Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

28 November 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States Within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093

Information as of 1600 28 November 1967

# HIGHLIGHTS

1. South Vietnamese Police Director Loan has agreed to postpone his resignation for several months.

I. Military Situation in South Vietnam:
No large-scale engagements between allied and Communist forces were reported on 27-28 November; only small-scale attacks and harassing fire were reported from widespread sections of the country (Paras. 1-3). Communications intelligence continues to reflect the withdrawal of enemy units from the Dak To area (Paras. 4-7). Enemy troops are improving their supply route through the A Shau Valley (Para. 8). Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy Province are having supply problems and losing control of the population, according to a captured document (Paras. 9-11).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Military Developments: Vietnam may be one of the five major Chinese engineer units in North moving to another location in North Vietnam or back to China (Paras. 1-2).

V. Communist Political Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093

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68783 H-67 CIA

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
---
# I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. No large-scale engagements between allied and Communist forces were reported on 27-28 November. There were small-scale attacks and guerrilla activities in much of South Vietnam.

2. The latest flurry of hit-and-run actions included mortar attacks on two US - South Vietnamese air bases in the delta. The airfields at Soc Trang in southern Ba Xuyen Province and at Rach Gia about 100 miles southwest of Saigon were hit early on 28 November. Damage to helicopters and observation planes was moderate at Soc Trang, and three Americans others were wounded. One American was killed and two were wounded at Rach Gia.

3. The increase in harassment, in the wake of 14 mortar attacks on allied targets in the delta provinces, the three-week battle at Dak To began with a series on 25-26 November. During the two-day period, the Communists also shelled two Special Forces camps, the US base at Nha Trang, and several US positions in the central highlands. These apparently coordinated attacks are probably designed to shift attention from the main force units, many of which are recovering from severe losses on several fronts.

4. Enemy Troops/Maneuver in the Western Highlands elements of the Dak To area of southwestern Kontum Province. The division headquarters and its military intelligence section were located on 26 November Cambodia near the Laos-Cambodia-Kontum Province border area. Another subordinate of the headquarters - the forward tactical element - had previously moved into the same area.

28 November 1967
---
Apglrevedfor Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093

3 99 O1

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5. \ \ the regi- 3.3(h)(2) mental subordinates of the let. Division suggest that they also may be moving from the Dak To area. These is believed to be under the division's controlunits-—the 32nd, 66th, and the 174th Regiment, which group, resupply, The units may be withdrawing to in ties atthe Dak To operation—-suffered heavy casual- during Dak To. re- and prepare for future activity the western highlands.

6. The North Vietnamese 24th Regiment, however, is still a threat to allied forces northeast of Dak To. Enemy reconnaissance patrols continue intensive surveillance of allied positions\ \ 3§NhX2)

‘ Ele- 'ments of the North Vietnamese 95B Regiment, strategic with local forces units,also are a threat totogether positions in northern Pleiku Province.

7. The casualty count in the Dak To area since 3 November now stands at 1,502 enemy killed in US)con- trast to friendly casualties of 344 killed (287has and 1,240 wounded (1,015 US). No enemy action been reported since the series of mortar attacks on Kontum city and vicinity early on 27 November. Enemy Activity in the A Shau Valley

8. Enemy troops are working on several bypasses 3;NhX2) around damaged sections of the road through the A Shau Valley. \

K::::]at Keast one new bridge has been constructed just north of A Shau. In addition, vehicle tracks have been noted in the valley, indicating that the North Vietnamese have succeeded in trucking supplies from Laos into this region. The A Shau Valley is the most direct supply the area south of Da Nang. corridor into route from the Laotian infiltrationThe Commu- nists are believed to have supply trails extending.- Quang 2nd Divi- from A Shau down into the Quang Nam ince border area where the North Vietnamese Tin Prov- sion has been extremely active in recent months.

28 November 1967

I-2

s.5(¢

35(6)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
---
# Communist Problems in Phuoc Tuy Province

9. A Communist document, captured on 1 November in central Phuoc Tuy Province some 50 miles east of Saigon, provides information on the impact of recent allied operations on Viet Cong logistics and population control.

The undated paper was prepared by a recapitulation of allied activities throughout the southeastern area of III Corps from January to September of this year.

10. The document admitted that, as a result of allied sweep operations, especially along strategic highways, areas have been resettled by allied forces. A great part of the population in Viet Cong controlled areas as well as a number of depots and transportation facilities which were destroyed.

11. The document speaks of a "critical situation" resulting from the tight allied control on the manpower and economic resources of the area and calls for an increased covert effort within government-controlled areas to compensate for allied pressure on the Communist logistics network. This is the second recent captured document which has emphasized development of Viet Cong installations in territory not under their control in order to meet the logistical demands of their forces in the area.

28 November 1967
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093 3.5(c)

if ;.|.-U-J."’SEbKlt!, 1 \ 35¢:()

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Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093J
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093 I "i ium@emmfifiT 3&9 s.5(¢

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28 November 1967 No Foreign;g£%?m/BEE?'TORelease: 2019/03/29 C03010093se Only 3&9 Approved for CRET
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093 J 3_5(C)

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28 November 1967

II—2

3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093
---
# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

28 November 1967
---
|I. T \-V|1|Jr)|A?|
|---|---|---|---|
|CHINA|VIETNAM|LANG SON|CAO BANG|QUANG NINH|LANG SON|
|LAO CAI| | | | | |
|HANOI| | | | | |
|LAOS| | | | | |
|THAILAND|INDIA|DONG HOI|DEMARCATION LINE| | |
|NORTH VIETNAM| | | | | |
---
# OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. One of the five major Chinese engineer units in North Vietnam may be moving to a new location in North Vietnam or returning to China. It is leaving its normal base in the Cao Bang area. An intercepted message from Kun-ming military region headquarters on 26 November indicates that the unit may be moving to the northwest.

2. It is possible that the unit has completed its mission in the Cao Bang area in North Vietnam or it may be reassigned to higher priority work elsewhere in China. Less is known about the engineering activities of this unit than of the similar Chinese units elsewhere in North Vietnam.

28 November 1967
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03010093 "THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM[15602335].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military situation updates in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and other communist military developments",
"When": "28 November 1967",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "North Vietnam", "A Shau Valley", "Phuoc Tuy Province", "Dak To area", "Laos", "Cambodia", "Cao Bang area"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789

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# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# Ce//ztml Intelligence Bulletin

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3 November 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
{,,};22i1'12iieat' Dzlzrem

‘%Tln~: CICZVTRAL INTELIJGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.

Where, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for limited dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated to recipients on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789

# 3.5

3 November 1967

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Congo (Kinshasa): State of mercenary invasion of Katanga unclear.|(Page 3)|
|Israel-Syria-Jordan: Continued Arab terrorism increases chances for Israeli retaliation.|(Page 4)|
|Peru: Growing financial crisis adds to Belaunde's worries.|(Page 6)|
|Cambodia-Communist China: Sihanouk responds favorably to Chinese move to ease relations.|(Page 7)|
|USSR: Satellite weather data|(Page 8)|
|Turkey: Possible violence|(Page 8)|

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789

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3 NOV 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789 3_5(C)

South Vietnam: The third Communist assault within four days against allied positions at Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province was repelled with heavy enemy losses. The two-pronged attack, conducted on 2 November, was broken off with the help of heavy allied artillery and mortar fire. The Communists suffered a reported 238 killed in the assault, raising their losses over the past five days in this area to nearly 850. Friendly casualties during the same period total 25 killed, including eight Americans, and 118 (32 US) wounded.

Although the repeated enemy attacks around Loc Ninh suggest a determined effort to overrun the allied positions, enemy positioning in Binh Long and immediately adjacent areas suggests that the enemy strategy may be to draw in and tie down allied forces in another sparsely populated border stronghold. Elements of three divisions are in the area, and they may be willing to take substantial casualties in large-scale combat if they can attract allied forces away from the populated coastal regions and thus relieve the pressure there.

Recent enemy actions in the delta and along the central coast suggest that the Communists are using tactics designed to reduce the effectiveness of friendly reaction forces and create a maximum psychological impact upon the population. The latest example of these occurred on 2 November in the southern coastal area of Quang Nam Province when the enemy conducted a series of simultaneous, widespread attacks and harassments on US troops and Vietnamese villages. Allied Vietnamese losses in these actions were ten US Marines and nine civilians killed compared with only four enemy known killed.

The North Vietnamese 2nd Division is apparently withdrawing from contact and moving into the highlands of south-central Quang Nam Province. In the past two months, the subordinate regiments of the 2nd Division

3 Nov 67 TOP Rlw 3-5°

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789

SECRET

are believed to have been the most active enemy units in South Vietnam. The approximately 2,000 killed the enemy is believed to have sustained in clashes with allied forces may have forced it to withdraw into the highlands to regroup and possibly receive reinforcements. Last week the 3rd Regiment of the division appeared to have been caught in a vulnerable position on the Quang Nam coastal plain. Lhas extricated itself and joined the rest of the division.

3-3(h)(2)

3 NOV 67

TO

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
# DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO116

|A CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC|s u 0 A N|
|---|---|
|$1|.|

CAMEROON

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Luanda ANGOLA

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|O|100|200|3OOM1Lzs|
|---|---|---|---|
|O|100|200|300 KILOMETERS|

6853I ‘H-67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
---
Congo (Kinshasa): There is no firm information on the invasion of Katanga by white mercenaries and their African hangers-on.

The invaders entered the country from Angola via Dilolo, seized a train and set out in the direction of Lubumbashi. By late yesterday, they had seized the rail stations at Kayembe and Tshianda, approximately 70 miles west of the town of Kolwezi.

Meanwhile, Katangan governor Paluku ordered a stretch of tracks west of Kolwezi torn up to impede the invaders long enough for Congolese troops to ambush them before they can reach the town.

There is little chance that either civil authorities or Congolese troops will be able to mount an effective defense. The army may take reprisals against whites in the area.

However, unlike last July when it broadcast inflammatory accounts of a "foreign invasion" and exhorted the populace to defend itself, Radio Kinshasa seems to be fairly restrained. Moreover, Paluku appears to be more reasonable than his predecessor and may be successful in keeping the army under control.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 003179789 3-5(6)

Israel- Syria;Jordan: Continued Arab terrorism increases the likelihood of strong Israeli action against Syria and Jordan.

A clash between Arab terrorists and Israeli border police on 30 October was the eleventh incident of the month along the border with Jordan. In at least two of these incidents, Jordanian military units apparently used machine-gun fire to cover the retreat of infiltrators on the East Bank. Such acts, although probably not condoned by Amman, could provide the Israelis with a pretext for striking at Jordan.

While the Israelis would probably strike at what they believe to be terrorist centers in Jordan and Syria, they might also strike at military bases near Damascus. An Israeli raid against Jordan probably would increase the pressure on King Husayn to abandon his moderate stance and acquiesce in extremist policies toward Israel. A tougher tone in his dealings with the US might also result.

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789 35(0)
IQ-P-S'EC‘K'ET
3.3(h)(2)

3 NOV 67 5 3-5“)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789 35¢

Peru: A growing financial crisis may add to President Belaunde's political problems.

Widespread lack of confidence in the government's ability to resolve economic problems has caused a run on central bank foreign exchange reserves and further devaluation of the currency may be necessary. Such a move would be politically unpopular and increase the likelihood of renewed labor protests over the rising cost of living--some ten percent between 1 September and 15 October.

One such protest has already been scheduled. The nationwide government employees’ union has declared it will go on an indefinite national strike on 4 November if the government does not grant its demand for salary increases. If the strike comes off, it probably will be supported by leftist-led unions dissatisfied with the amount of the recent pay increases.

3 NOV 67 6 85¢

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
Cambodia - Communist China: Prince Sihanouk has responded favorably to Peking's latest effort to ease its relations with Cambodia.

Sihanouk announced on 1 November that he had received a message from Premier Chou En-lai calling for the "reestablishment of sincere friendship" between the two countries. According to Sihanouk, Chou acknowledged Sihanouk's leadership of the Cambodian people and reaffirmed China's adherence to the "Bandung principle" of nonintervention in Cambodia's internal affairs. Sihanouk has charged repeatedly over the past several months that China's propaganda activities in Cambodia amounted to a repudiation of such "principles."

Chou's letter may have been sent in an effort to head off any move by Sihanouk to carry out his recent threat to cut off Chinese aid. It appears to be a more artful version of one he sent in mid-September which caused Sihanouk to reverse a decision to withdraw Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking. Although that letter played effectively on Sihanouk's personal regard for Chou, its wording did not allay Sihanouk's suspicions.

The Prince now states that he is willing to terminate anti-Peking propaganda and compose his differences with China. He also implied, however, that a reconciliation will depend on a cessation of Communist activity in Cambodia. The continuing dissemination of Communist propaganda in the countryside and a reported renewal of small-scale Communist dissident activity may prove to be a persistent irritant.

At any rate, Sihanouk's response to Chou's gesture underlines his desire to maintain at least a facade of cordial relations with China, particularly at a time when international attention is focused on Mrs. Kennedy’s visit.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 c0s1797%93(C)

NOTES

USSR: The Soviets have resumed passing satellite weather data to the US. Weather information from Cosmos 184, launched on 24 October, was received yesterday after a month and a half lapse in transmissions. The pictures were not transmitted within six hours of the time they were taken, as the US-Soviet weather exchange agreement specifies, and some were of low quality.

Turkey: Violence may occur during today's scheduled public funeral for three leaders in the former Menderes regime who were executed and buried in a prison cemetery after the 1960 revolution.

Emotions could run high during the funeral. Although any incident could snowball rapidly, available security forces should be able to maintain control.

3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789
To cret
To ret
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03179789 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602385].pdf"

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Intelligence analysis, Current intelligence briefings, Satellite weather data, Enemy attacks in South Vietnam, Invasion in Katanga, Terrorism in Israel-Syria-Jordan, Financial crisis in Peru, Relations between Cambodia and Communist China",
"When": "3 November 1967",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Congo (Kinshasa)", "Israel", "Syria", "Jordan", "Peru", "Cambodia", "Communist China", "USSR", "Turkey"],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758630

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Monthly Food for Regiment Supply 33

no. OF moms = 3

December 1967 (N)

OF ACQUISITION

SAIGON, Vietnam

Regiment had the responsibility of transporting Cambodian rice from Station 007, CAMBODIA, to the storage at H2 257653. Other food included buffalo meat and canned milk were purchased from CAMBODIA. By 19 November 1967 the rice storage at H2 257653 had not been discovered by forces.

‘-‘E’. ‘L.‘.;5 " ~48 -I-it s; ~‘-W fr

Monthly Food for Regiment Supply 33

no. OF moms = 3

December 1967 (N)

OF ACQUISITION

SAIGON, Vietnam

Regiment had the responsibility of transporting Cambodian rice from Station 007, CAMBODIA, to the storage at H2 257653. Other food included buffalo meat and canned milk were purchased from CAMBODIA. By 19 November 1967 the rice storage at H2 257653 had not been discovered by forces.

‘-‘E’. ‘L.‘.;5 " ~48 -I-it s; ~‘-W fr

Monthly Food for Regiment Supply 33

no. OF moms = 3

December 1967 (N)

OF ACQUISITION

SAIGON, Vietnam

Regiment had the responsibility of transporting Cambodian rice from Station 007, CAMBODIA, to the storage at H2 257653. Other food included buffalo meat and canned milk were purchased from CAMBODIA. By 19 November 1967 the rice storage at H2 257653 had not been discovered by forces.
---
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Page 2

NOTE: Source's infiltration group TRUNG DUNG came to the YA HEEO and LA LOP River crossing and remained there for two months in order to transport Cambodian rice to Como-liaison Station 17 approximately (YV 816717) After transporting rice twice. LEmVed"WTfh the entire regiment to the forest (HQ 2b7653) approximately h00 meters from CHU RBON Village, in CHO REC District, PHU ON Province, SVN.).

STORAGE AREAS.
In July 1967, a rice storage had been located at HR 2606h2 more pan one kilometer norpeast of CHU RBON Village CHEO RED District, PHU EON Province, SVN. It was stated in May two rear service cadres of Regiment 33. The rice storage was constructed and guarded by 1966 to store Cambodian rice as well as pe rice grown by Regiment 33 (HQ in two fields located approximately one kilometer norpwest of DUNG Village 3L56lO). The rice storage was temporarily constructed under a large shade tree and had patch roofs, green canvas covers and bamboo floors pat were covered wip canvas. The rice storage contained approximately six tons of Cambodian rice transported by Regiment 33 from Station CO7, CAMBODIA.

Twice a month Regiment 33 (350 men) and regiment headquarters (composed of Battalion 1 (320 men), Battalion 3 (140 men)) transported rice. The only men left to defend the regiment headquarters were: battalion commanders, assistant battalion commanders, political officers, regiment commanders and assistants, field grade political officers and platoon guards. Each battalion, at one day separations from one another, took 12 days to transport about 500 kilograms of rice. The rice had been bought by Regiment 33 Rear Service cadres from Cambodian civilians at CO7. Upon receiving an order for rice, the Regiment soldiers and cadres left their camp location HQ 2h7653, and moved along the 30 centimeter-jungle path westward across National Route 11, to the YA HI.-E0/YA I.-OP Rivers where they rested a day before reaching CO7. Rucksacks were used to transport rice in loads which depended on the physical strength of the soldiers. Seven days were required to carry rice from CO7 to their location.

Comment: Although the quantity of 500 kilograms of rice per trip does not seem great for such a number of men to be transporting, it is not out of line when viewed with the soldier's monthly ration of 21 kilograms of rice per month and the fact that Regiment 33 itself grew rice near DUNG Village).

FOOD AND EQUIPMENT PICKUP

Regiment 33 formed two 30-man groups from the battalions and one 20-person group from Regiment Headquarters to buy sufficient food (not including rice) and equipment on a monthly basis

Every soldier was given four hundred grams of sugar. Cadres, from Company level received one kilogram and four hundred grams of sugar; pey also were given Cambodian canned milk "CON THO" "BUP BE" or GVN "CON CHIM" pat was bought by pe production element at pe Montagnard villages in PHU ON Province. Everyone was given six hundred grams of green beans costing GVN$h0 per kilogram. Soldiers and cadres received 600 grams of salt at GVN$7 per kilogram. Nine persons received a small container of oil to use in peir lighters.
---
Soldiers and cadres were given 30 grams of seasoning powder bought from Cambodians; 100 grams at GVN$60 and 30 grams of tobacco (100 grams cost GVN$15). They received 21 kilograms of rice at GVN$12 a kilo. Sufficient food and equipment was bought on a monply basis.

Troops operating at BUON DUNG on 17 November 1967 located a food storage at HQ 238612 approximately 100 meters from BUON DUNG. Later pe Americans fired pis storage which contained 25 kilograms of sugar, 5 kilograms of tobacco and 5 cans of "CON CHIM" milk. This storage had been used for patients under treatment at pe Regiment 33 dispensary (HQ 2A6656). The rice storage at HQ 260642 located in pe CHU REON forest had not been discovered by 19 November 1967. CAMBODIAN_RICE_STORED_IN[15617828].pdf

Output:
{
	"Who": "Regiment 33",
	"What": "Transporting Cambodian rice and other food supplies, storing rice at various locations, food and equipment pickups",
	"When": "December 1967",
	"Where": ["SAIGON, Vietnam", "Station 007, CAMBODIA", "H2 257653", "YA HEEO and LA LOP River crossing", "Como-liaison Station 17 (YV 816717)", "CHU RBON Village", "CHO REC District, PHU ON Province, SVN", "HR 260642", "CHU REON forest", "DUNG Village", "National Route 11", "BN DUNG", "HQ 238612", "HQ 2A6656"],
	"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: §;Aa|_E"SE§:RaTm4a?'i3|ssEM|NATION Appr0Ved fof Ree|Q?_5e_5 2019/04/17 C03023639'' R0!‘ "vs AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

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PAGE 2 SAIGON ®323'S“E-€—fi—E—¥¥—

AGREEDO D9 ON 5B JANUARY 1968, GENERAL WESTMORELAND CALLED ALL COMPONENT COMMANDERS, FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS AND BG IRZYX DIRECTING AN IQQ PERCENT ALERTO THE ATTACK OCCURED ON 51 JANUARYO UNQUOTE@

ZQWPLEASE ”PAes”ETB_"B~YK'"Kk\i5“lTl1%'§I T"”“E”“”"”““35(:

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023639
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. _-ICABLEAQECMAT DISSIEMINATION_                                                                                Appr0Y§dfor R¢.'.Q?§Q1_2°19/04/.1.7_Q°_3.Q2§639»Lg' _—                                                                                RO‘ we AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY V                                                                                i_

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"II EIEEE VISIT EIINAEEN WAS TO INF HQS IN NHAETRANG._                                                                                E                                                               §W§I                             s ;- asun

MG PEERS, ca, ATTENDED BRIEFING.                                                                                ‘fly

2. AS WE HAVE FOUND ELSEWHERE, IFF HAD INTELLIGENCE                                                                                A;§§\V?

~                                                                                E

POINTING TOWARD SOME SORT OP VC OFFENSIVE IN LATE JANUARY                                                                                A F5* >

OR EARLY FEBRUARY, BUT THIS INFORMATION DID NOT PIN DOWN                                                                                \/'

EXACT DATES AND SCOPE. BY AND LARGE IN II CORPS THE FOCUS

OF THREAT EEENED T0 DE IN WESTERN HIGHLANDS.-

\NND IN CAPTURED                                                                                3jMhX2)

DOCUMENTS MOVEMENT OF MAJOR ENEMY FORCES COULD BE FOLLOWED

WITH FAIR ACCURACY, ON 5 JANUARY A DOCUMENT WAS PICKED

UP DESCRIBING PLANS FOR AN ATTACK ON PLEIKU. ON 25 JANUARY

IFF ALERTED ALL UNITS TO PROBABILITY OF LARGE-=-SCALE

ATTACKS "IN CONJUNCTION WITH TET."

4, IN THIS CORPS AREA, INFILTRATION INTO CITIES WAS

ACCOMPLISHED LARGELY BY LOCAL FORCES AND SAPPERS, WITH

MAIN FORCE UNITS HELD OUTSIDE TOWN READY TO MOVE IN WHEN

INEILTRATORS HAD STARTED ACTION.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023639
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-                                                                      ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS O)- SEEN BY

EABLESECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION             Approved for  |v.._,.,»,~U.I.\..L1-;=»;»|r-=|..-Release" 2019/04/17 C03023639. - .._.,_ _ _. L-       . ~

PERSON/UNITNOTIFIED                                                             IXCLUDID FROM AUTOMATIC

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PAGE 2 SAIGON @324 S-E-C—R—E—¥—-

5. THE G—2 FELT HIS LIAISON WITH BOTH ROK AND ARVN WAS GOG). GENERAL PEERS, HOWEVER, POINTED OUT KOREANS WERE SOMETIMES RELUCTANT TO PASS INFORMATION TO SOME ARVN UNITS, EVEN VIA UNITED STATES CHANNELS, BECAUSE OF WHAT KOREANS CONSIDER WEAKNESS IN ARVN SECURITY.                                                         V

60 [:::::::]eNvE TEAM BRIEFING IN WHICH HE ENPHASIZED                                                                              35¢» WHEAT-AND~CHAFF PROBLEM CONFRONTING INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WHO RECEIVE WEEKLY DELUGE OF ATTACK REPORTS, FEW OF WHICH ARE VALIDO ALTHOUGH APPROPRIATELY CAST FOR II CORPS N1aNNNNns,[::::]PNov1nED IN PARA s OF HIS NHA LQNNG 2613                                                                             E 3.5(C) (BEING POUCHED) A GENERALIZED ANALYSIS WHICH COULD BE,

APPLIED COUNTRYMWIDE. IN GIST, HE SAYSgERE SIMPLY WAS7”

NOT ENOUGH INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE THAT A COORDINATED                                                                              v

AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK 0N PROVINCIAL CAPTIALS WOULD

occufi DURING‘TET PERIOD.

79 TEAM THEN WENT ON TO VISIT NO STONE,.CG‘4TH US DIVISION, WHO EXPLAINED HIS DIVISION WENT TO FULL ALERT ON 24 JANUARY AS RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATING INNINENT ATTACKS ON KONTUN, PLEIKU, AND DAK TO. THIS INTELLIGENCE CANE FROM ALL SOURCE, INCLUDING ATTACK PLAN FOR PLEIKU

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023639—5E6RET-
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cABLEVSr_cRETAR|ATD|ssEM|NA-HON                                         7                 R0’  * ,-1G AND/OR INITIALS 'SEEN BY
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PAGE 5 smeoos
(PARA 5 ABOVE).
80 WE NEXT MOVED ON TO PLEIKU AND ARVN II CORPS.
AGAIN, DOCUMENTS ANQERISONER INTERROGATIONS INDICATED A
COMING ATTACK IN HIGHLANDS. INTERROGATIONS OF PRISONERS
TENDED TO CONFIRM THE CAPTURED PLEIKU ATTACK PLAN. ON
25 JANUARY PLEIKU WENT TO AN ALERT STATUS AS NOTED IN
PARA 5. THIS REQUIRED ONE-THIRD OF FORCE TO BE IN
BUNKERS AFTER DARK. ARVN ISSUED AN ALERT MESSAGE
ON 29 JANUARYO AT TIME OF ATTACK ARVN HAD TWO DIVISIONS
IN II CORPS AREA AT FULL STRENGTH AND TWO AT HALF STRENGTH

_
DUE TET LEAUESG
9e LOCAL UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES FELT COOPERATION
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FIRST VISIT ON 2O MARCH WAS TO III CORPS HEADQUARTERS WHERE TEAM BRIEFED BY SENIOR ADVISOR, COL PETERS, AND G-2 ADVISOR, LC KIZIRIAN 0

COQPETERS STATED OFFENSIVE WAS EXPECTED EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER TET. AS IN OTHER INSTANCES, NOTHING PINPOINTED EXACT NATURE OF ATTACK UNTIL 5O JANUARY WHEN A PRISONER SAID FOLLWOING DAY TAN SON NHUT, OTHER MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CORPS AREA AND SAIGON CITY WOULD BE HITO ALERTING MESSAFES HAD ALREADY GONE TO ARVN FROM III CORPS, BUT ARVN TROOPS WERE AT ABOUT 59 PERCENT STRENGTH BECAUSE OF TET.

THERE WERE NO REPORTS FROM CIVILIANS PASSED TO THE III CORPS ADVISORS; BUT, AGAIN, POINT WAS MADE THAT THERE WERE NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ONCE VC HAD MOVED IN.

III CORPS FELT MOST SIGNIFICANT EARLY WARNING WAS REORGANIZATION OF vc COMMAND STRUCTURE IN THE CORPS AREA.

[:::]e1EN HoA POINTED our THAT, WITH THE SITUATION 35¢»

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|PAGE 2 smeom m252}|=/eflfif|AS IT WAS IN THE CORPS AREA BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE, CONTROL OF THE POPULATION WAS NOT THE SORT THAT ENCOURAGED PASSAGE OF INFORMATION0 THERE ARE NOW SO RD TEAMS IN PEACE AND 5O DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTERSO|
|---|---|
|6. TEAM THEN VISITED II FIELD FORCE WHERE IT WAS BRIEFED BY COL FOULK, G-2° AS IN OTHER BRIEFINGS, COL FOULK STATED THAT ATTACKS WERE ANTICIPATED, BUT THE PRECISE FORM THEY WOULD TAKE WAS THE UNKNOWN FACTOR. THE FIELD FORCE WATCHED THE INDICATORS BUILD AND, ON 29 JAN, GEN WEYAND SENT A FLASH ALERTING MESSAGE WARNING ALL HIS COMMAND ELEMENTS THAT AN ATTACK ON FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS COULD BE EXPECTED DURING THE NIGHT OF 29=3O JANUARY“| |
|7. COL FOULK FELT HIS INTELLIGENCE WAS GOOD“ HE REMARKED THAT ARVN III CORPS G-2 DID NOT BELIEVE AN ATTACK WAS IMMINENT.| |
|8. TEAM NEXT WENT TO CAN THO FOR A IV CORPS BRIEFING. MG ECKHARDT, SENIOR ADVISOR, ATTENDED8 IN THE BRIEFING IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS SOMETHING WAS BUILDING AS EARLY AS OCTOBER WITH NO SPECIFIC INDICATION OF THE TARGETSO IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO REAL| |

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED                         Ewmqm
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PEFI1§O!4/UNITNOTIFIED EICLIDEsnour1 FRDI AIITOIIITIC

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FILERID RET. TO BRANCH DESTROYEI SIG.

PAGE 3 SAIGON 0252 3,5/e’R'E/E

9. AS WAS THE CASE IN 111 CORPS, ARvN WAS CELEBRATING TET AND WAS WELL UNDER STRENGTH3

10. IT WAS NOTED HERE, AS IT HAS BEEN ELSEWHERE, THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT THE SORT THAT ENCOURAGED CIVILIAN REPORTING —- IT WAS TET; THE NUMBER OF STRANGERS IN THE VILLAGES WAS NOT UNUSUAL (FOR YEARS VC HAVE COME INTO TOWN FOR THE CELEBRATIONS, SINGLY AND IN GROUPS - ON FOOT AND IN SAMPANS); AND ONCE THE VC MOVED, IT WAS DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS FOR ANYONE WHO NIGHT BE WILLING TO REPORT TO DO SO.

11. [::::::::::]0AN THO BRIEFING IT WAS AGAIN NOTED 35¢ THAT ARVN WAS FAR FROM READINESS» THRE WAS A DISCUSSION oFfl:j]AssETs, SOME OF WHICH HAD PRODUCED GENERAL 3;NhN2) WARNING -—- IN ONE INSTANCE A GROUP OF VC SAPPERS WERE ROLLED UP As A RESULT oF[::::::]oPERAT1oNs. 3;NhN2)

12. IV CORPS UNITED STATES' COMPONENTS ARE NOW ORGANIZING AN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING CENTER AT CAN THO BASE¢

15. [:::::::::]PLEAsE PASS TO DIA AND J-5; [:::::::j 35¢» 35(0)

-3-:-0’R’E'T' BY -151E<5I!IEI> Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023639
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|CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION|CLASSIFY TO FILE NO __?_|
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|BY|FILE RID II RET. TO|
|ACTION 7!.-'|BRAN¢H E] DESTROY |:| 5|G_|

Approved 101 Release: 2019/ow? e_g_§9g§_§s9

REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED

DElLl$§IFIlLl'IIOH

TEAM VISITED III MAF, ARVN I

SON AND STAFF, INCLUDING5- 5Aagili

ROVIFIUNAII,I

IN SUMMARY, GENERAL CUSHMAN FELT HE HAD ANPLE FOREWARNING; wAs ABLE TO KEEP UP NTTH NovEmENTs OF HosTTLE ELEMENTS, AND ACTED ACCORDINGLYQ

ALL AGREED THAT, ASIDE FROM DANANG, SPECIFIC vc TARGETS WERE NoT NNDNN, ALTHOUGH THERE wAs A GREAT DEAL OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATING SOMETHING wAs COMING AROUND TETQ

GENERAL cusHNAN NDTED THAT ATTACKS 0N CITIES HERE EXPECTEDQ DEFENSE FORCES HAD BEEN POSITIONED, HowEvER, To DEAL WITH DIRECT ATTACKS (FORCES WERE sTATT0NED ABOUT 5 KILOMETERS ouTsTDE CITIESJA INFILTRATIGN wAs NoT ANTICIPATED 0N THE scALE USED BY THE vc.

As FOR DANANG, TT HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR s0NETImE,[::] , THAT THE CITY w0uLD BE THE
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FILE,                 VR,

PAGE 2 SAIGON D191 S’E,G’RfE/T/T

TARGET OF AN ATTACK; BUT AGAIN, THE PRECISE TIMING WAS NOT KNOWNO

THERE WERE ONLY TWO KNOWN REPORTS OF CIVILIANST

VOLUNTEERING INFORMATION0                                   GENERAL CUSHMAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT VILLAGERS HAD NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATING ONCE THE VC HAD MOVED INO

THERE WAS NO TET TRUCE IN I CORPS AND ALL UNITS, INCLUDING ARVN AND ROK MARINES, WERE ON FULL ALERT STATUSO

GENERAL CUSHMAN FEELS COOPERATION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN THE CORPS AREA WAS GOOD0

THE III MAF G“5 SAID HE FELT HE HAD AMPLE INTELLIGENCE FOR HIS PURPOSESO                          BOTH HE AND GENERAL ROBERTSON NOTED THAT IT IS-IMPOSSIBLE TO SPREAD FORCES TO COVER ALL POSSIBLE TARGETS WHEN EXACT ENEMY INTENTIONS ARE NOT KNOWNO

MEMBERS OF THE TEAM VISITEDN

WHERE                                                              on THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS:
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SRID COPY FILE VR

PAGE 5 SAIGON 0191 S/E/(3/R'E T 3.3(h)(2)

METHODS OF HANDLING AND COORDINATING INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED

[:::::::::::::1AND FROM 0TNER[::::§ouRcEs WERE DISCUSSED 35@fi IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND IT wAs APPARENT THAT CLOSE COORDINATION HAD BEEN MAINTAINED AMONG SAND firm: 3-5(6) UNITED STATES AND GVN MILITARY AUTHORITIES.)

Q 35@fl sq [::::::::]PLEAsE PASS TO DIA AND J=5; E1 35¢» 3.3(h)(2)

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|CABLE SECRETARY OF STATE|DISEMINATION Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023639/SE|
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|IRON RATIONATIC| |
|Q|N|
|(when Filled In)|O|
|SLOTTED| |
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED| |
|ADVANCE COPY|ISSUE: YES NO|
|INDEX:| |
|CLASSIFY TO FILE| |
|BY:|X-REF TO FILE NO.|
|DISSEM BY|PER INFO|
|URID COPY| |
|DATE|21015552 MAR 68 CITE|
|PRIORITY|TO DIRECTOR|
|REF: HONOLULU 6725 6-+|TO MEET AT SCHEDULED TIME ASSUMING PLANE CONDITIONS MET.|
|BT| |
---
|CABLE SECURITY/SENSITIVITY|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03023639|
|---|---|
|PE 53|UNIT NOTIFIED|
|SIKHRETT| |
|(When Filled In)| |
|REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED| |
|ADVANCE COPY|USSUE|
|DETONATION|CLASSIFY TO FILE No______________|
|AT:| |
|BY:| |
|X-REF TO FILE NO| |
|DESTROY AFTER:| |
|FILE|FILE No. REFER TO|
|ED555| |
|2 DR| |
|CO| |
|SNAC| |
|3 SCHEDULED (REF) 25 MARCH HONOLULU STOPOVER.|REF DIRECTOR 81985|
|CONTACTED STATION REQUESTING TO SEE| |
|DURING|APPOINTMENT|
|CURRENTLY SET FOR @950 25 MARCH WITH| |
|LATTER WILL BE ELSEWHERE| |
|ON TDY THAT DATE.|SUBJECT DIRECTOR 81155.|
|SECURITY| | SAIGON_0323[15617972].pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "General Westmoreland, LTG Weyand, President Thieu, Ambassador Bunker, General Peers, Col Foulk, MG Eckhardt, General Cushman, General Robertson",
  "What": "Discussions and decisions regarding intelligence, operations, troop movements, and alerts during the Vietnam War Tet Offensive",
  "When": "January 1968",
  "Where": ["Saigon", "Pleiku", "Can Tho", "Danang"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}