Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

Top Secret

12 7 s.5(¢)

16 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544
---
# Information as of 1600

16 February 1968

# HIGHLIGHTS

Scattered fighting and shelling continues in I Corps and low-level reports continue to point to another round of attacks. Enemy tanks have been observed in the eastern part of the Demilitarized Zone for the first time.

# I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Enemy tanks were reported in the Demilitarized Zone north of Con Thien on 16 February. Sharp skirmishes have taken place in several parts of the I Corps area during the past few days, and enemy attacks in the Quang Tri city area may come soon.

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Captured documents underline a Communist intent to engage in a long-range campaign to build their strength in the cities. Progress is slow in opening roads to bring food supplies into Saigon, although stocks are adequate and prices are falling.

# III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# V. Communist Political Developments:

The first high-level Communist analysis of the Tet offensive was published in the North Vietnamese Army daily on 11 February. Routine Communist propaganda begins to emphasize the need for a long-term struggle. The Poles are stepping up political support for the Liberation Front.
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. North Vietnamese forces have intensified their shelling of allied strongpoints from Khe Sanh eastward along the Demilitarized Zone to the South China Sea. They have also brought in armor, first employed against Lang Vei on 6 February, to the Con Thien area. Meanwhile, at least two regiments of North Vietnam's 324 "B" Division are continuing battlefield preparations. Elsewhere in the northern provinces, the battle near Quang Tri city for Hue entered its 19th day on 16 February with enemy forces still ensconced within the walls of the Citadel.

2. Most urban areas of II and III Corps remained under firm allied control on 16 February. New attacks against Nha Trang Airfield and a district town near Tay Ninh city, however, may portend renewed major attacks against the capitals of Khanh Hoa and Tay Ninh provinces.

3. Although enemy pressure on the Saigon area has eased considerably, police Loan has warned that a second wave of Communist attacks involving the northern provinces and Saigon may come as early as 18 February.

4. With the exception of renewed attacks against two airfields in Phong Dinh Province and sporadic fighting on the outskirts of Can Tho city, quiet on 16 February. Allied sweep forces continued to press a series of operations designed to deflect reported Viet Cong plans for further widespread attacks against heavily populated urban areas in the delta.

16 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544

I corps

Demilitarized Zone approximately five miles east of Con Thien on tanks were observed in north-5,Three enemy 16 February. At last report, the US Marine-tanks were preparing to fire on the enemy tanks and air strikes had been requested. There has been no word on the results. The North Vietnamese would most likely employ the light, amphibious PT+76-type tanks in the Con Thien area. These were used successfully by the Communists in their attack on the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. The amphibious capability of these tanks would enable them to cross the Ben Hai River.

Allied positions along the gunners continue to shell North Vietnamese length of the Demilitarized Zone. The base at Khe Sanh was hit by 14 heavy rockets Marines were killed rounds-on l5-l6 February and over 100 mortar and 28 wounded. Other outposts Two in northern Quang Tri Province reported nearly l00 rounds of incoming mortar and artillery fire.

Allied forces continue to press operations in the Citadel area of Hue. Heavy air strikes and naval gunfire are supporting Marines and infantry resistance has been stiff. US the attack. Enemy men have bloody actions down the length l2 US troops were also reported numerous of I Corps during the smallest scale but past few days. On 14 February an ambush fives miles killed and over 100 wounded in west of Camp Carroll. Sharp skirmishes have also been reported southwest of Quang Nang along the Quang Nam — Quang Tin south of DaTri city, on the outskirts of Hue, and border.

Enemy Threat in Quang Tri City Area

The North Vietnamese may be preparing large-scale Extremely detailed reconnaissance reports and coordinated attacks in the Quang.Tri city area. Other offensive preparations have been noted for some days by the 812th Regiment. It now appears almost certain that the 803rd Regiment has crossed the Cua Viet River and joined the 812th east of Quang Trl city. Attacks may come within the next few days.

16 February 1968

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544
---
# II Corps

9. Early on 16 February the Nha Trang Airfield was hit by 14 rounds from 82-mm. mortars. The barrage resulted in no allied casualties and only minor damage.

10. An unconfirmed report made available by South Vietnamese police officials claims Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units are positioned several miles west of the provincial capital city of Nha Trang. These forces are reportedly awaiting orders for a large-scale attack on the city in conjunction with massive mortar attacks on military and administrative headquarters in and near the city. This report is similar to a flurry of renewed enemy attacks on major urban areas undoubtedly intended to alarm the populace and confuse the cities' defenders. Nevertheless, the potential threat poses a serious problem of further attacks on key military and civil targets throughout the country.

# III Corps

12. In Tay Ninh Province, an estimated force of 300 to 400 attacked the Phu Khuang district on 16 February. A sector headquarters, two town Vietnamese outposts, and a training center were the targets of the attack which lasted for more than four hours and included more than 50 rounds of B-40 rocket fire. Preliminary reports show 21 South Vietnamese wounded, killed, and eight weapons captured.

# Saigon

13. Although the Saigon area has seen a sharp decline in enemy pressure during the past few days, National Police Director General Loan warned on 16 February that a second wave of Communist attacks involving Khe Sanh, the Demilitarized Zone area, Quang Tri city, Hue, and Saigon could break as early as 18 February. Loan reportedly based his warning on information derived from the interrogation of prisoners, some of whom were recently apprehended while en route from neighboring Long An Province to Saigon.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544

(L 35/\/'\O0)

quirel4. Loan further estimated that it would ree tion in Saigon to its.pre#Tet level.three months to restore the security situa---In view of this, he strongly argued that three South Vietnamese battalions, in addition to his police units, should be permanently based inside the capital to share responsibility for the city!s security.

# IV_CorEs'

15. Phong Dinh Province, some.l00 miles southwest of Saigon, was the focal point of the most significant Communist military activity re- ported in the delta.on 16 February. The allied airfields at Binh Thuy.and.Can Tho were shelled by the fourth and fifth times, respectively, forenemy mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle fire since the Communist Tet offensive began on 29 January. "Allied-casualties and aircraft damage resulting from the attacks were minimal.' Both airfields remain.operati0nal.

16. MeanwhileI allied 3.3(h)(2) _ \reported several heavy' 3.3(h)(2) clashes on.l5 February three miles'southwest" of Can Tho, which resulted in 54 Viet Cong killed.

16 February 1968

A

A

{~ 35/52\/O

T?'

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Communist Plans for Action in the Cities

1. Recently available texts of a long-term captured documents confirm that the Communists have a plan to build up their strength in the cities. It thus seems likely that the Viet Cong will follow the recent Tet offensive with continuing military pressure against the urban areas.

2. Documents discussing activities in the cities have appeared frequently over the past years; however, they began to increase gradually in number late last summer, apparently as the Communists began preparations for their offensive against urban centers. Long aware of their neglect of this area, they acknowledged that "in many cities and towns, party committee cadre have not given proper attention to carrying out the revolution's policy." But..."cities, in particular, are the enemy's last sanctuaries and should be destroyed at any cost. We must strongly develop guerrilla warfare to strike regularly in those places."

3. Detailed instructions for Viet Cong agents being sent into the cities were captured near Saigon last June. Methods for infiltrating and exploiting labor unions and other organizations were spelled out. An indoctrination lesson captured in I Corps in December called for "more emphasis on cities and towns to develop political struggle movement and armed actions therein." A Viet Cong directive of 20 November called for city units in Pleiku Province to use secret guerrilla cells to "prepare the battlefield inside the city and create favorable conditions there to bring troops inside for operations," presumably with the Tet offensive in mind.

4. Assuming that some urban centers would be liberated, a directive of 16 November probably issued from Military Region 5 Headquarters instructs Viet Cong units on how to behave. The civilian directive of 16 February 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544

population and private property were to be protected. Looting and drinking were prohibited. South Vietnamese military personnel and civilian officials, to be presumably excepting “traitors and tyrants," were pre-propagandized, but not ill-treated.

The Communists in their Tet offensive failed to enlist widespread popular support, but their directives suggest a longer term effort to get at dipopulation in cities and towns.

Economic Conditions

Food prices in Saigon fell approximately six percent by 14 February, but they remain 60-65 percent above the pre-Tet level. According to the US Embassy, shipments of some foods are slowly beginning to arrive in the capital, but other foods are becoming more scarce. The road situation does not appear to have improved appreciably. A boatload of shrimp arrived from Nha Trang on the 14th and one convoy of foodstuffs was also reported to have arrived in Saigon from the Mekong Delta, but it never reached the markets, apparently because all of it went to the government and other priority consumers. Pork and poultry are in particularly short supply in the city because of insecure road conditions and a lack of proper feed.

Route 4, the principal land artery to the delta, has been passable between My Tho and Saigon for some time, but police and army movement of food were being required to unload outside of Saigon. The supplies were then loaded onto much smaller commercial vehicles. Route 15 to Vung Tau is open, but travel is recommended only in convoy.

Reports from the delta point to widely varying economic conditions. Commercial activity in My Tho and Can Tho is near normal, but Vinh Long city reported on 13 February that the market was closed and commercial activity was almost at a standstill. Similarly in Ben Tre, where the marketplace was completely destroyed and numerous shops and small industries severely damaged, almost no economic activity has been reported.

16 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

There is nothing of significance to report.

16 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544

Another interesting aspect of Binh's article is the polemical language he uses. The use of such language usually indicates disputes among the hierarchy itself or jibes by the Vietnamese Communists at foreign Communist powers, such as Peking and China. In Binh's article, the jibes appear to be aimed at military doctrine, although the possibility of internal disagreement among the North Vietnamese leadership itself cannot be ruled out. There are two polemic references in the article. The first characterizes the attack on the cities as a wholly new and brilliant strategy which the "southern leadership" was able to devise because they are not "bound by outmoded experiences."

The second reference to the same issue says, "the facts emerging during the past few days have clearly proved that the view held by the southern revolution is extremely clear-sighted;... The war is not like any war in history." Both references could clearly be considered insulting to the Chinese, but they could also refer to disagreements within the Vietnamese Communist leadership.

Communiqués from several of the Viet Cong regional commands reviewing also beginning to take since the Tet offensive are the military situation the line that the "victories" achieved in the past two weeks lay the groundwork for a more intensive period of fighting ahead.

Communiqués from the Communist commands in the highlands and in the delta claimed the "victories" recorded in the offensive produced still favorable conditions for an advance toward greater victories. An editorial in the Hanoi party daily broadcast on 16 February followed the same line. It claimed that the recent fighting had "smashed the enemy's grip on the countryside and loosened it claimed, have tipped the balance of allied control in the urban areas." These successes, forces in favor of the Communists and created favorable conditions for their advancing toward total victory.

16 February 1968

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544

8. While promising new and greater victories, current Communist propaganda is also pointing out that such successes will be costly. In analyzing the "successful struggle" in Saigon, Radio, in a 14 February broadcast, pointed out that "no fierce difficulties, hardships, or sacrifices" can slacken the surging thrust of the people of the capital city. Other statements using the well-worn Communist theme that more fiercely the US struggles, the greater its defeat will be, have warned of increased difficulties, but guarantee that perseverance will bring victory.

Polish Support for the Viet Cong

9. Liberation Front representative in Warsaw, Tran Van Tu, met with a Polish announcement cited on 16 February, according to Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz on Reuters. No details of the meeting were made public. Warsaw radio made a similarly uninformative announcement on 15 February that Tran Van Tu had met with Foreign Minister Rapacki three days earlier.

10. The Polish press in the last two weeks has given front page treatment to the "heroic" Viet Cong offensive, and almost daily meetings of Front representatives with various Polish groups have been dutifully reported. It is possible that Tu's progress up the ladder of Polish officialdom is in line with this propaganda, and that it may lead to an enhancement of the Front's status in Warsaw.

16 February 1968

V-3

"LQP-S-E-€'R‘ET 3

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786544 THE_SITUATION_IN_VIETNAM[15617745].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
    "What": "Situation in Vietnam including military, political, and economic developments",
    "When": "16 February 1968",
    "Where": [
        "Vietnam",
        "South Vietnam",
        "Demilitarized Zone",
        "Con Thien",
        "Quang Tri city",
        "Hue",
        "Saigon",
        "Nha Trang",
        "Tay Ninh",
        "Phong Dinh Province",
        "Lang Vei",
        "Khe Sanh",
        "My Tho",
        "Can Tho",
        "Pleiku Province",
        "Vung Tau",
        "Da Nang",
        "Ben Tre",
        "Vinh Long",
        "Pols",
        "Hanoi",
        "Peking",
        "China",
        "Warsaw",
        "Poles"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

24 February 1968
---
# DAILY BRIEF

24 FEBRUARY 1968

|South Vietnam|Saigon remains relatively quiet, but firefights persist on all sides of the city. Some of these doubtless involve elements of the three Communist divisions now deployed in the capital area. More enemy troops are apparently headed that way, and one report, attributed to a Viet Cong official, says the Communists will launch another large-scale attack on the city before March.|
|---|---|
|Several cities in the north|Several cities in the north also appear threatened. These include Da Nang, Quang Tri, and Hoi An. In the delta provinces, the signs are especially bleak. The Viet Cong have overrun many rural areas, while South Vietnamese forces remain tied down defending the cities. The Communists have been having such success in their recruitment drives in the delta countryside that their strength seems greater now than it was prior to the Tet offensive, despite their heavy casualties.|

Laos

At last word, Communist forces around Saravane had not yet followed up yesterday's artillery attacks with miles of ground assault on the town. A few miles to the southwest, however, heavy fighting was reported underway most of yesterday at the Laotian regimental headquarters at Lao Ngam. Reports suggest that the attackers had been repulsed.

Japan
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295

41

3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295

|Thailand|Government forces are finding it rough going as they try to sweep several hundred tribal insurgents out of the northern mountains.|
|---|---|
|India|3.3(h)(2)|
|Panama|No significant change.|
|Cyprus|Makarios had expected to be unopposed in tomorrow's presidential election, but he was wrong. He has given up union with Greece as a practical objective, and the pro-unionists have put up their own man, a prominent psychiatrist. The Archbishop will probably swamp the psychiatrist, but over the passions are quick to rise Cypriot union issue, and there may be some unpleasantness.|

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295

The "consultative meeting" of Communist parties opening in Budapest on Monday will be the biggest such affair since 1960, but is not likely to come to much. Moscow has had to water down its objectives in order to draw a halfway respectable turnout. Some sixty parties have been dragooned into sending representatives, but none are coming from the Far East. The Romanians

Soviet diplomats in various parts of the world continue to do battle on behalf of the US-Soviet draft nonproliferation treaty.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974295
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295

‘@ L<§§ ahim54?‘{QNao‘<F

\Q~05° sures 0? ““€'$\Q1

FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY.

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

“Ti1]rSec1=et— s.5(¢)

24 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295?‘
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

24 February 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974295

Limited Trade Between Singapore and North Vietnam May Be in Prospect: The North Vietnamese trade delegation which was originally scheduled to leave Singapore on 26 February is remaining an additional three days. It concluded a number of deals with Singapore and rubber businessmen, particularly for the purchase of rice.

Hanoi does not have a regular trade office in Singapore, but may establish one there in the near future. Trade between the two countries is likely to remain quite small.
---
Threat to Kill US Prisoners: The Communists threatened on 22 February to retaliate for any execution of Viet Cong prisoners in Hue. According to both Liberation Radio and Hanoi, the "Thua Thien-Hue People's Revolutionary Committee" threatened to adopt appropriate measures against US troops captured in Hue if Communist prisoners were executed by South Vietnamese authorities. The Communists frequently make such threats against US personnel in order to prevent executions of Viet Cong prisoners. The only different element in this threat is the use of the new local "revolutionary Front Thua Thien Province committee" - an organization which the Liberation and Hue city claims is non-Communist and is now in "control".
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974295 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617944].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President",
    "What": "Daily briefings on the situation in South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, India, Panama, Cyprus, Japan, and North Vietnam",
    "When": "24 February 1968",
    "Where": [
        "South Vietnam",
        "Saigon",
        "Da Nang",
        "Quang Tri",
        "Hoi An",
        "Laos",
        "Saravane",
        "Lao Ngam",
        "Thailand",
        "India",
        "Panama",
        "Cyprus",
        "Japan",
        "North Vietnam",
        "Singapore",
        "Hue"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835

iii

)np-Satin?

3-5“

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

/Tnpsnfi2 1 30

3 January 1968 3-5(9)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835
---
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
---
# Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

3 January 1968 s.5(¢)

# Iran: The Shah is angered with the consortium over oil revenues. (Page 5)

3.3(h)(2)

# CUBA: Castro's annual speech (Page 7)

s.5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835
---
# THAILAND

CAMBODI

DARLAC

GULF OF SIAM

SOUTH VIETNAM

| |25|50|75|100Miles|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | |Diameters|
---
South Vietnam: Intercepted enemy tactical messages reveal intense Communist preparations for a new round of attacks near Dak To.

The preparations include extensive reconnaissance patrolling and reporting on allied movements, as well as the repositioning of enemy units within the southwestern Kontum Province area. Several messages mentioned the period between the 2nd and 6th of January as the time for the attacks. Other messages gave specific instructions to strike an airfield, presumably the one at Dak To shortly after US transport aircraft have landed in an effort to hit both the aircraft and the troops concentrated there.

Elements of at least four North Vietnamese regiments are scattered throughout this general area. They have been keeping pressure on US field positions through numerous mortar attacks in recent weeks.
---
i-12*’
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835Z 3_5(C)

3 Jan 68 2 TOP ET[j saw M Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835
---
3 Jan 68

TOP
CRET
we
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033 100 'U1 3.3(h)(2)

s.5(¢

('1'1'l\Tl'I'\'I\ A ‘r 'r\1'r1-\~m-|- ~r 'I'lN'If\\'1'r~1'I—\ --.----- 1- 3 Jan Approved for Release. 2019/03/29 C02033835E Map
---
# Approved for Release: 2619/03/29 C02033835  35(0)

vumn1                                                 3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835
---
Iran: The Shah appears to be heading for a showdown with the Western consortium over the issue of oil revenues for Iran.

The Shah is especially angered because the consortium's latest quarterly payment was based in part on the predevaluation pound, a loss to Iran of about $12 million. Using such terms as "robbery" and "thieves," the Shah told the US ambassador on 28 December that if the consortium members wanted the possibility of unilateral legislation to ensure Iran "war," they could have it. The Shah suggested the undepreciable payments, and to provide for Iranian sale of oil which the consortium does not export. He has previously threatened to take the oil revenue issue "to the Iranian people." The consortium states that its position is legally correct, but it is making efforts to find some sort of compromise.

The payments issue is an irritating facet of the over-all problem of oil revenues which has been under discussion since October. The Iranian Government has presented the consortium with the schedule of the oil exports required to fulfill Iran's "fourth plan" (1968-1972). The Shah claims to need $5.9 billion from oil revenues for that period, but the consortium believes that this figure is excessive. Iranian officials concede that the plan was drawn up on the basis of faulty oil revenue estimates, but insist that the consortium must come up with the money one way or another.

The oil revenue problem, a recurring one, is particularly touchy this year because Iranian expectations were so high. Iranian officials have assumed that their cooperation with the consortium during the Middle East crisis would guarantee them favorable treatment in the form of greatly increased oil exports.
---
The Shah has long claimed that Iran, as a stable and progressive nation, is more deserving of large revenues than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or the sheikdoms. He is bitterly disillusioned now that the expected favorable treatment does not seem to be materializing. The consortium believes it is doing all it can for Iran in view of the near glut in the world oil.

3 Jan 68
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835

NOTES

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

* Cuba: Fidel Castro devoted most of his annual 2 January speech to a discussion of Cuban economic developments. He admitted that increased fuel consumption has caused an acute shortage of petroleum products and said that as a result Cuba will face belt-tightening and rationing in 1968. Closing the speech with his usual jab at "US imperialism," Castro declared Cuba independent from any ideology but its own and said that his regime "will carry forward its internationalist policy of solidarity with the revolutionary movement throughout the world."

3.5(c)

3 Jan 68

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835
---
To

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835

cret V B;

To cret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02033835 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602413].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Director of Central Intelligence, President, National Security Council, senior government officials",
    "What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin production process, intelligence interpretation, classified information disclaimer, Vietnam situation report, Shah's oil revenue issue in Iran, Castro's annual speech in Cuba",
    "When": "3 January 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "Iran", "Cuba", "Thailand", "Cambodia", "Dak To", "Gulf of Siam", "South Vietnam"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # REPORT

|REPORT CLASS|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|
|SUBJECT|SITUATION REPORT ON HOI ANAN CITY AND QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AS OF 1800 HOURS 8N 9H 11 FEBRUARY|

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON HOI ANAN CITY AND QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AS OF 1800 HOURS 8N 9H 11 FEBRUARY

ACQUIRED: VIETNAM/DANANG (IFEBRUARY 68)

SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 11 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS

1. IN HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, LOUDSPEAKERS TOLD PEOPLE OF CURFEW AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS. PEOPLE WERE ADHERING TO RESTRICTIONS. THERE WAS NO APPARENT FEELING OF PANIC, BUT THE PEOPLE WERE NERVOUS AND ACTIVITY PROCEEDED AT A REDUCED PACE. ROAD BLOCKS RESTRICTED CIVILIAN TRAFFIC. VIET CONG (VC) WERE HERE IN THE AREA IN VARIOUS DISGUISES, BUT MOST VC HAD LEFT THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF ROI AN TOWN.

2. DUY BUYEN DISTRICT WAS ATTACKED BY THE VC ON THE NIGHT OF 31 JANUARY AND THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS CONTINUED TO BURN IN THE AFTERNOON OF 1 FEBRUARY. SOME OF THE RESIDENTS HAD BEEN EVACUATED.

3. IN HOA VANG DISTRICT, THE BUDDHISTS CLAIMED THEY HAD ONE THOUSAND REFUGEES IN NEED OF FOOD, AND THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO LOOK INTO ASSISTANCE FOR THEM ON THE MORNING OF 2 FEBRUARY.

4. CONTACT WITH REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE (RDC) TEAMS WAS LIMITED DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS. TRAILS IN HOA VANG
---
VANG VANS AND AND DIEN BANH DANE DISTRICTS HAD CONTACTCONTACT WITH THE VC. TEAM TEAH 4's LEADER AND HIS ASSISTANT WERE KIA; TEAM THAN 11 SUFFERED ONE KIA; TEAM 5, 5, ONE KIA; TEAM 7 , 7. ONE KIA; AND THAN 28 HAD CONTACT AT 0300 ON CAN THANH ISLAND, ABOUT 50 METERS ACROSS FROM THE MARKET IN HOI AN, WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY THE VC. 5. ONE RALLIER TO THE FITTY FIRST ARVN BATTALION, ALLEGEDLY A MEMBER OF THE SECOND NORTH VIETNAM (NVA) DIVISION, ONE OF THREE VC ELEMENTS KTTIEIEE XXX:IEIKB THAT ATTACKED THE DANANG COMPLEX, SAID THAT THESE FORCES (UNSPECIFIED) SUFFERED DAVY HEAVY CASUALTIES. HE CLAIMED HE WAS THE BOLE SOLE SURVIVOR OF HIS PLATOON, ONE REASON HE RALLIED. ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENT THE MISSION OF THE THREE UNITS WAS TO ATTACK HOI AN AND DANANG CITY DURING THE FIRST TIREE DAYS OF01' TET. 6. FIXLD FIELD DISSD: DISSEH: BTATB STATE USMACV USEACV III HAP CORDS "SITUATION REPORT ON HOI A[15561227].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "CAS (Center for Advanced Studies)",
    "What": "Situation report on Hoi Anan City and Quang Nam Province in South Vietnam, activities of Viet Cong (VC), attacks by VC, contact with Revolutionary Development Cadre teams, information from a rally to the First ARVN Battalion",
    "When": "11 February",
    "Where": ["Hoi An, Quang Nam Province", "Danang"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: #

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836Top Secret 3.5(c)

# DIRECTORATEOF

# DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCEOF

# INTELLIGENCE

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

# 3.5(c)3.5(c) Top Secret210 January1968

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836     3.5(c)3.5(c)
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
                                                  ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam:|Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|---|
|NR|NR|NR|
|TOP SECRET|TOP SECRET|TOP SECRET|

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836

5 January 1968
---
# Vietnam:

|North Vietnam:|The North Vietnamese are doubtless pleased by the worldwide attention being given to Foreign Minister Trinh's recent remarks about talks.|
|---|---|
| |Hanoi probably feels that its indicated willingness to talk is being widely interpreted as having put the ball in the US court.|
| |The Vietnamese seem bent, however, on not having Trinh's statements distorted or embellished by others.|
| |Hanoi's sensitivity on the issue was underscored in Paris on 4 January which sought to clarify a Western correspondent's account of an interview with their spokesman the day before.|
| |The Soviets are also handling the issue gingerly.|
| |Crucial portions of the Trinh speech were reported without comment on 2 January.|
| |Hanoi cleared the text of a dispatch on the speech with the Vietnamese before sending it to Moscow.|

US military authorities in Saigon now estimate that some 53,600 North Vietnamese troops infiltrated into South Vietnam in 1967. The final figure for 1967 will probably be considerably higher as there is a lag between the time an infiltration group arrives in South Vietnam and when it is noted in these statistics. In any case, it appears that infiltration in 1967 will not exceed the 88,500 counted in 1966.
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836|
|---|---|
|[uNoRth|.|
|NO RT H|Demilitarized Zone|
|ANG|TR|
|Hue|4UAhIFR|
|Da Nang|#UANGNAM|
|CoRpS|Que Son Valley|
|OUANGTIN|ovang|
|NGA|KONTUM|
|MINADINIS|PLEIKU|
|F'HU|Jun P'AU|
|C A M B 0 D [ A|DARLAC CORPS|
|KiiANh|HDA|
|OUANGDUC|TUYEN Cam RANH|
|NINA|THUAN|
|TAUA|BINA|
|SAICON|Yung|
|HOA|Capital Special Zone|
|Vinh|MINA|
|CoRps|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|SOUTH VIETNAM| |

691641-68

69164 1-68

5 Jan 68

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 Co2033838 INMap

TitmTt TATITAT Dttt
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836

TOP SECRET

South Vietnam: North Vietnamese Army troops launched a series of assaults against 1st Cavalry Division positions in the Que Son Valley on 3-4 January. Some 196 enemy were killed in these attacks, bringing the number of Communists killed in the valley in the past two days to more than 300.

Buddhist monks from both the moderate and militant factions are talking with some Buddhist senators about organizing a political party to counteract growing Catholic political influence. The monks apparently visualize a party to counteract growing Catholic party influence, which would be managed by the senators. It is questionable, however, whether leaders of the two Buddhist factions can either adequately reconcile their own differences or find sufficient common ground with prominent national politicians to forge a viable political alliance.

5 Jan 68

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836     NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
---
Top-Secret   Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
             Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
 Top Secret
             Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836
             Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033836 CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-BULL15478308.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
    "What": "Information on North Vietnam's reaction to talks, North Vietnamese troop infiltration, military activities in South Vietnam, and political developments in Vietnam",
    "When": "5 January 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Que Son Valley", "Saigon"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05009904

15 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Agency Vietnam Discussion

1. At 1430, concerned Messrs. Vietnam problem. Those Monday, with the 11 March, the Director convened a resent of Agency officers R.J. Smith, Abbot Smith, and Carver.

2. The two questions: Director asked those assembled to address themselves, in turn, to each of regarding Vietnam (i.e., bombing, troop dispatch, etc.)? (1) If you were President, what actions would you take? (ii) What is your assessment of the Thieu-Ky combination:

a. Can the Thieu-Ky government remain in power?

b. Can it run the CNN with any reasonable chance of success?

3. The situation discussion was marked by expressions of general ensuing disquiet in Vietnam, contained many more judgment on, most of which ranged from despondency to despair. The thoughts expressed adjectives than nouns. Detailed program the in the near future, ostensibly favored stopping was no articulation of, should follow. Some humanitarian action let alone consensus President the bombing, either now or reasons but actually to disencumber the U.S. of the bombing's doing little good political opprobrium at home political given and, felt the bombing was stopped; for if but new constituted and abroad. Others hence, should not be it were, Hanoi would minority felt the mix of targets should be adjusted. with conclude that our determination to persevere was crumbling. A small.

Approved for Release: SEGREP2019/04/17 C05009904
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05009904

same expansion, for both military and political reasons. There no more was similar diversity of opinion on the troop dispatch issue: some believed U.S. assets troops should be sent, since they felt what could be sent now should be, as the war was unwinnable and further commitment emergency, but decisions on gauged. One or two should be painless. Others additional dispatch tide over the could be fail: a reserve deferred until than 200, and defense posture have a political impact on Hanoi whether or not the GVN performance would permit the dispatch of even more which 000 troops would troops were sent. presently constituted, could probably hang Though most if propped up by 4. The group's assessment vicurrent and reasonably foreseeable more, and somehow, felt the GVN, as continuing U.S. guidance and support, few felt that it could generate the enough drive and improvement to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by Communists' present exposed and extended position. much of the group's general malaise seemed present to be the belief (or assumption or judgment), explicitly stated by some, that Underlying U.S. objectives would cover the establishment of enthusiasm, courses that within Vietnam the bulk of the population -- were simply not viable. reasonably stable attainable. GVN might stave off near term disaster. but dampened positive thinking regarding whose This led several to advocate, with little lines of action that could turn the present situation to maximum advantage. to function The least a minimum level of that in the CNN's ability, or inability, to any satisfactory resolution of the Vietnam problem. Without a certain at at group did generally agree competence lay the essential key threshold Vietnamese performance, virtually no incremental U.S. input could As indicated above, however, the group make much appreciable over the likelihood of the Vietnamese reaching that difference. was less than sanguine threshold. minimal performance 'L I find it hard to summarize the am ~apparently very much ant of phase sense of the 11 March meeting accurately and without distortion, since colleagues. While I certainly do not. with the minimize current thinking of the problems, and hence the an insoluble Vietnamese most of my challenge. we face in Vietnam, I do still regard it as to challenge rather than lie with our most of the magnitude of morass. a. I agree completely that the key success for failure) allies, but I do not yet share the almost entirely bleak assessment my colleagues seem to make of the possibilities for operational improvement critical sphere. in this plan " Gem-se A. Carver. I 1'. Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs. AGENCY_VIETNAM_DISCUSSION[15617893].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Directors, Agency officers R.J. Smith, Abbot Smith, and Carver",
    "What": "Discussion on Vietnam situation, including bombing, troop dispatch, Thieu-Ky government, and CNN involvement",
    "When": "15 March 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516

LLIG

'f9Na0‘<T o'\’/“H441 \-5 E,‘

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

17 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
---
The CENTRAL Intelligence BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

The interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

Vietnam:
Situation report.
(Page 1)

West Berlin:
A student rally Sunday could lead to violence.
(Page 6)

Panama:
Struggle to control election machinery dims outlook for peaceful election.
(Page 8)
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516

0‘ Y‘ M 7 W? \.. .151, \\ I n NORTH '- VIETNAM \\__ \. \\__K ‘J .» (‘ in“Y' \‘ Demi/iturizecl Zone ¢.) ‘ d" \_oCoh»Thien | - '7 KQUANG TR! _ BQE T"V 755.33: ~ , ' V\’ \-'We fi_ 5 "'1Hue. _ , M ; , I ,1, P/Umy O '-KTHUA THIE ; I E I , ' _ '\--._ a Nang J -m >7 ,, (P QUANG NAM A E \~* > fr‘-. FL '~ QUANG \ ‘ 1. \ lx,\ KONTUM // I‘ l ‘ M ' - ‘-\., ' . . BINH DIN \['§;:T' _H - ;Yf \_‘ _ - Q. Pleiku‘PLEIKU - ;, Q , ., ~. ’ . - PHU 1Y\“\\ ‘-\ E; ' ?¢ EON PHU _ (X Tonia’ . - , _ 4 _ V _ 1 _g.up‘\ \ C A M B O D I YEN 1 _ {'53. \ {E ““- DARLAC §§?}f'§~ ,/ 4‘ 7;. \ .K"A"".»~~;,*f; \o=-4 ' ' 3',“ \f‘ '_ 1 ' HOA ‘-. _ .-\- ‘ 5'-1‘!~ ‘ QLIANG DUC ‘ ' N /-\V~_/‘*“ E "- " awO ~e DUC .eMe-MNH. T 22$$5 " ,_ PHUOC NINH_ _ . LONG ~ ' a" BINH LAM DONG . THUN,£r‘.§zl1.“:‘#§ ‘ ‘\\ \ TAY LONG ( NINH V V , BINH ¥ BINH >\ {:~L§'I- DUONG ' J K’ -4/‘ -"_-\ = E E pp E pp 4J) MEN‘. [ - j .- ‘ KIEN ATE ® V‘ v e;>ps__ 3 I K ' \~-\/—\’_\r CDTIACU HQNG TUONG LCl::G §l|':\H Pqfgsc ,7 =>~;:<§»}. I C/\ ..\ yr“ ‘pmy au V,H H;.»,. ;..W ;,f bi.‘ ’, } :1‘>'E“ “F” 4 ‘ iv ~ '34‘ U IANG v|NH \ . i ., Q‘ BINH * L *Iif;'ii’51’i.», y (‘I’1F()FI ' ' K El'A xuvsu ‘ ,~ ' ' K BINH L - * K SI/111/I I5i'i‘*i??“l§?§1Yi“f}“§T§ \‘ , _. “P 4 0 &* * ' ' ~ -, E ., I BAC LIEU?‘ ‘ ' 3 ' XUYEN "‘ SOUTH V|E1-NAMA , 25 H 5O7 mum C: 75 lOOMrIes 0 25 50 75 X00 Kdomelers

Ia:-1 * .. \ “ H 69634 2-68 CIA s.5(¢

17 INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
---
# Vietnam

North Vietnamese gunners shelled allied strongpoints from Khe Sanh eastward along the length of the Demilitarized Zone on 15-16 February. The heaviest barrage came at the Khe Sanh base, where two US Marines were killed and 28 were wounded.

In the eastern section of the Demilitarized Zone, enemy tanks were sighted approximately five miles north of Con Thien. This is the first time tanks have been seen in this sector. At last report, airstrikes had been called in, but there is no word on the results.

It now appears almost certain that the North Vietnamese 803rd Regiment has crossed the Cua Viet River and joined the 812th north and east of Quang Tri city.

Ground action elsewhere was generally light on February 15-16. Allied forces are still meeting stubborn enemy resistance in the Hue Citadel; however, several small but violent skirmishes broke out along the northern coast.

There have been a number of low-level reports in recent days suggesting that new Communist attacks on major urban areas may be imminent. Reports like these are undoubtedly intended to alarm the civilian population and keep allied forces off balance. Nevertheless, the disposition of Communist forces does pose a serious problem to a number of cities and towns throughout the country.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C031865161. 350.

Viet Cong propaganda has picked up the theme of several recent Hanoi broadcasts and seems to be stressing the longer term effects of the Tet offensive. Communiques from several Communist regional commands in the South take the line that the offensive has laid the groundwork for more intensive fighting ahead. The propaganda also points out that further "successes" will be costly and that continuing sacrifices and hardships are necessary before final victory. 3.5 c)(

17 Feb 68 2 6 3-5'

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO3186516
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516

3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
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| |003186516|35(0)|
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|17 Feb 68|3|35(6)|
|T|ECRET| |
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516| | |
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 003100510             3-5(6)

3.3(h)(2)

17 Feb-68

3.5 C)(

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516|3'5(C)|
|---|---|
|1 ur 01:|KL 1|
| |3.3(h)(2)|

17 Feb 68

5

s.5(¢)

TO

CRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
---
West Berlin: An outdoor rally planned this Sunday by organizers of the anti-Vietnam Congress could well lead to violence.

Congress sponsors, including the radical Socialist German Student Federation, appear determined to test the newly expressed resolve of authorities in Bonn and Berlin to keep student unrest in bounds. Mayor Schuetz appears determined not to back down or temporize, lest he suffer the fate of his predecessor, who quit last fall after failing to cope with the growing student problem.

Principal target for the Sunday demonstration is the US headquarters complex in the southwest part of the city. Rally leader Rudi Dutschke has urged participants to wear raincoats and protective headgear and to use flagstaffs and placards as weapons against the police. Although the demonstrators may number more than 5,000, the police should be able to prevent the full impact of the demonstration from reaching the headquarters area.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 003100510 3-5(6)

1:, L

3.3(h)(2)

17 Feb 68 7 35(0) TOP CRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516_L \I.l. lJJ_l\J.L\..l_1 J. 3_5(¢)

Panama: A struggle for control of the election machinery is dimming the prospects for a peaceful election on 12 May.

Government candidate Samudio, faced with a likely defeat at the polls by National Union candidate Arnulfo Arias, appears determined either to control the electoral process at any cost or to postpone the elections. The struggle is centered on authority within the key electoral tribunal, which now favors Arias.

Samudio scored a tactical victory in getting National Guard Commandant Vallarino to reinstall a Samudio supporter as head of the tribunal's documentation office. For their part, Arias’ followers are now considering a special session of the National Assembly to impeach President Robles for electoral misconduct. Arias says he hopes to work out a legal solution. He warns that if the government moves to postpone the elections he will use his majority in the assembly to replace Robles with First‘ Vice, Pre"s'ide'nt Del Valle, an Arias supporter.

The current conflict could erupt into violence, and put Vallarino in a difficult position. He has tried to remain neutral, but he has been under pressure within and outside the Guard to support Samudio. Violence in the streets could force Vallarino to side or with the government or, as a last resort. intervene and take over himself. 1 3_5(¢)

17 Feb 68 8 Z35’???

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 003100510
---
|Approved|/|7 CO3186516|s.5(¢|
|---|---|---|---|
| | | |3.3(h)(2)|
|17 Feb 68| | | |
| | | |3.5 c|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516| | | |
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516
~’Fop%ee|=et_
—‘Fop—$ee|=e¢
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186516 CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_BULL[15617890].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Current intelligence report on national security issues, including situation reports on Vietnam, West Berlin, and Panama",
"When": "17 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "West Berlin", "Panama"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974291

Presidential Daily Brief

22 February 1968
---
# DAILY BRIEF 1968

22 FEBRUARY

1. South Vietnam Saigon. Sharp fighting continues aroundnoElsewhere, there have been significant changes in the military situation during the night.

In Hue, some progress is being flmade toward repairing the city's disrupted facilities. Our station in Saigon, however, believes that re-establishment of civil government in Hue will be difficult.

Few of the city's significant public officials have even tried to return to work, while others have surrendered to the Viet Cong. Those officials who are on the job show little initiative and do not control their subordinates. The Saigon with enough authority to re-weighed in government has not yet establish confidence and public support.

2. Geneva Conference
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974291
Japan
3.3(h)(2)
4- Laqs
"l"6'P-5'-EG-R-Elli -
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974291
---
# Panama

Robles has further inflamed the bitter struggle for control of the electoral machinery by engineering the suspension of two pro-Arias electoral judges. If the judges are in fact dismissed, Arias might carry out his threat to impeach Robles or call a massive march on Panama City.

Robles has assured Ambassador Adair that he will maintain public order and respect democratic processes. The National Guard, which feels caught in the middle, was put on full alert Tuesday and probably could keep order in the short run.

# Communist China

Posters attacking one Chi Pen-yu have recently been seen in Peking. The personage was a charter member of the radical Cultural Revolution group set up in 1966 and one of its chief spokesmen throughout last year. He was also one of the last of the group to be publicly active, most of the rest having faded from sight back in September.

These attacks on Chi, apparently officially inspired, strengthen our belief that the radical elements in the leadership continue to lose ground.

# Soviet Union

On 12 February the Soviets made the first-test flight of a new launch vehicle, probably intended for a weapons system.
---
# ANNEX

Interrogation of North Vietnamese Captain

Preliminary interrogation of a North Vietnamese Army captain captured in Danang is providing a large volume of information on enemy strategy and future intentions. Much of what the prisoner says appears to reflect Communist plans for the current military campaign. The prisoner's comments indicate the Communists view the current effort as one which will extend over several months and eventually conclude with a political settlement on their terms. He suggests that major new attacks against urban centers like Khe Sanh are likely and that the build-up at Khe Sanh is basically intended to divert US resources' attention to that area while Communist forces make headway elsewhere.

The prisoner says that the current offensive is part of a three-phase strategy in which the Communists would first launch a general offensive against rural areas, then move to besiege the cities and at the same time lure US forces into the Khe Sanh area. If this failed, they were to regroup in the Western Highlands or near Saigon and be "wiped out." Finally, "decisive" battles would occur, and a coalition government would be established as a result of sustained pressure on the allies.

In support of this, the Communists were stepping up activities in southern Laos to permit large-scale infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces to tie down more US troops.

The prisoner gave very detailed and probably accurate information on Communist plans and organization in the Danang area. His comments that major enemy ground attacks can be expected in the northern coastal provinces are in accordance with intelligence.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974291

TOP SECRET

Beyond the area in which he himself served, the prisoner's knowledgeability is more questionable. His description of the basic outline of enemy strategy probably is correct, but we doubt that he can speak with authority battles will be fought. Moreover, on broad political topics, such as his allegation that the Chinese have offered two million combat troops to North Vietnam and will enter the conflict if the United States increases its military strength in the South, he is unlikely to have had access to first-hand information.

A-2

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974291
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974291

\T@7*Sfc~».=4=e-L

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974291
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974291

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

s.5(¢)

22 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974291
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

22 February 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Claim on North Vietnam Claims Civilian Casualties: About 800 civilians were killed or wounded by US air strikes around Hanoi, Haiphong, and Vinh Linh during the last three months of 1967, comparable with periodic claims made during the first nine months of last year. The February claim increased Hanoi's reported total of civilian casualties for 1967 to about 5,000.

# Hanoi Atmospherics:

Comments on life in Hanoi at the end of last month:

- Some efforts were made during Tet to brighten up the state store. More goods were on display for those fortunate enough to obtain permission to shop, but prices were very high. The smallest transistor radio was selling for three times the average worker's monthly wage, and a bicycle was selling for ten times his monthly wage.
- Every major government building is being equipped with its own massive bomb shelter. The embassies of the Communist nations are following suit to live unprotected, while non-Communist representatives continue.
- New Year's Day (29 January) brought out large and happy crowds of people who enjoyed themselves for 24 hours but not. The temper of the masses as it was displayed during Tet does not suggest war weariness was so severe as to be a critical factor in the situation.
---
# Hanoi Promotes a General with Experience in South Vietnam:

A general with a long background in South Vietnamese military affairs has been promoted into a defense ministry job in Hanoi, presumably after giving up his former responsibilities in the South.

The broadcast says that Major General Nguyen Don, identified as vice minister of national defense and an alternate member of the party committee, is in Moscow heading up a delegation to the celebrations of Soviet army day. Don has been identified for years as a leading figure in the Viet Cong prisoners and captured documents in the Viet Cong in the early 1960s in military command structure in South Vietnam. He became commander of Viet Cong Military Region South which covers most of the northern half of Vietnam. One prisoner captured a year ago claimed that he had been demoted to deputy commander of the region in mid-1966, but there is no other evidence of this. There has been no hint of Don's activities over the past year or so. Don's move to the defense ministry may be a routine personnel shift for a man with many years of active duty in the South. His trip to Moscow and his new position indicate he is still in good standing, and it seems likely that in his new role, he will continue to play an important military job. It is even possible that he was shifted to the defense ministry in order to provide the Hanoi high command with the benefit of his specialized knowledge of the situation in the northern half of South Vietnam, focusing their attention where the Communists now seem to be.

# Swedish Ambassador in Peking Travels to Hanoi Today:

The Swedish ambassador to China, Petri, is scheduled to travel to Hanoi on 22 February. This will be Petri's second trip to North Vietnam. It also is the latest step in Hanoi's current campaign to present its position on settling the war to representatives of Western and neutralist governments.
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974291

the Swiss ambassador to Peking, who has been in Hanoi for the past three days, of the 21st. return to China on the evening was scheduled toIn -part, the ambassador's visit was apparently to establish some form of diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. According to a 21 February announcement of the Swiss foreign minister, the ambassador has been named official "representative" to North Vietnam--a position involving "purely technical contacts" with the North Vietnamese, but not to be construed as full diplomatic recognition. France is the only other non-Communist European country with which Hanoi currently has diplomatic relations.

NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

its English language broadcast of 21 February, HanoiInHanoi Praises US Writers Who Oppose the War: included a message from several Liberation Front writers‘ organizations have refused s war policy." writers and editors whoto a group of to pay a "war tax" and who are opposed to "Johnson’448 American The message predicted that the American people would oppose more policy" and would demand that the US immoral war strongly¢"the Johnson administration's settle the war on Communist terms.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974291 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617856].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "U.S. President, North Vietnamese Army, Communist China, Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Swedish Ambassador to China, Swiss Ambassador to Peking, Liberation Front writers' organizations",
    "What": "Update on military situation in South Vietnam, Geneva Conference, Panama political struggle, attacks in Communist China, Soviet Union's new launch vehicle, interrogation of North Vietnamese Army captain, civilian casualties in North Vietnam, life in Hanoi, promotions in North Vietnamese military, diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, Hanoi's position on war settlement, U.S. political attitudes on the war",
    "When": "22 February 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam Saigon", "Hue", "Geneva", "Panama", "Peking", "Hanoi", "Switzerland", "Danang", "Khe Sanh", "southern Laos", "North Vietnamese", "Moscow"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # MEMORANDUM

|SUBJECT:|Support of Viet Cong by ARVN and Civilian Elements|
|---|---|
|021200 EST|2 February 1968|

1. There is little evidence that either ARVN or civilian elements in the provincial cities and Saigon have supported the Viet Cong during the series of attacks which began 30 January. Reporting for this period has been screened, and the few instances of the VC receiving support are recorded. It is still too early to state that the VC did not receive support in the cities, since more detailed coverage is required. There is yet no detailed reporting on what has occurred in the countryside outside the cities. The problem is further complicated by reports of the VC use of ARVN uniforms and also changing into civilian clothes.

2. The Viet Cong entered Saigon expecting internal support elements to be greater than was actually the case. They had been misled by exaggerated reporting from VC cadre within the city as to their effectiveness in building support for the VC cause. An attempt to organize a demonstration for peace in Saigon failed.

3. At the An Quang Pagoda on 31 January, the 2 GVN Marine companies refused to attack, so combat police made the assault but were driven back. There is no evidence that the VC in the An Quang Pagoda have the cooperation of the monks. On the contrary, GVN authorities believed the VC forced their way in and are not assisted by Thich Tri Quang or his supporters. At 1200H some 30 monks and nuns demonstrated in sympathy with the VC attacks on Saigon and were dispersed by the police.
---
# Several VG prisoners captured by GVN military forces had been bona fide members of GVN Combat Police who had apparently infiltrated that organization

I CORPS
II CORPS
III CORPS

# In Danang, Dai Viet and Buddhist leaders have cooperated with the GVN in preventing VC sponsored demonstrations.

In an attempt to take over the Tin Hoa Pagoda on 30 January, the VC organized a rally and tried to convince the people that the VC had won a significant victory. There was little reaction by the populace, and the police made a number of arrests.

# In Pleiku city during the night of 31 January, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units who were protecting the American civilian compounds were forced to pull back into these compounds after receiving heavy fire from unknown sources believed by some to be ARVN elements

# In Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Darlac Province, two American civilian compounds came under .50 caliber MG and M79 grenade fire on the night of 30 - 31 January from an armored vehicle with indigenous personnel in ARVN uniforms.

American advisors attempted to advise the ARVN troops that the compounds were American, and both advisor plus Montagnard guards were wounded when the supposed ARVN troops responded by throwing grenades. The Khanh Hoa Province chief informed 5th USSF in Nha Trang that elements of the ARVN 45th Regiment, 23rd Inf Div had defected to the VC and joined the fighting in Ban Me Thuot.

# In Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province, the National Police Special Branch reported that there are indications the VC attackers on 31 January were being assisted by members of the extreme Buddhists Movement.

Five Buddhist nuns were arrested, and the police are attempting to confirm Buddhist involvement. The VC attempted to organize demonstrations in pro-VC hamlets in Bien Khanh District, 10 kms west of Nha Trang. The VC succeeded in gathering about 200 persons, but there is no evidence of a general uprising.

According to interrogation of prisoners during the attack on Nha Trang, NVA troops were told prior to the attack they would be able to take and hold Nha Trang because the VC organized the population to assist them. This assistance did not materialize.
---
# III CORPS

9.
No information of support.

# IV CORPS

|10.|In Ben Tre city, Kien Hoa Province, a large number of teenage boys were seen riding on bicycles through the streets during the fighting. They were unmolested by the VC and assumed to be acting as couriers for the VC.|
|---|---|
|11.|Prior to Chau Doc city's coming under attack on 31 January, it appears the residents were aware of VC intentions to occupy the city, and they did not inform GVN officials. The populace did not have TET celebrations the night of 30 January but stayed in their homes. During the attacks, many uniformed GVN officials abandoned their uniforms and only put them back on after the town had been secured by friendly forces. (Hqs. Comment: This is not an unusual occurrence in the Delta and has happened previously.)|

# SAIGON (Additional)

|12.|Militant Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang said there were no VC in An Quang Pagoda before 31 January and that he and other senior bonzes fled after VC came to the pagoda. Buddhist Monks in An Quang Pagoda during the police assault on 1 February say there were no VC in the pagoda before or during the attack.|
|---|---|
|13.|The VC effort to impress local intellectual circles with their power and capability has had some success. There are definitely those who feel that the current offensive proves there is no other solution than formation of a coalition government with the NLF. The wife of well-known engineer Nguyen Ngoc Bich advocates creation of such a coalition.|
|14.|A senior GVN official says that if the Viet Cong are not cleared from Saigon within 48 hours the already deteriorating civilian morale will be further reduced and supplies will begin to run short. The mood of the populace is edgy, and its susceptibility to rumors is high. The use of such measures as destructive in clearing target areas of inhabitants and firing these areas could prove destructive in terms of psychological support from the people.| "SUPPORT OF VIET CONG BY A[15561245].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": ["ARVN", "Viet Cong", "GVN authorities", "American advisors", "National Police Special Branch", "NVA troops", "teenage boys", "Thich Tri Quang", "Nguyen Ngoc Bich", "GVN official"],
"What": ["support of Viet Cong by ARVN and civilian elements", "series of attacks beginning 30 January 1968", "resistance against VC", "assistance to VC during attacks in different cities", "interrogation of prisoners", "defection of ARVN troops to VC", "support by extreme Buddhists Movement", "lack of support in III CORPS and IV CORPS areas", "militant Buddhist leaders' statements", "effect of Viet Cong presence on civilian morale"],
"When": "2 February 1968",
"Where": ["Saigon", "An Quang Pagoda", "Danang", "Tin Hoa Pagoda", "Pleiku city", "Ban Me Thuot", "Nha Trang", "Ben Tre city", "Chau Doc city"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172623

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172623

Secret
3.5(c)3.5(c)

# STAVES OF DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

Secret

No January 7, 1968

0001/68

61-2+6523/1 No. 0001/68

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172623

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172623

v;,-2'd-15S:.3/I
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172623     3.5(c)3.5(c)
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Page
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---
# THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

VIETNAM
major problems are Hanoi In record wip violated of Communist cease-fire military forces violated pe New Year pe Communist cease-fire attacks. wrestling wip budgetary attacks military a wip wip In record number Saigon number President Thieu of incidents and pe New Year's and reform and pe two two cabinet major Saigon, President and Thieu land reform cabinet are wrestling pis week in strengpened budgetary exchange for its land commitment problems. to talk Hanoi wip pis pe US strengpened commitment to talk wip pe US in exchange for a bombing cessation.

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

|Page|WEEKLY SUMMARY|Jan 68|
|---|---|---|
|Page i|Jan 68| |
---
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# NR

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---
# FAR EAST

Hanoi has issued a less ambiguous statement of its position regarding international bombing and domestic pressure in an effort to stimulate greater US concessions.

Hanoi's conditional cessation of bombing and domestic pressure to stimulate greater US concessions "will halt in conditional North Vietnam to extend the cease-fire of un-war" Foreign Minister Trinh may hold talks with the US after acts of war against North Vietnam have been timed to encourage efforts for a flexible displeasure settlement negotiated late in January.

Hanoi's move to appear more flexible in negotiations over Chinese displeasure settlement negotiations was evident in Peking's silence on Trinh's statement.

|Page|WEEKLY SUMMARY|Jan 6 868|
|---|---|---|
|1|WEEKLY SUMMARY 5|Jan 6 868|
---
# THAILAND

CAMBODIA
THAILAND

# VIETNAM

Demilitarized Zone
Quang Tri
Hue
Quang Ngai
Kon Tum
Phu Bon
Nha Trang
Da Lat
Ban Me Thuot
II CORPS
III CORPS
IV CORPS
Special Zone
Capital
Can Tho
IV CORPS
IV CORPS
III CORPS
III CORPS
SAIGON
COL HIDENTIAL
SOUTH VIETNAM
100 MILES
100 MILES
---
# WEEKLY SUMMARY

The allied New Year was punctuated by the record cease-fire identified as intense Vietnamese mortar and rocket bombardment. The South Vietnamese base was shelled as the 261st and 263rd-170 Communist-initiated incidents were identified. The enemy was shelled and identified as intense enemy mortar and rocket bombardment. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in large-scale attacks, resulting in losses on both sides. Most major losses were suffered during a US artillery attack on a northern Tay Ninh province. The enemy was reportedly routed, with losses including a battalion commander. Before the assaults, the attackers lost 60 on the both sides. The multibattalion attack on the garrison in Tay Ninh resulted in heavy casualties and wounded.

The attack on the night of either 1-2 January was well launched by the enemy fire period a week earlier. Heavy truck traffic was observed in both North and South Vietnam during the observed New Year stand-down. The 9th and 272nd Viet Cong Divisions struck the 271st stand-down. The newly constructed US artillery position below Camodian border was noted above the Demilitarized Zone.

Since the end of the holiday respite and the resumption of major operations and search-and-destroy allied operations, the enemy losses have been sporadic. More than 153 American troops and 380 enemy troops were in contact with the enemy territory, resulting in heavy losses on both sides. Both Communist units have probably been reinforced, but have suffered heavy losses in the last October attack. It is also possible that the current allied movement is designed to divert attention from nearby infiltration and supply routes. The second major enemy violation of the cease-fire occurred in the Dinh Tuong Province of the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam, where elements of two Viet Cong battalions were identified.
---
# 3.3(h)(2)

ShERET ci1.:,~ , .l.'.,..l

bombing of North modifying its shows hard-line sign settlement terms bombing no shows no of sign of Vietnam terms of for North modifying Vietnam, negotiated but its hard-line for a negotiated settlement.

ister Nguyen Duy reception speech Trinh diplomats reception In last speech week, at a Foreign diplomats' Min-declared Min- that his ister Nguyen government Duy Trinh "will declared hold talks his that with government Washington if the US" will hold questions talks conditi concerned with onally terminates Washington about un questions concerned terminates acts the if the US bomb unconditionally ing and all other the of war bombing against all and North North other Vietnam acts of Ha - noi war 5 previous position had been based noi's on previous Trinh position statement had of been 28 January 1967 based on Trinh's to statement effect the talks 1f of that 28 January there J.967 could actions be the effect the that US there took could these be talks if the US took these actions.

Vietnamese less This less ambiguous North This posi ambiguous increase probably North istic n probably designed to posi Vietnamese designed international ing to of a. increase pressure and ticn domestic is and the US extension for of the international bomb pressure halt on an extension the US for bombing cease-fire halt and dur - an ing month. lunar new year the attacks ing lunar An new end year later this month tive long An end a to primary objec- to the attacks has the has tive original Hanoi achieve this long of of the been offer regime obj1:!c- been Hanoi primary year and regime, ago and was the designed original making to any significant offer a year ago without mak substantive ing was without designed concessions to any achieve significant on this settlement of conces the :sions war on a settlement of the war. The foreign minister a voiced

Hanoi on Bombing Cessation spelling any The out talks timing or avoided, d fo:reign the minister con - Hanoi Of on a Cessation content Of Bombing_ that tent of the any of basis talks, but indicate Vietnam that Vietnam the prob and for basis lem remained Hanoi solving the problem reimained Hanoi's itself in Hanoi begin talks with Hanoi to has publicly committed has publicly committed the four points che program of four points and Liberation Front the political the political

US itself return to begin for talks end an with to the program of the Liberation Front. 3.5(c)

# Page 4 WEEKLY SUMMARY

# Page 5 Jan 6 8 68
---
#

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# NR

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Secret

Secret

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Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03172623 WEEKLY-SUMMARY15478126.pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
  "What": "Weekly intelligence summaries including updates on Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and North Vietnam's position on bombing cessation",
  "When": "7th January 1968",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "Thailand", "Cambodia", "North Vietnam"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}