Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:

---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830 3.5(c)
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830SbLrz

# C 0 N T E N T S

Information as of noon EST, December 1967

|THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE|Far East|Page|
|---|---|---|
|VIETNAM|Recent developments in the area surrounding Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province suggest that the Communists may be preparing for another major offensive. The recent resignation of Police Director Loan and the conviction of some vulnerable generals eased to Communist infiltration appears to have generated friction over the attempted inefficient|NR SECRET|

# WEEKLY SUMMARY Dec67

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
# SECRET FAR EAST

Military activity in South Vietnam remained at relatively low levels last week but there were indications that Communist forces are preparing for a new offensive in northwestern Quang Tri near the Demilitarized Zone. There was further evidence of closer coordination between scattered Viet Cong and North Vietnamese operations relieving allied pressure with Viet Cong forces aimed at harassing attacks at widely scattered points.

With the approach of holiday truce periods, there have been renewed efforts to persuade the Soviets to agree to talks if the US refrained from setting the terminal date for the projected bombing pause. The North Vietnamese have not joined the Soviets in this effort and there is no indication that the Soviets are acting at Hanoi's behest. However, heightened concern that the war might spread into Cambodian territory was evident in Phnom Penh. The Cambodian statement reserved the right to pursue Communist forces into its territory, warning against any false pretexts on Cambodian soil and again denied that there are Communist forces on Cambodian territory.

# WEEKLY SUMMARY Dec 67
---
# SECRET

VIETNAM

|areas surrounding Khe Sanh in the western Quang Tri Province|Recent developments in tactical vi over the Vietnam|
|---|---|
|significant miles east of Saitozl|force battalion preparing for another major gest that the Communists may of be early this Dec some soldiers were killed 235 enemy about six day-long battle 13 Americans were Vietnamese and Forty-one South|
|Province suggest Cong 50 2nd week force battalion|staging from the US Marine US reconnaissance patrols rison numerous small enemy forces at Khe Sanh have encountered|
|gar- tered in the mountains northwest of their base|The engagement resulted from an allied probe deep into Viet Cong controlled territory - the first in this particular area|
|Special Forces positionshave been and recoil and other nearby friendly field atedly since 1961 US military offi- cials credited the strong of the lead- ership and aggressiveness with|cut deeply into the ful encounter that of the enemy trength unit|
|attacked by mortar recent weeks repe less increase in rifle fire tiated activity maybe|This Communist-initiated large-scale offensive prelude to costly ambush into success|
|lines Heavy overland rainshave disrupted monsoon allied upply|unit_ Politics in South Vietnam|
|movements of Long range tacti reconnaissance patrols into Khe Sanh only Vei Lang east--is road access Route 9_-the to and vehicular from presently will not be the upply points|Therecent friction gen- erated over of Police Director Loan and the conviction of some generalsthat the new government|
|closed to is inefficient and vulnerable generalsthat the new government|appears to have infiltration ap- to Communist eased for the moment troops and South Vietnamese Ma - In the Mekong De lta US|
|3.3(h)(2)|WEEKLY SUMMARY Dec 6 7|

Page

SECRET
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830Tl7-100" 108|104|
|---|---|
|c (H N N 0 R T h c H 1 N A B U RM V | E N A M HanOL = 6 ( L F "f L A 0 S To N K [N HATnAN VIENTTANE DemilifarizedZone Lang Vei Khe Sank Seecial ForcesCamp Hue T HA I L A N D IDa Nang BANGKOK A MB D 1 A TONLESAF GULF Or SIAM PHNOM PENH BICoN 5a -Dec SEA DAOPHU Quoc(Vietnam) SBerET cHINS 100 50 Miles 1C0 50 Kilometers CON SON sou"h 68883 12-67CIA SPERET| |
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830| |
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830

3.3(h)(2)

The moderating influence KyfarexertedbyVicePresident S0 whor reportedlyheadedoff Loantoaskingtheothergeneralsandbyhave chancetomay tion givethe governmentstabilizing effect thatThegovernmenthas announced Buddhiststrugglemovement, 1966ome20 leadersofthewhich centered in HueandDa Nang, will Sovietdiplomatspastweekon several be broughttoincludeseveralThe20 trial on 19Decem-army occasions duringthe ber be broughttoincludeseveralThe20 trial on 19Decem-army occasions duringthe ber includeseveralThe20 trial on 19Decem-army occasions duringthe ber officersand NguyenVanMan formermayorofDa Nang trialislikely to raise furor timewouldleadtotalkswithto amongoppositionelements p-ticularly militantBuddhistspar- the LowerHouse andoppositiondeputiesinthe to projectedpauseinVietnamduringthetothe bombing ofNorthday:effortsconducted prior TheUpperHouseinLowerHousehascallingjoined holi Theyaresimilar withthe Soviet totheChristmas truce period mobilizationdecreegovernmentreviewofthe Bothhouses proachesalthough there15are lastYearalongthislineisnoFurtherSovietap- haveclaimedthatthedecree expected proval becauseithaveinvitedgove rn-ap-an atHanoi behest 3.5(c) ment representatives toappear before thentode fendit

# SECRET

Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 8 Dec67

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
NR
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
Page
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03187830 "WEEKLY SUMMARY_15472969_.pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Unknown",
	"What": "Weekly summaries on military activity in South Vietnam, potential Communist offensives, political developments, coordination between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, efforts for holiday truces and talks",
	"When": "December 1967",
	"Where": ["Vietnam", "Far East", "Quang Tri Province", "Demilitarized Zone", "Phnom Penh", "Cambodian territory", "Hue", "Da Nang", "Saitozl", "Khe Sanh", "Mekong Delta", "Soviet", "Hanoi", "Cambodian soil", "Lang Vei"],
	"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181

The President's Daily Brief

Secret 20 December 1967

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
# DAILY BRIEF

|20 DECEMBER 1967|
|---|
|1. South Vietnam|3.3(h)(2)|
|2. Philippines|3.3(h)(2)|
---
# Communist China

Preparations for the next nuclear test are progressing.

# Common Market

Britain's application to join the Common Market has been formally vetoed by France. This was an avowal of Paris' isolated position--and as such was a "success" for the Five. The ball is now in their court. Their ability to do anything will probably depend on Germany's attitude. The Germans may try to play the crisis. Bonn's partners among the Five, however, are likely to attempt to smooth things over. German...

# Greece

Negotiations for the King's return have so far run into a stone wall. King Constantine has described the junta's latest terms as a deliberate attempt to humiliate and completely unacceptable. Other emissaries, however, still want to try and have the junta appear to their hands, and recognition seems still possible.
---
# Czechoslovakia

|6.|The off, last central week committee meeting post- from is apparently about to come and rancorous divisions among some duce the leadership fireworks. Thenow probably rumor mill pro- asis working overtime, but it sort looks if siveresult the compromise might that the has enabled inconclu-of the re- ime to muddle throu h ast crises.|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)| |

# Yemen

3.3(h)(2)

# Congo

|8.|Schramme and in his Rwanda. mercenaries are wants is languishing and in making them back get noisesthe discuss Kayibanda two his in about Congo sending for Mobututrial, army to hand them them if still refuses to over. The leaders were to the problem again today.|
|---|---|
|3.5(c)| |
---
#

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

20 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

20 December 1967

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

No Sign continuing of Give: North Vietnamese spokesmen abroad are to parrot the hard line on settling the war. They precede that insist in any an unconditional end to bombing must negotiations, and their terms. settlement a must be in accordance with last During Tran week, a lengthy Viet Dung, refused interview counselor with a journalist of Hanoi's representation for in France, to consider any suggestions achieving a settlement except on claimed the of well-known the basis the Communist positions. He and placed that blame American war squarely on the US the make is it to destroy North Vietnam's sovereignty influence." and part of the that US the "sphere much Dung also claimed Liberation but Front was unable stronger agree than "Saigon clique" he proposal to to or "compromise" to North even comprehend--a safely that, agree if to this was so, the Vietnamese could a government in the South. Communists Front of are Anniversary the using the Propaganda: anniversary seventh of the founding Liberation Front war. voice to their determination to press on with the
---
# TOP

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

* * *

Poles Talk to Governorthe Romney on Vietnam: on "feeds Foreign Minister Rapacki of is told preventing which Governor Sundayon choosing Rapacki a that the is itself," point "mechanism" at work has and repeatedly went how bombing. Rapacki, escalation, made on negotiations-- before. give words after his begin guarantees carefully, to say that he could no as to soon negotiations would cessation of How-

would a become in said unconditional ever, experience" weeks an would elapse and halt and the ing only that knows possible." Rapacki few after the last had year "reasons" half before a that negotiations to "sufficient for the "think- bombing, well added He "US Government lead perfectly that stopping the bombing would to negotiations."

3.3(h)(2)

* * *

-2-

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181

|3.3(h)(2)|Miscellaneous Comments on Living Conditions:|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|Refugees details further who left of the austere life in frequently in the city, Hanoi. Electric power was but that portable generators seemed to take up the slack.|
|3.3(h)(2)| |

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

There was an active black market in Hanoi and that had rationed a right commodity marketeer; was purchased could be by those were to price. Black on I lit relatively actions easy identify that If trans carried out but the street. Marketeer the authorities observed the sale, not black would if even foodstuffs, had be he fined on been caught spot, before. and punished Rice watches other and further, cigarettes, clothing, were popular items on the black market.

3.3(h)(2)

The criterion for determining performed of the size rations was the amount of physical labor

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Officials: Front A 15 Reports on December of Liberation Planned Meeting Front reference Of-with commentary US includes of reports the a first planned Vietnamese between meeting Communist US and Front to officials in Saigon. The statement tricks that says have "all bankrupt--including deceitful the US aggressor" their vile proposal giving peace act of the rise gone to a myth about the so-called of Front to send representatives to the United Nations, the and Embassy the points. on about these in Front's Saigon. Representatives It went statement coming The of on to Front underscore did not to comment to the independence determination importance and "Vietnamese order and the voice "surge the forward the on all of battlefields" the in the people" to "realistically to greet" anniversary of Front.

3.5(c)

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974181 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602384].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President",
    "What": "Daily briefings on various countries including South Vietnam, Philippines, Communist China, Common Market, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yemen, Congo, North Vietnam",
    "When": "20 December 1967",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Philippines", "China", "Britain", "France", "Germany", "Greece", "Czechoslovakia", "Yemen", "Congo", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi"],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT no: 150

SUBJECT: QUANG DA Special Zone; Organization, Geographic Boundaries, and Military Units Within.

DATE OF INFO: 5 February 1968

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 17 February 1968 (C) on the Central Vietnam staff

DATE: 35/3/68

NUMBER OF PAGES: 3

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 17 February 1968 (C) on the Central Vietnam staff

DATE: 35/3/68

NUMBER OF PAGES: 3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2019/04/17
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758625

The QUANG DA-DANANG Special Zone was established during November and December 1967 to take charge of all military/political activities within the zone at the request of the Central Vietnam (Regions Bo) Staff, an organization which ranks Region V over VIET GONG (VC) Military character of the Government of Vietnam and Allied forces in the area. Its creation was a response to the large and modern including the large installations in DANANG Municipality. Considered fully developed by January 1968, the Special Zone is composed of 11 Districts: VC HOA VANG, DIEN BAN, DAI UC, DUY XUYEN, TAY GIANG, BAC GIANG, NAM GIANG, HOI and Districts 1, 2 and 3. District 1 runs from the HUE and District 3 comprises the DONG GIANG area of NHON NUOC. The VC established in conjunction to THUY TU; District 2 falls within DANANG Municipality, BAC GIANG and NAM GIANG are newly created districts which TAY GIANG, are bounded by the THUONG DUC River. Of the 11 districts; District 2 is considered as the most critical. The cadres of District 2 will compose the DANANG Administrative Committee if the VC succeed in their offensive.

The Special Zone has both a headquarters base command staff and a mobile staff. The mobile staff is composed of about 20 officers who have mobile 15-watt radio. The command level, located at QUE SON Mountain, and who operate in DUY XUYEN, AI LOC, and GO NOI areas. DUY XUYEN is staffed by the following personnel: At HQ PHUOC, political officer of field grade rank, also a committee member of Military Region 5; Senior Colonel HOE, Assistant Chief; Colonel VO THU, Chief of the Special Zone; Major DUC, Chief of Staff; Major HOAN, Chief of the Staff Section; Lieutenant Colonel DU, Chief of the Political section; Chief of the Rear Service Section (name unknown).
---
f0_r Release: 2019/>(_)_4_/717 CO0758625

Appr0\v/ed,

F,

Page 3

The following VC units are in pe QUANG BA/DANANG zone and are available for use in pe general offensive.
A. Sapper Battalion T87, Composed of approximately 350 people and located norp of DANANG in pe NAM 0 area.
B. Sapper Battalion T89, composed of about 350 people and located in HAO THO and HOA THAI Villages near DANANG City.
C. Two rocket regiments (575 and 577) whose total strengp is approximately 2,100 men. Bop units are located west of DANANG City at approximately AT 810760.
D. Provincial Mobile Battalion R20 composed of approximately 500 people. It is located soup of DANANG and is operating in GO' A NOI, DU! XUYEN, and DAI LOC Districts.
E. Provincial Mobile Battalion R25, composed of about 500 troops. Located soup of DANANG, it is operating in HOI AN and DUY XUYEN Districts.
F. Norp Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment 31 which infiltrated from Norp Vietnam during January 1968 is located at AN HOA Village area; DUY XUYEN Districts.
G. One Special Mobile Company located inside DANANG City for pe General offensive, led by Company Commander HIEN, and Assistant Commander THAN who is also a DANANG City Security Committee Member. The strengp of pis company is approximately 140 people, most being between pe ages of 16 and 17. Their mission is to destroy gas tanks, power stations, and to occupy pe DANANG weapons depot during pe offensive. In addition, pey are to discover enemy intelligence personnel and peir employees and to eiper assassinate or kidnap pem. The unit is armed wip pistols (wip silencers) submachine guns, and TNT.
H. The DANANG City Combined Operational Section. This unit is charged wip pe mission of proselyting bop GVN military personnel and all classes of civilian personnel wipin pe DANANG City area.

X 3 3(h)(2) QUANG_DA_SPECIAL_ZONE__OR[15617798].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Vietnam (Regions Bo) Staff, South Vietnam Report no: 150",
    "What": "Organization, Geographic Boundaries, and Military Units Within QUANG DA Special Zone",
    "When": "5 February 1968",
    "Where": ["QUANG DA-DANANG Special Zone", "DANANG Municipality", "QUE SON Mountain", "DUY XUYEN", "AI LOC", "GO NOI", "NAM 0 area", "HAO THO", "HOA THAI Villages", "AN HOA Village", "DONG GIANG", "NHON NUOC"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005072858

|0.0|nzguzlssssn ossosss|zx K 0|L DE|
|---|---|---|---|
|o ososxsz zvn|FM CIA|A| |
|TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM-|SSO ACSI DA.|SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION|AFSSO USAF|
|CWO|A| | |
|DIA/ISC|A| | |
|JCS|A| | |
|NIC|A| | |
|NSA COMMAND CENTER|A| | |
|STATE (RC1)| | | |
|CIA-DCI| | | |
|ZEM-| | | |
|CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN-BLUESEM SECTION 1 OF 2-|33-(h)(2)-| | |
|012 TDCS 514/04205-as (ADVANCE) REPORT-CLASS-CONFIDENTIAL-NO-FOREIGN-DISSEM-| | | |
|COUNTRY|SOUTH VIETNAM| | |

II CORPS SITUATION REPORT AS-OF 13 HOURS 8 MARCH

SUBJECT ACQ SOURCE

1. THE SITUATION WAS GENERALLY QUIET CITY, PLEIKU THROUGHOUT THE II PROVINCE, AND KONTUM CITY, KONTUM PROVINCE, CORPS AREA DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS, PLEIKU REPORTED MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS, WHILE PHAN THIET CITY, THREATS OF LARGE SCALE SMALL ARMS FIRE-NEAR THE EXPERIENCED ATTACKS CONTINUE HAVE REPORTED IN THE HIGHLANDS AND SOME UNEASINESS NOTICEABLE II CORPS LOCAL POPULACE, A CERTAIN AREAS, PEOPLE IN THE COASTAL PROVINCES IN APPEAR TO BE VIETNAMESE CONG (VC) PROVINCE SEEM TO ATTACKS, THAT FORWARD, FROM FEAR OF THE VC CAN STRIKE AT TREMENDOUS. ECONOMICALLY. THE VIET THE PREPARING FORTIFICATIONS FOR IN. PHU YEN HAVE ADDITIONAL BELIEVE MADE A HILL AND THEIR LEAP ATTITUDES OF ADVERSE OF 7 MARCH, PLEIKU CITY, PLEIKU VARY ARE CONVINCED THE VC-TO BELIEF THE U,S, IS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE THE ROUNDS OF BZMM MORTAR FIRE, PRESSURE AT HOME, AS YET, NIGHT PROVINCE, RECEIVED SO NO CASUALTIES HAD BEEN REPORTED AND ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE WAS INFLICTED ON THE AREA, ONE ENEMY ROCKET 5, MACV HEADQUARTERS, KONTUM 8 MARCH, ROUND AT 0110 DURING LOCATED AROUND KONTUM CITY, HOURS, NO DAMAGE REPORTED TO THE INSTALLATION, HAMLETS THE NIGHT OF 7 MARCH, ENEMY FORCES ACTION HAS BECOME A INITIAL TET FOOD WHILE IN OF ENTERED NUMEROUS THIS TYPE SINCE THE START OF THE BUY OR TAKE AND DAK. TO HAS A, ATTACKS, ENEMY BEENTHALTED COPYROAD OF INTERDICTION BY ENEMY THE TROOPS PROPAGANDIZE, HAMLETS, BECAUSE TRAVEL BETWEEN RECRUIT, AND KONTUM CITY MINES,

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005072858
---
I           IN DARLAC PROVINCE, 1949/29°J2§€8NuR To ADDITIONAL ENEMY DEPLOY AROUND THE CITY OF BAN. UNITS HAVE BEEN REPORTED INFILTRATING SOME OF THESE NEW PROVINCES. BELIEVED TO BE OF REGIMENTAL SIZE.

WEEK ON 7BAN ME THUOT EXPERIENCED ITS TO REMAIN NIGHT OF THE ALTHOUGH MARCH, THE PEOPLE CONTINUE OF NEW ENEMY ATTACKS. HAMLETS VC CONTROL, THE PROVINCE. CELEBRATING TAKING THE AND ARE EXPLOITING ARE MANY VILLAGES OF THE TET THROUGHOUT ADVANTAGE AND THIS CONTROL IN THEY ATTACKS. TYPE AREAS TELLING VILLAGERS THE VC ARE BY THEIR "VICTORY" IN RECEIVED ATTACK FROM ME THUOT AND OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL ARE PROMISING THAT VIETNAM (COSVN) SOUTH THE PEOPLE OF THE ON 5 MARCH A SERIOUS TO ORDERS BAN LAUNCHED WHICH ME THUOT, THEY HAVE REPUBLIC LOCATION 12 (ARVN) AN ARVN NORTH THAT OF VIETNAM KILOMETERS BATTALION. SAME ARMY AT A NEW ATTACKS WILL OPERATION OF BAN WAS STARTED DEFEAT TO BEEN DEPLOYED RESULT-TWO BE SHORTLY. AN RESULTED IN BATTALIONS ENEMY CITY IS AS A IN THE OF THESE HAVE AREA AGAINST THE ARVN ADDITIONAL WELL-FORTIFIED THE FORCE. NOW MUCH MORE TROOPS LEAVING BAN ME THUOT, GROUND ASSAULT. VULNERABLE TO AN GENERALLY QUIET DURING FIRE WERE 5. THE SITUATION THE PHAN THIET, BINH THUAN PROVINCE WAS ENEMY IN NIGHT OF 7 MARCH. WEST TO NORTH- AND SMALL PROBING REPORTED WERE ALSO DETECTED, SEPARATE INCIDENTS OF SCATTERED SMALL ARMS ACTIONS.

NEST OF THE CITY LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE. MORTARING AN ENEMY BUT THESE WERE OF 6. 7 DUE PRIMARILY TO THE 4 MARCH OF THE THE LOKVL POPULACE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF OF CAM RANH GROUND ASSAULT HAVE SPREAD THROUGH AIRFIELD, WIDESPREAD RUMORS CAM RANH AREA. THE REPORTED THE AND NEW FACES" IN HOMES OF THE AN PEOPLE HAVE SEAT LAM DON, CITY QUANG BY THE MANY HAMLETS NEAR RESIDENTS ARE FORTIFYING THEIR OF "STRANGE GOVERNMENT PROVINCES, THREE WERE NOT HIT DUC AT BA NGOI. PROVINCES IN IITHUAN, WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE AND RECRUITMENT OFFENSIVE, HAVE ALL REPORTED ACTIVITY IS IN VC ACTIVITY HAMLET COUNTRYSIDE. 7. NINH CORPS GENERALLY THIS ENEMY'S. TET THE FORM OF IN ENTRY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSEf- EODD COLLECTION. or YOUTHS. CENSUS GRIEVANCE THERE INCREASED VC UCTIVITY, IN THE THE UNEASINESS WHILE OF VIETNAM- s;HHH2) sxns As INDICATE or THE IS A GENERAL REPORTS A THESE THERE HAS REMAIN STEADY EROSION _HIaHwAYs - cevN> ORIENTED, PROVINCES BEEN A BASICALLY GOVERNMENT RESULT PEOPLE IN IN THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE IN NINH FOR THE MOST PART, BUT THHAN, ROUTES 1 GVN'S ABILITY AND PROTECT DONG, ROUTE 20, AND.11, IN QUANG NUC TRAFFIC 'IS TO IN LAM THEM. ARE SUBJECT PHU YEN PROVINCE, APPROXIMATELY 3200 HOMES HAVE .OPENT0-CONSTANT VC HARASSMENT-AND ATTACKS BEEN DESTROYED, As A RESULT OF THE SERIES OF TAXATION. 0N TUY HOA, WITH 1600 PEOPLE CURRENTLY LISTED HAVE owN As REFUGEES. FURNISHED QUARTERS. MANY OF THOSE PEOPLE FORMERLY LISTED HAVE BUILT SOME TYPE OF SHELTER OR As REFUGEES THEIR BEEN TEMPORARY NITH THE U.S. OUTSTANDING HAS BEEN "A THREE SECTOR S-2-ADVISOR HAS SAID PROVIDING THE DAY, THAT POLICE CO0PERATION_"- BEST DESCRIBED THAT HAS BEEN INFORMATION As THE BODIES WITH THE RECEIVED. RING CIRCUS", NITH BUT I POLICE DURING SOME OF THE TUY HOA IS PEOPLE-GOING To szz BEING LIKE AND wATcHINe THE FIGHTING, AT NIGHT THERE IS ALMOST NOTHING MOVING EXCEPT-THE-POLICE. A

GP—1\_ Xerox froH'AH1ck Copy Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072858
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072858

NNNNIM

RECEIVED

|DE|ssssn B ossosss|
|---|---|
|00|19&>n»< 10 29|

zxzx 00 ZSL DE
0 0809182 ZYH-
FM CIA
TO wnrrz HOUSE sxruarxou ROOM
sso ACSI DA
sso ARLINGTON HALL STATION
AFSSO USAF
cuo
DIA/ISIC JCS
NIC DIRNSA commnun czurzn'1 srnrz (RC1)

CIA-OCI

ZEM N F I B E N T I-A L HOFORN-DiSSEM'FINAL SECTION OF TWO C-9 CITE TDCS 514/04203-63 (ADVANCE) IN 9. 'ECONOMICALLY, THE CONCENSUS AMONG VIETNAMESE CITIZENS TUY HOA, PHU YEN PROVINCE, IS THAT THE VC HAVE MADE A TREMENDOUS LEAP FORWARD. 'AFTER THE TET ATTACK, MANY OF THE MILITARY UNITS WERE PULLED IN TO PROTECT THE LARGER TOWNS-AND CITIES. AT THE END OF THE FALL HARVEST THE VC OBTAINED AN ESTIMATED 450 TONS OF RICE. OF THE 24,500 TONS OF RICE EXPECTED FROM THE WINTER/SPRING HARVEST WHICH HAS NOT YET ENED, IT FOR, WITH BETWEEN 4,000 TO 4,500 TONS GOING TO THE UNACCOUNTEDIS ESTIMATED THAT AT LEAST 6,000 TONS WILL BE VC. POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, THE VC HAVE SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE PEOPLE OF TUY HOA THAT THE VC HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE ANY PLACE AND ANY TIME AT THEIR OWN CHOOSING AND THAT THE POPULATED URBAN AREAS ARE NO LONGERTHAT SECURE. .EVEN IF THE PEOPLE REALIZE THIS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THEEY WILL STAY IN THEIR RURAL TOWNS AND VILLAGES FOR THEY ARE AWARE THAT MOST OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED". ATTITUDE OF THTHE VC, TOWARD THE GVN AND TOWARD THE U.S. ISTHE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, ENDANGERING THEIR LIVES AND PROPERTY.PEOPLE IN PHU YEN PROVINCE, BOTH RURAL AND URBAN, TOWARD IS'A REAL FEAR OF THE VC AND WHAT THEY CAN DO. VARIED. “THERE THOSE WHO HAVE RELATIVES_AMONG THE VC RANKS ARE MORE INCLINED TO LEAN TOWARD THE VC, YET THEY DO NOT WANT THE VC IN THEIR AREA FOR FEAR.OF REPRISALS BY FREINDLY FORCES. ‘TOWARD THE GVN, THERE ARE THOSE WHO FEEL THAT THE GVN PERFORMED CREDITABLY WHILE OTHERS LOOK AT THE GVN AS DISUNITED AND CORRUPT,-ONLY INTERESTED IN BECOMING RICH AT THE EXPENSE OF THE RURAL PEOPLE AS A RESULT OF THE WAR. TOWARD THE U.S., SOME BELIEVE- THAT THE U.S. PERMITTED THE PENETRATION OF TOWNS AND CITIES: THE BEHAVIOR OF THE ANTI—COMMUNIST ELEMENTS OF SVN. TO DETERMINE THE FAAITHFULNESS OF THE BUDDHIST CHURCH ANDOTHERS BELIEVE THAT THEE U.S. IS IN TROUBLE BECAUSE OF ADVERSE PREESSURE ._u FROM THE PEOPLE IN THE U.S.

10. [:::::]n1sszm= IFFV conns 11 CORPS
SAIGON DISSEM: STATE MACV CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLTT 7TH AF II_CORPS_SITUATION_REPORT[15617943].pdf

Output: {"Who": "CIA, White House Situation Room, DIA/ISC, JCS, NIC, NSA Command Center, State, CIA-DCI", "What": "Vietnam War situation reports, enemy movements, attacks, VC activities, urban areas security", "When": "8 March", "Where": ["White House Situation Room", "Arlington Hall Station", "II Corps", "Pleiku", "Kontum City", "Ban Me Thuot", "Binh Thuan Province", "Cam Ranh Airfield", "Phu Yen Province", "Tuy Hoa"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: ‘ lu—rhfiuz-H1-»mtJ'JHa-wfilm—£1.34.”...-ul‘--.¢|

m'..,~ ‘fi‘n

*

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772368;. “Approvedfor Release201W1/17C06772368""*

·:,·,

·:,e:::rt~~~~~5;~11

· ENTREI CENTRAL: INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

AGENCY PRIORITY

PRIORITY EO.

Intelligence Information

Intelligence. Information Cable

Cable 1N

13633

43633

13526

35a»

AIR)

PAGEBBC11 OF orON£33 PAGES

STATE/INR

STATE/lNR DIA·.

ourfehuochu:NMCC/MC TQMNAVYAflUV

NAVY AIRI ClA/NMCC

CIA/NMCC NIC

NIC NGA

NBA SDO ONE CR53-5

|001|DDI'|EXOEXO|
|---|---|---|
|UnitedState:Withintho meaning of the Belonaao Lawa, 11uo 18, u.s.o.(c)OER|OER|PBl8|
|FBIB|DCS|069|
|IRSIRB|AID|AID|
|u~~;3.5(c)|U8”-| |

Tbla matertal oontatna Information affecting the National

Thismourn!containsInformationaflooroveJauon ot which lD

s-. '793 ancs Boon.793 and '794,

794. t.ho the U'IUlamlllBOD or rov

masonor sum:the Notional Defense or the orwhichDefenseof thein aar manner to an unautbortud

ourmannerUnited Stata Wlt.htn thetoan unauthorizedpel'IIOD ta prohibited l>r law,lawn.Tm.18’personToprohlhiltomoonlngofthefi‘rg17I“: 0.8.0.

AN INFORMATION REPORT.

FINALLY EVALUAT D

CITE

CITELL________~

3.5(c)·

35(0)’

0,5, A 'FEEBUABY‘ 1953

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 1130 1150 HOURS 4 FEBRUARY 1968.

SUBJECT PLEIKU PROVINCE SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1130

HOURS 4 FEBRUARY 1968.

ACQ

SOURCE

3.3(h)(2)

SIHhxz) o

'f v."3-3(h)(2)3.3(h)(2) 1.l. 1THETHE VIET CONGCVC) COP:G(VC)-

COMMITTEE COMMITTEE II, II, VHOWHO WAS CAPTUREDL______~

3.3(h)(2) ISj

JANUARY 1968, STATED THAT THAT THE THE AIM AIM OF OF THE THE PRESENT PRESENT ACTION ACTION IS

fro'AcHIEVE TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS SET FORTH GOALS SET FORTH IN IN RESOl.UT ION RESOLUTION 13

15 OFOF THE THE

c o N F 1 ' N T 1 A L NO FOREI '

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772368..... ··~ ..... --,..... .

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772368
---
CONFI AL NWEM

|CENTRAL|NORTH VIETNAM COMMUNIST CLAO (LAO DONG) PARTY, TH1~T THAT IS, 1;|
|---|---|
|GUIDE PEOPLE TO STRIKE AND DEMONSTRATE AND TO . TO LIBERATE ALL| |
|ARE/'. 5. WAS MAS SCHEDULED TO LAST SEVEN DAYS AND WILL EN~ END ON 5 FEB.| |
|ALLIED ACTION THIS WEEK VEEH RESULTED.IN ALMOST COMPLETE Ag| |
|AN:H!ULATION OF THE VC H-15 LOCAL FORCE BATTALION <BN>: #%! ..<~:| |
|TH:: TRF :.'('~~ANDING CCMMANDING OFFICER WAS MAS CAPTLJRED AND ONLY 23 25 MEN ARE UNACCOUNTEDUNACCOUNTED :2..;-·.. ,--., FOR.| |
|THE VC 407TH ABTTH AND 408TH ADBTH SAPPER SAPPER BNS BNS SUFFERED SEVERESEVERE GT LOSSES:| |
|THEIR OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY IS EXTREMELY LIMITED. ER.| |
|THE 4TH AND THE 5TH BNS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY CNVA) <NVA> 11%| |
|958 953 RF.GIMENT <REGT> (REGT) AND THE NVA_52ND32ND REGT ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN THE NORT H~IEST ERN PART REPORT _OF OF PLE !KU PROV INCE. ACCORD ING TO A SPECIAL POLICE AGENT REPORT OF 4 4 FEBRUARY, TWO VC ' y” BATTALIONSBATTALIONS ARE ABOUT ABOUT 15 MILES NORTHWEST NORIHUEST OF PLEIKU CITY AND E POSE A POSSIBLE THREAT TO THE PLEIKU AREA. ·AN -AN ATTACK ATTACH AGAINST AGAINST FPS?| |
|PLEIKU CITY ON THE NIGHT OF 4 FEBRUARY IS A DEFINITE ISA DEFINITE POSSIBILITY • ;1| |
---
ROADBLOCKS
ROADBLOCKS HAVE BEEN SET UP/ALL DP/Kfi INGRESS ROUTES INTO THE CITY, AND ALL VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGNARDS ARE EE n1r. STOPPED AND SEARCHED. THE POLICE AND ARVN HAVE COMPLETED THEIR SEARCH OF MOST HOMES, HAVE APPREHENDED MANY VC SUSPECTS AND HAVE LOCATED SEVERAL CACHES.
REPORT CLASS
CONFIDENTIALDIA-NO N9_£93£IeN—eTSSEfiFORE Hrn 81 SSE':f'
ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED JCS TO NIC WHITE OCI. STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NSA

CONFIDENTIAL "PLEIKU PROVINCE SITUATION[15561453].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State",
    "What": "Intelligence Information regarding the situation in Pleiku Province, South Vietnam",
    "When": "4 February 1968",
    "Where": ["Pleiku Province, South Vietnam", "North Vietnam"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718

Secret
3.5(c)
# UNTEDESLATES Current Intelligence Digest

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Secret

November 1967

No 0218/67

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718  3.5(c)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718SEERET

# C 0 N T E N T S

(Information        as of    1200EDT)

# GENERAL

|Vietnam|Situation|Report|
|---|---|---|
|(Page1)| | |

SECRET

Nov 67   Approved for Release:2018/06/28 Co6662718igest    Page
---
# Vietnam

North Vietnam: Moscow delegation has top-drawer renew anti-government activities arrived in Vietnamese to participate militant orders have come the officials. According to Saigon headquarters, these come from the faction calling for a step-up in include activities to anti-government activ-immolations.

The First Secretary Le Duan delegation headed by The local police evidence of who claim to party includes Defense Minister Vo other politburo have substantial members Giap and Foreign Minister two Viet Cong efforts to manipulate Nguyen Buddhist organizations in Hue Nguyen Duy Trinh have taken measures to prevent.

The Soviets serious trouble greet the North Vietnamese trotted out their top brass to lead the reception committee was focused on action Military northern in the South General Secretary Brezhnev the III President Podgorny and Premier Corps are where the Communists Kosygin also met Vietnamese delegation the North Viet-at the airport. Ninh forces time on 31 Special in three days for the attacked the Loc Enemy South Vietnam Police au- the camp and suffered heavy failed again to overrun authorities in Hue believe that militant Buddhists are set to casualties. Over 350 Communist the soldiers have been killed in the two assaults So far.

Nov67
Current SECRET intelligence Digest
Page
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
                                              ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066627-
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662718 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466630].pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
	"What": "Vietnam situation report, top-drawer anti-government activities in North Vietnam, manipulation efforts by Soviets and Viet Cong, militant Buddhists preventing measures",
	"When": "November 1967",
	"Where": ["Vietnam", "Moscow", "Saigon", "Hue"],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: F54 CIA,. Approveqfor Release: 2019/04/17 C001

To ssoHHTTE DA‘ ACSI HousE SITUATQ}N Room' sso ARLINGTON HALL STATIQN - AFSSO usAE cwo DIA/ISIC NIC 13526

A DIRNSA COMMAND ‘cENTER'g sTATE (RCI)“' cTA-OCI ZEM COUNTRY souTH VIETNAMEEBRuARY11g§§

001 117

SUJECT- SITUATION REPORT As OF Tqqqgmgpgg LOCAL TIME 17 FEBRUARY 1968 ACQ \/TETNAH SAIGON < 17 FEBR*U}§?_E§;$§§§:1§3_:6‘851_ §!_E_(§} SOURCE THIS IS A AT 1599 HOURS LOCAL T1MEE§LflLfi&§E5RUBBX§l953-

NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF ygQ;£%§§BELIABlflITY SUGGEST THAT A RENEWED ATTACK_ON SAIGON IS IMMIQEN1§@§§§£§£QRTS@POI&T@ TO THE TETH FEBRUARY As THE DATEy,QIEERg§fiQ§§§gfiAD£%QQ}Q§IED T TH: 11TH,‘l2TH, 15TH AND-15TH.
Hou:v:R, no HoT RT“THIS TIME*SUGGEST7THE§QMNiNENCE§&EfiANfi§TTACK
IN PRECINCTS ONE THROUGH FIVE MAY BE H0nTE1EDgs0HET1HEENExT WEEK TO ALLOW movEHEwT BY THE PoPuLAcE-’WMV_““ We UNTIL 2100 HouRs. <s0uRcE= AMERICAN
OF THE wTRTER5§PRTNefieAmRA1eN FURTHER WIYHIN THE ERAHEHQRH SIGNIFICANT vTET come /NORTH v1ETNAHEsE@ARMRwAcTTvTTY. CAN BE EXPECTED. EAvoR OF A QUICK E0EE0w;uR;T0 THE;TETh0FFENsTvE.MOREOVER, sTRATEeTc AND@$ACTICAL#CONSIDERATIONS HETEH HEAVILY TH IN THTs REGARD, HowEvER, THE ENEMY MUST REALIZE'THAI&IHE_LONGER HE WAIT5, THE HQRE DIFFICULT MILITARY TAsKHHE;wILLHHAvE@~ THE FIRST ATTACK, THE TET OFFENSIVE, WAS LAUNCHED*UNDER@TBE c0vER OF THE TET HQLIDAY, A KNOWN PERIOD OF SECURITT RELAXATION AND c0uRTRYTTDE CONCERN ONLY WITH cELEBRATT0N.REwHIEE”THE;§EHERAL OUTLINES 0E THE TET OFFENSIVE WERE DEscRTBEn¢To ENEMYECADRES IN SOME cAsEs LONG BEFORE THE ATTAcH wAsTEAuNcHE0;fiIHE;sREcTTTc'T .»g%H§%EER@;@§%@E§§EEE<H DETAILS or TIRE AHD PLACE WERE NOT PAssEn OUT UNTIL THE FTHALEMQMEHTTEEHTTHTH.THE GENERAL PLAN, WAS EHvTsTOREO,IT How APPEARS ERQR-RRTs0HER;IHTERR0eAT10NsiTHAT A SECOND ATTAcH WHETHE&@§§§§BhEN¥NQ§:§§@A}§§@lN€’ EFFECT, FGLLOUING THE RTETTARY EATLURE@0E§£§E$F¢RST?sTAeETTI§T NOT HHoHH,-
FIELD DISSEH: sTATE usHAcv 7TH ATRfiEQRcE§cTwcPAC§RAcEET' PACAF

45 O lp’r°v'e‘ for Release Data 1997

for Release: 2019/04/17 C001268903E!iHir'lIII‘||| SITUATION_REPORT_AS_OF_13[15617756].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "CIA",
    "What": "SITUATION REPORT regarding potential attack on Saigon during Tet Offensive in South Vietnam",
    "When": "17 February 1968",
    "Where": ["Saigon", "Arlington Hall Station", "South Vietnam"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # NANO INTERROGATION REPORT

This report is the result of the interrogation activity conducted by the National Interrogation Center under the auspices of the National Special Activities Group (U.S.), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the joint auspices of the National Interrogation Center and the Central Intelligence Organization.

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM (SVN), SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)

SUBJECT: Reaction to Infiltration - December 1967

DATE OF REPORT: 26/1/68

NIC REPORT NO: 099/68

NIC CASE NO: 26/1/68

DATE OF INFO: 15 January 1968 (I-U), December 1967

PLACE: QUANG (I-V), DANANG, NAM

OF ACQUISITION: DANANG, NAM

This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 1 January 1968 in DANANG, Municipalit;y. The source is not available. Source was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 14 January 1968 in DANANG, NAM for further exploitation.

In preparation for infiltration in April 1967, Source received political indoctrination that emphasized the poorness of U.S. combat techniques and told the soldiers to remain as close as possible to the U.S. troops in order to avoid bombings and shellings.

Source's unit had not had to be used in combat yet. The cadres said that four-fifths of SVN had been liberated and a few units had to avoid combat. The death ratio in SVN units was extremely low and even in large victories, the unit suffered few casualties.

Source's major complaint was the heavy load and sickness. Source's unit was only called to the battlefield when necessary. During infiltration, Source read GVN leaflets secretly and was strongly affected by one that showed a corpse outside DUC CO Post. Food and medicine were also in short supply on the trip.

DISTRIBUTION: US MACV, US EMBASSY (OSA)

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENTS: None
---
BegInning_from the deyhe received the pre-infiltration course

Afterthe for his family of his coming departurecourse, stay if in he NVN,whethergo He felt thatitwas or not he insigted hie rice ration would gurely be cut He felt he should wag his fate. or not the completion of the pre-infiltrationcut •he Bhould ask his superiors toallow him to stay in NVN,becaube if that it askhis his fate. would ration superiors He became hesitantand undecisive whether He became hesitant to and undecisive to allow him because if he insisted rice surely be .After completion of visitpre-infiltration the course, ba wesallowed to gootherwas wished. be allowed was Sourceto free .to inform his15 days leave hisnever wanted tolet his his aged parentskow about hi8 departure,to coming departureLike familye Like the other men,he wasfor the men, he free .to inform and never familywanted his that of for SVN,1f he wished SVN, Source was Bad and lethis however _ them,onesince he realized thatthiswa8 probably the lasttimeof the however, since before be returnedtohisunit ,he informedthem dey this the last he cried 'would see3.3(h)(2) bitterly,day ..,them, regretfvlly infiltration. infiltration.one whereas his father remained guiet _before Upon learning thisto Source's Upon learning be fatherhis this, returned Source' 9 motherhis unit, mother Source ga1d that hig parents he ito:: :: :: r•cried 3 .3(h)(2) also regrett\;ll,y pitterly., whereas accepted his departure &8 inevitable_ his remained departurequiet. Sour ~as parents .a.1.so . accepted as inevitable..

builtup thelr troops 'morale.. The infiltretion was thoroughly prepared ahead of time. Of the pre-infiltration course,companyand battalion J'he intiltra~ion was thorougltl.y prepared companyand battalion cadres ceagelesslyperioda.head of time. cadres Throughout the period ot the pre-infiltration course; Inell politicalindoctrination sessions, theyceaselessly muld never and the telling would never misg telling the soldiers thatthe U.S.combat techniques wereup their troops•morale. In all political indoctrination sessions, they needed todo miss very poor and then U,S. bombingsand ghellingsto U.S. very poor do during the actionweg during u.s~soldiers soldiers the U.S, soldiers werenot the were not that well-seasoned, 48 clobe to U,S,elementswell-seasoned, the only thing they the combat techniques the only thing were they said that four-fifths of SVN had beenmanage 88 possible, four-firths fight as possible, needed been 'uged in'U,S. of et all, because sometimesthoseunits Jaarm U.S. to then the bombings was action at SVN had because liberated., would hardly and to manage to stay as to ahellings liberated,and probably Source' 8elementswould hardly barm them.stay close to them. .s Cedres unit Cadres ····..:would that ·· ··nev~rWANVC Unitain SVN wasextremelylow., cagualties .those neversJtld the called to the sufferedextremely minor very sometimes the Consequently, according no1:.have ~een ·usedto in ' combat. combat . all, They explained thatthe percentage of deathof They been e.xp],.ainedrew infiltrated units had Largeunit low, a few infiltrated unit830 far had that and probably percentage unitsSource• of so death had far of ..' •. . . .:·· ·,v!:c;toriea . ... '· . , only :called ·and .yetSVNwas to the' cedrescadres, in Source' g unit would the battlefield when very necesbary .Conseauently, Source .• s unit very when would ! had large accordi~J 3.3(h)(2) 3 .3(h)(2) opl.y.,· ~' to the battlefield necessary • ..really tried .22 kilos, whichhe had' tocarry &llthe On the" infiltration route_ the first hardehip he experienced was the heavySource..During the ~-;:;''./,·~Q~.~~i( i~fil::t,r~t:i~n \ ,/_:, ~ '.•.~; ... really,a~ut ........prac .tice tried. 80 thathe would notgettired. ;.:lnd %1 aboutcarrying Same a8 the othere,he would throw off 8omestones from practice of carrying heavyth~ :.first .ot .o.f 22 The same ld.los, · which he. would loadsothers, tired.·the all throw way .tosome the'WOuld havetask~ z:oute~ heavy loada prior to theinfiltration, he hadprior t;o .hardship carry to to infiltration, SVN .. he to he the weyto Source never . waa..the stones~~vythe. During never . · to _carry es if hehad ' been torturedterribly. his . basket heavy ·that carry heavy things8 verylong The a. verynot ' get way, as the long way,but when hehe would He never thought he wuld heve He, never wasputto he well actual thought totheactual task, off he from . · tcf slippery hill.things been he felt terribly._especially when he climbedbut when he was put 3.3(h)(2) he telt as hill. if he Then, beginning\ had· tortured es_in in Lao8, he other infiltratorswereno driedfood slipperyinfiltrators other Then,were beginning be deadHe was exhausted stay 1still triedtofollow hib not bombed or ambushed . nQ.tothersnoticed ·were that still during Sourcecatch ableSourceused to reed GVN Leafleta secretly,wnitwa 83.3(h)(2) the : infiltration., to used up the was the to the Group. leaflets Group:-_ Fortunately,hi8and one of them very strongly affected him. QOmbedor .ambushed. This read on the written the SVN people who were lying dead within the fenceof to Governm~nt of them verystNngly the affected of DUC CO post ;on the back of the him. really Living in happine8s; that green aged mother that deceased within the deceased soldier' 8 letter to hie aged mother written in prose. really hewes deceived by the NVN green fieldsand gcenes in SVN were too lying dead the fence letter NVN Government to liberate DUCCO post; his back in SVN people to prose. leaflet He thought Hewas thought t~at he was deceived by the fieldsto liberate the in liberation; NVN,and he who were beautiful tobe had seen gentle and beloved mothere in SVN jugtlike his mother in NVN,and he b1autifulliving not gentlein smeared tobe smeared with blood because of the fooligh liberation; the the happiness; with that blood because SVN of by and the like NVN. Government was 80 scenes that could not understand why a had seen and beloved bloody liberation by the NVN mother mothers liberation in just his.Gove~nment in he necesgary. coμld why bloody the was so n'-cessary.I.~..
---
# REPORT NO: 099/68

Page 3

|6|In addition to psychological effects, Source found that his living conditions were except that 700 psychological According to sort of galty soup eat living were not receive poor-grade at of not pleasant at all. the they tried to prepare actually daily of to all. rice According to daily rations effects., Source found each rations., receive man was 500 or that each man was supposed each his conditions supposed to receive 700 grams of rice but actually each would receive about grams of poor-grade rice only. grams rice to some. 8:etas, they only. but They had no other food to eat with the rice, would about 500 or 600 600 sick were issued medicine, prepare They had no other not all their stomachs vegetables to make soup vegetables except their nu were get even medicine, Medicine was in who were not soup so that to even vitamins but they were allowed to rest only the stomachs. soup. they make tried In some areas, they could not even find consumable wild Irt Medicine 8 on 8 sort could salty where es wa8 in short something who were not really sick never short supply; only the seriously supply; really food to even find sick seriously unit 80 thet they could with they consumable wild the rice., could hoped to get locations quartering location: hoped sic~ issued vitamins whereas those but they were allowed to reat and stay in the unit and stay never in the|
|---|---|
|7|Source said that he could judge his comrades' reactions through their bold words, said that he while could in judge NVN hi s comrades' know the situation very well, reactions situation through their bold . _·, :·· .: wrds , - Previously Previously while in NN they did not but 8ince they-. judgement properly, in they arrived in SVN, Source strongly believed that they could use SVN, Source strongly lmow the they did not that very well, their judgement properly, although the majority of them are very young; from their since arrived majority believed they young:, could use from 17 to 23. Some openly said that they would not of them ar~ although the would from 17 s~w to 23. Some openly the thinge they hed been promised .a~d that they not believe anything until they believe anything until they gaw or received the or received things they took place only in NVN _ had been promised.|
|8|Ledej there were no more deserters; because from there it wuld be8 real problem notic~d. Source noticed that degertiong took Sourcethere that desertions place only in there desert NVN. it of seasoning real into As they entered into entered Ws~ problem for for were them to go back to NVN, ii' them the the to were baek no more deserters; go to NVN taking they if they wished to because wis~ed grams . from to desert. would Measures Measures a · · · pwdar from the goldiers against desertion soldiers applied (the amount of geasoning powder Bach s3ldier was by because with this seasoning pwder he could away 300 of seasoning isgued before the infiltration) 90ll it for 60 NVN piastres which WJs still in NVN) ; and spend entrusting way beok to his native village (1f he wee enough for NVN); and by entrusting the sell · for native ini'iltration), which because seasoning him to NVN piastres the amount of was emugh with for him to spend on the way this powder each powder he wa.s seasoning soldier on the could reliable men to guard the others back to his village others he• (if was still in by the reliable men to guard the|
|9.|.Before arriving in Laos, Source had little hope that he would be eble to route and wa8 told that he Source return to NVN, because he met a to and higher would be allowed cadres r,turn to and was told beaLlowed to return to NVN ro.ute s~me soldiers would combat units in SVN. However after they had turned OvBr NVN, because cadres combat unitshim that ranking NVN, ai'ter that the cadres ranking from Assistant Platoon Leader the met hard-core from cadres Assistant on the Platoon turned Leader the goldiers to and the higher to to in return SVN. after to However J when arriving in Laos he met when arriving thib wa8 m they had in Lao8 over he met longer happening. some other cadres who told hin that after 2 other who told 2 September 1967 September 1967 this was no|
|10.|Speaking of the treatment le>nger happening. treatment of local people, Source 8aid that hi8 infiltretion group did not giyup by they had received to local did ot the go go through any populated erea in SVN said of people., to in be indifferent his probably area Source SVN, but in NVN the treatment but that NVN the infiltration beceubethey given by the people to the troops appeared to be groups at1ll in some arees because in ebpecially those living in MRL;, had borne. given the had received to because the villagers tried to troops many infiltration groups already. and worse appeared indifferent., steal thinge from the already :. and probably worse troop8. still Source said that this rczulted fron the hard life which the NVN people, ti-QC>pa. pe~ple, especially Source said those that livine in MPJ~., from the had borne hard life which the NVN| REACTION-TO-INFILTRATION15478170.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": ["National Interrogation Center", "National Special Activities Group (U.S.)", "Central Intelligence Organization (CIO)", "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)"],
"What": ["Reaction to Infiltration", "Interrogation Report", "Preparation for Infiltration", "Living Conditions", "Deserters Measures", "Treatment of Local People"],
"When": "26/1/68",
"Where": ["NORTH VIETNAM (SVN)", "SOUTH VIETNAM", "LAOS", "DANANG", "QUANG (I-V)", "NAM", "DUC CO Post"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 3

(As of 4:30 P.M. EST)

1. Attacks on the US Embassy and Saigon:

A report on the Saigon offensive spread to Saigon before dawn on January 31 where mortar series in offensive area were launched. The enemy rocket attacks on the US Embassy and ground of Saigon with mortar and small arms fire was abated before dawn. The compound was subjected to fire assaults on Saigon.

2. Viet Cong penetrated the fire compound. The Embassy building and terrorists abated. Later reports indicate that the Viet Cong had apparently "control" of the Embassy. However, Marine guard reinforcements were sent to the compound. No casualties have been reported.

3. According to various reports, shelling and small arms fire have been occurring in and around Tan Son Nhut airfield. Both Bien Hoa and Saigon fire bases have been shelling elsewhere. There have been reports of ARVN casualties under mortar fire.

4. Da Nang: Allied mopping-up operations are sporadic in the Da Nang urban area following exchanges of fire with groups within the city of strategic points. Viet Cong attacks on Da Nang urban area are said to be continuing as of January 30.

5. Civilian casualties and strafing of sections of the city by government planes are reported to be heavy due to the fighting.
---
# TOP SECRET

city,city, 5 _ the provincial capitel5.the tbatan estima tedHoi HoiofprovincialIn installationsQuang An :

30 Januaryattack
200-300inc ludingpe pe_ January of Quang Nam ,on attack troopsnowNam,on  pisittbisnow
capital200-300 of                                                       enemy                                             it                     seized
appears numberpat  ofa Iliedalliedestimated an                                                                 ARWNengineerincludingtroopsenemy                                                                                pe prov -seized
incial hospitaland a number                                                                andinstallations                                                                                batta lion compound                                                       prov-
The incial Communist hospital                                                  forces_apparentlyARVNengineer stillbattalion control compound. .

The areaCommunist forces apparently still th _e _ area.

Ele -        3.3(h)(2)

Ele~ withto otherhave loca 1involved Cong in the Hoi An action, forces.

InfantrybeenreceTvedhad apparently occupied tion has Division in the that troopsof 7he6 6.Attacks Hestern Highlands :US4th

Kontum era l government Tbe  enemyDivision installationsearlyofonoccupiedoutsev - eral tion Kontum city force Infantry hascity government  been where  theypushedtroops where installations estimatedatbave pushed have they bad apparently two the early battallonstrength_Communists on the 30 Januaryof US 4th January. outofsev- has

The beenbombardmentpositions allied, artilleryand enemy drivenforce, to positions estimated at on thetonorthern andTheViettwothebattalionnorthernstrength,out- attackingdrivencity, skirts ca 1 hasskirts airof the city forceandNorthNVA the was apparently fromNorthbeVietnamese soldiers_-thewbere can wherebe allied.composed can brought brought on composedbear.artillery bothof tacti- tobear Theout-tacti- Cong ' guerrillasfromtbe NVA24th Regiment_official attackingforce was apparently both of Viet latter Cong guerrillas probably and Vietnamese soldiers--the latter 7probably TheDHZ Area :the There24th baveRegiment. reports Sanba1rofThe Sanbthe7. Demilitarizedof STgnTTTcantaction todaybeenno DMZArea: There have been any that1n no sector of reports the significant closedZone due action Pressreportstodayreports bombardmentin anythat sectorKhe of official airDemilitarized confirmed dueorto clarified CommunistsKhestripwasconfirmedor toZone. enemy have have not yet been clarified through official channels _ continuedOtherthe8 8. Other theirRe la tedActionsRelated BroadcastsActions: begunThe begunThe on 30 Januarybave Communists have whichcondemn truce continued The which forces bave centra1havemany simultaneous condemnbroadcasts theirthe launchedmanySimultaneousbroadcast broadcastshave broadcasts,for violating theCommu -a 1lies allies for announced30the violating on thatJanuary,TetTet nist said spring in spring"thecampa ignwe re "punishing'° Vietnam.USOneCommu- nist northern and saidnorthernattacksand in the campaign attackshavecentral a imed at developingthe and were"punishingdeveloping forviolating andlaunched SouthVietnan_ that aimedSouth at announcedtbethe US forthe violatingOne broadcast attacks attacks "winter- ''winter-

# TOP SECRET
---
# TOP SECRET

statement claiming for the cessation of military the "order" for issued has "completely the Communist the Communist "order" also the cessation a Foreign Ministry of military attacks attacks. Hanoi Hanoi claiming has that has truce' air attacks during also truce" US has Foreign issued and condemning the US Ministry cancelled statement 1968 "completely Americans for cancelled the continuing the 1968 Tet and attacks condemning the Tet Americans for continuing the afr during Tet. 9 9. There bass0 There commentary, has the so current military action far been no far either no been other significant foreign commentary, either military from from bloc or non bloc sources on the South bloc sources on current action in South Vietnam.

# TOP SECRET THE-SITUATION-IN-SOUTH-VI15478305.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Intelligence analysts",
    "What": "Document detailing attacks on US Embassy and Saigon, situation in South Vietnam including Da Nang and Tan Son Nhut airfield, Viet Cong's control of the US Embassy, and commentary on current military actions",
    "When": "30 January",
    "Where": ["Saigon", "Tan Son Nhut airfield", "Da Nang", "Hoi An", "Quang Nam", "Kontum city", "Western Highlands", "Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)", "Hanoi"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

12 January 1968 3.5(C)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
# Vietnam: Situation report (Page 1)

# France- Belgium: France is stepping up efforts to induce Belgium to buy Mirages. (Page 3)

# Congo (Kinshasa) - Rwanda: Break in relations (Page 4)

# Brazil: No support for US position in Vietnam (Page 4)

# Algeria: Gold reserves (Page 4)
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814

I

Z

CHINA

Lao Cai

Lang Son

THAILAND

Dong Hoi

VIETNAM

VIETNAM

NORTH

VIETNAM

|0|25|50|75Kilnrneiers|Z|i‘ / _Lm 0 c z u 1|~/"|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | |HM| |ff|1!)?» ............................ Vi‘|03|

69252 ‘I-68

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 002031014

Map
---
# Vietnam

South Vietnam: The arrest of six labor leaders may have prevented early settlement of an electrical workers' strike in Saigon and could precipitate wider labor trouble.

The strike began yesterday morning over demands for additional wage benefits. Union negotiators are reported to have made major concessions and to have been at the "half-way mark" toward settlement when the police made their arrests, invoking a little-used 1964 law forbidding strikes. The six men are scheduled to be tried by a military court for violation of the law.

It is not clear who authorized the arrests, but Police Director Loan recently indicated that the ban would be enforced. Moreover, the minister of labor, a controversial figure, has advocated police intervention in other recent labor disputes. The mayor of Saigon, who is Loan's brother-in-law, opposed the arrests and may exert some influence toward securing the release of the other labor leaders.

Other unions in Saigon, including port and transport workers, had earlier threatened sympathy walkouts if any arrests were made in connection with the electrical workers' strike. Action by these groups could put a crimp in public activities in Saigon.

North Vietnam: Unusual flight activity by two MIG-21s in the Thanh Hoa - Vinh area suggests that the North Vietnamese may be preparing to expand their MIG operations southward.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814

V)T)»P’SfC]RET 3 '5(0)

3.3(h)(2)

W

%

-v

3.3(h)(2)

12 Jan 68

2
s.5(¢)
Approved TO for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814CRET
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814

France- Belgium: France is stepping up its efforts to induce Belgium to buy Mirage aircraft rather than US F-5s.

To overcome Belgian concern over availability of spare parts for the projected 116 Mirages, Paris had already offered to guarantee never to embargo parts shipments.

Despite the favorable French offer, the Belgians have delayed a decision, apparently to avoid appearing to reward Paris when its actions in NATO and the EC have aroused much displeasure in Belgium. Ambassador Knight in Brussels believes, however, that the political deterrent may have subsided and that the Mirage is now the probable choice.

One Belgian official has suggested that the US ought to link conclusion of the F-5 contract to any exceptions or concessions made on the new US balance of payments program. The Belgians want to negotiate for special treatment because they are counting on US help in their efforts to revitalize economically-depressed areas of their country.

12 Jan 68

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
Congo (Kinshasa) - Rwanda: The Congolese decision to break part of a plan diplomatic relations with Rwanda may be designed to shift the blame to Rwanda for the eventual repatriation of the mercenaries. Mobutu has privately expressed a willingness to let all but the mercenary leaders leave for Europe, but apparently feels he cannot publicly sanction the departure. He may claim a reason that, with relations broken, the Congo can now no longer able to influence what Rwanda does.

Brazil: Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto continues to refuse Brazil's active support for the US position in Vietnam. He told a visiting US senator on 9 January that Brazilian public opinion is influenced by what the foreign minister sees as disunity among the allies in Vietnam and by news reports that even Americans are not supporting the war. The foreign minister does not believe that the end of the Vietnam war will mean an increase in US aid to Brazil, and he has concluded that conditions for an understanding between the US and Brazil on Vietnam have not yet developed.

Algeria: On 5 January gold reserves had reached $400 million. If Algiers follows the French example of holding 75 percent of its reserves in gold, it could soon convert another $150 million into gold. It converted $150 million into gold last November and December.
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814|iii?|
|---|---|
|v|’1lQ-P—SE-6iR'E"I‘|3-5<°>|
| |M :;WW|
|-| |
| |$2.21:|
| |%|
| |~r~|
| |33|
| |1.|
| |i|
| |i‘|
| |"W|
| |¥\|
| |W.“ I|
|'| |
| |W JN|
| |‘~|
| |R.|
| |3-3(h)(2)|
| |\|
|A| |
| |"M|
| |%|
| |\|
| |T|
|S| |
| |*1§|
| |":=ii%:L|
| |Q9,‘|
| |,2|
|<.-9»,| |
| |,\ 4",;|
| |*'a.~;"|
|E| |
| |W|
| |w|
| |§|

12 Jan 68

5

s.5(¢)

"LQR-SE-€-RET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C020318$

'aw'

inpsefi

Top

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031814 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602432].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
  "What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin containing intelligence information on national security matters",
  "When": "12 January 1968",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "France", "Belgium", "Congo (Kinshasa)", "Rwanda", "Brazil", "Algeria", "China", "Thailand"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: #

# Approved 0756606

RAND

0

11?‘ fr 6 so U '35”

1

SAIGON,

Vietnam

REF: 228/586

DATE OF INFO: 14-16 January 1968

DATE OF REPORT: 2/3/66

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Prior Warning in KONTUM Province of Suspected B-52 Strike

DETAILS

1. On 26 February 1968, sometime between 1700 hours and 0600 hours, elements of Battalion 406 received notification of an impending B-52 strike on its base camp located about 3 kilometers south of KONTUM City. The notification was delivered to the battalion by a villager from the Zenaan hamlet on its base camp perimeter. The battalion announced the expected strike and ordered the KONTUM Province committee to move villagers from the area. The following day, the battalion abandoned its camp and moved south. There was no evidence that the attack was intentional.

2. The battalion abandoned its camp near grid 516168 during the Tet Offensive.

WARNING: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RELEASE AUTHORIZED BY: AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
---
# Page2

'*“*HAP*REFERENGE*

Scale 1/50,000, Edition 1.

1. At approximately 1700 hours sometime during the period 1L-16 January 1968, Independent Sapper Battalion L06, directly subordinate to the VC's KONTUM Provincial Comittee, received warning of an impending B-52 strike on its base camp. At that time, the battalion was located about three kilometers south of the Montagnard hamlet of KON GUN (AS 805105), KONTUM Province.

2. The notification of the attack was delivered to the battalion commander by a messenger from the KONTUM Provincial Committee (location unknown). It announced "the expected time of the air strike on the following day and ordered the battalion to move south towards KONTUM City to a specified location. The journey took one day to complete.= (Source had no knowledge of any means by which the VC/NVA obtain..ed information concerning B-52 strikes.)

3. While many trenches and foxholes had been prepared in the battalion's base camp area, they were not considered adequate protection for personnel in the event of a B-52 strike. Members of the battalion had been previously told that if a bomb hit within 10 meters of the trenches and foxholes they were hiding in, they would be killed.

4. Independent Sapper Battalion L06 abandoned its base camp and traveled by foot throughout the day to the new area designated by the KONTUM Provincial Comittee. (Exact location unknown.) Members of the battalion had not been ordered to carry all their equipment with them and some cooking utensils and weapons were left behind. Several days later, a few personnel from the battalion returned to the old base camp area to retrieve the equipment which had been left there. There was no evidence that such an attack had actually taken place. Upon returning to the battalion's new base camp, they reported that the area had not yet been bombed.

5. (SOURCE COMMENT: The warning of a B-52 strike had been false and had been intentionally sent to the battalion in order to have it move nearer to KONTUM City in preparation for its attack there during TET. He based his opinion upon the fact that no one had seen any enemy aircraft flying over their former position He was the period immediately prior to the receipt of the warning notification. convinced that the KONTUM Province Committee had used this means to move the battalion closer to KONTUM City without having to inform its members of the upcoming attack on the province capital.) PRIOR_WARNING_OF_SUSPECTE[15617760].pdf

Output:
{
	"Who": "RAND",
	"What": "Prior Warning in KONTUM Province of Suspected B-52 Strike during the Tet Offensive",
	"When": "14-16 January 1968",
	"Where": ["SAIGON, Vietnam", "KONTUM City", "Montagnard hamlet of KON GUN", "KONTUM Province"],
	"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Current Intelligence Digest

|Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692|Secret|
|---|---|
|VEoSAEg AMERICD|42|
|DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE|13November0226/671967|
|No_|Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 06662692|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692  3.5(c)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06862693SECRET

CONTENTS
Information as of 1200 EST

# GENERAL

|Vietnam|Situation Report|
|---|---|
|(Page 1)| |

13 Nov 67 SECRET

Current Intelligence Digest

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692 Page
---
# GENERAL

Vietnam

Three apparently US prisoners released in Cambodia

The release of three US prisoners in Cambodia was designed for maximum propaganda impact. The prisoners were turned over in Phnom Penh to a US peace committee representative. They were then held incommunicado until the following day when they were put on a Czechoslovakian Airlines plane bound for Prague. The prisoners and the peace committee representative left on the American commercial airliner and will return to the US on the plane at Beirut. The US commercial airliner, however, departed Beirut this morning. The Viet Cong's propaganda interest in getting as much mileage as possible from the release is underlined in an official Cambodian document describing the Viet Cong representative in Phnom Penh and the Cambodian foreign minister at a late August meeting. The Cambodian representative explicitly stated that the prisoners would be released for encouraging humanitarian reasons, but with the real aim of demonstrating that the Viet Cong and US anti-war groups had always treated prisoners well. He claimed that US officials in the past had kept freed prisoners out of reach of the public and prevented them from freely expressing their ideas.

Hanoi marking the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution

The 77-year-old President was a Soviet party paper contributor and writer for the occasion. Given his absence from the festivities, his illness may have prevented him from attending. Ho has made only three public appearances in recent months. The last was for national day celebrations in North Vietnam held in late August. Despite his apparent aloofness from the political scene, there has been no immediate leadership vacuum. The evidence suggests that the regime's major policies, particularly on strategy and negotiations for the war and peace, have been made on collective decisions.

Vice President Ky is not entirely pleased with the composition of the new cabinet. Reportedly, there are only five members of the cabinet or the directorates who can be called Ky supporters.

|Names|Ky supporters|
|---|---|
|Linh|(continued) 3.3(h)(2)|

13Nov67 SECRET

Current Intelligence Digest
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662693SECRET

Quang Vien Nguyen minister of interior; Bao Tri minister of revolutionary development; Xuan Phong Truong minister of information; Thai Ton minister of economy of the directorate Ngoc Linh and Nguyen of information.

Sharp engagements continue to be reported in the Dak area of the central highlands.

Between US forces participating in Operation MACARTHUR and elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front the heavy fighting in Cumulative casualties for the first 12 days of November are: two missing; US - 96 killed, 48 wounded, and enemy - 619 killed, 101 individual and 25 crew-served weapons captured, seven detained.

# SECRET

13 Nov 67 Current Intelligence Digest

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28C06662693
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C0666
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662692

Secret

Secret

# Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C06662692 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466671].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, US peace committee representative, Cambodian foreign minister, President of North Vietnam, Vice President Ky",
"What": "Information related to US prisoners released in Cambodia, 50th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, composition of the new cabinet, ministerial positions in Vietnam, Operation MACARTHUR in Dak area, casualties in November 1967",
"When": "13 November 1967",
"Where": ["Phnom Penh", "Prague", "Beirut", "North Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Dak area of the central highlands"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Memorandum

Date: 13 February 1968

Subject: Vietnam

1. In the aftermath of the Communist Tet offensive most observers have agreed on the need to suspend judgment until more data is available. Nevertheless, such avowals have been quickly followed by broad judgments ranging from the blackest pessimism to the wildly optimistic. Inevitably, judgments concerning the objective situation in Vietnam have been mixed with and influenced by a complex of attitudes on the justification or lack thereof of our policy in the area and its impact on life in the US and our posture in the world at large. Perhaps a non-emotional approach to the problem is no longer possible for anyone with any sense of involvement. (Many of us have been involved, in one way or another since at least 1950 and can point to this or that estimate, recommendation, or action which if properly followed through by wise statesmen and soldiers would have avoided our present frustration and malaise.)

2. But here we are and our first responsibility is to assess the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries and the will and

|GROUP 1|Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification|
|---|---|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201| |
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201

competence of our friends. Over the past two weeks the general trend has been to inflate the power of the former and to derogate the performance of the latter.

An objective appraisal of the Communist position should begin with the understanding that the winter-spring campaign -- in both its military and political aspects -- does represent a radical shift in tactics. Beginning last fall with the battles of Loc Ninh and Dakto, we witnessed a departure from the low-risk approach of a protracted war effort and the switch to a determined effort to force a relatively early and successful conclusion of the conflict. This new strategy was impelled, not by a sense of great strength, but by a realization in Hanoi that the US/GVN effort in South Vietnam was gathering momentum, that manpower in the South was increasingly being denied to the Viet Cong, and that a war of resistance in the South based on a predominately northern force was not politically viable. In brief, Hanoi calculated that the strain of the war could not be borne indefinitely and that something drastic had to be done to retrieve the situation.

The Tet offensive itself, far from demonstrating unexpected Communist strength (give it excellent marks for daring,

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201

S=E-G-R-E=T

Fair marks for coordination), confirmed the low state to which many local Viet Cong units had fallen. In Saigon a large number of inexperienced, recently impressed young men were used in attacks on key targets. It also appears that many local Viet Cong units had to be stiffened by North Vietnamese replacements. Surely, if better trained Viet Cong units familiar with the street plans of the various towns and cities had been available they would have been used, possibly to decisive effect. The failure of main force units -- Viet Cong and NVA -- to follow up quickly to exploit the confusion of initial attacks shows poor coordination, a lack of confidence, or both.

It might be said that the hoped for effect on the GVN was worth the sacrifice of the poorly trained local units and even their experienced cadre. But this does not detract from the argument that the Tet attacks are further evidence of high-risk tactics on Hanoi's part. Many of the attacks were in fact carried out by Main Force units -- Viet Cong and NVA. Hanoi could not be sure that surprise would be achieved; they were risking substantial losses of trained manpower. And as it turned out, losses to these units -- as in Kontum -- were high even with surprise. Exposing the 2nd NVA Division in the vicinity of Danang-Hoi-Hu

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201
---
_ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201

where it was badly beaten between 8-10 February makes no sense

except in terms of a. high risk determined effort for an early

and decisive impact on the ARVN, the GVN, and the US.

6. Obviously, the military punishment which Communist

forces took last fall along the Cambodian border, around the

cities during Tet, and around Khe Sanh over the past month

has not forced Hanoi to call off its major effort. The scenario

is far from played out and the Communists probably have other

surprises yet to spring. More NVA Divisions can be committed across the DMZ, new Soviet-made weapons can be introduced, Viet Cong units can be replenished by impressment from the unprotected countryside, perhaps Khe Sanh can be over run by s. maximum effort But Communist forces in the field are not composed of supermen, they continue to demonstrate the inability to coordinate actions closely, to meet readiness deadlines, to stand up to the superior fire power and mobility of US/ARVN forces. Their chances of success continue to rest heavily on destroying the will and effectiveness of the ARVN and GVN.

T. The failures of the ARVN and the GVN are, of course, the source of much of our pessimism and frustration. We want or expect the GVN to snap to, vitalize national administration,

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201

raise taxes, weed out corruption, get cracking on pacification, stimulate democracy, and generally win the hearts and minds of the people. Progress toward many of these objectives in the short term is quite unrealistic in view of the cultural inertia of a traditional Confucian society and quite out of the question in the midst of a major war. Perhaps the US should be encouraged by the simple fact that a government of sorts has now been in continuous control since the emergence of Ky and Thieu in 1966. Certainly the GVN and the ARVN could and should do more -- the ARVN a good deal more -- to make the overall political and military effort more effective. But perhaps if we had expected a little less we would be more willing to acknowledge that some progress had been made before Tet, that ARVN and GVN reactions during Tet were not so futile, that South Vietnamese morale has stood up amazing well over the past two weeks, and that the outlook is not totally black. Obviously, if the US wavers at this juncture, the entire structure could unravel quickly.* But there is still no

And if "satisfactory" negotiation to ease the US departure from this should happen there would, of course, be no chance for a Whether or not the US should take this opportunity to Vietnam. shed its burdens and make a fast exit is another matter. if it The point here simply is that it would have no alternative appeared now to reduce its commitments.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201

SECRET

evidence of a widespread preference for the Communists in South Vietnam, even if there is little evidence of a passionate loyalty to the GVN. (Ho Chi Minh may be a popular nationalist figure in Vietnam, this does not mean that his party shares in this esteem either in North or South Vietnam.)

Thus, the issue remains in doubt. The Communists have risked much already, including their prestige and the morale of their forces. Many of their regular units have been subjected to prolonged and continuous harassment and attrition. If they back off now and return to a protracted war line they will risk an adverse reaction among their less committed adherents in the South who have been sustained by hopes of an early end to the war. Meanwhile, the strains of the war which led to the adoption of high-risk tactics will still be there. If they continue to commit their resources in all-out effort over the next few months and fail to achieve their purpose they will be in an even less advantageous position to prolong the fighting.

JAMES GRAHAM

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201 VIETNAM[15617978].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "James Graham",
"What": "Analysis of the Communist Tet offensive and assessment of the situation in Vietnam",
"When": "13 February 1968",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

19 February 1968
---
# DAILY BRIEF 1968

19 FEBRUARY

|South Vietnam|The new round of Communist attacks has been directed thus far at targets in the southern provinces. Vinh Long in the delta and Phan Thiet on the coast east of Saigon have received the heaviest ground assaults. Casualties on both sides, however, have been considerably lighter than during the Tet offensive.|
|---|---|
|Saigon|Saigon itself appears to be a high-priority enemy target. It received sporadic rocket and mortar fire overnight, and additional high-level Communist command elements have moved in nearer the city.|
|The battle for the Citadel area of Hue|continues to be indecisive.|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974285

3.5(C)

# 3.3(h)(2)

2. Soviet Union

3. Pakistan

In a continuing effort to play down the seriousness of Ayub's illness, Pakistani newspapers over the weekend carried pictures of him in pajamas and robe with a newspaper in his lap. Defense Minister Khan--one of the three men currently holding the government reins--told Ambassador Oehlert that Ayub might wish to make a trip to Britain and the US as part of his recuperation. Khan suggested a meeting with the President might be arranged.

4. United Kingdom

A public opinion poll taken early this month gives the Tories a 22.5 percent lead--the greatest enjoyed by any party in the 31-year history of British polling. If this margin holds up, the Labor Party stands to lose five of the six seats for which by-elections are now pending.

3XNhX2)

3.5(C)

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974285
---
# Laos

Over the strong objections of the Polish member, the International Control Commission has voted to visit the embattled city of Saravane. A preliminary ICC group is headed that way today and the commissioners are expected to follow about mid-week. Thus far, Laotian Army forces still hold the city.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974285                     u___  ,  ___

                                            .  3' ""‘~"~¢-'__

             _T@7~51:+14e-L

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974285
---
# FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on

19 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974285
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

19 February 1968

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Communists Focus Attention on Northern South Vietnam: Despite the relative lull in new fighting in the northern part of South Vietnam, Vietnamese Communist propaganda continues to zero in on that area in particular. Recent Viet Cong attacks and Hanoi broadcasts strongly imply that new military administrative control of wide areas in that part of the country will be accompanied by efforts to take over the country.

The North Vietnamese party daily on 18 February carried an editorial praising "initial victories" in the current "general offensive and simultaneous uprisings" in central Vietnam (most of I and II Corps). It claimed that Communist forces have "turned the military and political tide" there and quoted a communiqué from the Communist command in that region saying that "vast rural areas" had been "liberated" and Saigon's control had been broken in a "string" of provincial capitals and towns. According to the paper, this put the Communists in a position to "overwhelm the enemy in many areas," and it promised even bigger and more resounding victories in the future.

Similarly, Hanoi came down hard on 18 February with an endorsement of the establishment of a new "People's Revolutionary Committee" of Thua Thien Province and Hue city, which was announced by the Viet Cong radio last week. The announcement claimed this committee was in the process of taking over the administration of Thua Thien and Hue, and that Saigon's authority had been liquidated or was disintegrating. The new "provisional administration" in Hue city allegedly has been set up under the auspices of the "National, Democratic, and Peace Alliance," a front group unveiled by the Communists at the Tet offensive. Le Van Hoa, who was earlier head of the Hue "alliance," was also said to be the chief of the new "revolutionary committee."
---
Hanoi said the committee had decided to "wipe out the South Vietnamese administration structure at all levels," and to "recognize" new revolutionary committees allegedly being set up throughout the Thua Thien Province.

Much of this doubtless is sheer propaganda designed to bolster Communist claims that "revolutionary elements" from all parts of South Vietnamese society are rising up of the claims, Thien to establish some sort of new political structure in the region through political agitation and organizational efforts now being conducted in both urban and rural areas.

Morale in Hanoi is high now because the people are convinced that the Communists have achieved important successes in the South in recent weeks. The people believe the war will be over within one or two months.
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974285

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

-3-

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974285
---
# Pham Van Dong on the San Antonio Formula; Father Berrigan

Berrigan, who has been in Hanoi in connection with the release of the US pilots, told the press about Pham Van Dong's statement, but the press has garbled the report. The following, according to Ambassador Sullivan, is the correct version; "President Johnson-formula is an easy one to agree to. However, is unacceptable. It imposes conditions. Johnson demands productive conversation. That imposes conditions. Only a conqueror can ask this. We repeat our demand for unconditional cessation of bombing. At that time we will talk seriously. When we make war, we do it seriously. So when we talk of peace, we will do that seriously."

# French ambassador in Laos informed Ambassador Sullivan

More on Trinh's Interview of 8 February: Sullivan answered last week that Foreign Minister Trinh did not answer one of the questions posed by the French correspondent. That question was about the level and the composition of the negotiating teams which Hanoi has in mind for the talks it says it will agree to after a US bombing halt. The question was designed to draw out Hanoi on the role it envisaged for the Liberation Front in the talks. In his response to the question, Trinh simply noted that he preferred not to answer it now, but "would be pleased to reconsider at a later date." Ambassador Sullivan has the impression that Hanoi may be feeding questions to the French correspondent in an effort to smoke out answers of interest to French policy.
---
# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

"Hanoi on Antiwar Activities in the US: On Saturday, to a speech of 15 February by John Kenneth Galbraith. Hanoi reported that Galbraith had defeated"pointed out that the Saigon regime would certainly be
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974285

and its army would Galbraith had disintegrate." The broadcast went on to say that also "stressed that the recent military offensive of the National Liberation Front testifies to the wide support being given by the population."

The same broadcast claimed that more than universities law professors and students from 50 universities had signed a statement opposing US policies on Vietnam. The broadcast claimed. "The drive to collect signatures is continuing."
---
   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974285            _ -
1                                      ~       ;-  4  ,.      -v—

                                ee

   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974285 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617898].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "President of the United States, Communist forces in Vietnam, Pakistani officials, British politicians, North Vietnamese officials, US Ambassador to Laos, French Ambassador in Laos",
"What": "Communist attacks in South Vietnam, political situations in Pakistan and the UK, North Vietnamese propaganda, US political attitudes on the Vietnam War, negotiations between US and North Vietnam, US anti-war activities, release of US pilots in Hanoi",
"When": "19 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Vinh Long", "Phan Thiet", "Hue", "Thua Thien Province", "Hue city", "Laos", "San Antonio", "Hanoi", "US", "France"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}