Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758700

confidential

C O N @i D € N T I 4 L K I # RaND "3 8 {368

# INTERROGATION REPORT-NASCC

BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION. THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED. THIS REPORT IS NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) .-,. }' 07 Detachment 6, S OF THE ORGANIZATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER AND ri,•J.l·i:;: ·Lr....,.AUSPICES r.Tri',. t,~~D1rHg TREU.8. CENTRAL JOINT c:i .., t' ;.:r,;"f'p AT .-1;·· 64991H SPECIAL ACTIVITIES WITH THE PARTICIPATION INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITE TKE PARTICIPATION OF "DETACH?•'i:•'.N'I' 6499'1'H Sf"fi'."'T'e.1AC'l'I VITI;;'CGROUP . (USAF ). INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) .- ....... . v.i...iL -c ..,.,. T.i"t,..j.J6.t

NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)

COUNTRY COUNTRY.. ·i. NORTHSOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) ANLF SWN Civilian Political Cadre'0NIC CASE NONO : -109/68VfflNAM (NVN) NIC REPORT NO NIC REPORT 109/68 SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) 170/2/67

SUBJECT Opinion of the War Political 11 January 1968 War in Vietnam Cadre's NLF SVN Civilian DATE OF REPORT: 25/1/68 DATE OF REPORT: 2'J/l/68 NO .OF PAGES 3 NO. OF PAGES : 3

DATE OF INFO ll January 1968

OF ACQUISITION DATE AND PLACE 11 January 1968 (W- U) SAIGON; SOURCE: SAIGON Vietnam

The NFL SVN will eventually win the war in Vietnam. The purpose of the war in Vietnam is the intention of the U.S. to harm & exploit the Vietnamese people. There are many U.S. citizens who support the NFL SVN. They have demonstrated their support through street demonstrations and protest movements. In addition, many "Veterans' have sent material aid such as medicine and blood plasma to the NFL SVN.

It is the intention of the U.S. to eventually drive out the U.S., reunify the country, and establish an independent government. The U.S. citizens who support the NFL SVN have demonstrated their support through street demonstrations and protest movements. In addition, many U.S. organizations, including the "Dubois Club", the "2 May Movement", and the professor-student movement at the University of Michigan, have supported this revolution. Unless the U.S. Government understands that their aid is a great spiritual encouragement to the NFL SVN Government.

# ATTACHMENTS:

DISTRIBUTION CLASSIFICATION

US 'MACV EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC CONFIDENTIAL None

US 'EMBASSY (OSA) DECLASSIFICATION NOTICE AFFECTING MATERIAL CONTAINED INFORMA TION None

MAR 5 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758700

Militarily, the U.S. and the NFL SVN are equal, but the NFL SVN in this war cannot be won militarily, politically, other nations are only supplementary for a long time. The war will go on for a long time. The eventual victory of the NFL SVN will come as a result of winning the support of all Vietnamese people, including many nations of the world.

The NFL SVN has the support of all Vietnamese people, but winning the support of the nations of the world is only supplementary. The purpose of this revolution is to drive the U.S. out of the country and to establish a new independent government there. Since 1950, the U.S. has interfered with the internal affairs of SVN, with the intention of promoting aggressive war and a "new feudalism policy" in SVN.

The NFL SVN is supported by many people, including many nations of the world, for a just cause. The purpose of this revolution is to drive the U.S. out of the country and to establish a new government in SVN. Hatred is felt only for this aggressive war in Vietnam. Many Americans support the NFL SVN spiritually and materially.

Many organizations have sent material aid to the NFL SVN, including the "2 May Movement," the "Dubois Club," and the "Veterans of Michigan University." Before President Johnson was elected, he promised to find a way to end the war in Vietnam, but now the American people do not believe he will carry out his promise.

Unless the war is equal, the NFL SVN cannot negotiate the settlement of the war with any U.S. President. The NFL SVN is winning the support of the people, and even the U.S. people who work for the Government cannot see it. The NFL SVN is capable of continuing the fight until the last day, just as the VIET MINH, who had no modern weapons, were able to eventually drive out the French.

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00758700
---
The major advantage of the NFL SVN 16 Its' belief in "the People Force." The aid received from other countries is only supplementary advantage NVN are receiving the people. Their belief continues to fight because from other NFL SVN. Even if the aid were completely terminated, the people. However, supplementary fight time the aid were completely terminated, countries received is only would continue present Even if it the NFL SVN would to because NFL has NFL SVN the support of all the SVN and support and NVN are receiving material support at of all However, at the from the present the U.S.S.R, Communist U.S.S.R, time China, Albania, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, East Germany, Cuba and Poland. Romania, China, Albania, (type unknown) from all of these countries. The NFL SVN and NVN have received weapons, Hungary, NVN from all the have received North material Czechoslovakia, support from the weapons, medicine, and medicine, Germany, East Communist Cuba and implements" Poland. The most important and contributors this ammunition. The reason for this SVN is )8Xalled. and NVN and their transportation to SVN is very difficult due to the control "implements" Germany, and Cuba. Nevertheless, GVN/U.S. The reason Cuba. this shortage is that the weapons the East to the unknown) and are delivered Nevertheless, of these the NFL SVN 18 short of weapons U.S.S.R., Communist China, Czechoslovakia that The NFL SVN will overcome is difficult NFL SVN will of weapons countries. NFL SVN is Communist China, are delivered The most important short Czechoslovakia to the situation to by the GVN/U.S. troops South of the 17th parallel and NVN and ammunition. by transportation of the their for to shortage very the weapons are control delivered due to these enemy forces. this situation by capturing the weapons and ammunition of these enemy forces. powerful will lose. The victory of the NFL SVN will war GVN/U.S. forces. NFL SVN the military forces continue to win victories against the GW/U.S. forces of the increasing forces lose of the nations of the world. In the meantime long powerful nation. Vietnam is very small, But if the war lasts great end increasing support The NFL SVN cannot defeat the U.S. The NFL SVN the U.S. nation. will cannot defeat the U.S. militarily. The U.S. 18 a long time, Vietnam is the The victory very of the NFL SVN will U.S. small. militarily. if But The U.S. is as the the U.S. meantime, the NFL SVN come as come lasts a result of the great support of the to nations of the world. against In the the In 1966, for example, the VIET CONG defeated twelve U.S. battalions and destroyed 52 GVN battalions. In addition, the NLF now controls 75 per cent of SVN, according battalions. to a 1966 article to 1966 article in the official In addition, in official newspaper of the NFL SVN. NLF now controls of the 75 NFL SVN cent. A-NLF-SVN-CIVILIAN-POLITI15478101.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Organization, National Interrogation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, University of Michigan",
"What": "Interrogation report on the war in Vietnam, opinions on the conflict, support for the NFL SVN, details on aid and organizations involved",
"When": "11 January 1968, 25 January 1968",
"Where": ["Saigon, Vietnam", "North Vietnam (NVN)", "South Vietnam (SVN)", "University of Michigan"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064 Top Secret

3.5(c)

SAES E

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

ILLEGIB

3.5(c) TopSecret195 December1967

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064  3.5(c)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

Contents
Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
NR
NR

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064

8 December 1967

3.5(c)
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064|
|---|
|1|
|1|
|8|:|
|1|1|
|11J|
|N|
|88|2|1|
|9|
|8|{|
|<|<|
|E|4|1|
|7|
|{|
|L `|A|
|3.5(c)|
|8 Dec 67 CFNTRATApproved for Release: F BILL FTINC03175064 Map|
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064 3.5(c)

Mortar fire fell on US Marine positions near Con Thien, South Vietnam: Nearly 300 rounds of artillery fell on 6 December. During the bombardment, the heaviest in the area in over two months, a company-size North Vietnamese unit attacked a Marine outpost about two miles northeast of Con Thien. US losses in the attacks came to 13 killed and over 100 wounded. Air strikes and intense artillery barrages were directed at suspected North Vietnamese artillery positions.

The stepped-up enemy activity in the area suggests that the North Vietnamese may have decided to launch fighting around Con Thien, possibly in conjunction with attacks near Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province.

8 Dec 67

TOP SECRET 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/1-C03175064
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
---
 Iop-Secret  Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064
Top "Secret
             Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03175064 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL_15472686_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Bulletin, Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military report on mortar fire on US Marine positions in Vietnam, North Vietnamese attacks, casualties, enemy activity near Con Thien and Khe Sanh",
"When": "8 December 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam, Con Thien, Khe Sanh, Quang Tri Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET//XGDS

EO 13526

EO 13526

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report on the Situation Around Saigon

Intelligence Directorate

February 2, 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report on the Situation Around Saigon

According to South Vietnamese police officials, captured documents and Communist prisoners taken during the action on Saigon beginning on January 31 say that plans for this action only at the first phase of Communist reportedly aimed at creating turmoil in preparation for another major attack. The second phase reportedly is designed to seize Saigon. Specific areas for staging Some areas for staging to the north of Saigon are indicated by documents, VC and police officials apparently believe it is imminent. No the attack was indicated by the prisoners and documents, but the police officials apparently believe it is imminent. Large concentrations of unidentified Vietnamese Communist forces have been noted in two areas north and south of Saigon since February 11, 1968.

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766063

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766063

TOP SECRET

As of daybreak in Saigon on 3 February, the city was reported quiet. There were a few reports of allied attacks on Communist positions, but in general, it appeared attacks have been the quietest since the enemy attacks began earlier this week. "SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUAT[15561230].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Intelligence Directorate, South Vietnamese police officials, Communist prisoners, VC and police officials",
"What": "Spot Report on the Situation Around Saigon including plans of Communist forces, concentrations of forces, and attacks on Communist positions",
"When": "2nd February 1968, 3rd February 1968, February 11, 1968",
"Where": ["Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696   Records Center

5
Current Intelligence Digest
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Secret

17 November 1967

No 0230/67

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696  3.5(c)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696 SECRET

# CONTENTS

Information as of 1200 EST

# GENERAL

|Vietnam|Situation report|
|---|---|
|(Page 1)| |

17 Nov 67 CeApproved for Release: 2018/06/28 SECRET C066626962st Page
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                              ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
# Vietnam

ToareafireagainstEnemy activityinthetowas16againconfinedposi-Dak South Vietnameseunits havethe countered heavyfireduring en- mortar Novemberallied past three days _ tionson Enemyshellscausedhoweverlittle theUS25thDivisionOn15Novemberelementsof damageyes the15thfourseparate barragesterday on andHauNghiaprovincesTayinsufferedNinh totalingsome20killedand2290roundsinflicted 32killedinenemymortar barrages _ USlossesofaddition wounded_the15th destroyedIn theshell- inthefightInindicationsareTherecontinuestobeingadjacentPhuoclullaroundtheLoc ingon milliondollarsofUSmaterielseveral Ninharea ItispossiblethatCommunist unitsaroundDakTomay have thatthe North Vietnamese88th Regimenthasmoved withdrawn temporarilytogroup aroundthetownof SongassaultintoBepositions andresupply _ maybegetting ready It This slackeninginthe pace or alongRoute14inhopesof oftheenemyattackwillprob- ablybeactionmayDakTowhereto luringanalliedreaction_force shortlived Thescene shiftsoon an area northof

# 17Nov67

CeApproved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696 Pade
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
                                                   NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C06662696
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
                                              ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662696

Secret

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C08662696 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466606].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
  "What": "Current Intelligence Digest on Vietnam Situation on 17th November 1967",
  "When": "17 November 1967",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "Dak South", "Tay Ninh", "Hau Nghiaprovinces", "Phuoc Loc"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

February 1968

MEMORANDUM

13526

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 99 13526

(As of 11:30 A.M. EST)

1. The Communists are continuing to apply heavy pressure against a number of major population centers and their surrounding environs throughout the four corps areas of South Vietnam. The allied military position appears critical in Hue, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, and there are indications that the Communists are planning renewed attacks in the Saigon area, although the situation at present remains relatively stable.

2. Fighting continues in Hue. Communist and US and South Vietnamese forces who continue to offer stiff resistance within the city. Quang Ngai remains quiet, however, a late report states that the massing of 30 Communist troops poses a serious threat to the provincial capital.

3. In the city, the occupation remains critical in the western highlands, at Ban Me Thuot and Kontum, both cities and their surrounding environs. Civilian casualties continue to mount in areas, largely because of allied air strikes against enemy units holed up in heavily populated sections. Enemy forces have also resumed battalion-sized or larger attacks against Pleiku City.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050

C02833597

0028335974'-"

•rop~ 'FOP 'JET 3.5(c) - 3.5(c)

4. In forces the coastal provinces and provinces, to Corps, capitals continue II of North Vietnamese apparently maintain aa major Province, fighting Dinh Lat presence in Binh Lat Da of Thuan reported and Phan Thiet respectively. No major fighting has been reported in Khanh Hoa Province, the scene recent heavy enemy activity.

Saigon and Corps positions Viet Cong troops are attempting to move the positions within Saigon renewed the and on the outskirts of the city. In preparation for renewed attacks, according to of a number An estimated area; estimated 2,000 another Communists were reported near preparing Saigon the port area; another 200 station were said and to attack police precinct station possibly the US radio transmitting station in Cholon.

There were no the new north attacks Saigon February, on 2 in the however, area Corps there are indications that the capitals of Tay Ninh, Binh Long, border and Phuoc Long have generated under where have targets may be the next to come attack. Some city 4,000 refugees been in the Bien Hoa city area, where fighting in recent days has resulted in heavy damage to civilian housing.

IV Corps The Communists continue to apply pressure against several provincial capitals and key time be according February. to information of 1800 Saigon appears time be on enemy and where The most the 2 February. critical area appears place. Ben Tre controls heavy where fighting city. taking reported is taking place. The enemy controls most in of the outskirts Sporadic city. sniper fire and fighting in the Tang vicinity reported is in Can Tho, remain Soc Gia no immediate information Moc Hoa, Soc Trang vicinity Tho, Ca and My The Can VC Tho, elements Camau, remain in Gin no immediate and the of pected. situation There Rac is further additional information attacks on are the ex- situation at Vinh Long.

3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766050
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050
C02833597C0283359 7

Status of Enemy Forces

a. 8. Available effort. Available effort.
notevidence elements in peir IV Com-indicates pat pe II Corps which have been committed offensive effort. The probably combining substantially situation in III and Corps is less and clear, but is substantially capable same.
In launching III and II Corps pe strong remaining units are capable of additional attacks assaults in certain areas and can also reinforce pe current assaults.
In norpern Enemy four Quang Tri along Province pe Demilitarized Zone remains considerable strengp of Norp Vietnamese battalions and local force battalions are still available in pe norpern coastal provinces.
Dahave elements Quang by 10.10. In pe Nam and Quang Tin Province regions, pe 2nd Norp Vietnamese Division area as countryside and by least Da Nang, Hoi Joined At Tam An and Ky local forces scattered in units actions attacks in pis area.
The picture in Quang Ngai is not clear. However, at pis juncture, it appears pe enemy has used at least elements from many of his seven battalions here at pis juncture.
Most local of 12. pe force It\31•d about In 3rd battalions Vietnamese coastal Corps, pe available situation 5p Hoa Iorsoveraland is several uneven.
Furper soup, about one-half enemy local force strengp at Tuy ea and Nha Trang, while pe majority of enemy local force strengp here has been committed.
Only a small percentage of heavy highlands at Front and available combat power has participated. Up to five regiments and a few more separate battalions remain uncommitted and available in pe western central highlands.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766050
C02833597C0283359 7
---
# C02833597

3.5(c)I

Popular Political Offensive

Developments in Vietnamese employing Communist propaganda anti-American theme Tet

An effort to rally support for Communist objectives. Developments have characterized by both the Hanoi current and offensive Liberation as primarily directed toward ridding the "lackeys" of US "imperialists" and Saigon.

The program of the Liberation Front is singled out as the guide to achieving these objectives.

A Front broadcast on 11 February pitched the armed anti-American forces appeal directly to South Vietnamese police personnel. After painting a black picture of American involvement in South Vietnam, it told these people that their "golden had come to contribute to the salvation of their country and urgently called on them to "resist the Americans."

The broadcast contains: "Grounded reminded them that the program of the Front joins Communists in the anti-American struggle, saying that even if the situation does not wait for immediate and urgent time."

The theme that the offensive represents an anti-American groundswell of popular sentiment favoring an anti-American struggle was also underscored in a February article in Hanoi the party daily Nhan Dan.

The article claimed that the strength of the revolution aggressors and union said resisting the US "aggressors", all of which is in line with the Front's program.

Statements "alliances" objective formation discussing the formation of new popular front their "alliances" first withdrawal in Hue and Saigon to oppose troops, have stressed and US, bring about the withdrawal of US troops, to negotiate with the Liberation Front.

The attempt to characterize the uprising the Communist military the Viet and in a special offensive US Cong Saigon Liberation as a broad, patriotic regime Front uprising was carried statements further.

on 1 February.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766050
|C02833597|C02833597|
|---|---|
|describing The masses,"18. and the Viet; claiming "insurrectional Cong that issued the tons at atmosphere nationwide" special communique" of attacks the were an "irrepressible uprising of tens of millions of people" bent on a common course of recent "national liberation. It said that although the provided fighting recent occurred for only a short time, it provided a basis for continued military successes throughout the country.| |
|Nguyen in Hun himself Tho, head of the National Hanoi anti-Liberation Front, February special wrapped in the same patriotic, anti-American robes in a special appeal carried by Hanoi radio on 22 February. Tho's appeal was addressed to South Vietnamese military and civilian personnel and the highest US goal", to Saigon. He said join regime. is in the common Front's struggle only and save The country against| |

|..EEELSECRET|3.5(c)|3.5(0)|3.5(c)|3.5(0)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|a........ I. . . . . . . .o-n..._....._..__._.. .._.._..._...-nh-u-hnn-uutr-l'ion-u—o-a—n u-u._...| | | | |

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766050 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15561236].pdf"

Output: {"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency", "What": "Situation update in South Vietnam, Communist attacks and military positions", "When": "February 1968", "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hue", "Kontum", "Ban Me Thuot", "Saigon", "Pleiku City", "Quang Ngai", "Tay Ninh", "Binh Long", "Phuoc Long", "Bien Hoa", "Ben Tre", "Can Tho", "Vinh Long", "Quang Tri Province", "Da Nang", "Nha Trang"], "Security Clearance": "SECRET"}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793

To%cret 3

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

To0°" secret 3.5(C) 13 November 210 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.

When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793

3.5 c'

November 3-5, 1967

# Cm/ml Intelligence Bulletin

# CONTENTS

|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Congo (Kinshasa): Further snags in repatriating mercenaries|(Page 5)|
|Indonesia: Rice shortage|(Page 6)|
|Greece-Turkey: Greek Air Force alert|(Page 7)|
|Panama: Presidential race still wide open|(Page 7)|

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793

NORTH VIETNAM

Demilitarized Zone

|HAIPHONG|THIEN|HUE|DA NANG|
|---|---|---|---|
|QUANG TRI|QUANG NGAI|QUINHON|NA TRANG|
|PLEIKU|BAN ME THUOT|DA LAT|SAIGON|

SOUTH VIETNAM

0 25 50 75 100 Miles
---
# Vietnam:

The Viet Cong’s release of three US prisoners in Cambodia this weekend was apparently designed for maximum propaganda impact.

The prisoners were "turned over" to a US "peace committee representative" at a ceremony in Phnom Penh on 11 November; then held incommunicado until the following day, when they were put on a Czechoslovakian Airlines plane bound for Prague. The prisoners and the "peace committee representative" left the plane at Beirut, however, and will return to the US on an American commercial airliner departing Beirut this morning.

Cumulative casualties for pe heavy fighting in pe first 12 days of November are:
US--96 killed, 487 wounded and two missing;
enemy--619 killed, seven detained and 101 individual and 25 crew-served weapons captured.

Sharp engagements continue to be reported in the Dak To area of the central highlands between US forces participating in Operation MACARTHUR and elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front.
---
Approved for Release: 11 U1' umn/2019/03/29 C03179793 3 -5(¢)

3.3(h)(2)

12 Nov 67 2

TOP CRET 3-5“)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793 s.5(¢)

3.3(h)(2)

13 Nov 6'7 3 3'5“) Tm/%EfiR’ET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793 3 '5(0)

3.3(h)(2)

13 Nov 67 4

3-5<°>

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793

Congo (Kinshasa): Schramme's mercenaries may be allowed to return to their home countries, but they apparently will not be leaving Rwanda soon. The OAU commission which met over the weekend in Kinshasa voted to permit the mercenaries repatriation. Its resolution, however, demands indemnification of the Congolese Government for the damage they have caused, and insists on ironclad guarantees that they will not be allowed to return to Africa. These conditions will probably be rejected by the mercenaries' home countries, and a period of extensive haggling seems likely to ensue.

Schramme's Katangan troops were not mentioned in the commission's resolution and presumably can be sent to Zambia as soon as Kinshasa and Lusaka work out the details.

13 Nov 67

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793 s.5(¢)

# NOTES

Indonesia: A seasonal rice shortage and a consequent price spiral may create a major political problem for the Suharto regime. Although imports will partially relieve the shortage, the scarcity--aggravated by speculation and poor distribution facilities--will persist until the next harvest in late March. Acting President Suharto effectively blunted last week’s demonstrations by youth groups which protested high prices and corrupt officials, but continuing political pressures seem likely.

13 Nov 67

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793
---
# Greece-Turkey

The Greek Air Force is on alert as a result of a number of alleged violations of Greek air space by Turkish aircraft since 4 November. Ankara has rejected a Greek protest over the incidents, and has lodged a counter-protest with Athens over an alleged violation of Turkish airspace by Greek planes on 10 November. The Turks maintain that their flights are for "training" purposes over international waters, that they will continue, and that the Greek reaction is unwarranted. Ankara's motives in the affair are not clear, but its hard-nosed attitude and the Greek response are symptomatic of the continuing frustration over the prolonged Cyprus problem.

# Panama

The presidential race appears to be wide open again. The Electoral Tribunal reportedly has ruled, on the basis of an obscure point of law, that National Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallarino--a possible compromise candidate--need not resign on 12 November to be eligible.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793

To ret

To secret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179793 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602453].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Director of Central Intelligence, President, National Security Council, Senior Government Officials",
    "What": "Current intelligence on national security issues, intelligence information, immediate and preliminary views, classified information, intelligence items designated for no further dissemination, espionage laws",
    "When": "13 November 1967",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Prague", "Beirut", "Phnom Penh", "Dak To", "Central Highlands", "Kinshasa", "Rwanda", "Zambia", "Indonesia", "Suharto regime", "Greece", "Turkey", "Ankara", "Athens", "Cyprus", "Panama"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729

|UNED|Current Intelligence Digest|
|---|---|
|DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE|Secret|
|November 1967|No 0223/67|

# Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C06662729
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729 3.5(c)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729SBERET

|Information as of|1200 EST|
|---|---|
|GENERAL|NR|
|Vietnam|Situation report.|
|(Page 1)| |

SEERET

Nov 67 Current Intelligence Digest Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                   NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                              ]
Page
       Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
# Vietnam

In the western highlands, heavy fighting was reported in November. Meanwhile, enemy attacks continue around Loc Ninh, asserting that they constitute retaliation for US bombing and marking the Hanoi airstrikes on the open area of the winter-spring campaign in South Vietnam.

Two North Vietnamese regiments fought elements of US forces southwest of Dak To, a strategic Special Forces camp. Routes of infiltration in the adjacent Kontum Province were engaged. 26 Americans were killed in engagements, while enemy losses were 116 killed.

At Loc Ninh, 18 US soldiers were killed last week and 38 wounded in engagements with enemy forces. The intensity of Communist propaganda on the subject suggests that the attacks would carry maximum psychological impact. Communists may believe they have been successful, causing difficulty for allied forces in demonstrating sustained security for some in an area 72 miles from Saigon.

3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Current Intelligence Digest
---
                                                   NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                              ]
Page
       Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729
Secret
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662729 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466581].pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
	"What": "Current Intelligence Digest, Vietnam situation report",
	"When": "November 1967",
	"Where": ["Vietnam", "western highlands", "Loc Ninh", "Dak To", "Kontum Province", "Saigon"],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # REPORT CLASS

|COUNTRY:|SOUTH VIETNAM, DANANG|
|---|---|
|DOI:|4 FEBRUARY 1968|
|SUBJECT:|SITUATION IN I CORPS AS OF 1200 HOURS 44 FEBRUARY 1968|
|ACQUIRED:|VIETNAM, DANANG (4 FEBRUARY 1968)|
|SOURCE:|THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 44 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS|

1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 3-4 FEBRUARY THERE WERE FEW DEVELOPMENTS AND NO SIGNIFICANT VC ACTIVITY IN QUANG TRI, QUANG NGAI, AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES. IN QUANG NAM RAH PROVINCE THE PUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) TROOPS LAID AN AMBUSH IN THE VICINITY OF HIEU NHON DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS; CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE VC WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARYN) ENGINEER COMPOUND IN HOI AN CITY RECEIVED THREE ROUNDS OF 60MM MORTAR.

2. ON 33 FEBRUARY, THE DANANG CITY POLICE ARRESTED A 14-YEAR-OLD BOY WHO WAS TRYING TO CONCEAL A PACKAGE AS THE POLICE APPROACHED. THE PACKAGE CONTAINED TWO K-54 PISTOLS AND 30 KILOGRAMS OF EXPLOSIVES. HE IS NOW UNDERGOING INTERROGATION. THERE WERE TWO SIGHTINGS OF FROGMEN REPORTED IN THE THANH BINH BEACH AREA OF DANANG BUT THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED. OTHERWISE, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE IN DANANG.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00198088

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 000198088
---
# A RETIRED MAJOR, NOW AN EMPLOYEE OF CAS, DISCUSSED THE PRESENT FIGHTING WITH NUMEROUS PERSONS IN DANANG. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG THE POPULACE IN DANANG CONCERNING THE PRESENT FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM SEEMS TO BE THAT THE U.S. AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) DID NOT HAVE ANY ADVANCE INFORMATION OF VC MOVEMENT INTO THE CITIES. THE VC WON A POLITICAL VICTORY BY DEMONSTRATING TO THE WORLD THAT THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES WITH WHICH IN ONE NIGHT TO ENTER VIRTUALLY EVERY IMPORTANT CITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARILY THE U.S. AND TROOPS HERE WERE VICTORIOUS AS EVIDENCED BY THE MANY VC KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THE MANY WEAPONS CAPTURED.

|FIELD DISSEK:|STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF HAP 7TH AF USARV COINAVFORY WL\ID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON) REPORT CLASS GROUP II JOO) END OF MESSAGE|
|---|---|
| |NND 941536 --- - 17| "SITUATION IN I CORPS AS O[15561274].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "CAS, Danang City Police, Public of Korea (ROK) troops, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARYN), Retired Major, U.S. and Government of Vietnam officials",
    "What": "Situation report on 4 February 1968 in I Corps of South Vietnam, including VC activities and military actions, arrest of a 14-year-old boy with weapons and explosives, discussions among the populace in Danang regarding the U.S. and GVN knowledge of VC movement",
    "When": "4 February 1968",
    "Where": ["Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, Quang Nam Rah provinces, Hieu Nhon District Headquarters, Hoi An City, Danang, Thanh Binh Beach area of Danang, South Vietnam"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

# Date: JANUARY 1968

Summary: Rocket/Mortar fire abating; damage to main lobby of Embassy.

Current Situation: Areas of fire continues in area of Embassy compound, Saigon.

Details: Viet Cong are presently within the Embassy compound.

Embassy Knowledge: One Embassy Marine wounded.

Actions: Our F/T 6302057 was aware of Viet Cong presence within the Embassy.

Damage: Rocket/Mortar fire abating; damage to main lobby of Embassy.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011475 "SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUES[15604021].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Embassy staff, Viet Cong, Embassy Marine",
"What": "Rocket/Mortar fire, Viet Cong presence, damage to main lobby, small arms fire",
"When": "JANUARY 1968",
"Where": ["Embassy compound, Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

|The Situation in Vietnam|To: Secret|1 1 9|
|---|---|---|
|22 December 1961|s.5(C)|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215

Information as of 1600 22 December 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

Another Chinese antiaircraft artillery division has apparently moved into South China; this suggests that one of the North Vietnam may be replaced.

# I. Vietnamese Situation in South Vietnam:

The Military civilians were killed and nearly 50 wounded during an enemy mortar and rocket barrage just south of Hue late on 21 December. Skirmishes were reported in scattered areas, but no large-scale fighting developed. US forces have begun a new operation in the Loc Ninh - Bu Dop area along the Cambodian border northwest of Saigon.

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

The lower house of the National Assembly joined the Senate in voting down the government's partial mobilization decree. The Senate on 22 December elected Nguyen Van Huyen as its permanent chairman. General Khanh has voiced his discontent with President Thieu's leadership and has predicted the military will have to remove him after the war if he does not improve. Four of 26 Da Nang "strugglers" were convicted of treason and given relatively light sentences. Strikes threaten transportation and electrical services.

# III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

The movement of another Chinese Communist antiaircraft artillery division to South China suggests that one of the Chinese divisions in North Vietnam may be replaced.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215

Communist Political Developments: Hanoi is apparently taking a cautious approach to President Johnson's recent television remarks in much the same manner as it treated Ambassador Goldberg's remarks of 2 November regarding Liberation Front participation at the UN (Paras. 1-3).
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215

SECRET

# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Five South Vietnamese civilians were killed and nearly 50 wounded on 21 December during a 45-minute mortar and rocket barrage directed at the Thua Thien Provincial Reconnaissance Unit compound just south of Hue. Ten houses were destroyed. An allied reaction force drove off the attackers.

2. Other enemy mortar attacks and skirmishes were reported in scattered parts of the country on 21-22 December, but no large-scale fighting developed. The recent step-up in terrorist incidents in the Saigon area has continued. A terrorist threw a grenade into a group of US servicemen standing at a bus stop early on 22 December; five were wounded.

3. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment began Operation FARGO in northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long provinces early on 22 December. The operation is directed against three subordinates of the Viet Cong 9th Infantry Division--the 271st, 272nd, and the 273rd regiments--currently scattered in the Loc Ninh - Bu Dop area of northern III Corps.

4. The Viet Cong 9th Division is estimated at nearly 4,000 men. Another 4,000 enemy troops--including the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 7th Division, the Viet Cong 275th Regiment, and North Vietnamese 88th Regiment--are believed situated within seven miles of the area of the operation.

5. Some of these Communist main force units have recently suffered heavy losses and may attempt to avoid the US force. Nevertheless, other units such as the North Vietnamese 88th Regiment may base stiff resistance in order to protect sensitive infiltration and supply areas and the withdrawal and/or the penetration of other enemy forces.

22 December 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The government's bid to have the National Assembly endorse its partial mobilization decree was rejected by the Lower House on 21 December. The Lower House's action follows a similar move by the Senate and clears the decks for the National Assembly to move ahead with creating its own version of a national mobilization order. One of the dilemmas facing the legislature in this regard, according to Senator Nguyen Van Chuan, is how to do this without the government or the assembly losing face.

2. Despite its setback, the government is going ahead with plans to implement the controversial decree. It was announced in Saigon on 21 December that veterans in the 18-33 age bracket will be recalled in 1968.

3. The Senate on 22 December elected Nguyen Van Huyen, a Catholic, as its permanent chairman. Huyen, President Thieu's favorite for the post, beat out the popular Tran Van Don who had been the leading contender for the post. Two other Catholics, Nguyen Gia Hien and Hoang Xuan Tuu, were elected vice chairmen.

4. Senator Nguyen Van Ngai, a Revolutionary Dai Viet Party member, recently disclosed to an embassy officer the formation last week in the Senate of a new coalition of about 40 senators calling themselves the Group of Independent Senators. Ngai declined to call the group a bloc and did not define it any further. He also claimed that it included all senators except those who belong to the National Democratic Socialist Bloc headed by the two Catholic senators, Nguyen Gia Hien and Huynh Van Cao.
---
# Discontent Among the Military

General Le Nguyen Khang, III Corps commander, has again voiced his discontent with President Thieu's leadership of the government. Khang is particularly disappointed with Thieu's failure to initiate any major programs and added that if Thieu does not become more effective it will be necessary for the military to remove him, but not until the war is concluded. He believes that any extra constitutional action now would create serious problems with South Vietnam's allies and disrupt the war effort at a time when he believes that victory is in sight.

Khang also expressed doubts that the government would be able to make any significant headway against corruption. He does not, however, entirely blame the government for its failure, claiming that corruption is an issue that is quite complex and very deeply interwoven in the political and economic fabric of the country. He despairs altogether of any anticorruption campaign catching the "big operators," who he declares have political leverage and are too clever in arranging their dealings. He does think that a campaign against corruption may sweep in lower officials who do not have protection. Part of the problem in rounding up big offenders is finding subordinates who are willing to risk their careers by testifying against corrupt superiors.

# "Strugglers" Convicted

According to a late press report, four former members of the Buddhist "struggle" effort of early 1966 were convicted of treason on 22 December. Twenty-two other defendants, all military officers, were reportedly acquitted. Prominent among those convicted were the former mayor of Da Nang, Dr. Nguyen Van Man, and a former area commander in Quang Nam Province, Colonel Dam Quang Yeu, both of whom received relatively light sentences of ten years for what is normally a capital offense. It remains to be seen whether President Thieu will exercise clemency as he has previously indicated he might.
---
# Strikes and Strike Threats

Workers have struck both Pan American and Air America demanding substantial wage increases, and electrical workers are again threatening to strike since they are not convinced they will get the benefits they have been promised. Four hundred Vietnamese walked off their jobs at Pan American on 21 December to enforce their demand for a 30-percent increase in wages, maintaining they will continue striking until their demands are met. The situation has been aggravated by a false rumor that the company would import foreign workers to continue service.

At Air America, 700 Vietnamese employees struck on 22 December after no agreement was reached on their demands for a 40-percent wage increase and other benefits. The embassy reports that Air America's operations may be drastically curtailed if the company's foreign workers also strike in support of their own demands for an 80 percent increase in wages.

In addition to these strikes, the electrical workers' union is once again threatening to strike on 25 or 26 December against the French-owned power company whose franchise will be taken over by the government on 31 December. The union apparently is dissatisfied with the letter from the minister of public works promising them a wage increase and bonuses, fearing that the government's commitments will not be kept. US officials are actively concerned with all of these labor difficulties and are trying to keep negotiating channels open.

Date: 22 December 1967
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is noping of significance to report.

22 December 1967
---
# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. Another Chinese Communist Air Force anti-aircraft artillery division has apparently moved into South China, possibly to release a unit already stationed there for duty in North Vietnam.

The 104th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division has moved into the Nan-ning/Ning-ming area. The previous location for the unit is not known.

2. The movement of the 104th could portend the replacement of the air force's 105th Antiaircraft Artillery Division, which has been stationed in the Lang Son area of North Vietnam for over six months. Chinese antiaircraft units in the past have been rotated in and out of North Vietnam in six-to-eight month cycles. The divisions currently at Ning-ming would probably be the replacement. Either the 111th or 113th Antiaircraft Artillery Division at Yen Bai in northwestern North Vietnam is also due for rotation soon.

3. The arrival of the 104th raises the number of major Chinese antiaircraft artillery units in the Nan-ning/Ning-ming area from five to as many as seven divisions. The normal contingent was three divisions until October 1967.

Date: 22 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215 35(0)

FOP s.5(¢)

COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The Vietnamese Communists are taking a cautious public approach toward President Johnson's television remarks about possible South Vietnamese contacts with the Liberation Front. There has as yet been no official comment from either Hanoi or the Liberation Front.

2. The chief of the Front mission in Prague, however, seems to have dismissed the President's statements rather perfunctorily, but probably without any authoritative instructions. A Czech newspaper says he "answered" President Johnson in an interview on 20 December. "We do not intend in puppets either to ease the position of the Saigon any way or to help the American imperialists solve their problems," he said.

3. Hanoi appears to be wary of such brusque disclaimers, probably because it sees US encouragement of contacts between Saigon and the Front as another step toward bolstering the role of the Front in any future settlement. The Vietnamese Communists took a similar approach toward Ambassador Goldberg's congressional testimony on 2 November in which he said the US would not stand in the way of Front representatives appearing at the UN Security Council or at a Geneva-type conference. They completely avoided comment on Goldberg's remarks at that time. Only after the US disclosed Front overtures for a presence at the United Nations did the Vietnamese Communists address themselves to the issue. Then both Hanoi and the Front denied the overtures and once again dismissed the competence of the UN on Vietnam issues.

22 December 1967

V-l

A A s.5(¢)

§$”°‘R-ET 3-5<°>

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215

'

'

(Q

.1

Top ret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752215 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [15602396].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Updates on military, political, and communist developments in Vietnam",
"When": "22 December 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Hue", "Saigon", "Loc Ninh", "Bu Dop", "Da Nang", "Hanoi", "Nan-ning/Ning-ming", "Lang Son", "Yen Bai"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Appr0\?/ed for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704 S LJ ll

3.3(h)(2)

OFFICE o1= "._..l D 1

3.3(h)(2) DA_-r5 : arc T9‘ Jack MBKN I N ?~YQ~ix

FROM: Ed 2 *4 3'3(h)(2) 5'-15-'E¢T=More on (2 Cables) >—1Zm71?=1CO

REMARKS:

3 '3(h)(2) 1. groper-ts on 'his l9 March visit to the -Danang area;

a. Lt. Gen. Cushman, Marines, said he had ample forewarning. Only specific target known was Danang, He much intel indicating something coming around Tetz_and forces positioneattacks on cities were expected and defense Scale of infiltration not expected, and precise timing was not knot-m,,-No Tet truce in I Corps; all units were fullz alerted.

b. Team visited 2 had been maintainedregional HQ and 3_3(h)(2) Deputy Chiefjbriefed on various programs, Clear that ose coordination bgneenj find tn; Us and cm military. 3.3(h)(2) when in2. Shae been asked to seeon 23 March,He will see

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704
---
SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

|PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|---|
|GROUP|(1)|(r)|

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

ADVANCE COPY. UNCLASSIFIED. AS REQUIRED

|DATE|YES|NO|
|---|---|---|
|RT|Z|CM W|e~<>———-|>6'|F/QQ V [JI|

X-REF TO FILE no.

LE5

FILE

TO

RECORD

LE5

DATE

SECRET

MARK

2015

DIRECTOR

TEAM VISITED III MAF, ARVN I CORPS, PROVISIONAL

VIETNAM, AND REGION I on 19 MARCH

BRIEFING AT

III MAF WAS CONDUCTED BY LG CUSHMAN AND STAFF, INCLUDING

ROBERTSON, ee 1 MARDI

IN SUMMARY, GENERAL CUSHMAN FELT HE HAD AMPLE

FOREWARNING; WAS ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH MOVEMENTS OF HOSTILE

ELEMENTS, AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY

ALL AGREED THAT, ASIDE

FROM DANANG, SPECIFIC VC TARGETS WERE NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH

THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATING SOMETHING

WAS COMING AROUND TETO

GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED THAT ATTACKS

ON CITIES WERE EXPECTED. DEFENSE FORCES HAD BEEN

POSITIONED, HOWEVER, TO DEAL WITH DIRECT ATTACKS (FORCES

WERE STATIONED ABOUT 3 KILOMETERS OUTSIDE CITIES).

INFILTRATION WAS NOT ANTICIPATED ON THE SCALE USED BY THE

VC

AS FOR DANANG, IT HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME

THAT THE CITY WOULD BE THE

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704
---
|CABLE 2_>'_ECREI'ARlAT DISSEMINATION|CLASSIEIED MESSAGE _|TOTAL COPIES|ROUTING AND/OR INlTlAl._S- SEEN BY PERSON/LINIT NOTlFlED_‘|
|---|---|---|---|
|Shen Fillefl In)T|rm! Aumunc|2|KOQQUI|

ADVANCE COPY

D’! U ISSUED E SLOTTED REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED Ulbbl

mozx: U YES U no

BY: AT z_ CLASS"-W TO FILE X'REF TO FILE NO DISSEM av PER * |=||_e mo El RET. TO BRANCHU , ossrnovljsne. II) ACTION INFO: FILE, VR,

PAGE 2 szueow 2:191 s/E/e/fa T

TARGET OF AN ATTACK; BUT AGAIN, THE PRECISE TIMING ums NOT KNOWNO

THERE WERE ONLY TWO KNOWN REPORTS OF CIVILIANS VOLUNTEERING INFORMATIONO GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT VILLAGERS HAD NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATING ONCE THE VC HAD MOVED INO

THERE WAS NO TET TRUCE IN I CORPS AND ALL UNITS, INCLUDING ARVN AND ROK MARINES, WERE ON FULL ALERT SIAIUSO GENERAL CUSHMAN FEELS COOPERATION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE CORPS AREA WAS GOODO

THE III MAF G=3 SAID HE FELT HE HAD AMPLE INTELLIGENCE FOR HIS PURPOSESO BOTH HE AND GENERAL ROBERTSON NOTED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SPREAD FORCES TO COVER ALL POSSIBLE TARGETS WHEN EXACT ENEMY INTENTIONS ARE NOT KNOWN°

mzmszns or" rm: TEAM vIsIIEn\ 3.3(h)(2) wusmz on THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS: 3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704
---
|TABLE SECRETARIAI DISSEMINATION - CLASSIFIED MESSAGE|TOTAL COPIES|AIRROU I'ING AND/OR lNI11ALS - SEEN BY PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|---|---|---|
|(When Filled In)| | |
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED| | |
|ADVANCE COPY ISSUED BSLOTTED|mozx; U YES I] NO|CLASSIFY YO FILE|
|X-REF TO FILE NO.| | |

SAIGON

METHODS OF HANDLING AND COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED FROM OTHER G APPARENT THAT CLOSE SOURCES WERE DISCUSSED

IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND IT WAS

COORDINATION HAD BEEN MAINTAINED AMONG K::]ANn-THE

UNITED STATES AND EVEN MILITARY AUTHORITIESO

80 [:::::::::] PLEASE PASS TO DIA AND J=s;[::::::::]

§,E.s—E+E'I

BT

/$5@REI
---
|CABLE SEPARATE DISSEMINATION|
|---|
|CLASSIFIED MESSAGE|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704|
|AND/OR Initials - SEN BY|
|TOTAL CO|
|PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED|
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED|
|UNAUTHORIZED|
|Issued|Yes|No|
|AT|
|CLASSIFY TO FILE|
|DESTROY Issue|
|Action|
|Priority Saigon Info Directory 192@58@Z|Request|58|Ciphers|
|E&+&m¢a3|r4-73728|
|REF DIRECTOR 81985|
|REQUEST TO SEE|COURIER STATION|
|DURING SCHEDULED (REF) 25 MARCH|
|STOPOVER|APPOINTMENT|
|CURRENTLY SET FOR 0930.23 MARCH WITH|
|LATTER WILL BE ELSEWHERE|
|ON TDY THAT DATE|
|SUBJECT DIRECTOR 8115-I|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786704| MORE_ON_TRIP[15617710].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Lt. Gen. Cushman, Marines, Ed, Team visited III MAF, ARVN I Corps, Provisional Vietnam, Robertston",
    "What": "Discussion on intelligence gathered, coordination with military authorities, visit to Danang area, security measures, Tet truce status, communication issues with villagers, coordination on various programs, attack preparations",
    "When": "19 March",
    "Where": [
        "Danang",
        "III MAF",
        "ARVN I Corps",
        "Saigon"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
---
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
---
# 76

# 77

# 78

# 79

# 80

# 81

# 82

# 83

# 84

# 85

# 86

# 87

# 88

# 89

# 90

# 91

# 92

# 93

# 94

# 95

# 96

# 97

# 98

# 99

# 100

# 101

# 102

# 103

# 104

# 105

# 106

# 107

# 108

# 109

# 110

# 111

# 112

# 113

# 114

# 115

# 116

# 117

# 118

# 119

# 120

# 121
---
122
123
124
125
126
---
# Document Title

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 8
SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HUE
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 3
UNTITLED (ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH)
SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUES IN AREA OF EMBASSY COMPOUND-ROCKET-MORTAR FIRE ABATING-DAMAGE TO MAIN LOBBY OF EMBASSY, AND AT LEAST ONE EMBASSY MARINE GUARD WOUNDED-TO BEST OF OUR KNOWLEDGE NO VIET CONG ARE PRESENTLY WITHIN EMBASSY(CASE NLJ 87-123 DOC 43)
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR- SNIE 58-1-68- THE COMMUNIST HAVE GREATLY STRENGTHENED THEIR COMBAT FORCES IN LAOS- ALTHOUGH EVENTS IN VIETNAM COULD CHANGE HANOI'S INTENTIONS IN LAOS THE COMMUNISTS HOPE TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES WITHOUT MILITARY COUNTERACTION
BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI (SITE 85)
SITUATION APPRAISAL OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES BEHIND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS IN NORTHERN LAOS BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM
COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR THE TET OFFENSIVE IN RETROSPECT (PUBD IS UNKNOWN)
THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH (ALSO ATTACHED) THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1968 & CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES IN THE KHE SANH AREA DATED 7 FEBRUARY 1968
THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE
SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN TAY NINH-PROVINCE DURING DECEMBER 1967
AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI (SITE 85)
SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN HUE
MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (WHEELER) TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA
MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (SMITH) TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (HELMS)
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND POLICY ADVISORS
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
NEW VC TACTICS IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE
INFILTRATION STATIONS; PERSONNEL AND SUBORDINATION
REACTION TO INFILTRATION
A NLF SVN CIVILIAN POLITICAL CADRE'S OPINION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM
MEDICAL SUPPLY OF A NVA UNIT DURING INFILTRATION
FOOD SUPPLY OF A NVA UNIT DURING INFILTRATION
---
# LAO DONG PARTY ORGANIZATION IN NVA INFILTRATION BATTALION 140; PROCEDURES FOR ADMITTANCE

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

# ONE MEMO 1/18-/68 ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF HANOI'S INTENTIONS

# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 4 (AS OF 7:00 AM EST)

# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 5 (AS OF 12 NOON EST)

# THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH

# THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE

# 31 JANUARY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SAIGON STATION

# CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

# SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN II CORPS DURING DECEMBER 1967

# VC TO SHELL MY THO CITY, CHAN PHUC LIEM U.S. BILLET AND DONG TAM BASE FROM JAN. 20 TO JAN. 27, 1968

# (U) VC ACTIVITY PLAN

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

# ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF HANOI'S INTENTIONS

# 31 JANUARY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SAIGON STATION

# THE ENEMY THREAT TO KHE SANH, A SPECULATIVE APPRAISAL
---
# CABLE TO FLASH SAIGON, HONOLULU FROM FLETCHER KNIGHT

# THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Location of Headquarters of the 174th North Vietnamese Army Regiment in North Vietnam and Infiltration of a 60-man Detachment from this Regiment into Laos

The Situation in Vietnam - 23 January 1968

Summary of Viet Cong Activities in Pleiku Province During December 1967

The Situation in Vietnam - 24 January 1968

The Situation in Vietnam - 25 January 1968

The Situation in Vietnam - 26 January 1968

Weekly Summary

The Situation in Vietnam - 28 January 1968

The Situation in Vietnam - 29 January 1968

The Situation in Vietnam - 30 January 1968

The Situation in South Vietnam - 30 January 1968

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 3

Indications Received in CIA, 15-30 January 1968

Spot Report on the Situation in Hue

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 5

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 4
---
# STATUS OF FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN LONG AN PROVINCE DURING DECEMBER 1967

SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME

SITREP AS OF 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 31 JANUARY 1968

THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 31 JANUARY 1968
---
|CADRE Reference Id|Published Date|Originating Agency|Declassifying Agency|
|---|---|---|---|
|C00010636|2/2/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00010637|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00010650|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00010773|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00011475|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00011542|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00011920|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00012510|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00012514|1/1/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00013067|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00016884|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00028244|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00095175|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00095748|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00114129|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00193257|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00235974|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00235986|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00339612|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00339630|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00382490|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00395731|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00577996|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758681|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758689|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758690|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758700|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758706|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00758707|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|Control Number|Date of Document|Agency|Record Number|
|---|---|---|---|
|C00758716|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00809271|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00809272|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00809273|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C00837646|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C01142498|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02008420|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02008421|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02031813|1/2/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02031814|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02031815|1/27/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033835|1/3/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033836|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033837|1/6/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033838|1/9/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033840|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033841|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033842|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033843|1/22/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033844|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02033845|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02055071|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02397521|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02412677|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02547965|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02547971|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02806236|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02962544|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02966921|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02988201|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C02988203|1/28/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172623|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172629|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172633|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03172642|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186501|1/4/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186502|1/8/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186503|1/15/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186504|1/16/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186506|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186507|1/20/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186508|1/23/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03186509|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C03398212|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05009954|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05010230|1/8/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|Number|Date|Information|Information|
|---|---|---|---|
|C05053038|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974200|1/1/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974202|1/2/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974204|1/3/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974206|1/4/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974208|1/5/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974210|1/6/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974212|1/8/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974214|1/9/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974216|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974218|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974220|1/12/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974222|1/13/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974224|1/15/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974226|1/16/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974228|1/17/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974230|1/18/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974232|1/19/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974234|1/20/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974236|1/22/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974238|1/23/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974240|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974242|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974244|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974247|1/27/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974249|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974251|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C05974253|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06475772|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06475773|1/10/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753731|1/11/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753732|1/23/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753733|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753734|1/24/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753735|1/25/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753736|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753737|1/26/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753738|1/28/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753739|1/29/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753740|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753741|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753742|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753743|1/30/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753744|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753745|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753746|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|C06753747|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|---|---|---|---|
|C06753748|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753749|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753750|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
|C06753751|1/31/68|CIA|CIA|
---
|Number of Pages|OGA Referral|
|---|---|
|6|LBJ Library|
|2|LBJ Library|
|3|LBJ Library|
|1|LBJ Library|
|1|LBJ Library|
|12|LBJ Library|
|2|LBJ Library|
|3|LBJ Library|
|11|LBJ Library|
|10|LBJ Library|
|5| |
|35| |
|5|LBJ Library|
|9|LBJ Library|
|3|LBJ Library|
|2|LBJ Library|
|13| |
|21| |
|4| |
|12| |
|10| |
|10| |
|5|NSA|
|3| |
|3| |
|3| |
|3| |
|2| |
|3| |
---
|4|NSA|
|---|---|
|3| |
|4| |
|5|NSA|
|19| |
|11|NSA|
|14| |
|11| |
|10|NGA, NSA|
|13|NSA|
|13|NSA|
|11| |
|12| |
|14| |
|13| |
|17|NSA|
|14| |
|11| |
|13|NSA|
|16| |
|12| |
|11|NSA|
|8| |
|13|NSA|
|7| |
|4| |
|13| |
|6| |

|4|
|---|
|7|DIA|
|34|
|37|
|40|
|39|
|12|
|13|
|15|NSA|
|11|
|10|
|13|NSA|
|17|NSA|
|15|NSA|
|20|
|4|
|1|
---
|4|4|9|13|NSA|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|10|10|13|9|13|
|13|10|11|11|12|
|8|12|11|12|11|NGA|
|12|10|12|7|11|
|10|11|12|5|5|
|2|24|3|21|22|NSA|
|4|12|12|11|3|3|35|NSA|
|2|10|5| | |
---
# 3 6 5 3 15 Jan-1968-Tet-Metadata-Spreadsheet-for-CIA-Pre-battle-Collection.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
    "What": "Documents related to the situation in South Vietnam, enemy threats, communist activities in Laos, and military operations",
    "When": "January 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hue", "Khe Sanh", "Laos", "Phou Pha Thi"],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

9 November 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF

9 NOVEMBER 1967

# 1. Congo

Mobutu has called an emergency committee meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for tomorrow to discuss the evacuation of the mercenaries now in Rwanda. He has also asked the Rwandans not to allow any evacuation until the meeting considers the matter.

Mobutu has backed down somewhat in his demands for extradition of the mercenaries, and now says he will allow them to leave if he can get a guarantee that they will not return. Whether the Rwandans will allow the mercenaries to stay in their country until uncertain. OAU the acts, however, remains

# 2. Nigeria

3.3(h)(2)

# 3. West Germany

Chancellor Kiesinger is holding firm to the middle ground on the delicate question of Britain's entry into the European Communities.

His recent public statements have been so vague as to lead the press into contradictory interpretations. Thus, one West German newspaper concludes "Kiesinger supports De Gaulle," while another maintains that the Chancellor is demanding "De Gaulle, give in."

Embassy Bonn views wump tactics as further determination to avoid continue gentle persuasion vis the French.

Kiesinger's mugr evidence of his a crisis and con tactics vis-a-
---
'✓·. T _L___________________~.1
4. Communist China There are a number of signs that Peking is having trouble convincing militant Red Guards to abandon violence and return to school. Tensions between opposing Red Guard organizations remain high in many areas and clashes between rival groups appear to have increased. The level of violence, however, is still lower than that of last summer.
5. Vietnam We have an unconfirmed report that a Soviet ship Hai is carrying military equipment to Hanoi which they have tentatively identified as two PT boats. The Soviet freighter Yasnomorsk has probably been identified as carrying cargo on a dry barge and tugboat. Efforts are underway to conclusively identify the cargo involved in the deck question. If the gunboats are the first known delivery of weapons by sea from the Soviet Union to North Vietnam.
6. Cuba A large number of "old-line" Cuban Communists have been arrested whether renewed campaign against this pre-Castro Communists. If so, it will certainly inflame the grievances between the old guard and the "new" types and probably further damage Havana's relations with Moscow.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

9th November 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

9 November 1967

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Hanoi Reaffirms Terms for Settlement: Premier Pham Van Dong reaffirmed settlement terms to US delegation visiting Hanoi. He honored the war talks basis for settling the Vietnamese Dong problem on the anniversary of the Vietnam-Soviet talks. The settlement is the genuine political program of the representative Liberation Front - the only North Vietnamese Government declared act that "must act if South Vietnamese people." He further stated on 28 January US talks statement of Hanoi, Foreign Minister Nguyen Trinh. That statement called for all other US to halt the war unconditionally, no bombing against North Vietnam and gave such indication as the bombings halt that is "definitive" conditions for Hanoi acts now (i.e., final or permanent) as Party First Secretary Supreme Soviet Duan in Moscow speech before.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974111

The Premier and also provided of published North a similar statement on British Dong November. Expect negotiations reporter, the escalation that the subjects No-told a variety reporter were other the war on and Vietnamese to names ready further it. He pointed Russell to the forthcoming session Bertrand war crimes tribunal as that event of great more international importance, claiming will throw light on the some monstrous crimes the US. Dong also went to length be Front's stressing representative in the and importance of Liberation new true program that the organization's claim Saigon Vietnamese only to the South people. Quislings termed are Dong present administration who not taken seriously, and asserted that the struggle against the Americans favor compels everyone to take a stand--no either road.

Construction Continuing at Yen Bai Airfield: Photography to continuing of the 29 October at runway and appears Bai Yen construction airfield been north-1s west of Hanoi. Concrete to have taxiway laid on part of the aprons, runway the parallel. Three parking were 13 the aircraft revetments, and dispersal taxiway that also preparations since This June observed when first it progress appeared noted field were 20 under way to surface the runway.
---
# Effects

Correspondent River of US Mining Operations: A has 3.3(h)(2) stationed North Vietnam

told US officials that, as of early August, the people of North Vietnam were distressed by the fact that mines had been dropped into rivers. The mines had not been removed because the North Vietnamese Navy was not familiar with minesweeping methods. The traffic of river craft carrying rice and vegetables was restricted and river navigation appeared to be greatly obstructed, especially on rivers between Hanoi and Haiphong.

# Hanoi Says "Get in the Rice":

On 5 November, Hanoi issued its seasonal exhortation to mobilize labor in the countryside to harvest this month's rice
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974111

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

Largely because of thisa long period of drought, it is estimated that year's important 10th month two-thirds of about 4.5 million ton average yearly crop-will be croppercent 10 or 200-300earlythousand had Graintonsanshort. The harvested summer shortfall in estimated 200have thousand ton imports imports year this been running far ahead of 1966

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Hanoi on Negro Servicemen: A 6 November Hanoi English: asserts Vietnam language that broadcast America to US denied are in not free-Negroes troops South only "suffering racial brutality are and their against the broadcast in claims and domin ghettos," the armed forces Negro but and also in "discriminated Vietnam." The few soldiers can get as officer's that rank quotes Senator Edward Brooke saying "the Negro Hanoi not is given cites the authority to, attain command." T~n also that 28 a May to be a report in the US magazine desk Tob claiming Negro colonel was given a from that never existed fore, "simply to keep him being assigned a field command."

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974111
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4111 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602367].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "President",
    "What": "Emergency committee meeting in Congo, evacuation of mercenaries, North Vietnam situation, construction at Yen Bai Airfield, Communist China struggles with Red Guards, Nigeria, West Germany and Brexit, Cuba arresting Communist supporters, US mining operations in North Vietnam, Hanoi's seasonal exhortation for rice harvest, reflections on US political attitudes on the war from North Vietnam",
    "When": "9 November 1967",
    "Where": ["Congo", "Rwanda", "Nigeria", "West Germany", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Yen Bai Airfield", "Communist China", "Cuba", "US"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153

The President's Daily Brief

3.5(c)

23

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
---
# DAILY BRIEF

4 DECEMBER

|1. Cyprus|Greece|Turkey|
|---|---|---|
|Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey have accepted the official word of the UN's offer. As of 5:00 PM EST, Thant's good news that Cyprus has accepted. Consultations to end the crisis at the UN are now expected to shift.| | |

|2. South Vietnam|Saigon officials|
|---|---|
|South Vietnam is considering resuming diplomatic relations with Indonesia. The South Vietnamese have suggested opening a consulate general's office in Djakarta. Some South Vietnamese want a full embassy, but others, including Ky and the Foreign Minister, appear willing to get what they want.| |

3. Nigeria
The Nigerian federal government can now buy military equipment in London from Britain. Previously, arms sales were restricted. The British government is willing to sell to pe Nigerians what pey want. The federal representative has sent a military shopping list.

|4. Congo|Rwanda|Katangese rebels|
|---|---|---|
|Most of the Katangese rebels who had fled to Congo have been repatriated. They have been treated decently so far. However, the white mercenaries are still in Rwanda, causing irritation. They are being "processed" by the Organization of African Unity.| | |
---
# Soviet Union

3.3(h)(2)

# Communist China

Units clashes between rival Red from The Guard widely continue scattered west to parts of China. Key railroad closed to through traffic firearms of the Red Guard activities. Many of Guards again was using summer on a as did during however, then. Still the bloody months. Fighting is smaller scale than it.

# Cambodia

Sihanouk has been saying on this the Sino-Cambodian relations back track; he has underlined by accepting military Cambodia gesture things Chinese new Chinese offer of aid. The have since been 1964, supplying with arms but this latest is clearly a peace offering to smooth over after Sihanouk's fall. Earlier this anti-Chinese Peking's outbursts new aid will include a number of planes, ammunition, patrol boats, and an unspecified reconnaissance.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

4 December 1967
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

4 December 1967

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Traffic Moves rail Hanoi: in the principal and highway Hanoi area as of 1 December, heading of Most trains toward the Hanoi. Both Doumer and Canal des Râpides bridges were operating at full capacity on Friday night. Train and truck movement on both bridges had been heavy and continual during the preceding week. At the Canal des Râpides rail bridge, an alternate pontoon bridge was still out, but carrying additional truck traffic.

Military truck convoys were reported moving from Haiphong to Hanoi south Route, and traffic was also observed moving on Route 1A. Moderate truck activity was noted. No delays were evident on Highway 3. It is suggested that Hanoi is taking advantage of heavy supplies to replenish the poor flying weather over North Vietnam weeks to consumed during the past six weeks of bombing in the capital.

* * *
---
/TO p ,Ui
           CRET~_____________________J.Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974153       3 5(c)

                                                                                3.3(h)(2)

                                                                                3.3(h)(2)

                                                                                3.3(h)(2)

                                                                                3.3(h)(2)

                                              -'2-

                                                                                3.5(c)

                               Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153
---
Peking Protests Ship Incident: The Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry issued a statement Saturday protesting an anchored freighter on 25 November at the US Northair attack Vietnamese port on Chinese Hon Gai. The crew from Peking claimed the attack damaged the ship, wounded eight Chinese members, and seriously injured some.

The Chinese protest rhetoric went further than standard "Vietnamese stand for the anti-US people," and its pledges of support.
---
# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Liberationon More Radio Secretary crowed McNamara: and on 30 November Viet The that Cong's "McNamara has been dismissed," defeated that "all this happened because the Communists have strategies and tactics of the most talented that is "now collaborator aggression of Johnson." The reviews imperialists commentary US says going the to war collapse of 1961 completely." It US was progress "McNamara Vietnam in himself" since and the says strategies it that who devised and tactics and by guided their execution. The commentary concludes asserting that "any talented leaves man ignominious shoulder behind, dares who defeats." the more heavy bitter, (McNamara) load will surely face stronger, and more.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4153 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602388].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President, Saigon officials, Nigerian federal government, Organization of African Unity",
    "What": "Updates on international relations with Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, South Vietnam, Indonesia, Britain, Congo, Rwanda, Katangese rebels, Soviet Union, Communist China, Cambodia, North Vietnam, Chinese protests, US political attitudes on the Vietnam War",
    "When": "4 December 1967",
    "Where": ["Cyprus", "Greece", "Turkey", "South Vietnam", "Indonesia", "London", "Congo", "Rwanda", "Soviet Union", "China", "Cambodia", "North Vietnam", "China", "Hanoi", "Haiphong", "US Northair attack Vietnamese port", "Hon Gai"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}