Input:
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Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release 2019/04/17 C03150366

Top-Secret

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

26 March 1968 350

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03150366

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03150366
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03150366

TU'r—s-11-b-it-s,+ 3-5<¢> 26 March 1968

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam: Situation report|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Panama: "President" Delvalle charges National Guard with acting arbitrarily.|(Page 3)|
|Guatemala: Kidnaping of archbishop tied to rightist plot against Mendez government.|(Page 7)|
|USSR: Soviets deploy mobile missile system to Sino-Soviet border.|(Page 8)|

8-5<<=>>

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3.3(h)(2)
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---
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1. North Vietnam: Hanoi evidently has decided to pump substantial follow-up to the Tet offensive, new forces into South Vietnam, possibly for a strong unusually heavy south-bound enemy truck traffic in North Vietnam and Laos.

The messages convey a distinct sense of urgency.

An average of more than 100 trucks a day moving through the Mu Gia Pass area between 20 and 23 March, the highest level since just before the Communist Tet offensive.

Some of these trucks carried troops, a most unusual procedure, again suggesting urgency, high degree of activity by North Vietnamese logistic authorities in Laos near the South Vietnam border.

As part of their longer-term efforts to sustain military operations in the South, the Communists continue to improve their logistics network, building a new road which apparently will skirt the western end of the Demilitarized Zone. This will provide a considerably shortened supply route to the areas than provided by the usual route through the Khe Sanh and A Shau Valley Mu Gia Pass.

Progress in the construction of the new road has been rapid with some 16 miles of high-quality road completed southward from the Dong Hoi area in North Vietnam in two months. (Map)

(continued)

26 Mar 68

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South Vietnam: Action in the ground war continued at a slow pace on 24-25 March.

The most significant fighting was near Khe Sanh and Camp Carroll in Quang Tri Province where some 80 Communists were killed. The action near Khe Sanh took place on Hill 575, where a US Marine patrol encountered a platoon-size enemy force in fortified positions.

Enemy which overlooks the Khe Sanh airstrip plan to establish antiaircraft positions on Hill 575.

26 Mar 68
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Panama: In an address last night, "President" Max Delvalle creation of a state of siegeowith arbitrary action and thecharged the National Guard Followers of National. Union (NU) presidential candidate Arnulio Arias as well as prime target sinceothers opposed to Robles have made the Guard their yesterday morning's raid on NU headquarters and the arrest of over 300 party members. Opposition media gave heavy play to the use of tear gas, set off periodically as a "clearing operation," The tear gas also inspired the first allusions to the US presence in Panama, The Delvalle cabinet was considering a protest to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the Guard's use of US AID-delivered riot weaponry for political purposesc A televisionformer treaty negotiator, Jorge lllueca, asserted on that "there are 1,000 Guard members paid by a foreign power," In an open challenge to the Guard, Delvalle has summoned the National Assembly today refuses to rec-to hear a message on electoral reformso The Guard ognize the Assembly and yesterday denied deputies entrance to the building. Delvalle promised to "rectify" Guard measures and appealed for equanimity on the part of the citizenryt Earlier yesterday, Christian Democratic presidential candidate Antonio Gonzalez Revilla also placed the blame on the Guard for "whatever trouble results" and praised the actions of the National Assemblye Gonzalez made the original call for the impeachment of President Robles and thus touched off the month-long legal jockeying that climaxed Sunday with the installation of Delvalle as chief executive,

(continued)

26 Mar 68
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03150366 3-5<¢>

With NU media continue to call for a general strike. his NU Secretary General Nicosia under arrest, assistant has been ordered to get the strike moving.

President Robles continues to dispute Delva1le's claim to the presidency and has strongly endorsed the Guard's action.

26 Mar 68

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26 Mar 68
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Guatemala: The recent kidnapping of Archbishop Casariego has been tied to a plot to overthrow the Mendez government.

President Mendez asserts "there is no doubt it was the work of extreme rightists." He adds that he has no evidence yet of any military involvement although it is possible that military elements might have been a party to the plot. Some rightist plotters have been arrested, but Mendez is not likely to take action against the vice president or the military if it would alienate essential support.

The ramifications of the recent plot point to the possibility of further attempts against his government.
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USSR: The Soviets have deployed a mobile missile system to three Strategic Rocket Forces bases on the Sino-Soviet border.

The transporter for the missile system was first seen in a parade in Moscow last November. Subsequently, an article stated that this system was in the hands of the Strategic Rocket Forces. The missile, which has a range of about 450 miles, may be the SS-12, within the environmental pod carried on the transporter, which has probably been operational since late 1965.

The deployment of this system would considerably increase the ability of local commanders to destroy transportation centers and military concentrations inside northern China in the event of hostilities.
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3.3(h)(2)

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03150366 CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_BULL[15618067].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": ["Director of Central Intelligence", "President", "National Security Council", "Senior Government Officials", "Departments of State and Defense", "North Vietnam", "US Marine patrol", "Jorge llueca", "National Assembly", "Christian Democratic presidential candidate Antonio Gonzalez Revilla", "NU Secretary General Nicosia", "President Robles", "Archbishop Casariego", "President Mendez", "Soviets", "Strategic Rocket Forces"],
"What": ["Central Intelligence Bulletin", "Current intelligence", "National security issues", "Intelligence information", "Intelligence interpretations", "Logistics network in North Vietnam", "Enemy troop movements in South Vietnam", "Deployment of mobile missile system to Sino-Soviet border", "Kidnapping of Archbishop tied to rightist plot in Guatemala", "State of siege in Panama", "Political unrest in Panama", "Election reform", "Impeachment of President Robles", "Plot to overthrow the Mendez government in Guatemala"],
"When": "26 March 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Panama", "Guatemala", "Laos", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Panama", "Yemen", "Sino-Soviet border", "Moscow", "Northern China"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772392

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772392

Z:

EOEC)

13526

13526

1/58751111

3.3(h)(2)

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EOEC)

13526

13526

3.5(c)

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# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

# The Situation in Vietnam

T/oe Sit/15272072 272 Vietnam

Top ret

77 February 1968

3.5(c)

7&39 196835m

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---
# WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

3.5(c)
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772392

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FLEebrnanLli1200 Information 1968of 7 InformationFebruarv as as 968of 1200 35((3)_

# HIGHLIGHTS

miles The from Lang Khe Ve Sanh, Special Forces has by fallen tanks. to Communist Saigon, camp, North scant Vietnamese five Army the entrenched units spearheaded by Chalan tanks. section Communist forces remain entrenched in the Cholon section Da of Saigon, and the enemy position clashes the in the city of reported is Da Lat-is strong. Scattered clashes have been throughout the country.

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Lang situation Vei Special Forces camp in heavy pressure (Paras. has Corps fallen (Paras. 1-3). The situation elsewhere in II Corps is described (Paras. Lat, 4&7). Except for heavy pressure at Kontum and Da (Paras. Lat, the situation in II Corps is relatively quiet (Paras. 8-10). The situation in III Corps is unstable although (Paras: 11-13). enemy security Can Saigon is in was in Can Saigon Tho city itself was the Corps scene remains of the only significant enemy action is in IV Corps (Para. 14). The status of Route 44 reported (Para. 15).

# Political Developments in South Vietnam:

A number of influential personalities seem to be coming will provided the around increase the view to the View people' the that the Viet Cong the offen- sive ernment, anti-Communist government support will provide increase the the 'people's the government support for the gov- ernment, properly exploits present anti-Communist sentiment (Paras.1-8). Many senators The attitude support the (Para. and worded 9-10). their are to express situation for passage to The express attitude food criticizing situation for military of support prevented prevented the in in military of the-government the- 11). is Saigon government is leadership, improving, resolution (Paras. and prices are coming down (Para. ll).
---
# III. Military Developments part of the North in Vietnam:

Unprecedented activity on the North Vietnamese bombers and transport aircraft during the past week suggests that Hanoi will employ its limited air power in some way to support the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam (Paras. 1-9).

# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# V. Communist Political Developments:

Interrogation of captured Viet Cong who participated in the recent attacks on major cities indicates some of their pre-offensive indoctrination took the same line the Communists are now peddling in their propaganda (Paras. 1-7). Vietnamese Communist diplomats speaking in Pyongyang have linked the Pueblo incident with the Vietnam conflict (Paras. 8-9). Vietnamese Communist spokesmen are underscoring their contention that the first moves to end the war must come from the US (Paras. 10-11).

# VI. Other Major Aspects:

Some of the trained Communists who attacked Saigon were apparently trained in Cambodia, according to prisoner interrogations. Three truck deliveries to North Vietnam are reported (Paras. 1-5).

Statistics Note: Because of the disruption of a schedule, BattlefieZd Vietnam reporting Statistics from MACV will not be published when available.

February 1968
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|THAILAND|THAILAND|THAILAND|
|---|---|---|
|THAILAND|THAILAND|THAILAND|

|PHUanQUOC|GULF OF SIAM|
|---|---|
|GULF OF SIAM| |

SOUTH VIETNAM

7FEBRUARY 9244CONF sp NTIAL15 IQOM-Ies 56 is '50Krlometers

695 6955.33 2- 2-6B-CIACIA

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# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Lang Sanh, Vei Vei has Special Forces camp, five miles from Khe Sanh, has fallen to North Vietnamese Army units and spearheaded by tanks. The enemy position reported in Da Lat appears stronger than previously reported, holding several key strongpoints.

2. In Saigon, little activity has been reported, as the South Vietnamese forces have not pushed against the Communist forces entrenched in Cholon. Sporadic firing continues primarily in a number of isolated Communist urban areas.

3. On February 7, at least nine PT-76 tanks, supported by the Special Forces, overran the Lang Vei Special Forces camp. Latest reports indicate that allied company 7 controls the camp. An allied reaction force on February 14 rescued approximately 70-100 US Special Forces advisers and indigenous forces at the camp.

4. The attack against Lang Vei was originally coordinated with a mortar and artillery barrage against the main Khe Sanh combat base and a ground probe fire against Hill 861. On February 7, intermittent fire was reported to be continuing against US positions in the Khe area.

5. Khe Sanh has reported continuing attacks from the 6,000 refugees. MACV has reported that Vei Lang has an estimated area of one square mile from Khe Sanh where refugees have moved to. This presents a serious tactical problem for Khe Sanh, and efforts are being made to deter the refugees from moving any closer.

February 7, 1968
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4. On February 55 radio stations serving the headquarters of the Communist Thua-Thien-Hue Military Region and the headquarters of the 6th Regiment were located in the immediate vicinity of Hue city. A prisoner captured during the fighting in the city has stated that the Hue municipal unit and the 800th battalion, 6th Regiment, had the mission of conducting a three-day attack against the MACV compound. If allied resistance was heavy, the attack, according to the prisoner, would continue for seven days, and if the Communist units were reinforced, they would maintain the pressure for 15 days. The prisoner claims that the municipal unit and 800th battalion consist largely of regroupees or local Viet Cong, lending credence to some assumptions that most of the recent attacks in I Corps, and elsewhere, were primarily conducted by Viet Cong units, and that by and large few North Vietnamese Army units have been committed.

5. An after-action report indicates concerning the attack that elements of the attack on every combat effective city force in the province were used in the attack. Captured documents and prisoners have identified eight sapper/infantry battalions and 12 local force companies as having participated in the assault.

6. Weapons captured during the attack indicate that the enemy was well equipped. The RPG-7 rocket launcher was employed for the first time in Quang Ngai. In addition, US advisers report that much of the enemy's ammunition was new. Sapper munitions, such as satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes, were well made, suggesting that they came from an arms factory and were probably not homemade. The enemy force attacking Quang Ngai estimate the total city strength was around 3,600. Enemy killed, according to Vietnamese and advisory body counts, exceeded 1,200. Included in the enemy losses were several high-ranking officers.

7. February 1968

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|such battalion's 48th|the subordinate battalion company commander and two of II Corps Communist forces Da Lat, except for continuing heavy pressure situation capitals by II Corps was relatively quiet. Heavy contact between US forces and probable elements of the North Vietnamese Army 66th Regiment apparently damaged continues northeast of Kontum city. The heavily city is bracing for an epidemic that plague reports of the Vietnamese and cholera. 24th Sector has commander, also responsible for defense of Kontum, has been relieved for incompetence.|
|---|---|
|In Tuyen Due Duc city Province, an estimated 1,500-man Viet Cong force reportedly remains entrenched within the Da Lat city limits.|In Saigon III Corps towns, while the provincial allied control, the city; provincial capitals and district security in Saigon remains unstable. The situation clearly at its worse on the southwestern side of the city; it appears as though the Viet Cong are trying to isolate the Cholon section soldiers from the rest of the city. On February 16, allied near 120 Tan Son Nhut Air Base reported killed northeast of in Saigon. In a battle near Tan Son Nhut area, three Military activity centered elsewhere in February, the Hau Nghia 56 III Corps in the Province. In three engagements there were 6-7 on February 6 allied losses of 51 killed and 28 wounded.|

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# Interrogation of a prisoner

The prisoner captured on February 5th provided the capability that Hoa Bien in the area has heavy weapons support. The prisoner stated Viet Cong support and a radio in his organic unit. The division provided the division with language cryptographers, a radio intercept, and a Cryptoanalysis capability proficient in the English language. By utilizing these elements, the prisoner recently claimed to avoid at least one B-52 strike and thwart an allied ground attack. The source also stated that the 5th Division had a 140-mm. "light" artillery regiment providing rocket support. The prisoner claims the division possesses a weapon larger than the 140-mm. rocket, but he was unable to provide any details.

# IV Corps

On February 14th, the city of Can Tho was out of significant Communists clashes. The Communists barricaded themselves in university buildings, and there was reported activity around them.

# Status of Highway 44

Route 15, linking Tuong Dinh to Saigon, was reported impassable on February 15th. The route to Vinh Long, with numerous highway interdictions, 4 provinces, and strategic Ba Xuyen, was reported clear. However, the status of the road in Bac Lieu is unknown.

February 7, 1968
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. An increasing number of influential personalities seem to be coming around to the view that the Communist offensive has not only hurt the Viet Cong image in the eyes of the people but will also serve to increase support for the government. They say, however, that the degree of popular backing which the government can expect will depend on the government's ability to provide for the people and mobilize them for the anti-Communist fight.

2. Tran Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, told an embassy officer on Feb- ruary 6 that he believes many people previously "neutral" have now swung to support of the government. This opinion was concurred in by Vo Van Tai, secretary general of the confederation's Saigon Council. Tai, who is still scheduled to be tried for his part in the recent labor disputes, had previously issued a statement on behalf of his council voicing full support for the government in the crisis.

3. Buu told the embassy officer that the regime now has a perfect opportunity to capitalize on anti-Communist sentiment, but should not use its own resources exclusively to mobilize the population. The government would do better, he feels, to encourage the direct participation of leading nongovernment personalities.

Buu's own efforts to organize his confederation affiliates to assist the government are being encouraged by several cabinet members.

4. Oppositionist views in the Lower House voiced optimism at the lack of popular response to the Viet Cong and, like Buu, views the present situation as a good opportunity for the government to broaden popular support by calling on the assistance of various prestigious figures. Chung said that the Lower House will continue to support the government's efforts in the current crisis, as long as no unconstitutional steps are taken.

February 1968
---
# feated

|feated|detective|
|---|---|
|detective|police|
|feated|presidential|
|presidential|police Phan Khac|
|Phan Khac|custody Suu, candidate, oppositionist|
|February|taken into custody|
|because of be pro- a Viet Cong prisoner's allegation that Suu would be kidnapped.| |
|government!~x Suu. has expressed his eagerness to help the government.| |
|confer with any other political leaders| |
|his willingness to work with official government or organization.| |
|Although Suu's remarks were made before the police believe took him into custody, there is little reason to that his attitude has changed.| |
|His ability to carry through if he remains in custody will be hampered.| |
|These indications of a willingness to join forces with the government from persons who, like Tai, have a grudge against the oppositionists are encouraging signs.| |
|All should considerable anti-Communist effort.| |
|The confusion for the people themselves, a number of reports indicate the confusion exists, but still find currency, and there continues to be criticism of the government.| |
|Some rumors still find currency, and there continues to be criticism of the government, but for the most part, sentiment observers growing in localities.| |
|Despite the fact that people in some localities view the Viet Cong offensive as having resulted in a psychological victory for the Communists.| |

February 1968
---
# TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

7/3.5(c)

Upper House Dissent

Despite these encouraging signs, there continue to be serious expressions of dissent from the Upper House. During a heated session on 6 February, several senators severely criticized the government, particularly the military leadership. They charged that, although the security services had prior warning of impending Viet Cong attacks, no steps were taken to prevent them. One senator called the military "a incompetent irresponsible, saying that "a sense of decency should compel them to resign."

As a result, on the February session, the wording of a resolution was unable to voice support for the government. The question was deferred until the 7 February session, when a resolution was finally drafted without any explicit mention of backing the government. The resolution expresses dissatisfaction with the military commanders and urges the creation of an armed self-defense force. It also muted criticism of the government and expressed gratitude to allied forces. Antigovernment sentiment and criticism were somewhat muted, but more can probably be expected in the future.

Food in Saigon is not in a serious crisis. The food situation in Saigon first appeared limited and early in February. Food stocks in the markets were very limited, and prices skyrocketed to three or four times the normal price in many instances. By 3 February, however, prices began to come down. Food vendors reported almost a complete stock of foodstuffs, including fish, meat, and poultry. Fresh products were arriving from areas close to Saigon. Stocks of rice, which are held up in warehouses in the Saigon-Cholon area, were planned to be moved out for greater distribution to the city in the succeeding days.

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# TOP SECRET

AN-2

|AN-2|Activity|
|---|---|
|The southward deployment considerations of North Vietnam's force may also have been complicated by weather conditions or tactical considerations.| |

About seven of AN-2s did depart Hanoi/Gia Lam in the late afternoon of 7 February and flew at least 50 miles south of Vinh.

Shortly thereafter, these planes attempted to land - possibly at the airstrip at Tchepone, Laos, which is located about 35 miles west of the Khe Sanh area.

These AN-2s ran into bad weather in a region and were forced to abort their mission in this region.

Five AN-2s from the country did fly in the north from the early evening hours of 7 February of the country (Hanoi time). By 2200 hours, three of the AN-2s landed at Vinh. It is unclear whether the AN-2s at Gia Lam Airfield were involved in a transport or an attack mission.

Meanwhile, North Vietnamese B-52 air defense nets in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone continued to carry warnings of operations on 7 February. The steady bombardment of Communist positions by these bombers makes them an important target for North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile units which are based near Hanoi; to be in the area, or for 7 February 1968.

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# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1.
There is nothing of significance to report.
7 February 1968
---
# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Interrogation attacks captured the propaganda of Viet Cong who took part in the recent pre-offensive indoctrination. The captured propaganda indicates some of their prisoners are now peddling the Communist propaganda in their areas. These prisoners hoped the Tet military offensive would attract dramatic popular support, particularly in urban areas.

2. A group of officers captured at Nha Trang were informed on Communist intentions that were embodied in Resolution No. 13. Although references to this policy date back to the spring of 1967, details are insignificant and sketchy.

3. Many political prisoners claim the purpose of the military offensive was to establish a significant Communist presence in important cities to strengthen the hand of the Liberation Front in negotiations with the US. The technique used was to establish new "fronts" composed of Liberation groups or individuals with a record of disagreement or disaffection with the Saigon government. These new "fronts," planned to form a new national government for South Vietnam, could negotiate directly with the US for the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

4. Many political prisoners claim to have no knowledge of any long-range objectives of the Tet offensive. Others, like the Nha Trang group, claim their mission was primarily propaganda. One man says he was under instructions to organize the kind of popular "opposition" groups which Hanoi and Liberation Radio have claimed were springing up in South Vietnam.

5. Reports claim that part of the plan at Nha Trang was to capture the local radio station so that the Communists could use it to generate a general uprising among the people. The existing government administrative structure was to be won over or destroyed.

February 1968
---
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If TOME TO~ 3.5(c) early4. December, Another he Nha and Trang military 40 prisoner and claims political that in types fronts were democracy"--now how indoctrination were and instructed in organized organize area sessions. instructed on how to name, to organize new popular fronts. He were used be even used in says that even the widely "alliance for peace and democracy"--now used widely in Communist propaganda--was used in the indoctrination sessions. Such Viet fronts the Cong were to successful to be organized in holding area in any territory--a possible explanation of why Communist propaganda has such no so organizations springing up was reports, only Nha up in for in Hue and Saigon so such military prisoner died far. The prisoner reports, for example, that no such organization was formed in Nha Trang because the military action died out too quickly.

Prisoners from other details have areas provided variants recurs--the same of the theme of Communists are creating new "fronts" for the purpose establishing "coalition" with the a Liberation as political Front. capable coalition power This of challenging then will the pose present governmental authority.

Although the popular a failure support failure of the Communists to win over significant popular part weakness, the offensive support in the initial effort clearly shows a glaring weakness, their actual expectations been for the first part of the Tet offensive may have believe. By creating chaos they and insecurity in widespread sections of the South, political military have agita~out-they have brought about conditions where increased political agitation, still Communist the combined with continuing situation may still Communist the promote kind of situation prisoners is which is lined by documents propaganda and by prisoners and captured documents.

February 1968

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7. Hanoi's Resolution 13, furthermore, may have framed only the long-range goals of the offensive, which is based on broad-based policy directives on which current strategy is based. The tactics of the Tet offensive spelled out in these documents continually referred to in resolution.

In late 1966 or the early 1967, which put renewed stress on improving political position, the Liberation Front and played up the importance of political tactics, possibly including a "talk-fight" strategy in negotiations with plans to achieve US. It is unlikely that these long-range have even though initially.

Vietnamese Laud North Korean Support

8. In what seems to have been a deliberate attempt to link the Pueblo incident with the Vietnam conflict, a rally was held in Pyongyang at which Vietnamese Communist representatives praised the North Koreans for their support.

9. Although their specific claim of capturing the Pueblo in order to support the North Vietnamese struggle in Vietnam, the Communists described the action as an effective contribution to the South Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese ambassador was not explicit in claiming that Vietnamese Communist successes would be "unthinkable" without the support tendered by the North Koreans. Earlier Communist propaganda between Pueblo and events in Vietnam seemed to avoid making any direct connection.

7 February 1968

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Front Spokesmen in Cairo

10. Vietnamese Communist contentionspokesmen continue to underscore peir contention pat any moves to end pe war must start wip pe US.
11. The head press conference of pe Liberation Front's mission in Cairo held a press conference on 6 February to make pis point and to present pe Front's line on pe current Communist offensive. The approach was pat taken by his colleague in Moscow on pe same day. Bop rejected a coalition government or expressed determination wip Thieu-Ky to continue pe government, pe struggle, and bop as long as necessary to achieve a settlement. The Front spokesman in Cairo sidestepped a question about volunteers if pere are "doubled" its strengp in Vietnam, saying pere are plenty of Vietnamese, bop Norp and Soup, and pey will "always be able to defeat" whatever forces pe US sends.

Communists Stress More Fighting

Earlier and AFP that fighting ahead. Vietnamese that be are short-term the present Communist effort appeals that military and propaganda will stress-offensive more to difficult characterize is not days the fighting as "urgent" and stressed the immediate objectives. Front Hanoi statements would recent in days have predicted fiercer, but that greater victories are yet to come. The censored correspondent AFP sometimes in Hanoi, whose the material is censored and sometimes inspired by the North Vietnamese, only reports he was told a "new present from the fighting is only at the beginning of a "new phase" the struggle from in the which first will blow. Such morale fighting successes propaganda must be achieved and designed to encourage greater fear among already and shaken South Vietnamese populace and to magnify and prolong the Communist threat.

In the absence of any genuine popularity found it necessary by quarters to continue in the initial order to stressing Viet bolster Tet nail that Cong uncertainty some is fear down the South threat. Such morale fighting successes propaganda must be achieved and designed to encourage greater fear among already and shaken South Vietnamese populace and to magnify and prolong the Communist threat.

February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772392
---
# VI.

Preliminary indicate that interrogations some of the Communist Viet Cong units which attacked Saigon were trained on Cambodian territory.

# 1. Preliminary prisoners

Several members of Company 33 of the Viet Cong 6th Independent Battalion have stated that their 40-man company received military training from a village near South Vietnam's Hau Nghia Province. In addition, many of the captives reported undergoing military training in the area. They had no knowledge of any other Viet Cong units participating in the Tet offensive, although this could have resulted from tight security.

# 2. Ba Thu village

Ba Thu village is populated almost entirely by Vietnamese and has long served as a rear area for Viet Cong training, medical, and logistic facilities. In the past, though, the Communists have refrained from basing higher organized combat units there, presumably to avoid political repercussions. However, they seem to have given higher priority to tactical requirements.

# 3. Truck Deliveries to North Vietnam

Trucks probably shipped by the Soviets almost 1,400 vehicles to North Vietnam during the three-month period from November 1967 to January 1968. These vehicles were imported by sea from Communist countries during the same period.

# 4. Imports

Imports into Vietnam appear to be somewhat higher than previously and may have increased in response to increasing truck losses. The Vietnamese have been suffering in both Laos and North Vietnam since June. Hanoi would have had to increase its estimated truck imports during that period to maintain its inventory of about 11,000 vehicles.

# VI-1 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15561273].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Military Personnel, Political Personalities, Communist Prisoners, Vietnamese Communist Representatives",
"What": "Military and Political Developments in Vietnam, Interrogation of Prisoners, Perspective on Communist Offensive, Import Information",
"When": "7 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Gia Lam", "Vin Long", "South Vietnam", "Hue", "Nha Trang", "Pyongyang", "Cairo", "Cambodian territory", "Ba Thu village"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

|Classification|Date|Control Number|
|---|---|---|
|Top Secret|16 January 1968|3.5(c)3.5(c) 2323|
---
# DAILY BRIEF 1968

16 DAILY BRIEF JANUARY 16 JANUARY 1968
1. Soup Vietnam
Soup Vietnam auporized The Confederation of Labor has today. There are more indications of sympapy for strikes, however, pe government arrested six labor leaders last week. This could pave pe way for pe settlement of pe strikes.
3
TOP SECRET
---
                                                     NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226     NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226
                                                  ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226
---
                                                           NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226            NR
      Approved for Rel ease: 2018/07/26      C05974226
                                                        ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226
      Approved for Rel ease: 2018/07/26      C05974226
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

|Top Secret|3.5(c)3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|16-January 161'9:68January161968| |
---
# Special Daily President's Report on North Vietnam

Date: 16 January 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Concern that talks on the current rural rice crop shortage are not urgent. Recent orders by Nhan Dan to suspend all complete sowing. The sowing and planting of seedlings are proceeding too slowly, which might lead to a shortfall in planted acreage and seedlings for transplanting.

North Vietnamese officials have been building a new underground headquarters between Lang Son and the Red River in the hills. It is reported that there is a possible facility in this area, but details are not confirmed.

In addition, there have been reports of high-level VIP flight activity outside Lang Son last summer, suggesting that Ho Chi Minh himself or other officials may have been living there.
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226

3.5(c)

continueParis. VanBo Januaryone trend ,representative continueRelations Relationstheirwith France:gradual with gradualFrance: Vietnamesewarming Paris-Hanoi representativedip-Paris-Hanoiaccordingrelations to their trend, according to EmbassyhasdiplomaticThe Bo, January officialstatusVan lomatic Office Embassy in official OfficereceptionHanoithethattheNorththeirthe man in invited in lomatic ParisParis Paris, hasinexplained the enjoyedsuch privileges Foreignthe status diplomatic reception_byThe FrenchForeign Mai Mai explainedgroundson10 onThe 10reception.Bo North North edgedone edgedVietnamese wantthatThetoFrenchandofto Bo askedthe by attending step attending tepcloser toFrench invitedcloser hisbe histofirst to firstdip-to that asked be repre-to thethe reception in on on the grounds that the French repre- sentative French sentative reciprocityaccededHanoi access acceded toFrenchto NorthVietnameseHanoi Frenchrequestsuch in privileges, in enjoyed request the interests interestsHanoitheand of reciprocity. French Theto the theirin French access overrelationspast Vietnamesein a gradualtowant pastyearHanoileaders man leadersto andgivenmaximum be be and given have cooperatedmaximum the upgradingcooperated trend willof upgradingwill have of apparently diplomaover relationswith diplomatictic year with Hanoi.gradual in This apparently continue in 1968 trend continue in 1968. ployees ployeesExtra of Extraof Work diplomatic* community the Work:diplomatic * The efficiencyof The affectedcommunityof severaltoworkefficiency* Vietnamese in Vietnamese in Hanoi isem-em- the because in Hanoi is apparently apparently seriously seriously ofdutiesduties,affectedare requiredaddition becauseforrequired in in addition to fortheir to their agenciesnormal norma 1 theythey are for to hourswork eachagencies for of thegovernment the government several hours each night night 3.3(h)(2)

that;This, •••••••• _____..J 3.3(h)(2) This requirement for additional Workmay in mean evacu- quiredhasthatfor ation So requirement ation much to so much hastothatshrunk theshrunkadditional help allthe available and_governmentthe a11 available skilledpersonscapitalre- the manpower the citymanpower and skilledmayin meanfunction work poolpool personsthe capitalfunctionre-thar'evacu-are quired city government . 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2)

* * * * 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2)

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C0597 4226
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226

3.5(c)

elerBlack Marketingto Hanoi have been buying porkcadres Black Marketing: government governmentAccording According to into incards on Namthe a theWestern DinhWestern trav_trav-areaeler haveHanoi, to and resellingtofourthefarmers cadresration cards from Nam Dinh then purchasing pork marketpurchasing area then pricespork been buying rangingpork reselling and ration toit it onfrom the black market at ranging from two times at costprices from two four times the original origina 1 cost.

# III. ATTITUDES NORTHVIETNAMESE REFLECTIONSOFUS

NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS ONTHEWAR* * OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR 3.3(h)(2)

broadcaseHanoi Hanoi in onEngTish on English USAntiwarProtests:WesternpressUS US Antiwar wrap-up Protests: of demonstration inpressHanoiYesterdayHanoi Yesterday re- ports concerningrecentwrap-up broadcast concerning allegedthat ports broadcastJustice Departmentdemonstrationthe1n Justicerecenta that antiwar Unitedfirmlypersecution antiwarprotestsof protests Western in the US.re- The broadcast of the alleged the last week was ina pro - testfront againsttheof the Johnson Departmenta dministrationlast week was "pro- testfront againsttheof the US dirtyAmericanVietnam oftest five the intellectuals Johnson administration's Pressopposedofwho persecutionthe thefive of US the dirtydemonstrationsAmerican war war inin is Vietnam."front forof with report ,intellectuals infront citedoftheA UnitedthetheFa irmontHotelofthe who firmly Press report opposed report thatin San aggressioninside "Rusk RuskFrancisco demonstrationsispleadingAnother Francisco inside Vietnam_economistswas was328 letterinAmericanCongressmen who a lso pleadingcited,forwithreport, recently policythatof a~soin Anotherthe the JohnsonsaysHanoi Johnson the Fairmont comment commentHotel policy ofin an tells openwar of arguing tothatarguing 328in American to that USUS iteconomists "constituteswhoprotest says aga inst constitutesto. protest to recentlysenttheprincipalagainstHanoi, sent source the sourcewar,ofUS economic US economic difficulties it the principal difficulties." -3-

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974226

3.5(c) THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478066.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "The President, North Vietnamese officials, labor leaders, Vietnamese government officials",
    "What": "Daily briefings on Vietnam, including strikes, rice crop shortage, VIP activity, building of underground headquarters, diplomatic relations with France, Black marketing in Hanoi, US antiwar protests",
    "When": "16 January 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "Lang Son", "Red River", "Hanoi", "France", "San Francisco"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

"The Situation Room is a 5,525 square foot complex of rooms in the basement of the West Wing of the White House, equipped with secure, advanced communications equipment for the President to maintain command and control of U.S. forces around the world in times of crisis."

# INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The intelligence agency provides material for tentative assessments which are essential to gauge the current communist military action on the battlefield.

# VIETNAM SITUATION

The prevailing situation in Vietnam is clear. The offensive and defensive military actions are reported to be ongoing in various areas, particularly in rural regions of South Vietnam.

# INTELLIGENCE REPORT

According to the prevailing situation, both offensive and defensive actions are being carried out by the government, the people, and the armed forces in Vietnam. The situation in many exchange areas, particularly in the rural regions, is critical.

# ENGAGEMENT

Government forces have been engaged in combat with enemy forces and have suffered casualties. Some areas have been cleared, but in some regions, the enemy forces have not been located, possibly due to being cut off from their main forces.

# ONGOING DUTY

For duty and country, the Long Province has been a stronghold for the ongoing operations.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00193286

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---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00193286

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3.4(b)(1).. 3.4(b)(1)

NO_CONTENT_HERE "SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUAT[15561270].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "White House Situation Room, Intelligence Agency, Government Forces, Armed Forces",
    "What": "Discussion on military actions in Vietnam, ongoing operations and engagements, intelligence assessments",
    "When": "17th January 2019",
    "Where": ["White House", "Vietnam", "Long Province"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011920

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert W. Komer, Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc LOAN

Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc LOAN, head of the Directorate General of National Police (DGNP) and chief of the Military Security Service (MSS).

A review of this reporting indicates that General Loan has been involved in a wide gamut of political activities and that he has used the summary covers the period from September 1966 to date.

Following is a list of some of General Loan's activities:

- Loan has instructed the security services to mount an all-out effort to gather high-ranking government information concerning corrupt or immoral activities, obtain personality information on possible presidential candidates, and military personalities.
- Loan has twice indicated that if the elections brought about a civilian government, the military might have to mount a coup d'etat to retain power.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/04
---
C. Loan has placed under detention military officers suspected of being close to General Nguyen Huu Co, recently deposed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense;

D. Loan has ordered the establishment of "political situation rooms" in every province in order to ascertain the strength of local political movements;

E. A Constituent Assembly (CA) member reports to Loan three times a week on CA activities;

F. Loan is involved in organizing a new Buddhist Layman's League of Vietnam in support of Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chan;

G. Loan has placed police agents in the port and dock workers and has reactivated a dock workers union in opposition to the union affiliated with the established Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT);

H. Loan informed CVT head Tran Quoc Buu that development of a trade union hindered the war effort and that a solid trade union movement would have to wait until after peace had been achieved;

I. Loan owns a Vietnamese-language newspaper and has articles printed attacking the CVT;

J. Loan has curtailed the newsprint quota of newspapers refusing to print articles attacking the CVT;

K. Loan instructed one of his subordinates to ask all IV Corps province chiefs if they would support Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky for the presidency.

Attached are copies of all reports on which the above listing is based.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PLANS:

William E. Colby "BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN [15604022].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc LOAN",
"What": "Involved in political activities, gathering government information, potential coup d'etat, detaining military officers, establishing political situation rooms, organizing Buddhist league, interfering with labor unions",
"When": "from September 1966 to present",
"Where": ["Washington, D.C.", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The Presidents Daily Brief

Top Secret 11 January 1968

3.5(c)3.5(c) 2323
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

3.5(c)

|DAILY BRIEF 1968|11 DAILY JANUARY BRIEF|11 JANUARY 1968|
|---|---|---|
|Vietnam has again endorsed South Saigon for Vietnamese Communist propaganda| | |
|The idea of coalition government condemned has again endorsed in Vietnam for and simultaneously in South Vietnam and seeking| | |
|Simultaneously seeking to Hanoi unrest in spelling block avenues condemned to peace Saigon doing So to seeking doing fanning Hanoi block seems seems avenues more interested interested peace. In in the in South out the South over in fanning this issue unrest it calls the than in the| | |
|What it means issue when than in for out Coalition government a co- alition government| | |

NR

2

NR

2

NR

3

NR

3

NR

4

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

3.5(c)
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
---
# Top Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

|Top Secret|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|11 Jan 1968| |

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

3.5(c)

Special Daily President on North Vietnam Report

for the President's Eyes Only

11 January 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

1. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

3.3(h)(2)

Given the French-US military conversation with the US Embassy on the Trinh Statement:

The Embassy officials in Vientiane interpreted the statement in a balanced way. The recent secret conversation has surprisingly balanced the recent Trinh statement. In contrast to some French statements, the diplomat offered a significant and forthcoming opinion that altered the nature of the Trinh state. There were no hard signs of negotiations. In addition, the bombing tactic seemed particularly suited to put pressure on the North Vietnamese to stop the bombing.

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C0597421

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

*                *

North Vietnamese Railways:

Railways:

comments 3.3(h)(2)

on the rails the Vietnamese railway system.

North Vietnamese Railways repair and maintain many railway lines. The repair crews normally consist of civilians augmented by locally recruited men (sometimes about 16 men) to complete repairs. Repair work on damaged bridges may begin as soon as two hours after a bombing raid. Often temporary bridges are constructed that bear the weight of locomotives and cars on either side. Passenger cars are usually at the front, and trains are mixed with cargo traveling from Hanoi to Lang Son on the border, armed with antiaircraft guns.

Decentralization: One aspect of the government's efforts to decentralize the economy places more responsibility on provincial administrators.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

2=

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C0597421
---
# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

3.5(c)

|3.3(h)(2)|in mid-1966 the workers at the phosphate plant in mid-1966 ing in the people and south pro the in Thanh workers Hoa at the phosphate plant were products that operating by told forth that henceforth plant henceforth the Thanh the plant province south would province Hoa, of 3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|be Hanoi, responsible were products told for operating by the and for would ducing al1 be responsible used the for pro- 3.3(h)(2)|
|3.3(h)(2)|ducing all what that they their were the disheartened by this people. 3.3(h)(2)|
|3.3(h)(2)|feared administration what they felt jobs difficult feared the and that workers their jobs disheartened be would be made more by this news difficult and by would be would be inefficient ad- 3.3(h)(2)|
|3.3(h)(2)|* * * * * * 3.3(h)(2)|
|3.3(h)(2)|X NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS * * OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES|
|II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS ON THE WAR|ATTITUDES ON THE WAR|
|announced various "US Gathering: Antiwar that Antiwar Gathering of Hanoi group of representatives 50 radio on 9 January|of American organizations aggressive a group 50 representatives in Europe met opposed of|
|to the war in Vietnam" in Paris|ating 7 broadcast and formed American the January aggressive formed war a in continent-wide Vietnam Opposition coordin- in Paris|
|The dirty promote US demonstrations broadcast demonstrations April by on in Vietnam" reported by on George Washington|that Americans Washington's the group pledged against "the to|
|committee announced birthday US war dirty and on in Vietnam" 2 tha April. it would circulate the|Additionally 1 George the peti-com-|
|tion among Americans announced that in Europe encourage it would circulate declaring the peti-in-|sistance of tention among the signatories in Europe, to declaring draft the re-|

# TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

3.5(c)3.5(c)
---
TOB SECRETI  Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
             Approved for Release:    2018/07/26 C05974218---------~        3.5(c)
                                                                            3.5(c)
                                                                      3.3(h)(2)
                                                                       3.3(h)(2)
                                    4-
                                  -4=
TOP SECRE                                                                   3.5(c)
                                                                            3.5(c)
             Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218
             Approved for Release:    2018/07/26   C05974218
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974218

Top Secret THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478067.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Daily Briefing on Vietnam, North Vietnam Railways, French-US military conversation, North Vietnamese reflections on US political attitudes and the war",
"When": "11 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "South Saigon", "Hanoi", "Lang Son", "Vientiane", "Paris", "Hanoi", "Thành Hóa", "North Vietnam", "US"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

3.5(c)

ZeLEIGENG

QEQSies Intelligence Report

DIRECTORATEOF INTELLIGENCE

The Situation in South Vietnam(Weekly) Secret 149 No_December19670379/67

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218Secret

3.5(c)

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to unauthorized persons is prohibited by law.

GROUP AUTOMATIC

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
# POLITICAL SITUATION

Military manpower;
Some discontent wip new government Lower House activities

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Revolutionary Development Plans for new public administration and corruption;
Press and information;
Deployment of Revolutionary Development and Truong Son teams November (Map)

# ECONOMIC SITUATION

Prices;
Currency and gold

# ANNEX: Saigon Retail Prices in and Currency Prices

Weekly Free Market Gold Saigon (table)
(graph)
---
# POLITICAL SITUATION

With the new government, there is apparently growing discontent among some of the senior generals, particularly supporters of Vice President Ky, who has already averted one potential crisis by persuading the police director to withdraw his resignation. The Senate is concerned that the government may be unconstitutional because a mobilization decree was promulgated before the full legislature invested. The Minister intends to invite Prime Minister Loc to discuss the decree and answer questions.

A number of Lower House deputies and ten-day Members of two Lower Houses seeking better security spent a recent recess seeking more government assistance for their constituents oriented toward the Catholics. Groups reportedly agreed to form an alliance toward the Buddhists in an attempt to offset the pro-government influence of the Democratic Bloc.

Some Discontent with New Government

The growing discontent among generals appears to stem from what some of them see as the Thieu-Ky conflict, with at least some of the senior generals continuing to regard the new government's "soft" attitude toward Communism with suspicion and disenchantment.

Much of the suspicion and disenchantment between Thieu and Ky supporters exists due to the mutual distrust that tends to color the outlook of each camp. The result is that decisions are judged not on their merits but rather on the power each camp has in the context of the struggle. Ky's apparent willingness to sit back and take a less significant role in influencing key decisions is neither making Thieu supporters nor Ky supporters happy.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2) Loan and Ky IIIsupporters should be more aggressive particularly police director Corps commander Khang protecting feel his own that Ky and his camp the wall "by Thieu in they against interests before are all forced 3 secretary appointment apparently brought Thieu of Nguyen Van Huong as his discontent to general has fairly head Communist or at least There is ing among the generalsthat Huong is and that his appointment to security posi- pro-Communist power will endanger national tion of such and Thieu reportedly intends to take on intelligence rather than budgetary matters as his own responsibili- This would ties give Huong significant access the prime minister influence over to and having the matters man whose background he Loan 18 naturally skeptical question - regards as about able placed in position to influence intelligence and security organs Loan and others close to Ky prime minister designate Prime Minis- fear that Huong might actu- ally be Thieu readiness for the pas being kept in political faux day when ter Loc makes ious to please supporters reportedly fear is sympathi- is likely Ky 5 to do just that everyone including Communist too anx: They think he that Loc toward Thieu not helping matters by zers and is and Ky He is courting his attitude both men The and government attempting to act as consequently bridge between them unified body, three is acting as in ments rather than as the source opinion political Despite all this to resign and Staff chief soft reportedly threatened Joint they believe 1 sits has other generals crisis including 1s not imminent what General has said the General Khang government Vien attitude general lack might also quit over of effectiveness and toward Communism.

3.5(c)
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218SECRET

3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)

Huong will that Loc is to give Loc has reportedly urged Khang and Loan he agrees Ky has also attempted not stem government be the danger to the are true to particularly effective Van Ky fears chance that Nguyen ing out point although be that able to if even do little for the accusations Communists with the Huong will glare of publicity on him and leanings with Ky supporters alerted to his pro-Communist

3.3(h)(2)

Military Manpower fied with Defense Minister Vy is reportedly dissatisfied with the caliber of Vietnamese Army officers and is Rather con sthan idering revampimg the selection process use college degree as school the sole Vy criterion reportedly first officer candidate for admission to induct college graduates as privates would giving commiss and then screenionsthem for officer qualifications before to those who measure up

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
|Lower House Activities| | |
|---|---|---|
|10. The Senate also took upon 25 November the subject of military manpower during its displeasure with the government in promulgation of been indicating general the mobilization decree before the ing its session. iegislature had of senators criticized the of the Although the decree invested particularly the lowering substance 0f ity were concerned with its constitutionality. his draft age themajor- was finally agreed that Prime Minister Locor It language of the decree and to answer questions representatives should be invited before to discuss the the Senate the invitation was 28 November. Final on at the Senate to have been decided session on| | |
|Several members from 11 December while its rules period seeing to the The Lower House recessed between 21 November committee began work needs of highland provinces met with Defense Minister their constituents central relief supplies in such things as war damage approached Vy roads on in their area their constituencies or 21 November to request deputies distributed Other better security along the government for more refugee assist- ance and better compensation for| | |
|12. Several deputies of apparently differing persuasions reportedly spent the recess 19 loose alliance informing met members of the largely Catholic Independent Group on which is composed 13 members of Central Vietnamese 22 November with primarily of the Progressive 3.3(h)(2) Bloc Buddhists It was agreed that the two groups could probably never controversial issues viewson some differences should not prevent be integrated because of their these them but that differing concert on number 0f other issues domination from acting in pose of the alliance 18 to prevent The stated pur- but Lower House by the pro-government members coalition Will probably need several additional the before it can effectively counterbalance the Democratic Bloc influence of the 50-member Democratic Bloc| | |
---
# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The problem of corruption seems to be inexorably woven into government attempts to strengthen its national administrative apparatus and make progress in Revolutionary Development. Despite some efforts to upgrade the training of provincial and district officials and to eliminate corruption, corrupt officials at the government are seemingly immune from higher levels of prosecution. It remains to be seen, however, if the Thieu government will make genuine efforts systematically to root out corrupt officials. Efforts appear to be based on political party cadre programs, General Thang and the RD, to have become involved in the efforts. Senator Nguyen Gia Hien to form broadly elevated and press information activities have been Korean forces prime minister to the inaction South Vietnam office against will reportedly take stronger populace suspected of harboring show elements of the civilian the provincial Viet Cong. The deployment of the RD and map is attached which Truong Son teams as of November.

# Revolutionary Development and Corruption

In recent conversation with US officials, Vice President Ky described his official training of provincial government for the Vung Tau Revolutionary Development Training Center and for the reorganization of the civil administration. A four-week Vung Tau training course will be instituted in December for selected civilian and military officials to give an understanding of their duties and responsibilities and attempt to make clear to them the need for a new approach to Vietnamese government.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

public administration - providing for pe greatest good for pe greatest number of people and pat chiefs would be replaced in January 1968, province. In his remarks Ky indicated pat most administrative affairs pe chain of command will be taken out for pe province and aupority will be given to Minister of pe Interior, division commanders and Corps commanders. The interior military responsibilities in Corps commanders, however, retain peir current political machinations. In pe light of pe Vietnamese government and division commanders apparently persisting in Soup Vietnam, pe influence of pe Corps is somewhat doubtful. Almost all of whom are military officers in local province chiefs' wishes of pe Ministry of pe Interior will accede to pe Saigon corps and division commanders. Recent remarks by Colonel Khoi have pe chief of Vung Tau course will be mandatory for all province Vietnamese chiefs, provincial RDA army officers, district chief positions chiefs. According to Khoi and pe provincial RDA, district chiefs very few officers are being detailed to pe province and pese jobs military province scapegoats peir concern on pe reluctance of army and district commands. They might officer to seek result of pe corruption drive in any affected by pe government. Thus far, pe only officials known to have been affected by pe corruption drive in any province and district of measures have been pe US provincial and district levels. The role of an elder he believed tender who assumed recently an anticorruption Mission officer pat has told his defeat as officials presidential statesman Tran Van Huong provincial. The campaign would be since pese individuals were by and large wipout any substantive.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

SECRET 3.5(c)

political support offenders - many of whom he Huong does not believe believes however are punished that occupying the worst high positions in the government will be elements vice president he would at he this suggested responsibility for the government that as in early in the elimination of October Nguyen assume About Cao Ky major responsibility corrupt same time there was disciplinary spate of Vietnamese press reports on dishonest officials measures taken by Ky reportedly authorized Ky against allegedly sanctions against seven officials in Kien Giang former province chiefs chiefs former Province three chief one deputy province ordered and two service the and the also reportedly the Police Special Branch the removal in Province of city Vung Tau and service of Chief He finance chief in Binh Duong automobile registration reorganization of the Vung Tau were poor procedures Tuy in the Ministry of Transport and Communications to the province correct its chief of Phuoc At about and the mayor of this time replaced. chief 6 of Binh Dinh was death tried along With him and sentenced to relieved Several Binh Dinh During September-October tried for corruption the province tion Province staff officers were and also judged guilty however Press they received lesser sentences Vietnam on 30 October District chief in refugee program embezzlement the involved had been refugee service announced that several Dinh former chief Dinh of some 10 million piasters in apprehended for the re The additional officials Province the former Hoai Nhon in Binh of in public case in the funds have and several other officials involved of complaints from this case inhabit Investigation of the local was begun been charged with the misuse of on the basis ancs to ment. be widespread at In Blatant corruption has levels of the govern this connection the higher long been reported 3.3(h)(2)

III Corps Commander Khang, who 3 - 3.5(c)

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

3.5(c)
several of pe reportedly believes pat corruption higher-ranking generals is rampant among
II replaced recom-has Khang reportedly claims pat bop are Corps Commander
mended pat two corps commanders be Loc and IV
incorruption Corps Commander Manh deeply involved of peir actions all corps commanders and should be removed. handlan example Khang cited peir Asing of by Tet bonus given pen Premier Ky for distribution among peir division last year bonus as action in distributing pe million-piaster commanders and oper subordinates In contrast to his own apparently pocketed most or all instructed Khang said pat Loc and Manh Khang also alleged pat Tri Minister of peir bonuses of Revolutionary Development Nguyen Bao Linh Quang Vien notoriously corrupt. and Minister of Interior are have pus to be seen far been removed from ass1x province chiefs unofficial According to if and 40 to office however pe Thieu government outsources 50 district remains It as chiefs many will make dishonest officials genuine effort The possibility to root pat systematically initiated exists October che anticorruption measures and November will subside during Plans for New Political Party agreed to use his Nguyen Duc Thang has reportedly General broadly official position Nguyen at pe Joint General Staff to work wip Senator party. to form based political Gia Hien 3.3(h)(2)
4- SECRET 3.5(c)

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

|10_|Hiennational political party nucleus foresees nonsectarian Greater Solidarity Forces Moderate Buddhist Thich Tam Giachas reportedly (GSF) as the agreed to provide some of his followers for the on his and Thang Will cadres to Hien will begin work allegedly attempt the political recruit plan Hao the proposed party February to base of and Cao Dai Hoa at which time he Democratic announce of next year of Nationalist intends to Socialist Front party in January or the formation as an extension Bloc in Development teams organizers in revolutionary aegis by early 1969 will operate the Revolutionary of his National Democratic Socialist the Senate His under the front and he hopes to transform the front into party enthusiastic over the idea of building 11 Thang is reported to have been quite political party system in South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
|12 GSF members into RD teams Tam Gia care appear that Thang 12 _ It convinced that political and Thich Hien party is communist pol the grassroots level to counteract needed at ical work three men Com- the event any advantage created believe as possible to offset party must the war ends the be the Viet as by negotiation Cong might have soon such in 13 similar plan by Senator Tran Van Dong grassroots political and organization has establish his followers to be end developing very lowly Tran One of the individuals involved in US Embassy officer that this effort, Van Tuyen he was very concerned at recently told the lack of any national| |

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

political organization of hostilities began to subside adding that once the political problems level would be further compounded if grassroots political organization was not in place.

Press and Information

In the new government, internal and external press and information directed from the prime minister's office. The creation of and Press an office of the Director General of Information the prime minister (DGIP) separates Chief of the office in the prime minister's office. This the organization suggests national political image come more concerned with its domestic and international former an ex-adviser to Vice The DGIP is Nguyen Ngoc director of the Vietnam Press President Ky and organization of government information. Linh is willing to undertake activities major re- In the new and staff levels be tween the executive organization functions will be consolidated the operational plan must staff and The DGIP reorganize Minister Locitl staffs will be however Linh eliminated. still receive Prime has compasses both already established Division which however ion single second Informat Saigon and all operating division will handle all external Service (VIS) field elements information program single administrative office be grouped under All service function swill press also Linh DGIP include the removal of the establishment proposed reorganization of the censorship from of central and information activities ing and policy and program malys = is the director general inspectorate office with research an capability and an has weed indicated to US employee training and certifica- staff responsible to officials that he would Linh to like strong interest in out patronage employees and has expressed tion as requisite for continued employment.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
3.5(c)
proving remains pe general how effective Linh will be to be seen most output and performance of pe in VIS_ one of pe ineffective provincial agencies
3.3(h)2)
7 - SELXE
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

| |SOUTH VIETNAM| |
|---|---|---|
|Revolutionary Development Cadre|November 1967|DEMARCATION LINE|
|Total Personnel: 26,078|OUJANG| |
|Total Teams: 516| | |
|Truong Son Teams (Montagnard)|TAUA| |
|Total Personnel:|IMIEN|CORPS|
|Total Teams:| | |
|Static Census Grievance Cadre (SCGC)|DOA NANG|TEAMS STRENGTH|
|Total Personnel: 366|429|354|
|Total Cadre: 37,525|OUANGNAM|SCG CADRE|
|RD Priority Provinces for 1968|CANGTIN|L,481|
| |OUANGNGAE|3.5(c)|
| |NTUM| |
| |UNK|CORPS|
| |HU BON-PHU|TEAMS STRENGTH|
| | |68|1,337|
| |SCG CADRE| |
| |BARLAC|344|
| |KHANHHOA| |
| |UANG DUC|TUYEN|
| |LETO21|RANH|
| |UANG DUC|NINE|
| |PHUOC THUAN| |
|PHNOM PENH|ONG LONG| |
|KIEN TIAU|HONG|PHUOC|
|DOS|LONG| |
|ICHAAH|BINA|TKUAN|
| |TUY| |
|90 LIGON| |CORPS|
| |PHUOC| |
|LOC| | |
|Military District Capital SCG CADRE|VINABINH|285|
|CHIONG|BA| |
|THIEN XUYEN| | |
|AN LIEU|TEAM CORPS STRENGTH| |
|XUYEN|463|7,199|
| |1,556|ZI|
| | |100 Kilometers/190 Miles|
---
# ECONOMIC SITUATION

The steady retail price index in Saigon held for the third consecutive week and gold prices rose. Freemarket currency levels were 33 percent higher than on January 20, with a sharp response to the devaluation of the British pound and the Hong Kong dollar.

Retail prices in Saigon continued to be stable for the third consecutive week, with the price of rice consumed mainly by the working class 33 percent higher than at the beginning of the year. The USAID index, which is used in calculating the price of milled rice, rose somewhat. The embassy attributed the increase in rice prices to imported rice, while other domestic rice prices remained unchanged. Prices of charcoal and firewood declined slightly, while the price of vegetables rose slightly. Food prices have increased by 39 percent since the beginning of the year, while non-food prices have also gone up. Foodstuffs such as fish, pork, and rice account for about two-thirds of the total expenditures, with respective increases of 19 percent, 41 percent, and 65 percent.

Despite the increase in food prices, traffic conditions have allowed larger deliveries of fish and vegetables. The overall level of prices was unchanged as better traffic conditions resulted in increased deliveries.

(A table of weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the Annex.)

The USAID index for prices of US-financed imported commodities was unchanged during the week.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218

SECRET
3.5(c)
Ending 21 November at part because of many goods were caused Prices of rumors level only 8 percent higher higher reportedly January than on in new of higher taxes and customs duties to fall, offsetting the increases. Substantial arrivals the price of cement for other items.

Currency and Gold

Sharply Free market currency and gold prices valuation of the 20 November in response to the de- rose on British pound and the Hong Kong dollar. The price of green dollars rose eight pias - increased per dollar, and the rate for ters (scrip) to 164 piasters MPC dollar piasters per The price six piasters to 121 piasters per of gold leaf rose to 211 the previous week dollar (A graph nine piasters higher than on monthly and weekly currency and gold prices is included in the Annex.)

III-2
3.5(c)
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
|Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon|1 Jun 1966|Jan 1967|30 Oct 1967|Nov 1967|13 Nov 1967|20 Nov 1967|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Index for Food Items|172|225| |3|X1|20|
|Rice - Sack (100 kg)|1,250|1,700|2,300|2,250|2,350|2,100|
|Rice - Sack (1 kg)|90|130|220|220|220|220|
|Fish - Can for Bellies (1 kg)|120|150|270|150|260|150|
|Nucc Mam (jar)|70| | | | | |
|Index for Non-Food Items|1|11|2|222|246|222|
|Firewood (cu. meter)| |130|120|530|560|520|
|Gasoline (liter)| |14|16|16|1|17|
|Kerosene (liter)| | |1| | | |

Sources: For all indexes and prices, January 1965 = 100.

Price level set at 100 for January 1965.

Released on: 2018/07/11 C02717218
---
| |1964|1965|1966|1967|SEP|OCT|NOV|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|GOLD: Basis gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce| | | | | | | |
| | |US $10 GREEN| | | | | |
|US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip)| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |68804 11-67|
---
Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C02717218 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI_15472872_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": ["Directorate of Intelligence", "ZeLEIGENG", "Senators", "Prime Minister Loc", "Vice President Ky", "Nguyen Van Huong", "Colonel Khoi", "Vice President Nguyen", "Cao Ky", "Minister of Defense Vy", "Nguyen Bao Linh Quang Vien", "Tran Van Huong", "Senator Tran Van Dong", "Senator Thien Xuyen"],
"What": ["Political Situation in South Vietnam", "Revolutionary Development Plans", "Economic Situation in Saigon", "Corruption issues", "Deployment of Revolutionary Development Teams", "Military Manpower concerns", "Press and Information management", "Revolutionary Development Cadre Strength"],
"When": "November 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Vung Tau", "Vietnamese government", "US Embassy"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: 9>
    ~
---

---

 CIA-RDP79-00849A001100070013-1.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "CIA",
    "What": "Document",
    "When": "Unknown",
    "Where": [],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}