Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area

Intelligence Memorandum

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area

February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C011656-70
---
# WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws: Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

3.5(c)
---
CENTRAL Directorate INTELLIGENCE AGENCY of Intelligence AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

February 1968

# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area

Summary

The deployment of more than 22,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops in the Khe Sanh area has been paralleled by a rapid acceleration of enemy logistic point construction and activities to offensive operations. The construction of resupply facilities from two new roads from Laos to the Khe Sanh area will facilitate the enemy's positions and weapons emplacements. These emplacements in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh appear to be well fortified and will be extremely difficult to neutralize, providing the enemy with an improved capability to defend the area and interdict friendly movement.

Information on logistic operations during the past five months indicates a sharp increase in supplies moved into the area. The estimated traffic has been more than adequate to meet the hate.

Note: This memorandum was prepared jointly by the Vietnamese Affairs Staff and the CIA. It should be read in conjunction with the Current Intelligence Enemy Threat to Khe Sanh memo of 2 February 1968.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670

The ammunition, logistic requirements greatly intensified these forces, particularly rates of combat come to 20 tons by 60-90 days. There is no reason to doubt that the daily Communist rear estimated units can service both the 35 and tons at Khe Sanh in the north-central DMZ area under heavy conditions.
---
# New Road Construction

Aerial photography has revealed two new roads near Ban Dong in Laos. These roads converge in the Khe Sanh area. One road is from Vietnam to the north and the other from the south and southwest. Work on both roads has progressed to the Laos-South Vietnam border. This new road network significantly increases the logistic capability of North Vietnamese forces near the DMZ.

This new capability reflects the intensive nature of enemy preparations for major operations in the Khe Sanh area. The North Vietnamese have gained the use of Route 9, which had been blocked by Communists since late January. Large storage bunkers and numerous strikes have been detected in the area.

# Supply Depots

The Vietnamese have established numerous new depots and distribution points to support combat preparations. A series of storage depots or way stations have been established across the border zone, about 10 to 15 miles from the Laos panhandle. Additional storage areas have been detected near the eastern terminus of the southernmost Laos border.

Recent developments preclude estimating the main US capacity at Khe Sanh, but the facilities appear to be extensive.
---
# Fortifications

Fortifications emplacements, northwest heavy construction to and large strongpoints. Khe of those built in foxholes.

There are indications from recent entrenchments, fortifications bunkers, and strongpoints. Khe Sanh of Vietnam.

Large quadrant indications ranging from recent weapons. Some of Sanh groups had been under heavy Communist pressure in May and some in April 1967. One Vietnamese regiment that has remained in these positions since then may have maintained recent usable condition.

More construction includes a large number of points in the southeast positions and large mass of bunkers, entrenchments, south of Khe Route Sanh have been built to extend westward.

Other fortifications and entrenchment activity has also been observed north of Route 99 along the main hills and ridges west and southwest of the US base.

Photography taken in late January shows several large hut groups within and unoccupied foxholes on the main base.

Forces are to encircle prepared activities US to defend the suggest completely areas that are the assembly to now siege Communist, to extend now their positions progressively closer to ours in siege fashion, and to prepare in mounted advance areas from which subsequently assaults can be mounted. If these positions are subsequently connected by communications trenches, airfield to Communists of fire from the battlefield will be able to maneuver their forces under cover from one portion of friendly battlefield. They would also be able to block Communist techniques on similar movement from the main base at to the northwest outlying US. These techniques are similar positions are on the hills siege those to the employed by the Communists in their prolonged siege campaign at Dien Bien Phu.
---
# Location of Mortar and Rocket Sites

Sanh37.are TheThe rangesareThe The37. representativedrawn various shown selected weapons of many sites~shownfiiniFigureg'Qifffuf;_ i" sites such map sites in the Sanh area. the which weapons of to approximates indiCate; ;;Kherepresentative many suchmap sites in the Sanh area.the whichcircles drawn on various types indicate on the map ranges on fired on from base. weapons organic include _These-include of some types weapons can be (82-mm.Ut¥~3__fl._ mortars) The 75-mm. in range are which which are area organic-to approximates is enemy infantry the Units. the units. _f. ;1_

The 120-mm. pack lZO-mm. in range howitzers also mortar ring also range ;Qfqp" o:E of 75—mm. pack howitzers the Thewhich which the mortar the enemy believed mates to have the the the area. of the'The l60—mm.Khe-Sanh. have approxi-' 122—mm. at 160-mm. rockets mortar which ring approxi;fi_;11 ring the the Com—_; munists have already employed 37-mm.Khe 37—mm. which Sanh.have at · Thus 'Thus faryfa‘ a:ntiaircraft detected only positions positions for weapons weapOns been d,etected rear depot 152—mm. northeast-of the observed-Withinil,500ui;-only areas. positions at positions Positions been Positionshave of for from which from for 12.7—mm.-antiaircraftp~~37§ 12.7-mm. they antiaircraft can protect; machine north meters for guns, and 152-mm. northeast however, have been weapons airfield. the observed been airfield.',EmplaCee'éflbeenEmplace-within 1,500 ments artillery weapons of have detected-f at distances outpoststhese beyond maximum emplacements airfield US range of the main reach although the some of weapons outposts these in northwest emplacements airfieldVeiof to the could reachi',7j 1rf___-Jand Special Forces camp at Lang Vei to the west. ments.8. positions to of enemy vulnerable Prcifiles It is evident that of interdiction enemy Khe the from a these known the terrain Khe the from to straight Sanh terrain and known terrain a features n and gui in in-a these base straight and features airfield linei“hm~32+” line emplace- emplacefj7_ _and offf·€;.,yIN-,§_] _ from Khe the each Sanh has runway to fire, attack. nearly air. are . indicated indicated runway enemy that shew show that position of in nearly to and every the eVEIY-CaSefgfl center case of the from enemy vulnerable advantage although There pesitions has the advantage although. the of cover the cover. and positions concealment concealment friendly ground fire. little may be more vulnerable to air attack. .There. is there is doubt which that cannot for every be detected location noted the noted from the there are air. many "WV

# The Logistic Build-up

9. Khe The deployment of deployment was upwardsthan 12,500 and of more more than 22;00§_NVAttroOPSi§eif_: 22,000 in NVA troops#2 in the Sanh area area logistic the of and upwardS'of“12.500 ain rapid·the fiw the ig~~= north—central of acceleration operations acceleration of DMZ enemy enemy area logistic the was accomplished activities. by by agIntelligence Intelligencerapid- E;;j,-:u on cm logistic operations during the during the were an five past past fiVe months 120~calso else-[y :Lndicates into a the sharp sharp increase increase in January in January the volume estimated volume-cfof supplies supplies ;_ _ moved of moved tons t°ns 0f supplies or area. more area. or more During During per day were an moved moved. thr0ughuthe g,g; gestimatedtlZOffgpy,_through the
---
# Laos</h10>
|Laos panhandle|twice from North Vietnam.|
|---|---|
|This volume is more than needed from North Vietnam.| |

Supplies normally needed from North Vietnam are substantial in Laos and South Vietnam. In addition, substantial amounts of ammunition traffic are moved directly to the DMZ 60590 area, providing adequate support for combat at intensified rates.

Traffic through the Laos Panhandle has significantly increased during the last five months compared to the past. The volume of supplies moved into the Laos panhandle from North Vietnam during this period has been estimated to provide stockpiles sufficient for rates of 60-90 days of combat at intensified rates.

Increases in traffic deployment of supplies and troops destined for Khe Sanh have closely paralleled the heavy deployment of forces along the border in Laos.

According to reports, truck traffic in Laos has significantly increased, with trucks moving towards Laos averaging about 17 per day. These trucks could have delivered over 5,000 tons of supplies to Communist-held forces in Laos during this period.

Roadwatch reports are not available for Routes 137/912 from North Vietnam. Aerial reconnaissance over this route reveals a substantial increase in activity in 1967, although there is no way to quantify the tonnage moved. The tonnage moved on Routes 137/912 could have been more than the tonnage moved on Route 15.

Moreover, truck aerial reconnaissance reports show considerable activity on Route 911 and Route 9, which could indicate operations for supplies.

Estimates for losses in transit and due to air losses are also included.
---
# two~~-~ branch

lead Routeto lead to the the thethetwoborder new néw roads Scuth roadsSouththat that now new branch off off from fromiy ..JU;'. Route 99 to border Of of Vietnam in the the direca tion southaofKhe level southoflow observedindicating in in ofKheSanh. Sanh. of Roadwatch Roadwatch teams on_Routes teams consistently and consistently_re+re-96 port a of discharged9,the truck lowfirst9,their increase reconnaissance level cf_truck traffic on Routes 92 may 927and396;ffgt'f;i indicating_thatthatthemost trucks trucksofmay, haveFurthermore, theirincrease_in 9. discharged the loads loads aerial 1967.truckin truck_traffioiin_-vicinity vicinity_oiouterii‘-traffic Route in this afterarea this area °bserV6d by bY.aerial-reconnaissanceqbegan'13?;ufii;began J‘" after the first of'Novemberj1967;'¢_~ Traffic to the DMZ Area' : I I'd ._ 13.13. 1 _believedmovement _ 3.3(h)(2)

K: continuedDMZbelievedmovementlevel units :JtheIthe to highlocatedin be located injustof of amNUnition ammunitionjust northto to .orf"'" _ Communist the south continuedDMZ of units reached reached jtohigh and a be level NoVember-'or Novembernorth

and high high in in December December it is and.January;;estimated e'S”tI‘LIm=1L*~--e<.iJanuary.that that at“ ,i ** 3.3(h)(2) least of leastof area 500 500 tons DMZof DMZofinammunition inammunition_were it-iswe+e aboutshipped aboutshipped'to_thef7to in the area the Nevember, lowerJanuary.De-420 420-tonstons in Des =f ej9V¥ = cember, camber,forandand aboutmonths 250 250.tens_duringr1922=JanuarYa rtons during 1-22 Data for earlier months show show muchmush'lower.volume5, volumes, 1“ -‘_3£t2)3.3(h)(2)j thirds thirds lery 14. of During November 14.ofDuringammunition. the second.Shipments identified identifiedNoVember ,Shipments-of:antiaircraftgammuniéW.¢<1and and_December“nearlYLtwofeff*ffw, tonnage tonnage small antiaircraft of December shipped shippedtherewasammuni-gqif "nearly was twoartil- artile,"] tion tion ranked cannot_be rankedcannot second,--The-small explained,shipments explained,shipmentsidentified_a The thereof ofismortarmortar ammunition ammunitionunidentified be but .The tabulation:large_gJis_aglargejfp1 a volume volume of of unidentified ammunition. shipments shipments are are shoWn_in shown in thethe follOWing'tabulation:, .. .._.

Short T¢hsi-.-»»—fTons
November1967{December}
NOVembEr.'1967,.__._ DecemberF? _

Total ((rounded) rounded) _ 'ffi . :f_ 500 500 _ “420o."I420 -v—-vw-u

|Artillery|(152 and 122 mm.,|320'|""'|“uh—.—|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Artillery|(152 antitank)antitank)mm.,and 122|320;|' .,-;_240 ff"|.,___u...|
|Antiaircraft|12.7 (100,-85,mm.)|57,._-|41|HeiS3 5 tH5 __..—|
|Antiaircraft|37, and 12.7 mm.)|41|83| |
|Mortar|(82 mm.)| |240|-.\|
|Rocket|(140rifle mm.) (122.4a‘_|7|°1 ;;o,'.1”“0| |
|Recoilless mm.)and 82| | | |3|3|
|Explosives, unidentified grenades, mines,|120 =I.j*T '_94:f ff;*f| | | |

-7-

3.5(c)I
---
# Logistic Requirements for Communist Forces

15. Communist forces currently deployed in pe area of Khe Sanh would require:
- 37 tons of supplies per day under sustained heavy combat conditions.
- Actual daily resupply would depend on consumption rates and regimental requirements.
- The 325C regiments and pe 304p NVA artillery are likely to receive support from Laos.
- The forces in pe area of Khe Sanh would probably receive peir supplies from Laos.

16. In addition to pese forces, Vietnamese infantry regiments have been deployed to harass pe Norp Vietnamese Division in pe DMZ.
- The 320p Division is likely to receive reinforcements from pe central area.
- Moving peir logistic requirements from east to west toward Khe Sanh would be relatively less pan pose in pe Khe Sanh area.
- The 320p Division forces probably receive peir supplies from across pe DMZ.

17. Since pe deployment of pese forces in pe Khe Sanh and DMZ areas, Communist forces probably began stockpiling weapons, ammunition, and equipment by mid-November.
- Wip estimated traffic flow of 60 days, pe Communists have a daily resupply capability to maintain peir stockpiles.
- The infantry battalions and pe two AAA battalions are given a higher combat rate pan pe artillery battalions.

*The rates of combat used by MACV as representative of the 1967 campaigns.
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670|
|---|
|Routes|.9221v|
|Muqnwhiré| |
|69504|2-68 CIA|
|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670| |
|Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670| |
---
ENEMY POSITIONS AROUND KHE SANH - BASE
Harv.
---
#

Approved

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670fer Release 2019/01/17 C01165670

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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C01165670 Approved fer Release 2019/01/17 CO1-16567.0 "CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTIC[15561281].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, CENTRAL Intelligence AGENCY",
"What": "Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area, Deployment of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, Enemy logistic point construction and activities, Resupply facilities construction, Fortifications emplacements, Location of mortar and rocket sites, Logistic Build-up, Truck traffic in Laos, Logistic Requirements for Communist Forces",
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["Khe Sanh Area", "Laos", "South Vietnam", "DMZ area", "Vietnam", "Ban Dong", "Lang Vei"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207

The Situation in Vietnam

To:

15 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 006752207

Information as of 1600 15 December 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

Chinese fighters were conducting low-altitude bombing exercises near the North Vietnamese border on 11 and 12 December.

# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

North Vietnamese artillery units in the DMZ area are experiencing difficulties due to rains. Action in the ground war was relatively light on 14-15 December.

# Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Quang Nam San, a member of the Lower House from Bui Quang Province, was assassinated on 14 December by two unknown persons. The Lower House is upset by the impending trial of 26 struggle-leaders, calling for either a postponement or a complete strike for 18 December. The Electrical Workers' Union is threatening a strike if its demands for increased benefits are not met.

# Military Developments in North Vietnam:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# Other Communist Military Developments:

Chinese troops have lived in North Vietnam for a number of years. Spanish refugees have reported on the activities of Chinese troops there.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
# Communist Political Developments:

Chinese residents of North Vietnam who have fled to China apparently are causing some concern to Peking (Paras; 3-5).

15 December 1967
---
# SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

# MILITARY

North Vietnamese artillery units in the area of the Demilitarized Zone are experiencing difficulties as a result of heavy winter rains. The rains, however, have not prevented the sporadic firing of 287 rounds on 14 December.

Ground Action

Action in the ground war was light on 14-15 December. The US Americal Division of Da Nang continues to report sporadic enemy resistance south of the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province border area. A notebook captured recently in this region reveals that the North Vietnamese 2nd Division has been ordered to launch an offensive prior to the Christmas truce period. This is unusual in view of the heavy losses suffered by this unit during the past four months. The document itself notes that the division failed to achieve its 1967 autumn campaign objectives.

15 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06_752207

In Binh Dinh Province during pe early morning Vietnamese Popular Force company was overrun by an enemy company. At first light US and Soup Vietnamese reinforcements were moved into pe area and fighting continued proughout pe day. The enemy force wipdrew at dusk. Allied losses were 21 killed and 22 wounded (ten US).
Enemy losses were put at 55 dead (pree US).

# 15 December 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Lower House deputy Bui Quan San from Quang Nam Province was killed on the evening of 14 December by in Saigon is that the killing may have been the result of a squabble within the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) or a Viet Cong terrorist act; There is substance for the former belief. San was involved in a factional dispute and switched allegiance within the party. His "second wife," who apparently saw the murderers, reported that they had familiar faces and spoke the patois of Quang Nam.

2. Some elements in the Lower House have already seized on the killing to flay the government for not providing protection to National Assembly members. Their complaints were cut off by interim Lower House Chairman Nguyen Ba Luong who counseled that judgment should be reserved until the official investigation is completed. Luong also reported that an assassination note was found pinned to San's chest, but that its contents had not been disclosed. Western press reports, however, claim that the note accused San of wife-stealing, torturing civilians, and having a son working for US intelligence. Under the constitution, a special election must be held within three months to fill the vacancy left by San's death.

3. The Lower House during its 13 and 14 December sessions devoted lengthy debate to the for pending trial of 26 struggle movement leaders im- treason. Placed on the agenda because of a petition signed by 70 deputies, the subject evoked considerable protest, and it was eventually decided in that the house should "make known its attitude" opposition to the trial. A decision on the exact form of any action was deferred until the 15 December session.

4. Deputy Nguyen Dai Bang of Hue started off of the discussion by reading a letter from relatives the defendants claiming that the struggle had been for legitimate purposes and that it had, in fact, resulted in the establishment of the present government.

15 December 19.1
---
Characterizing the trial as an act of revenge against genuine nationalists, Bang said that he personally intended to write letters to President Thieu, the chairmen of both houses of the National Assembly, and the president of the Third Military Field Court conveying the views of the defendants' families.

Another deputy, Nguyen Ngoc Nghia of Thua Thien, argued that it was not the 26 defendants who had led the struggle, but rather the monks who issued the orders. He asked rhetorically why the monks themselves were not put on trial--a line also taken by militant Buddhist Thich Thien Hoa, a leading participant in the struggle, in a communiqué issued on 13 December.

Those deputies who favored proceeding with the trial spoke cautiously, and the majority appeared strongly in favor of some sort of leniency, if not cancellation of the trial and release of the defendants. The two alternatives placed before the house for later consideration at its 15 December session were the immediate release of the prisoners or the establishment of a special committee to draft an amnesty law covering political prisoners arrested since 1 November 1963. If the latter alternative is adopted, the Lower House would request that the trial be postponed during the drafting process. The Upper House has already decided to drafting process resolution, and Senator Tran Van Don recently told Vietnam Press that the Senate would definitely send a letter to the President requesting postponement of the trial.

As part of its other business during the 13 and 14 December sessions, the Lower House also decided to establish 14 permanent committees. Deputy Ho Huu Tuong attempted to have a committee on foreigners' affairs established to examine violations of Vietnamese sovereignty by foreigners, but his proposal received the support of only five deputies. The majority felt that the judiciary and interior committees could handle such cases.

In connection with the legislature's challenge of the mobilization decree, the government will send a delegation to answer questions at the morning session of the Lower House on 18 December and the afternoon session of the Upper House. The government representatives will include Defense Minister Vy, Minister for Legislative Liaison Tuong, and Undersecretary for University and Technical Education Cung. The Lower House session probably will be closed, while the Upper House will probably open its session to the public.

15 December 1967
---
# Possible Electrical Workers' Strike

9. The Electrical Workers' Union has threatened a strike to begin on 18 December. The Compagnie des Eaux et d'Electricite, a French-owned public utility, does not meet its demands for severance pay, an extra month's salary, a 15-percent cost of living allowance, and a 1,000-piaster Tet bonus. The unions are retroactively asking for these benefits, with the company turning its operations over to the government and all payments to be made by 31 December. The company intends to give the workers severance pay and Tet bonuses, but any increase in the cost of living allowance must be discussed with the Ministry of Public Works after 31 December.

10. Vo Van Tai, general secretary of the Saigon Council of Unions, stated that the council will provide moral and financial support if a strike occurs. He believes there will not be a strike as the minister of labor has not taken any action to mediate the dispute or address the workers' concerns.

11. Tran Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, has urged Prime Minister Loc to take action on the issue. The strike agenda was placed on the Council meeting for 14 December, affecting not only Saigon but also other cities where affiliated French companies have installations. The union has agreed to stagger power outages so that all areas will not be completely cut off.

15 December 1967
---
# III.   NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1.  There is nothing of significance to report.

15 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Chinese Activity in Norp Vietnam
Several of pe recent Spanish repatriates from Norp Vietnam have told of pe activities of Chinese Communist engineer and antiaircraft troops in Norp Vietnam. Their reports give a detailed picture of pe Chinese activities.
Some of pe refugees described in detail pe personal appearance and movements on truck and foot, bivouac areas of pe Chinese. In performing pe tasks, pe Chinese were mainly involved in construction and antiaircraft tasks.

15 December 1967
---
# 6. The Spaniards described Chinese troops manning AAA guns and repairing bridges and railroads at Lang Son, Lao Chai, and other areas in northern North Vietnam.

Said that Chinese engineers were building a huge airfield near Yen Bai, and a "strategic" road from Lao Cai through Yen Bai to Son Tay

3.3(h)(2)

# 7. According to the Spaniards' reports, Chinese troops were billeted in tents and caves near Chi Ne, about 35 miles south of Hanoi.

Some of the caves were used for AAA guns. The guns were controlled electrically and moved on tracks to the cave entrances when planes appeared.

3.3(h)(2)

# 8. The refugees probably reflected the claim-feelings of many of their Vietnamese neighbors in feeling that, in effect, the Chinese had "taken over" certain areas.

All the refugees noted, however, that an official North Vietnamese presence was maintained in all regions where numerous Chinese were observed, and none said the Chinese exercised any control over the population or attempted to disseminate Maoist propaganda.

Some of the Spaniards indicated the unhappiness and uneasiness of the Vietnamese because of the many Chinese, but there were no reports of serious friction or any actions by resentment. The Chinese which might arouse popular

15 December 1967
---
# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Chinese Refugees From North Vietnam avoid the war are apparently causing Chinese who have fled North some concern to Peking. According to a Red Guard publication, Chou En-lai told a group of Red Guards on 14 November that among the people causing trouble in Canton were those who have fled from Vietnam. The Chinese premier asserted that air attacks, although actually fled from fear of US, not study Chairman Mao's left because they could they were claiming they thought in North Vietnam.

Chou admitted that there was revisionism in both China and North Vietnam but pointed out that this was not the real reason for the refugee's flight. He minimized the importance of revisionism.

Date: 15 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 0067522073-5(9)

(.

TOP,SECRET M 35¢:>

in North Vietnam, asserting that the major preoccupation there was fighting the US.

Chou's comments suggest that Peking finds the refugees unwelcome. They spread stories detrimental to feedto Sino-Vietnamese relations and are extra mouths

15 December 1967

V-2

s.5(¢

E?/SECRET s.5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 006752207

To cret

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.

T ecret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752207 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [15602379].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Military Personnel, Political Figures, Red Guard",
"What": "Military and Political Developments in Vietnam, Chinese Activity in North Vietnam, Strike Threat by Electrical Workers' Union",
"When": "15 December 1967",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Saigon", "Binh Dinh Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Quang Tin Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542

SNIE

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United States

APPYUYHI FUR RHUSE

um: .3.£.E!§=eL’.§.L.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this document:

- The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring:

- Vice Adm. Rufin Taylor, the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
- Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- U. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- U. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

- Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission
- Mr. William O. Gregg, for the Acting Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING:

This material contains information concerning the
national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR

# CONCLUSIONS

A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 56,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. We do not think that the RLG could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, Le4%chz?>\?|5rovolce US entry into the Laotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communists to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla forces, to strengthen their bargaining position. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be halted as a prerequisite to discussions of an internal settlement that must be based on "the realities of the current situation."

C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter Hanoi's intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further reinforcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi's calculations concerning Laos, in general, we believe that the Communists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction.

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542

DISCUSSION

1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provoking a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory.

2. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with military factors operating on the RLG and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side.

3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Jarres Agreements, which established a tripartite government - rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the Communists are developing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. Moreover, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have demanded that the internal settlement must take into account "the realities of the current situation."

5. PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such 'realities' mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and one-half the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvanna no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present government is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying the groundwork to claim a larger role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction.

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6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrangement, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a "permanent feature" of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the N00 Lao Halt Xat (NL.HX) spokesman in Vientiane.

The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage.

7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political indoctrination programs. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying to consolidate their hold over the rice-rich Se-done Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been attached to the Communist administration for the first time.

8. By the fall of 1967, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962. The Communists finally responded by turning an RLC offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Communists administered a series of defeats to the RLC government setback since the precarious days of which added up to the worst. The psychological impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.

9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted themselves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than heretofore. RLC forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the Se: ccnter spread maps.

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542

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10. 'l‘lnn\e tlt"-t-luprm'|tt.~. in tlt-;- |mlit;tr>' ztnrl political fields. seent to form part of :1 pattern related III large part to Cornniuni.\t strategy in South Vii,-tntun. In i71VItKt(‘\I3Z7\7tVl7tt8 that 1963 would he 1| “<leei~.i\'e" plntse in Vietnam, Hanoi rnoved to wage,» wincre:Tst- it; logiatie ezlpuliilitit-s in Laos, Strengthen its forces there, rL“C0ver km 'm,t‘nt$ they have set the stage for demanding ground, and set bnelt and rli-moralizc RLC  a new And in their recent state-forces.settlement on more favor-able f£‘fTDS shouid the situation in South Vietnam move into Serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed :1 stronger military position while at the same tirneithey are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into g _m__Qrg active political phase in Laos.

12. PL and FAR troops are probably  or battalions, and man for man theabout evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, however, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat.f This however success_ 7as the 7RUwith effectiveV  en]oy d *51 since 1962 is due largely to the air support use of friendly guerrilla forces.

13. For several years, Souvztnna and other RLC leaders, includirg the military of NVA troops, RLC forces felt that if it were not for the presence eoultl prohzthly q\ti(‘kl.v tlirsprrw of the Pl. threat. ln our view, this is proliablv tn0 Optirnintic. Although in term}; of present _\treng_th\" on lmtlt aides. flu_\-ul

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# Lao Communist Forces

Outnumber those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions.

While the Royal Lao Government (RLG) Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the enemy it confronts, we also believe that the RLG forces could almost certainly contain them.

In northern Laos, the RLG forces could probably not reduce Pathet Lao forces and territory very rapidly--if at all--without substantial outside logistical and air support.

We estimate that the Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Army (PL/NVA) forces in Laos have the military capability to reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do so without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North.

We do not think that RLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

# Communist Intentions

There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun most of Laos.

They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. As long as the outcome in Vietnam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new political settlement there had been tested.

We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on the RLG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, they will probably make a considerable effort to reduce the number of guerrilla sites and consolidate their claims.

They will also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the south, they will constitute the threat to the Mekong from Thakhel to Champassak Province.

They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs and protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor.
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17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotiations on better terms.

18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi’s calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi's policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them.

19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military campaign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control.

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542

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Approved for Release 2019/04/04 C00011542 "COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AN[15604018].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": ["Central Intelligence Agency", "Department of State", "Department of Defense", "NSA"],
"What": ["Communist capabilities and intentions in Laos", "Military pressures in Laos", "Political strategies", "Intelligence findings"],
"When": "2019/04/04",
"Where": ["Laos", "South Vietnam", "Geneva", "Vietnam", "Vientiane", "North Vietnam", "Savannakhet Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:

---

---

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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634

TOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2)

Walt Rostow said is the most promising way if we are establishment of confidence serious. The key to is the with Thieu about this type of dialogue. The President said there are four areas for immediate attention. The first is the expediting of additional troops to Vietnam. The second is the equipping of the South Vietnamese army with the best equipment. Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working on this presently.

The third area was the placement of B52's in Thailand. Secretary Rusk said he would discuss this with Ambassador Unger. The United States wants to place 25 rather than 50 B52's in Thailand.

The fourth area is the need for additional road money. Secretary McNamara said he would try to get this.

The President asked what would United States policy be on the proposal pointed out that the Viet Cong had added of pauses over the holidays. He to the number of days. Secretary Rusk said that the government should announce an offer to meet Hanoi about extending the truce. As before, he does not expect that they will meet with us.

General Wheeler said that the U.S. Troops have rules of engagement which will protect our supplies just north of the DMZ troops. He pointed out that last Tet North Vietnam moved 23,000 tons of.

General Wheeler said we must assume they will do everything possible to take maximum advantage of these pauses.

The President said, "We should announce what we are going to do and then let them have it" if they violate the truce. "We have been too tolerant of these people."

Bob Komer asked about the possibility of a reciprocal military standdown. General Wheeler said we cannot do it.

The President said we make an agreement and stand by it; They make an agreement and break it:

TOP SECRET

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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634

The President asked why we are so silent about the Cambodian particularly in light of recent press reports about base camps along the Cambodian border.

Secretary Rusk said that Prince Sihanouk has invited 20 newsmen to visit Cambodia and is also writing the United Nations on this matter good opportunity to invite the United Nations to act on this matter of Cambodia being used as a sanctuary. The Secretary said this will provide for North Vietnamese troops.

The President said he was tired of Sihanouk's actions.

Secretary McNamara said we need to surface more information about Cambodia.

General Westmoreland explained that his men had tipped off the two discussed in the press this morning: United States newsmen about the location of the camp which had been the thing on which "This is the one we can get cooperation from the Saigon press.

The President said we should get Ambassador Goldberg to deliver some speeches on this.

The President asked about recommendations for operations inside Laos.

General Westmoreland said he was anxious to initiate action in base pointed out that the missiles that hit Da Nang came area 607. He said this action would require two Vietnamese battalions through this base area and raid of three to four days.

Ambassador Bunker said he was anxious to see this act taken. "80% of their supplies come through Laos. To give them free hand is Suicidal."

General Wheeler said over the past 12-18 months the enemy has built truck road through this area. He said the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that within the next 60 to 90 days General Westmoreland should be authorized to initiate action in this area.

The President asked about the increase in the number of planes lost. beginning to agree with Bob McNamara that it does not appear the targets are worth the loss in planes.

# TOP SECRET

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634

General Wheeler explained that the North Vietnamese have changed their tactics in barrage pattern. The MIGS have developed firing Sams. He said the United States forces are going to have to vary the pattern of attack. The President emphasized "the clock is ticking opposition in this country." The bombing arouses so much opposition. Get the targets.

In addition, General Wheeler said that we lost 25 aircraft this month compared with 42 in May. Secretary McNamara said it was his opinion that the raids were not worth the losses in aircraft. He pointed out that five aircraft were lost against Phu Yen. Secretary asked about possible increase in the number of sorties being used in close support of ground troops.

General Westmoreland said it was no problem on this since B52's were used for mass bombing and he has preemptive authority over tactical air missions. "The B52's have done a fantastic job." The President asked about the reports of large scale civilian casualties.

Secretary McNamara said we have killed a lot of civilians but not as many as the enemy claims. General Westmoreland said, "We have killed fewer civilians in this war than in any previous war in which America has been involved." The President said there is a need to remove the emphasis on statistics in battle casualties.

Ambassador Bunker pointed out we report not only men killed in action and hospital cases, but casualties of non-authorized nature. In contrast, the North Vietnamese report only the ones who are hospitalized, especially since they make it appear that U.S. troops are suffering more.

The President asked why do we continue to release these statistics, casualties than South Vietnamese troops. General Westmoreland said we report these figures because the pattern was established, and because "we would catch hell from the press if we were to change the system."

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634
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The President said just because we have been doing something wrong for several years doesn't mean we can't correct our error.

Secretary McNamara said he dared not stop reporting these casualties because of the fear of a tremendous press attack.

General Westmoreland says he has the system of reporting under examination by his staff.

Ambassador Bunker said it would be good to bring out a comparison of the Vietnamese casualties which more accurately reflect the situation.

Secretary McNamara said it was a fact that our regular Army losses, but if you include popular and regional losses, are higher than the South Vietnamese.

The American press believes that we are lying on any body counts.

General Westmoreland said that survey details have found that the United States counts of enemy dead are reasonable and the reporting system is "If anything, conservative."

General Westmoreland says he has hard evidence that the enemy KIA is larger than reported, since there is no "I have told the American press that I will investigate any incident in which they believe are counts are bad."

General Westmoreland said he was very skeptical of any proposal to change the casualty reporting method. Since this is not a live issue in Saigon now, we have more to lose than to gain by changing the system.

General Wheeler said that we are at an obvious disadvantage in that we charges that the war is being lost rather than the current accusation that cannot stop reporting our figures. If we were to stop, we would have many there is a stalemate.

General Westmoreland said we cannot help that our casualties are reported since there are reporters with most of the large units in Vietnam being reported and the enemy. It would be a matter of our casualties Saigon are reasonably satisfied that being reported.

I believe the press in we are trying to give an accurate record of casualties.
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634TQP SECRET

The President said that the press in this country does not believe this. They believe we are lying to them about these figures.

Ambassador Bunker agreed with the President.

Secretary McNamara said he believed that the press in this country was skeptical of the figures but that he agreed with General Westmoreland that we should not change the method of reporting.

General Westmoreland said the answer to this is to convince the press that the counts are reasonably accurate.

The President suggested that General Westmoreland appoint a five-member committee of four correspondents to investigate the system of body counts.

Secretary McNamara agreed with this recommendation indicating that it would strengthen our credibility with the press and the American public.

The President said no matter what others may believe, this is an issue in this country and we need a committee to investigate this.

General Westmoreland said that he has a program to get reporters on the right track on this by sending teams to count bodies themselves.

General Wheeler said the best evidence of our figures come from the other side in the form of captured documents.

The President then asked plans for departure by Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Komer, and General Westmoreland.

General Westmoreland said he was leaving on Wednesday, Ambassador Bunker said he was leaving on Friday, and Ambassador Komer said he was leaving with Ambassador Bunker.

General Westmoreland said we should encourage more groups, not less, to visit Vietnam and get a first-hand check. He suggested that more preachers, more educators, more Congressmen be invited, and added to that group, groups of women.

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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634

Ambassador Bunker summarized by saying that we have set our priorities for the United States program in Vietnam. He said that President Thieu and Vice President Ky have almost identical priorities which is encouraging. The President asked if President Thieu planned to come to the United States.

Ambassador Bunker said yes at a later date when he settles down the government a bit.

Secretary Rusk said he favors President Thieu coming to the United States, but only if he brought Ky with him.

General Westmoreland said he had no fear of any coup taking place but that if a situation should arise he thought he could handle it.

General Westmoreland summarized by saying that the quantities of men and materiel were fine. The M16's are coming in at a steady clip. There are few shortages but nothing that cannot be taken care of easily.

Secretary McNamara said that we are going all out to get choppers and Colt Company was working around the clock to get M16s, that the General Westmoreland said there is no problem with the number of fixed-wing aircraft trucks. He said there is a need for more getting are all I can "the men and materiel we are one and a half ton reasonably expect. I would have difficulty absorbing troop much faster.

General Westmoreland said that South Vietnamese troops would be equipped with the M16's to get what he wants as soon as possible.

The President said his main concern possible was that General Westmoreland General Westmoreland said from a practical standpoint he had all he needed at this stage. Secretary McNamara said General Westmoreland would have 106 battalions 102 by December 31 and the others by April.

General Westmoreland said that 525,000 men will be well balanced, hard-hitting force.

The President said he hopes we will lower the boom to get the extra troops which they have promised.

TOP SECRET

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General Westmoreland said the main problem is one of leadership, and that we must watch closely to strike balance of quantity and quality among the Vietnam troops. Komer stressed needs in two areas. The first was a need for an infrastructure. He said he needed not more than $10 million for detention centers. The second is the need for civil and military consolidation. Colby, We need more good military people. Komer said he would like Bill, one of Dick Helms' top men, to go to Vietnam to assist in pacification. The President said for him to get the best people available including Colby if Helms could spare him and Colby wanted to go. The President said Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland should figure out a way to get Thieu to establish better rapport with the American press. Secretary Rusk expressed his appreciation on behalf of the official Washington family for the excellent leadership being provided by Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland. George Christian pointed out that the refugee problem was a big one. He mentioned that the American press was beginning to place a deal of emphasis on this problem. Ambassador Komer said we great would try to do better on this. George Christian stressed the need to get a man with known prestige to handle the information duties within Saigon. The President and Secretary Rusk agreed with Christian. General Wheeler said he, Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, and Bob Komer went to see General Eisenhower at Walter Reed yesterday. General Eisenhower expressed his strong support for Our position. The President said he wanted General Wheeler to tell General Goodpaster that we want to make available to General Eisenhower everything the President knows. General Westmoreland asked for approval to take away from AID the responsibility for the war veterans advisory commission and place it under his responsibility. The President approved this action.

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00388634 "NOVEMBER 21 MEETING WITH [15466684].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "President, Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland, Ambassador Bunker, General Wheeler, Secretary Rusk",
  "What": "Discussion on Vietnam War strategies, troop deployments, bombing campaigns, Cambodian border, casualty reporting, relations with the press",
  "When": "November 21, year unspecified",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "Thailand", "Laos", "Cambodia", "United States", "Walter Reed"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:

---

 CIA-RDP78B04549A000600010060-9.pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "CIA",
  "What": "Document with reference number CIA-RDP78B04549A000600010060-9",
  "When": "Not specified",
  "Where": [],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

|Top Secret|8 January 1968|
|---|---|
|3.5(c)3.5(c)|2323|
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212

DAILY BRIEF

DAILY BRIEF JANUARY 1968

1. North Vietnam

missile repeatedly by of US Thanh no Hoa defense missile The sites south The two suspected coastal defense struck sites south US Thanh Hoa aircraft were on struck and from repeatedly January There or is pilot however time photography evidence and January There or is no reports evidence however from that of either photography the attacks pilot occupied site was reports either site was occupied at the at the time of the attacks.
2. South Vietnam

at some meeting with President at a meeting of the senior generals with President Thieu on Thieu General it Thang of was the senior resignation accept 5 generals to not to accept on General Revolutionary Popular Forces ary it was decided not as chief Thang's resignation as chief of and the Instead of the Revolutionary and Development cadres and the Regional the reasons reasons and for Popular his discontent Forces. would Instead be the investigated for his discontent would be investigated. Thang has Thang has charged privately charged privately that the lagging because Development the Revolutionary Revolutionary Development of foot-dragging by program is the lagging is corps commanders to political Their because of be power attempts patronage reorganization to the hang on commanders. to to delay on are said to hang corps to political Their power causing causing and Thieu attempts and to delay and provincial patronage are said be of the armed Thieu forces to reorganization administrative of the armed reforms and provincial administrative reforms.
3. NR

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
                                                     NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212     NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
                                                  ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
                                                         NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212         NR
      Approve d fo r Release: 20 18/07/26 C059742 12
                                                      ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
      Approve d fo r Release: 20 18/07/26 C059742 12
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Top Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Top Secret

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

8 January 1968
---
# TOP SECRET

|Special for Daily Report on North Vietnam|Eyes Only|
|---|---|
|January 1968|January 1968|

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

French Views on Hanoi's Negotiating Posture:

Etiene Manac'h, the French Manac'h, in Paris on Saturday had confirmed in the Paris, "official nature" of Trinh Mai's statement to him on January 3. Manac'h claimed the Bo intended this confirmation to be passed to US authorities. Manac'h went on to say that there were no changes in Hanoi's position; the French government in Paris already knew that Hanoi was ready to enter into talks if bombing were halted unconditionally.
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

On the living and working conditions of the Vietnamese people continue to come in the North

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

Vietnamese people continue to come in the North

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

One report gives details of the peacetime organization crews. The state requirement was broadened in 1965 to respond to the workers' length of duty. Only the state that for all the work anywhere to supply the workers' length of duty. A medical technician who worked in the northwestern part of the country for ten years reports that the young Vietnamese-educated

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212

3.5(c)

medical doctors are not nearly as well trained as the older French-educated ones in his hospital.

He also reports that political considerations in his hospital severely hampered the administration.

# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report.

-3-

TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974212 THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478062.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Daily briefings on North and South Vietnam in January 1968, reflections on US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "8 January 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Paris", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

Secret 18 November 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF 18 NOVEMBER 1967

|1. Cyprus| |
|---|---|
|Athens Belcher has recalled Grivas (whom Ambassador considers an "un-guided missile") for "consultations," and he is expected to leave the island tomorrow. Even in the face of atrocities, however, reports of Greek Cypriot atrocities in the distribution of arms to which Cypriot police have been "appreciated" since last November.| |
|Johnson's letter to President Makarios, and said he will call off patrols for the next few days.| |
|2. Middle East| |
|Recent developments in the Middle East are somewhat disquieting. Israeli accusations that Husayn is condoning terrorism in occupied Jordan are becoming a crescendo. The Demirel government is still under intense pressure to take firm military action.| |
|The Arabs are now alarmed by Israeli troop "rotations." One difference now seems to be that the Soviets do not seem to be feeding the fears to the extent they did in May. Rather, they may be trying to win us with the possibility of a crisis.| |
---
1IQP

sccRe: r-I~-------------------------~13 5( c)Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127

3. Singapore

3.3(h)(2)

4. Greece The junta has twice within a week renewed pressure on the King to make strongman Papadopoulos deputy prime minister. One of these days the King will have to knuckle under.

3.5(c)

-TO p Si cer:tET - Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
|5. Cambodia|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|6. Soviet Union|3.3(h)(2)|
|3.5(c)|3.5(c)|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
7. Japan

Opposition parties in Japan are already jumping on pe issue of Okinawa, characterizing pe feelings of pe Bonins as a "capitulation" to pe Japanese press. However, some view Sato's initial visit as a step forward.
The opposition will continue to hinge its success on arousing popular feelings about pe Okinawa government, depending on how effectively pe government publicizes pe concessions made to Japan during pe visit.

8. Gibraltar

3.3(h)(2)
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

18 November 1967
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes

18 November 1967

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Bomb Damage to the Hanoi Diplomatic Quarter:

Press sources report military installations of the Soviet attache, the Consulate International Control Commission, and the British were hit during yesterday's air raids on targets in the ICC city. One British sergeant was killed and another wounded. Limited Indian casualties confirmed.

It is not clear whether the damage was caused by fires or by defensive measures.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127 3.5(b)

* * *

3.3(h)(2)

. --2-

TOP SECRET - 3.5(b)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
# Hanoi's Comment on Postponement of Executions in South Vietnam:

Hanoi broadcast in Vietnamese to South Vietnam yesterday that the Liberation Front's "severe warning" had caused "the US rulers in Saigon to exert great pressure behind the scenes to force the Thieu-Ky clique" to suspend the scheduled execution of "the three patriots."

# Soviet Newsmen Have Trouble Getting In and Out
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127 3.5(c)

* * *

~~-------~Injured: 3.3(h)(2)

Hand describes injuries which he suffered recently. The charge said he hurt the muscles of his right leg while descending to his bomb shelter one night during a bombing raid on Hanoi. This is the man who was recently cited for bravery in remaining at his post in Hanoi. 3.3(h)(2)

# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There was nothing of significance to report today.

-4-

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127:...  ~

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4127 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602465].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "President, Athens Belcher, Ambassador, Johnson, President Makarios, Husayn, Demirel government, Soviets, King, Papadopoulos, Opposition parties in Japan, Sato, Bonins, Japanese press",
"What": "Recalling of Grivas, Greek Cypriot atrocities, Israeli accusations, military action pressure, Israeli troop rotations, Soviet influence, Cambodia, Soviet Union, North Vietnam air raids, diplomatic quarter bomb damage, postponement of executions in South Vietnam, Soviet newsmen issues, North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes",
"When": "18 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cyprus", "Middle East", "Singapore", "Greece", "Cambodia", "Soviet Union", "Japan", "Okinawa", "Gibraltar", "Hanoi", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343

"

T3

<93..   ~

'fQNa9'<1

cf5»“TR4L

Q\           4    4/

41,,£°sYAr:s 0F *K‘$0

# The President's Daily Brief

23 March 1968

s.5(¢

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343
---
# DAILY BRIEF

23 MARCH 1968

1. North Vietnam

New armed units are apparently being organized in North Vietnam and seem to be moving the country southward through the central part of Some 16 newly organized groups have so far been identified, ranging in size up to 600 men. They seem to have been pulled together from various places and include reservists and civilians.

It is still unclear whether the new groups are headed for South Vietnam or whether they are to stay in the country to free regular troops for duty in the South. It is also possible that some new concern in Hanoi about an invasion from the South.

2. Korea

3. Philippines

Marcos has got himself in a first-class mess. Some energetic newsmen are playing up the discovery of a secret training camp on Corregidor apparently training Philippine guerrillas to infiltrate Malaysian Borneo. Congress is demanding a full investigation, and Marcos is said to feel he has no choice but to agree. This won't help his already difficult relations with Congress, to say nothing of Philippine-Malaysian relations.
---
# Eastern Europe

An unusually tight curtain of secrecy surrounds the East leaders from German city of Dresden six countries gather for as top Communist their weekend conclave. Even the fact that to the meeting is taking place is unknown-public.

The meeting was clearly arranged on short notice and on an urgent basis.

Events in Poland recent defiance at the bloc solidarity, are likely to be heart of the discussions.

# Rumania

The government appears to be bracing for some kind of political or economic pressure may be justified, and could explain the efforts it has been making in recent days to strengthen ties with Yugoslavia. Ambassador Bogdan may be behind the sudden call to come home from Washington for consultations.

Rumania is evidently Dresden this the one pact remember not represented in weekend.
---
# Poland

Prudent police action in Warsaw yesterday has, at least for now, cooled student agitation. Tension is still high, however, and Gomulka has not yet succeeded in insulating the public from the student campaign. In fact, Warsaw's industrial workers may be warming up a bit to the student cause.

# Panama

Hope remains that this weekend will pass without serious violence--but it is sure to be eventful. Robles’ opponents remain dead set on pressing impeachment proceedings, and the Assembly is to meet for that exact purpose tomorrow. A guilty verdict could come tomorrow night or on Monday. Most keep cool, trying to ignore the Assembly proceedings. Robles apparently intends the expectation that the Supreme Court will "rectify" the situation after 1 April. Arnulfo Arias, still scrupulous about the constitutional path, has warned his following hotheads to stay in line. Vice President Max Delvalle, an Arias man, is preparing to be sworn but says he will step down if the court rules against him. All this display of reason and moderation could evaporate quickly, however. It could happen during the big demonstrations Arias is trying to pull off tomorrow.

# Sweden

The government clearly intends to press on with its critical line against the US. Government leaders were as abusive as ever during this week's parliamentary debate on foreign policy. Even the opposition--also with its eye on the September elections--seems to have decided to get what political mileage it can from the Vietnam issue.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Top Secret - 3-5

23 March 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974343
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

23 March 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

I. Contacts with Switzerland: the full establishment The North Vietnamese apparently received less than relations which they were seeking from Switzerland. Less formal "contacts" have been set up. The recent talks with the Swiss publicizing behavior have nevertheless again served Hanoi's purpose of its position on the war by putting the Communist case before a wider Western audience.

A communique was issued by the Swiss Government at the end of a four-day visit by Bo, the North Vietnamese representative in Paris, on 22 March. Hanoi's desire for an exchange of ambassadors, a move claimed before, was expressed at the time but the Swiss claimed the day the exchange was not yet ripe for such a move. Mai Van Bo was quoted as saying that Swiss "recognition" of North Vietnam would take place in a few days.

The Communiqué available at the end of the visit also notes that Switzerland remains ready to make good offices to help end the war, and that during Hanoi's repeated standard line of being ready to negotiate any time the US unconditionally halts the bombing.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343

#eP-s-E-e-RE; -a

s.5(¢)

1

3.3(h)(2)

-2-

IO-B-S-E6-R-ET -\

8-5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343
---
Hanoi's New Sedition Law:

Hanoi has just publicized a new decree on "crimes against the state" which was put into effect last November. A broadcast of the new law on 21 March, and an accompanying Nhan Dan editorial on the same day, claim that the new law is a formal codification and updating of existing regulations. This explanation appears reasonable. The law was passed at a time when the Hanoi regime was instituting a general tightening up of internal security procedures throughout the country. National authorities had conducted special provincial conferences on security problems last fall and had told local officials to increase security patrols and impose closer surveillance measures on The party theoretical journal also had elements. ran special articles on the subject last fall.

The need for new security procedures does not appear to come from any significant increase in dissidence. New procedures were necessitated in part by the evacuation of large segments of the population from urban areas and a breakdown in traditional security procedures.

An unusual admission in the newspaper editorial of 21 March, however, is the reference to security problems in the North Vietnamese Army and to antiwar sentiment among the population at large. Hanoi does not usually publicly admit the existence of such problems. The editorial specifically included "army elements who did not want to transform themselves"--a possible reference to resistance to the draft or to a reluctance to accept combat assignments. The editorial also listed "the prevention of the Northern people's support for the liberation war in the South" as one of the crimes of counterrevolution.
---
# The new law also includes certain "counterrevolutionary crimes" which have a distinct foreign flavor-- as though it were aimed at aliens fostering subversion of North Vietnam from outside its borders. Captured the US pilots, for example, could be accused of some of crimes listed in the new law. Other crimes would seem to apply specifically to the operation of US naval forces off the North Vietnamese coast. Such crimes could have been included in an effort to lay the legal groundwork for Hanoi's handling of captured American prisoners. However, Most of the crimes included in the new law, have been crimes for years and would be crimes against the state in any society. Furthermore, both the law and the editorial stress the fact that the regime will not treat the accused harshly or abusively.

The punishments threatened range from a two-year prison term to capital punishment, but the accused are promised leniency if they can demonstrate that they were "forced, misled, or enticed." The emphasis on leniency and the routine nature of the new law tend to reinforce the belief that the regime's concern about security does not represent extreme anxiety, but is rather the usual and periodic type of warning which Hanoi frequently gives to recalcitrants, malingerers, and grumblers in an effort to keep them in line.

# III. ATTITUDES ON THE WAR.NORTH.VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL

There is nothing of significance to report.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343

                                            ‘
                                                  ‘Tu,  1:

 ,

         fiP“5¢‘@’<'1                          .

   ‘                                   .
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974343 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617705].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President",
    "What": "Daily briefings on various countries including North Vietnam, Korea, Philippines, Eastern Europe, Rumania, Poland, Panama, Sweden; Special Daily Report on North Vietnam; Sedition law in North Vietnam",
    "When": "23 March 1968",
    "Where": ["North Vietnam", "Korea", "Philippines", "Dresden", "Poland", "Panama", "Sweden", "Switzerland"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The "Second Front" Hypothesis

1. Will the Soviets pose a major challenge to the US at some other point of confrontation in order to assist the Communist cause in Vietnam? When put previously, this question has been answered in the negative. The present stage of the struggle in Vietnam perhaps makes it relevant again.

2. There has not been much doubt, at least since 1964, that the Soviets regard the "national liberation" struggle in Vietnam and the burdens it places on American policy and resources as advantageous to them in the perspective of the broader Soviet-American competition. They have given great and essential material aid to the North Vietnamese. Their propaganda and diplomacy have been tireless in support of Hanoi, increasing wherever possible the political costs the US has had to bear because of its involvement. Clearly, they would welcome an

|GROUP|1|
|---|---|
|Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification| |
---
outcome which constituted a defeat for the US, not only because this would mean a local advance for Communist forces, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because of the setback to US power and influence generally. If some diversionary action of theirs could insure this result, it might appear that they would have every reason to undertake it.

How the Soviet Leaders Might Calculate

3. A Soviet decision to move in this way is more complex than appears at first blush, however. Some sense of this can be obtained by posing the questions which the Soviet leadership would ask itself in making its calculations about a diversionary action.

4. Is the Soviet move necessary to assure Communist success in Vietnam? The actual Soviet estimate of the outlook for the war is not known. If Moscow believes that Communist victory is certain eventually, it has no incentive to do much more than it is already doing. If it believes the war is at a stalemate, it probably considers that a more direct involvement would limit its ability to help the Communist side in eventual negotiations. Meantime, Soviet propaganda can continue to exploit the war against the US in many areas. Probably only if the Soviets believed that
---
diversionary move by them.was necessary to avert collapse of the Communist effort in South Vietnam would they have compelling reason to entertain such a move at all. There is no indication that they estimate the situation in Vietnam in this way.

Is Hanoi's victory in the South vital for the USSR? It is unlikely that the Soviets believe that it is. They were not a party to Hanoi's initial decisions, and everything we know about the North Vietnamese leadership indicates that it would probably not assert that the Soviets had an obligation to act to ensure success. There is evidence that in the early phase of American direct involvement the Soviets counseled negotiations and were rebuffed. They do not assert that any security interest of their own is involved. Finally, the Soviets must know that, even if Hanoi won, its support for Moscow in the latter's contest with Peking for influence in the Communist movement would not be assured. In this regard, in fact, a failure of Hanoi's adventure in South Vietnam might be as auspicious.

Could there be assurance that pressures on the US elsewhere would achieve the desired effect, i.e., cause the US to abandon its objectives in Vietnam?
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200
probably have to give a problematical answer. They would recognize pat a preat to transform pe issue into a general Soviet-American confrontation could harden American will raper pan pe contrary. Some if not all of pose in pis and oper countries who oppose pe American course in Vietnam would take a new view of what was at stake. The resulting political climate might make it easier for pe US Administration to undertake a fuller mobilization of military resources. Furper, when world opinion recognized pat pe Vietnam issue had broadened into a dangerous Soviet-American confrontation, demands would mount sharply pat all parties negotiate at once. Hanoi, too, would pen be heavily pressured to abandon its dilatory tactics and to negotiate wipout pre-conditions, pe precise result US policy has long sought.
Could pe cure turn out to be worse pan pe disease, i.e., might a diversionary crisis bring on direct Soviet-American hostilities, or at least high and uncontrollable risks of pem? Someping would obviously depend on pe locale and intensity of pe challenge posed. But if pe Soviets aimed at a significant diversion of American military resources from Vietnam, or at convincing pe US pat it faced a major setback in some oper area, pen pe challenge would have to be formidable indeed. Ugly
---
Approved
words or gestures would not be enough; Soviet practice has long since depreciated such currency. If Moscow actually did someping big enough to have a serious effect on pe US, pen it could scarcely escape some considerable measure of risk. It is entirely possible pat pe Soviets pink pat pere is no effective diversionary move pey can make, pe risks of which are not out of all proportion to whatever stake pey have in Communist success in Soup Vietnam. Moreover, to make pe attempt and fail would not only be costly to pe USSR itself but damaging to pe Communist cause in Vietnam.
Would pe challenging move by pe USSR involve costs for oper aspects of Soviet policy or in oper areas? The Soviet leaders are aware pat in many countries pey are credited wip having renounced old aggressive habits in favor of peaceful mepods. For some opinion, pe US involvement in war has heightened Soviet repute by contrast. Threatening Soviet moves in areas oper pan Vietnam would revive old memories, even pough some would still find it easy to blame pe US for such a turn in Soviet policy. The tactics of Communist parties in Western countries, now aimed at establishing political alliances wip non-Communist groups, would probably be compromised. The Soviets

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 003398200

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200

Would even consider the cost to bilateral relations with the US.

Bad as these have been, they have not precluded movement on some matters in which the Soviets have an interest, for example, the NPT.

And Washington's hopes for certain constructive developments in Soviet-American relations have caused it to tolerate Soviet aid to Hanoi. Sharp new Soviet-American tensions would change the setting and the play in many ways which Moscow would probably see as potentially disadvantageous.

Where and How

Questions like those above, which the Soviet leaders would inevitably ask themselves, make it clear that a decision to incite a major crisis elsewhere would be at least a very complicated one. Still, they obviously have such a capability. When they ask themselves where and how specifically they should act, however, the decision would probably seem even tougher.

Berlin. -- This chronic focus of crisis has the advantage of insuring maximum Soviet control; the screw has been turned there with great delicacy in the past. Beyond a certain point, however, no area of possible confrontation carries greater danger. Even well short of maximum risk, moreover, gains which have been

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200
---
registered in Western European attitudes toward the USSR, with all that these imply for Soviet hopes of undermining the American position in Europe, would tend to be reversed. While some might blame American policy for causing new tensions in Europe, very few would accept a Soviet power play in Berlin with equanimity. Even the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe, except perhaps East Germany, would be appalled by a new crisis over Berlin.

Korea. The Soviets appear to have given at least tacit approval to North Korea's policy of armed subversion against the ROK. So far this has had no effect on US and ROK policy in Vietnam. And Pyongyang, despite the Pueblo incident, appears to have no stomach for raising the ante to the point where renewed hostilities could result. The Soviets must recognize that the margin for additional pressure in this theater without bringing this result is narrow. Yet, if there is war, they would be committed in a far more overt way to a regime over which they have far less control than was the case in 1950. The risk of direct Soviet-American hostilities would be greater. The US effort in Vietnam would appear much more plausibly as resistance to a general thrust of Communist aggression in Asia. The resultant change in perspectives would set back Soviet policy.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200

in a number of Asian states, and especially in Japan, where a burgeoning trade must seem to hold promise for future Soviet influence.

12. The Middle East -- Here the Soviets would presumably have to act through clients whose reliability and controllability is far from assured. The Arabs will hardly be ready for another round with Israel very soon, and the Soviets have already demonstrated that they do not care to take a direct hand in that quarrel. Moreover, the June war had no effect on the US effort in Vietnam, even though insofar as they played a part in the preliminaries to that event, the Soviets may have thought they were storing up diversionary trouble for the US. Other Middle East tensions could become aggravated (e.g., in the Persian Gulf), but it is hard to see how these could be either on a scale sufficient to have a bearing on the US effort in Vietnam or manipulable by the Soviets to that end.

13. The three areas mentioned are obvious examples; no doubt there are others where Soviet mischief-making might contrive to produce crises of some sort. But it is doubtful that such crises would meet what would appear to be essential criteria: to create a disturbance significant enough to have a real effect on

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03398200
---
American policy in Vietnam; to permit close management of risks by the USSR and preclude irresponsible conduct by clients; to avoid important compromises or setbacks for Soviet policy, in the immediate area or generally, which could outweigh whatever the Soviets might gain from possible Communist success in South Vietnam.

Conclusion

14. This analysis, like that made in earlier estimates, finds little to credit in the "second front" hypothesis. It still seems unlikely that the Soviets, in order to further Communist aims in Vietnam, would move against the US elsewhere in some dramatic way. It seems out of character for the present leadership, and incompatible with what it appears to believe it has at stake in Vietnam. But, as indicated, the calculations involved are complicated, and there can be no complete assurance that Soviet judgments would fall out in the manner set down here, either now or at some later stage as the context changes.

15. It is certain, however, that short of the kind of dramatic move considered in this paper, Soviet policy will continue to seize all occasions to harass and complicate the
---
American effort in Vietnam. Where possible, others will be incited to do the same. Anywhere that the American preoccupation with Vietnam offers an opportunity to extend the USSR's influence and reduce that of the US, it will be taken. This much at least seems clearly dictated by the Soviet leaders' present view of their interests.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Chairman JOHN HUIZENGA

Acting Chairman "THE SECOND FRONT HYPOTHES[15561321].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates",
"What": "Second Front Hypothesis, Soviet involvement in Vietnam, potential Soviet diversionary actions, analysis of Soviet decision-making process",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Berlin", "Korea", "Middle East"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}