Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
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} Text: # Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence

Memorandum From the Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Smith) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)

Washington, January 18, 1968.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 80 R 01580 R, Executive Registry
Subject Files, Peace Talks
Secret.

An attached note from Helms to Rostow, January 22, reads: "Here are three copies of an effort on our part to fulfill your request for an examination of certain hypotheses in connection with Hanoi's intentions: I have sent copies to no one else. If you want further distribution, please advise me."

A second attached note from Smith to Helms, January 18, reads: "This has been revised after consultation with George Carver, Dean Moor, and DDI: I believe they are now satisfied with it."
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# VIV VL

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CONTROL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

18 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Alternative Interpretations of Hanoi's Intentions

INTRODUCTION

1. There are several hypotheses concerning the progress of the war in coming months and the intentions of the Communists. Most of them can be argued plausibly, for and against, and can be supported by some evidence. None is capable of conclusive proof or disproof, mainly because the evidence is either insufficient or can be interpreted in various and often diametrically opposed ways.

2. For example, there is the question of whether the North Vietnamese are willing to "negotiate." Hanoi has declared that it will "talk" if the bombing of North Vietnam is stopped. It is idle to say that this represents no change of attitude whatsoever.

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It is equally idle to assume that of itself it indicates an early end to the fighting. One may argue, quite plausibly, that Hanoi has finally comprehended that war against the power of the US can have but one ultimate conclusion, and is now probing to find out what US terms are. But one may also regard this latest statement simply as another political and psychological move to encourage dissent in the US and inflame world opinion against Washington.

In present circumstances, it is true that any multitude of things could happen, at almost any time. Hanoi could quit tomorrow, or at any time thereafter; the Chinese could enter the conflict with their own armed forces in great number; China could collapse in total chaos; the Soviets could take a far more active role, either in support of Hanoi to continue the war or in withdrawing such support; the South Vietnamese government and polity could disintegrate; the Sino-Soviet controversy could become far more or far less acute than it is, and thus change the context of the Vietnam struggle; the policy of the US government could change in any of a number of ways, and so on.

A balanced estimate of the situation cannot rule these and other possibilities wholly out of consideration. The best it can do is to decide, on the basis of evidence and careful argument.

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that many of that many of them are so unlikely as to be irrelevant, at least until more evidence appears and that others should be held as possible qualifications and correctives in a net judgment. In the paragraphs that follow we attempt to show how the evidence and arguments may fit or not fit into alternative estimates of the prospects in Vietnam.

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|5.|There are three hypotheses under which the situation in Vietnam may be considered and to which most of the evidence may be related:|
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|(1) Hanoi has decided that it must terminate the fighting in the course of this year;| |
|(2) Hanoi still feels a good measure of confidence in its prospects and firmly intends to fight on until a break in its favor in US policy;| |
|(3) Hanoi is less certain of its prospects and is keeping several options open. It intends to continue hard fighting in the months ahead but recognizes it may be advisable to seek a compromise solution within the next year, according to the way things develop.| |

I. EESSISH I HANOI

6. The more solid evidence supporting the proposition that Hanoi intends to quit at an early date comes from an analysis of

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Communist prospects in South Vietnam.

|Communist prospects in South Vietnam.|According to our view of the data, the leaders in Hanoi could conclude that their prospects in South Vietnam are steadily and surely diminishing. The toll on their forces is increasingly heavy; their losses cannot be reduced without undermining the effectiveness of their military and political operations; recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming more difficult, control over the population is diminishing, and morale is becoming more of a problem as the war continues without conclusive results. Even though such problems may not be critical, the overall effect is that the Communist position will be weaker at the end of 1968 than it is now. Military action can arrest the decline but cannot change it fundamentally.|
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|Proceeding from this analysis, Hanoi's current efforts on the military and political fronts can be seen as one last push to gain the best possible terms in an early settlement. For example, it can be argued that Hanoi would not intentionally seek the bloody and costly battles it has unless it knew that the fighting would end fairly soon and replacements would not be a problem. Hanoi would not, under this hypothesis, commit part of its strategic reserve unless it believed there would be no real threat of an invasion from the US. Nor would the North|Secret|

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# Vietnamese

Vietnamese claim that 1968 would be "decisive" they actually lead to the formation of a "coalition" government unless they actually anticipated an early political settlement.

There are, of course, various other considerations factors which could cause Hanoi to seek an early end to the fighting; some of these have an evidential base. Perhaps the burden of the war on North Vietnam is in itself a factor. The leadership may find that the annual loss of young men, added to the sum of economic and material damage, is unacceptable in its implications for the future vigor and productivity of the nation.

Our the recent testimony based on the Spanish view, however, variety of sources and buttressed by the recent testimony of the Spanish repatriates, is that the strains of the war on North Vietnam are still well within manageable limits.

There are other possibilities which are no better than sheer conjecture, but which cannot be entirely excluded. For example, it could be that Moscow, concerned over a decline in Communist strength in Vietnam, a possible US invasion of the north, and greater Chinese involvement and influence in North Vietnam, such pressure could be exerting pressure on Hanoi to end the war. Such pressure could have taken the form of a threat to terminate major military aid.
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after pe completion of pe deliveries negotiated pis past fall, along wip a promise to provide substantial aid for economic development once pe fighting stops.
Pressures from Peking could also be responsible for pe decision to end pe fighting. The Chinese, for example, might have made peir continued aid conditional on Hanoi's acceptance of Chinese advice on bop military and political strategy.
Neiper of pese conjectures can be supported by any available evidence. Indeed, Peking and especially Moscow have appeared reluctant in pe past to apply direct and heavy pressures on Hanoi; neiper wants to force Hanoi into pe embrace of pe oper. While Moscow, unlike Peking, is not committed to prolongation of pe war, it has always seen some advantages in pe fighting and has demonstrated no willingness to intervene wip Hanoi in favor of early negotiations.
Alternatively, Hanoi may have concluded pat pe Sino-Soviet dispute will undermine effective aid. The USSR may be refusing to ship certain weapons prough China, or to risk delivery by sea. Hanoi may anticipate pat one of pe Communist giants will insist pat it takes a clear-cut stand in pe dispute.

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this would plece Hanoiin this would place Hanoi in the position of alienating at least one side.

Another possibility is that the North Vietnamese leaders may have concluded that turmoil and disruption in China make it a poor prospect as a "reliable rear area." Hanoi may fear that China's antics are encouraging the US to escalate the war without fear of Chinese reactions. And Hanoi might even fear that the time will come when the Chinese will insist that North Vietnam begin its own "cultural revolution."

There is, of course, evidence of Hanoi's concern over the Sino-Soviet dispute and over China's internal policy. Last year, the North Vietnamese Politburo and Central Committee apparently passed a resolution affirming Hanoi's neutrality in the dispute. Missions were sent to both Moscow and Peking to explain this position, which has been continually re-emphasized. At one point last year, Hanoi apparently had to become directly involved in ensuring that Soviet supplies transited more expeditiously through China. Hanoi also reacted to Mao's cultural revolution by issuing fairly pointed criticism of Chinese behavior and the cult of Mao. Added to these concerns is the

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A fairly open record of Chinese opposition to any hint of talks between Hanoi and the United States.

What is lacking, however, is any evidence that the tensions with China or the concern over Soviet support have reached the level where Hanoi would fear Soviet or Chinese disengagement. The physical evidence suggests that both Peking and Moscow are in fact increasing their aid.

If for any of the reasons discussed under this hypothesis Hanoi should decide to end the fighting, it would have at least two alternatives. It could simply decide to allow the conflict to die down, without seeking a political resolution. Or it could attempt to obtain the best possible terms for a settlement under the existing circumstances. In this latter case, the recent Trinh statement on talks with the US could be read as the first step in the gradual development of a negotiating position. The North Vietnamese, of course, recognize the need to be favorable would still bargain for favorable terms, but they would also recognize the need to be more forthcoming and to reduce their demands for a settlement. It would also make sense under this interpretation for Hanoi to get negotiations underway before.

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retherthan eftertheAmerican elections reasoningthat during rather than after the American elections, reasoning that during an election campaign It would have more room for maneuvering against the US. Hanoi's handling of the follow up to the Trinh Interview will be a test for this hypothesis; if it is correct confirmatory evidence should become available before long.

II. CONFIDENCE IN HANOI
17. The Norp Vietnamese may be more impressed wip peir achievements in pe past two years pan wip pe problems pey have encountered. They have wipstood pe massive American intervention in pe Soup and pe heavy bombing of pe Norp.
Despite pe bombing, pey now fight wip more and better arms and ammunition, and peir supply lines are more elaborately developed. The political infrastructure in pe Soup has been maintained, even if in somewhat weakened condition. Their military effort, based on pe increasing preat from pe border areas, not only presents a new challenge to pe US on pe ground but also introduces political complications for pe Americans.
Politically, of course, because of peir experience wip pe ebb and flow of pe French war, pe natural inclination of pe political leaders would be to exaggerate peir own strengp and expect pe

now of the French war, the natural inclination of the political leaders would be to exaggerate their own strength and expect the

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protected War defeat USto concede defeat rather than face the prospect of a protracted war.

18. Hanoi determination to keep fighting could also be explained by what it believes are fundamental weaknesses in the American and South Vietnamese position. The Communists may be convinced that the Saigon regime has little chance of becoming an effective government, generally accepted by the people. Moreover, Hanoi may be persuaded that the South Vietnamese army will never develop into a fighting force which is effective enough to assume part of the US burden. Thus, even if the US military effort is highly successful, in the end the US will find it has no political base in South Vietnam and will be forced to conclude a political settlement with the Front.

19: Even if Hanoi does not read the situation in South Vietnam in this way, it may be relying on assurances of substantial external support which will enable the Communists to fight effectively and even some combat units in order to meet any manpower needs in North Vietnam. The Soviets may have promised new weapons to cope with superior American firepower and the air and naval attacks on the North.

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# 20. Perhaps the best evidence in support of this general interpretation of Hanoi's outlook is the record of the past two years.

At each phase of the US buildup, Hanoi has been willing to respond by committing additional resources to the struggle in the South. A high level of infiltration has been maintained; the most recent deployments near the western end of the DMZ may express a determination not only to persist in the war but to try for a decisive defeat of the US in some local battle. Hanoi's leaders have not taken advantage of several opportunities for negotiations; this could mean that they believe nothing can be gained at the bargaining table unless it has already been won on the battlefield. Finally, a commitment to fight a protracted war was the main decision of the North Vietnamese Central Committee resolution of late 1965, was reaffirmed by the Central Committee in early 1967, and continues to be cited as basic policy.

# 21. As to evidence of external support, Hanoi has recently concluded a series of new agreements with its Communist allies.

Moscow has openly promised a variety of weapons; Soviet coastal defense missiles could be the first of several new items on the list. New Chinese weapons have shown up in the Delta for the
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first time in the war. We known of no increases in Chinese troop strength in North Vietnam in recent months. Recent high level reaffirmations of pledges to support Hanoi, however, could be read as a willingness to increase Chinese commitments. And air defense cooperation between Hanoi and Peking has grown markedly in recent months.

We know of no evidence that is totally inconsistent with an intention to continue the war for the same considerable period of time. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Hanoi would never draw down its home army and weaken the defense of North Vietnam if it looked forward to a long war, particularly in light of continuing concern over an American invasion. And it could be further argued that Hanoi would not tell the troops in the South that this would be a "decisive" year if in fact it believed the war was likely to continue well beyond 1968. Finally, why Hanoi would want to keep alive hopes for negotiations, aggravating the Chinese in the process, if it had no intention of reaching a political settlement in the near future?

If Hanoi's mood and outlook is roughly as assumed under this hypothesis, then its attitude toward peace talks is

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Likely to be intransigent. Upon exploration, moves like the recent Trinh statement will come to nothing. Hanoi, of course, would welcome an end to the bombing, but will adamantly refuse to pay any price for it. Negotiations would be mainly to register the defeat of the US and the end of the Saigon regime.

Finally, one may conjecture that Hanoi's postulated confidence rests on some factor or event which is not yet apparent to the US, such as a major escalation by the Communists. This might take the form of a military offensive in Laos which would threaten to expand the area of conflict and further strain US resources in Southeast Asia. Or escalation might take the form of Chinese moves in Vietnam or elsewhere around its periphery. Or again, the North Vietnamese could be relying on the USSR to create a diversionary crisis, say in Berlin.

Such possibilities have been carefully considered almost since the beginning of the US intervention in Vietnam. Thus far, there is no persuasive evidence that Hanoi, Peking, or Moscow intends to enlarge the war beyond Vietnam or take major action elsewhere against the US.

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# III. SUSPENDED JUDGMENT IN HANOI

2.26.
The third hypothesis assumes that Hanoi's estimate of the situation is based on a mixture of increased pessimism and continuing confidence, which are compounded by other factors, particularly the American elections. Under this hypothesis, Hanoi is keeping several options open and will continue to do so at least until late spring or summer, when it should be in a better position to judge the effect of the American primaries and conventions and the results of its own military offensive. At that time, Hanoi will also be better able to judge the effectiveness and durability of its military offensive and the Saigon government.

27.
If this is so, Hanoi's winter-spring offensive is designed not only for its immediate military objectives but for its overall impact on the US. Hanoi would recognize that its chances for a military victory have evaporated, but it would still hope, by sustaining high levels of combat in the months ahead, to create the impression of a stalemate. It would not expect the US to capitulate, but it would see increased chances for a compromise on terms that would protect the Viet Cong infrastructure and provide the basis for a new political phase in the revolutionary struggle. Hanoi could not be confidently about the outcome of its.
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own efforts will be. But It would recognize that the next twelve months provide an unusual opportunity because of the American elections.

28. Even if political overtures combined with military pressures do not bear fruit, Hanoi could reason that by agitating the question of a coalition government and contacts with the Front, the strains between Washington and Saigon will grow and the US will come under increasing international pressures to modify its own terms. In short, Hanoi would do what it could to maintain its military pressures, its diplomacy, waiting for some time but would at the same time become more flexible in its diplomacy, waiting for some months more to decide whether to make the best deal possible, continue along present lines, or even to adopt a radically different way of fighting, i.e., guerrilla warfare.

29. This hypothesis rests on a different reading of much of the same evidence already cited. Hanoi has made military decisions which strike some observers as inexplicable given the nature of their problems; Hanoi cannot possibly hope to drive the US into the sea and probably cannot expect another Dien Bien Phu. Thus, it would seem better advised to conserve its forces for a protracted war in which it would hope to sap the will of the US.

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Instead, the North Vietnamese commit more troops and seek costly battles. Moreover, since last July they do seem to have indicated more interest in maintaining private contacts with the US and, in some cases, actually inviting US negotiating probes -- moves which their rather rigid public position would not justify.

This hypothesis is supported by some negative evidence. For example, why should China be so cool to the new program of the NFL unless Peking senses that the revision of the program was a step toward negotiating situations? Why did the Front try to send representatives to New York, if as Hanoi claims the UN has absolutely no business in the Vietnam question? And, above all, why do the captured documents contain intriguing tidbits suggesting that the war may not go beyond 1968? These contradictions or inconsistencies could be reconciled within the framework of this third hypothesis.

Uncertainty could also grow out of the state of relations with China and the USSR. In fact, we know little of Hanoi's relations with its allies. What we do know is based on glimmerings from captured documents, deductions from overt statements, and an occasional hint.

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Soviet Source. In any case, Hanoi cannot be very confident that Moscow and Peking will not fall into an even more bitter conflict, or that the situation inside China will not deteriorate further. Indeed, Hanoi could conclude that it would be better to explore US terms for a political settlement while China is still in disarray rather than later, when the Chinese leadership might be reunified and tempted to interfere more directly in Hanoi's affairs.

Indications of uncertainty could also be reconciled with an even more extreme variant of this hypothesis, namely, that the North Vietnamese Politburo is badly divided on policy and is pursuing an indecisive and at times contradictory policy. Perhaps Ho Chi Minh's health has declined, factionalism has reared its ugly head and led to a fairly even split between hawks and doves. Both factions could seek comfort and support from abroad, the hawks from Peking and the doves from Moscow. The hawks may insist on the need for further intensive military effort while the doves could be arguing for a shift to political tactics.

Though there is some evidence that the North Vietnamese leaders have engaged in debates over policy, mainly on the proper
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military tactics, there has never been sufficient evidence to conclude that the leadership is divided on basic policies of whether to fight or quit. A power struggle in Hanoi, of course, is a possibility after Ho and could be developing. But the evidence is lacking, and this explanation of Hanoi's behavior seems highly unlikely.

Even less likely but still within the realm of the imaginable is a split between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As Hanoi has assumed more of the burden and direction of the war, it may have alienated a faction within COSVN. The Viet Cong could argue, with support from certain figures in the Hanoi leadership, that Hanoi may suspect all Chinese bent in the Viet Cong, etc. There may be actual divergencies between Hanoi and some of the Viet Cong leaders, but a real split should be excluded as unlikely.

As noted at the outset of this discussion, we cannot rule out any of these three hypothetical explanations for Hanoi's behavior. It would certainly not be surprising if the North Vietnamese continued the war through next year and for some time.

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afterward. It would be more surprising if they decided to end it soon. We believe there is much to recommend the third case: in the months ahead Hanoi will continue its military effort but will probe more intently to discover what the shape of a political settlement might be.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

ABBOT SMITH

Chairman

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Footnote

VN Iqt)(Jff)OfcC00235986/ [z316

VN IC/ LI: (~5 Inf'

Xr _ Helt Rostou

Mr. Walt Rostov

Here are three copies of certain hypotheses at request. Intentions part of certain hypotheses to fulfill your request for examination. In connection with Hanoi's copies in connection of an examination. If you want further distribution, please advise.

Richard Helms

Attachments:

Attachments - Interpretations of X8 Jan

ONE's me of Henof '0 Intentions or Hanoi's - Interpretations of 22 January 1968. Alternative Interpretations.

SECRET SEGHEI

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Output:
{
"Who": "Chairman, Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency (Smith)",
"What": "Analysis of Hanoi's intentions in the context of the Vietnam War",
"When": "18 January 1968",
"Where": ["Washington", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "China", "Soviet Union", "United States", "Laos", "Berlin"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:

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# Lower House Activities

Period 13-16 November have been its membership and with validating the election of largely concerned Lower house plenary sessions during the

Validation election of some dated assembly for committee merits each case discussed by as continuing process carried members the on

Temporary with parliamentary procedures of its members and ue chairman iiamentary procedures of its temporary with par house miliarity also appears that opposition elements will their performance voice in student resolution issue It Nguyen Ba Luong this assembly judging and the unfa have influential by on the 10 the As of 16 November 100 of its 137 the lower house had validation is

Validation election of some dated assembly for committee merits each case discussed by as continuing process carried members the on

Individually on its vote recommendations and the assembly its own with and presented to the indi recommended validation To date the committee has in each case remaining cases voted to accept its probably be disposed of in the next few days will resolutions rather the 17 students who were arrested 11 lengthly debate was centered on government in some to intervene with the way on and drafted for The ten-man committee issue was behalf of anti-election by two representatives finally settled demonstration activity composed of deciding to appoint from each of the corps areas civilian life and Saigon and Gia Dinh of the will intervene for return The to student demonstrators look into the whole to committee reportedly matter of illegal detainees Three of the committee members Bard" Nguyen Trong Nhotrong supporters Nguyen Dai and Truc Vien were expected to play of the maybe generally major origina role in the new committee opponents of resolutions characteri and are These three the zed as men present government.

# Senate Rules Drafting Continues

12 submitted by During its the rules committee continuing consideration of draft rules the Senate on
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3.5(c)

November approved the against having establishment of secretary 12 standing general on its decided committees and board 11 and 14 November of presiding officers nine At subsequent sessions on standing committees articles dealing with approved the duties of these were tion, 13_culture The 12 committees and youth affairs agriculture; educa - are communications and public works fare foreign budget internal affairs and rules judiciary finance economics taxes and labor and social wel-information and health; between five and ten members include the affairs; and interior defense; with Each will the exception of many budget and finance committee form subcommittees Senate 14 voted to forgo election of In discussing its presiding officers general secretary the and establish instead the of secretary general was committee The position internal affairs and rules one of considerable power in the apparently reluctant Provisional National Assembly and the senators were will probably be responsible for again. to vest 80 much power in one man such tasks The committee as controlling the agenda and ruling on legislative procedures 15 major point of contention arose during duties articles dealing the debate on 11 and 14 November standing committees on with ators the attempted to have responsibility Several assigned to for defining sen- national defense committee was information of allied forces provision cases included the disapproved status annotational though defense committee and foreign affairs both In committee or the move was either the the as which an to the allied reports article by the committee "examines and tary to the on the terri on regulations upper house for mili forces such told forces tory here are officer that he of the Senator Tran Vietnam, when Republic of high expects Senate later Van Lam status an embassy the of forces question to rank on the list of priorities Some Senate Work on of the more has begun to slow after the 16 59 articles energetic start earlier in the month the rules than 200 have been ap- proved thus far The rules drafting process will I-5 3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

probably continue well into December that it could some earlier optimistic predictions contrary to be completed by mid-or late November over the rules governing the establishment of blocs. There was lively debate on 15 November within the Senate. The minimum number to constitute had proposed that 21 - which would have insured the rules drafting committee bloc should be creation of no more than two blocs in accordance to the 60-member system. This would facilitate the movement toward Article committee upper house. This course encourages the progress toward the system. The committee also argued that in its opinion any sense voted rules which do not foster such progress would in however, be unconstitutional. Only ten senators forth the committee proposal from the floor to set to approve four Senate than went on the minimum bloc its own measure blocs to be organized. Recommendation was that while membership at 15 which will allow as argument many as against the committee. The progress toward the constitution commits the nation to "encourage two-party system," it says nothing about forcing such movement.

New Political Party Developing. Senator Tran composed largely of retired Van Don announced in early November that formed originally in July as party of-association ing Don subsequent the provisional group to become a political an embassy the veterans officer known who is chairman of the group clarified the as the Freedom Fighters objectives Association, association and plans. He does not expect that the group can be political party - a process which be organized as official requires says of the and village the establishment of national for structures throughout possibly two large part provin- Don has country already begun establishing contacts in at least year and some organize with persons who will probably agree to or- areas local chapters but little beyond this has.

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yet tion which can success mass been accomplished fully appeal yet the association Dinh but been drawn up or program outlining this no platform compete He foresees with the Communists mass organiza- Quang Hoang Mai Huu Xuan That Pham executive Among those generals Ton concept has on for the association committee are retired Nguyen Van Tran Tu Oai Thai Le Van Nghiem, Former General Van Dong1s also an association member Saigon chapter serving as chairman of the group the Farmer-Worker-Soldier group told relationship with 21 As for the association of which also provisional president would develop he the embassy Donis of- while maintaining considerable liaison because of ficer that the two groups independently 1ndependently their partially overlapping leadership it is not yet clear what Don organizations will be in the relationship Although to the two to the personal reference are the overlapping leadership--he and Ton future his That Dinh only two individuals who overlap--being, indicates that he intends at leas merger He may hope for the time that by to keep his hand in both groups group his the other fails attempt foundering or can two groups if so doing one he can of the if own political appears to be save skin by falling back on one Revolutionary Dai Viet Split Continues heading for Viet Party developed in few of October is having Another already established political party factional difficulties and 19 apparent ly tionary Dai leader Ha Thuc Ky and to go along with permanent split rift in early his followers the Revolu- when party the central committee refused on decision that the party should accept Van Ngai of the majority led by Senator Nguyen the assembly validation of the presidential elections the two factionshave collaborated on day Since then 3.3(h)(2) to-day party matters to but both Ky ceeded with efforts consolidate and Ngai their respective have pro- including some publications and 700 of control report- positions the party Ngai does however claim of 89 intellectual leaders its 900 cadre edly feels that he has the advantage as Ngai holder the

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|timepublicoffice|toimprovehisimageasbut thatheneedsnational politicallittlemore leaderand to expandhiscontrolof thepartybefore hecansuccessfullybreakwithKy .|
|---|---|
|Buddhist Reconciliation Efforts|24 mixed group of Buddhists and politicians calling themselves the on Committee Campaigning to Unite Buddhism, met 12 November to seek resolution of the of both representatives current the militant and charter dispute the moderate repre- This may factionswereblesssignal not have the in fact, ing of either Tri Quang or present, the the beginning of the meeting apparently Tam Chau did third either without intended emerging as force reported to be middle-of-the-road grouping to work for the unity of to the extreme views of the church reference leader.|
|Some 30 people from various meeting, along the Buddhist sects with acting lower house chairman Nguyen Ba Luong and organizations were present at Soldiers late the Thich Huyen and Senator Trinh Quang Qui of the Farmer-Worker- faction and the chief Minh was repre- sentative of moderate Thich Phap problem faction the meeting Sieu appeared to be the militants length on Both Minh and Sieu spoke at some sole delegate the charter of his each professing his Minh for unity desire and the desire moreover expressed both hope that Buddhist congress which would examine to the convene charters and decided on the retention of exactly participants would work unsure of one The others present they however seemed what should do--whether to Tri tablishes formal organization to supersede both Chau Buddhist Quang and Tam merely factions informal initiate convene contact between the congress two or factions organizations note 26 but The meeting ended on significantly Buddhist group of six I-not including Phap Sieu--remained representatives of that inconclusive the behind to draft one militant representative declaration also rather inconclusive pledging The only to declaration was promote.| |

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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808

|SEGRE|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|The creation of the association an association which would include permanent office and The Buddhist to leader many board of unite Buddhism. sects would have than directors rather ingle apparently declaration further calls off for the proposed association to congress consider specifics| |

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|Approved for Release:|2018/07/11 C02983808OLUIL|
|---|---|
| |3.5(c)|

A recent decree of the Vietnamese government provides for clemency for 327 prisoners. Another government decree reduces the sentences of prisoners and directs the destruction of criminal records. The security situation for the affected number of persons in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces sharply decreased in September and continued to decrease in October. The number of Vietnamese Revolutionary Development (RD) teams is growing, but the strength per team is declining. The direct support to around a number of Vietnamese army battalions remains. Revolutionary Army battalions in Quang Nam rallied in November. As of the RD 25 Armsonly government under had 329 persons. The US increased to 653 persons at the same date last year. The rate of returnees to the Open program has been below 15,220 persons weekly. However, the number of returnees has recently doubled compared to last year. The status of prisoners in South Vietnam in conjunction with the recent National Day celebration and the presidential inauguration, the GVN reportedly released and reduced the sentences of approximately 6327 prisoners. In addition, a decree was issued on October 30 which grants complete freedom or erasure from records of charges and convictions for prisoners detained under specific categories. The status of how many people in Saigon are affected by the decree is uncertain. GVN officials have made vague statements concerning the decree and the release of prisoners.

|Approved for Release:|2018/07/11 C02983808|
|---|---|
| |SECRET|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808D 3.5(c)

prisonerAnrecently ofJustice2 officialinformedUSofficialsin the Vietnamese Ministrythethat release andsentencereductionwasindividualsPresident Nguyen directactofclemency from VanThieutotheNationalPoliceGeneralNguyenconcerned_ The Directorofth personally NgocLoantolddowiththematter had nothingtotheprimeministercertainUS official thathebutthathetold be lievedthatchiefstorelease theprovinceon occasion ofNational Dayon November 3 Thesemi-officialVietnamPresson 31Octoberreportedthat482werereleased--l,167 who received clemency of the 327prisoners politicaldetaineesand4320suspects--and509 civilianand 336 military prisonershadtheir sen tencesreduced_ Since the specificselectionofpersonsapparentlyleftin lands tobereleasedwas USofficialsthe ofthepossiblethat itwas local authoritiesbeliefnumberofpoli-ticaldetaineesViet Congwerefeelthat includedamongThisthereportofandNovembersuspects released_ issomewhatsubstantiated by Kien statedthatPleikuafter they hadtakenantofight ThuaThien ofloyaltytotheCong_Hoa provincesgovernmentDinh Tuong ,whichin VietnamPresspoliticaldetaineeswere PhuYen and promisedreleasedandoath againsttheViet sentencedOfby 32385,5 Thecivilianprison andoverthis figure17,000arepopulationnowbeenalmoststill15000haveawaitingtrialtotals A breakdown 5,793areprobablyViet Congtheoffendershows(ethnic535 politicalprissonersthe categoryof 20 largestnumberof whon criminalprisoners 002Viet Cong suspects or armedrebelsKamputier KromandgroupdissidentssuchastheKhmer minorityFULRO) and5 ,055 militarypriprisoners000soners In addition thereareinapproximatelyinterrogation1centersthroughout atanygiventime thecountry

# SECRET 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808ULILL

As of the end of October, approximately US military officials have reported that military prisoners of war included about the government of Vietnam POW. This total of 260 were in the custody of persons whose origins are 224 regroupees, 59 southerners, and about 485 ethnic North Vietnamese, 612. All but about 385 captured since January 1966 prisoners have been 385 of these still unidentified. The total number - some 4,981 - have been and about half of by US forces. POWs in allied medical facilities who are not included in the prisoner total have constructed five major one US 7 to house these POWs detention centers and GVN forces capacity of only 11,000 these centers have under one in normal conditions each corps area and on Phu Quoc Island minor POW internal alterations they however with 14,000 POWs can quarter about. Security in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces 8 CORDS' report on pacification in South According in security during report declining security Vietnam during September substantiates earlier information which suggested situation some central coastal provinces decided decline in Nam provinces and Quang to set the CORDS in September in Quang Nga there was Tu severe Quang Ngai Nghia District for 10 setback when 5 pacification efforts suffered the days enemy occupied eastern August attack on the provincial capital following the 29-30 Tu Nghia is the most important of the intensity of campaign areas in five Eastern RD number (RF/PF) Force the enemy offensive drove the the province Regional and The Eroopalar reaction was delayed and cautious of hamlets soldiers and the RD cadres (ARVN) The Vietnamese Army after their forces were augmented by two battalions from even Quang Tin to have been successful the RF/PF Province ARVN forces staten pozadily however appear clearing the area in at least and cadres.

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
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Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808SELRE

3.5(c) have reportedly supporting returned to the hamlets The Quang Ngai ARVN and units have been Withdrawn from Vietnamese forces in the province have returned to the security skeptical of the status prior to September local forces US officials ability are topreserveandsecurity and feel that enemy forces could, Tuindeed may, repeat their seizure of eastern Nghia, 10 During September Quang Nam that Province experienced includes reversal caused Hieu Nhon Enemy pressure similar to of Quang Ngai of security loss in coastal least District temporary which its one point five RD hanlets because of continued the provincial capital of Hoi An team had to be temporarily At withdrawn from their October of security its offensive During forces and directed much of the enemy lack in Quang Nam and effort against the districts enclaves Loc to force government Hieu Duc, Enemy forces into seem of Dai attempting to be 1n Hoi An Da Nang and the district towns Revolutionary Development Cadre Vietnamese On 11 were deployed with RD teams October CORDS field strength 505 reported that of 23442 the number of team has increased during While the total field throughout South Vietnam. 1967 remained relatively constant properly Job expected 59-man and the tasks strength of the strength per team has team has decreased perform team RD the is the optimum size fewer men in motivated and of it with delta province required to trained team however assigned can do the under ideal security situations considerable For example Giang the relatively secure of An there are economic development whose 38 teams of 20 men function is primarily village They work one group to there 12 In addition to the Vietnamese RD teams were also 106 Truong Son (montagnard) RD teams and 5,340 Static Census Grievance Cadres in the field on October The total strength II-4

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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808OLAJIL 3.5(c)

On that date of the three cadre groups, the 45295 command and control cadres and trainees was about the Vung an Despite 13 large number of graduates from prevented Tau National Training Center percent has cadres attrition rate of quantitative increase in about 34 Vietnamese for RD RD cadres basic course Vung Tau graduated 1,585 August on 373 students from the approximately on students basic the 000 trainees November recruits November with October on and 3222,675 an effort to now started Vung Tau who about training Tau qualitative efforts of the RD teams in prove on. In has the now offers technical Vung specialists or 400 initiated Intelligence cadre scheduled to will number of courses into train 1968 be Research and students in This course training course four classes is of 100 students train each include Other leadership and medical training. specialist cadre courses at Vung Tau level 14 off The Truong Son program is expected to at strength located of about 000 about The training center in 1,211 students the basic cadre course in Pleiku had during October and including trainees had 7,477 persons in the program direction of the military teams are also under the 15. Civil RD Cadre Directorate. There are 35 teams teams are composed 32 are in of II technical Civil-military Corps service cadres and Regional or Popular Force platoons 16. For September CORDS reported that 99 enemy-initiated lives of 54 cadres and anti-RD wounded about 142 this incidents cost the Vietnamese figure includes RD cadre losses killed for September were 597; discharged captured (11) and deserted (308) Vietnamese Armed Forces in Revolutionary Development under 17 battalions October As of 164 Vietnamese Army training (ARVN) the RD mobile training team program had completed their RD To.

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808SbUKE 3.5(c)

begin refresher training slippage is to ensure that there is no in the program. RD in November course scheduled to usually 18 committed to the direct support of RD. Although the number of ARVN battalions Corps 10 battalions fluctuating battalions in On averages 53, the units involved and 17 November the number per corps has been MACV report shows only 52 - 14 III Corps and 15 battalions and three US battalions in II Corps IV Corps in 13 battalions in 17 November US forces had deployed two in Corps Corps in support of RD. Corps one in II III.

Despite the difficulties imposed by operational requirements continuing trained in September Force approximately 219 of these companies are RF companies. 513 companies had been RD training through for the direct Regional support of RD. Throughout the platoon try coun are 745 Popular Force (PF) in direct support of RD 115 training. RF 20 companies addition in northern in the Corps Corps have received their 80 of the approximately platoons have completed their combined Motivation/RD. In 672 Popular Force (PF) their over-all Indoctrination military posture and RD reportedly Vietnamese training. To further enhance forces in Corps additional are in the process of activating an 15 RF companies and 41 PF platoons.

Since August, elements of the ARVN 22nd Division have been and Duong Corps province of Binh Dinh in the II Son Plain conduction Lieu Valley to prepare the an operation in the Bong this for pacification area operation has ambush operations in been to The increase the number general concept of small unit and vicinity of the Cay Giap mountains and the village and with the cordon-and-search techniques to ferret hamlets out enemy in the infrastructure area.

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# ECONOMIC SITUATION

One percent prices in Saigon declined in November because the week ending for Retail during domestic rice and other foods of lower prices. Free market economic and gold prime cabinet occupied by Ton in the unknowns currency posts relative ces increased. Most of Economy record during and Minister his previous. Import orders smaller than undistinguished the 1967 were position was first nine months of terms in the result of hands of importers during the existing large inventories anticipated as of personnel recently goods in the substantial USAID found insect infestation in PL-480 rice stored by the South Vietnamese Government. The relationship between increasing since 1965 supply future additions to that the of piasters price level has and the in-tightened supply will and place greater pressure on prices.

|Prices|sharply the previous week November declined during the week ending in Saigon food price index Retail prices|
|---|---|
|1 percent|risen domestic 3 percent as prices declined rice as well as the type dropped of pork of rice used in of most varieties of fish and chicken|
|The price of the USAID index declined to 22.5 piasters per kilogram, the lowest since croprice continued to arrive in mid-February as deliveries of new non-food| |
|Saigon|of the price of laundry as Prices soap rose increased slightly items Firewood the result again as and first the high cost of also coconut oil latter for charcoal prices tail prices early September the rose of weekly re-time since in Saigon is included in (A table the Annex.)|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808OLOILL 3.5(c)

US-financed sheet resulted in rods flour and galvanized iron new arrivals imports index for wholesale prices because

The USAID of wheat also declined lightly ces of The price of stocks and however for these items because of low wire lower prices lack of new deliveries rose sharply

Currency and Gold Free November two The prices of green dollars market currency and gold prices increased on rose respectively to 155 and 115 graph leaf per the highest rates since mid-August and MPC piasters (scrip) dollar four piasters piastersto The 201 price of gold dollar increased piasters per is monthly and weekly currency and gold prices on included in the Annex.

New Economic Administration in the new while most of once again gone to economy Thai Ton, b1 engineer 1965 to figures his record was The cabinet has key portfolio of minister of Truong the related ministries will be headed less well known previous iyserved as and from Ton minister an of economy culture from June February 1966 government and economic consider hin capable and hard undistinguished at the time 1967 de experience in February 1967 to mid-March He has had Wi adviser in appointment was of his the prime minister but serving as but officials in administrative ability any US an lacking office working by past experience Judging they do not expect from trong leadership on economic matters to come his office.

The scope who it was of Ton his predecessor tion as post apparently will be Nguyen smaller than could minis at present Bank of Vietnam Hanh of the wield under retains his posi from Under Huu National which governor still try direct supervisory responsibility Hanh Finance he and commerce had but the finance two have now become the called the Ministry of Economy considerable influence communications industry for and transport and latter.

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
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|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|Separate Ministries|The departments of commerce, commercial Lyare for commerce and Vo Van Nhung for industry now headed by undersecretaries.|
|Nguyen Chanh Ly has been a junior official in the credit section of the electrical engineer. National Bank.| |
|As in the general finance minister of field in which he has been working for many years. Luu Van Tinh will continue as minister of finance under Tran budget and foreign aid as new.| |
|The an assistant to Hanh on communications is Luong as director of the Van Huong and in Ky 5 government as tax policy. The well minister of transport and Sieu, who has been technical director of government-owned Nong the coal mine near Da Nang.| |
|The other major economic ministries Ton That Trinh agriculture and labor, who worked with Ton as headed by the prime minister an advisers University of Da Lat while on Pho Ba Long teaching the defeated senatorial candidate who administration at has been political science and business leave from Esso where he worked in public and employee relations.| |
|Import Situation|Orders for imports this year result have been large inventories smaller than anticipated as in the hands of importers of goods goods ordered by nine months the of existing. The monthly value of in Vietnam during the first commercial importers Jelow quite high because of the 1966 to 25 percent 20 1967 (measured be letters of credit opened) the monthly average for was. The level in 1966 was removal of import quotas and restrictions entry of new joint Embassy / USAID study and the effect firms into the importing business and the according to the main concern now will have is end of June 1967 both bank and non-bank on the size of inventories it the market for imported goods next year financing of total of By the importers roughly 25 billion piasters inventories was estimated to the expected value of orders or for all of 1967 about 60 per.|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808

may readysupplies dampening effect on that importers. The large inventories have allowed consumers access of imported goods at stable prices, thus providing domestic price increases. Placing large new orders until inventories have been wary. The danger of, however, is the run down and prices start moving up, an unsettling effect on price increase. Orders would not only have an impact on bank liquidity but also on port operations, such as was experienced in 1966.

US officials in Saigon expect that the large inventories will discourage any increase in the import sector this year. They anticipate that orders will pick up through the end of 1968 but see major problems confronting the economy between the time orders are placed and the goods arrive. To reduce the time lag between orders and arrivals, adequate credit must be available to finance the imported goods and rapidly replace the stocks.

There is a shortage of imported goods and to maintain the shortage, the time lag must be reduced. About seven to nine months early in the year, importers should be able and willing to react quickly before shortages appear and currently, importers are running short. This year, the hope is to tackle the time lag of about nine months between orders and arrivals in order to somewhat reduce shortages.

Credit procedures are being viewed for streamlining, particularly by US officials in the hope of easing current bank pressure on importers to repay outstanding loans. Infestation of stored US rice by rodent and insect infestation in PL-480 rice. USAID personnel recently found substantial infestation in warehouses rented by the Vietnamese Government in Cholon and Thu Duc, which have two-thirds of the combined capacity of 108,000 metric tons of imported rice in the Saigon stock area at the end of September.

The infestation exists in warehouses both in Cholon and Thu Duc.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808

plans reportedlyisworstinmove thesestocksemergency controlledstoragespaceare underway tocontractprivateonwarehousesuntiltheCholonwarehousesUSAID, an intoUSAID-and basis and protectthericein officialsOctober the governmentcanhasalreadyreportedhiredtheThusuchservicesabout1futuresaid500tonscostlyforDucofspoiledricefirmtofumigateAID asof10derably greatertoteamalsoshipmentofdur-butandmuchmorerecommendedPL-480losses wouldbe consi fumigation Thesurvey thanthat iffeasible futurecontractsfor riceandotherfoods Vietnamships priortoandinclude provisions ing loadingandtoinhibit durth during for improvedinspectionoffoodswithingloadingvoyagesdustingoforeliminateinsecticidesinsect grow- 10studymadeinAugustisThisrecentsurveybyUSDAAtthattimereminiscentof simipri- andlarvateAmericanricemillers technicians they allowrecommendedfor goodventilationand urged frequentfumi-differentsystemof pilingto gation.

Inflation The CostofMorePiasterg countryrapid pacethedirectservicesavailableinat11_money supply(currency plus checking Undercertaincircumstanceschangesin accounts) canhave andsubstantial impact on thenthepriceIfgoodsandavailable that countrymorethe pricesofnstbuyersofthansupplyof moneyincreasesbyotherthosetheto bidmore vigorouslygoodsisvery of goodsto rise are forced agai ceivethesituationandaccommodatethebuyerseach Suppliersratherquicklyper- raisingprices ofmoneyfallsitsFurtheroftherisholdmoneylevel)as the purchasingpoweringprice verylongas noone is particularly(becauseanxioustowilldeclineeven purchasingpower for further Consequently most individualsattemptto spendtheir moneyincomeasthepressureonpriin- flationfurtherincreasingexplainthesevereIn This processseemsinSouthVietnamin1965 . itthusthat begantobest soon as theyreceiveces.

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
---
|Selected Countries|Money Index 1960|Money Index 1965|Price Index 1960|
|---|---|---|---|
|Ceylon|107|152|104|
|India|122|193|119|
|Pakistan|126|195|116|
|Philippines|126|204|108|
|South Vietnam|138|391|95|
|Taiwan Korea|189|460|149|
|South|181|468|133|
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
3.5(c)

pace with the money the supply of piasters by the agricultural - second but significant factor was the absorption Vietnamese economy _ turalsectoroftraditionallySouthreliedonof This sector had apiytregorred instead barter of national goodsexchanged for goods Thiralls from the first two currency more and factors country money norma in the course growth and development piasters and piaster checking income increased more As South Vietnam number of transactions accounts were transactions required to and facilitate the greater the larger piaster amount of these came evident 1965 to South Vietnam slack 14 of In when the OS began sending large economy which that numbers troops there was little it quickly be left in the money stock without inflation. would allow substantial additions to of The remainder the subsistence sector became rather qui mone- because magnitude tized And the additions to the money additional piasters required were of such of economic growth were even that of lesser importance than the commercial they import and Food 1965 were before for Peace of prevent- Consequently Programs were left with almost all of the burden ing inflation in South Vietnam To lesser extent the growing black market in currency and gold actea and still acts as Vietnamese with deterrent to further inflation piasters ding currency then holding idle cash be by provi for purposes of stant value were used South future trangactions piaster is to hold as idle source of con- the would balances balances costly If becausedeclining. tantly the purchasing power of con- largely 15 responsible for the The South Vietnamese budget deficit is and upward growiral money consequently ing the government to raise necessary According to in more piasters appears to be for the spira the in prices employed by wholly inadequate revenue as tax collections not are the prospects based on addition to the money of price cent estimates 1968 are the possible budget deficit less borrowing good_ Estimates for price increases stability (which provides the net upply

III-7
3.5(c)

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
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|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808ULL|3.5(c) for1968NationalBank)|
|---|---|
|fromthe Formerministerconservatiaseconomyandfinancegoof high as 75percent Hanh35-percenthoweverincreaseis vely predictingabout| |
|III-8|3.5(c)|

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808
---
|Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon|13 Jun 1966|3 Jan 1967|16 Oct 1967|23 Oct 1967|30 Oct 1967|6 Nov 1967|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Index for 61 Items|173|225|291|290|304|300|
|Index for Food Items|190|242|326|324|345|336|
|Of Which: (In Piasters)|Rice-Soc Nau 100 kg|1,250|1,700|2,300|2,300|2,300|2,250|
| |Pork Bellies 1 kg|90|130|200|200|230|220|
| |Fish - Ca Tre (jar 1 kg)|130|150|220|220|270|260|
| |Nuoc Mam|70| |150|150|150|150|
|Index for Nonfood Items|140|195|227|228|230|233|
|Of Which: In Piasters|Firewood cu. meter|360|560|500|500%|520|53016|
| |White Kerosene (liter)|207.8|33|10.5|#| |16|

Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100. Price level just prior to the 18 June devaluation.
---
| |31OCT|6 NOV|
|---|---|---|
|1964|197|201|
|1965|153|155|
|1966| | |
| |1967|AUG|SEP|OCT|Nov|

GOLD: Bosisgoldloaf worth $35 per troy ounce

US $10 GREEN

US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip)
---
# Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808

# Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02983808 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI_15472957_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Lower house members, Senate rules committee, Vietnamese government officials, Buddhist leaders, US military officials",
"What": "Discussion and validation of election results, drafting of Senate rules, development of new political party, reconciliation efforts among Buddhists, economic situation updates",
"When": "13-16 November",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

|FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY|Date: FEBRUARY 1968|
|---|---|
|COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM|GROUP: 35H2|
|SUBJECT: POST-VC-OFFENSIVE PROBLEMS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND ANTICIPATED ENEMY ACTIONS|AGQ: 35H|
|SOURCE: 35C| |

SUMMARY: IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, WHERE MOST OF THE ASSAULT FORCES WERE NV'A, THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OF HIS STRENGTH AND PERHAPS ANOTHER ONE-FOURTH IN WOUNDED. THE ENEMY FOLLOWED HIS PLAN OF ATTACK EVEN THOUGH IT WAS
---
Approvedf0 Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477r

I

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Emu       Ion           dlaaem controls                                                                                -1

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’\_;      ;oBv1ous RE HAD FAILED T0 ACCOMPLISH HIS 0BJECTIVES.P_M0ST                                                                  _     .      .       --

*‘A§ALLiEn COMMANDERS WERE WELL PREPARED T0 MEET IHE ATTACK WHEN...                                                                           E*~         "

“.§1r CAME.                WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS evn OFFICIALS AND ARVN

1"§RERFoRmEn WELL.                         THE PEOPLE REDSED TO RALLY T0 THE ENEMY

OF THE PROVINCE ADMINISTRATION WERE OPEN AND Fuwcrxouxms.

THE ENEMY'S MOVE zmro FORMER RD PRIORITY AREAs 1s REGRETTABLE.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ADDED TO THE RECOVER£RECONSTRUCTION

EFFORT THAT LIES AHEAD WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE.l968

PACIFICATION EFFORT.                             A SECOND VC/NVA ATTACK IN OUANG TRI

NOW SEEMS LESS OF A POSSIBILITY, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE,

THAN IT DID THE FIRST THREE WEEKS FOLLOWING TET.

THE ENEMY

j‘_DOES SEEM MOTIVATED, HOWEVER, BY AN OVERWHELMING COMPULSION'“

TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AND STARTLING VICTORY.                                                ALTHOUGH THE

“ENEMY SAW AN OPPORTUNITY IN HUE, HE WILL SOONER OR LATER

TIRE OF THE HUE STRUGGLE AND DRIVE AT SOME OTHER TARGET

FOR A QUICK PSYCHOLIGICAL VICTORY, WHICH COULD BE A PRELUDE

TO NEGOTIATIONS.                       RRE sARR IS THE_MOST oBv1ous’oRPoRruR1rY.

BECAUSE OF u.s. AIR AND FIRE POWER HE PROBABLY wouuo BE                                                                  '

FORCED TO USE AIR POWER                           As WELL AS TANKS.                      _WHEN THIS                                                   1

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-     ..                -»~---Approved for Release: 2o19R>A/17 'c0e7sE477'?:'-                          '
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477

HAPPENS HE WILL IN REALITY BE ESCALATING THE WAR.L WHETHER HE IS READY AND WILLING TO DO SO IS OPEN TO QUESTION. THE CHARACTER OF THE TET OFFENSIVE INDICATED THE ENEMY. WAS MORE INTERESTED IN A QUICK END TO THE WAR. MOST ALLIED COMMANDERS FEEL THAT THE VC MUST EFFECTIVELY BLOCK ALLIED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY COMBAT ELEMENTS IF HE WANTS TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK IN QUANG TRI. THE ENEMY DOES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED BASES ON ROUTE NO. 9 AND EASTWARD TO CUA VIET WITH ARTILLERY. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN MORE ADEPT AT PROPAGANDAIZING THE PEOPLE THAN THE ALLIES. HE HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE AMONG THE PEOPLE, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ALLIES HAVE BEEN CONSTRAINED TO REMOVE THE PEOPLE AS REFUGEES. THE ENEMY NEEDS TO SUBSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF HIS OWN FOR THE PRESENT SYSTEM - WRECK GVN HAMLET AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS, LAND-USE SYSTEMS AND CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC TAPROOTS. THE OUTLOOK IN QUANG TRI IS THAT THE ENEMY WILL RESIST VIGOROUSLY ALLIED EFFORTS TO PERMANENTLY REESTABLISH RD SECURITY. HE WILL STEP UP HIS ATTACKS AGAINST BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY, IF NOT AS A PRELUDE TO A SECOND

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477

OFFENSIVE. HE PROBABLY WILL TRY TO HANG ONTO TO HUE,AND/OR THE ENVIRONS OF HUE. HE MAY IN DESPERATION TRY TO TAKE KHE SANH TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. WAR EFFORT. HAVING LOST FACE,

AND WITH COMMUNIST CHINA'S BACKING AND URGING, THE ENEMY MAY BE HEEDLESS OF THE ESCALATION FACTOR. IF THAT IS THE CASE THE ALLIES HAVE A NEW FACTOR TO WORRY ABOUT. END SUMMARY.

1. THE NATURE AND THE EFFECT OF THE ENEMY'S SO-CALLED TET OFFENSIVE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE APPEARED TO BE VERY MUCH LIKE "WHAT HAPPENED IN MOST PROVINCES UP AND DOWN THE COUNTRY. THERE WERE SOME SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES HOWEVER. FOR EXAMPLE, MOST OF THE ALLIED COMMANDERS IN-PROVINCE CORRECTLY DIAGNOSED THE ENEMY'S INTENT IN ADVANCE AND WERE WELL PREPARED TO MEET THE ATTACKS WHEN THEY CAME. AS A RESULT THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST ONE—FOURTH OF HIS TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE QUANG TRI LOWLANDS AND ANOTHER FOURTH MAY HAVE BEEN WOUNDED. IN QUANG TRI THE ASSAULT FORCES WERE MOSTLY REGULAR NVA UNITS, NOT VC. AS WAS THE CASE IN MANY PROVINCES, THE ENEMY'S PLAN WAS INCORRECT IN CONCEPT AND FAULTY IN EXECUTION. IN QUANG TRI HE TELEGRAPHED HIS PUNCH IN MANY WAYS AND HE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A COORDINATED EFFORT WHICH WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIM A MUCH GREATER SHOCK EFFECT.
---
# PULSIVELY FOLLOWED HIS PLAN OF ATTACK IN OUANG TRI EVEN THOUGH IT

IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE HAD FAILED T0 ACCOMPLISH HIS PRELIMINARY OBJECTIVES OF CUTTING OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND NEUTRALIZING. A

POUR COMBAT BASES..

2. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE ENEMY EXPECTED_A GREATER RESPONSE

FROM THE PEOPLE THAN HE RECEIVED. ITHE PEOPLE NOT ONLY REFUSED TO

RALLY TO THE ENEMY'S SIDE, IN MANY CASES THE COURAGEOUSLY FOUGHT BACK.

THE PERFORMANCES OF MANY POPULAR FORCE/REGIONAL FORCE (PF/-

50F) AND RD GROUPS NERE ESPECIALLY NOTENORTHY. ALTHOUGH MANY OF

THESE UNITS NERE REDEPLOYED TO MORE SECURE AREAS AS THE ENEMY'S

ATTACK UNFOLDED, OTHERS WERE LEFT IN POSITION TO FIGHT, AND FIGHT

IN SOME AREAS THE RURAL PEOPLE REFUSED FOOD TO FORAGING

THEY DID.

INVA SOLDIERS. THE PEOPLE WERE as(h) as(lh)

STILL PROVINDING TIMELY INFORMATION DESPITE THE SHARP INCREASE IN

THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS IN THEIR MIDST AND DESPITE THE INTENSE

ENEMY PSYNAR_EFFORT THAT ACCOMPANIED HIS BATTLE EFFORT
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5.                      NO GVN OFFICIAL IN QUANG TRI DESERTED HIS POST OR OTHER-|

v
T?

WISE PROVED T0 BE A TRAITOOR on A cowmw.

THE CHIEF BUDDHISTPRIEST

IN OUANG TRI, THICH THIEN BINH, WAS DEMONSTRABLY PROPGVN THROUGHOUT
THE EMERGENCY PERIOD.

ONLY THE PROVINCE CHIEF, LIEUTENANT COLONEL
NGUYEN AM, APPEARED TO BE SHOCKED TO A POINT OF TOTAL INEFFECTIVE-
NESS AT THE HEIGHT OF THE ENEMY ATTACK. BUT HIS.BURDEN WAS
PICKED UP BY THE REST OF HIS STAFF AND BY HIS AMERICAN ADVISORS.

THE COMBINATION OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE TET HOLIDAY PREVENTED
THE PROVINCE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FROM FUNCTIONING FULLY FOR
SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE EMERGENCY ABATED.

BY 15 FEBRUARY, HOWEVER,
MOST OFFICES WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING.

FORTUNATELY THE SOCIAL
WELFARE AND REFUGEE SERVICES WERE ON gjE JOB THROUGHOUT THE MEER-
GENCY PERIOD.                                                                                THEY FUNCTIONED VERY WILL INDEED.

4.                     THE MOST DISCOURAGING JFACTOR FROM THE FREE WORLD'S STAND-

POINT WAS THE PARALYSIS WHICH GRIPPED THE 1ST ARVN REGIMENT.

THIS
FOUR-BATTALION REGIMENT SUFFERED ONLY LIGHT CASUALTIES DURING THE
ATTACK BUT THEY FAILED TO SEIZE THE IOPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT THEIR-

ADVANTAGE AFTER THE ENEMY WAS REPULSED WITH HEAVY LOSSES. _THIS,
COUPLED WITH AN ALMOST COMPLETE ALLIED

SYWAR BREAKDOWN IN THE
PERMITTED THE ENEMY TO MOVE INTO THE POWER
RURAL AREAS, V-

Y

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786477

VACUUM IN THE FORMER RD PRIORITY AREA IN OUANG TRI PROVINCE.

THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF ENEMY-GENERATED BLACK PROPAGANDA PLOYS. A RADIO BROADCASTING STATION PURPORTING TO BE AN OFFICIAL GVN OUTLET STATED ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS THAT GENERAL MEN HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE AN OUANG BUDDHISTS IN SAIGON WHO HAD PUBLICLY GONE OVER TO THE VIET CONG; THAT AMERICAN B-52S HAD BOMBED HUE; THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PULLING OUT OF THE WAR AND OPTING FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE IMMINENT, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN THE CEDING OF QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES TO NORTH VIETNAM. IN THE RURAL AREAS THE ENEMY REPEATEDLY TOLD THE POPULACE THAT KHE SANH HAD FALLEN AND THAT HUE WAS IN VC HANDS. STORIES OF ARVN, POLICE, AND RF/PF MASS DESERTIONS TO THE ENEMY WERE ALSO BRUITED ABOUT. (COMMENT: LINH QUANG VIEN IS INTERIOR MINISTER; CAO VAN VIEN IS JGS CHIEF.)

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH THE PEOPLE WE USUALLY CONSIDER TO BE THE ELITE IN THIS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE MORE AFFECTED BY RUMORS THAN THE COMMON FOLK. THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST ARVN REGIMENT IN FACT PUBLICLY CHASTISED THE AMERICAN MILITARY'S RESPONSE TO THE ENEMY'S CHALLENGE. HE SIMMERED DOWN LATER, BUT AT TIMES OTHER GVN OFFICIALS SEEMED TO BE DEEPLY DEPRESSED AND SOMEWHAT UNREASONABLE.

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IN §'o 3 /4/ -9

PAGE Yb;/_3 moss. 'J

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IN THEIR ATTITUDES. THE HUE SITUATION AFFECTED MANY OFFICIALS WHO HAD FRIENDS AND RELATIVES IN THAT BESIEGED CITY. THE VORTEX OF POWER AND CULTURE WHICH DESCENDS FROM HUE TO THIS PROVINCE WAS SUDDENLY AND COMPLETELY WIPED OUT, OR SO IT SEEMED TO THE OFFICIALS IN OUANG TRI. IT WAS LAMENTABLE BUT NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, TO FIND ARVN COMMANDERS ESPECIALLY IN A STATE OF SHOCK. BY 25 FEBRUARY SOME ASPECTS OF NORMALCY HAD RETURNED AND AN EFFORT, STILL RELATIVELY FEEBLE, WAS BEING MADE TO SAT ON WITH RECOVERY AND PACIFICATION.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN OUANG TRI AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS NOT SEVERE, BUT THE REFUGEE POPULATION GENERATED AS A RESULT OF PRE-TET AND POST-TET MILITARY OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN HUONG HOA (KHE SANH) AND CAM LO DISTRICTS, HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE. APPROXIMATELY 14,000 NEW REFUGEES WERE EXPECTED. THE CARE AND FEEDING OF THESE PEOPLE COMMANDED A GOOD PROPORTION OF THE STAFFS OF BOTH CORDS AND THE GVN AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO FOR SOME TIME. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ADDED TO THE RECOVERY-REBUILDING EFFORT WHICH LIES AHEAD PROBABLY WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT. THE 1968 PACIFICATION EFFORT IN QUANG TRI.

THE SECOND ATTACK ON QUANG TRI CITY, WHICH, DURING THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF FEBRUARY, SEEMED INEVITABLE AND IMMINENT.

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---
# classification) fdlsscm controls

NOW SEEMS TO BE LESS OF A POSSIBILITY — AT umsr IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE ENEMY APPARENTLY COMMITTED THE BULK OF HIS AVAILABLE FORCES IN THIS AREA TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. WHEN THAT FAILED, HE SAW AN OPPORTUNITY IN HUE AND SHIFTED SOME FORCES, THE 8l2TH AND THE 95TH- TO THUA THIEN. IT DOES NOT NEW HE CAN REINFORCE HIS TROOPS IN AND AROUND HUE SOON ENOUGH. THE ENEMY DOES SEEM TO BE MOTIVATED HOWEVER, BY AN OVERWHELMING COMPULSION TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AND STARTLING VICTORY. HE THEREFORE MAY THROW GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD, GAMBLING ON WEAKENING OF OUR RESOLVE TO HOLD HUE. SOONER OR LATER THE ENEMY IS BOUND TO TIRE OF THE HUE STRUGGLE AND IN A LEMMING-LIKE FASHION DRIVE AT SOME OTHER TARGET FOR A QUICK PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY WHICH COULD BE A PRELUDE TO NEGOTIATIONS FAVORABLE TO THE NFLSV.

THE MOST OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY OPEN TO HIM IS AT KHE SANH. ALTHOUGH KHE SANH NO‘LONGER HAS ANY POLITICAL VALUE VIS-A-VIS THE GVN, IT HAS ASSUMED AN IMAGE GREATER THAN IT DESERVES IN,TERMS OF U.S. MILITARY PRESTIGE IN VIETNAM. IT IS STILL, THEN, A,LEGITIMATE TARGET IN HANOI'S EYES. THE ENEMY NO LONGER HAS THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE WORKING FOR HIM IN KHE SANH. HE MUST REALIZE THAT WHEN HE BEGINS HIS ASSAULT ON_KHE SANH HE WILL PROBABLY BE HIT ON THE &E€'R‘F['
---
# FLANKS AND REAR BY ELEMENTS OF TWO AIR-MOBILE U.S. DIVISIONS..q AND

MASSIVE AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS. AT KHE»SANH THE ENEMY ET‘ 'DOES HAVE SHORT SUPPLY LINES AND FAVORABLE TERRAIN. ‘TO TIP THE SCALES IN THE ENEMY'S FAVOR, HOWEVER, THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY BE 'FORCED TO USE TACTICAL AIR AS WELL AS ARMOR@ WHEN THIS HAPPENS (T THE ENEMY PROBABLY REALIZES HE WILL IN REALITY BE ESCALATING THE iWAR ANOTHER NOTCH. WHETHER HE IS READY AND WILLINQ TO DO SO IS @0PEN T0 QUESTION.

K E '=VL§R§¢;V¥¢VHNNH4E
---
# THE CHARACTER OF THE TET OFFENSIVE; HOWEVER? INDICATED

THAT THE ENEMY WAS MORE INTERESTED IN A QUICK END T0 THE WAR, NOT.

AN ESCALATION. THE MUCH-HERALDED SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS ON CITIES

AND TOWNS IN VIET NAM WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THE ENEMY TO BRING

OFF BECAUSE THE FIRST ATTACK WAS SO EXPENSIVE FOR HIM.

HE SUFFERED GRIEVOUS LOSSES IN MANPOWER AND SUPPLIES. GUERRILLAS AND CADRES WHO HELPED HIM IN ALL PHASES (LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND GUIDES) HAVE BEEN HURT. THE PEOPLE, SOME or WHOM WERE MueQNumPs BEFORE, HAVE HARDENED AGAINST HIS CYNICAL AND BLOODTHIRSTY VISAGE- AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE HOW THE ENEMY CAN REPEAT IN ACHIEVING TACTICAL SURPRISE. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WOULD PROBABLY SHOW THAT WHERE THE ENEMY DID NOT ACHIEVE THE ELEMENT ow SURPRISE, HE was SOUNDLY DEFEATED. THIS WAS THE DIFFERENCE IN QUANG TRI AT LEAST.

# ASSUMING THAT THE ENEMY STILL WANTS TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK IN OUANG TRI, MOST COMMANDERS FEEL THE ENEMY MUST EFFECTIVELY BLOCK ALLIED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY COMBAT ELEMENTS.

HE MAY STILL STRIVE FOR TACTICAL SURPRISE BY SACRIFICING.HIS UNDER-/STRENGTH BATTALIONS NOW IN QUANG TRI IN DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS ON BASES AND CITIES FROM THE REAR, WHILE THROWING IN FRESH
---
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classification:

THE ENEMY HAS TROOPS IN A MAIN EFFORT FROM THE NORTH AND WEST. THE CAPABILITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED AREAS ON ROUTE N-oi AND EASTWARD TO CUA VIET WITH ARTILLERY. A MASSIVE ARTILLERY SIEGE OF THESE BASES COUPLED WITH THE GROUND TACTICS MENTIONED ABOVE COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME BUT NOT NECESSARILY CATASTROPHIC.

THERE IS A DANGER IN VIEWING THIS CAMPAIGN IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TERMS. THE ENEMY ALREADY HAS FORCED THE ALLIES IN KHE SANH AND ALONG THE DMZ TO THINK IN TERMS OF "SET PIECE" BATTLES, AFTER FORCING THE ALLIES INTO MILITARY POSTURES FOR ENGAGEMENTS OF THIS SORT, THE ENEMY THEN REVERTED TO REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE WHICH HAS TO DO MORE WITH PEOPLE AND POLITICS THAN IT DOES WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE ENEMY STILL CONTINUES TO HOLD THE RD AREA OR A GOOD PART OF IT, HE HAS BEEN MUCH MORE ADEPT IN PROPAGANDIZING THE PEOPLE THAN THE ALLIES HAVE. HE HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE AMONG THE PEOPLE, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ALLIES HAVE OFTEN BEEN CONSTRAINED TO REMOVE THE PEOPLE AS REFUGEES. THIS TENDENCY IS VIEWED BY MANY AS PACIFICATION IN REVERSE, THE ENEMY'S GOAL IS HAVOC AND ANARCHY - TO ELIMINATE "OUR" SYSTEM IN ORDER TO SUBSTITUTE ONE OF HIS OWN. THE ENEMY NEEDS TO WRECK GVN HAMLET AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS, LAND-USE SYSTEMS, AND CULTURAL AND
---
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6-pa-

4

PAGE /3 pr _/guess _

ECONOMIC TAPROOTS. THE DELIBERATE GENERATION OF REFUGEES,0 - ES-'

PECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE GVN-ORIENTED IN THE MAIN, IS TANTAMOUNT TO Hf AN ADMISSION OF PACIFICATION BANKRUPTCY.

THE OUTLOOK IN OUANG TRI IS THAT ENEMY WILL RESIST_

VIGOROUSLY ALLIED EFFORTS TO PERMANENTLY REESTABLISH RD SECURITY.

HE WILL STEP UP HIS ATTACKS AGAINST BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNIF CATIONS AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY IF NOT AS A PRELUDE TO A SECOND OFFENSIVE.

HE WILL PROBABLY TRY TO HANG ONTO HUE ANQ/ OR THE ENVIRONS OF HUE. HE MAY IN DESPERATION TRY TO TAKE HHE SANH TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. WAR EFFORT. HAVING LOST FACE, AND WITH.

QRED CHINA'S BACKING AND URGING, THE ENEMY MAY BE HEEDLESS OF THE ESCALATION FACTOR. IF THAT IS THE CASE THE ALLIES HAVE A NEW FACTOR TO WORRY ABOUT.

REPORT CLASS N_o__E.ua-Ea-err1>'1“ssErYT\* SITUATION_APPRAISAL_OF_PO[15617909].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "CIA Field Station, Clandestine Services",
"What": "Intelligence information about post-VC-offensive problems in Quang Tri Province and anticipated enemy actions in South Vietnam, details on enemy's activities and motivations, ARVN and GVN responses, refugee problems, and propaganda efforts",
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Quang Tri Province", "Hue", "Khe Sanh", "Thua Thien"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists

16 November 196723
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768R I F!

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

s.5(¢)

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# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003029708 3-5(°)

UL',§-l:'.*UK11;'1'\

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence16 November 1967

# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists

A Monthly Report

# Contents

- I. Military Developments: which had been basedMajor elements of the North Vietnamese B-3 Front, in Cambodia since 1966, have moved to the Dak To area of South Vietnam (Para. l).
- Other B-3 Front elements have moved from their normal operating areas in Cambodia into South Vietnam (Para. 2).
- There is no evidence that Communist units involved in the attack on Loc Ninh in late October staged from the territory, although it is likely that Cambodian territory was useful in a supplementary role for the enemy's operation (Paras. 3-4).
- There are more reports of Communist medical and communications facilities in Cambodia (Paras. 5-6).
- Cambodia is establishing a number of new outposts in the northeast, possibly to control tribal dissidence rather than to counter the Communists (Paras. 7-9).

The Vietnamese Communists continue to obtain foodstuffs and other nonmilitary supplies from Cambodia (Para. ll).

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Clandestine Services.

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# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768

1. It procured ammunition in Cambodia, and his unit was based in Cambodia. The Cambodian border post promised his unit "tar fire support" if required during operations in South Vietnam (Paras. 12-15).

2. Political Developments:

- Prince Sihanouk again denies that Vietnamese Communist troops are based in Cambodia (Para. 20).
- Military operations warning of consequences of US belief that the Communists will win in South Vietnam (Paras. 21-22).
- Chou En-lai's most recent effort to improve Chinese-Cambodian relations receives favorable response from Sihanouk (Paras. 23-26).
---
|THAILAND|MEANCHEY|MONDOLKIRI|
|---|---|---|
|5D0k T0|RATA YAKIR|PHUGC LNB|
---
# Military Developments

# Communist Base Areas

1. During October, there was a northeastward movement of major elements of the North Vietnamese 66th – which are subordinate regiments – the 32nd and B-3 Front. Two of three NVA regiments to the Front, which apparently have been based in Cambodia since 1966, had relocated near the Dak To area of South Vietnam by late October. The third regiment, the 88th, was resubordinated in September and moved out of the border area of the highlands to Phuoc Long Province in South Vietnam.

2. Headquarters elements of the B-3 Front 1st Division also moved north from their normal operating area in Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia into the tri-border area. In addition, at least one element of the B-3 Front's 33rd Regiment moved eastward from Cambodia into South Vietnam's Darlac Province. This regiment has been located in South Vietnam during most of 1967.

3. Farther south, the headquarters and forward elements of the North Vietnamese 7th Division were located in Cambodia's Kompong Cham Province in early October, while units of the Viet Cong's 9th Light Infantry Division were located along the border in Kratie Province. There were, however, no indications of participating in the attack against Communist units that Loc Ninh in late October staged from Cambodian territory or took sanctuary there during the course of the battle.

4. Fighting at Loc Ninh and directed Cambodian border units to take precautionary defensive measures. In contrast with past practice, the Cambodians did not mention instances of Viet Cong intrusions across the border during the battle, or clearly state the posture that Cambodian forces were to maintain in the face of such border violations. The proximity of Loc Ninh to the border, however.
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the fact that the Communists have maintained medical facilities and have received foodstuffs and other supplies in this area, strongly suggest that Communist base areas often overlap the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.

|5.|A North Vietnamese recently, has described Communist facilities in Cambodia opposite southwestern Tay Ninh Province. He gave the location of a Viet Cong 300-man hospital and a hand-grenade factory on Cambodian territory and two Viet Cong broadcasting stations and a commo-liaison station along the border. He stated that at one time he had seen 250 North Vietnamese troops at the latter installation.|
|---|---|
|6.|The area in which these facilities are located is one long associated with heavy Communist use. Captured enemy documents reveal that one of the principal uses the Communists make of Cambodian territory is the location of medical facilities.|

This statement also underlines the extent to which Cambodian Communist base areas often overlap the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border.

Cambodia Increasing Border Forces

7.
Meanwhile, there are signs that Phnom Penh is making a greater effort to increase the government's presence in isolated areas of the northeast. A number of new border outposts have been recently established in Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri provinces along the South Vietnamese and Laotian borders. The Cambodian elements of Army's 23rd Battalion were being deployed to positions in the Ia Drang Valley. North Vietnamese troops have been active in the valley since late 1965, when a major battle was fought on the South Vietnamese side of the poorly defined border. Other small Cambodian military detachments are moving into sparsely populated areas.
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‘i11()P Eflkflihll s.5(¢

inhabited and rugged country north of Route l9 in Ratanakiri Province.

cated in areas of these new Cambodian posts are lo-8.Although known or suspected Communist ac-"

t" ‘ty,ivi ommunists.their immediate purpose is to counterthere is no in d‘ica iont" 3.3(h)(2)

E;;:%;::]that e 3.3(h)(2)

In ad‘ 3.3(h)(2)

eratingto the problem of Cambodia is now tribal dition on its territory,serious outbreak offaced withNorth Vietnamese regulars op- a fresh and potentially been re- dissidence there. ported, tribal and in one case surrounded and forcedpeople have mounted a number Although no clashes have of large demonstrations of a police outpost. The tribesmen the evacuation The tribesmen have been provincial years thatCommunistthethere haveposts by in- the establishment of additional food shortages andpro-demonstrating against security been reports been over thebrought under authorities. some of influence, it is notAlthough montagnard tribes have spired.whether the current dissidents, however, did clear dissidence is Communist Some of the visit—-a line which the Com-tribal munists have Kennedy's other areas of Cambodia. protest Mrs. pushed in

l0. Phnom Penh is also showing some sensitivity to possible The Cambodian press reporting that USAllied intelligence agency on 7 Novemberoperations in the northeast. cited were placing sources" in forces"journalistic small teams in Ratanakiri the“Viet Cong" forces and to layProv- ince to seek out US "invasion." groundwork for a 3;xhX2)

[:::::::::::] Cambodian border units have been possiblein- US cross-border is also onevigilance against of heli- structed to copters. There operations unconfirmed report thatincrease their involving the use three South Vietnamese soldiers who allegedly par-The ticipated in such which Phnom however, suggests thatoperations have has thus far Penhbeen captured.ac- low—key corded the alleged it lacks hard evidence of any attention operations,such activities.

5 s.5(¢)

TO CRET 3-5<¢>

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# Supply Activity

The Communists are continuing to procure substantial amounts of foodstuffs and other non-military supplies from Cambodia. In September, a large number of boats were moving foodstuffs and medical supplies for North Vietnamese forces in Laos. Although some lengthy disruptions have been reported, the level of traffic on the river so far this year appears to be similar to that observed in 1966.

Meanwhile, supplies are also being transported along the South Vietnamese border, despite some Cambodian efforts to curtail this illicit flow.

A combat unit has given an account of its involvement in Cambodian territory and supply operations. The unit transported ammunition from a cache on the Mekong River a mile inside Cambodia to a transfer area, also within Cambodia. Another unit relayed the ammunition to the Seven Mountains area of South Vietnam's Chau Province. The ammunition, mostly of Chinese Communist origin, was for 60-mm. mortars, B-40 rocket launchers, and small arms.

The source did not explain how the ammunition arrived at the Mekong pickup point, but he said that the Viet Cong did not use the Mekong as a north-south transportation route. They crossed the Mekong only at night, as required by the Cambodians to avoid "diplomatic embarrassment." He claimed that Cambodian civilians feared the presence of the Viet Cong because of the danger of hostilities developing in the area. The Viet Cong did, however, enjoy compatible relations with Cambodian military personnel. There were no restrictions on the Viet Cong other than the regulation to move supplies only at night.

It was noted that his unit supported the Viet Cong last March in an attack on an Allied post across the border to Cambodia. The battalion later retreated in South Vietnam.
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|TOP SECRET|5|
|---|---|
|with the dead and wounded, and remained there to "prepare for future operations." the Viet Cong with a Cambodian border post provided He claimed that small amounts of recoilless rifle ammunition during the attack and that the Cambodians assured them of "mortar fire support" if needed.| |
|15. The area of the Communists for sanctuary and has 3.3(h)(2) long been used byments is at variance with captured Viet Cong ever, which specifically prohibit Viet Cong units supply. Efilrlaccount of the battle, docu-how- from crossing the border with weapons or conducting assaults from Cambodian territory. 3.3(h)(2) armed Viet Cong units found in Cambodia would not be allowed to remain. The source's account of Cambodian soldiers providing small amounts of Viet Cong tion may be true. It is doubtful that the ammunition were given a broad guarantee of Cambodian mortar support, or that instances of fire support are common along the border. evidence that the use of Cam- ever, provide further The rallier's statements, however, provide further bodian territory by Communists is often determined by the extent of friendly relations with local officials.| |
|TOP SECRET|5|

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‘,9 TOP                     ET                                       s.5(¢

3.3(h)(2)

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# Political Developments

20. Prince Sihanouk took advantage of the presence of a large Contingent of Western newsmen in Phnom Penh in early November to reiterate denials that Vietnamese Communist troops are based in Cambodia. As he has in the past when affecting a posture, Sihanouk admitted that it was possible that "small numbers" of Communist troops may occasionally pass through Cambodian territory. He asserted that when such troops are encountered by Cambodian patrols they are asked to return to South Vietnam. He also offered the newsmen government transportation to the northeast to "see for themselves" if North Vietnamese "divisions" are in Cambodia or whether the "Sihanouk trail" is being used.

21. Sihanouk did go farther than he has in the past to warn of the possible consequences of US military operations in Cambodia. He stated that Cambodia would resist any effort by the US to occupy territory along the border to prevent the Viet Cong from taking refuge there. He warned that such action would only serve Communists and Communist hands of the Vietnamese China.

22. Sihanouk also indicated that he still believes the Communists are going to prevail in South Vietnam. His reference to a US withdrawal within two years, however, does not jibe with his previous assertions that the US would not be driven from South Vietnam. He was also forced to admit that a Communist take-over in South Vietnam did bode well for Cambodia's future.

# Cambodia's Relations with Communist China

23. Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest effort to ease its relations with Cambodia. Sihanouk announced on 1 November that he had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai calling for the "re-establishment of sincere friendship" between the two countries. According to Sihanouk:
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Chou acknowledged Sihanouk's leadership of the Cambodian people and reaffirmed China's adherence to the "Bandung principle" of nonintervention in Cambodia's internal affairs. Sihanouk has charged repeatedly activities in Cambodia over the past several months that amounted to repudiation of these "principles." The Chinese premier's message, which appears to be a more artful version of one Chou sent in mid-September which caused Sihanouk to reverse a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking.

In response to the latest message, anti-Sihanouk stated his willingness to terminate Peking propaganda and accept a "complete reconciliation." Subsequently, he also called off a referendum he had previously intended as a vote of confidence in Sihanouk's government and, as such, would have been embarrassing for the pro-Peking leftists who have called for a change in Sihanouk's policies.

The Prince has also stated, however, that a real reconciliation will depend entirely on the cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. Thus, continued dissemination of Communist propaganda throughout the country, and a reported renewal of small-scale Communist dissident activity, could prove to be persistent irritants in Cambodia's relations with China. Nevertheless, although Sihanouk recently voiced his suspicion that Peking will continue to maintain at least a facade of discreet support of Cambodia's pro-Communists, to underline his desire to maintain relations.
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768
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                                            s.5(¢
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768  3 5(C

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029768 "CAMBODIA AND THE VIETNAME[15602369].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Military and Political Developments in Cambodia and the Vietnamese Communists, Supply Activities, Communist Base Areas, Cambodia's Relations with Communist China",
"When": "16 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cambodia", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "Thailand", "Mondolkiri Province", "Ratanakiri Province", "Phnom Penh", "Chau Province", "Ia Drang Valley", "Darlac Province", "Kompong Cham Province", "Kratie Province", "Tay Ninh Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}