Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02150029

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 002150029 W EOEO 13526 13526 31XhX2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c)> 3.5(c)

|SC SC|No. 07433/68|
|---|---|
| |07433/68|

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence February 5, 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation (As of in South Vietnam EST) No. 1515

1. Allied forces appear to have regained the initiative in many provincial capitals of South Vietnam's urban areas. Most of the major capitals were reported relatively quiet into the morning. However, throughout the night, fighting of 4-5 Feb still continues in Hue, as well as in isolated sections of Saigon and district towns. The Communists also hit at Khe Sanh after a long period of relative quiet.

2. There have been no significant political developments since those reported in the 5 February Central Intelligence Bulletin. Khe Sanh

3. Early on 5 February, US Marines drove back some 200-300 North Vietnamese regulars during an assault on the defensive position atop strategic Hill 861. The attack was staged in conjunction with a four-hour artillery, rocket, and mortar barrage on the main base camp of Khe Sanh.

4. Communist losses totaled 100 killed in contrast to seven American casualties, with seven killed and 44 wounded. No major damage to the base was reported, and the airstrip remains open.

TO *CRET

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1.01p

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02150029A provedforRelease:2019/01/17002150029

CJ/'vdfi/ U.U\Ul V.V\V/

Co1·1~ £92322

continuingBit t.er, pressure continuing.in exert exert 5. increasing in Huepressure door-to-door dooreto-door as US and on South pockets fightingVietnamesereported Vietnamesecity.enemysoldiersof was enemy reportedsoldiers re-sistance in several sectors-oiof the city. Progress is slow, with deterniined Communist clements on clinging to bank isolated isolated strongpoints River.in in the citadel and the south bank of the Perfume River.

Heavy a fighting city, district erupted capital in the to Additionally the to market north marketnorth placo of Trieu Phong, at mid-morning today. Additionally ported possibly toward four, of moving is 1 though Communist city other four, possibly moving it is eight, Quang toward eight, Quang Communist Tri Tri a city battalions from the is i1~m.a-are west, and it possible that is a new other in th.is area, report.

Other reports provincial state the Communistsof are planning time Quang to strike tho capitals towns Tam Ky and Quang Ngni city and several district towns some-campaign, enemy enemy·still Although imminent enemy enemy imminent time campaign, before hoforo the 10 10 action January. may Although still may-be-bo retains retains part such potential of scare of the a reports Communist to scare mount rocket· forays and at least. "limited least limited th1·0\.1ghout attacks, I I supported Corps.

There are no developments on tho the entire trepf:! themassing Division, Vietnamese in February. Nang- tho the Da Da Nang forces, area including reported the in entire our Si treps 2nd or of 3 and 4 February. Corps'· During today, the throughout continue the night of relatively of 4-5 4-5 February ancl and up up t\.1 to mid—morning activity there offensive today, Tuy elements ~ii tuatio11 central flush throughout was relatively the the central little part enemy part enemy of South Vietnam, Allied forces continue Thuot, up to in Dalat. out flush out areas cities where small elements Ban are holed up in several cities !'very In ”very Kon tun\ Kontum quiet. as Pleiku, such at ware Sporadic, and ttas Pleiku, Tuy Hoa, the light night Ban situation Me Me Thuot, mortar mortar was attacks and attacks reported damage were Dalat. were directed at a few cities last night but damage and casualties were reported light.

3.5(c) 3.5(0)

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---
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highlands, Communist substantial highlands, continue continue major to under 10. to Communist military oppose the military forces in the direction of the threat in B-3 key forces to regiments the Front, western cities and the of major North allied Vietnamese outposts there. Division Three have regiments been 3.3(h)(2) 31tg) relocating to maneuver the Dak To area in central Kontum Province. This maneuver was further confirmed by two prisoners purportedly from the North Vietnamese 32nd Regiment which, according to the regiment was to remain together about 3 captives, is to launch a attack regiments. Dok reported and units cities, there another the tack Communist on Dak To, together with 66th and 174th ts. A reported and rocket mortar at attack there on February was and earlier. The Other round of earlier. Other Communist main force units remain active in vicinity round of Kontum and Pleiku cities, there another and major of fight- ing could develop in Corp~

Cor1Js11.11. area No No new night attacks were early reported in the III Corps area last night or early this morning. Saigon 12. South Vietnamese report National Police with and ARVN soldiers Cong continue last with into the with into the report Cholon, clashes The city sharp sharp Saigon. Chinese groups clashes with groups of fighting Cong Viet city of Saigon. The heaviest fighting last the night southwest in was in Cholon, the Chinese quarter incidents have been corner reported of the in capital, nearly every but section. US intelligence sources in Saigon responsible feel that a relatively small recent number of terrorist Viet of Cong are responsible for the most recent terrorist time activities. At esti- mated that less than 100 Cong "action agents" remained talions on in the the boundaries the city with of probably the western three-four precincts. bn t- . capital. to Division enemy main evidence appear appear capital. Cong . 14. 9th to Division Strong There Strong be deployed deployed a move evidence on is has a move is enemy with it forces, has further further within main forces, towards striking Saigon the of in range that Saigon range addition, the from ted of Viet the still northwest III Corps, movement which was earlier based on captured documents and defector

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02150029

statements. The US three in Command disclosed days last 9th last night that prisoners from all three regiments of the 9th Division have been captured in recent days in the general area north and west of Saigon.

Information has come in recent days from a number of prisoners interrogations which tends to support the theory that, in general, Communists may have been believed to support the people for revolution in Saigon and other urban areas. For example, it was apparently provided that plans for withdrawal could not be questioned since their superiors told them that a "general uprising" could be sparked.

Nevertheless, Communist high command was prudent enough to first express assault. Thus, it is possible that the viewpoints expressed by the prisoners mainly represent exhortative and estimates pumped into them by the hardcore cadre, and these estimates are not true representations of the real Communist intentions.

US forces remained in contact with an estimated 100 Viet Cong early this morning within the Fighting of the provincial capital of Vinh Long. Fighting also continued within or on the outskirts of towns and a number of other delta provincial capitals and district towns in the delta.

At Go Cong, a small Viet Cong force released over 100 enemy prisoners from the provincial jail; the town continues to be surrounded by some 2,000 of the enemy.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02150029 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15561240].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
    "What": "Intelligence Memorandum on the Situation in South Vietnam",
    "When": "5 February 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hue", "Saigon", "Khe Sanh", "Perfume River", "Trieu Phong", "Quang Tri", "Tam Ky", "Quang Ngai", "Dalat", "Vin Long", "Go Cong"],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02800005

AGENCY PRIORITY

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable
IN-45472

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO 50? ONE CRS DDI EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AIDAID USIAUSIA

This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Excluded GROUPI from automatic downgrading and Clo-classification.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

3.5(c)

0701232 CITE L DIST 6 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: 7 FEBRUARY 1968 3.3(h)(2) EO

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III CORPS 13526

AS OF 0600 HOURS 7 FEBRUARY 1968 3.5(c) BIRc

ACQ: SOURCE 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) BINc

TAY NINH PROVINCE: AT 2355 HOURS 6 FEBRUARY TAY NINH

CITY CAME UNDER ITS SECOND ATTACK OF THE NIGHT, THE ATTACK CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF MORTAR FIRE. THE ONLY DAMAGE

mun-.4;

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02800005
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02800005

IN-4~4/Z

PAGE 22 OF 22 PAGES

REPORTED AS OF 0140 STAR HOURS 7 FEBRUARY WAS THE DESTRUCTION OF TWO FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER (CFAC) (FAG) AIRCRAFT, ON THE AIRSTRIP AT TAY NINH CITY, AND A GASOLINE DUMP AT THE AIRSTRIP. AN AC-47 "SPOOKY" RESPONDED AND WITHDREW IN A SOUTHWESTWARD DIRECTION TOWARD THE NEW MARKET LOCATED ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY. CASUALTY REPORTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE AS OF 0140 3143 HOURS.

OTHER PROVINCES IN III CORPS HAVE NOT REPORTED ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE FRIENDLY OR ENEMY SITUATION SINCE 2400 HOURS 6 FEBRUARY.

REPORT CLASSIFICATION CON AL NO FOR EH.Pd F b i5S!£M.- EM. GROUP-1

(ADVANCE COPY NICTRANSMITTED TO: WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR UCS 'NIC NSA--OCI.)' "SITUATION REPORT ON ENEMY[15561246].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO 50? ONE CRS DDI EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AIDAID USIAUSIA",
"What": "SITUATION REPORT ON ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III CORPS 13526 - regarding attacks in Tay Ninh Province",
"When": "7 February 1968",
"Where": ["SOUTH VIETNAM", "TAY NINH CITY", "TAY NINH PROVINCE"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Memorandum

For: Deputy Director for Support

Subject: Vietnam Situation Report

The following is a survey of cable traffic from close of business 2 February to 0700 hours 5 February 1968.

# Personnel:

1. The following agency affiliated personnel were reported as unaccounted for on 1 February:

Hr. Eugene Weaver, Staff
Hr. David Hayes, Staff
Capt. Robert Hubbard, USMC - Military Detailee
Hr. Virgil Harris, Contract

These people were located in Hue, SVN prior to 0130 hours on 5 February.

2. A cable in February indicated that Virgil Harris, Hue, and Robert Hubbard were among a unit of individuals who escaped from Hue, SVN and were hit by the VC. Harris was wounded and is reported to be in Phu Bai Hospital at the present time. Robert Hubbard was also wounded and remained behind just South of a small bridge in South of Hue.

Virgil Harris, Robert Hubbard, and others split into two groups prior to 5 February in an attempt to make an escape from Hue. One of these groups comprised Harris and Hubbard.

# Physical Security:

1. During the weekend, there have been various reports of VC attacks on different Police Stations in Saigon, especially in the Cholon district. The attacks have been repulsed but several policemen have been wounded. Tan Son Nhut airport outside Saigon is reported to be back to normal operation including commercial flights. The Saigon Government will apparently resume normal operation on Monday, 5 February. There is a curfew in Saigon which will be in effect from 1700 hours until 0800 hours.
---
# Vietnam Situation Report

Page
2

2. Military action in Hue is still reported as quite active. Reportedly there are approximately 1000 VC in the city and the Marines are now engaged in house to house fighting. Another battalion of VC are reported as approaching Hue from the South and Southeast areas in an effort to augment the VC troops in the city. We are receiving communications from the city although in an infrequent manner. The VC are reported to have control of the Jail and part of the Citadel. The Marines are making slow progress in clearing out the Citadel area. The airfield is under ARVN control but no incoming or outgoing flights have been reported. The Route #1 bridge across the Perfume River at the Southeast entrance to Hue has been destroyed by the VC.

3. The situation from a military standpoint is still considered as serious in Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Ben Tre, and Bien Hoa Province. In other areas of SVN fighting has subsided and normal operations are resuming.

# Logistics:

No serious logistics problems involving TAl personnel have been reported in cable traffic received thus far.

# Communications:

Communications in SVN are still considered in excellent condition with the exception of Hue. This situation is caused by the considerable military action in the city which is disrupting normal activity. The cable traffic received during the weekend from SVN is considered light as compared with traffic received last week. "VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT[15561328].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Deputy Director for Support, Hr. Eugene Weaver, Hr. David Hayes, Capt. Robert Hubbard, Hr. Virgil Harris",
"What": "Vietnam Situation Report, Personnel status, Physical Security updates, Military actions in Hue, Logistics and Communications updates",
"When": "2 February to 5 February 1968",
"Where": ["Hue, SVN", "Saigon", "Cholon district", "Phu Bai Hospital", "Tan Son Nhut airport", "Kontum", "Ban Me Thuot", "Ben Tre", "Bien Hoa Province"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662726

Secret 3.5(c)

3.5(c)

# Current Intelligence Digest

UNITED STATES

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Secret

21 November 1967

0232/67

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662726 3.5(c)

Page

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662726SECKEI-

# C 0 N T E N T s

(Information as of 1200 EST)

|GENERAL|NR|
|---|---|
|Vietnam Situation report|(Page 1)|

SECRET

21 Nov 67 Central Intelligence Digest Page

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---
# SECRET

Vietnam 3.3(h)(2)

ingbrokeNovenbermostNewofwasSouthVietnam fight-out southwest Dak

To on 20 inwhat describedas the intensive actionhighlandscampaign two-week-intheenemy old heavyon portsPreliminary casualtyshowthisengagement are no figureslosses ;enemyAmerican yeton there war Ehreemore North VietnamaircraftairUS In were casualtiesRegimentThe NorthVietnam- downedtheon 20November bringing ese 174th was apparof to 18duringnumber ofUSplanes ently therecenttimeinengagedactionsunithasthetheThislargest lost the past five days is beenfirst committed thebattle to in airresultby These lossesappearap-beof vigorous to current campaign withdefense proceduresUSstrikes plication Hanoi ofitsusualcoupled drawalssignificantTherehas beenenemywith-noevidence against heavilydefendedlargenumberof ofany fromthebattleanditappearsin area inthe area thehighlands thatthe fightingwillcontinue the political On scenetothe airmissileandconventional begettingoff newadministrationappearsstartto shaky antiaircraftfire countedfor ten of theSAMs18 planes _ac whileconventional fireSAM The wassuccessresponsiblefortwobeprobablynumbercan accountedforthelargefighters attributed ofmissilestofiredtwo andMIGpossibly four planes 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)2) SECRET

21Nov 67 Central IntelliqenceDiqest Page
---
                                                  NR
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                                              ]
Page
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                                             ]
Page
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NR
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Page
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Page

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---
                                                  NR
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                                              ]
Page
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                                                  NR
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                                             ]
Page
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C06662726

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C066627262 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE[15466670].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, United States",
  "What": "Vietnam situation report, intensive action in South Vietnam, casualties, air engagements, defense procedures, new administration",
  "When": "21 November 1967",
  "Where": ["Vietnam"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/9fgkp¥go151§1e§mm

Case "NtJ/CBS"

# SANITIZED

# SANITIZED

A""‘°'"Y- NL 3/‘ E’ $ \ Dicumant "8 zieeembe-1-—r9‘s7"'—*

By, NARS, Date 5'7-Y2

# The Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Position On Coalition Government

1. The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) called for the creation of a coalition government in its original manifesto at the time of its creation in 1960. At the beginning of 1962, the Communist Lao Dong Party renamed its component in South Vietnam the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) and stated that the immediate task of the PRP was to unite the forces struggling to liberate Vietnam and set up a broad democratic coalition government that will achieve national independence and democratic freedom. Although the emphasis on coalition government waxed and waned during 1963, immediately prior to and following the fall of the Diem regime the coalition theme was again stressed. On 11 September 1963, for example, the NFLSV sent a three-point peace plan to the United Nations which called for an end to American military assistance, withdrawal of American forces, and a coalition government of political and religious organizations.

2. In retrospect, it appears that Hanoi read the failure of the NFLSV to take over South Vietnam at the time of Diem's overthrow as the failure of political and diplomatic tactics. The "general uprising" and "coalition" government themes went into eclipse, and the military road was taken. It is necessary to journal,§2§ gap, North Vietnam's authoritative army smash the administrative machinery... This revolution can and should be settled only by the use of revolutionary acts and the force of the masses to defeat enemy force. It absolutely cannot be settled by 'talks' and 'negotiations' as advocated by the treaties and modern revisionists.

# References:

|1.|Douglas Pike: Viet Cong--The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
|2.|Ibid.|
|3.|Ibid.|

III-l 11:5: W212 Z0122 Ease:

wZ 5LIi - ow.’ _13.7 __ yLBRARY_ __'_”

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/0040 000145463

for South Vietnam changed the character of the war. In 1965, however, U.S. military support. The 1966 resolution of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) — the Lao Dong 12th Resolution — while emphasizing protracted military struggle, kept the "coalition" option open in its references to the need to intensify struggle for national unity and by calling for the front to "demand the withdrawal of American troops, to overthrow the lackey regime, and to establish a national democratic coalition government." As early as October 1966, there were reports of anticipation of a general attack and a general revolt, interest in reviving the democratic party in then scheduled for early 1967, which would result in the formation of a coalition government in liberated provinces. Courses on the 12th Resolution for North Vietnamese Army personnel in September 1966 in Quang Ngai Province included the disclosure by a lieutenant colonel, political officer for the school, that "If combat did not result in a complete VC/NVN victory, it would at least give the VC/NVN an upper hand when entering negotiations for a coalition government, to be held in 1967."

PRP had abandoned the notion of forming a resistance government and, instead, was concentrating on a coalition government which would depend to a large extent on the cooperation of sympathetic individuals outside of the NFLSV. He claimed that the idea of a coalition government mentioned in the 1966 PRP central committee resolution was disseminated to all levels from province committee according that the policy of neutralist peace was paid to the VC/NVN "in keeping with the balance of forces in the world and in the country." He also added that

CDEC 02-1854-67 and 04-3379-67.

NIC 680/67, 3 August 1967.
---
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NFLSV was no longer enough but would give way to a coalition front wider than the NFLSV which would back up the coalition government. The important problem for the VC/NVN, he emphasized, was to control the lower levels of government, especially the hamlet council which is referred to below as the 13th Resolution, was formulated in the fall of 1966 and discussed with the Soviet Union and Communist China in January 1967. It was disseminated to COSVN in February 1967. The major additional clarification of policy was that North Vietnam formalized its neutral stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and that volunteers would not be accepted from either the Soviets or the Chinese. The Lao Dong delegation to Moscow gained immediate Soviet approval of the resolution, but the delegation to Peking ran into strong Chinese opposition to North Vietnam's acceptance of negotiation as a contingency policy.

In May and June 1967, a series of political reorientation courses were held throughout South Vietnam on the 13th Resolution. At some of these, guarded references were made to negotiations and coalition government. There were also oblique references to the conditions under which the new policy would be implemented. A notebook captured in July 1967, for example, describing a study COSVN directive was discussed, indicated that the ultimate objective was a general counter-offensive and a general uprising if U.S. troop strength was raised to 600,000 men, but "changes will be made if the number of U.S. troops surpasses this limit." There was mention of coalition government, in the sense of local VC administration in Saigon -- a common theme as is reflected in a captured VC/NVN notebook containing notes of a June 1967 training course.
---
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strategy involves the simultaneous conduct of war and negotiations....Victory will be achieved through a general offensive uprising....Despite the existence of a central government, the governmental infrastructure should be in our hands....Even in the event of peace negotiations, our efforts must be directed toward creating military and political conditions which favor our subsequent general offensive and uprising. If a peace table materializes, our political attacks will be targeted at the U.S. and the puppet governments. Our efforts will then be devoted to the isolation of the U.S. and acquisition of the sympathy of the countries of the world. It is imperative that we hit the enemy harder before engaging any negotiations." (9) A document captured on 27 August 1967, otherwise undated, stated: "There may be a turning point in 1967 because peace negotiations may take place....In order to come to peace negotiations successfully, we should kill more enemy soldiers, coordinate the three-pronged attack, and increase diplomatic activities. That is the only way to obtain peace. On the other hand, we should admit the fact that no means satisfied our basic purpose. We only regard it as a victory in diplomacy, a sort of stratagem in support of our three-pronged attacks and activities of our legal agents...."(10)

|6.|The communiqué published by adopted the extraordinary congress of the NFLSV, which new program of the NFLSV on 20 AugustGovernment," 1967, called for a "National Democratic Coalition and seems in retrospect to have initiated a new phase in the treatment of coalition government. The new program itself did not mention coalition government as such. In terms of ultimate goals, it insisting on the absolute monopoly of the NFLSV, is a "hard line" program, but it did attempt to broaden the appeal of the Front, with specific|
|---|---|
|9.|CDEC 08-Z744-67.|
|10.|CDEC 09-Z373-67.|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00145463

Attention to the sensitivities of "capitalists," landlords, intellectuals, and religious communities. Ralliers questioned about its significance, however, found little that was new in the program, and internal, cadre-oriented propaganda concerning the program has been relatively low key in South Vietnam itself.

The "reindoctrination" courses stress Party resolutions and directives. October 1967, still speak of "lack of complete information" on the new political program of the NFLSV. According to these documents, however, the new program should be studied since it calls for an "anti-American struggle for national salvation," promotion of peace and neutrality, and confirmation of the NFLSV as the legitimate and sole representative of South Vietnam. These documents also refer to the mission of the NFLSV in establishing a democratic coalition government and state that the "NFLSV political platform" should be studied in preparation for the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign. In this regard, NVN Premier Pham Van Dong to Le Nouvel Observateur it is interesting to note the recent comments of concerning the requirements for negotiations. Pham Van Dong stated that NVN's four points of April 1965 were still in effect, as a basis for political settlement, and that unconditional cessation of all acts of war against NVN was the condition for initiating talks.

"And what is the position of the Front?" he replied, "It has been expounded in a fundamental and comprehensive manner in its political program made public last August," and he referred to its effect on world opinion and to its mobilization of "all strata" in South Vietnam.

Beginning about September 1967, the concept of a coalition government has been heavily emphasized by the VC/NVN in the context of their impending "winter-spring campaign." The breadth of the appeal and the depth of the indoctrination concerning it seemed to make a qualitative leap. A letter dated 18 September 1967 (apparently between unit commanders.

11. CDEC 11-2062-67

12. FBIS Daily Report, 20 November 1967.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00145463

and political problems are also discussed) outlined the VC/NVN's goals in late 1967 and early 1968 by stating that: "This is a historical during this phase consists of the withdrawal of U.S. phase, and the immediate goal for the entire Party Coalition Government." (Z3) forces and the forming of a People's Democratic contains notes on a reindoctrination course ap-Another key document of the course, which covered a 1967 COSVN resolution, apparently held in September 1967. (14) The notes

resolution, began with the disarming observation that "The guidelines of the 12th Resolution remain unchanged; only the situation is new."

The basic VC should "concentrate forces to defeat the enemy in his limited war and force the establishment of members of the Front as the nucleus." a People's Democratic Coalition Government with the VC/NVN found grounds for optimism in the course Apparently of the war and the troubles confronting the U.S. at home and abroad. that "From these In any event, the VC/NVN stated defeated." During the course, the VC/NVN spelled points, we judge the enemy to be government.

out in considerable detail the nature of a coalition VC/NVN held that "The coalition government may in-The most striking feature was that the clude a‘non—revolutionary element as president. But he must follow the essential line of action as stipulated by the Front." The VC/NVN appear to have gone to some length to explain to the cadres that a coalition government was not a sell—out:

"A coalition government opens the way to attaining Our revolutionary goals. What is important is that we must have tight control over the government, the laborers, and agricultural workers. It does not matter if there are a few notables at the top. The main lines of the Front's policy must be followed."

cise overall control over it, and if our agents In short, the VC stated that "Our party will exer- out the principal lines of action of the Front, the Party will lead the revolution to the final objective...." It was noted that "At first, the cadres ernment, but after the study, they became aware of felt anxious when hearing about the coalition gov— its importance and appeared to be full of confidence."

13. CDEC 10-1558-67. 14. CDEC 10-1995-67.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00145463

8. The VC/NVN also appeared to modify their stand toward the withdrawal of U.S. troops and creation of a coalition government. "The immediate objectives as set forth by the Party at this time are ‘suitable’ because the Americans are being defeated and the puppet forces are deteriorating. But we are not strong enough now to deal them a lethal blow." Moreover, the COSVN resolution discussed at the reindoctrination session expressed that: "The people's democratic revolution must not draw a line between its short range objectives and its long range ones, because neutrality is close at hand. From democratic independence we move to socialism....We must take risks and form a coalition government without having to wait until the Americans have completely pulled out...." (15)

A troop indoctrination lesson dated 1 September 1967 and captured 25 November 1967 stipulates that the VC "do not appreciate a neutral regime which is usually regarded as the third political solution by capitalists." "Not any type of coalition government, but a conditioned one, a coalition government with the key role to the NFLSV after the withdrawal of U.S. aggressors. Only such a coalition government will be able to reunify the country and implement socialism in both parts of the country." (15)

9. The unrealistic military goals of this movement of a coalition government in a report "winter-spring campaign" were tied to the establishment of a coalition government. "During this phase, military victories should be won to change the actual balance of force and to expand our scope of control in the countryside. Three quarters of the actual GVN—controlled areas should be liberated, and 30 percent of ARVN posts and guard houses should be crushed in order to enforce the withdrawal of Allied forces and the establishment of a coalition government." (17)

15. CDEC 10-1995-67.

16. CDEC 11-2552-67.

17. Field Information Report, Kien Hoa Province, 10/167467, Dated 28 October 1967.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00145463 -

that only the first phase of the 1967-68 winter-spring campaign, for October 1967 to March 1968, has been prepared so far. Plans for the second phase, from April to June 1968, will be drawn up later "in accordance with the situation." (18)

This report describes the two immediate targets of the struggle as follows:

- To use all forces to weaken the Americans’ will to invade South Vietnam and to force them to pull out of SVN
- To force the U.S. to accept the Front as the only representative of the South Vietnamese people and to form a coalition-democratic-peaceful-neutral government in which the NFLSV is the principal element.

American troops must be withdrawn, the report continued, and "The internal problems of South Vietnam must be resolved by the South Vietnamese people." Admitting that the VC cannot completely destroy the American troops, the report stated that the will force withdrawal and recognition of the Front.

On the subject of negotiations, the VC/NVN approach characteristically engaged in a question-and-answer. Thus, they asked: "If the Americans recognize the NFLSV, do we negotiate with them?" The answer was: "The NFLSV will negotiate, but we will not neglect our objectives — the withdrawal of the American troops during a fixed short period of time and the formation of a coalition-democratic-peaceful-neutral government of which the NFLSV is the principal element....At the central level, the coalition government will include elements of all religions and may include a number of puppet elements. At zone level, the coalition government authorities may include, according to the local situation, representatives of the people. At province level, the authority must be entirely elected by the people. The Party must hold the people's organizations at this low level in order to back up the high level in the correct implementation of Party policy...."

In part, the above report seems to describe in a believable fashion the "layered" nature of the coalition envisaged by the VC/NVN. The report, however, then goes on to repeat the unrealistic military goals of wearing down the U.S., destroying ARVN, and bringing about a general uprising, adding "these 'three conditions...outline the policy of the Party that drawn up a year ago." (19)
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00145463

ll. Despite public statements that the upcoming U.S. elections make no difference in their war plans, the VC/NVN appear to put some weight on the elections in timing their moves. For example, the report from Tay Ninh states that "Johnson wants to settle the Vietnam problem soon so that he can win the election." This theme is repeated in a recent report from Long Khanh Province which states that the VC/NVN's purpose in the winter-spring campaign is to force the U.S. to approve VC/NVN conditions toward peace negotiations. The report goes on to add that the VC/NVN believe that President Johnson will lose in the next election and that the new President will not dare continue the war in Vietnam.

12. It appears that the VC/NVN emphasis on coalition government is, at least in part, preparation for a potential negotiating move. Should they reach a point, through intensified military action, where they have inflicted substantial casualties on Allied forces and expanded VC/NVN control in the countryside, the VC/NVN might conclude that they were in an advantageous bargaining position. Then, in effect, the VC would be applying the strategy described in a speech given by North Vietnamese Army General Nguyen Van Vinh, Deputy Chief of Staff of the NVA, to a meeting of the COSVN Congress in April 1966. From Vinh's vantage, the war would proceed through (a) the negotiating stage; (b) the stage of fighting while negotiating; and (c) negotiations and the signing of agreements. After this, the question of whether war would resume would depend on the balance of forces. If Communists could dominate the situation without resorting to military tactics anew; if they could not, they obviously would return to military action. On the basis of captured documents, and on the basis of tactical and strategic considerations as viewed by U.S. military observers, the "choice point" now seems to be on or before March 1968.
---
# If talks were held, the minimum initial demands to be made by the VC/NVN would, on the basis of the above, probably include:

- (a) a time-table for the withdrawal of significant portions of U.S. troops;
- (b) the continued control of the VC/NVN administrative apparatus at local levels where it exists;
- (c) recognition of some members of the Front in Saigon.

In return might be a cessation of hostilities, a withdrawal of a portion of NVA troops, probably without public admission inasmuch as there has been no public admission of their presence, and a qualified avowal of allegiance to the office, if not the person, of GVN authorities above the province level. In making these concessions, the VC/NVN would probably feel that in the ensuing period, and probably in a relatively brief time, they could bring about civil disorder of sufficient magnitude to bring in a government which they could completely dominate.

# In addition to the documents cited in the footnotes above, the following documents were consulted and contain background information or references similar to those cited on coalition government and negotiations:

- 67-09-1983-67
- 10-1657-67
- 11-1209-67
- 11-1935-67
- 01-3226-67
- 04-3379-57
- 08-1744-67
- 08-1805-67
- 11-2212-67 "THE VIET CONGNORTH VIETNA[15604023].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), Communist Lao Dong Party, North Vietnamese Army, United Nations",
"What": "Coalition government, military tactics, negotiations, peace plan, resistance movement",
"When": "1960-1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Vietnam", "United Nations", "North Vietnam", "Quang Ngai Province", "Saigon"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |C02406677|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06475773|
|---|---|
|C02406677,| |
|E51404| |
|00YTE[?| |
|SrOMEE."~~04| |
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| |3.3(h)(2)| |

|CCWDITIONSIy|4401 JWRInC TX6HQLIDAYT?UC?P:RICDS|
|---|---|
|,~YZSTzPN 03S~?.Vi:R w40TRAVELs403t4 VIETNAXESE CAPITAL775 'JETLYTo#ANOIHAS1JENTLY 1\:-'!~~ECAPITAL| |
|REPORTEDOwThzSITJATIONIn Txz '.lO~T=-!VET:-1.r:rn: c·!m!ST:-1AS| |
|2\'WRI"C| |
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|TH~ MeCLAIMEDThat T'•H1 5IT !.MTIOM Pl P~RIO:JS. !,Ji-{0 TRA'ISLS TH!r\!ORTK \/IEPJt. >1SS'!.SC IJNDE )AIR:•T::'~!)!J~HJG TXZCMRISTWASTO ·•L~NOI rf;'\:| |
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TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06475773

Approved for Release : 2018/07/26 C064 75773rRET
---
C02406677

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06475773

Approved for Release : 2018/07/26 C06475773TOP SECRET

C02406677-

NORTH VIETNAMESE TRADE IN DECEMBER

NORTH VIETNAMESE TRADE IN NORTH VIETNAM JYALL FOREIGN FLAGSHIPS DECEMBER

|TOTAL ED Tons ASOVE THE July-November|HIGH MONTHLY TOTALED|
|---|---|
|3837 $ TONS ASOVE TXZ DURING. THE|HIGH CARGO DELIVERED TO DUR IVG THE FIRST|
|In DECEMBER TOTALE)|HJ DECEMBER CARGO DELIVERED|
|MONTHLY AVERAGE P.SOUT 128,•H!~ FIRST AVERAGE,|AVERAGE TQ NORTH VIETNAM ~Y HALF 0F IS 1967 128 ,430 TON S: THIS IS EQUAL TO THE TO~IS. ALL FORETGN HALF TO 45,990 TON?|
|THIS OF PETROLEIM DELIVERIES 1967. JLAG SHI~S EQUAL TO AND SOME|AND SOME TKE|
|53 INGINc28,159TCVSAnJFOod ST WFFTo 245,30]TonSAnD447,239Tots|J8, ~~ -} JULY-NOV~~BE? WERA'E:.. PETROLEUM DELIVERIES|
|RSSPZCTIVELY. 1967 YEAR-Zwd TOTALS TO 245,31J|TOTALED 28, l '.hJ TO~S AN'.) FOOD 5T~F"r|
|BRINGING Thz 1967 Y[AR-END TOTALSA,'iGJNTED TO 45,9(70 TONS,|CCMPAREDTHE•. LAYOVE~AUG JJST.|
|R!SPZCTIVELY To 33 LAYOVER TIME AvER4GED ONLY 15 days In DECEMBER DAYS In TIM~ 4VER~G£D ONLY 15|DAYS IN ryEC!MBER TO"S TONS AND 447,13~|
|C0:'1PMlED SIXT'.!EN ro SOv IET SHIPS--ELEVN DRY CAROO AnD FIVE TankeRs--33 DAYS u; AUGUST.|SIXTSEN HELIVERED IvdzcembeR Total Of 59,75 3 Tors OF CARGO IntjWCRTH VIEINAD SOV!ET S:-tI?f-.-•EL:l:!-: i>~Y CAROO MlD li"IVE TANXSHS•-|
|TCNS DURING COmpARE)IQ O!LIVER~D A TOTAL OF 59,753 MoNthLY AVERACE 07 TO~S OF CA~CO INTO NORTH V!!T~A~430uT 66,75} IvOt'.Cil~ 3£R Tvr FIRST SIX REMA INInG TYELVE CAmE SHIPS ORIGINATED|TCNS DURING T~E FJ~ST IN TKE bLack SEA, 0F SAIPP ING INTO NO~TH Vl~TNAM IS ABOUT TeN COMPM<E!:> TO AN)IHE MONTHS|
|AN) THE MonTXS'fer NoftX V IETNAM IS EXPECTED SIX RE~AINING T~SLVEC~ME FROM FAR ARRIVED ti_ MO!'JT:<L C7 ~\JE~AGE 0~ 1967.|1967. FouR SHIPS FAR !ASTERN fOUR l\30UT FROm 65, ORIGINATED 75,3 EASTERN PORTS:T4Z VOL UKE I~ THE 3LAC~ SEA,|
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|SHIPS HAVE THIS VLADIVOSTOK:|FrOM FROM HAVS 32 EN NOMl~ATEn TO MAKE VOYAG~ VLADIVOSTOK.|
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|REPORT F.J SGH:,)L'£D TO VkCY As EEN IN EuRopz For Tii~|TIEN'S TRIP IS SouthV [ETNAMESE FORE IGW MINISTZR Do. VANTl~~, "iAS 3'.:E'.~ HI RZPCRTZOLY Ths Last SEVERAL HEEYS, THE L!9~~ATIO~ ~RONTRSPRESEHTATIVE E:UROP.E FOR IM TUNISIA In Txs NEXT A?.qivE:rn TIJNISi~ IN TH~ ~SC[~T|
|THENEXT.no. VISIT VOYLD 35|THIS ijOULD1£ q COUNTRY VISITOAYS. TI~~•s|
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|AND In TERNATIONA PRESTIGE. T4E Front|AND I~TERNATIONAL FURT~ER ATT~M?T YtA~S. 52 FURTHER FIRST VISIT TO ~RO~DEN THE ORG-NIZATION'S|
|TO h45 SEEN ThE ORGANIZATION' 53£~N Very ACTIVE Iv TO TUNISIA| |

NEIGHBORING

~~IGH3CRI~G ALGE1IA FO~ SO~E FRONT~~s PRESTIGE. r~r

VERY ACTIVS I~

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06475773

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C064 75773
---
# North VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS

NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE VARVAR

HRNOI EXPLOITS DR. SPOCK

DR. HANOI, IN ITS INITIAL PROMINENT BY THE JOHNSON

HANOI EXPLOITS DR. SPOCK COMMENT ON THE CHARGES FILED AGAINST

HAS HANOI, HAS SPOCK AND FOUR OTHER

DR. SPOCK HAS CLAIMED AROUSED THAT AND FOUR OTHER PROMINENT

IN ITS INDIGNATION AMONG LARGE NUMBERS DEMONSTRATORS,

THAT INITIAL PROSECUTION BY THE DEMONSTRATORS, THEIR PROSECUTION BROADCAST ANTI-WAR OF AMERICAN

COMMENT ON THE CHARGES FILED ANTIWAR ADMINISTRATION AGAINST.

REPORTED THE STATEMENT, SPOCK'S REMARKS ABOUT AMERICAN CLAIMED

PEOPLE HAS AROUSED INDIGNATION SPOCK'S LARGE NUMBERS ON LEGALITY OF BROADCAST IN ENGLISH THE LEGALITY IN ENGLISH ON JANUARY,

THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT,

REPORTED IN DETAIL AND QUOTED LEADERS AND BY THE LAWYERS

ASSOCIATES, THE ANTIWAR MOVEMENT,

PEOPLE. THE STATEMENT,

LEADERS IN DETAIL AND QUOTED OTHER COMMENTS BY ANTIWAR

ASSOCIATES, BY THE LAWYERS WHO REMARKS, WHO WILL DEFEND

WILL DEFEND OTHER AND HIS FOUR SPOCK ANTIWAR

SPOCK THE AND HIS FOUR JANUARY,

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2) SPECIAL-DAILY-REPORT-ON-N15478125.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "NORTH VIETNAMESE TRADE",
"What": "Trade statistics and activities of North Vietnam in December",
"When": "January 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "Black Sea", "Vladivostok", "Tunisia", "Algeria", "Europe"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}

{
"Who": "DR. SPOCK",
"What": "Exploitation of Dr. Spock's comments by Hanoi on US political attitudes",
"When": "January",
"Where": ["Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: In December 1967, several members of Company 3, forest YC the BABattalion were sent for 15 days training at an installation in a in THU area, CAMBODIA.

About ten days later, Company 3 commander to the CAMBODIA/SVN border. Adjacent temporarily disguised cease training and observed as local inhabitants as a U.S. press delegation was coming to the area.

After four or five days when the delegation did not show up, they resumed their training.

The report was collected by NIC Field EXPLOITATION team for the interrogation in February 1953.

Source is available at the SAIGON City, SVN.

|DISTRIBUTION|2|
|---|---|
|CLASSIFICATION|ATTACHMENTS:|
|CONFIDENTIAL|None|

US must (C0) Q the Am:

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENTS:

None

Summary:

In December 1967, several members of Company 3, forest YC the BABattalion were sent for 15 days training at an installation in a in THU area, CAMBODIA.

About ten days later, Company 3 commander to the CAMBODIA/SVN border. Adjacent temporarily disguised cease training and observed as local inhabitants as a U.S. press delegation was coming to the area.

After four or five days when the delegation did not show up, they resumed their training.

The report was collected by NIC Field EXPLOITATION team for the interrogation in February 1953.

Source is available at the SAIGON City, SVN.

|DISTRIBUTION|2|
|---|---|
|CLASSIFICATION|ATTACHMENTS:|
|CONFIDENTIAL|None|

US must (C0) Q the Am:

CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

ATTACHMENTS:

None
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00759176

In December 1967, several members of Company 3, VC Battalion 6 were sent for military training at an installation in a forest in the BATHU area, CAMBODIA, adjacent to the CAMBODIA/SVN border. Nearby was a dispensary for VC wounded.

The instructors were military cadres sent from COSVN regional level and included among the instructors were: BAO, BA DEN, TU HEN and LAM. The installation could only receive about 50 recruits and the training period was about 15 days.

The installation consisted of two buildings measuring 8 x 8 meters which were used as teaching conference halls. During training, the VC recruits went daily to conference hall for study and to neighboring forests for military practice. At night they slept in the houses of the local people most of whom were Vietnamese. Duty attendants were responsible for their food.

Shortly after the members of VC Battalion 6 arrived at this installation in December, they were advised not to leave the premises. Two days later, two Cambodian soldiers came to the installation and asked them if they were from SVN. Ten days later, TY, the Company Commander of Company 3, Battalion 6, arrived and told them training was to be stopped temporarily and they were to disguise themselves as local inhabitants. The explanation was that the Cambodian government was permitting a U.S. press delegation to come there to observe the situation because of GVJ accusations that Cambodian territory was sheltering liberation troops. However, after waiting four or five days for the U.S. delegation which did not show up, the training was resumed. VC_RECRUIT_TRAINING_INSTA[15617960].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Members of Company 3, VC Battalion 6, Company 3 commander TY, instructors BAO, BA DEN, TU HEN, LAM, NIC Field EXPLOITATION team",
    "What": "Training of VC recruits, interactions with Cambodian soldiers, attempted visit by U.S. press delegation",
    "When": "December 1967",
    "Where": ["BATHU area, CAMBODIA", "CAMBODIA/SVN border", "SAIGON City, SVN"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Appr0ved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216/773,0

(    -                                                  ( .'[gB$9¢%

9°

F£2 £8

9»      E

5

(IQNCEIETJ

Q4,'17’$14125 OF"T\q'/

DIRECTORATE OF                                        MEMORANDUM

INTELLIGENCE

The Si/ml/ion in V1.6/Mm

B-7 U1ef(DQCD (D mber 1967     3'5“)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

TO CRET :7

Information as of 1600 25 December 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

Allied ground and air operations have resumed in Vietnam following the Christmas activity, Communist military standdown. Except for small-scale guerrilla forces generally respected the cease-fire resupply-while at some time apparently Political leaders the same regular to be increasingly affairs of units. repositioning and in Saigon, meanwhile, appear disenchanted with President Thieu's conduct of the government.

# I. Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Allied forces have resumed military operations in Vietnam following the Christmas cease-fire. While Communist truce violations were recorded, at least 92 during the allies 24-hour version of that Communist the cease-fire, no major attacks occurred, suggesting main force units were generally content to abide by for future offensives. Reposition troops the standdown while continuing to

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

President Thieu‘s government appears to be under mounting criticism from political leaders in Saigon leadership has adversely affected Thieu's inability the performance to exert forceful of both the executive and legislative branches. Vice President Ky is steering clear of the government and relaxed attitude toward workers against its problems. The criticism Thieu appears to be taking a strikes by Vietnamese are continuing Pan American and Air America airlines.

# III. Military Developments Vietnamese may have in North Vietnam:

Utilized the Christmas holiday (the North bombing standdown to
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

To1>_s-Ecfi

resupply and reinforce Communist forces in the southern DRV, the DMZ area, and in South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces (Para. l).

V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

VI; Other Major Aspects: extended eastward intoThe motorable portion of Laotian Route ll0 has been South Vietnam. (Paras. sgyhxz) l-3).

25 December 1967

TOP CRE

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216
---
# MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Allied forces have resumed offensive ground and air operations against the Vietnamese Communists. While in the South, officials state that the holiday cease-fire brought major ground fighting to a virtual standstill, with preliminary reports from American field charge at least 29 violations during the 24-hour pause by the allies. Twenty-nine of these violations are considered "major," as they resulted in casualties.

2. Communist truce violations reported thus far occurred in South Vietnam's I Corps and III Corps areas. Over-all contacts during the truce period included 40 allied casualties resulting from enemy-initiated actions (2 US killed, 2 US wounded, 23 US missing, 16 GVN, 1 ROK), and Communist losses numbered 28 killed and four captured.

3. Most of the allied outposts and camps were the product of harassing fire against Communist reactions to intensified air reconnaissance and ground Marine observation activities. In one case, a US plane was downed by enemy fire in the Communist-infested A Shau Valley area of Thua Thien Province. No major enemy attacks occurred, suggesting that they were content to abide by the standdown.

4. Significant repositioning of major enemy units in southern and western areas of I Corps, the DMZ, and the highlands continued to be reflected during the holiday period, suggesting possible impending Communist initiatives.

25 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

It appears to be in the Quang Nam - Quang threat would the near future. The most immediate Tin Province area where SIGINT has evidenced a major and pro-buildup of- vincial Viet Cong units subordinate main enemy units. The 2nd NVA Division, to Military Region 5, with the 320th NVA Division--elements of and a new communications group tenuously which have associated been detected in southward deployment since early November--are involved.

The allies will observe a 48-hour standdownsecond 24-hour cease-fire on New Year's Day and a uary and early February. Lunar Viet Cong in late Jan- for Tet, the Vietnamese -The New Year, have an- nounced a respite for Tet (27 January—3 February). 72-hour pause for New Year's Day and a seven-day

25 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Saigon politicians are continuing to grumble about the lackluster performance of the Thieu government.

2. Their major complaint is that President Thieu has failed to provide the kind of dynamic leadership needed to break the inertia which has gripped the government since it was installed two months ago. One high-ranking government official asserts that Thieu has been delinquent in not establishing a close working relationship with Prime Minister Loc, whose political inexperience and retiring personality has proved to be a major liability.

3. The leadership vacuum has affected the performance of ministries in the executive branch. Although some progress has been made in clearing the decks for implementing new programs and carrying out added responsibilities, reorganization has been painfully slow. The foreign and economy ministries have been cited by observers as examples of departments which are almost certain to face critical new problems in the coming months but which are still caught in the grip of bureaucratic indecision.

4. Thieu's inability to exert strong leadership has also contributed to the problems which the National Assembly has encountered in getting organized. A number of deputies have commented that the work of the legislature, especially in the politically fragmented lower house, would be assisted considerably if Thieu or Loc made a real effort to organize a progovernment bloc to push through the administration's programs.

5. Vice President Ky, meanwhile, is taking pains to steer clear of the government and its problems. According to one of his followers, Ky is turning aside complaints about Thieu's performance with assertions that Thieu and Loc deserve the opportunity to run the country's affairs without interference. Ky's withdrawal from active participation in the government.

25 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

however, has given rise to speculation that he is only biding his time until he can play a more prominent role.

towards Thieu appears to be taking a relaxed attitude the mounting criticism of his government. He recently told a civilian adviser that he appreciated the need for more forceful leadership and that he was disappointed in the performance of some of his officials. He also stated, however, that popular dissatisfaction stemmed, at least in part, from the unrealistic expectations of the Vietnamese people, and that they must be taught not to expect too much from the government.

# Strike Activity

The strikes by Vietnamese workers against Pan American and Air America airlines are continuing. According to a labor minister conciliator, negotiations between the companies and the workers have been exacerbated by managements insistence on firing the strike leaders. An additional problem is Pan America's use of management and US military personnel to keep its military-associated operations running. Air America activities have been brought to a virtual standstill. The US Embassy believes that the strike against Pan American is essentially for union recognition, with wage demands a peripheral issue. The next negotiating round is scheduled for 29 December, although labor leaders have expressed interest in getting talks resumed sooner.

25 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

35(0)

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(

3.3(h)(2)

I

25 December 1967

I-11'."-1

s.5(¢) 3-5(°)

T(>1’$*‘?‘3‘1iET

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Signals from

[have been intercepted six times since 20 November in an area northwest North Vietnam The actual number of radars in of Haiphong. is not known.

The Tan Son Nhut early warning radar provides ground control of a tactical air control outstation intercept information to the Haiphong The relocation Cat Bi area in mid-November, the North Vietnamese are role. suggests that a in ground control intercept have been added]

along the North Vietnamese border since mid-November;

along the Vietnamese and Laotian borders, providing early warning of Tonkin, coverage of almost all of North Vietnam, the Gulf southwest China, and parts of Laos.

25 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

TOP SECRET

V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.
25 December 1967
---
# VI. OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

1. extended eastward across the northeast Vietnam.

the motorable portion or Laotian Route extremity of I10 has been Cambodia and about one mile into South

2. The new construction is visible to within four miles of SVN Route 512 which hooks up with SVN Route 14 in the Dak To region of the central highlands. The Communists already have access to this area via foot trails and the motorable route will aid in supply movements. A second two-mile southerly extension of Route 110 into Cambodia is also under construction, but there are no motorable Cambodian roads in the area and this construction is probably to aid in moving supplies to the adjacent regions of South Vietnam.

3. A small section of Route 97 along the Laotian-Cambodian Tonle Kong border are being used to send supplies—mainly rice--into Laos. At least 15 tons per day are estimated to have reached Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam, largely via these routes, during the 1966-67 dry season.

25 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

Top et

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216
---
|VIETNAM NORTH|VIETNAM NORTH|
|---|
|THUA THIEN|MILITARY REGION I|
|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|
|KONTUM| |
|PLEIKU|PHU BON|
|DARLAC|KHANH HOA|
|QUANG DUC|PHUOC THUAN|
|BUON MA THUOT|DAK LAK|
|NGHIA BINH|KIEN PHONG|
|KI'HONG KIENEN|TUONG AN|
|CHAU DOC|NHIA CORPS|
|CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE|CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE|
|OUAC EN|SONG BE|
|GULF OF SIAM|BA RIA|
|BAC LIEU|SOUTH VIETNAM|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216

3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C06752216
---
# CHINA

Attope

NORTH

VIETNAM

DakTo

VIETNAM

SEA

Kontum

SOUTH VIETNAM

Pleiku

Vlrachel

Duc Co

Scburlq

Bouni Long

Anga hec (Bo Kheo) - New road construction

Lomphat

Stung Treng

| |10|20|4|69°34'12-67 CIA|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|30 Miles| | |107| |

2*o Kilometers "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [15602358].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military and political situation in South Vietnam and North Vietnam, Communist military and political developments, airstrike activity, road construction, Communist radar signals",
"When": "25 December 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "Cambodia"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974325

The President's Daily Brief

Date: September 13, 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974325

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Approved for Release 2019/04/17 C05974325
---
# DAILY BRIEF

13 MARCH 1968

|Vietnam|level.Military activity remains at a low in most of South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
| |Clouds obscured most of the territory photographed on the BLACK SHIELD mission of 8 March, but good coverage was obtained around Khe Sanh.|
| |The photographs showed further development of the Laotian road network to the west of Khe Sanh. In addition to Route 9, the Communists have built (over the past several months) two spurs running east from Route 92. These roads appear to have advanced about two miles within South Vietnamese territory.|
| |All of the routes west of Khe Sanh appeared to be in serviceable condition. No vehicles were photographed, but extensive tracking suggests that moderate to heavy traffic uses these roads.|

Panama
---
# Eastern Europe

Police in Warsaw had to use tear gas again yesterday to put down demonstrations, and students in other Polish cities are beginning to voice support for their colleagues in the capital.

The government is cracking down on people it thinks instigated the demonstrations or failed to rein in the demonstrators. Yesterday, for instance, it fired three high government officials whose children had been seen leading the protestors. The official line has begun to take a heavily anti-Semitic slant. There may be unrest in the labor movement, too, notwithstanding the government's propaganda to the contrary. At least, that was what four workers claimed yesterday when they turned up at our embassy to ask if they could use its printing press to print an anti-regime pamphlet. (This may have been a provocation; the embassy turned down their request.)

Labor leaders in Czechoslovakia are also having their troubles. Prague radio yesterday announced the resignations of three of them, including the head of the central council of trade unions. This official said he took on himself part of the blame for various "shortcomings" in the labor movement. The union hierarchy has been a Novotny stronghold.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974325

|49-P—S-EGR-Ell|8-5(¢)|
|---|---|
|Q| |

Egypt-Israel thinkBoth Jarring and the Israelis Cairo will soon take its grievances back to the Security Council.

Nasir's domestic troubles probably are behind his renewed believes intransigence. Our embassy in Cairo that the recent student and worker demonstrations have made Nasir back away from even indirect talks with the Israelis. The regime apparently plans to have another go at diverting internal public opinion with a noisy hassle in the UN.

Communist China 3-3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

IF-9-P-5-EGRE-'1‘ -\
8-5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974325
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974325

_I019—§-efret

Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974325
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Date: 13 March 1968
---
# Daily Report on North Vietnam

Special the President's Eyes Only

13 March 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325

8-5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

Conditions in Haiphong:

The people in the port city appeared to be well or at least adequately fed but poorly dressed. For the holiday, the city probably confident in ultimate victory, just a large number of children in the officials seemed sure about the civilians. The work in the port area continued on an around-the-clock basis.

3-5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325

On ll March domestic broadcast, Hanoi announced in Hanoi Calls Local Elections: the triennial election of representatives to zones, 17 provinces, people's councils in North and two special cities functions on the local level Vietnam's two autonomous held in April will be. These organizations carry out similar to the National Assembly.

The most recent election in North Vietnam was held last April when representatives for the districts, small towns, and provincial capitals were voted into office. In the upcoming vote, the Communist Party, as usual, will present the electorate a list of acceptable candidates from whom to choose.

* * *

3.3(h)(2)

* * *

# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Hanoi Reports Court-martial of USAF Captain: Hanoi has been quick to comment on the court-martial of Captain Dale Noyd. In an ll March broadcast, the North Vietnamese recounted the particulars of his trial and conviction, and noted that despite his punishment, Noyd continued to voice his disapproval of the war in Vietnam, where he considered broad- was fighting a war of aggression. A recent Gallup Poll also noted that according to any previous time more Americans now than at any previous time feel the US was wrong to get involved militarily in Vietnam. The broadcast commented that this poll become increasingly concerned "the Americans in lives also showed that at present about the cost have and money caused by the US war of aggression in Vietnam."

-3-

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325

[
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974325 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617860].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "The President",
"What": "The President's Daily Brief includes information on Vietnam, Laos, and Eastern Europe",
"When": "13 March 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Khe Sanh", "South Vietnam", "Panama", "Eastern Europe", "Warsaw", "Polish cities", "Czechoslovakia", "Haiphong", "Hanoi", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

Secret 12 December 1967

3.5(c)
---
# DAILY BRIEF

|1. Yemen|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
| |3.3(h)(2)|
|2. South Vietnam|3.3(h)(2)|
| |3.3(h)(2)|
| |3.5(c)|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974167
---
# Greece

Early this month, former Prime Minister Karamanlis publicly condemned the junta from his safe haven overseas. He said he does not plan to get involved in Greek politics at the moment. If he goes back to Greece at all, he said, it would be only after reforms have been carried out and it would be possible to lead a normal political life. Karamanlis ran the Greek Government for almost eight relatively trouble-free years (1956-1963).

# Cyprus

The Security Council probably will consider the UN peacekeeping mandate for the island late this week. Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus all seem to favor a short-term renewal of the present mandate, putting off discussion of an "enlarged" UN role. The present mandate expires 26 December. As things stand now, the Greeks are not planning to withdraw their officers (about 500) assigned to the Cypriot national guard. The Turks do not know this yet and there may be trouble when they find out.

# Haiti

Ambassador Ross has just completed an assessment of the situation in Haiti. The ambassador sees no real threat to Duvalier's control so long as he can find the money to pay his security goons. Haiti will continue to deteriorate economically, socially, and politically, but, the ambassador feels, Papa Doc will be there presiding over the downhill slide for some time to come.
---
6. Communist China

If local officials in China's provinces are not already confused by the contradictory edicts flowing out of Peking, they soon will be. The latest instructions in Mao's name are to handle state exuberance gently, that their fractious Guards be more revolutionary turned into productive--but unspecified--channels.

Increased fighting, interpret sit to lead to local hands as authorities could order on their directive.

7. Nigeria

The civil war there goes on. Casualties are mounting, followed by little progress on either side. The Soviets have stepped up their aid to the federal government with arms. The Americans are offering economic assistance; but they also face growing anti-Unity African sentiment. The Nigerian Organization of African Unity is trying to make progress on the warring factions, but so far there has been no progress.

8. Soviet Union

Kosygin will visit India from January 25 to February 5. There is nothing to indicate this fence-riding trip is anything more than routine.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

12 December 16 1967

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes

12 December 1967

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

gees confirms nam the A Report who capitalthat recently from managed Hanoi's* One get of out Hanoi: * to propaganda* the I of about NorthI refu- saw US little Viet- raids

on is much exaggerated. He
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 416

bomb damage in the very city and comments that "the Americans have been occasional selective" in raids, "although accidents had occurred."

Hanoi Calls for Renewed Support and Trade Workers organization by the World: The Vietnamese federation has issued an appeal to further increase support for workers of the world to "still support their movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese people." This is in commemoration of the seventh anniversary of the founding of the Liberation Front on 20 December. The appeal was reported by the French news agency to strengthen the opposition world's workers to the American aggression in Vietnam by every appropriate and creative means.

The Chinese Reports Hanoi people New "are playing a big role of support in the rear" and will continue their support for the Vietnamese until victory. This speech quotes the Chinese names from Foreign Minister Chen Yi's mission honoring reception in China on 9 December in Peking. The Liberation Front's report broadcast an account of yesterday's permanent broadcast in Peking. Chen Yi's speech in itself has not yet settled its status and the Cultural Revolution.

# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR

The Viet Cong have praised the "Stop the Draft" anti-war week activities in Hanoi during December, according to a broadcast in English on the 10th of December. No "brutal force" can silence the protesting voice of the American people in the Viet Cong. The broadcast states that Americans are seeing more.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974167

Clearly that the US is following a "ruthless" policy and are opposing the "dirty war" in Vietnam.

North Hanoi of Allegations on US Troop Behavior: The Vietnamese are continuing to report alleged incidents broadcast in insubordination or cowardice on the part of US troops platoon in South Vietnam. Hanoian platoon day Provinces reported that on the 11th of December, Mya Tho in English stayed away from its base for nearly another day to avoid being sent on a raid. Another platoon reportedly refused to obey orders at the cue of Viet "buddies" to avoid being "badly mauled" on the same bases in other areas by res- in the Cong. Throughout the South Vietnam, incidents were reported in which five survivors of guns were broad- cast, a Saigon. American attack which by including threw away US of recent closed their and fled to. The article commenting of to aggrees- that "more realize it the that more the only US war deeds." unjust to soldiers is of it an have war come sion and practical out way is rise up and oppose by.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

CONTINUED PRESSURE ON STERLING AND THE DOLLAR

3.3(h)(2)

Dec 29, 1967

No. December 12 1683/67 1967

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

I EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC00..,.-l'i(H!ADJNG AND OFCI..-\SSlf'lCATlC)~,GROUP ·i-·- :]

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# Directorate of Intelligence 1967

12 December

# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Summary

The British Government is reported to consider a failure within a few days if its recent devaluation of the pound is not followed by a move to a floating exchange rate, perhaps within a few days. If too much were done in the market until sterling could stabilize its system, a move downward probably at a lower rate than $2.40. Such a move would disrupt financial and possibly causing upheaval in world trade and economic recession in many countries.

Britain's exchange rate contemplation arises from several causes. Both within the UK economy and abroad there has been a growing belief that any devaluation to stability was small to appreciable of sterling. This effect has led the UK Bank to renewed pressure to support the pound, with resulting losses of foreign exchange reserves. Another element has been a French program, run by de Gaulle and the Finance Ministry, to undermine both sterling and the dollar. If the French pressures succeed and sterling is scuttled, a number of nations may be reached placing the dollar in extreme jeopardy. The ultimate French objective will probably be well.

The UK is almost certainly contemplating action on it is aware of the consequences. It would put heavy pressure on the US dollar, touching off.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It prepared jointly by the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Current Intelligence.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

a series of vicious could devaluations in competitive Western Europe and elsewhere. It create of 1930 an international atmosphere as systems the as and force trade return to comprehensive restrictive industrial and commercial controls by most recession large of the a world's reduction countries. This serious lead could to world trade and in those developed countries that rely heavily on foreign commerce.

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

1. A reliable source reported on 10 December that the UK may consider its recent devaluation and move to a floating exchange rate. Sterling would then be stabilized at $2.400. If this downward financial action occurs, it would likely lower market forces until the world economy is free from recession and could depress trade, inducing economic challenges in many countries. The source indicates that the UK may take action within a few days.

2. British contemplation of such causes arises from several unsettling factors. Since the UK devaluation three weeks ago, there has been an increasing belief, both within the UK and abroad, that any appreciable devaluation of 14.3 percent was too small to be beneficial to the UK economy. This belief has led to renewed pressure on England's pound, which lost support in the last week of December. The Bank of England lost $95 million in reserves through support operations. With British foreign exchange reserves dwindling, one reason to consider such operations is to support the devaluation.

One further immediate advantage of adopting the floating rate may be to forestall competitive pressures from other countries, which may prefer to wait for market forces to stabilize the pound at a new, lower rate.

3. Another element of pressure against the pound has been a consistent effort on the part of the French Government to undermine both sterling and the dollar. The French President De Gaulle is running a program overseen by the Ministry of Finance to uncannily object to the serious leaks of information that France has against sterling. These leaks have stirred up the dollar. The French government, through direct approaches by semi-official representatives, has held importance against sterling and the dollar. For example, Argentina was warned to get out of French sterling by Antoine Piney, a former member of the government and now head of -2-

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

mission Argentinato South America. French technical/commercial advice, his did so ica. On the the evaluation of strength before of We have circumstantial evidence official Treasury. Paris million $125 in French $150 complicity Algeria's recent conversion of into gold, direct from amount most the was US bought in At least with francs million that of this constituted of the Algerian exchange reserves. If sterling is in fact scuttled, French pressures will have had their effect and there will be more of an even chance that the French objective dollar devaluation will be reached.

The UK is almost certainly aware of now the float probable consequences of action it policy: to a contemplating. reason templating. will The British considerable probably aing them necessity rate expansionary them give of supporting new, that domestic a economic leeway weak pound with without scarce pursue reserves. rather than Moreover, the be pegged at a fact lower the before sterling rate, will will float create give UK precious uncertainty abroad of and probably time atory and balance payments advantages retaliatory devaluations take place.

The holders escape I the heavy is unlikely pressures rate. assets sterling, as that that their sterling scramble the would US dollar develop began will a result many of free sterling If of sterling would to sell out. move As they unloaded they first US would into French francs, West of German marks, marks the chief and would dollars, soon but would ha.ve sought as. Many dollar be the taken limited up and supplies the would francs. be and come currency off inal the store new dollar value.

The holders British $8 billion, short-term seek net gold their sterling portion lia of of about redeemed and cashed within large a of short would these the going as convert As the these claims time. market could rate sterling sterling. be claims for into are other The relatively a currencies holders in, demise the of at under disorderly sterling would conditions a reserve place the currency dollar in immediate jeopardy.

lized competitive or In continued the devaluations longer fall in to run, slowly, Western whether a Europe the whole pound series and other of
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167

areas could be expected to The as international 1930s, re-atmosphere least could be the as vicious during the and not turn the results would probably be a to comprehensive systems of restrictive trade and commercial controls by the most of the world's processing of industrial countries. Both disorderly competitive devaluation and re-emergence of trade controls contraction large throughout the World of industrial trade West serious lead and could recessions in those developed countries that rely heavily on foreign commerce.

In the event that the US and other powers strong countermeasures before the crisis developed--such as pooling of reserves, prohibition implementation that Worldwide of possible of gold US, loss some reserve hoarders, inevitable, implementation of some private sales to be in monetary case Although of smaller. the creation would results reserves, and scheme--especially quick competitive be different is those devaluations operative atmosphere orderly would could any keep their be timing and size coop-organized there would in be on some less disruption fashion. trade of As most and result, fewer the West's important repercussions some of economies.

If, and the US it in other fact, major the British currencies adopt are free .a devalued ex-substantially, the dollar would be seriously ened. Unless is then be willing to support an overvalued natives: De and dollar, increase objective; would the price faced with gold, two which alter is General Gaulle's or the demonetization of gold.

as no new available, and widely the national dollar such as reserve new asset AS long reserve may is diminish, asset currency created, but. 'the the the is ensure however, importance can would be secure role reserve If the role of the of the world dollar US main in the world's trade major will trading that currency dollar if devalued.

sterling The should political adoption not cause the of problems floating Wilson exchange The at government home. rate any Labor
---
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majority in parliament can be expected to back the move. Most of them have long believed that preoccupation with the pound has impeded domestic social and economic progress. They will view the lifting of this tremendous burden from their government. Conservative opposition will condemn recent devaluation as another point to measure the country's economic faith with international holders of sterling. They further claim that it erodes Britain's standing.

The recent appointment of Roy Jenkins as the chancellor of the exchequer is seen as a helpful and quite an unexpected initiative. The immediate selling job will be quite challenging.

The devaluation can be made much less deflationary if a program of confidence-building is made, as stringent as possible, to accompany the negative side. On the public side, however, if shaken, their confidence in the government will be confused about what support can be provided, although this will evaporate quickly if the economy does not improve markedly during 19.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4167 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602346].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "The President, CIA, various ambassadors and officials",
"What": "Daily briefs on various countries and topics including Vietnam, Greece, Cyprus, Haiti, Communist China, Nigeria, Soviet Union, UK's financial situation",
"When": "12 December 1967",
"Where": ["Yemen", "South Vietnam", "Greece", "Cyprus", "Haiti", "China", "Nigeria", "Soviet Union", "North Vietnam", "UK", "France", "US", "Argentina"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C00143908 485/4

Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)

Saigon, December 29, 1967, 2052 2

CAS 6462

Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET S/BUTTERCUP

Secret; Nodis; Buttercup

Received at 4.45 p.m.

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO0143908
---
# Department of State

|Approved for Release:|Date:|Control Number:|
|---|---|---|
|2018/07/11|C00143908|Vt [TELECRAM|

3.3(h)(2) - SECRET

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To: CIA

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3.3(h)(2) USIVE7oR MR Rostow 3_3(h)(2)4

SECDEE EXCLuSIvEFor SECRETARY MCBANAPAFoRMR VDECASES #EER_

CIRECTORCI: PREPARATIONEvEwINC 0F9UIT3.3(h)(2)

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Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO0143908
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO0143908

SECRET

|FROM|SAIGON|DATE|13 DECEMBER|WHERE|WE|HAVERE|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|SUBJECTS|SECRET|DEPARTURE|2|SAUKA| | |
|FROM|SAIGON|WHERE|WE|HAVERE| | |
|SECRET|INFORMATION| | | | | |
|ALMOST|IMMEDIATELY|THE|STAFF| | | |
|GENERAL|MOST|OF|THE| | | |
|GROWTH|OF|THE|PEOPLE|WITH|THE| |
|NEED|TO|WORK|TOGETHER|IN|ORDER|TO|
|IN|ORDER|TO|REAP|THE|BEST|RESULTS|
|EVERY|DAY|INSIGHT|PLANS|FORCES|DISCUSSIONS|WHICH|
|LEADS|TO|THE|EXCHANGE|OF|IDEAS|ETC.|
|FAMILY|EXCHANGES|THROUGH|POSSIBLE|DISPUTE|THAT|WE|
|ARE|AMONG|PROBLEMS|TOO|TO|OVERCOME| |
|WE|ARE|ALREADY|TOO|INVOLVED|IN|THESE|
|BACK|TO|IDENTITY|WE|WILL|WITH|CAMBODIA|
|LIKEWISE|REGISTRATION|LOCAL|ISSUES|WHICH|LOCALLY|MANUFACTURED|
|CARD|PLUS|EQUALLY|HELPLESS|WHICH|ISSUE|ROUTE|
|TO|REGISTRATION|HOWEVER|SHE|DID|PRIOR|TO|
|INSISTS|IN|GETTING|IN|TO|AND| |
|LIVE|IN|PHNOM|PENH|SAYS|THAT|SHE|
|HAS|NO|SPECIAL|COMMERCIAL|RELATIONSHIP|WITH|THE|
|FACILITY|ROLE|WORK|COMMISSION|MADE|THAT|SHE|
|AND|WELL|IS|BEING|BY|RELEASED|IN|
|HER|OLD|FRIEND|SAUKA|HOWEVER|WHENEVER|WE|
|RECEPTIVE|ADVANTAGES|FACE|WE|HAVE|DISCUSSED|WITH|
|RESPONSIBLE|SECRET|TALKS|BETWEEN|REPRESENTATIVE|OFFICIALS|THAT|
|AND/OR|OTHER|OF|GOVERNMENT|VIET|AND| |
|TO|SO|THAT|SHE|COULD|MENTION|TO|
|THE|U.S.|THAT|OURS|IN|ORDER|TO|
|HELDA|WHEREIN|THIRD|COULD|GUARANTEE|SAFETY|(UNSPECIFIED)|
|U.S.|MILITARY|REGION|CLOSE|TO|DAU| |
|VIETTIEN/BENCUI|IN|THIS|CONTEXT|SHE|HAS| |
|CONCERN|THEMSELVES|WITH|THE|PROXIMITY|AND| |
|ARE|INFORMED|WITH|THE|PROXIMITY|ARE| |
|ELEMENTS|OR|CHECKPOINTS|ABOUT|SHE|HAS| |
|PROMISED|TO|RELAY|THIS|PER|CONG| |
|TO|HER|HUSBAND|AND|DEMONSTRATE|HAS| |
|MIGHT|BE|INTERESTED|WHEN|HEARS| | |
|OF|OUR|SIDE|TO|AND|SAUKA| |
|SECRET| | | |Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 CO0143908| | |

SECRET "TELEGRAM FRM THE CIA STAT_15472882_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon",
"What": "Telegram communication regarding secret information, discussions, and exchanges of ideas between different officials and representatives in Saigon",
"When": "29th December 1967",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Cambodia", "Phnom Penh", "Dau Viettien/Bencui"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072856

HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO WHITE DA

SSO ACSI

SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION

AFSSO USAF

DIA/ISIC

NIC

DIRNSA COMMANDER

STATE (ROI)

CIA-OCI-O

TOP SECRET NOFORN

TDCS-314/04415-68 "(ADVANCE)"

SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: II CORPS SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1500 HOURS 13 MARCH 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072856

|1.|IRE ONLY REPORTED SIZEABLE ENEMY MILITARY CONTACT IN I CORPS AREA DURING THE PAST 24 HOUR PERIOD IN KON TUM DISTRICT, KONTUM PROVINCE. AS HAS BEEN INDICATED CONTINUOUSLY SINCE THE ORIGINAL ATTACKS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, THE LARGER, MORE IMPORTANT PROVINCE CAPITALS IN II CORPS HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPECTED NEW LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS (AND SOME HAVE RECEIVED THEM) AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN FLOODED DAILY BY REPORTS INDICATING THAT THE ENEMY HAS BEEN MASSING AND PREPARING ITS TROOPS FOR A DEFINITE PUSH.|
|---|---|
| |THIS CONSTANT THREAT OF ATTACK HAS KEPT FRIENDLY MILITARY FORCES DISENGAGED AROUND THE PROVINCE CAPITALS IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, ALLOWING ENEMY FORCES TO OPERATE ALMOST AT WILL IN MANY RURAL AREAS. ONLY IN A VERY FEW LOCATIONS HAS THERE BEEN AN EFFORT PUT FORTH BY FRIENDLY FORCES TO MOVE OUT FROM THE CITIES TO REGAIN SOME OF THE INITIATIVE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.|
|2.|DURING THE NIGHT OF 12 MARCH, APPROXIMATELY 100 ENEMY MORTAR ROUNDS STRUCK VARIOUS LOCALITIES THROUGHOUT KONTUM DISTRICT, KONTUM PROVINCE. CONTACT BY FRIENDLY UNITS WITH AN ENEMY FORCE OF UNKNOWN SIZE WAS CONTINUING IN AN AREA NORTHWEST OF KONTUM.|
|5.|IN TUY HOA, PHU YEN PROVINCE, INDICATIONS ARE THAT VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES WILL ATTACK THE CITY FOR A FOURTH TIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE. LOCAL OFFICIALS BELIEVE NEW ENEMY UNITS HAVE ARRIVED IN THE PROVINCE TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING ENEMY FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN BADLY DEFEATED IN PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENTS. THERE MAY BE TWO BRIDGES THAT ARE TARGETS FOR THE NEXT ATTACK. THERE ARE INDICATIONS OF CONNECTING TUY HOA WITH SOUTHERN PHU YEN PROVINCE; THE AIRFIELD AND THE PROVINCE RE-EDUCATION CENTER.|
|4.|DISS EM=IFFV CORPS II CORPS SAIGON DISSEM: MACV STATE GINGPAG ARPAG PAIBLT 7TH AF|

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05072856 II_CORPS_SITUATION_REPORT[15617850].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "House Situation Room, White House, SSO ACSI, SSO Arlington Hall Station, AFSSO USAF, DIA/ISIC, NIC, DIRNSA Commander, State (ROI), CIA-OCI-O",
    "What": "II Corps Situation Report as of 1500 hours 13 March 1968 detailing enemy military contact, enemy mortar attacks in Kontum province, potential future attacks in Tuy Hoa, and operational updates in Saigon.",
    "When": "13 March 1968",
    "Where": ["I Corps Area", "Kon Tum District, Kontum Province", "Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen Province", "Saigon"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET NOFORN"
}