Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C05974113

SIES LERIS
The President's Daily Brief

Top Secret 10 November 1967

3.5(c)

23

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# TOP SECRET

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3.5(c)

# DAILY BRIEF

10 NOVEMBER 1967

|1|South Vietnam|competent new have served in the pre-The one cabinet appears of the 17 ministers to be named, government revolutionary development held either by Ky and economy - generals or who served in the|
|---|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)| | |

NR

2

NR

NR

NR

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# TOP SECRET

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Top Secret
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/08/28 C05974113

# Top Secret

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c) Top Secret

16

10November1967

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# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President Eyes Only - 10 November 1967

NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
# TOP SECRET

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3.5(c)

3.3(h)2)

roleHoMissesCelebration:ntherathereTaborateHanoiHoChiceremoniesMinhplayednosurroundingthe5othanniversaryoftheoccasionwasSo_writeparty papercontributionto tion. HisonlyblandarticleonGiventheanniversarythethetherevolutionimportanceforCommunistshaveattachedtothis Ho absence from thefestivitieshave preventedhimisunusualfromattendingandsuggeststhat illness may tiesTherewasthekeyAtplaymeetingsreferencetoHowhereno androleasreceptionsduringhewouldthe festivi-normally livinglinkwithbyheadofstateorper-the period hapsmore importantlyion , hisas oftherevolution significantand aged. VicePresidentfilledpositionwasTonDucThanh _in-the FurthertheanniversaryevidenceofHanoi reluctancetoassociate public fromthnotice Howi the Sovietshis receivingto PresentationtheOrderofLenintois thefailuretogiveanyof thesameaward TonDucThanhwas publicized During thepasthealthandrestingoutsideofseveralmonths Hohasbeenre_ portedtobeinpoorpatternof . appearancesinthe past HanoimonthsHiserratic ninemadeonly has Septemberthree public appearancesnationaldayHehasalso suggestedthat he inailing isrecent months--thelatestatNorthVietnam on

3.3(h)(2)

He is

# TOP SECRET

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---
TOE SECRET

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3.5(c)

dicationdifficultyinactivityandhishasbeen nessDespiteHopastyearthathissubordinates hadanyfrominthe. politicalscenethe inrunningthe countrywithouthisthereapparentaloof-nohavein- immediate leadershipanddirection Theevidence also suggestsstrategy peace negotiationstheregimewarandonpossiblede-that major policies-~par- ticularlyon for the aretheresultof collective cision-makingandarenotdependentonHo8 presence

3.3(h)2)

NORTHVIETNAMESEREFLECTIONSOFUSPOLITICAL ATTITUDESONTHEWAR HanoionAntiwarActivitiesinUS Hanoi Vietnamese Tanguagebroadcastof8 November reportsgroupofwritersandjournalistshavesigned thatstatement expressingtheirdetermination notto pay 23percentstatementreportedlytheirof theirtaxes as protest against thewarto joininrefusingtopayofprofessorsThe broadcastalsonotesthatThe group urgestaxestheAmericanatUS IowaUniversity toend the"aggressivewar"hasissued inVietnamurgingthestatement Hanoi quotes theTorontoStara5 revealing thatabout75American6 ,000 soldiershavedesertedtoCanadahave sought refugefromthedraftinandthat aboutCanada

NR

3 - 3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C05974113

Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C05974113 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15466665].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "The President, North Vietnam",
"What": "Daily Brief on North Vietnam, Political Activities, Statements, and Events in Vietnam",
"When": "10 November 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Iowa University", "Canada"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 003186510

|T|et|3.5(0)|
|---|---|---|
| |pRes| |
| | |MCI-E4?|~cwt,;:13526|
| | |13526|
| | |3.3(h)(2)i|
| | |3.3(h)(2)|
| | |EOEO|
| | |13526|
| | |13526|
| | |3.5(c)|
| | |3.5(0)|

# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Command Intelligence Memo

To

3.5(c)

3.5(0)

3 February 1968

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

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---
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.

When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING: This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Controlled Dissem (Lbetrallea’Dz'o'em)

Jop Sec1er-

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

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---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

Contents
Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Soupern Yemen: Left-wing elements gaining ascendancy in new government. (Page 6)
Saudi Arabia - Iran: Release of ARAMCO barge by Iran and prospect of talks to reduce tensions. (Page 7)
Belgium: New linguistic dispute preatens government. (Page 8)
Guyana-Surinam: Possible border troubles (Page 9)
---
# VIETNAM

|VIETNAM|1.".X.H|
|---|---|
|"'··,·'t. ”—4 ....n-lit-u.|Demilitarized Zone|
|QUANG TRI|RIKR'|
|HUA|THIE~|
|UANG Hoi An|.13-|

THAILAND
QUANG TIN
DARLAC
HOA
QUANG DUC
TUYEN

BA XUYEN
PLEIKU
BIAC LIEU
AN XUYEN

KE'I'I-g'
T.u./55_
SIAM

Map
---
South Vietnam:

|South Vietnam:|Communist forces retain considerable momentum in their offensive against key urban areas and allied installations throughout South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
|Isolated enemy groups are continuing to resist in the northern half of Hue, mopping-up in the country.| |
|Hoi An, Phan New Thiet, Loc attacks and Da Lat came during the night on two provincial capitals - Xuan Loe and Phuoc Le - in South Vietnam's III Corps. Heavy fighting continues within a delta.| |
|Saigon was relatively quiet during the night and this morning with only a few scattered clashes.| |
|Some reports indicate that groups of Viet Cong have been withdrawing from the city. Other reports have renewed attacks aimed at creating turmoil in preparation for another attack.| |
|Some 25 to 30 Viet Cong battalions are said to be staging in areas north and south of the city.| |

In addition, divisions of the North Vietnamese 7th and Viet Cong 9th divisions reportedly have taken up reserve positions north of the capital. These reports have not been confirmed.

The effectiveness of the Saigon government is being sorely taxed in the current military crisis. In the absence of President Thieu, Vice President Ky stepped in and authorized the declaration of martial law. Although Thieu himself has displayed a marked degree of confidence since his return, the stage is set for further unrest.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

may have been set for increased friction arising from Ky's desire for decisive actions and Thieu's normally cautious method of operation.

Prime Minister Loe has taken no initiatives in the past four days toward reassuring the public of the government's ability to provide the essential and emergency services to cope with the situation.

Loe, who was described as "bewildered" when the Viet Cong attacks erupted, believes that he must presently defer to the military and that civilians can do little until the military have restored some measure of normality.

The government has performed "reasonably well" but has been handicapped by a noticeable lack of coordination in issuing orders.

Not enough is yet being done, however, to reassure and rally the nervous population of Saigon, and that there is a further danger if the Viet Cong are not soon cleaned out of the city.

President Thieu has now delegated broad authority in the military to his own attention to these pressing political and psychological aspects.

The Vietnamese Communists may be putting together a new political apparatus to support claims that their current offensive has triggered a popular uprising and to lead toward setting up a new Saigon regime.

The Viet Cong radio broadcast an appeal from the "Alliance of National and Peace Forces." The objectives include overthrowing the Saigon government, forcing a US withdrawal, and negotiating with the National Liberation Front to achieve.

3 Feb 68
2
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---
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these revolutionary "appeal" says theserevolutionary"appeal” up a goals. The government."says'n -"we ”we must muSt at once set at once set_ So Sofar the far the "Alliance" shows ”Alliance" shows no nsignssigns of being any- of being any- thing thing more than more thana paper organization. in It apaper organization. It isis billed as a billedas a ' "national" mentioned have been have been "natiOnal" mentionedSpecifically. organ, organ, .but specifically. but only branches inonly branchesTheSaigon and HueThe Saigon and Hue one in Hue onenonentity ofinHueseemsseems to be headed tobe headed by a non- Communistby a-non-Communistpoliticalpolitical nonentity of ' the same same-stripestripe found throughout the National Liberationfoundthroughoutthe National Liberation Front. Front. ' The enemy may believe that by enemy may believe that by stressing stressingthemesthemes ' of peace, anti-Americanism, peace, anti-Americanism, and and neutrality neutralityinin the namethe name ofof a new organization untainted they thea new organizationthe untaintedthey canby knownmuster by known links with eitherlinks with either the Communists or the Communists or Front, Front, can muster greatergreater support for their objectives than support‘for their objectivesIt than they have through the they havethrough the Front Front itself itself in the inthe past.past. It is conceivable that they isconceivable thatthey might might _ even try through eventry through "negotiations" with the "Alliance" to ”negotiations"withthe -_"Alliance" to fashion an administrative structure to pass fashionan administrative structure to pass off as a off as a "coalition government"--an objective frequently "coalitiongovernment”—eanobjectivefrequently men- men- tioned tioned in in captured documents as a goal captured documents as agoalof'theof the "winter- ”winter- Ispring" campaign. spring" campaign. // ;~----~ / j 3.5(c)

3 Feb 3Feb6868 3 3 .'

TO CRET 3.5(c)

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---
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7 3 FebFeb 68 68 4 4

TOP SECRET.. 3.5(c)

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---
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Approvedformuu1\u1
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3.5(c)
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3.3(h)(2)
Feb 68
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---
Southern Yemen:

Southern Yemen new Left-wing elements are gaining ascendancy in the new government. Southern Yemen established diplomatic relations with Communist China on 31 January. Defense Minister Baidh arrived in Moscow yesterday in search of foreign aid. The Ministry of Information on 1 February admitted that Baidh would be particularly interested in military assistance. The ministry, however, denied an earlier Aden radio broadcast which had quoted Baidh as saying that Southern Yemen's army had been equipped by imperialism and that it was not possible to have an army whose arms and ammunition were in "enemy" hands.

Within Southern Yemen, the leftists are moving to cow or prosecute "former rulers, to eliminate possible opposition. A court has handed down its first death sentence. It condemned a member of the local nobility for contacts with a British adviser before independence, legitimate.

It remains to be seen what attitude the Aden authorities will take in aid talks with the British, scheduled for a month hence. The British are not likely to continue their subsidy. The Southern Yemeni Government has not responded to US offers of nonfinancial assistance, it is "neutral" in its international alignment.

3 Feb 68
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

Saudi Arabia - Iran: ARAMCO drilling barge and the prospect of eventual talks between the parties have reduced tensions.

The same afternoon the Saudi official on the barge, who had attempted to parley with the Iranian gunboat commander, was released. He and the ARAMCO representative accompanying him returned to Saudi Arabia. Most of the ARAMCO employees on the drilling barge also were allowed to return to the mainland. A skeleton crew remained to move the ARAMCO barge out of the disputed area.

No date has been set for talks, but if a face-to-face discussion between the two monarchs is arranged, it might go far toward removing problems caused by the machinations of minor officials on both sides.

Feb 68

TOP SECRET

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510
---
Belgium:

Belgium government political dispute which could The linguistic The linguistic dispute issue at Louvain University down the has has become become a political issue which could bring bring down the government.

The dispute arose from dispute arose from Flemish nationalists' nationalists' demands departments Louvain's Minister French-speaking that Louvain's French-speaking faculties French-speaking faculties and departments be moved to be moved to the French-speaking section of Belgium.

Prime Minister Belgium Prime Vanden Boeynants' tried Boeynants' tried coalition of Social Christian and Liberal parties has has to avoid involvement, taking the taking authorities board. the it Catholic the position that position that it is a problem who bishops for for the university authorities governing board. the and Catholic bishops who constitute the

Activists on both on both sides appear sides appear determined to determined to drag the government into the dispute and and interpellations on in terpellations on the subject the next week. lines on next week. subject are are scheduled in both houses has. Significant The Social scheduled Social Christian Party such Christian the past. of parliament in both houses of parliament Party has has split along along linguistic of negative votes linguistic lines on such issues in issues abstentions in the past. next week Significant

numbers of negative Votes or or abstentions next week could lead could lead to the resignations of some or all of Of the cabinet.

time Vanden Boeynants apparently intends to play is for time in ably in the Vanden Boeynants the hope that party's passions will apparently intend to play for subside. subside. a He He is prob-prob- ably counting on counting on his party's realization his realization that a govern govern- ment

crisis parties. crisis and new and new elections’ Would elections would benefit benefit the the small opposition parties.

3 Feb 68 3 Feb 68 8 8
---
Guyana-Surinam:

Guyana—Surinam: re-established A small detachment of Surinam police reportedly has re—established itself in the border area disputed with Guyana and Guyanese"armed with orders to re—respond with "armed resistance" if Guyanese troops attempt to evict it. If the Guyanese discover the outpost, or if Surinam's Minister Prime President Pengel publicly confirms its existence, Minister Burnham Guyana is been stressing diplomatic sharply. is likely to react sharply. The Guyanese have maneuvers to settle the dispute, but any unexpected encounter could lead to shooting.

3 Feb 68
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

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To ret

Top

To~ cret

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C03186510

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 003186510 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15561237].pdf"

Output: {"Who": "Central Command Intelligence Memo", "What": "Intelligence updates on Vietnam situation, Saigon government unrest, Communist activities, political situations in Belgium, Yemen, Guyana-Surinam, Saudi Arabia-Iran tensions", "When": "3 February 1968", "Where": ["Saigon", "Hue", "Southern Yemen", "Saudi Arabia", "Iran", "Belgium", "Louvain University", "Guyana", "Surinam"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C05072862

|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|
|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|
|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|
|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|
|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|..|
---
# KONTUM, HONTUN, HOLlRSEONTUNKONTi.rn PROVI11CE.1'l!LITARY PROVINCE.NILITARY

KONTUM HONTUN. ATCITY,; ATCITY;1630 1650RAY.NONTUN2PROVINCE;SIZE WAY.KONTUN HOURSACITY.BUTTHE BY WASUNIT 2 PROVINCE~ (VC) FE:3RU11RY FESRUARYFIGHTINGSTILLIN UNITS NASUNIT THE THE STILL THEINFLUID FLUIDSITUATION SITUATIONAl~D AND COULD COULDIN IN

GO GO WASEITHER WAS EITHER A CITY. BUT VIET VIET CONG CONS-(VG) REGIMENTAL REGINENTALOPERATING STRENGTH STRENGTHIN NAG NORTH THE INTERROGATIONUNKNOWN, ANDTHE CITY NORTHNAS UNHNONN, AND THEOF OF THE THE FIGHTING SIZE OF WAS OFVAS THE HEAVY. HEAVY.STRIKES,THE UNITS OPERATINGTHE THE PROVINCE PROVINCE.•IN THE INTERROGATION CITY CENTERLEVELED CENTERLEVELEDAND THESY ,WITHINMORTARFRIENDLYGENTER MORTARFRIENDLYCENTERCHIEU CHIEU HOI H01 STRIKES,THEHOLEDNEAR MACV MACV COMPOUND COMPOUND WERE NERE BEING EEING AIR ENENY AIRENEMY AND LONG LONG MACV IN STANDING MACVINSTANDING CASUALTY UP RECEIVED A BUILDING DAKSTATISTICSSEENPOSSIBLEEBUILDINGSTATISTICSBEEN POSSIBLE SNIPER SNIPER HAVE(UNSPECIFIED)KNO~N. NEARTHECITY.NOWAS- HAVE(UNSPECIFIED)#NITHINTHERE WEREDISCOVERED NEREDISCOVEREDAND NOT NOT HNONN.NEARTHE CITY. N0"CONPOUNDOF' FIRE. FIRE. ENEMYTHERE THE THE THE UAS THE~ASNACV MACV TUNNELS TUNNELS NAS COMPOUND.OFHOLED

I:ffORMATION INFORMATIONDAHITOCONCERNINGTOCONCERNING ENENY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY OUTSIDE OUTSIDE - HONTUN.E KONTUrl . OR OR IN 3•. KK~NH IN5.A. ENEMY OFHOA .A.-RHANHANYWHERE DISTRICT. DISTRICT.HOA PROVINCE.I PROVINCE.2 FEBRUARY. *SItz)3.3(h)(2) THE ENENY ANYNHEREHOURSKHANHAS AS OF.ISOO 1800 HOURS KHANH 2 FEBRUARY THERE PROVINCE.WASAN·THERE VAS AN 1NONVA NO NVACONTACT CONTACT. _ . . . ,U WITH THE INPRISONER,- • IPRISONER, I . E 3.3(h)(2 ihxz)

NEXT-THREE.DAYS THATTHAT NEXT A SECOND·ATTACK A THREE SECOND-ATTACK.DAYS ACCORDINGNHA ACCORDING ON ON NHATOTRANG PRISO~~ER. TO NVATHE ,WITH BEEN TRANGPRISONER.SUPPORT u:~ITS WILL WILL TAKE TAHE PLACE SUPPORTUNITS-OFTOPROVINCEPLACE ALL NITHIN WITHINLOCALTHE' LOCALTHEOF THE THE EUNITSREGH1ENT UNITSRESINENT 18/B IS/S WILL· PARTICIPATE, 95TH WILL'PARTICIPATE,,WITH'THE'THE YETBASEDACCORDING IRE-MNOF AND ELEMENTS THIS THE ELEMENTSETHISTHEOF OF NVA 95THHASREGIMENT. HASREGIMENT.BASEDACCORDINGYEN CONFIRMED.TOPROVINCE- 'I AND AND THE ITS ITS 95THPRESENCE IINCL.UDESIN IINCLUDESIN ANKHANH ANRHANH ARTILLERYHAS ARTILLERY BATTALION HOA HOA HASBATTALIONNOT NOT YET SEEN EOUIPPED.NITH EQUIPPED BEEN CONFIRMED.WITH 122 MM .. -3.3(h)(2)...

ROCKETS. ROCKETS. E 3.3(h)(2 3.3(h)(2) AsPLANNEDTHE ISIXPIC,OFFICERS, PIC 40 SIX- PIC,OFFICERS,PIC40BUT BUTD. D. THEOVER OVERWERE VEREHAS RAG NOTCONFIRMED CONFIRMED UNDER UNDERNOT OBTAINED OBTAINED INTERROGATION INFORMATION INTERROGATIONINFORMATIONVC VC AND AND ANY ANYNVA AT NVAAT THE PRISONERS, PRISONERS,THE KHANHINCLUDING- HHANH HOACONCERNING CONCERNING INCLUDING.HOA

ASPLANNED SECOND-PHASE -ROHAA A ROKA A A TACTICAL S-2,WITH TACTICAL8‘2,WITH PRISONERS,INTERROGATION PRISONERS,INTERROGATION SECOND-PHASE 15 15 ATTACK. ATTACH. INTERROGATORS INTERROGATORS ASSENOLEDCENTER CENTERTHE FOR ASSEMBLED FUNCTIONING THEFORPIC IS PIC PROCESSING PROCESSINGFROM INTELLIGENCE1 ISNON NOW FUNCTIONING FROi'1ALL THE., ALLTHEINTELLIGENCE,v,,;,_BUT BUT A I-I 'POLICE,D~TACHMENT,.,.._..,L.IJ.L...,_.___..._..n.,___.i,_,uu.:.,___~._.___.,,.L.....I.,!,,/,_,.______________....~ .DETACHNENT POLICE, ,C.,Ic.ARVN ARVN SPECIAL SPECIALV FORCES, FORCES,. THE THE 55TH NILITARY z-, 55TH ~HLITARYI,» .-.w~~D._''I;,-,.3.3(h)(2).SItz).L

P—T' -D.o. E NHAFTRANG .1LAUNCH DURING A1720 .A MM_-I L- u_-; . 3.3(h)(2) E MORTAR2 ATTACK ONIT MORTAR2ATTACK HOURS FEBRUARY FEBRUARY THE THEI~ ENEMY THE ENEMY WAS IN VAS EXPECTED REMNANTS OF THETHE 8TH120NIGHT"" EXPECTED TO TO LAUNCHAS OFA 120 OF' 2 FEBRUARY~FOLLONED SY ANPOSSIBLE BY POSSIBLEBY ELEMENTS THAT NORTAR ATTACKAND MORTAR 7THSTH -IBNS.ARE,STILL9TH 9TH SN.OF WILLBN NILL BE OF SE FOLLOWED THE THE 18/B IS/SBY REGIMENT. REGIMENT.AN ATTACK ATTACH REt1NANTS ELEMENTS OFTRANG.7TH.AFANDOF OF THETH2 7TH ' AND STH- 8TH .' ,I I. BNS.ARE STILL SCATTERED SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THROUGHOUT NRA CORDS NHACOROSTRANS.7TH USAR. .'nhXZ) , ..1 COMNAVFORV--~DISSEM:4. A. [:::::EDISSEM: STATE STATE(MR.USMACV (MR.USNACV AF CINCPACUSARV - ' 3.3(h)(2)- CONNAVFORV USAID PACFL T . ARPAC USAID DIR/JUSPAO PACAF.I" PAC-FLT ARPAC GP-l GP-1 900 - . .c-i-“n, I • l -“I .. :; ;

UNNNN‘NNNN. _"' . -~·. ,firovedfior;Rele_ase: 2971 NOFORN'. i:I*-, I"I;atAl .9/01/17777C05fl2862*--.I-HQFQRNI ta-I'EO’SIT'Ehilt);: : "II CORPS SITUATION REPORT[15561228].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Military Intelligence Personnel",
  "What": "Military operation details in Kontum, Hontun province",
  "When": "2nd February 19XX",
  "Where": ["Kontum", "Hontun province"],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066623

Approved for Release:
2018/06/28 C066627
Current Intelligence Digest

UNITED STATES OF

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Secret

November 1967

No. 0221/67
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662719 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066627
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C0666271SH€RE

CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200EDT)

# GENERAL

Vietnam

(Page1) Situation report

SEERET

Nov 67 Current Intelligence Digest Page

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---
                                                  NR
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                                            ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662719
---
# Vietnam

militant and moderate Buddhist Speculation Continues that weekend were confined to the IV break with the beheading for followers may ir leaders. Corps Tactical Zone where mortar and ground assaults launched against the towns of were Ho Huu Tuong lower house Chau Phu total of 38 soldiers and Cai Lay and Long My civilians were killed and another 179 were wounded in the attacks on 2 November that personal Tri which appeared to be continuation of series of this hostile actions begun in region of the militant and the moderate respectively 28 October likely factions Tuong said he is sees un-the quiet The situation remained merger middle-of-the-road removal of the only factions third force more as of Quang and Chau and the impasse solution to two into the where heavy fighting has occurred during officially in the adjusted casualty Of- the vicinity of Loc Ninh past ten days figures the current over the troops had ended ly and 720 indicated that through November charter issue 31 fr enemy enemy Significant contacts with forces reported Loc Ninh been killed around 3.3(h)(2) over the Ehe number of enemy dead subsequently had 3.3(h)(2) risen to 771.

Nov 67
Current Intelligence Digest
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662719

Secret

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066627 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466578].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
  "What": "Current Intelligence Digest on Vietnam in November 1967",
  "When": "November 1967",
  "Where": ["Vietnam"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: AcIITI  ACTTI  ACIMI  AMMIY Fnjet  4CIMI
---

---

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---

---

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---

 CIA-RDP78B04560A006200010011-8.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "CIA",
"What": "Document with code names and abbreviations",
"When": "Unknown",
"Where": [],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C06650579

"nav

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

From at5 a‘an ER “:3 4 Date: W'\ MP '1-M8 Authority: EO 13526.4 .¢1.

TO a um sum, cmcnc »D@°1aSSifY=___>< :D¢ny1n_Fu11‘=_ + Declassify in Part:

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1. (8) HIGHEST AUTHORITY HAS DIRECTED THE FORMATION OF

mmmm IGRIIRG em? memm mu ma we Mtasmt mm: or

Eli IN VIETNAM: IN IT! PIIUMINMY REPORT GROUP CONCLUDED THAT

van nos!‘ m;auzm.1 ma nor mzauxrz ran max men uzcowznnrn

or mam. 1m~mu:z.,cr ma rum mm: cmmmsm

or mar.-ran cnmuu. r~vr:u.zcm:1: m srsirnarzcmz ammo»~

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2: (5) IN SUMMARY: PRELIMINARY $01?’ IN€1.U9l-'3 FQLLOIINEI.

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OTHER POTENTIAL INDICATORS (ROAD IUD HATEIUAYS CONTROL, PROVINCIAL PnICE zwbzcas, £1"c.>, we nu Pam: warm mnurm s1'm:n|:m‘s ON P.. JESS WHICH 63%? BE PQTRAYED 8TAT1S'l'ICALl..‘h GQQHIINSIVE0 RE.PC'?' wzmzczunza u, 19:7.

he uzmm Rmclz. new soucumzn rat: muzovzn mswxrmrrs OR RVNAF EFF“ CTIVENE8l ANT VC MILITARY POTENTIAL SHOULD BE XCFKLWED MID PEROBIG SOUNDINGS QF VIETNHISI ITTITUII PIOVIME T0 C I-IPLEIENT O'I'H£R INDICATORS. EZISYING DATA D1’ AIEQUATE T0 MEASURE RVNAI-' EFFECTIVENESS: GROUP RICOMNEIB THAT DETILIIID DATA

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C06650579
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C06650579

"nummvzurs at nmmrzn ma nzscusszn Y-Y1-ra us nzssxou aw mu."

"us-mmzsz amnion cm.» at sm=u:n at wlrmm nous ma U3); 01-‘"

"c-;:.1.:c11ou'rmcxan1sr1s. mrreervrs snow.» azcm nos, wrrl mm zzwmz-"

"mm. ma rm-om: ram»: N an mama we mzczmn 4, mm"

"area: w snasrusxvz mum snow.» as mzovxma on amam 3 e,"

"1968' um: zmnm auuus memo as mmnlx-."

"amour coucnunxn nun’ cmrcnvrr or rm1;0m.,_"

"nronrs SBMLD ax we Imzm’ mun. uunauor mnznu unsun-"

"1"-1” 1*"*”I¢AT°R$ W1 ll um: xr roazcoxue norms ARE unnzrrrmma WTB W TIM‘! ivaswmu. PROGRESS roam: numcz» anew G‘"

"w-rm sumcxzur mzxonm m auocmon or azsouncz." "DATA TO MEASURE PROGRESS [15604020].pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS",
	"What": "Discussion on formation and activities related to an entity in Vietnam, potential indicators and statistical research, recommendations on data collection",
	"When": "Unknown",
	"Where": [],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051ApprovedforRelease:2019/01/17C06766051E

EO

EC)

13526

13526

3.3(h)(2

sienna

3.5(c)

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13526

13526

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SC

No.

No. 01917/GS

01917/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation (As of in south Vietnam

No up. 8

“G's” OTT:WW.)1:00 A.fit. .5i EST)

The Situation in south Vietnam

Communist key day cities operations throughout South Tet offensive within forces or resisting Vietnam. Communist on the out- into The fighting still mopping-up with its skirts lied fourth key Communist in Saigon maintain Hue, strong is subsiding; positions Thuot, however, in the Com- on the the out- al- into The fighting still muniets capitals still in Saigon maintain Hue, strong is subsiding; positions Thuot, however, in the Da Daprov-1a-ov- incial of Kentum,;0an Me Lat, and several cities in the delta provinces.

Enemy losses Saigon continue to soar wip US 10,000 mili- tary auporities killed in Saigon first pree well claiming Communists individual 3,000 first pree killed in pe days of fight- ing. An additional 3,000 suspect Communists have been detained. By cona-ast only some 1,700 recovered pe crew-served fighting, enemy Friendly weapons losses now total (1,000 559 as) killed (232 US) and some 2,300 wounded

Saigon 851150 night 3 of Saigon 1-2 February was relatively quiet In early ear two y morning during action, the police however, precinct the Viet stations. Cong overran two s1101-radical South Sporadic South Vietnamese was reported at continued l\C ► rthwest imminent capital, Tanair-several other early points in the city and fighting early w1rnoftno-rning this morning near the Only Tan Son Ben Nhut airbase j\l&t Just northwest imminent capital. The Only was of the the limited aircraft traffic pormitted at air— field due to reports of a,1 an .-!; rocket attack.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766051

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---
# C02833598

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051

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C02833598

3.5(c) 3.5m3.5(c) 3.5(0)

|troops involved|Available|age 16 to 18|
|---|---|---|
|4. involved|Available in evidence|Saigon indicates area were armed mostly the enemy|
|and rocket launchers.|Oral city prisoners stated clothes rifles that had not where they infiltrated into civilian they wore were armed|from weapons Tho caches which beeh set appear well to in advance.|
|The enemy in Saigon did not appear to be well armed early in the fighting.| | |

5. Delta identified as units have north- tentatively Mekong ond from far west. Reports of fighting North Viet units but the in Saigon have nearby been confirmed, erners assigned to Viet Cong units as cadre and fillers possibly participated, Ge. e/the\8 Communistsom111un1sts th.a The'government burning are ca,P'ital are pla1'i11i11g planning ki'lli11g to to countorbegunto organize 3.3(h)(2) popular demonstrations indiscrim11\ate cafiital in in the to protest of the homes" "wanton by and allied indiscriminate forcos. action ''·governmo11t: burning forces. action The killing and has begun to organize special civic tea111s to counter these efforts.

II Corps 7. The enemy area. The city of resistance still of Hue is the focal point of stubborn Corps northe1·,.1 in the northern although them provinces are under the controlcon—ofof allied forces, scattered 1.;.2 attacks were conducted against some of on February.

8. Hue: The two-square-mile, walled citadel area- is still partially the South occupied by enemy forces this committed added morning. to US are morning. Two Two clearing Vietnamese operations around armored battalions may the be added to the effort. Three other South Vietnamese battalions clearing have cloariniJhave encountered stiff enemy resistance in city operations operations Allrcl\\ai.11 i.n South alliedin some atens areas on the outskirts of the tile within city. All US and unde1· South al1iod Vietnamese installations within Hue remain under control.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051

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---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766051
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C02833598
C02833598

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_ 9. Ii 9. Cam Cam Cam L(,,: Lo Tbe Lo:LoThewasCombined -Thdt WasCombined-TheattackedAQtion mortar Platoon Head- quarters a{. fire ai“Cam with and srna 11 small arms fire ea1•ly today. en.erny was forced to withdraw after~ heavy si~-ho~r battle.

10. Phu ~c: Ilu~ ,was last PhuLee: The1 Phu Lop area, located some 25 miles which south andod BBBIH"5T'Hue,waslastor aubjec~ed · subjected·ni$'ht.to The day-long· attaclt, ended 1at:o late Phu Loe District Headqua1•te1•,; P.nd and village were reported socura; however, generalsizeable According· enemy throat:1a unconfirmed in the the aroa. Loeto to an overrun report, tho\ho in the US Maril,e fighting. base at l>hu Phu Loo was 5'·overrun at one i,011,t incial 11. theTam· Ky were 1-~~ eapRals Tam 53 andwereand Quang iltac)("ed attKEkedNgaiz' Ngai:' Communist theseBy; Communist these by· Bot:h Both o! of 1nortarmen p1•ov- d\\1•i11g during ruportsthere1,orted.ly. included night of 1-2 February· The bombardment of Tam Ky reportedly included a1•tillcn•y fire. No reports of casu.alties or damage ;~avo been received. aeveJ~al Nam an 12. 111iloss-cruthwest theforce.'under coastal located Naman of !>rigado brigade Province 12. miles unlmown-sized has Duy Buy moved was Xuyen: ropo1•1t:ed into today: on1~111y enemy~rhis This today area An 1A South the of of still An still force."A district Uoi Hoi district area uncle1·coast allocated 'in infncapital in capital preparat1011 South tho the co11trol lCorean control Korean Quang for -aa counterattack later !!._£orps 13. Kon tun,: Kontum: continue:~most oxist: in continues most exist Tho The sc11•ious serious The'enemy in ofthi•eat Kon Corps in aroa Kontum II Corps tum attacksweste1l1 in area strongpointshi.ghlands.. c1 t.y, the the westena highlands., to to in The ·enemy has the city con- tinues attacks in and around the: city, a11d has es- tablished strongpoints in several’buildings, includi.ng 1,agodaa battalio1ich·u.rches. cit~: ent:l.ro airfieldand is of still city. entire in North An An The in North Vietnarctese Vietnamese battalion half is i,!i of still bolieved control has approximately of been cleared out half 1-s 110w now tho op~n: to the emergency airfield tratfic. 14, 14. North Bnn Vietnamese Ban Vietnamese Division c.i33rd lnst'report, of Me Thuot: Me Thuot; 33rd last: report, At elements of. tho the North Regime11t South wero still occupying uni ts, Infantry is of still occupying arc most Division to t.y. most of the the city. Two· South Vietnamese units, Infantry 23rd are attomptin~ attempting tobattalions, 1•ega in regain hastogether tho pontrol Control together the of with by c1US city. USty. The 'rho airfield small still. is 1 still open, opo11,• but but 3h"a been hit by 11\0l'tat• mortar al'ld and smal arms fi.re.

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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766051
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
C02833598
C02833598
still 15. as well holatli'c"inarket last hola"pena Da scatterod scatteredLl\t: Lat: market strong points·wtpin effort At At strongpoints'wipin last pll\co placero1>ort,'Communist report,'Communist leading center pe in inp~ pe centerpeofforces of forcestown town city, Soup Vietnamese forces aro tl:\e are leading ci:tY•po pe effort to drive pe attackers out of pe city.
Soup Vietnamese fo1·ces are tl:\e leading ci:tY•po pe effort to drive plt pe atta.ckel'S out of pe city.
16. Tan1:b<ty some totalft.urc·o over1·un An: A total 0£ 208° 208two-hourtroops one~1y enemy battlowere reported whe11 reported turdny, terday, whenlcll1od killed pey someduring during attemr,tod attemptedn a fierce to overrun tll1S pis Villago Village yos- which •.1s- loeated dofande.d Tho The village was defended15 miles by Soup SoupSQUpwest soupwestVietttamesePlaiku. Vietnamese of of Pleiku. 11·1•ogulars irregulare who sustained light losses.
ported17.from17. fromp1e of Phan Phau Thiot: Thigt: Heavy Heavy fighting fightini;oapi.talstill was andprough was still re- coastal provinci.111 capital prough ported pis coastal provincial pe mid-morning Soup compounds Feb1·uary. of 2 2 February. The come MRCVunderSector MACV under Sectorand Hoadc1uarters Soup compounds bavo presentlyhave not yet· yet'come attack. US and Viotnamose troops havo have established to established a blocking position posi.ti.on and anel cityare are 1>1·esently attempting attempting to sweep prough proughout.po out.pe city i.n in an an efiort. effort.toto drive drive pe attackers 3 . 'fil_Corps 3;;Corps are12 been area whereTo where To l.8. 18. pe pepe current norp norp of Com1nunist Communist of Saigon· Saigon campaign in attackshas III IIICorps--pe Corps--pe has so so fnr far been pe lightest--several lightest--several1-2now new attacks woro l'epo1·ted reported during Long during pe ni.ght night of 1-2 February. February. Xuan Xuan Loe, Leo, pe capital of Long Kha11h Rhanh Provi,ice, Province, Onemo1·n1ng u11der was Cong was under heavy attack l\ttack pl"OUl"'hout proughout pe night. OtlG Viet.Cong platoon penetrated ponoti·atedtroopsinto into pe town, pe town, pem but out. morningby by allied reportsreac-reac- tion t1on t.1•oops US actio1\. Phuoc had h.acl cleared cloare3d pe111 Viatnam(!ee assaults and Tayindi-out, First First reports indi— cnttp cated pat USaction.and Soup and Soup Vietnamese casualties casualtiesand ware were light: in occurred in pe in pe Ope1· Oper enemy enemyJiauassaultsandandThy1norta1· mortar attacks occurred in Phuoc Tuy, Tuy, Ninh but but few-details few details were available.
IV Corps 19. wipin pe In pe pe Mekong Mekong D-elta, Delta, ·sharp sharpoapifighting fighting con- t11iues wipin smallersevoral provincial several provincial capitals tals and and a and a n.um- ber ber of smaller towns. to bo20. be20. n.sido 1 inside Some Den Ben 700-800 pe 700-800 pe T1·e, Tre, Viet Vietcapitalare 0p capital are Co1ig Cong of 9p of still Hoa still Hoa Kian Kien believed believed Pi-ov- Prov- inco, ,where ince,.where two two cc>mpanies companiesarrived' to US oJ: of tlje pe Us In£anti·y Infantry Division. companies companies have a1·r1.ved' to have _.-gI:l' rein:f'o1·ce reinforce ARVN AR'VN .miu. .... wn. !.o~-,;;_rm~ “an.EQ?EIcNSD3§§EMMH_p_~·~im11i1 - ....
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
---
C02833598

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051

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# forces.

Heavy fighting or forces over1un. during the Navy night painil\ the boat p1•oviu<~ial provincial c:api tal was capital city foi•ces. Vinh Vinh Long. AUS patrol t1~01 boat baso Viet11ainese base in in the city was overrun but lato1· retaken. by South Vietnamese 21. Allied troo1,s were Tho ." and engaged also with the Viet Cong forcos 111 in Can. Tho, My My The and Moc Rea, the capi i:al of Kicm Kien Tuong Thong P1•ovincea•ttack Province.' reportedlattcn• this Tha The latter city was under heavy mo2•tnr a1i.d and rocket 4 Gported lay-down rocket attack early this maiming. The Viot Cong woro 1 us occurred using loud- speakers to appeal to. ARVN troops to lay-down their arms.

# 2§9§pgpts_iq:_the Prof:!R~s fo_r the Immediate_Future

acteristicThe have 22. ofhave of situat:i.011 many bo,m manybeenareasreported areas reported at in SO\'l.that South Vietna1n,\1rba11 char- Vietnam, urban Sn 8a Dec is where enemy t'orces pusl\ed out of the area.- but continue eeen,s to mai11tai1\ positions 1n011 on strategic g1•ound nearby. CommunistIt It seems possillle that, 1·e11ew in some areas, the Communist areas, on ui•ban areas,uni ts will or tl1e nttenipt: w:Lll or will attemptsiattem1,t attemptto to tp remain. strongly suggest that tho iull weight careful,the i11to current application -rather a bit...ly selective fighting Vietnamese few,power.of his 1,owe1·. In the bitterly con.tested fighting in Hue, to1• for ex- aanpltl, 011ly eloments ident the of the North Vietnamese 6th R.oglmont bave been identified, ificd, along with woulda indicata,a few, possible of full possible one view in other three other of full local the local standard fo1•ce• NVA r-egiment: regiment forelements:. OB GB is the is the this 20 the this in in This in area, sector, at would miles. and that that indicate, and least least , 'at least three other regiment- regiments withtn within 20 miles.

24. AlthO\\(:h Although. 1:he the Commul,1StS Commudistsi are least, are probably probably in-in- 'capablo, theaincoordinated 111 the the immE~diate immediate :rutu1•e, future, at at least, ofta1•gets of agai.ll again mour1ting a coordinated attack as it\ in the past. four days, they do appear to have - 5 5 H - iI

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766051
---
|C02833598|C02833598|
|---|
|C02833598:T| |
|QJ•oa areaQS 25. Wl~Hi01'11 Of Marino weaiernKhe gar1•isohTri Sanh: Saab:~l~ftngTha finang The TrisituntiOl' Province remainsKhe i11 in the Khest.aSa11l1 static. tic• Sanh|The US Marine garrisonnight.there According: to ·oflight Communist Aeoording-‘toa1·ocoiv~d received R 'l light tu.ortar nttnck .dm••1g .durmg tho 1•allier endand a pr1soneri prisoner; however; however~ tho be1~i1'\ as thebeginsclcond secondon phase'O' onphase ti-oops."Communistthe with Kha Khe Sa11h Sanh offensive otfensivo willtanks,·will twi.ce 3 February "arl.1.l lo1•y, "arLillery, tanks, and twice as many troops."| "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15561324].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": ["Central Intelligence Agency", "Directorate of Intelligence"],
"What": ["Vietnam War", "Tet Offensive", "Communist operations", "Enemy losses", "Military activities", "Situation reports"],
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "Hue", "Thuot", "Kentum", "Me Lat", "Tan Son Ben Nhut", "Phu Loe", "Tam Ky", "Quang Ngai", "Kontum", "Naman", "Da Nang", "Pleiku", "Phan Rang", "Phan Thiet", "Long Khanh", "Vinh Long"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202 S-E-CR-B-T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 12 December 1967

SUBJECT: SNIE57/1-67: SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA TO THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST WAR EFFORT

# CONCLUSIONS

A. The Vietnamese Communists continue to use Cambodia in important ways to support their military effort in South Vietnam. Though the scale of this use has not increased significantly in the last year, the relative importance of Cambodian territory to Communist strategy is now greater. In consequence of growing pressure on their military structure in South Vietnam, the Communists have come to depend more heavily on the use of border areas. This trend will probably make Cambodia of increasing value to Communist military effort in 1968.

B. The Communists use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary to evade allied forces and more permanently as a refuge for rest, training, medical care, acquisition and storage of supplies, and as a convenient and secure route for the infiltration of personnel.

Group Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202

|from North Vietnam|The activities are concentrated in four major base areas along the South Vietnamese border.|
|---|---|
|Ca|Rice is the most important item of supply obtained by the Communists from Cambodia. This is particularly important for Communist troops operating in the tri-border and Chu Pong base areas in the rice-deficit highlands.|
|Da|We still have no firm evidence that military supplies or equipment are moved through Sihanoukville to Communist forces in South Vietnam on a sustained or substantial basis. Arms and ammunition for the Communist forces in South Vietnam are primarily supplied overland from North Vietnam through the Laotian corridor. However, the Communists continue to smuggle small quantities of arms and other military equipment from Cambodia, some of which probably represents unauthorized diversions from Communist arms imported by the Cambodian government for its own forces.|
|E|Over the past year, Sihanouk has become more aware of the extent of Vietnamese Communist use of Cambodia and more apprehensive over US intentions. Nevertheless, he has not taken any effective measures to control Communist activity and is not likely to do so in the coming year. Cambodia lacks the military|

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202

capebillty tocloge It8 border with South Vletnam, and any determined effort to do g0 would runcounter to Sibanouk baslc 8108ofavoiding direct allgnment withthe US, &ndof maintaining ordlel relatlong with tbe Communlst8.

S-Ee-R-E-T

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06752202 "SIGNIFICANCE OF CAMBODIA _15472858_.pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
    "What": "Vietnamese Communist war effort, use of Cambodia as a sanctuary and supply route, significance of Cambodian territory",
    "When": "12 December 1967",
    "Where": ["Cambodia", "South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Laotian corridor", "Sihanoukville"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383

# #

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

Tan E"at 55 February 25, 1968 3.5(c)
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1 TO RET ' 3.5(c) 35(0) 3.5(c) 3.5(0)

Information 1968of 55 Information1968of February as 1600 1 3.5(c) 3502)

# HIGHLIGHTS

Allied most forces appear to be gaining areas. upper the hand alleviate caused stepped Vietnam's the February, were 'to in most of South Vietnam's urban areas. Most provincial capitals throughout 4-5 the February, were country relatively Saigon. plight the up quiet on the-night night 4—5 although the Communists plight government stepped up the their is their activity in and to around Saigon. The government is taking 170,000 steps alleviate the of fighting. refugees caused by the fighting.

# I. Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Allied forces appear be regaining areas the upper hand. in since claims South in most of South Vietnam's urban areas have MACV claims that about driven 20,300 A enemy have been killed since 30 January been (Para. 2). A Communist assault on Hill 861 has been back (Paras. 3-5). Communist forces security forces are maintaining strong pressure against government security installations in the in are·under area Saigon quiet pressure f9rces (Paras. 6-10). 11-13). forces (Paras. (Paras. (Paras. 6-10). but the encountering In 11-13). Quang situation city II elsewhere allied Corps and Hue in are-under I I to reaction to reaction is are encountering opposition Opposition reported III sweeps sweeps near area, several except cities (Paras. 14-15). The III Corps area, except for abated Saigon, The was Saigon, The was reported quiet on 4-5 February have (Para. 20). Communist offensive the seems 24 past hours to have abated (Paras. somewhat 21-22) in IV Corps during the

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

The deal government to problems is continuing resulting to mobilize from the Communist its resources mander confidence (Paras. President attacks a popular new confidence of support {Paras. the III 1-2). has 3-5). around the l—2). and Corps has President area 3—5). authorized around General Thieu steps Saigon, is Khang, rally to and area com- an- other itself, officer in be appointed by appointed to an command the capital area itself, may be accused by an Upper House committee of laxity in protecting Saigon (Paras. 6-7). Khang,

3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(0)
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|16J164|
|---|
| |VIETNAM|VIETNAM|
|Demilitarized zone|
|QUANG TRI|
|KHE SANH|KHE SANH|
|THUA THIEN|
|THAILAND|THAILAND|
| |KONTUM|NGAI|
|BINH DINH|
|PLEIKU|
| |DARLAC|PHUBON|TUYEN HOA|
|KHANH HOA|
|QUANG DUC|
|PHUOC TAY|
|NINH DINH|YUQV|
|QUANG NGAI|
|NINH THUAN|
|YUQV|
|CHUONG THIEN|BA XUYEN|
|AN GIANG|BAC LIEU|
| |SOUTH VIETNAM|VIETNAM|
|5 FEBRUARY|

69513 2-68 CIA

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Most of Soup Vietnam's provincial capitals appear to be regaining urban areas.
Most of pe provincial capitals were relatively quiet in pe morning, alpough pe Communists stepped up peir activity.
Heavy fighting in Hue continued.
US Marines drove back an enemy assault on Hill 861 in pe norp.
Communications in pe highlands suggest making preparations for battle.
MACV claims pat about 4,500 enemy have been killed since January.
Allied losses stand at 6,931 captured, killed, and wounded in pe same period.

Early on 5 February, US Marines drove back an assault on Hill 861, on the edge of the Khe Sanh defense perimeter. The assault was preceded by a heavy rocket, mortar, and artillery barrage on the camp hilltop positions and on the main Khe Sanh base camp. Communist losses totaled 10108 killed, while American casualties were 14 killed and 32 wounded.

5 February 1968
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Situation in Saigon

6. Communist forces are maintaining strong pressure against government security installations in pe Saigon area, notwipstanding 24 battalion allied clearing operation.
An estimated Police 7-all The headquarters situation which enemy battalion in pis precinct Saigon overran pe night and Cholon, pe precincts in soupwestern 6 and section of pe located capital-.-has deteriorated to pe point pat Municipal pe jurisdiction have been removed from a pree-battalion Police Ranger jurisdiction task force. and placed under
8. Elsewhere incidents in Saigon, snipings have only a small number of terrorist officials incidents estimate and snipings have been reported. Viet of small force tive. described force Viet US of officials Cong Viet elements a in Cong--as estimate a few as Saigon few pe pat as Saigon only 100--remains· attacks rang- relatively ac— have been described as wearing variety of civilian outfits, Soup ranging from Buddhist Regional and robes and civilian attire to Soup Vietnamese Army, Force, Chieu Hoi, and jungle green uniforms.
9. There was reported pe merchants, an additional for ap-can to be an abundant Cholon supply of apparently February. estimated shops rice and bread in pe merchants, Saigon shops of Saigon and Cholon as of 44 February. Some however, are apparently not selling rice pat obviously waiting for prices to soar. It is estimated pat wipout Saigon pe populace can last until from or 99 or 11 February wipout additional food supplies from outside.

55 February 1968
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TO 3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

|II Corps| | | |
|---|---|---|---|
|11. US forces reported three major contacts--each with an enemy battalion--near Quang Tri city on 5 February. The Communists results were routed in two of the engagements. No results are available on the third. Heavy fighting erupted in Trieu Phong, a district capital just to the north of Quang Tri city.| | | |
|12. Bitter door-to-door fighting was continuing in Hue as US and South Vietnamese soldiers moved against pockets of enemy resistance in several sectors of the city. The enemy is clinging tenaciously to its positions, which include strongpoints in the citadel and on the south bank of the Huong River.| | | |
|13. The situation is reported as quiet in the capital cities of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and Quang Nam provinces.| | | |

II Corps

14. In the western highlands, allied reaction forces are sweeping for enemy concentrations near the provincial cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot. Battalion size engagements between allied and enemy forces are reported north of Kontum and southeast of Pleiku.

5 February 1968

3.5(c)

TOP ET | 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(0)

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# TOPM

Enemy forces are reported to be active in the Cam Ranh area. A clash between about 60 Viet Cong and Republic of Korea forces has been reported in the northern sector of the city, an area which has previously seen little or no enemy activity.

In Tuyen Duc Province, an estimated six enemy companies renewed the attack on allied positions in and around the city of Da Lat. Communist forces appear to be gaining the upper hand in the city and a US battalion is being diverted in Ninh Thuan Province.

Although there have been no enemy attacks reported against the provincial capital or district towns of coastal Ninh Thuan Province in II Corps, Viet Cong forces have reportedly entered unopposed a number of Revolutionary Development hamlets in the province. Between 31 January and 55 February, Communist units entered 12 hamlets that had either been worked by Revolutionary Development teams during 1967 or were scheduled for development under the 1968 program. None of the 12 hamlets had a team present. In addition, one hamlet protected by a team was harassed during this period.

The primary objectives of the Viet Cong in the 12 hamlets was reportedly to obtain foodstuffs and to propagandize against the South Vietnamese Government, the US, and the Revolutionary Development program. By a show of strength in these hamlets, the enemy is almost certainly attempting to detract pacification efforts previously considered completed. In the hamlets scheduled for development during 1968, the Communists reportedly attempted to recruit youth for their own forces and to discourage hamlet residents from cooperating.

A propensity of US officials in Ninh Thuan have noted a propensity of Viet Cong forces in the province to wait until sometime after teams move out of a hamlet before trying to reassert control. Hamlets under the protection of these teams have, no doubt, been harassed, but only seldom have they been made the target of a significant armed attack.
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# TOP SECRET

Corps 20. American observers in the area report no new outbreaks of Communist activity, except in the Saigon area. Enemy forces still pose a threat to some provincial capitals including An Loc and Phu Cuong.

Corps 21. The Viet Cong offensive seems to have abated somewhat during February in the delta provinces. There have been destruction and casualties in many of the provincial towns and civilian casualties were probably high. Press reports indicate that in the heavily populated town of My Tho at least 60 civilians have been killed and about 680 wounded.

Corps 22. During the night of February 55, a battalion repulsed an enemy Viet Cong attack on a provincial city. There was sporadic sniper fire in several other cities.
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

To handle the problems arising from mobilizing its resources, the government of South Vietnam is not functioning properly in Ban Me Thuot, Konturn, Hue, and Da Lat. Damage assessments have been requested, and ministries have been delegated specific responsibilities to deal with the situation. An appeal for donations of food, medicine, clothing, and building materials has been issued to assist the 170,000 refugees affected by the recent events.

The Ministry of Economy in Saigon is responsible for adequately distributing food and rice to the residents. Plans include organizing new identification cards and implementing a "five-family" system where each group of five families elects a chief who reports to the police.

President Thieu appears more confident in handling the crisis and his decisions in this situation. Various aspects of the situation are being managed by the Ministry of Saigon and the Ministry of the Interior, with plans to tighten control and implement new security measures.

President Thieu's conversation with his secretary Nguyen Van Huong suggested the appointment of a task force to head a fresh Vietnamese-US joint effort, which would give fresh impetus to the situation. Thieu welcomed US assistance and saw it as a positive opportunity. There was no hint of criticism or resentment in his tone.

Thieu's statement regarding Huong's resentment was sincere and positive, indicating a willingness to work together for the betterment of the situation.

|Date|TOP|RET|
|---|---|---|
|5 February 1968|3.5(c)|3.5(0)|
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|4.|On the subject of rounding up popular support for the government, Huong reportedly proposed to Thieu that representatives of the various personalities and religious be invited to meet possibly with groups and other government manifesto to prominent leaders personalities of pledge their support. Huong II is already attempting to contact many others. Thieu is apparently attempting to clear up the constitutional proclamation emergency decree declaration problems surrounding measures. The authority cited for the martial law declaration in 1965 is he of a state of war, permitting emergency prepare measures. Huong says he has been instructed with arrangements for securing National Assembly approval.|
|---|---|
|5.|Thieu is apparently attempting to clear up the constitutional proclamation emergency decree declaration problems surrounding measures. The authority cited for the martial law declaration in 1965 is he of a state of war, permitting emergency prepare measures. Huong says he has been instructed with arrangements for securing National Assembly approval.|
|6.|The first generally cooperative note February the attitudes Upper of real attitudes discord has been shown thus far by the various elements of the leadership during the defense government. The committee of defense of Saigon met on February and concluded that member the defense crisis.|
|7|The committee of defense of Saigon met on February and concluded that member the defense crisis.|

Possible Investigation of Senior Officers in generally cooperative The first note February the attitudes Upper of real attitudes discord has been shown thus far by the various elements of the leadership during the defense government. The committee of defense of Saigon met on February and concluded that member the defense crisis.

Senator Ngoc Nhuan senior early committee present, will therefore call for an early investigation of the military leadership when the Upper House specifically meets in plenary session for investigation on 66 February. Those reportedly officers. III Corps Commander picked Khang and Colonel Nguyen Van Giam, appointed Commander of the Capital Military District during the crisis.

55 February 1968
---
# 102

Samneua

LAOS

THAILAND

NORTH VIETNAM

5 FEBRUARY

| |CON|NTIAI.|25'|50'|75 Miles|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|0o|25|50|75 Kilometers|9.5|Saw a I|
|102|192|194|K1.|W| |
|69514|69514|2-68 CIA|2-68 CIA| | |
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. Unusual activity on pe part of Norp Vietnamese AN-2 aircraft
Unusual activity on pe part of Norp Vietnamese AN-2 aircraft, but pe purpose of pe activity is not yet clear.

2. Attack Transports
On January 12, attack transports of pis type, radar-modified facility for a ground role, were bombed. The facility supports US air operations in Laos against Norp Vietnam. The attack was not a success, and it could be pat pe AN-2s are preparing for a second try. On pe oper hand, pere are certain tenuous indications pat pe AN-2s could be directed against allied forces in pe vicinity of pe Demilitarized Zone.

3. Norp Vietnam
Norp Vietnam is believed to have five AN-2 aircraft configured for tactical operations. The planes are probably based at Hiep Hoa-Fa small airstrip located about 20 miles norpeast of Hanoi. Considerable activity has been noted between Hanoi and Hiep Hoa in pe past pree days, and on February 5, an undetermined number of AN-2s were directed to fly from Hiep Hoa to Hanoi.

During the same period, however, the raise the possibility that the AN-2s could be directed against other areas. On February 22, Nan-ning Airfield in Communist China contacted Hanoi/Gia Lam to get a
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report report weeks, 7ected on onpro pro'ected weather weather.conditionsconditions at at Vinh. Vinh. InIn North North operationslanding:may North were recent Vietnamese recentVietnameseweeks, may.be.attempting.be attempting to to develop develop anan_\the —. 3£MhX2) 3.3(h)(2) emergency emergency landinnacility.at.Vinh facility at VinhDemilitarized twototo support support air air operations in the vicinityVietnamese flying vicinity of of the the Demilitarized Zone. Zone, On On 33 February February three three North Vietnamese AN-2s AN—ZS and and two similar. Chinese aircraft Cornrnunist·china. aircraft were noted noted flying from from Meng-tzu to to Nan-ning Nan-ning in in.Communist China. Northdepartedthat· C--------6. 6.' 'ThereThere thatis no is notheindication ~---------~ theindicationNan-ning AN-,,2s.at any AN—Zs at Nan-ningfieldsor however,inat or at Hanoi1 Hanoi 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) h ave have departedVietnam~their their bases bases for any.fields in southern southern u North Vietnam; Air Air defense defense nets, nets, however, continue continue_ to to carry·reports of carry reports of the of allied allied •air air and andit ground ground activity activity inin the or the vicinity vicinity of the zone, zone, and to and it thisconceivableis is conceivable AN-,,2s ANrZS or MIGs MIGs could could be be deployed deployed to to this area. area. 7. 7. An unconfirmed noted unconfirmed sighting sighting report report4,000by of 4,000-feetUS newlyby a a US air graded, observer smooth, January observer graded, smooth,Januar~ on on 31 31 dirt dirt runway--about runway-—aboutnoted the the presence feet of newly presence AN-2a a inthe of in length~-located length-—located approximafely be South approximatelyin.northern16 used 16 miles milesfornorthnorth of of the zone. zone. supportSuch Such a a facility facility northern could could.beSouth.Vietnam.'groundused for for AN—2 ground support operations operations in in Vietnam. 5 5 February February 1968 III-2 III-2 3.5(c) TOP T 3.5(c) 3-5“) Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772383
---
# TOP SECRET

# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

5 February 1968.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772383

TOP

COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Hanoi's first statement on negotiations since pe beginning of pe Communist offensive in pe Soup was a routine rejection of pe San Antonio formula pat President Johnson's 11 February comments on pe prospects for settling pe war. A commentary claimed in pe party daily US Nhan Dan, was still demanding "reciprocity" price by US urging pe Vietnamese people to "pay a price" stopping or slowing down of pe patriotic struggle. This was demand, pe by pe essence of pe President reiterated on San 11 February, Antonio formula, according to repeated Nhan Dan. The paper reiterated pat Foreign Minister Trinh's 29 December "will" talk formulation was pe "just stand" of Norp Vietnam international support; and pat it was receiving increasingly wider international support.
2. In keeping wip oper statements, it made no mention of recent interpretations of pe San Antonio formula by US officials.
3. Reportedly, Giap tours Defense Sites. The report AFP correspondent of a current public appearance in Hanoi supplies by Norp Vietnamese Defense Minister claims in Giap pat many Giap and oper significant politburo members visited military units in Hanoi during pe Tet holidays. Giap reportedly visited pis antiaircraft units, a year a tour he frequently takes at pis time of pe year.
4. Alpough we have no confirmation of Giap's reappearance, pe AFP copy from Hanoi is censored and is probably newscasts make based on a Norp Vietnamese newscast.
5 February 1968

TOP

RET

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---
# TOP SECRET

Foreign flag cargo tons:

|Foreign flag tons:|45,000 tons|
|---|---|
|Some ships deliveries:|More than 192,300 tons|
|Large deliveries of foodstuffs:|56,300 tons|
|Fertilizer deliveries:|25,400 tons|
|Foodstuff deliveries:|34,400 tons|
|Petroleum deliveries:|25,400 tons|
|High tons deliveries to Rumania:|7,000 tons|
|High tons deliveries to USSR:|25,200 tons|
|Deliveries to China for Vietnam:|21,200 tons|

Transshipment to North China Vietnam:

Deliveries to North China Vietnam may be for subsequent transshipment through China to overcome insufficient storage or to offset previous deliveries from China to North Vietnam.

Layover time:

In January and August 1967, layover time for heavy cargo in North Vietnam averaged 33 days. In January, layover time may increase to about 20 days in February.

Soviet deliveries:

|Dry cargo:|65,600 tons|
|---|---|
|Tankers:|55,600 tons|

North Vietnamese exports:

In December, exports by sea totaled 43,200 tons, including 38,900 tons of coal. This is slightly higher than the tonnage shipped in December 1967.

Exports in February 1968:

38,900 tons "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15561248].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Various military and political leaders in Vietnam",
"What": "Military and political situation in Vietnam, Communist activities, troop movements, enemy engagements",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "North Vietnam", "Laos", "China", "Hue", "Khe Sanh", "Da Lat", "Ninh Thuan", "Quang Tri", "Quang Tin", "Quang Ngai", "Quang Nam", "Hiep Hoa", "Hanoi", "Thua Thien", "Kontum", "Pleiku", "Ban Me Thuot", "An Loc", "Phu Cuong", "My Tho"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # MEMORANDUM FOR: DD;

These memos were prepared for Mr. Warnke at the request of the Director.

/)1»w»v 5 Dirac-59; National Estimates

/~15 '7/4"’-* /1*-=4/I/%’~"'-w:9'

__1”“°h 1968 3-5(°)

w//2;/@742/» 'DATE'

# MEMORANDUM FOR: 3_5(C

These are from Bill Kyland.

FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10 101 (47)

1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED
---
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

Here is the memo you requested yesterday, for Mr. Warnke tomorrow morning. We need a corrected copy after you have seen it.

Meanwhile I have talked with Warnke. He agrees that there need not be an SNIE memorandum on the questions. We shall send him tomorrow a (second) posed for the SNIE plus the questions passed to George Carver. I will get this to you tomorrow before we send it.

A339? QIITH

Director

National Estimates

22 February 1966 (DATE)

FORM NO. REPLACES FORM IO I01 (47)

1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C033§§256

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

I. THE COMMUNIST POSITION

How does Hanoi view the present phase of the war; for example, has Hanoi concluded that a protracted conflict or collapse is impossible and that it must gain victory this year?

1. Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam has always embraced two propositions: to prepare for a protracted struggle and to seek victory in the shortest possible time. From the introduction of large US forces in 1965, through the summer of 1967 the emphasis was on the probability of a prolonged war of attrition. Some backing away from the protracted war theme became evident in captured documents and Hanoi's propaganda later in 1967. In our view the intensity of the Tet offensive and the exertions being made to sustain pressures confirms that Hanoi is now engaged in a major effort to achieve early and decisive results. Yet the Communists probably have no rigid timetable. They apparently have high hopes of achieving their objectives this year, but they will preserve considerable tactical flexibility.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
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2. It is still not altogether clear why the Vietnamese Communists chose this course of action at this time. They certainly were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war may have been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course, the tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate timing. In any case, it does not appear that they undertook the present offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict was no longer feasible for them.

What are the capabilities of the NVA/VC forces to sustain their present offensive, and, if they choose to, continue a prolonged war thereafter?

3. There is no doubt that the Communists have already paid a high price in the present offensive phase. They have not only lost manpower, but also quality resources such as the special units employed in the Tet attacks. Nevertheless, prior to Tet there was apparently a strenuous drive to bring units up to strength with new recruits and upgraded guerrillas. Complete

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Wei hi? guerrilla units also were merged with Local forces to form larger elements. Infiltration of replacements and units from the North has probably been heavier than previously believed. A part of the Main Forces have been withheld from major combat. Finally, an intensive effort to raise new levies is underway in the rural areas, where the Communists now enjoy fuller access. Thus, it is conceivable that the enemy's gross strength is not significantly lower now than it was in the latter part of 1967.

The Communist supply position might be a factor limiting combat capabilities in the next few months. Many forces are now deployed away from their bases at the end of longer lines of supply. Expenditures of ammunition and losses of equipment have been relatively high. These factors will be offset in some degree by the extraordinary stockpiling that evidently took place before Tet and by the increased availability of manpower in the countryside which will permit the continued portering of military supplies and food to V0/NVA forces.

While not strictly a matter of physical capability, the Communist position is much enhanced, for the time being at least, by their possession of the strategic initiative. Within limits, this permits them to choose the time and place of combat and to

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keep US/ARVN forces pinned down and dispersed in static defense of many potential targets.

Accordingly, we believe that the NVA/VC forces have the capability to sustain a relatively high level of combat and occasionally to intensify it over the next several months, including rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations, major battles with US forces and assaults on selected cities. At the same time, the Communists will have resources to consolidate their hold on formerly pacified and contested areas.

It is conceivable that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the ultimate outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to the maximum effort in the near term, even at risk of very high losses. But it is far more likely that they probably will not use their resources in such a reckless manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle well beyond the next several months.

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What is the Communist attitude toward negotiations: particular how would Hanoi deal with an unconditionalin terms for a settlement?

8.

The Communists probably still expect the war to end eventually in some form of negotiations. Since they hope the present military effort will be decisive in destroying the GVN and ARVN, they are not likely to give any serious consideration to negotiations until this campaign has progressed far enough for its results to be fairly clear.

9.

If, however, the US ceased the bombing of North Vietnam in the near future, Hanoi would probably respond more or less as indicated in its most recent statements. It would begin talks fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide ranging exploration of issues, but would not moderate its terms for a final settlement or stop fighting in the South.

10.

In any talks, Communist terms would involve the establishment of a new "coalition" government, which would in fact if not in appearance be under the domination of the Communists. Secondly, they would insist on a guaranteed withdrawal of US forces within some precisely defined period. Their attitude toward other issues would be dictated by the degree of progress in achieving these two primary objectives, and the military-political situation then obtaining in South Vietnam.

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256

ll. Cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations without significant Communist concessions would be deeply disturbing to the Saigon government. There would be a real risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, and this would in fact be part of Hanoi's calculation in accepting negotiations.

# THE OUTLOOK

What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over the next 10 months, assuming no change in US policy or force levels?

12. In the assumed circumstances a total military victory by the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10 months. It is manifestly impossible for the Communists to drive US forces out of the country. It is equally out of the question for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces. It is possible, however, that the overall situation in this period will take a decisive turn.

13. We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/GVN favor. To be sure, Communist forces are now exposed to aggressive counteraction, their supply lines are extended, and some base areas may be vulnerable. Morale may be poor in some of the units which have suffered heavy losses. But we see no
---
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evidence yet that the GVN/ARVN will be inspired to seize the initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Communist vulnerabilities, or quickly regain the rural areas. We doubt they have the will and capability to make the effort.

Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVN's morale and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVN will collapse, or that the ARVN will totally disintegrate. But there is a fairly good chance that Communist pressures will result in a serious weakening of the GVN/ARVN apparatus and an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country. In these circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the war would fall on US forces.

The Communists too will be weakened by further offensive efforts. Losses will be heavy, combat effectiveness will be lowered, and morale will be damaged by the failure to achieve a complete victory. Even though their situation vis-a-vis the ARVN will be strong, their forces will probably not be in a position to register decisive advances unless they radically escalate the war by an all-out invasion.

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16. In sum, there is a high risk that both the ARVN and GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed circumstances the overall situation 10 months hence will be no better than a standoff.

REACTIONS TO US COURSES OF ACTION

What is the likely NVA/VC strategy over the next 10 months if US forces are increased by 50,000, by 100,000, or by 200,000?

17. We would expect the Communists to continue the war. They still have resources available in North Vietnam and within South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their strong logistical effort and their ability to organize and exploit the people under their control in the South enable them to counter US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a ten-month period the Communists would probably be able to introduce sufficient new units into the South to offset the US maneuver battalion increments of the various force levels given above.

18. We cannot foresee the outcome of future combat resulting from the increase in US forces. The Communists would probably

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have to modify their current tactics, especially if the US increments were large enough to permit the formation of a strategic reserve as well as providing for the partial relief of the ARVN. In some places, they would retreat from the urban areas, trying to hold as much as possible of the countryside.

The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade Hanoi to gamble on an all-out invasion from the North to seize Northern I Corps before reinforcements could be committed. It is also possible that the Communists would greatly expand their military pressures in Laos. The purpose of such a move would be to draw off US forces from South Vietnam, and to indicate that, unless the war was ended, the US faced a continued expansion of its commitment.

We would not expect the addition of any given number of US troops to change the policy or attitude of the USSR or China. Both would be willing to increase assistance in weaponry and Peking would offer more manpower for North Vietnam. Both would be concerned that the US would still be frustrated and would eventually be led to invade North Vietnam. But neither China nor the USSR would be likely to enter the war in response

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256

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to a US buildup, and neither would be likely to take drastic diversionary moves outside of Vietnam.

21. The general international climate would certainly worsen for the US. There would be greater apprehension that the war in Vietnam would inevitably expand to the point of a US conflict with China, and perhaps even with the USSR. Many countries would blame the US for not trying to negotiate with Hanoi. International pressures for an end to the fighting would increase. At the same time, some US allies in Asia would be relieved that the US chose to reinforce rather than accept an unfavorable political settlement.

What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US strategy toward greater control over population centers, with or without increased forces?

22. In general the Communists would view this move as a success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves. If these were fairly large and embraced much of the outlying countryside, the Communists would believe them to be porous enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are doing now. If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however,

- 10 _

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256

Comunists would not try to overrun them in frontal assaults. Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating the countryside and isolating the various defended enclaves, in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to undertake expensive supply movements from out of country. A Comunist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade would be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at terrorist activity inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that a combination of military and political pressure, together with the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the Vietnam struggle, would eventually persuade the UB to extricate itself through negotiations.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398256 QUESTIONS_CONCERNING_THE[15617983].pdf

Output:
{
	"Who": ["Mr. Warnke", "Director", "Bill Kyland", "George Carver"],
	"What": ["Vietnam situation analysis", "Communist strategy and capabilities", "Negotiation prospects", "Potential US strategies and their implications", "Likely outcomes of different scenarios", "Likely Communist reactions"],
	"When": "22 February 1966",
	"Where": [],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: ,¢_  _. v >',__              Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005947645/

) W                                                                 nyzx/|\1_|                  /,

'

s.5(¢)

The President's Daily Brief

Tr/111 Secret 19 March 1968

TOP                CRET

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947645
---
# DAILY BRIEF

19 MARCH 1968

1. Vietnam
We have new evidence pat pe Communists have been continuing a high rate of infiltration into Soup Vietnam since Tet. Anoper group of radio stations controlled by pe High Command in Hanoi has been identified in pe infiltration communications network. The Communists are also rapidly expanding peir land-line communications link from Norp Vietnam to peir forces in pe Soup.
Hanoi has meanwhile moved at least one--probably two—-more of its IL-28 bombers from Soup China to Phuc Yen airfield. It already had two of pem pere.

2. Poland
For pe first time in pe current crisis, uniformed soldiers armed wip automatic weapons are being seen in pe streets of Warsaw. Armed police are also coming in from oper cities. Rumors abound pat Gomulka is short today. The Italian ambassador pinks perhaps pis may be pe occasion for announcing changes in pe party leadership. Security reinforcements in pe capital may be rounded up to help control pe crowds pat would be present for a Gomulka speech. Unrest continues in oper Polish cities.

3. France
The French are moving ahead wip preparations to resume atmospheric nuclear testing in pe Pacific pis June. If pey stick to schedule, pis year's series will include peir first true permonuclear shot.
---
# 4. USSR-Space

Something must have gone wrong with the re-entry of the Soviets’ latest unmanned spacecraft on 9 March. The details are not clear, the same day that Soviet officials were concerned and jumpy about events surrounding the re-entry space. A high space official telephoned Dmitri Ustinov, the party's watchdog Ustinov, to brief him on the trouble. Ustinov tried to calm his colleagues, implying that the outcome of the mission had given everyone some anxious moments. In the next breath, the space official was insisting to Ustinov that "we should not miss the 23rd under any circumstances." Presumably he was referring to another launch schedule, possibly the 23rd of March or April.

# 5. Israel

The Israelis are grim in the wake of yesterday's terrorist incident near the southern port of Eilat. At last word, two adults were dead and 27 children wounded after a school bus hit a mine. This surely raises the chances of a bigger than usual Israeli retaliation against Jordan.

# 6. Egypt

Nasir is to get six more medium bombers today from the Soviets. This is the second such delivery since the June war and raises the number of these jet bombers in Egypt to twelve, compared to 26 before the war.

# 7. Nepal

Only fragmentary information is available on King Mahendra's condition. He has been an autocratic ruler and following his heart attack on Friday. The lid will stay on even during a fairly might bring problems. His death, however, long convalescence. The King's son and heir, now a 22-year-old Harvard student, would have a hard time of it.
---
# 8. Iran

The Shah is putting the squeeze on the Western oil consortium. He insists that the next five years at production increase at a rate far greater than the consortium can entertain. If it does not come up with a solution, he has given it until 20 April. Otherwise, he may well seize the consortium territory, including more income for Iran. So, the consortium must produce oil wells on its own. He says Iran's development program must have the producing oil wells.

# 9. Panama

General Vallarino has decided not to issue the formal declaration of support for Robles which the President asked him for. Instead, he intends quietly to tell Arnulfo Arias that the National Guard will refuse to uphold a guilty verdict against Robles if the Supreme Court session on 1 April comes before the verdict. This looks like a clever move to put the monkey on the court's back. But no one is neutral in Panama, and the Supreme Court is packed with Robles' friends. Arias has been pressing hard for an assembly verdict before 1 April.

# 10. Chile

President Frei does not have the muscle to fight inflation. His able finance minister resigned in protest last week over the President's failure to back his new program. The result could well be a new surge of inflation and more budgetary problems. This would only benefit the Communist-Socialist coalition in the upcoming congressional elections, now only a year away. THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617945].pdf

Output: {"Who": "Top government officials, security personnel", "What": "President's Daily Brief containing updates on various international events including Vietnam, Poland, France, USSR-Space, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Panama, and Chile", "When": "19 March 1968", "Where": ["Vietnam", "Poland", "France", "USSR", "Israel", "Egypt", "Iran", "Panama", "Chile"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"}