201807060141993622018/C 259/126472016CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL2018053191022Case C-647/16: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal administratif de Lille — France) — Adil Hassan v Préfet du Pas-de-Calais (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 — Determination of the Member State responsible for the examination of an application for international protection lodged in a Member State by a third-country national — Procedures for taking charge and taking back — Article 26(1) — Adoption and notification of the transfer decision before the acceptance of the take back request by the requested Member State)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN920120180531EN001292102Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal administratif de Lille — France) — Adil Hassan v Préfet du Pas-de-Calais
   (Case C-647/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 — Determination of the Member State responsible for the examination of an application for international protection lodged in a Member State by a third-country national — Procedures for taking charge and taking back — Article 26(1) — Adoption and notification of the transfer decision before the acceptance of the take back request by the requested Member State)’2018/C 259/12Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Tribunal administratif de Lille

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Adil Hassan

      Defendant: Préfet du Pas-de-Calais

      Operative part of the judgment

   Article 26(1) of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person must be interpreted as precluding a Member State that has submitted, to another Member State which it considers to be responsible for the examination of an application for international protection pursuant to the criteria laid down by that regulation, a request to take charge of or take back a person referred to in Article 18(1) of that regulation from adopting a transfer decision and notifying it to that person before the requested Member State has given its explicit or implicit agreement to that request.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 70, 6.3.2017.


201807060531993882018/C 259/532812018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503383921Case T-281/18: Action brought on 3 May 2018 — ABLV Bank v ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3810120180503EN0053381392Action brought on 3 May 2018 — ABLV Bank v ECB
   (Case T-281/18)2018/C 259/53Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: ABLV Bank AS (Riga, Latvia) (represented by: O. Behrends, M. Kirchner and L. Feddern, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Central Bank (ECB)

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul the European Central Bank (ECB) decisions of 23 February 2018 that the applicant and ABLV Bank Luxembourg, SA are failing or likely to fail; and

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on ten pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the ECB’s assessment of the ‘failing or likely to fail’ criterion’ in respect of the applicant and its subsidiary ABLV Bank Luxembourg was erroneous and deficient in a number of regards.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the right to be heard and other procedural rights of the applicant.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the applicant’s right to an appropriately reasoned decision.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to examine and appraise carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging violation of the principle of proportionality.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of equal treatment.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the right of property and the freedom to conduct a business.

            8.

            Eighth plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the nemo auditur principle.

            9.

            Ninth plea in law, alleging that the ECB committed a détournement de pouvoir.

            10.

            Tenth plea in law, alleging violation of the applicant’s right pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights because of a failure to ensure the handling of the applicant’s affairs by the relevant institutions and bodies of the Union.


201807060131994342018/C 259/393212018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180509282811Case C-321/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 9 May 2018 — Terre wallonne ASBL v Région wallonne
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2810120180509EN0039281281Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 9 May 2018 — Terre wallonne ASBL v Région wallonne
   (Case C-321/18)2018/C 259/39Language of the case: French
      Referring court

   Conseil d’État

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Terre wallonne ASBL

      Defendant: Région wallonne

      Questions referred

            1.

            Is a decree by which a body of a Member State establishes the conservation objectives for the Natura 2000 network, in accordance with Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (
                  1
               ), a plan or programme within the meaning of Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (
                  2
               ), and, more specifically, within the meaning of Article 3(2)(a) or Article 3(4) of that directive?

            2.

            If so, must such a decree be subjected to an environmental assessment in accordance with Directive 2001/42/EC, even though such an assessment is not required under Directive 92/43/EEC, on the basis of which the decree was adopted?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 1992 L 206, p. 7.
   (
         2
      )	Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ 2001 L 197, p. 30).


201807060211994402018/C 259/272142018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180326191911Case C-214/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Sopocie (Poland) lodged on 26 March 2018 — H.W.
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1910120180326EN0027191191Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Sopocie (Poland) lodged on 26 March 2018 — H.W.
   (Case C-214/18)2018/C 259/27Language of the case: Polish
      Referring court

   Sąd Rejonowy w Sopocie

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: H.W.

      Other party: PSM ‘K’ w G., Komornik Sądowy przy Sądzie Rejonowym w Sopocie Aleksandra Treder

      Questions referred

            1.

            In the light of the system of value added tax deriving from Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, (
                  1
               ) in particular Article 1, Article (2)(1)(a) and (c) and Article 73 in conjunction with subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 78, and the principle of VAT neutrality, which is a general principle of EU law, is it permissible — taking into account the content of Article 29a(1) and Article 29a(6)(1) of the Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2004 r. o podatku od towarów i usług (tekst jednolity Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1221 ze zm.) (Law of 11 March 2004 on tax on goods and services (consolidated version Dz. U., 2017, No 1221, as amended), ‘the UPTU’) in conjunction with the wording of Article 49(1) and Art. 35 along with Art. 63(4) of the Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 o komornikach sądowych i egzekucji (tekst jedn. Dz.U. z 2017 r., poz. 1277 ze zm.) (Law of 29 August 1997 on court enforcement officers and enforcement (consolidated version Dz. U., 2017, No 1277, as amended), ‘the UKSE’) — to adopt the position that the enforcement fees charged by court enforcement officers already include the tax on goods and services (i.e. VAT)?
            If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative:

            2.

            In the light of the principle of proportionality, which is a general principle of EU law, is it permissible to adopt the position that a court enforcement officer — as a VAT taxable person in connection with his enforcement activities — does actually possess all the legal instruments in order to perform the tax obligation correctly, assuming that the enforcement fee charged on the basis of the provisions of the UKSE includes the amount of the tax on goods and services (i.e. VAT)?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.


201807060121993482018/C 259/136602016CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531101121Joined Cases C-660/16 and C-661/16: Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof — Germany) — Finanzamt Dachau v Achim Kollroß (C-660/16) and Finanzamt Göppingen v Erich Wirtl (C-661/16) (References for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Supply of goods — Article 65 — Article 167 — Payment on account for the purchase of an item not followed by delivery of that item — Supplier’s legal representatives convicted of fraud — Insolvency of the supplier — Deduction of input tax — Conditions — Articles 185 and 186 — Adjustment by the national tax authorities — Conditions)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1010120180531EN0013101112Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (requests for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof — Germany) — Finanzamt Dachau v Achim Kollroß (C-660/16) and Finanzamt Göppingen v Erich Wirtl (C-661/16)
   (Joined Cases C-660/16 and C-661/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(References for a preliminary ruling — Taxation — Common system of value added tax (VAT) — Directive 2006/112/EC — Supply of goods — Article 65 — Article 167 — Payment on account for the purchase of an item not followed by delivery of that item — Supplier’s legal representatives convicted of fraud — Insolvency of the supplier — Deduction of input tax — Conditions — Articles 185 and 186 — Adjustment by the national tax authorities — Conditions)’2018/C 259/13Language of the case: German
      Referring court

   Bundesfinanzhof

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Appellants: Finanzamt Dachau (C-660/16), Finanzamt Göppingen (C-661/16)

      Respondents: Achim Kollroß (C-660/16), Erich Wirtl (C-661/16)

      Operative part of the judgment

            1.

            Articles 65 and 167 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, a potential buyer may not be refused the right to deduct the value added tax relating to a payment on account in respect of the goods in question where that payment has been made and received and where, at the time that payment was made, all the relevant information concerning the future supply could be regarded as known to that buyer and the supply of those goods appeared to be certain. However, that buyer may be refused that right if it is established, having regard to objective elements, that, at the time the payment on account was made, he knew or should reasonably have known that that supply was uncertain.

            2.

            Articles 185 and 186 of Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted as not precluding, in circumstances such as those at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, a national law or practice which has the effect of making adjusting the value added tax relating to a payment on account for the supply of an item conditional upon that payment being refunded by the supplier.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 86, 20.3.2017.


201807060651994562018/C 259/542822018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503394021Case T-282/18: Action brought on 3 May 2018 — Bernis and Others v SRB
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3910120180503EN0054391402Action brought on 3 May 2018 — Bernis and Others v SRB
   (Case T-282/18)2018/C 259/54Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Ernests Bernis (Jurmala, Latvia), Oļegs Fiļs (Jurmala), OF Holding SIA (Riga, Latvia) and Cassandra Holding Company SIA (Jurmala) (represented by: O. Behrends, M. Kirchner and L. Feddern, lawyers)

      Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul the decisions of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) of 23 February 2018 regarding ABLV Bank, AS and ABLV Bank Luxembourg, SA;

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on thirteen pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the SRB lacked the competence for the decision as to liquidation.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the applicants’ rights by announcing a formal decision not to adopt resolution measures.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the applicants’ rights owing to its erroneous assessment pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014. (
                  1
               )

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the applicants’ rights owing to its erroneous assessment pursuant to Article 18(1)(a) of Regulation 806/2014.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging that that the SRB violated the applicants’ right to be heard and other procedural rights.

            6.

            Sixth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the applicants’ right to an appropriately reasoned decision.

            7.

            Seventh plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to examine and appraise carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the case.

            8.

            Eighth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the principle of proportionality.

            9.

            Ninth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the principle of equal treatment.

            10.

            Tenth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the applicants’ right of property and the freedom to conduct a business.

            11.

            Eleventh plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the nemo auditur principle.

            12.

            Twelth plea in law, alleging that the SRB committed a détournement de pouvoir.

            13.

            Thirteenth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the applicants’ rights pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union because of a failure to ensure the handling of the affairs of ABLV Bank SA by the relevant institutions and bodies of the Union.

      (
         1
      )	Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).


201807060171993492018/C 259/403452018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180525282922Case C-345/18 P: Appeal brought on 25 May 2018 by Caviro Distillerie Srl, Distillerie Bonollo SpA, Distillerie Mazzari SpA and Industria Chimica Valenzana (ICV) SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-211/16: Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN2820120180525EN0040282292Appeal brought on 25 May 2018 by Caviro Distillerie Srl, Distillerie Bonollo SpA, Distillerie Mazzari SpA and Industria Chimica Valenzana (ICV) SpA against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 15 March 2018 in Case T-211/16: Caviro Distillerie and Others v Commission
   (Case C-345/18 P)2018/C 259/40Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Appellants: Caviro Distillerie Srl, Distillerie Bonollo SpA, Distillerie Mazzari SpA and Industria Chimica Valenzana (ICV) SpA (represented by: R. MacLean, Solicitor)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

      Form of order sought

   The appellants claim that the Court should:

            —

            set aside the General Court’s judgment to the extent that it erred by impermissibly substituting its own reasoning when evaluating the second plea in the appellants’ application;

            —

            set aside the General Court’s judgment on the grounds of manifestly distorting the evidence put before it in respect of the evolution and final situation of market share of the Union industry;

            —

            uphold the appellants’ second plea in law concerning the General Court’s defective evaluation of the market share situation and exercise its powers to adjudicate itself on the this plea and render final judgment;

            —

            in the alternative, to refer the case back to the General Court to properly decide upon the appellants’ plea on this point;

            —

            confirm that the General Court made a manifest error of assessment and breached Articles 3(2) and 3(5) of the Basic Regulation (
                  1
               ) when it arrived at the conclusion that the Commission did not commit any manifest error of assessment when adopting its findings relating to material injury;

            —

            confirm that the General Court did not provide sufficient reasoning and engaged in contradictory reasoning; and

            —

            order the Commission to pay the appellants’ legal costs and expenses of this procedure as well as the legal costs and expenses of the proceedings at first instance.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   The appellants rely upon three grounds of appeal. All three pleas in law presented to the Court of Justice relate to the second plea submitted to the General Court. In summary, the pleas in law raised before the Court of Justice are the following:

            1.

            The General Court erred in law by substituting its own reasoning for that of the Commission when evaluating the significance of the decrease of the market share of the Union industry, in both relative and absolute terms, and/or manifestly distorted the evidence put before it in respect of the drop in the market share of the Union industry.

            2.

            The General Court made a manifest error of assessment and breached Articles 3(2) and 3(5) of the Basic Regulation when it reached the conclusion that the Commission did not commit any manifest error of assessment when adopting its findings relating to material injury.

            3.

            The General Court did not provide adequate reasoning for its determination on this point since it failed to explain why the Commission’s error in the assessment of the market share of the Union industry did not justify the annulment of the contested regulation as requested by the appellants. In addition, the General Court engaged in contradictory reasoning since it found an error of assessment in the Commission’s evaluation of the market share of the Union industry but ultimately ruled in its favour.

      (
         1
      )	Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, OJ 2009, L 343, p. 51.


201807060051994002018/C 259/141902017CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180531111111Case C-190/17: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid — Spain) — Lu Zheng v Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Controls of cash entering or leaving the European Union — Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 — Scope — Article 63 TFEU — Free movement of capital — Third-country national transporting a significant amount of undeclared cash in his luggage — Obligation to declare the sum being taken out of Spanish territory — Penalties — Proportionality)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1110120180531EN0014111111Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 31 May 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid — Spain) — Lu Zheng v Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad
   (Case C-190/17) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Controls of cash entering or leaving the European Union — Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 — Scope — Article 63 TFEU — Free movement of capital — Third-country national transporting a significant amount of undeclared cash in his luggage — Obligation to declare the sum being taken out of Spanish territory — Penalties — Proportionality)’2018/C 259/14Language of the case: Spanish
      Referring court

   Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicant: Lu Zheng

      Defendant: Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad

      Operative part of the judgment

   Articles 63 and 65 TFEU must be interpreted to the effect that they preclude legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that the failure to comply with an obligation to declare significant sums of cash entering or leaving the territory of that State is punishable with a fine which may be up to double the undeclared amount.
   (
         1
      )	OJ C 221, 10.7.2017.


201807060261994522018/C 259/282602018CJC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180416192022Case C-260/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 16 April 2018 — Kamil Dziubak, Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN1920120180416EN0028192202Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 16 April 2018 — Kamil Dziubak, Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA
   (Case C-260/18)2018/C 259/28Language of the case: Polish
      Referring court

   Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

      Parties to the main proceedings

      Applicants: Kamil Dziubak, Justyna Dziubak

      Defendant: Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA

      Questions referred

            1.

            Do Articles 1(2) and 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (
                  1
               ) make it possible — if the determination of certain contractual provisions which stipulate the manner in which an obligation is to be performed by the parties (its amount) as unfair were to result in the contract being annulled in its entirety, which would be unfavourable to the consumer — to fill gaps in the contract not pursuant to a supplementary provision of law which explicitly replaces the unfair term, but rather pursuant to provisions of national law which provide for supplementing the effects of a legal transaction as expressed in its substance to include the effects arising from the principles of equity (rules of social conduct) or established customs?

            2.

            Should the possible assessment of the consequences for the consumer of the contract being annulled in its entirety be conducted on the basis of the circumstances existing at the time of its conclusion or on the basis of those existing at the time when the dispute arose between the parties concerning the effectiveness of the clause in question (at the time when the consumer claimed that the clause was abusive), and what relevance attaches to the position taken by the consumer in such a dispute?

            3.

            Is it possible to uphold provisions which are unfair contractual terms within the meaning of Directive 93/13/EEC if the adoption of this solution would be objectively beneficial to the consumer at the time when the dispute is being settled?

            4.

            Could declaring certain contractual provisions stipulating the amount and manner of performance of an obligation by the parties to be unfair result in a situation in which the form of the legal relationship determined on the basis of the contract, except for the effects of unfair terms, may differ from that intended by the parties with respect to the parties’ main obligation; without limitation, does declaring a contractual provision to be unfair mean that other contractual provisions related to the consumer’s main obligation which have not been claimed to be abusive may continue to apply where the form of those provisions (their incorporation in the contract) was inextricably linked to the provision challenged by the consumer?

      (
         1
      )	OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.


201807060741994112018/C 259/552832018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180503404121Case T-283/18: Action brought on 3 May 2018 — Bernis and Others v ECB
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4010120180503EN0055401412Action brought on 3 May 2018 — Bernis and Others v ECB
   (Case T-283/18)2018/C 259/55Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicants: Ernests Bernis (Jurmala, Latvia), Oļegs Fiļs (Jurmala), OF Holding SIA (Riga, Latvia) and Cassandra Holding Company SIA (Jurmala) (represented by: O. Behrends, M. Kirchner and L. Feddern, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Central Bank (ECB)

      Form of order sought

            —

            annul the ECB’s decisions of 23 February 2018 that ABLV Bank, AS and ABLV Bank Luxembourg, SA are failing or likely to fail;

            —

            order the defendant to pay the costs.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicants rely on ten pleas in law.

            1.

            First plea in law, alleging that the ECB’s assessment of the ‘failing or likely to fail’ criterion’ in respect of ABLV Bank and its subsidiary ABLV Bank Luxembourg was erroneous and deficient in a number of regards.

            2.

            Second plea in law, alleging that the ECB violated the right to be heard and other procedural rights of the applicants.

            3.

            Third plea in law, alleging, alleging that the ECB violated the applicants’ right to an appropriately reasoned decision.

            4.

            Fourth plea in law, alleging that the ECB failed to examine and appraise carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case.

            5.

            Fifth plea in law, alleging violation of the principle of proportionality.

            6.

            Sixth plea, alleging that the ECB violated the principle of equal treatment.

            7.

            Seventh plea, alleging that the ECB infringed the right of property and the freedom to conduct a business.

            8.

            Eighth plea, alleging that the ECB violated the nemo auditor principle.

            9.

            Ninth plea, alleging that the ECB committed a détournement de pouvoir.

            10.

            Tenth plea in law, alleging violation of ABLV Bank’s right pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights because of a failure to ensure the handling of ABLV Bank’s affairs by the relevant institutions and bodies of the Union.


201807060511993962018/C 259/415682016TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180614303011Joined Cases T-568/16 and T-599/16: Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Spagnolli and Others v Commission (Civil service — Officials — Death of a spouse who was an official — Persons entitled under the deceased official — Survivor’s pension — Orphan’s pension — Change of post of the official, surviving spouse — Adaptation of salary — Method of calculation of survivor’s and orphan’s pensions — Article 81a of the Staff Regulations — Notice of modification of pension entitlements — An act affecting a person adversely within the meaning of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations — Article 85 of the Staff Regulations — Recovery of undue payments — Conditions — Claim for compensation for material and non-material damage)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3010120180614EN0041301301Judgment of the General Court of 14 June 2018 — Spagnolli and Others v Commission
   (Joined Cases T-568/16 and T-599/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil service — Officials — Death of a spouse who was an official — Persons entitled under the deceased official — Survivor’s pension — Orphan’s pension — Change of post of the official, surviving spouse — Adaptation of salary — Method of calculation of survivor’s and orphan’s pensions — Article 81a of the Staff Regulations — Notice of modification of pension entitlements — An act affecting a person adversely within the meaning of Article 91 of the Staff Regulations — Article 85 of the Staff Regulations — Recovery of undue payments — Conditions — Claim for compensation for material and non-material damage)’2018/C 259/41Language of the case: Italian
      Parties

      Applicants: Alberto Spagnolli (Parma, Italy), Francesco Spagnolli (Parma), Maria Alice Spagnolli (Parma) and Bianca Maria Elena Spagnolli (Parma) (represented by: C. Cortese and B. Cortese, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Gattinara and F. Simonetti, acting as Agents)

      Re:

   Application pursuant to Article 270 TFEU for, in Case T-568/16, annulment of Notice of modification No 3 PMO/04/LM/2015/ARES of the Commission’s Office for the Administration and Payment of individual entitlements (PMO) of 6 February 2015 containing the statement of the new amounts of the survivor’s and orphan’s pensions granted to the applicants and, in Case T-599/16, firstly, annulment of Decision PMO/04/LM/2015/ARES/3406787 of the PMO of 17 August 2015 for recovery of amounts paid unduly to the applicants by way of survivor’s and orphan’s pensions and, secondly, for compensation for the losses allegedly suffered by the applicants.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action in Case T-568/16;

            2.

            In Case T-599/16, annuls Decision PMO/04/LM/2015/ARES/3406787 of the Office for the Administration and Payment of individual entitlements (PMO) of the Commission of 17 August 2015 ordering recovery of the amounts paid unduly to the applicants by way of survivor’s and orphan’s pensions and dismisses the action as to the remainder;

            3.

            Orders each party to bear its own costs in each case.

      (
         1
      )	OJ 2016 C 111, p. 43 (case initially registered before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal under number F-140/15 and transferred to the General Court of the European Union on 1.9.2016).


201807060581993892018/C 259/562992018TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180516414221Case T-299/18: Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Strabag Belgium v Parliament
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN4110120180516EN0056411422Action brought on 16 May 2018 — Strabag Belgium v Parliament
   (Case T-299/18)2018/C 259/56Language of the case: French
      Parties

      Applicant: Strabag Belgium (Antwerp, Belgium) (represented by: M. Schoups, K. Lemmens and M. Lahbib, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Parliament

      Form of order sought

   The applicant claims that the Court should:

            —

            declare the present application for annulment admissible and well founded;

            —

            consequently, annul (i) the decision of 19 April 2018 confirming the decision of the European Parliament of 24 November 2017 to award the framework contract for general contractor works in the European Parliament buildings in Brussels (Call for tenders No 06/D20/2017/M036) to five tenderers other than Strabag Belgium SA and not to the latter undertaking, and (ii) the tender analysis report (addendum) drafted on 26 March 2018 by the evaluation committee appointed by the responsible authorising officer;

            —

            order the European Parliament to pay all of the costs, including procedural compensation.

      Pleas in law and main arguments

   In support of the action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement:

            (i)

            of Article 110(5) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ 2012 L 298, p. 1) as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/1929 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 October 2015 (OJ 2015 L 286, p. 1), providing that the Commission is to be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 210 concerning details on the award criteria, including the most economically advantageous tender;

            (ii)

            of Article 151 [of Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012], as amended by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2462 of 30 October 2015 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ 2015 L 342, p. 7), setting out the rules applicable to abnormally low tenders; and

            (iii)

            of Article 102 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, enshrining the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination in public contracts.

      The applicant takes the view that those rules were infringed in so far as the contested decision:

            (i)

            indicates that no element provided either in the tenders submitted or in the additional explanations subsequently requested makes it possible to state that the tender of one of the companies awarded the contract was abnormally low in the light of the applicable rules; and

            (ii)

            regards the abovementioned tender as the lowest compliant tender without adequate reasoning, whereas that tender was evidently not the lowest compliant tender, contained abnormally low prices and ought to have been declared improper and rejected following a more specific and thorough examination conducted by the European Parliament.


201807060501993952018/C 259/425972016TC25920180723EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL20180607313111Case T-597/16: Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — OW v EASA (Civil service — Members of the temporary staff — Assignment in the interest of the service — Transfer to a new post — Manifest error of assessment — Obligation to state reasons — Right to a fair hearing — Misuse of powers)
 ---documentbreak--- C2592018EN3110120180607EN0042311311Judgment of the General Court of 7 June 2018 — OW v EASA
   (Case T-597/16) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Civil service — Members of the temporary staff — Assignment in the interest of the service — Transfer to a new post — Manifest error of assessment — Obligation to state reasons — Right to a fair hearing — Misuse of powers)’2018/C 259/42Language of the case: English
      Parties

      Applicant: OW (represented by: S. Rodrigues and C. Bernard-Glanz, lawyers)

      Defendant: European Aviation Safety Agency (represented by: initially F. Manuhutu and A. Haug, and subsequently by A Haug, acting as Agents, and by D. Waelbroeck and A. Duron, lawyers)

      Re:

   Application under Article 270 TFEU for annulment of Decision 2015/155/ED dated 20 July 2015, by which the Executive Director of EASA assigned the applicant to a new post.

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the action;

            2.

            Orders OW to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 296, 16.8.2016 (case initially registered before the European Union Civil Service Tribunal under Case No F-27/16 and transferred to the General Court of the European Union on 1.9.2016).


201807130362004222018/C 268/1062017CJC26820180730EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201806078922Case C-6/17 P: Judgment of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias v European Commission (Appeal — Arbitration clauses — Perform and Oasis contracts concluded in the context of the Seventh framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) — Eligible costs — Reimbursement of sums paid — Counter-claim)
 ---documentbreak--- C2682018EN820120180607EN00108292Judgment of the Court of Justice (Sixth Chamber) of 7 June 2018 — ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias v European Commission
   (Case C-6/17 P) (
         1
      )
   ‛(Appeal — Arbitration clauses — Perform and Oasis contracts concluded in the context of the Seventh framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (2007-2013) — Eligible costs — Reimbursement of sums paid — Counter-claim)’2018/C 268/10Language of the case: Greek
      Parties

      Appellant: ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias (represented by: S. Paliou, dikigoros)

      Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: R. Lyal and A. Kyratsou, acting as Agents)

      Operative part of the judgment

   The Court:

            1.

            Dismisses the appeal;

            2.

            Orders ANKO AE Antiprosopeion, Emporiou kai Viomichanias to pay the costs.

      (
         1
      )	OJ C 63, 27.2.2017.


title: Case C-414/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 22 June 2018 — Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo v Banca d’Italia

text:
               3.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 311/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio (Italy) lodged on 22 June 2018 — Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo v Banca d’Italia
      (Case C-414/18)
      (2018/C 311/09)
      Language of the case: Italian

         Referring court

      Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Iccrea Banca SpA Istituto Centrale del Credito Cooperativo

         Defendant: Banca d’Italia

         Operative part of the order

      Does Article 5(1), in particular subparagraphs (a) and (f), of Delegated Regulation 2015/63, (1) interpreted in the light of the principles referred to in that regulation, in Directive 2014/59, (2) Regulation No 806/2014 (3) and Article 120 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the fundamental rules of equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality laid down in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the prohibition on levying double contributions, preclude, for the purpose of calculating the contributions referred to in Article 103(2) of Directive 2014/59, the application of the regime laid down for intragroup liabilities also in the case of a ‘de facto’ group or, in any event, in the case of interconnectedness between an institution and other banks forming part of the same system? Alternatively, in the light of the above-mentioned principles, may the preferential treatment reserved for liabilities arising in respect of promotional loans in Article 5 of Delegated Regulation 2015/63 also be applied, by analogy, to the liabilities of a ‘second-level’ bank vis-à-vis other banks in the (cooperative credit) system, or should that characteristic of an institution, in fact operating as a central bank within an interconnected and integrated group of small banks, including in its relations with the European Central Bank and the financial markets, give rise, under existing rules, to some form of adjustment to the financial data submitted by the national resolution authority to the relevant Community bodies and to the determination of the contributions payable by the institution to the resolution fund in respect of its actual liabilities and risk profile?

         (1)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of 21 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements (OJ 2015 L 11, p. 44).

         (2)  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance (OJ 2014 L 173, p. 190).

         (3)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).


title: Case C-362/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Székesfehérvári Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Hochtief AG v Fővárosi Törvényszék

text:
               3.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 311/6

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Székesfehérvári Törvényszék (Hungary) lodged on 5 June 2018 — Hochtief AG v Fővárosi Törvényszék
      (Case C-362/18)
      (2018/C 311/06)
      Language of the case: Hungarian

         Referring court

      Székesfehérvári Törvényszék

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Hochtief AG

         Defendant: Fővárosi Törvényszék

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Are the basic principles and rules of EU law (in particular Article 4(3) TEU, and the requirement for uniform interpretation), as interpreted by the Court of Justice, especially in the judgment in Köbler, to be interpreted as meaning that the declaration of liability of the court of the Member State ruling at final instance for a judgment infringing EU law may be based exclusively on national law or on the criteria laid down by national law? If not, are the basic principles and rules of EU law, particularly the three criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in Köbler for declaring the liability of the ‘State’, to be interpreted as meaning that whether the conditions for liability of the Member State for infringement of EU law by the courts of that State are met is to be assessed on the basis of national law?

                  2.

                  Are the basic principles and rules of EU law (in particular Article 4(3) TEU and the requirement for effective judicial protection), particularly the judgments of the Court of Justice concerning the liability of the Member State delivered, inter alia, in Francovich and Others, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame and Köbler, to be interpreted as meaning that the force of res judicata attaching to judgments that infringe EU law delivered by courts of the Member State ruling at final instance precludes a declaration that the Member State is liable for damages?

                  3.

                  Are the principles of ‘effectiveness’ and equivalence established by Directives 89/665/EC, (1) 92/13/EC (2) and 2007/66/EC (3) and the judgments of the Court of Justice in Kühne & Heitz, Kapferer, Impresa Pizzarotti and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales to be interpreted as meaning that, in review proceedings, a party may no longer rely on the assessments contained in a judgment of the Court of Justice delivered in conclusion to preliminary ruling proceedings initiated by the court of second instance in the dispute in the main proceedings, given that those assessments were not taken into consideration in the dispute in the main proceedings, in particular in the case where the Member State court adjudicating at the highest instance dismissed the appeal in cassation brought against the judgment delivered in the dispute in the main proceedings on the ground that the party did not rely in due time on the assessments contained in the judgment of the Court of Justice?

                  4.

                  Are the directives cited in the third question referred for a preliminary ruling, the case-law of the Court of Justice arising in particular from the judgments in Impresa Pizzarotti (C-213/13), Kapferer (C-234/04), Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00) and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08), concerning the admissibility of an action for review, and the basic principles established by the Court of Justice in Cases C-470/99, C-327/00 and C-241/06, concerning the time-limits laid down by national law for review procedures relating to public procurement, to be interpreted as meaning that national courts act properly in not taking into consideration — because relied on out of time by the party in the proceedings at second instance — the judgment of the Court of Justice delivered at the request of the court of second instance in the proceedings pending before it or a judgment of the Court of Justice which was not available in the official language of the Member State in question until the second instance, and in nonetheless dismissing as inadmissible the action for review brought by that party on the basis of judgments of the Court of Justice on which the party had relied but which were not taken into consideration, and facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments?

                  5.

                  Are the directives cited in the third question referred for a preliminary ruling and the case-law of the Court of Justice arising in particular from the judgments in Impresa Pizzarottoi (C-213/13), Kapferer (C-234/04), Kühne & Heitz (C-453/00) and Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08) to be interpreted as meaning that, in a case where a party to a dispute refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice in Kempter (C-2/06) — to the effect that it does not need to rely on the judgments of the Court of Justice, the court being required to apply them of its own motion — the national courts act properly in not taking into consideration judgments of the Court of Justice, in accordance with national rules of procedure and contrary to the ruling given in the judgment [in Kempter], in such a way as not even to mention this fact in the decision terminating the proceedings or in the grounds thereof, and in nonetheless dismissing as inadmissible the action for review brought by that party on the basis of judgments of the Court of Justice on which the party had relied but which were not taken into consideration, and facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments?

                  6.

                  Is the requirement of a sufficiently serious infringement laid down in the judgments in Köbler and Traghetti del Mediterraneo to be interpreted as meaning that such an infringement does not exist if the court ruling at final instance dismisses an action for review as inadmissible, in clear contravention of the established case-law, cited with maximum detail, of the Court of Justice (which is also supported by various legal opinions), without making any reference to that case-law or giving any reasons for that decision in the light of EU law, and, conspicuously, without examining or even alluding to the need to refer the case to the Court of Justice, notwithstanding the fact that, in order to justify that need, reference has also been made with maximum detail to the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice? In the light of the judgment of the Court of Justice in CILFIT (C-283/81), must the national court justify its decision in the case where, departing from the binding legal interpretation established by the Court of Justice, it dismisses an action for review as inadmissible and, in that regard, refuses to make a reference for a preliminary ruling without giving any reasons for doing so?

                  7.

                  Are the principles of effective judicial protection and equivalence in Article 19 TEU and Article 4(3) TEU, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services laid down in Article 49 TFEU, and Council Directive 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, as well as Directives 89/665/EEC, 92/13/EEC and 2007/66/EC, to be interpreted as [not precluding] the competent authorities and courts from dismissing one after another, in manifest disregard of the applicable EU law, the appeals brought by the applicant because it has been excluded from a public procurement procedure, appeals for which it is necessary to prepare, depending on the circumstances, numerous documents with considerable investment of time and money or to participate at hearings, while, although it is true that, in theory, liability may be declared for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions, the relevant legislation prevents the applicant claiming from the court compensation for harm suffered as a consequence of the unlawful measures?

                  8.

                  Are the principles laid down in the judgments in Köbler, Traghetti del Mediterraneo and San Giorgio to be interpreted as meaning that compensation cannot be paid for damage caused by the fact that, in breach of the established case-law of the Court of Justice, a Member State court ruling at final instance has dismissed as inadmissible a review, requested by the party concerned in due time, in the course of which the latter would have been able to claim compensation for the costs incurred?

                  9.

                  Where, in accordance with national law, review proceedings must be declared admissible by reason of the existence of a new decision of the Constitutional Court and in the interests of restoring constitutionality, is it not also necessary, in the light of the principle of equivalence and the content of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales (C-118/08), to declare review proceedings admissible in the case where, in the dispute in the main proceedings, account was not taken, pursuant to the provisions of national law relating to procedural time-limits, of a judgment previously delivered by the Court of Justice in another case, of a judgment of the Court of Justice delivered at the request of the court in the dispute in the main proceedings or of facts relevant for the purposes of such judgments?

         (1)  Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33).

         (2)  Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors (OJ 1992 L 76, p. 14).

         (3)  Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts (OJ 2007 L 335, p. 31).


title: Case T-408/18: Action brought on 3 July 2018 — Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)

text:
               10.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 319/18

      Action brought on 3 July 2018 — Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis v Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)
      (Case T-408/18)
      (2018/C 319/22)
      Language of the case: Greek

         Parties

         Applicant: Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis (Thessaloniki, Greece) (represented by: S. Paliou, lawyer)

         Defendant: Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the General Court should:

                  —

                  declare that the defendant’s demand, set out in debit note No 3241804913 of 16 April 2018, that the applicant repay part of the subsidy which it received for the ENHSA action is unfounded in respect of the sum of EUR 77 169,78 and declare that that sum corresponds to eligible expenditure;

                  —

                  declare that the defendant’s demand, set out in debit note No 3241804682 of 9 April 2018, that the applicant repay part of the subsidy which it received for the ARCHI-MUNDUS action, amounting to EUR 28 976,83, is unfounded and declare that that sum corresponds to eligible expenditure;

                  —

                  call upon the defendant to repay the foregoing sums with statutory interest; and

                  —

                  order the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency to pay the applicant’s costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      By the present action, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis contests the demand which the EACEA has formulated by debit note No 3241804913 of 16 April 2018 in the sum of EUR 84 955,12 relating to the ENHSA action. Also, Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis contests the demand which the EACEA has formulated by debit note No 3241804682 of 9 April 2018 in the sum of EUR 28 976,83 relating to the ARCHI-MUNDUS action.
      Those demands were made after the EACEA carried out an on-site audit at the applicant’s premises, when the EACEA disputed the reality of the expenditure that related to flat-rate daily allowances in connection with conferences that were held within the framework of the ENHSA and ARCHI-MUNDUS actions.
      In that context, the applicant asks the General Court of the European Union to declare that the flat-rate daily allowance (per diem) for the non-Greek-speaking participants at the conferences under the two actions corresponds to eligible expenditure.
      Aristoteleio Panepistimio Thessalonikis maintains that the expenditure contested by the EACEA is eligible. That is confirmed by the material which the applicant submitted to the EACEA during the on-site audit and by means of subsequent correspondence.


title: Case T-438/17: Order of the General Court of 11 July 2018 — The Scotch Whisky Association v EUIPO — José Estévez (JOHN COR)

text:
               10.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 319/26

      Order of the General Court of 11 July 2018 — The Scotch Whisky Association v EUIPO — José Estévez (JOHN COR)
      (Case T-438/17) (1)

      (2018/C 319/31)
      Language of the case: Spanish
      The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

         (1)  OJ C 309, 18.9.2017.


title: Case T-426/18: Action brought on 11 July 2018 — Bizbike and Hartmobile v Commission

text:
               24.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 341/21

      Action brought on 11 July 2018 — Bizbike and Hartmobile v Commission
      (Case T-426/18)
      (2018/C 341/32)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Applicants: Bizbike (Wielsbeke, Netherlands), Hartmobile BV (Amsterdam, Netherlands) (represented by: R. MacLean, Solicitor)

         Defendant: European Commission

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the application admissible;

                  —

                  annul Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/671 of 2 May 2018 making imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (1) on the grounds set out in the application; and

                  —

                  order the European Commission and any interveners to pay legal costs and expenses of the procedure.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on five pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law, alleging the existence of the manifest error of assessment of facts and law resulting in the infringement of Article 10(4)(c) of Regulation 2016/1036 (2) and specifically the of requirement of establishing a sufficient degree of importers’ knowledge or awareness of dumping and injury sustained by the Union industry for the purposes of imposing registration of imports.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law, alleging that the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectation in the application of Article 10(4)(c) of Regulation 2016/1036 were breached.
                  The applicants claim that Regulation 2018/671 would breach the principle of legal certainty by imputing deemed awareness of the alleged existence of dumping and injury on the part of the applicants and attributing knowledge of a factual situation to them before any legal measure was adopted.
                  Regulation 2018/671 would also breach the principle of legitimate expectations by developing an interpretation of deemed awareness in Regulation 2018/671 that would have rendered the exceptional character of, and requirements for, the process of registration of imports ineffective.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law, alleging that the manifest error in fact and law resulted in a breach of Article 10(4)(d) of Regulation 2016/1036 and Article 16(4)(d) of Regulation 2016/1037 (3) by failing to evaluate all the relevant evidence relating to the relevant economic factors affecting the performance of the Union industry to establish injury and a causal link with imports of the product concerned.

                  4.

                  Fourth plea in law, alleging that the applicants’ rights of defence were violated by failing to provide prompt and timeous access to key submissions lodged by the complainants to the detriment of the applicants’ ability to properly and effectively rebut the complainants’ allegations concerning satisfaction of the legal requirements for registration of imports to be imposed.

                  5.

                  Fifth plea in law, alleging that the sufficient reasoning to motivate key findings in Regulation 2018/671 was absent to justify registration of imports and more specifically to provide adequate reasoning as to why allegedly additional injury would be caused by a continued rise in imports from the People’s Republic of China at allegedly decreasing prices without taking sufficiently into account the submissions by the applicants to the contrary.

         (1)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/671 of 2 May 2018 making imports of electric bicycles originating in the People’s Republic of China subject to registration (OJ L 113, 3.5.2018, p. 4).

         (2)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 21).

         (3)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union (OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 55)


title: Case C-427/18 P: Appeal brought on 26 June 2018 by the European External Action Service against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 13 April 2018 in Case T-119/17, Alba Aguilera v EEAS

text:
               24.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 341/6

      Appeal brought on 26 June 2018 by the European External Action Service against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 13 April 2018 in Case T-119/17, Alba Aguilera v EEAS

      (Case C-427/18 P)
      (2018/C 341/07)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: European External Action Service (represented by: S. Marquardt and R. Spac, acting as Agents, M. Troncoso Ferrer, abogado, F.-M. Hislaire, avocat, S. Moya Izquierdo, abogada)

         Other parties to the proceedings: Ruben Alba Aguilera, Simone Barenghi, Massimo Bonannini, Antonio Capone, Stéphanie Carette, Alejo Carrasco Garcia, Francisco Carreras Sequeros, Carl Daspect, Nathalie Devos, Jean-Baptiste Fauvel, Paula Cristina Fernandes, Stephan Fox, Birgitte Hagelund, Chantal Hebberecht, Karin Kaup-Laponin, Terhi Lehtinen, Sandrine Marot, David Mogollon, Clara Molera Gui, Daniele Morbin, Charlotte Onraet, Augusto Piccagli, Gary Quince, Pierre-Luc Vanhaeverbeke, Tamara Vleminckx, Birgit Vleugels, Robert Wade, Luca Zampetti

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the appeal admissible and well founded;

                  —

                  consequently, set aside the General Court’s judgment of 13 April 2018 in Case T-119/17;

                  —

                  grant the form of order sought by the EEAS at first instance;

                  —

                  order the other parties to the proceedings to pay the costs and expenses incurred in the various proceedings.

         Grounds of appeal and main arguments

      The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law in the General Court’s interpretation of Article 1 of Annex X to the Staff Regulations. According to the General Court, that provision imposes an obligation to adopt general implementing provisions (GIPs) in accordance with Article 110 of the Staff Regulations which applies to the whole of Annex X to the Staff Regulations, and in particular Article 10 thereof (paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment under appeal). The legislature, however, expressly formulated, in Annex X, an obligation to adopt GIPs only in Article 3. By contrast, in other provisions, such as the second paragraph of Article 2, Article 5(2), the first paragraph of Article 8, and Articles 10 and 21, that legislature has provided only for ‘conditions’ or ‘implementing rules’ adopted by the appointing authority.
      The second ground of appeal alleges an error of law in the General Court’s interpretation of Article 10 of Annex X, in so far as it constitutes a provision lacking clarity and precision to such an extent that it lends itself to arbitrary application making the adoption of GIPs necessary (paragraphs 28 and 29 of the judgment under appeal). The appellant takes the view that Article 10 of Annex X provides a sufficiently detailed legal framework, placing precise limits on the appointing authority’s discretionary power.


title: Case C-436/18 P: Appeal brought on 2 July 2018 by Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 April 2018 in Case T-675/15: Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel v European Commission

text:
               24.9.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 341/7

      Appeal brought on 2 July 2018 by Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) delivered on 23 April 2018 in Case T-675/15: Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel v European Commission
      (Case C-436/18 P)
      (2018/C 341/08)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co. Ltd (represented by: E. Vermulst, J. Cornelis, advocaten)

         Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Eurofer, Association Européenne de l'Acier, ASBL

         Form of order sought

      The appellant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  set aside the judgment of the General Court of 23 April 2018 in Case T-675/15, Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co. Ltd. v European Commission;

                  —

                  annul Commission lmplementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1429 (1) of 26 August 2015 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel cold-rolled flat products originating in the People's Republic of China insofar as it concerns the appellant; and

                  —

                  order the European Commission to pay the appellant’s costs of this appeal as well as those of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-675/15.

            Alternatively,

                  —

                  refer the case back to the General Court; and

                  —

                  reserve the costs of the proceeding before the General Court and on appeal.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      ln support of the appeal, the appellant relies on two grounds of appeal.
      First, the contested judgment illegally interpreted the second sentence of the second paragraph of Article 2(7)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 (2) of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community by reading into that provision a condition that is not in the text of that provision when selecting the analogue country.
      Second, by holding that adjustments to the normal value are in principle not possible when applying Article 2(7)(a) Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, the contested judgment violated this provision.

         (1)  OJ 2015, L 224, p. 10.

         (2)  OJ 2009, L 343, p. 51.


title: Case C-517/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 August 2018 — Fédération des fabricants de cigares v Premier ministre, Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/9

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 August 2018 — Fédération des fabricants de cigares v Premier ministre, Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé
      (Case C-517/18)
      (2018/C 364/09)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Fédération des fabricants de cigares

         Defendants: Premier ministre, Ministre des Solidarités et de la Santé

         Other party: Société nationale d’exploitation industrielle des tabacs et allumettes (SEITA)

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Must Article 13(1) and (3) of Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 (1) be interpreted as prohibiting the use, on unit packets, outside packaging and tobacco products, of any brand name calling to mind certain qualities, however well-known it is?

                  2.

                  Depending on the interpretation to be given to Article 13(1) and (3) of the Directive, do those provisions, in so far as they apply to names and trade marks, comply with the right to property, freedom of expression, the freedom to conduct a business and the principles of proportionality and legal certainty?

                  3.

                  If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, do the provisions of Article 13(1) and (3) of the Directive, taken in conjunction with those of Article 24(2) thereof, respect the right to property, freedom of expression, freedom to conduct business and the principle of proportionality?

         (1)  Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 1).


title: Case C-501/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Bulgaria) lodged on 30 July 2018 — BT v Balgarska narodna banka

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/4

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Bulgaria) lodged on 30 July 2018 — BT v Balgarska narodna banka
      (Case C-501/18)
      (2018/C 364/05)
      Language of the case: Bulgarian

         Referring court

      Administrativen sad Sofia-grad

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: BT

         Defendant: Balgarska narodna banka

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Does it follow from the principles of EU law of equivalence and effectiveness that a national court is obliged to regard, of its own motion, an action as having been brought on the ground of a breach of an obligation arising from Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) by a Member State if the action relates to the non-contractual liability of the Member State for losses arising from an infringement of EU law that were allegedly caused by an authority of a Member State, and

                              —

                              Article 4(3) TEU was not expressly specified as a legal basis in the application, but it is clear from the grounds for the action that the loss is asserted on the ground of an infringement of provisions of EU law;

                              —

                              the claim for damages was based on a national provision regarding State liability for losses that arise in the performance of administrative activity, and that liability is strict and was incurred under the following conditions: unlawfulness of a legal act, act or omission of an authority or official in the course of or in connection with the performance of administrative activity; material or non-material loss incurred; direct and immediate causal link between the loss and the unlawful conduct of the authority;

                              —

                              under the law of the Member State, the court must determine, of its own motion, the legal basis for State liability for the activity of the judicial authorities on the basis of the circumstances on which the action is based?

                  2.

                  Does it follow from recital 27 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/201[0] (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) that, under circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, the recommendation issued on the basis of Article 17(3) of the regulation, in which an infringement of EU law by the central bank of a Member State in connection with the deadlines for paying out guaranteed deposits to the depositors in the respective credit institution has been established:

                              —

                              confers on the depositors at that credit institution the right to invoke the recommendation before a national court in order to substantiate an action for damages on the ground of that infringement of EU law, if account is taken of the European Banking Authority’s express power to establish infringements of EU law, and if it is considered that the depositors are not, and cannot be, the addressees of the recommendation and the latter does not establish any direct legal consequences for them;

                              —

                              is valid, having regard to the requirement that the infringed provision must provide for clear and unconditional obligations, if consideration is given to the fact that point (i) of Article 1(3) of Directive 94/19/EC (2) on deposit-guarantee schemes, if it is interpreted in conjunction with recitals 12 and 13 of that directive, does not contain all the elements required to establish a clear and unconditional obligation for the Member States and does not confer direct rights on depositors, and taking account of the fact that that directive provides for only minimum harmonisation that does not cover the indications by means of which unavailable deposits are determined, and that the recommendation has not been substantiated by other clear and unconditional provisions of EU law in relation to those indications, in particular the assessment of the lack of liquidity and the current lack of prospects of payout; an existing obligation to order early intervention measures and to maintain the business activity of the credit institution;

                              —

                              in view of the subject matter, the deposit guarantee, and the power of the European Banking Authority to issue recommendations on the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, is valid in relation to the national central bank, which has no connection with the national deposit guarantee scheme and is not a competent authority pursuant to point [iii] of Article 4(2) of that regulation?

                  3.

                  Having regard also to the current state of the EU law relevant to the main proceedings, does it follow from the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 12 October 2004, Paul and Others (C-222/02, EU:C:2004:606, paragraphs 38, 39, 43 and 49 to 51), of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du pêcheur and Factortame (C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79, paragraph 42 and 51), of 15 June 2000, Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission (C-237/98 P, EU:C:2000:321, paragraph 19), and of 2 December 1971, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council (5/71, EU:C:1971:116 paragraph 11) that:

                              A)

                              the provisions of Directive 94/19, particularly Article 7(6), confer on depositors the right to assert claims for compensation against a Member State for defective supervision regarding the credit institution that administers their deposits, and are those rights restricted to the guaranteed amount of the deposits or is the term ‘rights to compensation’ in that provision to be interpreted broadly?

                              B)

                              the supervisory measures adopted by the central bank of a Member State to reorganise a credit institution, such as those in the main proceedings, including the suspension of payments, which are provided for, in particular, in the seventh indent of Article 2 of Directive 2001/24/EC (3), constitute an unjustified and unreasonable infringement of the depositors’ right to property that incurs liability for losses arising from an infringement of EU law if, having regard to Article 116(5) of the Law on credit institutions and Article 4(2)(1) and Article 94(1)(4) of the Law on bank insolvency, the law of the respective Member State provides that contractual interest is calculated for the duration of the measures and the claims that exceed the guaranteed amount of the deposits can be satisfied in general insolvency proceedings, and provides that interest can be paid?

                              C)

                              the requirements provided for in the national law of a Member State for non-contractual liability for losses arising from an act or omission in connection with the exercise by a Member State’s central bank of the supervisory powers covered by the scope of application of Article 65(1)(b) TFEU must not run counter to the requirements and principles of that liability that apply under EU law, specifically: the principle according to which actions for damages are independent of actions for annulment and the established illegality of a requirement under national law that a legal act or an omission on the basis of which compensation is sought must be annulled beforehand; the illegality of a requirement under national law regarding the culpability of authorities or officials for whose conduct compensation is sought; the requirement in respect of actions for damages to compensate for material harm whereby the plaintiff must have suffered actual and certain damage at the time the action was brought?

                              D)

                              on the basis of the principle of EU law according to which actions for damages are independent of actions for annulment, the requirement that the relevant conduct of the authority be unlawful must be met, which is equivalent to the requirement under the national law of the Member State according to which the legal act or the omission on the basis of which compensation is sought, namely the measures to reorganise a credit institution, must be annulled, if consideration is given to the circumstances of the main proceedings and it is considered that:

                                          —

                                          these measures are not directed at the applicant, which is a depositor at a credit institution, and that it is not entitled under national law and in accordance with the national case-law to apply for the annulment of the individual decisions by means of which these measures were ordered, and that those decisions have become final;

                                          —

                                          EU law, specifically Directive 2001/24 in this area, does not impose an express obligation on the Member States to provide for the possibility of challenging the supervisory measures for the benefit of all creditors in order to establish the validity of the measures;

                                          —

                                          the law of a Member State does not provide for non-contractual liability for losses incurred due to lawful conduct on the part of authorities or officials?

                              E)

                              In the event of an interpretation to the effect that, under the circumstances of the main proceedings, the requirement that the respective conduct of the authority be unlawful is not applicable to actions of depositors at a credit institution for compensation due to acts and omissions of the central bank of a Member State and, in particular, for the payment of interest for guaranteed deposits not having been paid out within the deadline and for the payment of deposits exceeding the guaranteed amount, which are brought to seek compensation for an infringement of Articles 63 to 65 and 120 TFEU, Article 3 TEU and Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are the requirements established by the Court of Justice of the European Union for non-contractual liability applicable to losses:

                                          —

                                          that arose due to lawful conduct on the part of an authority, specifically the three cumulative requirements, namely the existence of actual loss, a causal link between that loss and the act concerned, and the abnormal and special nature of the loss, particularly in the case of actions for the payment of interest for guaranteed deposits not being paid out within the deadline, or

                                          —

                                          in the domain of economic policy, particularly the requirement ‘only if there has been a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of individuals’, particularly in actions of depositors for the payment of deposits exceeding the guaranteed amount, which are asserted as a loss and to which the procedure provided for by national law is applicable, if account is taken of the wide discretion enjoyed by the Member States in connection with Article 65(1)(b) TFEU and the measures under Directive 2001/24 and if the circumstances pertaining to the credit institution and the person seeking compensation relate to only one Member State but the same provisions and the constitutional principle of equality before the law apply to all depositors?

                  4.

                  Does it follow from the interpretation of Article 10(1) in conjunction with point (i) of Article 1(3) and Article 7(6) of Directive 94/19 and the legal considerations in the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 21 December 2016, Vervloet and Others (C-76/15, EU:C:2016:975, paragraphs 82 to 84), that the scope of application of the provisions of the directive cover depositors

                              —

                              whose deposits were not repayable on the basis of contracts and statutory provisions during the period running from the suspension of payments of the credit institution to the withdrawal of its authorisation for banking business, and the respective depositor has not expressed that he seeks repayment,

                              —

                              who have agreed to a clause that provides for the guaranteed amount of the deposits to be paid out in accordance with the procedure governed in the law of a Member State, and specifically after the withdrawal of the authorisation of the credit institution that manages the deposits, and that requirement has been met, and

                              —

                              the aforementioned clause of the deposit contract has the force of law between the contracting parties under the law of the Member State?

            Does it follow from the provisions of that directive or from other provisions of EU law that the national court may not take such a clause in the deposit contract into consideration and may not examine the action of a depositor for the payment of interest due to failure to pay out the guaranteed amount of deposits within the deadline pursuant to that contract on the basis of the requirements for non-contractual liability for loss arising from an infringement of EU law and on the basis of Article 7(6) of Directive 94/19?

         (1)  Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ 2010 L 331, p. 12).

         (2)  Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit-guarantee schemes (OJ 1994 L 135, p. 5).

         (3)  Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions (OJ 2001 L 125, p. 15).


title: Case T-401/18: Action brought on 3 July 2018 — SFIE-PE v Parliament

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/13

      Action brought on 3 July 2018 — SFIE-PE v Parliament
      (Case T-401/18)
      (2018/C 364/13)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Syndicat des fonctionnaires internationaux et européens — European Parliament Branch (SFIE-PE) (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Parliament

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare this action admissible and well-founded;

                  —

                  consequently:

                              —

                              annul the decision of 2 July 2018 requisitioning interpreters for 3 July 2018, as well as future decisions requisitioning interpreters for 4, 510 and 11 July 2018;

                              —

                              order the defendant to pay compensation for the non-material harm suffered, evaluated ex aequo et bono at EUR 10 000, and

                              —

                              order the defendant to pay all costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

                  1.

                  First plea in law: (i) breach of the right of collective action and right to information and consultation enshrined in Articles 28 and 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community — Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on employee representation (OJ 2002 L 80, p. 29) and detailed and implemented by the framework agreement of 12 July 1990 between the European Parliament and the trade unions or staff associations of the personnel of the institution, and (ii) infringement of the right to good administration enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter.

                  2.

                  Second plea in law: lack of competence of the author of the act and infringement of the principle of legal certainty.

                  3.

                  Third plea in law: breach of the right to an effective remedy provided for in Article 47 of the Charter.


title: Case C-505/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 30 July 2018 — COPEBI SCA v Etablissement national des produits de l’agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer)

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/7

      Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 30 July 2018 — COPEBI SCA v Etablissement national des produits de l’agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer)
      (Case C-505/18)
      (2018/C 364/06)
      Language of the case: French

         Referring court

      Conseil d’État

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Appellant: COPEBI SCA

         Respondent: Etablissement national des produits de l’agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer)

         Other party: Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation

         Question referred

      Is European Commission Decision 2009/402/EC of 28 January 2009 concerning the ‘contingency plans’ in the fruit and vegetable sector implemented by France (C 29/05 (ex NN 57/05)) (1) to be interpreted as covering aid paid by the office national interprofessionnel des fruits et légumes et de l’horticulture) (ONIFLHOR) (National Fruit, Vegetables and Horticulture Trade Board) to the comité économique agricole du bigarreau d’industrie (CEBI) (Economic Committee for the Whiteheart Cherry Industry) and allocated to producers of whiteheart cherries for industrial uses by the producer groups which are members of that committee, even though CEBI is not one of the eight economic agricultural committees referred to in paragraph 15 of the decision and the aid in question, unlike the financing mechanism described in paragraphs 24 to 28 of that decision, was financed only by subsidies from ONIFLHOR and not also by voluntary contributions from producers, known as sectoral contributions?

         (1)  OJ 2009 L 127, p. 11.


title: Case T-459/18: Action brought on 31 July 2018 — Lotte v EUIPO — Générale Biscuit-Glico France (PEPERO original)

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/17

      Action brought on 31 July 2018 — Lotte v EUIPO — Générale Biscuit-Glico France (PEPERO original)
      (Case T-459/18)
      (2018/C 364/17)
      Language in which the application was lodged: French

         Parties

         Applicant: Lotte (Seoul, South Korea) (represented by: G. Ringeisen, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

         Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Générale Biscuit-Glico France (Clamart, France)

         Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

         Proprietor of the trade mark at issue: Applicant before the General Court

         Trade mark at issue: European Union figurative mark PEPERO original in colours red, brown, yellow, white

         Procedure before EUIPO: Cancellation proceedings

         Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 May 2018 in Case R 913/2017-1

         Form of order sought

      The applicant claims that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the present action admissible;

                  —

                  annul the contested decision to the extent that it cancelled European Union trade mark No 7 413 651 of the company LOTTE and ordered it to reimburse the fees and costs of the company Générale Biscuit-Glico France;

                  —

                  order EUIPO and the company Générale Biscuit-Glico France to reimburse the company LOTTE the representation expenses in each of the proceedings;

                  —

                  order EUIPO and the company Générale Biscuit-Glico France to pay the costs.

         Pleas in law

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 64 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, read in conjunction with Article 8(5) thereof;

                  —

                  Infringement of Article 94 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.


title: Case C-508/18: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 6 August 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v OG

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/8

      Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 6 August 2018 — Minister for Justice and Equality v OG
      (Case C-508/18)
      (2018/C 364/07)
      Language of the case: English

         Referring court

      Supreme Court

         Parties to the main proceedings

         Applicant: Minister for Justice and Equality

         Defendant: OG

         Questions referred

                  1.

                  Is the independence from the executive of a public prosecutor to be decided in accordance with his position under the relevant national legal system? If not what are the criteria according to which independence from the executive is to be decided?

                  2.

                  Is a public prosecutor who, in accordance with national law, is subject to a possible direction or instruction either directly or indirectly from a Ministry of Justice, sufficiently independent of the executive to be considered a judicial authority within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision (1)?

                  3.

                  If so, must the public prosecutor also be functionally independent of the executive and what are the criteria according to which functional independence is to be decided?

                  4.

                  If independent of the executive, is a public prosecutor who is confined to initiating and conducting investigations and assuring that such investigations are conducted objectively and lawfully, the issuing of indictments, executing judicial decisions and conducting the prosecution of criminal offences, and does not issue national warrants and may not perform judicial functions a ‘judicial authority’ for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision?

                  5.

                  Is the Public Prosecutor in Lübeck a judicial authority within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States?

         (1)  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (Framework Decision) (OJ 2002, L 190, p. 1).


title: Case T-646/16 P: Judgment of the General Court of 19 July 2018 — Simpson v Council (Appeal — Civil service — Officials — Upgrade — Classification in grade — Decision not to award the applicant grade AD 9 after he had passed a grade AD 9 open competition — Dismissal of the action at first instance after referral back by the General Court — Composition of the panel of judges which adopted the order at first instance — Procedure for appointment of a judge to the Civil Service Tribunal — Tribunal established by law — Principle of the right to a judge assigned by law)

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/11

      Judgment of the General Court of 19 July 2018 — Simpson v Council
      (Case T-646/16 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - Civil service - Officials - Upgrade - Classification in grade - Decision not to award the applicant grade AD 9 after he had passed a grade AD 9 open competition - Dismissal of the action at first instance after referral back by the General Court - Composition of the panel of judges which adopted the order at first instance - Procedure for appointment of a judge to the Civil Service Tribunal - Tribunal established by law - Principle of the right to a judge assigned by law))
      (2018/C 364/10)
      Language of the case: English

         Parties

         Appellant: Erik Simpson (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: M. Velardo, lawyer)

         Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer and E. Rebasti, acting as Agents)

         Re:

      Appeal brought against the order of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 24 June 2016, Simpson v Council, (F-142/11 RENV, EU:F:2016:136), and seeking to have that order set aside.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside the order of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 24 June 2016, Simpson v Council (F-142/11 RENV);

                  2.

                  Refers the case to a chamber of the General Court other than that which ruled on the present appeal;

                  3.

                  Reserves the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 419, 14.11.2016.


title: Case T-402/18: Action brought on 3 July 2018 — Aquino and Others v Parliament

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/14

      Action brought on 3 July 2018 — Aquino and Others v Parliament
      (Case T-402/18)
      (2018/C 364/14)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Applicants: Roberto Aquino (Brussels, Belgium) and 30 other applicants (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

         Defendant: European Parliament

         Form of order sought

      The applicants claim that the Court should:

                  —

                  declare the present action admissible and well founded;

                  —

                  consequently:

                              —

                              annul the decision of 2 July 2018 requisitioning interpreters for 3 July 2018 as well as future decisions requisitioning interpreters for 4, 5, 10 and 11 July 2018;

                              —

                              order the defendant to pay compensation for the non-material harm suffered, assessed on equitable principles at EUR 1 000 per applicant;

                              —

                              order the defendant to pay all of the costs.

         Pleas in law and main arguments

      In support of the action, the applicants rely on three pleas in law which are essentially identical or similar to those relied on in Case T-401/18, SFIE-PE v Parliament.


title: Case T-693/16 P: Judgment of the General Court of 19 July 2018 — HG v Commission (Appeal — Civil service — Officials — Posting to a third country — Lodging provided by the administration — Disciplinary penalty — Dismissal of the action at first instance — Composition of the panel of judges which delivered the judgment at first instance — Procedure for appointment of a judge to the Civil Service Tribunal — Tribunal established by law — Principle of the lawful judge)

text:
               8.10.2018

               EN

               Official Journal of the European Union

               C 364/11

      Judgment of the General Court of 19 July 2018 — HG v Commission
      (Case T-693/16 P) (1)

      ((Appeal - Civil service - Officials - Posting to a third country - Lodging provided by the administration - Disciplinary penalty - Dismissal of the action at first instance - Composition of the panel of judges which delivered the judgment at first instance - Procedure for appointment of a judge to the Civil Service Tribunal - Tribunal established by law - Principle of the lawful judge))
      (2018/C 364/11)
      Language of the case: French

         Parties

         Appellant: HG (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

         Other party: European Commission (represented initially by G. Berscheid and C. Berardis-Kayser, subsequently by G. Berscheid and T. Bohr, acting as Agents, and A. Dal Ferro, lawyer)

         Re:

      Appeal against the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union (Second Chamber) of 19 July 2016, HG v Commission (F-149/15, EU:F:2016:155), seeking to have that judgment set aside.

         Operative part of the judgment

      The Court:

                  1.

                  Sets aside the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal of the European Union (Second Chamber) of 19 July 2016, HG v Commission (F-149/15);

                  2.

                  Refers the case back to a chamber of the General Court other than the one which has ruled on the present appeal;

                  3.

                  Reserves the costs.

         (1)  OJ C 441, 28.11.2016.