Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

Secret 27 December 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF 27 DECEMBER 1967

1. Communist China: Civil disorder and violence are spreading. In some areas, local conditions appear to be as bad as last summer. There are reports of increasing number of Guards using guns and machine weapons. The army seems to be doing little to prevent military outbreaks, only keeping the violence from spreading.

2. Communist China

3. Cambodia: The International Control Commission was unimpressed by its reported investigation of two American correspondents. Camp
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192

3.3(h)(2)
---
# TOP SECRET

4. Soviet Union

Recent glimpse satellite photography has shown a huge space booster expected to launch in 1968. The vehicle is about 320 feet tall and 50 feet in diameter, resembling the Saturn V. One of the two pads under construction at Tyuratam is likely for this vehicle.

The engineering pads suggest that the Soviets are close to completing the structural check of the launch vehicle before wasting time in readying these facilities.

5. Yemen

6. Aden

# TOP SECRET
---
Approved for Relea~e: 2019/0~/29 C0597 4192

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

27 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes

27 December 1967

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Giap Fails to Show: Preliminary news accounts of the attendance of the 23 December in Hanoi indicate that Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap was not present. Defense Army Day is an occasion for which Giap is expected to attend.
---
# General

returning Giap's normally unusual. ported he not speaks, reported Giap and not on his only from absence the activities anniversary on has Soviet is attends, since but Hanoi he was celebrations in mid-November.

Communists. Hanoi Chary are still Contacts cautious on maintaining a The Vietnamese silence on President Johnson's contacts press interview comments about possible Hanoi Front between two the Thieu occasions government and the Liberation On recent have when authoritative on this itself. spokesmen and this Front avoided specific comment particular subject the occasion presented Hanoi in in issued which two propaganda President's attacks past weekend the five points were condemned general terms and his joint statement travels Thieu with in Australia and his pre-Christmas were described as tricks was and not peace frauds. The issue reluctance of Thieu-Front contacts discussed. The same between to openly discuss the issue of contacts the Liberation Front and the Thieu government was demonstrated French newspaper representative a Front in an interview for a

# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Antiwar Protests Reported broadcast, Hanoi: by In a 26 December English number language Hanoi noted that without comment a of antiwar activities took
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974192

place demonstration during Christmas well the week building US. UN press the in "stirring was reported as near as a conference December on 21 by Harvard Professor Hughes H. called Stuart for Hughes "immediate on the same end date, the in which Vietnam." an to bombings of North

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974192
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602472].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "President, Soviet Union, North Vietnam",
"What": "Civil disorder in Communist China, Soviet Union's space booster, North Vietnam's Defense Minister attendance, Antiwar protests in North Vietnam",
"When": "27 December 1967",
"Where": ["China", "Cambodia", "Soviet Union", "Yemen", "Aden", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

3 PAGES

PAGE 1

|STATE/INR|NMCC/MC|SECDEF|JCS|ARMY|NAVY|AIR|CIA/NMCC|NIC|NSA|SOO|CNS|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|STATE/INR|NMCC/MC|SECDEF|JCS|ARMY|NAVY|AIR|CIA/NMCC|NIC|NSA|SOO|CNS|
|ghia réigkteriaé 794 the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.| | | | | | | | | | | |

NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT.

|COUNTRY|BULGARIA/VIETNAM|
|---|---|
|DATE|LATE-MARCH 1968|

SUBJECT: BULGARIAN REACTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM

ACQ T

SOURCE - 3.3(h)(2)

IN BULGARIA TODAY THERE IS MUCH TALK ABOUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM BY THE "MAN ON THE STREET." THE CONFLICT IS ALSO A FREQUENT TOPIC OF CONVERSATION AMONG A LARGE NUMBER OF WRITERS AND INTELLECTUALS SUCH AS PAVEL VEZHNOV AND PETUR NEZNAKOMOV OF STURSHEL; LUDMIL STOYANOV, THE POET LAMAR, EMIL MANOV AND ORLIN VASILEV.

THERE IS A STRONG GENERAL FEELING AGAINST THE VIETCONG TET OFFENSIVE AS STUPID BLOODLETTING WHICH KILLED MANY PEOPLE AND ACHIEVED NO CONCRETE RESULTS FOR NORTH VIETNAM.
---
# ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE BULGARIAN MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE NORTH VIETNAM WAR EFFORT IS NOT LARGE, MANY BULGARIANS THINK IT IS

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT SEVERE PRICE INCREASES. THEY BELIEVE THAT BULGARIA HAS NO BUSINESS BEING INVOLVED IN THIS WAR AND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH. THEY ACCEPT THE PREMISE THAT SOUTH VIETNAM IS A CLIENT STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEY DO NOT MORALIZE ABOUT IT. BULGARIA IS ESSENTIALLY A LAND OF PEASANTS AND MOST OF THESE PEOPLE TRANSLATE A STRONG SENSE OF VALUE OF LAND INTO SIMPLE TERMS OF DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORY. THUS, THE AMERICANS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO FIGHT TO HOLD THE LAND AGAINST INCURSIONS FROM THE NORTH.

BULGARIAN WRITERS DO NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "WAR OF LIBERATION" AND ONLY WISH FOR THE WAR IN VIETNAM TO BE FINISHED. THEY DO NOT THINK NORTH VIETNAM WILL WIN AND THEY SEE A LONG FRUITLESS STRUGGLE AHEAD. ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE VIETNAMESE WAR, THE MORALE OF NEW ARMY CONSCRIPTS IS POOR AND IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS NEW HARSH DISCIPLINARY MEASURES HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT TO QUELL THE RESTLESSNESS AND INCIPIENT ECOLOGISM IN THE BARRACKS.
---
THE BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS DISTURBANCES
1. ID.ISSEM: NONE BULGARIAN_REACTION_TO_THE[15617765].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
    "What": "Bulgarian reaction to the war in Vietnam",
    "When": "Late-March 1968",
    "Where": ["Bulgaria", "Vietnam"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 c"L<’"_~ "‘~;.‘

I s.5(¢)

xéx

CQXXTRAL ‘I~31\r2I0‘<T U Y- °$T1nEs orN‘\€$\° DIRECTORATE OF MEMORANDUM INTELLIGENCE The Situation in w- —'Eop—Secre=t—N 126 ll February 1968 s.5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

Information 1968 as of 1200 ll February

# HIGHLIGHTS

Around cities and towns easing of enemy pressure. There has been an increase in some areas, but new fighting has broken out in the delta. Fighting continues. Developments in South Vietnam: Military in areas near Saigon and the. The situation in the Mekong Delta (Paras. 1-3).

Four corps areas is summarized (Paras. 4-15).

# Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Internal bickering and red of the task force set up ing the efficient operation tape appears to be hampering to handle civilian problems (Paras. 1—3). The militant Buddhists have sent Ambassador Bunker an insulting letter accusing the US of firing indiscriminantly on the An Quang Pagoda (Paras. 4-6).

# North Vietnamese Military Developments:

The North Vietnamese moved their IL-28 bombers Phuc Yen Airfield to Gia Lam Airfield and orbit them near the DRV/Chinese border to avoid damage from aircraft have been detected making flights to US air strikes (Para. 1). Additional transport and could have gone on into South Vietnam Vinh (Para 2).

# Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# Communist Political Developments:

Liberation Front officials abroad continue to maximize their publicity opportunities. The Front man in Phnom Penh discusses a possible coalition government (Paras 1-3). In Djakarta, Communist spokesmen emphasize the political successes of the Tet offensive (Paras. talk offer (Para. 6). in Hanoi endorses Trinh's will-5) The Front man Foreign Communist support (Para. 7).
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Around cities and towns:
There has been in some areas of pe country an easing of enemy pressure during pe weekend, alpough pe delta has been pe scene of new attacks. Soup of Da Nang appear to be forces concentrated. Elements of pe Communist wipdrawing to pe soupwest, but indications of imminent enemy activity near Dak To continue. The situation at Khe Sanh, Hue, and Da Lat has undergone no significant change in pe past 48 hours.
There are persistent low-level reports of Viet against Saigon to launch "large-scale attacks". Cong intentions some time before 13 February. The Viet Cong 5p and 9p divisions or pe NVA-Some of pese reports allege pat elements of Divisions-located norp of pe capital wipin 7p striking distance-will be engaged in or support such attacks.
Bien Hoa Air Base was pe target of a 122-mm. rocket attack on pe night of 10 February, in which one American was killed, 60 wounded, and aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The same evening, a US battalion had a sharp engagement wip a Communist force near Tan Son Nhut Air Base which resulted in 165 enemy killed. A fire started by Communist rockets in pat area of a bunker containing pe Communists 105-mm. ammunition. In pe delta of Bac Lieu and Kien Giang provinces, new activity in Kien Phong and Phong-Dinh provinces has increased.
Khe Sanh received sporadic mortar attacks proughout 10 February and a heavy mortar and rocket barrage around noon on 11 February, but shelling had become sporadic by early afternoon. The Lao battalion in pe area is being evacuated to Da Nang, and preparations are being made to ferry it back to Laos.

11 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

1 T; s.5(¢)

'5. \ has reflected 3.3(h)(2) the shipment of large quantities-of-heavy caliber ammunition—-up to 152-mm.¥eto points just north of the DMZ within the past week. \ 3jflhX2)

Eg:;::]l8 on 8 February. .There are also indications- e iveredtruckloads of 130-mm. ammunition were being in\ ithat-at-least one mak-bat— 3XXhX2) talion of preparations suggest that the Tri Province, Messages of ll February in coastal Quang lst Battalion Viet River into-Trieu active. ing attackthe North Vietnamese 8l3th Regiment is of the regiment.may be preparing to where.other.Phong District,cross the Cua enemy units have been.

6. In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese- troopsgare.continuing their efforts to dislodge enemy forces-from the citadel area. The Communists still hold the Imperial Palace, a portion along the citadel's southwest wall, and a section immediately east of the citadel.South of the Perfume River, where US MarinesSnipers are still prevalent throughout the_ had city.gained control earlier, widespread.looting is becoming a major problem.

II Corps

7. There have been no major changes in the situaw tion-throughout-II Corps, despite a continued-threat to- the Dak To area. In Da Lat the Communists still control a hamlet on the western outskirts of the city.. In Darlac Province, elements of the NVA 33rd Regiment are still believed to be located about 20 kilometers southeast of Ban-Me Thuot.

Saigon and III Corps

8. In addition to the major skirmish north-north-. west of Saigon and the harassment.at Tan-Son Nhut Air Base, sporadic smallescale fire fights-persisted in the Cholon section of the capital.where ARVN troops are still engaged in clearing efforts.

ll February 1968

I-2 s.5(¢)

8-5<c> " Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

9. Preliminary interrogation of a field commander and political officer from a Viet Cong unit which participated in the recent attacks on Saigon has revealed additional information on enemy plans, the prisoners, the seize and the cost. The main mission of the two-company strike force near Saigon was to hold Chi Hoa prison. They were absolutely forbidden to retreat and were told that if the attack on the prison failed, they would be executed. The field commander near Saigon stated that a total of 30 battalions were in or around Saigon with one to two divisions in reserve and artillery units to come later. The political officer claimed that there were some 25 battalions of artillery in the area, and that Divisions 5, 7, and 9 were programmed for reserve attack, the "second to provide support" phase of forces.

10. Elements of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Light Infantry divisions and the NVA 7th Division continue to be located within striking distance of the capital.

IV Corps

11. Communist actions in the delta during the past few days have emphasized continued attacks by fire against ground assaults against lightly interspersed provincial and district towns, defended rural outposts. The overall intensity of ground attacks has declined sharply, although several Viet Cong units in IV Corps remain deployed in close proximity to heavily populated areas. Bac Lieu city was attacked on 10 February by a Viet Cong force within the town. Some of the attackers have attempted to exfiltrate, using women and children as shields. Thirty-three persons were killed or wounded, and a large portion of the city has been destroyed by fire.

11 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

Province, came under rocket attack of Kien Giang. Rach Gia, the capital, came under attack during the early morning hours of 11-February. The 30-minute bombardment resulted in 19 friendly casualties and total destruction to the CORDS building and the city. There apparently was no follow-up ground attack and it is now reported quiet.

An estimated 500-man Viet Cong force has surrounded Cao Lanh, the capital of Kien Phong Province. This strike force, supported by some 400 laborers, has constructed bunker complexes 1,000 to 1,500 meters from the city proper. Due to eroding security in the rural areas, all Revolutionary Development teams in Kien Phong have been withdrawn from their hamlets and pulled into the capital or district towns.

The Headquarters of Military Region (MR) 3, a major Viet Cong command authority, has made an unprecedented move. On 8 February, Headquarters, MR 3, was identified outside its normal operating area for the first time since July 1963, some 50 miles to the southwest. The relocation of this headquarters into Phong Dinh Province, coupled with the recent identification of three Viet Cong main force battalions in the immediate area of Can Tho, may portend renewed enemy offensive activity in and around the provincial capital.

ll February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The task force established to cope with Vietthe- massive problems arising in the aftermath of the Cong Tet offensive is apparently running into serious difficulty tape,/because of internal bickering and bureaucratic red. In a frustration, on the task General Nguyen Duc Thang, Vice President Ky's deputy was resigning. He has declared on 9 February that he meetings. force, failed to appear for subsequent.

2. Many of the cabinet members on the task force, most notably the ministers of health and refugees, have been unable or unwilling to work together and insist on following normal ministerial procedures. The result is that needed services are not being provided for the people in a timely and efficient manner.

3. Vice President Ky urged to have the constitution amended so that he could be appointed prime minister. Several Lower House deputies, some senators, Ky's own advisers, and General Thang have all reportedly approached Ky with the proposition. Ky has apparently put them all off, at least so that he is doing his best to improve Prime Minister Loc's image and to include him in the task force's plans and activities.

4. The militant Buddhists of An Quang Pagoda have sent Ambassador Bunker an insulting letter accusing the US of attacking the pagoda "both militarily and politically." An Quang director, Thich Thien Hoa, charged that the US was careless in defending Saigon, attacked the population indiscriminately and fired on the pagoda even though there were no Communists inside.

Militant Buddhists Attack Alleged US Actions

Date: 11 February 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

5. The Americans were charged also with slandering of America that the Viet Cong the Buddhist church-by were in the pagoda. broadcasting over Voice The letter concluded with a "request" that the ambassador order a halt to the "calumny" and with charge that the US alone is responsible for the deteriorating relations between the Americans and the Buddhist church. during the 1 February Pagoda suffered little damage. The An Quang attack to rout the Viet Cong force entrenched there. No American troops joined in the attack, except possibly as advisers to the Vietnamese Rangers who carried it out. as the one militant Buddhists have stood out thus far. The significant group which has not denounced the Viet Cong attacks and has not voiced a "modicum of support for the government.

11 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
# NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

In an effort to protect their IL-28 bombers from US bombing raids, the North Vietnamese moved the planes on 9 February from Phuc Yen to Hanoi/Gia Lam. This airfield is Hanoi's international air terminal and has not yet been struck. On at least four occasions since their transfer to Gia Lam, the IL-28s left the airspace over the field and circled in while US strike aircraft were in the Hanoi area.

At least four transport aircraft completed a Hanoi to Vinh flight during the February. The purpose of the flights is not yet known, but the aircraft could have continued on of late afternoon of 11 into northern South Vietnam.

Date: 11 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is noping of significance to report

ll February 1968
---
# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Liberation Front officials abroad are continuing to make every effort to be seen and heard. Twice last week, Nguyen Van Hieu, the most authoritative Front's representative in Phnom Penh and one of its representative spokesmen on foreign affairs, discussed Viet Cong plans for a coalition government. Radio propaganda and prisoners captured in the Tet offensive have indicated that the Front intends to establish unilaterally a coalition government in opposition to Saigon; Nguyen Van Hieu, however, is the first responsible Front official to comment publicly on this issue.

In an apparent effort to drum up some support for such a government (if it should ever be established), Hieu gave a press conference on 8 February, and on the 9th reportedly held a special briefing for neutral diplomats in the Cambodian capital.

According to Wilfred Burchette, who the Front planned to establish a coalition government consultation with South Vietnamese Government after to replace the "other revolutionary forces." According to a Burmese diplomat who attended the briefing on 9 February, same thing. Hieu told his diplomatic colleagues virtually the intended to convene a national conference of the "peace and democracy forces for the purpose of forming a provisional government" and would hold negotiations with the US for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of US troops. Hieu also told the diplomats that the Front would seek "recognition and respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam from the world and especially from Cambodia, Laos, India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Japan."

At home, the Communists are taking the same possible coalition government and are continuing to pump up the "democratic and peace alliances.

11 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

"119-P*SETCiI§"? y 3-5

W ) 35/\/\ OO\/\/

\

The Front central Committee-issued a statement on February, and the Tri-Thien-Hue Liberation Front issued a similar statement on the 5th, offering to hold discussions with the new peace alliances out-"to work out the best solution for getting the US of Vietnam and restoring peace." Both statements dramatize the intent of the new peace alliances to "set up a government of the people."

Communist officials in Djakarta also discussed Viet Cong intentions on several occasions in recent days in private forums. Prior to the Tet offensive in late January, the office told Indonesian Government officials that last attended a Front central committee meeting and had come away a rare admission of past optimism on the war. In with renewed confidence difficulties, the official admitted that US forces had had some success in the past two "dry seasons" (the winters of 65-66 and 66-67). He boasted that Communist units how had new weaponry and much greater experience and the US would not do so well this year. The Viet Cong intended to strike "several blows" this year, he said.

In two conversations in early February (after Vietnamese Embassy denied current press speculation the opening of the Tet offensive), lower North officials of both the Front mission and the ranking of Viet-Khe Sanh was to be a second Dien Bien Phu. There would be no When asked what could be considered a large-scale attack on Khe Sanh "now," they said. battle in the current military campaign, decisive Nhut Airfield. the two officials pointed to the fight at Tan Sonbe-"They boasted that communications between the field and Saigon were broken and that international civil traffic had been disrupted. The Front man claimed that the Communists intended a "long fight against this base." Both officials emphasized the political significance of the Tet attacks. They said that one of the major objectives of the first phase of the fighting was to increase

ll February 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616

the Front's political support and that this aim was as important as any military results. In these post-Tet conversations

Q:

Front Endorses Trinh Statement

6. In Hanoi this weekend, the Front spokesman issued an unequivocal endorsement of the recent North Vietnamese offer to talk with the US in exchange for a bombing cessation. on this island in general has avoided comment Front propaganda, but on 9 February Front representative Nguyen Van Tien, in an interview with a Hungarian (the ist, said the Front "entirely agrees with journal- North Vietnamese foreign minister's) statement and fully supports its contents.". The Front representative also used the interview to boast that "revolutionary forces" controlled three out of eight districts in Saigon. The Viet Cong, he said, intended to mobilize the young people of towns and villages and arm them to help defeat any possible American "counterattack."

Foreign Communist Support

7. In Moscow and Prague, the Front representatives were received by prominent Communist party tion, issued a special Tass the North Vietnamese leaders amid much publicity statement supporting The Soviets, in addition the Viet Cong offensive and offer to talk. They are also staging mass rallies.

ll February 1968 THE_SITUATION_IN_VIETNAM[15617786].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military situation updates in South Vietnam and North Vietnamese military developments",
"When": "11 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Mekong Delta", "Saigon", "Hue", "Da Nang", "Phuc Yen Airfield", "Hanoi", "Gia Lam Airfield", "DMZ", "Da Lat", "Ban Me Thuot", "Can Tho", "Kien Phong Province", "Phong Dinh Province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Intelligence Information Cable

Central Intelligence Agency

Intelligence Information Cable

Page 1 of 14 Pages

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

|DATE|13 February 1968|
|---|---|
|COUNTRY|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|COVERAGE OF THE SOURCE|VIETNAM, SAIGON 7 FEBRUARY 1968 - 9 FEBRUARY 1968|

SOURCE

The following chronology of events was posted at the Combined Security Committee as the events were reported. Subsequent reporting indicated that a few of these entries contained some inaccuracies. The chronology is presented, however, since it gives a good picture of how the VC attack on Saigon-Gia Dinh developed during the period covered.

3 FEB

0000H - THE CURFEW IS LIFTED FROM DSPMH TO 0600H TODAY IN SAIGON AREA. IT IS ONLY IN EFFECT FROM THE 1ST PRECINCT TO THE 5TH PRECINCT, EXCEPT THE 9TH PRECINCT AND GIA DINH AREA. VEHICLES AND BICYCLES ARE NOT ALLOWED MOVING ON THE STREETS.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 006786606
---
Approved for Release 2019/04/17 C06786606.

PAGE 1 OF 54 PAGES

THE VC ARE CONCENTRATING AT WAREHOUSES LOCATED AT COORDINATES XS 790369 AND XS 789859, ALONG THE COC CANAL
REQUEST AIRSTRIKES TO BE DIRECTED ON THESE COORDINATES.
FRIENDLY FORCES REMOVED. BODIES OF THREE VN DEAD POLICEMEN AND ONE NEWS REPORTER ON LY THAI TO STREET
DEAD CIVILIANS AND VC ARE REMOVED BY THE SAIGON FIRE BRIGADE.
A VN RANGER UNIT IS ORDERED TO CROSS THE NHI THIE DUONG BRIDGE /8TH PRECINCT/ TO CLEAR A VC MACHINE GUN CELL.
A VC PLATOON IS APPEARING AT THE NGUYEN VAN TO POLICE STATION /5TH PRECINCT/.
MSS/CMD INFORMED THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 VC FULLY ARMED ARE APPEARING AT A ROW OF TEN HOUSES NO 322 ON SU VANS HANH STREET /5TH PRECINCT/.
REQUEST TO CROSSCHECK THIS INFORMATION REPORTED BY LOCAL POPULATION.
AN ARVN JEEP BEARING PLATE NO. 123415 WAS SEIZED BY THE VC. IN THE VICINITY OF NO. 30 PETRUS KY STREET /5TH PRECINCT/.
THO T ARMED VC ARE APPEARING AT HOUSE NO 194 TU DUC STREET /1ST PRECINCT/.
A NUMBER OF VC ARE PENETRATING INTO THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL LOCATED AT THE CORNER OF SU VAN HANH AND LY THAI O STREETS.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786606.
---
# PHOTOGRAPHIC DISSEMINATION

|1|5TH PRECINCT|SEVERAL NFOICS NORVING THERE ESCAPED|
|---|---|---|
|IGSOH|FEARFULLY| |
|THE 5D PRECINCT POLICE APPREHENDED TWO VC AT FY VIEN TU|PAGODA LOCATED at THE conwzn or PHAN nlwd PHUNG AND RAN ce|STREETS /SD PRECINCT/|
|TEN SUSPECTS ARE FPOTTED ENTERING A CATHOLIC cunacn LOCAFFO| |AT NO. as KY DONG sgnzsr /so PRECINCT/..|
|IT IS CONFIRMED THAT THE ARUN VEHICLE STOLEN "Y THERVC THIS|AFTERNOON IS AN AWRULANCE JEEP BEARING LICEN§E PLATE NO‘~.|l934I5.|
|vc WEAPONS ARE RFPCQTLDLY ear ur AT TH? mac n1wn cu! CEMETERN|FACING rue u.s. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE;| |
|A VC GROUP IS APPEARING AT NO. 16/1 HOANG DIEU STREET /TAN| |BINH DISTRICT/.|
|vc FIRED APPROXIOUR ROUNDS or B-40 ROCKETS INTO THE srn|PRECINCT PoL1gE srnrxou.| |
|A RICE WAREHOUSE LOCATEQ,ON LE OUANG LIEM OUAY /6TH§ERECINCT/| |was uuosn vc PRESSURE.|
|A VC BATTALION IS REPORTEQLY APPEARING IN THE VICINITY OF A ROKFV|ANMO DUMP AT COORDINATES XS 792884 IN THE 6TH PRECINCT.|““i§§§§E?%$§§§§&§|
---
|HE|flO9flOH|A NIINRER OF VC APPEAR ON THE ROOF OF THE RIHH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT LOCATED ON LE OUANQ LIEM OUAY /6TH PPECINCT/‘EACING|
|---|---|---|
| |093BH|THREE VC APPEAR AT THE BINH TIEN BRIDGE /6TH PRECINCT/|
| |OSSSH|THE VC /STRENGTH UNKNOWN/ CONCENTRATED IN THE VINH 'KHANH MOVIE THEATER LOCATED ON LE QUANG LIEM OUAY /6TH PRECINCTI APPROX. 70 METERS FROM|
| |lOSAH|APPROX. ONE VC COMPANY WAS SPOTTED AT THE REAR OF THE BINH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT LOCATED ON LE OUANG LIEM QUAY /GT1] PRECINCT /.|
| |lO55H|A VN RANGER UNIT CLASHED WITH THE VC AT THE BINH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT /sTH PRECINCT/|
| |l>58H|THE 6TH PRECINCT POLICE REQUESTED THAT REINFORCEMENTS BE PROVIDED TO NGUYEN VAN TO POLICE SUB-STATION?|
| |lll5H|A VN RANGER UNIT OPERATING AT THE BINH TAY ALCOHoL PLANT AsHEo|
| |I25 DH|A POLICE JEEP BEARING LICENSE PLATE Ho. vA 9469, PAINTED LIGHT BROWN, WAS STOLEN BY THE VCQ|
---
Tia

Approved: 2019/04/7 C0676606

PAGE 5 OF 14 PAGES

ABOUT 15 VC WERE SPOTTED AT THE VUNG BOT ALLEY

TRAN NHAN TON STREET /5TH PRECINCT/, BETWEEN HUNTINGTON AND VINH VIEN STREETS.

SNIPER FIRED ON THE 5TH PRECINCT POLICE FORCE THAT WAS OPERATING ON SU VAN HANH AND HUNG HANA STREETS, AT VUON LOI WARD /5TH PCT/.

THE VC ATTACKED AN ARVN JEEP MOVING ON BINH TIEN HETNSE /6TH

IT WAS REPORTED THAT VC RETURNEES WHO WERE STATIONED AT A RETURNEES' CENTER LOCATED AT THE CORNER OF TRAN NHAN TON AND VINH VIEN STREETS /5TH PRECINCT/, HAVE LEFT THEIR CENTER.

LOCAL PEOPLE DISCLOSED THAT APPROXIMATELY 15 VC WEARING VARIOUS CLOTHES, FULLY ARMED, WERE SPOTTED CONGREGATING IN CAY XOAI MARKET LOCATED ON THE ROAD LINKING TRUNG MILITARY TRAINING CENTER AND SAIGON.

TONIGHT A COMPANY-SIZED VC UNIT WOULD PROBABLY CONDUCT AN ATTACK ON A FRIENDLY UNIT STATIONED AT COORD. XS 866958.
---
PAGE 6 OF 14 PAGES

THE VC WILL ALSO SHELL THE TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE AS WELL AS THE SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS LOCATED IN SAIGON CITY;

IT IS KNOWN THAT THERE ARE TWO PAGODAS WHERE THE VC ARE REPORTEDLY HIDING—

1. THICH CA TU PAGODA LOCATED ON TRAN HUNG DAO STREET

2. PHAP VAW PAGODA LOCATED ON TRUONG MINH GIANG STREET

IN THE 7TH PRECINCT.

THE VC, USING A MEGAPHONE, APPEALED TO THE OWNER OF BINH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT IN THE 7TH PRECINCT TO LET THEM IN.

AN ESTIMATED 40 VC HAVE PENETRATED INTO THE STORAGE AREA OF THE SAIGON HARBOR LOCATED IN THE TRIANGULAR AREA COVERING LY THAI TO PETRUS KY AND HUNG VUONG STREETS (5TH PRECINCT). SEVEN HARBOR PERSONNEL ON DUTY HAVE FLED.

THE VC HAVE CUT BARBED WIRE AND BROKEN INTO HOUSE NO. 341-

THE PETRUS KY STREET (5TH PRECINCT).

HOUSES IN THE VICINITY OF NGUYEN VAN TO POLICE SUB-STATION (6TH PCT) HAVE BEEN SET ON FIRE BY THE VC.

-

Approved for Release. 2019/04/17 C06786606
---
|25OH|TEN U/I PERSONS, WEARING BLACK PAJAMAS, HAVE REPORTEDLY MOVED INTO AN AREA COVERING NGUYEN CANH CHAN, CHUONG DUONG, PHAT DIEM AND TRAN HUNG DAO STREETS, 2D PRECINCT.|
|---|---|
|ZSASH|A NUMBER OF U/I PERSONS HAVE APPEARED AT A VACANT HOUSE NO "KI" LOAN" 152VC BUI THI XUAN STREET /2D PRECINCT/. A SIGN FACTORY IS IN FRONT OF THE HOUSE;|
|ZSASH|A NUMBER OF VC HAVE REPORTEDLY APPEARED IN AN AREA COVERING PHAN DINH PHUNG, NGUYEN THIEN THUAT, PHAN THANH GIAN AND LY MU TO STREETS.|
|OODSH|OUR FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE EXCHANGED FIRE WITH THE VC IN THE ABOVE RECTANGULAR AREA;|
|DO25H|A VC PLATOON HAS REPORTEDLY MOVED FROM PHU LAM AREA TOWARD SAIGON, PASSING BY LO SIEU HANLET /6TH PRECINCT/;|
|fl93mH|A COMPANY-SIZED VC UNIT HAS INFILTRATED INTO HOUSES LOCATED AT THE REAR OF TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE SUB-STATION /8TH PRECINCT/, AND TWO OR THREE OF THEM WERE KILLED BY THE POLICE;|
|O325H|THE ENEMY HAVE CONDUCTED AN INTENSIVE GROUND ATTACK ON TRAN VAN; CRIM POLICE SUB-STATION.|
|O425H|THE VC HAVE ATTACKED A RF GUARD POST LOCATED AT NHI THIEN DUONG.|
---
# A

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17

.T.

;‘.itT

V awn‘-unnani 7'

H-»-_____ _____-_-____‘_‘;~— V

rgnu ~ 1094-; -; u-,1 u-mvwu-\ 15-00 |,n||l|'H.

A

T-‘ a»‘

0

PAGE H OF ]4PAGES

1- . (¢;,,.=.,¢|¢-.,m~¢n conrxn (dI'w"| r',r"1I_'~'"f_"_ Wrnmwm,.,--_J. flu W-

{'71- i

kl .4 BRIDGF IN TTH rwscwwcf.

04 3 am THE TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE $UR~STATION HAS PARTLY COLLAPFED,

THE VC HAVE STAYED CLOSE TO THE FENCEQQE

THE VC HAVE ATTAC HE KIEU cows mun! POLICE SUP-QTATION.

THE POLICE JEEP as s LICENSE PLATE no cs 1-12, Enurékzn

JITH A MACHINE nun s ssxzsn av THE vc AT wrap AN aprons

an PHAH THE HIEN H PRECINCT/:

GTOEH REQUEST FRIENDLY IRE RE DIRECTED AT CODRD. Y? 77535.

GTIOH SAIGON HARBOR POLI MAKING A SEARCH OF THE STORAGE

AREA LOCATFD at Tna’q‘HNER or PETRUS KY AND uus vuoub srnesrs

/5TH PRECINCT/.

B722H REQUEST FRIENDLY ARTY RE DIRECTED AT CDORD. YS 777R37.

lO27H VN POLICE FORCES ARRESTED ONE SUSPECT WHO CROFSED THE

HUNG THAP TU AND NGUYEN THIEN THUAT INTERFECTION

/SD PRECINCT/.

ABOUT 260 VC REPORTEDLY INFILTRATED INTO THE VICINITY OF PHU

THO HIPPODROME /5TH PRECINCT/.

l225H THE VC ARE RECEIVING AMMUNITION AT THE ESSO GAS STATION LOCATED

AT THE conusn or HAI an rnuowc gnu TRAN cao van STREETS

/asr

s/qor‘cour1RmEn/.

ponrzns(dmem controla) rm onmmm $'59 y7

vAppr0ved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786606
---
# for Réiease: 2019/04/17 006786606 T*M’TI:_E

|VIN|um i-mymua|
|---|---|
|-~00|u-nmww J;|
|*#fi$HP| |

4

3.5(c)

PAGE 9 or 1/1PAGES

0

'u

-'~_ (Classification)

CONFIl11TI*Tjdlsarm matron)

mrmmwnmnu

1

1325H ABOUT FIVE TO TEN VC ARE SIGHTED AT THE CORNER OF NHAN' YI AND HUNG VUONG STREETS /5TH PRECINCT/2

1330? THE VC ARE ESCAPING FROM NGUYEN THIEN THUAT STRFET TOWARD A

A'

THE ROKFV BILLET LOCATED ON PHAN THANH GIAN STREET /3D PCT/.

15 mm A SIZEABLE vc UNIT 1s REPORTEDLY smzurznmc "AT THE QUANG noxc

CEMETERY LOCATE‘) IN THE VICINITY or PHI! mo RACE “Timex mm PCT/.

TWO UC COMPANIES HAVE FEPOHTEDLY PENETRATED INTO THE

ORPHANF' HOUSE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF CONG HOD MILITARYvI

OHOSPITAL IN 5Q VAP DISTRICT /CIA DINH PQOU./ TO GET FOOD.

AN ARMED VC MNIT /QTPENGTH UNFNOWN/ I9 REPORTEDLY LOCATED IN

THE VICINITY OF THE BINH LOI BRIDGE ON NATIONAL HOBO “O E THU DUC DISTRICT /CIA DINH PROVINCE/.

AN ESTIMATED gflm ADMED vc FROM BLOCK no 5, cav PAT wano, wawv E5

REPORTEDLY movzo ALONG A cwzsx TO srnriow ruimsaybzs or fitncw W.I

no 5 or THE same wnno /3TH PRECINCT/.

LAST NIGHT , 4 Fan Qq. Tvn vc COMPANIEF, FWJ.Y nwmxn, STA?T1FG Q

FROM BINH TIEN wano, arrncvso THE ncuvam van TO POLICE sup- 4’-,11,1-

STATION /6TH PRECINCT/.

ANOTHER VC PLATOON ARMED WITH THREE AUTOMATIC RIFLES HAVE REPORTEDLY‘PENETRATED INTO DO SIEU HARD-0' l 3

IN THE VICINITY OF CAY MAI ARVN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL /srn PRECINCT/.

O I’

__LCJl4F¥*i-B11T1FI A L IKJFORRIONIMESEM

(clanvlflcallorqy ,_Jdl:.Iem controls)
---
TWO VC $~'T)!!4!DS ARE i'§I!‘~.~.‘iTF;D APPE.A"I‘JG AT THE HONC LAC HIGH SCHOOL OPPOSITE THE NATIONAL ADf.ZI,'\'IS'l'iM'l‘IOT\' l.\S'l'lTU'l'l-.' L()(lA'I'T-J)

ON TRAN ""!OC TO‘\N STREET}/3D PRECINCT/. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE VC HAVE CONCEALED THEIR WEAPONS AT LAN THY NGHIA PAGOUA LOCATED AT ALLEYWAY NO I3 TRUONGE MINH GIANG STREET SD PRECINCT/z. AN ESTIMATED l,flflfl VC HAVE APPEARED AT THE HIEP AN BRIDGE IN THE VICINITY OF TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE SUB-STATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACONDUCT AN ATTACK ON THE 8TH PRECINCT POLICE STATION TONIGHT.

TOYOTA SEDAN, LICENSE PLATE EH 3533, IS BEING USED TO TRANSPORT VC WEAPONS. IT HAS FREQUENTLY MOVED AROUND MINH MANG, PHAN THANH GIAN, FHA" OINH PHUNG STREETS /SD AND 5TH PRECINCTS/.

THE TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE SUB-STATION HAS BEEN OVERRUN BY THE VC. SUBSEQUENTLY THE VC ARE CROSSING THE RIVER TO ATTACN THE 8TH PRECINCT POLICE STATION. NOW THE 5TH PRECINCT POLICE ARE EXCHANGING FIRE WITH THE VC.

THE 8TH PRECINCT POLICE STATION HAS BEEN SET ON FIRE BY THE VC. POLICEMEN_NHQ ARE STATIONED THERE HAVE MOVED TO THE BRIGADE STATION OPPOSITE IT.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO6786606
---
L-_\ 7

It

_ c o1vs~1 n 2 n T xanxsssu °

if "1

|7_| L (dlurm rormnli) M

| _.

".0.

~.,

‘§_5'i' {f s FEB 1

..¢,Hal

\“‘ UBISH AN ESTIMATFD sm vc HAVE REPORTEDLY novzo FRON "INH LAY

‘§'_ i

..

1,,139-. a

-3--',_ I

ml MARKET PLACE T0 CAY MAI MILITAPY INTELLIGENCE §CHOOL LOCATED

ow PHAM oxnu HO §TREET /srn PRECINCT/6 "

THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY APPEARED ON TONG DOC PHUONG STREET AND

AT CHA TAM CATHOLIC cnuncn LOCATED AT THE srn PRECINCT.

As wazsn

AN ESTIMATED |@w vc HAVE(REPORTEDLY movzo rnom CAY MAI INF.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE QCHOOL TOWARD SAIGON:

THE CHOLON POWER PLANT LOCATED ON TAN HUNG STREET /5TH PRECINCT/

WAS DAMAGED BY AN EXPLOSION OF UNKNOWN LYPE AND A NUMBEROOFUV J

wonxsns on uurv wens wouwosn.

THE VC ARE CONDUCTING A GROUND ATTACK ON BA HOA POLICE SUP-

STATION LOCATED AT 7TH Pngcgwcr wrrn €REW- ssnvan NEAPONF.

nzxwroncsmzwrs ARE REQUESTED.

03lflH

THE curse or BA HOA POLICE SUB—STATION AND A wuméén or POLICEFEN.

wens wouwnzn nunrus THE vc ATrAcgA

THE V0 VAN HOI POLICE SUB-STATION /5TH PPECINCTI IS BEING ATTACKEDANLI

BY THE VC.

morn BA HOA AND vo VAN HOI POLICE SUB-STATIONS ARE LOSING RADIO

CONTACT wxrn SMPD AND DGNP.

h-‘NIL-3-Ji-U!

A

I»

c o n nzsssn

r cnlslpmlloq) 1-‘ (dlnem controls)

a""'

%;f7¥
---
# A

Approved for Release: 2019/4/17 CO786606

TI J LE fl‘.

I

3009

IN

3.5(c)

| |PAGE 120$ 14 PAGES|
|---|---|
|I|c I 1r—n Ti‘l)iU;IQH mssszza|
|W VcIlT\l|HI|!!'1:") HU'_Il"7l <"‘I;l{;‘":V_‘| |
|P|PISBHH CORRECTIC-N-— THE TRAN VAN CHM! POLICE SIJR-STATIONVHAS NOT PFEN|
| |SEIZED BY THE VC N9 REPORTED AT 2H3?IH ON 5 FER 6H.‘ POLICEFEN|
| |H ..|
| |.1' SEIZED BY THE VC N9 REPORTED AT 2H3?IH ON 5 FER 6H.‘ POLICEFEN|
| |R“|
| |R"|
| |L F,_.<|
| |THE NIGHT.|
| |N|
|*$- GBBPH|TH: vc any srnrrsn zw PE VICINITY or NGUYEN vnw LIEN POLICE SUB-STATION /8TH PRECINCT/J|
|lfl3flH|NGUYEN V!\N_THOAI POLICE SUB-STATION IS UNDER VC FINE. ONE|
| |POLICEMAN was wouwnzn.|
| |THE UC ARE SIGHTED APPEARING AT THE COHNER OF PHO CO DIEU AND LY NAM as STREETS /5TH PRECINCT/2|
| |THE vc SET BARRELS o~ HOA HAO STREET /5TH PRECINCT! ron BARPI-CADE$-|
| |A.|
| |1‘.|
|1‘.|1a4sH|
| |s;xhX2y}|
| |‘THE . vc HAVE PUT A Tnxrcnn IN THE MIDDLF OF THE TRAN HUANG QUAN AND THUAN FIEU INTER!-TECTION IN OHDEP|
| |T0 BLOCK THE TRAFFI¢.|
|I045H|AT zwnmn on 5 FEB es Two vc BATTALIONS CONCENTRATED AT PHU HUN VILLAGE /APPPOX €§ s1s»sa/|
| |awn TAM on VILLAGE /APPROX. rs nnesss/. THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED T0|
| |NOVA INTO sarcow CAPITAL.--|
| |3':|
| |“T 2525" 0" 5 FEB 68. FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LOCAL|
| |PEQPLET€IT;IS T ‘.- KNOWN THAT ABOUT awn vc, FULLY ARMED, %ERE|
| |ll 1.. TH»|
| |-H|
| |Tu on) __1dlur1n}control.|)|

IIIin‘III.'IIIIGiIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIiIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIiIHIflllIIIII!!llIIIlIHll!'l"

5 =» ~¥* ’*A‘JNT7N'*‘N“‘“”ApflnHedf0rRemase:2019KMJT7C06786606
---
Release Date: 2019/04/17

_. ._. . -5..-,_€.__.._-v-:T_--:3‘-:y:;:_W _r__Zgri—_1-_- 19-''
1
M: -‘J:-":'»::“ A'44
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

SIGHTED APPEARING at co “D. xs 650930 own xs 5549A0§1mAn
THE PROVINCIAL ROAD HO
THEY SAW STEP'TIL
THEY 5’/\V?_-' ~‘.‘§TEP"’Ti’L‘
DISTRICT
A P“L'¢E 1"**’*""‘
TOWARD one eav HOF"ITflL RECEIVED vc suxrzn FIR?
THE em Pie?-‘rtmcf \"~*1;,1r~=e
THE so nnvn "ARINF RATTA'InN Jusr nnrv Tn Wflflpnprr fHF nqllrp
“Ow THFY AR" sraTzuv»n A; PETRUS rv PU"LIfi u1nw Qrun0L4
LOCATED on sown Hon srwvvr OPPOSITF Tvw nnHP HFAUnUqpTFpg
THE POLIEE ARE connucrlnn A FEARCH OPERATION IN TH? €%cTn~cuLAw
“RF“ °°VE"1"" V" T"~fiH. "nun non. rwnw nuns nno qrnrffq AND
“N ALLFWAY f‘M'N\l.L§"l. TO FQNG HOA .'?'l'RI-"FYT
THE POLICF ARV wow PQNDUPTING A Qrnwrw OPFRATIOH IN Th?
PECTANGULAR AREA COVERING NGUYEN cnuu cunw, vo THnNH,%

|con?|con?|con?|con?|
|---|---|---|---|
|(nnlflcaflnn)|(dlssrn controls)|sm|fij‘-M|

Approved for Release. 2019/04/17 C06786606
---
|NGUYEN CU TRINH AND PHAT DIEM STREETS|PRECINCT|
|---|---|
|OUR FRIENDLY FORCES HERE|HIT BY VC FIRE AT THUAN VIEU AND|
|TRAN HOANG QUAN|INTERSECTION|
|OUR FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE CLASHED WITH AN ESTIMATED|100 VC|
|AT THE REAR OF VIEN DONG SCHOOL LOCATED ON NGUYEN VAN THOAI| |
|STREET (TAN BINH DISTRICT)| |
|WE SUFFERED| |
|AN ESTIMATED 20 ARMED VC HAVE| |
|INFILTRATED INTO THE GIAC MINH PAGODA AND| |
|ANOTHER PAGODA NEXT TO THE GIAC MINH.| |
|THESE PAGODAS ARE LOCATED ON PHAN THANH GIAN STREET (5D|PRECINCT)|
|NEAR A ROK TROOPS BILLET| |
|THE VC JUST RELEASED AN ARVN SERGEANT| |
|AND 24 ADDITIONAL ARVN SOLDIERS| |
|PLACE OF CAPTURE AND PLACE OF RELEASE|NOT KNOWN|
|THE ARVN SGT ESTIMATES THAT THE VC STRENGTH IS BETWEEN|100 TO 126|
|THEY ARE IN POSSESSION OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF 3-WHEEL| |
|LAMBRETTA BUSSES, JEEPS, GMC TRUCKS AND AMBULANCE|VANS. THERE|
|IS SPECULATION THAT THE VC WOULD USE THESE VEHICLES TO|INFILTRATE INTO THE SAIGON CAPITAL (INFORMATION FROM DGNP)| COVERAGE_OF_THE_SAIGON-GI[15617911].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Chronology of VC attack on Saigon-Gia Dinh, VC movements and activities",
"When": "13 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "Saigon-Gia Dinh", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

|Classification|Date|Control Number|
|---|---|---|
|Top Secret|31 January 1968|3.5(c) 2323|
---
# 104

# 106

# 106NORTH

# 108

# NORTH

# VICTNiM

# VIETNAM

# Demilitarized Zone

# Sepone

# SE?pone

# QUANGTRI

# Hue

# THUATHIE

# Hue

# THIEN

# Mekong

# 0

# (THUA

# Da Nang

# QUANGHoi AnD~ Nang

# 16

# (__)

# HOi An

# NAM

# CORPS

# THAILAND

# THAILAND

# QUANGTIN

# Quanp Neai

# QUANGNGAI

# KONTUM

# Kontum

# Q

# BINH DINK

# Pleiku

# Gui Nhon

# Pleiku

# i Nhon

# PHU

# BON

# PHU

# YEN

# IICORPS

# DARLAC

# CORPS

# Ban Me

# KAANH

# HOA

# Trang

# na

# QUANGDUC

# TUYEN

# Dag8c

# Am RANH

# PPENoMG

# PHUOC

# NINA

# BINA

# LONG

# LAMDONG

# THUAN

# TAY

# LONG

# NINH

# Tan g83NGutBiesr Aba)BINARINA

# BINH

# LONC

# THUAN

# H

# ong Binh'TUY

# Sihanobeville

# Sihanob

# ville

# CHAUDo2

# KitrPAONGTuonGKIENSATGO

# Dinh TuongNGhiLONG

# Ho^

# Yung TauPhuOcTut

# It

# corps

# 1

# CING

# DEC

# Capital Special Zone

# UT H

# iO

# GULF OF

# GULF SIAMOF

# SIAM

# AN

# IV

# CORPS

# XUYEN

# SOUTH VIETNAM

# SOUTH

# VIETNAM

# CONFI DENTIAL

# o......,..,._..,;2.;.5

# 0 ~25

# ~__,:5;,:.0 _ IOO K lonetersIOO Mitcs

# 50

# 75

# I 00 K1lome1e,s__;7;,:.5_ __:,,;;;100M,le~

# 101

# 106

# 108

# 110
---
# DAILY BRIEF 1968

# 31 JANUARY 1968

South of Vietnam various continuing and key attacks forces At last word, Communist forces (as of Vietnam AM 5:30 EST) were continuing cities installations allied military attacks against self civil cities and sporadic sniping installations. In Saigon it in the various self, sporadic but many parts of the city was continuing into well terrorists river day were in the various day, were but parts withdrawing Viet Cong into across well the ter_Cong the ter-river. raids terrorists captured during 3.3(h)(2) tacks are the raids claim terrorists that additional captured during 3.3(h)(2) tacks are planned for the city tonight. So far the area around Khe Sanh remains relatively quiet, Communist build-up remains but the most ominous in the country. The spectacular series mainly of Communist attacks designed mainly for the concerned effect to the Communists powerful shock seems designed are for all apparent ly shock effect. The Communists force capable to only the parent ly force country capable that out they if are still seriously disrupting are seriously temporarily still disrupting to powerful all the country, if only temporarily. The logistical extensive harassment centers appears and of command of US air fields, communications logistical centers and centers, command designed also and signed communications inhibit and to centers immediate appears allied de-reaction preparatory to retaliation. It intended could be prepara early Communist or to or offensive intended to support operations just south of the Demilitarized Zone.

# NR

# TOP SECRET

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
|LAOS|102|China|
|---|---|---|
|MEKONG|THAILAND|CAMBODIA|
|BURMA|NORTH VIETNAM|HOA BINH|
|Nom|Samneua|Phou Pha Thi|
|Moung Hiem|Prabang Luong|Na Khang|
|Xieng Cua Rao|Khouane|Khammouane (Thakhek)|
|Udon Thani|Communist-controlled territory|THAILAND|

|0|25|50|
|---|---|---|
|KILOMETERS|MILES| |
---
# TOP SECRET

|3|3.|Laos|
|---|---|---|
|key driveare|nistsSigns government|counterinsurgentforcesmajor|
|Signspreparingforthatfrom|are|preparing areare growing|
|growing for forcesa that majorefforttheCommu-|the|effort|
|to|government|baseatPhou atfromPhouthePha|
|Thi|troopsPatheta lready|key counterinsurgent alreadyandNorthup positions|
|encirclinghavethePathet|Lao|and takenwhichupVietnamese|
|encircling|troops have|base taken provides positions im-|
|NR|portant|navigationalNorthVietnamUS(Map)the basej support|
|NR|airportant operationsnavigational over|support Vietnam. for|

|4|4.|
|---|---|
|NR|NR|

|5|5.|
|---|---|
|NR|NR|
---
                                                       NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253       NR
      Approved for R Ie ease: 2018/07/26 C05974253
                                                    ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
      Approved for R Ie ease: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26         C059 74253
         Tob Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26         C059 74253
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

Top-Secret

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

31 January 1968
3.5(c)3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253|3.3(h)(2)|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253|3.5(c)3.5(c)|
|Page| |
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253| |
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253| |
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

3.5(c)

TOP

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253.

RET

3.3(h)(2)

|Front|to Open Office* in Tanzania :|The Liber|
|---|---|---|
|Front|continuing abroad Tanzania: Open Office effort has in|improve its diplo-|
|Front's representation continuing|effort to taken another|dip-|
|representation|agreed announced step|to allow diplomatic forward 29 Tanzanian President When permanent forward. to representation allow January that on 29 Tanzanian in the Front Sa laam. the Dar Front that Front representation Es abroad President to set his government has up Nyerere, taken Julius a staffed another Nyerere has|
|this|and sub-Sahara will Communist agreements The Front in this sub-Sahara tions representations Africa, the Free in the post fifth will Africa Free World on representation also be the first third Front on the continent has and representations the fifth in World. for representa- The also tions has in all or countries agreements except for Yugoslavia in all Communist countries Yugoslavia.| |

Foreign Visitors: Hanoi Hanoi may be easing its re- I foreign strictions s tr i c Foreign of Visitors: t 1ons visitors of the past several may e s'----'=--- ~e---'-r---=v---=a--'---'l=-----we--= weeks .:..:.....::...e_k=be on o=----=n'---=t:_::'-=.! easing mttinga dm iits i=-= a=d=ic..:t'---'ngre-~ ~ foreign visitors .

3.3(h)(2)

Since early December the North Vietnamese had from foreign writers con- sistently turned to down requests to down the the North Vietnamese had con- turned to enter requests country from foreign writers for permission for permission enter the country.

Manpower:

although from the take have suffered on This war area, had there were on of taken many sufficient the young men and 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

away although the the war area had there taken many sufficient of the young women men and children did not seem take children from to away to the to their places their suffered. places were the the farms ; report farms; women crops is crops in in This report is

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

3.5(c)3.5(c)

line with other information which has suggested that manpower problems are not yet affecting agricultural production.

A significant factor in North Vietnamese attitudes on the war reflects reflections of US political.

Nothing significant to report at this time.

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

3.5(c)3.5(c)
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253 THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478112.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President",
    "What": "Briefing on Vietnam War activities and North Vietnamese military movements",
    "When": "31 January 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Thailand", "China", "Cambodia"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

|Secret|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|Pees|5 ta5$|
|Sa2|RecuedsC~tee|

NIo ANE

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

Secret52

No _24November0317/671967

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494  3.5(c)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

# SECRET

# CONTENTS

(Information as of noon EST, 22 November 1967)

|Far East|Page|
|---|---|
|THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE| |
|VIETNAM| |
|The US strongpoint at Dak To third week of fighting in resulted in the area surrounding the Communist large number of friendly casualties as main force units renewed their vigorous efforts to pin down American troops in southwestern Kontum Province| |
| |NR|
| | |
|Europe| |
| |NR|
|SECRET| |

Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov67

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
# SEERET FAR EAST

SouthTheCommunist campaignintheDakToareathirdVietnam centralnighlands nowinits of week prolongedfightingsincehasdevelopedintothe most intensiveandIa DrangValleybattle the twoyearsago_military preparationsthroughout theThismajoroperationandextensive Communist central highlandsappeardeterminationintendedtodemonstratethe Communistsforcesandtoinflict heavycasualties theallied andcapacitytooutlast onthem Christmasbythelunar on SaigonNationalLiberationFrontstolethemarch andannouncing72-hourtruces duringthe lullduring New Yearholyearinlate Januarynew-idaysand seven-day blyleadersarestill preoccupiedwith organizingInSaigon ,PresidentThieuandNationalAssemblythenewgovernment by The continuing problemscaused weretensionsbetweenThieuandVicePresidentKy reflectedinPrimeMinisterLoc private ingdirectivesissued bythetwo leaders_ complaintabouttheconfusioncreated byconflict- NR

# WEEKLY SUMMARY 24Nov 67
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

SECRET

CHINA
VIETNAM
THAILAND
LAOS
CAMBODIA
MYANMAR
INDIA
NEPAL
BANGLADESH
SRILANKA
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
IRAQ
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT
LIBYA
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
NIGER
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
CHAD
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
UGANDA
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
SAUDI ARABIA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
QATAR
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
TURKEY
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT
LIBYA
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
NIGER
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
CHAD
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
UGANDA
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
SAUDI ARABIA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
QATAR
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
TURKEY
SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
# VIETNAM

In the third week of fighting in the area surrounding Dak To, the US Regiment have now spread battle elements of the NVA throughout the area north and east of Dak To. The strongpoint at Dak To resulted in a large number of casualties as Communist main units renewed their vigorous efforts to engage and tie down friendly forces as far south as central Darlac Province.

Heavy fighting developed when US patrols encountered several North Vietnamese (NVA) regiments - the 32nd Army, 66th, southwest, and 174th - in the hills of Dak To. The Communist forces are under the control of the B-3 Front and are making extensive preparations throughout the way by the North Vietnamese units in an effort to extend allied control in the central highlands.

Current Communist tactics involve withdrawing well-prepared defensive positions in favorable terrain where they can concentrate maximum firepower. The primary goal of the current winter-spring campaign is to pin down and destroy major allied units. The lack of landing zones and the steepness of the jungle canopy make American troop movements in the central highlands the most difficult in South Vietnam.

The heavy presence of caches of ammunition, discovery of many enemy bunkers, and other well-constructed defensive positions indicate the presence of an extensive enemy force in the area, with up to 8,000 enemy troops. Activity in the Laos Panhandle indicates that large supply shipments have resumed moving south in South Vietnam following the end of the rainy season in November.

|SECRET|
|---|
|Page|WEEKLY SUMMARY|24 Nov 67|
---
# Vietnam

observers into spotted Laos over 300 trucks were by aerial in late October. It is also clear from photography going heavy stockpiling has been that on in the Mu Gia Pass area. The two houses of the National Assembly continue to move ahead with their internal organization work. The participation of dry weather since at least September in Politics in South Vietnam is proceeding. The upper house is organizing internal rules to allow formation of internal blocs with a minimum membership of 15. Members have slowly voted on proposals that would have allowed the formation of only two blocs.

President Thieu has reportedly begun organizing his personal office staff for his position in the presidency. The key in the validation of a 60-man body in the lower house is almost completed. There has been considerable discussion on the plight of 17 students who were demonstrating against the election. The lower house has drafted rules for the election and has agreed to discuss the matter further.

Nguyen and the manager Van Huong of Thieu's close adviser presidential campaign are slated for the present military. Several specialized advisory councils will also be attached to the presidential office. The principal officers of this committee are outspoken opponents of the government who may hope to embarrass it over the issue inherited from the previous military regime.

On 18 November, military forces ordered their cessation of military actions to observe a 72-hour lull during both the lunar New Year holidays. President Thieu a few weeks ago informally proposed a 24-hour ceasefire.

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

24 Nov 67
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

cease-fire periods at only and New Year The Viet Cong and Christ-48 weapons or procedures tactics rather than of any new hours for Tet announcement also makes the Christmas 24 hours longer and New Year than the corre-cease-fire periods of surface-to-air missile fire was an exceptionally high level and anti-corresponding periods they called for aircraft artillery Although (AAA) last year reported were fired many of the missiles at random, they Air Defenses nonetheless accounted for ten of Hanoi the US losses more effective while the usually two planes AAA downed only units North Vietnamese air defense were unusually successful Hanoi of MIG force from bases only about estimated extensive operations in downing 18 US aircraft in in the Hanoi / craft still operating Haiphong area between 16 and of November The effectiveness 20 in North US planes during Vietnam this period four shot down Un-have been the result of established the Communist defense appears to vigorous application of more known causes claimed two additional aircraft 3.5(c)

# WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494

Secret

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494 "WEEKLY SUMMARY[15466600].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
    "What": "Weekly summary of intelligence activities in various countries, focusing on Vietnam",
    "When": "22 November 1967",
    "Where": [
        "Vietnam",
        "China",
        "Thailand",
        "Laos",
        "Cambodia",
        "Myanmar",
        "India",
        "Nepal",
        "Bangladesh",
        "Sri Lanka",
        "Pakistan",
        "Afghanistan",
        "Iran",
        "Iraq",
        "Syria",
        "Lebanon",
        "Israel",
        "Jordan",
        "Egypt",
        "Libya",
        "Tunisia",
        "Algeria",
        "Morocco",
        "Mauritania",
        "Senegal",
        "Gambia",
        "Guinea",
        "Sierra Leone",
        "Liberia",
        "Ivory Coast",
        "Ghana",
        "Togo",
        "Benin",
        "Niger",
        "Nigeria",
        "Cameroon",
        "Chad",
        "Central African Republic",
        "Sudan",
        "Uganda",
        "Kenya",
        "Ethiopia",
        "Somalia",
        "Yemen",
        "Oman",
        "Saudi Arabia",
        "United Arab Emirates",
        "Qatar",
        "Bahrain",
        "Kuwait",
        "Turkey"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

|Date|16 December 1967|
|---|---|
|Declassified|23|
---
# DAILY BRIEF

|Thailand|Yemen|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|3.3(h)(2)|

TOP SECRET - 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974175
---
# Greece

The junta seems willing, return or even eager, to have King Constantine return. The presence of the colonels would probably lend an aura of legitimacy to their regime.

Rome conveys to the various emissaries of the junta that the King is en route to return, and conditions will be fixed for his return unless the junta says otherwise. At least a date for a referendum on the return of Constantine.

# Communist China

3.3(h)(2)

# Soviet Union

3.3(h)(2)
---
# Algeria

The chief dispute between Boumediene and Army of staff Z'Biri, simmering for a there to and over boil. a could whom some month, Tanksbe has are apparently being disorders. about, moved come But Boumediene, to the assumed owes army its favored position, has personal command and does not seem to be in danger.

# Denmark

Krag, his have new ever night, an has defeated on anti-infla- and will tion called measure last elections time: for the resigned 23 January. He a rough polls show party's popularity took gone a down year steadily ago. since he office
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

16 December 1967
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes

16 December 1967

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
· IQP  SECRET   -  Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 417...,__--------~3_S( C)

                                                                                3.3(h)(2)

                                      -2-

 TOP   SECRET-  -  Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175                             3.5(c)
---
|TOP SECRET|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|SECRET|3.3(h)(2)|
|SECRET|3.5(c)|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175
---
# Chinese Refugees from North Vietnam: Former Chinese residents escape the Red Guard of North Vietnam within Vietnam who have gone back to China

According to a study of Red Mao's Guards newspaper, Chou En-lai told a group last month that "they fled for fear of being killed by planes."

Peking stories clearly find more excuses for the refugees' flight unwelcome. Not only are they detrimental to Sino-Vietnamese relations, but they also mean more mouths to feed.

# Desertion of a North Vietnamese Soldier
---
# a deserter from the North Vietnamese Army.

The soldier said he had been wounded in Soup Vietnam and had subsequently escaped from pe hospital. He said he would never return to pe Soup, pat pe only pings awaiting Norp Vietnamese soldiers pere are hunger, sickness, and misery.

# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Nothing of significance to report today.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602425].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "President, Military Officials",
  "What": "Daily briefings on various countries and topics including Greece, Communist China, Soviet Union, Algeria, Denmark, North Vietnam, Chinese refugees, North Vietnamese soldier desertion, US political attitudes on the war",
  "When": "16 December 1967",
  "Where": ["Thailand", "Yemen", "Greece", "Rome", "Algeria", "Denmark", "North Vietnam", "China"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C0677237 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 (WimgmMTmmwg

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

13526

Page 1 of 4 Pages

TRANSMISSION

PRIVATE/INR

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Summary:

PRESIDENT OF VIETNAMESE CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CVT) TRAN QUOC BUU is encouraged by assurance from the Minister of Labor that his offer to help will be accepted, despite the rebuffs he received earlier. He has an appointment to see Vice President Ky on 7 February. Buu is also encouraged by reports that the common people are shaking off their apathy and realizing that they too must participate in the fight. According to Buu, Luong Trong Tuong, head of the Hoa Hao Church, has accepted his advice.
---
# 'Amrgveamfiw Release 2_01§76?“ET7”6‘6§772374'

.”I‘HHOIIaIU-‘III|

N.o
---
# THAT BROADCAST AN APPEAL TO ALL HOA HAD TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT.

END SUFTARY. TRAN QUOC BUU, PRESIDENT OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFEDER-ATION OF LABOR (CVT): HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN APPOINTMENT WITH VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ON 7 FEBRUARY. BUU PLANS TO OFFER KY THE COOPERATION OF THE CVT AND ALL ITS AFFILIATED TRADE UNIONS AND THEIR PERSONNEL.

ALTHOUGH BUU'S INITIAL OFFERS OF AID MADE TO THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE WERE REBUFFED, HE IS ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS THAT THE ATTITUDE OF SOME MINISTERS IS BECOMING TO CHANGE. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 FEBRUARY, BUU RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE MINISTER OF LABOR, WHO PERSUADED HIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACCEPT BUU'S OFFER TO HELP. THE LABOR MINISTER TOLD BUU NOT TO LOSE COURAGE AND ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS RECOMMENDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPT THE HELP AND COOPERATION OF ALL PRIVATE CITIZENS.

IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH A COLLEAGUE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 FEBRUARY, BUU STATED WITH SOME EXCITEMENT THAT REPORTS FROM HIS CADRES INDICATED THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE MOST. . .
---
11':TA TAMI,:ENSEEETNEaRE

fl.pproved for Release.-2019/01/17

fl.pproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C0677237 4 ··H.,mAAar;~.-“,_"_'.. v

POPIJi..il ·. POPULAT 31 AREAS OF SAIGON BEGINNING NOT ONLY TO BLAME THE

VIET Ci ; 3 CVC) FOR THE RECENT BLOODSHED BUT ARE COMING FORWARD

UIET Ci (VC) FOR THE RECENT BEOODSHED BUT ARE TO DEN-- :JCE TO THE POLICE CERTAI'N INDIVIDUAL VC. BUU FEELS THIS

TO DEN-- :JCE TO THE POLICE CERTAI'N INDIVIDUAL VC. BUU FEELS THIS

COULD f:· E- THE FIRST POSITIVE INDICATION INDICATION THAT THE THE POPULACEPOPULACE. IS IS ABAN- ABAN-

DONING rs APATHETIC NUETRALITYNUETRALITY AND REALIZING THAT IT TOO MUSTMUST her-eraM,lrem‘

BECmiff '.~IVE 'STIVE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTSo COMMUNISTSO HE ADDED :D-Rr—z

THAI SC.~ S(;E OF HIS MORE CAUTIOUS CADRES WERE HERE ALSO ABANDONING THEIR syg

NEUTRAL~ 5T NEUTRAL'ST ST AND. I‘m.,..

OFFICER WHO NHO AD JUST ARRIVED FROM CHAU DOC PROVINCE BY BY PLANE

HAD Tr: TFF- HU: HIE r HE HOA HAO ARVN *-hvxa’}2

OFFICER WHO NHO AD JUST ARRIVED FROM CHAU DOC PROVINCE BY BY PLANE

HAD Tr: TFF- HU: HIE r HE HOA HAO ARVN *-hvxa’}2

VC WITI .. NITH "KNl':ES "KNIVES AND CLUBSo" HE TOLD BUU HE HAD ASKED THE R.«A

GOVERNMENT f FIR1R VEAPONS· SO SO THAT THEY COULD FIGHT MORE EFFEC- u.$.32-h..._.:-'I.*'I:

TELEPHONED L :ONG ONG !RONG TUONG, HEAD OF THE HOA HAO<NARCH,CHURCH, -t_,-_..1'fi

AND URGED HI. TO MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT OVER VIETNAMESE rr-'713%

TELEVISION DENOUNCING'IHETHE VC AN~ AND URGING HIS PEOPLE TO SUP- '.')

THEPORT THE .. GOVERNMENT.;;ACCORDING~~ ~·~·~\. ~ ~LATE AEF-g,;::ACCORDING _ ~

POSITIVE AND AND;DURINCDURING TH£ {HE‘LATE AFTERNOON HE HE WENT wENT-- TO THE STATION '1“;a.-."
---
450.35
45(135
3.5(c)
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

3.5(c)
szxc)
REPORT

CL:

Cis:s

~RET /NO~SSEM

5 BET/N0

Ran 1555M GROUP I1

ADVANCE cop FRANSMITTED

TRANSMITTED TO:

WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI ocr

Approved

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C0672374 "ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS [15561306].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "TRAN QUOC BUU, President of Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT)",
"What": "Offering cooperation and assistance to the government in Vietnam, reports on people's attitudes towards government and communist forces",
"When": "7 February",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Chau Doc Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: . _,‘ a.a.__.__a.;i .i;:l_;..,_i._a...¢.:a,...i_i,,_,_Appr0ved for Release: 201191/Q4/_]7_QQOp71§§§3_y _'TT?'“*'“"-"!-!!““"R"*HQPFIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHIIIIIIIIQQUIInnglluiillgl_, _____ _> _ M a                          W  _

Stfi

§ANlTIZED QQZX

lS February 1968

W       _Uw_ The Intelligence Bacggggugd of the
Current Communist_9§£ensive

Evidence has been building up for the past several weeks that the Communists intended to launch a major and widespreadaoffensive in South Vietnam in connection with the Tet Season. Indications of this were plentiful in the Ist and Ilnd Cofps areas along the coast, and in_the provinces of the central highlands. Evidence of enemycoffensive preparations was also apparent, butslesssplefitifulg infthe IIIrd Corps provinces aroundlSaigoh and in the Delta._ ~s@_!~ 1

It Was"c1eaf”thatmthe*offensive would include attacks on some of thedsfialler provincial“and Qdistrict.

seats?-as have major~Cofimunist campaigns in the past; It also appearedthat the attacks might inc1udé'”””””'” strikes against some major urban centers such as Hue, Pleiku and, possibly) Saigon.j The fact that the attacks would involveznear"sififiltaneous assaults against over three—foutths of the province capitals and other major cities; however, was not anticipated, nor was it probably possible to do so on the basis,of the avail-.

able intelligence. .Qhe growing ability of the enemy -

Conlenl UNCU\SSiHED_

per.. -_._°_5537§(                      __         __ fi___

J   Hate is                                                 Li _

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883
---
to better coordinate both the movement of his forces and the timing of his assaults had been apparent, particularly since the advent of his current "winterispring offensive."

During the cast several weeks, the publications of the Central Intelligence Agency that are distributed throughout the US Government have regularly reported on and warned of the enemy intentions within the scope I have described. On 8 January, for example, one of our publications took note of the step "up which" had already occurred 'in coordinated attacks by enemy forces against government administrative centers and allied outposts throughout the country. Between 8 and 10 January, our publications directed particular attention to the increase in enemy actions against strongpoints and population centers in the Saigon area. On 8 January, one of our publications described an attack on a provincial capital near Saigon and stated that "this type of enemy activity may continue." It would include mortar and rocket attacks on Saigon and other nearby targets.

By 20 January, we were stating that Communist forces in the northern Ist Corps area "may intend to carry out simultaneous attacks against both the Khe
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883

Sanh area and population centers along the coast.” We noted at least five North Vietnamese regiments in position to conduct attacks near the coast. On 24 January, we described the expansion of the threat into the Quang Nam — Quang Tin Province area where the positioning of Communist units "has increased the threat to other allied positions ranging from Da Nang to Tam Ky”. By 26 January, we reported that a "widespread coordinated offensive by enemy forces throughout the northern part of South Vietnam appears imminent."

Our publications during this period also indicated the possibility that enemy offensives in the northern provinces might be coordinated with attacks in the western highlands. The present positioning of enemy forces, together with the material in captured documents, we state a point to an impending Communist effort against US and South Vietnamese forces in Kontum and Pleiku. In the Delta area, our publications noted during January that the intensity of enemy activity has increased markedly and that the Communists have evinced an ability to launch coordinated mortar and ground attacks in several provinces at one time.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883
---
The intelligence upon which we based our reports of the impending enemy military activity was a combination of that collected by the US and South Vietnamese.

I might note that publications of the US military command in South Vietnam contained many of the same warnings regarding enemy intentions as did our own.

Evidence as to the exact kickoff time of the enemy offensive was conflicting. There were indications beginning around 20 January which suggested that a "D-day" type of date had been chosen by the enemy sometime during the period between about 27 January and 5 February. By 29 January, analysis of this intelligence led us to warn in our publications that "D-Day may be set for as soon as 30 January." This had to be regarded as very tenuous, however, since the enemy in the past, although he had taken advantage of truce periods to improve his tactical position and to launch scattered attacks, had refrained from a general offensive.
---
Fragmentary material on the political objectives of the current Communist offensive has, in retrospect, been available for some months in captured enemy documents, agent reports, and prisoner interrogations. The information; however, has been extremely ambiguous and somewhat contradictory. Much of it appeared too grandiose and "unrealistic to be taken seriously as a guide to future Communist intentions. I speak in particular of hints that the Communists intended to launch a general uprising. We simply did not, and still do not, give them the capability for doing so. We were thus reluctant to believe that they would risk potential disaster to their military machine by staking their future on a bid to spark such a revolution. It will probably still be some weeks before we can ascertain with any certainty whether this was their basic objective, or whether they really sought more limited political goals.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883 THE_INTELLIGENCE_BACKGROU[15617872].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "US Government, Central Intelligence Agency, US military command in South Vietnam",
"What": "Impending enemy offensive in South Vietnam during Tet Season, coordinated attacks by Communist forces, warning of enemy intentions, evidence of enemy preparations and positioning",
"When": "15 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Ist Corps area", "Saigon", "Central highlands", "Quang Nam", "Quang Tin Province", "Da Nang", "Tam Ky", "Kontum", "Pleiku", "Delta area"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02397527

1

'V ZC 3'5") 119;-s1€61ii;'rv

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

9 February 1968

# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

29¢ Situation in South Vietnam No» 2?"*1?-ta §r'swt>~1>.~u,.e Em~

§Y3AAireP°V°19PW9Ft§ 3.3(h)(2)

2. The transfer of eight IL-14's ffom the DRV on the 6th, and a mission this far south on the reserve airfield at Yunnani in south China to'Hanoi high priority mission involving either cargo and/or personnel. The A Shau valley is a major logistic base for NVA operations in northern South Vietnam.

A§i?9ko§{§Pa§“Pi99$i§Pm"a”i?9§

3. There are a number of indications that the "Communists may be preparing for a new phase of attacks in South Vietnam, possibly within the next few days. Evidence of this is seen in the positioning ne targets of so far uneommitted enemy unitsLFJMklgnW

4. North_Vietnamese forces all along the Demilitarized Zone appear to be in an offensive posture. Major concentrations of enemy forces have also been detected Just south of Da Nang and around Dak To in the central highlands. 33NhX2)

Approved for Release:
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02397527

%' qmin-e£:n:Eq*iTj% 35*»

3.3(h)(2)

1. To the South, elements of the North Vietnamese 7th, and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions are operating some distances from their normal base areas and are in a position to strike key US installations in central III Corps or to serve as a reserve force against Saigon.

31NhX2)

2. A number of enemy prisoners and documents captured since late fall have indicated that the "winter-spring” offensive would have a second phase lasting through March. Several prisoners taken in the recent fighting have claimed that there would be follow up attacks within a week or 10 days.

3. Interrogation of prisoners captured in the recent Viet Cong attacks on populated centers continues to indicate that most of these soldiers actually believed that their attacks could succeed, that failures would be minimal, and that these initial efforts would be followed up by similar attacks until the Communists had eventually gained full control.

4. The latest group of Viet Cong prisoners to contribute to this picture of Communist intent was captured in the battle of Pleiku city. Many of these men were hardcore Communist party members, long-standing members of the party's provincial committee. Their attack indoctrination was virtually identical with current Communist propaganda claims. They report that their pre-rise up in support believed that the population would of their attack. They say they were under instructions to destroy the local GVN administrative structure.

5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02397527
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02397527

to replace it with a coalition of prominent local personalities and groups in cooperation with local Front representatives.

10. The reasons they gave for such optimistic anticipation of military success involved a belief that only one third of the Communist forces had been committed to the initial attacks and that the remaining two-thirds would be sent in later if the initial attack failed. The soldiers were also enthusiastic about recent issues of large quantities of new foreign-made weapons.

Probable future Communist strategy in the war: It is important to observe in assessing that the Viet Cong would not be ready to quit, even in the event the attacks all failed. They all agreed that the Front would continue both the military and political aspects of the struggle, that the "Liberation Army" would continue to be strengthened in both numbers and firepower, and that the cities would be struck again. They believed that even large personnel losses would not dampen Communist ambitions. Local force losses, he felt, would be especially easy to recoup. He claimed that the Front simply would not admit or disseminate information on the extent of such losses. THE_SITUATION_IN_SOUTH_VI[15617775].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence",
    "What": "Information on the situation in South Vietnam, Communist preparations for attacks, North Vietnamese forces, captured prisoners' testimonies",
    "When": "9 February 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Yunnani", "Da Nang", "Dak To", "Pleiku city"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265

é§@LIQ€jvOQ

o@NTR4£

'r~7Na9‘<7

¢\

4’/;F1) STArcs o\="*‘$3\'

T/.76 P1/exiaieniiv Daily B1/ief

TO1; S551/5;‘ 7 Febrzzmy 1968

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265
---
# DAILY BRIEF

7 FEBRUARY

|1. Vietnam|North Vietnamese regulars, spearheaded by Soviet T-34 tanks, were believed to have beaten back from the strategic Lang Vei Special Forces camp near Khe Sanh last night. The night-long assault was timed to coincide with a heavy bombardment of the Khe Sanh base. At last report the enemy force was pulling back. This is the first time the Communists have used armor in South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
| |The North Vietnamese could be planning another "first," this one using aircraft against allied positions near the Demilitarized Zone. Yesterday three of North Vietnam's eight IL-28 jet light bombers returned to Phuc Yen airfield from China, where they have been since last spring. Although the IL-28s are old and slow by today's standards, they could reach the Demilitarized Zone from Phuc Yen. North Vietnam's AN-2 light transports also have been unusually active. Some of these aircraft are adapted for ground attack.|
|2. Korea|A number of South Koreans demonstrated against the Panmunjom talks this morning. The demonstration was at Freedom Bridge on the road leading through US lines to the meeting site. At the bridge, the demonstrators got across where they were met and turned back by US troops. There have been no significant developments in North Korea overnight. Pyongyang is rebroadcasting the sixth alleged confession by a Pueblo crewman.|
---
# LAosA PANHANDLE

Enemy Controlled Territory
---
# A new series of Communist Lao attacks

on government positions in the panhandle may be coming. A North Vietnamese defector reports Saravane will be one of the first targets.

Saravane is the government-held position closest to the infiltration trails winding down to Cambodia and South Vietnam. Although its loss would not be an important military base, it would have a serious psychological impact on the already nervous leadership in Vientiane.

# Greece-Turkey

# Chile

Frei's left-wing political opponents in the Senate are so dedicated to seeing the Chilean President fail that they have sacrificed much-needed economic legislation ahead to the 1970 presidential election, but their determined inaction leaves the economy drifting further into serious inflation.
---
6. Communist China

Two party,veterans, bop disgraced- and dismissed early in pe Cultural Revolution, were recently put in charge of Hopeh, pe key Norp China province where Peking is located.of groufidby pe rection suggests pe capital.a loss This resur- militant group however, continuesin Fac- tional fighting, proughout China.

7. Soviet Union

The Soviets appear to be getting ready for anoper lunar probe. K:::::j‘and pe position 3.3(h)(2) tor soviet space support ships suggest pe launch will come today or tomorrow.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265
---
# Special Daily/ Report on North Vietnam

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974265

February 7, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

7 February 1968

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Viet Cong Press Conference:
The Viet Cong attempted to capture foreign press attention on 6 February by calling an unusual press conference in cow. The purpose of the conference was to increase news coverage of the Communist version of the Tet offensive in South Vietnam. The Communists played up the entire Moscow giving plenty of advance notice to the conference by press corps, including US and other Western press representatives.
---
# According to a Reuters dispatch

The head of the Liberation Front office in Moscow claimed that the current military effort would get "fiercer" and that the Front already had "large areas of the country under the control of revolutionary power." He said Communist demands for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and that any move in that direction was entirely up to the US. The main Communist objective in the new offensive was to overthrow the Saigon government and under no circumstances would the Communists consider participating in a coalition government with Saigon authorities. He closed the conference with a hard determination to fight until the US withdraws from Vietnam and until the Communists have achieved "final victory no matter how long that takes."

The Communist spokesman also dredged up the old "foreign volunteers" issue. This has not been used extensively by the Communists for more than a year, and they appear to be using it at this time as they have in the past to dramatize their potential military strength. The Front man in Moscow said simply that the Communists have "every right to accept foreign volunteers if the time comes."

# Vietnam: Communist Claims of Popular Support in South

After more than a week of claiming popular support for their "surging forward," the Communists have still failed to be specific, except in a few minor instances. The only three days cited in Communist propaganda in the past new groups are small groups of servicemen whom the Viet Cong claim have deserted from South Vietnamese Army units. In some cases both individuals and specific units are named. Most of these units are located in the northern coastal provinces, although one group of 31 was reported in a delta province. The only new nonmilitary groups claimed are an amorphous "federation of patriotic and peace-loving workers, farmers, and Buddhists in central Vietnam," cited in a Front broadcast of 3 February, and a "union of patriotic and peace-loving Buddhist servicemen in central Trung Bo" (coastal South Vietnam) reported in Hanoi's Nhan Dan on 5 February. There is no information on the existence of these organizations.
---
# A

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265

TOP/SECRET

Hanoi Blasts US Ministry in Hanoi issued a Tactics in South Vietnamese Cities: on 6 February condemning the US and its South Vietnamese "henchmen" for their "savage bombing" of heavily populated sections of Saigon, Hue, and other cities. The statement, which also charged that "poison gas" had been used in Hue, claimed that US and South Vietnamese attacks in the cities had caused death and injury to many civilians and the destruction of many homes and other buildings.

The Hanoi statement went on to appeal to "progressive mankind" all over the world to join in the condemnation of the US and the "Thieu-Ky clique of traitors."

# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report.

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265
---
|4'! 1|'¢ 2|
|---|---|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265| |
|e| |
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265| | THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617895].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "US Intelligence Agency",
    "What": "Daily briefs on Vietnam, Korea, Laos, Greece-Turkey, Chile, Communist China, Soviet Union, North Vietnam situation, US political attitudes on the war",
    "When": "7 February 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "Korea", "Laos", "Greece", "Turkey", "Chile", "China", "Soviet Union", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |DATE OF REPORT:|13/3/68|
|---|---|
|DATE OF INFO:|11 January to 30 January 1968|
|NO. OF PAGES:|1|
|DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION:|29 February 1968 (NHA TRANG, Vietnam)|
|REPORT NO:|291+/68|

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) NIC CASE NO: FET I.

SUBJECT: LAQ DONG Youthwere Group members of Company I, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B, Division 325, informed on 22 January 1953 that NHA TRANG would be attacked but details were not provided. The Company began to march toward NHA TRANG on 22 January. On 28 January company personnel were informed that the attack would take place at 2400 hours, 29 January 1968. The company reached its objectives without difficulty but withdrew at 0700 hours, 30 January.

This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 29 February 1968 in NHA TRANG City, KHANH HOA Province, SVN. Source is the NIC for further exploitation.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 000758585
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758585

he REPORT no = 308/as

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|5 .| | | |
|1. The first indication that Source had that his unit Company 1, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B, Division 325, would be involved in an attack during the TET holidays occurred on 11 January 1968.| | | | |
|On that day all LAO DONG Party members in the company were called together for a meeting and based on past experience, the holding of such a meeting meant that the unit was shortly to be involved in an attack.| | | | |
|The following day (12 January 1968) Source and other members of the LAO DONG Youth Group in Company 1 were summoned to a meeting and informed that the Company would attack NHA TRANG. No details, such as date or objectives were provided.| | | | |
|2. The details for the attack were revealed to Company 1 personnel in the following way:| | | | |
|(1) On 11 January 68 company Party members held a meeting;| | | | |
|(2) On 12 January LAO DONG Youth Group members were called to a meeting and informed that the company would attack NHA TRANG;| | | | |
|(3) On 16 January the company Military/Civilian Council held a meeting and all remaining company personnel were informed that NHA TRANG would be attacked;| | | | |
|(4) On 18 January company squad leaders were called together and unit objectives were identified (NHA TRANG Radio and Transformer Stations) and located on a map for them;| | | | |
|(5) On 19 January squad leaders met with their individual squads and discussed their missions;| | | | |
|(6) On 20 January the company had a "Jubilation Ceremony" and the company commander, four squad leaders, and two reconnaissance personnel went to NHA TRANG to reconnoiter company objectives;| | | | |
|(7) On 21 January all company personnel cleaned and checked their weapons and equipment;| | | | |
|(8) On 22 January personnel were issued a twelve-day supply of rice and held a departure ceremony at which everyone took an oath to fight without fear of death. At this time the company departed from BA CUM, KHANH HOA Province for NHA TRANG.| | | | |
|3. Travel to NHA TRANG was on foot during daylight hours through forested areas. Personnel were fed by people living in villages that were passed along the way. On the night of 28 January the company arrived outside NHA TRANG and was rejoined by personnel who had gone over the unit mission and company objectives. These personnel who had gone to reconnoiter informed the unit personnel of the approach route they would use to the objectives. It was at this time that the unit personnel were informed that they would attack at 2400 hours, 29 January.| | | | |
|4. Sixty-two personnel were assigned to Company 1 at the time of the attack. This figure included 15 replacements that had been assigned to the company two or three days before departure from the BA CUM Area. All personnel were NVA personnel. No local force personnel were assigned. Local force personnel of BA CUM were to remain in the area and act as a security force.| | | | |
|5. The company reached its objectives and attacked at 200 hours, 29 January. Because the company commander and the other above-mentioned personnel reconnoitered the approach, the company had no difficulty in reaching its objectives. Once reached, however, they could not be taken because of strong GVN defenses. By 0700 hours, 30 January 1968, the company had lost two men killed and one wounded and was ordered to withdraw from NHA TRANG.| | | | |
|6. Because the unit did not capture its objectives the Source considered the attack to be a failure. This fact made him think that no other VC unit attacking NHA TRANG had succeeded either because his was a much praised, elite unit that was most apt to succeed. Source became convinced that the company would not take its objectives within two or three hours after the attack started because, not yet taken, the arrival of reinforcements would preclude such an event.| | | | |
---
# Approved for Release: _2019/04/17 CO0758585

NIC REPORT NO. 308/68

Page 3

Unit morale was high prior to and during the attack and no change was observed at the time the Source rallied. Morale was high because personnel believed that the attack would lead to ultimate victory in the near future. Prior to notification of the attack on NHA TRANG, many of the unit personnel were in a low state of morale and tired of the war because of the hardships they had to endure.

Source believed that the VC would re-attack SVN cities because they said they would take over the cities. He said that once the Communists say that they will do something, they will not cease their efforts until they have succeeded. He believed that replacements would be sent to the initial attack units from the GIA LAI Province area (his political officer said new NVA infiltration groups were located there) and that when they arrived, a new attack would take place soon after. Source said that any future attack could be predicted by watching VC units for a schedule of events similar to that given in paragraph 2 above. He said that all attacks are preceded by those events. PREPARATION_FOR_AND_ATTAC[15617921].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "NIC Field Exploitation Team, LAQ DONG Youthwere Group, Company I, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B, Division 325",
"What": "Information on planned attack on NHA TRANG in Vietnam, Details of Company I activities and preparations for the attack, Outcome of the attack, Unit morale before and during the attack, Predictions of future VC attacks on SVN cities",
"When": "11 January to 30 January 1968",
"Where": ["NHA TRANG City, KHANH HOA Province, Vietnam", "BA CUM, KHANH HOA Province, Vietnam", "GIA LAI Province area, Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}