201806220211970752018/C 240/232172018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180326202121Case C-217/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — La Gazza s.c.r.l. and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2010120180326EN0023201212Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — La Gazza s.c.r.l. and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto
   (Case C-217/18)2018/C 240/23Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: La Gazza s.c.r.l., Umberto Bernardi, Giovanni Bressan, Bruno Ceccato, Alessandro Cerbaro, Virgilio Cerbaro, Alessandro Conte, Antonio Costa, Maurizio Dalla Pria, Daniele Donà, Fausto Guidolin, Gianni Mancon, Claudio Meneghini, Antonio Pesce, Dario Poli, Rino Salvalaggio, Luciano Simioni, Tiziano Sperotto, Armando Tollio, Marco Toson, Silvano Marcon, Lorella Cusinato, Federica Marcon, Eleonora Marcon, Caterina Marcon, Azienda agricola Bacchin Fratelli, Baldisseri Giancarlo e Mario s.s., Azienda agricola Ballardin Bortolino e Giuseppe, Facchinello Egidio e Giuseppe s.s., Azienda agricola Marchioron Fratelli di Marchioron Maurizio e Giuliano, Marchioron Ruggero e Massimo s.s., Azienda agricola Milan di Milan Mauro e Maurizio s.s., Azienda agricola Pettenuzzo Luciano e Aurelio s.s., Azienda agricola Stragliotto di Stragliotto Giovanni & c. s.s., Azienda agricola Todescato Giuseppe e Maurizio s.s., Azienda agricola Toffan Piermaria e Antonio s.s.

      Respondents: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

      Questions referred

            1.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law be interpreted to the effect that the consequence of the conflict of a legislative provision of a Member State with the third subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (
                  1
               ) is that producers are not obliged to pay the additional levy if the conditions laid down by that regulation are met?

            2.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law, and in particular the general principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, be interpreted as meaning that the expectations of persons who have performed an obligation laid down by a Member State and who have benefited from the effects associated with performance of that obligation may not be protected if that obligation has proved to be in conflict with EU law?

            3.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, do Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 (
                  2
               ) of 9 July 2001 and the EU concept of ‘priority category’ preclude a provision of a Member State, such as Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157/2004, approved by the Italian Republic, which lays down varying methods for refunding an additional levy that has been over-charged, drawing a distinction, in terms of timetables and methods of repayment, between producers who have relied upon due compliance with a national provision that has proved to be in conflict with EU law and producers who have not complied with such a provision?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 1992 L 405, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Commission Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 of 9 July 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy on milk and milk products (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 19).


201806220151970742018/C 240/103272017CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804127822Case C-327/17 P: Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 12 April 2018 — Cryo-Save AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), MedSkin Solutions Dr. Suwelack AG (Appeal — European Union trade mark — Revocation proceedings — Withdrawal of the application for revocation — Appeal which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN720120180412EN00107282Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 12 April 2018 — Cryo-Save AG v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), MedSkin Solutions Dr. Suwelack AG
   (Case C-327/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — European Union trade mark — Revocation proceedings — Withdrawal of the application for revocation — Appeal which has become devoid of purpose — No need to adjudicate)’2018/C 240/10Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Appellant: Cryo-Save AG (represented by: C. Onken, Rechtsanwältin)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: D. Hanf, Agent), MedSkin Solutions Dr. Suwelack AG (represented by: A. Thünken, Rechtsanwalt)

      Operative part of the order

            1.

            There is no need to adjudicate on the present appeal.

            2.

            Cryo-Save AG shall pay the costs incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) in the present proceedings.

            3.

            Cryo-Save AG and MedSkin Solutions Dr. Suwelack AG shall bear their own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 330, 2.10.2017.


201806220711970862018/C 240/552522018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180422484811Case T-252/18: Action brought on 22 April 2018 — European Anglers Alliance v Council
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN4810120180422EN0055481481Action brought on 22 April 2018 — European Anglers Alliance v Council
   (Case T-252/18)2018/C 240/55Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: European Anglers Alliance (Offenbach am Main, Germany) (represented by: L.-B. Buchman, lawyer)

      Defendant: Council of the European Union

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            confirm that the European Anglers Alliance has a legal interest in bringing the present proceedings;

            —

            annul the provisions of Article 9(4) and (5) of Council Regulation (EU) 2018/120 of 23 January 2018 fixing for 2018 the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, applicable in Union waters and, for Union fishing vessels, in certain non-Union waters and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/127 (OJ 2018 L 27, p. 1), on the grounds that:

                     —

                     in the light of the objective that they pursue, those provisions give rise to unjustified discrimination between citizens of the European Union and infringe the principle of equality;

                     —

                     the Council of the European Union exceeded the bounds of its discretion by failing to take account of any objective data regarding the effects of harvests from marine recreational fishing on sea bass stocks;

                     —

                     they infringe the principle of proportionality and fail to comply with Article 17 of the Common Fisheries Policy in so far as the economic and sociological importance of marine recreational fishing has clearly not been taken into account.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of equal treatment in so far as, in the light of the objective pursued, the contested provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/120 give rise to unjustified discrimination between European citizens, as well as between recreational fishermen and industrial fishing.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Council exceeded the bounds of its discretion.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of proportionality.


201806220221970362018/C 240/242182018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180326212221Case C-218/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — Latte Più Srl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2110120180326EN0024211222Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — Latte Più Srl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto
   (Case C-218/18)2018/C 240/24Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Latte Più Srl, Azienda agricola Benedetti Pietro e Angelo s.s., Azienda agricola Bertoldo Leandro e Ferruccio s.s., Sila di Bettinardi Virgilio e Adriano s.s., Bonora Delis, Capparotto Giampaolo e Lorenzino s.s., Cristofori Alessandra, Cunico Antonio, Dal Degan Santo e Giovanni, Dalle Palle Silvano e Munari Teresa, Dalle Palle Tiziano, Fontana Luca, Gonzo Dino e Stefano s.s., Guarato Giuseppe, Guerra Giuseppe, Magrin Stefano e Renato s.s., Marcolin Graziano, Marin Daniele, Gabriele e Graziano s.s., Azienda agricola Mascot di Pilotto Bortolo e figli s.s., Azienda agricola 2000 di Mastrotto Giuseppe, Matteazzi Mario, Mazzaron Roberto, Pozzan Michele e Luca, Radin Alessandro, Raffaello Carlo e fratelli s.s., Azienda agricola Rodighiero Elena di Bartolomei Roberto e Michele s.s., Sambugaro Andrea, Scuccato Gervasio, Serafini Candida, Toffanin Giovanni e Mauro s.s., Trevisan Francesco, Zanettin Gianfranco e Giampietro s.s.

      Respondents: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

      Questions referred

            1.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law be interpreted to the effect that the consequence of the conflict of a legislative provision of a Member State with the third subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (
                  1
               ) is that producers are not obliged to pay the additional levy if the conditions laid down by that regulation are met?

            2.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law and, in particular, the general principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, be interpreted as meaning that the expectations of persons who have performed an obligation laid down by a Member State and who have benefited from the effects associated with performance of that obligation may not be protected if that obligation has proved to be in conflict with EU law?

            3.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, do Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 (
                  2
               ) of 9 July 2001 and the EU concept of ‘priority category’ preclude a provision of a Member State, such as Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157/2004, approved by the Italian Republic, which lays down varying methods for refunding an additional levy that has been over-charged, drawing a distinction, in terms of timetables and methods of repayment, between producers who have relied upon due compliance with a national provision that has proved to be in conflict with EU law and producers who have not complied with such a provision?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 1992 L 405, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Commission Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 of 9 July 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy on milk and milk products (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 19).


201806220661970622018/C 240/562532018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180423484922Case T-253/18: Action brought on 23 April 2018 — VY v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN4820120180423EN0056482492Action brought on 23 April 2018 — VY v Commission
   (Case T-253/18)2018/C 240/56Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: VY (represented by: J.-N. Louis, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the decision appointing [confidential] (
                  1
               ) to the post of Head of Unit of the Delegation of the European Union to Japan and the decision rejecting the applicant’s candidature;

            —

            order the Commission to pay the costs

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement of the vacancy notice.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of Article 1d of the Staff Regulations.

      (
         1
      )	Confidential information omitted.


201806220121970662018/C 240/116402017CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804178811Case C-640/17: Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 17 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal de Coimbra — Portugal) — Luís Manuel dos Santos v Fazenda Pública (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Internal taxation — Prohibition of discriminatory taxation — Article 110 TFEU — Uniform road tax for motor vehicles — Setting of tax rate according to the date of first registration of the vehicle in the taxing Member State — Second-hand motor vehicles imported from other Member States — No account taken of the date of first registration in another Member State)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN810120180417EN00118181Order of the Court (Eighth Chamber) of 17 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal de Coimbra — Portugal) — Luís Manuel dos Santos v Fazenda Pública
   (Case C-640/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Internal taxation — Prohibition of discriminatory taxation — Article 110 TFEU — Uniform road tax for motor vehicles — Setting of tax rate according to the date of first registration of the vehicle in the taxing Member State — Second-hand motor vehicles imported from other Member States — No account taken of the date of first registration in another Member State)’2018/C 240/11Language of the case: Portuguese
      Referring court

   Tribunal Administrativo e Fiscal de Coimbra

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Luís Manuel dos Santos

      Defendant: Fazenda Pública

      Operative part of the order

   Article 110 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State pursuant to which the uniform road tax established by that legislation is levied on light passenger motor vehicles registered or listed in that Member State without taking into account the date of first registration of the vehicle where registration took place in another Member State, which results in higher taxation of vehicles imported from another Member State compared with similar non-imported vehicles.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 42, 5.2.2018.


201806220441970552018/C 240/683152018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180516585921Case T-315/18: Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Calvo Gutierrez and Others v SRB
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN5810120180516EN0068581592Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Calvo Gutierrez and Others v SRB
   (Case T-315/18)2018/C 240/68Language of the case: Spanish
      Parties

      Applicants: Maria Graciela Calvo Gutierrez (Alcobendas, Spain) and 21 other applicants (represented by: R. Vallina Hoset, A. Sellés Marco, C. Iglesias Megías and A. Lois Perreau de Pinninck, lawyers)

      Defendant: Single Resolution Board

      Form of order sought

   The applicants claim that the General Court should:

            —

            Declare that the Single Resolution Board has incurred non-contractual liability and order it to repair the harm suffered by the applicants as a result of both its actions and omissions which caused the total loss of the investment in BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL, S.A. subordinated bonds;

            —

            Order the Board to pay the following amounts to the applicants as compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered:
            As compensation for pecuniary damage, the total sum of EUR 7570098,17in respect of the redemption of shares in Banco Popular, divided on a pro rata basis, according to the shareholdings of each of the applicants, as follows:

                     —

                     María Graciela Calvo Gutiérrez: EUR 8836,67;

                     —

                     Eric Gancedo Holmer: EUR 35257,42;

                     —

                     María Graciela Calvo Gutiérrez and Eric Gancedo Holmer: EUR 39358,01;

                     —

                     Carlos Eric Gancedo Calvo: EUR 7374,19;

                     —

                     Gabriel Gancedo Calvo: EUR 7062,93;

                     —

                     Jorge Gancedo Calvo: EUR 8545,24;

                     —

                     Lucía Gancedo Calvo: EUR 7388,69;

                     —

                     Manuel Gancedo Calvo: EUR 9472,17;

                     —

                     José Gancedo Calvo: EUR 7389,45;

                     —

                     Claudia Sáez de Montagut Gancedo: EUR 763,66;

                     —

                     Bosco Sáez de Montagut Gancedo: EUR 2879,18;

                     —

                     Yago Sáez de Montagut Gancedo: EUR 379,16;

                     —

                     VICA58, S.L.: EUR 265763,84;

                     —

                     Diana Luisa Gancedo Holmer: EUR 175499,04;

                     —

                     Guillermo de Zavala Gancedo: EUR 722,47;

                     —

                     Alfredo de Zavala Gancedo: EUR 718,65;

                     —

                     Cosme de Zavala Gancedo: EUR 1006,27;

                     —

                     Bruno de Zavala Gancedo: EUR 689,66;

                     —

                     María Astrid Gancedo Holmer: EUR 442136,41;

                     —

                     Marco Gancedo Holmer: EUR 442135,64;

                     —

                     LOS PRUNOS DEL SETO, S.L.: EUR 6898,14;

                     —

                     MANUEL GANCEDO, S.A.: EUR 5340911,85;

                     —

                     EVEDAM INMUEBLES, S.L.: EUR 620238,46;

                     —

                     GANCEDO Y GONZÁLEZ, S.L.: EUR 138671,57; and

               As compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the sum of up to EUR 7570098,78or such amount as the General Court shall see fit to award, divided on a pro rata basis for each of the applicants in the same proportion as the amount awarded as compensation for pecuniary damage.

            —

            Increase the amount due with corresponding default interest as of the date of delivery of judgment in the present case until its payment in full of the amount due, at the rate set by the European Central Bank (ECB) for main refinancing operations, increased by two percentage points;

            —

            Order the Board to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The pleas in law and main arguments are similar to those relied upon in Case T-659/17, Vallina Fonseca v Single Resolution Board (OJ 2017 C 424, p. 42).


201806220161970672018/C 240/12852018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201804108922Case C-85/18 PPU: Order of the Court (First Chamber) of 10 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Judecătoria Oradea — Romania) — CV v DU (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility — Child custody — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Articles 8, 10 and 13 — Concept of ‘habitual residence’ of a child — Judgment delivered by a court of another Member State concerning the place of residence of a child — Wrongful removal or retention — Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN820120180410EN00128292Order of the Court (First Chamber) of 10 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Judecătoria Oradea — Romania) — CV v DU
   (Case C-85/18 PPU) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Urgent preliminary ruling procedure — Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — Judicial cooperation in civil matters — Jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility — Child custody — Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 — Articles 8, 10 and 13 — Concept of ‘habitual residence’ of a child — Judgment delivered by a court of another Member State concerning the place of residence of a child — Wrongful removal or retention — Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction)’2018/C 240/12Language of the case: Romanian
      Referring court

   Judecătoria Oradea

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: CV

      Respondent: DU

      Operative part of the order

   Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, and Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in which a child who was habitually resident in a Member State was wrongfully removed by one of the parents to another Member State, the courts of that other Member State do not have jurisdiction to rule on an application relating to custody or the determination of a maintenance allowance with respect to that child, in the absence of any indication that the other parent consented to his removal or did not bring an application for the return of that child.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 152, 30.4.2018.


201806220401970812018/C 240/422992017TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529393911Case T-299/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (1000) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 1000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN3910120180529EN0042391391Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (1000)
   (Case T-299/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 1000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)’2018/C 240/42Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Sata GmbH & Co. KG (Kornwestheim, Germany) (represented by: M.-C. Simon, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools Co. Ltd (Pengjie Town, China) (represented by: S. Fröhlich and M. Hartmann, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 6 March 2017 (Case R 650/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools and Sata.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sata GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201806220601970432018/C 240/693172018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180518596021Case T-317/18: Action brought on 18 May 2018 — Fugro v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN5910120180518EN0069591602Action brought on 18 May 2018 — Fugro v Commission
   (Case T-317/18)2018/C 240/69Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Fugro NV (Leidschendam, Netherlands) (represented by: T. Snoep and V. van Weperen, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            in the alternative, partially annul the contested decision, in particular Article 1(2) of the decision;

            —

            order the European Commission of the European Union to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the Decision breaches the principle of proportionality.

                     —

                     The Commission did not enjoy a broad discretionary power in adopting the Decision and the review of whether the Decision breaches the principle of proportionality should not be limited to reviewing whether the Decision is clearly or manifestly inappropriate in light of the objectives pursued. The Decision breaches the principle of proportionality since:

                              —

                              the Decision exceeds the limits of what is necessary to attain the pursued objectives;

                              —

                              the Commission did not choose the least onerous measure from the available appropriate measures; and

                              —

                              the disadvantages caused by the Decision are disproportionate to the objectives pursued.

                     —

                     Even if the Commission would enjoy a wide discretionary power, the Decision is nonetheless a manifestly inappropriate means of achieving the objectives pursued.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the Decision infringes Fugro’s right to property ex Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Fugro’s freedom to conduct a business ex Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

                     —

                     The Decision infringes Fugro’s right to property as it destroys Fugro’s business. The loss of property is significant and goes beyond a reasonable economic risk; and

                     —

                     the Decision affects the very existence of Fugro’s freedom to conduct a business.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the Decision breaches the principle of non-distortion of competition.

                     —

                     The Decision prevents the European Union from fulfilling the essential task of establishing an internal market free from distortion since:

                              —

                              the Decision results in a public sector intervention in the offshore GNSS Augmentation services market incompatible with the principles of undistorted competition; and

                              —

                              contrary to Article 3(3) TEU and Protocol No 27, the Decision interferes with the offshore GNSS Augmentation services market where there is no market failure.


201806220131970352018/C 240/13342018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL2018011891021Case C-34/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Regional Court of Appeal, Hungary) lodged on 18 January 2018 — Ottília Lovasné Tóth v ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt.
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN910120180118EN001391102Request for a preliminary ruling from the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Regional Court of Appeal, Hungary) lodged on 18 January 2018 — Ottília Lovasné Tóth v ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt.
   (Case C-34/18)2018/C 240/13Language of the case: Hungarian
      Referring court

   Fővárosi Ítélőtábla

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellant: Ottília Lovasné Tóth

      Respondent: ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt.

      Questions referred

            1.

            Must point 1(q) of the Annex to Directive 93/13/EEC, (
                  1
               ) as an EU law having the status of a rule of public policy, be interpreted as a general prohibition, making any further analyses unnecessary, that prevents a lender from imposing on a debtor classed as a consumer a contract term in the form of a standard term or a term that has not been individually negotiated, when the purpose or effect of that term is to reverse the burden of proof?

            2.

            If, pursuant to point 1(q) of the Annex to Directive [93/13], the purpose or effect of the contract term has to be assessed, can the following types of contract term be held to prevent consumers from exercising their rights?

                     —

                     A term that gives a debtor with the status of a consumer good reason to believe that he must perform the contract in its entirety, including all its terms, in the manner and to the extent required by the lender, even when the debtor is convinced that the performance demanded by the lender is not due, whether in full or in part.

                     —

                     A term that has the effect of limiting or excluding the consumer’s access to a dispute resolution mechanism based on equitable negotiation, given that it is sufficient for the lender to invoke this contract term in order for the dispute to be deemed to have been resolved?

            3.

            If a decision is required as to whether the contract terms listed in the Annex to Directive [93/13] are unfair in the light of the criteria established in Article 3(1) of the Directive, is the requirement in Article 5 of the Directive for terms to be drafted in plain, intelligible language satisfied in the case of a contract term which affects decisions by the consumer about performance of the contract, resolution of disputes with the lender through judicial or non-judicial channels, or the exercise of rights, when (although the wording is clear grammatically) the legal effects of the term can be determined only by interpreting national laws on which the courts had not formulated a consistent position at the time the contract was concluded, and on which no consistent position has emerged in subsequent years?

            4.

            Must point 1(m) of the Annex to Directive [93/13] be interpreted as meaning that a contract term that has not been individually negotiated can also be unfair where it authorises the party contracting with the consumer to determine unilaterally whether the consumer’s performance of the contract satisfies the terms of the contract, and when the consumer acknowledges himself to be bound by the term even before the contracting parties have performed any obligations?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).


201806220751970242018/C 240/703212018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180518616111Case T-321/18: Action brought on 18 May 2018 — Serenity Pharmaceuticals v EUIPO — Gebro Holding (NOCUVANT)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN6110120180518EN0070611611Action brought on 18 May 2018 — Serenity Pharmaceuticals v EUIPO — Gebro Holding (NOCUVANT)
   (Case T-321/18)2018/C 240/70Language in which the application was lodged: English
      Parties

      Applicant: Serenity Pharmaceuticals LLC (Milford, Pennsylvania, United States) (represented by: J. Day, Solicitor)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Gebro Holding GmbH (Fieberbrunn, Austria)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

      Trade mark at issue: EU word mark NOCUVANT — Application for registration No 13 053 434

      Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2018 in Case R 584/2017-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision;

            —

            annul the decision of the Opposition Division of 27 January 2018 in Opposition No. B 002437922;

            —

            order EUIPO and Gebro Holdings GmbH to bear their own costs and pay those of the Applicant.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 47(2) of Regulation No 2017/1001;

            —

            Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 2017/1001.


201806220041970332018/C 240/141552018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180222101121Case C-155/18 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2018 by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2017 in Case T-120/16: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN1010120180222EN0014101112Appeal brought on 22 February 2018 by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2017 in Case T-120/16: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office
   (Case C-155/18 P)2018/C 240/14Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd (represented by: A. Norris, Barrister)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Burlington Fashion GmbH

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court dismissing Tulliallan Burlington Ltd’s (TBL) appeal from the Board of Appeal;

            —

            set aside the decision of the Board of Appeal [or alternatively refer the case back to the General Court to be decided in accordance with the Court of Justice’s decision];

            —

            order the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Burlington Fashion GmbH (BFG) to pay the costs incurred by TBL in connection with this appeal.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The appellant (‘TBL’) appeals from the General Court's judgment on the basis that the General Court made the following errors of law:

            1)

            Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(5)EUTMR (
                  1
               )

                     a)

                     The General Court erred in failing to make any findings in relation to ‘link’.

                     b)

                     Further, the General Court erred in holding that TBL had not provided the proof necessary to establish detriment to distinctive character or unfair advantage.

                     c)

                     In concluding as it did that the necessary proof had not been provided, the General Court erred by (i) setting the legal bar too high, and (ii) failing to take into account the relevant evidence.

                     d)

                     In fact, the only conclusion available to the General Court was that there was detriment to distinctive character or further or alternatively unfair advantage.

                     e)

                     The General Court wrongly rejected TBL's submissions that the Board of Appeal's decision was vitiated by its evident failure to take into account the submissions made to it.

            2)

            Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(4) EUTMR

                     a)

                     The General Court declined to find that the Board of Appeal should have requested additional submissions on Article 8(4) in circumstances where the only way to ensure procedural justice would have been for the Board of Appeal to invite those submissions or decide the issue on Article 8(5) only and remit the issue of Article 8(4) back to the Opposition Division. The Board of Appeal's decision should have been set aside by the General Court.

                     b)

                     The General Court was wrong to uphold the Board of Appeal's conclusion that TBL had not demonstrated the prerequisites for making out Article 8(4). The General Court ought to have found that the Board of Appeal was in error, set aside the Board of Appeal's findings on Article 8(4) and substituted its own finding that Article 8(4) had been infringed.

      Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1) EUTMR

            a)

            The General Court erred in applying Praktiker because in the light of the decision of the Court of Justice in EUIPO v Cactus (C-501/15 P; EU:C:2017:750), Praktiker does not apply to the Earlier Marks here.

            b)

            Further or alternatively, the General Court erred in applying Praktiker because that judgment does not apply to shopping arcade services.

            c)

            Even if TBL's Earlier Marks fell within the scope of ‘retail services’ and therefore fell within the ambit of Praktiker, the General Court was wrong to interpret Praktiker as necessarily precluding a finding of confusing similarity.

            d)

            Because it erred in its findings on the application of Praktiker, the General Court failed to either (i) conduct an assessment of the likelihood of confusion or (ii) refer that exercise to the Board of Appeal. In the circumstances, it was obliged to take one of these steps.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017, L 154, p. 1).


201806220501970582018/C 240/713232018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180522616222Case T-323/18: Action brought on 22 May 2018 — Fomanu v EUIPO — Fujifilm Imaging Germany (Representation of a butterfly)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN6120120180522EN0071612622Action brought on 22 May 2018 — Fomanu v EUIPO — Fujifilm Imaging Germany (Representation of a butterfly)
   (Case T-323/18)2018/C 240/71Language in which the application was lodged: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Fomanu AG (Neustadt a.d. Waldnaab, Germany) (represented by: S. Reichart, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Fujifilm Imaging Germany GmbH & Co. KG (Willich, Germany)

      Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

      Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant

      Trade mark at issue: EU figurative mark No 5 481 403

      Procedure before EUIPO: Invalidity proceedings

      Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 March 2018 in Case R 2241/2016-2

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            annul the contested decision in so far as it declared the contested EU trade mark to have expired for the following goods and services:
            Class 9 — CDs; DVDs; computer programs and software, in particular software for the exchange, storage, reproduction and systematic capture of data;
            Class 16 — Printed matter included in Class 16, excluding printed matter customised with personal photos (in particular photo books, photo calendars, photo canvases, photo puzzles, photo notebooks and photo folders);
            Class 38 — Providing access to a computer database for downloading information via electronic media (the Internet); computer-aided transmission of messages and images;
            Class 40 — Bookbinding;

            —

            order EUIPO to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law

            —

            Infringement of Article 58(1)(a) and (2), in conjunction with Article 18(1), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

            —

            Infringement of Article 19(1), in conjunction with Article 10, of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430.


201806220301970792018/C 240/252192018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180326222321Case C-219/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — Brenta Scrl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2210120180326EN0025221232Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 26 March 2018 — Brenta Scrl and Others v Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto
   (Case C-219/18)2018/C 240/25Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Consiglio di Stato

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Brenta Scrl, Michele Bianchin, Antonio Bortignon, Doriano Bortignon, Bruno Caron, Francesca Carraro, Antonio Didonè, Loris Donazzan, Rino Guidolin, Silvano Orsato, Valentino Rigo, Roberto Sacchetto, Emiliano Sonda, Azienda agricola Rebesco Antonio e Guerrino s.s.

      Respondents: Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura (AGEA), Regione Veneto

      Questions referred

            1.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law be interpreted to the effect that the consequence of the conflict of a legislative provision of a Member State with the third subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (
                  1
               ) is that producers are not obliged to pay the additional levy if the conditions laid down by that regulation are met?

            2.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, must EU law and, in particular, the general principle of the protection of legitimate expectations be interpreted as meaning that the expectations of persons who have performed an obligation laid down by a Member State and who have benefited from the effects associated with performance of that obligation may not be protected if that obligation has proved to be in conflict with EU law?

            3.

            In a situation such as that described in the case in the main proceedings, do Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 (
                  2
               ) of 9 July 2001 and the EU concept of ‘priority category’ preclude a provision of a Member State, such as Article 2(3) of Decree-Law No 157/2004, adopted by the Italian Republic, which lays down varying methods for refunding an additional levy that has been over-charged, drawing a distinction, in terms of timetables and methods of repayment, between producers who have relied upon due compliance with a national provision that has proved to be in conflict with EU law and producers who have not complied with such a provision?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December 1992 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ 1992 L 405, p. 1).
   (
         2
      )	Commission Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001 of 9 July 2001 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy on milk and milk products (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 19).


201806220371970392018/C 240/151562018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180222121321Case C-156/18 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2018 by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2017 in Case T-121/16: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN1210120180222EN0015121132Appeal brought on 22 February 2018 by Tulliallan Burlington Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 6 December 2017 in Case T-121/16: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office
   (Case C-156/18 P)2018/C 240/15Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellant: Tulliallan Burlington Ltd (represented by: A. Norris, Barrister)

      Other parties to the proceedings: European Union Intellectual Property Office, Burlington Fashion GmbH

      Form of order sought

   The appellant claims that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the judgment of the General Court dismissing Tulliallan Burlington Ltd’s (TBL) appeal from the Board of Appeal;

            —

            set aside the decision of the Board of Appeal [or alternatively refer the case back to the General Court to be decided in accordance with the Court of Justice’s decision];

            —

            order the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Burlington Fashion GmbH (BFG) to pay the costs incurred by TBL in connection with this appeal.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The appellant (‘TBL’) appeals from the General Court's judgment on the basis that the General Court made the following errors of law:

            1)

            Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(5)EUTMR (
                  1
               )

                     a)

                     The General Court erred in failing to make any findings in relation to ‘link’.

                     b)

                     Further, the General Court erred in holding that TBL had not provided the proof necessary to establish detriment to distinctive character or unfair advantage.

                     c)

                     In concluding as it did that the necessary proof had not been provided, the General Court erred by (i) setting the legal bar too high, and (ii) failing to take into account the relevant evidence.

                     d)

                     In fact, the only conclusion available to the General Court was that there was detriment to distinctive character or further or alternatively unfair advantage.

                     e)

                     The General Court wrongly rejected TBL's submissions that the Board of Appeal's decision was vitiated by its evident failure to take into account the submissions made to it.

            2)

            Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(4) EUTMR

                     a)

                     The General Court declined to find that the Board of Appeal should have requested additional submissions on Article 8(4) in circumstances where the only way to ensure procedural justice would have been for the Board of Appeal to invite those submissions or decide the issue on Article 8(5) only and remit the issue of Article 8(4) back to the Opposition Division. The Board of Appeal's decision should have been set aside by the General Court.

                     b)

                     The General Court was wrong to uphold the Board of Appeal's conclusion that TBL had not demonstrated the prerequisites for making out Article 8(4). The General Court ought to have found that the Board of Appeal was in error, set aside the Board of Appeal's findings on Article 8(4) and substituted its own finding that Article 8(4) had been infringed.

      Pleas in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1) EUTMR

            a)

            The General Court erred in applying Praktiker because in the light of the decision of the Court of Justice in EUIPO v Cactus (C-501/15 P; EU:C:2017:750), Praktiker does not apply to the Earlier Marks here.

            b)

            Further or alternatively, the General Court erred in applying Praktiker because that judgment does not apply to shopping arcade services.

            c)

            Even if TBL's Earlier Marks fell within the scope of ‘retail services’ and therefore fell within the ambit of Praktiker, the General Court was wrong to interpret Praktiker as necessarily precluding a finding of confusing similarity.

            d)

            Because it erred in its findings on the application of Praktiker, the General Court failed to either (i) conduct an assessment of the likelihood of confusion or (ii) refer that exercise to the Board of Appeal. In the circumstances, it was obliged to take one of these steps.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017, L 154, p. 1).


201806220581970172018/C 240/572602018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180425495021Case T-260/18: Action brought on 25 April 2018 — Makhlouf v Commission and ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN4910120180425EN0057491502Action brought on 25 April 2018 — Makhlouf v Commission and ECB
   (Case T-260/18)2018/C 240/57Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Rami Makhlouf (Damascus, Syria) (represented by: E. Ruchat, lawyer)

      Defendants: European Commission and European Central Bank

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the General Court should

            —

            declare the applicant’s action admissible and well founded;

            —

            consequently, order the European Union, the defendants, to pay compensation to the applicant in respect of all of the harm suffered, in the sum of EUR 6900000, plus interest;

            —

            order the defendants to pay all of the costs of the action.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging infringement, on the part of the Commission, of Article 17(1) TEU and of Article 13(3) and (4) of the ESM Treaty in so far as it failed to ensure that the memorandum of understanding of 26 April 2013 was compatible with EU law;

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging misuse of powers and infringement of Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, on the part of the ECB, in so far as it used its powers in matters of monetary policy in order to impose the terms of bank restructuring on the Eurogroup and the Government of Cyprus.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging expropriation of the applicant’s assets without fair compensation.


201806220741970322018/C 240/433002017TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529394022Case T-300/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (3000) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 3000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN3920120180529EN0043392402Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (3000)
   (Case T-300/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 3000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)’2018/C 240/43Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Sata GmbH & Co. KG (Kornwestheim, Germany) (represented by: M.-C. Simon, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools Co. Ltd (Pengjie Town, China) (represented by: S. Fröhlich and M. Hartmann, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2017 (Case R 653/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools and Sata.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sata GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201806220051970502018/C 240/262322018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180329232311Case C-232/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Almería (Spain) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Banco Popular Español, S.A. v María Angeles Díaz Soria, Miguel Ángel Góngora Gómez, José Antonio Sánchez González and Dolores María del Águila Andújar
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2310120180329EN0026231231Request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Almería (Spain) lodged on 29 March 2018 — Banco Popular Español, S.A. v María Angeles Díaz Soria, Miguel Ángel Góngora Gómez, José Antonio Sánchez González and Dolores María del Águila Andújar
   (Case C-232/18)2018/C 240/26Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Audiencia Provincial de Almería

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Banco Popular Español S.A.

      Defendants: María Angeles Díaz Soria, Miguel Ángel Góngora Gómez, José Antonio Sánchez González and Dolores María del Águila Andújar

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is a provision such as that laid down in Article 465.5 of the Spanish Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil 1/2000 (Law on Civil Procedure) which limits the power of the Tribunal de Apelación (Court of Appeal) to assess of its own motion all the effects of a declaration of invalidity, which is upheld on appeal, compatible with Article 6(1) of Directive 93/13, (
                  1
               ) when those effects have been determined restrictively at first instance and the consumer has not appealed against the judgment at first instance declaring the term null and void?

            2.

            Is the foregoing compatible with the principles laid down in Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive 93/13, if it means that the effects of a finding that a clause such as that at issue is unfair will be limited for persons making a claim under the ruling of the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) in its judgment of 9 May 2013, declared invalid by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 21 December 2016? (
                  2
               )

            3.

            Does res judicata under national law (or following from the analysis that the appeal court might make when only the party claiming that the clause is valid has brought an appeal) affect only any declaration of nullity (of the clause[,] or also the full effects of that nullity when they have been limited in the judicial decision and no party has contested this?

      (
         1
      )	Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).
   (
         2
      )	Judgment of 21 December 2016, Gutiérrez Naranjo and Others (C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15, EU:C:2016:980).


201806220651970202018/C 240/443012017TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529404121Case T-301/17: Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (2000) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 2000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN4010120180529EN0044401412Judgment of the General Court of 29 May 2018 — Sata v EUIPO — Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools (2000)
   (Case T-301/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU word mark 2000 — Absolute ground for refusal — Descriptive character — Article 52(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 59(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001) — Equal treatment — Principle of sound administration — Obligation to state reasons)’2018/C 240/44Language of the case: German
      Parties

      Applicant: Sata GmbH & Co. KG (Kornwestheim, Germany) (represented by: M.-C. Simon, lawyer)

      Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Hanf, acting as Agent)

      Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools Co. Ltd (Pengjie Town, China) (represented by: S. Fröhlich and M. Hartmann, lawyers)

      Re:

   Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 8 March 2017 (Case R 651/2016-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Zhejiang Rongpeng Air Tools and Sata.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders Sata GmbH & Co. KG to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 231, 17.7.2017.


201806220791970282018/C 240/722302016TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180516626211Case T-230/16: Order of the General Court of 16 May 2018 — C & J Clark International v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN6210120180516EN0072621621Order of the General Court of 16 May 2018 — C & J Clark International v Commission
   (Case T-230/16) (
         1
      )2018/C 240/72Language of the case: EnglishThe President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 260, 18.7.2016.


201806220181970692018/C 240/272342018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180403242521Case C-234/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Komisia za protivodeystvie na koruptsiata i otnemane na nezakonno pridobito imushtestvo v BP, AB, PB, Agro In 2001 EOOD, Acount Service 2009 EOOD, Invest Management OOD, Estate OOD, Trast Vasilevi OOD, Bromak OOD, Bromak Finance EAD, Viva Telekom Bulgaria EOOD, Balgarska Telekomunikatsionna Kompania AD, Hedge Investment Bulgaria AD, Kemira OOD, Dunarit AD, Technologichen Zentar-Institut Po Mikroelektronika AD, Evrobild 2003 EOOD, Technotel Invest AD, Ken Trade EAD, Konsult Av EOOD, Louvrier Investments Company 33 S.A, EFV International Financial Ventures Ltd, LIC Telecommunications S.A.R.L., V Telecom Investment S.C.A, V2 Investment S.A.R.L., Interv Investment S.A.R.L., Empreno Ventures S.A.R.L.
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2410120180403EN0027241252Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sofiyski gradski sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 3 April 2018 — Komisia za protivodeystvie na koruptsiata i otnemane na nezakonno pridobito imushtestvo v BP, AB, PB, Agro In 2001 EOOD, Acount Service 2009 EOOD, Invest Management OOD, Estate OOD, Trast Vasilevi OOD, Bromak OOD, Bromak Finance EAD, Viva Telekom Bulgaria EOOD, Balgarska Telekomunikatsionna Kompania AD, Hedge Investment Bulgaria AD, Kemira OOD, Dunarit AD, Technologichen Zentar-Institut Po Mikroelektronika AD, Evrobild 2003 EOOD, Technotel Invest AD, Ken Trade EAD, Konsult Av EOOD, Louvrier Investments Company 33 S.A, EFV International Financial Ventures Ltd, LIC Telecommunications S.A.R.L., V Telecom Investment S.C.A, V2 Investment S.A.R.L., Interv Investment S.A.R.L., Empreno Ventures S.A.R.L.
   (Case C-234/18)2018/C 240/27Language of the case: Bulgarian
      Referring court

   Sofiyski gradski sad

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Komisia za protivodeystvie na koruptsiata i otnemane na nezakonno pridobito imushtestvo

      Defendants: BP, AB, PB, Agro In 2001 EOOD, Acount Service 2009 EOOD, Invest Management OOD, Estate OOD, Trast Vasilevi OOD, Bromak OOD, Bromak Finance EAD, Viva Telekom Bulgaria EOOD, Balgarska Telekomunikatsionna Kompania AD, Hedge Investment Bulgaria AD, Kemira OOD, Dunarit AD, Technologichen Zentar-Institut Po Mikroelektronika AD, Evrobild 2003 EOOD, Technotel Invest AD, Ken Trade EAD, Konsult Av EOOD, Louvrier Investments Company 33 S.A, EFV International Financial Ventures Ltd, LIC Telecommunications S.A.R.L., V Telecom Investment S.C.A, V2 Investment S.A.R.L., Interv Investment S.A.R.L., Empreno Ventures S.A.R.L.

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/42/EU (
                  1
               ) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union, which provides for the establishment of ‘minimum rules on the freezing of property with a view to possible subsequent confiscation’, to be interpreted as meaning that it permits Member States to adopt provisions on civil-law confiscation that is not based on a conviction?

            2.

            Does it follow from Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union, taking into account Article 4(1) thereof, that the institution of criminal proceedings against the person whose assets are the subject of confiscation is, of itself, a sufficient basis on which to bring and conclude civil-law confiscation proceedings?

            3.

            Can the grounds given in Article 4(2) of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union be interpreted broadly as permitting civil-law confiscation that is not based on a conviction?

            4.

            Is Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that a right to property may be withdrawn, as having been directly or indirectly obtained by way of a criminal offence, on the sole ground of the discrepancy between the value of a person’s assets and his lawful earnings, in the case where there is no final criminal judgment finding that the person concerned committed the criminal offence in question?

            5.

            Is the provision contained in Article 6(1) of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that it provides for confiscation from third parties as an additional or alternative means of direct confiscation or as an additional means of extended confiscation?

            6.

            Is the provision contained in Article 8(1) of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union to be interpreted as meaning that it ensures the application of the presumption of innocence and prohibits confiscation that is not based on a conviction?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2014 L 127, p. 39.


201806220561970602018/C 240/582702018TC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180426505121Case T-270/18: Action brought on 26 April 2018 — O'Flynn and others v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN5010120180426EN0058501512Action brought on 26 April 2018 — O'Flynn and others v Commission
   (Case T-270/18)2018/C 240/58Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Michael O'Flynn (Cork, Ireland), Paddy McKillen (Dublin, Ireland) and David Daly (Malahide, Ireland) (represented by: M. Cush, SC, D. Hardiman, Barrister, P. O’Brien and D. O'Keeffe, Solicitors)

      Defendant: European Commission

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul European Commission decision C(2018) 464 final of 25 January 2018 (SA.43791(2017/NN)) (
                  1
               ) in so far as it raised no objection to alleged aid to and through the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) or alternatively did not consider such a measure to constitute aid,

            —

            award the applicants the costs including those incidental to the proceedings.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on four pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the defendant should have initiated a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU.

                     —

                     The applicants allege, inter alia, that, by failing to initiate such a procedure, the defendants infringed the applicants’ procedural rights under Article 108(2) TFEU and also the principle of good administration by failing to comply with its obligations to undertake a diligent and impartial investigation of the alleged aid.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging manifest errors of assessment.

                     —

                     The applicants allege that the defendant made manifest errors of assessment in adopting the contested decision, including its finding that there was no allegation of misuse of aid by the applicants whereas such an allegation was expressly made in paragraph 5.25 of the complaint. The applicants also allege that the defendant’s assessment of NAMA’s activities was deficient in various ways.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging a failure by the defendant to give reasons.

                     —

                     In this regard the applicants allege that the defendant failed to give reasons or failed to give adequate reasons for the contested decision by, inter alia, failing to explain adequately or at all or in any verifiable way the basis for its acceptance of NAMA’s methodology in determining the viability of development projects.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging a breach of Article 106 TFEU.

                     —

                     In addition to the alleged violation of the provisions of the TFEU on State aid, the applicants allege that Article 106 TFEU was breached, as stated in their complaint, on which point they received no reply from the defendant.

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2018 C 60, p. 4.


201806220311970302018/C 240/282412018CJC24020180709EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180405252511Case C-241/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Napoli (Italy) lodged on 5 April 2018 — easyJet Airline Co. Ltd v Regione Campania
 ---documentbreak--- C2402018EN2510120180405EN0028251251Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Napoli (Italy) lodged on 5 April 2018 — easyJet Airline Co. Ltd v Regione Campania
   (Case C-241/18)2018/C 240/28Language of the case: Italian
      Referring court

   Commissione tributaria provinciale di Napoli

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: easyJet Airline Co. Ltd

      Defendant: Regione Campania

      Question referred

   Must Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 30/2002/EC (
         1
      ) and Annex II thereto be interpreted as meaning that they preclude a provision such as Article 1(169) to (174) of Law No 5/2013 of the Campana Region because the determination of the tax is not preceded by an overall plan relating to the measure to adopt to reduce aircraft noise emissions at airports and in areas surrounding those airports, for the purposes of Article 5 of the Directive and Annex II thereto.
   (
         1
      )	Directive 2002/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 March 2002 on the establishment of rules and procedures with regard to the introduction of noise-related operating restrictions at Community airports (OJ 2002 L 85, p. 40)


201806290101986442018/C 249/223162018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180514171821Case C-316/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom) made on 14 May 2018 — Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN1710120180514EN0022171182Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom) made on 14 May 2018 — Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge
   (Case C-316/18)2018/C 249/22Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

      Defendants: The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is any distinction to be made between exempt and non-taxable transactions for the purpose of deciding whether VAT incurred for the purposes of such transactions is deductible?

            2.

            Where management fees are incurred only in relation to a non-taxable investment activity, is it nonetheless possible to make the necessary link between those costs and the economic activities which are subsidised with the investment income which is produced as a result of the investments, so as to permit VAT deduction by reference to the nature and extent of downstream economic activity which carries an entitlement to deduct VAT? To what extent is it relevant to consider the purpose to which the income generated will be put?

            3.

            Is any distinction to be drawn between VAT that is incurred for the purposes of providing capitalisation for a business and VAT that produces its own income stream, distinct from any income stream derived from downstream economic activity?


201806290211986352018/C 249/233252018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180517181811Case C-325/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 17 May 2018 — Hampshire County Council v C.E., N.E.
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN1810120180517EN0023181181Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Ireland) made on 17 May 2018 — Hampshire County Council v C.E., N.E.
   (Case C-325/18)2018/C 249/23Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   Court of Appeal

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Hampshire County Council

      Defendants: C.E., N.E.

      Questions referred

            1.

            Where it is alleged that children have been wrongfully taken from the country of their habitual residence by their parents and/or other family members in breach of a court order obtained by a public authority of that State, may that public authority apply to have any court order directing the return of the children to that jurisdiction enforced in the courts of another Member State pursuant to the provisions of Chapter III Council of Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 (
                  1
               ) or would this amount to a wrongful circumvention of Article 11 of that Regulation and the 1980 Hague Convention or otherwise amount to an abuse of rights or law on the part of the authority concerned?

            2.

            In a case concerning the enforcement provisions of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 is there a jurisdiction to extend time for the purposes of Article 33(5) where the delays are essentially de minimis and an extension of time would otherwise have been granted by reference to national procedural law?

            3.

            Without prejudice to question (2) where a foreign public authority removes the children, the subject matter of the dispute, from the jurisdiction of a Member State pursuant to an enforcement order made ex parte in accordance with Art. 31 of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 but before the service of such orderon the parents thereby depriving them of their rights to apply for a stay of such an order pending an appeal, does such conduct compromise the essence of ‘parents’ entitlement under Article 6 ECHR or Article 47 of the Charter such that an extension of time (for the purposes of Article 33(5) of that Regulation) should otherwise be granted?

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (OJ 2003, L 338, p. 1).


201806290111986452018/C 249/243272018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180518192021Case C-327/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 18 May 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v R O
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN1910120180518EN0024191202Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 18 May 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v R O
   (Case C-327/18)2018/C 249/24Language of the case: English
      Referring court

   High Court (Ireland)

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Minister for Justice and Equality

      Defendant: R O

      Questions referred

   Having regard to:

            (a)

            the giving by the United Kingdom of notice under Article 50 of the TEU;

            (b)

            the uncertainty as to the arrangements which will be put in place between the European Union and the United Kingdom to govern relations after the departure of the United Kingdom; and

            (c)

            the consequential uncertainty as to the extent to which the respondent would, in practice, be able to enjoy rights under the Treaties, the Charter or relevant legislation, should he be surrendered to the United Kingdom and remain incarcerated after the departure of the United Kingdom,

            1.

            Is a requested Member State required by European Union Law to decline to surrender to the United Kingdom a person the subject of a European arrest warrant, whose surrender would otherwise be required under the national law of the Member State,

                     (i)

                     In all cases?

                     (ii)

                     In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case?

                     (iii)

                     In no cases?

            2.

            If the answer to Question 1 is that set out at (ii) what are the criteria or considerations which a court in the requested Member State must assess to determine whether surrender is prohibited?

            3.

            In the context of Question 2 is the court of the requested Member State required to postpone the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant to await greater clarity about the relevant legal regime which is to be put in place after the withdrawal of the relevant requesting Member State from the Union

                     (i)

                     in all cases?

                     (ii)

                     In some cases, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case?

                     (iii)

                     In no cases?

            4.

            If the answer to Question 3 is that set out at (ii) what are the criteria or considerations which a court in the requested Member State must assess to determine whether it is required to postpone the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant?


201807200152013572018/C 276/394322016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180412303011Case C-432/16: Order of the President of the Court of 12 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña — Spain) — Carolina Minayo Luque v Quitxalla Stars, S.L., Fondo de Garantía Salarial, Ministerio Fiscal
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3010120180412EN0039301301Order of the President of the Court of 12 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cataluña — Spain) — Carolina Minayo Luque v Quitxalla Stars, S.L., Fondo de Garantía Salarial, Ministerio Fiscal
   (Case C-432/16) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/39Language of the case: SpanishThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 410, 7.11.2016.


201807200422013172018/C 276/58872018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529343414Case C-87/18: Order of the President of the Court of 29 May 2018 — European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3440120180529EN0058344341Order of the President of the Court of 29 May 2018 — European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
   (Case C-87/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/58Language of the case: FrenchThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 161, 7.5.2018.


201807200092013222018/C 276/405382016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180518303012Case C-538/16: Order of the President of the Court of 18 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main — Germany) — Kevin Joseph Devine v Air Nostrum, Líneas Aéreas del Mediterráneo SA
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3020120180518EN0040302301Order of the President of the Court of 18 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main — Germany) — Kevin Joseph Devine v Air Nostrum, Líneas Aéreas del Mediterráneo SA
   (Case C-538/16) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/40Language of the case: GermanThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 30, 30.1.2017.


201807200642012852018/C 276/416312016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180417303013Case C-631/16: Order of the President of the Court of 17 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Noord-Holland — Netherlands) — X B.V. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane, kantoor Rotterdam Rijnmond
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3030120180417EN0041303301Order of the President of the Court of 17 April 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Noord-Holland — Netherlands) — X B.V. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane, kantoor Rotterdam Rijnmond
   (Case C-631/16) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/41Language of the case: DutchThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


201807200332013482018/C 276/021632016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806122211Case C-163/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag — Netherlands) — Christian Louboutin, Christian Louboutin SAS v Van Haren Schoenen BV (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Trade marks — Absolute grounds for refusal or invalidity — Sign consisting exclusively of the shape of the product — Concept of ‘shape’ — Colour — Position on a part of the product — Directive 2008/95/EC — Article 2 — Article 3(1)(e)(iii))
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN210120180612EN00022121Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag — Netherlands) — Christian Louboutin, Christian Louboutin SAS v Van Haren Schoenen BV
   (Case C-163/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Trade marks — Absolute grounds for refusal or invalidity — Sign consisting exclusively of the shape of the product — Concept of ‘shape’ — Colour — Position on a part of the product — Directive 2008/95/EC — Article 2 — Article 3(1)(e)(iii))’2018/C 276/02Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Rechtbank Den Haag

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Christian Louboutin, Christian Louboutin SAS

      Defendant: Van Haren Schoenen BV

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 3(1)(e)(iii) of Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks must be interpreted as meaning that a sign consisting of a colour applied to the sole of a high-heeled shoe, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, does not consist exclusively of a ‘shape’, within the meaning of that provision.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 211, 13.6.2016.


201807200302013472018/C 276/202582018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180413141411Case C-258/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Netherlands) lodged on 13 April 2018 — H. Solak v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN1410120180413EN0020141141Request for a preliminary ruling from the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Netherlands) lodged on 13 April 2018 — H. Solak v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen
   (Case C-258/18)2018/C 276/20Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Centrale Raad van Beroep

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: H. Solak

      Defendant: Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen

      Questions referred

            1.

            Can a Turkish national who is duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a Member State, has obtained the nationality of that Member State without renouncing his Turkish nationality and subsequently voluntarily renounced the nationality of that Member State and thus Union citizenship rely on Article 6 of Decision 3/80 (
                  1
               ) to avoid a residence requirement in national social security legislation which can, however, be imposed on Union citizens?

            2.

            Is Article 6(1) of Decision 3/80, with due regard to Article 59 of the Additional Protocol, to be construed as meaning that it precludes a statutory regulation of a Member State such as Article 4a of the TW, (
                  2
               ) on the basis of which an awarded supplementary benefit is withdrawn if the recipient moves to Turkey, even if that recipient has left the territory of the Member State on his own initiative after voluntarily renouncing the nationality of a Member State and whilst it has not been found that he is no longer duly registered as belonging to the labour force of that Member State?

      (
         1
      )	Decision No 3/80 of the Association Council of 19 September 1980 on the application of the social security schemes of the Member States of the European Communities to Turkish workers and members of their families (OJ 1983 C 110, p. 60).
   (
         2
      )	Wet van 6 november 1986, houdende verlening van toeslagen tot het relevante sociaal minimum aan uitkeringsgerechtigden op grond van de Werkloosheidswet, de Ziektewet, de Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet, de Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering en de Wet arbeidsongeschiktheidsvoorziening militairen (toeslagenwet) (Law of 6 November 1986 on the award of supplements to the relevant social minimum to persons entitled to benefits under the Law on unemployment, the Law on sickness, the general Law on incapacity for work, the Law on insurance against incapacity for work, and the Law on incapacity for work of members of the armed forces).


201807200272013412018/C 276/426862016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180508303014Case C-686/16 P: Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 8 May 2018 — Meissen Keramik GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3040120180508EN0042304301Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 8 May 2018 — Meissen Keramik GmbH v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)
   (Case C-686/16 P) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/42Language of the case: GermanThe President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 161, 22.5.2017.


201807200062012702018/C 276/59882018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180529353511Case C-88/18: Order of the President of the Court of 29 May 2018 — European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3510120180529EN0059351351Order of the President of the Court of 29 May 2018 — European Commission v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
   (Case C-88/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/59Language of the case: FrenchThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 161, 7.5.2018.


201807200562013262018/C 276/035302016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806132322Case C-530/16: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 13 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Poland (Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Railway safety — Directive 2004/49/EC — Failure to adopt to provisions necessary to ensure the independence of the investigating body)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN220120180613EN00032232Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 13 June 2018 — European Commission v Republic of Poland
   (Case C-530/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations — Railway safety — Directive 2004/49/EC — Failure to adopt to provisions necessary to ensure the independence of the investigating body)’2018/C 276/03Language of the case: Polish
      Parties

      Applicant: European Commission (represented by: W. Mölls and J. Hottiaux, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: Republic of Poland (represented by: B. Majczyna and K. Majcher, acting as Agents, and by T. Warchol, ekspert)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Declares that, by failing to adopt the measures necessary to ensure that the investigating body is independent, in terms of its organisation and decision-making, of railway undertakings and rail infrastructure managers controlled by the Minister for Transport, the Republic of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 21(1) of Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community’s railways and amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification (Railway Safety Directive).

            2.

            Orders the Republic of Poland to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 14, 16.1.2017.


201807200492013002018/C 276/43712017CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180322313111Case C-71/17: Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 22 March 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça — Portugal) — David Vicente Fernandes v Gabinete Português de Carta Verde
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3110120180322EN0043311311Order of the President of the Second Chamber of the Court of 22 March 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça — Portugal) — David Vicente Fernandes v Gabinete Português de Carta Verde
   (Case C-71/17) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/43Language of the case: PortugueseThe President of the Second Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 129, 24.4.2017.


201807200212012752018/C 276/212632018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180416141522Case C-263/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag (Netherlands) lodged on 16 April 2018 — Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV, Tom Kabinet Holding BV, Tom Kabinet Uitgeverij BV
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN1420120180416EN0021142152Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag (Netherlands) lodged on 16 April 2018 — Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet BV, Tom Kabinet Holding BV, Tom Kabinet Uitgeverij BV
   (Case C-263/18)2018/C 276/21Language of the case: Dutch
      Referring court

   Rechtbank Den Haag

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene Uitgevers

      Defendants: Tom Kabinet Internet BV, Tom Kabinet Holding BV, Tom Kabinet Uitgeverij BV

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is Article 4(1) of the Copyright Directive (
                  1
               ) to be construed as meaning that ‘any form of distribution to the public by sale or otherwise of the original of their works or copies thereof’ as referred to therein includes making available remotely by downloading, for use for an unlimited period, e-books (being digital copies of books protected by copyright) at a price by means of which the copyright holder receives remuneration equivalent to the economic value of the work belonging to him?

            2.

            If question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative, is the distribution right with regard to the original or copies of a work as referred to in Article 4(2) of the Copyright Directive exhausted in the Union, when the first sale or other transfer of that material, which includes making available remotely by downloading, for use for an unlimited period, e-books (being digital copies of books protected by copyright) at a price by means of which the copyright holder receives remuneration equivalent to the economic value of the work belonging to him, takes place in the Union through the rightholder or with his consent?

            3.

            Is Article 2 of the Copyright Directive to be construed as meaning that a transfer between successive acquirers of a lawfully acquired copy in respect of which the distribution right has been exhausted, constitutes consent to the acts of reproduction referred to therein, in so far as those acts of reproduction are necessary for the lawful use of that copy and, if so, which conditions apply?

            4.

            Is Article 5 of the Copyright Directive to be construed as meaning that the copyright holder may no longer oppose the acts of reproduction necessary for a transfer between successive acquirers of the lawfully acquired copy in respect of which the distribution right has been exhausted and, if so, which conditions apply?

      (
         1
      )	Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10).


201807200392012782018/C 276/046502016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806123311Case C-650/16: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — A/S Bevola, Jens W. Trock ApS v Skatteministeriet (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 49 TFEU — Corporation tax — Freedom of establishment — Resident company — Taxable profits — Tax relief — Deduction of losses incurred by resident permanent establishments — Authorised — Deduction of losses incurred by non-resident permanent establishments — Excluded — Exception — Optional scheme of international joint taxation)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN310120180612EN00043131Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 12 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret — Denmark) — A/S Bevola, Jens W. Trock ApS v Skatteministeriet
   (Case C-650/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 49 TFEU — Corporation tax — Freedom of establishment — Resident company — Taxable profits — Tax relief — Deduction of losses incurred by resident permanent establishments — Authorised — Deduction of losses incurred by non-resident permanent establishments — Excluded — Exception — Optional scheme of international joint taxation)’2018/C 276/04Language of the case: Danish
      Referring court

   Østre Landsret

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: A/S Bevola, Jens W. Trock ApS

      Defendant: Skatteministeriet

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State under which it is not possible for a resident company which has not opted for an international joint taxation scheme, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to deduct from its taxable profits losses incurred by a permanent establishment in another Member State, where, first, that company has exhausted the possibilities of deducting those losses available under the law of the Member State in which the establishment is situated and, second, it has ceased to receive any income from that establishment, so that there is no longer any possibility of the losses being taken into account in that Member State, which is for the national court to ascertain.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 63, 27.2.2017.


201807200572013112018/C 276/601962018CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180601353512Case C-196/18: Order of the President of the Court of 1 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) — Portugal) — Raúl Vítor Soares de Sousa v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3520120180601EN0060352351Order of the President of the Court of 1 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) — Portugal) — Raúl Vítor Soares de Sousa v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira
   (Case C-196/18) (
         1
      )2018/C 276/60Language of the case: PortugueseThe President of the Court has ordered that the case be removed from the register.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 190, 4.6.2018.


201807200252012762018/C 276/056652016CJC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806134411Case C-665/16: Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 13 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny — Poland) — Minister Finansów v Gmina Wrocław (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 2(1)(a) — Supply of goods for consideration — Article 14(1) — Transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner — Article 14(2)(a) — Transfer of the ownership of property belonging to a municipality to the Public Treasury in return for the payment of compensation for the purposes of the construction of a national road — Concept of ‘compensation’ — Transaction subject to VAT)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN410120180613EN00054141Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 13 June 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny — Poland) — Minister Finansów v Gmina Wrocław
   (Case C-665/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Article 2(1)(a) — Supply of goods for consideration — Article 14(1) — Transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner — Article 14(2)(a) — Transfer of the ownership of property belonging to a municipality to the Public Treasury in return for the payment of compensation for the purposes of the construction of a national road — Concept of ‘compensation’ — Transaction subject to VAT)’2018/C 276/05Language of the case: Polish
      Referring court

   Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Minister Finansów

      Defendant: Gmina Wrocław

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 2(1)(a) and Article 14(2)(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that a transfer of ownership of immovable property belonging to a taxable person for value added tax purposes to the Public Treasury of a Member State, carried out in accordance with the law and in return for a payment of compensation, constitutes a transaction subject to VAT in a situation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, where the same person simultaneously represents the expropriating authority and the municipality that is the subject of the expropriation and where the latter continues the practical management of the relevant property, even if the payment of compensation has been made only by means of an internal accounting transfer within the budget of the municipality.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 112, 10.4.2017.


201807201122013552018/C 276/61TC27620180806EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180626363611Case T-259/13 RENV: Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2018 — France v Commission (EAGGF — Guarantee Section — EAGF and EAFRD — Expenditure excluded from financing — Rural development support measures — Areas with natural handicaps — Flat rate financial correction — Expenditure incurred by France — Loading criterion — On-the-spot controls)
 ---documentbreak--- C2762018EN3610120180626EN0061361361Judgment of the General Court of 26 June 2018 — France v Commission
   (Case T-259/13 RENV) (
         1
      )
   ‛(EAGGF — Guarantee Section — EAGF and EAFRD — Expenditure excluded from financing — Rural development support measures — Areas with natural handicaps — Flat rate financial correction — Expenditure incurred by France — Loading criterion — On-the-spot controls)’2018/C 276/61Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: French Republic (represented by: D. Colas, S. Horrenberger, R. Coesme, E. de Moustier and A.-L. Desjonquères, acting as Agents)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented initially by: D. Bianchi, G. von Rintelen and J. Aquilina, and subsequently by D. Bianchi, G. von Rintelen and A. Lewi, acting as Agents)

      Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: M. Sampol Pucurull, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application on the basis of Article 263 TFEU seeking the partial annulment of Commission Implementing Decision 2013/123/EU of 26 February 2013 on excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the Guarantee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (OJ 2013 L 67, p. 20).

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders the French Republic and the European Commission to bear their own costs;

            3.

            Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 207, 20.7.2013.