Input:
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Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772

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# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# MEMORANDUM

The Si/zzaz/2'0/4 in Vietnam

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20 November 1967

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# Information as of 1600 20 November 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

Fighting has broken out again southwest of Dak To, and US forces took serious losses in one engagement. In the air war, intensive North Vietnamese air defense measures have resulted in the loss of US aircraft in the past five days.

# I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Renewed fighting occurred southwest of Dak three-day Vietnamese paratroopers have concluded a sweep northeast of the US base (Paras. in III Corps 1-4). The position of Communist main force units suggests further attacks (Paras. Operation SHENANDOAH II has ended in northern III Corps (Paras. 9-10).

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Conflicting statements in South Vietnam: Prime Minister Loc is complaining that directives from the President and vice president are hampering him at Da Nang. A Quaker relief ship has been denied landing rights. Eighteen US aircraft have been lost in the past five days to aggressive North Vietnamese air defense measures.

# III. Military Developments:

Elements of the probable 304th Infantry Division are in the process of moving southward. The 31st Regiment of the 341st Division has been located in the Laos panhandle just north of Route 922.

# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# V. Communist Political Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.
---
|VIETNAM|Hue|Da Nang|Ninh|Phuoc|Bin|Song|Tay|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | |USA|OPERATION|SHENANDOAH II| | |
| | | |RANH| | | | |

SOUTH VIETNAM

|Tahyubw|1|2|50|75|100Miles|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |13|25|50|75|100 Kilometers|
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Renewed fighting on 19-20 November has in the hills several miles southwest of Dak To been described as the most vicious in the two-and-one-half-week-old highlands campaign.

2. The largest of November when two company-several new engagements in the area began on 19 patrols ran into elements of the North size US reconnaissance 174th Regiment in well-Vietnamese bunkers. A third US company joined the fight and was immediately hit Preliminary casualty by another enemy incomplete information, show force reports, based losses of 40 killed, word yet on heavy and another 32 American missing. There is no 42 wounded, on enemy casualties.

3. Also on 19 November, engaged an enemy force northeast of the North Vietnamese 24th of Dak To. The enemy was identified as a subordinate which has been involved in the recent Division north of Dak To. This engagement culminated and accounted 34 killed and soldiers a three-day drive 51 enemy 161 wounded along three miles of ridge line for killed. Our losses were southwestern Kontum Province on 3 November.

4. Since the current campaign began in US forces 150 weapons. 868 enemy losses for the 18 have killed soldiers and captured nearly American day 41 missing. stand at 197 killed, 750 wounded, and period now The South Vietnamese say they have killed some 350 Communists, raising Dak To the overall number of enemy dead in the immediate area to more than 1,200.

20 November 1967
---
The Situation in Northwest II Corps

ments in the attacks can be that further III Corps area expected in thissuggests5.The disposition of north of Saigon regi-main force enemy region.

a commandUS Special Forces camp at near the 6.\ group of the Viet Cong Song Be in remain;5th Division west 3.3(h)(2) central Cong 275th and North Vietnamese controls the Viet Phuoc Long Provinces This group 88th regiments and conducts extensive reconnaissance activities. In addition, the 272nd Regiment—-a subordinate of the Viet Cong 9th along the Phuoc Long border just west to a P0SitiOn Division--has been noted moving recently of Song Be. Together these units make up a division- size force which could threaten Song Be or Phuoc Binh, the nearby provincial capital.

The other two subordinates of the Viet Cong 9th Division, the 271st and 273rd regiments, are believed to be Ninh and Binh Long provinces, where positioned along the Cambodian border in northern Tay attacks they are resupplying and reorganizing. Mortar area against allied positions have during the past week. Long fighting in the Loc withNew Province could eruptincreased in thisNinh area of northern Binh. 7th Division and its subordinate l0lst and 8. The headquarters of the North Vietnameseregi-l4sth re- main in their normal operating areasbut probably Tay ments have not been fixed recently, in northern Ninh Province. 3.3(h)(2) be positioning rice caches for ‘enemy forces may opera-planned.offensivedis- tions in this area. Likely objectives would be trict towns and Special Forces camps and possibly Tay 165th, wasNinh city. located\The 9th Division's third regiment, the November near a district town in southern Binh on Province.l5 3-3(h)(2) Long

20 November 1967

I-2
---
# Operation SHENANDOAH II Ends

The operation accounted for 956 enemy soldiers killed. The 51-day multibattalion search-and-destroy operation, SHENANDOAH II, ended on 19 November.

The sweep began in north-central Binh Duong Province some 38 miles north of Saigon and was extended to include all of Binh Long Province when Communist forces mounted a series of large-scale attacks in the Loc Ninh area.

American casualties totaled 107 killed and 322 wounded. Enemy losses also included nearly 400,000 pounds of rice and more than 100 weapons.

Date: 20 November 1967
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Quaker Relief Ship Barred From South Vietnam

The yacht Phoenix, chartered by South Vietnam Quakers to deliver medical supplies to Nang, has been denied landing rights at Da Nang on 22 November. The decision was made by President Thieu and Vice President Ky after they learned that the Quakers would try to distribute their supplies to the militant Buddhists. The government contends that the Quaker plan violates the conditions under which entry visas were granted to them in Hong Kong—namely that the supplies would be turned over to the Vietnamese Red Cross for internal distribution. The US Embassy believes that the government apparently decided that the Quakers would get groups other than the militant Buddhists a share and that this may have influenced the Quakers to attempt to hand the supplies directly to the militants.

Date: 20 November 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772

TOP/5-F:CRET 3-5(6)

4. An official spokesman told the press on 20 November that, since the medicines on the Phoenix had been brought to South Vietnam only the North, Hanoi refused to let them be landed denying entryin because the South Vietnamese Government was to the Quakers. Since this bare-bones explanation will probably leave the government open to criticism, the embassy is urging the government's action in a better light.

20 November 1967

II-2

TOP-S-E-CRET 3-5<°>

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# 4Kppr0ved for Release: 2019/03/29 C030297A

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. Three more US aircraft were shot down by North Vietnamese air defense units on 20 November. This means that 18 US planes have been lost in the past five days. The heavy losses occurred on 16 November against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. In the preceding week, inclement weather had held air activity and losses to a minimum.

2. Communist air defense successes in recent days appear to have been the result of a more vigorous application of normal tactics, rather than any new weapons or procedures. SAMs accounted for 10 of the 18 US losses, while conventional gun fire was responsible for two.

3. The success on the part of the SAMs, which have been far less effective than AAA, is probably customarily attributable to the great number of missiles fired. An operational SAM site northwest of Hanoi on 19 November had assumed an active role, but there was no indication that any new techniques were being employed.

4. North Vietnam's MIG fighters accounted for a significant accomplishment in view of the limited number of fighters remaining in the country. The group of fighters which has been effective against US strike groups during the past five days probably consists of about eight aircraft, four of which may be MIG-21s.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# NVA Division May Be Deploying in North Vietnam

|6|ments of the entire division are in the process ofthe probable 304th NVA Infantry Division and possibly southward.|
|---|---|
|6|deploying area of Central North has been based in The 304th Vietnam. Thanh Hoa|
|9|It is 304th Division whether they It is andtoo early to will move whether ele-determine into Laos thence into South Vietnam or will move southward toward the Demilitarized entire divisionZone. also or a single regiment iswhether move. too early to determine on the the|
|9|The 304th Division long has had a training role for units headed for South Vietnam. The 66th NVA To fighting was a subordinate, recently movedRegiment, for example, which is Other elementsinvolved in the Dak have trained by A Shau the 6th Regiment. they became part ofValley area through the 304th Division of South Vietnam where|

20 November 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772

Kr TQP/8'E'CRE1 H

31st Regiment in Laos

|10.|Airborne radio direction finding on 19 November located the headquarters of the 31st Regiment of the north of Route 341st North Vietnamese Division justis a922 in the Laos panhandle. the regiment's ll November location near the junction of Routes 911/912.|
|---|---|
|11.|The ultimate destination of the 31st Regiment is not known. It would appear that the unit is headed for either the A Shau Valley area of Thua Thien Province.Sanh outpost. It could take up a flanking position near the Khe|
|12.|The unit had formerly confined its operations to the eastern part of the Demilitarized Zone area. Elements of the regiment were active, for example, around Con Thien and against South Vietnamese units farther east. The deployment of the regiment into the Laos panhandle after a period of refitting and rest in North Vietnam suggests that another unit has taken its place in the eastern DMZ. It is possible the 31st Regiment is preparing, in conjunction with other NVA units, for coordinated combat activity along the whole length of the Demilitarized Zone.|

20 November 1967

III-3

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

# V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report

20 November 1967
---
# DLKQOR AS'PE'C'TS

3.3(h)(2)

20 November 1967

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772
---
tgprovedfor Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03029772 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602416].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military developments in South Vietnam, Political developments in South Vietnam, Communist military developments, Communist political developments, Military developments in North Vietnam",
"When": "20 November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: C02406640

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956

TOP SECRET

Top Secret

LLIGEFNCA

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Top Secret

28 December 1967

TQP BECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
---
# Special for Daily Report on Eyes Only the President North Vietnam

Date: 28 December 1967

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Reports on living conditions in North Vietnam continue. More on Living Conditions:

- Great women have replaced men women about one half of the field of majority of endeavor the militia in "virtually every and that and constitute the armed security service.
- Natural and construction workers usually work about a seven-hour day and are subjected to short week--a political indoctrination excessive requirements sessions in view of war needs and the Communist penchant for about once not political of 18 and citing examples of the deferments are not indoctrination illegal successful the draft age.
- Uncommon medical officials and personnel cadre bribery that both of assignment and recruitment charge.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956  3.3(h)(2)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
---
# C02406640

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956

TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

II - NORTHVIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956
---
Co2406640

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485958

Walt workup(last paragraph) and get statement on what they do when they used someone someone we pause Senator the peace initiative to make 1t about how EBJ2887 LZ

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06485956 "SPECIAL DAILY REPORT ON N_15472908_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "LLIGEFNCA, President",
"What": "Special Daily Report on North Vietnam, living conditions in North Vietnam, North Vietnamese reflections of US political attitudes on the war, Senator the peace initiative",
"When": "28 December 1967",
"Where": ["North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Intelligence Information Special Report

Country: South Vietnam

Date of Information: March 1968

Subject: Vietnamese Ambassador's View that President Thieu Must Demand Policies Conducive to Uniting GVN Leadership

Source: Central Intelligence Agency

1. Cooperation within and among the newly-organized anti-communist fronts gave rise to the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States following remarks by the following remarks by the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States:

2. According to Bui Diem, a number of Ky's supporters, particularly those in the military, have in the past urged Ky to seize initiatives and assert authority, but Ky has always refused to do this. Bui Diem warned that the day might come when these military officers could not be put off by Ky, but would move ahead on their own and "wipe out Thieu." They would not eliminate Ky, Diem remarked, because they understand his position. Diem speculated that some Major might be running things some day. He explained that he has no particular Major in mind but just wanted to make the point that an element might be running things some day.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 000210140K
---
of younger army slipping exists which will not be content to see the country officers down the drain because of inefficiency"

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---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210148

5. Bui Diem reiterated that the essential point to be made to Thieu was that the United States supports him and would not support Ky over him. With this reassurance and the knowledge that his success or failure depends entirely on American support, Thieu would accept the admonition.

6. Bui Diem said it was difficult to talk in this manner to an American because he was "100% Vietnamese" and had the pride of the Vietnamese. He said to anyone else and under normal conditions would not want any American interference in Vietnamese politics. Conditions were not normal because of the war and because of American presence. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long.

7. FIELD DISSEM: 'STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER ONLY)'

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00210148 VIETNAMESE_AMBASSADORS_VI[15617922].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem, President Thieu, General Ky",
"What": "Concerns about potential power struggles within GVN leadership, insights into Thieu and Ky's dynamic, importance of American support for Thieu",
"When": "March 1968",
"Where": ["United States", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297

xéatk'

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# The Presidential Daily Brief

_‘]1UP_§.f-@,@@.;_ 26 February 1968

\ \ s.5(¢

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
# DAILY BRIEF

26 FEBRUARY 1968

1. Soup Vietnam

Enemy activity has dropped to its lowest level since pe Tet offensive began on 30 January. The preat to a number of urban areas continues, however.

In Saigon, pe Viet Cong are telling residents of Cholon pat a new attack is planned for tomorrow.

2. Laos

Communist forces are maintaining pressure in pe soupern panhandle. The towns of Attopeu and Saravane were attacked yesterday after two days of heavy pressure on peir outposts. The regional commander considers Attopeu untenable and intends to wipdraw if pe situation worsens.

3. Japan

Ambassador Johnson notes, "from bits and pieces" recently picked up, pat bop Sato and Foreign Minister Miki are privately showing deep concern about US prospects in Vietnam. Vietnam would realize pat US failure in Vietnam would destroy him politically, appears to be wondering wheper he should try to disengage himself. Miki, a prospective successor "who wants to carve out a political position for himself, is likely to be even more standoffish pan Sato. The ambassador believes bop men will wait to see how pe wind blows--and trim peir sails if necessary--before again publicly associating pemselves wip pe US position in Vietnam.
---
# Panama

Both Robles and Arias have backed off from the threat of major violence has on their collision course, diminished. The National Guard, still on full alert, ought to be able to quell any political arguments among pre-Lenten carnival-goers.

# Paraguay

Our embassy has it from a good source that President Stroessner, during his late March visit to Washington, may to Vietnam. Stroessner would probably offer to send a Paraguayan battalion to Vietnam. Stroessner would probably hope for some goodies in return. Other Latin American leaders, many of whom have a low regard for Stroessner, would not be impressed.

# Czechoslovakia

Party conservatives, possibly led by ex-boss Novotny, are attacking Dubcek's "liberalizing" program on grounds that it dilutes the power of the party. As the issue is shaping up, liberals nor hardliners can win. A real struggle on this issue too much. A real struggle on this issue with the possibility that neither the hardliners can win a clear-cut victory at the mid-March Central Committee meeting.

# Bahamas

The US consul general has been privately tipped off that Premier Pindling will announce today his decision to call general elections. The voting, which will then have to be set for sometime late March or early April, will surely strengthen Pindling's hand, both at home and in his determined efforts to get the British to give the colony more self-rule.
---
# 1  -Pep-seeng -               Approved for Release" 2019/O4/17 CO5974297'      3_5<c>

8. Communist China                                                    3-3(h)(2)

-                                                     3-5(6)

Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974297
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974297
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Top Secret

26 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
Approved for Release 2019/04/17 CO5974297Z

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

26 February 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

More US Prisoners to be Released?: Last Saturday, Ambassador Sullivan met the North Vietnamese chargé in Laos for the first time since the release of the three American fliers. The chargé, affable and willing to talk, considered the released pilots to be in good shape and had indicated they were treated satisfactorily in Hanoi's policy to treat prisoners well. He said, "You have already received three prisoners. There are two others..." At this point, the information officer rolled up, and the chargé never finished this tantalizing sentence. Ambassador Sullivan will see the chargé again to try to find out what he was about to say.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297

Views of Ex-French Correspondent in Hanoi; Bernard Cabanes, on His way back to Paris last week from his lengthy tour in Hanoi, talked with an officer of our embassy in Vientiane. Cabanes, who impressed the officer as an intelligent and reflective observer (and obviously sympathetic to North Vietnam), made the following points:

- Hanoi is not counting on the US elections to lead to a short-term end to the war favorable to North Vietnam, and the population has been given no such promises;
- The North Vietnamese had hoped the recently released US pilots would return to Hanoi via commercial air, but were "disappointed rather than surprised" that they chose to go on a US military plane;
- The release of these prisoners, Cabanes thought, was a "genuine gesture of good will" at a moment when it seemed that such a sign "might cover a little of the distance on the road to negotiations";
- He believes, on the basis of his experience with the temper of the North Vietnamese people, that they "will be the winners."

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297

A journalist has told our embassy in Prague to Hanoi Comments of Czech Ambassador to Hanoi: A Czech while the ambassador was the Czech ambassador recent conversation with in Prague on home leave.

According to the journalist, the ambassador has the impression that Moscow's influence in Hanoi is growing at Chinese expense. The ambassador also directed at improving its position in anticipation believes Hanoi's offensive in South Vietnam was di-of negotiations sometime this summer. as having affair, the ambassador was quoted On the Pueblo that this action was closely coordinated with Hanoi, and that the North Koreans were "playing a very dangerous game." There is no firm evidence that Hanoi and Pyongyang acted in concert regarding the Pueblo, although the timing of the incident has fostered considerable speculation to this effect.

French Communists to Hanoi: The French Press Agency on Saturday broadcast an announcement that a delegation of the French Communist Party would members of the party's leave for Hanoi today. top policy body and at least The delegation will include one member of the Central Committee.

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Nothing of significance to report.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974297
---
Approved for Release: 20%9/04/17 C05974297

I

/

\1'Wfi‘§~e+1=e-L

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974297 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617949].pdf

Output:
{
	"Who": "Various government officials, ambassadors, journalists, and correspondents",
	"What": "Daily briefings on Vietnam, Laos, Japan, Panama, Paraguay, Czechoslovakia, Bahamas, Communist China, North Vietnam, US prisoners in North Vietnam, French Correspondent views on North Vietnam, Czech Ambassador to Hanoi's comments, French Communists visiting Hanoi",
	"When": "26 February 1968",
	"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Japan", "Saigon", "Cholon", "Panama", "Paraguay", "Czechoslovakia", "Bahamas", "North Korea", "Czech Republic", "Hanoi", "Paris", "Prague"],
	"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196

The President's Daily Brief

Secret 29 December 1967

3.5(c)

23
---
# DAILY BRIEF

29 DECEMBER 1967

1. Cambodia

Sihanouk has been quoted by pe Washington Post saying he would "not intervene" if at least pese conditions were met: US troops entered Cambodia in pursuit of Vietnamese Communists--under certain conditions. One of pe conditions was pat he be convinced pe Vietnamese had entered Cambodia illegally, and in any attacks, it would be in an uninhabited region. He insisted pat Cambodian troops resist on areas where Vietnamese had been "incursion" for a long time, as well as any Soup Vietnamese troops. US officials said Sihanouk would not have talks, alpough he added he would gladly receive any envoy from President Johnson. All of pis would be a major flip-flop for Sihanouk, alpough we have no confirmation pat he has in fact changed his affirmed position, as recently as two days ago, pat pere would be no fighting in Cambodia to pe last man if Soup Vietnam or pe US invaded.

2. Laos

Small-scale skirmishing is continuing in pe soupern part of pe country. There is still no indication, however, pat a major Communist offensive is underway.
---
# 3. Hong Kong

over Peking, the use groups dissatisfied down Kong, concerned things Hong time of toning violence for in some probably encourage hopes Local to Communist the will Communist, other join in but "confrontation." out leaders will probably but try may to carry trouble Peking's directive, have reining in their bomb-throwers.

# 4. Nigeria

The federal government plans to announce on Saturday that all Nigerian currency will - Biafra be replaced now sometime next to probably Nigerian fairly try month. of sell its pounds sizable will have holdings discount hurry, to in a at a steep Up ging the now, been civil selling has for gradual Biafra's war - which source holdings chief of these is still of funds drag along.

# 5. Rumania

Moscow is purchase to said have "broken" a contract equipment to Prague Bucharest, drilling be oil pressuring fro~ to from railroad irri-cancel and a to large This order probably for Rumanian-made stems Soviet cars. stand tation on over important Rumania's international "independent" issues, and the in more offing economic such reprisals may be.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

16

29 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only 29 December 1967

I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Hanoi commentary on President Thieu's domestic comments on his meeting with Thieu: Hanoi radio's service broadcast a Nhan Dan article last Sunday on President Johnson. The article goes about "acting shamelessly on the orders of his masters, raved traitor Thieu" referring to the joint national policy. The article on President Johnson's five-point peace proposal asserts that "cheap, recent Americans deceive themselves through the lie series of aggressive actions," according to the article. Included among these actions is the "urgent airlift" of US troops last week. Hanoi's international service summarized a similar editorial by Nhan Dan the next day. The US Embassy has conciliatory comments. Hanoi rejects all peace initiatives and shows three Red River crossings: causeway-pontoon, Photography Red bridges in north or south, and Doumer Bridge. The causeways are under construction across the River, just north and south of the Doumer Bridge. The gravel banks are constructed of rock and laid across sand bars. Pontoon sections are laid where necessary to complete about three-quarters of the causeway-pontoon crossings. Two are located a mile northwest of the Doumer Bridge, under construction. The others, about a mile and a half south of the new Red River bridge, should be operational. The crossings are believed to be truck traffic capable until the Red River returns to normal in June. There are twelve causeways washed out of low moderate level when the Red River is seasonally undermined by water for several months.
---
|rno|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974196 3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|other River, alternate them crossing facilities along the the DoumerRed bridge. half of within five miles of| |
|Truce: Heavy Traffic in Hanoi in Area compared traffic the Hanoi During during Christmas 24- 3.3(h)(2) hour roads Christmas truce observed heavy with on all in the Hanoi area and it similar high volumes of traffic weather have which occurred during periods when inclement prevented US air activity. observed because way-pontoon into traffic crossing 3.3(h)(2)| |
|Hanoi over what (apparently to appeared two pontoon or boat-borne bridges the recently darkness. Paul to Doumer complete bridges bombed referred Heavy Hanoi in traffic the Bridge previous was was item). also in almost observed The com-re-on highways leading into from all directions. 3.3(h)(2)| |
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

Hanoi Sends More Students to Europe: Despite demands on manpower reserves at home, Hanoi is continuing to send large groups of people to bloc countries for training.

3.3(h)(2)

Information on previous groups has indicated that many are being trained in industrial and technical skills which would be necessary in the postwar rebuilding of the North Vietnamese economy.

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196
---
# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

The Front's Christmas Message to the American People: broadcast Liberation of The Front's radio on letter December the text the for a Solidarity Christmas from the Front's "Committee with The time the American people. American contrasted to People" letter happiness of Christmas in the US with the misery experienced by war those Vietnamese--especially the who children. It American that claimed people coming openly the the year of new will the be marked and by an unprecedented development the antiwar movement. demand movement, on, will The all wishes, US that troops. Government to respect Front message went war, the American people's put an end the and repatriate US

Reports in English an Hanoi without language Reports Antiwar broadcast antiwar Protest yesterday in Texas: re-Hanoi comment a recent in Texas. stated Quoting the Western War "members new the the held Austin the ranch broadcast End that of Committee to Vietnam Christmas protest day vigil outside war "to against the US sources, protest

President's of aggression in Vietnam."
---
#

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4196 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602445].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President, US officials, Hanoi, President Johnson, President Thieu",
    "What": "Update on international situations in Cambodia, Laos, Hong Kong, Nigeria, Romania, North Vietnam; Hanoi's rejection of peace initiatives; North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes on the war",
    "When": "29 December 1967",
    "Where": ["Cambodia", "Laos", "Hong Kong", "Nigeria", "Romania", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "US"],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # WHITE HOUSE

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00193271 VIEWS_OF_O[15617714].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "JCS, USAF, Army",
"What": ["Views of Army prisoners concerning the Tet Offensive", "Interrogation of, and reactions from, prisoners"],
"When": "January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Arlington"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197

MEMORANDUM FOR: Sent for your information at the request of the Director.

Keith, Director National Estimates

Attachment: Memorandum for the Director, dated 26 February, "The Outlook in Vietnam"

FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101 (47) 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

This is the Memorandum requested by Paul Nitze.

OCI and the Clandestine Services concur. George Carver does not agree with the last page: he thinks that either outcome (a) or outcome (b) is more probable than (c), but that one cannot at this time choose between them.

cc: DDI, WWADirector National Estimates 26 February 68 (DATE) FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101 (47) 1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 February 1968

MEMORANUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.
2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:

GROUP l
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197

(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.

# Communist Plans and Prospects

Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy
---
infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.

5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C0339819Y

SECRET

If the push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.

GVN/ARVN Prospects

The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual outcome.

In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However, the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the countryside has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.

The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Saigon area.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C0339§197

S-E-G-R=E=T'

to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.

# 10. The overall position of the government has been weakened

Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.

# 11. The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus.

The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C0339§197

of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.

Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C033_981y972 7

e. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

ABBOT SMITH

Chairman

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197

                                                            ‘
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   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
---
     Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197
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     Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398197 THE_OUTLOOK_IN_VIETNAM[15617941].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Keith, Paul Nitze, George Carver, DDI, WWADirector, Abbot Smith",
"What": "Vietnam outlook, Communist plans, GVN/ARVN prospects, potential outcomes of the war",
"When": "26 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Saigon", "Washington"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694

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X

Approveq for Releese: 2019/03/29 C06749694
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
---
# Information as of 1600 November 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

The Communists are continuing their costly assaults against allied positions in northern Binh Long Province.

# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Another abortive assault on Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province early on 2 November resulted in heavy enemy casualties. A series of enemy attacks southwest of Da Nang on 2 November caused heavy damage to a South Vietnamese refugee center. The North Vietnamese 2nd Division is regrouping in a heavily forested hill area just west of Que Son in southern Quang Nam Province.

# Military Developments in North Vietnam:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694

|104|\|166|l-Sa|W|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|VIETNAM| | | | |
|QUANG TRI| | | | |
|THUA THIE|Da Loc| | | |
|QUANG NAM| | | | |
|KONTUM| | | | |
|BL NH PHU| | | | |
|PLEIKU| | | | |
|PHU| | | | |
|EON| | | | |
|YENY| | | | |
|Turtle|M-BV'()_pD| | | |
|CQEQP5|DARLAC| | | |
|NGOU| | | | |
|TUYEN|Da Lat|RANH| | |
|PHUOC|Duc| | | |
|PHU| | | | |
|LPNG|LAM DONG|TU'AL':'I'| | |
|TAY| | | | |
|KIEN|KHCA/;<;7‘:..~E~| | | |
|CDHQACUZNONG TUONG| | | | |
|BA XUYENRK| | | | |
|SIAM| | | | |
|Bc__l_|Eu| | | | |
|SQUTH VIETNAM| | | | |
|25|50|75|100|Kilometers|
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Another abortive assault on allied positions at Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province was launched by Communist troops early on 2 November.

2. The two-pronged attack was directed at two battalions of US reinforcements near the Loc and South airstrip and at a nearby Special Forces camp Vietnamese outpost. Heavy allied artillery and mortar fire forced the enemy to withdraw shortly after daybreak leaving behind 238 dead thus raising the five-casualties during killed to nearly 850. The attacks were light. Allied casualties were twenty killed (eight US) and 118 wounded (32 US) during the five days of enemy attacks.

3. According to preliminary interrogation of an enemy soldier captured earlier this week, there is a large Communist base camp less than five miles north of Loc Ninh, just south of the Cambodian border. The prisoner claimed that the camp was receiving supplies daily from Cambodia. He said that two or three French-made ten-wheel trucks transported rice and foodstuffs across the border to the depot. The supply area allegedly houses an estimated 1,000 soldiers.

4. A series of well-coordinated enemy attacks in coastal Quang Nam Province some 15 miles west of Hoi An resulted in extensive damage to a South Vietnamese refugee village early on 2 November.

5. The activity began with a mortar attack followed by an estimated 100 Communist soldiers. The attackers were finally forced to withdraw by a heavy concentration of US artillery and air support. The Communists then shifted their target to a nearby US Marine position. Mortars, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges were used during a fierce one-hour attack. Simultaneously, two other nearby allied positions - another Marine night defensive position and a combined action platoon - came under heavy attack which included intense small arms fire.

2 November 1967
---
# During these actions

A group of enemy troops entered the refugee center at Dai Loc and burned 160 of the homes. to the northwest and en-The Communists then went to a populated area just burned another 180 homes. Casualties for the nine tire episode included ten Marines killed and wounded; nine South Vietnamese civilians were also killed. Only four enemy bodies were found in an initial sweep of the area.

# This tactic of multiple small-unit attacks

Targets, although cluster of military and civilian concentrated on a not new, is being used increasingly by Communist troops throughout South Vietnam. This tactic, involving several dispersed incidents within a short time, tends to restrict the effectiveness of allied reaction forces. Additionally, the tactic gives the enemy a greater psychological impact on the area and may also divert attention from the movement of supplies or personnel for future offensive activities.

# This trend also encompasses closer coordination

Among main force, local force, and guerrilla units throughout the country. The close coordination displayed in a series of attacks last week in the delta suggests they were planned and controlled at the province level. in Quang Nam Province. in the latest action This may have been the case

# North Vietnam's 2nd Division Regrouping

The headquarters of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division and all three of the division's heavesubordinate regiments are now concentrated in a hilly forested hill complex just west of the Que Son valley in southern Quang Nam Province. The 3rd Regiment has apparently extricated itself from its vulnerable position of last week in the coastal plains. The 2nd Division may be in the highlands to reorganize and receive replacements as it did in early October.
---
TOP SECRET

10.
During the past two months the 2nd Division has been the most active enemy division in South Vietnam. troops have been killed fighting it nearly 300 US Cong forces along the Quang Nam - Since the first week in September and local Viet Quang Tin border. Over 2,000 enemy soldiers have been reported killed in this sector.
2 November 1967

No Foreign Dissemination - Background Use Only

TOP SECRET
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694 93 5(0)

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2 November 6 7 II-l

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694
---
# MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

There is nothing of significance to report.

2 November 1967

# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694

"‘m‘"

s.5(¢)

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2 November 1967

|V-1|1|
|---|---|
| |3-5<<=>>|
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| |E|
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 CO6749694
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0674_96949

|TOP SECRET|S|E|RET|
|---|---|---|---|
|V-2|Z| | |

2 November 1957

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06749694 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602457].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, US military forces, Communist troops",
"What": "Military situation in South Vietnam, Military Developments in North Vietnam, Other Communist Military Developments, Communist assaults, troop movements, enemy attacks",
"When": "2 November 1967",
"Where": ["Binh Long Province", "Da Nang", "Quang Nam Province", "Que Son", "Turtle Lake", "Da Loc", "Duc Phu", "Duc Pho", "Quang Tri", "Thua Thien", "Kontum", "Pleiku", "Phu Yen", "Darlac", "Da Lat", "Binh Phuoc", "Lam Dong", "Thu Duc", "Kien Hoa", "Nong Tuong", "Ba Xuyen", "Siam", "Quang Tin border"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: J&k/ I-,,,‘V, _

-,-;. \ _ _

‘NR%¥ 4.=,_.‘W§_ ,7 Rw SITUATION IN vxzrwam as 0? xsqm zsr-1s DECEMBER assv .‘é';f=. I 55>;

é‘?-#~\‘%*::_1@ I ,<:ji> wflm I_.;,_:<> I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM RMRW RRRRY “-3.1! fir 2%: -<..

|am i’|1. Numsaous SMALL umzr ENG~~ 1‘) (3I-Y1 azure WERF1 _ $0 P1- figggg 3 §9§M,E7 PORTED IN VIDELY SCRTTERED AREAS OP THE COUNTRY ON 18 DECEMBER. TOT L OF NE L1’R" 4O S H A A A C CLASHES LN w THE I AND 11 CORPS AREAS RESULTED IN 25 ENEMY KILLED E£en@RuRyE%nd@w|
|---|---|
| |AND szvsw CAPTURED. €kw@§??€il2é§i5\\|
|2.|ow 11 DECEMBER A CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP (CIDG) COMPANY RAN INTO A FIGHT IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE ABOUT 26 NILES NORTHWEST OF SAIGON. Y|
| |SECOND COMPANY AIREIFTED INTO THE BATTLE AREA ALSO CAME UNDER HEAVY FIRE. FOUR HELICOPTERS WERE DONNED|
| |AND SIX WERE DAMAGED. ALLIED LOSSES WERE FIVE KLLED AND 15 WOUNDED, AND ENEMY CASUALTIES CAME TO 42 DEAD.|
|3.|THE ENEMY FORCE INVOLVED NR8 PROBQBLY THE VIET CONG 269TH MAIN FOR F()' U3 I» P”! ‘*3 Tl’ F.- -4*@ Z 0 ""4'3 HEAVY :1. \- K \ WEAPONS COMPANY OF THE ESOTH IS REPORTED TO HAVE FOUR HEAVY 12.8—NN. ANTIAIRCRAFI GUNS. A RECENT DEFECTOR REPORTED THAT VIET CONG UNITS IN RAU NGHZA WERE RECEIVING TRQINING IN'ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE TECH- LOCATED IN THE BA THU V AREA OF CAMBODIA, OPPOSITE THE HAU NGHIA PROVINCE BORDER.|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207_
---
# COMMUNIST MILITARY

THE COMMUNISTS ARE APPARENTLY PLANNING TO INTENSIFY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF 1 CORPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

AGENT REPORTS ALL POINT IN THIS DIRECTION.

NEW COMMUNICATIONS COMPLEX, FIRST HEARD

AN AGENT HAS REPORTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS PLAN A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK ON QUANG NGAI THIS MONTH.

A RECENT SOURCE STATED THAT A COMMUNIST BATTALION WAS FORMED FROM AND BETWEEN DECEMBER AND FEBRUARY.

THE "ENTIRE QUANG NGAI PROVINCE FORCE" PLANS TO ATTACK.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
# ‘4
~4» -                                                                                ,_                                            _            “_fV,Approved f0r_Re|ease:_2019/03/29 CQ1001gQJ7.;Me'                                                                                W-
‘“'    ~                   T

‘                   ‘_~TACK THE PROVINCIAL c§§¥rAL.I

I -1.                                     momaovzn , \

II

<|\-s:‘,.I\

.‘ v\\H ‘                                 INDICATE THAT ADDITIONAL manta .,.                                                                                vxzrmamsss MILITARY.                                  I               V
I -

5
§§                       j            'UNITS OR GROUPS OF REPLACEMENT-PERSONNEL ARE IN

‘fiflz_,_v,.(_,,                          THE PROCESS OF INFILTRATING INTO THE flRE&.                                                                                INFOR-

. \-
T"
'MATION comraxuzn IN A RECENTLY CAPTURED swsmv NOTE-
ABOOK ALSO SUGGESTS THAT FUTURE NQJOR COMMUNIST OF-vl

FENSIVES WILL BE MOUNTED ALONG THE COASTAL AREA
IOF CENTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM.

INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY EXPECTED IN THE SAIGON AREA

pr1).:                                                   8.                          A NUMBER OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS POINT TO

‘

.' :'
%g                             ,A PERIOD OF INCREASED TERRORISM AND HARASSMENT THIS
Em,r.-.

‘fi%.1 .4VQ-<14
’                                   WEEK IN AND AROUND SAIGON»                                                                                REPORTEDLY INCLUDED IN
@*1.                            THE commumzsr PLANS ARE A SERIES or MORTAR--AQD P68-
SIBLY ROCKET--ATTACKS ON MILITARY TARGETS IN T 2'11 P1

CAPITAL AREA.                                                                                TAN SON NHUT AIRFIELD, WITH ITS
RUNAF AND MACV SEfiDQUARTERS COMPLEX, IS &"‘4_»\                                                                                ‘UC.) U‘        ‘QQ CU F» ("*1Kup

~

TARGET, AS IS exam sea AIR ease, wszcw, [::::::::::] -

‘

t~=}      E U) CI U3 JECT OF EX-

\                                                                                L was BEE8

TENSIVE SURVEILLANCE QND RECOHflAISSANCE¢                                                                                THERE
\

~  J;,_‘.3‘                    HAS BEEN A MINOR INCREASE IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDQ,

IQQEI":-'ii“?{                        AND TERRORISM IN THE CAPITAL zg RECENT DAYS.. .

_. z_-
“QC                                              9.                           THREE COMHEMORATIVE DAYS FALL IN THE 19TH TO 22ND

PERIOD.                                                        THE FIRST OF THESE IS I9 DECE\?bi F1 2 o m a. ,1O

TIONAL RESISTAMCE DAY, cammsmoaarzxe THE comvrF5 Z3 W1 I

,.-                                      /
-
\
z                                                                                \               *'H      (
‘                          ’                V                                                                                ‘                  ’-?» \1-                                              \                      I                K

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-                                                           1                   1                                                             c              1* ‘Li »_;‘=',--- ..¢j?7/,.‘                                \ 1       f                       v

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‘                                                                  "-3- “_-' ,‘                                                  '-‘, "".“' ', _‘                                ""‘                            ‘

'*-                   \;. n‘w‘-if‘, "1!,.}<‘>'.-0‘ -",' x ' ' ~ ‘~-. .                             \               ~_"§H‘~ >,.; 5-‘  .                                               .,, \_

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
# APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2019/03/29 C01001207

'J mzur or THE VIET MINM&g£$1SIANCE AGAINST was FRENNR

IN 1946. THE 7TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IS ON 20 DECEMBER, AND 22 DECEMBER IS THE 23RD ANNIVERSARY OF THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY.

THE COMMUNISTS HAVE USED SUCH OCCASIONS IN THE PAST TO STAGE DRAMATIC ATTACKS FOR A MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA EFFECT.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. DAMS nuc KROI, NEWLY APPOINTED SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO VICE PRESIDENT KY, BELIEVES POLICE DIRECTOR LOAN IS BEHIND THE RECENT UPSURGE IN ANTI-AMERICAN EDITORIALS IN THE PRESS AND TO RESTRAIN LOAN, KHOI REPORTEDLY MET WITH KY ON 13 TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM AND MENTIONED SEVERAL INSTANCES OF ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO LOAN AND HIS SUBORDINATE, EAL DEN, NHOM KHOI DESCRIBED AS THE 'MASTERMIND' OF THESE INCIDENTS. ONE WAS THE SERIES OF ANTI-AMERICAN ARTICLES WHICH HAVE RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE DAILY CONG CHUNG, A PAPER GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE UNDER AT LEAST A DEGREE OF CONTROL BY LOAN.
---
# S2. KHOI EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT, NHILE'THE LOAN - MAI DEN CAMPAIGN HAS NOT YET REACHED SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, CONTINUED FREE REIN FOR THEM COULD DAMAGE US-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS AND EVEN HURT THE NAB EFFORT. as THEREFORE Anv1szn, 3jMhX2)

THAT KY PERSUADE LOAN TO DISMISS MAI nan AND STOP PUBLICATION OF CONG CHUNG. KY REPORTEDLY PROMISED TO TALK T0 LOAN BUT SAID NE WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME PERSUADING HIM TO LET MAI DEN GO; KY SAID HE HAD TRIED THIS ONCE BEFORE TO NO AVAIL.

# 3. KHOI SAID HE AD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE SITUATION NITH LOAN. ALTHOUGH LOAN AGREED THAT THE AMERICANS POSED NO REAL LONG-RANGE THREAT TO VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE TWO COULD REACH NO COMMON GROUND ON HON TO LESSEN SHORTER RANGE FRICTIONS WHICH RESULT FROM THE MASSIVE AMERICAN PRESEWCEO LOAN J

REPORTEDLY TOLD KHOI THAT MAI DEN WAS A DEDICATED, CLEVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WHO HAD DONE NOTHING WORSE THAN CRITICIZE rd 2'3 I11 C1 U1 0‘ LOéN THEREFORE FELT IT WOULD BE INCONGRUOOSLTOMFIRE HIS SUBORDINATE P-4FE OTHm w m 3) ca c>UT NHOM LOAN HAD EVIDENCE OF SO NRONGDOING WERE KE?T ON BY THEIR SUPERIORS.
---
MOBILIZATION DECREE DEFENDED BEFORE ASSEMBLY

DEFENSE MINISTER NGUYEN URN VY MET WITH BOTH HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 18 DECEMBER TO DEFEND THE GOVERNMENT'S PARTIAL MOBILIZATION DECREE OF 24 OCTOBER. ALTHOUGH VY’S PERFORMANCE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY, ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, THE UPPER HOUSE MEETING ON 19 DECEMBER VOTED OVERWHELMINGLY TO REJECT THE GOVERNMENT'S JUSTIFICATION OF ITS DECREE. PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION MAY BE SUPPORTED BY THE ASSEMBLY.

THERE IS AT LEAST ONE REPORT THAT THREE MEMBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE ARE CIRCULATING A DRAFT DECREE TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S DECREE.

VY MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE UPPER HOUSE FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS IN AN OPEN PLENARY SESSION ATTENDED BY ALL 66 MEMBERS. HE READ A STATEMENT OUTLINING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND DEFENDED THE FORMER RATE'S ACTION IN PROMULGATING THE DECREE AS LEGAL UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION. VY MAINTAINED THAT PROMULGATION IN OCTOBER WAS NECESSARY IN VIEW OF AN ANTICIPATED 1968 REQUIREMENT FOR 64,000 ADDITIONAL MEN AND BECAUSE OF THE NEED TO GIVE THOSE WHO WILL BE AFFECTED AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO PREPARE FOR THE EVENTUALITY. HE ALSO ARGUED THAT LOWERING THE DRAFT AGE FROM 20 TO 18 WAS NECESSARY.
---
“J'v_

I

1‘ ~._.» Y 7 Y A Qépproved for Release: 2019/03/29 C010012QZ}I§|e-__-__...- -_....e_~__-I_,_,_____»-

~< J‘) l8'NAS A LOGICAL COURSE"-3*-‘OR A NATION AT WAR. HE ADDED,

/fix7}v

‘Z-§";§‘}‘-L, '-:5 ‘ HONEVER, THAT 18 YEAR OLDS UILL NOT BE CALLED UP BE HQ ., .» FORE THE_ ,END OF I968» STUDENT DEFERNENTS, HE NOTED,

.. ,1 /> ,_ .'-*~.~:-.»~~N ' WOULD BE FLEXIBLE, ALLOWING SUPERIOR STUDENTS TO _' l. N """i5T'i‘=,

1,.L - 7‘J.1/4 ,~-Id"V-.1 -T -.» -34.; ICONTINUE THEIR STUDIES¢ THOSE WHO WANT TO STUDY ABROAD v ¢\ I -, 13,,-n '.. 1 WILL BE REQUIRED TO PASS SPECIAL EXANINATIO Z3U]0 3 AND THEY WILL HAVE TO PURSUE STUDIES THAT WTLL BENEFIT THE NATION.

6. THE QUESTION- AND-ANSWER PERIOD IN THE SENATE NAS GENERALLY ORDERLY AND WITHOUT RANCOR. VY ANSWERED QUESTIONS TOUCHING ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS THE RATES O? DESERTION AND DRAFT EVNSIONCBOTH DOWN ED PERCENT IN J >2 DESERTION AND DRAFT EVNSIONCBOTH DOWN ED PERCENT IN I967 FROM 1966); POSTPONENENT OE C IT) Z13 -4 3» v- 23' :y g,/My #%wI .-1 MOBILIZATION DEGREE UNTIL THE NNTIDNAL éSSZN3LY HAS W13? \‘.w|;~.';;. -1-":5. - THE OPPORTUNITY TO _P") (D 1*LIZE THE ORDER (THERE IS NO LONGER A QUESTION OF AMENDING OR SUSPENDING THE DEGREE-— THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO APPLY IT EAIRLY); QND THE SUBJECT OF DRAFT DEEERNENTS (NO FAVORS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SONS OF WEALTH? OR PRONINENT FAMILIES AND A CRACK-' DONN SHOULD SE MADE ON STUDENTS WHO USE THEIR STUDIES TO EVADE THE DRAFT). NNOTHER QUESTION TOUCHED ON THE wi, POINT OF WHY THE DRAFT QGE WAS LONERED IF ONLY A 64,0DD- NAN INCREASE IS NEEDED (REPLACENENTS ARE NEEDED FOR CASUALTIES AND DISCHARGES AS WELL AS TO INCREASE THE SIZE OE THE MILITARY-A \12 U] C) ‘LY 4D PEROENT OF B 4-< QJ» x H UT NEEDS WILL BE NET BY CONSCRIPTION IN I968). SUSPICIONS was vezczn THAT THE eovzawmznw uszn THE NGBILIZAT I’-‘I C)Z‘:

/

\ v I 1 I. 1 \ 1. \ ~.' - - _, -. -- 1‘ '44 1" ‘ >-.._>-. ‘_,_»_:_ - ) ‘Q ,_ _'phe ,\ .~___ _ ,. M. 1 ,\\ ‘, \ ~‘_y,'\- . -_ ‘F M1, "L '.- ~_r_: -_ ._-»‘ I '_,_. ;__> :,|'1', _\ ‘_; .<__.‘ 1‘. ‘ _. I,“¢_.. 1, -‘. ,l._ \ \ < 4:\' ‘ - - -3 . -\.\ _ _ Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
OF SPECIALISTS as A wa fife CONTROL oPPes1w1om1sIs‘E@%-"WT

DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS ARE THE ONLY COESIDERETION FOR

WHICH_ARE IN PARTICULAR SHORT SUPPLY).

1. VY APPEARED BEFORE A CLOSEu m w A m

LOWER nouss ow THE Airsamoom ow as nzczasR.[::::::]

VY’S~PERFORNANCE was ,

AS GOOD AS THE ONE HE GAVE BEFORE THE UPPER HOUSE@-

AFTER READING A PREPARED STATEMENT, HE REPLTED TO SOME

120 QUESTIONS. INQUIRIES REPORTEDLY FELL INTO THREE

BROAD CATEGORIEWGC I) THOSE CALLEEGIEG THE CONSTZTU'

TIONALITY OF THE DECREE ITSELF; 2) THOSE OUESTTONTNG

THE FAIREESS OF THE DEGREE; AND 3) THOSE RELATTNG TO

WHAT ACTION THE GOVERNMENT MTGHT TAKE IE_THE NATIONAL

ASSEMBLY "REJECTS" THE DEGREE OR REQUEST THAAT ITS

APPLICATION BE SUSPENDED. VY, 2 x M m 1 0 iv

QUESTIONS POSED, STREESED THE NEED FOR THE IMMEDZATE

APPLICQTION OF TEE DECZZIO HE DECLARED, HOWEVER, 4’THAT

THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FOLLOW ADOTHER *=“iLTZATTOS LQUin U

ONE QERE PASSED BY THE ASSE G F < 0 1

IF

—4P#&fi>#&%?%r+%i?E:::::]flfi-FOfiEi6fl-OISfifififfifififififififififi-DSE-fifitY 35¢»
---
# FARNER-HORKER-SOLDIER BLOC OF THE DOHNSWING

THE LOWER HOUSE CONTINGENT OF THE FARMER-WORKER-SOLDIER BLOC HAS REPORTEDLY DECIDED TO DISBAND FOR LACK OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION. THE UPPER HOUSE CONTINGENT MAY ALSO BE NEAR DISSOLVING.

MEMBERS OF THE LOWER HOUSE SAID THEY MADE THE DECISION TO DISBAND ON 10 DECEMBER, FOLLOWING A SERIES OF MEETINGS WHICH WENT ALMOST UNATTENDED.

THEY ATTRIBUTE THEIR GROUP'S DEMISE TO THE DIMINISHING POPULARITY OF THE BLOC'S LEADERS, MOST OF WHOM ARE SENATORS. SENATOR DANG VAN SO38 AND OTHERS SAY THAT DINH IS TOO PRO-BUDDHIST AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT.

THE FIVE MEMBERS OF THE BLOC, INCLUDING DOB AND DEER, ARE SAID TO BE GOOD MEN BUT NOT POLITICALLY ASTUTE. ACCORDING TO SENATOR NGUYEN GIQ HIEN, LEADER OF THE SENATE'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST BLOC, THE BLOC IS LOSING PRESTIGE IN THE UPPER HOUSE.

HIEN CLAIMS THAT BOTH DOB AND DEER ARE PRIMARILY MILITARY MEN, UNINTERESTED IN POLITICS OR POLITICAL AIMS.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
FIND NO CONFRONTATION GROUND WITH MEMBERS OF OTHER UPPER HOUSE

BLOCS AND WILL NOT DISCUSS PRACTICAL POLITICS

ALTHOUGH HIEN'S ATTITUDE MAY BE SLIGHTLY COLORED BECAUSE OF DON'S REFUSAL TO GO ALONG WITH A PROPOSAL THAT THEIR TWO BLOCS MERGE, THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS OF DON'S POLITICAL INEPTITUDE. THIS MAY HURT NOT ONLY HIS BLOC, BUT ALSO HIS CHANCES FOR ELECTION TO THE UPPER HOUSE CHAIRMANSHIP. HIEN HAS SAID THAT HIS BLOC'S VOTES WILL GO TO SENATOR NGUYEN VAN HUYEN, DESPITE DON'S APPEAL FOR HIEN'S SUPPORT. PRESIDENT THIEU, IN ADDITION, HAS REPORTEDLY INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR HUYEN OVER DON.

NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. THERE ARE BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT ELEVEN MIG-21S AND POSSIBLY SEVEN MIG-17S AT VARIOUS AIRFIELDS WITHIN NORTH VIETNAM. AT LEAST A

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
L V ' " __- 1 ~ V “ A ‘Approved for Release: 2_019/03/29 C010012Q];1

Two AND POSSIBLY Fouaéfihe-11s wznz snow Down BY k”?

US AIRCRAFT CANNON FIRE ON 18»AND 19 Dgcgmgggo

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILETAw < c£vELOP;~1Em'g

THERE IS wownzms OF SIGNIFZCANCE Y6 REPORT.

V. COMMUNIST PCLITICAL DEVELO FU E <""1 U):71

TO TAKE A woman LIJE on YHE QUES?’‘Q- (I)i

WAR. THEY INSEST THAI AN UNCGNDZYIONAL CZSSAEION c?

THE BOMBING M552 ‘U 3] [*1 Q F. C3 I’-=1 1> 2 ~< GC)1 »4 31> ‘>2.I-= C) 22 U? ll» 2.’U Tug;

A SETTLEMENT MUST BE ZN 1') ('2 ('2 (J 3'0 _t:"@593 W133 Igggg Twgmgo

IN A LENGTHY EUTERVIEW WIEH A UISTERM JOUR-NALIST LASTB-JEEZ(, 'IR.3=N V151" DUKGG, C0U;‘$S7Lca :0 0 ‘>1*

2'2 CL I0 1. vzzrmnmssz mzsszew IN FRANCE? REFSSZD re ca»-SIBZR ANY sueeasr P1 ca G "11 0R Acwxzvzxa A SETYLEMFHT EX-

02?: om THE BASIS 0? wELL—Z61 ZZ ('3= ~:.. ‘>- <.. ,- CGHHUNIS? PGSZ??OMS.

U‘? ‘D? n'- F“. "' "* "-‘Q’-.1~»~-- --. H

4r_.- - ..."C£_',D -1 3?._ q._..1H_| .4 0 :0 F” 1\-I $1~~ m“=‘!*l-\;lU;‘§REA-L3V Oi‘: 1:31. Us-.< -@~-.--~ 1::

VZE?NAM'S savzazzawrv awe BR:EdG) 2? INTO THE us "SPHERE

0? INFLUENCE." Bums ALU3 C) C‘) P" :5» ~F"-I3(“*1U Q- ‘J1 p Lii Pi 0-TI312 N1 F4 I-=4 DJ F1 DU J‘; '-I 0-4 C)

was UNABLE T0 AGREE T0 ox rs zvzm cC) m DJP1~ iv~:m0 A PR6-POSAL THAT THE CI U3 I2 Eli C3 $3 C) Y’-J Pi Z11 <1 l»-‘=4:"P3 Q.0;.~ <ZTHDRAW awn

LEAVE A COEPROHISE eovzawmsmr IN THE soars.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C01001207
---
# LIBERATION FRONT 5th ANNIVERSARY

"THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS ARE USING THE OCCASION OF THE SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE LIBERATION FRONT TO VOICE THEIR DETERMINATION TO PRESS ON WITH THE WAR. AT A MEETING IN HANOI, FRONT AND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS SPOKE OF THEIR RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE. ONE SPOKESMAN PORTRAYED THE CONFUSION OF VIOLENT AND FIERCE BATTLES." BUT CLAIMED THAT THE PEOPLE WILL NOT SHRINK FROM ANY SACRIFICE OR TRIAL AND THAT THE NORTH ABIDES BY THE SLOGAN, "EVERYTHING FOR THE FRATERNAL SOUTH."

SIMILAR STATEMENTS WERE MADE AT A GATHERING OF FRONT OFFICIALS IN A "LIBERATED AREA" IN THE SOUTH.

HIGH-LEVEL, "PEACE NEGOTIATIONS" ACCORDING TO AN INSIDE SOURCE. HE ALSO SET FORTH THE FUTURE TREND OF THE 1953 OF THE SOUTHERN AND PEOPLE."

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 "HW SITUATION IN VIETNAM A[15602478].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Military officials, Viet Cong, Communist military leaders, Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy, Senator Dang Van Son, President Thieu, Liberation Front officials",
  "What": "Military situation updates, plans for attacks, political developments, defense mobilization, disbandment of political blocs, peace negotiations, propaganda",
  "When": "18th to 22nd December 1967",
  "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Hau Nghia Province", "Quang Ngai", "North Vietnam", "Cambodia", "France", "Hanoi"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607

EH61

P»-5<<=> //6‘ /05Z,

/

# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Cm/ml Im‘e//zgmce Bu!/e/in

3554204C210

28 November 1967 saw

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
The CENTRAL Intelligence BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
---
# Cm/ml In/e//zgmce Bu//e/in

Cyprus: Negotiations are continuing. (Page 1)
Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 2)
France: De Gaulle sharper and more explicit in his latest press conference. (Page 4)
Canada-NATO: Ottawa may reduce NATO units in Europe. (Page 5)
Singapore: Ties wip Eastern Europe (Page 6)
---
# Cyprus

Ankara has submitted stiff counterproposals to Athens in the latest round of negotiations. Although no details are available, NATO Secretary General Brosio states that the new Turkish conditions "will be more difficult for the Greeks to accept." In addition to these latest demands, Ankara is insisting all Greek "illegals" leave Cyprus within 45 days.

The armed forces of both nations remain in a high state of alert; a number of patrol craft and minelayers which had been with the "invasion force" in southern Turkish ports suddenly left Mersin this morning. The transports carrying the troops, heavy weapons, and armor remained in port, however.

Despite a general lessening of tension on Cyprus, patrol activity by Greek Cypriot police and civil defense elements has increased. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriot news coverage has become less strident in tone during the past day or so.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607

|South Vietnam: In the area north of Con Thien|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|that new attacks are being prepared. A third unit, the 164th Artillery Regiment, is in position to provide supporting fire against Con Thien and Gio Linh.| |
|The South Vietnamese Government's recent mobilization decree, aimed at strengthening the armed forces, has run into difficulty with the new Senate. In its session on 25 November, the Senate indicated a general displeasure that the decree had been promulgated by the government before the new legislature was invested. The majority of the senators question the constitutionality of the decree.| |
|South Vietnamese Defense Minister Vy is reportedly dissatisfied with the caliber of Vietnamese Army officers and is considering revamping the officer selection process. Under Vy's reported plan college graduates would first be inducted as privates and then screened carefully for officer qualification before being awarded commissions. A college degree is now the prime criterion for admission to officer candidate school.| |
| |5(c)|

28 Nov 67

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
Appfqvedfor Release: 20‘19/03/29 C03009607  3 5 (C)
3.3(h)(2)
28 Nov 67                            3
3-5“)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607 3 '5(C)

France: A sharper tone and more explicit terms than he has used previously characterized De Gaulle's press conference yesterday.

Aside from a fleeting prophecy of a downward trend for the dollar as a consequence of British devaluation, De Gaulle's major reference to the United States came in his treatment of the Middle East. Until Washington disengages itself "from the vile war it is conducting" in Vietnam, the big-four solution he envisages for the Middle East is impossible, he reiterated. He made clear that any settlement must include Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory and international status for Jerusalem. In return, Israel would receive access to the Suez Canal.

De Gaulle's aggressive views on French-Canadian sovereignty focused on resistance to US domination and on the role of French Canada in assuring a global outlook for the French language. He clearly hopes to promote both aims through his espousal of an association of two Canadas similar to that recently endorsed by Quebec politician Rene Levesque.

In rejecting London's bid for early negotiations on Common Market membership, he specified that only British submission to French conditions can open the door. Until Britain radically transforms itself into "one of the pillars of a European Europe" he held out only the possibility of a free-trade association including the other Northern European countries.

De Gaulle began and ended his monologue on domestic matters. He again reminded everyone that his regime has given France political stability, and implied that the French populace should be thankful to him for the improved living standards they now enjoy.

28 Nov 67 4

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---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607 35(6)

Canada-NATO: Ottawa may be considering reducing its NATO forces in Europe.

The government's campaign to reduce spending is requiring the Department of National Defense to cut the budget sharply. Some defense officials are said to favor deactivating a major unit, and Canada's NATO forces are viewed as a likely candidate.

Senior government officials are considering a cut of about one third in Canada's forces in Europe. These now consist of 6,500 army troops and six squadrons of aircraft. As a partial alternative, Ottawa could deactivate the small NATO-committed forces stationed in Canada.

Defense Minister Cadieux told Parliament last week that he will discuss reduction of Canada's military strength at the NATO meeting in Brussels on 13 December.

28 Nov 67 5

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---
# NOTES

Singapore: Singapore's interest in expanding trade opportunities has led to pe establishment of diplomatic and economic ties wip a number of East European countries. Last week Bulgaria became pe first Communist country to open an embassy in Singapore, and pe Lee government has agreed to exchange diplomatic missions wip Rumania and Yugoslavia. Soviet and Polish trade missions are already functioning in Singapore. Hungary is expected to open one soon.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C030096073_5(C) T-9-P—S-ECKET

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 24 November 1967 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 70- 1- 67
"Liberation Movements of Southern Africa"
s.5(c)
28 NOV 67

TD-P-SE-6-RET 3'5“

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607

Top ret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03009607 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602371].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Director of Central Intelligence, CIA, Senior Government Officials",
"What": "Current intelligence on national security issues, classified information, international negotiations, military actions, diplomatic relations, intelligence estimate",
"When": "28 November 1967",
"Where": ["Cyprus", "South Vietnam", "France", "Canada", "Singapore"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786610.1

On 7 February, a member of my staff did an informal memorandum for me on the effects of the Tet offensive on the pacification program, an update of that memorandum I sent to you. Attached is a memorandum, done by the same officer, that you may find of interest.

George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

O. D. Rostow

Mr. Habib

Secretary McNamara

General DePuy

Governor Harriman

Magi

Mr. Leonhart

Ambassador William

Special Assistant to the President
---
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Effect of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive on the GVN Pacification Program

REF: Memo dtd 7 Feb 68, same subject

The data in this memorandum updates reference memorandum and utilizes all information received from province and corps situation reports received as of 0900 hours EST 12 February 1968.

Summary and Conclusions

There is little change in the situation since reference. The map attached to reference should now show Quang Duc Province as probable minor disruption to the reflect major disruption instead of "probable major disruption." To date, casualties reported for all programs (RDC, Truong Son, Static Census Grievance, and PRU) are 56 KIA, 83 WIA, and 37 MIA. VC casualties casualties caused by the RDC or PRU elements are 60 KIA (body count) and 1 captured.

|I Corps|Quang Nam|
|---|---|
|A. Hoi An RDC Team #28 located inside the city suffered 3 KIA and 7 WIA when it was hit by 2 VC mortar rounds on the night of 8 - 9 February.| |
|B. On 11 February Quang Nam reported that the next 10 days the pacification program for the moment refugees, transport, communications, and food or so until such items as was at a halt and would be for are dealt with.| |
|Quang Ngai reported on 11 February that since 31 January casualties are 2 PRU WIA; 10 RDC KIA, and 30 WIA; 1 soc KIA; 2 RDC Control Group KIA and 3 WIA.| |
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786610

1. Quang Tin reported that RDC casualties, as of 11 February, as listed by the National Police are 4 RDC KIA.

2. Quang Tri reported 10 February that refugees number 3,000 primarily from RD areas in Trieu Phong District. At least 3 New Life Hamlets were destroyed, are in the RAD areas. The refugees have stories of VC atrocities. At least 3 VC battalions ll Corps appear to be increasing problems for most provincial capitals.

3. On 9 February II Corps RDC reported that economic resulting dislocations from the influx of refugees and damage to the cities as a result of the military activity. With the major highways and lines of communications to the cities either cut or disrupted, food supplies are dwindling and prices rising. Hoarding of foodstuffs is occurring in some cities where the population is fearful of further attack.

4. Pleiku reported 8 February that the Montagnard Training Center was attacked at 0010 hours. The attack lasted three hours. Three guards were killed and two wounded. Ten local VC sappers were killed, grenades crew served and 5 individual weapons captured along with ammunition, and mines. Heavy damage was inflicted by the VC on the farm demonstration area, the farm classroom and barber shop were demolished. There was some damage caused by friendly rounds and supporting gunships. The guards' barracks damaged by southeast tower bunker was demolished and B-40 rounds. The camp security force performance was exemplary.

5. Quang Duc reported 10 February that the RDC and Truong Son teams have not been specifically targeted by the enemy although their movement to 1968 hamlets has been delayed due to better defensive position being located in their old locations.

6. Binh Long reported that during the night of 2 - 3 February during the VC attack on Phu Loc village that 2 RDC were killed and 2 wounded.

7. Hau Nghia reported that on 1 February RDC Team #2 had heavy VC contact along Rt. #1.
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786610

12. Long Khanh reported that, as of 4 February, the PRU was located along Highway 1 but was unable to return to Xuan Loc because of the security situation. The Census Grievance Chief and Assistant Chief were unable to return from a currently insecure district where they spent the Tet holidays. The RD program situation was unclear at this time. Some of the hamlets where the RDC were located were reported in enemy hands, but other reports stated that the RDC had held off the VC. On 31 January a RDC Team reported killing 2 VCO. By 8 February, Long Khanh reported that the GVN pacification program was operative.

IV Corps

13. An Xuyen. Static Census Grievance Cadre were reporting, as of 8 February, on attitudes and reactions of the populace, VC movements, VC propaganda activities.

14. Bac Lieu reported 8 February that 1 RDC Team had been fired on twice but no casualties were reported. On 11 February, 30 PRU engaged the VC northeast of Bac Lieu city. The CORDS compound in the city had been attacked and was on fire as of 11 February.

15. Kien Giang reported 11 February that the CORDS compound had been destroyed in Rach Gia.

16. Kien Phong reported 11 February that all RDC Teams had been pulled back to either Cao Lanh or other district towns.

17. Vinh Long, in reviewing the VC attack of 31 January, reported that the RDC house was hit by B-40 rockets and sprayed with automatic fire. The house was never physically assaulted although it was frequently hit by harassing fire. The PRU assisted ARVN during the fighting, suffered 10 KIA, and 16 WIA when their compound came under helicopter rocket fire on 2 occasions and was hit by artillery on another occasion. The PRU compound was completely destroyed. On 12 February, Vinh Long reported that the Static Census Grievance program was back in operation reporting on VC forces used the U.S. in the attack on the city, people's complaints against the VC, ARVN, and others.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 006786610
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Appr0\/'ed for Release: @019/04/17 006766610

- Distribution: EFFECT_OF_THE_VIET_CONG_T[15617861].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": ["George A. Carver, Jr.", "O. D. Rostow", "Mr. Habib", "Secretary McNamara", "General DePuy", "Governor Harriman", "Magi", "Mr. Leonhart", "Ambassador William", "Special Assistant to the President"],
"What": "Effects of the Viet Cong Tet Offensive on the GVN Pacification Program",
"When": "12 February 1968",
"Where": ["Quang Duc Province", "Quang Nam", "Quang Ngai", "Quang Tin", "Quang Tri", "II Corps", "Pleiku", "Binh Long", "Hau Nghia", "Long Khanh", "IV Corps", "An Xuyen", "Bac Lieu", "Kien Giang", "Kien Phong", "Vinh Long"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}