Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text:

---

---

---

---

---

---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247LLAN

3.5(c)

civilian proselyting activities they in the countryside organization or have made. Moreover their provincial territorial number of changes in the educate the administrative. Other evidently area structure responsibilities of Some of these changes and re administrative overhead reports refer designed to and release streamline more movement of tary to men for milic address service from higher to and revitalize lower echelons to leadership at the lowest levels in an the enemy strength en grassroot organization the be effort to intention to decentralize compete with government gains. It may authority and allow lower level officials and organizations to be degree of more flexible in certain situations tions 12 that by the demoralized by Over the past year the enemy allied military there have been indica- cadres have been number of district Village pressures prospects of fighting what govern- they believe will be protracted war and by the ment Chieu Hoi program. North Vietnamese cadre specializing in anti-pacifica- tion activities were and those infiltrated attrition demoralized Purges cadres be cadre have reportedly occurred of lost through normal to replace the in many provinces nists have in resources degree of support the Com- mu-13 The amount or mate of what an RD area the combined with their esti- withdraw determines whether or not the Communists will usually GVN will put into the area villages their overt apparatus in the hamlets members reportedly being Secret party ana Liberation Front and establish tay-behind designated in rural areas are serve as itself. In forces should the government some the sympathies of counter areas partly to the pea - to RD programs and to retain had to and landowners sants reform--or occasionally the Communists have reportedly reduce--some of their taxes Communist Proselyting gani14_zational The Communist have flexibility and resilience and shown remarkable within or- ering local situations certain limits appear to be highly adaptable to dif- There has been and still

3.5(c)

CONFIDENTIAL

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247

remains lack of 'armed propaganda units detailed information on Communist political action change their modus operandi These conform elements apparently to local situations interrogation report however captured documents and these cadres and units and suggest have Yielded that the enemy promotes and maintains strong psychological warfare effort task 15 and teams armed propaganda units Agit/Prop Teams assault propaganda teams (AP) - also referred to action political as units comes appear to be the Communist organization which teams GVN-controlled probably con-closest to the cept of the targeted against contest ea or GVN RD The APs are village star and hamlets and night--assemble at Generally residents the they enter and spread usually and hamlet-leaflets ganda and Civilian/military banners collect information conduct propaganda proselyting activities In their proselyting the units AP teams attempt to recruit villagers for military the government urge those with relatives WO lagers are ionally rking for or act their relatives to desert money or as permit and occas Where security often accompanied by extract conditions goods from the vil-cultural or the AP agents to persuade in place teams entertainment the government and ment groups whose shows extolling geared are the Viet Cong. to discrediting The AP This units apparently seldom engage in terrorism. is probably left to district commit-proselyting cadres who may units tees using local suasion rely The professional guerrillas be part propaganda and per-almost entertainment, special cell and/or exclusively on or propaganda, of these agit/propaganda members although for defensive coerce or Nevertheless purposes intimidate local the presence of their weapons people can still serve to into cooperating. The Communists usually make organized on distinction between full-time AP units and those an ad hoc basis to carry out propaganda mission against ties conducted by or the sharply specific target the Viet Cong probably disseminated in latter contested The majority in units Although propaganda areas are of propaganda government-controlled carried out by activities -7 -

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247
---
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GONFHDENTTAL

this manner not may necessarily effectiveness--it gives lack certain degree of professionalism--but the thing the government often lacks some Viet Cong an instant response to local incident

Prospects Strategic and in the against RD or of Saigon The recent increase of enemy activity in the heavily populated provinces along more central coast the deltas south programs primarily has been are Enemy attacks on now becoming fairly routine occurrences directed refugee and Chieu Hoi RD-related centers growing concern he has completed his is suggest These attacks addition trategy on pacification and weak beginning it that clearly indicative of the enemy in the over the RD programs assessment of to hit at allied what he regards as probable spots in and

Small-unit tactics expected to continue against these including harassment by fire and the government appears cadres hamlet administrators terrorism, can be targets and against the RD llage the National Police Vi and The enemy moreover capable of accelerating these activities achieve in 20 The degree of success the Communists can the their anti-RD efforts will depend in final uation analysis meshing of programs in the particular over-all friendly security sit-on the area Such and forces in an security is dependent upon upon the fortitude motivation, and training well a 5 government area as of the in lower levels civilian and military leadership at the both respects create a conditions for pacification are before really adequate long way to go The GVN still has

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GONFHDENTFAL
---
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Confidential

Confidential

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---
Mnemo Control Form

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247LLAJJIriCA | IUN OF MEMO (OCI)

|NOTICE NO|016-67|COVER SHEET|DISSEM AUTHORIZATION|
|---|---|---|---|
|MEMO NO 1666/67|DATE 00 November 1967|Due|D/OCI Review|
|SUBJECT: Command Communication Against the Revolutionary Dates;|Dissemination: November 1967| | |

|REQUESTED OROR|Program in South Vietnam Self-initiated|
|---|---|
|PURPOSE:| |
|ASSIGNED TO: Goldin/rE|GRAPHICS|COORDINATEONE/BAVNuDP|
|DISSEMINATION|OUTSIDE OCI|
|Preliminary (DDI, D/OCI, and their staffs)| |
|Category|Recommended to D/OCI|3,5(c)|
|Category|Finally Authorized By:|
|Specified Other|Release to Commonwealth Liaison Reps|
|Cat; D (Routine internal CIA internal)| |
|Cat. E (Routine internal and Washington to DDI Reps Abroad)|Release|
|Cat. B (Subcabinet and internal CIA only)| |
|Cat. A (Elite-External top officials only and internal CIA)|2024 OBSOLETE|

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---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

Page

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---
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

Page

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03003247 "COMMUNIST COUNTERACTION A[15466656].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Goldin/RE, CIA",
"What": "Information on Communist political action, armed propaganda units, proselyting activities, anti-RD efforts, enemy activity in Vietnam, small-unit tactics",
"When": "00 November 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610   Seeret

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Secret

47

15 December

No   0320 /671967

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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610  3.5(c)

Page

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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610

# SECRET

# CONTENTS

(Information as of noon EST, 14 December 1967)

|Far East|Page|
|---|---|
|THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE|VIETNAM|
|The Communist "winter-spring" offensive has evidenced a series of costly reverses and enemy main force units hope there evade major contact with allied forces on operations. On the political scene, so far the new Thieu government has shown few signs of promising new programs for the country.|15|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
|Europe|NR|
|SBERET| |

WEEKLY SUMMARY

15 Dec67

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# SECRET FAR EAST

petencetodealagain rejectedUnitedNationsInits firstcommentonUS soundingsconcerning renewedHanoihas withthe Vietnam question com- policy debateinthe this stepandasLiberationFrontGeneva agreementsittoanattempttomakeHanoidenouncedSecurity Councilscrapthe 1954 the UNserveUS TheNationalsendrepresentativestothea1sodeniedthat hadtriedtoThant statementthat suchan approachUN despitehadbeen made_ minationtocontinuethewarwithoutconcessionsIn moveto emphasizeits abilityanddeter- Hanoi publicizedChinesesupportrenewedpledgebyForeignMin-'until complete of victory hasbeenwon NR

# WEEKLY SUMMARY 15Dec67
---
# SECRET VIETNAM

"winter-springTheCommunistcountry-wideoffensivehas There continuestobeevi-centlyencountered seriesofre dencethat sone Commnunistmain costlyreverses forceunits hopetoforceson lastThe largestactionoccurred contactwithalliedevademajor ionenemyforce engagedtwobat-weekendwhen sweepoperaticns talionsof theSouth Vietnamese nameseElementsof USavoidmajor confrontationwith2ndDivisionalsocontinue 2lstDivisioninthe MekongDelta to provinceof Chuong'Thien.troopsconcentrationof enemywhereSuch This divisioncentralreportedly isbesetwithmoralesweepsin whichandleader-Corps is unusual inthedeltayearhasthe ship prob_lems hassufferedQuaegvy enemyformore than lossesinthe QuangTin operatedprimarilyin company-size formationsbattalion-size attacksand haslauncheaonly NamprovinceareaiIlrecent occasional months Viee SouthCongsomereportedly TheencounterVietnamesewerekilledSixty450 killedcosttheand SouthVietnamesePoliticalSituaion 102wounded _ ThenewgoverrmentofPresi- Large-scale dentThieuafter mionthandsigns tinuedinofnortheasternBinltherice-richcoastal halfinoffice hasshownfew flallands DinhProvincenearBong programsforthegovernmentcountrytobenainlyFeusPfor_ elenentsofof subordinatethe22nd Regiment , Lhe seems theNorthVietnan- organizationandrelationships concernedwithitsawninternal temptingDivision eseanAlliedfighthavebeenout unsettledindicationsthat of ofTamQuangencirclementBattleThis VicePresidentKymaybecompli- engagement--knownas thefar catingthewholeprocessofwork- soldierskilledThe ing outfutureprograms not deliberately SabotagingThieuAlthough gestsDecemberforces on theNorthfightingsug-sinceit began effortswait-and-seeattitudeinKyappearscontentto 3rd Division adopt of sufferedseriouslosses since pectsownfuture politicaleuhance early 1966 havebeenreinforced litical commitserious and resupplied_ Ky pros - SEERET Page WEEKLYSUMMARY 15Dec6 7
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610

North CONFIDENTIAL VIETNAM Demilitarized Zone

|1AAMLAND|TAIEN|48 CORPS|
|---|---|---|
|Quang Nbai|am Quang|Kontum Bong Son|
|C A M B 0 D 1 A|DNF i 4C CORPS|Ban Me TuYTN|
|AVaL: Am RANR|FhvOC 4N - Lim DCRG|NiNH Caplta DINA|
|BINH Special|BINA AUAN|Zone IKAANT Tuy|
|TutosiTuY ACNG|Tuor ili CORPS|LONG Hoa|
|KIEN DINA|CIINA GIANs BIN:|XuY SOUTH|
|S4M BACE|XUYENAN ivCORPS|BOUTH VIETNAM|

186 68961.12-67 CIA

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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610

Complaints have been voiced by persons about what they call a dilettante approach to the day-to-day problems of governing close to the government. Thieu is evidently not providing adequate guidance. Prime Minister Loc, who appears to be waiting before moving from the President, composed largely of technicians, has yet to come up with any significant new programs. Thieu appears particularly reluctant to take any bold steps in the economic sphere, which might draw criticism from influential circles. In addition to the internal pressures, the government is reportedly contributing to a lack of decisiveness, which is contributing to the internal pressures faced by Thieu.

Certain military officers are facing resentment from fear they may lose their prerogatives under the civilian government. Such attitudes among the military officers must be taken into consideration by the new administration, delaying the anticipated reorganization of the military establishment. The civil administration, including anticorruption drive, may further hinder its promised reforms.

Neither house of the National Assembly is yet in a position to enact legislation. Both the Upper and Lower houses are still preoccupied with their own internal matters.

|House|Position|Legislation|
|---|---|---|
|National Assembly|Not placed legislation|Legislative proposals have yet been before it|
|Upper House|Occupied with their own internal matters|No legislative proposals|
|Lower House|Still preoccupied with their own internal matters|No legislative proposals|

Both houses are still preoccupied with their own internal matters.

On 12 December, Hanoi charged the US of making up tricks against Vietnam and reiterated its rejection of UN jurisdiction and scrapping the Geneva agreements.

The article insisted that the Geneva Conference is the only international body with any responsibility for the Vietnam problem and that the UN has no responsibility whatsoever in the Vietnam problem.

The UN has the duty to respect it.

SECRET

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Seeret
Seeret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C03172610 "WEEKLY SUMMARY_15472895_.pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Thieu government, Prime Minister Loc, National Assembly, Hanoi",
	"What": "Weekly intelligence summaries, military actions in Vietnam, government issues in Vietnam, UN and US relations with Vietnam",
	"When": "15 December 1967",
	"Where": ["Far East", "Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Demilitarized Zone"],
	"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786717

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/IIC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OER FBIS DC5- IRS AID USIA

IE §I '§§tn-lnsln!thetzanslnlsslorm‘tlonafl on orecungmve1aflon_ :1 whlclrlnfig’theHtlona1Def I Es iiE 5;ottheAro11lb_. In'8'Tlfle18,U._0.‘ 8_I

'N6-FQRE+GN_IU£EEIL_'I - A -‘YA> _ Y A_ .1, =@__ IAI Ir I.

THIS ls AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

s}QRE’]':< 'ClTEV 3.50

nlsr ~16 MARCH 1968

couumv soum VIETNAM/CAMBODIA

001 JANUARY - FEBRUARY 19655 /IE6 Asilshfio

sumac? .VlET cone USE OF CAMEDDIA

ACQ s.5(¢

SOURCE

SUMMARY.- PRISONERS AND DOCUMENTS CAPTURED -SINCE .THE BEGINNING OF TET OFFENSIVE ON 29 JANUARY I968 HAVE PROVIDED FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE USE OF. CAMBODIA BY THE V|ET_ CONG. SOMETOLDAOF VC RECRUITMENT.ACT|_\/ITIES AI/DNGEETHNIC VIETNAMESE IN CAMHJDIAQ ALLEGEDLY THERE IS A TRAINING ‘SITEWHICH CAN ACCOMIVODATE FIFTY RECRUITSAA-T A TIME IN THE BA THU AREA. AEDUT I5 JANUARY I968 THE AN GIANG ‘PROVINCE COMMITTEE SECURITY SECTION ESTABLISHED A CAMP NEAR »-AP. VIN_H_A AN- WHERE EPRISONERS TAKEN DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WERE TO BE SENT". A HARDER CADRE "CLAIMED IT WAS‘HIS»DUTY TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS _ $oEo@R‘ Aye -MEN _ANDL.‘MATE_R|EL<_ TOIZROSS THE BQRDER. HE ESTIMATED 2,000 TONS OF ‘CARGO PER 3 MONTH ‘TRANSITED THE HJRDER INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. ANOTHER PRISONER CLAIMED THAT I-ll.\'J93|FU'l

CAMH)DIAN OFFICIALS COOPERATED IN AGREEMENTS ALLOWING THE cluasi film (diasem controls)

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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786717

3-5 PAGES

1. VIET CONG USE OF CAMBODIA AS A SAFEHAVEN FOR INSTALLATIONS, AS A SOURCE AND TRANSIT ROUTE FOR FOOD AND SUPPLIES, AND TO SOME EXTENT AS A SOURCE OF MANPOWER WAS SUSPECTED AND TO A LIMITED DEGREE CONFIRMED PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE OUR KNOWLEDGE HAS BEEN AUGMENTED THROUGH INTERROGATIONS OF SEVERAL KNOWLEDGEABLE PRISONERS, SOME VERY LOW LEVEL, WHO KNEW NOTHING MORE THAN THAT THEY HAD BEEN TRAINED IN CAMBODIA OR HAD INFILTRATED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM CAMBODIA, AND SOME WHO HELD RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS WHICH GAVE THEM ACCESS TO INFORMATION ABOUT VIET CONG (VC) USE OF CAMBODIA.

2. THE VC APPARENTLY WERE RECRUITING ETHNIC VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA FOR SOME TIME PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. RECRUITMENT UNDOUBTEDLY OCCURRED AT SEVERAL LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT CAMBODIA BUT WAS CENTERED IN PHNOM PENH AND THE CAMBODIAN PROVINCES CLOSE TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER. A CAPTURED VC DOCUMENT DATED 6 JANUARY FROM GROUP 80C TO COMPANY/GROUP 129 SAID THAT NBA BE (POSSIBLY NHA BE SUBREGION MR M) HAD RECEIVED 79 TYPE "C" RECRUITS (VIETNAMESE PREVIOUSLY LIVING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES). GROUP 129 WAS REQUESTED TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RECEPTION OF AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF THIS TYPE OF RECRUIT FROM THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

IN NOVEMBER 196Y CONTINGENTS OF SEVEN OR EIGHT ETHNIC VIETNAMESE WHO HAD BEEN RECRUITED BY THE VC WERE LEAVING ON THE AVERAGE OF ONCE A WEEK FROM PHNOM PENH. A 3H-YEAR-OLD VC CADRE CAPTURED IN SAIGON DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE SAID THAT HE AND OTHERS
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786717

IN-

A 1s.5(¢)

RAGE A-0P5 BAGES

O~éifiiiligi‘ 4%}—F9RE+£H+49+$§£¥+

(cia.|'slflc¢tion)'(a;um=controls)

25,QE§EMBER 1967 HIS UNIT wAs IN A FOREST on CAMBODIAN TERRITORY WHERE THE STORAQEFDEPOTS OF GROUP 858 (9TH vc DIVISION} WERE LOCATED. IN MID-JANUARY HIS UNIT MOVED BACK To SOUTH VIETNAM FROM CAMBODIA T0 PARTTc|PATE-TN THE TET OFFENSIVE. ANOTHER DIARY KEPT BY SOMEONE WHO HAD INFILTRATED FROM NORTH VIETNAM.TO SOUTH VIETNAM NOTED THAT ON 18 JANUARY IITIIIE WR“]I‘TER ‘HAD PERFORMED ‘"GARDI%v!?II\-’:=i"AS A CAMBODIAN SOLDIER" JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM CAMBOH A T0 SERVE IN THE TET OFFENSIVE.

Y”-6._ soR SOME TIME GOODS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN SHIPPED FROM-CAMBODJA Tb SOUTH VIETNAM

FeR’UsE~BY'THE-vc,‘ ?E:<mwE OF THE PRISONERS CAPTURED DURING IHE TET OFFENSIVE c1vEs A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE TRANSACTIONS. ACCORDING TO A BORDER CADRE OF THE vc AN~ GIANG #RdvTNcE COMMITTEE wHosE DUTIES INCLUDED CONTACTING LOCAL CAMODIAN OFFICIALS To ARRANGE EOE VC MEN AND MATERIEL To TRAVEL ACROSS THE BORDER, GOODS WERE TRANSPORTED FROM PHNOM PENH AND SIHANOUKVILLE FOR USE BY THE vc. HHEEESTIMATED T.2,000:TONS OF CARGO PER MONTH WERE BROUGHT BY OAT, SAMPAN, OR TRUCK INTO SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE vc.' THE PRISONER SAID; HOWEVER, THAT SINCE MID-1967 ONLY ABOUT SIXTY PERCENT OF THE USUAL AMOUNT OF GOODS HAS FLOWED ACROSS THE BORDER BECAUSE BORDER CONTROLS BEGAN TO BE I/ORE’ EFFECTIVELY

IMPLEMENTED BY SIHANOUK. PRISONERS CAPTURED IN III CORPS REPORTED THAT THEIR UNITS OBTAINED RICE FROM CAMEDDIA. BONE SAID ITHAT HE WAS SENT TO CAMBODIA THREE OR FOUR TIMES A MONTH To HELP TRANSPORT RICE FOR HIS UNIT.

1. I-THE COMPLICIITYEOF CAMBODIANMILITARY OFFICIALSQIBORDER GUARDSAND CUSTOMS PERSONNEL‘ IN VC ACTIVITIES INICAMBDDIA HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY REPORTED BEFORE. ONE OF

THE RECENT PRISONERSI
---
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WALKED FROM CAMBODIA FOR SEVEN NIGHTS BEFORE THE SAIGON BATTLE. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN PRESSED INTO SERVICE BY THE VC. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER CAPTURED VC, THE BATTALION WHICH ATTACKED I/DC HOA WAS MADE UP OF ETHNIC VIETNAMESE RECRUITS FROM CAMBODIA.

THE VC HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTING TRAINING SITES AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN CAMBODIA AT LEAST SINCE 1960. ACCORDING TO SEVERAL PRISONERS CAPTURED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE, THE BA THU AREA OF CAMBODIA SERVED AS A TRAINING SITE FOR THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, COMPANY 3, VC 6TH BATTALION COMPOSED OF FORTY SOLDIERS, WAS THERE FROM EARLY JANUARY 1968 UNTIL 28 JANUARY; THE RECRUITS, HOWEVER, ARRIVED AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE LATTER PART OF 1967. THE TRAINING CENTER COULD TRAIN ABOUT FIFTY RECRUITS AT A TIME.

ALLEGEDLY TRAINING INCLUDED COURSES IN THE MAINTENANCE AND FIRING OF AK AND CKC RIFLES, AND IN INDIVIDUAL COMBAT TECHNIQUES. IN ADDITION, THE RECRUITS STUDIED MILITARY THEORY--DAILY. ACCORDING TO ONE PRISONER, COMPANY 3 WAS THE ONLY UNIT TO LEAVE THE BA THU AREA FOR SAIGON AT THE END OF JANUARY. NONE OF THE OTHER UNITS AT BA THU WAS IDENTIFIED.

ACCORDING TO ONE PRISONER, POLITICAL PRISONERS TAKEN DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WERE TO BE SENT TO A NEW CAMP WHICH THE AN GIANG PROVINCE COMMITTEE SECURITY SECTION HAD ESTABLISHED NEAR AP VINH AN ABOUT 15 JANUARY. THIS PRISONER ALSO SAID THAT SINCE 1960, VARIOUS PROVINCE AND DISTRICT COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN USING THREE OTHER CAMPS LOCATED ON CAMBODIAN SOIL FOR MEETINGS, TRAINING SITES, BIVOUAC AREAS, AND COMMUNICATION-LIAISON STATIONS. ALL OF THE CAMPS USED SOME SORT OF CAMOUFLAGING TECHNIQUES AND AT LEAST ONE OF THEM HAD NO PERMANENT BUILDINGS AND MOVED EVERY THREE DAYS WITHIN A ONE KILOMETER RADIUS.

IN A CAPTURED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) DIARY, THE WRITER STATED THAT ON

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---
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GIANG PROVINCE COMMITTEE HAD RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL COOPERATION FROM CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS SINCE 1960. AGREEMENTS WERE MADE TO ALLOW THE VC TO CROSS THE BORDER FREELY AND FREE OF CHARGE, TO SET UP CAMPS ON CAMBODIAN SOIL, AND TO COLLECT TAXES FROM VIETNAMESE MERCHANTS CROSSING THE BORDER. COOPERATION WITH CAMBODIAN OFFICIALS WAS SUCH THAT THE VC WERE PERMITTED SAFE PASSAGE IF THEY WERE TRAVELING ALONG A PREARRANGED COMMUNICATION-LIAISON ROUTE AT A SPECIFIED TIME, OR IF THEY WERE PROPERLY DOCUMENTED. DURING THE LATTER PART OF 1967 THE ABOVE MENTIONED PRISONER CROSSED FROM CO TO MOUNTAIN IN CHAU DOC PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM, TO A MEETING AT CAMP BE ON CAMBODIAN TERRITORY. HE AND HIS TRAVELING COMPANION CARRIED A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FROM THE COMMANDER OF BATTALION 510, WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BORDER RELATIONS, IDENTIFYING THE BEARER AS A MEMBER OF BATTALION 510 AND GRANTING PERMISSION FOR HIM TO TRAVEL THROUGH A PARTICULAR AREA AND REQUESTED THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE AREA TO GRANT HIM FREE PASSAGE.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786717 VIET_CONG_USE_OF_CAMBODIA[15617749].pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": ["STATE/INR", "DIA", "NMCC/IIC", "SECDEF", "JCS", "ARMY", "NAVY", "AIR FORCE", "CIA", "NMCC", "NIC", "NSA", "SDO", "ONE", "CRS", "OER", "FBIS", "IRS", "AID", "USIA"],
  "What": ["Viet Cong use of Cambodia for various activities", "Training sites and installations in Cambodia", "Cooperation of Cambodian officials with Viet Cong", "Transportation of goods from Cambodia to South Vietnam", "Recruitment of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia", "Security arrangements for Viet Cong in Cambodia"],
  "When": "16 March 1968",
  "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Cambodia", "Phnom Penh", "Ba Thu area", "Ap Vinh An", "Sihanoukville", "Saigon"],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

The Situation Summary in Vietnam

To: SECRET

AGENCY ARCHIVES PLEASE REMEMBER

Date: February 25, 1968
---
# Information

1968·of as as of 1600 2 February 1968-

# HIGHLIGHTS

As day, the Communist offensive continued into its fourth day, the military situation remained critical

In several provincial enemy capitals and their kind meanwhile, there renewed indications being that touched up together that the enemy may be planning renewed attacks at Saigon area. The Communists, meanwhile, may be trying to put some of their kind in new current political facade has to back claims of objectives long-sought by them.

# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

As the Communist offensive against urban centers rolled into its fourth day, enemy losses were counted at well over 10,000 dead (Paras. 1-2). In II Corps, fighting continues in Hue. Several city district towns have also come under attack and the city of Quang Ngai appears to be once threatened once again. The situation remains critical with the enemy massing troops on its outskirts.

In Da Nang, the Communist move in the highlands still holds the province southern portion in place of II Corps. In Ban Me Thuot and Kontum, the Communists are still attempting to put new positions in Saigon from outlying areas, but no new attacks have been reported. In the rest of III Corps, there have been only scattered attacks (Paras. 9-10). In IV Corps, the area of Vinh Long also remains critical; the city is also the scene of heavy fighting (Paras. 11-12). Allied losses remain critical; the Communists have been capability to commit further forces to sustain their activity (Paras. 14-16).

# Political Developments in South Vietnam:

Fumbling courage early President Thieu's current crisis lifted soon for Minister and Prime Minister Loc in the current stages of the crisis may encourage Vice President Ky to press for greater executive powers (Paras. 1-3). There is some talk that martial law may be lifted soon and the 24-hour curfew
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766064

E

TOME—j TO~TI 3.5(c) 3.5(c)31103.5(c)

|in Saigon|temporarily suspended the crisis Na-Na—|
|---|---|
|National Assembly reactions to the current crisis are mixed generally 7-9).| |
|Popular reaction has been one of confusion and causing an increase in refugees (Paras. 10-12).| |
|Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.| |
|Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.| |
|Communist Political Developments: Communist propaganda is portraying the current military offensive as one having broad popular support (Paras. 1-3).| |
|Some new kind of political offensive may be touched off trying to put up a popular facade to support claims (Paras. 4-11).| |
|Other Major Aspects: Improvements in the Laotian road net enable the Communists to ship greater quantities of supplies into northern South Vietnam (Paras. 1-4).| |

February 1968

35 3.5(c) TOP SECRET- 3.5(c) 3.5(c)
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The military Communist offensive continued for pe fourp day. The military situation remained critical in pe provincial capitals of Hue, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Da Lat; and a number of oper key towns is also being pressured in peir immediate environs. There are renewed indications pat Saigon may be planning attacks in pe area alpough pe situation presently appears relatively stable.

2. Enemy losses continue to soar. According to US military auporities, Communist dead now number well over 10,000 and an additional 3,000 enemy suspects have been detained. Weapons losses have been last reported at some 1,700. Allied losses have been only about 280 Soup Vietnamese and 1,200 Americans killed and 1,590 Soup Vietnamese and 630 Americans wounded.

# Corps

3. Heavy fighting continues in and around Hue where Communist forces entrenched in pe two-square-mile citadel area norp of pe Huong River continue stiff resistance. Two ARVN armored battalions have been attempting to fight peir way into pe walled city, and an ARVN airborne battalion has been lifted into pe citadel in pe vicinity of pe Soup Vietnamese 1st Division Headquarters. Two oper ARVN battalions have been committed to pe effort to secure Hue, and may be joined by a battalion of pe US 1st Cavalry Division. All US and government installations are in allied hands, but severe house-to-house enemy fighting is reported proughout all sections of pe city. The VOA transmitter is presently inoperative after enemy mortar attack.

4. Elsewhere in I Corps, pe fighting continues near several provincial towns. The Cu Loc District headquarters, which was seized on 1 February, is now reported in allied hands but remains preatened by a large enemy force in pe area. Quang Ngai city, alpough quiet, may also be preatened by enemy forces which are again reported massing nearby after being routed from pe town two days ago. The city received mortar fire on pe night of 12 February. Tam Ky, pe capital of Quang Tin Province, also sustained a mortar attack, possibly mixed wip artillery fire, on pe same night.
---
|Province,district|The district is reported town of Duy under enemy control, al-Xuyen, in southern Quang|
|---|---|
|The provincial Vietnamese forces remains Ban allied military situation critical in the central capitals Kontum and Me Thuot.|Regimental-size particularly their both North forces still occupy major portions of both towns and their environs. Heavy damage has been reported, particularly in Ban Me-Thuot.|
|In the center south of Da Lat Communists and scattered still town strongpoints hold the market particularly in the western part of the town. Small-arms fire is reported allied throughout the but there are indications that allied reinforcements spearheaded by South Vietnamese troops are beginning to bring the situation under control.|Against Pleiku coastal city report, recent battalion-size attacks near the village were reported. Heavy fighting also resumed in the city of Phan Thiet in southern II Corps.|
|There move past have into been new reports in around Communists that the were attempting to move into positions in Saigon and materialized, outlying areas during however, the past 24 for hours. No firing new attacks have however, except evidence had and enemy sporadic firing units in the Tay around the airport.|There attacks has been that enemy units the involved in recent attacks on Saigon moved into north capital the area from as far as Tay Ninh Province. No North Vietnamese have been confirmed as in the Saigon Viet Cong fight- ing although units may some have northerners participated. assigned as fillers to Viet 22 February 1968|
---
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10.10. To the north, the Cuong Binh of Saigon, few scattered attacks have been reported in Phu city and area around Cuong in this area of Duong Province. No attacks were reported in this area in III Corps on 2 February, but there have been indications that Tay-Ninh, An Loc, and Phuoc Vinh, the capitals of provinces near the bordering Cambodia, may be targets.

IV Corps provinces, where the sharp fighting continues, Communists in the Mekong continue to apply pressure against several provincial capitals and surrounding areas. The most critical situation exists at Ben Tre in Kien Hoa Province, where heavy fighting continues against some 700-800 enemy troops still in the city. Two US companies of ARVN 9th Division have arrived to reinforce the ARVN troops in the area.

12. The fighting in the city of Vinh on the night of 1-2 February was the scene of heavy fighting. Two other towns, Moc Hoa in Kien Tuong Province and Ca Mau in An Xuyen, came under attack on 2 February but were driven out. Sporadic firing continues to have been around these towns as well as Can Tho and My Tho, which had been attacked earlier.

Nationwide Aircraft Losses:

13. Reports from Kontum airfields indicate that these airfields presently remain completely attacked by enemy forces. In these attacks, about 15 fixed-wing aircraft and an additional 85 helicopters were destroyed, and 267 helicopters were damaged.

2 February 1968
---
# Prospects for the Immediate Future

|14.|Although the Communists have been pushed out of most urban positions, they continue to hold strategic areas or major towns. They may attempt to renew their attacks, major strategic attempts to ground pressure near several towns.|
|---|---|
| |They may attempt to maintain pressure on surrounding areas to keep up the tension and intimidate the populace.|
|15.|Despite the extremely high losses in the recent fighting, the Communists' units appear to be prepared to carry out the offensive. This is probably because most of their forces involved in the fighting into Hue have not thrown their full effort. For example, only elements of the 6th North Vietnamese regiment, plus some local forces, have been involved. At least four enemy regiments are within 20 miles of the city. There is evidence that parts of some regiments of the B-3 Front in the northern highlands and the MR-10 Front in the western Quang Tri area remain at least poised for action.|
---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. A leadership crisis could develop in the military government as a result of continuing pressure in urban areas. Vice President Ky took charge of the Joint General Staff decisions from the delta to declare martial law on the evening of January 31. President Thieu and Ky returned to Saigon to press for the mobilization of the nation. Ky reportedly urged the president to call the National Assembly into session and ask for "full powers" to run the nation. Ky also feels present actions taken by Viet Cong will begin to doubt the government's ability to protect them and will start to believe in an eventual Viet Cong victory.

2. Prime Minister Loc was reportedly in a state of bewilderment after the crisis erupted on January 30 and allowed the military to run the show. On February 1, Loc called an evening cabinet meeting which resulted in a decision to draft a communiqué to be broadcast outlining the situation in broad terms. The rest of the cabinet meeting was unproductive, according to sources.

3. The fact that Ky took the initiative in the early stages of the crisis will probably cause the senior generals to criticize Thieu more than the government. Thieu's indecisiveness in handling the government will probably come under fire. Loc's apparent willingness to function in a crisis situation will also come under fire. A possible result is that Ky may seek greater, extra-constitutional, executive powers in the government. There have been earlier reports that Ky might attempt to seek a constitutional amendment which would allow him to hold concurrently the position of vice president and prime minister.

22 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766064

# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766064

According to unconfirmed press reports, martial law would be proclaimed in the cities. It was reported on January 31 that it will remain in effect only until the Viet Cong have been cleared out of the major cities. A spokesman for Thieu reportedly said today that "it shouldn't be long now;" and suggested that the martial law government is no longer convinced that the situation is rapidly coming under control and that the Communist threat will soon be reduced to the point where some controls can be relaxed.

The embassy indicated that the 24-hour curfew is to be reduced to 3 hours on February 3, and the lifting of the curfew is scheduled for February 7. The curfew will be lifted to allow people to move about for essential purposes such as purchasing food. The embassy also said that the Ministry of Social Welfare is currently trying to provide food and shelter to victims of the fighting in Saigon.

National Assembly Reaction

Viet Cong offensive and its effects on the population and the government thus far has been mixed. Senator Truong Tien Dat believes the Communists hoped to achieve a psychological victory by demonstrating their strength to the urban population. The result, Dat believes, was both military and psychological defeat. He is also confident that the government will rally the people to cause. Senator Huynh Van Cao also views the outcome as a psychological defeat for the Viet Cong.

On the other hand, Senator Nguyen Van Cong Ngai believes the Viet Cong have won a psychological victory despite the fact that Saigon residents are indignant at having the Tet holiday disrupted.

February 2, 1968
---
# Ngai

Ngai does not feel, however, that the people's outrage will necessarily be enough to make them more responsive to the government.

# 8.

The consensus imposition of assembly members apparently on President Thieu's imposition of martial law is apparently that the assembly will approve the emergency measures, even though many individual members are outspokenly critical. Senator Ngai told a US Embassy officer that the Communist attacks revealed the "weakness and ineffectiveness" of the government security apparatus. He regards the situation as serious enough to warrant assembly consideration of a no-confidence vote. Ngai believes, however, that the assembly will support Thieu's actions--a belief concurred in by Senators Dat Bat and Cao and the prime minister's secretary, Doan Nguyen Ba Cang. Van Huyen Cao to has issued urged a Upper statement House expressing the house's support for Thieu's actions.

# Impact on Population

# 9.

Popular reaction to the crisis has, in general, been one of confusion and fear. Rumors are rampant in some areas of a possible coup in Saigon, of a possible coalition government, and of more Viet Cong attacks. After the attack on Saigon, rumors circulated that, since Vice President Ky had signed the martial law by decree, President Thieu had either been killed by the Communists or "kidnaped still forces by staging some a coup. Such stories are prevalent in some areas, along with rumors that the US permitted the attacks as a means of pressuring the government into negotiating.

# 10.

Attitudes toward the Viet Cong and their actions range from outrage at the Communists' flagrant violation of the cease-fire to fear and surprise at their strength. Many have criticized the government's failure to provide security for them, and some local observers fear that the net result will be a loss of confidence in both the government and the US. Despite this, however.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766064

(., (,... TO~TI TOMfl 11/" 3.5(c) 35(0)-3.5(c)

there has been no indication of a significant swing to the Viet Cong and no apparent public response to the new Communist front organizations.

11. A number of areas have reported large refugee flows. The population of Quang Tri city is estimated to have doubled in the 48 hours between 30 January and 1 February. In Quang Nam Province residents of Duy Xuyen district town, had been evacuated by 11 February, and Hoa Vang District reported that approximately 1,000 refugees needed food. The Binh Long provincial capital areas, seen has seen a steady flow of refugees from outlying areas, which are reportedly in Communist hands and there are some 4,000 refugees in Bien Hoa city. In Long Khanh Province, where no major enemy attacks occurred until the night of 1-2 February, people were reported leaving the provincial capital because they feared an imminent assault.

22 February 1968

3.5(c)

TOP RET- 3.5(c) 3.5(c)

. 'i.

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---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

There is nothing of significance to report.

# IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

2 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006766064

The Communists offensive are attempting to characterize their military offensive as a broad, patriotic uprising against the strong US and to support anti-Americanism. Saigon government and are injecting a strong note of anti-Americanism into their propaganda in an effort to garner popular support.

Viet Cong broadcasts on 11 February described the "insurrectional atmosphere attacks people!" and claimed of an "irrepressible masses" common uprising and that the nationwide attacks were an uprising of resistance against tens of millions of people. Other statements have called for continued resistance against the US "imperialists" and their anti-American "lackeys." Saigon Front broadcast pitched the anti-American appeal directly claiming South Vietnamese armed forces had a chance to contribute to the salvation of their country, and urgently calling on them to "resist the Americans."

Front statements discussing the formation of new popular "alliances" in Hue and Saigon have stressed the popular nature of the US offensive and claimed that their purpose is to oppose with the withdrawal of US troops, and to negotiate with the Liberation Front.

The new Vietnamese offensive political facade touched by the Communists may be trying to put together current Vietnamese claims in favor of objectives sought by the Communists.

The appeal from The Viet Cong radio Leadership Committee broadcast called the "Alliance of National and Peace Forces." The appeal was designed to show that the "revolution" has "broken out." It called on all South Vietnamese to join the "ranks of people" and said that Saigon "regime" must be set up once a revolutionary government. The goals of the "Alliance" are said to include overthrowing the Saigon regime and replacing it with a "really" representative "administrative power," recovering national independence by demanding the withdrawal of US forces, and achieving negotiating and building an independent South Vietnam, ending the war, and negotiating with the National Liberation Front to achieve these goals. 2 February 1968

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6. It is doubtful that the new "Alliance" will be any more useful to itself to the Communists than National Communist Liberation Front itself in basic accomplishing objectives. The Front's weakness most since total South hodge-podge The individuals support been failed it was failure formed to in attract late 1960 support been has from its politically Vietnam. South hodge-podge The Vietnam. significant individuals Front's leadership and groups is in composed of a of who Communists, leftists, failed and political inspire unknowns who collectively have to inspire any demonstrable popular to, following except the in, the among Communist already those movement. committed or enlisted signs 7. The being new by anything "Alliance" Communists than more presently than a paper shows organization created by the Communists "Alliance" serve to their purposes. Although the "Alliance" is presented as a "national" organization, Communist broadcasts have cities referred of Saigon and Hue. 8. in 'Saigon. and A said details 8. There are no details about reported organization in Saigon. Hue doctor it broadcast alliance A Hanoi broadcast reported its establishment and said it had issued a manifesto. In Hue, however, Hanoi claims the alliance is headed by Le Van Hao, Hue over a doctor of ethnology and professor of Saigon and universities. Hao reportedly read an "appeal" over Hue radio. 9. political Le the throughout nonentity 9. Le nonentity the Van active of the to National Van ranks of in the same ranks Hao seems of in the same of the to National be a stripe non-Communist Liberation found Front. He was active the 1966 Buddhist struggle movement and year. He was imprisoned between June and October of that year. He has also been mentioned in connection anti-government with the Hung Viet group Party, the formed a in Party, a small-Vietnam known little during is at shortly even or known support anti-government or shortly after group the formed struggle central in movement. Vietnam Little Little is known of Hao's have but "Alliance" influence in may central or Hue support University, his he be Vietnam able generate at some or even Hue University, his but "Alliance" he may be able among to in to Front to generate some who for active university university students, who have frequently no or been antigovernment that agitation. There is active in antigovernment that agitation. had There is no evidence to indicate Hao has had Viet Cong or Liberation Front connections.

22 February 1968

TOP SECRET

3.5(c)

3am

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---
Approved
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|Ban,x‘J"WeAngI/n»33*|1""!HA‘ ri§m4cj?lyrQ“E/0' U AN E|
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CIA
---
# VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS

Road 1. net Recent have in provided supplies improvements the Communists in the Laotian panhandle with greater flexibility in moving supplies.

Route The 2.92 Communists immediately are south of building of Tchepone a new road link - the western edge of the Demilitarized Zone, according to photography of 21 January. Although the area, road is still eight miles short of truck of the Khe Sanh area, weapons positions indicate that the completed portion is already in use.

The construction zone of Route 3. The North a new Vietnamese road north have also resumed from Route 9 toward the southern terminus of Route 103 in the zone, suggesting that the Communists may attempt to link the two. Such a development of moving alternate Demilitarized means would provide trucks into the Communists western edge with an alternate of the Zone.

4. The Communists are also making additional efforts to make the construction net less vulnerable to attack. The construction of numerous additional bypasses throughout the road net will enable the Communists to better diversify damage from the bombing and depending on the amount of damage overall capacity of the system.

February 1968 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15561300].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, CIA",
  "What": "Military situation in South Vietnam during the Communist offensive in February 1968, Political developments in South Vietnam, Communist military developments, National Assembly reactions, Popular reaction to crisis, Refugee flows, Formation of alliances by the Communists, Building of new roads by the Communists in North Vietnam",
  "When": "February 1968",
  "Where": ["Saigon", "Hue", "South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "Laotian panhandle"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: /éipapirovedfor Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799 - /4'76 0

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DIRECTORATE OF MEMORANDUM INTELLIGENCE

The Sittttttioii in Vietnam

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
# Information as of 1600 10 December 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

AreasSharp fighting was reported in widely scattered areas of South Vietnam over the weekend. In the delta, South Vietnamese forces claim to have killed 400 Viet Cong in a battle in Chuong Thien Province.

# The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

South Vietnamese troops claim to have killed 451 Viet Cong guerrillas in a Mekong Delta battle which began on 8 December and continued sporadically over the weekend. Sharp fighting was also reported near the Demilitarized Zone, in Quang Nam Province south of Da Nang, in Binh Dinh Province, and near An Loc, the capital of Binh Long Province.

# Political Developments in South Vietnam:

The Upper House has voted to draft an amnesty bill covering certain persons arrested since 1 November 1963. A Viet Cong captive has provided a description of the difficulties involved in carrying out Communist political activities in a contested area.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: The Chinese have upgraded the Liberation Front office in Peking to a diplomatic mission (Paras. 1-2). Statements by Front spokesmen are reported (Paras. 3-6). The Liberation Front has issued a statement supporting its call for holiday truces (Para. 7).

3.3(h)(2)

10 December 1967

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# OTHE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. South Vietnamese infantrymen and rangers claim to have killed 451 Viet Cong guerrillas in a Mekong Delta battle which began on 8 December in Chuong Thien Province and continued sporadically over the weekend. 102 were wounded. Sixty South Vietnamese died in the fighting and five US advisers were also wounded.

2. The fighting in Chuong Thien, the second major action in the delta in a week, began when two battalions of the South Vietnamese 21st Division came under heavy fire while moving down both sides of the O Mon Canal. Three additional South Vietnamese Ranger battalions were quickly moved into the battle area to reinforce the attacking ARVN forces. Fighting continued throughout the day, and during the night of 8-9 December heavy air and artillery strikes were directed at the Viet Cong positions. On the morning of 9 December, small groups of Viet Cong were sighted attempting to withdraw. Additional air strikes were called in and the advancing government battalions continued to meet sporadic resistance throughout that day and the next.

3. Elements of three Viet Cong battalions have been identified in the fight, an unusual occurrence in the delta where for several months the enemy has operated for the most part in company size formations, launching occasional battalion-size attacks. The units engaged were the 303rd Main Force Battalion and the U-Minh—10 and Tay Do Local Force battalions, all veterans of numerous delta battles.

4. To the north of Saigon near An Loc, the capital of Binh Long Province, soldiers from the US 1st Infantry Division reported killing 124 North Vietnamese troops as the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to overrun a US artillery fire support base on 10 December. One American was killed and 31 were wounded in the battle. Captured documents tentatively.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799

Identify the enemy unit as an element of last en-the North Vietnamese 165th Regiment. October 14 miles north gaged in battle between 29 in the vicinity of Loc Ninh, about This unit was November and 3 of this most recent action.

Sharp fighting was also reported over the weekend in the coastal plains south of Da Nang and farther north near Gio Linh, the allied strongpoint just below the Demilitarized Zone. In the fighting south of Da Nang, US 1st Cavalry troops report killing 94 enemy soldiers over the weekend while suffering relatively light losses themselves. In the fighting near Gio Linh, ten South Vietnamese and 45 North Vietnamese troops died in a clash on 9 December. The latter fight developed when South Vietnamese force which into an estimated company-size enemy moved into well-fortified positions less than two miles northwest of Gio Linh. Meanwhile, continued skirmishes in the Bong Son plains of northern Binh Dinh Province have raised the enemy casualty count there to 252 dead in three days reported as losses in this sector have been of relatively light fighting.

10 December 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799

II. POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 3.3(h)(2)

National Assembly Activities

5.
The Lower House voted on 7 December to set the minimum membership for formation of an officially recognized in the 137-member would permit as many as nine blocs bloc at 14. This house and is proportionately 10 December 1967

TOP E 3-5(0)

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# Provisional National Assembly

Similar to the 12-member requirement of the former House, by contrast, has set its minimum at 15, allowing only four blocs.

# In other National Assembly developments

The Upper House on 7 December heard a report from Senator Tran Van Don's special committee to review clemency appeals submitted to the senate. Don reported that, since the committee's establishment in mid-November, 107 cases had been reviewed. Twenty of these involved persons implicated in the coups attempted coups of 30 January 1965, 19 February 1965, and 20 May 1965, and in the government's move on 30 June 1966 against struggle movement forces in Da Nang. During the ensuing debate, the Upper House voted to draft an amnesty bill covering certain categories of persons arrested since the overthrow of the Diem regime on 1 November.

# Political Difficulties in Contested Areas

A Viet Cong captive has described difficulties encountered in carrying out Communist political activities in a particular area controlled by neither the Viet Cong nor the government. The source's description is probably typical of the claim effective control by neither side. It is probably safe to assume that the government encounters equal difficulty with its own efforts in such regions.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799 A 35(6)

9. As an example of the problems involved, the described his own efforts at indoctrination of the local populace. Extreme caution must be exercised, he said, in order that neither the Viet of the government agents and Cong cadres nor the people themselves will run afoul soldiers who frequently enter the area. tion increasing risk, and the Communists had in al0.sessions the source's own area, full indoctrina-In were abandoned in early 1967 because of the to sort to speaking to persons or families singly house-to-house canvas. as ten families together safely The source had previously been able to gather session.as many for a propaganda

ll. Difficulties were still encountered, however, as many people refused to open their doors to the Viet Cong cadres because they feared government reprisals. The Communists, further, were unable to determine what effect their indoctrination had on the local inhabitants because no effective control measures existed. Viet the Cong agents could not live in the hamlet to oversee known to be Communist sympathizers and even those people execution of Viet Cong policies, and supporters could not be rewarded because of the danger of government discovery.

12. This example also inhabitants who probably points up the extreme pressure exerted upon local in many cases favor government. As a result, either they are forced neither the Communists nor the into actions simply out of fear or they refuse to cooperate with either side, making progress equally difficult for the Viet Cong and the government.

10 December 1967

II-3

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
# LAOS

|Lang Son|Thiai|Nguyen|
|---|---|---|
|Lao Cai|Phug|Gia Lam|
|Hung Yen|Hanoi|Elations|
|Thanh Hoa| | |

# THAILAND

Bong Ho

# VIETNAM

DEMARCAT/ON LINE ?
VIETNAM
LAOS
---
         Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003027799  0  3-5(6)

           V        l\J1" onbmlil \                                 s.5(¢)

      \

                                                                   3.3(h)(2)

"                                                                      s.5(¢)
   Y            mr SELJRTI/1'                              s.5(¢)

         Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799

OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

There is nothing of significance to report.

10 December 1967
---
# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Chinese Grant Liberation Front Diplomatic Status

1. According to a Hanoi announcement, the Chinese have upgraded the Liberation Front diplomatic mission in Peking to the status of a Front representative, placing it on a par with other diplomatic posts in the country. On 5 December, Hanoi radio, in reporting a Peking reception honoring the new Front representative, "regards the NFLSV permanent mission in China warmly quoted Premier Chou En-lai as stating that Hanoi issued a statement praising the mission." On 10 December, China issued a statement praising the action and quoted a Liberation Front announcement claiming that this new status "further raised the international prestige of the NFLSV, the only genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people" and thanking the Chinese for their "whole-hearted" moral and material assistance.

2. Peking's action is in keeping with the considerable official and propaganda support it has rendered the Front over the years. Such support included giving Front representatives exalted positions, sometimes above representatives of Hanoi, at meetings and diplomatic functions. China is the third country, after Cuba and Cambodia, to grant the Front such diplomatic status. Cuba did so in June of this year, and other nations where the Front currently enjoys representation may follow suit.

Comments by Front Spokesmen

3. Liberation Front spokesmen are continuing to emphasize the reasonableness and acceptability of their new program and to imply that more than a cessation of the bombing of the North is necessary to bring about conditions for ending the war in the South.

4. Nguyen Van Tien, currently the Front representative in Europe, stated in a December interview on the French radio that on 10 December 1967.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003027799 35(6)

first gesture required to bring about favorable conditions for peace is the cessation of the US bombing of the North. He stressed, however, that acceptance of the Front's objectives is necessary before the fighting in the South can be ended. He defined these objectives as aggression against us, the cessation of the bombing, the withdrawal of all US and satellite troops from the South, and recognition of the Front." representative in Prague, Ha Thanh Lam, in the Front5. Much the same line was adopted by a recent interview in the Italian press, only a portion of which has yet US stop the bombing of the will continue to fight been received. North unconditionally the Lam demanded that but insisted that the NFLSV until the US agrees side-stepped the question of how an agreement to withdraw. such a withdrawal Both Tien and Lam would be carried out or whether withdraw was sufficient to get negotiations under way. when the Front has presumably come to after the has outline for the period of transition power and 6. In his interview, Lam also provided an time promulgated a new constitution. Drawing on the precepts of the new Front program, which stress the country, Lam claimed the NFLSV will reconstruct neutralism, give the South an independent foreign policy, accept help from all countries, gradually and approach the issue of unification with the over a period of several years. to cooperate with By way North of illustrating the other political elements in the that the Front is ready defeated presidential can-Front's willingness South, respect "to "support and Lam claimed the democratic front of candidate, Duong Dinh Dzu. Dzu has several times as been cited in Front statements and propaganda who would of individual in the "Saigon establishment" the type be welcome.

3.3(h)(2)

10 December 1967 V-2 s.5(¢) s-5<c>

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799

Liberation Front on Holiday Truce statement stressing the Front has issued a lengthy proposal for truce periods at Christmas, New Year and Tet and to "force their superiors" to observe the calling upon South Vietnamese Front‘s order for broadcast on 8 December claimed that the a suspension of military attacks. The statement South Vietnamese Government undermine the Front‘s "together with their US bosses" are attempting to of military attacks. It pointed out that the to talk about a cease-fire Thieu-Ky "clique" has been obliged to "in order good will" but that it has it has not pretend opinion and to cope with the Front‘s had to acquiesce to the US view "proving that right to solve problems dealing with our people's feelings." Communists‘ resolve not to let advantage of the The statement ended by "enemy" carry the stressing the out provocative acts or to take suspension of military attacks.

10 December 1967

V-3

3.5 c

3.5(c

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003027799 3-5(6)

W 1 U13’ m:.u1u:.1 saw

10 December 1967

VI-l saw

ApprovedTOPSECREF[::::féé9&@ for Release: 2019/03/29 C03027799
---
|App_/2:/edfor Release:|2019/03/29|C03027799|
|---|---|---|
|To|et| |
|Approved for Release:|2019/03/29|C03027799| "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602381].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Memorandum Intelligence",
  "What": "Military and political situation in South Vietnam, Communist military and political developments, National Assembly activities in South Vietnam",
  "When": "10 December 1967",
  "Where": [
    "Vietnam",
    "Mekong Delta",
    "Chuong Thien Province",
    "Da Nang",
    "Quang Nam Province",
    "Binh Dinh Province",
    "An Loc",
    "Peking",
    "North of Saigon",
    "Gio Linh",
    "Lang Son",
    "Thiai",
    "Nguyen",
    "Lao Cai",
    "Phug",
    "Gia Lam",
    "Hung Yen",
    "Hanoi",
    "Bong Ho",
    "Laos",
    "Thailand",
    "Prague",
    "Italy"
  ],
  "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501

3.5(c)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3.5(c) Top-Secret 4211c January 1968

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
---
# 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam|Situation report|Page 1|
|---|---|---|
|NR| | |
|NR| | |
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26

C03186501

THAILAND

XU YEN

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

12'::, 1 50 75 100 Meters

0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

3.5(c)

4 Jan 68

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501TIN Map
---
# Vietnam:

|South Vietnam:|Communist pressure in various portions of the country has been increased.|
|---|---|
|Enemy gunners hit the US base at Da Nang with at least 30 rounds of 122-mm. rocket fire before dawn on 3 January.|Three aircraft were destroyed and 17 were damaged in the ten-minute barrage.|
|The fire probably came from a North Vietnamese rocket regiment which has been in this area since early last year.|Rockets were fired at Da Nang area coming in mid-July when scores of aircraft were destroyed or damaged.|
|Communist gunners lobbed rockets into US 1st Cavalry positions south of Da Nang.|In addition to the Da Nang attack, Communist gunners also overran a South Vietnamese civic action platoon in this area and directed harassing fire at other government positions.|
|Allied losses in these attacks were 21 killed and 88 wounded.|The Communists also launched mortar attacks on US airfields in Binh Dinh and Darlac provinces, destroying four and damaging 26 aircraft.|
|North Vietnamese took advantage of the New Year's cease-fire to step up supply movements through the southern provinces.|During the 36-hour stand-down, about 400 trucks were observed moving in the southern part of North Vietnam. This number of trucks could move up to 1,200 tons of cargo.|
|Two North Vietnamese MIG-17s were shot down on 3 January when they attacked US planes 25 miles.| |
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501DLUL- 3.5(c)

Approved for Release : 2018/07/26 C03186501 3.5(c)

northeast of Hanoi. Later in the day an F-105 was downed by an air-to-air missile from a Communist northeast downed by an air-to-air Later in the day an F-105 was of Hanoi. MIG-21 40 miles west of the cityfrom MIG-21 40 miles west of the city.missile a Communist

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

4 Jan 68
2
3.5(c)
TOP_SEERET 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501~ 1 ~- --~
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501      NR
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                                                   ]
Page
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
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---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501     NR
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---
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                                                   ]
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---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501      NR
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                                                   ]
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       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501      NR
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501     NR
                                                   ]
Page
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
       Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
Top-Secret

Top Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C03186501 CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-BULL15478121.pdf

Output: {"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)", "What": "Vietnam conflict, Communist activities, attacks on US bases, supply movements, military actions", "When": "4 January 1968", "Where": ["Vietnam", "Da Nang", "Thailand", "Hanoi"], "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974313

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | |'&§QLLIG(>1 A3| | | | | | | | |
| | |60%| | | | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | |

TZ76’ President? Daily B1/ief

_I€f__§.fl.7.n~ 6 March 1968 s.5(¢

# Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974313
---
# DAILY BRIEF- 6-MARCH 1968

|1. South Vietnam|Close to 20,000 North Vietnamese are estimated to have infiltrated South Vietnam in January--the highest monthly total of the war.|
|---|---|
| |The US Embassy has taken a preliminary look at damage done by the Tet offensive to the South Vietnamese economy and concluded it has been severe. Aside from the serious disruption to movement of goods and products, industrial facilities have suffered extensive damage, and most business activity has been suspended. As for the offensive itself, there have been no major clashes reported so far today. Communist units continue to move toward cities in the north, and there are indications that a major attack may be mounted on Da Nang later this month.|

2. Panama
AriasRobles is refusing to compromise; is equally determined to get concessions or proceed with impeachment; the National Guard remains uncommitted; and the situation is ugly. The National Assembly is scheduled to meet today to hear the report of the commission that was to investigate the charges against Robles. It is not clear, however, whether the assembly will meet, and there are reports that the government is planning some action--such as suspension of the constitution--in an effort to keep it from convening. Meanwhile, Arias-controlled radio stations are broadcasting inflammatory reports on the situation.
---
# Laos

The week-long lull in fighting continues, although the Communists still threaten government positions.

# Czechoslovakia

Tension between the various East European states is high, focusing on the Czech political scene. The Soviets originally approved Dubcek's nomination as party first secretary but began having second thoughts when they saw how far he intends to go down the liberalization path. The Soviets do not understand how popular this course is and could run into serious trouble if they overplay their hand in trying to restrict Dubcek's reforms.

Dubcek is planning some major personnel changes, as seen when an old Novotny ideologist was eased out of his job as the party's top ideologist. Novotny was not on the Czech team Dubcek led to the Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia.

# Warsaw Pact

Top leaders of the pact countries sit down today in Sofia; Russian-Romanian fireworks are expected. The Romanians intend to propose some major changes in the pact's command structure, which would dilute Moscow's authority. The Romanians may even threaten to withdraw from the pact. It is doubted that the Romanians will go through with such action, but they will probably use the threat for tactical bargaining. The Romanians and Russians will also be crossing swords on the nonproliferation treaty and on relations with West Germany.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974313

6. Japan
3.3(h)(2)

7. Bolivia-Chile

The last of Che Guevara's guerrillas are headed back to Cuba by way of Easter Island, Tahiti, and Paris. The five survivors had crossed from Bolivia in February into Chile, where they were arrested on the orders of Salvadore Allende, Chile's left-wing senate president. With the prompt intervention, the five were freed and whisked off to Easter Island to begin their homeward journey. Bolivia is protesting the release of the guerrillas, but is not likely to get satisfaction.

8. Soup Yemen
3.3(h)(2)

9. Liberia
3.3(h)(2)
---
Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974313

\

—1'30j9—5-».¢e4=e-t—

I

1‘

Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974313
---
‘Y /"_ .. Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974313 Jflnsww

’ - I ‘mPIr‘vb50;:\_~\v- Qfié iv.‘

o9NTR4L 4 'f~3N:~10‘<Y *1; JJ4C’F M.,\ D was A

FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

-Top-Secret— 3 5<<=> 6 March 968

Approved for Release: 2019/O4/17 CO5974313
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

6-March 1968

NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974313

3-5(¢)

3.3(h)(2)

Conditions in Hanoi: The morale of the people of Hanoi appears High and they seem no less willing to support the regime's war effort.

33|1 2)_( )(

3.3(h)(2)

The electric power supply in the city is

-2-

-IO-P—S-E€-RE‘?

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974313

3.5(¢)
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974313

Now restricted to three days a week for ordinary residents, but foreign embassies have no restrictions placed on them.

Gasoline and oil are in very short supply, with embassies allowed a monthly ration of 400 liters; requests for additional supplies frequently are turned down.

Vietnamese students in China during the Cultural Revolution many returned to North Vietnam were badly treated, and hostility toward China.

With feelings of the most evident economic aid in Hanoi the form of bicycles and medicine, particularly in East Germany, is that supplied by.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974313
---
# II. ANORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Language"War Protest Activity: broadcast reported on 5 March that American Hanoi’s English language playwright at a meeting attended by some 5,000 Arthur Miller had criticized US policy in Vietnam persons in New of the meeting, the broadcast said Haven, Connecticut. Quoting various press accounts that Miller had undermines "even the pride of the cancer which compared US policy in Vietnam to American life."

The same broadcast also reported that Dick Gregory was going to stage another 40-day hunger strike to protest the war.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974313

1

—F@p—§¢+~>+z-

<

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974313 THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617698].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "US Government officials, foreign diplomats, intelligence agencies",
"What": "Daily briefings on various countries including South Vietnam, Panama, Laos, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Bolivia-Chile, Soup Yemen, Liberia, Hanoi, North Vietnam, US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "6th March 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Panama", "Laos", "Czechoslovakia", "Japan", "Bolivia", "Chile", "Easter Island", "Tahiti", "Paris", "Hanoi", "North Vietnam", "China", "East Germany", "US"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report on the Current Viet Cong Strategy

|1.|More detailed and comprehensive reporting based on prisoner interrogations is beginning to come in concerning the strategy and objectives of the Communists in their mass attacks on urban areas.|
|---|---|
|2.|One report is based on statements by several medium-level city political and military cadre from the city area in the Province. The burden of their testimony is that the enemy had plans--in this area at least--for either a success or failure in the assaults. If complete success had been achieved and if the cities were held against government reaction, the VC would have attempted to organize a new front apparatus whose main objective would have been to enlist popular support in favor of the overthrow of the Thieu regime and the withdrawal of the Americans from South Vietnam.|
|3.|If the attackers do not appear to have failed very many of the cities--confidently expected to hold them--consequently, they were to withdraw to previously assigned rendezvous points in the countryside to await new orders.|
|4.|It does not appear that the attackers at least in the area were promised that a major second wave assault would be launched if the first one failed. Most prisoners stated they had no orders beyond withdrawal to base points if the attacks failed.|
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772389

' .. --,-. -e .... ~ .... ' .. .2. LL}, SEGRET 3? -)-

5. ~---------~ theJthe enemy their enemy their high com— 3.5(c) 3.5(0)

would apparently mand be repulsed saw in the short possibility They order. that appear assault to have chosen the weakest to support elements the assault, divi- of the NVA sion in the local area areatosnmport holding the others in reserve.

6. Thus far in no that clearly no concrete evidence major has hasthebeen istobeen developed planned indicate this to that a second major attack is now planned. .. .TheThe enemy clearly retains according bility to do so in this area, however, according local of loss observers. the element A new of VC attack surprise would probably and which hampered loss probably be by loss by of part prior covert the VC apparatus existed ~----~ prior to 30 January. 3.3(h)(2) 31MhX2)

7. itsonin new, Communist As in other areas of South Vietnam, the chances for a new, major assault will probably depend primarily inchances on the Communist assessment of the need for it and its chances for that success. Most of the subjected prisoners expected in any case, that the city would be subjected to continuing harassment and small scale ground probes.

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772389

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 006772389 "SPORT REPORT ON THE CURRE[15561309].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Viet Cong, Communists, Thieu regime, Americans, NVA",
"What": "Viet Cong strategy in mass attacks on urban areas, plans for success or failure, organization of new front apparatus, enlistment of popular support, withdrawal to countryside, no promise of second wave assault, division of NVA forces, potential for new major assault, continuing harassment and small scale ground probes",
"When": "30 January",
"Where": ["South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Current Intelligence Digest

|Directorate of Intelligence|Secret|38|December 1967|0240/67|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06662703| | | | |
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06662703 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C08662703
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06662703

# SECRET

# CONTENTS

(Information as of 1200EST)

# GENERAL

|Vietnam|Situation report|
|---|---|
|(Page 2)| |

Dec 67 CurJApproved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06662703 + Page
---
                                                  NR
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---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06662703
                                             ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/11 C06662703
---
# GENERAL

Vietnam of enemy continuing heavy pace The attacks in northwestern provides further to dominate 275th from Phuoc evidence of Tuy Province- III Corps of South Vietnam the Communists in- Communist intent the present indicates that are this region At three major placing this region high military priority time elements of located here on enemy units are The Communists may force hope to divisions Cong the Viet 7th and the North Viet-Sth and 9th Vietnamese Division establish another main enclave in this area central those in the DMZ will help North and similar to highlands which re lieve allied pressure on units deployed closer to South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Viet- nam the coast population the Saigon and incenters along III Corps area The like the DMZ and northwestern area the of highlands provides battle- an enemy ambush on 27 November ground with favorable terrain On 29 November two South features nearby out-of-country Vietnamese battalions engaged sanctuaries and access to main an estimated 500-man enemy supply routes from Cambodia and force believed North Vietnamese to the to be sub- Laos ordinate east of the US nine miles north- 24th Regiment stronghold at Therecent movement of two northwestern III Corps area new enemy regiments into the DakTo enemy were One reported killed hundred thirty while the North Vietnamese 88th from the highlands and the Viet Cong friendly casualties were light.

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

Dec67 Current Intelligence Digest
---
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                                                  ]
Page
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/1C06662703
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/1 - C06662703

Secret

Approved for Release: 2018/07/1 C06662703 "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGE_15472685_.pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
  "What": "Current Intelligence Digest on Vietnam situation report",
  "When": "December 1967",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "Phuoc Tuy Province", "III Corps area", "DMZ", "northwestern area", "highlands", "DakTo"],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief

22 November 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF 22 NOVEMBER 1967

|1. Cyprus|peacetime appears to be running out for the island. Although feverish diplomatic efforts continue to defuse the critical situation in Athens and Ankara, both Turkish war machine - already in a high state of readiness - is being geared to move into Cyprus to respond to any move by Greek forces.|
|---|---|
|2. Israel-Jordan|Jordan's interest in discouraging terrorism along its borders has been shaken by the artillery pounding it received from Israel on Monday.|

TOP SECRET - 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133
---
# North Vietnam

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|The main rice crop now being harvested looks as if it will be below average. A combination of bad bombing weather and disruptions brought on by responsible. In a normal year, North Vietnam can expect a three-million ton fall harvest. This year's may drop 200,000 tons below that mark. With this shortfall, Hanoi will have to maintain its already high level of food imports and perhaps increase them.| | | | |
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133

South Korea in the National Assembly has moved a step closer to resolving a five-month political impasse. Opposition representatives have expressed willingness to end their boycott of the Assembly. The government party has promised steps will be taken to satisfy opposition grievances stemming from irregularities in last June's elections. However, some major issues such as the number of seats "corrected" were not addressed, leading to potential further delays in seating.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974133
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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4133
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# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4133

FOR  THE                 PRESIDENT'S                     EYES  ONLY

Special Daily Report on                                                         North         Vietnam

Tn~                 ~t ~        3.5(c)

;:~~..,... ; 22  November    1967

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4133
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

for the President's Eyes

22 November 1967

# NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Report on Situation in Hanoi

capital early this month. the situation in the lull in late the bombing, following the intensive in October. the Vietnamese morale of their North the raids had not appreciably weakened the capacity of determination to fight. Neither the bombings nor the prospect of additional raids Hanoi's leaders seemed to have affected the North Vietnamese Severa1 officials told however, that "Hanoi would experience more dark days."

changes in Hanoi's preparations for a number of raids.

Despite orders the city's bombing defenses were strictly observed. Loudspeakers continued to announce the approach of enemy planes and security alert remained.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4133

As shelters, as no soon the sirens went off people as shelters entered longer standing outside in the past. In constructed sections reinforced of the city concrete for North Vietnamese attack officials in case of prolonged.

Hanoi Urges Diplomatic Missions to Provide Own Water, Electricity:

Vietnamese provide and have urged equipment pis generate all foreign to missions peir own electricity. Hanoi claims is necessary of plants. "critical pe situation" well, bombing crews Viet- and digging Norp pe of power

For offered $800 provide about per the Vietnamese have to and pumps. The abroad missions are expected to get their own generators.
---
# 3.3(h)(2)

Parliamentarians: Last week we parliamentarypossino e e ii y mightsome a sort visit of delegation try to Hanoi.

We now have more detail. External Early Affairs this month adopted Parliament's a resolution Committee asking on the Department possibility of External Affairs resolution, look both to into North the committee visiting and South followed Vietnam. The request however, to has not been with a formal put request the department. Until the is in writing, the department intends to take no action itself. The committee, its of course, is free to ask both Hanoi and Saigon on own.

# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Hanoi Broadcast broadcast Encourages in Negroes Englishto to Desert: A 20 November Hanoi US troops up "rise in and South oppose Vietnam are this encourages since Johnson to war." Negro Hanoi GI's asserts fighting to nothing that no for the that in there reasons Johnson The justify Negroes Vietnam Negroes." has administration does good the broadcast goes on claim Viet Cong consistently treated threeprisoners "the as and well notes the recent release of US soldiers an example. Therefore, Hanoi let concludes, be best way for rather Negr·o GI is to himself taken prisoner than be killed."
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4133 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602393].pdf"

Output:
{
    "Who": "President, diplomatic officials, military officials",
    "What": "Tensions in Cyprus, Israel-Jordan conflict, North Vietnam rice crop, South Korea political impasse, North Vietnam bombing, Hanoi's preparations, diplomatic missions in Hanoi, US political reflections on the war",
    "When": "22 November 1967",
    "Where": ["Cyprus", "Athens", "Ankara", "Israel", "Jordan", "North Vietnam", "South Korea", "Hanoi", "Saigon", "US"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}