Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

29 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241

s.5(¢)

K

g s.5(¢)

Information as of 160029 December 1967

HIGHLIGHTS

A US Marine battalion suffered heavy losses on 27 December in a battle in Quang Tri Province.

# I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

A US Marine battalion lost 48 men killed and nearly 80 wounded on 27 December, in a battle east of Quang Tri city.

Light scattered actions have been reported elsewhere over the past few days. Several recent developments provide further evidence of an enemy intention to attack in the Khe Sanh area.

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

The Upper House has organized blocs and has presented a resolution to the government dealing with the controversial mobilization order.

Senator Nguyen Van Ngai has given the US Embassy an account of maneuverings behind the selection of chairmen of committees in the Upper House.

# III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

Reports of Spanish ex-legionnaires that Chinese troops are manning missile installations in North Vietnam appear doubtful.

# V. Communist Political Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

s.5(¢)

s.5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. A battalion of the US 1st Marine Regiment lost 48 men killed and nearly 80 wounded in a battle along the coast about nine miles east of Quang Tri on 27 December. Initial reports state that the enemy, probably part of the North Vietnamese 5th Regiment, lost 27 killed.

2. In three separate clashes 10-25 miles south of Da Nang on 28 December, US and South Vietnamese forces killed 65 enemy troops. Ten allied troops were killed and 59 wounded.

3. To the south in Pleiku Province, Viet Cong guerrillas on 28 December killed 21 South Vietnamese and wounded 15 in an attack on a hamlet. It was the second such attack in the central highlands in two days. On 27 December, the Viet Cong killed 13 and wounded 28 as they overran a hamlet on the outskirts of Kontum city. The latest attack took about 13 miles northeast of Pleiku city. Light scattered actions were reported elsewhere.

Developments in the Khe Sanh Area

4. Several recent developments provide further evidence of the enemy's intention to attack near Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province. Radio direction finding indicates that the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 304th Division completed an eastward movement in the Laos panhandle on 29 December, which places it approximately 22 miles west of Khe Sanh. The headquarters of the 325C Division has moved from the Dong Hoi area in North Vietnam to a position in Laos just west of the Demilitarized Zone.

29 December 1967
---
# New Year's Cease-fire

The allies' 24-hour New Year's cease-fire is scheduled to begin at 5:00 AM (EST) 31 December and continue until 5:00 AM (EST) 1 January. Although no allied military operations are scheduled during this respite, a full alert will be maintained.

29 December 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The Upper House of the National Assembly on 27 December formed itself into two blocs, one formal and the other a rather loose coalition of "independent" senators. The formal grouping is the 19-member National-Democratic Socialist Bloc, composed largely of the slates headed by Nguyen Gia Hien and Huynh Van Cao. The composition of the blocs will mean, among other things, that committee assignments will be made on a two-to-one basis in favor of the independents.

2. The Upper House on 27 December also began debate on a resolution relating to the government's partial mobilization decree which it had apparently rejected earlier this month. On 28 December, the Upper House unanimously passed a resolution in which it noted its displeasure with the government's explanation of the mobilization order. The resolution calls upon the government to clarify the terms of service, as well as the composition and criteria for its proposed call-up of various specialists; it further recommends the full utilization of personnel between the ages of 20 and 30 before calling up youths of 18 and 19. In the main, however, the mobilization decree appears to have emerged from the Upper House relatively unchanged.

3. Senator Nguyen Van Ngai recently commented on the election of Committee Chairmen in the Upper House. In a conversation with US Embassy officers, he mentioned several aspects of the election on 22 December, highlighting the careful behind-the-scenes arranging which contrasted to the open election of the permanent bureau of the Upper House. This maneuvering apparently ensured that the "independent" group would gain the leadership of the most important committees, whereas the Hien and Cao slates gained the chairmanships of two relatively minor committees: social welfare and health.

Date: 29 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241_5(C)

(I TOP/SECRET)

4. Ngai indicated that the Hien and Cao slates apparently committed a serious tactical error in not opting to go along with the other blocs in their prearranged plans. This, he indicated, would have guaranteed that all slates received their share of the committee chairmanships with sufficient majorities to enhance their prestige in other slates went ahead with Hien chair—dealing with the government. As it turned out, plans and virtually froze out their original the and Cao chairmanships are held by members of the following of the slates. The balance of the other committee slates: Tran Van Huyen's slate affairs and rules, and cul-(he is also chairman Upper House), internal culture and education; Tran Van Don's, defense, public works, and agriculture; Tran Van Lam's, budget and Ngoc Ky's, foreign affairs, and interior; and Nguyen finance, economics, and judiciary.

5. In addition to the tactical blunders of the Hien and Cao slates, the results of the voting for committee chairmanships may reflect a more fundamental fact of life in the Upper House. According to the embassy, the Hien—Cao bloc is widely regarded, correctly or incorrectly, as strongly progovernment. Although many the government on many issues, to members of the "independent" group will side with when they will feel constrained in there will be times make to preserve their "independent" credentials. jabs at the "progovernment" Hien—Cao bloc order

29 December 1967

(I TOP/SECRET)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241
---
# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. The recently repatriated Spanish foreign legionnaires who lived for several years in North Vietnam continue to provide reports on the activities of Chinese Communist troops there. One of the Spaniards said that there were approximately 10,000 Chinese troops in the Chi Ne area manning missile installations and constructing tunnel complexes. Another source said he heard that the Chinese moved missiles on mobile platforms out of a cave to fire at attacking planes in this area.

2. Another Spaniard gave details concerning Chinese troops in the Yen Bai area. He said that Chinese troops are manning an SA-2 site nearby, and that infantry and artillery troops were concentrated between Yen Bai and Phu Tho. He distinguished these troops by their weapons: artillery troops carried only pistols, and the infantrymen carried machine guns.

3. These latest reports appear less accurate than those received earlier. The number of Chinese troops reported in the Chi He area is not realistic, and the description of the missile activity conflicts with an earlier report which indicated that antiaircraft guns, not missiles, were housed in caves. Chinese antiaircraft artillery troops normally carry rifles and sub-machine guns as well as pistols.

29 December 1967
---
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                                                                                Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752241 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [15602362].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "US Marines, National Assembly of South Vietnam, Spanish Legionnaires",
"What": "Heavy losses in battles, political developments, military movements, committee chairmanships",
"When": "29 December 1967",
"Where": ["Quang Tri Province", "Da Nang", "Pleiku Province", "Khe Sanh", "North Vietnam", "Laos", "Demilitarized Zone"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: <
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1I'm sorry, but without the full content of the document, I am unable to provide further details. If you can provide more content or specific sections to include, I'd be happy to continue. "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602366].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Unknown",
  "What": "The document seems to contain a table with numerical entries",
  "When": "Unknown",
  "Where": [],
  "Security Clearance": "Unknown"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009603
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009603
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009603
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009603 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15466740].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
    "What": "Document titled CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15466740].pdf",
    "When": "28th June 2018",
    "Where": [],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # REPORT CLASS COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN QUANG TRI, QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI, AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES AS OF 0900 ON FEBRUARY 22, 1968
ACQUIRED: VIETNAM, DIXANG BEHANG (2 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT PREPARED BY OAS, CAS

# THERE WAS LITTLE ACTIVITY IN QUANG TRI CITY ON THE NIGHT OF 2 FEBRUARY.

VIET CONG FORCES (VC) MADE A NUMBER OF CONCERTED ATTACKS IN THE DISTRICTS OF CAM LO AND HAI LANG, AND CONTACT WITH ALLIED FORCES IS CONTINUING IN THESE AREAS.

# AT 2345 HOURS ON 11 FEBRUARY, TAM KY CITY IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE RECEIVED ROCKET AND ARTILLERY FIRE WHICH LASTED UNTIL 0020 HOURS. OTHERWISE, THERE WAS NO REPORTED ENEMY ACTIVITY. THE PROVINCE CHIEF HAS IMPOSED A VERY STRICT TRAVEL BAN MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTACT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE TEAMS. REPORTS RECEIVED TO DATE INDICATE TEAM #1 HAS KILLED TEN VC, AND CAPTURED SEVEN WEAPONS; TEAM #12 HAS KILLED FIVE VC AND CAPTURED ONE WEAPON.

# QUANG NGAI CITY WAS QUIET ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 FEBRUARY WITH LITTLE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY IN THE CITY LIMITS. THERE WERE NO REPORTS AVAILABLE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
---
# OUTLYING DISTRICTS

ARVN AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) FORCES IN HOI AN CITY
IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HAD NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACTS DURING THE NIGHT OF 1-2 FEBRUARY.

FIELD DISSEM: STATE USldACV IIIMAF EAFCORDS REPORT CLASS GROUP II

END OF MESSAGE "SITUATION REPORT IN QUANG[15561231].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "OAS, CAS, ARVN, Republic of Korea (ROK) forces",
    "What": "Situational report on Quang Tri, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Quang Nam provinces",
    "When": "22 February 1968",
    "Where": ["Quang Tri City", "Cam Lo", "Hai Lang", "Tam Ky City", "Quang Ngai City", "Hoi An City"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: APPF0V_e£_f9F Re|e@_$§_2Q19/64/17 66676662971

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Information - Cable '~~ 1-‘+6826 1{J1

Intelligence

NSA --A E1 or 5 mafia

|STATE/INR|DIA|NIlC¢/MC|(SECDEF|JCS|ARMY|NAVY|AIR)|DCS V|R5|AID|USIA|FBI5|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|OER| | | | | | | | | | | | |

This material contains information the disclosure of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the laws. Title 18, U.S.C.

Ed 794, the transmission

‘I 6.0V’ alumni

llduld Inn oldCtwnglcnlmq c-*'.~<~;.~,.-E,

This is an INFORMATION REPORT. INQ_‘l_; FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

0818162 FIT-5*

§/COUNTRY VIETNAM

DUl 1 - 4 FEBRUARY 1366

SUBJECT PRISONER'S VIEWS OF VIETCON5 (VC) ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES IN SAIGON DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE

VIETNAM, SAIGON <5 FEBRUARY 1955) FVS=l6,578 <wfiW%w -§'

SOURCE INTERROGATION OF NINE VIET CONG SUSPECTS AT THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER.

BETWEEN 1 FEBRUARY AND 4 FEBRUARY 1968, AT LEAST 101 PERSONS.

WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT VIET CONG§~»+--_(VC)

ACTIVITIES IN amen» warn. m..\asri=_z> AT

AVAILABLE INFORMATION INDIC-' U1

om

THAT ONLY TNO OF THE FHISONEHS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR THE VC) NGER

THAN ONE YEAR. ALL PRISONERS ARE LOW-LEVEL, THE MAJORITY CLAIMING

1967 On, IN ONE CASE, EVEN

TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED IN MID TO.LATE

AS LATE AS 31 JANUARY 19ss. THE MAJORITY'0F rnssa PERSONS~HAD

BEEN‘ \(CAPTUHED, BUT ND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) X2)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786629
---
# THE TWO INDIVIDUALS WITH THE LONGEST vc AFFILIATION WERE

TWO PERSONS PROVIDED THE ONLY ANSWERS OF SUBSTANCE TO A SERIES OF QUESTIONS REGARDING VC ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES. THE QUESTIONS AND THEIR ANSWERS FOLLOW:

Q. WHAT WERE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COUNTRYWIDE MILITARY ACTION?
THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) IN DECEMBER 1967 OR EARLY FEBRUARY 1968 (DURING TET), OR THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL ATTACK BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL (ORGANIZED DEMONSTRATIONS) TO DEMAND U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND A "COALITION, PEACE AND NEUTRALIST GOVERNMENT FOR SVC."
WE HAD SUFFICIENT FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.
---
Wed for Release 2019/04/11 @6186629

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|---|---|
|DEHONSTRATION IN wHICHK:::jWA5ITO PAHTICIPATE. THE DEMONSTHATION|IIH|
|WOULD EVENTUALLY END AT THE SAIGON HAAKLT NHEHE THE DLMONSTRATORS|3jMhX2)|
|WOULD ORGANIZE A MEETING CALLING FOH THE NITHDHAWAL OF ALLIED| |
|TROOPS (ESPECIALLY u.s.> FROM SAIGON. IF IME vc FAILE0[:::]wAs|3j%hX2)|
|T0 RETURN ro/ / AND IF NO CONTACT|ll|
|wAs EsIABLIsHEo[:::]wAs T0 THY AGAIN on A FEERUAHY AT ANOTHER|um|
|LOCATION wMEM[:::]wouLo EE GIVEN A MEM ASSIGNEMENT. [:::::]MAs to|lfl|
|REPORT THE RESULTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION BACK TO|LIN|
|THE. BASIS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, VC POLITICAL CADHES WOULD FORM|33(hX2)|
|A RESOLUTION T0 HAND T0 THE EXISTING svw GOVEHNMENT. [:::::::::::]|ll‘|
|SAID THAT THE vc WOULD TKY TO CREATE THIS GENEHAL UPRISING|I3&hX2)|
|THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THE HOEE THAT THEY COULD PnE.SSURE| |
|GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) INTO ACCEPTING A COALITION GOVERNMENT.| |

Q. WERE YOU TOLD AND DID YOU BELIEVE THAT THE POPULATION WOULD JOIN IN A GENERAL UFHISING AGAINST evu Ana AMERICAN FORCES.

|A.[:::]REPpRIEn rMAI\|\ §;xhX2)|
|---|---|
|IN SAIGON) HAD SAID THAT THE AMEHICANS I.-JOULD COOPEHATE WITH VC FORCES"|P1|

I, .EI$D4flREHfflflEEM - A --' *

_;J;4k%4?*::T'*, I

-=‘ (.- .. A_

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786629
---
# 1

'Aim-L ___,_                               ,,_.._.',a,_,4_...,..,- »._.._                           ...._,.@.;.~_vg>;~, .,\\ , ~v.~-'                                                                       for Re'ea$e12019/64/17 666766629

IN                Q6826                                                                      I'-

mess

- ;4?c1€E T                                                                                +w+Fauncn1n€§§W"

fcluuljlcaflon)                                                    (_dls§em controla) V

an.»-.n\.-~ av-a~~¢ , ,. . :. -.                                                                     ‘? . -                                                                    O                           .;.                           . .-                      _      - '5'. '                        <           -          -.- - a-~ -~- -v-q--—-.-,----p- --- . < .-

BY REMAINING SILENT OR INACTIVE, THUS ALLOWING THE VC TO ATTACK THE GVN FORCES THROUGHOUT SAIGON.

[::] BELIEVED THIS                                                                                ( X2)

AND ruousnr THAT THE SAIGON POPULATION MOULD RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE VC UPRISING. [iiiiijruoueur THERE WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT FROM THE POPULACE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WAR HAD LASTED S0 LONG AND MANY WAR VICTIMS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT FOR A CESSATION OF THE FIGHTING.

Q.                     WHAT ACTUAL SUPPORT DID You RECEIVE FROM rfia FOPULACE?

A.                      NEIIHER[:::::::::::::1sAw ANY ACTUAL SUPPORT roa THE vc FROM                                                                                3.3(h)(2)

THE FOPULACE.

Q.                      WERE YOU LED TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT MILITAHY ACTION w0ULD BE SUPFLEMENTED BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH- KHE SANH

OR DMZ AREA?

A. [:::]HAD HEARD or NOTHING SPECIFIC - ONLY ATTACKS THROUGHOUT                                                                                W252                  X2)

THE couwraw.                                                                     [:::::]nAD NOT HEARD OF ANY ornaa POSSIBLE UFRISINGS.                                                                                W                     X2)

Q.                     ARE YOU AWARE OF AN                                                                                EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE                                                                                ll. d\

AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION MOVEMENT T0 NEGOTIATE WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT                                                                                (NFLSV)?

A.                                                                                ‘ANSWERED NO.                                                                                3.3(h)(2)< !

Q.                     ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR FOLLOW-UP STEPS IN THE CURRENT STRATEGY?                                                         IF SO, WHAT?

§j§§ArE‘F                                                                                NOlE§§HJPflT§§5r’4
---
|PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES|PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES|
|---|
|- -$—E'C'§’E'¥’_|NO SSEM|
|ifclasrlpmtlovgi)|lifdbaem controls)|
|A. [iiijxwiw wornxwa or ANY FUATHEA|3.3(h)(2)|
|PLAN5.[::::::]DID NOT KNOW|1.,’1 1A|
|OF ANY FOLLOW-UP STEPS|*|
|TIME THE vc WEHE so suaa iH;Y WOULD WIN.|'4‘|
|Q. IF THE cuangnr MILITAHY ACTIVITY 1s NOT DECISIVE, AND IN FACT|.2,‘|
|THE vc APPEAR T0 HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE MILITAAILY As AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS,|How no YOU ANTICIPATE rnxs wILL as EXPLAINED|
|BY THE NFLSV oa HANOI?|‘ -IMlL;h\\(.'4In.|
|A. [:::]HAn NO ANSWER T0 THIS SPECIFIC ouasrxow.|[:::]STATED 3.3(h)(2.9!» THAT THE vc WOULD HAVE T0 EXPLAIN T0 THE PEOPLE 1w THLIR AREA|
|THAT THEY HAD DONE THEIR UTMOST AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE T0 WAIT|FOR ANOTHLR OPPORTUNITY. HANOI WOULD |\ir_VEH DISCUSS FAILURES|
|...|...?'.'=.~‘;'§:fi*::-3:?|
|BUT WOULD PRAISE THE ACn'I.£Vl-.s‘ZziNTS.|.¢_! ...,¢v_|
|.|.-’{:"'-‘A31,’¢:>|
|.|J _<,o01(c|

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO:
STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR ucs NIC NSA ocrWHITE HOUSE PRISONERS_VIEWS_OF_VIET_C[15617707].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY",
    "What": "Prisoner's views of Viet Cong (VC) activities and objectives during the Tet Offensive in Saigon",
    "When": "1-4 February 1968",
    "Where": [
        "Vietnam",
        "Saigon"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CAQLESECRE-fAR|A'|'D|S5EM|NA-HON

|PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|EXCLUDED mm muAuvoumc|
|---|---|
|__ a ‘A IJ-I|novmaunmc|

ADVANCECOPY >_ISSUEI3 USLOTTED INDEX: III YES III NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE No.________________.

X"REF TC FILE NO

FILE mo [I RET. -ro BRANCHD DESTROYUs|e.

PER Q___L_.l

ACTION @C/ > RID COPY F'"‘ W-1235 IIIAI

TEAM WAS BRIEFED BY STATION SUNDAY AND BY NACV MONDAY. WILL SPEND TUESDAY DANANG, WEDNESDAY NHA TRANS AND PLEIKU, THURSDAY BIEN HOA AND CAN THO, FRIDAY ADDITIONAL UL‘33 I-"I (TI .1.“.NGS SAIGON. PLAN LEAVE SAIGON ON SCHEDULE SATURDAY.

WESTNORELAND MONDAY MORNING. DISCUSSION EASY AND FRANK. NO PROBLEMS. STATION SRIEFING EXCELLENT. NACV BRIEFING ROUTINE.

INITIAL IMPRESSION IS THAT PRELIMINARY POST MORTENS WILL STAND UP WELLG WASHINGTON APPEARS TO HAVE HAD SAME MATERIAL AS SAIGON, OUT ATMOSPHERE OF ALL HELL ABOUT TO BREAK ..LOOSE, WHICH EXISTED SAIGON, DID NOT FULLY 7.

LARGE AMOUNT 0? MATERIAL POUCHED THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.

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---
|CABLE SECRETARY OF STATE|Approved for Release:|7|
|---|---|---|
|ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BYI J PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|EXCLUDEDGROUPI rnom AUTOMATIC|6|
|When Filled I")|§§lv['.G:§.'I'.'l°.:.'l'I|2|
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|ADVANCE COPY B ISSUED m SLQTTED|INDEX: III vss [I NO|UI|
|BY AT i|CLASSIFY TO FII.;E X REF TO FILE MO.| |
|DISSEM #|FILE RID |:]RET TO.|BRANCH I1 DESTROY E] SIG.|
|ACTION|mro| |

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DANANG PRIORITY uua TRANS, BIEN HOA, LANNINILINEDOSRRECTOR

I-03 3 U

REF:

SAIGON 9905 (NOT SENT DIRECTOR)

WORKING GROUP DESCRIBED REF WILL VISIT DANANG ON

TUESDAY, NHA TRANG AND PLEIKU ONIQNESDAY, BIN HOA AND

CAN THO ON THURSDHY.

GROUP PLANS TO SPEND ABOUT ONE HOUR

w1Tn[::::::jPR1oR T0 DEPARTURE, REMAINDER OF TIME WITH

AMILITARY COMMANDS WILL BE

UNITED STATES AND GVN MILITARY.

ADVISED THROUGH THEIR ONN CHANNELS.»

SRIGON HAS ALREADY PASSED TO GROUP COPIES OF ALL

REPORTING FROM FIELD COVERING PERIOD I5-SO JANUARY SO YOU

WILL NOT NEED TO DO THIS." COPIES OF YOUR RESPONSE TO

QUESTIONS C AND D ALSO PASSED TO GROUP.

ASSUME GROUP WILL

WANT TO EXPLORE THESE QUESTIONS AND INQUIRE ABOUT YOUR

vanxous Pnoannms.

CAS MEMBERS OF GROUP CONSIST OFL::::::::::::j

35¢»

MILITARY MEMBERS CONSIST OF TAJOR GEN. ROBERT R. GLASS,M

COL. JOHN V. LANTEMAN, COL. GEORGE C._VINEY AND MAJOR

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO3023640
---
# ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

A

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2

ADVANCE COPY B ISSUED U SLOTTED I2EI'

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INFO

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# PAGE 2 éaleou L____j§_;,s-R’E’I~

BARRIE WILLIAMS. TWO CINCPAC OFFICERS ALSO RCCOMPANYING GROUP AND Macv EXPEETED T0 SEND AT LEAST out OBSERVER; 4;' Foh DANANG. M0sT OF MEMBERS 0F snow? WILL DEPARI

VIA AIR AMERICA AT ovzm on TUESDAY WITH GENERAL GLASS AND MACV REPS WILL DEPART ONE Hbfih LATER so ARRIVAL TIMES wILL PROBABLY coIwcIDE@' wHILE AT DANANG

eRouP WILL BREAK uP AND V1sIT III MAP e-2 AND e~s, I CORPS

cnkvbi commawntfi AND sfiwion ADVISOR As WELL As[1"'

PARTY PLANS T0 HAVE LUNCH WITH MARINES; GEN; GLASS

ANn[:::::::::]PLAN T0 CALL on GEN; cflénméw AND GEN. LfiSS

MAY ‘ALSO VISIT PHU BAI.

WILL ADVISE FURTHER DETAILS RE II; III nun Iv

CORPS VISITS ASAP;

3.5-€fR'E'ir’

P‘-I .~.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640
---
# CABLE SUMMARY

PERSON/UNIT OF F

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640

ROUTING INITIALS - SEEN BY

# ADVANCE COPY

|ISSUED|SLOTTED|mxz:|YES|NO|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | |CLASSIFY TO F-5 NO| | |

BY: AT1

XREF TO FILE NO.

PEEL QCZ *

FILE NO: [ ] RET. TO BRANCH: [ ]

DISSEM BY

ACTION: NFC

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

3505.

REFERENCE:

A. DIRECTOR 25552

B. DIRECTOR 25553

MACV RESPONSE REFERENCES FOLLOWS:

WE FOUND NO ENEMY BASE AREAS IN THE SAIGON AREA; HOWEVER, THOSE AREAS WHICH WERE OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY AND SUBSEQUENTLY RETAKEN BY FRIENDLY FORCES YIELDED SPARSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. SOME DOCUMENTS WERE FOUND WHICH ALLOWED US TO...

AND WE DISCOVERED A FEW CACHES OF WEAPONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. REGARDING OUR OVERRUNNING COSVN'S BASE AREA, THE COSVN HQ WAS NEVER IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN SAIGON ITSELF ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT ELEMENTS WERE IN THE OUTSKIRTS. OPERATION YELLOWSTONE IN TAY TINH RENDERED SEVERAL TONS OF DOCUMENTS, SOME OF WHICH WERE CONDUCIVE TO OUR ANALYSIS OF ENEMY POST-TET STRATEGY. THIS WILL AID OUR FUTURE OPERATIONAL PLANNING.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640
---
CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO3023640 ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - seen BY

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED INDEX: [I was III NO CLASSIFY TO FILE BY AT X REF TO FILE NO-

DISSEM BY PER FILE RID III "am". TO BRANCH DESTROY SIG

TO KNOW WHO CAN SEE INFO FILE VR

ALL SOURCES OF INTELL CONTRIBUTE TO EFFORT TO GET AT THE ENEMY COMMUNICATION ROUTES AND TO FIND CACHES - THESE PLUS IMPRESSED PORTERS ARE THE ENEMY'S FORWARD SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM. UNQUOTE

REGARDING REF B, PARAGRAPH 5, OPERATION QUYET THANG HAS YET TO PRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE THOUGH A NUMBER OF WEAPONS CACHES HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED FRIENDLY OPERATIONS OVER PAST YEAR THROUGH REFERENCE B SAIGON AREA HAVE NOT ENCOUNTERED SIZEABLE ENEMY BASE AREAS OF TYPE CONTAINING LARGE VOLUME DOCUMENTS SUCH AS FOUND CEDAR FALLS AND JUNCTION CITY

Approved for Release. 2019/04/17 C03023640
---
# A

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640

AND/OR |M|IIAIs -Rm» W

nmr D T S ARKS

INWI [:i:j:€:::::::::] 3.5(c) 1s-e—ir1r—B—1- I505‘ $

1». 7511

FATE: 16 March 1968 Io

Am s:cmAn|Ari|§§zmuMAinou E] mm: |:] nzsnov E] n '|‘O__.__.._._.. nuncn [I] mu MI

ru 19¢/ 1; [:| nomoex B ‘mc usno.

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¥d?|oS3: '_;;-I,A P0I I Q__;¢|n.)m3,-5;. mmlbor)I {L cm m|u:c1o: 8 5 5

be -|- IMMEDIATE SAIGON

mar: SAIGON 0049 (IN nsse)

1. QUESTIONS IN DIR 82580 RELAYED AS RECEIVED FROM REQUESTER AND RECOGNIZE MIAY LACK PRECISION BUT BELIEVE QUOTE SAIGON AREA UNQUOTE WAS MEANT TO INCLUDE THREE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS:

A. unsm AREA INCLUDING SAIGON, cm LON AND GIA munA

B. OPERATION FAIRFAX AREA

CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT

c. SEPARATELY.

Rsquesr THAT aevom mam. wrmI mass THREE AREAS’

2. WE INTERPRET TIME PERIOD TO BE COVERED BY REPORT TO INCLUDE 1 FEB TO 16 MARCH 1968.

3. DOES CURRENT OPERATION QUIT THANG HAVE ANY BEARING ON RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN DIR 825801’ AT TIME QUESTIONS WERE -FRAMED BY REQUESTER

INFORMATION ON‘ QUIT THANG NON-EXISTANT BACK HERE.

4. BELIEVE QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN DIR WERE PROMPTED BY LINE OF REASONING THAT KNONING THESE "ENEMY BASE AREAS" EXISTED IN THE COOIDINAIINO omcm A . , .

III-IAIINIO omcu II-"gfii §'~~";i:m""¢ *""g:gz<E‘;" REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE I5 PROHIBITED. ¢°*”~' "°-
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640

MESSAGE FORM

TO:

"SAIGON AREA" WHAT DO WE DO WITH THE INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM THEIR —|cm "mm $3553

END OF MESSAGE

SENIOR DUTY OFFICER

ESTINE SERVICES

D/OER (telecord)

DUTY OFFICER

COMMUNICATING OFFICERS

INCLUDING AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640|
|---|
|CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION|
|CLASSIFIED MESSAGE|
|Copies Total|
|PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED|
|ADVANCE COPY|ISSUED|SLOTTED INDEX|YES|NO|
|CLASSIFY TO FILE|BRIEF TO FILE AND|FILE RID|NOT TO BRANCH|DESTROY AFTER USING|
|DISM BY|PER|RID COPY|
|C/IS COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM|
|TO|
|IN COORDINATION WITH|
|BY|INAMF DIVISION AND EXTENSION|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640|
---
|~§“ABLE SECRETARMTUISSEWNATION|-.. .__._._._ lll-EL'lI:&' rnTAl comes|I I ROu rms AND/OR INITIALS GI- seen BY|
|---|---|---|
|PERSONNNITNOWIED|-SEER-I:-l—|“mm-MAM|
|A; f WhenFllled In|DUIIKIDIIHIII N|nmummm|
|5:DO|/ REPRODUCTION 0F THIS COPYPROHIBITED|-h|
|AnvANcE cow|El SLOTTED INDEX: U YES E] NO|TjIi 7 ~ 10-\|
|0 2- CLASSIFY TO FILE NO_|P 1'51 Nil-'<:§ E| |
|i3 AT:|X-REF TO FILE NO|PRLQKCFY|
|D|55EM 5y pg“ m0:2:_____j|FILE RID [:1 RET. TO z BRANCH U| |
|ACTION Emucoev|H_ D D-T| |
|,fl_ VRI V H§\|t 0 Av I| |
|;,, e,£,e'R’E'T 1102112@/FE 01 =AR 6:|‘F9=-Ieou :%Q14| |
|IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR|3| |
|REF: D1REcfeR séésm|PER PARA 1A, PLEASE CLARIFY QUOTE SAIGON AREA uueuore|AND SPECIFY TIME FRAME TO BE COVERED BY REQUESTED REPORT.|
|’§,E»€’fi’E’}| | |
|BT|(i;'J5,Wl;f'| |
---
# EXT: 5 I. 1

DATE: 16 March 1968

SECURITY INFORMATION

|A|B|C|D|E|F|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|IV|€3'|rn_.fi¢/|#1 2/|no mmf|mgnuzs nu|

TIME: IllF0|V

P520

A RED COPY

IMMEDIATE - SAIGON

REF: sucou 0049 (IN 11986)

QUESTIONS IN DIR 82580 RELAYED AS RECEIVED FROM REQUESTER AND RECOGNIZE MAY LACK PRECISION BUT BELIEVE QUOTE SAIGON AREA UNQUOTE WAS MEANT TO INCLUDE THREE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS:

A. URBAN AREA INCLUDING SAIGON, CHO LON AND GIA DINH

B. OPERATION FAIRFAX AREA

C. CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT

REQUEST THAT REPORT ON WRITING MASS THREE AREAS

WE INTERPRET TIME PERIOD TO BE COVERED BY REPORT TO INCLUDE TO 16 MARCH 1968.

DOES CURRENT OPERATION QUIT THANG HAVE ANY BEARING ON RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN DIR 82580? AT TIME QUESTIONS WERE FRAMED BY REQUESTER INFORMATION ON QUIT THANG NON-EXISTANT BACK HERE.

BELIEVE QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN DIR 82580 WERE PROMPTED BY LINE OF REASONING THAT KNOWING THESE "ENEMY BASE AREAS" EXISTED IN THE COORDINATES, OFFICIAL

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
---
Appreved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640

MHMG Fm noutmc AND/OI mmus - sv InW

TOTAL COPIES: 5

IIQI

hm

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PAGE Two

"SAIGON AREA" WHAT DO WE DO WITH THE INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM THEIR CAPTURE? EN D OF MESSAGE

Qn(C)

3.5(c)

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5BNIOR DUTY OFFICER CLANDESTINE SERVICES ER (telecord) DUTY QFFICER COOIDINATING OFFICEIS

uuumo omen r.a|-Q-‘§'i'$’.‘.?.'§'..-...». Aurueurncnrmo “S-E—&~R_|;__'y_ dwnw-“wand omcn

REPR9DUC_,N BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE ‘I5’ PROHIBITED. ¢°PY "0-

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640
---
# 15

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640

IOUUNF finnl OR;‘llf‘l7lAl.S - 5'60

|.1°l|G'_|DCI SAVA|i|7"Y"—s—I-3-6-R-E_'pM’|
|---|---|---|---|
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{.1 , .-_, £IL: if H E" I I’ 7 cm: omecron 8 2 J u

[PRIORITY SZAIGON

*1

3.5(c)

ON 12- GENERAL TAYLOR PASSED A LIST OF QUESTIONS TO MOST TWO WIILL REQUIRE FIELD INPUT:

A..ctA. REPORT IS DESIRED A.S TO THE OUTCOME OF ATTACIYKS WHIC

HA.VE BEEN MA.DE BY U.S. /SVN FORCES ON ENEMY BASE AREAS IN THE SAIGON AREA. FOR INSTANCE, NOW THAT THE OLD COSVN AREA HAS BEEN OVER~RUN WHAT WAS FOUND THERE, PARTICULARLY WHAT INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WAS OBTAINED WHICH WAS OF VALUE FOR XXIX FURTHER' MILITARY OPERATIONS?

B.u WHAT INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS ARE NOW BEING MADE BYI U.S. /SOUTH VI ETNAM ELEMENTS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE FORWARD1

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM UTI LI ZED BY THE ENEI»/IY FOR THE SUPPOPCT OF ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS, AS THE BASIS 1012 INTERDICTI ON OF SUCH 'HELD "DISTRI BUTICIN BY OUR MI LI TARXo§;Q§'Q¢E‘§F‘fcm>3

f.\=F!(‘.!EQ Excluded from uuiomulit .I AU‘I'HENTlCAT!N'; down 4;w an<1aw gl

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ZHE ISSVING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. COPY "3-

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640MESSAGE nourmc amnion lNI‘I‘lAl.$V- TEEN mr

ems: UN": EOE F E ¥ Eli-1 E

EXT:

DATE : L

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_____D____H_____V H _ S IUD COPYi _ FILE , VI , (elfle)

(clossificufion) (date and fime filed) (reference number!

to I“ PAGE TWO *1

Z. REQUEST YOU GENERATE THROUGH YOUR75* BEST POSSIBLE COORDINATED (I . E. , STATION PLUS MA.CV) SAIGON FI ELD RESPONSE AND S BACK THROUGH OUR CI-IA.NNEL5. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE OUR RESPOIVSE, INCORPORATI NG YOUR INPUT, BY COB MONDAY, 18 MARCH. END OF MESSAGE

3.5(C) D,/OER *1’;/ocl

DDI

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1 3 Lficludad From uulomugcj ATING ¢-.._~_..___._e-__- ,7 ._s_E_6 R E ¥.___ -_..-__ J _ -1e§Lw1_f@ss=3191\_____l rfiewngrudipg end j Qpruj 5:

7.'I§?"?'-31-Z}§‘1€.?*'f."'5%,‘)E\i Z3‘? {;"T§'iER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE é PROHIBITED.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023640 SAIGON_0096[15617933].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Station SUNDAY, NACV, WESTMORELAND, BARRIE WILLIAMS, CINCPAC OFFICERS, MACV REPS, GENERAL GLASS, GENERAL THANG, COMMUNICATING OFFICERS, SENIOR DUTY OFFICER, DUTY OFFICER",
"What": "Briefings, Travel Plans, Post-Mortems, Military Operations, Intelligence Efforts, Forward Supply Distribution Systems, Recommendations/Questions",
"When": "16 March 1968",
"Where": ["SAIGON", "DANANG", "NHA TRANG", "PLEIKU", "BIEN HOA", "CAN THO"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135

The President's Daily Brief

November 1967

3.5(c)

23

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135
---
# DAILY BRIEF 23 NOVEMBER 1967

|1. Cyprus|issueThe Turks have not moved and the is still in the political arena as of PM 5:00 AM Ankara).(noon EST in Cyprus and 1:00 in|
|---|---|
| |The Turkish cabinet morning in was session Athens' early ing 17 until reply this the to Turkish consider-note of November. "Not satisfactory" was the verdict announced in a statement still after insisting the meeting. withdrawal The the Turks of Greek forces. illegally on island.|
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135

|2.|South Vietnam involving division recent Analysis of communications the 304th strongly Vietnamese North infantry many that as as four of its suggests regiments are Laos moving elements South toward Vietnam. The deploying panhandle which seem headed for the rather than the Demilitarized Zone, route for the division which infiltrated.|
|---|---|
|3.|Soviet Union The after was long-awaited lift-off space yesterday. failed shot shortly We believe circumlunar manned try probably to mission. this have been The or an Soviets could again in will the next day wait so, but they want to find out what went wrong. I|
| |There will be another December lunar good launch "window" about 20 ..|
|4.|Nonproliferation Treaty|
|5.|Chile A strike This strike anti-inflation Se-general has been called for today to protest measures. will years lightly be the first general government forces in four and the government is not have taking it put security been on alert.|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135

6. India

The fall days three of state government in two has, if anything, helped Mrs. Gandhi. The Congress Party had been of in all states back now has Hariana, (Punjab, West Bengal) and a hand to get in. A Socialist-sponsored confidence motion will it be has debated in Parliament passing today, but no chance of.

West Bengal, with Communist-inspired mobs most roaming Calcutta streets, has potential for a nasty explosion, but moving the new in state government seems to be with determination.

7. Syria

Damascus, despite growing isolation and the ability, own in its Arab world, extreme warnings military from Moscow, goes right ahead with likely a hard-headed rigidity serious is quite.

The open Syrians' latest on moves clash include Israel with an call for another round of fighting and denunciation of all resolutions put before the UN.

8. Japan

3.3(h)(2)

9. Japan

# TOP SECRET

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

23 November 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes

.23 November 1967

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Ambassadors Return Cuba, to Czechoslovakia, Hanoi: The North Vietnam-ese ambassadors to Germany, Rumania, Hungary, and East have all returned to Hanoi in the past ten days. The simultaneous return of this many diplomats strongly suggests a special kind of problem. A conference held on some issue seems unlikely that another general North Vietnamese policy review is underway. The last such review was held this past summer in Peking and Moscow; it covered the entire range of issues related to North Vietnam's post-war situation. We would expect diplomats to be far from their chief in France, following his return after another signex-gathering that no ambassador they have. Vietnamese to Indonesia just returned to an earlier session.

Hanoi's Propaganda traveling Japan: Viet in exhibit The Con North Japan. Vietnamese have opened a in It consists of North Vietnamese and weapons weather ite.

# Report on Recent Hanoi Damage:

On Monday, latest report on targets the born of ings around Hanoi Damage: On conceded that the US strikes
---
# SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974135

'were capital probably military airfields and factories near the He intended us nevertheless wondered whether the "the bombs are also to break the will" of civil him leaflets population. The of pellet air bombs and the warning dropped from the over Hanoi lead to suspect this, he reported.

ever, Th~~----~ noted ano signs of panic, how- 3.3(h)(2) and no evidence of general exodus from the city.

tions The The in~----~ also Bridge," Chinese already reported Hanoi just before the recent series of raids. was Paul Doumer October, being repaired by he said. He and added that · the span port areas foot bicycle bridge traffic the by power mid-November. around the in and hit again in late experts," could sup-

The plant are now daylight hours. "absolutely deserted" * * * level Cuban the Cuban Military Delegation to Hanoi: A high- military according delegation Vietnamese has arrived in Hanoi at invitation of the a North November Ministry of Defense, The of 'mission to includes 21 announcement by Hanoi.. and between the represents Cuban armed forces in chief growing staff probably another link their the ties "Yankee the probably two countries in struggle against will imperialism." While in Hanoi, the delegation inspect the North Vietnamese air defenses--particularly air missiles--and tactics. exchange defense and surface-to-air information on guerrilla warfare a The Cuban representation in Hanoi has long included number of militar personnel 3.3(h)(2) union . Other delegation a Italian Travel which * Notes: has * The * North welcome "Italy been in Vietnamese since tride 15 November received "rousing at the head- quarters of the United Socialist account. Party on Socialist 22 November, according reportedly are affirmed to press their support Party the for officials unconditional meeting. cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam at the
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135

Ganda-Soviet media Reactions: have not taken yet Interestingly, note of the in recent Soviet bomb damage to the attache in office press Hanoi. This has, however, been reported elsewhere.

|Hanoi: Pravda|Home Office Worries About its People in 3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|Hanoi and Moscow: Pravda the home office correspondent in Moscow in 3.3(h)(2)| |

In recent Moscow, worried about the effects of the most bombing. "All of our people in are unhurt, we were delayed-action Galya's office for four very day (Galya is evidently row Soviet bombardment fragmentation on 18 down a on y ... a November) ... and in hole "The was blown female the day working before has at gone the yesterday on bombs rained area." in 3.3(h)(2)

NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Trip: Viet in The Cong Liberation Comment Front, on November, clandestine the in Bunker-Westmoreland a broadcast recent the Vietnamese to return on the 16 US of General reflects Westmoreland reported that and Ambassador Bunker "clearly the confusion panic peril claims and of that these despite two US their aggressors." awareness The of the and stalemate, the US officials people "dare to lie to themselves and to fool American by boasting enthusiastically on over this the situation broadcast in South recounted the Continuing cast Communists Vietnam." the current in numerous "winter-spring" "victories" theme, won the campaign by the US land money and Vietnam." broadcast will to "it asserted for is certain more and reinforcements, aggressive that pursue that in view their of and these aid, Westmore-weapons, serious war in
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 413 3.5(c)

Liberation Radio went on to ridicule President Johnson's recent tour of US military bases as an effort to "flatter, deceive, and incite US troops to go to Soup Vietnam and die shamefully," and to contrast pis wip Governor Wallace's call for a cut in US aid in order to force pe US "satellites to send mercenaries to Soup Vietnam."

* * * 3.3(h)(2)
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4135 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602405].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Daily briefings on various international topics including Cyprus, South Vietnam, Soviet Union, Chile, India, Syria, Japan, North Vietnam, Hanoi, and US political attitudes on the Vietnam War",
"When": "23 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cyprus", "Ankara", "Cyprus", "Vietnam", "Soviet Union", "Chile", "West Bengal", "Calcutta", "Syria", "Damascus", "Japan", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "US"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # IN45177 13526

|STATE/INR|DIA|EXONMCC/MCNMCC/MC|CSECDEF|(SECDEF|JCS|ARMY|NAVY|AIR)|CIA/NMCC|NIC|NSA|SDO|ONE|CRS|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|DD/I|EXO| | | | | | | | |FBIS|DCE-S|IRS|AID|USIA|

This material contains transmission Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP II Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: 3.3(h)(2)

SUBJECT: PROPAGANDA, RUMORS, AND ATTITUDE OF THE POPULACE DURING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY/VIET CONG TET AGRESSION.

ACQ SOURCE: 3.3(h)(2)

The most prominent theme or question that has developed among the local indigenous populace in Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa province, focuses on the rumor of a possible coalition government set up by the Americans in collusion with the Viet Cong (VC). Some Vietnamese in Nha Trang believe that because no American installations in the city were attacked.
---
# PAGE 2

|C-0-N-F-I-|-T-I_--A-L|NO|
|---|---|---|
|(classification)|(dissem controls)|(dissentControls)|
|CWHICH|(VHICH IS ERRONEOUS)|THAT "WASHINGTON AND SAIGON", THROUGH A PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENT, HAD ALLOWED THE VC TO ATTACK GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) FORCES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND POSSIBLE TAKE OVER CITIES AND TOWNS IN ORDER TO FORCE THE GVN INTO ACCEPTING A COALITION GOVERNMENT. AT PRESENT, THIS RUMOR APPEARS TO BE SPREADING THROUGH THE VIETNAMESE POPULACE WITH SIZEABLE MOMENTUM AND MANY PEOPLE SEEM TO BE PLACING CONSIDERABLE BELIEF IN ITS VALIDITY.|
|2.|ALL LOCAL VIETNAMESE QUESTIONED FELT THAT THE BULK OF THE POPULATION WAS ANGERED BY THE VC/NVA ATTACKS. THE FACT THAT THEY OCCURRED DURING TET AND ESPECIALLY AFTER THE ENEMY HAD SPREAD LEAFLETS CALLING FOR A SEVEN DAY TRUCE PERIOD WAS DESCRIBED AS "DISGUSTING AND SHAMELESS." THE COMBINATION OF A BROKEN TRUCE PROMISE AND THE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION WHICH RESULTED FROM THE ATTACKS HAS CAUSED EVEN THOSE VIETNAMESE SYMPATHETIC TO THE VC CAUSE TO CRITICIZE VIOLENTLY THE ENEMY'S EFFORT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE LARGE URBAN CENTERS.| |
| | |3.|IN MOST INSTANCES, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FELT THAT THE LOCAL GVN FORCES REACTED PROMPTLY AND COURAGEOUSLY. SOME WERE CONVINCED THAT CERTAIN GVN OFFICIALS POSSESSED|
---
# 9—O—N—F-----T—I—AwL

(classification) - (dissem controls)

INFORMATION

WARNINGScR=THE WARNINGS OF THE ATHENS? 1 ATTACKS BUT DUE TO ENTHUSIASTIC CELEBRATIONS, THESE WARNINGS TENDED TO BE IGNORED. IN FACT, AS A RESULT OF INFORMATION RECEIVED BY POLICE HEADQUARTERS AND ARVN, ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO HAVE AT LEAST FIFTY PERCENT STRENGTH MANNING ALL POSTS, BUT THESE ORDERS WERE NOT FULLY OBEYED BECAUSE OF TEI ALSO, SOME VIETNAMESE FELT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH BEING DONE TO RELIEVE THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES WHO ARE NOW POSING A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN MOST URBAN AREAS. SOME LOCAL VIETNAMESE SAID THAT VC PROPAGANDA WAS NEGLIGIBLE OTHER THAN THE SPREAD OF RUMORS OF COALITION GOVERNMENT..

MR. THO, CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, IN A BROADCAST CALLING FOR THE SOLDIERS OF THE GVN TO "TURN RIFLES TO OVERTHROW THE THIEU-KY CLIQUE AND FIGHT AGAINST THE AMERICAN AGRESSORS"

REPORT CLASS IAL NO ~FORE SSEM

ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO USIB MEMBERS "PROPAGANDA RUMORS AND A[15561293].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "STATE/INR, DIA, EXONMCC, MCNMCC, MC, CSECDEF, JCS, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CIA, NMCC, NIC, NSA, SDO, ONE, CRS",
  "What": "Rumor of possible coalition government in South Vietnam, attitude of the populace during North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong Tet aggression, propaganda spread by VC, reactions of local Vietnamese to VC/NVA attacks, warnings ignored during attacks in Athens, refugee problems in urban areas",
  "When": "Unknown",
  "Where": ["Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa province, South Vietnam"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |COUNTRY|SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)|
|---|---|
|NIC REPORT NO|307/68|
|SUBJECT|Montagnard Disenchantment with NIC|
|CASE NO|FET|
|DATE OF REPORT|13/03/63|
|DATE AND PLACE|1 March 1968 (BAN ME THUOT City, DARLAC Province)|
|DATE OF ACQUISITION|None|
|INFO|December 1967 - January 1968|
|NO. OF PAGES|2|
|INVITATION OF WARDEN|KCHHE-N'I|
---
V.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758584

page 2

In early December 1967 VIET CONG cadres went to BUON CO Hamlet, BUON HO District, DARLAC Province, gathered the people together and told them to prepare to help the VIET CONG in the coming months as the war would be decided in favor of the VIET CONG by March 1968. They were told that the coming battles would be country-wide. The people in the village were told to eat vegetables, save their rice for the liberation forces, and act as guides. They were forbidden to eat rice and would have to carry food and ammunition for the Army of Liberation when the time came.

The villagers were afraid of the VIET CONG no longer; they had been promised victory in 1966, achieved by March 1968. Now total victory would be theirs. They were told not to fear enemy aircraft flying overhead, but every day there were more aircraft destroying their crops and houses because they lived in a VIET CONG-controlled area. Their life became more difficult as it was harder to grow food.

People were leaving the village, trying to leave the controlled area, but most were brought back after an unsuccessful attempt to escape. The villagers were not allowed to leave with their families as they would not return. The only way a man could leave the village was alone.

The people in BUON CO. Hamlet could not go to the GVN authorities at will and draw their attention to VIET CONG activities in the area for fear of reprisals.

Confidential KIN 2

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 000158584 MONTAGNARD_DISENCHANTMENT[15617684].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "NIC (National Intelligence Council), Montagnard villagers",
"What": "Viet Cong activities in South Vietnam, villagers' disenchantment with NIC, fear of reprisals",
"When": "1 March 1968, December 1967 - January 1968",
"Where": ["Buon Co Hamlet, Buon Ho District, Darlac Province, Ban Me Thuot City, Darlac Province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release 2019/03/29 C03186503

9‘eLI~1Gze /155

o9“TR41.

“I9N:=.t9‘4

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Cm/ml Inte/lzgmce Bz/Z/aim T are' 3 C) 15 January 1968

Approved for Release 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503

Central Intelligence Bulletin

The Central Intelligence Bulletin is produced by the director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031865033.5(C)

1 \J 1.’ K11 1

3.5(c)

15 January 1958

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Laos: Communists overrun Nam Bac. (Page 3)
Cyprus: Makarios calls for presidential election. (Page 5)
Cuba: Castro criticizes US "imperialism" and Communists who lack revolutionary vigor. (Page 6)
Yugoslavia: Party purges opponents of Tito's liberal reforms. (Page 8)
West Germany - Yugoslavia: Diplomatic ties (Page 9)

3.3(h)(2)

# TOP RE

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
# Approved for Release: CQ3186503

|J1|\,, .\,|NORTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|---|
|Demilitarized Zone| | |
|THAILAND|QUANG TIN| |
|QUANG NGAI|KONTUM| |
|BINH DINH|FLEIKU| |
|PHU YEN|CAMBODIA| |
|DARLAC|KHANH HOA| |
|VI|QUANG DUC| |
|PHUOC TUY|BA RIA| |
|LONG KHANH|THUAN THIEN| |
|TAY NINH|BINH THUAN| |
|LONG AN|THUAN THUAN| |
|PHUOC LONG|QUANG TRI| |
|Capital Special Zone| | |
|DINH TUONG|VIETNAM| |
|HA|SON| |

SOUTH VIETNAM

25 50 75 100 Miles

15 Jan 53 CTA
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503

# Vietnam:

South Vietnam: There are continued indications of Communist preparations for increased offensive activity in South Vietnam's northern provinces.

The enemy continues to re-position major command and control elements in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and the western end of the DMZ. Several recent small unit contacts with Communist forces point up the increased enemy presence in the Khe Sanh area. East of Khe Sanh, a reinforced enemy platoon in well-fortified positions ambushed a US Marine convoy on the morning of 13 January killing 19 and wounding 70 Marines in heavy fighting. At least ten enemy troops were killed.

In the central DMZ area, westward movement by major enemy elements.

The government's continuing pressure on striking workers in Saigon may be forcing labor to yield.

On 14 January, some electrical workers were headed back to work under orders of the government. Firm countermeasures against the strikers were authorized by President Thieu who fears that the strikes may be intended as a test of the new government's strength.

One unconfirmed press report says a general order for the Saigon area has been canceled by union leaders. They reportedly will confer with government officials today in another effort to seek a settlement.

15 Jan 68

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
Approved for Release: %?"’5\*1<1:,Z2019/03/29 C03186503-(C)

3.3(h)(2)

North Vietnam:A ‘ A ' “ \ ' \ 3.3(h)

12 January attack on the Laotian outpost at Phou Elrthea Thi was conducted by four North Vietnamese AN-2 (COLT) aircraft. While two of the aircraft circled nearby, two others each made bombing and strafing runs on the position. One of the attackers was downed by rifle fire from an Air America helicopter and a second apparently by ground fire.

ct ' ‘ " ' \ 8-3(h)(2>‘

the flight originated in the Hanoi area and was controlled from the Hanoi/Gia Lam-Airfield.

This was the first time North Vietnamese aircraft have been used to attack a target in Laos.

3.5(C)

3.3(h)(2)l

3.5(c)

15 Jan 68 2

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503

</
---
Laos: The Communists have succeeded in overrunning the important Laotian outpost at Nam Bac.

The collapse of the government's defense perimeter on 14 January culminated a ten-month campaign by the Communists to reoccupy an area they lost in August 1966, after controlling it for nearly ten years. Government forces are being redeployed approximately 20 miles to the south to block further Communist advances.

Lack of communication with Nam Bac has prevented an accurate assessment of the situation, but it appears that the Laotian Armed Forces General Staff, faced with growing Communist military pressure, decided that it was not worthwhile to hold the position. The King, fearing the loss of Nam Bac would threaten the approaches to the royal capital at Luang Prabang, had pressured the military into overextending itself in order to defend the area. This had resulted in a general weakening of the government’s defense posture throughout Laos, most significantly in the south.

The loss of Nam Bac is more a reflection of the lack of decisive leadership within the Royal Laotian Army than an indication that the Communists have embarked on a larger offensive role in Laos.

Commander in chief General Ouan Rathikoun's reputation will probably be eroded, and there may be a new round of political maneuvering within the military for control of the armed forces.

15 Jan 68
---
Approved for Release: l.l LII’EbRE42019/03/29 C03186503\5(C) 3.3(h)(2)

(5

IKI

1/

2

3

a

15 Jan 68 4 s.5(¢)

TOP H a %S-

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
Cyprus: President Makarios’ sudden call for national elections next month may represent a significant change in his public posture on the Cyprus dispute.

His widely publicized statement calling for new elections warned the Greek Cypriots that compromise will be necessary since "what is desirable" is not always "feasible." He appeared to be telling the Greek Cypriot community that enosis--union of the island with Greece--is no longer a realistic goal.

In an apparent gesture to the Turkish Cypriots, Makarios for the first time referred publicly to the "Turkish Community" rather than speaking of the Turkish minority on the island. He also noted that a "Charter of Rights" would be "entrenched" in the constitution.

Makarios further appeared to be calling for direct talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He declared that his government is developing a "document" which could become the basis for discussions and urged the other side to do likewise.

Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leaders have reacted cautiously to the announcement. Ankara has indicated it will not oppose elections if they are held according to the present constitution, but this could be a sticking point as Makarios no longer regards this constitution as valid. Turkish Cypriot leaders have thus far declined to comment, probably awaiting guidance from Ankara.

Although Makarios’ new overture to the Turkish Cypriots may clear the way for direct talks between the two communities, past experience with Makarios weighs heavily on the side of caution. He may be trying to consolidate support within his own community by silencing criticism from the right-wing element that has been pushing for enosis.
---
Cuba: Fidel Castro has delivered one of his most bitter verbal attacks against US "imperialism."

Speaking at the closing session of the international Havana Cultural Congress on 12 January, Castro abandoned the relatively passive tone of his more recent speeches. He called the US a "universal enemy," the "buttress of all the reactionary governments" in the world and compared US foreign policy with that of Hitler. He expressed special annoyance with the US economic denial program, saying that the US is "sabotaging" Cuban efforts to make trade deals in Western Europe.

Castro, returning to his theme of last summer, made some stinging remarks about Communists who are lacking in revolutionary vigor. Undoubtedly referring to the pro-Moscow parties in Latin America, Castro said that Marxism needs to be revamped to "conduct itself like a revolutionary force, not like a pseudorevolutionary church." Castro castigated those parties not supporting "armed struggle" as being in the "rear guard" of the struggle against imperialism.

He described Ernesto "Che" Guevara as a paragon of revolutionary virtue, and offered to trade 100 political prisoners in Cuba "to be selected by the CIA and the Pentagon" for Guevara's corpse.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031865035(C)1Uli’ bit]:Z 1

3.3(h)(2)

15 Jan 68 '7 s.5(¢) TOP RET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
---
Yugoslavia; The Yugoslav party has taken another step in its long-awaited purge by ousting 400 members of the Belgrade city organization.

The expulsions are the first large-scale reflection of Tito‘s call in a TV interview who oppose his on 29 December for cleansing the party of members liberal economic and social reforms. Most of those marked for expulsion are conservative older ex-par-tisans and minor bureaucrats who had backed former party secretary Aleksandar Raiikovic before he was ousted in July 1966 for opposing the reforms and plotting against Tito...

Replacement of his supporters with new, younger members, combined with a current reorganization of local party machinery, will be an important step by the liberals in consolidating their control prior to the party congress scheduled for December. The purge is likely to add to the regime"s already ticklish nationality problem. Many Serbs, in particular, regard the decentralizing reform program as a blow to their prestige and economic interests.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503

West Germany - Yugoslavia
German and Yugoslav officials will meet in Paris pis week to discuss procedures for restoring diplomatic ties between Bonn and Belgrade. Despite some anxiety about repercussions in Bonn, bop countries are eager to normalize relations, which have been broken for more pan ten years. Neiper is expected to attach conditions to such a step. Controversial issues yet to be resolved, however, include pe Yugoslav demand for indemnification of victims of pe Nazis and Bonn's desire for Yugoslav support of pe German right of self-determination.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503

pp,$e1fit

To ret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602449].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin, intelligence reports on Vietnam, Laos, Cyprus, Cuba, Yugoslavia, West Germany, North Vietnam",
"When": "15 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Cyprus", "Cuba", "Yugoslavia", "West Germany", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317

The President's Daily Brief

Volume 29, 8 March 1968
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# NORTH VIETNAM

Location: Bai Chay, Ha Long Bay

Points of Interest:

|Huiphn|25'|
|---|---|
|CAC BA csu|NAUTICAL MILES|
|DoSon|GULF OF TONKIN|
|Novol Bose| |

Chinese Hydrofoil PT Boat
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# DAILY BRIEF

8 MARCH 1968

|North Vietnam|Chinese-built hydrofoil torpedo boat-- the most modern craft of its kind. Because of greater speed and stability, the North Vietnamese will find it considerably superior to the Soviet torpedo boats which they already have. It is excellent for hit-and-run tactics, and could be used against US naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf.|
|---|---|
|South Vietnam|A motion of no confidence in the government of Premier Loc has been placed before the lower house, but it is not expected to be acted upon for some weeks. Action on the government budget has priority on the agenda, and any formal recommendation of no confidence must have the approval of both houses of the assembly.|
|Panama|Robles, in a nationwide radio-TV speech yesterday, virtually slammed the door on a negotiated settlement. He announced that he had not appeared before the assembly commission investigating the charges against him because he views the entire procedure as "illegal and immoral." The impeachment process, he said, is completely null.|
|Warsaw Pact|SofiaThe two-day pact meeting ended yesterday without any sign of a new Soviet-Rumanian confrontation. There are no reports yet on what was discussed, and a final communique has not been released.|
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317

FA 8-5(c) 3.3(h)(2)

5. Berlin

6. Western Europe

The informal arrangements by which the US and the West Europeans have traditionally organized themselves to sell gold to world buyers may be breaking down.

London Gold Pool system managed by the Bank of England. Under the system each member is expected to share the burdens of any reserves other who is hit hard by loss of to speculators and hoarders.

But Italy, for instance, now finds itself already purchasing directly from the US all of the gold that it is required to provide to the pool. Other members are also wavering.

If this trend continues, the pool would lose its purpose. The US would in effect assume a 100 percent share of the gold losses in the official European gold market. The other members would retain their gold reserves, while US reserves would continue to decline.

The immediate problem is that between 29 February and 5 March, losses of the pool reached $224 million; for US in turn has had to ask members for an additional contribution of $200 million.

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# 4. Czechoslovakia

The defection of the Czech general has caused a major stir in Prague. The main party daily because of protection general got away is suggesting that the Other voices secret police chief, and given him by are calling on the defense Novotny and his backers. minister, the the prosecutor general to resign. All of this comes at the best possible time for the new party secretary, Dubcek. As a result, the attacks on Novotny should pick up markedly; his resignation as president is probably not far off.

# 8. Philippines

US-Philippine relations took a strange turn yesterday. The Philippine Embassy in Saigon told our embassy there that, effective immediately, Clark Air Base and other US bases in the Philippines will be prohibited to US servicemen and civilian personnel visiting on leave. Clarification from Manila is expected shortly.
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Date: 8 March 1968
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# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

8 March 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

further debriefing by US Embassy officers in Paris, More Comments from French Correspondent: Cabanes, the former French Press Agency correspondent in Hanoi, reports that the North Vietnamese were not completely satisfied with the Tet offensive.

In private conversations, North Vietnamese officials have displayed disappointment over the relatively good showing made by the South Vietnamese and the fact that few South Vietnamese members defected to the Viet Cong.

In other aspects of the war, Cabanes provided little beyond the standard optimistic North Vietnamese line.

He characterizes the party of the population as "strong and effective." He says the North Vietnamese leadership's political dependence on Moscow and Peking is minimal, and he tries especially hard to discount Chinese influence in Hanoi. He recounts a story about North Vietnamese officials being extremely disturbed over bomb damage to Chinese vessels in Haiphong because these officials feared it might trigger a Chicom response or the sending of Chinese volunteers into North Vietnam.

# North Vietnamese Combat Officer's View of the War:

A recently captured 7-page notebook, formerly concerned with combat strength ratios, is property of a North Vietnamese signals officer. The writer states that if the ratio is 15 allied to one Communist, the ratio is five to one. He believes that "the enemy will lose if the ratio is two to one," but "the enemy will win" after the ratio is one and one-half to one. After the 1966-67 dry season, North Vietnamese reinforcements "continue to increase day after day in order to prevent the enemy from increasing the ratio. We presently have 400,000 troops."
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The writer asserts that the Communists have the initiative in the current winter-spring campaign. He says that in 1966-67 "we succeeded in deploying the enemy to the strategic positions selected by us." He feels this year’s campaign may be a good opportunity to achieve ultimate victory because opposing forces will be stretched thin. The writer's views may not be an entirely accurate reflection of North Vietnamese strategic thinking, but they are illustrative of an apparently widespread Communist conviction that the balance of forces favors them. In earlier phases of the war, Communists were instructed to believe in ultimate victory primarily the emphasis is on the superiority of their cause. Now because of the righteousness of Communist forces and strategy.

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---
# Internal Security Measures

In late 1967 the regime laid down strict measures to further tighten controls over the populace.

- Included increased patrols by the new measures in local security forces.
- More emphasis on detection of espionage, tighter controls over the rice ration, closer surveillance of individuals deemed "bad elements," and detention of "dangerous elements" in special camps to do forced labor.

None of these measures is new to life in North Vietnam, and it seems likely that increased vigilance last fall was prompted largely by the disruption caused by stepped-up US air attacks. There were at least two propaganda pieces last autumn emphasizing a similar theme. Our best guess is that the regime was simply taking further precautions to maintain its already tight control apparatus, especially because of the growing number of evacuees from urban areas. Evacuation was accelerated last autumn and it doubtless has created problems and confusion of which we are only dimly aware. Security almost certainly is a rural authorities were exhorted to be more responsible in caring for the needs of those evacuated from the cities, to be on guard for spies, rumormongers, and gossips who maligned the regime in the ranks of these refugees.

# French Medical Aid for the Viet Cong

The Franco-Vietnamese medical association in Paris has assembled medical supplies valued at about $20,000 for air shipment to Cambodia and onward to the Viet Cong. Funds for this particular shipment have come from the medical association and the Mouvement Du Milliard, which has previously sent medical aid to North Vietnam. The shipment reportedly will be received in Cambodia by the National Liberation Front representative there, Nguyen Van Hieu.
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317

Front Spokesman Discusses Tet Offensive: The deputy chief of the Liberation Front office in Moscow told recently that the Tet offensive had proven that Viet Cong military forces are still powerful and not "tired" as he claimed the Pentagon and President Johnson had alleged. He also said the objective of Viet Cong efforts is to get the Americans out of Vietnam. In tough and cocky language, he warned that the Communists are prepared to outlast the Americans despite "their stubborn nature," and that only after the US has "evacuated South Vietnam" will there be negotiations.

View of the POL situation in North Vietnam Overcomes POL Problems: A detailed review of the last year indicates that Hanoi has overcome the effects of the 1966 bombings of petroleum storage facilities. Specifically:

- POL imports were significantly larger in 1967 than in 1966. Most of the oil came by sea from the USSR.
- The system of lighters at Haiphong is working well.
- Consumption in 1967 was also higher than in 1966, partly because the North Vietnamese had to depend more heavily on truck transport and POL-driven electric power plants. But POL losses from bombing were drastically lower, and the net outcome was a modest increase in reserves.
- The North Vietnamese have dispersed most of their storage facilities and are not even bothering to repair the central facilities damaged in the 1966 bombings.

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NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report.
---
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974317 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617733].pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "US Government officials, US Embassy officers, French Correspondent Cabanes, North Vietnamese officials, Communist forces",
  "What": ["Chinese-built hydrofoil torpedo boat in North Vietnam", "No confidence motion in South Vietnam government", "Impeachment process in Panama", "Informal gold arrangements breaking down", "Defection of Czech general", "Restrictions on US bases in the Philippines", "Special daily report on North Vietnam", "Internal security measures in North Vietnam", "French medical aid for Viet Cong", "North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes on the war", "POL situation in North Vietnam"],
  "When": "8 March 1968",
  "Where": ["Bai Chay, Ha Long Bay", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Panama", "Warsaw Pact", "Berlin", "Western Europe", "Czechoslovakia", "Philippines", "Paris", "Hanoi", "Haiphong", "Cambodia", "Moscow", "Prague"],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
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Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269

The President's Daily Brief

9 February 1968
---
# DAILY BRIEF

9 FEBRUARY 1968

Vietnam
We have no word of enemy action as of 5:30 AM in pe Khe Sanh area today. Reports say pat some 124 enemy troops were killed in pe fighting pere yesterday; US casualties were 21 killed and 27 wounded.

North Korea. No new developments have been reported overnight.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269

3. Jerusalem
4. West Germany
Antiwar demonstrations by leftist students against US installations in West Germany are becoming more and more violent. An especially bold assault on pe Frankfurt Consulate early pis week almost broke in.
US officials on pe scene believe pat pe local auporities have been too lenient, and pat pis is encouraging pe agitators. "The next target is likely to be pe Hamburg Consulate pis weekend."
5. Soup America
Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia are considering pe establishment of diplomatic and formal commercial relations wip pe Soviet Union pis year. Influenced by events in Chile last monp, and by Chile, which restored relations in 1964, pese countries hope pe move might help pem unload some of peir hard-to-sell commodities and pus ease growing economic troubles.

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974269

|6. Sweden|The number of US deserters known to have been given asylum in Sweden now stands at 24.|
|---|---|
|7. Rhodesia|Soon, Ian Smith wants to visit the US.|
|8. Congo|Mobutu says he will propose at a meeting of the Organization of African Unity that the mercenaries be allowed to leave for Europe. Although Mobutu still believes these men should be punished, he apparently will not attach any strings to their departure.|

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974269
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# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

9 February 1968

I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

North Vietnamese Diplomat Comments: Hanoi is keeping the door to talks open but is not giving an appearance of flexibility.

U Thant Meets With Hanoi Representative in New Delhi

UN Secretary-General Thant met with the North Vietnamese consul general in New Delhi on 8 February, according to press reports. UN spokesmen characterized the meeting as "useful" and claimed that Thant met with the Hanoi representative in a personal capacity and not as Secretary-General. No indication was given as to the matters discussed.
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269

3-5<°>

3.3(h)(2)

Hanoi has maintained a consistent position in opposition to UN involvement in the Vietnam situation. The North Vietnamese have never openly criticized Thant personally; however, they view any meeting with him as an opportunity to convey their position on the war and negotiations to an influential international figure who is on record in favor of several aspects of their stand, particularly on the end of the bombing.

American Prisoners to be Released Today: Hanoi has confirmed its intention to send the three captured American pilots out of North Vietnam on the ICC flight today. Hanoi has cabled the head of the ICC in Saigon a manifest for the Hanoi-Vientiane leg of the flight; the names of the three pilots are on the passenger list at 11:30 local time today. The plane left Saigon for Phnom Penh and Hanoi.

3.3(h)(2)
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Saturated with propaganda relating to now been intensive. Hanoi radio has for some days the Tet offensive. time. There is nothing significant to report at this

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                               Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974269 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617699].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "The President, US officials, UN Secretary-General Thant, North Vietnamese Diplomat, Hanoi representative",
"What": "Updates on Vietnam and North Korea, Antiwar demonstrations in West Germany, Establishment of relations with the Soviet Union by South American countries, US deserters in Sweden, Ian Smith's visit to the US, Mobutu's proposal at the Organization of African Unity, Special Daily Report on North Vietnam, American pilots release from North Vietnam, North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "9 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "North Korea", "Jerusalem", "West Germany", "Sweden", "Rhodesia", "Congo", "Bolivia", "Venezuela", "Ecuador", "Peru", "Colombia", "Chile", "United States", "Europe", "New Delhi", "Saigon", "Phnom Penh", "Hanoi", "Vientiane"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}