protection, the Member State which receives a take charge or take back request under Articles 21 and 23 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, which, after making the necessary checks, has replied in the negative to that request within the time limits laid down in Articles 22 and 25 of Regulation No 604/2013 and which, thereafter, receives a re-examination request under Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1560/2003, must endeavour, in the spirit of sincere cooperation, to reply to the re-examination request within a period of two weeks.
      Where the requested Member State does not reply within that period of two weeks to the re-examination request, the additional re-examination procedure shall be definitively terminated, with the result that the requesting Member State must, as from the expiry of that period, be considered to be responsible for the examination of the application for international protection, unless it still has available to it the time needed to lodge, within the mandatory time limits laid down for that purpose in Article 21(1) and Article 23(2) of Regulation No 604/2013, a further take charge or take back request.

         (1)  OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.


title: Case T-454/17: Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2018 — ‘Pro NGO!’ v Commission (Public procurement — Tendering procedure — Investigation by an external auditor — OLAF investigation — Finding of irregularities — Commission decision imposing an administrative penalty on the applicant — Exclusion from procurement and grant award procedures financed by the general budget of the European Union for a period of six months — Registration in the Early Detection and Exclusion System database — New plea in law — Right of defence)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/42

      Judgment of the General Court of 8 November 2018 — ‘Pro NGO!’ v Commission
      (Case T-454/17) (1)

      ((Public procurement - Tendering procedure - Investigation by an external auditor - OLAF investigation - Finding of irregularities - Commission decision imposing an administrative penalty on the applicant - Exclusion from procurement and grant award procedures financed by the general budget of the European Union for a period of six months - Registration in the Early Detection and Exclusion System database - New plea in law - Right of defence))
      (2019/C 16/51)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant:‘Pro NGO!’ (Non-Governmental-Organisations/Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen) e.V. (Cologne, Germany) (represented by: M. Scheid, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: F. Dintilhac and B.-R. Killmann, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, seeking annulment of the Commission decision of 16 May 2017 imposing the administrative penalty of exclusion of the applicant for a period of six months from procurement and grant award procedures financed by the general budget of the European Union and laid down in Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1) and the exclusion of the applicant for the same period from the grant of funds laid down in Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund (OJ 2015 L 58, p. 17).

         Operative part of the judgment

      The General Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders ‘Pro NGO!’ (Non-Governmental-Organisations/Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen) e.V. to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 330, 2.10.2017.


title: Case T-639/18: Action brought on 23 October 2018 — SGL Carbon v Commission

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/51

      Action brought on 23 October 2018 — SGL Carbon v Commission
      (Case T-639/18)
      (2019/C 16/62)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: SGL Carbon SE (Wiesbaden, Germany) (represented by: K. Van Maldegem, M. Grunchard, R. Crespi and S. Saez Moreno, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible and well-founded;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay to the applicant damages suffered by the applicant as a direct consequence adoption of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, of 2 October 2013, amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2013 L 261, p. 5), insofar as it classified pitch, coal tar, high temp as Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410), evaluated at a total amount of 1 022 172,00 EUR, or any other amount as further established by the applicant in the course of the proceedings or by the Court;

                  —

                  in the alternative, rule on interlocutory judgment that the defendant is obliged to make reparation for the loss suffered and order the parties to produce to the Court, within a reasonable period from the date of the judgment, figures as to the amount of the compensation agreed between the parties or, failing the agreement, order the parties to produce to the Court within the same period their submissions with detailed figures in support;

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay to the applicant compensatory interest at the default rate from the date of the losses suffered (i.e. either from the date of entry into force of the unlawful classification or from the date when the damage materialised);

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay default interest of 8 %, or any other appropriate rate to be determined by the Court, calculated on the amount payable as from the date of the Court’s judgment until actual payment; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay all costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on one plea in law, alleging that the defendant caused damage to the applicant by the adoption and entry into force of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, (1) classifying the substance pitch, coal tar, high temp. as Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance. On 22 November 2017, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal of the European Commission against the decision of the General Court to partially annul Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 insofar as it classified the substance pitch, coal tar, high temp. as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance due to a manifest error of assessment. The applicant incurred in costs to apply the unlawful classification. The defendant would be responsible for those costs pursuant to Articles 268 and 340 TFEU since the conduct of the defendant is unlawful in that it amounts to a sufficiently serious breach of law, the damage caused is actual and certain and there is a direct causal link between the conduct of the defendant and the damage relied upon.

         (1)  Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013, of 2 October 2013, amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ L 261, 3.10.2013, p. 5).


title: Case C-288/17: Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 19 September 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — France) — Fédération des fabricants de cigares, Coprova, E-Labo France, Smakq développement v Premier ministre, Ministre des Affaires sociales et de la Santé, interveners: Société J. Cortès France, Scandinavian Tobacco Group France, Villiger France

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/32

      Order of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of 19 September 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État — France) — Fédération des fabricants de cigares, Coprova, E-Labo France, Smakq développement v Premier ministre, Ministre des Affaires sociales et de la Santé, interveners: Société J. Cortès France, Scandinavian Tobacco Group France, Villiger France
      (Case C-288/17) (1)

      (2019/C 16/40)
      Language of the case: French
      The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 256, 7.8.2017.


title: Case C-457/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — Heiko Jonny Maniero v Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes eV (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin — Directive 2000/43/EC — Article 3(1)(g) — Scope — Concept of ‘education’ — The award by a private foundation of scholarships aimed at promoting projects for legal research and studies abroad — Article 2(2)(b) — Indirect discrimination — Award of scholarships conditional on applicants having first passed the First State Law Examination (Erste Juristische Staatsprüfung))

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/20

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof — Germany) — Heiko Jonny Maniero v Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes eV
      (Case C-457/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin - Directive 2000/43/EC - Article 3(1)(g) - Scope - Concept of ‘education’ - The award by a private foundation of scholarships aimed at promoting projects for legal research and studies abroad - Article 2(2)(b) - Indirect discrimination - Award of scholarships conditional on applicants having first passed the First State Law Examination (Erste Juristische Staatsprüfung)))
      (2019/C 16/24)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Bundesgerichtshof

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Heiko Jonny Maniero

         Defendant: Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes eV

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Article 3(1)(g) of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin must be interpreted as meaning that the award by a private foundation of scholarships to support research projects or studies abroad falls within the concept of ‘education’, within the meaning of that provision, where there is a sufficiently close link between the assigned financial payments and participation in those research projects or studies which, themselves, fall within that same concept of ‘education’. That is the case, in particular, where such financial payments are linked to the participation of potential candidates in such research projects or studies, and are designed to remove all or some of the potential financial barriers to participation, and where those payments are appropriate to achieve that aim.

                  2.

                  Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a private foundation established in a Member State restricts the award of scholarships to support research projects or studies abroad to candidates having successfully completed, in that Member State, a law examination, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not constitute indirect discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin within the meaning of that provision.

         (1)  OJ C 347, 16.10.2017.


title: Case T-643/18: Action brought on 29 October 2018 — August Wolff v EUIPO — Faes Farma (DermoFaes)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/52

      Action brought on 29 October 2018 — August Wolff v EUIPO — Faes Farma (DermoFaes)
      (Case T-643/18)
      (2019/C 16/63)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Dr. August Wolff GmbH & Co. KG Arzneimittel (Bielefeld, Germany) (represented by: A. Thünken, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Faes Farma, SA (Lamiaco-Leioa, Spain)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union word mark DermoFaes — Application for registration No 15 069 289

         Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 June 2018 in Case R 1842/2017-2

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the contested decision;

                  —

                  uphold the opposition and reject the contested application;

                  —

                  order EUIPO and, as the case may be, the intervener to bear the costs of the proceedings and the costs incurred by proceedings before EUIPO.

         Plea in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case C-461/17: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) — Ireland) — Brian Holohan and Others v An Bord Pleanála (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Directive 92/43/EEC — Conservation of natural habitats — Conservation of wild fauna and flora — Road construction project — Appropriate assessment of effects on the environment — Extent of the obligation to state reasons — Directive 2011/92/EU — Assessment of the implications of certain projects — Annex IV, Point 3 — Article 5(3)(d) — Meaning of the concept of ‘main alternatives’)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/21

      Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 7 November 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) — Ireland) — Brian Holohan and Others v An Bord Pleanála
      (Case C-461/17) (1)

      ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Directive 92/43/EEC - Conservation of natural habitats - Conservation of wild fauna and flora - Road construction project - Appropriate assessment of effects on the environment - Extent of the obligation to state reasons - Directive 2011/92/EU - Assessment of the implications of certain projects - Annex IV, Point 3 - Article 5(3)(d) - Meaning of the concept of ‘main alternatives’))
      (2019/C 16/25)
      Language of the case: English

         Referring court

      High Court (Ireland)

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Brian Holohan, Richard Guilfoyle, Noric Guilfoyle, Liam Donegan

         Defendant: An Bord Pleanála

         Intervener: National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS)

         Operative part of the judgment

                  1.

                  Article 6(3) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora must be interpreted as meaning that an ‘appropriate assessment’ must, on the one hand, catalogue the entirety of habitat types and species for which a site is protected, and, on the other, identify and examine both the implications of the proposed project for the species present on that site, and for which that site has not been listed, and the implications for habitat types and species to be found outside the boundaries of that site, provided that those implications are liable to affect the conservation objectives of the site.

                  2.

                  Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43 must be interpreted as meaning that the competent authority is permitted to grant to a plan or project consent which leaves the developer free to determine subsequently certain parameters relating to the construction phase, such as the location of the construction compound and haul routes, only if that authority is certain that the development consent granted establishes conditions that are strict enough to guarantee that those parameters will not adversely affect the integrity of the site.

                  3.

                  Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43 must be interpreted as meaning that, where the competent authority rejects the findings in a scientific expert opinion recommending that additional information be obtained, the ‘appropriate assessment’ must include an explicit and detailed statement of reasons capable of dispelling all reasonable scientific doubt concerning the effects of the work envisaged on the site concerned.

                  4.

                  Article 5(1) and (3) of, and Annex IV to, Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, must be interpreted as meaning that the developer is obliged to supply information that expressly addresses the significant effects of its project on all species identified in the statement that is supplied pursuant to those provisions.

                  5.

                  Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2011/92 must be interpreted as meaning that the developer must supply information in relation to the environmental impact of both the chosen option and of all the main alternatives studied by the developer, together with the reasons for his choice, taking into account at least the environmental effects, even if such an alternative was rejected at an early stage.

         (1)  OJ C 338, 9.10.2017.


title: Case C-299/18: Order of the President of the Court of 22 August 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf — Germany) — Stefan Neldner v Eurowings GmbH

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/32

      Order of the President of the Court of 22 August 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf — Germany) — Stefan Neldner v Eurowings GmbH
      (Case C-299/18) (1)

      (2019/C 16/41)
      Language of the case: German
      The President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.


title: Case T-830/17: Judgment of the General Court of 13 November 2018 –Szentes v Commission (Civil service — Officials — Recruitment — Competition notice — Open competition — Admission conditions — Professional experience — Selection board’s decision not to allow the applicant to sit the competition — Request for review — Plea of illegality — Obligation to state reasons — Distortion of information in the application form — Manifest error of assessment — Breach of the notice of competition)

text:
               14.1.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 16/44

      Judgment of the General Court of 13 November 2018 –Szentes v Commission
      (Case T-830/17) (1)

      ((Civil service - Officials - Recruitment - Competition notice - Open competition - Admission conditions - Professional experience - Selection board’s decision not to allow the applicant to sit the competition - Request for review - Plea of illegality - Obligation to state reasons - Distortion of information in the application form - Manifest error of assessment - Breach of the notice of competition))
      (2019/C 16/53)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Gyula Szentes (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: F. Moyse, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Mihaylova and B. Mongin, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Application based on Article 270 TFEU seeking the annulment, first, of the decision of the chair of the selection board for Competition EPSO/AD/330/16 — Nuclear safeguards inspectors (AD 7) of 24 February 2017 not to admit the applicant to the next stage of that competition and, second, as far as necessary, of the decision of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) of 29 September 2017 rejecting his complaint.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the action;

                  2.

                  Orders Mr Gyula Szentes to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 63, 19.2.2018.


title: Case T-81/19: Action brought on 12 February 2019 — Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission

text:
               25.3.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 112/49

      Action brought on 12 February 2019 — Apostolopoulou and Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki v Commission
      (Case T-81/19)
      (2019/C 112/60)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicants: Zoe Apostolopoulou and Anastasia Apostolopoulou-Chrysanthaki (Athens, Greece) (represented by: D. Gouskos, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the General Court should:

                  —

                  join for judgment their present action with their related action of 25 October 2018, registered as Case Τ–721/18;

                  —

                  uphold the action and order the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to each of the applicants the total sum of one million one hundred thousand euros, as fianancial compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicants because of the attack on their character, as that sum is broken down in their pleadings;

                  —

                  order the defendants to refrain in future from any attack on the character of the applicants;

                  —

                  order the first named defendant to restore the honour and reputation of the applicants by means of its declaration;

                  —

                  order the defendants to pay the general costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      This action has been brought against the European Commission and the European Union. Given that the latter is always represented before the General Court by the institution to which the contested act or conduct is attributed, the Commission is consequently called as the only defendant to this action.
      In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  The first plea in law is based on an infringement of the requirement of truth and equity in proceedings, infringement of the fundamental general principle of the fair administration of justice and infringement of the applicants’ right to a fair trial.

                  2.

                  The second plea in law is based on an infringement of the human dignity and the character of the applicants and an infringement of the principle of sound administration.

                  3.

                  The third plea is based on the infringement of the principles of legality, good faith and protection of legitimate expectations.


title: Case C-798/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 17 December 2018 — Federazione nazionale delle imprese elettrotecniche ed elettroniche (Anie) and Others v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Gestore dei servizi energetici (GSE) SpA

text:
               1.4.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 122/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 17 December 2018 — Federazione nazionale delle imprese elettrotecniche ed elettroniche (Anie) and Others v Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Gestore dei servizi energetici (GSE) SpA
      (Case C-798/18)
      (2019/C 122/07)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Federazione nazionale delle imprese elettrotecniche ed elettroniche (Anie), Società Agricola N.B. Solar s.r.l., 3G s.r.l., AET s.r.l. Apparati Elettromeccanici e Telecomunicazioni, Società Agricola La Fontana s.s., Società Agricola Le Macchie di Sparapani Gabriele e C. s.s., Agricoltura Innovativa s.r.l. — Società Agricola, Società Agricola Agrilite s.r.l., Agrisolar Società Agricola s.r.l., Agrisun s.r.l., Società Agricola Agroenergia s.r.l., Alpi — Società Agricola s.s., Ambrasol 2 s.r.l., Ambrasol 3 s.r.l., Ambrasol 4 s.r.l., Ape Immobiliare s.r.l., Arizzi Fonderie S. Giorgio s.p.a., Artech s.r.l., ASP Solar Italia Alpha s.r.l. Società Agricola, Associazione Centro Servizi Pastorali Mons. Biglia, Aurora Group s.p.a., AVG s.r.l. Società Agricola, Tosi Sante, Cinesi Palmino, B&B Energia s.r.l., Bauexpert s.p.a., Belvedere Società Agricola a r.l., Biancolino Società Agricola a r.l., BMN Green Energy s.r.l., Brandoni Solare s.p.a., Brenta CRE s.r.l., Calipso s.r.l., Cappello s.r.l., Casale s.a.s. di CGS Energia s.p.a. & C. Società Agricola, Cavicchi Solar s.r.l., C.B. s.r.l., Ce.Ma.Co. s.r.l., Cedro s.r.l., Centro Risorse s.r.l., CGA s.r.l., Chiarano Green Power s.r.l., Chierese Pak s.r.l., C.L. Solar s.r.l., Colombo Bolla s.r.l., Comino Energia s.r.l., Corà Domenico & Figli s.p.a., Corfin Energy s.r.l., Corna s.r.l., Coronet s.p.a., Società Agricola Coste della Chiesa s.r.l., Ecoenergy 04 s.r.l., Elektrosolar s.r.l., Elettronica Cimone s.r.l., Energia Capoterra Società Agricola s.r.l., Energia e Impresa s.r.l., Società Agricola Energo di Buratti Enrico & C. s.s., Energy Gestion s.r.l., Energy Italia 3 s.r.l., Energy Italia 4 s.r.l., Energylife s.r.l., Energy Resources Pesaro 2 s.r.l., Enervis s.r.l., EQ Energia s.r.l., Esco Roma s.r.l., E-Solar s.r.l., E. Sole s.r.l., Euroline 2 s.r.l., Eurosun Tarquinia s.r.l., Fratelli Dalle Crode s.p.a., Fratelli Raviola s.r.l., Falmec s.p.a., Fiere di Parma s.p.a., Flash Energy s.r.l., Fotoeos s.r.l., Fotosfera s.r.l., Fotosintesi 1 s.r.l., Fotosintesi 2 s.r.l., Fotosintesi 6 s.r.l., Fotovoltaica s.r.l., Fresia Energie s.r.l., Giuseppe Ciccaglione, Generali PIO s.p.a., Gi.Gi.Emme di Caramello Marta e C. s.a.s., Gifa s.r.l., G.P.B. Energia s.r.l., Green Energy Ambiente e Tecnologie s.r.l., Green Land di Giuseppe Ciccaglione s.s. agricola, Green Power 2010 s.r.l., Happy Island Società Agricola s.r.l., I.C.S. Industria Costruzioni Stampi s.p.a., Iesse Commerciale s.r.l., ISA s.r.l. Società Agricola, Isolpack s.p.a., Italcoat s.r.l., La Base s.r.l., La T.I.S. Service s.p.a., Società Agricola Lombardia Group s.r.l., Mafin Green Power s.r.l., Marina Costruzioni s.r.l., Mercato Solare s.p.a., Metalco Group s.r.l., Società Agricola Mostrazzi Solar s.r.l., Mozzone Building System s.r.l., Mozzone Fratelli s.r.l., MSM Solar s.r.l., New E-Co s.r.l., Nordpan s.p.a., Nuvoleto s.r.l. Società Agricola, Omera s.r.l., Palar s.r.l., Paolin Energia s.r.l., Pbsol 1 s.r.l., Pizzarotti Energia s.r.l., Plasti Max s.p.a., PMM Energy s.r.l., Società Agricola Poggio Tortollo di Alessandra Pennuto, Profilumbra s.p.a., Quabas s.p.a., Reco 2 s.r.l., Reti s.r.l., Revi s.r.l., Righi Group s.r.l., Società Agricola Righi s.r.l., Righi s.r.l., Rovigo Solare A s.r.l., Rovigo Solare B s.r.l., Rubner Haus s.p.a., Rubner Holzbau s.p.a., Rubner Tueren s.p.a., Ruscalla Energia s.r.l., Sabenergia s.r.l., San Felice Agrar s.r.l. Società Agricola, Sangiorgio Fotovoltaica Società Agricola a r.l., Società Agricola Sargenti Agroenergie s.s. di Sargenti Carlo & C., SD Agrar s.r.l. Società Agricola, Senergia s.r.l., å Sequenza s.p.a., Sider Sipe s.p.a., Sinergya s.r.l., S.I.Pro. — Agenzia provinciale per lo sviluppo s.p.a., Siriac s.r.l., Società Agricola Cascina Gallotto s.s., Società Agricola Solar Farm s.r.l., Premi Giuseppe — Adelfranca — Piergiorgio s.s. Società Agricola, Sociovit Società Agricola s.s., Solivrea s.r.l., Studio Agri Power s.r.l., Studio Energia s.r.l., Taricco Fratelli s.s., Tecno Pool s.p.a., Toscasolar s.r.l., Trea s.r.l., Trifase s.r.l., Uniernergy s.r.l., V.S. 1 s.r.l., Vercelli s.p.a., Vetraria Bergamasca — Tecnovetro s.r.l., Vinlisca s.r.l., VRV s.p.a., The Wierer Holding s.p.a.

         Defendants: Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Gestore dei servizi energetici (GSE) SpA

         Question referred

      Does EU law preclude the application of a provision of national law, such as that in Article 26(2) and (3) of Decree-Law No 91/2014, as converted by Law No 116/2014, which significantly reduces or delays the payment of incentives already granted by law and defined on the basis of corresponding agreements concluded by undertakings generating electrical energy by means of photovoltaic conversion with Gestore dei servizi energetici SpA, a public company responsible for that process?
      In particular, is that provision of national law compatible with the general principles of EU law relating to legitimate expectation, legal certainty, sincere cooperation and effectiveness, with Articles 16 and 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, with Directive 2009/28/EC (1) and with the rules governing support schemes laid down in that directive, and with Article 216(2) TFEU, in particular in relation to the European Energy Charter Treaty?

         (1)  Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).


title: Case C-700/18 P: Appeal brought on 7 November 2018 by Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 12 October 2018 in Case T-416/18, Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. v European Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/2

      Appeal brought on 7 November 2018 by Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 12 October 2018 in Case T-416/18, Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. v European Commission
      (Case C-700/18 P)
      (2019/C 164/02)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellants: Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.), Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. (represented by: P. Ruth, Rechtsanwalt)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission
      By order of 14 March 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.


title: Case C-722/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 19 November 2018 — KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A.

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/2

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 19 November 2018 — KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A.
      (Case C-722/18)
      (2019/C 164/03)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k.

         Respondent: Porr S.A.

         Question referred

      Does EU law, in particular recitals 13, 20 and 22 of Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (1) and Article 18 TFEU laying down the principle of non-discrimination, permit the possibility of excluding compensation for late payment in respect of transactions financed in whole or in part by the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, which follows from Article 4(3)(c) of the Ustawa o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions)?

         (1)  OJ 2000 L 200, p. 35.


title: Case C-745/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 27 November 2018 — JA v Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/3

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 27 November 2018 — JA v Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów
      (Case C-745/18)
      (2019/C 164/04)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Najwyższy

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: JA

         Respondent: Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów

         Question referred

      Should Articles 73 and 78(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) and the preceding Article 11.A(1)(a) and 11.A(2)(a) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, (2) understood in the light of the general principles of a Member State’s liability to provide compensation for damage, as established in the case-law of the Court of Justice (including, in particular, in the judgments of 19 November 1991, Francovich and Others, C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428; and of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame and Others, C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79), be interpreted as meaning that, with effect from 1 May 2004, they give rise to an obligation on a Member State which acceded to the European Union on that date to lay down regulations providing for the granting to a trustee in bankruptcy or insolvency of remuneration increased by the amount of value added tax (VAT) payable on that remuneration?

         (1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

         (2)  OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1.


title: Case C-779/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 12 December 2018 — Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw v XO

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 12 December 2018 — Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw v XO
      (Case C-779/18)
      (2019/C 164/05)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw

         Defendant: XO

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, as amended, (1) in particular Articles 3(g), 10(1) and 22(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding ‘non-interest credit costs’, determined as a lump sum in accordance with the statutory calculation formula set out in Article 36a of the ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o kredycie konsumenckim (Dziennik Ustaw z 2018 r., poz. 993, tekst jednolity) (Law of 12 May 2011 on Consumer Credit) (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 993, consolidated text) (the Law on Consumer Credit), from being distinguished from the ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’, as defined in that directive, in a manner that enables the actual non-interest credit costs borne by the loan provider to be concealed from the consumer?

                  2.

                  Should the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as amended, (2) in particular Articles 1(2), 6(1) and 7(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding a review of the terms of consumer credit agreements with respect to the conditions set out in Article 3 of that directive in so far as it includes ‘non-interest credit costs’, the criteria for determining which are described in Article 36a of the Law on Consumer Credit?

         (1)  OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.

         (2)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.


title: Case C-824/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 December 2018 — A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/5

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 December 2018 — A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa
      (Case C-824/18)
      (2019/C 164/06)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellants: A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J.

         Respondent: Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Should Article 2 TEU, in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 4(3), Articles 6(1) and 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that
                  an infringement of the rule of law and of the right to an effective remedy and to effective judicial protection occurs in a situation where the national legislature, in granting the right of appeal to a court in individual cases concerning service in the office of judge of the court of last instance of a Member State (the Supreme Court), stipulates that a decision made during the selection procedure preceding the submission of a motion for appointment to the position of judge of the aforementioned court is final and effective where not all parties to the selection procedure have appealed against the decision made with respect to the joint consideration and assessment of all candidates for Supreme Court judges, who also include a candidate not interested in appealing that decision, namely a candidate indicated in the motion for appointment to the aforementioned position, which as a result:

                              —

                              undermines the effectiveness of the remedy and the competent court’s ability to carry out a genuine review of the aforementioned selection procedure?

                              —

                              and, where the scope of that procedure also includes those positions of judges of the Supreme Court to whose holders the new lower retirement age has been applied without leaving the decision on whether to take advantage of the lower retirement age to the sole discretion of the judge concerned, in the context of the principle of the irremovability of judges — where it is found that this principle has been thereby undermined — also has an impact on the scope and outcome of the judicial review of the aforementioned selection procedure?

                  2.

                  Should Article 2 TEU, in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 4(3) and Article 6(1) TEU, in conjunction with Articles 15(1) and 20, in conjunction with Articles 21(1) and 52(1), of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in conjunction with Articles 2(1), 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that
                  an infringement of the rule of law, of the principle of equal treatment and of equal and indiscriminate access to public service — service in the office of judge of the Supreme Court — occurs in a situation where, although the right of appeal to a competent court in individual cases concerning service in the office of judge of the aforementioned court has been granted, as a consequence of the criteria for the finality of the decision described in the first question, the appointment to a vacant position of judge of the Supreme Court may take place without the competent court conducting a review of the aforementioned selection procedure where such a review is initiated, and the absence of such a review, by infringing the right to an effective remedy, infringes the right of equal access to public service, thereby undermining objectives of general interest? And does not a situation in which the composition of the body in a Member State whose purpose is to safeguard the independence of the judiciary (the National Council of the Judiciary), and before which the procedure concerning service in the office of judge of the Supreme Court takes place, is designed in such a way that representatives of the judiciary in that body are elected by the legislature undermine the principle of institutional balance?


title: Case C-3/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 3 January 2019 — Asmel società consortile a.r.l. v ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 3 January 2019 — Asmel società consortile a.r.l. v ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione
      (Case C-3/19)
      (2019/C 164/07)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Consiglio di Stato

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Asmel società consortile a.r.l.

         Respondent: ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) of Legislative Decree No 163 of 12 April 2006, which restricts the autonomy of municipalities to entrust [procurement] to a central purchasing body to only two organisational models (the union of municipalities, if it already exists, or a consortium to be established between municipalities), infringe EU law?

                  2.

                  In any event, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) of Legislative Decree No 163 of 12 April 2006 which, read in conjunction with Article 3(25) of that legislative decree, regarding the organisational model based on consortia of municipalities, excludes the possibility of creating entities governed by private law, such as a consortium under ordinary law whose members include private entities, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts?

                  3.

                  Lastly, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) which, if interpreted in the sense of allowing consortia of municipalities that are central purchasing bodies to operate in a territory corresponding to that of the participating municipalities as a whole, and so, at most, to the provincial territory, limits the scope of operation of those central purchasing bodies, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts?


title: Case C-11/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 7 January 2019 — Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea v Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/7

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 7 January 2019 — Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea v Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova
      (Case C-11/19)
      (2019/C 164/08)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Consiglio di Stato

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea

         Respondent: Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of Article 5 of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, in conjunction with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 thereof, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990?

                  2.

                  Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of the provisions of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990, in the limited sense of placing the contracting authority under an obligation to give the reasons for the decision to award the contract for the provision of ordinary patient transport services by way of tender procedure rather than by direct award of the contract?

         (1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).


title: Case C-14/19 P: Appeal brought on 10 January 2019 by the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 25 October 2018 in Case T-286/15: KF v SatCen

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/8

      Appeal brought on 10 January 2019 by the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 25 October 2018 in Case T-286/15: KF v SatCen
      (Case C-14/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/09)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) (represented by: A. Guillerme, avocate)

         Other parties to the proceedings: KF, Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the judgment under appeal;

                  —

                  order the applicant in first instance to bear all the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In its appeal, SatCen relies on the following grounds:

                  —

                  the General Court erred in law in the finding that it has jurisdiction to rule on the heads of claim submitted by the applicant, as it (i) did not assess if the factors forming the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction were met and it (ii) erroneously interpreted the principle of equal treatment.

                  —

                  the General Court erred in law in the finding that the General Court’s jurisdiction to rule on this dispute is based on article 263 and 268 TFEU;

                  —

                  the General court distorted the facts in examining KF’s claims as regards the conduct of the administrative inquiry;

                  —

                  the General Court erred in law interpreting article 1, annex IX of the SatCen’s Staff Regulations and the concept of the rights of the defence.


title: Case C-15/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 10 January 2019 — A.m.a — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri.

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 10 January 2019 — A.m.a — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri.
      (Case C-15/19)
      (2019/C 164/10)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Corte suprema di cassazione

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: A.m.a. — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA

         Cross-appellant: Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri.

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31/EC (1) preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 transposing those provisions of [EU law] into national law apply retroactively, with the result that pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate are subject, unconditionally, to the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation, in particular in so far as they extend the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years?

                  2.

                  In particular, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31, which provide that Member States must take ‘measures to ensure that all of the costs involved in the setting up and operation of a landfill site, including as far as possible the cost of the financial security or its equivalent referred to in Article 8(a)(iv), and the estimated costs of the closure and after-care of the site for a period of at least 30 years shall be covered by the price to be charged by the operator for the disposal of any type of waste in that site’ and ‘measures in order that landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are already in operation at the time of transposition of [that directive], may. continue to operate’ respectively, preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate, where the measures implementing those obligations, in particular in relation to those landfill sites, are limited in Article 17 of that legislative decree to the provision of a transitional period and do not include any measure seeking to limit the financial impact of the extension on the ‘permit holder’?

                  3.

                  Moreover, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31 preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 also apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate as regards the financial burden resulting from the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation and, in particular, from the extension of the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years, by imposing that burden on the ‘permit holder’ and thereby legitimising the adjustment — to the detriment of that permit holder — of the costs set out in the commercial agreements regulating [waste] disposal activities?

                  4.

                  Lastly, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31 preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 also apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate as regards the financial burden resulting from the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation and, in particular, from the extension of the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years, given that — in order to determine that financial burden — account must be taken not only of waste to be deposited as from the entry into force of the provisions transposing those provisions of EU law into national law but also of waste already deposited prior to that entry into force?

         (1)  Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste (OJ 1999 L 182, p. 1).


title: Case C-16/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Poland) lodged on 2 January 2019 — VL v Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Poland) lodged on 2 January 2019 — VL v Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie
      (Case C-16/19)
      (2019/C 164/11)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: VL

         Respondent: Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

         Question referred

      Should Article 2 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (1) be interpreted as meaning that the differing treatment of individual members of a group distinguished by a protected characteristic (disability) amounts to a breach of the principle of equal treatment if the employer treats individual members of that group differently on the basis of an apparently neutral criterion, and that criterion cannot be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the measures taken in order to achieve that aim are not appropriate and necessary?

         (1)  OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.


title: Case C-25/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała v Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/11

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała v Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen
      (Case C-25/19)
      (2019/C 164/12)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała

         Defendant: Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

         Question referred

      Should Article 152(1) and (2), in conjunction with Article 151, of Directive 2009/138/EC (1) and recital 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 (2) be interpreted as meaning that the representation of a non-life insurance undertaking by an appointed representative includes the receipt of a document which initiates court proceedings for damages in respect of a road traffic accident?

         (1)  Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1).

         (2)  Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79).


title: Case C-26/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena (Italy) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Azienda USL di Modena v Comune di Sassuolo

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/11

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena (Italy) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Azienda USL di Modena v Comune di Sassuolo
      (Case C-26/19)
      (2019/C 164/13)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Azienda USL di Modena

         Defendant: Comune di Sassuolo

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is Article 9(8) of Legislative Decree No 23 [of 14 March 2011], which allows Italian national health service bodies an exemption from IMU [single municipal tax] for real estate which they own and whose intended purpose is exclusively the performance of statutory tasks, consistent with Article 107 TFEU, which prohibits State aid ‘in any form’, if that national legislation is interpreted as meaning that the tax advantage is also available to an AUSL [a local public body providing healthcare services] which leased a property to a public-private commercial company (51 % owned by that body) which, in that property, provides healthcare services in competition with other hospitals that are entirely privately owned, thus giving rise to a tax advantage which may be classified as State aid that distorts the rules of the free market?

                  2.

                  Does the Italian tax ruling provided for by Article 11 of Law No 212 [of 27 July 2000] — which precludes an interpretation of Article 9(8) of Legislative Decree No 23, by analogy with the case-law of the Italian Supreme Court concerning the ICI [Municipal Tax on Immovable Property], to the effect that the IMU exemption does not apply to an AUSL when the property is used by a public limited company in which that public body also has a holding and which provides healthcare services there in competition with other entirely privately owned commercial companies which also provide healthcare services, thus giving rise to a tax advantage which may be classified as State aid that distorts the rules of the free market — comply with the Treaty, specifically Article 107 TFEU, which prohibits State aid ‘in any form’?


title: Case C-28/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 16 January 2019 — Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust and Others

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/12

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 16 January 2019 — Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust and Others
      (Case C-28/19)
      (2019/C 164/14)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Consiglio di Stato

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellants: Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust

         Respondents: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust, Ryanair Ltd, Ryanair DAC

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is the second sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an online check-in fee and an ‘administration fee’ for credit card purchases, which are additional to the price of the ticket, and the VAT applied to air fares and to optional supplements for national flights, fall within the category of unavoidable, foreseeable or optional price supplements?

                  2.

                  Is the fourth sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 to be interpreted in the sense that the word ‘optional’ covers price supplements which the majority of consumers are able to avoid?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast) (OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3).


title: Case C-61/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Orange Romania SA v Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/13

      Request for a preliminary ruling from Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Orange Romania SA v Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal
      (Case C-61/19)
      (2019/C 164/15)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Tribunalul București

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Orange Romania SA

         Defendant: Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, (1) what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as specific and informed?

                  2.

                  For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as freely given?

         (1)  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).


title: Case C-70/19 P: Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v European Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/15

      Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v European Commission
      (Case C-70/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/17)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: T.S. Bohr and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings: HM

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v Commission;

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The Commission relies on two grounds of appeal.
      The first ground of appeal, which consists of three parts, alleges that the General Court erred in law as regards the division of competences between the selection board and the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO).
      In the first part of that ground of appeal, the Commission submits that the General Court erred in its legal categorisation of the contested measure, that is to say, EPSO’s decision of 17 August 2015 not to submit the appellant’s request for review to the selection board on the ground of delay. That notification was made in the context of the competence conferred on EPSO by Section 3.1.3. of the General Rules governing competitions to conduct all correspondence with candidates.
      In the second part, the Commission argues that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the General Rules. Section 3.4.3. of those General Rules should not to be read only in conjunction with Section 3.1.3., but also in the light of the wording and purpose of Section 3.4.3., which grants EPSO the competence to conduct the internal review procedure.
      The third part alleges an error in law in the interpretation of Article 7 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations. The notification in question constitutes an administrative measure to ensure the application of uniform standards in competitions in accordance with the first paragraph of that article. It also corresponds to EPSO’s role of assisting the selection board, as noted by the General Court in the judgment in Case T-361/10 P, Commission v Pachtitis. (1)

      The second ground of appeal alleges that the General Court erred in law in the interpretation of the plea concerning the lack of competence of the author of the measure. In the present case, the General Court failed to examine whether, if the error concerning lack of competence had been corrected, a measure with the same or a different content would have been taken. In the absence of such an examination, the General Court could not annul the contested measure.

         (1)  ECLI:EU:T:2011:742.


title: Case C-75/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Mureș (Romania) lodged on 31 January 2019 — MF v BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/16

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Mureș (Romania) lodged on 31 January 2019 — MF v BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl
      (Case C-75/19)
      (2019/C 164/18)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Tribunalul Specializat Mureș

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: MF

         Respondents: BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Do the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC [of 5 April 1993] on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular recitals 12, 21 and 23 and Article 6(1), Article 7(2) and Article 8 thereof, preclude national courts from adopting an interpretation according to which a consumer may not, in the context of opposing enforcement (which in national law is a special action that may be brought only under certain restrictive conditions and within a certain time limit after enforcement proceedings have been commenced), rely on the existence of unfair terms in a credit agreement which he has concluded with a seller or supplier (that credit agreement constituting, under national law, the enforceable instrument on the basis of which the enforcement proceedings have been commenced against the consumer) for the reason that such a ground is inadmissible in that type of action, the national legislation providing instead for an action pursuant to ordinary law, not subject to any time limit, by means of which a consumer may at any time apply for a declaration of the existence of unfair contractual terms, which will thus not be binding, even though the judgment on such an action may not have any direct consequences for the enforcement proceedings, there being a risk that enforcement will be completed before the judgment in the action pursuant to ordinary law is obtained?

                  2.

                  If the first question is answered in the affirmative, do those same provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC preclude a provision of national law which sets a time limit of 15 days from the date of communication of the first enforcement measures (that time limit being mandatory and a matter of public policy, and failure to comply with it entailing the dismissal of the action for having been brought out of time) within which period a consumer opposing enforcement (a debtor against whom enforcement is being exercised) may argue the unfair nature of contractual terms in a credit agreement concluded with a seller or supplier, bearing in mind that the same regime applies under national law to the making of similar objections that will be treated as arguments in defence on the merits, and also bearing in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, national courts are under an obligation to consider, of their own motion, whether contractual terms are unfair, once they have at their disposal the necessary elements of fact and law to do so?

         (1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


title: Case C-84/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 31 January 2019 — Profi Credit Polska S.A. v QJ

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/17

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 31 January 2019 — Profi Credit Polska S.A. v QJ
      (Case C-84/19)
      (2019/C 164/19)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Profi Credit Polska S.A.

         Defendant: QJ

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (1) be interpreted as precluding the application of the provisions of the directive in regard to the examination of the fairness of individual contractual terms concerning non-interest credit costs, in the case where the legislative provisions in force in a Member State impose an upper limit on those costs by providing that non-interest credit costs arising from a consumer credit agreement are not payable in excess of the maximum non-interest credit costs calculated in the manner prescribed by law or the total amount of the credit?

                  2.

                  Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 be interpreted as meaning that a non-interest cost incurred and paid by a borrower together with a loan, in addition to interest, related to the conclusion of the agreement and the granting of the loan itself (in the form of a fee, commission or otherwise), as a term of that agreement, is, if expressed in plain intelligible language, not subject to the assessment expressed in that provision in the context of its unfairness?

                  3.

                  Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 be interpreted as meaning that contractual terms which introduce various types of costs associated with the granting of a loan are not expressed ‘in plain intelligible language’ if they do not explain in return for what specific services they are charged and do not allow the consumer to determine the differences between them?

         (1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


title: Case C-85/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria v RK

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/18

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria v RK
      (Case C-85/19)
      (2019/C 164/20)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria

         Respondent: RK

         Question referred

      Are a provision in a collective agreement and an employer’s practice, pursuant to which, for the purposes of remuneration and promotion, the length of service of a part-time female employee whose working hours are ‘distributed vertically’ over the whole year is to be calculated solely on the basis of time actually worked, contrary to Clause 4(1) and (2) of the Framework Agreement on part-time work [annexed to] Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997, (1) and to Articles 2(1)(b) and 14(1) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast)? (2)

         (1)  Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (OJ 1998 L 14, p. 9).

         (2)  Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).


title: Case C-86/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — SL v Vueling Airlines S.A.

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/19

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — SL v Vueling Airlines S.A.
      (Case C-86/19)
      (2019/C 164/21)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Referring court

      Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: SL

         Defendant: Vueling Airlines S.A.

         Question referred

      Where the loss of a suitcase has been established, must the airline compensate the passenger in each and every case with the maximum compensation limit of SDR 1 131, since that is the most serious of the situations provided for in Articles 17(2) and 22(2) of the Montreal Convention of 28 May 1999, or is that maximum compensation limit one which can be adjusted by the court, including in the event of loss of a suitcase, in the light of the circumstances, so that the amount of SDR 1 131 will be awarded only if the passenger establishes, by whatever means are permitted in law, that the value of the items and personal effects he was carrying in the checked baggage, and of those which he had to purchase to replace them, came to that limit, or, failing that, may other criteria be taken into account, such as, for example, the weight of the suitcase or whether the baggage was lost on the outbound or return journey, for the purposes of assessing the non-material damage caused by the inconvenience arising from the loss of the passenger’s baggage?


title: Case C-114/19 P: Appeal brought on 8 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2018 in Case T-811/16, Di Bernardo v Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/20

      Appeal brought on 8 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2018 in Case T-811/16, Di Bernardo v Commission
      (Case C-114/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/22)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Mongin, G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

         Other party to the proceedings: Danilo Di Bernardo

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 29 November 2018 (Seventh Chamber), Di Bernardo v Commission, T-811/16;

                  —

                  Refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  Reserve the costs incurred at first instance and on appeal.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The first plea, which concerns paragraphs 41 to 53, last sentence, of the judgment under appeal, alleges an error of law in the definition of the extent of the selection board’s obligation to state reasons in a decision not to include a candidate on a reserve list. In the first place, the Commission submits that the General Court departed from the established case-law of the Court of Justice, which distinguishes the decisions relating to the examination of applications such as those relating to the candidate’s qualifications or experience from decisions relating to the assessment of candidates’ merits following participation in the tests. In the first case, the selection board must indicate the specific information which is missing from the application, taking into account the qualifications required by the notice of competition. Whether in its initial decision or in its response to the request for review, in the present case the selection board satisfied the conditions laid down by the case-law; the General Court infringed that case-law by extending its review to the selection criteria adopted by the selection board and by requiring the selection board to decide on all the information provided in the application form. The fact that the selection board gave reasons for its decision in response to request for review does not extend that obligation to state reasons. In the second place, the General Court confused the requirement to state reasons, whatever its value, with whether the statement of reasons is well founded, which is a question of the substantive legality of the decision taken.
      The second plea, which concerns paragraphs 37 to 38 and 53 to 56 of the judgment under appeal, alleges an error in law which consists in disregarding the court’s duty to determine, of its own motion, compliance with the obligation to state reasons. The General Court departed from the settled case-law according to which, where the statement of reasons is inadequate, additional clarification may still be brought in the course of the proceedings, which remove the basis of the plea for annulment alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons. By excluding the possibility to supplement the statement of reasons where there is an ‘almost complete’ lack of the statement of reasons and by assimilating the ‘almost complete’ lack of the statement of reasons with a complete lack of the statement of reasons, the General Court has made an additional statement of reasons in the course of the proceedings impossible. Such assimilation has no basis in the case-law of the Court of Justice. By limiting the possibilities of rectification in the course of the proceedings, the General Court limited the role of the court which could have been, in the circumstances of the present case, to prevent annulment of the contested decision for breach of the obligation to state reasons.


title: Case C-133/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.S. v État belge

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/21

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.S. v État belge
      (Case C-133/19)
      (2019/C 164/23)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: B.M.M., B.S.

         Defendant: État belge

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor?

                  2.

                  Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy?

         (1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.


title: Case C-136/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.M. v État belge

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/21

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.M. v État belge
      (Case C-136/19)
      (2019/C 164/24)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: B.M.M., B.M.

         Defendant: État belge

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor?

                  2.

                  Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy?

         (1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.


title: Case C-137/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.O. v État belge

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/22

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.O. v État belge
      (Case C-137/19)
      (2019/C 164/25)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: B.M.O.

         Defendant: État belge

         Question referred

      Must Article 4(1)(c) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) read where appropriate with Article 16(1) of that directive, be interpreted as requiring that third country nationals, in order to be classified as ‘minor children’ within the meaning of that provision, must be ‘minors’ not only at the time of submitting the application for leave to reside but also at the time when the administration eventually determines that application?

         (1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.


title: Case C-152/19 P: Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/23

      Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission
      (Case C-152/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/26)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Deutsche Telekom AG (represented by: D. Schroeder and K. Apel, Rechtsanwälte)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Slovanet, a.s.

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14 in so far as it dismisses the action;

                  —

                  annul, in whole or in part, Commission Decision C(2014) 7465 final of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) as corrected by Commission Decisions C(2014) 10119 final and C(2015) 2484 final of 16 December 2014 and 17 April 2015 in so far as it relates to the appellant or, in the alternative, annul or further reduce the fines imposed on the appellant;

                  —

                  in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay all the costs arising from the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The appellant relies on four grounds in support of its appeal.
      First, the General Court incorrectly interpreted the legal principle according to which it is necessary, for a refusal of access, that the access sought is indispensable for activity on a downstream market and, consequently, failed to apply that principle and thereby incorrectly applied it.
      Secondly, the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the parent company has actually exercised a decisive influence.
      Thirdly, the General Court failed to apply and thereby incorrectly applied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the subsidiary has carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company.
      Fourthly, the General Court incorrectly applied the legal principle that the right to be heard must be respected in administrative proceedings.


title: Case C-172/19 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17 Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) and Others v European Commission

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/25

      Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17 Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) and Others v European Commission
      (Case C-172/19 P)
      (2019/C 164/28)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) (represented by: W. Spieth and N. Hellermann, Rechtsanwälte)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Deutscher Braunkohlen-Industrie-Verein e.V., Lausitz Energie Kraftwerke AG, Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH, eins energie in sachsen GmbH & Co. KG

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  1.

                              a)

                              set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17;

                              b)

                              declare the action admissible; and
                              in the event that the Court of Justice concludes that it is appropriate for it to issue a decision, in accordance with the form of order retained in its entirety from the application of 7 November 2017,

                                          —

                                          annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 of 31 July 2017 establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions under Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on large combustion plants, (1) to the extent to which, by that decision, BAT associated emissions levels (BAT-AELs) were accepted and set for NOx emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.3 of the Annex, Table 3) and mercury emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.6 of the Annex, Table 7) which result from the combustion of coal and/or lignite;

                                          —

                                          in the alternative, annul Implementing Decision 2017/1442 in its entirety; and

                                          —

                                          order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings;

                              c)

                              if and to the extent that the Court of Justice finds that it is not appropriate for it to issue a decision in respect of the form of order referred to in 1.b) above, refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for a decision;

                  2.

                  order the European Commission to pay the costs of the appeal.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The appellant relies on the following two grounds of appeal.
      First, the order of the General Court is based on a procedural error, which adversely affects interests of the appellant (the second situation of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union), and also infringes certain general principles of EU law. In its order, the General Court failed to consider the appellant’s submission, which was relevant to the decision, in which it stated that its capacity to sue is derived from an infringement of the appellant’s procedural standing, which it had in the context of the relevant exchange of information regarding the development of the BAT conclusions, which were challenged in the action in question. Not only was the appellant an actual party to the procedure, but it also had a specific and defendable legal position, which guaranteed it a particular procedural standing. These grounds alone give the appellant the capacity to sue. The order of the General Court contains no examination, assessment or other such reasoning concerning the appellant’s submission in that regard. This constitutes an infringement of the obligation to state reasons under the first sentence of Article 36 in combination with the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. This substantiates the existence of a procedural error and, equally, an infringement of the general EU law principles of the right to effective legal protection and the right to a fair hearing.
      Second, the order of the General Court also infringes EU law in the sense referred to in the third situation of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute. By its order, the General Court wrongly dismisses the appellant’s action as inadmissible. The General Court misapplied EU law when it failed to find that the appellant’s personal status satisfied the conditions for the admissibility of an action in the form of a qualified interest as referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Its qualified interest and the resulting legal standing flow from the disregard for its procedural standing, which it had in the context of the procedure for the development of the BAT conclusions, which formed the subject of the action. Not only was the appellant an actual party to that procedure, but it also had a specific and defendable legal position, which gave it a particular procedural standing. This therefore conferred on it a right of action, as it concerned the enforcement of its procedural rights. These procedural guarantees protecting the appellant were disregarded by the Commission when it developed the BAT conclusions, in particular in so far as it limited the appellant’s right to be heard and its right to be a party to a procedure and failed to comply with its obligation to evaluate. Consequently, the dismissal of the action as inadmissible is based on a misapplication of EU law.

         (1)  OJ 2017 L 212, p. 1.


title: Case C-192/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

text:
               13.5.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 164/27

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane
      (Case C-192/19)
      (2019/C 164/29)
      Language of the case: Dutch

         Referring court

      Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: Rensen Shipbuilding BV

         Other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

         Question referred

      Additional note 1 to Chapter 89 of the Combined Nomenclature provides that (inter alia) the CN subheadings 89012010 and 89019010, entitled ‘Seagoing’, are to be taken to apply only to vessels that are designed as seagoing. What should be understood by the term ‘seagoing’ in this context?