title: Case T-205/19: Action brought on 5 April 2019 — BD v Commission

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/47

      Action brought on 5 April 2019 — BD v Commission
      (Case T-205/19)
      (2019/C 213/47)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: BD (represented by: F. Wagner and N. Voß, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

                  —

                  in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The application is based on the following grounds.

                  1.

                  Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU
                  In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.
                  In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.
                  It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

                  2.

                  Infringement of the principle of equal treatment
                  In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.
                  In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

                  3.

                  Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
                  In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

         (1)  Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55).


title: Case T-234/19: Action brought on 9 April 2019 — Infineon Technologies v Commission

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/53

      Action brought on 9 April 2019 — Infineon Technologies v Commission
      (Case T-234/19)
      (2019/C 213/52)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: Infineon Technologies AG (Neubiberg, Germany) (represented by: L. Assmann and M. Peiffer, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the defendant’s decision, notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1), of 28 May 2018 on aid scheme SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by Germany for baseload consumers under Paragraph 19 of the Stromnetzentgeltverordnung (Regulation on electricity network charges, ‘the StromNEV’); and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The application is based on one plea in law, arguing that the contested decision is unlawful because the exemption from the network charges under the second sentence of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV is not State aid within the meaning of Article 107 et seq. TFEU.
      In this regard, the applicant first argues that the exemption from network charges granted on the basis of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV was not granted through State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU but was financed through German electricity grid operators which are organised under private law and are not attributable to the State. Neither does the effect of the disputed surcharge equate to a levy on electricity consumption in Germany. In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany has no control over the transmission system operators which are entrusted with the management of these resources.
      It is further claimed that the exemption from network charges on the basis of Paragraph 19(2) of the StromNEV differs in significant aspects from the underlying circumstances in Cases C-206/06, Essent Netwerk Noord and Others and C-262/12, Vent De Colère!. The disputed case is comparable, however, with the surcharge in Case C-405/16 P, Germany v Commission, and therefore not classifiable as aid.


title: Case T-237/19: Action brought on 8 April 2019 — GTP v Commission

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/54

      Action brought on 8 April 2019 — GTP v Commission
      (Case T-237/19)
      (2019/C 213/53)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicant: GTP — Glastechnik Piesau GmbH & Co. KG (Neuhaus am Rennweg, Germany) (represented by: F. Wagner and N. Voß, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 (OJ 2019 L 14, p. 1) in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

                  —

                  in the alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in respect of the years 2012 and 2013;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges, baseload consumers with at least 7 500 annual hours of use repay more than 15 % of the published network charges, and baseload consumers with at least 8 000 annual hours of use repay more than 10 % of the published network charges;

                  —

                  in the further alternative, annul Decision SA.34045 (2013/C) (ex 2012/NN) of 28 May 2018 notified under document C(2018) 3166 as against the applicant in so far as it orders that baseload consumers with at least 7 000 annual hours of use repay more than 20 % of the published network charges; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay the costs, including lawyers’ fees and travel expenses.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The application is based on the following grounds.

                  1.

                  Wrongful presumption of the existence of State aid for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU
                  In the first plea in law, it is claimed that the defendant erred in law in its examination of the contested exemption from network charges by presuming the use of State resources.
                  In addition, in the examination of the ‘selectivity’ criterion, the reference system was incorrectly and incompletely identified.
                  It is further claimed that, because of the incomplete identification of the reference system, the defendant failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU.

                  2.

                  Infringement of the principle of equal treatment
                  In the second plea in law, it is alleged that the defendant’s decision provided for the obligation to make additional payments only for baseload consumers who were fully exempted from network charges in the years 2012 and 2013. Those baseload consumers were therefore unequally treated and unfairly disadvantaged vis-à-vis baseload consumers who, over the same period, enjoyed flat-rate network charge reductions and for whom there were no obligations to make additional payments.
                  In that respect, it is further claimed that the defendant, with regard to the unequal treatment, failed to comply with its obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 42(2)(c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the unequal treatment infringed the principle of non-discrimination under Article 32(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. (1)

                  3.

                  Infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
                  In the third plea in law, it is claimed that, in view of the particular circumstances, the applicant could expect to be allowed to retain the special network charges granted.

         (1)  Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ 2009 L 211, p. 55).


title: Case T-240/19: Action brought on 9 April 2019 — A9.com v EUIPO (Device of a bell icon)

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/56

      Action brought on 9 April 2019 — A9.com v EUIPO (Device of a bell icon)
      (Case T-240/19)
      (2019/C 213/55)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: A9.com, Inc. (Palo Alto, California, United States) (represented by: A. Klett and C. Mikyska, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark (Representation of device of a bell icon — Application for registration No 17 868 712)

         Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 4 February 2019 in Case R 1309/2018-2

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that:

                  —

                  The Court annuls the contested decision.

                  —

                  The respondent must pay the costs of the proceedings before the General Court and the proceedings before the Board of Appeal including the necessary expenses of Applicant in both proceedings.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Infringement of Articles 7(1)(c) and 7(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case T-571/18: Order of the General Court of 30 April 2019 — YR v Commission

text:
               24.6.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 213/84

      Order of the General Court of 30 April 2019 — YR v Commission
      (Case T-571/18) (1)

      (2019/C 213/83)
      Language of the case: French
      The President of the Eighth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 408, 12.11.2018.


title: Case C-450/17 P: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 8 May 2019 — Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg — Förderbank v European Central Bank, European Commission (Appeal — Economic and monetary policy — Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 — Article 6(4) — Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 — Article 70(1) — Prudential supervision of credit institutions — Tasks conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) — Single supervisory mechanism — Performance of those tasks by the national competent authorities — ‘Less significant’ credit institution — ‘Particular circumstances’ justifying a credit institution being considered ‘less significant’)

text:
               8.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 230/5

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 8 May 2019 — Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg — Förderbank v European Central Bank, European Commission
      (Case C-450/17 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Economic and monetary policy - Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 - Article 6(4) - Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 - Article 70(1) - Prudential supervision of credit institutions - Tasks conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) - Single supervisory mechanism - Performance of those tasks by the national competent authorities - ‘Less significant’ credit institution - ‘Particular circumstances’ justifying a credit institution being considered ‘less significant’)
      (2019/C 230/05)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg — Förderbank (represented by: A. Glos, T. Lübbig and M. Benzing, Rechtsanwälte)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Central Bank (represented by: E. Koupepidou and R. Bax, acting as Agents, and by H.-G. Kamann, Rechtsanwalt), European Commission (represented by: W. Mölls and K.-P. Wojcik, acting as Agents)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the appeal;

                  2.

                  Orders the Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg — Förderbank to pay the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 293, 4.9.2017.


title: Case C-291/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Brașov (Romania) lodged on 9 April 2019 — SO v TP and Others

text:
               22.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 246/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Curtea de Apel Brașov (Romania) lodged on 9 April 2019 — SO v TP and Others
      (Case C-291/19)
      (2019/C 246/09)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Curtea de Apel Brașov

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: SO

         Respondents: TP and Others

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by European Commission Decision 2006/928/EC (1) of 13 December 2006, be regarded as an act of an institution of the Union, within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU, and therefore amenable to interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union?

                  2.

                  Are the requirements set out in the reports drawn up under that mechanism binding on Romania, in particular (but not only) as regards the need to make legislative amendments which comply with the conclusions of the CVM and with the recommendations made by the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption?

                  3.

                  Must Article 2, in conjunction with Article 4(3), TEU be interpreted as meaning that the obligation on Romania to comply with the requirements laid down in the reports prepared in accordance with the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, forms part of the Member State’s obligation to comply with the principles of the rule of law?

                  4.

                  Does the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117), preclude the establishment of the section for the investigation of offences committed within the Judiciary, within the prosecutor’s office attached to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), in the light of the rules governing the appointment/removal of prosecutors as members of that section, the rules governing the exercise of functions within that section and the way in which jurisdiction is established, in connection with the limited number of positions in that section?

                  5.

                  Does [the second paragraph of] Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union relating to the right to a fair trial by means of a hearing within a reasonable time, preclude the establishment of a section for investigating offences committed within the judiciary, within the prosecutor’s office attached to the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (High Court of Cassation and Justice, Romania), in the light of the rules governing the exercise of functions within it and the way in which jurisdiction is established, in connection with the limited number of positions in that section?

         (1)  Commission Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (OJ 2006 L 354, p. 56).


title: Case C-320/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 19 April 2019 — Ingredion Germany GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland

text:
               22.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 246/10

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Berlin (Germany) lodged on 19 April 2019 — Ingredion Germany GmbH v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
      (Case C-320/19)
      (2019/C 246/10)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Verwaltungsgericht Berlin

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Ingredion Germany GmbH

         Defendant: Bundesrepublik Deutschland

         Question referred

      Are Article 18(1)(c) and the second subparagraph of Article 18(2) of European Commission Decision 2011/278/EU, (1) in conjunction with Article 3(h) and Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC, (2) to be interpreted as meaning that, for new entrants, the capacity utilisation factor relevant for the fuel-related activity level is limited to a value of less than 100 %?

         (1)  Commission Decision of 27 April 2011 determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 130, p. 1).

         (2)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ 2003 L 275, p. 32).


title: Case C-363/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Patent- and marknadsdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 7 May 2019 — Konsumentombudsmannen v Mezina AB

text:
               22.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 246/11

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Patent- and marknadsdomstolen (Sweden) lodged on 7 May 2019 — Konsumentombudsmannen v Mezina AB
      (Case C-363/19)
      (2019/C 246/11)
      Language of the case: Swedish

         Referring court

      Patent- and marknadsdomstolen

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Konsumentombudsmannen

         Defendant: Mezina AB

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Do Articles 5 and 6, read in conjunction with Articles 10(1) and 28(5) of Regulation No 1924/2006, (1) regulate the burden of proof when a national court is determining whether unpermitted health claims have been made in a situation where the health claims in question correspond to a claim covered by an application under Article 13(2) of Regulation No 1924/2006, but where the application has not yet led to a decision on authorisation or non-authorisation, or is the burden of proof determined according to national law?

                  2.

                  If the answer to question 1 is that the provisions of Regulation No 1924/2006 regulate the burden of proof, does the burden of proof lie with the trader making a given health claim or with the authority requesting the national court to prohibit the trader from continuing to make the claim?

                  3.

                  In a situation such as that described in question 1, do Articles 5 and 6, read in conjunction with Articles 10(1) and 28(5) of Regulation No 1924/2006, regulate the evidentiary requirements when a national court is determining whether unpermitted health claims are being made, or are the evidentiary requirements determined according to national law?

                  4.

                  If the answer to question 3 is that the provisions of Regulation No 1924/2006 regulate the evidentiary requirements, what are the evidentiary requirements imposed?

                  5.

                  Is the answer to questions 1–4 affected by the fact that Regulation No 1924/2006 (including Article 3(a) of the regulation) and Directive 2005/29 (2) can be applied together in the proceedings before the national court?

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 1924/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods (OJ 2006 L 404, p. 9).

         (2)  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005, L 149, p. 22).


title: Case C-379/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Bihor (Romania) lodged on 14 May 2019 — Criminal proceedings against IG, JH, KI, LJ

text:
               22.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 246/12

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Bihor (Romania) lodged on 14 May 2019 — Criminal proceedings against IG, JH, KI, LJ
      (Case C-379/19)
      (2019/C 246/12)
      Language of the case: Romanian

         Referring court

      Tribunalul Bihor

         Parties to the main proceedings

      IG, JH, KI, LJ

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Are the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, (1) and the requirements laid down in reports prepared in accordance with that mechanism binding on Romania?

                  2.

                  Is Article 2, in conjunction with Article 4(3), of the Treaty on European Union, to be interpreted as meaning that the obligation on Romania to comply with the requirements laid down in reports prepared in accordance with the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established by Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006, forms part of the Member State’s obligation to comply with the principles of the rule of law, including in so far as concerns a constitutional court (a politico-judicial institution) refraining from intervening in order to interpret the law and to establish the specific and mandatory rules for the application of the law by judicial bodies, a task which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial authorities, and in order to introduce new legislative measures, a task which falls within the exclusive competence of the legislative authorities? Does EU law require that the effects of any such decision, adopted by a constitutional court, should be disregarded? Does EU law preclude a provision of national law which governs the liability to disciplinary action of the judge who disapplied the decision of the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court), in the context of the question referred?

                  3.

                  Does the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber, judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, C-64/16, EU:C:2018:117), preclude the competences of courts being replaced by decisions of the Curtea Constituțională (Decision No 51 of 16 February 2016, Decision No 302 of 4 May 2017 and Decision No 26 [of 16 January 2019]), the result of which is that criminal proceedings are unforeseeable (retroactive application) and that it is impossible to interpret the law and apply it in the case under consideration? Does EU law preclude a provision of national law which governs the liability to disciplinary action of the judge who disapplied the decision of the Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court), in the context of the question referred?

         (1)  Commission Decision 2006/928/EC of 13 December 2006 establishing a mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption (OJ 2006 L 354, p. 56).


title: Case C-389/19 P: Appeal brought on 20 May 2019 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 7 March 2019 in Case T-837/16, Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission

text:
               22.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 246/13

      Appeal brought on 20 May 2019 by European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 7 March 2019 in Case T-837/16, Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission
      (Case C-389/19 P)
      (2019/C 246/13)
      Language of the case: Swedish

         Parties

         Appellant: European Commission (represented by: R. Lindenthal, K. Mifsud-Bonnici, G. Tolstoy, acting as Agents)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Kingdom of Sweden,
      Kingdom of Denmark,
      Republic of Finland,
      European Parliament and
      European Chemicals Agency

         Form of order sought

                  —

                  Set aside the judgment delivered by the General Court (Fifth Chamber) on 7 March 2019 in Case T-837/16, Kingdom of Sweden v European Commission, dismiss the action at first instance and order the Kingdom of Sweden to pay the costs, or, in the alternative,

                  —

                  Remit the case to the General Court for reconsideration and reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal, and

                  —

                  Order that the effects of the contested decision be maintained.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The appeal concerns the judgment delivered by the General Court (Fifth Chamber) on 7 March 2019 in Case T-837/16. In that judgment, the General Court annulled Commission Implementing Decision C(2016) 5644 final of 7 September 2016 on authorisations for certain uses of lead sulfochromate yellow and lead chromate molybdate sulfate red, and dismissed the Commission’s claim that the effects of the decision should be maintained until the Commission could review the application for authorisation.
      The Commission has put forward four grounds in support of its appeal.
      The first ground of appeal: In those paragraphs of the judgment relating to the standard of proof to be applied in the analysis of the alternatives, and in particular paragraphs 79, 81, 85, 86, 90 and 101, the General Court made a manifestly incorrect application of the law as regards the standard of proof which is applicable under Article 60(4).
      The second ground of appeal: Throughout its reasoning and in particular in paragraphs 86, 90 and 96, the General Court made a manifestly incorrect application of the law in that it wholly disregarded the Commission’s discretionary powers to set the threshold value for technical and economic viability in the analysis of the alternatives under Article 60(4) and thus applied an incorrect criterion for the judicial review and interfered in the Commission’s weighing up of social, economic and technical considerations.
      The third ground of appeal: In paragraphs 86, 97 and 98, the General Court made a manifestly incorrect application of the law with regard to the contested decision, first by failing to have regard to the fact that no authorisation was granted for uses in which the characteristics of lead pigment as regards technical performance is not necessary and, second, by describing the conditions in the contested decision so that they showed that the condition relating to the analysis of the alternatives in Article 60(4) had not been satisfied.
      The fourth ground of appeal: The second paragraph of the operative part, in which the General Court ordered that the effects of the contested decision were not to be maintained, is based on a manifestly incorrect application of the law in paragraph 112 of the judgment.


title: Case T-161/16: Order of the General Court of 22 May 2019 — Puma v EUIPO — CMS (CMS Italy) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — International registration designating the European Union — Figurative mark CMS Italy — Earlier international figurative marks representing a feline bounding to the left — Relative grounds for refusal — Reputation of the earlier marks — Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Evidence of reputation — Previous decisions of EUIPO recognising the reputation of the earlier marks — Taking account of those decisions — Obligation to state reasons — Principle of sound administration)

text:
               22.7.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 246/21

      Order of the General Court of 22 May 2019 — Puma v EUIPO — CMS (CMS Italy)
      (Case T-161/16) (1)

      (EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - International registration designating the European Union - Figurative mark CMS Italy - Earlier international figurative marks representing a feline bounding to the left - Relative grounds for refusal - Reputation of the earlier marks - Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Evidence of reputation - Previous decisions of EUIPO recognising the reputation of the earlier marks - Taking account of those decisions - Obligation to state reasons - Principle of sound administration)
      (2019/C 246/21)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Puma SE (Herzogenaurach, Germany) (represented by: P. González-Bueno Catalán de Ocón, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Costruzione Macchine Speciali Srl (CMS) (Alonte, Italy)

         Re:

      Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 January 2016 (Case R 229/2015-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Puma and Costruzione Macchine Speciali (CMS).

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     The decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 January 2016 (Case R 229/2015-2) is annulled.

                  2.

                     EUIPO shall pay the costs, including those incurred by Puma SE.

         (1)  OJ C 222, 20.6.2016.


title: Case C-628/17: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 12 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy — Poland) — Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Orange Polska S.A. (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Directive 2005/29/EC — Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices — Concept of an aggressive commercial practice — Consumer required to take a final transactional decision in the presence of the courier handing over the general terms and conditions of the contract)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/4

      Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 12 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy — Poland) — Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Orange Polska S.A.
      (Case C-628/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Directive 2005/29/EC - Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices - Concept of an aggressive commercial practice - Consumer required to take a final transactional decision in the presence of the courier handing over the general terms and conditions of the contract)
      (2019/C 263/04)
      Language of the case: Polish

         Referring court

      Sąd Najwyższy

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów

         Defendant: Orange Polska S.A.

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 2(j) and Articles 8 and 9 of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council must be interpreted as meaning that the application by a trader of a model for concluding or amending contracts for the supply of telecommunications services, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the consumer must take the final transactional decision in the presence of a courier who delivers the standard-form contract, without being able freely to take cognisance of the content of that contract while the courier is present:

                  —

                  does not constitute an aggressive commercial practice in all circumstances;

                  —

                  does not constitute an aggressive commercial practice through the exertion of undue influence solely on the ground that not all the standard-form contracts were sent to the consumer individually beforehand, for example by email or to his home address, where that consumer had the opportunity, prior to the courier’s visit, to take cognisance of their content; and

                  —

                  constitutes an aggressive commercial practice through the exertion of undue influence where the trader or its courier adopt unfair conduct, the effect of which is to put pressure on the consumer such that his freedom of choice is significantly impaired, such as conduct that makes that consumer feel uncomfortable or confuses his thinking concerning the transactional decision to be taken.

         (1)  OJ C 104, 19.3.2018.


title: Case C-634/17: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 23 May 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg — Germany) — ReFood GmbH & Co. KG v Landwirtschaftskammer Niedersachsen (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Environment — Shipments of waste within the European Union — Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 — Article 1(3)(d) — Scope — Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 — Shipments of animal by-products)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/5

      Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 23 May 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg — Germany) — ReFood GmbH & Co. KG v Landwirtschaftskammer Niedersachsen
      (Case C-634/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Environment - Shipments of waste within the European Union - Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 - Article 1(3)(d) - Scope - Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 - Shipments of animal by-products)
      (2019/C 263/05)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Verwaltungsgericht Oldenburg

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: ReFood GmbH & Co. KG

         Defendant: Landwirtschaftskammer Niedersachsen

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 1(3)(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of waste, must be interpreted as meaning that shipments of animal by-products falling within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 laying down health rules as regards animal by-products and derived products not intended for human consumption and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 (Animal by-products Regulation), are excluded from the scope of Regulation No 1013/2006, unless Regulation No 1069/2009 expressly provides for the application of Regulation No 1013/2006.

         (1)  OJ C 52, 12.2.2018.


title: Case C-646/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Brindisi — Italy) — Criminal proceedings against Gianluca Moro (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Judicial cooperation in criminal matters — Directive 2012/13/EU — Right to information in criminal proceedings — Article 6(4) — Right of a person to be informed about the accusation against him — Being informed about any change in the information provided when that is necessary to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings — Change in the legal classification of the acts upon which the accusation is based — The accused person being unable to request, during the trial proceedings, the imposition of a negotiated penalty provided for under national law — Difference in the event of a change in the facts on which the accusation is based)

text:
               5.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 263/6

      Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 June 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Brindisi — Italy) — Criminal proceedings against Gianluca Moro
      (Case C-646/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Directive 2012/13/EU - Right to information in criminal proceedings - Article 6(4) - Right of a person to be informed about the accusation against him - Being informed about any change in the information provided when that is necessary to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings - Change in the legal classification of the acts upon which the accusation is based - The accused person being unable to request, during the trial proceedings, the imposition of a negotiated penalty provided for under national law - Difference in the event of a change in the facts on which the accusation is based)
      (2019/C 263/06)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale di Brindisi

         Parties in the main criminal proceedings

      Gianluca Moro

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 6(4) of Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, and Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation under which the accused person may request, during the trial proceedings, the imposition of a negotiated penalty in the event of a change in the facts on which the accusation is based, and not in the event of a change in the legal classification of the acts on which the accusation is based.

         (1)  OJ C 52, 12.2.2018.


title: C-406/17 to C-408/17 and C-417/17: Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 May 2019 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio — Italy) — Acea Energia SpA (C-406/17), Green Network SpA (C-407/17), Enel Energia SpA (C-408/17) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica il Gas e il Sistema Idrico, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni C-406/17, C-407/18 and C-408/17), Hera Comm Srl (C-417/17) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica, il Gas e il Sistema Idrico (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Directive 2005/29/EC — Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market — Directive 2009/72/EC — Internal market in electricity — Directive 2009/73/EC — Internal market in natural gas — Directive 2011/83/EU — Aggressive commercial practices — Conclusion of contracts for electricity and natural gas supply which were not requested by consumers — Conclusion of distance or off-premises supply contracts in breach of consumer rights — Competent authority to penalise such conduct)

text:
               26.8.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 288/3

      Order of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 14 May 2019 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio — Italy) — Acea Energia SpA (C-406/17), Green Network SpA (C-407/17), Enel Energia SpA (C-408/17) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica il Gas e il Sistema Idrico, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni C-406/17, C-407/18 and C-408/17), Hera Comm Srl (C-417/17) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica, il Gas e il Sistema Idrico
      (C-406/17 to C-408/17 and C-417/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court - Directive 2005/29/EC - Unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market - Directive 2009/72/EC - Internal market in electricity - Directive 2009/73/EC - Internal market in natural gas - Directive 2011/83/EU - Aggressive commercial practices - Conclusion of contracts for electricity and natural gas supply which were not requested by consumers - Conclusion of distance or off-premises supply contracts in breach of consumer rights - Competent authority to penalise such conduct)
      (2019/C 288/03)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicants: Acea Energia SpA (C-406/17), Green Network SpA (C-407/17), Enel Energia SpA (C-408/17), Hera Comm Srl (C-417/17)

         in the presence of: Adiconsum — Associazione Difesa Consumatori e Ambiente, Movimento Consumatori, Federconsumatori, Gianluca Salvati, Associazione Codici — Centro per i Diritti del Cittadino, Coordinamento delle associazioni per la difesa dell’ambiente e la tutela dei diritti di utenti e consumatori (Codacons), Tutela Noi Consumatori, Movimento Difesa del Cittadino (C-406/17 to C-408/17)

         Defendants: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l'Energia Elettrica il Gas e il Sistema Idrico, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (C-406/17 to C-408/17), Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica, il Gas e il Sistema Idrico (C-417/17)

         in the presence of: Federconsumatori (C-417/17)

         Operative part of the order

      Article 3(4) of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and Article 3(2) of Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation in accordance with which conduct such as that at issue in the main proceedings, consisting in concluding supply contracts which were not requested by the consumers or consisting in concluding distance or off-premises supply contracts in breach of consumer rights, must be assessed in the light of the provisions of Directives 2005/29 and 2011/83 respectively, with the result that, according to that national legislation, the sectoral regulator, for the purposes of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC and of Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, is not competent to penalise such conduct.

         (1)  OJ C 338, 9.10.2017.


title: Case T-108/15: Order of the General Court of 27 June 2019 — Bundesverband Glasindustrie and Others v Commission (State aid — Aid granted by certain provisions of the amended German law on renewable energy sources — Annulment of the act criticised by the Court — Action which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)

text:
               2.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 295/31

      Order of the General Court of 27 June 2019 — Bundesverband Glasindustrie and Others v Commission
      (Case T-108/15) (1)

      (State aid - Aid granted by certain provisions of the amended German law on renewable energy sources - Annulment of the act criticised by the Court - Action which has become devoid of purpose - No need to adjudicate)
      (2019/C 295/39)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Applicants: Bundesverband Glasindustrie (Düsseldorf, Germany) and the other 11 applicants whose names are annexed to the order (represented by: U. Soltész and C. von Köckritz, lawyers)

         Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by: T. Maxian Rusche and R. Sauer, and subsequently by: T. Maxian Rusche and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents, and by H. Wollmann, lawyer)

         Re:

      Application on the basis of Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1585 of 25 November 2014 on the aid scheme SA.33995 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (implemented by Germany for the support of renewable electricity and of energy-intensive users) (OJ 2015 L 250, p. 122).

         Operative part of the order

                  1.

                     There is no longer any need to adjudicate in the case.

                  2.

                     There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the applications for leave to intervene of ArcelorMittal Hochfeld GmbH, successor in title to ArcelorMittal Ruhrort GmbH, and of P-D Glasseiden GmbH Oschatz.

                  3.

                     The European Commission shall bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred by Bundesverband Glasindustrie and those of the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex.

                  4.

                     ArcelorMittal Hochfeld GmbH, successor in title to ArcelorMittal Ruhrort GmbH, and P-D Glasseiden GmbH Oschatz shall bear their own costs of the applications for leave to intervene.

         (1)  OJ C 138, 27.4.2015.


title: Case T-451/19: Action brought on 3 July 2019 — Gemelli v Parliament

text:
               2.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 295/68

      Action brought on 3 July 2019 — Gemelli v Parliament
      (Case T-451/19)
      (2019/C 295/89)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Applicant: Vitaliano Gemelli (Rome, Italy) (represented by: M. Merola, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Parliament

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare non-existent or annul in its entirety the measure of which the applicant was informed by means of the contested communication, in which the European Parliament re-determined retirement pension rights and ordered recovery of the amount paid on the basis of the earlier pension calculation;

                  —

                  order the European Parliament to refund all the sums unduly withheld, and to pay statutory interest from the date of withholding to the date of payment and order the European Parliament to implement the judgment and undertake all the necessary initiatives, acts or measures to ensure the immediate, full re-establishment of the original pension amount;

                  —

                  order the European Parliament to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied on in Case T-389/19, Coppo Gavazzi v Parliament.


title: Case T-512/19: Action brought on 18 July 2019 — Del Valle Ruiz and Others v SRB

text:
               2.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 295/87

      Action brought on 18 July 2019 — Del Valle Ruiz and Others v SRB
      (Case T-512/19)
      (2019/C 295/113)
      Language of the case: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicants: Antonio Del Valle Ruiz (Mexico City, Mexico) and 36 other applicants (represented by: P. Rubio Escobar and B. Fernández García, lawyers)

         Defendant: Single Resolution Board

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the General Court should:

                  —

                  annul the Decision (SRB/CM01/ARES (2018) 3664981) of the Single Resolution Board of 20 May 2019 agreeing not to draw up the definitive valuation report provided for in Article 20.11 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 in the context of the resolution of Banco Popular and, consequently, order the Single Resolution Board to draw up that definitive valuation report in accordance with the applicable legislation;

                  —

                  additionally, in accordance with Articles 133 and 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, order the defendant and the parties intervening in full or partial support of the form of order sought by it to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of their action, the applicants invoke five pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea, alleging failure to state or failure sufficiently to state the reasons on which the measure is based and, consequently, infringement of Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).

                  2.

                  Second plea, alleging infringement of Article 20.11 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, (1) in so far as the defendant states that the definitive valuation report on Banco Popular provided for in that provision will not be drawn up.

                  3.

                  Third plea, alleging infringement of the principle of sound administration provided for under Article 41 of the Charter, in so far as the Single Resolution Board deviated from the opinion of an independent expert on the need to draw up the definitive valuation report without substantiating its decision with any scientific or economic arguments.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea, alleging infringement of the right to an effective legal remedy and rights of defence and, consequently, infringement of Article 2 TFEU, Article 47 of the Charter and Article 24 of the Spanish Constitution.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea, alleging infringement of recital 24 of Regulation No 806/2014 and failure to comply with the ‘Meroni’ case-law, in so far as, first, the defendant has not been delegated the power to decide at its discretion whether or not it is appropriate to issue the definitive valuation report, and, secondly, and in any event, a decision such as the decision contested in the present action should have been overseen by the European Commission.

         (1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).


title: Case T-526/19: Action brought on 25 July 2019 — Nord Stream 2 v Parlement and Conseil

text:
               9.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 305/70

      Action brought on 25 July 2019 — Nord Stream 2 v Parlement and Conseil
      (Case T-526/19)
      (2019/C 305/80)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Nord Stream 2 AG (Zug, Suisse) (represented by: L. Van den Hende, J. Penz, lawyers and M. Schonberg, Solicitor)

         Defendants: European Parliament and Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  order the annulment of Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 in its entirety;

                  —

                  order the defendants to pay the applicant’s costs in these proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of the general EU law principle of equal treatment as the amending Directive leaves the applicant without the prospect of derogation from the application of the rules of Directive 2009/73/EC (1), notwithstanding the sheer magnitude of investment that had already been incurred as at the date of adoption of the amending Directive and even before it was first proposed, whereas all other existing offshore import pipelines are eligible for derogation.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the general EU law principle of proportionality as the amending Directive is incapable of achieving its stated objectives and cannot, in any event, make a sufficiently meaningful contribution to those objectives that outweigh the burdens it imposes.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the general EU law principle of legal certainty as the amending Directive fails to incorporate appropriate adaptations with respect to the particular situation of the Applicant, but on the contrary, is specifically designed to impact it negatively.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging misuse of powers, as the Amending Directive was adopted for a purpose other than those purposes for which the powers used to pass it were conferred.

                  5.

                  Firth plea in law, alleging breach of essential procedural requirements, as the Amending Directive was adopted in breach of requirements imposed under Protocol No 1 to the TEU and TFEU on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, Protocol No 2 to the TEU and TFEU on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, and the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging failure to state reasons as required by Article 296 TFEU.

         (1)  Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 94–136.


title: Case C-528/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 10 July 2019 — F-AG v Tax Office Y

text:
               30.9.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 328/25

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Germany) lodged on 10 July 2019 — F-AG v Tax Office Y
      (Case C-528/19)
      (2019/C 328/27)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Bundesfinanzhof

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant, and Appellant in the appeal on a point of law: F-AG

         Defendant, and Respondent in the appeal on a point of law: Tax Office Y

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which a taxable person carries out construction works on a municipal road on behalf of a city, is that taxable person, which has procured from other taxable persons services relating to the construction of the road that has been transferred to the municipality, entitled to deduct input tax in respect thereof pursuant to Article 17(2)(a) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (1) of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes?

                  2.

                  If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative: In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which a taxable person carries out construction works on a municipal road on behalf of a city, does a supply of goods for consideration exist when the authorisation to operate a quarry is the consideration for the supply of a road?

                  3.

                  If the answer to Question 2 is in the negative: In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which a taxable person carries out construction works on a municipal road on behalf of a city, is the free-of-charge transfer of the public road to the municipality treated, in accordance with Article 5(6) of Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, as a supply of goods free of charge even though the transfer serves commercial purposes, in order to prevent an untaxed final consumption by the municipality?

         (1)  Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1).


title: Case T-542/19: Action brought on 5 August 2019 — FV v Council

text:
               7.10.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 337/11

      Action brought on 5 August 2019 — FV v Council
      (Case T-542/19)
      (2019/C 337/12)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: FV (represented by: É. Boigelot, lawyer)

         Defendant: Council of the European Union

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the action admissible and well founded, and consequently;

                  —

                  annul the decision of 3 May 2019, notified to the applicant on 6 May 2019 by Mr [X], Senior Legal Counsellor at the Council, and taken by Mr [Y] in his capacity as appointing authority and under which ‘1. the applicant, born on 25 March 1956 [confidential], (1) official in Grade AST 7, is placed on leave in the interests of the service pursuant to Article 42c of the Staff Regulations and is entitled to the pecuniary benefits provided for therein. 2. This decision shall take effect on 31 December 2015.’;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay, by way of compensation for material harm and damage to the applicant’s career, subject to an increase or reduction in that amount in the course of the proceedings, EUR 151 101,72’;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay, by way of compensation for non-material harm and damage to the applicant’s reputation, subject to an increase or reduction in that amount in the course of the proceedings, EUR 70 000;

                  —

                  in any event, order the defendant to pay all the costs, in accordance with Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of the European Union.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 266 TFEU and of fundamental and general principles of EU law, including, inter alia, protection of legitimate expectations, the principles of sound administration, good faith, legal certainty and observance of the principle of proportionality.
                  In that regard, the applicant considers that the appointing authority has clearly not correctly applied and interpreted the abovementioned provisions and principles by not taking the necessary measures to give effect to the judgment given in proceedings for annulment by the General Court of the European Union on 14 December 2018, FV v Council (T-750/16, EU:T:2018:972). She also considers that the appointing authority infringed the principle which requires the administration to adopt a decision which is not disproportionate, that is to say, which is necessary in order to attain the objectives pursued, which entails that the content and form of the decision is in line with those objectives. Lastly, the applicant submits that there has been a breach of her legitimate expectation that the appointing authority gives correct and expeditious effect to the abovementioned judgment, T-750/16, not only through the correct application of Article 266 TFEU but also without retroactive effect.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging, first, that the contested decision infringed the conditions of Article 42c of the Staff Regulations and Staff Note 71/15 of 23 October 2015, in breach of the principle requiring the administration to adopt a decision solely on the basis of legally admissible grounds, that is to say, grounds which are relevant and not vitiated by manifest error of assessment, fact or law, and, secondly, abuse of process.
                  In that regard, the applicant considers that in adopting the contested decision in those circumstances, the appointing authority clearly did not correctly apply and interpret the abovementioned statutory provisions and Staff Note, basing its decision on reasoning that is incorrect both in fact and in law. She submits that the Council has not established that the decision was in the interests of the service, which it intended to further by applying Article 42c to the applicant, and has not identified genuine organisational needs which required the alleged acquisition of new skills which the applicant was not in a position to acquire, in addition, the appointing authority clearly used Article 42c in place of disciplinary proceedings.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging, infringement of the duty to have regard for the welfare of staff. In that regard, the applicant considers that in adopting the contested decision in those circumstances, the appointing authority did not respect the balance of rights and obligations which requires the institution to take into consideration all the factors which may affect its decision and to take account both the interest of the service and the interest of the official concerned.

         (1)  Confidential information omitted.


title: Case C-672/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil du Contentieux des étrangers (Belgium) lodged on 10 September 2019 – X v État belge

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/25

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil du Contentieux des étrangers (Belgium) lodged on 10 September 2019 – X v État belge
      (Case C-672/19)
      (2019/C 372/27)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil du Contentieux des étrangers

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: X

         Defendant: État belge

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is the statement contained in Article 34(5) of Directive 2016/801 (1) that the appeal provided for in that article is to be organised ‘in accordance with national law’ to be interpreted as meaning that it is for the national legislature alone to determine the procedural rules governing that appeal, without the national court being required to verify whether those rules are consistent with the right to an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

                  2.

                              (a)

                              If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must the appeal provided for in Article 34(5) of Directive 2016/801, in order to be effective within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, include a possibility of having access in all cases to an exceptional appeal procedure, conducted as a matter of extreme urgency, where the person concerned demonstrates that he has exercised all due diligence and that compliance with the time limits imposed in order to conduct an ordinary procedure could hamper the pursuit of the studies in question?

                              (b)

                              If the answer to that question is in the negative, must the same negative answer be given where failure to adopt a decision in a short period of time risks causing the person concerned irretrievably to lose a year of study?

                  3.

                  If the answer to part (a) or part (b) of the second question is in the affirmative, is the national court required to give preference to an interpretation of the law which is consistent with the purpose of Directive 2016/801 in order to arrive at a solution compatible with the objective pursued by that directive, by agreeing to examine as a matter of extreme urgency an application for suspension of enforcement of a decision as referred to in Article 20 of that directive, even though the travaux préparatoires for the law might suggest that that was not the legislature’s intention?

                  4.

                  If the answer to the first question is in the negative, does the appeal referred to in Article 34(5) of Directive 2016/801 require the Member States, in order to comply with Article 47 of the Charter, to provide that, in certain circumstances, the court may order the authority to issue the visa?

         (1)  Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (OJ 2016 L 132, p. 21).


title: Case C-680/19 P: Appeal brought on 12 September 2019 by Fulmen against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 July 2019 in Case T-405/15, Fulmen v Council

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/26

      Appeal brought on 12 September 2019 by Fulmen against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 July 2019 in Case T-405/15, Fulmen v Council
      (Case C-680/19 P)
      (2019/C 372/28)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: Fulmen (represented by: A. Bahrami, N. Korogiannakis, lawyers)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

         Form of order sought

      Primarily:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

                  —

                  give final judgment in the matter;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay Fulmen the sum of EUR 6 456 507 in respect of material damage and EUR 100 000 in respect of non-material damage, together with default interest;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay all of the costs.

            In the alternative:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay all of the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      Concerning the material damage, the General Court, in the first place, erred in law, infringed the principle of full reparation and deprived Article 340(2) TFEU and Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of their practical effect. The standard of proof required by the General Court made any compensation for the harm suffered impossible, despite the existence of a sufficiently serious and flagrant breach of EU law. In the second place, the judgment under appeal was vitiated by an error of law and by contradictory reasoning. In the third place, the General Court distorted the evidence and the facts.
      Concerning the non-material damage, the judgment under appeal contains no statement of reasons as regards the criteria taken into account in order to assess ex aequo et bono the amount of the compensation.


title: Case C-681/19 P: Appeal brought on 12 September 2019 by Fereydoun Mahmoudian against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 July 2019 in Case T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/27

      Appeal brought on 12 September 2019 by Fereydoun Mahmoudian against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 2 July 2019 in Case T-406/15, Mahmoudian v Council
      (Case C-681/19 P)
      (2019/C 372/29)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: Fereydoun Mahmoudian (represented by: A. Bahrami, N. Korogiannakis, lawyers)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission

         Form of order sought

      Primarily:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

                  —

                  give final judgment in the matter;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay the appellant the sum of EUR 966 581 in respect of material damage and EUR 500 000 in respect of non-material damage, together with default interest;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay all of the costs.

            In the alternative:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment under appeal in part;

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  order the Council to pay all of the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      Concerning the material damage, the General Court, in the first place, erred in law, infringed the principle of full reparation and deprived Article 340(2) TFEU and Article 41(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of their practical effect. The standard of proof required by the General Court made any compensation for the harm suffered impossible, despite the existence of a sufficiently serious and flagrant breach of EU law. In the second place, the judgment under appeal was vitiated by an error of law and by contradictory reasoning. In the third place, the General Court distorted the evidence and the facts.
      Concerning the non-material damage, the judgment under appeal contains no statement of reasons as regards the criteria taken into account in order to assess ex aequo et bono the amount of the compensation.


title: Case C-688/19 P: Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-53/18, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/28

      Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by the Federal Republic of Germany against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-53/18, Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission
      (Case C-688/19 P)
      (2019/C 372/30)
      Language of the case: German

         Parties

         Appellant: Federal Republic of Germany (represented by: J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents, and by M. Winkelmüller, F. van Schewick and M. Kottmann, Rechtsanwälte)

         Other party: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-53/18, Germany v Commission;

                  —

                  annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1995 of 6 November 2017 to maintain in the Official Journal of the European Union the reference of harmonised standard EN 13341:2005 + A1:2011 on ‘Static thermoplastic tanks for above-ground storage of domestic heating oils, kerosene and diesel fuels’ in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council; (1)

                  —

                  annul Commission Decision (EU) 2017/1996 of 6 November 2017 to maintain in the Official Journal of the European Union the reference of harmonised standard EN 12285-2:2005 on ‘Workshop fabricated steel tanks’ in accordance with Regulation No 305/2011; (2)

                  —

                  in the alternative to (2) and (3), respectively, refer the case back to the General Court;

                  —

                  order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds:

                  First, the judgment under appeal infringes Article 18(2), in conjunction with Article 17(5), of Regulation No 305/2011. (3) The General Court disregarded the fact that those provisions both empowered and required the Commission to adopt one of the measures suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany.

                  Second, the judgment under appeal infringes Article 18(2), in conjunction with Article 3(1) and (2) and Article 17(3), of Regulation No 305/2011. The General Court disregarded the fact that those provisions required the Commission to examine whether the standards at issue jeopardise compliance with the basic requirements for construction works.

         (1)  OJ 2017 L 288, p. 36.

         (2)  OJ 2017 L 288, p. 39.

         (3)  Regulation (EU) No 305/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 laying down harmonised conditions for the marketing of construction products and repealing Council Directive 89/106/EEC (OJ 2011 L 88, p. 5).


title: Case C-689/19 P: Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by VodafoneZiggo Group BV against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-660/18: VodafoneZiggo Group BV v Commission

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/29

      Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by VodafoneZiggo Group BV against the order of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 9 July 2019 in Case T-660/18: VodafoneZiggo Group BV v Commission
      (Case C-689/19 P)
      (2019/C 372/31)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: VodafoneZiggo Group BV (represented by: W. Knibbeler, A.A.J. Pliego Selie, B.A. Verheijen, advocaten)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the order of the General Court of 9 July 2019 in Case T-660/18 (the Contested Order);

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court for consideration;

                  —

                  reserve the costs of the present proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      First ground of appeal: errors of law in the General Court’s conclusion that decision C(2018) 5848 final of the European Commission (the Contested Decision) does not produce binding legal effects.
      First limb of the first ground: the requirement for national regulatory authorities to ‘take utmost account of’ comments of the European Commission made pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC (1) imposes a binding legal obligation upon those authorities.
      Second limb of the first ground: comments made pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC amount to an authorisation, because the European Commission is thereby choosing to conclude its investigation without using its right of veto.
      Third limb of the first ground: the Contested Decision cannot be qualified as a preparatory act because the procedure the European Commission follows is separate and distinct from the national procedure.
      Fourth limb of the first ground: the General Court, by deeming the Commission’s use of the word ‘decision’ to be ‘inappropriate’, exceeds its competence of judicial review.
      Fifth limb of the first ground: the Contested Order suffers from a lack of reasoning in its statement that the subject matter of the Contested Decision would be ‘irrelevant’.
      Second ground of appeal: errors of procedure by failing to address arguments capable of materially affecting the outcome of the case.
      First limb of the second ground: regarding the argument that an opportunity for BEREC to comment was foreclosed.
      Second limb of the second ground: regarding the argument that the foreclosure of an opportunity to be heard cannot be remedied by other, unrelated opportunities to be heard.
      Third ground of appeal: errors of law in the General Court’s conclusion that the appellant’s fundamental rights would not be infringed. The appellant enjoys fundamental rights under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in light of which its arguments and admissibility must be interpreted. Moreover, the procedure for a preliminary ruling cannot prevent the infringement.

         (1)  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002, L 108, p. 33).


title: Case C-694/19 P: Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by Italmobiliare SpA and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2019 in Case T-523/15 Italmobiliare SpA and Others v Commission

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/30

      Appeal brought on 18 September 2019 by Italmobiliare SpA and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 11 July 2019 in Case T-523/15 Italmobiliare SpA and Others v Commission
      (Case C-694/19P)
      (2019/C 372/32)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Parties

         Appellants: Italmobiliare SpA, Sirap-Gema SpA, Sirap France SAS, Petruzalek GmbH, Petruzalek Kft., Petruzalek sro, Petruzalek sro (represented by: F. Moretti, avvocatessa)

         Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The appellants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court in full or in part and, consequently, cancel or reduce the fines imposed on the appellants; or

                  —

                  in the alternative, redetermine the fines, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, with all the consequences that that may have on the validity of the decision.

            In any event, order the Commission to pay the costs of the present proceedings and of those at first instance.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the appellants rely on four grounds of appeal.

         First ground of appeal: infringement of Article 101 TFEU, misapplication or failure to apply the relevant case-law principles relating to the presumption of parental liability, misuse of power, failure to state reasons, infringement of fundamental rights by the General Court in relation to the attribution of liability to Italmobiliare for the alleged misconduct. The appellants claim in particular that, in any event, such an application of the presumption infringes the principle of legal certainty, the principle that penalties must be specific to the offender and the principle of presumption of innocence laid down in Article 6(2) and Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Articles 48 and 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the right to property laid down in Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the ECHR, Article 14 of the ECHR and Articles 17 and 21 of the Nice Charter, as well as the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment.

         Second ground of appeal: infringement and/or misinterpretation and misapplication of the Leniency Notice by the General Court; unlawful grant of immunity to another undertaking and existence of the appellants’ direct interest in its annulment.

         Third ground of appeal: infringement of law and/or infringement of essential procedural requirements by the General Court in that it wrongly considered the fines to be proportionate and adequate.

         Fourth ground of appeal: the appellants ask the Court of Justice to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction in accordance with Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003 (1) and redetermine the fines with all the consequences that that may have on the decision.

         (1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1).


title: Case T-568/19: Action brought on 16 August 2019 – Micreos Food Safety v Commission

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/32

      Action brought on 16 August 2019 – Micreos Food Safety v Commission
      (Case T-568/19)
      (2019/C 372/33)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicant: Micreos Food Safety BV (Wageningen, Netherlands) (represented by: S. Pappas, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  annul the decisions of the Director General for Health and Food Safety of 17 June 2019, forming a unity, by which the Commission: a) definitively refrained from the pursuance of the relevant Comitology procedure in relation to the Commission Draft Regulation ‘permitting the use of Listex™ P100 for the reduction of Listeria monocytogenes on Ready-To-Eat products of animal origin’ as a decontaminant under Regulation (EC) 853/2004 (1); b) refused to examine such use of Listex™ P100 as a non-decontaminating processing aid, and; c) prohibited for the first time the further placing on the market of Listex™ P100 being on the market since 2006 for use as a processing aid on animal-derived Ready-To-Eat food; and

                  —

                  order the defendant to pay its own costs and the costs of the applicant in the present proceedings.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on eight pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision as far as it rejected the application of the applicant to get recognition of Listex™ P100 as a decontaminant is taken without prior vote in SCoPAFF contrary to Articles 289 (1) and 291 (2) TFEU and Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 182/2011 (2).

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision is illegal on the ground that it was adopted on the basis of political considerations despite the fact that it is an implementing act.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the interpretation of Article 3(2) of Regulation (EC) 853/2004 was wrong.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging lack of reasoning and in any event illegal reasoning by not distinguishing between a decontaminant and a non-decontaminating processing aid.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging failure to consult SCoPAFF as far as the applicant requested recognition of Listex™ P100 as a non-decontaminating processing aid.

                  6.

                  Sixth plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 168 (3) TFEU by failing to ensure via Listex™ P100 protection and prevention from Listeria.

                  7.

                  Seventh plea in law, alleging an infringement of Article 14(9) of Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (3) and of the fundamental freedom of free circulation of goods.

                  8.

                  Eighth plea in law, alleging an infringement of legal expectations of the applicant as since 2006 Listex™ P100 was in the market and in 2016 EFSA declared it safe.

         (1)  Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin (OJ 2004 L 139, p. 55).

         (2)  Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ 2011 L 55, p. 13).

         (3)  Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (OJ 2002 L 31, p. 1).


title: Case T-606/19: Action brought on 5 September 2019 — Bartolomé Alvarado and Grupo Preciados Place v EUIPO — Alpargatas (ALPARGATUS PASOS ARTESANALES)

text:
               4.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 372/33

      Action brought on 5 September 2019 — Bartolomé Alvarado and Grupo Preciados Place v EUIPO — Alpargatas (ALPARGATUS PASOS ARTESANALES)
      (Case T-606/19)
      (2019/C 372/34)
      Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

         Parties

         Applicants: José Fernando Bartolomé Alvarado (Madrid, Spain) and Grupo Preciados Place, SL (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: P. García Remacha, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Alpargatas SA (São Paulo, Brazil)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Proprietors of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: Figurative mark ALPARGATUS PASOS ARTESANALES — European Union trade mark No 14 750 624

         Procedure before EUIPO: Proceedings for a declaration of invalidity

         Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 June 2019 in Case R 1825/2018-1

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  Find that the action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal dated 20 June 2019, which was notified to the applicants on 5 July 2019, has been submitted in due form and within the corresponding deadline; and, by way of the appropriate procedural steps, give judgment upholding the present action and, accordingly, annul the contested decision, reject any and all of the claims of the company ALPARTAGAS S.A., and order that the registration of EU trade mark No 14 750 624 be maintained, with all the legal consequences associated therewith.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Challenge to the contested decision with regard to the res judicata relied on by the applicant;

                  —

                  Challenge to the Office’s assessment of the similarity between the opposing marks;

                  —

                  The decision creates a monopoly of the name ‘alpargata’, thereby infringing the trade mark regime and the position adopted by the Office itself;

                  —

                  No likelihood of association or confusion.


title: Case C-82/17 P: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 12 September 2019 — TestBioTech eV, European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility eV, Sambucus eV v European Commission, Monsanto Europe, Monsanto Company, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (Appeal – Environment – Genetically modified products – Commission decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing genetically modified soybean MON 87701 x MON 89788 – Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 – Article 10(1) – Request for internal review of the decision, submitted under the provisions relating to public participation in environmental decision-making – Rejection of the request)

text:
               11.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 383/6

      Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 12 September 2019 — TestBioTech eV, European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility eV, Sambucus eV v European Commission, Monsanto Europe, Monsanto Company, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)
      (Case C-82/17 P) (1)

      (Appeal - Environment - Genetically modified products - Commission decision authorising the placing on the market of products containing genetically modified soybean MON 87701 x MON 89788 - Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 - Article 10(1) - Request for internal review of the decision, submitted under the provisions relating to public participation in environmental decision-making - Rejection of the request)
      (2019/C 383/04)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellants: TestBioTech eV, European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility eV, Sambucus eV (represented by: K. Smith QC and J. Stevenson, Barrister)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, G. Gattinara and C. Valero, Agents), Monsanto Europe, Monsanto Company (represented initially by M. Pittie, and subsequently by P. Honoré and A. Helfer, avocats), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Dismisses the appeal;

                  2.

                  Orders TestBioTech eV, European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility eV and Sambucus eV to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission;

                  3.

                  Orders Monsanto Europe and Monsanto Company to bear their own costs.

         (1)  OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


title: Case C-299/17: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 12 September 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Berlin — Germany) — VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte von Medienunternehmen mbH v Google LLC, successor in law to Google Inc. (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Industrial policy – Approximation of laws – Directive 98/34/EC – Procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services – Article 1(11) – Concept of ‘technical regulation’)

text:
               11.11.2019

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 383/7

      Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 12 September 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Berlin — Germany) — VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte von Medienunternehmen mbH v Google LLC, successor in law to Google Inc.
      (Case C-299/17) (1)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Industrial policy - Approximation of laws - Directive 98/34/EC - Procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services - Article 1(11) - Concept of ‘technical regulation’)
      (2019/C 383/05)
      Language of the case: German

         Referring court

      Landgericht Berlin

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte von Medienunternehmen mbH

         Defendant: Google LLC, successor in law to Google Inc.

         Operative part of the judgment

      Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services (as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998), must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits only commercial operators of search engines and commercial service providers that similarly publish content from making newspapers or magazines or parts thereof (excluding individual words and very short text excerpts) available to the public, constitutes a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of that provision, the draft of which is subject to prior notification to the Commission pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34, as amended by Directive 98/48.

         (1)  OJ C 309, 18.9.2017.