Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 Top Secret

|DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE|Central Intelligence Bulletin|Top Secret|
|---|---|---|
|3.5(c)|1241967|22 November|

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604  3.5(c)

Page

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---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

22 November 1967

# CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 3)

TOP SECRET 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
---
                                                  NR
      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
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---
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Page

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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604

NORTH Demilitarized Zone QUANGTRI Hue TAUATHIEN Da Nang QUANGNAM Curky THAILAND QUANGTIN QUANG Dak To NGAI KONTUM BINH DINH PLEIKU PHU BON PHU YEN CAMBODIA Stp DARLAC KHANH HOA QUANG DUC TUYEN CAM RANH Da Lat DUC PHUOC NINH Long Lam DONG TAUAN BINH DUONG BINH THUAN SAIGON Phuoc Tuy Vung Tau HoA (zpiiui Sppaiui Zviie vT /i GULF OF SIAM CONFIDENTIAL Ion Klameter*4SO Hues 6873811-67CIA 22 Nov 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604

SOUTH VIETNAM
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 3.5(c) TOP SECRET

*Vietnam: Fighting in the Dak To area continued on 22 November with an intensive mortar barrage against the US 173rd Airborne Brigade. Five US paratroopers were killed and 47 wounded in the barrage at Hill 875, approximately 19 miles southwest of Dak To. US losses have been heavy in the three-day battle for the hill, the summit of which is still in enemy hands. Massive artillery barrages and airstrikes have been directed at the Communist positions and it is estimated that their losses have also been heavy although only 17 bodies have been counted thus far. This has resulted in a total of some 1,152 enemy killed, against 246 US killed. Fighting in the Dak To sector since 1 November.

22 Nov 67

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 3.5(c) TOP SECRET
---
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      Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604

# Top Secret

# Top Secret

# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15466760].pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Central Intelligence Bulletin",
	"What": "Vietnam situation report, Fighting in Dak To area",
	"When": "22 November 1967",
	"Where": ["North Demilitarized Zone", "Quang Tri", "Hue", "Dak To", "Ngai Kontum", "Binh Dinh", "Pleiku", "Phu Bon", "Phu Yen", "Cambodia", "Saigon", "Vung Tau", "Gulf of Siam", "South Vietnam"],
	"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Abproved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810

Hi mi - EGIBI

s.5(¢

*§-¢e1~L1Ge/V9 iQ~\\\v1% A3,

OG,NTR,q£ 'r°1\I:={0‘<T /\

DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCE

Cmiml Im‘e/lzgeme Bu//e/zin PLEASE RETU ARCHIVAL RECORD

To rat 350uU 4 20 December 1967

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0203181&

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing the National Security Council, and other senior government officials with current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Further, but only on a need-to-know basis. Other intelligence items may be disseminated.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

WARNING: 3.5(c)

Secret

# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
20 December 1967

Central Intelligence Bulletin

|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Czechoslovakia: Party crisis may come to a head at central committee meeting.|(Page 3)|
|Congo (Kinshasa): Status of mercenaries|(Page 4)|

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
# T HAIL A N D

|VIETNAM|NORTH|
|---|---|
|THUA THIEN|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG TRI|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG NAM|KONTUM|
|QUANG NGAI|PHU YEN|
|BINH DINH|KHANH HOA|
|PHU YEN|LAM DONG|
|KHANH HOA|LONG KHANH|
|NINH THUAN|PHUOC TUY|
|LAM DONG|DAO PHU QUOC|
|LONG KHANH|PHU QUOC ISLAND|
|DAO PHU QUOC|PHU QUOC ISLAND|

SOUTH VIETNAM

|25%|50%|75%|100%Miles|
|---|---|---|---|
|0|25|50|75|100 Kilometers|

20 Deg 67

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map
---
South Vietnam: There is further evidence of Communist plans to intensify military operations in the southern part of I Corps.

An enemy document, captured recently, also pointed to a major expansion of Communist operations this winter in the heavily populated coastal sections in this part of South Vietnam.

In the latest manifestation of political tensions in Saigon, South Vietnam's Senate yesterday overwhelmingly rejected the government's controversial partial mobilization decree.

Individuals in both houses of the legislature have been critical of the decree, both for its content and for its promulgation without legislative approval, but eventual acceptance was still expected. Defense Minister Vy appeared separately before both houses on 18 December to defend the decree, and his performance appeared to have been well received. Several senators, in fact, indicated that the government would receive no trouble from that quarter.

Opposition to the decree is more vocal in the Lower House which is now likely to take its cue from the Senate and follow with another rejection. The issue
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810

RET xi 3.5(c)

comes up for a vote in this house on 20 Decembern The government has been saying that the decree will be applied as scheduled on 1 January, but Defense Minister Vy, during his Lower House appearance, indicated that a new de 4 ee from the new assembly would be acceptable. TI s.5(c)

20 Dec 67
2
M.
s.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810

Czechoslovakia; The recently intensified party crisis may come to a head at a central committee meeting pis week.
There has been ample evidence in recent monps pat pe political situation was becoming critical. The US Embassy believes pat pe most rancorous grave problems have also added to divisions but pat many oper divisions are on economic issues, strife in pe leadership. A Prague Foreign Ministry official has suggested, however, pat pere will be no basic policy changes, but instead an accommodation of views. In pe past pis sort of inconclusive compromise has enabled pe regime to muddle prough.
The central committee meeting was originally set for 13 December, but postponed until pis week. The postponement, following Brezhnev’s sudden visit to Prague on 8-9 December, has led to speculation concerning possible high-level personnel changes affecting even party boss Novotny.
---
NOTES

3.3(h)(2)

Congo (Kinshasa): The fate of Schramme's mercenaries in Rwanda is still uncertain, despite much discussion at the recent African leaders’ conference in Uganda. Agreement reportedly was reached to return the mercenaries to the Congo no later than 19 December to stand trial, but Rwandan President Kayibanda apparently had not concurred. Mobutu and Kayibanda are scheduled to continue discussions today in Tanzania. Congolese patience, however, appears to be running thin, and if there are no results soon, Mobutu may try to take matters into his own hands.

s.5(¢)

20 Dec 67

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
|2|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031-@ 4 Q|
|---|---|
|Top-Scuff W| |
|Tu|ret|
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810| | "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602429].pdf"

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
  "What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin with updates on Vietnam, Congo (Kinshasa), and Czechoslovakia; Communist plans in South Vietnam; Political tensions and government decree in Saigon",
  "When": "20 December 1967",
  "Where": [
    "Vietnam", "Czechoslovakia", "Congo (Kinshasa)", "Saigon"
  ],
  "Security Clearance": "SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

1Fop—See|=et—

s.5(¢)

(I/‘9»T35 O?

1:¢ ’§ Q ?

“f91\r:1€>‘4 V‘ A-9*‘ 0 ~§\°$T»1res ov “2“<2,

,$

# DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Cmtml Im?/lzgeme Bulletin —'Fep-Seera1-

c 214 23 March 1968 s.5(¢) ‘

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654 /0 9- 227 75‘?//
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
3-5<°
s.5(¢
Q
I
s.5(¢
2/
‘P
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
---
# 23 March 1968

|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Rumania - Eastern Europe: Bucharest braces itself for pressure from the USSR and its allies.|(Page 4)|
|Poland: Students abandon strike in Warsaw.|(Page 5)|
|Czechoslovakia: Premier Lenart becomes acting president as political factions maneuver.|(Page 7)|
|Hungary: Budapest approves of changes in Prague, but not at home.|(Page 9)|
|Philippines- Malaysia: Disclosure of Philippine preparations to infiltrate Sabah aggravates President Marcos' problems.|(Page 10)|
|India - Communist China: New Delhi concerned that dissident Naga tribesmen are being aided by Peking.|(Page 11)|
|Sweden: Erlander government will persist in criticizing US over Vietnam.|(Page 12)|
|Southern Yemen: Moderates gain|(Page 13)|
|USSR= Cuba: Trade protocol|(Page 13)|
|Panama: President's trial|(Page 14)|
---
# Vietnam

North Vietnam: A partial mobilization of new armed forces in North Vietnam could be taking place. Something unique is under way involving the organization and movement of substantial numbers of armed personnel in newly organized units. Some 16 military "groups" have now been identified in North Vietnamese Army Rear Services communications, apparently under the control of the Operations Directorate of the Hanoi General Staff. The identified groups range in size up to 600 men and seem to be moving southward through central North Vietnam as organized military elements. These groups have been pulled together from a variety of places and include civilians and reserves. Hanoi might thus be drawing on its paramilitary resources, such as the regional forces and self-defense militia. The groups may well be headed for South Vietnam as part of a stepped infiltration effort. It is also possible that they will stay in North Vietnam, possibly to free regular troops for duty in the South, or because of some new Hanoi concern over the danger of an invasion from the South.

South Vietnam: Despite the withdrawal of some enemy troops from primary attack objectives, Communist forces may be preparing to strike strategic urban areas.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

THAILAND

|KONTUM|PLEIKU|FM|
|---|---|---|
|PHUOC|EON|Ku|
|PHONG|TONG|PHUOC|
|LAM DONG|DARLAC|HA NHOA|
|QUANG DUC|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG TRI|THUA THIEN|QUANG NAM|
|QUANG BINH|QUANG NGAI|QUANG TIN|
|QUANG NAM|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|QUANG BINH|
|QUANG NGAI|QUANG BINH|QUANG NAM|
|QUANG BINH|QUANG NAM|QUANG TIN|

CAMBODIA

|CHUONG THIEN|TIEN PHONG|CHI LANG|
|---|---|---|
|CHI LANG|TIEN PHONG|CHUONG THIEN|
|TIEN PHONG|CHI LANG|CHUONG THIEN|

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 003192654Y

3.3(h)(2)
Alpough pe Communists probably do not possess at pe present moment pe capability to carry out anoper offensive of pe magnitude and scope of pe Tet attacks, pey are in position to launch widespread artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks against major allied military targets. Such an offensive could be accompanied by ground assaults in selected areas, eiper in pe norpern provinces or pe western highlands.
3.5(c)

23 Mar 68

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 003192054

3-5(°

.1. \/J. .|._'l\J.l.\..l_'J “L

Z6

3.3(h)(2)

23 Mar 68 3

35(0)

J19-P’S'E(€E/T

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
---
# Rumania - Eastern Europe

The Rumanian regime appears to be bracing itself for some type of political or economic pressure from the USSR or its East European allies.

The regime expects a deterioration in its relations, including economic difficulties, with the Soviet Union and those Communist countries which are "satellites" of Moscow.

Bucharest plans to improve its political and economic ties with Belgrade.

The joint Rumanian-Yugoslav mixed economic commission met in mid-March, subsequent to the Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia, to discuss expanded trade relations.

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic arrived in Bucharest on an unexpected official visit on 21 March. He was accompanied by two specialists.

In addition, the Rumanian ambassador to the US has been called home suddenly for consultations.

The Rumanian Government has started to enforce a two-year-old regulation restricting contacts by Rumanians with foreigners, including representatives of the other European Communist countries and especially the Soviet Union.

The Rumanian regime's fears of economic pressures by Moscow may be justified. In mid-March, Soviet Intourist officials cancelled Easter tours of the USSR, Poland, and Rumania which were to have been carried on five passenger aircraft chartered from the Rumanian airline, TAROM. The tours would have earned hard currency for Bucharest.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

Poland: Tension eased somewhat in Warsaw early this morning as militant students at the Polytechnic Institute apparently heeded faculty appeals to abandon a mass sit-in.

According to fragmentary press reports, some 4,000 students left the school, apparently without incident, after helmet-clad riot police sealed off access to them. Many left in buses for nearby hostels.

Earlier, the students had appealed for popular support, displaying posters which read "Warsaw help us" and "Workers, our cause is your cause." Friday night riot police quietly dispersed sympathetic crowds in front of the institute in a move to isolate the protestors.

Leaflets handed out yesterday by the Polytechnic students made clear that those involved categorically rejected Gomulka’s analysis of the situation. The students reiterated their uncompromising will to struggle against "hypocrisy and cant," and their opposition to the brutal application of "lupine laws." The leaflet said students had no course but to continue their protests, which are aimed at reversal of repressive domestic policies.

The high morale and organization at the Polytechnic has contrasted sharply with the demoralized atmosphere at Warsaw University. There, a sympathy sit-in broke up when police began to. There is no conclusive evidence that sympathy strikes are taking place at provincial universities.

According to one student, the demonstrators are giving the regime until 22 April to redress their grievances. Although the students made no threats, they reportedly will try to get worker support in the form of strikes and demonstrations if the deadline is not met.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
---
The emotional student appeals could now evoke a responsive chord among other elements, especially if there is new violence. The party continues to stage rallies of workers in attempts to demonstrate support. There is an increasing number of reports, however, that this tactic is failing. One such meeting in a Warsaw plant yesterday reportedly collapsed after the small number of workers who showed up walked out. Workers are also said to be collecting money to pay fines for students arrested last week.

There is continuing activity at the top party levels, but no new policy pronouncements have been forthcoming since Gomulka's speech on 19 March. Many persons in Warsaw reportedly consider the speech inadequate to the situation, and as a result there is general uneasiness about the future.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

The Czechoslovakia: Premier Josef Lenart has assumed duties of former president Novotny.

Lenart will be acting president until the National Assembly is called together to elect a new chief of state. Presumably this will not be until after 28 March when the party central committee meets to discuss changes in leadership and in national policies.

The ink was hardly dry on Novotny's resignation when the name of 72-year-old General Ludvik Svoboda was proposed as a replacement by the association of Czechoslovak veterans. Svoboda was commander of Czechoslovak forces which were formed in the Soviet Union during World War II; he was defense minister from 1945 to 1950, when he was purged. Svoboda is ill-equipped to be president and if he were elected, he would probably be a figurehead, unable to use the considerable powers of the office.

Josef Smrkovsky, a leading exponent of sweeping reform, is commonly believed in Prague to be the most likely candidate. The 57-year-old Smrkovsky is a member of the party's central committee. He had a good record as an underground leader during World War II. In 1950 he, too, was arrested on trumped up political charges. He was rehabilitated in 1963. If elected president, he would represent the antithesis of past Stalinist oppression.

Meanwhile, a Czechoslovak Embassy officer in Moscow has implied that the recent visit of Planning Chief Cernik may have sown the seeds of the first serious Czechoslovak-Soviet confrontation--on economic issues. The officer said that the new Czechoslovak leadership is deeply concerned with the need for economic improvement and is preparing to seek aid from the United States and Western European economic organizations.
---
He added, however, that Czechoslovakia's desire to attract Western aid is complicated by commitments to the USSR and its allies. It is possible that during his discussions in Moscow, Cernik attempted to reassure the USSR about Czechoslovak intentions to maintain close economic ties, even if it should turn to the West for aid.

Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
---
Hungary: Budapest has expressed approval of the changes in Czechoslovakia but made it clear that none are needed in Hungary, party daily wished the Czechoslovaks success. A signed editorial published on 21 March. This is in the main the first explicit approval the Czech liberalization has received from a Warsaw Pact member, although Rumania has been implicitly in favor of Dubcek.

The editorial warned Prague, however, of the danger of unbridled dissent under the guise of "complete liberty." Hungarians, it noted, learned to their sorrow in 1956 that criticism, originally justified, soon became excessive and "cost much in blood, personal tragedy, and material damage."

Hungarian authorities have taken steps to keep the population calm. On 22 March, for example, unusual radio broadcasts, concerning a temporary call-up of reservists for maneuvers, stressed that the matter was routine. Earlier, government officials reportedly prevented university students in Budapest from staging a demonstration in support of the Polish students.

In contrast to its reporting on Czechoslovakia, the tone of Hungarian coverage makes clear that the leadership takes a dim view of events in Poland.
---
|AP|PrO|VG|d|fOr|RG|E|8S6|2|0|1|9lO|4l|1|7|C|O3|1|92|6|54|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

Philippines- Malaysia: Public disclosure of a training camp presumably preparing personnel to infiltrate Sabah has aggravated President Marcos’ domestic problems. Marcos has already moved to comply wip pe Philippine Congress’ demand for a full investigation. His compliance reflects mounting difficulties wip pe Philippine Congress, where he is already under attack over a civic action team in Soup Vietnam.
Kuala Lumpur will probably take pe question up privately wip Manila. It is unlikely, however, to make a major issue of pe matter because of its interest in regional cooperation.

23 Mar as 10

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

|Brgzgmzzyazzfrg|_’_,.__/~\_.~*~\/" ‘ ‘~|
|---|---|
|Kofhmc|ndu|BHUTAN|
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|BIHAR|\\|
|PAKYis'rAN|_ A\._|
|AWEST|-;-¢1‘f ,_rnH"’r=-\__/‘Q 6)‘ S \1\ BURMA|
|TRIPURA|\\|
|OR|$A|:|

90012 3-68

3.3(h)(2)

23 ar IFFFELEIGENCE BULLETIN Map
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654

glndiag Communist China: New Delhi is concerned that dissident Naga tribesmen from northeastern India are being aided by Communist China.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recently told Parliament that "several hundred" hostile Nagas had gone to China for guerrilla warfare training.

Naga insurgents have long used northern Burma as a sanctuary and small groups of them could easily have passed through the unpoliced region to seek Chinese support. Although Peking has recently been giving propaganda support to Naga insurgency, there is no evidence that the Chinese have extended significant material assistance.

The Indian Army, in collaboration with state authorities in Nagaland, recently has been taking stronger action against some 6,000 rebel Nagas. The local population, apparently apathetic toward the rebels, has not resisted these army efforts. The neighboring Manipur administration reportedly has also succeeded in driving back to Nagaland most of the area underground groups which had gradually spread into that.

23 Mar 68

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
---
Sweden: The parliamentary debate on foreign policy this week demonstrates the Erlander government will persist in its critical line toward the US over Vietnam.

In his strongest statement to date upholding North Vietnam, Foreign Minister Nilsson described the Hanoi regime as "progressive" and enjoying the support of the people. There were few defenders of the US or the Saigon government. Even the non-Socialist opposition, which also has its eyes on the September national elections, hesitated to challenge the government on the issue.

Nilsson sought to picture the recall of Ambassador Heath as an attempt to put pressure on Stockholm. He said that even the threat of a deterioration in commercial relations with the US could not deflect the government from its course.

23 Mar ea
12
---
# NOTES

Southern Yemen: Events in Aden on 20 March appear to have stemmed from army part of the regime. recent extremist activities on the dissatisfaction with The upshot appears to have been a boost for the "moderates," with the army being allowed to suppress the extremists. The Front is still in authority, and it remains to be seen whether its policies will show any reversal of recent pro-Communist trends. A Soviet military delegation arrived on 21 March, presumably in response to earlier Southern Yemeni overtures.

USSR-Cuba: The announcement of a Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1968 suggests that political differences between the two countries have not seriously affected economic relations. The new pact, signed after six months of negotiations, calls for a ten percent boost in trade to a planned level of about $970 million. Press reports also mention a Soviet credit of $328 million. Such a credit might cover refinancing of previous credits, funds to cover 1966 and 1967 balance of payments deficits which exceeded expected levels, plus balance of payments assistance for 1968.
---
Panama: National Guard Commandant Vallarino reportedly intends to seal off the National Assembly area when President Robles’ trial begins Sunday morning. National Union leader Arnulfo Arias instructed his followers to avoid provocative actions against government supporters or Vallarino's troops, and he may change the site of the mass rally he had scheduled in front of the Assembly building during the trial. Although some radicals are pressing "to fight it out in the streets" if Vallarino does not remove Robles from office, Arias will probably avoid action pending a ruling from the Supreme Court when it reconvenes on 1 April.

23 Mar 68

$9-P-SE€=R-Ell1
---
                   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
—'Fap—See|=et—

                                                               §-v"

                                                               $3

                                                               Vi

                                                               ~_'ni-1@»'~

 —'l1ep-S»ee|=et—

                   Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654 CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_BULL[15617845].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Intelligence reports on various countries including Vietnam, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Philippines, Malaysia, India, Communist China, Sweden, Southern Yemen, USSR-Cuba, Panama",
"When": "23 March 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Bucharest", "Warsaw", "Prague", "Budapest", "Philippines", "Malaysia", "New Delhi", "Nagaland", "Sweden", "Aden", "USSR", "Cuba", "Panama"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO0016884

Content UNCLASSIFIED:

COLMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS

IN RETROSPECT

against South Vietnam concept 1

The overall concept of massive attack against Vietnam's cities and towns was probably formulated by the Eighth Command in Banoi at least as early as last summer. Subsequently, the outline Plan for the 1967-68 winter-spring Campaign was communicated to various headquarters in South Vietnam by September 1967.

From the beginning, extreme precautions were taken to keep the Tet plans secret in order to preserve the all-important element of surprise. Need-to-know criteria were probably strictly enforced in disseminating battle plans. Possibly only the Communists Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and some elements of the Military Administrative Regions and major theatre commands were given a complete overview of the planned offensive. At the other end of the Communist chain of command, battalion commanders probably were given the specifics only of their own missions and those of cooperating units. The country-wide character of the effort apparently was described only in the most general terms to the commanders at the provincial and regional levels. Thus, only the staffs even at

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO0016884
---
# highest

echelons probably had clear knowledge that virtually every major city and town in South Vietnam was to be invaded in force.

# The Communists began a new indoctrination program among all their party cadres and military.

In September, based on Resolution 13 of the Hanoi party central committee, a wide variety of battle preparations for the Tet offensive had to be undertaken, many of them starting in November. Detailed operations planning commenced at each command level.

Units would prepare the way for a Communist-dominated coalition government, with a wide variety of battle preparations for the Tet offensive. The planning needed to be strengthened by replacements and augmented or reinforced with newly arrived units, some of which were to infiltrate guerrillas.

Efforts were made to strengthen units in cities and towns by infiltrating guerrillas there. Local recruiting and new infiltrators provided some fresh personnel. Larger volumes of supplies had been upgraded from irregular elements and stockpiled; larger volumes of supplies had been obtained.

Copies and reflections of the resolution itself have been captured in documents, as well as other sources on strategy that have been obtained. Judgments on the strategy have been obtained to preclude any specific changes that the resolution might have called for.
---
# Communist Intelligence Security

Communist intelligence security, and logistical elements probably began to reconnoiter approach routes toward each target city and town. In order to assure that large forces would be able to march long distances in complete secrecy, key control points for detailed requirements to support stepped-up terror operations were detailed. City maps showing key cover story, and arrangements for special communications were made to coordinate the attack on Hanoi at each command level. Units presumably needed special training, and special training for newly organized sapper units was underway by late November, with training for street fighting in late November as well.

Many apparently received relatively little support, but to keep Hanoi's level well disguised, intentions were relatively well disguised. By December, the tactical plans of subordinate commands were monitored, and problems were solved along the way of implementation. Many coordination problems at all levels of the war were solved along the way. By this time, the Communist military apparatus must have had a clear idea that a major coordinated attack would be launched sometime around the turn of the lunar year.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO0016884
By By late December, preparations were almost certainly well along pe approach routes troops would begin to march in mid-January - Security arrangements were completed in mid-January.
To assure pat villagers living along pe approach routes kept silent. Bivouac areas were selected, prepared and staffed. Guides were arranged. Boats were prepared at water crossings. Ammunition was cached.
Some of pe heavier weapons were prepared near forward stations - cities and towns. Briefings were given to commanding officers on peir missions. When Hanoi decided pat preparations were given final approval, attack plans presumably were decided.
At all command levels, orders were issued to march at pe appropriate time. Thus, in mid to late January many Communist units began to converge on pe cities and towns of Soup Vietnam; some making relatively long forced marches and employing pe tightest possible security precautions.
Meanwhile, more routine operations continued in pe Khe Sanh, Sanhna DMZ, and I Corps areas.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00016884
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00016884
furpersoup - soup. These operations probably were mounted partly to help screen pe coming urban offensive- final pre-attack operations.
14. pe troops neared peir rear services elements presumably supplied stations, wip pe previously cached weapons and ammunition.
Final briefings were given to prepare troops to fight in new environment. Shortly before 30 January Hanoi gave pe attack order and pe Tet Offensive was launched. COMMUNIST-PREPARATIONS-FO15478205.pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Communist Intelligence, Communist Military",
"What": "Preparations for the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, indoctrination program, battle preparations, infiltration of guerrillas, strategic planning",
"When": "September 1967 to late January",
"Where": ["Banoi", "South Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Khe Sanh", "Dinh DMZ", "I Corps areas"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

Top Secret 3.5(c)

MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

The Situation in Vietnam

The Situation in Vietnam

ARCHIVAL RECORD Top Secret

PLEASE RETURN TO 125 AGENCY ARCHIVES, 25 January 1968

22n67d

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735     3.5(c)3.5(c)
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                                                  ]
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---
#
HIGHLIGHTS

</highlights>
|•|Action around Khe Sanh|Military|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|During the past twenty-four hours|Enemy activity indicators are light although there are large-scale indicators of impending enemy activity around Khe Sanh.|Quang Tri Province|
|3.3(h)(2)|Enemy action in Quang Tri Province was light on 25 January.|The Military Tight Situation in South Vietnam:|3.3(h)(2)|
|3.3(h)(2)|Indications of impending enemy activity increased in Quang Tri Province.|There are coordinated indicators of impending widespread enemy activity in the western and II Corps.|3.3(h)(2)|
|III.|Military Developments in North Vietnam:|The flight of US MIGs indicates that they were intercepted by two aircraft.|3.3(h)(2)|
|IV.|Other Communist Military Developments:|There is nothing of significance to report.| |
|V.|Communist Political Developments:| |3.3(h)(2)|

No Foreign Dissem/ Background

Use Only
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

TOP SECRET

Participation of city agency correspondent in Hanoi reports French press that French the that participation limited comment thus far Hanoi the press limited Tet (Paras. thus far of city comment correspondent on the Pueblo incident

Tet agency is taking taking a festive in on festive Hanoi has air offered has air Hanoi in offered anticipated reports

only (Para: on the Pueblo incident

(Para: 6)

25. January 1968

TOP SECRET

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

|THAILAND|QUANG NAM|QUANG TIN|Tam Ky|
|---|---|---|---|
|THANH HOA|QUANG NGAI|Dak To|Ben Het|
|communist|Communist|Military|Military|
|Region|Region| | |
|PLEIKU|BINH DINH| | |
|Le Thanh| | | |
|Special Forces Camp| | | |
|PHU BON|PHU TU|YEN| |
|DARLAC|KHANH HOA| | |
|QUANG DUC| | | |
|Da Lat|NHA TRANG| | |
|Cam Ranh| | | |
|PHNOM PENH|TAY NINH| | |
|PHUOC LONG|LAM DONG| | |
|THUAN|BINH DINH| | |
|KIEN PHONG|CHUONG THIEN| | |
|OC LUOC|XUYEN XUYEN| | |
|GIANG THIEN|PAORC| | |
|ChUONG THEN|XU TEN| | |
|OC LUOC|LIEU| | |
|XUYEN XUYEN| | | |
|SOUTH VIETNAM|SOUTH VIETNAM| | |
|23 JANUARY|CONFIDENTIAL| | |
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

ally-1.vicinity and 1 YgGinind Spotadibon Communist-initiated: activityin Commui;iist-initiated activity in was the gener-the imme- imme- diatelightartillerybarrageatJanuary 250-round diate ally light artillerysporadic ofof thebase-at the base on 25 25onJanuary KheSanhwas Khe0 24 January- 1v_e_r-, ~ a~Sanh followingfollowing gener- 3.3(h)(2)

[25J)-round QuangthisProvincewill that currentCommunist J indicatorsindicatorsbarra.ge campaign on suggestinhow ~suggest, 24 January howeverwesterne_ 3.3(h)(2)

that this Tri current Communist intensify campaign sharply sharply in westernbefore the Quang Tet the TetTri holiday period_ holiday Province period. will intensify before at 252 252.killed killedanaIncompletereports Incomplete 164 woundedshowUS, Marinelosses164reports show sincesine~U~ 20JanuaryMarine Jariuary.losses Mostof at of the casualtiesand wounded from Shellingsand are 300enemy20 small-scale probes Most countedcasualties . the Some are from enemy shellings bodiesand have been small-scale probes .Some 300 bodies have been counted. artilleryThe artillery3.Vietnanhas been ` confirmed _11 3 _ The useuse ofof 152-mm 152-mm. artillery artillery, inventorySanh inventory largestthethe largest weapon in the Communist' in _weapondurduring the theining the Communist's 11The ofbombardment Theweaponsin probablyits~lf.fromfrom been justbombardment-of South which have on thebaseitself in which South on pa::-obably the Laos24 Januaryrange 24 base Vietnam, have firedfrom positions- to southwest ,or or fired fromrangeridgestounderhas The ridges sanctuaryofof positions sanctuarythe just confirmed. of,themilespossibly to theto under southwest, Demilita-the themil~s, northeast northeast weapons,SanhKhe Khe possiblyofwerewere of rizedin rizedLaos Zone is beyondthe The range of_ the Demilita- Zone is beyond the range. namese'4 defector·4.defector,Continuing interrogation over-all strategy The parentdispositionslight ofj over-all thestrategyand·--~ sheds unit ~~----c-- sheds additional~ ~ additional~------= ----=,---,---=---of light 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2)I

thethe on on the and: unit dispositions I the enemy enemy had recently· been reinforcedwiththe in thethe in Northarea. Vietnamese recently Vietnamesepa~ent area The 325C Divisiontwo 325Cunit divisiontstwounit ofof the defector , North allegedly defector, allegedly the re~nforced Division, with antiaircraft threesixtoninehad allegedlyregimentsbattalions.an antiaircraft three regimentshadhadbattalionsantiaircraft: companyarmed 12 _7-mm 12.7-mm.antiaircraft-companyan been Eachmachineguns Each ofof thedivision} s the with armed with six to nine machine guns. 25. January 25. January 19681968
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

Deployment of support actions for this weapon on the large numbers of Vietnamese of 50-cal machine weapon, Cong time an hills surrounding the Vietnamese actions for well 50-cal. 5. of-the machine gun Cong time is an anti-aircraft weapon. This weapon has been seen in various units and is similar to the ground US Khe Sanh base together with unusually large aircraft at week. Sanh intensified accounts involved in the with Khe for air support effort cal aircraft involved in the past number-eight-of the US air-craft downed in the past week.

Main Sanh with simultaneous attacks of the North Vietnamese coincide with Khe ince force units. The defector also claimed that the North Vietnamese attacks the enemy by the enemy's offensive aircraft. The defector stated that the attack would coincide with Khe ince force units. He also claimed the North Vietnamese attacks the enemy by the enemy's offensive aircraft.

Although Vietnam armored personnel have been employed in South aircraft support, it appears questionable for Communist tactical troops in South Vietnam. There have been earlier enemy armored carriers used by the enemy in the southern and earlier self-pro-ported artillery out. Armored vehicles on enemy Vietnamese west just 24 325C of the vehicles of Division Quang Tri January when an overran an element of Laotian used by the North base camp just west the Quang Tri Province border.

Armored vehicles on enemy Vietnamese west just 24 325C of the vehicles of Division Quang Tri January when an overran an element of Laotian used by the North base camp just west the Quang Tri Province border.

Tracked vehicles possibly tanks traveling on Route 9 in Laos Sanh area. Despite these reports, their use in the Khe area is unsuitable for traveling.

Their mobility gives to their protect to Their protect mobility supply gives areas them and may use. These vehicles and the man infiltration points instead by points. Intended advantage in this role. 25 January 1968

3.5(c)

TOP SECRET

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
      Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735     3.3(h)(2)
                                                      3.3(h)(2)
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                                                  ]
Page
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---
# 3.3(h)(2)

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---
# 3.3(h)(2)

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---
# 3.3(h)(2)

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---
# Hanoi Supports and Distorts Saigon Seminars

Internal Hanoi in the US denunciations, the Vietnamese radio has to take note of the peace issue of two seminars held recently.

Hanoi claims that in the radio Saigon to discuss Vietnamese seminars has taken note of criticisms of the increasing failure of negotiations - from opposite viewpoints - and mentioned the US only Catholic.

One seminar was held by Greater Solidarity Forces on 21 January and took a hard line on negotiations opposing all demands of the seminar "plots." The Liberation Front took appropriate steps to demand the government to dispel the establishment probably take appropriate steps about the government. The seminar was held as much as Solidarity Forces radical elements. The group's leadership is still unfavorable to the settlement as the coalition was advanced by the US Embassy to also express that any genuine concern seminar about the possible advanced by the idea of the government to regime or the seminar Embassy, or there is also elements in the seminar the government amounted considerable criticism for the government. Although the idea of the regime of the came elements in the seminar amounted to an endorsement of the government's position.

The second seminar was held by a group of propaganda purposes for negotiations issued avoid Communist university. The professors issued a resolution whose seminar was held to avoid an impassioned plea for further bloodshed by a group of young professors. Most embassy, the opinion of the broadcast of the lights and its details does not appear in the community signatories, mostly extremist but naive sincere extremist into general according to the Buddhists, leftist Catholics, and young professors.

25 January 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

Thieu's "State of the Nation" Address

|8|In session of the state of the nation address before|
|---|---|
|8.|In a lengthy "state of the nation" address before the National Assembly of Thieu reiterated the positions on 25 January, stopped that negotiated settlement of the war.|
|He|stated Communists bombing of North Vietnam ceased, but not all hostilities could be proportionately reduced.|
|He added|that the bombing sown by the Communists in the South decreased their efforts regarding recent confusion by Communist propaganda.|
|He affirmed|the unacceptability of conquering South Vietnam within by political means.|
|Thieu criticized|unilateral Communist negotiations considerably, the US might explore indirectly the possibility of negotiating with North Vietnam.|
|He stressed|that despite minor differences, South Vietnam's identity depends principally on its purpose. He repeated its own future upon the leaders of North and South Vietnam.|
|Although|a complete test of Thieu's domestic reorganizations gave no timetable available, he stressed his plans for civil reforms of both the domestic and military administration.|
|He presented|no precise details and gave no timetable for pending reorganizations. He submitted various ministries' details and announced programs broken down to a 95-billion piaster defense budget.|
|He declared|that South Vietnam's resources would meet this year's 20 percent for defense, 10 percent for economic, and 66 percent for social development.|
|He promised|improved expenditures through tax collection and executive resources to the national unity legislation.|
|Thieu appealed|for understanding between the executive and the legislature on tax legislation for national unity.|
|He declared|that the law would be implemented and continued with student deferments.|

25 January 1968

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
C HIINA

|CHINA|CHINA|
|---|---|
|CHINA|CHINA|

LI>Ning-ming

LangSon

LhaulNguyen

PhuclYen

HHanoi /Gia Lam

Haiphong

Haiphong

Samneuj

Samneua

Bai,,.Bal@

Thanh Hoa

Thuong

Vinh Vinh1

Dong Hoi

Dong Hoi

DEMARCATION LINE

SOUTH

Huo ?

VIETNAM 3.5(c)

LAOS

VIETNAM

LAOS

VIETNAM

23 JANUARY

0-25-50
25
50
75 Kulomelers
75 Moles75 Mules
69414 1-68 CIA

69.414 1-68 CIA
---
# MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Three Norp Vietnamese MIG-21 fighter jet flights have been noted pis year in pe Thanh Hoa panhandle region.
The Vietnamese are trying to establish a capability to oppose US air strikes at Vinh based on infiltration routes in pis area.
A few days ago, Norp Vietnamese forces in Khe Sanh Zone reported pat aircraft in pe area would be supported by Norp Vietnamese forces.
It is possible pat pe runway at Vinh has been repaired in pe past pree weeks. If Vinh has only limited facilities, pe Soviet-built runway at Hanoi may be required as an emergency.

25 January 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

TOP SECRET

25 January 1968

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
# TOP SECRET

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1.
There is nothing of significance to report
25 January 1968
---
# V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Hanoi Prepares for Tet

The celebration of Tet, the lunar new year, is anticipated in Hanoi next week. AFP reports that the city is taking on a festive air in anticipation of Tet. The correspondent notes the crowded city with evacuees returning from the countryside. He reports on family reunions, traditional children's activities, and a relaxed atmosphere in the days leading up to January 24, 1968.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735

3.5(c)

daysa placed and provided year's holiday, to the the government strict tations were contrast on only tended placed more tended 5 •.half-day holhol only days, tations 5 _half-day placed iday this year this were In Iri contrast extra goods rations placed more goods ho .liday on ·display in two-and-a-half on iday period by to the last year when on the period and holiday last celebrations strict celebrations, display year government two-and-a-half when by in state speci-1 state has including stores ex- ex- stores limi-limi- food alities and alities. provijoyfully_While encouraging· the would not be ded and extra ~nrio~raging food rations the populace·to In would holiday to has keep-and celebrate speci- While enthusiastically populace celebrate cautioned wartime "joyfully placed wartime enthusiastically"; which In particular in inter-and the regime has also ing cautioned against excess against excess which festivities from stress not be from in stress keep- with conditions was placed on fer was ing ing fering with with agricultural and on preventing preventing conditions. the the security festivities particular, or weakening inter- the country with agricultural antiaircraft and defenses security or weakening the country's antiaircraft defenses.

North Vietnamese Reaction to Pueblo Incident radio 6 Pueblo provocation Korean on material 25 part incident rehashed brief North Korean 6. rehashed and called. In In brief reports North reports on 24 24 and and 25 on January, seizure January Hanoi Korea of Pueblo of plan radio the of There of the war provocation and called Vietnam preparation" the and material and preparation the of South incident part in seizure incident on ·the in of a.us US I plan "war situation no was in attempt the and to link party daily Nhan South with on the 25 January Korea. the There situation was no in attempt to The link ·the incident · Dan with Dan on provocative described Vietnam. Pueblo affair The paity affair daily as Nhan an- other provocative 25 January act described against the North Pueblo Korea of of which as ~ has which other further aggravated act tension against in North that part Korea the has world _" further aggravated tension in that ~art the world."

25 January 1968

V-2

TOP SECRET 3.5(c)

# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
# 3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
# 3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
# 3.3(h)(2)

Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735 THE-SITUATION-IN-VIETNAM-15478159.pdf

Output:
{
  "Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Thieu, Vietnamese radio, Correspondents, AFP",
  "What": "Military situation in Vietnam, North Vietnamese military developments, Political developments in Vietnam, US involvement, Tet celebration preparations, State of the Nation address by Thieu, Hanoi's reactions to incidents, Seminars in Saigon and Hanoi",
  "When": "25 January 1968",
  "Where": ["Vietnam", "Hanoi", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "North Vietnam", "Thailand", "China"],
  "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00010650

INTELLIGENCE BEBORQNDUH

Directorate of Intelligence - 30 January 1958

1. Area where a series of mortar and ground assaults were launched. The US Embassy was subjected to mortar or rocket fire, with small arms fire occurring outside the compound. Late reports indicate that this fire has abated. A report that the Viet Cong is apparently false. "Control" had penetrated the Embassy and taken over, however, terrorists reportedly enter the building and blow up the main reception desk. No casualties have been reported, aside from the wounding of one Marine. Military police have been sent to reinforce the compound.

2. According to various reports, shelling and small fire has been occurring elsewhere in and around the capital. Both Tan Son Nhut airfield serving Saigon and nearby Bionzea air base have been under mortar fire. There has been no report of damage or casualties. Press reports also state that Saigon uniforms were attacking around the presidential radio station, and that Viet Cong in ABVN palace. These reports remain unconfirmed.

3. Da Nang: Allied mopping-up operations are reportedly continuing following the series of attacks there on allied installations. Exchanges of fire with groups of Viet Cong are said to be continuing in a hamlet within the city limits about a mile from the ARVN Corps headquarters. Civilian casualties are reported to be heavy due to the fighting and the strafing sections of the city by government planes.
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00010650

In the January attack on this city, the provincial capital, Qui Nhon, it now appears that an estimated 200-300 enemy troops seized a number of allied installations including the provincial hospital and ARVN engineer battalion compound. The communist forces apparently still control the provincial hospital and ARVN engineer battalion compound area. A Republic of Korean (ROK) Marine Brigade was reported to have retaken the Qui Nhon airfield and, at last report, was advancing toward the city. Elements of the North Vietnamese 6th Division appear to have been involved in the Qui Nhon action along with other local Viet Cong forces.

Elsewhere in the western Highlands, one action has been effectively cleared. The US 4th Infantry Division have pushed the Communists out of Kontum city where they had apparently so January earlier government intelligence erroneously occupied several. The enemy force estimated at battalion strength has been driven to positions on the northern outskirts of the city, where allied artillery and tactical air bombardment can be brought to bear and engaging guerrillas and North Vietnamese soldiers - the attacking force was apparently composed both of Viet.

The broadcasts have announced that Communist forces have launched many simultaneous attacks from northern and central South Vietnam. The attacks were aimed at developing the "winter-spring" campaign and "punishing" the US for violating.

The DZ Area: There have been no official reports of significant action today in any sector of the Demilitarized Zone. Sanh air strip was closed due to enemy bombardment. The reports that Khe have not yet been confirmed or clarified through official channels.

Continued on 30 January, other Related Actions: The Communists have.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00010650
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00010650

The Communist "order" threatens reprisals for military attacks. Hanoi has also issued a Foreign Ministry statement claiming that the US has "completely cancelled the 1968 Tet truce" and condemning the Americans for continuing the air attacks.

There has so far been no other significant foreign commentary, either from bloc or non-bloc sources, on the current military action in South Vietnam.

Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15604026].pdf"

Output:
{
	"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
	"What": "Series of mortar and ground assaults in South Vietnam",
	"When": "30 January 1958",
	"Where": [
		"US Embassy",
		"Saigon",
		"Bionzea air base",
	"Da Nang",
	"Qui Nhon",
	"Kontum city",
	"Demilitarized Zone"
	],
	"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541

The Situation in Vietnam

127

18 February 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541

The Communists launched a new wave of Vietnam offensive action 17-18 February against urban centers in South Vietnam. The intensity of the attacks and casualties on both sides were much lighter than at Tet.

Communists launch lightest in the northern provinces. The Military wave of attacks on urban centers, reported, along with predictions of new attacks in the corps areas are the new situation in South Vietnam; the Saigon area is reported. The situations in the northern provinces are reported.

Thieu again voices reluctance to exercise forceful leadership. Some progress made on formation of anti-Communist political front. The government performance in the western highlands appears to be more gloomy. The picture in the delta is somewhat creditable.

North Vietnamese aircraft return from China with unusual air activity. Two IL-28s again engaged in fly south.

There is nothing of significance to report in other Communist military developments. Communist hierarchy in South Vietnam met on 12 February to review the situation and to prepare for the offensive. Communist propaganda continues to focus on the northern part of South Vietnam and to imply that the Communists are taking over administrative control of that part of the country.

# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541

# I.   THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1.   In what appears to be the start of a second phase of their offensive against urban centers, the Communists and-coordinated mortar and rocket attacks,on the night of 17-18 February launched widespread accompanied by scattered ground attacks, against more than 30 towns and airfields in South Vietnam.

2.    The bulk of the attacks were centered in South Vietnam's III and scattered actions through-IV Corps in the southern half of the country, without II Corps. I Corps has remained largely spared in the current.round, although skirmishing has been reported along the coastal areas together with shelling in the Hue — Phu Bai area and against Khe Sanh. There continue to be strong indications of impending enemy offensive action in I Corps and possibly against additional provincial capitals along the central coast.

3.    Heavy mortar and rocket fire has been directed against Tan Son Nhut Airfield serving Saigon, as well as against major installations north of the capital, possibly in allied headquarters and Saigon, to cover troop no ground attacks against effort though there has been shelling of police stations there have been movements toward Saigon within the capital and sporadic sharp fighting in outlying areas to the north and south. There are ominous Communist military and political moves indications that the capital is in for further

4. eThe current wave of attacks and resulting casualties on both sides so far appear lighter than Lat Tet. would be attacked against possible enemy action. ed at provincial capitals and Saigon all 2:00 A.M. on 18 February, nearly all areas were Primary Communist reliance on heavy weapons fire in the latest assaults has tended to minimize losses to Communist forces and the chances of direct ground engagements.

18 February 1968

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---
# Saigon Area

5. Attacks in the capital area began at Tan Son Nhut Airfield shortly after midnight on 18 February, with approximately 100 rounds of 82-mm. mortar and 122-mm. rocket fire. The first use of the latter weapon in the capital area resulted in four Americans killed and 92 wounded. Six aircraft were reported destroyed and 45 damaged. Some destruction of facilities on the base was reported. There was no ground follow-up against Tan Son Nhut, but several nearby positions, including that of an ARVN airborne element, received rocket fire.

6. In the central part of Saigon, approximately 20 rounds of mortar fire hit a police compound on 18 February, killing six and wounding 33. Fighting also occurred at points around the city, including a heavy attack against an ARVN training center north of the capital and a sharp battle some miles to the south. Major POL depots just south of the city and near Bien Hoa to the north received B-40 rocket fire, as did two ships unloading ammunition about five miles northeast of the capital. At last report, attacks continued on Tan Son Nhut and certain key targets in Saigon, including the National Police headquarters and a power plant.

7. There have been numerous reports from low-level prisoners in recent days that additional large-scale attacks would be mounted against Saigon. Police Director Loan predicted that the enemy may commit two main force battalions to the city's southwestern precincts against Tan Son Nhut, and that other forces may raid the capital.

8. There are some other indications of further action around the capital. A radio terminal serving Region 4 headquarters was tentatively fixed in the Viet Cong Military area about four miles southwest of Cholon--the Chinese-quarter of Saigon--on 17 February. This location would represent a move of 20 miles southward from the headquarters' last position on 15 February.

18 February 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541

W 3.5/\/'\O0)

3.5)

9. Another radio terminal believed possibly to serve an element of COSVN—the senior Viet Cong military and political headquarters in the South--was located by direction east of Saigon, or some 95 point less-than six miles finding on 16 February at a miles from its normal base area. Finally, there is tenuous evidence that a terminal serving an unidentified military "Front" headquarters in Binh Long Province, near the Cambodian border, may have begun a southward deployment. This headquarters is believed to be a coordinating authority over the three enemy divisions in III Corps, all of which have been noted closer out of their normal operating areas and in positions to Saigon since the Tet offensive.

III Corps

Saigon, at In addition to the 11 provincial capitals -10. mortar attacks around least seven of the in night of reported against. Some ground follow tion was 17-18 February. three capitals, Song Be and III Corps also received mortar attacks on up ac the Tay Ninh city north of Saigon and Bao Trai to the Song Be and used 122-mm. Some northwest. The Communists reportedly Tay-Ninh. rockets 200 enemy troops may sniper fire was noted at Be limits although only in the assaults on be within the Song last "still city" report. several US' Simultaneously with the assaults elsewhere, 11 military installations, including Bien Hoa Airfield and nearby headquarters of US brigades at rocket fire Lai Khe, Cu Chi, and Phu Loi, also received mortar or Scattered-harassment was also reported against US advisory compounds in the capital of Binh-Long Province as has been reported well as in areas east of Saigon. No major damage

18 February 1968

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IV Corps

12. Beginning about 1:00 A.M. on 18 February, coordinated mortar 16 provincial capitals in the delta and on a number of airfields and other military installations, including a US military headquarters near My attacks were launched against Can Tho. Ground Tho and major airfields around four cities, Vinh Long, Cao Lanh, My Tho and Ben Tre, but as in III Corps, the assaults appear to have been lighter than at Tet. The heaviest ground action seems to be at Vinh Long where air strikes have been called in against an estimated 700-800 enemy troops believed in the city.

13. There are unconfirmed reports of enemy concentrations in the vicinity of some provincial and district towns in the delta which have not yet been heavily attacked.

II Corps

14. Enemy action in II Corps has been somewhat scattered, with the major action against Phan Thiet on the coast and mortar harassment and ground estimated at two to three companies attacked force probes in the highlands area. An enemy Phan Thiet temporarily seizing the town jail and freeing 500 prisoners. Although allied forces have regained control of the prison, fighting reportedly continues in part of the city. Casualties so far appear to have been light.

15. Elsewhere, Communist forces conducted a mortar attack on the Kontum Airfield and a ground attack on a nearby position. Similar harassment was reported at Da Lat where, in addition, about two companies of enemy troops reportedly attacked and entered the city. No late details are available. Quang Duc Province, received mortar fire in the Farther south, the town of Gia-Nghia, capital first of enemy action reported in this province since the beginning of the year.
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16. Other major capitals in II Corps were not attacked during the weekend, but enemy concentrations are reported within striking range of both Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa on the central coast. No action has been reported in the Dak To area of Kontum Province.

17. Allied forces and positions in northern Quang Tri Province, at Hue, and at the MACV Forward Headquarters at Phu Bai were struck by mortar, and rocket, and artillery fire under daily mortar and artillery fire. Khe Sanh continues to come on 17-18 February. In addition, sharp skirmishes have continued to occur at several points along the northern coastal region between Da Nang and the DMZ, but there have been no major outbreaks of new fighting in I Corps.

18. Communist forces in this region, however, remain deployed of major targets in positions threatening a number of major targets and could renew wide offensive activity with little warning. The 803rd North Vietnamese Regiment, which recently moved southward from the DMZ to the area of Quang Tri city, suggests that attacks may have been planned which have not yet been carried out. Hanoi had ordered a general offensive in the northern half of South Vietnam to begin in the early morning hours of 18 February; however, reportedly arrived late, forcing a delay in the offensive.
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35

3.3(h)(2)

19. i _ ‘in Da Nang K::::::::] 3.3(h)(2)

been worked out, based on of attack on the city has a new plan in the initial attack at Tet. assessment of failures an No clear date for the attack was specified 3.3(h)(2) however, a further effort will be made to seize the city employing more thorough coordination between assets within the city major elements of the North the outside, including and attacking forces from Vietnamese 2nd Division. villages. be brought in from nearby Demonstrators would also If the attack fails, ‘the Communists will 3.3(h)(2) hope at a minimum to occupy surrounding villages as "stepping stones" to later attacks.’

20. In addition to the shelling of the southern half of the city of Hue, Communist action includes continued resistance by remnants within ern half. =Some evidence of the importance of Hue in Communist plans continues to be derived. from tenuous indications that one of the three regiments of the North Vietnamese 324B Division, -which has been mov- Quang A forward element of the operations in southern ing toward Quang Tri city, may Tri—Thien—Hue head- Hue. be deploying toward quarters, which controls enemy Province, has also Tri and all. of_Thua Thien been tentatively located K::::::::] in-the. Hue Citadel 3.3(h)(2) area.

18 February 1968

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# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

President Thieu has again voiced his reluctance to exercise more forceful leadership.

Anti-Communist Front.

A small step forward in the effort to form a based anti-Communist front occurred on 18 February, when a large number of widely varying political hues, and one-time military figures of veteran politicians participated in a Saigon conference dubbed the "People's Congress to Save the Nation." A number of national assemblymen were present, but apparently no members of the government's executive department or figures closely associated with President Thieu attended.

18 February 1968
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5. The meeting was characterized by an uncommon sense of urgency and commitment to the nation which held expressions of political differences and carping at the current performance of the Thieu government to a minimum...A number of speakers underlined the critical need for unity in the face of the growing Communist threat, and extolled the virtue of submerging political "prejudices," so that a unified bloc could be formed to aid the government's fight against the Communists. Aside from the rhetorical flourishes, the "Congress" took the practical step of electing a standing committee to begin organizing a nongovernment Communist front.

US Official Assesses Political Situation in Western Highlands

6. The government appears to have turned in a Tet offensive in the western highlands. The Communists creditable performance in reaction to

7. According to a Me Thuot towns, morale is high, US official who recently visited Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban and there is new-found confidence in the ARVN's ability to defend the towns successfully should there be new onslaughts. Among those who praised the forceful and effective response to the Viet Cong attacks and sons relief work past had been critical of the who in the which is now in full swing the government's military and administrative performance in the highlands.

8. The US official also observed that over the there does not appear to be any popular resentment in fact that much of the considerable destruction been towns--more than 20 percent of for example--was Ban Me Thuot has completely caused by allied fire power, the most part, taking burned to the ground, believes that the civilian population is; for a philosophical attitude toward the devastation, ascribing losses to the unpleasant realities of war.

9. Although there may be a "small minority" more critical of the government's effort, many local

18 February 1968
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541

Leaders are eagerly pitching in and helping with the government's relief program; and the Viet Cong failed to generate any US official also notes, situation for their effort. However, that his assessment pertains only to the situation in the towns. Access to the countryside is still extremely limited and reliable reports on the situation there have not yet filtered in.

Aftermath of Tet Offensive in Delta

A somewhat more somber picture has been painted by He reports that the destruction of Can Tho in the delta. A US official based at Can Tho city university's only permanent building during the Tet fighting has left ill-will toward the government, and by implication the US, which will probably prove difficult to erase.

He asserts that popular resentment has been fanned by the fact that Can Tho university is the only one located in the delta, and as such has been a source of pride and hope beyond the immediate confines of Can Tho. The opinion is widely held that the virtual destruction of the university by government air and artillery strikes was not justified by the small number of Viet Cong who were holed up in its science library building.

The lackluster performance of government troops during the delta attack as well as widespread ARVN looting has also contributed heavily to popular disaffection. In addition, relations between US advisers in the delta and government military and civilian officials apparently have suffered badly as a result of ex-post facto recriminations, particularly charges by some ARVN officers that US intentionally kept insufficient military support in the early fighting.

18 February 1968
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VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Vietnamese aircraft are again engaged in unusual activity, possibly associated with support to Communist forces in the northern part of South Vietnam.

Three IL-28s returned to Phuc Yen Airfield from China on the evening of 18 February for attack missions. One of these IL-28s was damaged by US air strikes, but the other two returned to North Vietnam. In addition, four North Vietnamese AN-2 transports took off from Hanoi on the night of 17 February for an unidentified mission in the southern Zone area. They may have been headed for the Demilitarized Zone. These transports earlier this month performed paradrop operations in the northwestern sector of South Vietnam and the adjacent area of Laos.

There are some tentative indications that elements from North Vietnam's only airborne unit are involved, or are preparing to become involved, in current military activities.

There is no other evidence bearing on the 305th or its three battalions.

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’ I-eP—s—Ec'IUfi"‘ 35 /\OO\/

\ s.5( )

or all ‘unusualof these units could be involved with the-DRV air transport activities of the past few weeks, including paradrop operations in the Laos/DMZ area.

18 February 1968

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T99 33¢-R-ET". 35/\O0

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

18 February 1968
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V. ACOMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Vietnamese Communist propaganda has again taken on a more strident tone in support of the new wave of coordinated attacks in the South.

Vietnamese Communists Hold Meeting

2. A meeting of top members of the Communist military and political hierarchy in South Vietnam was held on 11 and 12 February, according to a Viet Cong radio announcement on 17 February. The meeting doubtless was convened to review the overall Communist situation in the wake of the first part of the Tet offensive, and probably was used to pass on Hanoi's instructions for the coming weeks. A similar meeting was held in mid-January in which instructions for the countrywide assaults at the end of the month presumably were given to high-ranking leaders. The recent meeting probably covered some of the decisions leading up to the present resurgence of Communist military activity.

3. A full text of the communique published by this so-called "extraordinary enlarged session" of the Liberation Front's central committee is not yet available, but it is unlikely to disclose much of substance anyway. A preliminary report says the conference reviewed the "current general offensive" and discussed tasks for the immediate future.

4. A Hanoi broadcast summarizing the communiqué indicates it contained the usual glowing Communist description of the results of the Tet offensive, which it claimed had created conditions favorable for achieving final victory.

Communists Focus Attention on Northern South-Vietnam

5. Despite the relative lull in new fighting so far in the northern part of South Vietnam, Vietnamese Communist propaganda continues to zero in on

18 February 1968
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that area in particular. Recent Viet Cong and Hanoi broadcasts strongly imply that new military attacks will be accompanied by efforts to take over administrative control of wide areas in that part of the country.

The North Vietnamese party daily on 18 February carried an editorial praising "initial victories" in the current "general-offensive and simultaneous uprisings" in central Vietnam (most of I and II Corps). It claimed that Communist forces have "turned the military and political tide" there and quoted a communiqué from the rural nist command in that region saying that "vast areas" had been "liberated" and a "string" of provincial capitals and towns. According to the paper, this put the Communists in a position to "overwhelm the enemy in many areas," and promised even bigger and more resounding victories in the future.

Similarly, Hanoi came down hard on 18 February with an endorsement of the establishment of a new Province. The announcement of this committee was disintegrating the administration of Thua Thien and Hue, in the process of taking over GVN authority. The new "provisional administration" allegedly has been set up under the auspices of the Hue city "National, Democratic, and Peace Alliance," a front group unveiled by the Communists at the opening of the Tet offensive. Le Van Hao, who earlier surfaced as head of a new "revolutionary committee."

Hanoi said the committee had decided to "wipe out" the South Vietnamese administration structure "at all levels," and to "recognize" new revolutionary committees allegedly being set up throughout the Thua Thien Province.

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35/\/\ OO \/\/ 35

Much of this doubtless is sheer propaganda designed to buttress Communist claims that "revolutionary elements" from all parts of South Vietnamese society are rising up to topple the Thieu—Ky regime. Continued evolution in the Thua_Thien establishment suggests the Communists are determined to- Hue their. The persistence of the claims, however, and area SE9 some sort of new political structure in this region through political agitation and organizational rural efforts now being conducted in both urban and areas.

18 February 1968

V-3

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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541 THE_SITUATION_IN_VIETNAM[15618062].pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "US Intelligence Officials",
    "What": "Communists launched a new wave of offensive action in South Vietnam, focusing on urban centers",
    "When": "18 February 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Tan Son Nhut Airfield", "Hue", "Phu Bai", "Khe Sanh", "III Corps", "IV Corps", "Delta", "My Tho", "Ben Tre", "Vinh Long", "Da Lat", "Quang Duc Province", "Nha Trang", "Tuy Hoa", "Nothern Quang Tri Province", "MACV Forward Headquarters at Phu Bai", "Da Nang", "Dak To area of Kontum Province"],
    "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # TOP SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 30 January 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation (As Of 12 NOON EST) in South Vietnam

Some additional details have been received on two new enemy attacks against the coastal II Corps. Information is now available on attacks in Tuy Hoa and Ninh Hoa cities in II Corps.

In addition, enemy artillery bombardment appears quiet along the DMZ. There is no confirmation from US military sources. Otherwise, Khe Sanh airstrip has reported military bombardment.

Ground attacks in the Da Nang area included coordinated mortar and strategic rocket attacks on high-value targets such as the airbase and military headquarters on 30 January.

At about the same time, the enemy hit several installations in the Da Nang area, including the airbase, a US Army bridge, and the city's northwest area. The enemy also attacked the "Marble Mountain" facility, a US Marine facility, and Vietnamese forces guarding the strategic Hai Van Pass.

Almost five simultaneous enemy mortar barrages were directed at Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA, straddling the borders of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces.

Approximately 15 miles south of Da Nang, the enemy attacked a provincial capital which had a provincial artillery base.

Reports indicate that the situation in the Chu Lai and WHEELER/WALLOWA areas is quiet. Allied forces are conducting mopping up operations in Hoi An and Da Nang. The enemy appears to have been repulsed, and the situation is less clear.

# TOP SECRET
---
# TOP SECRET

pat alliedtoforces in and aroundHoi An havenotyetforced pe enemy to abandon positions
pat enemy allied to forces abandon positions and around he seized pe Hoi An have not yet forced pe enemy seized.
Qui Nhon · An estimated 44 Viet Cong sapper company and provincial has penetrated pe capital radio station facilities of Binh Dinh Province and nearby allied maintenance complex.
ports show maintenance controlling pe radio and Communist losses of five killed and 50 wounded. Preliminary casualty losses of pree US and 60 killed.
Nha Trang Sporadic fighting of Khanh Hoa wip units 55 off Hoa wip Allied casualties to date stand at 21 killed and 66 wounded.
Pleiku City provincial. Heavy fighting apparently continues wip ARVN forces attempting to block enemy routes of escape from pe Battle area. The enemy force is estimated to have total 7 killed and at least 22 wounded.
Kontum City being reported secure wip two companies employed against Communist control on pe outskirts of pe city. At least 165 enemy troops now reported under allied airstrikes.
Ban Me Thuot capital Fighting continues wipin pe city against planned casualties. Ban Me Thuot NVA Regiment captured, pe outskirts of pe city. Enemy losses of 91 killed and 28 wounded.

# TOP SECRET
---
# Ninh Hoa

Cong havetown district Sporadic coastal fighting in Khanh Hoa Province continues in this important town in killed coastal to date.

Eleven Viet killed to date.

# Tuy Hoa

Capital intercept seven 36 killed 10. 36 killed the units of enemy leaving the Yen. Heavy fighting has broken out in Phy Yen. Allied reaction attackers has while broken the city, forces, the provincial maintaining friendly have attempting thus far losses to sustain.

Of killed seven of the and attackers, 31 wounded.

# Tan Canh

ARVN regiment 11. Sporadic contact enemy continues between elements. No results of an ARVN regiment available and an force of unknown size. THE-SITUATION-IN-SOUTH-VI15478302.pdf

Output:
{
    "Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
    "What": "Intelligence memorandum detailing enemy attacks in South Vietnam",
    "When": "30 January 1968",
    "Where": ["South Vietnam", "Tuy Hoa", "Ninh Hoa", "DMZ", "Da Nang", "Khe Sanh", "Chu Lai", "Hoi An", "Quang Nam", "Quang Tin", "Hai Van Pass", "Qui Nhon", "Binh Dinh Province", "Nha Trang", "Khanh Hoa Province", "Pleiku City", "Kontum City", "Ban Me Thuot", "Tan Canh"],
    "Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}


Input:
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Bulletin

27 March

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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are promulgated by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis. Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192656

27 March 1968

# Central Intelligence Bulletin

# CONTENTS

Soup Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Panama: An uneasy calm has followed last night's rioting, but more trouble is likely. (Page 2)
Communist China: New purges of high-level figures under way. (Page 4)
Greece: The junta is seeking to improve its image prough its constitutional program. (Page 8)
Denmark-Sweden: Danes are first NATO country to buy jet fighters from a non-NATO country. (Page 9)
Brazil—France: Aircraft (Page 10)

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|.1|\., 5.6|
|---|---|
| |NORTH|
|VIETNAM|DongHo|
|Demilitarized Zone| |
|Savannakhet|QUANG TRI|
| |QUANG TRI|
|HUE.| |
| |QUANG NAM|
| |THUA THIEN|
|QUANG TIN| |
|QUANG NGAI| |
|QUANG DUC| |
|KHANH HOA| |
|PHUOC TUY| |
|KHANH HOA| |
|PHUOC TUY| |
|RAVH| |
|DA LAT| |
|PHUOC LONG| |
|LAM DONG| |
|THUAN HUY| |
|PHAN RANG| |
|PHUOC LONG| |
|PHAN RANG| |
|TAY NINH| |
|PHUOC THUY| |
|LONG KHANH| |
|PHUOC LONG| |
|BA RIA| |
|PHUOC TUY| |
|PHU QUOC| |
|PHU QUOC| |
| |BA XUYEN|
|SIAM| |
| |BAC|
| |VIETNAM|

|Continued|
|---|
|25|50|75|100|Miles|
|0|25|50|75|100|O|25|50|75|100|

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Soup Vietnam: The large enemy assault in Kontum offensive proughout pe western Province on 26 March may highlands signal a Communist
A multibattalion Norp Vietnamese force attacked a US 4p Infantry Division position west of Kontum city and was driven off after four hours of fierce fighting. This was pe first significant activity against US forces in pe highlands since pe Tet offensive, and pe enemy left some 135 dead behind.
There have been a number of indications pat renewed large-scale Communist attacks against allied forces in pe highlands might begin in late March. The provincial capitals of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot would be among pe targets.
Extensive reconnaissance, troop deployments, and oper battle preparations. In Darlac Province, for example, pe Norp Vietnamese 33rd Regiment appears to be massing for attacks on allied targets in pe Ban Me Thuot area. A 25 March Province referred to "coordinated attacks" and to "N-Day," pe Vietnamese equivalent of D-Day.
Elsewhere in pe country Communist military activity was at a relatively low level except for a major engagement norpwest of Saigon in Hau Nghia Province apparently involving elements of pe Viet Cong 5p Division. US and Soup Vietnamese forces killed some 284 in pis battle.

27 Mar 68

TOP-SECRET

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City after last An uneasy calm has returned to Panama*Panama:night's rioting, but more trouble is likely today.

The long-awaited confrontation between the Robles government and Arnulfo Arias’ National Union (NU) came yesterday afternoon when National Guardsmen prevented "President" Delvalle and his aides from entering the Assembly building. The Guard fired volleys of tear gas into a crowd accompanying Delvalle after stones and bottles were thrown. The gas spread into nearby slum areas, forcing hundreds to flee. Over 70 persons, many of them women and children, were treated for gas inhalation.

Incidents of arson, rock-throwing, and gunfire, directed chiefly against the Guard, quickly spread and, despite orders from General Vallarino, Guardsmen continued to use tear gas to break up angry crowds. By downtown the Guard had the situation under control in the late evening area, although there were reports of sporadic violence in other areas of the city.

Pro-Arias news media are making the most of what appears to have been an overreaction by the Guard. They are hammering away at the theme that the constitution is no longer in effect and that the Guard has, in effect, carried out a coup. Some radio stations are already charging that "Yankees of the Canal Zone" were "accomplices" of the Guard because they supplied the tear gas. There appears to be no immediate threat against the Canal Zone but one could quickly build if the NU decides to press an anti-US campaign. NU leaders are again calling for a general strike and as a result of last night's violence some businesses may close today. Delvalle and several pro-Arias deputies plan a march through the downtown area this morning and some of the deputies reportedly will try to enter the Assembly building.
---
During the five-week-old crisis, Arias and the elite families allied with him have shunned violence and stuck to a legal course to gain control of the electoral machinery. So far these tactics have failed to attract widespread public support. Events of the past three days, however, have pushed Arias and his followers into direct conflict with the Guard and a repeat of last night's incidents could rebound to their favor.

27 Mar 68
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Communist China: Purges of high-level figures may be again under way in Peking. According to foreign newsmen in the Chinese capital, massive demonstrations yesterday denounced three senior military officers as "plotters." The three men, not previously under serious attack, are Acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, the air force political commissar, and the Peking garrison commander. Yang, who was appointed early in the Cultural Revolution, has appeared to be a protege of Defense Minister Lin Piao. The dismissal of Yang might thus reflect adversely on Lin and possibly on Mao.

The apparent disgrace of these prominent military figures could indicate that a major political power is under way. Posters urging everyone to defend Mao Tse-tung, his wife, and Lin Piao are being displayed prominently along with the attacks on the three military men. One correspondent reports that many posters are being put up by soldiers, rather than by Red Guards as in past campaigns.

A tense atmosphere has been noted in Pekin for weeks. Soldiers carrying rifles with fixed bayonets have been patrolling the streets on foot and motorcycles. During the past month numerous big-character posters attacking civilian officials have been observed. Large numbers of troops and Red Guards have paraded and demonstrated almost daily since then against such long-discredited party leaders as Liu Shao-chi. One purpose of those demonstrations may be the exposure of the military officials denounced on 26 March.

Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.

27 Mar 68

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27 Mar 68                                                                         7
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Greece: The junta continues to hope its constitutional program will impress its allies and arouse domestic support.

After it offered a draft constitution for public discussion, the junta asked Washington and Bonn to remove restrictions on military aid. The government apparently believes that its move toward "constitutionalism" should convince friends of its good intentions.

At the same time, the government is engaged in an extensive domestic campaign to elicit comment on the proposed constitution. The response has been limited. Negative reactions from some formerly prominent politicians suggest that they intend to boycott the constitutional debate and the referendum scheduled for 1 September.

The regime needs a significant success to arouse some enthusiasm from an otherwise uncommitted population.

The junta so far has failed to come up with reforms that would clearly benefit the general public, and its continuing dismissal of military, civil service, and university personnel has not lessened public apathy towards the junta.
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Denmark- Sweden: Denmark has become the first NATO country to buy jet fighters from a non-NATO country.

According to press reports, the Danes decided on 26 March to buy 23 Swedish J-35 Draken aircraft to replace their aging F-84s. A decision whether to purchase more planes will be made later.

The Draken is a supersonic single-seat jet fighter designed primarily to intercept bombers flying at nearly supersonic speeds. It is built by SAAB and has a speed of about Mach 2.

Details of the deal are not known yet, but the Swedes almost certainly granted liberal terms. The sale, Sweden's first of advanced aircraft to a foreign buyer, will give Stockholm impetus to continue aggressive sales efforts in the jet fighter market. The Swedes are currently focusing their efforts on Austria.
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# Brazil- France: The French are pressing their efforts to get into the Brazilian aviation market and have offered to install a factory to build Fouga-Magister jet trainers in Brazil.

They are studying a proposal to have the factory also produce a conventional airplane of Brazilian design which would appeal to Brazilian nationalism and improve the factory's economic prospects. In addition, the Brazilian Air Ministry has agreed to exchange 20 of its Paris MS-760 jet trainers for seven Fouga-Magister trainers.

Date: 27 Mar 68
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192656

Top-Secret

Jerfietfi

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192656 CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_BULL[15617812].pdf

Output:
{
"Who": "Director of Central Intelligence, National Security Council, other senior government officials",
"What": "Intelligence Bulletin on various global situations including Vietnam, Panama, Communist China, Greece, Denmark-Sweden, Brazil-France",
"When": "27 March 1968",
"Where": ["United States", "Vietnam", "Panama", "Communist China", "Greece", "Denmark", "Sweden", "Brazil", "France"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
}