Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

Top Secret

5 February 1968

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624

Information as of February 1968

# HIGHLIGHTS

The Communists throughout most of South Vietnam have been comparatively quiet. Communist activity has eased. The Buddhist moderates and Saigon University faculty members have joined other groups in pledges of support for the government. In another interview setting forth Hanoi's position on negotiations, North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Trinh has given.

# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

The Communists throughout most of South Vietnam have been comparatively quiet over the past hours. The situation in the aftermath of Khe-Sanh somewhat on 8 February. Extensive maneuvering of Communist forces in northern Quang Tri Province has been noted. Heavy fighting continues in Hue. Scattered enemy action has been reported elsewhere in Da-Corps. Except for activity in Lat and near Kontum, the military situation in II Corps is relatively quiet. Fighting continues in parts of Saigon and elsewhere in III and IV Corps. There were instances of new Communist attacks against military installations and urban centers, but no large-scale actions.

# Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Vice President Ky is still critical of President Thieu but apparently intends to cooperate. Prime Minister Loc may be attempting, through promises of political favors, to foil a possible National Assembly move against him. Thieu will address the assembly on 9 February, partly to defend his declaration of martial law. The moderate Buddhists and the Saigon University faculty have added pledges of support for the government to those issued by several other groups.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624

</
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Communist activity through most of South Vietnam has been comparatively quiet over the last 24 hours. There are signs, however, that a new round of widespread action may be coming in the next few days.

Renewed Communist activity in the northern provinces and the western highlands. There are other reports indicating fresh attempts in the coastal provinces, in the delta, and in Saigon.

I Corps

Quiet down somewhat by noon on 8 February. The situation in the Khe Sanh area had North Vietnamese forces gained control of the Lang Vei Special Forces camp in the afternoon of the 7th. The camp's defenders were trying to evacuate under cover of intensive friendly aerial and artillery bombardment. Six of the 24 Americans and over three fourths of the 450-man Vietnamese garrison have not yet been accounted for.

Two relief columns had converged on the scene late in the afternoon of 7 February and entered the compound, but both did not help extricate some of the surviving friendly personnel. Neither column actually acted for a raid on the camp. The relief helilifted were composed of Special Forces personnel from Khe Sanh and the BV33, the Laotian volunteer battalion. At last report, friendly forces held some positions near Lang Vei, but the battalion commander and 40 of his troops were said to be at Khe Sanh.

The 6,000 refugees who approached to within a quarter mile of the Khe Sanh base have returned to the Lang Vei area. Less than one Lao; the rest of the refugees have now been identified as half of the are apparently local Vietnamese or montagnards.

8 February 1968
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strikes were reported to southwest of Lang Vei, air5. Some two miles have disabled two Communist tanks on the morning of 8 February. This brings the total of enemy tanks destroyed or damaged in the battle for Lang Vei to seven,

The identity of the Communist unit which have been Lang Vei has not been confirmed; of the attacked elements from the 66th Regiment it may North Vietnamese 304th Division.. A senior noncommissioned officer, who defected from the 66th one week ago, stated that when he left the unit, it was near Lang Vei awaiting orders to attack the camp.

The 304th Division generally south of Khe anh/Lang Vei in recent days.

It is possible that elements of the lOlD Regiment of the 325C Division were involved.

On the same day, the 325C Division headquarters shifted to a position some six miles west of Lang Vei.

The North Vietnamese 27th Independent Battalion has been ordered to block Route 9 and encircle the US artillery site at Cam Lo. This is directed first to destroy allied from the North Vietnamese to begin on 8 February, of tanks and then re-direct an element the battalion was request assistance, if necessary, namese 320th Division. The 320th Division is currently in the north-central sector of the province north of the US strongpoints at the "Rockpile" and Camp Carroll. extensive battle preparations, rocket The 27th Battalion has previously been noted making including the procurement of antitank mines, and and mortar ammunition.

Heavy south side of the Perfume River, in fighting continued in Hue on 8 February. On the US Marines were advancing clearing the residential of the river were progressing more rapidly South Vietnamese area. The than before in the citadel area north singing more slowly.

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---
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South of Da Nang; four allied battalions initiated on 4 February to relieve pressure from enemy Communist forces which pose a threat to the city. Forces believed to be in the sector include major elements of the 2nd North Vietnamese Division and other regimental-size elements.

According to an after-action report prepared for MACV advisers, the Communist forces attacked Tam-Ky city, Quang Tin Province, included elements of at least three battalions and eight local force companies, according to body counts by Vietnamese totaling about 1,600 men. Enemy casualties, according to Vietnamese and advisers, exceeded 500. This suggests at least a one-third reduction in the enemy force. A prisoner had no individual weapons but instead carried a bag of hand grenades in the assault. This is the first indication of any lack of weapons by US advisers elsewhere in South Vietnam during the Tet offensive. Reports from enemy units during the Tet offensive have indicated that the enemy was well-armed and well-equipped and, in some instances, utilized weapons not previously employed in certain sectors of the country.

Except for activity in Da Lat and near Kontum, the military situation in II Corps is comparatively quiet. It is noted that a new phase of Communist activity is about to commence throughout the II Corps area, particularly in the western highlands, for attacks on villages and key provinces, possibly beginning on Pleiku and Kontum allied military targets in western.

These Communist activities indicate that another phase is about to begin, referred to as "phase two," and that reports have also revealed that the current phase of operations is referred to as begin.

8 February 1968
---
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13. Fighting continues northeast of Kontum. Vietnamese and US officials in Kontum believe that the immediate Communist objectives in attacking Kontum were to kill the province chief, capture the province headquarters, and inaugurate a new "revolutionary administration."

Interrogations of captured prisoners indicate that enemy troops had been ordered to take and hold Kontum city. All of this miscarried, despite the fact that enemy troops were in the city from January 30 to February 2. The 24th North Vietnamese Regiment apparently spearheaded the attacks against Vietnamese Army installations and bore the brunt of the fighting while local Viet Cong units infiltrated the city and occupied most of the residential areas. Approximately 700 Communists were killed in the attack at the cost of some 40 friendly dead.

14. Operations against areas of the city where the Communists are continuing in Da Lat. No major concern that many flooding the city. Some areas controlled by Viet Cong are with the estimated 13,000 refugees. The enemy, but consideration is being given, for security reasons, to moving all Revolutionary Development teams in the surrounding area into district headquarters.

15. According to a North Vietnamese Army prisoner taken in the battle at Da Lat, the city was Communist intention to capture and hold for at least two months. They were ordered to use propaganda to get the population to rally to the Communists. The source admitted that this effort was unsuccessful. He believed that the people would have rallied if the Communists had taken the city.

16. Elsewhere in II Corps, there are reports that the Viet Cong positions west 18B Regiment in Darlac Province. In Nha Trang, a new American G-2 adviser reports that the North Vietnamese 33rd Regiment has been joined by the 95B Regiment from Pleiku Province and that another attack by these forces can be expected.

Date: 8 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624

III Corps and Saigon

17. As of 8 February there were some several hundred sixth, seventh, and eighth police precincts, all of which are located in Cholon. The Communists have constructed barricades in some areas and sharp fighting is expected before they are cleared. The Saigon police believe that the Viet Cong are still operating in Saigon's fifth precinct and reinforcements will be arriving soon with the expectation to hold these positions in the expectation that they are unaware of allied blocking operations in surrounding Gia Dinh Province.

18. Heavy fighting was reported on the northern and southern outskirts of Saigon where allied forces have contacted battalion-size Communist units. Two US Army infantry battalions are to conduct a sweep across the southern half of Saigon to clear the Viet Cong from this area.

19. Elsewhere in the III Corps area, mortar attacks were conducted against Phu Cuong, and against US Army base camps at Cu Chi and Lai Khe. Patrol skirmishes took place in a number of provinces, but no large-scale fighting has occurred. Recently attacks which the 7th Division, elements of which have apparently moved into central III Corps, would launch to "contain" the US base at Lai Khe city for the second time during the night Ninh6-720. Mortar fire was directed at Tay of February. Some near the center of the city before Communist elements penetrated the old market area being repulsed. Another enemy element was ambushed outside the city by friendly forces who had been forewarned of the attack by a Vietnamese security service source.

8 February 1968
---
# IV Corps

21. Vi Thanh, the capital of Chuong Thien Province, which has remained generally unscathed in the recent Communist offensive, received a number of rounds of 75-mm. recoilless rifle fire on the expected 6-7 February. One American was killed. The MACV ground attack failed to materialize, but several rounds fell on a Provincial Reconnaissance team killing 10 enemy in a small engagement.

22. Elsewhere in the delta, military activity yesterday was generally light. Viet Cong gunners unleashed a heavy mortar attack on Cao Lanh, some 75 miles southwest of Saigon. US Army troops fought a sharp battle with Communist troops near My Tho. The capital of Go Cong Province also came under mortar fire. The atmosphere in several provincial capitals and towns in the delta continues to be tense. In Moc Hoa, the capital of Kien Tuong Province, the population was reported particularly fearful because Communist forces warned that they would return to attack the town on 2 February to liberate the city.

8 February 1968
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

President Vice President Ky apparently still sees Thieu with a critical eye, although he has reportedly indicated to his closest advisers that he intends to cooperate with Thieu during the current crisis and has no thought of consolidating his own power. On 7 February Ky told a close Ky associate that he felt Thieu has shown his customary lack of initiative and aggressiveness in handling the crisis.

Ky is apparently less worried than some of his aides about what they regard as an attempt by Thieu to restrict Ky's duties on the Vietnamese task force, which Ky heads. Thieu reworded the draft paper setting up the task force to give it a shorter tenure by changing such phrases as "recovery of the people" to "relief of the people." A number of Ky's advisers were reportedly upset at the implications of these changes, but Ky rejected suggestions that the task force should not be more than a temporary organization and need a long-range charter.

Ky also reportedly rejected suggestions that he use the present situation to get rid of Prime Minister Loc and change the constitution to permit his own installation as prime minister.

Prime Minister Loc seems to realize that he is under considerable fire for his inability to cope with the crisis and possible efforts to remove him. He is apparently attempting to foil these efforts. Loc approached Senator Nguyen Van Ngai on 6 February with a request that Ngai not give him difficulty in the Upper House. He reportedly accompanied this with an offer of several return favors, promising to appoint 50 competent members of Ngai's Revolutionary Dai Viet Party to government posts. He reportedly sought Ngai's opinions on any future national policy decisions and to try to obtain weapons and money to arm Dai Viet Party members against the Viet Cong.
---
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|---|
|102|164|
|THAILAND|
|B_FEBRUARY|A|u|
|NORTH VIETNAMH|
|69548 2-68 CIA|25|25|50|75 Kilometers|Mnes|
|SE ET|
|IQ se DOnflI106:::'.:"'z::.".".".:::.' u::;:.::':.::( V I,- / 10¢ '|
---
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COACH (ll-l2) and CRATE (ll-lb) are low-wing, twin reciprocating engine aircraft used for passenger transportation. They are similar in appearance to the Convair.2hO and Martin 202.

Externally, the differences in appearance between COACH and CRATE are minor with the difference being in the shape of the vertical stabilizer. After COACH became operational in 1967 it encountered structural and performance difficulties which required extensive modification. CRATE was introduced into service in 1958 as an improved variant and has, in general, replaced COACH in service. The range of COACH is somewhat less than that for CRATE. CRATE is widely used in the Soviet air forces but the majority of these aircraft in the USSR are in civil air transport. They have been supplied to most Communist countries and to a number of non-Communist countries. Only a limited number of COACH aircraft remain in service.

A variation of CRATE, designated ll-lhM has an increased passenger capacity from up to 21, which was achieved by lengthening the fuselage. The performance figures given below are applicable to CRATE aircraft.

|Year in service|Power plant number/type|Gross weight (lb)|
|---|---|---|
|Normal cargo (lb)|Maximum cargo (lb)|Number of passengers/paratroops|
|Range/radius with normal cargo (nm)|Cruise speed (kt)|Service ceiling (ft)|
|1967|O\\p \n\\-J1‘ston|00|
|O|O\\—-\|~00|21|
|00/720|-I-*uu~ -3-‘|O O|

69549 2-as cm

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1: _ _ -L’

top-s-1% s.5(¢)

5. The operational characteristics of the IL-14 do nothing to clarify sending transport aircraft into the vicinity Hanoi's purpose of in the Demilitarized-Zone. if ever, been North Vietnam Unlike the AN-2s, this cargo plane has seldom, munist its IL-14s in their normal be too large trans-states in a tactical role. capacity as to "If used by Com- is using port aircraft; they would appear to surrounding airfields known to exist in the area land at any the zone.

6. It is possible that Hanoi has decided terial by northern to drop important men or ma-of- to use these planes in support of the Communist is fensive in parachute South Vietnam. This thesis suggested by the brief flights apparently made into this region during the hours of darkness. / 3.3(h)(2) during the could serve as beacons for IL-14s in-past three days have mentioned building fires which paradrop activities.

Rumors of Surface-to-Surface Missiles in DRV

7. A report from Hanoi has supplemented limited photographic evidence of a suspect Styx surface-to-surface missile site near Thanh Hoa on 19 December.

8. The Indonesian was informed by provided ambassador to Hanoi says. that in late representative that the December he Soviet Union had the French surface-to-surface missiles to North Vietnam which could be used against American ships.

8 February 1968

III-2

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9. The Frenchman explained that North Vietnam had pressed Moscow for the missile after the sinking of the Eilat, pointing out that their need for such a weapon was certainly greater than that of Egypt. The weapon used to sink the Eilat was the Soviet-Styx missile, which has a range of 20-30 miles but is thought to be adaptable to land launching.

In a later conversation, an East European ambassador in North Vietnam with Styx missiles implied to the Indonesian that the USSR had provided. 8 February 1968

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---
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# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report

8 February 1968

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624

# V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. In an effort to relate the fighting in South Vietnam directly to Hanoi's expressed interest in negotiations, North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh staged another interview on 8 February with the AFP correspondent in Hanoi. After condemning the stubborn US attitude and hailing the Tet offensive, the foreign minister took up the subject of talks after an unconditional question, Trinh said halt to the bombings; such talks could include Viet lems in connection with the settlement of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the 1954 Geneva raised ments, and other questions which would be agree by the two parties.

2. In the new statement, Trinh stresses peace-that there is no change is more forthcoming than before, ful settlement. North Vietnam's willingness to discuss the whole however, about problem of Vietnam, not just the war in the North. Trinh specifically rejected the San Antonio formula because it poses conditions for a halt to the bombings; to carry out talks to settle He maintained that because the US does not want it must be held responsible for the Vietnam problem, its own obstinacy.

3. The new effort to publicize Hanoi's willingness to the past week reinforces the impression fighting of talk in the midst of the intensified that the Vietnamese are pursuing to some extent their documents. fight-talk strategy described in many cap wants is concerned, the door to negotiations is tured to keep alive the impression that, as far as The foreign minister obviously Hanoi still ajar. This same impression has been generated on a less official level in a series of interviews which North Vietnamese diplomats and overseas Front representatives have granted in the past few days.

8 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624

4. In the most recent of these press interviews, the Liberation Front man in Algiers on 7 February emphasized the determination of the Communists their objectives. successes last week and had obtained an ard version of Communist that even the US had admitted that the Viet Cong He opened with the stand-said" committed only the "extensive" a small portion of their military on force to the Tet offensive. He dwelt at length popular support which the Viet Cong military assaults allegedly mustered throughout the country. The "alliances of peace" in Saigon and Hue, he said, were working with the Front to offorce" the withdrawal of US troops and the overthrow of the Saigon government.

5. In addition to their own propaganda touting the success of the Tet offensive, the Communists in South Vietnam are also contacting Western (non-American) correspondents in Saigon in an effort to publicize their cause. Two such interviews with Viet Cong officials have been published in the past few days--one with Observer correspondent Mark Frankland- and another with an unidentified AFP stringer. The Viet Cong are not identified, but the impression is given that the interviews were held in the heart of Saigon. The tone of the Communists is cocky and extremely hard line. boasted that the interview with AFP, the Viet Cong intended to "reconquer the capital the Communists the "general offensive" and that just as we are going.

6. In an Tet offensive was the beginning of to reconquer teristic of Hanoi's recent Communists from any blame the country." commentary, the local offi-Following a line characteristic tried to absolve the population by bombing with antipersonnel rockets. ing cities and claiming that it is the US the civilian for war—related destruction and death to that is burn-All the Viet Cong are doing is its sectors." One of the most favorable viewpoint, is "pushing back and useful as-the attacks on aspects of.this article, from the Communist the description of the relaxed and unrestricted way that "freely" about in the Saigon troops in uniform move Communist civilians and area.

8 February 1968

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---
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Correspondent Frankland describes his Viet Cong contact as an official assigned to organize plantation workers in the Saigon area. It is doubtful that this individual was very high rank. Some of his remarks are definitely out of step with known party positions. He freely admitted, for example, that North Vietnamese troops were in the South and said that they were there because it was the duty of the North to help the South.

In other areas, however, his comments were a reiteration of the Front's hardline approach to the necessity for continued fighting until the US agreed to negotiations on Communist terms.

8-February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786624 THE_SITUATION_IN_VIETNAM[15617704].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, President Thieu, Vice President Ky, Prime Minister Loc, North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh, AFP correspondent, Liberation Front man, Viet Cong officials, Observer correspondent Mark Frankland",
    "What": "Military situation in South Vietnam, Political developments in South Vietnam, Communist military developments, Communist political developments, Interviews and propaganda from Communist forces",
    "When": "5 February 1968 - 8 February 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Da Nang", "Khe Sanh", "Quang Tri Province", "Hue", "Saigon", "Kontum", "Lang Vei", "Phu Cuong", "Cu Chi", "Lai Khe", "Vi Thanh", "My Tho", "Moc Hoa", "Nha Trang", "Chuong Thien Province", "Thanh Hoa"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974335

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The President's Daily Brief

_I;;1y._§@¢=4=.;:-;- 19 March 1968 s.5(¢

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---
# DAILY BRIEF

19 MARCH 1968

1. Vietnam

2. Poland
For pe first time in pe current crisis, uniformed soldiers armed wip automatic weapons are being seen in pe streets of Warsaw. Armed police are also coming in from oper cities.
Rumors abound pat Gomulka is shortly to deliver a major speech, perhaps today.
The security reinforcements in pe capital may be to help control pe crowds pat would be rounded up for a Gomulka speech.
Unrest continues in oper Polish cities.

2. France
---
# USSR-Space

3.3(h)(2)

# Israel

The Israelis are grim in the wake of yesterday's terrorist incident near the southern port of Eilat. Two adults were dead, and 27 children were wounded after a school bus hit a mine. This surely raises the chances of a bigger than usual Israeli retaliation against Jordan.

# Egypt

3.3(h)(2)

# Nepal

3.3(h)(2)
---
Iran

The Shah is putting pe squeeze on pe Western oil consortium, and pis time he is deadly serious. He insists pat it must increase production over pe next five years at a rate far greater pan pe consortium can entertain. He has given it until 20 April to come up wip a solution. If it does not, he may well seize consortium territory, including producing oil wells, so Iran can produce more on its own. He says he must have pe income for Iran's development program.

Panama

Chile

President Frei does not have pe muscle to fight hard for his vital anti-inflation program. His able new finance minister resigned last weekend over pe President's failure to back him up in pe face of heavy political fire. The result could well be a new surge of inflation and more budgetary problems. This would only benefit pe Communist-Socialist coalition in pe upcoming congressional elections, now only a year away.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974335

'1'07>~S@@w

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974335

Top Secret

%I“ >2 $2QOQ Q

Central 'fQN:={0‘4

Q40 ”<*4/

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

Top Secret

19 March 1968

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---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

Date:
19 March 1968

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
'         '

* Approved for Release" 2019/04/17 C05974335'

‘F6-P-S-EG-R-E4; - \ 3.5(¢)

3.3(h)(2)

* *

3.3(h)(2)

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—'Fe|=-—sEeR~E+ -\ \ s.s(¢)

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---
# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Initial Hanoi Commentary on New Hampshire Pri-Hanof's first reference to the 12 March primary election in New Hampshire--a commentary in the daily Nhan Dan which the Hanoi domestic service broadcast 15 March--noted that President Johnson led Senator McCarthy in the voting by a margin of less than five percent. It claimed this was a "heavy blow" to the President's political prestige and influence, and that McCarthy's "victory" reflected the "disappointment of the American people with Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam war." The commentary quoted Senator Robert Kennedy antiwar feeling in the US. It noted that both Kennedy and Governor Rockefeller were considering entering the presidential race. The broadcast concluded that "the heavy losses suffered by nam will certainly the US aggressive troops in Vietnam will be advantageous cards in the hands of any Johnson opponent."
---
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7“q1~Se@¢aL

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974335 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617905].pdf

Output: {"Who": "The President", "What": "Daily briefings on various countries including Vietnam, Poland, France, USSR-Space, Israel, Egypt, Nepal, Iran, Panama, Chile", "When": "19 March 1968", "Where": ["Vietnam", "Poland", "Warsaw", "Eilat", "Iran", "Panama"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

Date: 22 January 1968
---
# DAILY BRIEF

22 JANUARY 1968

|1.|Brazil|Costa e Silva flatly told Ambassador Tuthill on Friday that Brazil will buy F-5s, not Mirages. The Brazilian President seemed to feel sure his plans would not be affected by recent US legislation.|
|---|---|---|
|2.|Venezuela|The government suspects a coup may be attempted within the next few days. The plotters--a group of right-wing military officers and civilians--are being carefully watched by security officers, however, and their chances for success are slim.|
|3.|Ecuador|Carlos J. Arosemena, anti-American cousin of Ecuador's President, has declared his support for the presidential candidacy of Jose Velasco. Elections are in June.|
| | |The two men have been bitter enemies--in fact, Carlos ousted Velasco from the presidency in 1961 before himself being thrown out by the military.|
|4.|Israel| |
---
# West Berlin

3.3(h)(2)

# Australia

have of years. is All willingAustralia's mail The labor The butofisGorton smack worstthe in middle one 20 gone in thetoon strike. truck governmentdrivers disputes discuss wage demanqs, wants tomail moving untilfirst. union refuses drive the it gets what it wants. So far, press is giving Gorton prestigem~rks not good strikecouldfor settled his firm stand. His the if is be damaged,shortly.however,

3.5(c)
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4236
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# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4236

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

3.5(c)

1968

22 January

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---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes

22 January 1968

# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Hanoi on State of the Union Address: The authoritative daily "Commentator" Nhan Dan which, had an editorial in effect, in working Sunday's the rejected San Antonio the formula--as a means of summary toward settlement of war. According by a of international article broadcast in English Hanoi on radio's service, "Commentator" went at length about President Johnson's references to Vietnam in the State of Union message. He began by declaring that more heavily the Vietnam problem is clearly Johnson obliged to US ways for this end was talk about to bring an formula, "around fighting. the President, however, "only beat the bush, declared. repeating his San Antonio the editorial "is but The a San habitual and Antonio US formula, to the of on trick put editorial the same said, footing force aggressor to the objectives" continued people the of Vietnamese the victim to give aggression up struggling and in like the face US aggression." The "war of the the "US insolent imperialists" are the laid laid bare not the in US only by Antonio "very but conditions" down San formula, South Vietnam. by and also continued up military raids buildup in North Vietnam by stepped US air over "Commentator" to then referred to the President's "empty of parts mentator" the promises" State of the the American message. the do Union people in These, other "Com- charged, will

ness" of the American people political, racial, economic, faced by the war, are the people of the the Vietnam to he but people declared, falsification and "awkward words sheer and an affront no will and good grow. and "restless- All the po- international problems US are caused mainly by President of Johnson's truth at home."

In conclusion, "Commentator" imperialists" that charged "recent words continuation and acts of the their US point merely to of "war of aggression"
---
TOP

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RET

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as settlement."more they make and more insolent conditions" for aconcludes9 TheresolvedVietnamese "people," the editorial remain to fight on. messageTheConginBroadcast sage:Vietcame * * on radio'sinfirstofmention*State the Union Mes- Liberationa broadcast Vietnamese toofSouthtfie Vietnam voted toonprogress theanFriday. attemptof Fully totherefutehalfthethe President's wasbroadcast "boasts"de- about asserted in general terms war. thatasthefacadeThePresident's thenbroadcast refer- ences to peacetheserved simply wasanoformula.broadcasttheforof further mention pos- expansion- of sible US North war. VietnameseAntonio andTheretalks completely ignored the San The program concluded with -assertions"upsetthat "it the US economy, caused and the is obvious"wordsmovement'athetheto has has Johnsonin thatshaken certain usedtheVietnam position US."restlessness' spreading describe war hasthe of the USin dollar, the US, antiwar

3.3(h)(2)

Saturday,Continuesrebroadcast Hanoi to* * * Circulate Bo's office itsofInterview:Ran-

On Hanoi to in 16 January goon the entire Mai Van Bo interview with the Frenchnewsman.

3.3(h)(2)

3.5(c)

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---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4236
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
* * * 3.3(h)(2)
* * *

A New Appraisal CIA of North Vietnam's Manpower Situation: A fresh appraisal leads to the conclusion that adequate reserves are to meet current demands and effort Hanoi that could be enduring than support a military years mobilization manpower higher present levels. The drains on manpower have been sufficient past the three admittedly to bring about some tightening acknowledged in overall availabilities. Hanoi manpower problems and responded by increasing use of women in the labor force.

North and South Vietnam effectively yet it has been forces maintains. 1.5 nearly controls maintain smaller South in Vietnam of the is manpower revealing situation Viet-both a much population, able to full-time North military. If times North the size that Viet= Vietnam were to call into

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4236
3.5(c)
---
full-time population military South service Vietnam, same the the share North of its as has Vietnam-ese military size; force would be more than double its present

Comments: Rumanian Ambassador's The Rumanian ambassador during commented to Paris, United farewell now his pressure went istries at been who is on really the his call leaving US post, Embassy that The ambassador States say winning Vietnam. to that its Hanoi's delegation in the Paris no longer has to hide exerting concern Hanoi over Peking on because of North Vietnam's alleged moves toward peace.

The Rumanian's statement must be tempered by his expressing is inclination his to views. be somewhat imaginative when he

NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Viet Cong Broadcast Quotes Governor Romney: On Saturday, the Liberation comments radio about quoted excerptsthe Union the strong message from Governor's as an example of circles" stream the the State of of criticism among many in the US and cast West" the carried regarding ciiticil Vietnam fragments policy. from leading same Brit-broad- ish and French newspapers.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4236 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602448].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Ambassador Tuthill, right-wing military officers and civilians, Carlos J. Arosemena, Jose Velasco, President Johnson, Nhan Dan 'Commentator', Mai Van Bo, Rumanian Ambassador",
"What": "Brazil buying F-5s, Venezuela coup plot, Ecuador election update, North Vietnam situation, North Vietnam's manpower situation, US-Vietnam relations, Governor Romney's comments on Vietnam policy",
"When": "22 January 1968",
"Where": ["Brazil", "Venezuela", "Ecuador", "Israel", "West Berlin", "Australia", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi", "South Vietnam", "Paris", "US"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069 EOE0

13526

3.3(h)(2)

February 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Information From Prisoners and Documents Which Indicate Possible VC/NVA Intentions During the Tet Period

I. The following information is based on Central Intelligence Agency reporting from the field as it has been received over the past four days and is, for the most part, uncollated and unevaluated information. This information should not be construed to be all the information that will become available to Agency reporters when the situation settles enough to permit a more favorable reporting atmosphere. The information received so far, including a few sketchy prisoner of war interrogations, permits some tentative generalizations concerning what the enemy hopes to accomplish by his attacks on urban centers.

Outside of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, which the enemy has repeatedly promised to liberate, it appears that the enemy's main objective was to gain a psychological victory. Despite the call for a general uprising, there is little evidence to suggest that the VC leadership really expected an uprising to succeed all over South Vietnam. It also appears that the enemy did not expect to permanently seize control of some provincial capitals. The forces that were committed were expected to hold out as long as possible against Allied counter-attacks, in order to gain psychological victories and to cover the impending enemy offensive in northern Corps.

Enemy objectives in attacking Quang Tri and Hue cities were undoubtedly tied in with the impending Communist offensive along the DMZ. Their attacks on other cities in the south indicate, however, that their over-all "winter-spring” campaign objectives are much broader and may, in fact, involve a continuing effort to put military pressure on urban areas during the coming week, pressure which has the political objective of collapsing the GVN as an effective governing institution.

A compendium of POW statements relating to enemy objectives follows:

I Corps
1) Quang Tri
Agent reports, POW interrogations, Chieu Hoi statements and documents consistently stated pat pe enemy planned to take
---
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766069

# Quang Tri

Based on POW interrogations and documents captured on 31 January, the VC were planning a five-day attack on Quang Ngai province to begin on the evening of 30 January. One VC or NVA battalion was resting and preparing to attack on the night of 31 January/1 February.

# Thua Thien

An FBIS Report (69) FOUO, indicates that a French press team captured in Hue were told by a NVA officer that "we are going to liberate all of South Vietnam in this offensive. We intend to keep what we hold in Hue. We have large stocks of food and arms hidden away over many months. Already we control 90 percent of the city, we will keep it."

# II Corps

Nha Trang - According to POW interrogations of NVA troops, NVA troops were told prior to the attack on Nha Trang that they would be able to take and hold the city because the VC organization within the city had organized the population to assist them. NVA officers, however, say they knew before launching the attack that it would fail, but they had to attack to support the nationwide effort and to make success possible elsewhere.

# Pleiku

Prisoners have stated that they had orders to "take Pleiku city or not return."

# III Corps

Bien Hoa - After the attack by the VC 274th and 275th regiments on Bien Hoa city, prisoners stated that they were told that it would be easy to overrun Bien Hoa city. Plans captured from prisoners and ralliers indicate the VC had no withdrawal plan.

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766069
---
# IV Corps Chau Doc

A VC prisoner captured in Chau Doc city, Chau Doc province in IV CTZ reports, on interrogation, that he was informed of the Viet Cong Tet military operations on the night of 30-31 January. He was told by his chief that the future plans of the attack called for the creation of conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to "proceed to peace." He was told that the attacks would be a departure from previous operational procedures.

The prisoner, Buu, stated that the VC realized they were committing everything and every person they had in this assault. He said it was obvious to all that it was a "go for broke" matter. He believes few of the participants expected success. He further mentioned that the VC expected a popular uprising in support of the Viet Cong and that the lack of all-out popular commitment would probably have an adverse effect on morale.

He said that District Forces would attack District Headquarters and that ten cadre Party members were to establish a provisional government in Chau Doc.

The intention of the VC to occupy and stay in the city was indicated by evidence of camp beds, rice, and personal effects left in occupied houses. "INFORMATION FROM PRISONER[15561241].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Information on possible VC/NVA intentions during the Tet period based on field reporting and POW interrogations",
"When": "February 1968",
"Where": ["Quang Tri", "Thua Thien", "Nha Trang", "Pleiku", "Bien Hoa", "Chau Doc"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Si/M/tian 2'//2 Viet/mm

39,8126;mag

3.5(c)

27 November 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

WARNING
---
# Information as of 1600 27 November 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

The South Vietnamese Government's recent mobilization decree has come under fire in the Senate. Hanoi is keenly interested in the US presidential elections but is cautious in assessing the impact of antiadministration sentiment.

# I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

North Vietnamese gunners attacked six allied positions in Kontum Province with mortar fire on November 26-27. US Marines reported two clashes in I Corps.

# II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

The Senate on 25 November began discussing the recent mobilization decree, charging that its promulgation was unconstitutional. The lower house has recessed temporarily, but several deputies have been actively seeking assistance for their constituents.

# III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

# V. Communist Political Developments:

The Vietnamese spokesman has expressed interest in forthcoming US presidential elections. Hanoi has, however, repeatedly indicated that it foresees no change in US policy as a result of the election.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091 3_5(C)

2 4 ll)V nrA.KlL|

3.5(c

mentVI. Other Maigr Aspects: The Laotian Government has registered against the possible extension of a defensive its strongest public protest to barrier into Laos" (Paras. 1-3).

27 November 1967

3.5 c(

3-5<¢>

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091
---
# Approve0| for Release: 2019/03/29 00301 0091_

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# 68776 ‘ll-67 CIA

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. North Vietnamese troops hit four US outposts in the Dak To area with some 250 mortar rounds on 26 November. Early on the 27th two allied positions in the nearby provincial capital, Kontum city, were also hit. US casualties in the attacks were six killed and 31 wounded. US military officers speculate that the enemy may have fired this large amount of ammunition to use it up prior to completing a withdrawal from the Dak To battle area.

2. I Corps and 66 wounded in a day-long fight in the lowlands some 19 miles southwest of Da Nang. In the heaviest action, 12 Marines were killed. Marines reported two sharp clashes in a coastal engagement near the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone cost seven US lives. Twenty-two North Vietnamese soldiers were reported killed in that fight.

The Situation in the DMZ

3. The Demilitarized Zone has been relatively quiet for nearly two months. The last major action in this area was the massive shelling of Con Thien in September. There are now indications pointing to a resumption of fighting in this sector.

4. The most important is the movement of the North Vietnamese 304th Division from its garrison area at the Thanh Hoa southward toward the zone.

27 November 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091

V H-)'l"T\ TILE, 1 3 '5(0) 3 5(¢

/2 3.;s(n)s.s(E; |\J)

27 November 1967

I-2 \ s.5(¢ s.5(¢)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091
---
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091|s.5(¢)|
|---|---|
|"*7| |
|s.5(¢| |
|3.3(h)(2)| |
|27 November 1967| |
|I-3| |
|3.5| |
|0|/\/\ OO|
|3.5| |
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091| |
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The Senate on 25 November took up and indicated discussion of the general government's recent mobilization decree. Although displeasure that the decree was unilaterally promulgated by the government before the Senate was invested, a number of senators criticized the substance of the draft, particularly the lowering of the constitu- tionality age. The majority finally agreed that Prime Minister Loc should be invited before the Senate to discuss the decree and answer questions. Final language of the invitation is to be decided at the Senate's next session on 28 November.

2. Defense Minister Vy reportedly is dissatisfied with the caliber of Vietnamese Army officers and is considering revamping the admission process. Rather than use college degree as the sole criterion for admission to officer candidate school, Vy would screen college graduates carefully for officer qualifications before giving commissions to those who then measure up.

3. The lower house has recessed until 1 December. Meanwhile, a number of deputies have been drafting rules while its rules committee begins work on seeing to the needs of their constituents. Several deputies from central highland provinces met on 21 November to request better security along roads in the area. Other deputies have approached the government for such things as more refugee assistance and better compensation for war damage.

27 November 1967
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

27 November 1967
---
Hanoi continues to show keen interest in the US presidential elections, but it is cautious in assessing the impact of anti-administration sentiment. North Vietnamese commentary takes pains to emphasize that the regime is not counting on the elections but must be won by frustrating US objectives in the change in US policy, and to stress that the South Vietnam.

Mai Van Bo, North Vietnam's chief representative in France, touched on some of these points in a recent conversation with a Western journalist. Bo said that he believes the Vietnam war will be a theme of the election, with US opinion polls showing a "some reservation" and a marked decline in President Johnson's popularity. He said he accepted the New Hampshire primary as a preview of the November election.

Bo also claimed that "aggressive" US military and economic policies will eventually become a "forced stalemate" and that the US will have to return to isolationism, and to a policy of "peaceful coexistence." His remarks are consistent with those of other regime spokesmen, who usually seek to avoid any implication that North Vietnam expects an early end to the war.

This theme was taken up recently in the army daily Quan Doi Nhan Dan, which commented approvingly on the antiwar sentiment in the US. The paper asserted that North Vietnam does not overestimate "internal victory, contradiction" in the US, is to "change the balance of strength in our favor on the battlefield by beating the Americans and their allies, militarily and politically." Whatever the results of the US presidential elections, the Vietnam policy of the US government, it went on, "will not change fundamentally by itself." - 27 November 1967
---
VI. OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

The Laotian Government, in its strongest statement to date, has reiterated its opposition to the extension in Laos of the defensive barrier being constructed south of the Demilitarized Zone. A recent article in the official government newspaper argued that a manned barrier in Laos would without doubt be an act in violation of the Geneva Accords.

The article, apparently written under the direction of Souvanna Phouma, appears in part to be an answer to a recent Newsweek article speculating that a manned barrier in Laos, without the approval of Vientiane, may be extended into Communist-controlled Laos, with the opportunity to placate the Russians, who have expressed irritation over his pro-Western remarks during recent trips to Washington and Canberra.

Although a barrier would somewhat tarnish Vientiane's neutrality, Souvanna appears more concerned that it would increase his country's direct involvement in the Vietnam war. He has also expressed fear that an artificial barrier would result in a de facto division of Laos and would encourage regional separatism.

27 November 1967

VI-l
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010091 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602374].pdf"

Output: {"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, North Vietnamese Government, US Marines, Senate, Vietnamese spokesman, Laotian Government", "What": "Military situation in South Vietnam, Political developments in South Vietnam, Military developments in North Vietnam, Communist political developments, US presidential elections, Laotian opposition to defensive barrier in Laos", "When": "27 November 1967", "Where": ["South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Laos"], "Security Clearance": "SECRET"}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # EHBO5-352

GRADING AND INTERNAL CONTROL DIVISION

DISTRIBUTION:

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE EXPLOITATION TEAM ON 11 February 1968 IN SAIGON City, SVN. Source is the NIC for further exploitation.

ACTIVITIES:

DATE OF REPORT: 2/3/68

NO. OF PAGES: 2

REPORT No: 250/68

FET 3(h)(2)

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: February 1968, SAIGON

REFERENCE: None

This report was collected by NIC Field Exploitation Team on 11 February 1968 in SAIGON City, SVN. Source is the NIC for further exploitation.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17

On February 5, 1968, received an order to go on a mission to meet Battalion 6 in the Suoi Cao area of the HOA District, Long An Province, with a platoon of 28 men at 1900 hours. The group was equipped with AK rifles and carried varying amounts of ammunition. The platoon leader had a KSA Pistol, and each man was provided with rice and daily payment.

The group followed a route passing through Tan Hoa and Cau Tree, mostly traveling at night. Nine men from the group attached themselves to a larger 100-man group equipped with AK rifles and B40s, moving towards Saigon. They arrived on the western outskirts of Cholon at about 0300 hours on February 6, 1968.

Later, the group was divided, and the captured individual was assigned to a sickly personnel unit. The other eight members were assigned to Company 1, Battalion 0. From February 7 to the time of capture on February 9, Company 1 was not involved in battle.

Company 1 had a strength of 60 to 70 men, all equipped with AK rifles and ammunition. The captured individual was taken into custody after a police sweep of the area where he was housed for the evening. NIC_REPORT_NO_25068[15617802].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Exploitation Team, NIC Field Exploitation Team",
    "What": "Interrogation activity, mission details, capture information",
    "When": "11 February 1968, 2/3/68, February 5-9, 1968",
    "Where": ["SAIGON City, SVN", "Suoi Cao area, HOA District, Long An Province", "Tan Hoa, Cau Tree, Cholon"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

213

2 January 1968
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813      3.5(c)
                                                      3.5(c)
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam:|Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|---|
|NR| | |
| | |3.5(c)|
| | |TOP SECRET|

Date: 2 January 1968
---
# Vietnam:

North Vietnam:

Hanoi appears to have given more positive indication of its willingness to talk wip pe US in return for a cessation of war acts
In a statement on 30 December, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh declared pat his government "will" if pe US unconditionally terminates pe bombing and hold talks wip Washington about questions concerned
His remarks were transmitted in an auporitative Hanoi English-language broadcast on 1 January.
The apparent modification in pe Norp Vietnamese position may stem from a concern in Hanoi pat its attitude had begun to appear overly rigid to sympapetic foreign observers.
Trinh claimed pat his statement was in part a response to US assertions pat "it wants to talk wip Hanoi and pat Hanoi has not reciprocated."
The Norp Vietnamese probably also believe pat peir statement will increase international pressures on pe US for a cessation of pe air attacks.

South Vietnam:

The New Year's Allied military operations have resumed following the New Year's cease-fire.

(continued)

2 Jan 68
---
# North Vietnam

|VIETNAM|Demilitarized Zone|
|---|---|
|Quang Tri| |
|Hue| |
|Hia|AIEN|
|Da Nang| |
|NGMAN CORPS| |

# THAILAND

THAILAND

# THAILAND

CAMBODIA

# THAILAND

CAMBODIA

# THAILAND

|PPENQM| |
|---|---|
|PHN-M. PENH| |

# THAILAND

|SAIGON| |
|---|---|
|VungTau|Capitol Special Zone|
|CORPS| |

# SOUTH VIETNAM

SOUTH VIETNAM

812~ 50 0¥ r 1 25 75 50 ifu K;lometers75 49O MvesI OOM11es

691011-6B

69101 1-68

2 Jan 68 CENTRAL CFM'T''Q Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813Ar. TNTET TJCENCE RIIL W FTIN Map

2 Jan 68 Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813

During the allied standdown, which was extended to 36 hours, 170 truce violations were initiated by the Communists. Of these, 63 involved casualties and were classified as major violations.

Allied losses during the one-and-a-half-day respite were 66 killed (27 US) and 273 wounded (191 US). Enemy losses were reported as 465 killed as the result of friendly reactions.

Two major incidents occurred on 1 January. Elements of two Viet Cong battalions shelled and attempted to overrun a South Vietnamese garrison in the delta. Sixty enemy troops were reportedly killed, including a battalion commander. Allied losses for the battle were 19 killed and 48 wounded.

Some twenty miles northeast of Tay Ninh City, a brigade of the 25th US Division came under heavy ground and mortar attack. The enemy broke contact after six hours. Initial results show 26 US personnel killed and 111 wounded, with 326 of the enemy killed and 5 detained.

2 Jan 68

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813     NR
                                                      NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813      NR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
---
                                                      NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813     NRNR
                                                   ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
---
Top Secret
Tnn ~ Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
,)9.--vvret :_,
TopSecret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C02031813 CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-BULL15478095.pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "Central Intelligence",
  "What": "Update on Vietnam situation regarding talks with the US and military operations",
  "When": "2 January 1968",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Demilitarized Zone", "Thailand", "Cambodia", "Saigon"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Intelligence Information Cable

|STATE/INR|om|NMCC/MC|(SECDEF|ARMY|NAVY|AIR)|CIA/NMCCwauw|NIC|NSA|s|:>o|om-|cns|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|DD|_|_|EXO| | | | | | | | | |

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Excu G§'°UPTI d ad omuumr

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

1920202 CITE T3-5(0)

DwT1 19 FEBRUARY 1968

|COUNTRY|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|---|---|
|DOT|18 FEBRUARY 1968|
|SUBJECT|III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL KHANG'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE VIET CONG ATTACKS AND ON PROBLEMS RELATING TO VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE|
|ACQ|VIETNAM, SAIGON <18 FEBRUARY 1968)|
|SOURCE|)(2)|

SUMMARY: ON 17 FEBRUARY, VICE PRESIDENT KY, III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL KHANG, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL VIEN AND MAJOR GENERAL THANG URGED PRESIDENT THIEU TO TAKE A STRONGER

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(classification)(disaem controg)

STAND AND TO SHOW MORE LEADERSHIP. KHANG ALSO OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION ON GROUNDS HE DID NOT WANT TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A WEAK GOVERNMENT AS THE PRESENT ONE. THIEU TOOK THE RESIGNATION UNDER ADVISEMENT AND MADE NO COMMITMENT ABOUT CHANGING HIS WAYS. KHANG DOES NOT EXPECT HIS RESIGNATION TO BE ACCEPTED. ON 18 FEBRUARY, KHANG SAID HE CONTINUED TO DOUBT THAT THE VIET COME WOULD LAUNCH A SEGGRD-WAVE ATTACK, ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED THEM TO TRY TO ISOLATE SAIGON. KHANG IS PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DIVISION COMMANDERS. GENERAL VIEN, ACCORDING TO KHANG, IS NOT PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCES OF II CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL LOC AND IV CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL HANH. KHANG EXPECTS MANH TO BE REPLACED BY GENERAL THANG AS SOON AS THE LATTER CONCLUDES HIS DUTIES WITH THE TASK FORCE. HE IS LESS CERTAIN THAT LOC WILL BE REPLACED BY GENERAL LAN. DURING THE MEETING WITH THIEU ON 17 FEBRUARY, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ISOLATED ATTACKS IN THE FUTURE BY CATHOLICS AGAINST BUDDHISTS. END SUMMARY

III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG SAID ON 18 FEBRUARY THAT DURING A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ON THE MORNING OF 17 FEBRUARY, HE, VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JG?) GENERAL CAN VAN UIEN AND MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG HAD ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE A STRONGER AND, IF NEED BE, TOUGHER LINE TOWARD THE CIVILIAN MINISTRIES. THIS WAS THE TIME FOR DIRECTIVES AND ORDERS, NOT

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S-E-C V SSEM 3_5

(Classification)(dissem controls)

DEBATE. IF A PARTICULAR MINISTER EITHER COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS, HE SHOULD BE DISMISSED. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THIEU CLEARLY INDICATE WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, IN TERMS NOT ONLY OF GENERAL POLICY BUT OF SPECIFIC TASKS. KHANG SAID THAT EVERYONE PRESENT, INCLUDING KY, STRESSED TO THIEU THAT THE PEOPLE ARE NOW IN THE MOOD FOR STRONG GOVERNMENT AND WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO GET IT. IF THIEU WAITED TOO LONG AND THE THREAT OF VIET CONG (VC) ATTACKS BEGAN TO DECLINE, THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLE WOULD CHANGE.

2. KHANG SAID THAT DURING THE MEETING HE HAD OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION TO THIEU, NOTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF HIS PERFORMANCE DURING THE CRISIS BY SENATORS AND DEPUTIES AND HE THUS WANTED TO GIVE THIEU THE CHANCE TO APPOINT A NEW CORPS COMMANDER IF HE WISHED. KHANG SAID HE ALSO TOLD THIEU HE WAS UNHAPPY WITH THE WEAKNESS OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND WOULD PREFER NOT TO CONTINUE IN HIS PRESENT POST UNLESS THIEU COULD GIVE HIM SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MORE FORCEFUL IN THE FUTURE. KHANG COMMENTED THAT THIEU TOOK HIS RESIGNATION UNDER ADVISEMENT, ADDING THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THIEU TO ACCEPT IT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THIEU DID NOT SUGGEST HE PLANNED TO REVISE HIS POLICIES OR HIS APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT, RATHER, HE JUST LISTENED AND THANKED EVERYONE FOR HIS VIEWS.

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3. KHANG SAID HE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE A SECOND-WAVE VC ATTACK ON SAIGON INVOLVING A LARGE COMMITMENT OF GROUND FORCES WAS UNLIKELY. THE VC, HE SAID, WILL MORE LIKELY RESORT TO ATTACKS BY HEAVY MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE. KHANG SAID HE BELIEVED THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE SAIGON BY INTERDICTING ROADS AND BRIDGES LEADING INTO THE CITY AND WILL RELY HEAVILY ON POLITICAL WARFARE, ESPECIALLY AMONG REFUGEES.

4. KHANG SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL THREE ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS IN HIS CORPS AREA AND THOUGHT THAT THE POLICE FIELD FORCES HAD PERFORMED WELL. HE HAD HAD SOME MINOR PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN VERY LITTLE SUCH ACTIVITY IN PROPORTION TO THE OPPORTUNITIES.

5. KHANG SAID THAT JGS CHIEF GENERAL VIEN VIEWS AS INADEQUATE THE PERFORMANCES DURING THE RECENT CRISIS OF II CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINH LOC AND IV CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN VAN MANH. VIEN IS ANGRY AT LOC FOR NOT HAVING BEEN IN HIS CORPS AREA WHEN THE VC ATTACKS BEGAN. LOC HAD COME TO SAIGON WITHOUT NOTIFYING THE JGS AND RETURNED TO PLEIKU ON THE MORNING.

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(classifififltwfl) (disaem controls)

OF 51 JANUARYU HE THUS WAS NOT IN COMMAND DURING THE INITIAL HOURS OF THE ATTACKO MANH IS UNDER FIRE BECAUSE OF THE POOR OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF ARVN TROOPS IN HIS AREA. THE 7TH DIVISION IN PARTICULAR SHOWED UP POORLY. ALSO, PACIFICATION IN IV CORPS HAS SUFFERED A SEVERE SETBACK IN THE DELTA, WITH ALL REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES TROOPS MANNING THE HIGHWAY FROM MY THO TO CAN THO OUT OF ACTION.

6. KHANG SAID HE BELIEVED MAJOR GENERAL THANG WILL REPLACE MANH IN IV CORPS AS SOON AS THANG CONCLUDES HIS DUTIES WITH THE COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF. HE WAS LESS CERTAIN ABOUT THE REPLACEMENT OF LOC BY MAJOR GENERAL MUU MONG LANG. KHANG SAID HE AND VIEN ARE PERSONALLY OPPOSED TO LAN'S APPOINTMENT BECAUSE THEY FEEL HE IS AND HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION AND IS NOT AN ESPECIALLY GOOD FIELD COMMANDER. KHANG SAID LAN GIVES A GOOD BRIEFING AND SUPERFICIALLY MAKES A GOOD IMPRESSION. HE HIMSELF, HOWEVER, DOES NOT THINK LAN WOULD MAKE A GOOD CORPS COMMANDER.

7. REVERTING TO THE 17 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH THIEU, KHANG SAID THE MEETING HAD BEEN HELD PRIMARILY TO WITNESS THE FORMAL RETURN TO KHANG BY VIEN OF THE SAIGON COMMAND. HE EXPLAINED THAT DURING THE FIRST FIVE DAYS OF THE ATTACK HE HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF BOTH SAIGON AND III CORPS AND HAD FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO FULFILL HIS SAIGON AND BIEN HOA DUTIES SIMULTANEOUSLY.

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(classification) (dissem controls)

A

VLEN HAD THEREFORE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAIGON, WITH KHANG AS HIS DEPUTY. KHANG COMMENTED THAT DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN WAS NEVER IN COMMAND IN SAIGON. HE WAS AND IS NON KHANG'S DEPUTY FOR SAIGON'S DEFENSE. MOREOVER, LOAN NEVER ASSUMED DIRECT COMMAND OF ANY ARVN TROOPS, ALTHOUGH ARVN AND POLICE FIELD FORCES DID CARRY OUT COORDINATED ACTIONS AND LOAN, AS THE SENIOR OR MOST FORCEFUL COMMANDER ON THE SCENE, MAY HAVE APPEARED TO BE THE OVERALL COMMANDER.

KHANG SAID THAT DURING THE MEETING THOSE PRESENT BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF ISOLATED CLASHES BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND BUDDHIST GROUPS IN THE FUTURE IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SHOW IT IS PAYING SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE. ACCORDING TO KHANG, A NUMBER OF CATHOLIC LEADERS BELIEVE THAT IN SEVERAL INSTANCES MILITANT BUDDHISTS WERE IN COLLUSION WITH THE VC AND AIDED THEM IN KILLING MILITANT ANTI-COMMUNIST CATHOLICS. AS A RESULT, IF THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROJECT A STRONG IMAGE
---
(Classification) ,_ (dtuem controls)                                                            _
AND INDICATE IT HAS TH’: s1IuAfioN unifiizn CONTROL, ISOLATED CATHOLIC
GROUPS MIGHT TRY TO TAKE REVENGE ON THE BUDDHISTS.
3jMhX2)

REPORT CLASS

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Output:
{
  "Who": "General Khang, Vice President Ky, President Thieu, General Vien, Major General Thang",
  "What": "Discussion on future Viet Cong attacks, leadership of the government, resignation offer by General Khang, performance evaluation of division commanders, potential replacements for corps commanders, concerns about possible clashes between Catholics and Buddhists",
  "When": "19 February 1968",
  "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Pleiku", "Mỹ Tho", "Can Tho"],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO3023641

MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:
2
ORIG:

UNIT:

EXT: 7121+

INDEX

DESTROY

REMARKS

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

REFERENCE NUMBER

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO OAS SAIGON

QUOTE THIS IS A JOINT GAS STATE DEFENSE NSA MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY AT 0012 9 MARCH TO AMBASSADOR, COMUSMACV AND UNQUOTE (Sig; Center copy from attached) END OF MESSAGE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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# PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has requested Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an appraisal of intelligence warning prior to the Tet Offensive. The task is to be completed by 10 April, with an interim report on 1 April. The DCI has convened a working group of USIB, plus representation from the Joint Staff, to make this appraisal and prepare a report. Much of the basic work, however, will have to be done in/by the field.

# QUESTIONS FROM PFIAB

1. WHAT INFORMATION REACHED J-2, MACV, IN THE PERIOD JANUARY 15-30 INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES? WHAT CAN BE SAID AS TO THE ORIGIN, THE QUANTITY, THE ACCURACY AND THE TIMELINESS OF THIS INFORMATION?
2. IN HOW MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND TOWNS DID THE RESPONSIBLE FIELD COMMANDERS RECEIVE WARNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO MAKE AMENDS?
---
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eunpuzsnnv PLEASE snow on A map-wnsnz wunsa ATTACKS occunnnn WHICH wsnz THUS FRUSTRQTED.

TO WHAT EXTENT urn THE vznwwamasx CIVIL POPULATION arvz INFORMATION T0 THE AUTHORITIES BEFORE AND nunznc THE ATTACKS? (IT -nns swan snxn on rnnnvxsxou rnnx rnznz was now A sxnann nnvonr FROM CIVILIAN souncss annnrxnc ovnx us FORCES TO THE IMPENDING ATTACKS.) (WORKING anon? ADDS: wnaw xnronuarxou nan vu INTELLIGENCE AND smcunxrv ACQUIRED wnlca wnnnsn or THE IHPENDIHG nwrncxszl

TU WHAT EXTENT WAS THERE A FREE AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORHATION BETWEEN GVN AND US neuncxzs? (woaxxnc anon? ADDS: AHGNG THE smvznnn us AGENCIES, nun AMONG was svn AGENCIES THEMSELVES?)

nnvn TH ENEMY uuzrs waxes nnencsn xx THE awrncxs mow BEER IDENTIFIED? IF so, wnnw coucnuszous HAVE BEEN nnawu rues rnmss IDENTIFICATIONS? (THE nonnv nncoauxzns THAT run eunsrrou IS moan pnopnanv PART or QUESTION H).

WHAT SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATED INFORMATION BEARING ON THQIATTACK ON THE CITIES REACHED THE FOLLQWIRG OFFICIALS IN THE PERIOD GP JANUARY 15~30?
---
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GENERAL WESTHORELAHD, JCS, SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, BCI, THE WHITE HOUSE. (WORKING 0200? ADDS: AMBASSADOR BUNKER)

INASMUCH AS IT CAN AN INCONVENIENCE, WE PICTURE OURSELVES HAVING TO ASK OFFICIALS NEWS OF THE SITUATION BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE EMBASSY.

1. YOU WERE CONCERNED WITH WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE INFORMATION REQUEST AND OUR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL AGENCIES IN SAIGON ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE IMPACT ON YOUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, WE PROPOSE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM TO ASSIST IN COLLECTING AND REVIEWING RELEVANT INFORMATION. SUBJECT TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS; PROPOSE ABOUT THREE DAYS OF SAIGON CONSULTATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AND TWO OR THREE DAYS AT SELECTED FIELD LOCATIONS WITH A ONE-DAY WRAP-UP IN SAIGON.

ASSEMBLE MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO BUNDY'S QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

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2%. PRTWlD$ $lAC‘l'8 KVALUATQGH 02*‘ TRIS MATERIAL, EEPECIAIJ.-Y ON QUEE-TI()RF3
C AND D-
PROVIDE A anxnxxnc on MACV‘$ PROCEDURES FOR vnncmssxnc AND EVALUATION 0? znnzcawmows INTELLIGENCE.
Panpnnn A nxsvonsn T0 QUESTIQN g_<1>.
AHRANGE A rxnnn ITINBRAEY in xncnunn vzsxra T0 amnncrnn unnnounnrzns AT CGEIFS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL, INCLUDING
a. [ii] ASSEEBLE Qgrnaxan connncrzn Tnnouen' [::]CH&NHELS nunzua Pnaxon 15_2a JANUARY wazcn ooxwaznxn IHBICATIOHE or run rm? orrznaxvn, AID unwnnxnn IH nzsrensn we qumswxous g_nuu Q.
PROVIDE snxxvxmus cu rats mnwanxan, AED ex[:::::]nvALuAr1uu or :1, ssvncznnnw on QUE8TIflN$ Q A59 Q.
PRGVIDE A BRIEPIHG ea[:::]vaoc5muams FGR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION er IHDICATION5 Ifi'L!Gi:TNC?

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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

PR£'}VII>E BFFICE SPACE AND CLF.RICf\L sumxmw.

SAIGQN C. m=<ov1.<m naxxrmes on ITS swm; 0?

wmmxnc or rm: THT omm.-wsxvg mm on ms zmssmnsza 'ro QUKSTIURS g AND Q.

1:. ‘<9 s.5(¢)

1. PROVIDE ANY WARNING INFORldDTIvI‘.!l\'
IT RECEIVED DURING 15--I10 JANUARY.

2. PRQVIDE BRIEFING OH THIS MA'I.'EP.IAL.

3. PTJNIDE BRIEFING ON ITS P'ROCEIIU'R.E3
FOR PROCEQBIHG AND }E2VALUA'I‘XO?€ 1‘?

IHI)ICi$’i‘IQNS INTELLIGENCE.

4. am;-m ~:r~.'e'r:~2 'rm~.'r STUDY 1:1»: concs:n'rnm~z::>
JAHUMIY PEIIIOD, BUT '{3IGHIFICfl-WI‘ I]’IF(?RW\TI(‘>N
or: THE is-we
RECEZVE33 PRIOR TO 15 JAWURRY EHOULD BE INCLUDED.

5. TEAM COMPOSITION T0 FULLOY? S13PA.E.?!fi MESSAGE.

Q
Innllfikisi

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# MESSAGE FORM

|DD/O01|S-E-6-H-E-T|
|---|---|
|0.1.1.|A|
|II‘:|W|
|flA]'Q| 8 MBTCI1| |
|cnv ucnnnma DIIIIMINATION|C|
| |[I] nutnov|
| |[I] urunu 1o..-____._....I._.0 umdcu|
| |[I] mu|
|30|Imp|
|R"Eom-|mm.|
| |RID COPY|
| |nu|
| |QM CSIQE,)_|
| |5.4|
| |<1-C50|
|(clumiflcaflon)|(date and lame filed)|
| |eferonce number|

To FPRIORITY SAIGON

FOR COS THIS IS A JOINT CAS STATE DEFENSE NSA MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY AT OOB 9 MARCH

TO AMBASSADOR, COMUSMACV

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD HAS REQUESTED DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERTAKE AN OF INTELLIGENCE WARNING PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE TASK TO BE COMPLETED BY 10 APRIL, WITH AN INTERIM REPORT ON 1 APRIL. THE DCI HAS CONVENED A WORKING GROUP OF USIB, PLUS REPRESENTATION FROM THE JOINT STAFF, TO MAKE THIS APPRAISAL AND PREPARE A REPORT. MUCH OF THE BASIC WORK, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE TO BE DONE IN AND BY THE FIELD.

JOINT STAFF HAS ASKED THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:

1. HAS INFORMATION REACHED J-2, MACV, IN THE PERIOD JANUARY 15-30 INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES? WHAT CAN BE SAID AS TO THE ORIGIN, THE QUANTITY, THE ACCURACY AND THE TIMELINESS OF THIS INFORMATION? (COS)

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 003023041

ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
---
# MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL copies: M6 A

HT:

mm olmnov nnunu 10. 77VVILr umucu mi kw

D. IN HOW MANY CASES OF ATTACKS UN THE CITIES AND TOWNS DID THE RESPONSIBLE FIELD COMMANDERS RECEIVE WARNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVOID BEING SURPRISED? PLEASE SHOW ON A MAP WHERE THESE ATTACKS OCCURRED WHICH WERE THUS FRUSTRATED.

c. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE VIETNAMESE CIVIL POPULATION GIVE INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACKS? (IT HAS BEEN SAID ON TELEVISION THAT THERE WAS NDT A SINGLE REPORT FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES ALERTING GVN/US FORCES TO THE IMPENDING ATTACKS.)

WHAT INFORMATION HAD VN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ACQUIRED WHICH WARNED OF THE IMPENDING ATTACKS?

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THERE A BIKE FREE AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GVN AND US AGENCIES? (WORKING GRGJP ADDS: AMONG THE SEVERAL US AGENCIES, AND AMONG THE SVN AGENCIES THEMSELVES?)

HAVE THE ENE/iY UNITS WHICH ENGAGED IN THE ATTACKS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED? IF SO, WHAT CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THESE IDENTIFICATIONS? (THE BOARD RECOGNIZES THAT THE QUESTION IS MORE PROPERLY PAR}6F QUESTION A).
---
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|ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY|MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES: 6|
|---|---|
|DATE:|10|

|TO:|(P&“‘° 3’)|
|---|---|
|WHAT SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATED INFORMATION BEARING ON THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALS IN THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 15-30? (1) GENERAL WESTMORELAND (2) JCS, (3) SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, (4) DOI, (5) THE PRESIDENT. (WORKING GROUP ADDS: AMBASSADOR BUNKER)| |
|IN SO FAR AS IT CAN BE RECONSTRUCTED, WHAT PICTURE DID THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OF THE SITUATION BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES?| |
|YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE BULK OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED IN VIETNAM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL AGENCIES IN SAIGON ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE IMPACT ON YOUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, WE PROPOSE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM TO ASSIST IN COLLECTING AND REVIEWING THE RELEVANT INFORMATION. SUBJECT TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS, PROPOSE ABOUT THREE DAYS OF SAIGON CONSULTATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AND TWO OR THREE DAYS AT SELECTED FIELD LOCATIONS WITH A ONE-DAY WRAP-UP IN SAIGON. (cont'd)| |

|CLASSIFIED BY|REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.|
|---|---|
|AUTHENTICATION|COPY|
|DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION|OFFICER|
---
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MESSAGE FORM ROUTING AND INITIALS - SEEN BY

TOTAL COPIES: 6

ORIGI again'!- 1

|UNITS|IXT1|
|---|---|
|DATE:|9|
|cum secummn nmemnmmon|[3 INDIX E] nnrnov urum ro..______.____ IIANCH [:1 III-l|
|K uvL_._.,_ _, H,_“;gI.¢J¢>_vl'ifl'KIII37*§"‘Q|j4Jw>v¢>QQ-q‘gv‘,,¢,AJfl ¢;_.__.,._______...|E] no man [:] nu IN cs ml no.' :|

W ,1 V M, Ill! ,VI

(emu) h

(cluuliflcaflon) (date and time Tiled) (reference number)

TO A. MACV. 1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO BOARD'S QUESTIONS A THROUGH E, FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE RETURN TO WASHINGTON 2. PROVIDE MACV'S EVALUATION OF THIS MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D. 3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON MACV'S PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE. A. PREPARE A RESPONSE TO QUESTION F (1). 5. ARRANGE I A FIELD ITINERARY TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SELECTED HEADQUARTERS AT CORPS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL, INCLUDING [::::::::::] Ei5(c) B_ Q s.5(¢) l. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL COLLECTED THROUGH[:::]cEAERELS DURING s.5(¢) PERIOD 15-30 JAEEARI WHICH CONTAINED INDICATIONS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, ART MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D. 2. PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON THIS MATERIAL, ARE oE[:::::]EvALEATIoR s.5(¢) OF IT, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D. (CONT"D)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IELEMIING omen - IR...,,.¢.§°m,'I.‘{.m“|'...'..?,...|¢ AUTHENTIEZATINO OFFICER

RBI-KODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE l$SUlN¢'6FFICE IS PROHIBITED. CQPY NO

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---
# MESSAGE FORM

TOTAL COPIES:
6

UNIT: 1 -@+@~H+

TO

F(Page 5)

3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

4. PROVIDE OFFICE SPACE AND CLERICAL SUPPORT.

C. EMBASSY SAIGON

PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON ITS STATE OF WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND ON ITS RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.

1. PROVIDE ANY WARNING INFORMATION IT RECEIVED DURING 15-30 JANUARY.

2. PROVIDE BRIEFING ON THIS MATERIAL

3. PROVIDE BRIEFING ON ITS PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

4. THE BOARD REQUESTS THAT STUDY BE CONCENTRATED ON THE 15-30 JANUARY PERIOD, BUT SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION RECEIVED PRIOR TO 15 JAN SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

5. TEAM COMPOSITION TO FOLLOW SEPARATE MESSAGE.

END OF MESSAGE
---
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|MESSAGE FORM|ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SECURITY|
|---|---|
|TOTAL COPIES:|6|
|ORIG:|N|
|UNIT:|S-E-R-E-T-P-|
|vh-|9|
|EXT| |
|DATE:|10|
|DISSEMINATION|muix|DISTROY|nnunu 1o_. >>n§<~— _ _.. _ unmcu U 1...;|
|- ~ _ Pi! W \- P9|no wont|nu m ca mu ma.|
|COMP:|'~F°=|
|H U RID COPY|FILE|VR|
|V|(classification)|(date and time filed)|IIQIBYQMB """1b9'I|
|CITE DIRECTOR|// ye|
|TO| |

(Page 6)

|State|Fred. Greene INR/REA|
|---|---|
|JCS|E. e|SACSA|
|DIA|3.5(C)|
|NSA| |
|SAVA| |
| |s.5(¢)|

(all by phone)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

R. J. SMITH

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASE

PRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICER IS PROHIBITED.

COPY ~0-

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVOID BEING SURPRISED? PLEASE SHOW ON A MAP WHERE THESE ATTACKS OCCURRED IN RELATION TO THE POPULATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACKS?

ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE REPORT FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES ALERTING GVN FORCES TO THE ATTACKS.

WAS THERE A BRIEF AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GVN AND US FORCES?

HAVE ENEMY FORCES WHICH ENGAGED IN THE ATTACKS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED? IF SO, WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THESE IDENTIFICATIONS?

WHAT SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATED INFORMATION BEARING ON THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALS IN THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 15-30?

- GENERAL WESTMORELAND
- SCS
- SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE
- DCI
- THE PRESIDENT
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

# WHAT PICTURE DID THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OF THE SITUATION BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES?

YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE BULK OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED IN VIETNAM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL AGENCIES IN SAIGON ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE IMPACT ON YOUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, WE PROPOSE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM TO ASSIST IN COLLECTING AND REVIEWING RELEVANT INFORMATION. SUBJECT TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS, PROPOSE ABOUT THREE DAYS OF SAIGON CONSULTATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AND TWO OR THREE DAYS AT SELECTED FIELD LOCATIONS WITH A ONE-DAY WRAP-UP IN SAIGON.

IN PREPARATION FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM, REQUEST MATERIALS BE ASSEMBLED, AS TIME PERMITS, AS FOLLOWS:

- ASSEMBLE MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO BOARD'S QUESTIONS A THROUGH E, FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

8. PROVIDE MAOV'S EVALUATION OF THIS MATERIAL ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON MAOV'S PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
A. PREPARE A RESPONSE TO QUESTION F (1).
5. ARRANGE A FIELD ITINERARY TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SELECTED HEADQUARTERS AT CORPS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL, INCLUDING:
ASSEMBLE MATERIAL COLLECTED THROUGH CHANNELS DURING PERIOD 15-30 JANUARY WHICH CONTAINED INDICATIONS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE; AND MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.
PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON THIS MATERIAL, AND EVALUATION OF IT, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

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                                                     _ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641

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                                                    ,/ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023641 CITE_CIA_8115[15617888].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Director of Central Intelligence, Joint Staff, USIB, GVN, US forces, MACV, Secretaries of State and Defense, DCI, The President, Ambassador Bunker",
"What": "Appraisal of intelligence warning prior to Tet Offensive, specific questions related to intelligence warning and response to attacks on cities and towns",
"When": "9 March, 1 April, 10 April",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}