Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report 39

Spot Report on the Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

Control reports late indicate the North Vietnamese gained control of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp on the afternoon of the 7th and from artillery bombardment. Six defenders under intensive friendly aerial evacuation of the Vietnamese and 24 Americans have not yet been accounted for. Earlier in the day, an estimated Communist company had controlled the camp above ground while friendly personnel were entrenched in underground bunkers.

Two relief columns were reportedly converging on the scene late in the afternoon for a combined aerial raid on the camp. Neither had entered the camp itself at last report. One of the relief forces was composed of Special Forces personnel helo-lifted from Khe Sanh; the other was a local Laotian volunteer.

The identity of the attacking Communist elements is not yet clear. The attack was possibly conducted by elements from the 66th Regiment of the NVA 304th Division. A senior non-commissioned officer left who do-affected the camp. Radio direction finding stated that generally when he has orders he also left south to fixed this attack of Khe Sanh/Lang Vei in recent days.

It is also possible that elements of the 101D Regiment of the NVA 325C Division were involved. A radio terminal possibly serving the headquarters of the NVA-SZSC325C Division.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02962534
---
# the Lang the 1011) Vei. lOED was wee 11.oted nofied moving moving 01i. on 6 6 l"ebru.:,.ry February to to tl1e the south south flmm WM...‘ of of'Leog Vei, On 0n the somG the samesix game day, the 325C 3250 headquarters firflllyl mOVGd to a 1,osi tion some six mil~s west west of of Lang Vei. According was nigl-1t Accerding to to a report reportwith Feb1·uar:r scene, Veifrom from the fiielly the scene, the the ' rf Khe Rho Sa11.h Saeh garriso1, the garrison was faced of faced with potentially poten whenset•iousserious complications Laotian eomplioetioneLaotian mately mateiy 6,000 6,000one-quarter1.~erugees on on the night refugeesof moved moved 7 7Februaryf l"om from Lang when Lang Vei approxi- approxiw --‘-' - . g3 , te,withinto within one~quarter mile mile of of Kh9 Keg Sanh. Sanh. ' -?;,f?he 1., Tile Khe Khe Sanll Sanktho1 l'om ibaee bP.se comi1H'H1ctcr commandercloset•,beento has has been been advised advised i253§9399térffih0.. to: (let.el'. the reI1.1goes refugeesthefrom moving; moving eloseb.fly Officials Officials ' 93in58aigoe'in Saigo1) \Vill will ask ask Laotian Laotian charge charge to to to clear Khefly to Khe 'SanhSanh a1'ea.tamerrowto1'ti6-:t~row to 'to 'rencourage . eeCOurage the the refugees refugees to clear the the area. of enemy8. situation, the the of calthe attack, for cal enemy theattack,for problems probleme8. situation,the Aside Aside co11fusion.rofugees the frOmthe base friendlsrshieldposes approach thebaee refugeesthemess massdefenders. obvious obvious eefendere‘of of could could refugees refugeesShould approachpolitical political shield ti•oops.hisShouldposeshis delicacy delicacy tho tacti- tacti- the Ol~ or causo ceuee confusion among among friendly troops. . 9. 9. areis It It isinpossible in defeoders that Ban possible that very veryoflarge dependentslarge numbers numbers of. refugees refugeee are the the Langarea. at Some Lang area.atSome of the Sane theSanedependents ,_ . of ofthethe the Laotian Laotianofdefendere Ben Houei dependents Houeidependentswere were in in > * .the vicini~y vicinity of of Vei, Vei, along along with of of , ~thethe Lang Lang Vei Vei camp camp itself. velopmentsThero 10. fis There 10. have by have beell been llO no othe1· other significant significant de- velopmeu reported reported by i'iold field elemcrnts elements on on the the military military v ; Ll situation eituation in South South Vietnam, Vietnam, or or with with regard regardftoto DR.V DEV . 3. ai1•craft. aircraft‘ ' .¢§.' ' ..~-'y - 2 - . u i ‘ oI".on Ina n Io InI gonI'I."I—|o.--d'gfl-l—HIIfl-II-MOM-nI—oh- g .1...lit-I'm "SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUAT[15561250].pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Intelligence agency or military personnel",
	"What": "Spot report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area, mentioning the North Vietnamese attack on the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp",
	"When": "7th February",
	"Where": ["Lang Vei", "Khe Sanh", "South Vietnam"],
	"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514

-Tap-See|=et-

fit Q7QQ!)

fit

c@“TR4¢\\\/ ’I~3N210‘<I

.1;

D $1/was 0? "2.7,,§(4“Q/

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central I1/zz‘e//zgezeee Bee//eizee

-‘Fop—See|=ot-

""j"¢ 214 8-5<¢>

12 Fébruary 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514 3_5(C)

12 February 1968

Central Intelligence Bulletin

|CONTENTS|M|
|---|---|
|Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)| |
|South Korea: President Pak expected to press for new US commitments.| |
|India: Bengal State direct rule (Page 4)| |
|"P6-P-S-E-G-R-E? 3'5| |

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C031 86514

U NORTH VIETNAM Demilitarized Zone

|Khe San|THUA THIEN|
|---|---|
|Da Nang|QUANG NAM|
|THAILAND|QUANG TIN|
|QUANG NGAI|KONTUM|
|KONTUM|PLEIKU|
|PHU BON| |
|PLEIKU| |
|PHUOC LONG|NINH THUAN|
|NINH DINH|BINH THUAN|
|KHANH HOA| |
|HOA BINH|QUANG DUC|
|TAY NINH|LAM DONG|
|LONG KHANH| |
|BA RIA|PHUOC LE|
|PHUOC TUY| |
|KIEN GIANG|BA XUYEN|
|CA MAU|GULF OF SIAM|
|BAC LIEU|BA RIA|
|CUU LONG|CON SON|

90 25 50 75 100 Mues

25 50 75 100 Kilometers

69578 2-68 CIA

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C031 86514 LETIN Map
---
# 7 CO3186514

South Vietnam: The widely anticipated "second phase" of the Communist offensive against urban areas of South Vietnam has still not materialized.

The past weekend actually saw a general easing of enemy pressure around cities and towns in some areas of South Vietnam, although new attacks were reported against two provincial capitals and two allied airfields in the delta.

Except for a damaging rocket attack against Bien Hoa Air Base on 10 February and continued enemy resistance to allied clearing operations in Cholon, the Saigon area remained relatively quiet over the weekend, with life in the capital gradually returning to normal.

In the northern provinces, the US Marine combat at Khe Sanh came under heavy artillery, rocket, and mortar fire on 10 and 11 February, although no accompanying North Vietnamese ground probes were reported. While no major new fighting erupted elsewhere in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) - northern Quang Tri Province area, the shipment of large quantities of heavy caliber ammunition--up to 152 mm--to points just north of the DMZ within the past week.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514

18 truckloads of Q delivered on 8.

The NVA 320... and 324 "B" divisions, the 270th Independent Regiment, and the 27th Independent "Battalion have revealed preparations for attacks against allied positions in the north-central DMZ area, in the northeastern coastal quadrant of Quang Tri Province, and in the Quang Tri city area.

In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese troops this weekend continued their efforts to dislodge stubbornly resisting enemy forces from the Citadel area. Late press reports indicate that a 400-man US Marine amphibious assault force has also joined the fray in a flanking maneuver designed to trap Communist elements holding out in the northern part of the city.

Elsewhere in I Corps, allied ground and air operations appear to have broken up a major concentration of enemy units threatening Da Nang from the Division, These forces, spearheaded by the NVA 2nd south, were last reported in a withdrawal to the southwest.

The highland and coastal provinces of central Vietnam reported no significant new enemy initiatives over the weekend, but sizable Communist forces continued to maneuver in the vicinity of a number of provincial and district capitals.

Liberation Front spokesmen continue to give the impression that they intend to establish unilaterally a coalition government in opposition to Saigon. There is still no indication, however, that they have plans to do so immediately.

In discussions on 8 and 9 February, the Liberation Front representative in Phnom Penh, Nguyen Van Hien, said that the creation of a "provisional government" was now a Front objective, but that the timing of its establishment would be decided "in consultation with other revolutionary forces.

12 Feb 68

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514C
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514

Soup Korea; President Pak Chong-hui is expected to press for new US commitments to Seoul in his meetings wip US presidential envoy Cyrus R. Vance.
Pak primarily seeks to have pe Mutual Defense Treaty amended to guarantee immediate US assistance in pe event of all-out Norp Korean attack and to assure a similar response to such Communist intrusions as last monp's presidential assassination attempt. Seoul believes pe treaty's stipulation pat "constitutional processes" must precede US intervention might delay or even bar timely US assistance.
Pak probably would also like to gain--but not necessarily use--pe power to wipdraw Soup Korean troops from UN command operational control, to recall his troops from Vietnam, and to mount attacks on Norp Korea. Some of pese points, which are reported to have been considered in a recent National Assembly session, may come up in pe course of Pak's negotiations.
In pe past two days pe government has stressed pe "military aid is not enough" peme prough pe press and has permitted several small protest rallies and demonstrations to take place.

12 Feb 68

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514
---
India: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi may move to impose direct rule from New Delhi on volatile West Bengal to avoid a scheduled confidence vote in the state assembly. The Congress Party dominates the state coalition government, but a growing dissident group, with which Mrs. Gandhi shares dislike for West Bengal party boss Atulya Ghosh, could undermine the coalition's narrow majority. Although New Delhi has long sought to avoid direct rule in West Bengal, Mrs. Gandhi may prefer it to either a less satisfactory new non-Communist coalition or a return to power of the Communist-dominated United Front.

Date: 12 Feb 68
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03186514 CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_BULL[15617849].pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, Director of Central Intelligence, President Pak Chong-hui, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi",
  "What": "Current intelligence on national security issues, Communist activity in Vietnam, South Korean-US relations, direct rule in West Bengal",
  "When": "12 February 1968",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "South Korea", "West Bengal", "Phnom Penh"],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502

Top Secret 3.5(c)

SITESOEKhE

DIRECTORATEOF

DIRECTORATE INTELLIGENCEOF

INTELLIGENCE

Central CentralIntelligenceIntelligence Bulletin

Top-Secret 3.5(c) 197 8January197C 1968 January 1968

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502     3.5(c)3.5(c)
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
                                                  ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
---
# TOP SECRET

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
NRNR

8 January 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

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Page

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---
# Vietnam:

North Vietnam:

Short-range, surface-to-surface missiles intended for coastal defense may have been introduced into Norp Vietnam.
If confirmed, pey could endanger US warships conducting shore bombardment operations along pe coast.
Photography of 19 December 1967 reveals two camouflaged equipment, including one object identified as probably an SS-N-2 (STYX) missile and several possible rail-type launchers.
Bop sites contain six revetted positions pat initially appeared to be intended for surface-to-air missile operations.
The sites were struck repeatedly by US Navy aircraft on 5 and 6 January and operational reports indicate pat extensive damage was inflicted.
There is no firm evidence pat eiper site was occupied at pe time of pe attacks.
If Norp Vietnam has received STYX missiles to oppose US naval operations near its coast, pe locations of pe sites noted in photography are well-suited to pis purpose.
This missile has a range of about 20 miles and was pe weapon used by pe Egyptian Navy on 21 October 1967 to sink pe Israeli destroyer Eilat. US aircraft carriers customarily operate beyond pe range of a STYX missile fired from pe Vietnamese coast.

# South Vietnam:

Vice President Ky claims that he and senior army generals have urged President Thieu to exercise more dynamic leadership.

8 Jan 68
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502|
|---|---|
|.i t.lbNorth|NORTH|
|V IETNAM|Damilitarized Zone|
|OMiNG TR|Hue|
|MUATHIENAPhu Loc|Da Nang|
|QANGNAM|CoR?|
|THAILAND|QUANGTIN|
|THAILAND|QUANG NGAI|
|KONTUM|DINH|
|PLEIKU|DARLACPAU|
|BON|PAU|
|CORPS|KHa|
|ANGOUC|TUYEN|
|HUOC|DabUc NINA CAM RANH|
|PHN?|TAUAN|
|Minh|BINA|
|uoht|TUY|
|Tan Uyen|BINA|
|KIFNLONGSAICOC|PAJocT|
|PhOnG|ung Tau Corps|
|FLC|Capital Special Zone|
|Fhu Qudc|NG|
|DIUA|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|XUYEN|CONFI DENTIAL|
|69 173 68 CIA|69 173 68 CIA|
|CEApproved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502'TN|3.5(c)|
|8 Jan 68|C~ppr::_o_'!~dfor Rele~~ 2018/07/26 C03186502 Man|
---
# Government administrative centers and Allied outposts

Government administrative centers and Allied outposts in various parts of pe country have been subjected to enemy assaults during pe past several days.
In Thua Thien Province on 6 January, pe Communists conducted a series of coordinated attacks against Phu Loc District headquarters, pree adjacent Combined Action Platoons, and a US Marine reaction force.
Friendly forces suffered 34 killed and 80 wounded in pese actions while pe enemy lost 91 killed.
On 5 January in Quang Tin Province, pe enemy assaulted a US fire support base near a district town which had been attacked on 3 January.
These two incidents cost pe Allies 46 killed and 113 wounded while pe enemy is reported to have lost 80 killed.
Oper district headquarters in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces have been recent Communist targets, while in II Corps, pere were several coordinated mortar barrages in and around pe capital of Darlac Province.
A district headquarters in Tuyen Duc Province of II Corps also received mortar fire on 5 January.
During pe night of 6 January, enemy forces appear to have coordinated a number of incidents in pe III Corps provinces of Binh Duong and Bien Hoa.
The brunt of pis effort was directed against a Vietnamese Army regimental.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502

TOP SECRET

headquarters at Tan Uyen in Bien Hoa Province: Communists did not succeed in overrunning the army headquarters at Tan Uyen in Bien Hoa Province. The compound, but they appear to have held the town for several hours. Almost simultaneously, at least four other engagements occurred in the adjacent areas of Bien Hoa and Binh Duong provinces. Preliminary casualty reports from all incidents indicate Allied losses of 12 killed and 45 wounded. Enemy losses were unknown.

In southernmost IV Corps, the Viet Cong on 6 January hit a military training center, an army convoy, and a Revolutionary Development area in Vinh Long Province. In adjacent Vinh Binh Province, two villages were assaulted and in Ba Xuyen Province, a district capital outpost apparently overrun. This flurry of enemy activity cost the Vietnamese at least 42 killed, 98 wounded, and 67 weapons lost. Enemy casualties are unknown.

8 Jan 68
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502     NRNR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
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---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502     NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502     NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502      NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502
---
# Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186502 CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-BULL15478281.pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "Central Intelligence",
  "What": "Vietnam surface-to-surface missiles, military activity in North and South Vietnam, enemy assaults on government centers, Communists attacks on various provinces",
  "When": "8 January 1968",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Thua Thien Province", "Quang Tin Province", "Quang Ngai Province", "Quang Nam Province", "Darlac Province", "Tuyen Duc Province", "Binh Duong Province", "Bien Hoa Province", "Vinh Long Province", "Vinh Binh Province", "Ba Xuyen Province"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The Presidents Daily Brief

|Approved for Release:|2018/07/26|C05974232|
|---|---|---|
|Approved for Release:|2018/07/26|C05974232|

Top Secret 19 January 1968

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

2323

|Approved for Release:|2018/07/26|C05974232|
|---|---|---|
|Approved for Release:|2018/07/26|C05974232|
---
                                                       3.5(c)
                                                       3.s(c)
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232
      Approved for R Ie ease: 2018/07/26 C05974232     NRNR
                                                    ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232
---
# 4. Laos

is Souvanna keeping cool
he Souvanna losses keeping pe troops aware
is aware of pe extent of government yet
he is not defending a pird of Nam Bac. So far, only losses to government positions have been about a pird of pe town troops. The military losses had drifted back to government positions. The probable considerable military equipment losses are considerable.
Anger hard Vientiane escape goat may come up to violations in pe Laotian Norp against pe flagrant Demands. Demands to resist, mainly for a scapegoat but up to now mainly pe Norp Vietnamese. Late Wednesday night in Vientiane, some hand grenades off pe Laotian Norp Vietnamese neutrality. The Embassy in Vientiane was pe target of some hand grenades.

# 5.

NR

# 6.

NR
---
|Approved for R Ie ease:|2018/07/26|C05974232|3.s(c)|
|---|---|---|---|
| | | |NR|
|Approved for Release:|2018/07/26|C05974232| |
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

Top Secret

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

|Top Secret|SINLS AMERIC|
|---|---|
|FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY|FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY|
|Top Secret 3.5(c)|3.5(c)|
|16| |
|19 January 1968| |

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

Approved for Release 2018/07/26 C05974232
---
# TOP SECRET

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

for the President's Eyes Only

19 January 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Propaganda Orchestration: North Vietnam has mounted return propaganda efforts to enter US bombing talks with its proposal. The orchestration seems to have mounted the Trinh Statement to press for full-blown US bombing cessation. For instance, in a radio interview on 16 January, Mai Van Bo gave another interview on 17 January in Hanoi, emphasizing North Vietnam's willingness for talks and stressing the now Paris-endorsed US willingness for talks. Bo continued to discuss military gestures and apparently stopped the reciprocal formula, even making more forthcoming gestures to Johnson on 17 January in Hanoi. He tried to emphasize that North Vietnam was ready to talk about "everything" and could be taken up after the National Liberation Front's discussions about the bombing halt. Bo said that the San Antonio formula could therefore be taken up in the current conversations between Hanoi and the Front.

Regarding the US bombing halt and questions about the San Antonio formula, Bo implied that everything could be negotiated. This interview commentary has not yet been endorsed as authoritative and accurate. As Bo's reported remarks suggest, Hanoi's position may not yet be entirely well and beyond previous large campaign themes. It appears that the North Vietnamese Communists intend to publicize their position and make it appear attractive and reasonable. Other Communist countries are expanding their coverage and picking up the Trinh statement in the most favorable light. Commentaries on the statement cast "actions and steps" in a strong endorsement of the North Vietnamese.

# TOP SECRET
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C0597423

government problemtnam aimed at a peaceful settlement of the Soviet statement Vietnam. This is the most forthright Trinh statement so far in characterizing the new Trinh statement. The "declaration" takes on the first official North Vietnamese statement on their offer. This is the first Trinh statement for a Communist country. The Czech statement also says that Prague supports not only the Vietnamese but also the US government problem, and that political and material support would continue to further support Vietnam with the Front on a settlement of the Vietnamese and US government.

The North Vietnamese consul in Rangoon held a press conference on January 18 to publicize the Trinh offer and condemn what he called a lack of response to the French News Agency. According to the consul, the US should guarantee a productive withdrawal of Vietnamese activity from South Vietnam before talks could be productive. When asked why they did not declare war on the US, the consul said that the US must show good intentions for peace. He conditionally went on to reiterate that if the US truly wants talks for peace, they should not bomb.

Henry Tanner, the bureau chief of the New York Times in Paris, informed the US Embassy that Bo Mai agreed to submit an interview with the New York Times on Thursday. Bo Mai then informed the US Embassy in Paris that he intends to submit interview questions in advance and Tanner intends to submit them today.
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C0597423 3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

|Unwelcome Cuban Present the*|*|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|---|
|Unwelcome Cuban Present: after all departure of the in| |3.3(h)(2)|
|French disease after was the a: departure but eliminated of the North Vietnam| |3.3(h)(2)|
|French, North Vietnam. venereal was all but eliminated in| |3.3(h)(2)|
| | |3.3(h)(2)|

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

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---
# TOP SECRET

Approved Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

|TOP|for Release: 2018/07/26|C05974232|
|---|---|---|
|RET|3.5(c)1| |

venereal venerealcountry hesaysthedisease the toCubanshasAuthorities_____________/:/·Lately, Latelybeenreintroducedhowever however~. moving\\into the country the "by "by disease Cubans." theAuthorities has been reintr_o_d~u_c_e~d------.--intoareare moving quickly , quickly, he says, to treattre~t the new new cases cases.

officialsHanoicontinue€oWorldTrade:worldtradeSeeksFreepursueTrade: * * * North Vietnamese officiaTsHanoi Seeks Free World free North trade Vietnamese con- 3.3(h)(2)

continue to pursue free world con- 3.3(h)(2)

tacts also attended and attempted thatNorth ese also Northat tended Vietnamand foreign theattemptedtradeforeign trade to difficultiescommi tmentstheto assure'--=cc~~~~·Vietnam- assure 1tne 3.3(h)(2)

be thatmet in spite of the difficulties caused by the bomb- 3.3(h)(2)

Hanoi has alsorecently also recently been pushing toopen to open 3.3(h)(2)

upup a tradetradeHanoi office officehas in Singapore in Singapore.

4-

-4-

# TOP SECRET

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---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

3.5(c)

TOP.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

3.5(c)

II_ NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES

NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Continuing Reports Opposition unconditional Hanoi. Hanoi there report Statements. by Bombing:

Reports Opposition to Bombing to by favoring response US favoring in statements an art unconditional to Foreign individuals Hanoi or isis groups

Continuing in groups of offer in the to US the the bombing to US report favoring favoring response US in South in statements an art unconditional to Foreign individuals cessa-Minister

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Hanoi executives that to ness Hanoi brbadcast reported reported beamed that 11 on an January urged US an organization servicemen organization in of American the American

Johnson Vietnam, busi- ad- ministration ness executives claiming 11 that January to consider on that part "offers formulation aread-the new urged the Johnson" very

Ministration to consider it the "offers new formulation an opportunity" very honest first step

For claiming on were seeking to a that of that our it tone gotiated settle-show an that opportunity we

For a first and sincere step on in reported our part show we are

Ment honest and The sincere broadcast in seeking negotiated Harold Williams settle~

Marine and Henry also Henry also True Corps Marine included such included Corps The Merideth prominent Merideth broadcast were Commandant Shoup, cochairmen Shoup, cochairmen

Americans and Rear as that of Harold as Admiral Admiral group which

Former Williams whihh Arnold True. the bombing by The broadcast an organization based in Paris a called for American

Also reported call for an end an end

Opposition Abroad" an Opposition to the bombing Abroa~• by based organization in Paris. called "American

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

# Approved for Release: 2018/01/26 C05974232

TopSecret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974232 THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478071.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Special Daily Report on North Vietnam, situation in Laos, North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes, Trinh statement, propaganda orchestration",
"When": "19 January 1968",
"Where": ["Laos", "North Vietnam", "Vientiane", "Hanoi", "San Antonio", "Paris", "Rangoon", "Singapore"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: CENTER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

8 February 1968

Memorandum NO. 67-68

Subject: Communist I-Balance Sheet

Summary: Vietnam

This is only an effort to provide some basis for continuing the debate on Vietnam; however, it is still early to be very confident about what has happened or what happens next. No effort made in this to survey the US GVN side.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398203
---
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

8 February 1968

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 8-68 (ONE Distribution Only)

SUBJECT: Vietnam: The Communist Balance Sheet

1. As in every major military-political effort by the Communists in Vietnam, the present offensive serves several objectives. Some are fairly obvious, such as the psychological shock of a sudden and massive assault on areas hitherto believed secure. In this they succeeded. Beyond this more or less minimum achievement, however, Hanoi and the Viet Cong apparently had and may still have much more far-reaching military and political goals, general uprising and the establishment of a new "coalition regime".

2. In general, what we have been witnessing since last September is a shift from the protracted war theory to what the Communist now call an "all-out attack". This does not mean that the fighting has to be over soon; the Communists have by

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
---
_  _   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C0339§8203
he?                                          his

genes-a-e=r'

no means exhausted their military capabilities for continuing
the conflict.       But they have gambled a good deal on the present
offensive, an effort which bears considerable resemblance to
General Giap's final campaign against the French in the winter
and spring of 1953-5k.

# Background

3.     The concept of the present military and political
effort was apparently worked out by the summer of last year,
and embodied in a high level decision in Hanoi.                      The essence
of this decision was subsequently conveyed to the troops in
quite general terms, under the rubric of a "General Offensive
and General Uprising."             Heavy indoctrination courses were
held throughout South Vietnam in October, November and December.     The general tenor of the new political line is reflected
in the following notes of a briefing on the party decision:
The Central (Executive Comittee) of the Lao Dong
Party came to the conclusion that the time is ripe to
directly stage the revolution.              The opportunity for the
General Offensive and the General Uprising has presented
itself.     The Central...and Uncle (Hb) order the SVN Party
Headquarters and the entire army and the entire people of
SVN to carry out the General Offensive and General Uprising
in order to gain a decisive victory for the revolution
during the 1968 Winter-Spring-Sumer phase...Strong violent
attacks must be launched with the people rising up like a

- 2 -

-s-e=c=a=E:T'

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we will establish our administrative control...Our troops surging wave that carries away everything in its wake. Then, will get ready for movement to the lowlands in order to march forward towards liberating the cities. We must use each regiment and division to take over the liberatedPropaganda must be conducted areas on a continuous basis. far and wide. Other documents indicated the broad scope of the new offensive and the shift in tactics. One cadre, for example was told that the three phase concept of the first Indochina war was now to give way to the doctrine of "all out attacks". Another document noted the "urgent requirement" to mobilize manpower and resources so as to obtain an "extraordinary victory" in a relatively short period of time. Finally, some documents indicated the formation in the provinces of "suicide units".

Another aspect of this new line was the increased emphasis on a "coalition" government. While the blueprints for such a new regime were intentionally blurred, it was nevertheless held out as a near term objective which would be achieved within the context of the General Offensive.

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By mid-December the Communists began to make careful plans for the attacks which were to take advantage of the beginning of Tet. They announced a proposed seven day Tet truce (and one can imagine what might have happened if this had been accepted by the GVN and US). Actually, at that very time, special training had begun for the attacks. Some more NVA replacements were scattered throughout some VC units; village guerrillas and raw recruits were impressed into Main and Local force units, and clandestine cadres and units began briefings and planning for the wave of attacks against cities and towns, and the formation of the new "Peace Fronts". A document just captured, but dated 16 January, mentioned "Emergency Directive No l". Just prior to the attacks an order of the day by the SVN Liberation Army was apparently read to all the troops and cadres.

It asserted that:

"This will be the greatest battle ever fought throughout the history of our country...it will decide the fate and survival of our fatherland."

The VC rank and file were further motivated by three general promises. They were told that major reinforcements would arrive within the first day of the attacks, so that the troops were to hold for as long as possible until help arrived.

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SECRET

Some cases this was true but definitely not so in other areas). Secondly, the troops were led to believe that the populace would rally to the Viet Cong. And, finally, many cadres and soldiers were told, or chose to believe that a new government would be quickly established and peace negotiations would soon follow.

8. The Attack. The offensive against the province capitals and district towns was apparently to be launched all over the country in the early morning of 30 January. As a country wide operation the attacks were fairly well coordinated But in their execution, there seems to have been a breakdown in many areas. The total picture as it now emerges is a rather bizarre kaleidoscope. Many obvious targets were not struck the first day, particularly in the delta. Some cities escaped altogether or for several days, when all element of surprise had been lost (Tay Ninh). Other attacks were little more than probes or harassments, while others developed into major engagements.

9. The general plan called for two stages and perhaps a third. First, the local city units, sappers and political cadres were to seize key objectives such as radio stations, police headquarters, provinceschiefs, US compounds and so forth

SECRET

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398203</h10>

S-E-€'R=E=T

This was to be exploited psychologically by broadcasts and proselytizing teams announcing that the VC had actually assumed power throughout the province and country. This initial effort was supposed to be followed up by actual infantry assaults. In some areas this second attack never materialized, or quickly bogged down. For example, several prisoners from a VC company attacking Saigon have said that their units were stalled on the outskirts before reaching their objectives. In some areas, such as Nha Trang no reinforcements were ever intended. A high level political cadre there nevertheless believed that though their local efforts might fail the country-wide attack would succeed.

There may have been plans for a third phase, which has not begun and may never begin. In this phase the larger NVA units still in reserve would be committed, especially in areas where there was a promising situation. In Hue the initial attack was by the VC city unit and a VC Battalion; they were to fight for seven days, and of reinforced for 15 days. Some of the units for a second attack are still in place and could attack, in some areas, particularly in I Corps. Their failure to do so yet could mean that this was only a contingency plan. However, in some cities there have been two general attacks (Hbi An).
---
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-S-E-G-R=E=T'_

Can Tho), though the second wave seems to have been a weak one.

The decision facing General Giap in whether to comit good troops to retrieve an unpromising situation. He may have no choice.

ll. The fgprising". As a purely military effort to seize and hold, the Communist have failed thus far. In part at least, their failure was because of the total lack of popular support. While it is difficult to know just how much support they expected, they must have counted on some in many areas. Initial propaganda exploitation heavily emphasized the idea of a "general uprising". The premature announcement of new "Peace Fronts" also fits in a patern of fomenting a popular seizure of power. Finally, the rather meager military effort in some cities suggest that the only hope in those areas was for the people to rally to the VC banner.

12. This failure is probably the single most impressive fact of the last few days. Given the excellent political cadre system developed over decades, one would think that political agitation and exploitation would be one of the Communists’ strongest instruments. In practice it proved the weakest.

_ 7 -

§=E-G-R'E=1r_

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5;-_E=.C»-R--E-T‘

And in the process the Communist have sacrificed their clandestine apparatus throughout most of the country. This cannot be quickly replaced, nor can the sapper and special action units that bore the brunt of the initial attacks. This aspect may prove more costly than the thousands of foot soldiers who have been killed in the last week.

The Cgkgtg-1' g j,Qe

13. The effect outside the cities is less clear. Strangely enough the pacification program apparently was not a major target of military attacks, perhaps because the only units not engaged were the guerillas. Nevertheless, in the process of assaulting the cities the Communists may have achieved significant damage to the revolutionary development program. Many cadre teams were forced to pull out of their areas once the protecting forces were withdrawn to the cities. In other areas, previously secured hamlets were invaded by propaganda and foraging teams. And of course there were outright attacks and assassinations. Thus, there may be more significant damage in the countryside than in the cities. If so, it will be a major blow to the US and the GVN.

.s-s-e=R=ET'f

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lb. Khe Sahn. The picture is also a mixed one if considered against another probable Communist objective. If Khe Sahn is parallel to Dien Bien Phu in Hanoi's thinking, then the Tet Offensive is analogous to the attacks which the Viet Minh launched in the winter-spring of 1953-Sh against many of the same targets which were struck in the past week. At that time Giap's objective, in his words was, as follows: "By successively launching strong offensives on the points they (the French) has left relatively unprotected, we obliged them to scatter their troops all over the place in order to ward off our blows, and thus create favorable conditions for the attack at Dien Bien Phu..."

Thus one of the military aims of the Tet Offensive was to draw ARVN, American and Korean units into the defense of urban areas. Obviously, this has succeeded to some extent. But at the same time, the attacks have not yet succeeded to the point where the outcome of Khe Sahn has been affected. Indeed one of the mysteries is the failure to launch the Khe Sahn battle simultaneously with the other attacks.

l5. If this is Giap's current strategy, however, then repeated attacks throughout SVN will have to be made despite the heavy costs. Not until the issue is decided at Khe Sahn will Hanoi be in a position to Judge the total impact and effectiveness of its bold but costly moves.

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---
The Outlook

The main question remains: is this the final effort of the Communists. Will they be forced into a peace settlement as their failure becomes clear, or, alternatively do they have every intention of suing for peace at a time when their political psychological "image" seems strong.

To begin with it must be remembered that the Communists conceive of the present effort as a campaign, openly announced to run through the spring, at least. It is not a single burst, even though the recent attacks were concentrated within a few days. There is still the battle of Khe Sahn, and the entire DMZ to be fought; and in many areas there is still a second cycle of attacks that could be initiated.

Equally important, all the dimensions of the political strategy are not fully apparent. The Communists are not going to quietly drop the new "Peace Fronts". There may still be some sensational developments in the political realm. For example, one rather doubtful report claims that General "Big" Minh will emerge as the head of a new "coalition" formed between the NFL and the new insurrectum committees and fronts. Thus it may still be a matter of months before the Communist play all their cards.
---
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_s-_a..c-R=E:r

19. Nevertheless, they are now fully committed to the proposition that the very last phase of the revolution has begun. They will try to claim an enormous success; and they may even believe that much has been achieved both politically, militarily internationally. They will certainly expect the debate and controversy in the US to be aggravated and the tensions within the GVN to be heightened. However, they must also know that there will be no uprising, no massive takeover, and no collapse in Saigon. In sum, they are almost back to square No. 1, and their forces are decidedly weakened. The question uppermost in their minds must be whether US and South Vietnamese confidence has been so shaken that within a few months the US will sue for peace.

20. It is in this context of uncertainty over their own prospects and the position of the US that the Communist may follow their military moves with further political initiatives. They will almost certainly want to test the US position in the wake of the Tet offensive and while the Khe Sahn battle is in doubt. The peace offensive if it comes could be as massive as the military one. From the Communist standpoint, after a major show of force

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---
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cf' E? 3-E-9-'R=E='T"

and demonstration of military capabilities, there is not likely to be a better political and psychological time to try for a political settlement.

-12-

.S=.E-G-RI'E='I"

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398203 VIETNAM_THE_COMMUNIST_BAL[15617851].pdf

Output:
{
	"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates",
	"What": "Analysis of Vietnam Communist offensive in 1968",
	"When": "8 February 1968",
	"Where": ["Vietnam", "Hanoi", "South Vietnam", "Tay Ninh", "Nha Trang", "Hue", "Saigon", "Can Tho", "Dien Bien Phu", "Khe Sahn", "DMZ"],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752133

CENTRAL Intelligence Agency

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN cA63.5(c)]

STATE/INR DIA NMcC/mC (SECDEF JCS Army Navy Air) CInNMcC NIC NSA Gcr SDO AID EXO UsiA ONE Orr DCg cas DDLL

Tbl mutariucontalns Inforuauonand794 uenaleeon tho Nadlon4 Dofanso Oftbo Oolted 8ltcMtnbotbemeadldg Of tbe01wblcbL} V Problbltod DJ1e _Ln:Tuo 18208.0_

No FOREIGN DISSEM

S-E-C R-E-T

CITE 852-657

DIST 11 DECEMBER 1967 3.5(c)

COUNTRY scl'h 12-

DOI 3.3(h)(2)

SUBJECT VIET ConG CLA IMS InLong An PROVINCE ThaT PEACE AnD COAL ITION GOVERNMENT WILLFOLL Op THELUNAR NEW YEAR HCLIDAY, 3.3(h)(2)

Acq SOURCE

SUMMARY: VIETCong (Vc) CADRESInLong ArPROVINCE ARE

S-EsC R-E-T

No FOREIGN DISSEM

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752133

|S-Ese R-E-T|NO FOREETGN DtssEM|
|---|---|
|(clouicotlow)|(duusncontro")|

TELLINGTHEJR TROOPS AND SYMPATHTZERSThat ALL VC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS InLonG AnWILL STOP AFTERTET (LUNARNEW YEAR ) ANDThaTPEACEWILLBE ACHIEVEDThrough COALITONGOVERNMENT InWHICHTHENATIONALFront FORTKE LIBERATION0F SOUTH VIETNAMWILL HAVE VICTORIOUS PLACE.THESEVC PROM ISES HAVEBEEN RECEIVEDSo ENTHUSIASTICALL Y BYVc TROOPSANd VILLAGERSTHATTHECHIEUHO I (OPEN4RMS) PROGR AM InLong AnKasBEEN ALMOST NULLIFIED ;VcFAILURE To LIVE 'IPToTHE EXFECTATIONS ThEYHAVECREATED KOWEVER WOULDRESULT In LARGE-SCALE DEFECTIONS_ ENDSUMMARY.

L .SINCEEARL YNOVEMBER 1967 VIET ConG (VC)CADRES AND UNITCOMMANDERS InLong ANPROVINCEKAVEBEEN TELLING THEIRSUBORD INATES ,SYPATHIZERS And ELDERSIn VC-CONTROLLED VILLAGESTHAT ALL VC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONSInLongAnWILL STOPAFTERTHETET (LUNAR NEWYEAR )HOL IDAYS. THE CADRES ARESAYINGTHAT VICTOR IOUSPLACEFORTKENATIONAL FRonT FOR TkcLIBERAT] ~N OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV )WILLBE ACHIEVED DURING TKEAFTER -TETPEACE Throlgh THE FORMATION 0F A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THENFLSVWILLFULL Y PARTICIPATE THIS THEMEHAS BEEN DISSEMINATEDInVc TROOP

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752133
---
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|S-Exc-R-E-T|NO FORETGN DISSEM|
|---|---|
|(closulicatlop) (dbsueu_controuu)| |
|UNIT D ISCUSSIONS ,ANdVC MIL [TARY. COMMANDERSAndSENIOR DISTRICTOFF ICIALSHAVEERIEFEDVCVILLAGE ELDERSANd NOTABLESonITIn An EFFORTT0GaINTHEIR SUPPORTAnD , THROUGHTHEM POPULAR SUPPORTFORTKEVcPROGRAM| |
|SEVERALVILLAGEELDERSHAVESTATED ThatSOMEVc D[ STR ICT ANd COMPANYCADRES InVC BENThUDISTR ICT (GOVERN - MENT0FVIETNAM (Gin )BENLUcANDTHUAThuaDI STR ICTS) VIEWEDTKECOALITIoNGOvER NMENT PLANGs APPL YINGONL YTo IIAnDd Iv CORPS = WHICH WOULDBETKEPRESERVE0FTHENFL SV , FIGHTING WOULD Continie ~HEY BEL IEVED ,In I AND IICORPS , WHICHWOULDREMAIN UNDER THECONTROL 0F HANOI .| |
|3 0LoNjAnVCCADRESAREASSUR InGTHEIR TROGPSAND VILLAGEOFFICIALSTHA THEYWILL HAVEPOSITIONS0FHoNOR ANdRESPONSIBILITYInTHENEWCOALITIONGOVERNMENT THIS KASALMOSTNULL IF IEDFORTHETIME BEINGTHEGv CHIEU HO I (GPEN ARMS}PROGRAM INLoNG An , (FIELDCOMMENT RALL IER F IGURES InLong AnDRG,PPEDFROm 59InOCTOBER To 39In NOVEMBER . WAVER InGHiGKER- EVELVCCADRESnowDc not Want To LOSE THECHAN;EToREAPTKEIRREWARDSFOR Long SERV ICE WITHTKEVcANdLow-RANKINGVcWILL notCHIEUHO [| |

S-BC-R-E-T

NOFOREtGN DISSEM

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752133

|S-E-CRE-T|~0FORETGN DTSSEM|
|---|---|
|(clauicetlon)|(dueam_conbrolu)|
|AndSUFrER|IKE LATEK [NViGN]i [ Ur SECONdCLasSCIILENSHIP|
|WHENBYWAITINGUNTIL AFTER TET ITHEYAREPROM ISED BoTH PEACEANd Honor| |
|THISPROM ISE0F AN AFTER -TETPEACEHAS BEEN RECEIVEDSOENTHUSIASTICALL YBYVcTROOPS AndVILLAGERS InLongAnThaT FAILURETo IMPL EMENT ItWoUld CREATEChaOS AMONG Vc SOLDIERSANd SUPPORTERS , WHILEHARD-COREVc WOULdUNDOUBTEDL Y'ACCEPT WHATEVERREASONTHEVC GAVEFOR NotIMPLEMENTING THE PLAN ManY VC CADRES,` SOLDIERSAnd VILLAGERSWOULD BESoDISENCHANTEDWITHTHE VCThatMasS DEFECTIonsAnd SHARP INCREASE In REFUGEESFROMVC - CONTROLLEDAREASWOULDRESULT| |
|COMMNENT :|NUMBEROFVC DOcUMENTS CAPTURED 3.3(h)(2) THROUGHOUT SoUTHVIETNAMSINCEEARL YNOVEMBER HAVERE - FERRED To PROSPECTS FOR CCAL ITIONGOVERNMENT AndTo THEPRESENTVcWINTER -SPRINGCAMPAIGN ASTHE ~DECISIVE: "CULMINATING" OR ~HISTORIC"PHASEOFTHE "REVOLUTION|
|SECRETTRAININGDOCUMENT CAPTURED ON 3 NOVEMBERWKICH Was ProbABLY ISSUED BY Vc Local FORCEBA TTALIOnIn LonGAnCONTAINSTHE MosT EXPLICITDOCUMENTARY REFERENCE To TIMEFRAMEFor PEACEInITSSTATEMENTThat "TKE YEARS 1967-68 WILL CONCLUDETHE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM)EleLD DISSEM:STATE USMACV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR:ZORTHIAN ONLY)CINCPAC PACFLTARPAC PACAF| |

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752133 "VIET CONG CLAIMS IN LONG _15472920_.pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
	"What": "Information regarding VC cadres in Long An Province making promises of peace and coalition government after Lunar New Year",
	"When": "11 December 1967",
	"Where": ["Long An Province", "South Vietnam"],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

|Classification|Date|Declassified|
|---|---|---|
|Top Secret|27 January 1968|3.5(c)|
|Top Secret|27 January 1968|3.5(c)|
|32|32| |
---
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---
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---
                                                                                NR
      Approve d for Release: 2018/0 7/26 C0597 4247
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                                                                        ]
Page
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---
                                                          NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26    C0597 424 7      NR
                                                       ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26    C0597 424 7
---
# Top Secret

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Top "Secret16 3.5(c)3.5(c)

27 January 1968
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247

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3.5(c)

# Special for the Daily President's Eyes Only

Report on North Vietnam

27 January 1968

NOTES ON THE SITUATION

On this occasion, the Hanoi radio service broadcast the announcement to release three US pilots. The broadcast stated that the captured US pilots, considered "aggressor pilots," had displayed a repentant attitude during their detention.

More Comment on the Pueblo Seizure

In a new editorial on 26 January, the Hanoi party newspaper, Nhan Dan, condemned the US seizure of the Pueblo as a "neat act of war provocation" and praised the North Koreans for capturing the ship and its crew of US spies.

There was no other effort in Hanoi to tie the situation in Vietnam to the seizure of the Pueblo.

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247 3.3(h)(2)

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247 3.3(h)(2)

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247
---
# TOP SECRET

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|Property Inventory:|urged a late December cadre, accurate|
|---|---|
|more "war environment accurate"|The article said methods during work party employees journal to fortify tighten property more|
|The number of people had "war environment protection"|The government declared their property responsibility in a widespread, and corruption are still|
|urged to tighten property more accurate|The government declared their property responsibility in a widespread, and corruption are still widespread.|

Mai Van Bo Gets a Flag: Mai claimed the status of the head of efforts to obtain prerogatives from the French Government, which go with his diplomatic mission, are making some official head status as the head vehicle way is now flying a flag and will soon be given diplomatic plates.

Heretofore, driving North Vietnamese delegate general had license plates around Paris with temporary tourist plates.

Hanoi on Tet Truce: Hanoi has continued propaganda on the impending shortened 36 Tet hour truce to contrast the "more humane" seven-hour stand-down for the allied ceasefire with the "more humane" seven-hour stand-down for the allied ceasefire.

The Communist January 25 comment from Hanoi claimed that the shortening of the tone of the manifestation of truce difficult from 48 to 36 hours was the "saving manifestation" for the South Vietnamese allies, who demonstrated the no regard for the state, went on to underscore the people's respect for the seven-day stand-down list of alleged US violations of past truces.

# TOP SECRET

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---
# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Nothing of significance to report.

4-

3.5(c)
---
# Approved for Release; 2018/07/26 C05974247

Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974247 THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478070.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "The President",
"What": ["Daily Report on North Vietnam", "US pilots release announcement", "Pueblo seizure commentary", "Property Inventory details", "Mai Van Bo's diplomatic status", "Hanoi's propaganda on Tet Truce", "North Vietnamese reflections of US political attitudes"],
"When": "27 January 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Paris"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Central Intelligence Bulletin

November 1967

Top Secret

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797  3.5(c)

Page

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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797

TOP SECRET 3.5(c)

6 November 1967

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report (Page 1) NR
TOP SECRET

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---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797

|North|Demilitarized Zone|
|---|---|
|Quang Tri| |
|Hue| |
|Tauathien| |
|Da Nang| |
|Quangnam|94|
|Tatlaad| |
|Quang Tin| |
|Quang Ngai| |
|Kontum| |
|Bina Ina?| |
|Peiku|Nhon|
|Pau| |
|Bon|Phu|
|C '4 M B 0 D|Yen|
|Darlac| |
|Khanh|Hoa|
|Quangduc| |
|Tuyen| |
|Loc Ninh|Buc|
|Pauoc|Nina|
|Phnqm| |
|Long Long|Lamdong|
|Nna| |
|Bina|5|
|Don;|Long|
|Thuan| |
|Binikaan|Binatuy|
|Chau Phu| |
|Doc|Riendhoh|
|Caiifntuong| |
|Jonsaigc| |
|Vung TauPhuoctuy|1|
|Cora| |
|Kien Phong|Onc|
|Kienhov|Capital Special Zone|
|Dina| |
|Giang| |
|Xuyen| |
|Rac Lieu| |
|An| |
|Xuyen| |
|South Vietnam| |
|Secret| |
|CIA| |
|6 Nov 67 Central Intelligence Bulletin Map| |
|Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797| |
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797

|3.5(c)|and moderate Buddhist followers may be heading for a break with their leaders.|
|---|---|
|South Vietnam:|Speculation continues that militant Ho Huu Tuong, lower house deputy and a Buddhist university official, told an embassy officer on 2 November that a personal reconciliation between Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau, leaders of the militant and the moderate factions respectively, is unlikely. Tuong said he sees the removal of Quang and Chau and the merger of the two factions into a more middle-of-the-road 'third force' as the only solution to the current impasse over the charter issue.|
|President Thieu's brother has indicated, moreover, that the government would be receptive to any charter recommendations made by a new reconciled Buddhist grouping.| |
|There are as yet no indications, however, that such a break is imminent.| |
|The weekend were confined to the IV Corps Tactical Zone where mortar and ground assaults were launched against the towns of Chau Phu, Cai Lay, and Long My. 38 soldiers and civilians were killed and another 179 were wounded in the attacks which appeared to be a continuation of a series of hostile actions begun in this region on 28 October.| |
|Ninh where heavy fighting has occurred during the past ten days. Officially adjusted casualty figures through 2 November indicated that 31 friendly and 720 enemy troops had been killed around Loc Ninh. Field reports on 5 November showed that the number of enemy dead subsequently had risen to 771.| |
|3.5(c)|6 Nov 67|
|TQPSECREF|3.5(c)|

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                                                  NR
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                                            ]
Page
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---
                                                  NR
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                                            ]
Page
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---
                                                  NR
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                                            ]
Page
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---
                                                  NR
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                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797

Top Secret

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C02031797 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15466756].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "",
  "What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin, situation report on Vietnam, speculation about Buddhist leaders, attacks in IV Corps Tactical Zone, casualty figures",
  "When": "6 November 1967",
  "Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Significance of Cambodia to the Enemy

Increasing allied pressure on the Communist military structure in South Vietnam has caused them to depend more heavily on the border areas. Cambodia is increasingly valuable as:

- 1. A sanctuary to evade allied forces
- 2. A refuge for rest, training, and medical care
- 3. A route of infiltration of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam

Our information adds up to an estimate that, since 1964, more than 19,000 infiltrators have come into the South through Cambodia. We base this figure primarily on PW and rallier reports.

Generally speaking, the infiltration trails continue southward from Laos and cross the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border before reaching the Kompong Cham "knee". Some come even farther south before crossing; however.

We also know that a portion of the military supplies moving southward from Laos are reported through Cambodia over a network of trails.

We also believe that an important share (15 to 20 percent) of the food requirement of the VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam comes from Cambodia. This means a daily flow of about 25 to 35 tons per day, mainly rice.

We do not believe that very much in the way of military supplies reaches the VC/NVA via either Sihanoukville or up the Mekong.

28 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

Ocean-craft on pe Mekong
It would be difficult to off-load arms shipments to pe VC from ocean-going ships on pe Mekong moving eiper to or from Phnom Penh because under present GVN control regulations:
1. Communist flag ships and cargoes from communist ports cannot enter pe Mekong.
2. Inspection of all cargoes is auporized.
3. Permission is required for shipment of weapons, ammunition, and oper cargoes of military significance. All craft must move in convoys escorted by GVN gunboats while in Soup Vietnam, bop from and to Phnom Penh. Four round trip convoys a monp are permitted. Maximum auporized convoy turnaround time in Phnom Penh is only 72 hours.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
# ShipmentsofArmsto_VC_Through_Cambodia(61 |n Aihansxik-iiu

There is not3le evidence0f any continuing substantial shipments of arms and ammunition to Communist forces through Sihanoukville_~; Xjivilim. The Communists do, however, smuggle small quantities of arms and war-related goods from Cambodia. Some of the smuggled goods probably are all unauthorized diversions from Ezzct arms imported by the Cambodian government for its own forces.

Known military and military-related goods that have arrived in Sihanoukville are not excessive to Cambodia's needs_6 L{'b-YKacent' Imow military goods arriving include 450Innt % +l h-*7n~;(Yli-L(L~ #bi 6- "6 tons of identified military cargo delivered by the Chinese ship Eeping in March, consisting of small arms and ammunition believed contracted for in October 1966.

Some military-related cargoes from China, Western Europe, and Japan have been discharged at Sihanoukville. A Chinese Communist ship delivered 150 tons of magnesium powder to Sihanoukville in May. A three-ton cargo carried to Sihanoukville in April on a Greek ship under charter to Communist China included detonators and fuses. A Norwegian ship, under Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 6 tons of dynamite in May. A Greek ship also under Chinese Communist charter delivered 70 tons of sodium nitrate in September. About 50 tons of explosives loaded in European ports were carried to Sihanoukville on French liners. Explosives and related cargoes were included among the cargoes that arrived from Japan. More than 300 tons of medicines and pharmaceuticals from Western Europe and several cargoes of medicines from Communist China were delivered to Sihanoukville during the first three-quarters of 1967.
---
# Supplies

Prince Sihanouk announced in November 1967 that Cambodia had a verbal trade agreement with the Vietnamese Communists to deliver rice, medicines, and other goods for payment in dollars. Sihanouk's statement apparently covers past periods and possibly 1968.

Rice is the largest and most important commodity the Vietnamese Communists obtain from Cambodia. The amounts involved, including paddy and milled rice, have been approximately 20,000 tons in 1966 and 1967. Cambodian rice amounts to about 15-28 percent of VC/NVA requirements in South Vietnam.

Cambodian rice is delivered and of particular importance to enemy troops located in the rice deficit areas of the South Vietnamese highlands and southern Laos. We do not believe that the enemy obtains Cambodian rice in the delta border areas (IV Corps) because he has easy access to South Vietnamese rice.

VC/NVA forces also obtain numerous other commodities from Cambodia such as batteries, cloth, paper, medicines, salt, fish sauce, and hand tools. Many of these purchases take place along the border of South Vietnam delta provinces because of the easy access to local markets on the Cambodian side.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349

Some chemicals which the Viet Cong use in making explosives such as potassium chlorate are obtained from Cambodia. In 1963, about 23 tons were captured in small shipments on South Vietnam delta waterways, particularly the Mekong River. We think this traffic has continued but we lack information as to its present tonnage.

The supplies the enemy obtains from Cambodia are relatively small compared to that obtained in South Vietnam, and only rice appears to be of real significance. Captured documents and interrogations indicate that the enemy makes most of his purchases in Cambodia because of convenience rather than absolute necessity.

Cross Border Trade

Goods and people move freely back and forth across the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia, particularly in the delta. The movement of goods is quite substantial and has gone on for years.

As an example of this trade, Saigon beer has been relatively plentiful in Phnom Penh since Cambodia restricted normal imports of beer a few years back. Reflecting trade the other way, Chinese Communist export goods and other commodities from Cambodia are displayed by vendors in Saigon.

We believe the Vietnamese Communists participate only to a small extent in this movement of goods between Cambodia and South Vietnam, but it is often difficult with the flow of information to distinguish in which the enemy is involved and that which is normal. Many newspaper articles also confuse the two.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349Qnnn

# Patrol Nets Waterways Game Warden

US and GVN river patrol operations in the Mekong Delta area since late 1965. These surveillance and inspection operations employ upwards of 160 water jet river patrol boats (PBR's), 12 minesweepers, and 12 helicopters.

Although Game Warden operations take place throughout the major tributaries of the Mekong (10 PBRs are stationed at Tan Chau, close to the Cambodian border), the majority of enemy contacts occur on the lower reaches of the Mekong, the Son Hau Giang, Son Co Chien, and Song Tien Giang Rivers.

Patrol boats observed 58,979 rivercraft during daylight hours in November 1967 and boarded and inspected 35,058 of these. During the same month, 126 suspect vessels were damaged, 101 were destroyed, and 16 captured.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
# GAMEWARDEN OPERATIONS

The following is a summary of GAMEWARDEN operations in South Vietnam during the period 110701-180700 EST December.

| |DETECTED|SIGHTED|VIOLATIONS|
|---|---|---|---|
|Craft day|13,065|7,849|211|
|Craft night|1,163|707| |
|Percent of craft boarded:|51%|12%|5%|
|Day|60.1%| | |
|Night|60.8%| | |

Average number of ships in operation: 109.4

Average number of helos in operation: 10.8

# SIGNIFICANT ITEMS

The areas in red on the facing map indicate contact which had the following results:

| |DESTROYED|DAMAGED|CAPTURED|
|---|---|---|---|
|US and RVN| | | |
|VC / NVN|43 structures|34 structures|2 sampans|
| |24 sampans|27 sampans| |

CASUALTIES:

US: WIA KIA

VC / NVN: PERSONS DETAINED

SOURCE: J-3

Dec 6 7 nmcc Operational Summary Page 13
---
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1                                                      1
   2
   2
                 2
                 3                                        8
                                                           ]
                                                          9
                                            03   1
                                                 3
                                                 6  3
                                                 0
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# Market Time Operations

Operation Market Time, the US Navy and Coast Guard sea surveillance of coastal waters off South Vietnam to minimize sea infiltration in coordination with the Vietnamese Navy, was begun in March, 1965.

US forces are authorized to stop and search vessels of any nation within South Vietnam territorial waters. Within 12 miles of the coast, US forces may require identification and intention of vessels of any nation. Supposedly, Naval forces form barriers at the 17th parallel and at the South Vietnam-Cambodian border.

Market Time forces are concentrated near the 17th parallel and along the South Vietnam coast from Vung Tau to Ca Mau peninsula, and in the vicinity of the Cambodian border in the Gulf of Thailand.

During November 1967, 36,600 vessels were observed, 8,500 were inspected and boarded, and 17,300 were inspected but not boarded. During the same period, 29 enemy vessels were reported as destroyed. As many as 118,000 vessels are detected each month during periods unaffected by adverse monsoon weather.

Various cargoes such as rice, salt, and medicine were captured. The official statistics for the first 10 months of 1967 do not claim the capture of any ammunition or significant quantities of war materiel as a result of Market Time operations.
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|
|---|
|104|06"|08"|10"|
|NORTH DEMARCATION|NORTH DEMARCATION|NORTH DEMARCATION|NORTH DEMARCATION|
|VIXTN!| |ZONE| |
|MSURVEILLANCE AREA| | | |
|THAILAND|AOs"|CAMBODIA|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|PHNOMPENH| |SAIGON| |
|DAMAGED SAM PAN| | | |
|DESTROYED STRUCTURES| | | |
|DAMAGED STRUCTURES CONTINENTAL| | | |
|1048|108"|1108| |
|75|100|125|150 Nautical Miles|
|SOUTH VIETNAM VS 000oot|SOUTH VIETNAM VS 000oot|SOUTH VIETNAM VS 000oot|SOUTH VIETNAM VS 000oot|
|11-18 December 1967|11-18 December 1967|11-18 December 1967|11-18 December 1967|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

Shipping to Cambodia in the Third Quarter of 1967

Summary

The only identified military shipment to Cambodia during the third quarter of 1967 was about a dozen cases of small arms ammunition unloaded from a French ship at Sihanoukville.

The importance of Phnom Penh relative to Sihanoukville has increased steadily during 1967 as shown in the following tabulation of ship calls and cargo discharged at Cambodian ports in the first three quarters of 1967:

| |First Quarter|Second Quarter|Third Quarter|
|---|---|---|---|
|Sihanoukville|63|56|56|
|Phnom Penh|74|90|97|
|Total|137|146|153|

|Cargo Discharged (Thousand Metric Tons)| | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|Sihanoukville|98.5|53.0|49.0|
|Phnom Penh|82.0|80.0|90.5|
|Total|180.0|133.0|139.0|

For Phnom Penh include and Tonle and petroleum deliveries upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong Cham Laos small but unknown volume of cargo in transit.

Data have been rounded to the nearest 500 tons. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

DAIA 0A AUTLUESHIPPING TO CAMBODIA IN THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1967

# Summary

The only identified military shipment to Cambodia during the third quarter of 1967 was about a dozen cases of small arms ammunition unloaded from a French ship at Sihanoukville.

The importance of Phnom Penh relative to Sihanoukville has increased steadily during 1967 as shown in the following tabulation of ship calls and cargo discharged at Cambodian ports in the first three quarters of 1967:

| |First Quarter|Second Quarter|Third Quarter|
|---|---|---|---|
|Sihanoukville|63|56|56|
|Phnom Penh|74|90|97|
|Total|137|146|153|

| |Cargo Discharged (Thousand Metric Tons)|
|---|---|
|Sihanoukville|98.5|53.0|49.0|
|Phnom Penh|82.0|80.0|90.5|
|Total|180.0|133.0|139.0|

Data for Phnom Penh include and petroleum deliveries small but unknown volume of cargo in transit for Laos upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong Cham and Tonle Betbeen rounded to the nearest 500 tons. Data have been rounded. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

NQCA

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349Fz3

Chinese Communist ship Jining in August and consigned to the Cambodian Armed Forces. Cargoes from Western Europe and China were discharged at Sihanoukville. The Tatiana discharged 10 tons of explosives in July, and a Greek ship, under Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 70 tons of sodium nitrate from China in August. Medical shipments consisted of more than 100 tons of medicines and pharmaceuticals from Western Europe, small consignments of medicines from Communist China, and some 30 tons of Soviet medicines shipped via Singapore.

Unidentified Cargoes

Most of the 10,500 tons of unidentified cargoes came from Western Europe (7,500 tons), Communist China (2,000 tons), and the entrepot port of Singapore (500 tons). Some of the commodities included in these cargoes are largely metals, textiles, and foodstuffs, but their quantities are not known.

|90%|60%|Lxtptaxia|
|---|---|---|
|0|0+|a}|
|AnCaxsllCmununu tAli|Cmsn{|Ak U|Xulov-%|7|Prm Pzuf|7416|
|Aicles|W k|ALJJ|6x2| | | |
|4|hayc|513-| | | | |
| | |Yuaa~~les| | | | | | |
| | |Andlzt| | | | | | |

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 Ci2013349REcAFAn-
---
|Category|Mid-1966|Old-1967|Mid-1968|
|---|---|---|---|
|I (Focal)|External: 42-47|Total: 190-213|External: 41-46|Total: 185-208|External: 43-48|Total: 197-220|
|II & IV (Weapons, Quartermaster, Medical, Engineer, Chemical, Signal, etc.)|5-6|13-20|5-6|18-20| |19-21|
|III (POL) (Ammunition)|Negl.|Negl.|Negl.|Negl.|Negl.|Negl.|
|Total|54-60|216-241|55-61|213-238|58-64|227-252|

Computed on the basis of actual strength, which is about 70 percent of full TO&E unit strength.

Includes replacement of the substantial quantities of food (15 percent recovery for spoilage), but does not include captured or destroyed.

One-third of the weight of the external requirement represents packaging factor. No packaging factor is included in estimating internal two-thirds of the weight is actual ammunition.

The total ammunition requirement does include the external packaging factor.

Revised: MIE 14.3-6724 August 1967
---
|INFILTRATION|AND ROAD CAPACITIES|
|---|---|
|Thanh Hoa|Communist roadnet|
|Other road| |
|Muong Sen|NORTH|
|Thu Quis|Personnel infiltration (by foot)|

| |Motorable road capacity (uninterdicted) in short tons per day (June 1967)|
|---|---|
|Phu Dien Chau|Dry season 500/00|
|Vinh|Rainy season 7920/120|
|Linh Can| |
|Kham|740/22|
|Napo|4108|
|Ha Tinh|0|
|Nat Keut|410|
|Ron| |
|Tonkin| |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C020133497

Significance of Cambodia in Allied procure during 1967 has caused the enemy to depend more heavily on the use of Cambodian territory for refuge, training, and medical care. In general, safe routes for the movement of personnel and supplies from North Vietnam and sources of supplies, most importantly for rice.

North Vietnamese infiltrators to VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam during 1956-67 moved on foot through Laos, eastern Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Since October 1956, more than 19,000 infiltrators have been traced through Cambodia.

Detailed information on the use of Cambodia as a base area and for the infiltration of troops was recently submitted to the AZ Hoc Interagency Committee to Prepare Documentation on Communist Use of Cambodia to Support the War in South Vietnam. This committee was chaired by Evelyn S. Colbert INR.

Southward to Prey Veng Province. Although the majority of the infiltrators entered South Vietnam from Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri Provinces.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

Ccezr-Crefton tb2EekorE
Ocean-going ships on pe Mekong river carrying eiper cargo from Saigon or Phnom Penh
because under present GVN control regulations:
1. Ships from Saigon:
- can enter pe Mekong.
2. Inspection of all cargoes is auporized.
3. Permission is required for shipments of:
- Weapons, ammunition,
- 22 cases cargoes of Military,
- Eicance
- All craft repairs;
- while in Soup Vietnam, bop
- and Phnom Penh. Four
- round trip convoys are permitted. Maritime auporized
- convoy turnaround time in Saigon: Phnom Penh is
- 72 hours.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C020133490

Shipments of Arms to Cambodia Through Cambodia

There is no tangible evidence of any continuing substantial shipments of arms and ammunition to Communist forces through Sihanoukville. The Communists do, however, smuggle small quantities of arms and war-related goods from Cambodia. Some of the smuggled goods probably are small unauthorized diversions from Communist arms imported by the Cambodian government for its own forces.

Known military and military-related goods that have arrived in Sihanoukville are not excessive to Cambodia's needs.

Recent known military goods arriving include 450 tons of identified military cargo delivered by the Chinese ship Heping in March consisting of small arms and ammunition believed contracted for in October 1966 for the Cambodian Army. Some military items may have been included among the 2,300 tons of unidentified cargo delivered by the Chinese ship Hong Zhou in January and among the 1,400 tons of unidentified cargo delivered by another Chinese ship in August.

Some military-related cargoes from China, Western Europe, and Japan have been discharged at Sihanoukville. Chinese Communist ships delivered 150 tons of magnesium powder to Sihanoukville in May. A three-ton cargo carried to Sihanoukville in April on a Greek ship under charter to Communist China included detonators and fuses. A Norwegian ship, under Chinese Communist charter, delivered about 6 tons of dynamite in May, and a Greek ship, also under Chinese Communist charter, delivered 70 tons of sodium nitrate in September. About 50 tons of explosives loaded in

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO2013349

European ports were carried to Sihanoukville on French ships. Explosives and related cargoes were included as the cargo that arrived from Japan. More than 300 tons of medicines and pharmaceuticals from Western Europe and several cargoes of medicines from Communist China were delivered to Sihanoukville during the first three-quarters of 1967.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

Prince Sihanouk announced in December 1967 that Cambodia had a verbal trade agreement with the Vietnamese Communists to deliver rice, medicine, and other goods for payment in dollars. Sihanouk stated that the agreement apparently covers 1968 and possibly 1969.

Rice is the largest and most important commodity the Vietnamese Communists obtain from Cambodia. The amounts involved, including paddy and milled rice, have been approximately 20,000 tons in 1966 and 1967. Cambodian rice amounts to about 15-20 percent of VC/NVA requirements in South Vietnam.

Cambodian rice is delivered and is of particular importance to enemy troops located in the rice-deficit areas of the South Vietnamese highlands and southern Laos. It is believed that the enemy obtains Cambodian rice near the border (IV Corps) because of easy access to South Vietnamese rice.

VC/NVA forces also obtain numerous other commodities from Cambodia such as batteries, cloth, paper, medicine, salt, fish sauce, and bamboo products. Many of these purchases take place along the border of South Vietnam delta provinces because of the easy access to markets on the Cambodian side.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 - C02013349
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

Eoxe chemicals Which the VietCong are using explosives such as potassium chlorate, were obtained from Cambodia. In 1953, about 23 tons were captured in small shipments on South Vietnam's delta waterways, particularly the Mekong River. We think this traffic has continued but we lack information as to the present tonnage.

The supplies are evidently coming from Cambodia are relatively small compared to that obtained in South Vietnam, and only rice appears to be of real significance. Captured documents and interrogations indicate that the enemy makes most of his purchases in Cambodia because of convenience rather than absolute necessity.

Cross-Border Trade

Goods and people move freely back and forth across the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia, particularly in the delta. The movement of goods is quite substantial and has gone on for years.

An example of this trade, Saigon beer has been relatively plentiful in Phnom Penh since Cambodia restricted imports of beer a few years back. Reflecting trade the other way, Chinese Communist export goods and other commodities to Cambodia are displayed by vendors in Saigon.

We believe the Viet Cong participate only to a small extent in this movement of goods between Cambodia and South Vietnam, so it is often difficult to distinguish the flow of information in which the enemy is involved and their intentions. Many innocuous articles also confuse the two.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C020133492

Patrol of Kekong waterways Game Warden

US and GVN river patrol operations, known as Operation Game Warden, have been underway in the Mekong Delta area since late 1965. These surveillance and inspection operations employ upwards of 160 waterjet river patrol boats (PBRs), 12 minesweepers, and 12 helicopters.

Although Game Warden operations take place throughout the major tributaries of the Mekong (10 PBRs stationed at Tan Chau, close to the Cambodian border), the majority of enemy contacts occur on the lower reaches of the Mekong - the Son Fzu Giang, Son Co Chien, and Song Tien Clang Rivers.

Patrol boats observed 58,979 river vessels during daylight hours in November 1967 and boarded and inspected 35,058 of these. During the same month, 126 suspect vessels were damaged, 701 were destroyed, and 16 captured.

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
Operation Market Time - the US Navy and Coast Guard surveillance of coastal waters off South Vietnam to minimize Viet Cong infiltration in coordination with the Vietnamese Navy, began in March, 1965.

US forces are authorized to stop and search vessels of any nation within South Vietnamese territorial waters. Within 12 miles of the coast, US forces may require identification and intention of vessels or take action. Naval forces formed barriers at the 17th parallel and at the South Vietnam-Cambodian border.

Market Time forces are concentrated near the 17th parallel and along the South Vietnam coast from Vung Tau to Ca Mau peninsula, and in the vicinity of the Cambodian border in the Gulf of Thailand.

During November 1967, 36,600 vessels were observed, 8,500 were inspected and boarded, and 17,300 were inspected but not boarded. During the same period, 29 enemy vessels were reported as destroyed. As many as 18,000 vessels are detected each month during periods unaffected by adverse monsoon weather.

Various cargoes - rice, salt, etc. - were captured. The official statistics for the first 10 months of 1967 do not claim the capture of any ammunition or significant quantities of war material as a result of Market Time operations.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

She only identified military equipment for Cambodia during the third quarter of 1957. About a dozen cases of small ammunition loaded from French ship at Sihanoukville. Some military-related cargoes like explosives and medicines arrived at both Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, but there is no evidence of any direct movement of these cargoes to the Viet Cong.

The importance of Phnom Penh relative to Sihanoukville has increased steadily during 1987, shown in the following tabulation of ship calls and cargo discharged at Cambodian ports in the first three quarters of 1987:

| |First Quarter|Second Quarter|
|---|---|---|
|Sihanoukville|63|56|
|Phnom Penh|74|90|
|Total|137|146|

| |Cargo Discharged (Thousand Metric Tons)|
|---|---|
|Sihanoukville|98.5|53.0|
|Phnom Penh|32.0|86.0|
|Total|180.0|133.0|

For Laos and petroleum deliveries, a small but unknown volume of cargo in transit. Data for Phnom Penh includes arrivals to the Cambodian port of Kompong Cham. Percentages may not add up to the total due to rounding.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349
---
| |Second Quarter|Third Quarter|
|---|---|---|
|Cement|57.5|29.5|
|Coal|1.0| |
|Notal product:|1.5|7.5|
|Chemicals and explosives|1.5|1.5|
|Asphalt, pyrites, rubber| |2.0|
|Petroleum|5.5| |
|Woodstuff|6.5|2.5|
|Military|0.5| |
|Other general cargoes|10.0|4.5|
|Unidentified|16.0|10.5|
| |9.0|30|

Data have been rounded to the nearest 0.5. Because of rounding, comparisons may not total to the totals shown.

The only military cargo known to have during the quarter was a consignment of about 1 dozen cases of 7.5cm and 8cm ammunition from the French cargo liner Zater. Several military items may have been included in the 1,400 tons of unidentified cargo in cases delivered by the.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02013349

Gnireze Cormnmict &h:pjining in fugust crdcorcigcdto tha Cenbodian Arscd Yorces

Scro silitary-rclatcd carzoesfron:T~stcrn Burono ard Ckin Vcre dfe-charged at Silanoukville. The %ctier dicchorged 40 tons of cxplogivcs in Jly, 23d2 Greckchig, undor Chinegc Comuurigt clarter, delivcred &bcut '70 %038 01 Bodiul nitrate from Chirie in August. Eedicalsbigucntg consieted cf #cre than JCO:torg Of rcdicineg and pharric " ~icalg fron Western Euroze G3ll consigrrents 02 ncdicines fron Cormunict China, ercSOle 30 tors of Soviet redicircs shipped via Gingepore.

Wnicentificd_Cerzeea

|203t02|10,500 torsoi inidcrtified cargoescaia _rom Hesiern Europe (7 _SCO tons)|
|---|---|
| |Cozrminict China (2,COO)|
| |and tho entrepdt port of Sincepore (SCO tons) included in thege cergces effs bevc been idc_tified buttbeir quent_tics ar8 not know.|

FJ Fkz

Approved for Release: 2018/07/1- C02013349 "SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA _15472906_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Allied military intelligence",
"What": "Significance of Cambodia to the Enemy, including use as a sanctuary, refuge, infiltration route, and a source of supplies for VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam",
"When": "28 December 1967",
"Where": ["Cambodia", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "Mekong River", "Phnom Penh", "Sihanoukville"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Meeting Details

|Meeting Began:|Meeting Ended:|
|---|---|
|8:30 a.m.|10:06 a.m.|
|8:30 a.m.|10:06 a.m.|

# Notes of the President's Meeting with the Democratic Leadership

Date: January 30, 1968

Location: In the Mansion
---
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                                                   ]
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---
# NR

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# NR

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# NR

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# NR

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---
# Senator Byrd:

Thank you very much for the briefing. I am very concerned about the build up at Khesanh. I have been told that we have 5,000 troops there compared with 40,000 enemy troops. Are we prepared for this attack?

On another matter, I think the actions which have been taken are prudent and wise.
---
# The President:

This has been a matter of great concern to me.

I met with the Joint Chiefs yesterday. I went around the table and got their answers in writing that they are prepared.

In addition, I have it in writing that they are convinced our forces are adequate. They said yes.

I asked, "Have we done all we should do?" They said yes.

I asked, "Are we convinced our forces are adequate?" They said yes.

I asked, should we withdraw from Korea. They said no, that Khesanh is important to us militarily and psychologically.

# Senator Sparkman:

I must interrupt to say that I must leave because of the hearing on the gold cover.

# Senator Long:

The American people are concerned about the damage to their national honor. I think we should take more firm military action.

# The President:

We see that we are taking the action we believe to be right. There are 700 enemy dead now as a result of our actions in Vietnam. That is not soft.

# Walt Rostow:

During the first day of TET, the enemy attacked in 10 places in Vietnam. Six were substantial attacks.

At 6:00 a.m. today, General Westmoreland said the enemy suffered the highest killed in one day of the war. They counted 700 enemy dead. The ratio of enemy killed to U.S. killed runs about 5 to 1.

The enemy is trying to terrorize the people. Reports said the ARVN performed very well. Khesanh's air field is open.

# General Wheeler:

On the matter of your question, about 5,000 U.S. troops versus 40,000 enemy troops. Khesanh is in very rugged areas.

There are 5,900 U.S. troops in the Khesanh Garrison. These are in support of this, there are 105 millimeter, 155 millimeter, and 8-inch guns.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00339630

TOP SECRET

The reare 175 millimeter guns operating from the nearby "rockpile."

There are 14 more 175 millimeter guns operating from pe nearby rockpile.
There are 4 Norp Vietnam divisions at Khesanh. We have available pe 1st U.S. Infantry Division.
We have dispatched one additional ARVN Division available wip units which can be dispatched quickly.
Roughly, pere are 40,000 allied troops to match pe 39,968 friendly forces versus 38,590 enemy forces.
We pink we are ready to take on any contingency.
In addition, each day pere are 40 B-52 sorties and 500 tactical air sorties hitting pe enemy.
I talked wip General Westmoreland yesterday. He had been in pe area and conferred wip senior field commanders. He placed pe entire field operation under his deputy General Abrams. He has as his air deputy General Momyer.
General Westmoreland is confident he can hold pe position. To abandon it would be to step backward. The Joint Chiefs believe pat he can hold. The Joint Chiefs agree wip and pat he should hold.
General Westmoreland considers it an opportunity to inflict heavy casualties on Norp Vietnam. It is 40,000 versus 40,000. We have 6,000 men pere, and 34,000 available.

NR

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00339630
---
NR
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---
NR

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00339630 NOTES-OF-THE-PRESIDENTS-M15478108.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": ["Senator Byrd", "The President", "Senator Sparkman", "Senator Long", "Walt Rostow", "General Wheeler"],
"What": "Discussion on military actions, troop numbers, and strategy in Vietnam, specifically at Khesanh",
"When": "30 January 1968",
"Where": ["Khesanh", "Vietnam", "Korea"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}