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} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03031268 Secret

UNIEQESIAES OE Intelligence Report

The Situation in South Vietnam(Weekly)

Secret

No _November1967

27 0378 /67

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WARNING

United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, Of the

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP

INCLUDED FROM DOWNCH

Secret

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# No Foreign Dissem/Background Use

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# Directorate of Intelligence

# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(20 November - 26 November 1967)

# CONTENTS

Section

# POLITICAL SITUATION

Government appointments

Legislative developments

Local difficulties

Resignments

New Loan government

Tran Van Huong

Buddhist political party

Possible moderate on the

# REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Viet Cong urban operations

Activity by status

Anti-infrastructure

Hamlets being worked of RD teams

# ECONOMIC SITUATION

Prices

Currency and gold

Highways (Map)

Commerce Route 4

Routes 20 and

# ANNEX: Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices

Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)

(graph)

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# POLITICAL SITUATION

Appointment government has Huong as secretary general established the president. The in of Nguyen Van announced the office and has 19-man Central Prime Revolutionary Development Council to oversee all Minister Loc the pacification effort done because of difficulty reportedly having some initial is ingetting are Thieu and Vice President his job. Thieu and Vice President Ky have established committees. Both houses of the legislature intercede with they regard as the lower dealing persons cratic Bloc in unjustly behalf six-point proclamation treated has issued the government on house primarily The Democratic Bloc in the need to preserve Vietnamese sovereignty.

Police Nguyen Van Huong reportedly because of his resignation appointment to the presidential candidate office. Van Huong has refused to can-Former presidential Tran Inspectorate accept the moderate Buddhist Tam Chau maybe working on party chairmanship of the new plans Thich faction of publication of Buddhist political daily newspaper and begin.

# Government Appointments

The President Thieu and appointment of Nguyen On 25 November the government announced to Van Huong, in manager adviser the an during election. His secretary general office announcement and will by the the prime minister in the embassy officer this position earlier outlined as duties in the as enumerated president for an. Huong had administration include president of all agencies run that and the various ministries and liaison between directly office will have the legislature office and office. Huong the rank of minister. Minister Also announced was Council to oversee Central Revolutionary Development Loc of all aspects of the pacification according to the effort. Will The 19-man most council cabinet ministers and announcement include the five.

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|highest-ranking generalsNguyenDuc Thang|presumably includingGen -Jointlop- eral chargedeputychiefot the mentCadreDirectorateandtheRevolutionaryDeve GeneralStaffin ot theRegional and Popular Forces secretarygeneralofthecouncil_ Ministerof RevolutionaryDevelopmentTri willbe special councilszone-alsobeestablished _anddistrict-levelcity- province- will Loc Difficulties QuocBuu,PrimeMinisterLoc15his complainsrecentlytoldtheVietnameseConfederation initial of Labor,presidentinbeinghamperedbydifficu1ty ofgetting apparentlyhavingjobdone Transome directionsthatheisLocascribesmostotconflictingLocthat 3.3(h)(2) andstatementsfromPresidentThieuand vicePresidentKyofcoordinationbetweenhisdiff1- cultiestoandclainsLackhasto spendingreatdealThieu and tryingtois hardly Kythatthisavoidthe ground hebeing caughtto getthemiddleoftimeHeaddea new government off whilepossiblyofthedifficultiesdescribedbyLocSomesymptomaticoftypicalpersonalthe ofthoseconflict mightoccurapparentlyfindingitalthoughhewhich withforaptto panic andLocisthem.longtimeunderpressureremarkshasno greatThieuandKyBuucommented in startinganynewlargeorganizationseem that difficulttocopehasknown Locis and respectshisBuualso surmisedintelligence Loc from hismeetingwith Locandfrom allegedly the problemscallsThieutheprimeministerwithThieu attributed forwhatheKyandisof running governmentdilettanteirritatedapproach to Legislative Develepments officersTheofStudentDemonstratorsteoutspokenin theReiease lowerhouse CommitteetohaselectedasIntervenefor threemenvicewhohavebeenquiCommitteechair- theircriticismof the government manTrucVien secretaryNguyen TTrongNhowereinstrumentalchairmanNguyen DaiBanginandes- tablishingthecommittee whichof17demonstratingintends to petition the governmentfor therelease students ar againstandsubsequentlydraftedfor rested the presidentialelections|

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said that the committee had already sent At the house session on 21 November. No letter his the government proposing if Prime he will explain to discussion of the student cases meet added that He with the the Minister Loc refuses to - presumably committee, be called before us full house - to actions The Senate on 18 November government on also established committee to intervene with the tion-centered but its committee appears less opposition larm matters coup of 19 February 1965 itself house The than that of the lower primarily with Senate committee will concern the cases of coup plotters tive arrested after abor- The question first arose when Senator Tran petition request be initiated by him and Van Don submitted ing that the signed by sentenced 32 other senators Van Pha this part reviewed the Phat, case of former General Lam recently absentia to death in for in letter, coup attempt temporary Senate chairman him. requests for leng explaining sent President Thieu through the Following Senate reviewed persons thy interces-discus- the sion in justice done sion of this implicated in and decided the Senate other that the cases be of all 45 the abortive coup should and for this purpose set up Intervention the Senate Special Committee to Con - The committee sider Applications for from each of is composed of two men six slates Democratic Bloch as issued house development In another lower According to point proclamation Viet-six- preservigicle thenew which appears to name se sovereignty emphasize the need Saigon Post arc calls for social revolu-of for 22 November the proclamation tion educational system and the diplomatic service true national reconciliation reform of both the protection of Vietnamese sovereignty, and economic sovereignty. the proclamation criticized what of unilateral 10 In detailing each of the it called of the war determination of the course points policy various and peace economic sovereignty, achieving efforts In addition the proclamation as step toward called

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for is perhaps It review of the significant that this added voice in significant entire problem of American aid therecent clamor internal affairs is that of the Democratic for sovereignty and against American interference in Democratic Bloc progovernment, The bloc 15 generally considered at least if not government-sponsored house movement the cabinet who was Government official minister in tion 11 and could be the Au Truong Thanh's qualified as lower presidential the Kythi rdbloc maybe in beginning the making in the of di concerted opposition 20 November that he independent deputies on candidate and told few colleagues are mentioned US He attempt- to form bloc of participating in the establishment of the bloc professed Saigon deputies Nguyen Trong Nho and Ho Huu Tuong as In view of Thanh Nho the proposed bloc is and the antagonism of that and Tuong to the government opposition activities would appear intended it as pro opposition grouping to and Farmer-Worker-Soldier an government Democratic counterbalance the essentially blocs Loan Resigns Director Nguyen Van Huong has reportedly induced Police 12 secretary general through on his earlier desire appointment as the president to resign Loan to follow an submitted in written resigna- tion to Chu Ngoc Lien On 24 November, Loan official the Ministry ing Interior, giving fatigue command position of reassignment to troop as his reason and request- Loan 13 brother-in-law who is the mayor of Saigon and Van Van Cu are all reportedly later told Lien however, that feeling that reason behind the had gone the resignation was Loan on promise in appoint President Thieu secretary backing Huong as his general According to Cua, Thieu had promised Loan and Vice President Ky Loan any public position his membership in that Huong would not be given objection to Huong is reportedly based on the Dai Viet Party Tran Van Huong on the New Government 14_ Former presidential candidate Tran position Van Huong has turned down the goveI-4rnment offer of

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intends to hold to his earlier announced decision at the head of the new Inspectorate and apparently to remain out of the new government. Both President Huouiatzy accept the Inspectorate chairmanship, par-and Vice President Ky had hoped to persuade because corruption which the new body has been set interest and was up especially to one of his prime campaign investigate has special issues officer 15 refused on country who conversation with said he had During Huong an embassy of the 24 November, however post because as long as there are people feel they are little more than Dis - do above the law body like the Inspectorate go after corrupt officials can the could be pursued district not be and even their higher-ranking protectors he said, but province officials lowest levels could at touched. been he had He portrayed this pos among the president Huong also confirmed earlier reports minister - offered and had refused the prime govern - that ment set-up as an would have Assembly one wedged in the new the National and the generals and merely indicated he executor of been dissatisfied with be policies ing the president body six months out of only 17 As for his own public life lionally con to him Huong gives the new is merely lifespan of claiming it cabinet transitional future he is apparently con - calscene from tent to remain distance observing the politi-comes ulting with advice younger political figures who and occas often for Possible Moderate Buddhist Political Party 18 An unconfirmed article on 22 November in the Vietnamese-language newspaper Tu Do has reported pos - sible plans by the moderate Buddhist faction of Thich Tam Chau to form a political party is labeling "Buddhist democratic party go on which the paper the paper apparently has nothing more to Although fragmentary reports and its own between venerables and speculation it than cites as evidence "numerous meetings Tu De claims unnamed) pro-Buddhist political figures will be nationalist-oriented and will The party,

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have the benefit of rumored to be some Considerable money wealth of operating resources million piasters will also be available to the Tam seven Chau fac- publish, tion for according to the article daily newspaper the faction intends to may Signal the beginning of 19 Tu Do speculate that these developments counter offen- creation over the Buddhist current moderate-militant general sive by Tam Chau in the dispute officially charter recognized political party Although the of an would give Tam Chau definite advantage over his legally rival Thich Tri Quang and would enhance Chau for success reputation as is points the US Embassy The embassy and doubtful of active Buddhist his position prospects laymen have remained most politically organizer and not have effective that Chau does out more important that loyal to Tri Quang faction I-6

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|REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT|
|Vietnamese National Police appear to have thwarted Viet Cong efforts to accelerate their urban operations. Although the Vietnamese Police have eliminated a number of enemy operations causing disturbance, it is difficult to determine the extent of enemy urban organizations and political support that continues to derive from urban operations to South Vietnam. Vietnamese officials have not fully accepted the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation concept; however, they believe that they will soon overcome and better structure operations for a more coordinated and effective result. According to the Vietnamese Cadre Directorate, by November 14, Ap Doi Moi had been established by setting up an additional 65 Ap Cung Ce teams along with 321 RD teams. This government under the Chieu Hoi program has rallied 785 persons in Ap Doi and 57 in Moi Binh Dinh. During the week of November 17, 400 persons rallied, which is less than in the same period of November 11-17, 1966.|
|Viet Cong Urban Operations|
|Effective Vietnamese National Police organization has accelerated term cities of Saigon, the autonomous context to the cities of Vung Tau and Nha Trang. They have apparently thwarted efforts by the Viet Cong in urban operations in areas such as Hue, Da Nang, Cam Ranh, Da Lat, and other large cities like Qui Nhon.|
|Security Service Overview|
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|have cells broken up in numbers significant number of Communist of these and cities including Sai-less much an from urban operations determine Nevertheless how derive financial and economic support he| |
|itensive Da Lat, still difficult to the enemy has continues it is urban organization Cam Ranh Nha Trang how ex-and to Cong derived from VSS there were of As of mid-1967 numerous agent reports sources an increased operations interest in tary enablerural Viet the compensate This greater interest may have been in strengthening their urban to tact countryside and/or to formili and poli them tourban tical retain con - losses with people migrating from to areas gati in their urban activities Communists to key 3 Captured enemy documents and few interro ception reports suggest that the continues be the con- promotion of the enemy has apparently led general uprising in South Vietnam awareness of him, the situation despite his theoretical However the rhetoric situation to Prior policies which best fit announce- adopto Front for the Liberation of the September pub_lic local ment by the National under several to agent Vietnam alleged of advoca NFLSV was South reports new front that the ting, coalition new establish (NFLSV) its new program, seeking NFLSV guisdance neutralist peace interest in and gov- ernment however to may be concept of Any such Communists upplement rather than up front an alternative their the general rising_ tions movements Viet Cong documents that Communist control_ upport 1966 were the conclusion and prisoner interroga- the "Struggle" Communist of documents tend to attribute their failures not under in this regard to poor communications and lower echelons The documents lack of initiative at imply however crises in the future and that the Communist Party may is preparing for similar in creating allow cums tances and exploiting local unrest initiative its agents greater in such cir- II-2| |
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Available information tends to confirm the Communists political organization and encouraging continued interest in promoting urban agitation remain. Although target groups within the cities, the traditional ones--such as student groups, influential social organizations trying to meld that reading trade unions, friend-tradesmen, and ship (such as broader complexion feelings are some associations and the Communists may have indications together including new front clubs) -- there are individuals who in fact some anti-American are physically or con-apathetic towards members within legal status the political situation the in most of the NFLSV mentally exhausted from conflict is likely to be in low key. Propaganda directed at or to while party or zones 25-year prolonged government latter gove= prominent positions in attempt as the past target groups penetrate and gain. The Communist in South Vietnam are apparently Party committees responsible for the larger cities. For the most part subordinate to urban committees have the provincial committees their own organic communications and military units staffs. Almost all of what the in Danear intelligence unit with are adjacent to or Nang. Over Communists the urban areas safe appear capability in generally the considerable in areas "located jur-city term committees some instances as committees and combined recon- is diction the city may exercise country side surrounding the city portion of the directly may be total enemy of agencies committee di- tions involves ever responsible for The conducted the city myriad by effort in the Urban opera- either province or relevels the party by certain Central Office for South Vietnam how- staff" elements at (COSVN) region, or directly certain the higher financial some operations also believed of agencies in North Vietnam are areas of to level entities. Most of the operations col-South trol con Vietnam in the urban collection operations involve intelligence.
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|plex of legal and In order to operate the organizational and other types of highly developed communication-liaison system from distant bases agents an extensive is required Commo-liaison systems handle written operations are generally divided between those which communications and compartmentalization is those used for conducting agent urban operations The enemy utilizes the traditional rule and recognition signals techniques of some extent by tradecraft, apparently clandestine including reinforced to radio communications secret writing In general one of the chief threats to loss of legal the Communists in their urban operations is the status by their operatives operations Of particular relevance in Communist urban Cong hoped are this threat has not feared sapper units the activities of the terrorists In the past year apparently mater the extent the allies urban or the Viet preparing for them, dramatic attacks and are hindered still favor large to although they have been constantly It appears that the in their ability shooting and grenade carry unit in Saigon them out commander is the work According to the recently captured sapper tossing urban sapper much of minor cadres not of the units gon is statements of 10 done randomly Ngoc Anh The suggestion that some Phung is somewhat borne out by female terrorist terrorism in Sai-the captured in the abortive Chinese Nationalist Embassy the press attache of the assassination attempt on In South Vietnam Ehe 25 September 1967 edition of the Situation in Week it Special Action Unit was suggested that 69 with the roll-up of the Viet Viet Cong threat to the US of in Saigon have percent of although Further ciEfals indicates ci 80 been neutralized that the the Viet Cong capacity analyses by for terrorism in Saigon has been seriously neutralized believed that is 80 percent of the affected threat has it not now been responsible for 29 which killed 58 persons however The terrorist incidents between Viet Cong Unit 69 was re-1965 March and 10 July 1967 and injured 274| | |

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|Unit11 the Confederation of Liberation Trade Anh unit, the Viet Cong Armed Propaganda series Unions (Chinese Resident Team)| |
|carried out assassinations and attempted assassinations in the Saigon between Vietnamese victims were several of the 15--were February and September unit ethnic Vietnamese all Vietnamese extraction. of Chinese Chinese 1967 personnel--about Other Among their several descent Americans unit Americans policemen victim g were ting of assassina-unknown in areas considered suitable for that although her three random individuals who happened apparently all Anh appears to have had the US fingered statements made it in advance clear ion and to hasty withdrawal be spotted alone Anh has not produced In addition any evidence interrogation of anything indicate that to the members of the unit were other than Viet Cong or recruiting, training Chinese Communist influence in the that there was any or direction of the unit. from the allegations the ether supplies is well docu-12 Although and use of urban operations to purchase medicines mented exaggerated ones remain only allegations blackmail cities of large-scale financial perhaps and support which may be done by few the enemy in urban areas cannot be ascertained reports suggest that rather than vice versa upported countryside urban operations are Nha Trang documents and interrogation shortages coun activities of the Da restricted by from the For municipal the example committees appear to be Lat and of money and according to interrogation reports--neither the efforts to the Saigon Market ing Committee Party Committee or the Saigon Intellectual Proselyt-have produced any significant funds Anti-infrastructure Activity ordination The Vietnamese government inte accepted ICEX--the acronym for the and exploitation program has lligence initiated by Co-still not CORDS officials as munists infrastructure means of all corps and provinces The US neutralizing the Com-ICEX structure has however, been established in| |

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|To prove the existence of components at all levels and eliminate duplication, ICEX is designed to coordinate and integrate the various resources, assets, and anti-infrastructure programs for funding in South Vietnam.| |
|The ICEX concept and its implementation were discussed by the US organization for the Situation (Weekly) in October.| |
|The burden of the anti-infrastructure effort in Vietnam rests with the ICEX reorganization set by the US. Since the Vietnamese officials hoped that the Vietnamese would follow the example and implement at least an ICEX-type program in Saigon, but they have been somewhat reluctant to do so.| |
|Some of the Vietnamese may have come with recent elections and changes in government security officials, leading to political uncertainties in South Vietnam. However, the initial disappointing reaction of the Vietnamese at the ICEX planning conferences is now being overcome.| |
|US officials have been working to overcome Vietnamese apprehensions, particularly with the National Police, and have been neither reassured about their organizational integrity nor their mode of operations. The National Police's participation in District Operations and DOICC (District Intelligence Coordination Center) is now more extensive, as they seem to believe that such participation is advantageous.| |
|The Vietnamese misgivings about ICEX and CORDS officials in Saigon are now being overcome. From the 53 DOICCs in II and IV Corps, a total of 14 are partly or wholly operational, with 7 in II Corps and 20 in IV Corps programmed for activation during 1968.| |
|At present, there are 22 DOICCs in II Corps and 28 in IV Corps. This projection may be in IIICorps.| |
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|revised upward during 1968 CORDS officials are striving to establish the DOICCs|No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only|
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|In addition to the existing capabilities and the utilization of the Provincial National Police policies and to revive the Vietnamese Provincial Intelligence Coordination Committees (PICC)|DOICCs continue to be assigned for ICEX and that as the national phase officials feel that the US ICEX organization should now be as large as completed US military personnel continue to move into the operational phase. Aside from completing negotiations with guidance from the GVN, support will be given by US officials to monitor the review of field operations reporting, the progress of the construction and utilization of facilities and detention, and the new provincial prisoner screening before the ICEX program can function effectively. Problems still exist and must be overcome. Although ICEX was supported from existing cases both now and envisioned, the management and coordination structure that would derive its structure from the Vietnamese ICEX, however, vehicles and communications still remain with the reactivation of the Vietnamese ICEX staff. In addition to the hoped-for Vietnamese ICEX staffs could further drain the already limited Vietnamese pool of qualified manpower and may not add substantial efforts to the Vietnamese anti-infrastructure.|
|Status of Hamlets Being Worked by RD Teams|Statistics derived from the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Cadre indicate that as of 18 November, in 321 RD hamlets throughout 437, Ap Doi Moi of Real South RD teams were working. These teams are constructing infrastructure.|

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New Life Hamlets" 65 are and at work in 4p Cung Cq (Consolidated Hamlets)(Pacified Hamlets) 57 are establishing Ap Binh Dinh 20149A} Dovember According to the Vietnamese Cadre Directorate, Doi Moi had been completed by the RD CORDS reported that as teams as of number of II eligible the September movement--had completed their move 30 Phase for hamlets 265 teams--58 percent of the teams to have The difference between of number the for by reported to which in their Phase teams completed Ap Doi Moi and the moved 15 presumably accounted the teams hamlets es - tablished 4p Cung Co and Ap Binh Dinh least 31 the 1967 program Wilinotend 137 are 38 as pisres 21 to The Vietnamese RD complete the 1967 Cadre Directorate still goal of 1 until a than lets however RD teams of An January 1968 composed of only addition there Giang Province to of this year in 38 In 20 workers each villages velopment teams are expected These Community De- ent villages for the civil-military established Ap 35 remainder tay in their pres- Of the approximately Vietnam, Binh teams operating in South at least 12 have Binh Dinh--all in Dinh Province--and have moved to Phase II hamlets 22 US advisers have been concerned with forming the RD Cadre Directorate recent actions in ing 550 RD new rather than effort by Vietnamese teams RD teams with ff orings in January Vung Tau graduates assured CORDS The Cadre Director- apparently aimed at establish- recent under strength teams The ate has Tau class however that graduates in 1968 will be first Vung that the used asting fillers and replacements for the exis teams II-8 No Foreign Diss SBCRikfround Use Only

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The USAID retail price index for Saigon was virtually unchanged during pe week ending 13 November alpough pe price of rice rose first increase pen pe new crop began to arrive rice merchants since early September when pe This for pe first time deliveries of to attributed shipments in offset by to an attempt by provincial holdup
Prices virtually The USAID retail price index for Saigon was unchanged during pe week ending 13 November alpough pe price of rice rose first increase pen pe new crop began to arrive rice merchants since early September when pe This for pe first time deliveries of to attributed shipments in offset by to an attempt by provincial
Prices of US-financed imports rose partly in about two percent during possible rumors rods The only decline was mainly because of duties and to widespread
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The USAID retail price index for Saigon was virtually unchanged during pe week ending 13 November alpough pe price of rice increased Freemarket dollar and early September slightly
gold rates rumors pat rose in response to be issued larger piaster banknote would commercial route Route in is Vietnam and important for transporting used
pe most is now most raper pan waterways from pe delta goods to Saigon Route 20 norp of Saigon has become increasingly important closure to commerce since pe
of Route along pe coast Prices virtually The USAID retail price index for Saigon was unchanged during pe week ending 13 November alpough pe price of rice rose first increase pen pe new crop began to arrive rice merchants since early September when pe This for pe first time deliveries of to attributed shipments in offset by to an attempt by provincial holdup

Prices virtually The USAID retail price index for Saigon was unchanged during pe week ending 13 November alpough pe price of rice rose first increase pen pe new crop began to arrive rice merchants since early September when pe This for pe first time deliveries of to attributed shipments in offset by to an attempt by provincial holdup
prices anticipation of higher official declines in pe prices of chicken rice shrimp was charcoal and most vegetables and firewood result in higher prices Inadequate deliveries of for pese items but prices of all oper non-food products Saigon is included in pe Annex

response Prices pe week ending 14 November 2 of US-financed imports rose partly in about two banknote mainly because of percent during possible rumors rods The only decline was duties and to widespread The price of cement- No Foreign Dissem/ Background Use Only SECRET
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|NORTHERN VIETNAM|CONFIDENTIAL|
|---|---|
|THAILAND|QUANGTIN|
|QUANGNGAI|KONTUM|
|DINH DINH|Pleiku|
|PLEIKU|PAU BON|
|CAMBODIA|YEN|
|VARLAC|KHA HOA|
|NHA TRANG|QUANG DUC|
|TUYEN|LA LAT|
|VINH|NINH|
|ONG THUF|BAO LOC|
|PHAN RANG|BINA|
|BINA THUTN|MANA TUY PHAN THIET|
|TUY|MY THO|
|MY THUAN|CAN THO|
|QUAN|VINH LOI LONG|
|SOUTH VIETNAM|100 MILES|

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|Currency and Gold mentioned on 13 market dollar and gold of highest bank-issuance of circulation is lightly Free 3 above November as 1,000-piaster note particularly result The those concerning the rates rose the rumors note now The prices piaster each for in of to 156 and 202 piasters weekly currency green dollars and gold per on unchanged at 115 dollar the 500-piaster note one The leaf rose rate dollar and gold prices graph was monthly and MPC (scrip) piasters per (Aisincluded in the Annex.)| |
|Highways of Commerce: Route Erom the delta are now commodities moving to Saigon series of reports by Vietnamese and US officials show that most transported by the condition of road roads has rather deteriorated and that in recent years from gon through eight provinces to Quan running_Ca Mau) than water rapidly the Viet Cong mining and heavy traffic Route Long from Saiin the most first nine months of Saigon was least part to An the Xuyen Province important commercial route distance of about Vietnam in 217 miles Dur-ing the 1967 three fourths of by road and all the delta rice delivered tot trucked at transported of Route of this was Saigon formerly was way are on also trucked Most fish and pork delivered via economic way to insecure Route Shipment by barge foodstuffs the most to transport and Saigon port area the many barge owners where they but delta waterways are have moved their equipment to now Rice and cement Saigon by barge only clinker are the can make more money major items still transported to but barges must now wait for convoys which travel three of four times month.| |
|Length of Route Under normal conditions from Quan Long to trip covering the Saigon takes nine pending on enemy activities and the weather periferries to 11 hours but this may be extended into days de- The normal trip often involves extended Mekong River ods at several one-way bridges and the waiting| |

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My Thuan to Trans-Bassac River ferries at Can Tho about 15 hard surface portion of the road varies been obvious effects to have been heavily cratered by tail attacked frequently during the to the Saigon feet wide mines past few months but many stretches Route has with on the deliveries combined with heavy food prices section of the market October, Prior rain was the main cause of highway VCI ining of presidential inaugurations six percent increase cratered the from My Thuan the My in capital that week. In the section to than 100 mines Tho the enemy has 168-foot road with more and blown up. This destruction closed the roads lowed traffic con-reinforced concrete bridge but the continued cratering has for only two days considerably of the the break in 6 road has been closed. If truckers learn in they transship either section advance that can drive de percent on made the roadside or delay shipment until repairs are containers because normal to to lay truck on the other they Fish shipped live in water con-fish day are are and the most vulnerable to trucker loses must wait up to their goods 20 the of hished delivers dead fish incurred at and if he 70 percent over-night two-day de of delays loss can be as much as. With the cost lay the many resource to where checkpoints along the wait 36 dif-there are costs the way In addition and at iod ferries One rice trucker reported payments bribe shortens to ing per-ferent parties on round trip between Saigon and Vinh Loi (Bac Lieu) Routes 20 and Route 20 running second important commercial highway is from about 44 miles east of Saigon ing to an major route Nha up the ing of Route railroad north to Da Lat Binh Long Khan and Wi th Tuy the clos coast, provinces and the in become which parallels Route for goods being transported from Saigon to embassy Rang Phan report Trang security and has improved Pleiku Accord.

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|considerably along the road in recent months traffic The maintained regular and since July on| |
|tax points|the V Chavanot the road. highway designed however to take now fixed and maintenance carries far more is poor than it was east of Saigon 8 Route and runs 20 begins about i43 miles at Province to Da Lat_ unction with Route hard-surface road mountain resort in Tuyen Duc feet in width averaging 14 repair have|
|weather traffic, and lack of|resulted in several stretches of mud and potholes but There are ford bridges and culverts on Route 20 hours most cou one be easily repaired within bridge MACV originally not yet damaged scheduled complete over few rapids except in the La Nga and expansion of the road for 1968 repair River available and other tary but there are no funds claiming mili routes have higher province officia_Route military priori With no inability assistance and cessary repairs 20 probably will slowly de- to keep up ne- teriorate hours ning time from de The security of the road constantly changes lays or except Saigon to Da Lat Route in rainy weather is five years ago in about double what it was 20 is open to traffic with few serious but still the normal ten to but 12 run- Long Khanh Province the South Vietnamese Army and series forces provide reasonably security with local between Baotrong points along the of is Loc and the Lan Dong-Tuyen Duc road The border stretch however highway insecure and the enemy they can interdict the for short peri_ods when choose and types No thorough check is made on 10 _ of cargo transported on Route the amounts 20 but one tons each of showed that about 200 table day vegetables are urvey grow It is known trucked daily from the vege - that more vehicles 100 metric than use the road other products ing center of Da Lat to Saigon and that trucked through Da Lat time is normal such the as from vegetables arrive fish the coast in marketable salt, and nuoc nam are If travel|

No Foreign Dissem'BackgroundUseOnly SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03031268
---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03031268 No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only SECRET

happens bananas and and Da goods Traffic in some 20 to Phan Rang, and consumers condition about half the days spoils and both direction but when suffer two load are required, the other as often farmers carries consumer from Saigon to Pleiku. Lat and for the frequently on civilian population Nha Trang Each day tons of area and then flown out pineapples are trucked from the Saigon tary planes to US installations in military planes hardship for the in Binh Thuan Province 125 now miles The closing of of Phan Thiet on to be about about and six hours 11 economy Phan away from Saigon by road Route Thiet used has been the particular but is coast 24 hours by water nuoc mam, and salt, current The area major industries embassy officer who toured are fish believes but with adequate security and the opening the road, the area of that sion of vegetable renewal of lumbering there would be development of rice production production and possibly Phan Thiet the expansion The fishermen of their product to Saigon of time now required for with trip because refrigeration is the cold inadequate for the length talk but apparently There has been storage facilities for of acquiring boats fishermen the old pattern of commerce real preference is Route using 1 return to the III-5 No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only SECRET Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03031268
---
| |13 Jun 1966|3 Jan 1967|23 Oct 1967|30 Oct 1967|Nov 1967|13 Nov 1967|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Index for all Items|173|225|29|304|300|301|
|Index for Food Items|190|242|324|345|332|332|
|Of Which: (In Piasters)|Pork Bellies (1 kg: 18")|Rice - Soc Nau (100 Nuoc Man (jar)|1,25090|1,700130|2,300200|2,300230|2,250220|2,350220|
|Fish - Ca Tre (1kg.)|130|150|220|270|260|260|
| |70|90|150|150|150|150|
|Index for Nonfood Items|140|195|228|230|232|236|
|Of Which: (In Piasters)|Firewood (cu. meter)|360|560|500|520|530|560|
|Cigarettes (pack)|10|14|14|16|16|16|
|White Calico (meter)|27|33|45| | | |
|Kerosene (liter)|7|10.5| |9| | |

Price level just prior to the 18 June devaluation. Data are from USAID sources. For all indexes, January 1965 = 100.

Preliminary.
---
| |1964|1965|1966|1967|SEP|OCT|NOV|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|GOLD: Basis gold leaf worth $35 per troy ounce| | | | | | | |
|US $10 GREEN| | | | | | | |
|US $10 MPC Military Payment Certificates (scrip)| | | | | | | |
---
Secret  Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03031268
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03031268 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15466576].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), United States officials, Vietnamese officials",
    "What": "Intelligence report on the situation in South Vietnam involving political, revolutionary, and economic developments, counterinsurgency efforts, infrastructure programs, and transportation issues",
    "When": "November 1967",
    "Where": [
        "South Vietnam",
        "Saigon",
        "Hue",
        "Da Nang",
        "Cam Ranh",
        "Da Lat",
        "Qui Nhon",
        "Vung Tau",
        "Nha Trang",
        "Quang Tin",
        "Quang Ngai",
        "Kontum",
        "Dinh Dinh",
        "Pleiku",
        "Pau Bon",
        "Yen",
        "Varlac",
        "Kha Hoa",
        "Phan Rang",
        "Bina",
        "Tuy Hoa",
        "Ninh Thuan",
        "Can Tho",
        "Vinh Loi Long",
        "My Tho",
        "Da Lat",
        "Hanoi",
        "Thai Binh",
        "Namdinh",
        "Hai Phong"
    ],
    "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595hi/pmmfit

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

8 December

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
---
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18. Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595

Information as of 1600

# HIGHLIGHTS

Fighting continues in coastal Binh Dinh Province. Enemy forces are also putting up stiff resistance to allied sweeps in III Corps.

# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Fighting was reported on between allied troops 7-8 December in North-eastern Binh Dinh Province. Vietnamese 3rd Division and elements of the North Enemy forces are active in Bu Dop area along the Cambodian border and are putting up stiff resistance to allied sweeps elsewhere in III Corps.

# Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# Communist Political Developments:

Premier Kosygin has told the Swedish prime minister that he did not think Hanoi would react to a US bombing halt.
---
Apes;/ed for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595

TOP SECRET

MILITARY SITUATION REPORT

SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Fighting continued on 7-8 December in Operation PERSHING in eastern Binh Dinh Province between US forces and more than 250 elements of the North Vietnamese 3rd Division. More enemy soldiers have been killed during three days of fighting. American losses are 16 reported killed.

2. The action began on 6 December when a helicopter patrol was fired on from what appeared to be a deserted village some 12 miles north of US 1st Cavalry Division were flown Brigade of the Bong Son. Two companies from the 1st into the area and almost immediately encountered stiff resistance from enemy troops in well-fortified, heavily and US the enemy. The village itself has been seized camouflaged bunkers. Vietnamese troops are attempting to block and South the North Vietnamese 3rd 1,500-man 22nd Regiment of the mountains to the west. Nine US companies are reported closing in on four South Vietnamese companies to force them toward the which are blocking the way to the mountains on the western perimeter of the battle area.

3. The Bong Son battleground is in the vicinity of one of South Vietnam's major rice-producing areas, and this may have been one of the main reasons for the enemy's presence there. The renewed fighting in the area after a lull of several months recalls indications that the Communist campaign farther west in the highlands late last month was designed to draw American forces access to the rice-rich coastal areas.

4. Operation PERSHING, a long-term search-and-destroy operation, has accounted for more than 4,500 enemy since mid-February. The Communist prisoners taken troops killed and 10,100 recent upsurge in sion in this elements of the North Vietnamese 3rd fighting by area also suggests that the enemy has Division received replacements and supplies and is now prepared to increase military activity throughout the province.

8 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
---
|NORTH VIETNAM|NORTH VIETNAM|
|---|
|OUANG TRI|HUE|
|HUA THIEN|KONTUM|
|QUANG NGAI|BINH DINH|
|QUANG NAM|PHU YEN|
|THAILAND|KHANH HOA|
|KHANH HOA|DA NANG|
|QUANG DUC|TUYEN QUANG|
|PHUOC TUY|HA TAY|
|KIEN GIANG|PHONG THUONG|
|BA XUYEN|VINH BINH|
|BA XUYEN|BA XUYEN|
|AN GIANG|BINH DECEMBER|
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595

|5.|Another subordinate of the 3rd Division has been identified in combat with South Korean 8th troops to the south of Operation PERSHING. The Viet Battalion of the 18th Regiment, together with a Cong local force unit, lost some 60 killed in a sharp 24-hour battle on 7 December in an area some 15 miles northwest of the provincial capital of Qui Nhon.|
|---|---|
|Enemy Forces in III Corps| |
|6.|Sporadic action continues in the Bu Dop area along the Cambodian border and Communist units are putting up stiff resistance to allied sweeps elsewhere in III Corps.|
|7.|A Viet Cong battalion launched a ground attack against a US 1st Division base being constructed just south of the Bu Dop Special Forces camp during the early hours of 8 December. The attack failed to breach the US defensive perimeter. Four Americans were killed. The Communists also shelled nearby Bo Duc district town and another 1st Division position in the area, causing light damage. Allied positions in this sector have been subjected to occasional mortar and rocket attacks and ground probes for the past nine days.|
|8.|On 7 December a South Vietnamese Army battalion lost 15 killed and 47 wounded in a clash 17 miles north of Saigon in Binh Duong Province. A US helicopter pilot was also killed and four US helicopters were downed. On the previous day a US 1st Division company reported 10 killed, 88 wounded, and 14 missing in another fight in Binh Duong Province, some 32 miles north of the capital. In both of these engagements the enemy units fought from well-constructed bunkers and underground tunnel systems. Enemy losses were reported as light.|
|9.|In the immediate Saigon area, an estimated 60-man Viet Cong unit attacked a South Vietnamese Regional Force company on 5 December, killing one soldier.|

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Approveq for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595gmi-Y' 3'5"

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wounding four.appearance of an enemy force of thisAlthough the attack lasted only l5 minutes, the

size less than than two Viet Cong in this area.new show of boldness by the miles from Sai on is ag 8 December 1967 I-3

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
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|Appr_0vecj for Releese: 2019/03/29 C03024595|1|3.5(c)|
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| | | |
|Z C03024595|1|3.5(c)|
| | |3-5(0)|
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29| | |
---
# 8 December 1967

|A|df|R I|22019/O3/29 CO3024595|
|---|---|---|---|
|ZR HI'l'|§?|3-5(C)|s.5(¢)|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
---
# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report

8 December 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595

# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Stockholm, According to a British Embassy official in Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson reports that Premier Kosygin, very pessimistic about prospects for peace in Vietnam, said he did not think Hanoi would react to a US bombing halt. He further stated that Hanoi was completely independent of Moscow or Peking.

In earlier press reports on his talks with Kosygin in late November, Nilsson indicated that the Soviet Premier had held out little hope for Soviet peace initiatives, stressing that Hanoi must make its own decisions. Kosygin's comment about possible results of a bombing halt is at variance with unofficial remarks by some lesser Soviet officials who have been attempting to paint a rosy picture of prospects if the bombing is halted.

8 December 1967

V-1

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
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Apprpvedfor Release; 2019/03*‘/29 C030245\9£-Li 35(0)

s.5(¢

3.3(h)(2)

8 December 1967

VI—1

s.5(¢)

,’D9-P'S'ET3RET 3.5 c)(

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595

Z   Emwefit           W

Top       cret

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03024595 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602342].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, US forces, Enemy forces, Premier Kosygin, Swedish Prime Minister",
"What": "Military situation in South Vietnam, Communist military and political developments, Fighting in Binh Dinh Province, Operation PERSHING, Combat reports, Enemy actions, US bombing halt discussions",
"When": "8 December 1967",
"Where": ["Binh Dinh Province", "III Corps", "Bu Dop area", "Cambodian border", "Qui Nhon", "Bong Son", "Saigon", "South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Thailand", "Stockholm"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611 Secret 3.5(c)

'WEDSatr ?

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

PLEASE RETURN TO ARCHIVAL RECORD AGENCY ARCHIVES, Secret

62-428933/1 22 December 1967 No _ 0321/67

For Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611 AGENCY A5ClWS 0

Job _ T0
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611   3.5(c)

Page

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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611

# SECRET

# CONTENTS

|Information as of noon EST, 21 December 1967|Far East|Page|
|---|---|---|
|THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE| | |
|VIETNAM low level military activity remained at Communist throughout its first test of strength with| | |
|week Meanwhile, in South Vietnam during relatively the past| | |
|the National approval to get full Assembly of the Thieu government failed its partial mobilization| |NR|
|COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS| | |
|The Communists have launched their annual dry-season wide-ranging effort may offensive and there are be made tenuous this year signs that more| |NR|

# SECRET

# WEEKLY SUMMARY 22 Dec 67

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C0317261SEGRET

FAR EAST

remained at Communist military activity in South Vietnam further evidence of plans for relatively low level but there was of heavily populated major Communist central South Front renewed seventh anniversary was offensive in the Vietnam Viet Cong the occasion assurances of The National Liberation and North Vietnamese coastal area of for resolve Chou En but confined himself to the standard Premier to continue Chinese support lai publicly promised fighting until final victory more effective description of China for the Vietnamese people role as dependable rear struggle Communist forces in Laos have launched their annual dry-season offensive sustained and wide-ranging campaign this year with some signs of more moving into northern tellof North Vietnamese troops Unconfirmed reports tack by Pathet Lao and North In reaction to an Laos government base in southern Vietnamese forces on Laos Premier Souvanna accords again denounced the presence of the Geneva Vietnamese Phouma as flagrant violation of the North NR

SEGRET

Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 22Dec67

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# North Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

|VANG TRI|Hue|Da Nang|
|---|---|---|
|THAI|Tin|QUANG NAM|
|KONTUM|Kortum|PLEIKU|
|PHU BON| | |
|Tonle|CAMBODIA| |
|DARLAC|Ban Me Thuot| |
|OT NAC|UYEN|Da Nang|
|Bac|Do|Bi Nk|
|GIANG| | |
|KIEN|Can Tho|HOA|
|XUYEN| | |

CHINA

SOUTH VIETNAM

SECRET
---
# VIETNAM

Communist-initiated military activity remained relatively low throughout the past week in South Vietnam. The few significant encounters in recent days resulted mainly in sensitive considerations into South Vietnamese sweep operations, some of which penetrated Communist bases. In its first test of strength, the National Assembly failed to get the approval of the Thieu government for its partial mobilization decree. Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy went before the assembly with the decree to defend the country, but the Upper House largely rebuffed the government, alleging that the decree may be unconstitutional. The Lower House may also not approve Vy's mobilization decree. The Democratic Bloc, which is generally pro-government, may have more leverage in the Lower House, leading to the rejection of the decree. The Thieu administration apparently plans to implement its decree in January without risking further difficulties in its relations with the legislature.

Documents recently captured outlined a plan for a Vietnamese diversionary attack near Que Son to draw allied reaction from nearby strongpoints. The plan involved conducting the attack near Que Son, then withdrawing and joining other forces to conduct a subordinated division attack. The 2nd Division in recent months suffered heavy casualties to the south, leading to doubts about whether the plan can be put into effect. In Quang Ngai Province, there is some doubt that the plan can be executed effectively.

ICssuggest
that the province and capital city may
SECRTT

Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 22Dec 67
---
# 3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611SEERET

NFLSVAnniversaryCelebrated

TheLiberationFrontingSouthendorse-pre

mentOn 19December the govern- tenslionofbethetrongVietnamesethe solerepre tarybroughttotrialinvolvedincourt 26 personsin mili peoplereceived sentativeof Corpswhichwas ment1966Buddhist the centeredinstruggle" move - ment thisweekinfromitspropagandaaccompany-Communistallies Da NangProminentamongmayorand fendantsareNguyenformerDr theformerVanManthede-of ingtheanniversary ber seventhcelebrationoftheFrontTheNorth VietnameseFronton20Decen- Dam QuangareaYeucommander Colonel stressedtheirownstruggleandthefinal heavysentencesmay bringConvictionaboutand victoryachievedin resolvetopointingt0thesuccessuntil anotherconfrontationbetweenthe governmentandthem_litantBudare alsoindications thattheexploittheissueprotestsViet are the plans temptingtostimulatemassby indicated at- In their propagandaon the Mosco...

... winter-springcampa_gn as evi- dencethattheCommunistsmilitaryinitiative have thatthe exploittheissueprotestsViet are the plans temptingtostimulatemassby indicated at- In their propagandaon the Mosco...

... conflict_differingstatementstook their Sovietline haveformedcommitteesto Moscow usual thatthe litical prisoners intothematter ofamnesty forpo- programwillbeparticularly portantin solvingtheVietnam-im- ese otherhandTheChineseonlyrarely referon BuiQuangSan, memberof theproblem. Provincepersons the Lower Housefrom QuangNamtwowas assassinated by totheprogramandthis chosetoemphasizeanduncompro-that portiontime unknown Government spokesmenhave claimedon15December havingtone treatmentmilitantits over-all mising Inanniversary thattheViet Congwereresponsible king repeateditsstrongbutofthe Pe- forSan some possibilitybutinvolvementdeath_ thattherei5killedhewas carefullywordedof-ersof en- intheresultofhis as political squabblewithin VietnameseNationalist Party (VNQDD)

SECRET

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

22Dec67

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|LAOS|
|C H 1 N|H 1 ~|
|HANOV|
|Nam Bac|
|LUANG|Phou-|
|PRABANG|Pha|Samneua|
|Thi|
|PRDVINCE|
|MuongWgan|
|VIENTIANE|
|OamercallorLint|
|T;H_A-L_L A' N_D|
|Saravene|SOUTh|
|VIETNAM|
|Lao_NgamBOLOVENS|
|PLATEAU|
|CONFIDENTIAL|
|ND FOREIGN DISSEM|
|ICQMue|M B 0 D [ 4|
|J? Ki omele 5|
|69012 12-67 Cia|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611SECRET|
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611

SECRET

COMMUNISTS STEP UP MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LAOS

The Communists are tenuous have launched are stepped-up intelligence and harass-almost certainly aware that annual and there wide-ranging dry-season offensive from operations are advanced bases being mounted in Laos and their of these are designed to signs that be made this year effort may more some attacks into the infiltration corridor thwart government encroachment munist activity has occurred near The most significant Com- The Communists also want to push the northern edge of Laos the Bolovens government troops to sustain unlikely from the Bolovens they are willing Plateau 11 December and North Vietnamese in southern two battalions On of Pathet Lao troopsoverran government base inflicting military commander the region At any rate will probably camp at Lao Ngamon the camp defenders important government guerrilla The try to use the plate auto Vientiane that the Communist threat persuade the an to outpost reoccupied Ngam was enemy was though Lao captured by the subsequently few miles to the north Al - general staff in northern southern- based troops to in recent deployment of Laos has the south precarious an long-range security setback military position government thenorth, the Communists and development programs in this continuing their campaign rich rice-growing area against government-supported west threatening the provincial The Communists are now capi- guerrilla outposts maybe planning of Samneua They south and tal of Saravane to isolate Phou Pha This staging base for government an impor- Saravane tant is only lightly and its tactical defended by government troops minimal but its importance is ernment troops past offensives hands during the area changed Such bases have fre- loss would be the government severe quently appear to recent enemy actions The hold any air support for govern- face of in the belaunchedin later esumption of ment troops Will This season probably also the Communists counter recent government gains attempt to increased presence around the The Communists of

SECRET

Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 22Dec67

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611

SECRET

inthenorth                  andthereare                  un-               wouldweakentheenemy                                south- confirmed           reportsVietnamesemanythatastroops                      ern     defenseofthePlainedes Jarres            TheCommunists                  are also thrustlikelyspotforrice-under aremovinginto LaosalongRouteCommunist         suppliesintonorthern Luang continuingtomovetroopsand Valleywouldberecentlybroughtproduc-in  the MuongNgan                       PrabangProvinceanotherpushsuggesting ing             an    important                                            that            positionsagainstgov -         area                                                               ernment                              atNamBac              3.5(c) governmentpresenceincontinued government            control                                              may     beinthe             offing. this      area

SECRET

# Page                 WEEKLYSUMMARY                       22Dec67

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Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611
Seeret
Seeret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172611 "WEEKLY SUMMARY_15472840_.pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE",
"What": "Weekly Summary of military activities in Far East, Vietnam, Laos, China, and South Vietnam",
"When": "22 December 1967",
"Where": ["Far East", "Vietnam", "Laos", "China", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02406688

EO 13526 3.3(h)(2)

EO 13526 3.5(c)

# FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

To: Secret

5 February 1968

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02406688
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

5 February 1968

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Military Liberation Hanoi offensive on the Current is still Offensive: being portrayed by The Communist Hanoi and the Liberation Front as "forces" government over—a spontaneous popular uprising political and "revolutionary" of Hanoi aiming at throwing and replacing the Saigon political and military role deliberately. Liberation of the Front seems to be downplayed deliberately. The Communists call the offensive, which is said to have generated new, broadly based organizations which, in conjunction with the Front, will eventually establish a coalition government for South Vietnam. These new organizations, supported by the propaganda but insisting on urgent benefits in Viet—of joining the struggle or at least supporting it. On the military political side, the offensive has brought about the formation of the Communists claim the political intellectuals, and noncombatant "alliances" throughout the country which are supported by such groups as students, women, businessmen, and actual spelled composition organization propaganda have not been spelled out. The key role of these alliances, coalition implies, will have a key role in setting up a government. An appeal from the on For February, Hue, time, in Hue, broad—cast by the that of by in the clearly. Hue 2 of reunification. Cong radio on For February, 2 first stated es—it claimed that one of the alliance's goals was the establishment of a "national coalition administration" with the appeals and in the South for "National and effect government North by Saigon the order setting to and effect Hue up of "alliances" reunification. normal the as relations well as Pre~ as by a so-called "National Leadership" the of Front, "Alliance" the "Alliance" have for the called formation Vietnam for negotiations of a coalition with government the Front, or but the not reunification of Vietnam.
---
# TOP

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02406688

The military struggle support is also being recently portrayed as based on popular support. Most recent statements by Hanoi ("Liberation Front new and the Front Armed avoid singling out the Viet Cong ("Liberation Armed Forces") as the focal point of the Communist military effort. The offensive appeal has spawned "revolutionary" new military forces. The Front broadcast on 3 February, carrying an appeal for patriotic support from the Viet Cong command, praised the "revolutionary people" for "simultaneously" rising up. It also hailed the "insurrectionary troops" and patriotic armed forces in the "revolutionary army" against the Viet Cong, and called for "coordinating forces." In a broadcast for united forces, their action the same day, it claimed such uprisings in Saigon were responsible for the "armed uprising" and that they had created an "insurrectionary revolutionary group committee" that would eventually establish a "revolutionary administration" in the city. A similar "alliances," Hanoi like people to another area (Quang Tri, Thua Thien provinces), have made strong appeals for support and return. These groups, according to Hanoi, have cooperation, support, and have promised rewards, position, and safety in return. There is virtually no evidence of any substance to these Communist claims. Even the existence of the "revolutionary organizations" and "alliances" is unproved and there is nothing to suggest they have any popular support or following. The Communists' purpose in creating such an organizational facade remains unclear. They may have intended to use their offensive set it to help win a "coalition government" if their offensive won popular support, and they may still intend for it to do so even if this has not happened. They could also use these organizations as scapegoats for their failure if their current efforts peter out. Several military commentaries from Hanoi have suggested a more prolonged offensive struggle. The Hanoi party paper on 3 February said the current fighting was creating conditions for additional military victories. The North Vietnamese Army forces journal called for the southern forces to maintain and develop their revolution.

-2-

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02406688
---
# TOP RET 3.5(c)

semxm 3.3(h)(2)

Trade Trade Mission to Singapore: North Kuan Lee Yew has told Ambassador Galbraith that a North Vietnamese trade mission will be coming to Singapore "imminently." Lee believes that the North Vietnamese coming at this time is part of a coordinated effort, related to the current offensive in the South, to embarrass the US and try to discourage those who support the US in Vietnam.

Lee concluded his talk with the ambassador by saying, "Do not worry. There will be no trade."

# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Effects of Tet Offensive: Hanoi, in a broadcast beamed in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 2 February, offered its analysis of the effects the Communist Tet offensive was having on the US political scene. It reported that both Saigon and Washington were in "fever" and that the first person to lose grace was "old US Ambassador Bunker." The broadcast played up alleged consternation in US Government circles over the Viet Cong penetration of the US Embassy and claimed that hundreds of Americans were killed or wounded in that attack alone. Continuing in this vein, the broadcast reported that the person with the biggest headache in Saigon was General Westmoreland whose "boastful nature" has been truly exposed by the events of the past three days. As a result of Westmoreland's boasting, President Johnson could not eat and sleep properly. He was confused "as the man in the moon."
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02406688
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 002406688

To met

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C02406688
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 002406688 "SPECIAL DAILY REPORT ON N[15561264].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "President",
"What": "Daily reports on North Vietnam, military strategies, political situation, trade mission to Singapore, reflections on US political attitudes",
"When": "5 February 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "Singapore", "South Vietnam", "US Embassy", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C00114129

PRIORITY 1113526Eo

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION - Cable N 29657 1,3(h)(2)

STATE/INR on NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC mc NSA SOO ONE CNS DDI EXO NPIC OSN FBI8 OCS MS UO USM NPICL-2

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, US Code, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

1313381 mT MST 15 JANUARY 1968

|COUNTRY:|LAOS/NORTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|
|DOI:| |
|SUBJECT:|AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI (SITE 12 JANUARY 1968 - 9 85)|
|ACQ:|LAOS, VIENTIANE <15 JANUARY 1968) FIELD NO:|

1-5(°) 3.4(b)(1)

1. FOUR DARK GREEN AIRCRAFT FLYING IN A NORTHWESTERLY DIRECTION PASSED THE VICINITY OF MUONG SANG (UH SSSM AT 1SDD HOURS ON 12 JANUARY. WHEN THE FOUR AIRCRAFT REACHED BAN ROUEI SOUI (1852), TWO OF THE AIRCRAFT BROKE FROM FORMATION AND ORBITED IN THE ROUEI SOUI AREA, WHILE THE SECOND TWO AIRCRAFT, WHICH WERE AN-2 COLTS, CONTINUED TO PHOU PHA-THI (SASS) AND COMMENCED BOMBING RUNS WHILE FLYING ON AN APPROXIMATE HEADING OF 90 DEGREES. 1510 HOURS. TWO WOUNDED CIVILIANS AND TWO GUERRILLAS COMMENT: A PRELIMINARY Q3230) ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI.

2. EACH OF THE TWO ATTACKING AIRCRAFT MADE ONE BOMBING AND STRAFING RUN AT

1.5(<=) 3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 5 AUG 1997;

for Release: 2019/03/29 C00114129
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C001 14129

2

PAGE 2 ‘OF 3 PAGES

T 1 5 c m=--SQ-wi BM‘)

Classification) Dissemination controls)

SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND fwofwouunen BY BDMBSQ BY FLYING DEBRIS. THE Bombs, WHICH ALL APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN 250 POUNDS, INFLICTED SLIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME BUILDINGS, most OF WHICH WERE BILLETS.

THE FIRST AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND BURNED IN THE VICINITY OF uu sesssé SHORTLY AFTER IT HAD COMPLETED ITS BOMBING RUN. "A ground TEAM FROM PHOU PHA THI SEARCHED THE AREA AT aseo HOURS ON 12 JANUARY AND REPORTED NOTHING WAS SALVAGEABLE» SEVERAL ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE ALSO HIT THE SECOND AIRCRAFT; WHICH bore TAIL NUMBER ass, AS IT MADE ITS BOMBING RUN. IT CRASHED IN THE VICINITY OF UH 570895.

A GROUND TEAM THAT REACHED THE CRASH SITE AT UH 5789 AT 1500 HOURS ON 12 JANUARY RECOVERED TWO OF THREE BODIES IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE TEAM COULD NOT REMOVE A THIRD BODY WHICH WAS WEDGED IN THE WRECKAGE. THE TEAM REPORTED ALL OCCUPANTS OF THE AIRCRAFT APPEARED TO BE VIETNAMESE. THE TEAM ALSO RECOVERED A SOVIET MANUFACTURED HF RADIO AND A SET OF 71 ACCESSORY CRYSTALS AND CHARTS AND NOTEBOOKS IN VIETNAMESE. ONE AERONAUTICAL CHART WAS

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C00114129
---
Appfovedfor Release: 2019/03/29

Q.

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

15(¢)

3'_4§b)(1)

(classification) (di-uem mntroh)

ANNOTATED AND SHOWEE THE FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE DIRECT TO PHOU

PHA THI: DUC THANG (XJ B262) T0 CANH MEO (UH 0274) TO SOP HAO (VH 4373), T0 MUONG HAM (UH 9747) T0 MUONG YUT (UH 7156) T0 PHOU PHA THI. THE RETURN ROUTE WAS PLOTTED FROM PHOU PHA THI T0 MUONG HET (UJ 9702) T0 YEN CHAU (VJ 3926) T0 VAN YEN (VJ-7129) T0 sou TAY cw 5s:ss> T0 nuc THANG.

DISSEM: sum: ARMY AIR USAID us1S usmncv 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PA_CF1..T PACAF ARPAC

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTEL T02 WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C00114129 "AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE [15602444].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "State/INR, NMCC/MC, SECDEF, JCS, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CIA, NSA, CNS, DDI, FBI, OCS, MS, USM, NPICL-2",
    "What": "Attack on Phou Pha Thi in Laos/North Vietnam by aircraft on January 12, 1968",
    "When": "15 January 1968",
    "Where": ["Laos", "North Vietnam", "Vientiane", "Muong Sang", "Ban Rouei Soui", "Phou Pha Thi", "Duc Thang", "Canh Meo", "Sop Hao", "Muong Ham", "Muong Yut", "Muong Het", "Yen Chau", "Van Yen", "Sou Tay"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Re|ee}s_e: 5913/95/17 005947652

s.5(¢)

e‘ ~¥ELLIQ€/V0QQ

cJ@NTR4L

'f~3l\1210

e/4;‘,

0,,          0

T/.26 Pmz'a/em"; Dalz'/y Brief

Top Sewer 26 March 1968

4

L

§rUP's'EcRe'r—

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05947652
---
# DAILY BRIEF 26 MARCH 1968

|Vietnam|While military activity in South Vietnam remains at a low level, we continue to get more signs of heavy enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. Truck traffic through the Mu Gia Pass is at the highest level since just before the Tet offensive. Some of the trucks carry troops--a highly unusual procedure which suggests that the movement has a good deal of urgency behind it. Some Communist messages convey the same sense of urgency.|
|---|---|
|Panama|Max Delvalle, the Arias supporter whom the Assembly elected to the presidency yesterday to replace Robles, has called the Assembly into special session this afternoon to make changes in the electoral code. This throws down the gauntlet to the National Guard, which refuses to recognize the impeachment of Robles and says it will not let the session meet. The confrontation could lead to violence, although Arias and his supporters seem to lack the resources in either manpower or equipment for an effective challenge to the Guard. The general strike proclaimed yesterday by off the ground.|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17

|3. Laos|BoardThe United States Intelligence has approved a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Communist intentions in Laos over the next two in- three months. The estimate notes that the Communists could in fairly short order reduce the area controlled by Vientiane to a few enclaves. It points out that the Communists might press ahead if, for instance, they saw an advantage in creating a "second front" in Laos to spread US resources. They might also do so if they thought it advisable to strengthen the Communist hand in any negotiations by taking as much territory as possible in Laos. But, on balance, the estimate concludes that the Communists will probably content themselves with theprob- of a few more positions and then reduce their pressure during the rainy season which begins in May.|
|---|---|
|4. Cambodia|Cambodian security forces have evicted Viet Cong elements from Cambodian territory and for the first time have destroyed a large Communist bivouac complex. The security forces were acting on information provided by the US. Particularly significant is the fact that the destroyed bivouac is in an area where local Cambodian officials have previously cooperated with the Viet Cong. Sihanouk reportedly is working up a full dossier on Viet Cong installations in Cambodia, in case he decides to blow the whistle publicly on their activities.|
---
5. Communist China

6. Saudi Arabia

The Saudis are predictably reluctant to go along with the Jordanian call for an early Arab summit. They fear--probably rightly--that they would be pressed at such a meeting to ante up more funds for Egypt and Jordan. They are also worried that Nasir would trap them into supporting another expedition against Israel. The Saudis torpedoed one proposed summit late last year, but in the emotional atmosphere following last week's military action, they may have trouble heading this one off.

7. Soviet Union - Cuba

Growing political irritations between Moscow and Havana seem to have had little effect on their economic relations. The trade protocol for this year, announced last week after six ten months of negotiations, calls for a percent boost in trade. Also, according to press reports, Moscow is shelling out more credits. The new credits would presumably be to refinance previous ones and to cover Cuba's balance of payments deficits. THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617899].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "United States Intelligence",
    "What": "Communist intentions in Laos, heavy enemy infiltration into South Vietnam, Saudi Arabia's reluctance for an early Arab summit, political irritations between Moscow and Havana",
    "When": "26 March 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Mu Gia Pass", "Laos", "Cambodia", "Panama", "Jordan", "Egypt", "Israel", "Soviet Union", "Cuba"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C020338.45Top Secret

T O et 3.5(c)3.5(c)

AMERICL
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret 3.5(c)3.5(c) c 207

25 January 1968

2.5 January 1968

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845     3.5(c)
                                                     3.5(c)
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
                                                  ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam:|Situation report. (Page 2)|
|---|---|
|Laos:|Government faces further Communist attacks after costly Nam Bac defeat. (Page 4)|
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845      NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
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---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845

'iii. i.ll ,4CRTH NORTHV1ETNAM Demilitarized Zone

Route 9 Route s-t~ti1'rSarif\ ('p3 Nang NANGNAM Cor? THAILAND THAILAND Luu C A M B 0 D I A X7 PPENV SAIGON Tuic Vung Tau CORFS Capitoi Specicl Zene "T #

|FV CC|Capitol Special Zone|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|---|
|(iF (F<>F| |SOUTH VIETNAM CONFIDENTIAL|
|SAM SIA!H| |100 Kilometers/490 Miles|

69405 1-68 CIA 25 Jan 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map 3.5(c)
---
# Vietnam:

|South Vietnam:| |
|---|---|
|active in the Khe Sanh area.|North Vietnamese units continue|
|Although no major fighting was reported on 24 January,| |
|US Marine patrols discovered breaks in the barbed-wire barrier surrounding the main strong-point.| |
|The patrols also report extensive enemy movement east and along Route 9 west of Khe Sanh.| |
|The Marine defenses are under pressure from sporadic enemy shelling.| |
|The main base at Khe Sanh came under artillery attack for almost five hours on the 24th.| |

# North Vietnam:

Hanoi now seems unwilling to elaborate publicly its present policy toward talks on the war.

In contrast to efforts made prior to President Johnson's State of the Union address to underscore the reasonableness of the Communist position, Hanoi now seems bent on preventing exaggerated interpretations of its intentions.

The North Vietnamese have since concentrated on denouncing the President's statement of the San Antonio formula and have in general returned to a hard-line treatment of the war, playing down their recent "will" talk offer.

In addition, the North Vietnamese spokesman in Paris, Mai Van Bo, who last week seemed eager for press contacts that would allow him to play up the positive aspects of Hanoi's position, on 22 January canceled a scheduled interview with the excuse that he had "said everything he had to say up to now."
---
A Western press source reports that Soviet Premier Kosygin may go to Hanoi after his current visit to New Delhi.

Such a visit is possible and could coincide with a visit to New Delhi. The story is not confirmed, but to North Vietnam was in January 1966 when politburo Tet bombing pause.

The last high-level Soviet visit with a member Shelepin led a delegation to North Vietnam during the 37-day bombing pause.

25 Jan 68
---
|LAOS|CHINA|NORTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|---|
|LAOS|CHINA|TAICAND CAMBODIA|
|Loi Cai|PTONG|NORTH VIETNAM|
|BUHMA|SOP|HOA BINH|
|Nam Bac|Houe|PhouPha Thi|
|MUANG HIEM|HOUA PHAN| |
|Luang Prabang|Soyaboury|XIENG KHOUANG|
|Ban Thieng|Paksane|Lak Soo|
|Pakloy|HENTIANE| |
|Udon Thani|Nakhon Phanom| |
|Communist-controlled territory|THAILAND|SECRET|

25 Jan 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
---
one 0f the most costly setbacks the Laotian Govern-Laos: 5'he Laos~ The Nam Bac defeat now appears to beNam Bae defeat now appears Govern-to be ment has suffered in several years.J Laos~ The Nam Bac defeat now appears to beNam Bae defeat now appears Govern-to be ment has [Although it will be some time before the exactsuffered in several years. number of government casualties can be fixed,lossesfAlthough it will be casualties Over a week hassome time can be fixed, before the exact probably will be considerable. number of government losses passed Since the Nam Bac defensive perimeter col- lapsed,but the government can account for less than passed will be considerable. the Nam Bae defensive Over a week hascol-perimeter half of the 3,500-man force deployed there.less lapsed, half of the but the government 3,500-man force can account deployed there.for The gOV- The gov-than munition,and other equipment: ] ernment also lost large stocks of heavy weapons,am- ernment munition~also and otherlarge lost equipmcmt.of heavy weapons, stocks am- drawing from the NamBac area and have prevented(Communist forces are harassing the troops with- line south of the base.estabUshingand have prevented the government from establishinga new defensive drawing '8ommunist the Nam Bae area from forces are harassing the troops with- the government from There is no indication;how- a new defensive ever,south of the base. line that the Communists intend to follow up theirThere is no indication, how- success with ever, successthat the Communists the tntend drive into government-held areas. to follow up their Prabang appears to be an attempt to tie down a sub- Communist activity near the royal capital of Luang Communist with a drive near activity into government-held royal capital of Luangareas. stantial number of government troops. Prabang appears to be an attempt to tie down a sub- stantial number of government troops.] nual[The Communists are also stepping up their an-IThe dryCommunists season campaign against government guer-campaignalso are stepping up their guer-an- rilla bases in northeastern Laos.posts near Phou nual dryseason against The enemy has re- rilla bases a number of outlyLaos. ing The enemy has re- Pha Thi,possibly in preparation for artillery attacks cently takenin northeastern a number of outlying posts near Phou on the airstrip. Pha Thi, possibly Loss of this base, which was unsuc-in preparation for artillery attacks cessfully attacked by North Vietnamese aircraft on on the airstrip. attackedLoss of this base, which was unsuc- 12 January would seriously disrupt government op- by North Vietnamese aircraft on erations in northern Houa Phan Province. 12 January, would seriously disrupt government This wouldop- also deprive the US of navigational aids for air opera- erations in northern Houa Phan Province. This would tions over North Vietnam:] also deprive the US of navigational aids for air tions over North Vietnam. j

(continued) (continued) 25 Jan 68 25 Jan 68 4 TOP SECRET 3.5(c)3.5(c)
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845

UrobKKE__., 3.5(c)

ment position at Muong Hiem on 23 January, suggesting that an early thrust may be made against Na Khang, the principal base for friendly guerrilla operations in northern Xieng Khouang Province.

25 Jan 68

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845     NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845     NR
                                                      NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
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---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845     NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
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---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845       NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845     NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845

# Top Secret

# Top Secret

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02033845 CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-BULL15478134.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Bulletin",
    "What": "Updates on Vietnam, Laos, North Vietnam, and Soviet Premier's possible visit to Hanoi",
    "When": "25 January 1968",
    "Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "New Delhi"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}