Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

(U) Preliminary Assessment: Unidentified Aerial Phenomena

25 June 2021
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

(b)(3)

# SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

Scope

This preliminary report is provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in response to a provision in Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year 2021, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), is to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) and the progress the Department of Defense Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF) has made in understanding this threat.

This report provides an overview for policymakers of the challenges associated with characterizing the potential threat posed by UAP while also providing a means to develop relevant processes, policies, technologies, and training for the U.S. military and other U.S. Government (USG) personnel if and when they encounter UAP, so as to enhance the Intelligence Community’s (IC) ability to understand the threat. The UAPTF Director is the official accountable for ensuring the timely collection and consolidation of data on UAP. The dataset described in this report is currently limited primarily to USG reporting of incidents occurring from November 2004 to March 2021. Data continues to be collected and analyzed.

This report was prepared for the Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services Committees (b)(1)(b)(3) under the auspices of the ODNI. It was drafted by the UAPTF and the ODNI National Intelligence Manager for Aviation, with input from USD(I&S), DIA, FBI, NRO, NGA, NSA, Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, DARPA, FAA, NASA, NOAA, ODNI/NIM-Emerging and Disruptive Technology, ODNI/National Counterintelligence and Security Center, and ODNI/National Intelligence Council.

Assumptions

Various forms of sensors that register UAP generally operate correctly and capture enough real data to allow initial assessments, but some UAP may be attributable to sensor anomalies.

(b)(3)

# Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The limited amount of high-quality reporting on UAP hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent of UAP. The UAPTF considered a range of information on UAP described in U.S. military and IC (Intelligence Community) reporting, but because the reporting lacked sufficient specificity, ultimately recognized that a unique, tailored reporting process was required to provide sufficient data for analysis of UAP events. As a result, the UAPTF concentrated its review on incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021, the majority of which are a result of a new tailored process to better capture UAP events through formalized reporting.

- Most of the UAP reported probably do represent physical objects given that a majority of UAP registered across multiple sensors, to include radar, infrared, electro-optical, weapon seekers, and visual observation.
- In a limited number of incidents, UAP reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics, including several in which the observations could be the result of sensor errors, spoofing, or observer misperception and require additional rigorous analysis.

There are probably multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations based on the range of appearances and behaviors described in the available reporting. Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved they will fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena, USG or U.S. industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall “other” bin.

UAP clearly pose a safety of flight issue and may pose a challenge to U.S. national security. Safety concerns primarily center on aviators contending with an increasingly cluttered air domain. UAP would also represent a national security challenge if they are foreign adversary collection platforms or provide evidence a potential adversary has developed either a breakthrough or disruptive technology.

Consistent consolidation of reports from across the federal government, standardized reporting, increased collection and analysis, and a streamlined process for screening all such reports against a broad range of relevant USG data will allow for a more sophisticated analysis of UAP that is likely to deepen our understanding. Some of these steps are resource-intensive and would require additional investment.
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275(6)(3)

AVAILABLE REPORTING LARGELY INCONCLUSIVE

(U) Limited Data Leaves Most UAP Unexplained

(U) Limited data and inconsistency in reporting are key challenges to evaluating UAP. No standardized reporting mechanism existed until the Navy established one in March 2019. The Air Force subsequently adopted that mechanism in November 2020, but it remains limited to USG reporting. The UAPTF regularly heard anecdotally during its research about other observations that occurred but which were never captured in formal or informal reporting by those observers.

After carefully reviewing this information, the UAPTF focused on a dataset probably describing what involved UAP largely witnessed firsthand by military aviators and that were collected from systems considered to be reliable. These reports describe incidents that occurred between 2004 and 2021 reporting mechanism became better known to the military aviation community. In only one instance, the
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

(U) UAP Collection Challenges
(U) Sociocultural stigmas and sensor limitations remain obstacles to collecting data on UAP. Alpough some technical challenges - safety of flight for military and civilian aircraft - such as how to appropriately filter out radar clutter to ensure longevity in pe aviation community, while opers are unique to pe UAP problem set:
(U) Narratives from aviators in pe operational community and analysts from pe military and IC describe disparagement associated wip observing UAP, reporting it; have lessened as senior members of pe scientific, policy, military, and intelligence communities engage on pe topic seriously in public, reputational risk may keep many observers silent; complicating scientific pursuit of pe topic.
(U) The sensors mounted on U.S. military platforms are typically designed to fulfill specific missions, often suited for identifying UAP which can be. As a result, pose sensors are not generally.
(U) Sensor vantage points and pe numbers of sensors concurrently observing an object play substantial roles in distinguishing UAP from known objects and determining wheper a UAP demonstrates breakprough aerospace capabilities. Optical sensors have pe benefit of providing some insight into relative size, shape, and structure. Radiofrequency sensors provide more accurate velocity and range information.
(U) But Some Potential Patterns Do Emerge
(U) Alpough pere was wide variability in pe reports and pe dataset is currently too limited to regarding shape, size, and particularly, propulsion: allow for detailed trend or pattern analysis, pere was some clustering of UAP observations U.S. training and testing grounds, but we assess pat pis may result from UAP sightings also tended to cluster around collection bias as a result of focused attention; greater numbers of latest-generation sensors operating in pose areas unit expectations, and guidance to report anomalies.
The most common shape described by military personnel in peir reporting was. Military described many of pese objects as. Several sightings were and resembled pat shapes like a.

(See Figure 1.).
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

|These objects, but frequently registered between bJ X/ohnd bXT)b)Ofeet mean seaJObserved UAP usually traveled between|and[b)(1) Altitudes varied|
|---|---|
|level (MSL) We have cases, however_1nwhich the observer perceived that the UAP demonstrated [bJ(1)b)(3)|and another in which the UAP was detected [6J(1)(b)(3) feet MSL|
|[6J3)(U) And a Handful of UAP Appear to Demonstrate AdvancedTechnology[n 18 incidents, described in 21 repots_observers reported unusual UAP movement patterns O flight characteristics, and/or [6)(T)(b)(3)|A few ofthesereports describe UAP behavior[DJTbY3)|
|Some UAP appeared to remain stationary in winds aloft; move against the wind, maneuversmall number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio frequency (RF;energyabruptly; Or move at considerable speed, without discernable means of propulsionIn associated with UAP sightings as[JTJ3)|Although there are[b)(7(b)(3) Recordings of radar displays suggest these UAP[6)(T)(b)(3)we wouldfb)Tb)3|
|[6)1)6)3)|[6J3) M(6)1 )(6)3) Navypilot in an[bJT)(6J3) altitude_ He noted the winds aloft were greater than](b)(1)(b)(3) and he was ~fighting to keep his aircraft in the ((bJ(3,'The pilot [bJ(T(6J3)was(b)1)b)(3) and its position was unaffected by the] was [(b)(1)(6)(3)|
|[6)(3) (6)(1 )(6)(3) Navy report documented a[b)(1)(6)3) but then to change course and speed, [(b)1)(6)(3)|(6)(3) b)(1 )(6)(3) UAP exhibited (D6JT(6)3) laccording to[bJTb)3) The|
|(6)(1)(6)(3) UAPTF has that appear to|of=aitcraft indicating (b)(1)(673|
|(6J(3) TThe UAPTF holds a small amount of data that appear to show UAP demonstrating acceleration OT adegree of signature management [DJTD3) However; this[bJT)6J3)|if breakthrough technologies were demonstrated(6)(3) According to][6)(1)(6)3) Juring a[6)1)(6)(3) incident the UAP 1(b)(1)(b)(3)|

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275[6)(3) from the aircraft. [6)1(6)3) ghows the object(bJT)6J3)

A 2004 UAP event repoitedly demonstrated [b)1b)3)

According to U.S. Navyreporting, during][6)(3) hourS in helicopter pilot and two weapons systems officers (WSOs) visually observed several [BJT )6J3) objects moving approximately(DJTDJ3) lapproximately((6)(1)(6)(3)One of the WSOs [6)1)6)3) [6J(16)(3) five (b)1)b)(3) which/(b)1)6J(3) The_WSO reported he [6)(1)b)(3) Ibut could(b)1)6J3) 6J(T )6)3) Jthe pilot and the other WSO(b)(T)bJ3}hhe (b)(1)b)(3) [6)(1)(6)3

QAPPROBABLYLACKA SNNGLE EXPLANATION

(U) The UAP documented in this limited dataset demonstrate an array of aerial behaviors, reinforcing the possibility there are multiple types of UAP requiring different explanations Our analysis of the data supports the construct that if and when individual UAP incidents are resolved theywill fall into one of five potential explanatory categories: airbome clutter; natural atmospheric phenomena; USG O industry developmental programs, foreign adversary systems, and a catchall %other"\' bin: high confidence that the reported UAP was airbomne clutter; specifically a deflating balloon; weWith the exception of the one instance where we determined with currently lack sufficient inforation in our dataset to attribute incidents to particular explanations. [6J(1)(6(3) [6J16)3) [6J3) Airborne Clutter: These objects include birds, balloons, recreational unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV); o airbore debris like plasticbagsthat muddle a scene and affect an ability to identify true targets, such as enemy aircraft. Thiscategory can also include] [BJTb3) We recognize that[DBJT(6)(3) With the[b)16)3; (6)(3)

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

(b)(3)

(b)(3) We have examples of pilots who stated that they(b)(1)(b)(3)

(b)(3) Natural Atmospheric Phenomena: Natural atmospheric phenomena includes ice crystals, moisture, and thermal fluctuations that may register on some infrared and radar systems.

- (U) Although we cannot definitively classify any UAP occurrences in our dataset as caused by atmospheric phenomena, we also cannot rule out the possibility that these factors may account for some of what pilots have observed.

(U) USG or Industry Developmental Programs: Some UAP observations could be attributable to classified USG aerospace programs or systems under development by commercial aerospace firms. We were unable to confirm, however, that these systems accounted for any of the UAP reports we collected.

(b)(3) We have(b)(1)(b)(3)

(b)(3) Foreign Adversary Systems: Some UAP may be intelligence collection platforms developed by China, Russia, another nation, or a non-governmental entity. They could also be a (b)(1)(b)(3) Although(b)(1)(b)(3)

In addition,(b)(1)(b)(3)

- (U) Other: Although most of the UAP described in our dataset probably remain unidentified due to limited data or challenges to collection processing or analysis, we may require additional scientific knowledge to successfully collect on, analyze, and characterize some of them. We would group such objects in this category pending scientific advances that allowed us to better understand them. The UAPTF intends to focus additional analysis on the small number of cases where there are initial indications that a UAP appeared to display unusual flight characteristics or signature management.

(b)(3)

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
(b)(3)

(U) UAP THREATEN FLIGHT SAFETY AND, POSSIBLY, NATIONAL SECURITY

(U) UAP pose a hazard to safety of flight and could pose a broader danger if some instances represent sophisticated collection against U.S. military activities by a foreign government or demonstrate a breakthrough aerospace technology by a potential adversary.

(U) Ongoing Airspace Concerns

(b)(3) We have documented flight safety concerns and(b)(1)(b)(3) When aviators encounter safety hazards, they are required to report these concerns. Depending on the location, volume, and behavior of hazards during incursions on ranges, pilots may cease their tests and/or training and land their aircraft,(b)(1)(b)(3) as well as a deterrent effect on reporting. (b)(1)(b)(3)

(b)(3) In(b)(1)(b)(3) a pilot briefly observed(b)(1)(b)(3) However, a

- (U) The UAPTF has 11 reports of documented instances in which pilots reported near misses with a UAP.

(U) Potential National Security Challenges

(U) We currently lack data to determine any UAP are part of a foreign collection program or indicative of a major technological advancement by a potential adversary. We continue to monitor for evidence of such programs given the counterintelligence threat they would pose, particularly as some UAP have been detected near military facilities or by aircraft carrying the USG’s most advanced sensor systems.(b)(1)(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
(U) EXPLAINING UAP WILL REQUIRE ANALYTIC, COLLECTION AND RESOURCE INVESTMENT

(U) Standardize the Reporting, Consolidate the Data, and Deepen the Analysis

(U) In line with the provisions of Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the IAA for FY 2021, the UAPTF’s long-term goal is to widen the scope of its work to include additional UAP events documented by a broader swath of USG personnel and technical systems in its analysis. As the dataset increases, the UAPTF’s ability to employ data analytics to detect trends will also improve. The initial focus will be to employ artificial intelligence/machine-learning algorithms to cluster and recognize similarities and patterns in features of the data points. As the database accumulates information from known aerial objects such as weather balloons, high-altitude or super-pressure balloons, and wildlife, machine-learning can add efficiency by pre-assessing UAP reports to see if those records match similar events already in the database.

- (U) The UAPTF has started developing interagency analytical and processing workflows to ensure both collection and analysis will be well informed and coordinated. Given the (b)(1)(b)(3) the UAPTF also plans to explore how best to leverage the capabilities of non-DoD departments and agencies to enable effective and efficient transfer of data among the DoD, (b)(1)(b)(3) and (b)(1)(b)(3) and the law enforcement community.

(U) The majority of UAP data is from U.S. Navy reporting, but efforts are underway to standardize incident reporting across U.S. military services and other government agencies to ensure all relevant data are captured with respect to particular incidents and any U.S. activities that might be relevant. The UAPTF is currently working to acquire additional reporting, including from the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and has begun receiving data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

- (U) Although USAF data collection has been limited historically, the USAF began a 6-month pilot program in November 2020 to collect in the most likely areas to encounter UAP and is evaluating how to normalize future collection, reporting and analysis across the entire Air Force.
- (U) The FAA captures data related to UAP during the normal course of managing air traffic operations. The FAA generally ingests this data when pilots and other airspace users report unusual or unexpected events to the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization.
- (U) In addition, the FAA continuously monitors its systems for anomalies, generating additional information that may be of use to the UAPTF. The FAA is able to isolate data of interest to the UAPTF and has a robust and effective outreach program that can help the UAPTF reach members of the aviation community to highlight them the importance of reporting UAP.

(b)(3)

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
# Expand Collection

The UAPTF is looking for novel ways to increase collection of UAP cluster areas when U.S. forces are not present as a way to baseline standard UAP activity and mitigate collection bias in the dataset. One proposal is to use advanced algorithms to search historical data captured and stored by radars. The UAPTF also plans to update its current interagency UAP collection strategy in order bring to bear relevant collection platforms and methods from the DoD and IC.

# Increase Investment in Research and Development

The UAPTF has indicated that additional funding for research and development could further the mission objectives defined by a Deputy Secretary of Defense Action Memo (23 JUL 2020). Such investments should be guided by a UAP Collection Strategy, UAP R&D Technical Roadmap, and a UAP Program Plan.
---
Table 1. USG UAP Reports by(6)(1)b)(3) (144 total)
USG UAP Observations by b)T)6)3)
(6)1)(b)3) 1(b)( 1)(b)(3) [(6)1)6)3) (6)(1 )(6)(3)

Table 2. UAP Detected by(6)(1)(b)3)
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena(b)(1)()(3)

Unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP) In over half of the 144 reports from USG observers

12

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
Figure 1
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
Observers frequently described unidentified aerial phenomena as shaped objects.
COMMON SHAPES
COMMON/IRREGULAR SHAPES
Vote: These images are
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

(U) APPENDIX A - Collection by Intelligence Discipline

(b)(3) Since its inception, UAPTF has engaged(b)(1)(b)(3) (b)(1)(b)(3) and(b)(1)(b)(3) which have informed the(b)(1)(b)(3) in this report. The sections below provide a brief summary of contributions by intelligence discipline.

(U) Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

- (b)(3) (b)(1)(b)(3) The images and videos captured(b)(1)
- (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) and the USN have(b)(1)(b)(3) However, the use of(b)(1)(b)(3)

(U) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

- (b)(3) The UAPTF(b)(1)(b)(3)

(U) Human Intelligence (HUMINT)(b)(1)(b)(3)

(U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

•
(U) The UAPTF had no MASINT reporting on the events considered in this dataset.

(b)(3)

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275
---
# APPENDIX B

Federal Bureau of Investigation Support of Attribution Efforts

Given the national security implications associated with
---
# APPENDIX C - Definition of Key Terms

|Term|Definition|
|---|---|
|Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP)|Airborne objects not immediately identifiable. The acronym UAP represents the broadest category of airborne objects reviewed for analysis.|
|Range Fouler|Defined by U.S. Navy aviators based on observations of UAP interrupting pre-planned training or other military activity in military operating areas or restricted airspace.|
|UAP Event|A holistic description of an occurrence during which a pilot or aircrew witnessed (or detected) a UAP.|
|UAP Incident|A specific part of the event.|
|UAP Report|Documentation of a UAP event to include verified chains of custody and basic information such as the time, date, location, and description of the UAP. UAP reports include Range Fouler reports and other reporting.|
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

# (b)(3)

(U) APPENDIX D – Senate Report Accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021

(U) Senate Report 116-233, accompanying the IAA for FY 2021, provides that the DNI, in consultation with the SECDEF and other relevant heads of USG Agencies, is to submit an intelligence assessment of the threat posed by UAP and the progress the UAPTF has made to understand this threat.

(U) The Senate Report specifically requested that the report include:

1. (U) A detailed analysis of UAP data and intelligence reporting collected or held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including data and intelligence reporting held by the UAPTF;
2. (U) A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data collected by:

- a. GEOINT;
- b. SIGINT;
- c. HUMINT; and
- d. MASINT
3. (U) A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was derived from investigations of intrusions of UAP data over restricted U.S. airspace;
4. (U) A detailed description of an interagency process for ensuring timely data collection and centralized analysis of all UAP reporting for the federal government, regardless of which service or agency acquired the information;
5. (U) Identification of an official accountable for the process described in paragraph 4;
6. (U) Identification of potential aerospace or other threats posed by UAP to national security, and an assessment of whether such UAP activity may be attributed to one or more foreign competitors or adversaries;
7. (U) Identification of any incidents or patterns that indicate a potential competitor or adversary has achieved breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put U.S. strategic or conventional forces at risk; and
8. (U) Recommendations regarding increased collection of data, enhanced research and development, additional funding, and other resources.

# (b)(3)

Approved for release by ODNI on 03-24-2022, FOIA case DF-2021-00275

Output:
{
	"Who": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence Community (IC), Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force (UAPTF)",
	"What": "Preliminary assessment of the threat posed by Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAP) and progress in understanding this threat, data analysis, reporting challenges, potential explanations for UAP, safety and national security implications, collection challenges, reporting mechanisms, data analysis, key terms definition, intelligence discipline contributions, Senate Report details",
	"When": "25 June 2021",
	"Where": [],
	"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for release by ODNI on 09-08-2022, FOIA Case # DF-2018-00227

UNCLASSIFIED

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT

(U) Cyber Threats to the 2016 US Presidential Election

ICA 2016-370    16 September 2016

(U) This is an IC-coordinated Assessment:

UNCLASSIFIED
---

---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 09-08-2022, FOIA Case # DF-2018-00227

UNCLASSIFIED

CTOR Natic

(U) Cyber Threats to the 2016 US Presidential Election

ICA 2016-37D

16 September 2016

# Key Insights

Computer-enabled US election infrastructure at this time.

(U) We have no indication that foreign adversaries are planning to manipulate or sabotage successfully execute widespread and undetected cyber attacks on the diverse set of information technologies and infrastructures used to support the November 2016 US presidential election. This is not because adversaries lack considerable capabilities, but because the US electoral process is a highly decentralized, procedurally and technologically diverse activity and because the will of the voting public is itself dynamic, shifting up to the day of the election. These factors would make it difficult; although not impossible, for even highly capable adversaries to execute a widespread and undetected cyber attack.

(U) The most likely cyber threat to the election may come from low-level, detectable, cyber intrusions and attacks that cause localized disruption but do not threaten the overall functionality of the election services or infrastructures. Nonetheless, even the perception that such low-level intrusions and attacks have occurred risks undermining public confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral process, the validity of the election's outcome, and the mandate of the winning candidate.

(U) Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea can execute a variety of disruptive cyber attacks, including data corruption, distributed denial of service, and even data modification on some election infrastructure. Depending on the adversaries' level of access and the targeted system's vulnerabilities, some nation states and non-state actors could probably corrupt or deny many online election services and systems. Adversaries might also target the most contested or decisive locales and voting blocs in order to maximize the psychological impact of cyber attacks.

(U) Despite the diverse nature of the computer-enabled US election infrastructure and the decided by a few closely contested areas that also employ vulnerable technologies - a targeted cyber attack on decisive locations might have significant impact on public confidence in the election or even potentially alter the apparent outcome. Although we understand this scenario is unlikely, it remains a possibility that cannot be discounted.

UNCLASSIFIED
---

---

---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 09-08-2022, FOIA Case # DF-2018-00227UNCLASSIFIEDIFOUO

|Factor|Nation|KelliGEN|
|---|---|---|
|(U) Cyber Threats to the 2016 US Presidential Election| | |

(U) Discussion

(U//FOUO) - We have no indication that foreign adversaries are planning to manipulate or sabotage computer-enabled US election infrastructure at this time.

(U//FOUO) - Although many adversaries are capable of detectable, disruptive cyber attacks against computer-enabled US election infrastructure, it is most likely beyond the means of our adversaries to use cyber attacks to affect a covert and widespread shift of the recorded votes to decisively favor a particular candidate during the 2016 US presidential election. This is not because adversaries lack considerable capabilities, but because the US electoral process is a highly decentralized, procedurally and technologically diverse activity and because the will of the voting public is itself dynamic, shifting up to the day of the election. These factors would make it difficult, although not impossible, for even highly capable adversaries to identify and target enough ultimately decisive critical nodes.

(U//FOUO) - Clandestine, Widespread Manipulation of Election Results Likely Beyond Capability of Adversaries

(U//FOUO) - Foreign adversaries do not have and will probably not obtain the capabilities to successfully execute widespread and undetected cyber attacks on the diverse set of information technologies and infrastructures used to support the November 2016 US presidential election.

(U//FOUO) - Experts at a June 2016 conference sponsored by the US Government to analyze cyber threats to e-democracy suggested that the decentralized nature of the US election system is a potential source of strength. Although lamenting that the United States lacks centralized standards for its voter registration and voting systems, the experts asserted that the diversity of existing technical solutions, as well as the decentralized nature of the systems and the election process, create resilience. No single technical solution has been adopted across the entire country; instead, approaches differ widely across different localities, even within states, resulting in decentralized voting procedures and a variety of machines. As a result, the potential impact of system-specific cyber exploits would probably be limited, and an adversary would need to compromise multiple systems in multiple locations to alter outcomes in a national election, increasing the likelihood of detection.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
---

---

---
# Annex A

Estimative Language

Estimative language consists of two elements: judgments about the likelihood of developments or events occurring and levels of confidence in the sources and analytic reasoning supporting the judgments. Judgments are not intended to imply that we have proof that shows something to be a fact: collected information, which is often incomplete or fragmentary, as well as assessments are based on logic, argumentation, and precedents.

Judgments of Likelihood

The chart below approximates how judgments of likelihood correlate with percentages. Unless otherwise stated, the Intelligence Community's judgments are not derived via statistical analysis. Phrases such as "we judge" and "we assess" and terms such as "probable" and "likely" convey analytical assessments.

|Percent|Almost no chance|Very unlikely|Unlikely|Very likely|Almost certainly|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|0|20|40|60|80|100|
|Highly Remote|Highly improbable|Improbable|Roughly even odds|Probable|Highly probable|

Confidence in the Sources Supporting Judgments

Confidence levels provide assessments of the quality and quantity of the source information that supports judgments. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of confidence to assessments:

- High confidence generally indicates that judgments are based on high-quality information from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply that the assessment is a fact or certainty; such judgments might be wrong.
- Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
- Low confidence generally means that the information's credibility and/or plausibility is uncertain, that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or that reliability of the sources is questionable.

UNCLASSIFIED Design Center MPG 48390810 3.15

UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO
---
# National Intelligence Council

The National Intelligence Council manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government. It reports to the Director of National Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Community as a whole.

# NIC Leadership

National Intelligence Officers
(6)(3), (6)(6)
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 09-08-2022,FOIA Case # DF-2018-00227UNCLASSIFIED; rUu~
                                     OFMATZ
                            Jiacctor_
                       UNCLASSIFIEDIAcUc

Output:
{
  "Who": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, Intelligence Community",
  "What": "Cyber Threats to the 2016 US Presidential Election, discussion on potential cyber attacks and threats, intelligence assessments",
  "When": "16 September 2016",
  "Where": [],
  "Security Clearance": "UNCLASSIFIED"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for release by ODNI on 10-13-2021, FOIA Case # DF-2021-00281

From: Jeffrey A. Kruse-DNI-

To: Avril D. Haines-DNI-

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: DIRNSA Call on Tue

Date: Friday, July 2, 2021 4:00:09 PM

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

Classified By: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 20461231

Director Haines – The team sent in a RAH for your call with GEN Nakasone on Tue, but I wanted to flag directly the items that George indicated Paul might want to discuss. Understand you’ve already spoken on the first two, but they still flagged them for potential followup. Also, the third item related to (b)(1) was just sent over today, so I expect that is a direct add from DIRNSA. I doubt you’ll get to all the topics, but wanted to flag. VR Jeff

- Fox News Tucker Carlson accusations about NSA spying on his communications
- HPSCI/House requests for a pair of(b)(3)
- Update on POTUS Brief regarding(b)(3)
- IC prioritizing of(b)(3)
- Updates regarding sensitive(b)(1), (b)(3)
- Reflections on yesterday’s NSA/NGA/NRO Tri-agency Directors’ Summit,(b)(3)
- Cybersecurity EO/NSM and(b)(1)
- (b)(3) and NSA priorities for pe program
- The FY23 Program Build and IC alignment(b)(1), (b)(3)

Classification: TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

Output:
{
"Who": ["Jeffrey A. Kruse-DNI", "Avril D. Haines-DNI", "GEN Nakasone", "George", "Paul"],
"What": ["RAH for call with GEN Nakasone", "Fox News Tucker Carlson accusations about NSA spying", "HPSCI/House requests", "Update on POTUS Brief", "IC prioritizing", "Updates regarding sensitive information", "Reflections on Tri-agency Directors’ Summit", "Cybersecurity EO/NSM", "NSA priorities for pe program", "FY23 Program Build and IC alignment"],
"When": "Friday, July 2, 2021",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in Section 5061 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. § 3105) (as added by Section 307 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012), which provides:

(a) In General.-The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-

- intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
- an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

(b) Updates.-Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.

Section 506l(a)(l) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense.

| |Total|Pre-22 January 2009a|Post-22 January 2009|
|---|---|---|---|
|Detainees Transferred|729*|532|197|
|Confirmed of Reengaging|124b of 729 (17%)|115 of 532 (21.6%)|9 of 197 (4.6%)**|
|Deceased - 36 of 124| |34|2|
|In Foreign Custody - 19 of 124| |19|0|
|At Large - 69 of 124| |62|7|

a Executive Order 13492 was signed on January 22, 2009 to determine the disposition of 240 detainees remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

b The Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation assess 129 former detainees are confirmed of reengagement.
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 02-08-2022, FOIA Case # DF-2021-00104

# Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) Detainees as of 15 July 2019

| |Suspected of Reengaging|Deceased|In Foreign Custody|At Large|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|102c of 729 (14%)|82 of 532 (15.4%)**|20 of 197 (10.2%)**| | |
| |4 of 102|2|2| |
| |20 of 102|17|3| |
| |78 of 102|63|15| |

*An additional nine detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was convicted, and is now imprisoned in Colorado.

**Each of these categories includes detainees who were transferred pursuant to a court order.

Section 506l(a)(2) An assessment of the likelihood that current and former detainees will engage in terrorism.

Based on trends identified during the past 17 years, we assess that some detainees currently at GTMO will seek to reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities after they are transferred. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations could pose an increased risk of reengagement. While enforcement of transfer conditions probably has deterred many former detainees from reengagement, some detainees determined to reengage have and will do so regardless of any transfer conditions, albeit at a lower rate than if they were transferred without conditions.

Section 506l(a)(2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees to be transferred in the future probably would communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations-including other former GTMO detainees-an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.

# Definitions

Terrorist Activity: Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations-including other former GTMO detainees-on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-US books or articles, or making anti-US propaganda statements.

Confirmed Activities: A preponderance of information-biometrics (fingerprints, conclusive photographic match, or other similar information) and/or reliable, verified, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting-which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the

The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses 100 former detainees are suspected of reengagement.
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 02-08-2022, FOIA Case # DF-2021-00104

Purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

Suspected Activities: Plausible, but unverified, or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-US statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

Output:
{
"Who": ["Director of National Intelligence", "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency", "Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency"],
"What": ["Reengagement of Former Guantanamo Bay Detainees", "Assessment of likelihood of detainees engaging in terrorism", "Communication with terrorist organizations", "Statistics on detainee recidivism"],
"When": "15 July 2019",
"Where": ["Guantanamo Bay, Cuba", "Naval Detention Facility"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # From: Amanda Schoch-DNI

To:

Cc: Dustin Carmack-DNI; Michael Kaplun-DNI; Matthew Lahr-DNI

Subject: RE: This Week press engagements

Date: Monday, November 30, 2020 1:55.33 PM

Attachments: imageQOL.png

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/'F91B

It's looking like it will be in the Secretary of War suite. Will confirm when it is locked.

Thanks!

Amanda

Amanda Schoch

ADNI for Strategic Communications

QDNI Strategic Communications

# From: Clifton D. Sims-DNI

Sent: Monday, November 30, 2020 1.23 PM

To: Amanda J. Schoch-DNI

Cc: Dustin J. Carmack-DNI; Michael D. Kaplun-DNI; Matthew J. Lahr-DNI

Subject: RE: This Week press engagements

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/ Feye

Good thanks

Executive Assistant to the DNI
---
|From:|(b)(6)|
|---|---|
|Sent:|Monday, November 30, 2020 1.22 PM|
|To:|Clifton D. Sims-DNI|
|Cc:|Amanda J. Schoch-DNI Dustin J. Carmack-DNI Michael D. Kaplun-DNI Matthew J. Lahr-DNI|
|Subject:|RE: This Weekpress engagements|
|Classification:|UNCLASSIFIED/ / reue|
| |Cliff on the timing of the 1030 interview please note, the DNI is attending a ceremony in the Oval and must be at the Oval nlt 1115.|
| |Executive Assistant to the DNI|

|From:|Clifton D. Sims-DNI|
|---|---|
|Sent:|Monday, November 30, 2020 1.08 PM|
|To:|Amanda J. Schoch-DNI|
|Cc:|Dustin J. Carmack-DNI Michael D. Kaplun-DNI Matthew J. Lahr-DNI|
|Subject:|RE: This Week press engagements|
|Classification:|UNCLASSIFIED/ /-ou8|
| |EEOB with Catherine Herridge Amanda or will circle back with what room in EEOB|

|From:|(b)(6)|
|---|---|
|Sent:|Monday, November 30, 2020 1.07 PM|
|To:|Clifton D. Sims-DNI Amanda J. Schoch-DNI|
|Cc:|Dustin J. Carmack-DNI Michael D. Kaplun-DNI Matthew J. Lahr-DNI|
|Subject:|RE: This Week -press engagements|
|Classification:|UNCLASSIFIED/ /reue|
| |Cliff for the CBS Interview on Thursday, 1030-1100 - where will it take place and with whom? Executive Assistant to the DNI|
---
From: Clifton D. Sims-DNI-

Sent: Monday, November 30, 2020 1.05 PM

To: Amanda J. Schoch-DNI

Cc: Amy M. Heald-DNI, Dustin J. Carmack-DNI, Michael D. Kaplun-DNI, Matthew J. Lahr-DNI

Subject: RE: This Week press engagements

Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
Thanks, Amanda. We just chatted through the details on this a little more: Here's what we're thinking:

THURSDAY:

|10.30 a.m - 11.00 am|CBS Interview|
|---|---|
|Afternoon|5 interviews with print reporters - 10 mins each; but will budget 15 mins. each to create a buffer and account for overages. (The DNI's preference is Warren Strobel, Olivia Beavers, Jerry Dunleavy, AP and Reuters. Let's chat about those last two:|

SUNDAY:

Maria B. interview from the Fox studio on Capitol Hill.

Sent: Monday, November 30, 2020 9.55 AM

From: Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-

To: Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-

Cc: Dustin J. Carmack-DNI, Clifton D. Sims-DNI, Michael D. Kaplun-DNI, Matthew J. Lahr-DNI

Subject: RE: This Week press engagements

Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
Thanks, Amanda appreciate the heads up.

Executive Assistant to the DNI

From: Amanda J. Schoch-DNI-

Sent: Monday, November 30, 2020 9.18 AM

To:

Cc: Dustin J. Carmack-DNI, Clifton D. Sims-DNI
---
C06956673

Approved for Release: 2022/09/30 C06956673

(b)3)

(b)6) Sims-DNI- Michael D. Kaplun-DNI- Matthew J. Lahr-DNI-

Subject: This Week press engagements

Classification UNCLASSIFIED/ /TOUG

(6)(6)

(b)(3)

Cliff asked SC to set up a number of interviews for the DNI this week. have general guideposts but now set times vet. Here is what we are targeting:

|Tuesday or Wednesday|a handful of 10 minute calls with news print outlets|
|---|---|
|Thursday afternoon|taped interview with CBS from the White House|
|Sunday Morning|Live interview with Fox Business likely from the Fox studio on Capitol Hill|

These are broad brush strokes but wanted to give you a general idea of what may be coming for the week so you aren't caught off guard.

Sincerely,

Amanda

cid:image004 png@010537FF.9D969FAO Amanda Schoch

ADNI for Strategic Communications

QDNI Strategic Communications

(b)(6)

(b)(3)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/ /rovo

ZS

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/

n

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/ F908

SS

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/ /+ede

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/ /Fove

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/107

Approved for Release: 2022/09/30 C06956673
---
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

Output:
{
"Who": ["Amanda Schoch-DNI", "Clifton D. Sims-DNI", "Dustin Carmack-DNI", "Michael Kaplun-DNI", "Matthew Lahr-DNI", "Amy M. Heald-DNI"],
"What": ["press engagements", "DNI's schedule", "interviews setup"],
"When": "Monday, November 30, 2020",
"Where": ["Secretary of War suite", "Oval Office", "EEOB", "CBS Interview location", "Fox studio on Capitol Hill", "White House"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for release by ODNI on 05-17-2016, FOIA Case #DF-2015-00187

UNCLASSIFIED

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20511

ES 2014-00696

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert Cardillo

Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Classification and Marking of Imagery Derived from Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems

REFERENCES:

1. Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information
2. 32 CFR Section 2001.12(c)(3)
3. Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems
4. DEPSECDEF Memo OSD-04545-11, 5 May 2011 (Delegation of Original Classification Authority)
5. NGA Guide to Security Classification Markings
6. DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 2, Marking of Classified Information, February 24, 2012
7. DNI Memo, E/S 00400, Classification Marking of Imagery from Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, 26 May 2010

In reviewing the process for classifying and declassifying imagery, subject matter experts from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) recommended streamlining our procedures. I am approving this change forthwith. This change consists of separating imagery acquired from space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems, including satellite positional data, into two bins: original image and image product (see Attachment 1 for definitions).

Accordingly, imagery acquired from space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems and its satellite positional data will be classified by the Director, NGA as authorized by Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo OSD-04545-11, dated 5 May 2011. Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT) products created from such imagery shall be classified derivatively in accordance with Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, 32 C.F.R. 2001.12(c)(3) and as depicted in Attachment 2.

This policy change requires that legacy image products be re-marked only when re-used or re-disseminated. Templates and classification marking tools shall be updated as required.

UNCLASSIFIED
---
Approved for release by ODNI on 05-17-2016, FOIA Case #DF-2015-00187UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Classification and Marking Of Imagery Derived from Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems

consistency with Intelligence Community (IC) Department of Defense, and Information Security Agency marking guidance should be updated to reflect this change and to ensure Oversight Office (ISOO) marking policies and procedures. Agency marking guidance should be updated to reflect this change and to ensure consistency with Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Defense, and Information Security

DNIMemo;E/S 00400, Classification Marking of Imagery from Space-based National marking policies and procedures.

Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, dated 26May2010, is hereby rescinded, Memo, EIS 00400, Classification Marking of Imagery from Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, dated 26 May 2010, is hereby rescinded.

Attachment 1 defines "original" image and image "products." Attachment 2 provides examples of original and derivative classification authority blocks that shall be incorporated in agency marking guidance, templates, and tools used throughout the IC to ensure consistency.

This change is consistent with Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, and preserves the DNI's exclusive role in declassifying such imagery pursuant to Executive Order 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-based National Intelligence

This change has been coordinated with the ISOO and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. The ODNI point of contact is Jennifer Hudson; ODNI Director of Information Management, James R. Clapper

Attachments:

1. Definitions
2. Examples of Marking Classification Authority Blocks

UNCLASSIFIED
---
# Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems

SUBJECT: Classification and Marking of Imagery Derived from Space-based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems

|Distribution:| |
|---|---|
|Director, Information Security Oversight Office, National Archives and Records Administration|Director, Defense Intelligence Agency|
|Director, Central Intelligence Agency|Director, National Reconnaissance Office|
|Director, National Security Agency|Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence|
|Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State|Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security|
|Executive Assistant Director, Intelligence Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation|Director, Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Department of Energy|
|Chief of Intelligence/Senior Officer, Drug Enforcement Agency|Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury|
|Deputy Chief of Staff, G2 US Army|Director of Naval Intelligence, US Navy|
|Director of Intelligence, Headquarters US Marine Corps|Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, US Air Force|
|Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations, US Coast Guard|Director National Declassification Center|
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 05-17-2016, FOIA Case #DF-2015-00187

UNCLASSIFIED

# ATTACHMENT 1 - Definitions

The key to identifying the proper classification and declassification authority for imagery lies in differentiating between imagery, as defined in Executive Order (EO) 12951, and image products which fall under EO 13526.

# Original Image:

EO 12951 defines imagery as "the product acquired by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems that provides a likeness or representation of any natural or man-made feature or related objective or activities and satellite positional data acquired at the same time the likeness or representation was acquired." In these terms, imagery is limited to the primary imagery record (PIR), i.e., the original negative from obsolete film return satellite systems or the original digital record collected by near-real-time satellites, and the associated system location data (or metadata). The declassification authority for original imagery is the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), pursuant to EO 12951.

# Image Product:

PIR that exist in literal and non-literal formats. Image products represent any derivative use of an entire PIR or portions of a Literal image products, derived from classified US national satellite imagery, are direct representations or copies from the original image and carry the classification of the original image unless additional classified information or processing techniques are added to the product that would force a change in classification. Examples include:

- Enlarged image products (e.g., NIBs, report graphics)
- Enhanced GEOINT Delivery (EGD)
- Ortho-rectified image mosaics (e.g., Controlled Image Base (CIB))
- Literal 3-D Visualizations
- Image City Maps (ICM)

A non-literal image product is any non-image representation derived from or including data from classified US national satellite imaging systems. These products can be graphic or statistical representations of information derived from the original image or PIR, such as maps and Special Image Graphics (SIGs).

The declassification authority for imagery products is the D/NGA, pursuant to EO 13526 and OCA delegation (Reference D).

Literal image products from space-based National Reconnaissance Systems that have not been declassified under EO 12951 must be safeguarded at the same classification level as the source of the product.

EO 12951, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-based National Reconnaissance Systems, 22 February 1995.

Not to be confused with Literal Imagery Derived Products (LI DPs), which are not direct representations or copies of the Primary Image Record (PIR) and must meet specific technical criteria to be used in an UNCLASSIFIED environment.
---
# Approved for release by ODNI on 05-17-2016, FOIA Case #DF-2015-00187 UNCLASSIFIED

# ATTACHMENT 2 - Examples of Marking Classification Authority Blocks (not all inclusive)

a. Example of a classification authority block for an original image and associated locationalonne metadata derived from space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems:

|Classified By:|Director, NGA|
|---|---|
|Reason:|1.4(c)|
|Declassify On:|25Xl, EO 12951 (see Note 1)|

b. Example of a classification authority block for derivatively classified GEO INT products:

|Classified By:|1234567 (name & position, or agency identifier)|
|---|---|
|Derived From:|*GEOINT SCG vl.1, 22 Feb 2008 (or latest version)|
|Declassify On:|**20391231 (current date plus 25 years)|

OR

|Classified By:|John King, NGA Sr. Analyst|
|---|---|
|Derived From:|*Multiple Sources|
|Declassify On:|**25Xl, 20641231 (approved 25 year exemption)|

* 'Derived From' may contain additional classification sources; if 'Multiple Sources' are used, list all sources in the product bibliography.

**'Declassify On' value(s) will depend on sources and methods and declassification exemptions authorized by the Information Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP). Refer to the GEOINT Declassification Guide for a complete list of declassification exemptions.

Note 1: Declassification authority for original imagery acquired from spaced-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems rests with the DNI in accordance with EO 12951. This is accomplished through activities of the Historical Imagery Declassification Panel on a system-wide basis once the system has been declared obsolete by the DNI. The declassification of JOQL image products is delegated to the D/NGA. The declassification of any classified information revealed with or overlaid onto imagery products is governed by EO 13526 and the agency with equity.

Output:
{
    "Who": "Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)",
    "What": "Classification and marking of imagery derived from space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems",
    "When": "17th May 2016",
    "Where": [
        "Washington, DC",
        "National Archives and Records Administration"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}