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+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
+The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission presided over
+by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. The draft underwent further revision at the hands
+"of well-known jurists, like Sir Barnes Peacock, and was completed in 1850. The Indian"
+Penal Code was passed by the then Legislature on 6 October 1860 and was enacted as
+Act No. XLV of 1860.
+Preamble. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide a general
+Penal Code for India; It is enacted as follows:—
+"COMMENT.—The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) exhaustively codifies the law"
+relating to offences with which it deals and the rules of the common law cannot be
+resorted to for inventing exemptions which are not expressly enacted.1. It is not
+"necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the IPC, 1860 at the present day in"
+accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the
+Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed
+between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to
+"construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible,"
+unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the
+contrary.2.
+[s 1] Title and extent of operation of the Code.
+"This Act shall be called the Indian Penal Code, and shall 3.[extend to the whole of"
+India 4.[except the State of Jammu and Kashmir].]
+COMMENT—
+"Before 1860, the English criminal law, as modified by several Acts,5. was administered"
+"in the Presidency towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. But in the mofussil, the"
+"Courts were principally guided by the Mohammedan criminal law, the glaring defects of"
+"which were partly removed by Regulations of the local Governments. In 1827, the"
+judicial system of Bombay was thoroughly revised and from that time the law which the
+criminal Courts administered was set forth in a Regulation6. defining offences and
+specifying punishments. But in the Bengal and Madras Presidencies the Mohammedan
+criminal law was in force till the Indian Penal Code came into operation.
+"[s 1.1] Trial of offences under IPC, 1860.—"
+"All offences under IPC, 1860 shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise"
+"dealt with according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC,"
+1973).7.
+[s 1.2] Overlapping Offences.—
+"Where there is some overlapping between offences contained in IPC, 1860 and other"
+"enactments, the Supreme Court has held that it would not mean that the offender could"
+"not be tried under IPC, 1860. The Court concerned can pronounce on such issues on"
+the basis of evidence produced before it. There may be some overlapping of facts in
+"the cases under section 420 IPC, 1860 and section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments"
+"Act, 1881 but ingredients of offences are entirely different. Thus, the subsequent case"
+"is not barred.8. A ""terrorist act"" and an act of ""waging war against the Government of"
+"India"" may have some overlapping features, but a terrorist act may not always be an act"
+"of waging war against the Government of India, and vice versa. The provisions of"
+"Chapter IV of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and those of Chapter VI of"
+"the IPC, 1860 including section 121, basically cover different areas.9. The mere fact"
+"that the offence in question was covered by the Customs Act, 1962 did not mean that it"
+"could not be tried under IPC, 1860 if it also falls under it.10."
+"1. MC Verghese v Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] : (1969) 1 SCC 37 [LNIND"
+1968 SC 339] : 1970 Cr LJ 1651 .
+"2. Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC)."
+"3. The original words have successively been amended by Act 12 of 1891, section 2 and Sch I,"
+"the A.O. 1937, the A.O. 1948 and the A.O. 1950 to read as above."
+"4. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, for ""except Part B States"" (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"5. 9 Geo. IV, section 74; Acts VII and XIX of 1837; Act XXXI of 1838; Acts XXII and XXXI of 1839;"
+"Acts VII and X of 1844; Act XVI of 1852. See Pramod Kumar, Perspectives of the New Bill on"
+"Indian Penal Code and Reflections on the Joint Select Committee Report—Some Comments,"
+(1980) 22 JILI 307.
+6. XIV of 1827.
+"7. Section 4(1) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Also see commentary under section 3 of IPC"
+infra.
+"8. Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2012 SC 2844 [LNIND 2012 SC 1473]"
+: (2012) 7 SCC 621 [LNIND 2012 SC 1473] .
+"9. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : AIR 2012 (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 [relied on State (NCT of
+"Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 11 SCC"
+600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715]
+"10. Natarajan v State, (2008) 8 SCC 413 [LNIND 2008 SC 1093] : (2008) 3 SCC (Cr) 507."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
+The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission presided over
+by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. The draft underwent further revision at the hands
+"of well-known jurists, like Sir Barnes Peacock, and was completed in 1850. The Indian"
+Penal Code was passed by the then Legislature on 6 October 1860 and was enacted as
+Act No. XLV of 1860.
+Preamble. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide a general
+Penal Code for India; It is enacted as follows:—
+"COMMENT.—The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) exhaustively codifies the law"
+relating to offences with which it deals and the rules of the common law cannot be
+resorted to for inventing exemptions which are not expressly enacted.1. It is not
+"necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the IPC, 1860 at the present day in"
+accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the
+Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed
+between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to
+"construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible,"
+unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the
+contrary.2.
+[s 2] Punishment of offences committed within India.
+Every person 1 shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for
+"every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty"
+within 11.[India] 12.[***]. 2
+COMMENT—
+This section deals with the intraterritorial operation of the Code. It makes the Code
+universal in its application to every person in any part of India for every act or omission
+contrary to the provisions of the Code.
+"Section 2 read with section 4 of the IPC, 1860 makes the provisions of the Code"
+"applicable to the offences committed ""in any place without and beyond"" the territory of"
+"India; (1) by a citizen of India or (2) on any ship or aircraft registered in India,"
+"irrespective of its location, by any person not necessarily a citizen. Such a declaration"
+"was made as long back as in 1898. By an amendment in 2009 to the said section, the"
+"Code is extended to any person in any place ""without and beyond the territory of India"","
+committing an offence targeting a computer resource located in India.13.
+"1. 'Every person'.—Every person is made liable to punishment, without distinction of"
+"nation, rank, caste or creed, provided the offence with which he is charged has been"
+"committed in some part of India. A foreigner who enters the Indian territories and thus,"
+accepts the protection of Indian laws virtually gives an assurance of his fidelity and
+obedience to them and submits himself to their operation. It is no defence on behalf of
+"a foreigner that he did not know he was doing wrong, the act not being an offence in"
+his own country. A foreigner who commits an offence within India is guilty and can be
+punished as such without any limitation as to his corporal presence in India at the
+time.14. Indian Courts have jurisdiction against foreigners residing in foreign countries
+but their acts connected with transaction or part of transaction arising in India.15.
+[s 2.1] Corporate Criminal Liability
+A company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. Although
+"there are earlier authorities to the fact that the corporation cannot commit a crime, the"
+generally accepted modern rule is that a corporation may be subject to indictment and
+other criminal process although the criminal act may be committed through its agent.
+The majority in the Constitution bench held that there is no immunity to the companies
+from prosecution merely because the prosecution is in respect of offences for which
+the punishment is mandatory imprisonment and fine.16. When imprisonment and fine is
+prescribed as punishment the Court can impose the punishment of fine which could be
+enforced against the company.17.
+"In CBI v Blue Sky Tie-up Pvt Ltd,18. the question again came up for consideration before"
+the Supreme Court and it was held that since the majority of the Constitution Bench
+ruled in Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement [supra] that the company
+can be prosecuted even in a case where the Court can impose substantive sentence as
+"also fine, and in such case only fine can be imposed on the corporate body, the contrary"
+view taken by the learned single Judge cannot be approved.
+[s 2.2] Vicarious Liability.—
+"Indian Penal Code, save and except some matters does not contemplate any vicarious"
+liability on the part of a person. Commission of an offence by raising a legal fiction or
+by creating a vicarious liability in terms of the provisions of a statute must be expressly
+"stated. The Managing Director or the Directors of the Company, thus, cannot be said to"
+have committed an offence only because they are holders of offices.19. Vicarious
+liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists
+in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such
+"vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the"
+complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions
+"constituting vicarious liability.20. The provisions of the Essential Commodities Act,"
+"1955, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Employees' Provident Fund (Miscellaneous"
+"Provision) Act, 1952, etc., have created such vicarious liability. It is interesting to note"
+that section 14A of the 1952 Act specifically creates an offence of criminal breach of
+trust in respect of the amount deducted from the employees by the company. In terms
+"of the explanations appended to section 405 of the IPC, 1860 a legal fiction has been"
+created to the effect that the employer shall be deemed to have committed an offence
+of criminal breach of trust. Whereas a person in charge of the affairs of the company
+and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable for the offence committed by
+the company along with the company but even in a case falling under section 406 of
+"the IPC, 1860 vicarious liability has been held to be not extendable to the Directors or"
+officers of the company.21.
+"There is no exception in favour of anyone in the Penal Code, but the following persons"
+are exempted from the jurisdiction of criminal Courts of every country:—
+"(a) Foreign Sovereigns.—The real principle on which the exemption, of every sovereign"
+"from the jurisdiction of every Court, has been deduced is that the exercise of such"
+"jurisdiction would be incompatible with his regal dignity—that is to say, with his"
+absolute independence of every superior authority.22.
+"(b) Diplomats.—United Nations Privileges and Immunities Act, 1947, and the Diplomatic"
+"Relations (Vienna Convention) Act, 1972, gave certain diplomats, missions and their"
+member's diplomatic immunity even from criminal jurisdiction. The Diplomatic
+Relations (Vienna Convention) Act had been enacted to give effect to the Vienna
+"Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. The effect of section 2 of the Act is to give"
+the force of law in India to certain provisions set out in the Schedule to the Act.
+A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
+State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except
+in the case of:
+(i) A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
+"receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the"
+purposes of the mission;
+(ii) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as
+"executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of"
+the sending State;
+(iii) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
+diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.23. A
+diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.24. Privileges and
+immunities are conferred on United Nations and its Representatives as well as
+on other international organisations and their representatives by the United
+"Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947.25."
+(c) Alien enemies.—In respect of acts of war alien enemies cannot be tried by criminal
+"Courts. If an alien enemy commits a crime unconnected with war, e.g., theft, he would"
+be triable by ordinary criminal Courts.
+(d) Foreign army.—When armies of one State are by consent on the soil of a foreign
+State they are exempted from the jurisdiction of the State on whose soil they are.
+(e) Warships.—Men-of-war of a State in foreign waters are exempt from the jurisdiction
+"of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction they are. The domestic Courts, in"
+"accordance with principles of international law, will accord to the ship and its crew and"
+"its contents certain immunities. The immunities can, in any case, be waived by the"
+nation to which the public ship belongs.26.
+"(f) President and Governors.—Under Article 361 of the Indian Constitution, the"
+President and Governors are exempt from the jurisdiction of Courts.
+2. 'Within India'.—If the offence is committed outside India it is not punishable under
+"the Penal Code, unless it has been made so by means of special provisions such as"
+"sections 3, 4, 108A, etc., of the Code. Under section179 of the Cr PC, 1973 even the"
+"place(s) wherein the consequence (of the criminal act) ""ensues"" would be relevant to"
+"determine the Court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, even the Courts within whose"
+"local jurisdiction, the repercussion/effect of the criminal act occurs, would have"
+jurisdiction in the matter. When the consequence of an act committed by a foreigner
+"outside India if ensued in India, he can be tried in India.27. Normally crime carries the"
+person. The commission of a crime gives the Court of the place where it is committed
+jurisdiction over the person of the offender.28.
+[s 2.3] Territorial jurisdiction.—
+The territory of India is defined under Article 1 of the Constitution of India. Article 1 of
+the Constitution of India deals only with the geographical territory while Article 297
+deals with 'maritime territory'.
+Article 297(3) authorises the Parliament to specify from time to time the limits of
+"various maritime zones such as, territorial waters, continental shelf, etc. Clauses (1)"
+"and (2) of the said Article make a declaration that all lands, minerals and other things"
+"of value and all other resources shall vest in the Union of India.29. Section 18 of the IPC,"
+1860 defines India as the territory of India excluding the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
+These territorial limits would include the territorial waters of India.30. Under the General
+"Clauses Act, 1897, India is defined to mean all territories for the time being comprised"
+in the territory of India as defined in the Constitution of India. Under the provisions of
+"Article 297 of the Constitution of India, all lands, minerals and other things of value"
+underlying the ocean within the territorial waters or the continental shelf or the
+exclusive economic zone of India vest in the Union. The Constitution of India does not
+"itself define the terms territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic"
+zone. Clause (3) of Article 297 states that their limits shall be such as may be specified
+"by Parliament. In 1976, Parliament implemented the amendments to the Constitution"
+"of India by passing the Maritime Zones Act, 1976.31. Insofar the Republic of India is"
+"concerned, the limit of the territorial waters was initially understood to be three nautical"
+miles. It had been extended subsequently; up to six nautical miles by a Presidential
+proclamation dated 22 March 1952 and to 12 nautical miles by another proclamation
+"dated 30 September 1967. By The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive"
+"Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 80 of 1976, it was statutorily fixed at 12"
+nautical miles. Section 3 of the Act stipulates that the sovereignty of India extends to
+"the territorial waters, the limit of which is 12 nautical miles. Section 5 of the Territorial"
+"Waters Act, 1976 defines the contiguous zone of India as an area beyond and adjacent"
+to territorial waters to a distance of 24 nautical miles from the nearest point of the
+baseline. Section 7 of the Act defines the Exclusive economic zone of India as an area
+beyond and adjacent to territorial waters up to a limit of 200 nautical miles.32.
+[s 2.4] Jurisdiction beyond Territorial Waters
+In the case of British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew
+"Industries,33. the Supreme Court examined the effective operation of the statutes of a"
+country in relation to foreigners and foreign ships.
+"In general, a statute extends territorially, unless the contrary is stated, throughout the"
+"country and will extend to the territorial waters, and such places as intention to that effect is"
+shown. A statute extends to all persons within the country if that intention is shown. The
+"Indian Parliament, therefore, has no authority to legislate for foreign vessels or foreigners in"
+"them on the high seas. Thus a foreign ship on the high seas, or her foreign owners or their"
+"agents in a foreign country, are not deprived of rights by our statutory enactment expressed"
+in general terms unless it provides that a foreign ship entering an Indian port or territorial
+waters and thus coming within the territorial jurisdiction is to be covered. Without anything
+more Indian statutes are ineffective against foreign property and foreigners outside the
+jurisdiction.
+"It is this principle which is reflected in section 2(2) of the Merchant Shipping Act,"
+1958.34.
+"Earlier in Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd v UOI,35. it was held that India has been given"
+only certain limited sovereign rights and such limited sovereign rights conferred on
+India in respect of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone cannot be equated to
+extending the sovereignty of India over the continental shelf and exclusive economic
+zone as in the case of territorial waters.
+"1. MC Verghese v Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] : (1969) 1 SCC 37 [LNIND"
+1968 SC 339] : 1970 Cr LJ 1651 .
+"2. Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC)."
+"11. The original words ""the said territories"" have successively been amended by the A.O. 1937,"
+"the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 3-4-1951), to read as"
+above.
+"12. The words and figures ""on or after the said first day of May, 1861"" rep. by Act 12 of 1891,"
+section 2 and Sch I.
+"13. Republic of Italy through Ambassador v UOI, (2013) 4 SCC 721 : 2013 (1) Scale 462"
+[LNINDORD 2013 SC 9114] .
+"14. Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC)."
+"See also State of Maharashtra v Mayer Hans George, 1965 (1) SCR 123 [LNIND 1964 SC 415] :"
+AIR 1965 SC 722 [LNIND 1964 SC 208] : 1965 (1) Cr LJ 641 .
+"15. Lee Kun Hee v State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND 2012 SC 89] : AIR 2012 SC 1007"
+[LNINDORD 2012 SC 443] : 2012 Cr LJ 1551 .
+"16. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+476] : AIR 2005 SC 2622 [LNIND 2005 SC 476] : 2005 SCC (Cr) 961; Asstt Commr v Velliappa
+"Textiles Ltd, 2003 (11) SCC 405 [LNIND 2003 SC 794] : 2004 SCC (Cr) 1214) Overruled."
+"17. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2006 SC 1301 [LNIND 2006 SC"
+145] : (2006) 4 SCC 278 [LNIND 2006 SC 145] : (2006) 2 SCC (Cr) 221. See also CBI v Blue Sky
+"Tie-up Pvt Ltd, (2011) 6 Scale 436 : AIR 2012 (SCW) 1098 : 2012 Cr LJ 1216 . Also see Aneeta"
+"Hada v Godfather Travels & Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 66 : 2012 Cr LJ 2525 : AIR 2012 SC 2795 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 260] .
+"18. CBI v Blue Sky Tie-up Pvt Ltd, (2011) 6 Scale 436 : AIR 2012 (SCW) 1098 : 2012 Cr LJ 1216 ."
+"Also see Aneeta Hada v Godfather Travels & Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 66 : 2012 Cr LJ 2525 : AIR 2012"
+SC 2795 [LNIND 2012 SC 260] in which it is held that directors cannot be prosecuted without the
+Company being arraigned as an accused–138 NI Act.
+"19. Keki Hormusji Gharda v Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475 [LNIND 2009 SC 1276] :"
+2009 Cr LJ 3733 : AIR 2009 SC 2594 [LNIND 2009 SC 1276] .
+"20. Maksud Saiyed v State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] : JT 2007 (11) SC"
+276 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] : (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 692.
+"21. SK Alagh v State of UP, AIR 2008 SC 1731 [LNIND 2008 SC 368] : (2008) 5 SCC 662 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 368] : 2008 Cr LJ 2256 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 686.
+"22. Per Brett, LJ in The Parlement Belge, (1880) 5 PD 197 , 207."
+"23. Article 31 (1) of Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act, 1972."
+"24. Article 31 (1) of Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act, 1972."
+"25. United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, Act No. XLV of 1947."
+"26. Chung Chi Cheung, (1939) AC 160 ."
+"27. Lee Kun Hee v State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND 2012 SC 89] : AIR 2012 SC 1007"
+"[LNINDORD 2012 SC 443] : 2012 Cr LJ 1551 ; Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857"
+[LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC) : 1958 SCR 328 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] .
+"28. Kubic Dariusz v UOI, AIR 1990 SC 605 [LNIND 1990 SC 25] : (1990) 1 SCC 568 [LNIND 1990"
+SC 25] : 1990 Cr LJ 796 .
+"29. Republic of Italy through Ambassador v UOI, (2013) 4 SCC 721 : 2013 (1) Scale 462"
+[LNINDORD 2013 SC 9114] .
+"30. BK Wadeyar v Daulatram Rameshwarlal, AIR 1961 SC 311 [LNIND 1960 SC 493] : 1961 (1)"
+SCR 924 [LNIND 1960 SC 493] .
+"31. Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd v UOI, JT 2008 (5) SC 256 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] : 2008 (6)"
+Scale 128 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] : (2008) 11 SCC 439 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] .
+"32. UOI Republic of Italy through Ambassador v UOI, (2013) 4 SCC 721 : 2013 (1) Scale 462"
+[LNINDORD 2013 SC 9114] .
+"33. British India Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Shanmughavilas Cashew Industries, 1990 (3) SCC"
+481 [LNIND 1990 SC 150] : JT 1990 (1) SC 528 [LNIND 1990 SC 150] : 1990 (1) SCR 884 .
+"34. World Tanker Carrier Corp v SNP Shipping Services Pvt Ltd, AIR 1998 SC 2330 [LNIND 1998"
+SC 461] : 1998 (5) SCC 310 [LNIND 1998 SC 461] .
+"35. Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd v UOI, (2008) 11 SCC 439 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] : JT 2008 (5)"
+SC 256 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] : 2008 (6) Scale 128 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
+The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission presided over
+by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. The draft underwent further revision at the hands
+"of well-known jurists, like Sir Barnes Peacock, and was completed in 1850. The Indian"
+Penal Code was passed by the then Legislature on 6 October 1860 and was enacted as
+Act No. XLV of 1860.
+Preamble. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide a general
+Penal Code for India; It is enacted as follows:—
+"COMMENT.—The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) exhaustively codifies the law"
+relating to offences with which it deals and the rules of the common law cannot be
+resorted to for inventing exemptions which are not expressly enacted.1. It is not
+"necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the IPC, 1860 at the present day in"
+accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the
+Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed
+between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to
+"construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible,"
+unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the
+contrary.2.
+"[s 3] Punishment of offences committed beyond, but which by law may be tried"
+within India.
+"Any person liable, by any 36.[Indian law], to be tried for an offence committed beyond"
+37.[India] shall be dealt with according to the provisions of this Code for any act
+committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act had been committed
+within 38.[India].
+COMMENT—
+This section and section 4 relate to the extraterritorial operation of the Code. The
+words of this section postulate the existence of a law that an act constituting an
+"offence in India shall also be an offence when committed outside India. Thus, taking"
+"part in a marriage which is prohibited by the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 by a"
+citizen of India beyond India is not an offence which can be punished in India.39. This
+section only applies to the case of a person who at the time of committing the offence
+"charged was amenable to an Indian Court.40. Thus, an Indian citizen who committed an"
+offence outside India which was not an offence according to the laws of that country
+would still be liable to be tried in India if it was an offence under the Indian law.41. An
+Indian citizen was murdered by another Indian citizen in a foreign country and the
+police refused to register an FIR on the ground that the offence was committed outside
+India. The Court held that the refusal was illegal and directed the police to register the
+crime and proceed with investigation in accordance with the law. The Court observed
+"that section 3 of the IPC, 1860 helps the authorities in India to proceed by treating the"
+offence as one committed within India. No doubt it is by a fiction that such an
+assumption is made. But such an assumption was necessary for practical purposes.42.
+In a series of cases43. it was also held that an offence committed outside India by a
+citizen of India can be investigated by the local police even without prior sanction of
+"the Central Government. Where both husband and wife are Indians residing at USA, a"
+complaint against the husband alleging cruelty is maintainable.44.
+"The operation of the section is restricted to the cases specified in the Extradition Act,"
+"1962 and the Cr PC, 1973, sections 188 and 189."
+"1. MC Verghese v Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] : (1969) 1 SCC 37 [LNIND"
+1968 SC 339] : 1970 Cr LJ 1651 .
+"2. Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC)."
+"36. Subs. by the A.O. 1937 for ""law passed by the Governor General of India in Council""."
+"37. The original words ""the limits of the said territories"" have successively been amended by"
+"the A.O. 1937, the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 3 April"
+"1951), to read as above."
+"38. The original words ""the said territories"" have successively been amended by the A.O. 1937,"
+"the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, (w.e.f. 3-4-951) to read as"
+above.
+"39. Sheikh Haidar v Syed Issa, (1939) Ngp 241."
+"40. Pirtai, (1873) 10 BHC (Cr C) 356."
+"41. Pheroze v State of Maharashtra, 1964 (2) Cr LJ 533 (Bom)."
+"42. Remia v Sub-Inspector of Police, Tanur, 1993 Cr LJ 1098 (Ker). The court referred to State of"
+"WB v Jugal Kishore, AIR 1969 SC 1171 [LNIND 1969 SC 8] : 1969 Cr LJ 1559 ."
+"43. Souda Beevi v Sub Inspector of Police, 2012 Cr LJ 58 (NOC) : 2011 (4) Ker LT 52 ;"
+"Muhammad Rafi v State of Kerala, 2010 Cr LJ 592 : 2009 (1) Ker LT 943 ; Vijaya Saradhi Vajja v"
+"Devi Sriroopa Madapati, 2007 Cr LJ 636 (AP); Samarudeen v Asst. Director of Enforcement, (1999"
+"(2) Ker LT 794 [FB]); S Clara v State of TN, 2008 Cr LJ 2477 (Mad)."
+"44. Harihar Narasimha Iyer v State of TN, 2013 Cr LJ 378 ; Rajesh Gupta v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ"
+3506 : 2011 (3) Crimes 236 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
+The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission presided over
+by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. The draft underwent further revision at the hands
+"of well-known jurists, like Sir Barnes Peacock, and was completed in 1850. The Indian"
+Penal Code was passed by the then Legislature on 6 October 1860 and was enacted as
+Act No. XLV of 1860.
+Preamble. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide a general
+Penal Code for India; It is enacted as follows:—
+"COMMENT.—The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) exhaustively codifies the law"
+relating to offences with which it deals and the rules of the common law cannot be
+resorted to for inventing exemptions which are not expressly enacted.1. It is not
+"necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the IPC, 1860 at the present day in"
+accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the
+Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed
+between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to
+"construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible,"
+unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the
+contrary.2.
+45.[s 4] Extension of Code to extraterritorial offences.
+The provisions of this Code apply also to any offence committed by—
+46.[(1) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India;
+(2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be;]
+47.[(3) any person in any place without and beyond India committing offence
+targeting a computer resource located in India.]
+48.[Explanation.—In this section—
+"(a) the word ""offence"" includes every act committed outside India which,"
+"if committed in India, would be punishable under this Code;"
+"(b) the expression ""computer resource"" shall have the meaning assigned"
+to it in clause ( k ) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information
+"Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000).]"
+49.[ILLUSTRATION]
+"50.[***] A, 51.[who is a 52.[citizen of India]], commits a murder in Uganda. He"
+can be tried and convicted of murder in any place in 53.[India] in which he
+may be found.
+54.[***]
+COMMENT—
+This section shows the extent to which the Code applies to offences committed
+outside India. The Code applies to any offence committed by—
+"(1) any citizen of India in any place, wherever he may be;"
+(2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be; and
+"(3) any person, whether or not a citizen of India, who commits any offence, from"
+"anywhere in the world, targeting a computer resource located in India."
+"Hence, except for the case of an offence committed against a computer resource"
+"located in India, to extend the scope of operation of IPC, 1860 against persons, either"
+the offender must be a citizen of India or he must have committed the offence on any
+ship or aircraft registered in India.
+[s 4.1] Crimes committed outside India.—
+Where an offence is committed beyond the limits of India but the offender is found
+"within its limits, then"
+(I) he may be given up for trial in the country where the offence was committed
+(extradition) or
+(II) he may be tried in India (extraterritorial jurisdiction).
+"Where an offence was committed by an Indian citizen outside India, it was held that the"
+"offence was punishable under the IPC, 1860. An investigation of such an offence would"
+"not require sanction of the Central Government under the proviso to section 188, Cr PC,"
+"1973. But an enquiry as contemplated by section 202, Cr PC, 1973 could only be with"
+the sanction of the Central Government.55.
+(I) Extradition.—Extradition is the surrender by one State to another of a person desired
+to be dealt with for crimes of which he has been accused or convicted and which are
+justiciable in the Courts of the other State. Surrender of a person within the State to
+another State—whether a citizen or an alien—is a political act done in pursuance of a
+treaty or an arrangement ad hoc.56. Though extradition is granted in implementation of
+"the international commitment of the State, the procedure to be followed by the Courts"
+"in deciding, whether extradition should be granted and on what terms, is determined by"
+the municipal law of the land. Extradition is founded on the broad principle that it is in
+the interest of civilised communities that criminals should not go unpunished and on
+"that account, it is recognised as a part of the comity of nations that one State should"
+ordinarily afford to another State assistance towards bringing offenders to justice.57.
+"The procedure for securing the extradition from India is laid down in the Extradition Act,"
+1962.
+(II) Extraterritorial jurisdiction.—Indian Courts are empowered to try offences
+"committed out of India on (A) land, (B) high seas or (C) aircraft."
+"(A) Land.—By virtue of sections 3 and 4 of the Penal Code, and section 188 of the Cr"
+"PC, 1973 local Courts can take cognizance of offences committed beyond the"
+territories of India. Where the Court is dealing with an act committed outside India by a
+citizen of India which would be an offence punishable under the Penal Code if it had
+"been committed in India, section 4 constitutes the act an offence and it can be dealt"
+"with under section 188 of the Cr PC, 1973.58. If, however, at the time of commission of"
+"the offence the accused person is not a citizen of India, the provisions of section 4 of"
+"the Penal Code and section 188 of the Cr PC, 1973 have no application.59."
+"Section 188 of the Cr PC, 1973, provides that when an offence is committed outside"
+India—
+"(a) by a citizen of India, whether on high seas or elsewhere; or"
+"(b) by any person not being such citizen on any ship or aircraft registered in India,"
+he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at
+any place within India at which he may be found.
+"The word 'found' in section 188, Cr PC, 1973 means not where a person is discovered"
+but where he is actually present.60. A man brought to a place against his will can be
+said to be found there.61. When a man is in the country and is charged before a
+"Magistrate with an offence under the Penal Code, it will not avail him to say that he was"
+brought there illegally from a foreign country. The Bombay High Court has laid down
+"this principle, following English precedents, in Savarkar's case.62. The accused Savarkar"
+had escaped at Mareseilles from the custody of police officers charged with the duty of
+"bringing him from London to Bombay, but was re-arrested there and brought to Bombay"
+and committed for trial by the Special Magistrate at Nasik. The High Court held that the
+"trial and committal were valid.63. The provisions of the IPC, 1860 have been extended"
+to offences committed by any citizen of India in any place within and beyond India by
+"virtue of section 4 thereof. Accordingly, offences committed in Botswana by an Indian"
+"citizen would also be amenable to the provisions of the IPC, 1860 subject to the"
+"limitation imposed under the proviso to section 188 Cr PC, 1973.64. Section 4 gives"
+extraterritorial jurisdiction but as the Explanation says the acts committed must
+amount to an offence under the Penal Code.65.
+[s 4.2] Acts done within Indian as well as foreign territory.—
+A person who is a citizen of India is liable to be tried by the Courts of this country for
+"acts done by him, partly within and partly without the Indian territories, provided the"
+acts amount together to an offence under the Code.66.
+(B) Admiralty jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction to try offences committed on the high seas
+is known as the admiralty jurisdiction. It is founded on the principle that a ship on the
+high seas is a floating island belonging to the nation whose flag she is flying.
+Admiralty jurisdiction extends over—
+(1) Offences committed on Indian ships on the high seas.
+(2) Offences committed on foreign ships in Indian territorial waters.
+(3) Piracy.
+Power to enforce claims against foreign ships is an essential attribute of admiralty
+jurisdiction and it is assumed over such ships while they are within the jurisdiction of
+the High Court by arresting and detaining them. Admiralty jurisdiction of the High
+"Courts in India has been historically traced to the Charters of 1774 and 1728, as"
+"subsequently expanded and clarified by the Letters Patent of 1823, 1862 and 1865 read"
+"with the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, and the"
+"Colonial Court of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 and preserved by section 106 of the"
+"Government of India Act, 1915, section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and"
+Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The pre-Constitution enactments have
+continued to remain in force in India as existing laws.67.
+The High Court as a Court of Admiralty is treated as a separate entity exercising a
+distinct and specific or prescribed or limited jurisdiction. This reasoning is based on the
+"assumption that the continuance in force of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890"
+as an existing law carves out a distinct jurisdiction of the High Court limited in ambit
+"and efficacy to what has been granted by the Admiralty Court Act 1861, and that"
+jurisdiction has remained stultified ever since. This restrictive construction is not
+"warranted by the provisions of the Constitution. Accordingly, a foreign ship falls within"
+"the jurisdiction of the High Court where the vessel happens to be at the relevant time,"
+"i.e., at the time when the jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, or, where the cause of"
+action wholly or in part arises. The Merchant Shipping Act empowers the concerned
+High Court to arrest a ship in respect of a substantive right. This jurisdiction can be
+"assumed by the concerned High Court, whether or not the defendant resides or carries"
+"on business, or the cause of action arose wholly or in part, within the local limits of its"
+jurisdiction. Once a foreign ship is arrested within the local limits of the jurisdiction of
+"the High Court, and the owner of the ship has entered appearance and furnished"
+"security to the satisfaction of the High Court for the release of the ship, the"
+proceedings continue as a personal action. The conclusion is that all the High Courts in
+India have inherent admiralty jurisdiction and can invoke the same for the enforcement
+of a maritime claim.68.
+Even while exercising extraordinary powers available under the Constitution the
+"jurisdiction of the High Court is primarily circumscribed by its territorial limits, viz., the"
+jurisdiction has to be in context of the territorial jurisdiction available to the High Court.
+"If the overall scheme of IPC, 1860 (section 4), Cr PC, 1973 (section 188), The Merchant"
+"Shipping Act, 1958 (section 437) and the Territorial Waters Act, 1976 (section 13) are"
+taken into consideration read with sections 2(2) and 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping
+"Act, it is apparent that for a Court, including High Court, to be vested with jurisdiction,"
+an offender or offending vessel have to be found within local territorial limits of such
+Court.69.
+[s 4.3] Piracy
+Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
+"(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for"
+"private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,"
+and directed:
+"(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or"
+property on board such ship or aircraft;
+"(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the"
+jurisdiction of any State;
+(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
+knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
+(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in
+subparagraph (a) or (b).70.
+The Convention on the Law of Sea known as United National Convention on the Law of
+"Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS) sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and"
+"armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities. UNCLOS, 1982 is a"
+comprehensive code on the international law of sea. It codifies and consolidates the
+"traditional law within a single, unificatory legal framework. It has changed the legal"
+concept of continental shelf and also introduced a new maritime zone known as
+exclusive economic zone. Exclusive economic zone is a new concept having several
+"new features.71. The UNCLOS signed by India in 1982 and ratified on 29 June 1995,"
+encapsulates the law of the sea and is supplemented by several subsequent
+resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations.
+"Before UNCLOS came into existence, the law relating to the seas which was in"
+"operation in India, was the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic"
+"Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, which spelt out the jurisdiction of the"
+"Central Government over the Territorial Waters, the Contiguous Zones and the"
+Exclusive Economic Zone. The provisions of the UNCLOS are in harmony with and not
+"in conflict with the provisions of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, in this regard. Article 33"
+of the Convention recognises and describes the Contiguous Zone of a nation to extend
+to 24 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
+"measured. Similarly, Articles 56 and 57 describe the rights, jurisdiction and duties of"
+the coastal State in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the breadth thereof extending to
+20 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
+measured. This provision is also in consonance with the provisions of the 1976 Act.
+"The area of difference between the provisions of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, and the"
+Convention occurs in Article 97 of the Convention which relates to the penal
+jurisdiction in matters of collision or any other incident of navigation.72.
+[s 4.4] Jurisdiction of Indian High Courts.—
+In view of the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court in M V Elisabeth v Harwan
+"Investment and Trading,73. the High Courts in India have inherent admiralty jurisdiction."
+The offences which come within the admiralty jurisdiction are now defined by the
+"Merchant Shipping Act, 1958."
+(C) Aircraft.—The provisions of the Code are made applicable to any offence
+"committed by any person on any aircraft registered in India, wherever it may be."
+[s 4.5] Liability of foreigners in India for offences committed outside its limits.
+—
+The acts of a foreigner committed by him in territory beyond the limits of India do not
+"constitute an offence against the Penal Code, and, consequently, a foreigner cannot be"
+held criminally responsible under that Code by the tribunals of India for acts committed
+"by him beyond its territorial limits. Thus, when it is sought to punish a person, who is"
+"not an Indian subject, as an offender in respect of a certain act, the question is not"
+"'where was the act committed,' but 'was that person at the time, when the act was"
+"done, within the territory of India'. For, if he was not, the act is not an offence, the doer"
+"of it is not liable to be punished as an offender, and he is, therefore, not subject to the"
+jurisdiction of criminal Courts.74. But if a foreigner in a foreign territory initiates an
+"offence which is completed within Indian territory, he is, if found within Indian territory,"
+liable to be tried by the Indian Court within whose jurisdiction the offence was
+completed.75.
+[s 4.6] Section 4 IPC and section 188 of Cr PC.—
+"Section 188 Cr PC, 1973 and section 4 of the IPC, 1860 spell out that if the person"
+"committing the offence at that point of time is a citizen of India, then, even if the"
+"offence is committed beyond the contours of India, he will be subject to the jurisdiction"
+of the Courts in India. The rule enunciated under the two sections rests on the principle
+that qua citizens the jurisdiction of Courts is not lost by reason of the venue of the
+"offence. However, section 188 of the Code places an interdiction in the enquiry or trial"
+over offences committed outside India by a citizen of India insisting for sanction from
+the Central Government to do so.76.
+"1. MC Verghese v Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] : (1969) 1 SCC 37 [LNIND"
+1968 SC 339] : 1970 Cr LJ 1651 .
+"2. Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC)."
+"45. Subs. by Act 4 of 1898, section 2, for section 4."
+"46. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for clauses (1) to (4)."
+"47. Ins. by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (10 of 2009), section 51(a)(i)"
+(w.e.f. 27-10- 2009).
+"48. Subs. by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (10 of 2009), section 51(a)(ii),"
+"for Explanation (w.e.f. 27-10-2009). Explanation, before substitution, stood as under:"
+"""Explanation.—In this section the word ""offence"" includes every act committed outside India"
+"which, if committed in India, would be punishable under this Code."""
+"49. Subs. by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch II, for ""Illustrations"" (w.e.f. 17-9-1957)."
+"50. The brackets and letter ""(a)"" omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch II (w.e.f. 17-9-"
+1957).
+"51. Subs. by the A.O. 1948, for ""a coolie, who is a Native Indian subject""."
+"52. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""a British subject of Indian domicile""."
+"53. The words ""British India"" have been successively amended by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"54. Illustrations (b), (c) and (d) omitted by the A.O. 1950."
+"55. Muhammad Rafi v State of Kerala, 2010 Cr LJ 592 Ker DB."
+"56. State of WB v Jugal Kishore More, (1969) 3 SCR 320 [LNIND 1969 SC 8] : 1969 Cr LJ 1559 :"
+AIR 1969 SC 1171 [LNIND 1969 SC 8] .
+"57. Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari v State of Maharashtra, JT 2010 (10) SC 202 [LNIND 2010"
+SC 858] : 2010 (9) Scale 460 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 125 : (2011) 11 SCC 214 [LNIND 2010 SC 858] .
+"58. Ajay Aggarwal v UOI, 1993 (3) SCC 609 [LNIND 1993 SC 431] : AIR 1993 SC 1637 [LNIND"
+1993 SC 431] : 1993 Cr LJ 2516 .
+"59. Central Bank of India Ltd v Ram Narain, (1955) 1 SCR 697 [LNIND 1954 SC 126] : 1955 Cr LJ"
+152 : AIR 1955 SC 36 [LNIND 1954 SC 126] .
+"60. Maganlal v State, (1882) 6 Bom 622."
+"61. Lopez and Sattler, (1858) 27 LJ (MC) 48."
+"62. Vinayak D Savarkar, (1910) 13 Bom LR 296 , 35 Bom 225."
+"63. Supra. Also see Om Hemrajani v State of UP, (2005) 1 SCC 617 [LNIND 2004 SC 1181] : AIR"
+2005 SC 392 [LNIND 2004 SC 1181] .
+"64. Thota Venkateswarlu v State of AP, AIR 2011 SC 2900 [LNIND 2011 SC 850] : (2011) 9 SCC"
+527 [LNIND 2011 SC 850] : 2011 Cr LJ 4925 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 772.
+"65. Rambharthi, (1923) 25 Bom LR 772 [LNIND 1923 BOM 115] : 47 Bom 907; Sheikh Haidar v"
+"Syed Issa, (1939) Nag 241."
+"66. Moulivie Ahmudoollah, (1865) 2 WR (Cr) 60."
+"67. See Kamalakar Mahadev Bhagat v Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd, AIR 1961 Bom 186"
+"[LNIND 1960 BOM 71] : (1960) 62 Bom LR 995 ; Sahida Ismail v Petko R Salvejkov, AIR 1973 Bom"
+"18 [LNIND 1971 BOM 74] : (1972) 74 Bom LR 514 ; Jayaswal Shipping Co v SS Leelavati, AIR"
+"1954 Cal 415 [LNIND 1953 CAL 202] ; Reena Padhi v 'Jagdhir', AIR 1982 Ori 57 [LNIND 1981 ORI"
+93] .
+"68. M V Elisabeth v Harwan Investment and Trading, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 : AIR 1993 SC 1014"
+"[LNIND 1992 SC 194] ; MV Al Quamar v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd, AIR 2000 SC 2826"
+[LNIND 2000 SC 1119] : (2000) 8 SCC 278 [LNIND 2000 SC 1119] : 2000 (5) Scale 618 [LNIND
+"2000 SC 1119] ; MV Free Neptune v DLF Southern Towns Private, 2011 (1) Ker LT 904 : 2011 (1)"
+KHC 628 .
+"69. MG Forests Pte Ltd v ""MV Project Workship"", Gujarat High Court Judgement dated 24"
+February 2004.
+"70. Article 100. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982."
+"71. Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd v UOI, JT 2008 (5) SC 256 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] : 2008 (6)"
+Scale 128 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] : (2008) 11 SCC 439 [LNIND 2008 SC 897] .
+"72. Republic of Italy through Ambassador v UOI, (2013) 4 SCC 721 : 2013 (1) Scale 462"
+[LNINDORD 2013 SC 9114] .
+"73. M V Elisabeth v Harwan Investment and Trading, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 : AIR 1993 SC 1014"
+[LNIND 1992 SC 194] .
+"74. Musst. Kishen Kour, (1878) PR No. 20 of 1878; Jameson, (1896) 2 QB 425 ."
+"75. Chhotalal, (1912) 14 Bom LR 147 [LNIND 1912 BOM 26] ."
+"76. P T Abdul Rahiman v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 893 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
+The Indian Penal Code was drafted by the First Indian Law Commission presided over
+by Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay. The draft underwent further revision at the hands
+"of well-known jurists, like Sir Barnes Peacock, and was completed in 1850. The Indian"
+Penal Code was passed by the then Legislature on 6 October 1860 and was enacted as
+Act No. XLV of 1860.
+Preamble. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide a general
+Penal Code for India; It is enacted as follows:—
+"COMMENT.—The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) exhaustively codifies the law"
+relating to offences with which it deals and the rules of the common law cannot be
+resorted to for inventing exemptions which are not expressly enacted.1. It is not
+"necessary and indeed not permissible to construe the IPC, 1860 at the present day in"
+accordance with the notions of criminal jurisdiction prevailing at the time when the
+Code was enacted. The notions relating to this matter have very considerably changed
+between then and now during nearly a century that has elapsed. It is legitimate to
+"construe the Code with reference to the modern needs, wherever this is permissible,"
+unless there is anything in the Code or in any particular section to indicate the
+contrary.2.
+77.[[s 5] Certain laws not to be affected by this Act.
+Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and
+"desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen in the service of the Government of"
+India or the provisions of any special or local law 1 .]
+COMMENT—
+This section is a saving clause to section 2. Though the Code was intended to be a
+"general one, it was not thought desirable to make it exhaustive, and hence, offences"
+"defined by local and special laws were left out of the Code, and merely declared to be"
+"punishable as theretofore.78. Thus, the personnel of the Army, Navy and Airforce are"
+"governed by the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, The Navy Act, 1957, and The Indian"
+"Air Force Act, 1950 in regard to offences of mutiny and desertion committed by"
+them.79.
+1. 'Special or local law'.—A special law is a law relating to a particular subject;80.
+whereas a local law is a law which applies only to a particular part of the country.81.
+The distinction between a statute creating a new offence with a particular penalty and
+a statute enlarging the ambit of an existing offence by including new acts within it with
+a particular penalty is well settled. In the former case the new offence is punishable by
+the new penalty only; in the latter it is punishable also by all such penalties as were
+applicable before the Act to the offence in which it is included. The Principle is that
+where a new offence is created and the particular manner in which proceedings should
+"be taken is laid down, then proceedings cannot be taken in any other way.82. However,"
+a person cannot be punished under both the Penal Code and a special law for the same
+"offence,83. and ordinarily the sentence should be under the special Act.84. This is,"
+"however, confined to cases where the offences are coincident or practically so.85."
+The Supreme Court issued specific guidelines regarding the interpretation of general law
+and special law. See the Box below for these Guidelines.
+Supreme Court Guidelines on Interpretation of General law and Special law
+(i) When a provision of law regulates a particular subject and a subsequent law
+"contains a provision regulating the same subject, there is no presumption that"
+the later law repeals the earlier law. The rule-making authority while making the
+later rule is deemed to know the existing law on the subject. If the subsequent
+"law does not repeal the earlier rule, there can be no presumption of an intention"
+to repeal the earlier rule;
+(ii) When two provisions of law — one being a general law and the other being
+"special law govern a matter, the court should endeavour to apply a harmonious"
+construction to the said provisions. But where the intention of the rule-making
+"authority is made clear either expressly or impliedly, as to which law should"
+"prevail, the same shall be given effect."
+(iii) If the repugnancy or inconsistency subsists in spite of an effort to read them
+"harmoniously, the prior special law is not presumed to be repealed by the later"
+general law. The prior special law will continue to apply and prevail in spite of
+the subsequent general law. But where a clear intention to make a rule of
+universal application by superseding the earlier special law is evident from the
+"later general law, then the later general law, will prevail over the prior special law."
+(iv) Where a later special law is repugnant to or inconsistent with an earlier general
+"law, the later special law will prevail over the earlier general law."
+[Maya Mathew v State of Kerala86. and P Raghava Kurup v V Ananthakumari87..]
+[s 5.1] Contempt of Court
+"Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act 70 of 1971) makes it clear that, Contempt of Court"
+means 'Civil contempt' or 'Criminal contempt'.88. 'Civil contempt' means wilful
+"disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court"
+"or wilful breach of an Undertaking given to a Court.89. ""Criminal contempt"" means the"
+"publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible"
+"representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever"
+which – (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority
+"of any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of"
+"any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends"
+"to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner.90. The provisions of this"
+"Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law"
+relating to contempt of Courts.91. Contempt proceeding is sui generis (of its own kind
+or class or unique). It has peculiar features which are not found in criminal
+proceedings. The respondent does not stand in the position of a person accused of an
+offence. Initiation of contempt proceedings against the respondent who is already
+"accused in a criminal proceedings, does not amount to double jeopardy.92. Mens rea is"
+not necessary for committing contempt of Court. The main ingredient of the offence of
+contempt of Court is the result of one's contumacious act of offending the prestige and
+dignity of the judiciary so as to lower it in the estimation of the general public. Whether
+the contemnor intended it or not is of no consequence.93.
+[s 5.2] Contempt of Supreme Court and High Courts
+"Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court,"
+"respectively, as a Court of Record which includes the power to punish the contempt of"
+itself. There are no curbs on the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of
+"itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.94. For the judiciary"
+to carry out its obligations effectively and true to the spirit with which it is sacredly
+"entrusted the task, constitutional Courts have been given the power to punish for"
+"contempt, but greater the power; higher the responsibility.95."
+[s 5.3] Contempt of Subordinate Courts
+"Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in"
+"accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of Courts"
+subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of itself provided that
+no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in
+respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable
+"under the IPC, 1860 [section 10 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971]. The procedure"
+"prescribed either under the Cr PC, 1973 or under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not"
+attracted to the proceedings initiated under section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
+The High Court can deal with such matters summarily and adopt its own procedure.
+The only caution that has to be observed by the Court in exercising this inherent power
+of summary procedure is that the procedure followed must be fair and the contemnors
+are made aware of the charges levelled against them and given a fair and reasonable
+opportunity.96.
+[s 5.4] Section 228 IPC vis-a-vis Contempt of Courts Act
+"What is made publishable under section 228 IPC, 186097. is the offence of intentional"
+insult to a Judge or interruption of Court proceedings but not as a contempt of Court.
+The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person
+which would either scandalise the Court or tend to interfere with the administration of
+justice. It would also include any act which lowers the authority of the Court or
+prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings. It is not limited
+to the offering of intentional insult to the Judge or interruption of the judicial
+proceedings.98.
+"1. MC Verghese v Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] : (1969) 1 SCC 37 [LNIND"
+1968 SC 339] : 1970 Cr LJ 1651 .
+"2. Mobarik Ali v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 (SC)."
+"77. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for section 5."
+"78. Ramachandrappa, (1883) 6 Mad 249; Motilal Shah, (1930) 32 Bom LR 1502 : 55 Bom 89."
+"79. UOI v Anand Singh Bisht, AIR 1997 SC 361 [LNIND 1996 SC 1341] : (1996) 10 SCC 153"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 1341] : 1996 Cr LJ 4435 : (1996) 1 SCC (Cr) 1198.
+"80. Section 41 IPC, 1860."
+"81. Section 42 IPC, 1860."
+"82. Bhalchandra Ranadive, (1929) 31 Bom LR 1151 , 1178 : 54 Bom 35."
+"83. Hussun Ali, (1873) 5 NWP 49."
+"84. Kuloda Prosad Majumdar, (1906) 11 Cal WN 100; Bhogilal, (1931) 33 Bom LR 648 ."
+"85. Joti Prasad Gupta, (1931) 53 All 642 , 649; Suchit Raut v State, (1929) 9 Pat 126."
+"86. Maya Mathew v State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 498 [LNIND 2010 SC 190] : (2010) 3 SCR 16"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 190] : AIR 2010 SC 1932 [LNIND 2010 SC 190] : 2010 (2) Scale 833 [LNIND
+2010 SC 190] .
+"87. P Raghava Kurup v V Ananthakumari, (2007) 9 SCC 179 [LNIND 2007 SC 215] : 2007 (2) SCR"
+1058 [LNIND 2007 SC 215] : (2007) 3 Scale 431 [LNIND 2007 SC 215] .
+88. Section 2(a).
+89. Section 2(b).
+90. Section 2(c).
+91. Section 22.
+"92. Delhi Judicial Service, Association, Tis Hazari Court v State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 2176"
+[LNIND 1991 SC 446] : 1991 (4) SCC 406 [LNIND 1991 SC 446] .
+"93. VG Ramachandran, Contempt of Court, 6th Edn, p 319 quoted in Re MV Jayarajan, 2012 (1)"
+Ker LT SN 23 : 2011 (4) KHC 585 .
+"94. V G Peterson v O V Forbes, AIR 1963 SC 692 [LNIND 1962 SC 298] : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 40 :"
+1963 (1) Cr LJ 633 .
+"95. HG Rangangoud v State Trading Corp of India, AIR 2012 SC 490 : 2012 (1) SCC 297 ."
+"96. Daroga Singh v BK Pandey, AIR 2004 SC 2579 [LNIND 2004 SC 485] : (2004) 5 SCC 26"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 485] : 2004 Cr LJ 2084 .
+97. [s 228] - Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.—
+"Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while"
+"such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one"
+"thousand rupees, or with both."
+"98. Daroga Singh v BK Pandey, AIR 2004 SC 2579 [LNIND 2004 SC 485] : (2004) 5 SCC 26"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 485] : 2004 Cr LJ 2084 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 6] Definitions in the Code to be understood subject to exceptions.
+"Throughout this Code every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and every"
+"illustration of every such definition or penal provision, shall be understood subject to"
+"the exceptions contained in the Chapter entitled ""General Exceptions"", though those"
+"exceptions are not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or illustration."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"(a) The sections, in this Code, which contain definitions of offences, do not express"
+"that a child under seven years of age cannot commit such offences, but the"
+definitions are to be understood subject to the general exception which provides
+that nothing shall be an offence which is done by a child under seven years of
+age.
+"(b) A, a police-officer, without warrant, apprehends Z, who has committed murder."
+Here A is not guilty of the offence of wrongful confinement; for he was bound by
+law to apprehend Z and therefore the case falls within the general exception
+"which provides that ""nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is"
+"bound by law to do it""."
+COMMENT—
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of the definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lies on the"
+accused.1.
+Section 6 is a convenient formula to avoid reproduction of lengthy exceptions in the
+"description of offences. In other words, all the offences must be read subject to"
+"Chapter IV relating to General Exceptions (sections. 76–106 IPC, 1860). So when an act"
+"falls within any one of these exceptions by virtue of section 6 of the Code, the accused"
+has to be given benefit of the appropriate General Exception even though it is not
+specifically stated over again in the description of the offence committed.2. Section 6
+of the Indian Penal Code imposes an obligation on the court to consider the case of
+exceptions on its own so far as it relates to the burden of proving legal insanity under
+section 106 of the Act. If the case of the accused comes within the purview of section
+"84 IPC, 1860, which is one of the provisions in Chapter IV of the General Exceptions of"
+"the Indian Penal Code, the court is to give due consideration and find out as to whether"
+at the time of the occurrence the accused had any mental disability so as not to know
+what he was doing.3.
+The provisions of section 6 should be read as a proviso to section 105 of the Evidence
+"Act 1872.4. When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the"
+existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in
+"the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.5."
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+(2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. Abdul Latif v State of Assam, 1981 Cr LJ 1205 (Gau); see also Patras Mardi v State, 1982 Cr"
+LJ NOC 7 (Gau).
+"3. Khageswar Pujari v State of Orissa, 1984 Cr LJ 1108 (Orissa), see also Smt. Sandhya Rani"
+"Bardhan v State, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 245 (Gau). Subodh Tewari v State of Assam, 988 Cr LJ 223"
+(Assam).
+"4. Khuraijam Somat Singh v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1461 (Gau)."
+5. Section 105 Evidence Act.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 7] Sense of expression once explained.
+Every expression which is explained in any part of this Code is used in every part of
+this Code in conformity with the explanation.
+COMMENT—
+"Section 7 of IPC, 1860 provides that 'every expression' which is explained in any part of"
+"the Code, is used in every part of the Code in conformity with the explanation. Let it be"
+"noted that unlike the modern statute, section 7 does not provide 'unless the context"
+otherwise indicate' a phrase that prefaces the dictionary clauses of a modern statute.
+"Therefore, the expression 'Government' in section 21(12)(a) must mean either the"
+Central Government or the Government of a State.6.
+"6. RS Nayak v AR Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 [LNIND 1984 SC 43] : AIR 1984 SC 684 [LNIND"
+1984 SC 43] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 8] Gender.
+"The pronoun ""he"" and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male or female."
+COMMENT—
+Section 8 of the Indian Penal Code lays down that the pronoun 'he' and its derivatives
+"are used for any person whether male or female. Thus, in view of section 8, IPC, 1860"
+"read with section 2(y), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973) the pronoun 'his'"
+"in clause (d) of section 125(1), Cr PC, 1973 also indicates a female.7."
+"7. Vijaya (Dr.) v Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, 1987 Cr LJ 977 : AIR 1987 SC 1100 [LNIND 1987 SC"
+"200] ; M Areefa Beevi v Dr. K M Sahib, 1983 Cr LJ 412 (Ker) : See also Girdhar Gopal v State, 1953"
+"Cr LJ 964 (MB) (Section 354 IPC, 1860)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 9] Number.
+"Unless the contrary appears from the context, words importing the singular number"
+"include the plural number, and words importing the plural number include the singular"
+number.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 10] ""Man"" ""Woman""."
+"The word ""man"" denotes a male human being of any age; the word ""woman"" denotes a"
+female human being of any age.
+COMMENT—
+"A female child of seven and a half months was held to be a ""woman"" for the purpose of"
+"section 354 IPC, 1860.8."
+"8. State of Punjab v Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63 [LNIND 1966 SC 130] : 1967 Cr LJ 1 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 11] ""Person""."
+"The word ""person"" includes any Company or Association or body of persons, whether"
+incorporated or not.
+COMMENT—
+"The term 'person' has been defined in section 11, IPC, 1860, and the same is in pari"
+"materia with section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act 1897. Obviously, the definition is"
+"inclusive.9. A natural person, an incorporated person or even an unincorporated"
+association or body of persons like a partnership can be a person under section 11 of
+"IPC, 1860.10. The Supreme Court has held in Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of"
+"Enforcement,11. that, as regards corporate criminal liability, there is no doubt that a"
+"corporation or company could be prosecuted for any offence punishable under law,"
+whether it is coming under the strict liability or under absolute liability. A juristic person
+"has been held to come within the meaning of the word ""person"" for the purposes of"
+section 415 (cheating).12.
+"The State and its instrumentalities are juristic persons,13. but by implication, the State"
+stands excluded from the purview of the word 'person' for the purpose of limiting its
+"right to avail the revisional power of the High Court under section 397(1) of Cr PC, 1973"
+"for the reason that the State, being the prosecutor of the offender, is enjoined to"
+conduct prosecution on behalf of the society and to take such remedial steps as to
+deems proper.14. Chief Educational Officer is an artificial person/ juristic person falling
+"under section 11 of IPC, 1860.15."
+[s 11.1] Accused person.—
+"Though the word ""person"" is defined in the Indian Penal Code section 11 and the"
+General Clauses Act section 3(42) which are identical and are not exhaustive but an
+"inclusive one. The words ""accused"" or ""accused person"" or ""accused of an offence"" are"
+not defined either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Indian Evidence Act or in the
+General Clauses Act 1897.16.
+[s 11.2] Complainant.—
+A complaint can be filed in the name of a juristic person because it is also a person in
+the eye of law. It is clear that complainant must be a corporeal person who is capable
+of making a physical presence in the court. Its corollary is that even if the complaint is
+made in the name of incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary
+that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and it is that natural
+"person who is looked upon, for all practical purposes, to be the complainant in the"
+"case. In other words, when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure"
+"complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complainant"
+to represent the former in court proceedings.17. A company is a person in law and not
+in fact. A person in law is always required to be represented by a person in fact. A
+"company can file a complaint for Defamation (section 500 IPC, 1860) through its"
+authorised representative.18.
+"9. Chief Education Officer, Salem v K S Palanichamy, 2012 Cr LJ 2543 (Mad)."
+"10. B Raman v M/S. Shasun Chemicals and Drugs Ltd, 2006 Cr LJ 4552 (Mad); Target Overseas"
+"Exports Pvt Ltd v A M Iqbal, 2005 Cr LJ 1931 (Ker)."
+"11. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2005 SC 2622 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+476] .
+"12. Reji Michael v Vertex Securities Ltd, 1999 Cr LJ 3787 (Ker)."
+"13. Common Cause, A Registered Society v UOI, (1999) 6 SCC 667 [LNIND 1999 SC 637] : AIR"
+1999 SC 2979 [LNIND 1999 SC 637] .
+"14. Krishnan v Krishnaveni, AIR 1997 SC 987 [LNIND 1997 SC 1883] : 1997 Cr LJ 1519 : (1997) 4"
+SCC 241 [LNIND 1997 SC 1883] .
+"15. Chief Education Officer, Salem v K S Palanichamy, 2012 Cr LJ 2543 (Mad)."
+"16. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, AIR 1994 SC 1775 [LNIND 1993 SC 656] :"
+(1994) 3 SCC 440 : 1994 Cr LJ 2269 .
+"17. Associated Cement Co Ltd v Keshvanand, AIR 1998 SC 596 [LNIND 1997 SC 1634] : (1998) 1"
+SCC 687 [LNIND 1997 SC 1634] : 1998 Cr LJ 856 .
+"18. CM Ibrahim v Tata Sons Ltd, 2009 Cr LJ 228 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 12] ""Public.""."
+"The word ""public"" includes any class of the public, or any community."
+COMMENT—
+This definition is inclusive and does not define the word 'public'. It only says that any
+class of public or any community is included within the term 'public'. A body or class of
+persons living in a particular locality may come within the term 'public'.19.
+"19. Harnandan Lal v Rampalak Mahto, (1938) 18 Pat 76."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 13] [Repealed]
+"[Definition of ""Queen"".] [Rep. by the A.O. 1950.]"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"20.[[s 14] ""Servant of Government""."
+"The words ""servant of Government"" denote any officer or servant continued, appointed"
+or employed in India by or under the authority of Government.]
+"20. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for section 14."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"20.[[s 14] ""Servant of Government""."
+"The words ""servant of Government"" denote any officer or servant continued, appointed"
+or employed in India by or under the authority of Government.]
+"20. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for section 14."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 15] [Repealed]
+"[Definition of ""British India"".] [Rep. by the A.O. 1937.]"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 16] [Repealed]
+"[Definition of ""Government of India"".] [Rep. by the A.O. 1937.]"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"21.[s 17] ""Government"""
+"The word ""Government"" denotes the Central Government or the Government of a 22."
+[***] State.]
+COMMENT—
+Legislature of a State cannot be comprehended in the expression 'State
+Government'.23.
+"21. Subs. by A.O. 1950, for section 17."
+"22. The word and letter ""Part A"" omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"23. RS Nayak v AR Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 [LNIND 1984 SC 43] : AIR 1984 SC 684 [LNIND"
+1984 SC 43] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"21.[s 17] ""Government"""
+"The word ""Government"" denotes the Central Government or the Government of a 22."
+[***] State.]
+COMMENT—
+Legislature of a State cannot be comprehended in the expression 'State
+Government'.23.
+"21. Subs. by A.O. 1950, for section 17."
+"22. The word and letter ""Part A"" omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"23. RS Nayak v AR Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 [LNIND 1984 SC 43] : AIR 1984 SC 684 [LNIND"
+1984 SC 43] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"24.[[s 18] ""India."""
+"""India"" means the territory of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir.]"
+COMMENT—
+This exclusion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in this section is not violative of
+"Article 1 and the First Schedule of the Constitution of India.25. In fact, Fazal Ali, CJ, as"
+"he then was, held that exclusion of a territory postulates the existence of a territory"
+itself; State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be taken as a foreign territory.26. Since the
+First Schedule to the Constitution of India specifically includes Jammu and Kashmir as
+"a part of the territories of India, the exclusion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir from"
+section 18 of the Penal Code only means that for the purposes of application of the
+"provisions of the Indian Penal Code, that State shall not be considered as a part of"
+"India. In fact, section 1 of the Code itself makes this position abundantly clear. The"
+State of Jammu and Kashmir has a separate Penal Code of its own. It is known as the
+"Ranbir Penal Code, which is almost same as the Indian Penal Code."
+"24. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, for section 18 (w.e.f. 1-4-1951). Earlier section 18"
+was repealed by the A.O. 1937 and was again inserted by the A.O. 1950.
+"25. KRK Vara Prasad v UOI, AIR 1980 AP 243 [LNIND 1980 AP 27] ."
+"26. Virender Singh v General Officer Commanding, 1974 J & K LR 101 (FB)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"24.[[s 18] ""India."""
+"""India"" means the territory of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir.]"
+COMMENT—
+This exclusion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in this section is not violative of
+"Article 1 and the First Schedule of the Constitution of India.25. In fact, Fazal Ali, CJ, as"
+"he then was, held that exclusion of a territory postulates the existence of a territory"
+itself; State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be taken as a foreign territory.26. Since the
+First Schedule to the Constitution of India specifically includes Jammu and Kashmir as
+"a part of the territories of India, the exclusion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir from"
+section 18 of the Penal Code only means that for the purposes of application of the
+"provisions of the Indian Penal Code, that State shall not be considered as a part of"
+"India. In fact, section 1 of the Code itself makes this position abundantly clear. The"
+State of Jammu and Kashmir has a separate Penal Code of its own. It is known as the
+"Ranbir Penal Code, which is almost same as the Indian Penal Code."
+"24. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, for section 18 (w.e.f. 1-4-1951). Earlier section 18"
+was repealed by the A.O. 1937 and was again inserted by the A.O. 1950.
+"25. KRK Vara Prasad v UOI, AIR 1980 AP 243 [LNIND 1980 AP 27] ."
+"26. Virender Singh v General Officer Commanding, 1974 J & K LR 101 (FB)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[[s 19] ""Judge."""
+"[s 19] The word ""Judge"" denotes not only every person who is officially designated as"
+"a Judge, but also every person,—"
+"who is empowered by law to give, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive"
+"judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a"
+"judgment which, if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive, or"
+"who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons is empowered by law to give"
+such a judgment.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A Collector exercising jurisdiction in a suit under Act 10 of 1859, is a Judge."
+(b) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has
+"power to sentence to fine or imprisonment, with or without appeal, is a Judge."
+"(c) A member of a panchayat which has power, under 27.Regulation VII, 1816, of the"
+"Madras Code, to try and determine suits, is a Judge."
+(d) A Magistrate exercising jurisdiction in respect of a charge on which he has
+"power only to commit for trial to another Court, is not a Judge."
+COMMENT—
+"Section 19 IPC, 1860 defines a 'Judge' as denoting not only every person who is"
+"officially designated as a Judge, but also every person who is empowered by law to"
+"give in any legal proceedings, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment"
+"which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment which, if confirmed by"
+"some other authority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons"
+empowered by law to give such a judgment. The Collector is neither a Judge as defined
+"under section 19 nor does he act judicially, when discharging any of the functions"
+under the Land Acquisition Act.28. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner while
+passing an order under section 7-A of Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
+"Provisions Act 1952 was 'Judge' within definition under section 19 of IPC, 1860.29. The"
+right to pronounce a definitive judgment is considered the sine qua non of a Court.30.
+"Illustration (d) is very important as it indicates that a Magistrate, who has power to try"
+"and determine cases, is a Court of Justice, but is not a Court of Justice when sitting in"
+committal proceedings.
+"27. Rep. by the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 (3 of 1873)."
+"28. Surendra Kumar Bhatia v Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 2009 SC 1961 [LNIND 2009 SC 209] : (2009)12"
+SCC 184 [LNIND 2009 SC 209] .
+"29. E S Sanjeeva Rao v CBI, Mumbai, 2012 Cr LJ 4053 (Bom) : 2013 (1) RCR (Criminal) 284."
+"30. Brajnandan Sinha v Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 [LNIND 1955 SC 98] : 1956 SCJ 155 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 20] ""Court of Justice.""."
+"The words ""Court of Justice"" denote a Judge who is empowered by law to act"
+"judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to act judicially as a"
+"body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A panchayat acting under 31.Regulation VII, 1816, of the Madras Code, having power to"
+"try and determine suits, is a Court of Justice."
+COMMENT—
+The word 'court' is a generic term and embraces a Judge but the vice versa is not true.
+"Therefore, the words 'court' and 'Judge' are frequently used interchangeably because a"
+Judge is an essential constituent of a court since there can be no dispensation of
+justice without a Judge. But that is not to say that when a Judge demits office the court
+ceases to exist Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v UOI.32.
+"31. Rep. by the Madras Civil Courts Act, 1873 (3 of 1873)."
+"32. Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee v UOI, (1994) 6 SCC 731 [LNIND 1994 SC 955] : JT 1994"
+(6) SC 544 [LNIND 1989 SC 165] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 21] ""Public servant.""."
+"The words ""public servant"" denote a person falling under any of the descriptions"
+hereinafter following; namely:—
+33. [***]
+"34.Second.—Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, 35.[Naval or Air] Forces 36.[37."
+[***] of India];
+"38. [Third.—Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge,"
+"whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory"
+functions;]
+"Fourth.—Every officer of a Court of Justice 39.[(including a liquidator, receiver or"
+"commissioner)] whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter"
+"of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or"
+"dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath,"
+"or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court, and every person specially authorized"
+by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties;
+"Fifth.—Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of"
+Justice or public servant;
+Sixth.—Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been
+"referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent"
+public authority;
+Seventh.—Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to
+place or keep any person in confinement;
+"Eighth.—Every officer of 40.[the Government] whose duty it is, as such officer, to"
+"prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to"
+"protect the public health, safety or convenience;"
+"Ninth.—Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend"
+"any property on behalf of 41.[the Government], or to make any survey, assessment or"
+"contract on behalf of 42.[the Government], or to execute any revenue process, or to"
+"investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of 43.[the"
+"Government], or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary"
+"interests of 44.[the Government], or to prevent the infraction of any law for the"
+protection of the pecuniary interests of 45.[the Government]46.[***];
+"Tenth.—Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend"
+"any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any"
+"secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or"
+"keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town"
+or district;
+47. [Eleventh.—Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered
+"to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or"
+part of an election;]
+48. [Twelfth.—Every person—
+(a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission
+for the performance of any public duty by the Government;
+"(b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under"
+"a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in"
+"section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956).]"
+ILLUSTRATION
+A Municipal Commissioner is a public servant.
+Explanation 1.—Persons falling under any of the above descriptions are public
+"servants, whether appointed by the Government or not."
+"Explanation 2.—Wherever the words ""public servant"" occur, they shall be"
+understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a
+"public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that"
+situation.
+"49.[Explanation 3.—The word ""election"" denotes an election for the purpose of"
+"selecting members of any legislative, municipal or other public authority, of"
+"whatever character, the method of selection to which is by, or under, any law"
+prescribed as by election.]
+50.[***]
+STATE AMENDMENT
+"Rajasthan.—In section 21, after clause twelfth, add the following clause, namely:"
+"— ""Thirteenth.—Every person employed or engaged by any public body in the"
+conduct and supervision of any examination recognised or approved under any
+law.
+Explanation.—The The expression 'Public Body' includes—
+"(a) a University, Board of Education or other body, either established by or"
+under a Central or State Act or under the provisions of the Constitution of
+India or constituted by the Government; and
+"(b) a local authority."""
+"[Vide Rajasthan Act, 4 of 1993, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 11-2-1993)]."
+COMMENT—
+Public Servant.—A line is drawn between the great mass of the community and certain
+"classes of persons in the service and pay of Government, or exercising various public"
+"functions, who are here included in the words ""public servant."" There are several"
+"offences which can only be committed by public servants and, on the other hand,"
+public servants in the discharge of their duties have many privileges peculiar to
+themselves.51.
+The test to determine whether a person is a public servant is (1) whether he is in the
+service or pay of the Government and (2) whether he is entrusted with the performance
+of any public duty.52. The definition is not exhaustive. A person may be a public servant
+in terms of another statute.53.
+Illustration.—The illustration at the end of the section relates to clause (10). The word
+"""Commissioner"" is used in the sense of a Municipal Councillor or member and not"
+"merely an officer designated as ""Commissioner.""54."
+"The definition of the term ""public servant"" cannot be extended to the provisions of the"
+Representation of the People Act where this Act makes reference to persons in the
+service of the Government.55.
+[s 21.1] Enlargement of concept under Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.—
+Section 2(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 has enlarged the concept of
+"public servant wider than that contained in section 21 IPC, 1860. A comparison of the"
+"definition of 'public servant' contained in section 21 of IPC, 1860 and that contained in"
+"section 2(c) of the 1988 Act would show that section 21 of IPC, 1860 did not include"
+"persons falling under sub-clause (ix), (x), (xi) and (xii) of section 2(c). Sub-clause (viii)"
+"of section 2(c) is also wider in amplitude than clause (12)(a) of section 21 of IPC,"
+1860.56. Definition of 'public servant' is of no relevance under the PC Act 1988.57.
+[s 21.2] Definition not exhaustive.—
+The definition under the section has been held to be not exhaustive. A person may be a
+public servant in terms of some other statute.58.
+"[s 21.3] Judges [clause ""Third""].—"
+"Examining the scope of clause ""third"", the Supreme Court has laid down in K"
+"Veeraswami v UOI,59. that this category of public servants would include judges of the"
+"High Courts and Supreme Court. The words ""every judge"", as used in the clause, the"
+"Court said, indicates ""all judges and judges of all courts"". ""It is a general term... and"
+should not be narrowly construed. It must receive comprehensive meaning. A judge of
+"the superior court cannot ... be excluded from the definition of ""public servant"". It is not"
+necessary that there should be master and servant relationship to constitute a person
+"as a ""public servant"". The court noted that section 21 IPC, 1860 does not define the"
+"expression ""public servant"" as a concept. It enumerates only the categories of public"
+servants. Each category is different from the other and in some of the categories there
+is hardly any relationship of master and servant. In the view of the Andhra Pradesh
+High Court the Central Government is not a competent authority for sanctioning the
+prosecution of a High Court Judge.60.
+[s 21.4] Explanation 2.—
+The person who in fact discharges the duties of the office which brings him under
+"some one of the descriptions of public servant, is for all the purposes of the Code"
+"rightfully a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold the"
+office.61. But even if a person is in actual possession of the situation of a public
+"servant, he is not a public servant unless he has a right to hold that situation, although"
+"in determining that right the legal defect, if any, has to be ignored.62. A public servant"
+under suspension does not cease to be a public servant within the meaning of this
+section.63.
+[s 21.5] CASES.—
+.64.
+The following persons are held to be Public Servants:
+(1) Member of Parliament (MP)65.
+(2) Chief Minister and Ministers66.
+(3) Judges of Superior Courts67.
+(4) Speaker of Legislative Assembly68.
+(5) Employee of a Nationalised Bank69.
+(6) All Railway Servants70.
+(7) Teacher in a Government school71.
+(8) Chairman of Managing Committee of a Municipality72.
+(9) Employees of Life Insurance Corporation73.
+(10) Member of Auxiliary Air Force74.
+(11) Employee of Bharat Heavy Electricals (India) Limited75.
+(12) Employees of Government Company76.
+(13) Officers of State Electricity Board77.
+(14) An employee of a Co-operative Society which is controlled or aided by the
+"government, is a public servant covered under section 2(c) of the IPC Act"
+198878. as also the manager for the commission of offence under section 409
+"of the IPC, 186079."
+"(15) Secretary, Health Supervisor of Municipality80."
+(16) Drug Inspector81.
+(17) Any surveyor while performing his legitimate function under any of the Revenue
+Civil Court82.
+(18) Government Pleaders83.
+(19) An IAS officer posted as the managing director of a State Financial
+Corporation84.
+(20) The sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat.85.
+The following persons are not Public Servants:
+(1) University Examiner86.
+(2) Elected office bearers with President and Secretary of a registered Co-operative
+Society.87.
+(3) A Chartered Accountant who had been appointed as an Investigator by the
+Central Government under the Insurance Act 1938.88.
+(4) Municipal Councillor89.
+(5) Laboratory Officer in Municipal Corporation90.
+(6) Member of IAS whose service placed at the disposal of Co-operative Society.91.
+(7) A Government Company is not a public servant though its employees are public
+servants Government Company.92.
+(8) Chairperson and Standing Committee Chairman of Municipality.93.
+(9) Leader of Opposition.94.
+(10) Hospital or the Authorization Committee constituted by the Government under
+section 9(4) of the Transplantation of Human Organs Act 1994.95.
+(11) Branch Manager under the Assam State Warehousing Corporation.96.
+(12) Commissioner appointed by Civil Court to seize account book.97.
+(13) A panel doctor under the ESI Scheme.98.
+33. Clause First omitted by the A.O. 1950.
+34. Clause First omitted by the A.O. 1950.
+"35. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Naval""."
+"36. The original words ""of the Queen while serving under the Government of India, or any"
+"Government"" have successively been amended by the A.O. 1937, the A.O. 1948 and the"
+A.O.1950 to read as above.
+"37. The words ""of the Dominion"" omitted by the A.O. 1950."
+"38. Subs. by Act 40 of 1964, section 2, for clause Third (w.e.f. 18-12-1964)."
+"39. Ins. by Act 40 of 1964, section 2 (w.e.f. 18-12-1964)."
+"40. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Crown"". Earlier the words ""the Crown"" were substituted by"
+"the A.O. 1937, for the word ""Government""."
+"41. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Crown"". Earlier the words ""the Crown"" were substituted by"
+"the A.O. 1937, for the word ""Government""."
+"42. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Crown"". Earlier the words ""the Crown"" were substituted by"
+"the A.O. 1937, for the word ""Government""."
+"43. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Crown"". Earlier the words ""the Crown"" were substituted by"
+"the A.O. 1937, for the word ""Government""."
+"44. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Crown"". Earlier the words ""the Crown"" were substituted by"
+"the A.O. 1937, for the word ""Government""."
+"45. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Crown"". Earlier the words ""the Crown"" were substituted by"
+"the A.O. 1937, for ""the word Government""."
+"46. Certain words omitted by Act 40 of 1964, section 2 (w.e.f. 18-12-1964)."
+"47. Ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"48. Subs. by Act 40 of 1964, section 2, for clause Twelfth (w.e.f. 18-12-1964)."
+"49. Ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"50. Explanation 4 omitted by Act 40 of 1964, section 2 (w.e.f. 18-12-1964). Earlier Explanation 4"
+"was inserted by Act 2 of 1958, section 2 (w.e.f. 12-2-1958)."
+51. M&M 20.
+"52. GA Monterio, AIR 1957 SC 13 [LNIND 1956 SC 66] : 1957 Cr LJ 1956 . See further"
+"Lakshmimansingh (Dr.) v Naresh KC Jah, 1990 Cr LJ 1921 : AIR 1990 SC 1976 [LNIND 1990 SC"
+370] : (1990) 4 SCC 169 [LNIND 1990 SC 370] ; where a municipal officer working on deputation
+on a Government post (public analyst) committed an act entailing his removal and it was held
+that his removal would have to be effected by the Municipality and there he was not a public
+"servant and hence, permission of the State under s 197(1) of Cr PC, 1973 was not necessary."
+"Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab, 2001 Cr LJ 2329 (P&H), sanction is necessary only when the"
+offence occurs in the course of the performance of official duty. For offences connected with
+"cheating, preparing false records, misappropriation of public funds, including criminal"
+"conspiracy against a public servant, no prior sanction is necessary."
+53. Naresh Kumar Madan v State of MP AIR 2008 SC 385 [LNIND 2007 SC 452] : (2007) 4 SCC
+766 [LNIND 2007 SC 452] .
+"54. Banshilal Luhadia, AIR 1962 Raj 250 [LNIND 1962 RAJ 124] ."
+"55. Abdul Rehman v State of Kerala, 1999 Cr LJ 4801 (Ker)."
+"56. PV Narsimha Rao v State (CBI/SPE), AIR 1998 SC 2120 [LNIND 1998 SC 1259] : 1998 Cr LJ"
+2930 .
+"57. State of Maharashtra v Prabhakarrao, (2002) 7 SCC 636 : JT 2002 (Supp1 ) SC 5."
+"58. Naresh Kumar Madan v State of MP, (2007) 4 SCC 766 [LNIND 2007 SC 452] : AIR 2008 SC"
+385 [LNIND 2007 SC 452] : (2007) 2 KLT 539 : (2007) 54 AIC 87 .
+"59. K. Veeraswami v Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 [LNIND 1991 SC 320] : 1991 SCC (Cr) 734"
+: 1991 Cr LR (SC) 677 .
+"60. Advocate General, AP v Rachapudi Subba Rao, 1991 Cr LJ 613 AP."
+"61. Ramkrishna Das, (1871) 7 Beng LR 446, 448."
+"62. Bira Kishore, AIR 1964 Orissa 202 ."
+"63. Dhanpal Singh, AIR 1970 Punj & Haryana 514."
+"64. M Karunanidhi v UOI, 1979 Cr LJ 773 : AIR 1979 SC 598 ; See also Shiv Bahadur, 1954 Cr LJ"
+"910 : AIR 1954 SC 322 [LNIND 1954 SC 30] ; AR Antulay, (1984) Cr LJ 613 : AIR 1984; Rajendra"
+"Kumar Singh v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 2807 (MP)."
+"65. PV Narasimha Rao v State (CBI/SPE), AIR 1998 SC 2120 [LNIND 1998 SC 1259] : (1998) 4"
+SCC 626 [LNIND 1998 SC 1259] (CB) Though another Constitution Bench in RS Nayak v AR
+"Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 [LNIND 1984 SC 43] : (1984) 2 SCC 183 [LNIND 1984 SC 43] that MLA"
+"is not a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 IPC, 1860, in view of the Narasimha Rao"
+case (Supra) MLA and MPs are public servant within the meaning of Section 2 (i) of PC Act. See
+"also Habibulla Khan v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 3604 ; L. K. Advani v Central Bureau of"
+"Investigation, 1997 Cr LJ 2559 (Del) : 1997 (4) Crimes 1 [LNIND 1997 DEL 319] ."
+"66. M Karunanidhi v UOI, AIR 1979 SC 898 [LNIND 1979 SC 135] : (1979) 3 SCC 431 [LNIND"
+"1979 SC 135] ; R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, AIR 2004 SC 692 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : (2004) 2"
+"SCC 9 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] , Minister is a Public Servant -R Balakrishna Pillai v State of Kerala,"
+"AIR 1996 SC 901 [LNIND 1995 SC 1239] : (1996) 1 SCC 478 [LNIND 1995 SC 1239] , Dattatraya"
+"Narayan Patil v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC 1685 [LNIND 1975 SC 157] : (1976) 1 SCC 11"
+"[LNIND 1975 SC 157] ; Rajendra Kumar Singh and etc. v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 2807 (MP)."
+"67. K Veeraswami v UOI, (1991) 3 SCC 655 [LNIND 1991 SC 320] : (1991) 1 SCC (Cr) 734."
+"68. P Nallammal v State, 1999 Cr LJ 1591 (Mad)."
+"69. UOI v Ashok Kumar Mitra, AIR 1995 SC 1976 [LNIND 1995 SC 295] : (1995) 2 SCC 768"
+"[LNIND 1995 SC 295] ; Mir Nagvi Askari v CBI, AIR 2010 SC 528 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : (2009)"
+"15 SCC 643 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] ; State (Delhi Administration) v S R Vij, 1999 Cr LJ 4762 (Del)."
+"70. Ram Krishan v State of Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 476 [LNIND 1956 SC 157] : 1956 Cr LJ 837 ,"
+"Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v The District Magistrate, AIR 1957 SC 23 [LNIND 1956 SC 60] : 1957"
+"Cr LJ 5 ; GA Monterio v State of Ajmer, AIR 1957 SC 13 [LNIND 1956 SC 66] : 1957 Cr LJ 1 ;"
+Bajrang Lal v State of Rajasthan AIR 1976 SC 1008 [LNIND 1976 SC 57] : (1976) 2 SCC 217
+"[LNIND 1976 SC 57] . But see KN Shukla v Navnit Lal Manilal Bhatt, AIR 1967 SC 1331 [LNIND"
+1966 SC 310] : 1967 Cr LJ 1200 .
+"71. State of Ajmer v Shiv Lal, AIR 1959 SC 847 [LNIND 1959 SC 67] : 1959 Cr LJ 1127 ."
+"72. Maharudrappa Danappa Kesarappanavar v The State of Mysore, AIR 1961 SC 785 [LNIND"
+1961 SC 60] : 1961 Cr LJ 857 .
+"73. State through Central Bureau of Investigation v D P Dogra, AIR 1986 SC 312 : (1985) 4 SCC"
+319 .
+"74. State (SPE, Hyderabad) v Air Commodore Kailash Chand, AIR 1980 SC 522 [LNIND 1979 SC"
+504] : (1980) 1 SCC 667 [LNIND 1979 SC 504] .
+"75. State of MP v M v Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1835 [LNIND 1975 SC 212] : (1975) 2 SCC 377"
+[LNIND 1975 SC 212] .
+76. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd v State AIR 2009 SC 1284 [LNIND 2008 SC 2243] :
+(2009) 1 SCC 407 [LNIND 2008 SC 2243] .
+"77. Bihar State Electricity Board v Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala, AIR 1986 SC 1653 [LNIND 1986"
+"SC 82] : (1986) 2 SCC 414 [LNIND 1986 SC 82] , Naresh Kumar Madan v State of MP AIR 2008 SC"
+385 [LNIND 2007 SC 452] : (2007) 4 SCC 766 [LNIND 2007 SC 452] .
+78. Govt. of AP v P Venken Reddy AIR 2002 SC 3346 : (2002) 7 SCC 631 .
+"79. Haridas Mondal v State of WB, 2016 Cr LJ 4335 : 2016 (4) Crimes 530 (Cal)."
+"80. Chairperson, Kanhangad Municipality v State of Kerala, 2012 Cr LJ 4366 (Ker); G S K"
+"Janardhana Rao v Guntupalli Guru Prasad, 2000 Cr LJ 2927 (A.P) - officers of Municipal"
+Corporation.
+"81. Laxmi Medical Distributors v State of AP, 2005 Cr LJ 1601 (A.P)."
+"82. Ram Avtar Sah v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 3899 (Pat)."
+"83. Appadirai v State, Rep. By The Station House Officer, Cid Branch, Pondicherry 2001 Cr LJ"
+3129 (Mad).
+"84. Girish Chandra Patra v Pinakee Enterprises Ltd, 1989 Cr LJ 527 (Ori)."
+"85. Sarat Chandra Dehury v Sankirtan Behera, 1989 Cr LJ (NOC) 162 Orissa; Sukhdev Singh v"
+"State of Punjab, 1988 Cr LJ 265 P&H."
+"86. Dilaver Babu Khurana v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 564 [LNIND 2002 SC 1739] :"
+"(2002) 2 SCC 135 [LNIND 2002 SC 1739] ; State of Gujarat v Manshanker Prabhashanker Dwivedi,"
+AIR 1973 SC 330 [LNIND 1972 SC 257] : (1972) 2 SCC 392 [LNIND 1972 SC 257] .
+"87. Govt. of AP v P Venken Reddy, AIR 2002 SC 3346 : (2002) 7 SCC 631 : Rabindra Nath Bera v"
+"State Of WB, 2012 Cr LJ 913 (Cal); Haladhar Sasmal v State Of WB, 2012 Cr LJ 1726 (CAL) A"
+"'public servant' within the meaning of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 is not a"
+"public servant under Section 21 of IPC, 1860; State of Maharashtra v Laljit Rajshi Shah, AIR 2000"
+SC 937 [LNIND 2000 SC 387] : (2000) 2 SCC 699 [LNIND 2000 SC 387] .
+"88. Ram Krishna Dalmia v Delhi Administration, (1963 (1) SCR 253 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] : AIR"
+1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] ; Insurance surveyer is not public servant- 1988 Cr LJ 311
+Delhi).
+"89. State of TN v T Thulasingam, AIR 1995 SC 1314 [LNIND 1994 SC 1256] : (1994) Supp 2 SCC"
+"405; Ramesh Balkrishna Kulkarni v State of Maharashtra, 1985 (3) SCC 606 [LNIND 1985 SC 235]"
+: AIR 1985 SC 1655 [LNIND 1985 SC 235] .
+"90. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jha, AIR 1990 SC 1976"
+[LNIND 1990 SC 370] : (1990) 4 SCC 169 [LNIND 1990 SC 370] .
+"91. SS Dhanoa v Municipal Corporation Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 1395 [LNIND 1981 SC 282] : (1981) 3"
+SCC 431 [LNIND 1981 SC 282] .
+"92. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd v State, AIR 2009 SC 1284 [LNIND 2008 SC 2243] :"
+(2009) 1 SCC 407 [LNIND 2008 SC 2243] .
+"93. Chairperson, Kanhangad Municipality v State of Kerala, 2012 Cr LJ 4366 (Ker)."
+"94. Sushil Modi v Mohan Guruswamy, 2008 Cr LJ 541 (Del)."
+"95. Santosh Hospitals Private Ltd Chennai v State Human Rights Commission, TN AIR 2005 Mad."
+348 [LNIND 2005 MAD 935] .
+"96. Ghulam Rabbani v State of Assam, 2001 Cr LJ 2331 : 2002 (1) Crimes 132 [LNIND 2001 GAU"
+403] (Gau).
+97. Padam Sen v State of UP AIR 1961 SC 218 [LNIND 1960 SC 221] : 1961 Cr LJ 322 .
+"98. State of Maharashtra v Dr. Rustom Franrose Hakim, 2000 Cr LJ 3401 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 22] ""Movable property.""."
+"The words ""movable property"" are intended to include corporeal property 1 of every"
+"description, except land and things attached to the earth 2 or permanently fastened to"
+anything which is attached to the earth.
+COMMENT—
+This definition is restricted to corporeal property; it excludes all choices in action. The
+"definition of ""movable property"" in the section is not exhaustive.99. The definition of"
+"""movable property"" given in the Indian Penal Code is basically meant for the provisions"
+"contained in the Indian Penal Code itself (section 125 Cr PC, 1973).100."
+"1. 'Corporeal property' is property which may be perceived by the senses, in"
+"contradistinction to incorporeal rights, which are not so perceivable, as obligations of"
+"all kinds. Thus, salt produced on a swamp,101. and papers forming part of the record of"
+"a case,102. are movable property within the meaning of this section. Even if an"
+"assessment order is not 'property' in the hands of the Income-tax Officer, it is 'property'"
+"in the hands of the assessee (section 420 IPC, 1860).103."
+"2. 'Land and things attached to the earth'.—This section does not exempt ""earth and"
+"things attached to the earth"", but ""land and things attached to the earth""; ""land"" and"
+"""earth"" are not synonymous terms, and there is a great distinction between ""the earth"","
+"and ""earth"". By severance, things that are immovable become movable; and it is"
+perfectly correct to call those things attached which can be severed; and undoubtedly it
+"is possible to sever earth from the earth and attach it again thereto. Earth, that is soil,"
+"and all the component parts of the soil, inclusive of stones and minerals, when severed"
+"from the earth or land to which it was attached, are movable property capable of being"
+"the subject of theft.104. Any part of ""the earth"", whether it is stones or sand or clay or"
+"any other component, when severed from ""the earth"", is movable property.105. Standing"
+"crop, so long as it is attached to the earth is not movable property as defined in the"
+"Code, but the moment it is severed from the earth its character is changed and it can"
+become the subject of theft.106.
+Fish in any water are corporeal property and they become subject of theft as soon as
+"they are separated from the waters, dead or alive, and are moved.107."
+"99. RK Dalmia v Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ"
+805 .
+"100. Bhagwat Baburao Gaikwad v Baburao Bhaiyya Gaikwad, 1993 Cr LJ 2393 (Bom)."
+"101. Tamma Ghantaya, (1881) 4 Mad 228."
+"102. Ramaswami Aiyer v Vaithiling Mudali, (1882) 1 Weir 28."
+"103. Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1969 SC 40 [LNIND 1968 SC 143] :"
+1969 Cr LJ 271 .
+"104. Shivram, (1891) 15 Bom 702."
+"105. Suri Venkatappayya Sastri v Madula Venkanna, (1904) 27 Mad 531, 535 (FB), overruling"
+"Kotayya, (1887) 10 Mad 255. It has been said that the words ""corporeal property of every"
+"description"" were not supposed to apply for all purposes. The matter before the court was that"
+of attachment of salary for payment of maintenance.
+"106. Kunhayu v State, 1965 KLT 66 : 1965 KLJ 51 ."
+"107. State of Rajasthan v Pooran Singh, 1977 Cr LJ 1055 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 23] ""Wrongful gain.""."
+"""Wrongful gain"" is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is"
+not legally entitled.
+"""Wrongful loss."""
+"""Wrongful loss"" is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person"
+losing it is legally entitled.
+"Gaining wrongfully, Losing wrongfully"
+"A person is said to gain wrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well"
+as when such person acquires wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully
+"when such person is wrongfully kept out of any property,1 as well as when such"
+person is wrongfully deprived of property.
+COMMENT—
+The word 'wrongful' means prejudicially affecting a party in some legal right. For either
+"wrongful loss or gain, the property must be lost to the owner, or the owner must be"
+"wrongfully kept out of it. Thus, where a pledgee used a turban that was pledged, it was"
+held that the deterioration of the turban by use was not 'wrongful loss' of property to
+"the owner, and the wrongful beneficial use of it by the pledgee was not a 'wrongful gain'"
+to him.108. The gain or loss contemplated need not be a total acquisition or a total
+deprivation but it is enough if it is a temporary retention of property by the person
+"wrongfully gaining or a temporary ""keeping out"" of property from the person legally"
+entitled.109. Forcible and illegal seizure of bullocks of a widow in satisfaction of a debt
+due to the accused by her deceased husband was held to be a 'wrongful loss'.110.
+"Where a person, who purchased rice from a famine relief officer, at a certain rate on"
+"condition that he should sell it at a pound the rupee less, did not sell it at the rate"
+"agreed upon, but at four pounds the rupee less, it was held that no wrongful gain or"
+wrongful loss had been caused to anyone within the meaning of this section. The rice
+"having been sold to the accused, and he having paid for it, it was not unlawful for him"
+to sell it again at such price as he thought fit.111. Where the accused removed jute kept
+in a pond of the complainant for wetting and requested the complainant to take it away
+"as the accused bona fide claimed the ownership of the pond, it was held that no"
+wrongful loss was caused to the complainant.112.
+"The words ""gaining wrongfully,"" or ""losing wrongfully"" would cover cases of wrongful"
+detention of property in the one case and wrongfully being kept out of property in the
+other.113.
+1. 'Wrongfully kept out of any property'.—When the owner is kept out of possession of
+his property with the object of depriving him of the benefit arising from the possession
+"even temporarily, the case will come within the definition. If a creditor by force or"
+otherwise takes the goods of his debtor out of his possession against his will in order
+to put pressure on him to compel him to discharge his debt he will be guilty of theft by
+"causing wrongful loss to the debtor.114. The loss must be caused wrongfully. Thus,"
+whose municipal officers demolished an unauthorised construction as the complainant
+"refused to remove the structure in spite of notice, they could not be held guilty of"
+"committing an offence of mischief within the meaning of section 425, IPC, 1860, for"
+there was no intention to cause wrongful loss to the complainant as the demolition
+was done lawfully in exercise of powers under sections 179 and 189 of the
+Maharashtra Municipalities Act.115.
+"Fees payable to a college for attending lectures are ""property"" within the meaning of"
+this section.116.
+108. (1866) 3 MHC (Appx.) 6.
+"109. KN Mehra v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1957 SC 369 [LNIND 1957 SC 14] : 1957 Cr LJ 552 ."
+"110. Preonath Banerjee, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 68."
+"111. Lal Mohomed, (1874) 22 WR (Cr) 82."
+"112. Paltu Goswami v Ram Kumar, AIR 1960 Tripura 40 ."
+"113. Krishan Kumar, (1960) 1 SCR 452 [LNIND 1959 SC 135] : 1959 Cr LJ 1508 : AIR 1960 SC"
+1390 .
+"114. Sri Churn Chungo, (1895) 22 Cal 1017 , FB; Ganpat Krishnaji, (1930) 32 Bom LR 351 ."
+"115. Shriram v Thakurdas, 1978 Cr LJ 715 (Bom)."
+"116. Soshi Bhushan, (1893) 15 All 210 , 216."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 24] ""Dishonestly.""."
+Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or
+"wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing ""dishonestly""."
+COMMENT—
+From this definition it will appear that the term 'dishonestly' is not used in the Code in
+"its popular significance. Unless there is wrongful gain to one person, or wrongful loss"
+"to another, an act would not be 'dishonest'. Wrongful gain includes wrongful retention"
+and wrongful loss includes being kept out of the property as well as being wrongfully
+deprived of property.117. An act done with the intention to cause 'wrongful gain' can be
+said to be dishonest.118. Deceit is not an ingredient of the definition of the word
+"""dishonestly"". ""Dishonestly"" involves a pecuniary or economic gain or loss.119. Thus,"
+"""dishonestly"" means an intention to cause either wrongful gain or wrongful loss. So"
+where municipal officers demolished and removed an unauthorised structure lawfully
+"by virtue of powers given to them under the Municipal Act, it could not be said that they"
+"committed the offence of theft under section 380, IPC, 1860, as their act was not"
+"committed dishonestly within the meaning of section 24 read with section 23, IPC,"
+"1860. And since ""dishonesty"" is an essential ingredient of the offence of theft, they"
+could not be charged with that offence.120. A mere erroneous belief and persistence in
+a wrong or perverse opinion cannot be said to be offence tainted with a dishonest or
+fraudulent intent.121.
+[s 24.1] Cheating.—
+"Two main ingredients of section 420 IPC, 1860 are dishonest and fraudulent"
+"intention.122. For the purpose of establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant"
+is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time
+of making promise or representation.123.
+[s 24.2] Breach of Trust.—
+The element of 'dishonest intention' is an essential element to constitute the offence of
+Criminal Breach of Trust.124.
+[s 24.3] Hire-purchase.—
+The element of 'dishonest intention' which is an essential element to constitute the
+offence of theft cannot be attributed to a person exercising his right under an
+agreement entered into between the parties as he may not have an intention of causing
+wrongful gain or to cause wrongful loss to the hirer.125.
+"117. Krishan Kumar v UOI, 1959 Cr LJ 1508 : AIR 1959 SC 1390 [LNIND 1959 SC 135] ."
+"118. Venkatakrishnan v CBI, AIR 2010 SC 1812 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] : (2009) 11 SCC 737"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1653] .
+"119. Dr. Vimala, AIR 1963 SC 1572 [LNIND 1962 SC 397] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 434 ."
+"120. Shriram v Thakurdas, 1978 Cr LJ 715 (Bom). See also Narendra Pratap Narain Singh v State"
+"of UP, AIR 1991 SC 1394 [LNIND 1991 SC 186] : 1991 Cr LJ 1816 ; N Vaghul v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 1987 Cr LJ 385 (Bom)."
+"121. N Vaghul v State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cr LJ 385 (Bom)."
+"122. Annamalai v State of Karnataka, (2010) 8 SCC 524 [LNIND 2010 SC 745] : 2011 Cr LJ 692 ."
+"123. B Suresh Yadav v Sharifa Bee, AIR 2008 SC 210 [LNIND 2007 SC 1238] : (2007) 13 SCC 107"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1238] ; Indian Oil Corporation vNEPC India Ltd, JT 2006 (6) SC 474 [LNIND 2006"
+SC 537] ) : (2006) 6 SCC 736 [LNIND 2006 SC 537] .
+"124. Venkatakrishnan v CBI, AIR 2010 SC 1812 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] : (2009) 11 SCC 737"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1653] .
+"125. Charanjit Singh Chadha v Sudhir Mehra, AIR 2001 SC 3721 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] : (2001)7"
+"SCC 417 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] ; Sardar Trilok Singhv Satya Deo Tripathi, (1979) 4 SCC 396 : AIR"
+"1979 SC 850 ; KA Mathai v Kora Bibbikutty, (1996) 7SCC 212 : (1996) 1 SCC (Cr) 281."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 25] ""Fraudulently.""."
+A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud 1
+but not otherwise.
+COMMENT—
+The intention with which an act is done is very important in determining whether the
+act is done 'dishonestly' or 'fraudulently'.
+1. 'Intent to defraud'.—The terms 'fraud' and 'defraud' are not defined in the Penal Code.
+The word 'defraud' is of double meaning in the sense that it either may or may not imply
+"deprivation, and, as it is not defined, its meaning must be sought by a consideration of"
+the context in which the word 'fraudulently' is found.126.
+"Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is"
+otherwise not due. Fraud and deception are synonymous.127.
+To 'defraud' or do something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the
+"Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly)"
+are made offences. These include:
+"(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (sections 206, 421, 424)"
+(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (section 207).
+(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (sections 208 and 210)
+"(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (sections 239, 240, 242 and"
+243).
+(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (sections 246–253)
+(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (sections 261–261)
+(vii) Fraudulent use of false instruments/weight/measure (sections 264–266)
+(viii) Cheating (sections 415–420)
+(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (section 422).
+(x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of
+consideration (section 423).
+(xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (sections 463–471 and 474)
+"(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc. (section 477)"
+(xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (section 496).
+"It follows therefore, that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently,"
+it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any
+"other law, unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or"
+other law.128.
+"The expression 'defraud' involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person"
+deceived. The injury may even comprise a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. Even in
+those rare cases where the benefit to the deceiver does not cause corresponding loss
+"to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied.129. The expression ""intent to deceive"""
+"is different from the expression ""intent to defraud"".130. ""Intent to defraud"" is established"
+only when the deception has as its aim some advantage or the likelihood of advantage
+to the person who causes the deceit or some kind of injury or the possibility of injury to
+"another.131. Thus, where an expert deposing before a court as a defence witness was"
+asked to produce his credentials before the court and it appeared from the documents
+"produced that they were not genuine, it was held that as he acted under the orders of"
+"the court and not voluntarily, it could not be said that his intention was to cause any"
+"one to act to his disadvantage. In the circumstances, he did not act with ""intent to"
+"defraud"". He was, therefore, held liable under sections 193 and 196 but not under"
+"sections 465 and 471, IPC, 1860.132."
+[s 25.1] 'Fraudulently'; 'dishonestly'.—
+"According to the Supreme Court ""the word ""defraud"" includes an element of deceit."
+"Deceit is not an ingredient of the definition of the word ""dishonestly"" while it is an"
+"important ingredient of the definition of the word ""fraudulently"". The former involves a"
+pecuniary or economic gain or loss while the latter by construction excludes that
+"element. Further, the juxtaposition of the two expressions ""dishonestly"" and"
+"""fraudulently"" used in the various sections of the Code indicate their close affinity and"
+"therefore, the definition of one may give colour to the other. To illustrate, in the"
+"definition of ""dishonestly"", wrongful gain or wrongful loss is the necessary ingredient."
+"Both need not exist, one would be enough. So too, if the expression ""fraudulently"" were"
+"to be held to involve the element of injury to the person or persons deceived, it would"
+be reasonable to assume that the injury should be something other than pecuniary or
+economic loss. Though almost always an advantage to one causes loss to another and
+"vice versa, it need not necessarily be so.""133."
+"Where the accused, after the execution and registration of a document, which was not"
+"required by law to be attested, added his name to the document as an attesting"
+"witness, it was held that his act was neither fraudulent nor dishonest and the accused"
+"was, therefore, not guilty of forgery.134. A person who is not a member of Scheduled"
+Caste or Scheduled Tribes obtains a false certificate with a view to gain undue
+advantage to which he or she was not otherwise entitled to would amount to
+commission of fraud135. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a
+fraud on the court.136.
+"126. Abbas Ali, supra."
+"127. Meghmala v G Narasimha Reddy, 2010 (8) SCC 383 [LNIND 2010 SC 761] ; Inderjit Singh"
+"Grewal v State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588 [LNIND 2011 SC 801] : (2011) 10 SCR 557 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 801] : 2012 Cr LJ 309 (SC).
+"128. Mohd. Ibrahim v State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 [LNIND 2009 SC 1774] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+929.
+"129. Dr. Vimala, AIR 1963 SC 1572 [LNIND 1962 SC 397] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 434 ; State of UP v"
+"Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201 : 1999 (2) SCC 617 ."
+"130. S Dutt v State of UP, 1966 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1960 SC 523 ."
+"131. Re: BV Padmanabha Rao, 1970 Cr LJ 1502 (Mysore)."
+"132. S Dutt, Supra."
+"133. Dr. Vimla, AIR 1963 SC 1572 [LNIND 1962 SC 397] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 434 ."
+"134. Surendra Nath Ghosh, (1910) 14 CWN 1076 . See also TR Arya v State of Punjab, 1987 Cr LJ"
+"222 (P&H); Pramod Malhotra v UOI, (2004) 3 SCC 415 [LNIND 2004 SC 1543] : AIR 2004 SC 3338"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1543] : (2004) 111 DLT 605 .
+"135. Lilly Kutty v Scrutiny Committee, AIR 2005 SC 4313 [LNIND 2005 SC 989] : (2005) Ibrahim v"
+"State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC751 : (2009) 3 SCC 8 SCC 283 Also see- Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v"
+"State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 3330 : (2005) 7 SCC 605 [LNIND 2005 SC 624] ."
+"136. Gowrishankar v Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust, (1996 (3) SCC 310) [LNIND 1996 SC 447]"
+"For meaning of fraud See :Ram Chandra Singh v Savitri Devi, (2003 (8) SCC 319) Roshan Deen v"
+"Preeti Lal, (2002 (1) SCC100) Ram Preeti Yadav v UP Board of High School and Intermediate"
+"Education, (2003 (8) SCC 311) [LNIND 2003 SC 741] ,Ashok Leyland Ltd v State of TN, (2004 (3)"
+SCC 1) [LNIND 2004 SC 1556] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 26] ""Reason to believe.""."
+"A person is said to have ""reason to believe"" a thing, if he has sufficient cause to"
+believe that thing but not otherwise.
+COMMENT—
+"""Reason to believe"" is another facet of the state of mind. It is not the same thing as"
+"""suspicion"" or ""doubt"" and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. It is a"
+higher level of state of mind. It means that a person must have reason to believe if the
+"circumstances are such that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning, conclude"
+"or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned.137. The word ""believe"" is a very"
+"much stronger word than ""suspect"" and that it involves the necessity of showing that"
+the circumstances were such that a reasonable man must have felt convinced in his
+mind that the note with which he was dealing was a forged one and that it was not
+sufficient to show that the accused was careless or he had reason to suspect or that he
+did not make sufficient enquiry to ascertain the fact.138. A person can be supposed to
+know something where there is a direct appeal to his senses. Suspicion or doubt
+"cannot be raised to the level of ""reason to believe.""139. ""Reason to believe"" in section 42"
+of NDPS Act is a question of fact and depends upon the facts and circumstances of
+each case.140.
+"137. Joti Parshad v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1167 : 1993 Cr LJ 413 ."
+"138. Hamid Ali v State, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 801 ."
+"139. Prabha Malhotra v State, 2000 Cr LJ 549 (All), the Court was examining the conduct of"
+doctors in reference to a patient and found no departure from the normal medical practices.
+"140. State of Punjab v Balbir Singh, AIR 1994 SC 1872 [LNIND 1994 SC 283] : (1994) 3 SCC 299"
+"[LNIND 1994 SC 283] ; Noor Aga v State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 [LNIND 2008 SC 1363] :"
+JT 2008 (7) SC 409 [LNIND 2008 SC 1363] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 27] Property in possession of wife, clerk or servant."
+"When property is in the possession of a person's wife, clerk or servant, on account of"
+"that person, it is in that person's possession within the meaning of this Code."
+Explanation.— A person employed temporarily or on a particular occasion in the
+"capacity of a clerk or servant, is a clerk or servant within the meaning of this section."
+COMMENT—
+"Under this section property in the possession of a person's wife, clerk, or servant, is"
+deemed to be in that person's possession. The possession must be conscious and
+intelligent possession and not merely the physical presence of the accused near the
+object.141.
+Corporeal property is in a person's possession when he has such power over it that he
+"can exclude others from it, and intends to exercise, if necessary, that power on behalf"
+of himself or of some person for whom he is a trustee.
+A man's goods are in his possession not only while they are in his house or on his
+"premises, but also when they are in a place where he may usually send them (as when"
+"horses and cattle feed on common land), or in a place where they may be lawfully"
+"deposited by him, e.g., when he buries money or ornaments in his own land, or puts"
+them in any other secret place of deposit.
+1. 'Wife'.—A permanent mistress may be regarded as a 'wife'. When a man furnishes a
+"house for his mistress' occupation, he may reasonably be presumed to be in"
+possession of all articles therein which can reasonably be inferred to belong to him or
+to be in possession of his mistress on his behalf. But the inference must be
+inapplicable to articles of which the mistress is in possession illegally or contrary to the
+"provisions of law, especially when the article in question is such that he might well"
+remain in ignorance that it was in his mistress' possession.142.
+Under this section the possession of the wife or servant must be shown to be on
+account of the accused otherwise he cannot be held liable for possession by his wife
+"or servant of any incriminatory thing even in his own house. In other words, it must be"
+shown that the accused was in conscious possession of the thing in question through
+"his wife or servant. Moreover, it must also be shown that the possession of the"
+"incriminatory thing amounted to an offence under the Indian Penal Code. Thus,"
+possession of illicit liquor or an unlicenced pistol by the wife of the accused in his
+house would not make him liable for an offence under the Prohibition Act or the Arms
+Act. The mere fact that the accused was the head of the family would not go to show
+that the accused must have been in conscious possession of the incriminatory
+thing.143.
+"141. Wahib Basha, AIR 1961 Mad 162 [LNIND 1960 MAD 38] ."
+"142. Banwari Lal, (1913) PR No. 20 of 1914; see also Narendra Nath Majumdar, AIR 1951 Cal"
+"140 [LNIND 1951 CAL 14] ; Dharam Singh, 1961 Cr LJ 152 (Pun) where the wife alone was held"
+responsible as she produced the key.
+"143. Chela Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1984 Cr LJ 17 .1143 (Raj); Narendra Nath Majumdar, AIR"
+1951 Cal 140 [LNIND 1951 CAL 14] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 28] ""Counterfeit.""."
+"A person is said to ""counterfeit"" who causes one thing to resemble another thing,"
+"intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception, or knowing it to be"
+likely that deception will thereby be practised.
+144. [Explanation 1.—It is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be
+exact.
+"Explanation 2.—When a person causes one thing to resemble another thing, and the"
+"resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed,"
+"until the contrary is proved, that the person so causing the one thing to resemble the"
+other thing intended by means of that resemblance to practise deception or knew it to
+be likely that deception would thereby be practised.]
+COMMENT—
+The aforesaid definition states that imitation is not required to be exact. It also says
+that it is not necessary that counterfeit note should be made with primary intention of
+its being looked as genuine. It is sufficient if resemblance to genuine currency note is
+"so caused that it is capable to being passed as such.145. In order to apply section 28,"
+what the Court has to see is whether one thing is made to resemble another thing and
+"if that is so and if the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived by it, there"
+will be a presumption of the necessary intention or knowledge to make the thing
+"counterfeit, unless the contrary is proved. The difference between the counterfeit and"
+"the original is not therefore, limited to a difference existing only by reason of faulty"
+"reproduction.146. The main ingredients of counterfeiting as laid down in section 28,"
+"IPC, 1860, are:"
+"(i) causing one thing to resemble another thing,"
+"(ii) intending by means of such resemblance to practice deception, or"
+(iii) knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised.
+There can be counterfeiting even though the imitation is not exact and there are
+differences in detail between the original and the imitation so long as the resemblance
+is so close that deception may thereby be practised. And if the resemblance is such
+"that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed until the contrary is"
+proved that the person causing one thing to resemble another thing was intending by
+means of that resemblance to practise deception or knew it to be likely that deception
+would thereby be practised.147.
+The word 'counterfeit' occurs in offences relating to coin provided in Chapter XII and
+offences relating to property marks and currency notes in Chapter XVIII.
+If coins are made to resemble genuine coins and the intention of the makers is merely
+"to use them in order to foist a false case upon their enemies, those coins do not come"
+within the definition of counterfeit coins.148. The prosecution must establish that the
+coins manufactured resemble the original. It must also establish that there is an
+"intention to deceive, or the knowledge that deception would be caused by such"
+resemblance.149.
+[s 28.1] Foreign Currency.—
+"The Supreme Court has observed that the word ""counterfeit"" has been defined in this"
+provision in very wide terms and the same has been further supplemented by the
+Explanation which draws an adverse inference against the maker of the counterfeit
+"matter. There being no restriction as to the subject-matter of the offence, quite"
+obviously the offence of imitating a foreign currency would be within the scope of the
+expression.150.
+"144. Subs. by Act 1 of 1889, section 9, for Explanation."
+"145. Narayan Maruti Waghmode v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 3318 (Bom)."
+146. Liyakat Ali v State of Rajasthan 2010 Cr LJ 2450 (Raj); Golo Mandla Ram Rao v State of
+"Jharkhand, > 2003 Cr LJ 1738 (Jha); Local Government v Seth Motilal Jain, (1938) Nag 192."
+"147. State of UP v HM Ismail, 1960 Cr LJ 1017 : AIR 1960 SC 669 [LNIND 1960 SC 29] ; K Hasim"
+"v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 143 : AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005) 1 SCC 237"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 1142] , exact reproduction is not necessary."
+"148. Velayudham, (1938) Mad 80."
+"149. Shahid Sultan Khan v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 568 (Bom)."
+"150. State of Kerala v Mathai Verghese, (1986) 4 SCC 746 [LNIND 1986 SC 461] : AIR 1987 SC 33"
+[LNIND 1986 SC 461] : 1987 Cr LJ 308 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 29] ""Document.""."
+"The word ""document"" denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance"
+"by means of letters, figures, or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended"
+"to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter."
+"Explanation 1.—It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters,"
+"figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used"
+"in, a Court of Justice, or not."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"A writing expressing the terms of a contract, which may be used as evidence of the"
+"contract, is a document."
+A cheque upon a banker is a document. A power-of-attorney is a document.
+"A map or plan which is intended to be used or which may be used as evidence, is a"
+document. A writing containing directions or instructions is a document.
+"Explanation 2.—Whatever is expressed by means of letters, figures or marks as"
+"explained by mercantile or other usage, shall be deemed to be expressed by such"
+"letters, figures or marks within the meaning of this section, although the same may"
+not be actually expressed.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange payable to his order. The meaning
+"of the endorsement, as explained by mercantile usage, is that the bill is to be paid to"
+"the holder. The endorsement is a document, and must be construed in the same"
+"manner as if the words ""pay to the holder"" or words to that effect had been written over"
+the signature.
+COMMENT—
+"An assessment order is certainly a 'document', under section 29, IPC, 1860.151. An"
+"agreement in writing, which purported to be entered into between five persons, was"
+signed by only two of them. It was held that it was a 'document' within the meaning of
+this section though it was not signed by all the parties thereto.152. Letters or marks
+imprinted on trees and intended to be used as evidence that the trees had been passed
+for removal by the Ranger of a forest are documents.153. Currency notes would be
+"included in the definition of ""documents.""154. A charge ticket for overseas calls which a"
+telephone operator has to prepare for accounting purposes is a document.155.
+"151. Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v State Of Maharashtra, AIR 1969 SC 40 [LNIND 1968 SC 143] :"
+1969 Cr LJ 271 (SC).
+"152. Ramaswami Ayyar v State, (1917) 41 Mad 589. Boraiah v State, 2003 Cr LJ 1031 (Kant),"
+post mortem report which was marked without objection was allowed to be read in evidence
+without its author being produced.
+"153. Krishtappa, (1925) 27 Bom LR 599 .The definition includes anything done by pen, by"
+"engraving, by printing or otherwise, whereby, it is made on paper, parchment, wood or other"
+"substance. Similar definitions of the word 'document' are found in Section 3, Evidence Act, and"
+"also in Section 3 (16), General Clauses Act. L K Siddappa v Lalithamma 1954 Cr LJ 1235 (Mys)."
+"154. Shyama Charan, AIR 1962 Tripura 50 ."
+"155. RV Sharma, (1990) 2 All ER 602 (CA)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"156.[s 29A] ""Electronic record."""
+"The words ""electronic record"" shall have the meaning assigned to them in clause (t) of"
+"sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.]"
+COMMENT—
+This section has been inserted by the Information Technology Act 2000 (Act No. 21 of
+"2000), which came into force on 17 October, 2000. With the on-going electronic and"
+"communicational developments, electronic commerce requires the use of electronic"
+record. Section 29A simply refers to the definition of 'electronic record' as the meaning
+assigned to these words in clause (t) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information
+Technology Act 2000. It reads thus;
+"""(t) ""electronic record"" means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored,"
+"received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated microfiche;"""
+"While giving meaning to the words ""electronic record"" and its definition under section"
+"29A one has to resort to the meaning of the words ""computer"" and ""data"" as given in"
+sections 2(1)(i) and 2(1)(o) of the Information Technology Act 2000. The words
+"""electronic form"" used in the definition of electronic record have further been defined in"
+"section 2(1)(r) of the Information Technology Act, which reads thus,"
+"""2(1)(r) ""electronic form"" with reference to informations, means any information"
+"generated, sent, received or stored in media, magnetic, optical, computer memory,"
+"micro film, computer generated microfiche or similar device."""
+"156. Ins. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"156.[s 29A] ""Electronic record."""
+"The words ""electronic record"" shall have the meaning assigned to them in clause (t) of"
+"sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.]"
+COMMENT—
+This section has been inserted by the Information Technology Act 2000 (Act No. 21 of
+"2000), which came into force on 17 October, 2000. With the on-going electronic and"
+"communicational developments, electronic commerce requires the use of electronic"
+record. Section 29A simply refers to the definition of 'electronic record' as the meaning
+assigned to these words in clause (t) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information
+Technology Act 2000. It reads thus;
+"""(t) ""electronic record"" means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored,"
+"received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated microfiche;"""
+"While giving meaning to the words ""electronic record"" and its definition under section"
+"29A one has to resort to the meaning of the words ""computer"" and ""data"" as given in"
+sections 2(1)(i) and 2(1)(o) of the Information Technology Act 2000. The words
+"""electronic form"" used in the definition of electronic record have further been defined in"
+"section 2(1)(r) of the Information Technology Act, which reads thus,"
+"""2(1)(r) ""electronic form"" with reference to informations, means any information"
+"generated, sent, received or stored in media, magnetic, optical, computer memory,"
+"micro film, computer generated microfiche or similar device."""
+"156. Ins. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 30] ""Valuable security.""."
+"The words ""valuable security"" denote a document which is, or purports to be, 1 a"
+"document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted,"
+"extinguished or released, or where by any person acknowledges that he lies under"
+"legal liability, or has not a certain legal right."
+ILLUSTRATION
+A writes his name on the back of a bill of exchange. As the effect of this endorsement
+"is transfer the right to the bill to any person who may become the lawful holder of it, the"
+"endorsement is a ""valuable security""."
+COMMENT—
+"The words ""valuable security"" also occurs in sections 329–331, 347, 348, 420, 467 and"
+"471. Account books containing entries not signed by a party are not ""valuable"
+"security.""157. A copy of a valuable security is not a valuable security.158. An 'order of"
+assessment' is a 'valuable security'.159.
+"1. 'Which is, or purports to be'.—The use of the words ""which is, or purports to be"""
+"indicates that a document which, upon certain evidence being given, may be held to be"
+"invalid, but on the face of it creates, or purports to create, a right in immoveable"
+"property, although a decree could not be passed upon the document, comes within the"
+"purview of this section.160. The words ""purports to be"" are wide enough to include a"
+document which is not in conformity with the provisions of the Registration Act. Such a
+document though not otherwise receivable in evidence would still be receivable in
+"evidence for the purpose of the Indian Penal Code.161. However, certificates which the"
+accused had forged in order to get admission in a college could not be described as
+"""valuable security"" and as such their conviction under section 471 read with section"
+"467 had to be changed to one under section 471 read with section 465, IPC, 1860.162.A"
+lottery ticket is a valuable security.163.
+"157. Hari Prasad v State, (1955) 1 All 749 ; Moosa v State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker. 68 ."
+"158. Gobinda Prasad v State, AIR 1962 Cal 174 [LNIND 1961 CAL 76] ."
+"159. Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v State Of Maharashtra, AIR 1969 SC 40 [LNIND 1968 SC 143] :"
+1969 Cr LJ 271 (SC).
+"160. Ram Harakh Pathak, (1925) 48 All 140 ."
+"161. Kalimuddin v State, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 261 (Cal)."
+"162. BK Patil v State of Maharashtra, 1980 Cr LJ 1312 : AIR 1981 SC 80 ; Noor Mohamad v State"
+"ofMaharashtra, 1980 Cr LJ 1345 AIR 1981 SC 297 ;."
+"163. Farzeen Sulthana v Government of Kerala, 2012 (1) KLT 309 ; Chacko v State of Kerala, 1970"
+"KLT358; relied on Central Government of India v Krishnaji Parvetesh Kulkarni, AIR 2006 SC 1744"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 253] : (2006) 4 SCC 275 [LNIND 2006 SC 253] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 31] ""A will""."
+"The words ""a will"" denote any testamentary document."
+COMMENT—
+'Will' is the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property
+which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.164.
+"164. The Indian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), section 2(h)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 32] Words referring to acts include illegal omissions.
+"In every part of this Code, except where a contrary intention appears from the context,"
+words which refer to acts 1 done extend also to illegal omissions. 2
+COMMENT—
+This section puts an illegal omission on the same footing as a positive act.
+1. 'Acts'.—An 'act' generally means something voluntarily done by a person. 'Act' is a
+"determination of the will, producing an effect in the sensible world. This word includes"
+"writing and speaking, or, in short, any external manifestation. In the Code it is not"
+"confined to its ordinary meaning of positive conduct of doing something, but includes"
+also illegal omissions.
+2. 'Omissions'.—Liability for an omission requires a legal duty to act; a moral duty to act
+is not sufficient. A duty arises from the former when an offence is defined in terms of
+omission. This is the situation where the legislature has made it an offence. A legal
+duty to act may also be created by a provision of either criminal or civil separate from
+the offence charged. Since there is no moral difference between (i) a positive act and
+"(ii) an omission when a duty is established, it is to be borne in mind that cases of"
+"omissions, the liability should be exceptional and needs to be adequately justified in"
+"each instance. Secondly, when it is imposed this should be done by clear statutory"
+language. Verbs primarily denoting (and forbidding) active conduct should not be
+construed to include omissions except when the statute contains a genuine implication
+to this effect.165.
+"An 'act' generally means something voluntarily done by a person, but in IPC, 1860 the"
+term 'act' is not confined to its ordinary meaning of positive conduct of doing
+"something but includes also illegal omission. The effect of sections 32 and 33, IPC,"
+1860 taken together is that the term 'act' comprises one or more 'acts' or one or more
+"illegal omissions. The Code (IPC, 1860) makes punishable omissions which have"
+"caused, which have been intended to cause or which have been known to be likely to"
+cause certain evil effect in the same manner as it punishes acts provided they were
+"illegal and when the law imposes on a person a duty to act, his illegal omission to act"
+renders (him) in liable to punishment.166.
+[s 32.1] Penalty for omission.—
+Maximum penalties applied to active wrongdoing should not automatically be
+transferred to corresponding omissions; penalties for omissions should be re-thought
+"in each case. Indeed, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 does include explicitly the liability"
+due to omissions. And even Indian courts have affirmed so.167.
+"165. Dr PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+166. Raj Karan Singh v State of UP 2000 Cr LJ 555 (All).
+"167. Dr PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 33] ""Act"" ""Omission"";."
+"The word ""act"" denotes as well a series of acts as a single act: the word ""omission"""
+denotes as well a series of omissions as a single omission.
+COMMENT—
+"An omission is sometimes called a negative act, but this seems dangerous practice, for"
+it too easily permits an omission to be substituted for an act without requiring the
+special requirement for omission liability such as legal duty and the physical capacity
+to perform the act. Criminal liability for an omission is also well accepted where the
+actor has a legal duty and the capacity to act. It is said that this rather fundamental
+exception to the act requirement is permitted because an actor's failure to perform a
+"legal duty of which he is capable, satisfies the purposes of the act requirement or at"
+least satisfies them as well as an act does. Specifically these two special requirements
+for omission liability help to exclude from liability cases of fantasizing and irresolute
+"intentions, important purposes of the act requirement.168. The effect of section 32 and"
+this section taken together is that the term 'act' comprises one or more acts or one or
+"more illegal omissions. The word 'act' does not mean only any particular, specific,"
+"instantaneous act of a person, but denotes, as well, a series of acts.169."
+"168. Dr PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+"169. Om Parkash v State Of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1782 [LNIND 1961 SC 201] : 1961 (2) Cr LJ 848"
+.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+170.[[s 34] Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
+When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common
+"intention 1 of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it"
+were done by him alone.]
+COMMENT—
+"Introduction.—Ordinarily, no man can be held responsible for an independent act and"
+"wrong committed by another. However, section 34 of the IPC, 1860 makes an exception"
+to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act.
+"The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention,"
+animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
+"intention. It deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or adverse by several"
+"persons, if all are done in furtherance of common intention. In such situation, each"
+person is liable for the result of that as if he had done that act himself.171. The soul of
+"section 34, IPC, 1860 is the joint liability in doing a criminal act.172."
+[s 34.1] History.—
+"Section 34 IPC, 1860 is part of the original Code of 1860 as drafted by Lord Macaulay."
+"The original section as it stood was ""When a criminal act is done by several persons,"
+each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by
+"him alone."" However, on account of certain observations made by Sir Barnes Peacock,"
+"CJ, in Queen v Gora Chand Gope,173. it was necessary to bring about a change in the"
+"wordings of the section. Accordingly, in the year 1870 an amendment was brought"
+"which introduced the following words after ""when a criminal act is done by several"
+"persons..."" ""…in furtherance of the common intention..."". After this change, the section"
+has not been changed or amended ever.
+[s 34.2] Object.—
+The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish
+between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common
+intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The true
+"contents of the section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly,"
+the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by
+"himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab,174. the existence of a common"
+intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of
+this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with
+commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may
+"be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common"
+"intention in order to attract the provision.175. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor,176."
+stated the true purport of section 34 as:
+The words of s.34 are not to be eviscerated by reading them in this exceedingly limited
+"sense. By s.33 a criminal act in s.34 includes a series of acts and, further, 'act' includes"
+"omission to act, for example, an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being"
+"done before one's very eyes. By s.37, when any offence is committed by means of several"
+acts whoever intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence by doing any one
+"of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence. Even if the"
+"appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in crimes as"
+in other things 'they also serve who only stand and wait'.177.
+[s 34.3] Principle.—
+This section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
+"Section 34 IPC, 1860 lays down the principle of constructive liability. The essence of"
+"section 34 IPC, 1860 is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons"
+"participating in criminal action to bring about a particular result. Section 34 IPC, 1860"
+stipulates that the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. In
+"fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together"
+and on the facts of the case it is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which
+of the persons who acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction
+exists between a charge for an offence under a particular section and a charge under
+"that section read with section 34.178. Therefore, section 34, IPC, 1860, would apply"
+even if no charge is framed under that section provided of course from the evidence it
+becomes clear that there was pre-arranged plan to achieve the commonly intended
+"object.179. Thus, where six persons were charged under sections 148, 302/149 and"
+"307/149, IPC, 1860, but two were acquitted, the remaining four accused could be"
+convicted on the charges of murder and attempt to murder with the aid of section 34 of
+the Penal Code.180. This section really means that if two or more persons intentionally
+"do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually.181. If the"
+criminal act was a fresh and independent act springing wholly from the mind of the
+"doer, the others are not liable merely because when it was done they were intending to"
+be partakers with the doer in a different criminal act.
+"[s 34.4] Scope, ambit and applicability.—"
+Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code recognises the principle of vicarious liability in
+criminal jurisprudence. The said principle enshrined under Section 34 of the Code
+would be attracted only if one or more than one accused person act conjointly in the
+commission of offence with others. It is not necessary that all such persons should be
+named and identified before the liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code can
+be invoked. So long as the evidence brought by the prosecution would disclose that
+one or more accused persons had acted in concert with other persons not named or
+"identified, the liability under Section 34 of the Code would still be attracted. Once the"
+"other accused stands acquitted in absence of said evidence, the vicarious liability"
+under section 34 of the Code would not be attracted so as to hold the accused liable
+"for the offence with the aid of Section 34 of the Code. However, the accused would still"
+be liable for the offence if the injury or injuries leading to offence can be attributed to
+him.182. A bare reading of this section shows that the section could be dissected as
+follows:
+(a) Criminal act is done by several persons;
+(b) Such act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all; and
+(c) Each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done
+by him alone.
+"(d) But, it is not necessary that all such persons should be named and identified"
+before the liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code can be invoked.183.
+"In other words, these three ingredients would guide the court in determining whether an"
+accused is liable to be convicted with the aid of section 34. While first two are the acts
+"which are attributable and have to be proved as actions of the accused, the third is the"
+"consequence. Once the criminal act and common intention are proved, then by fiction"
+"of law, criminal liability of having done that act by each person individually would arise."
+"The criminal act, according to section 34 IPC, 1860 must be done by several persons."
+"The emphasis in this part of the section is on the word ""done"".184. The section does not"
+envisage the separate act by all the accused persons for becoming responsible for the
+"ultimate criminal act. If such an interpretation is accepted, the purpose of section 34"
+"shall be rendered infructuous.185. Under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, a pre-"
+concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved.186. It is a
+well settled law that mere presence or association with other members is not per se
+sufficient to hold each of them criminally liable for the offences committed by the other
+"members, unless there is sufficient evidence on record to show that one such member"
+also intends to or knows the likelihood of commission of such an offending act.187.
+[s 34.5] Three leading Cases.—
+"The case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor,188. is a locus classicus and has"
+been followed by number of High Courts and the Supreme Court in a large number of
+"cases. In this case, the Judicial Committee dealt with the scope of section 34 dealing"
+"with the acts done in furtherance of the common intention, making all equally liable for"
+the results of all the acts of others. It was observed that section 34 when it speaks of a
+"criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, has"
+"regard not to the offence as a whole, but to the criminal act, that is to say, the totality of"
+the series of acts which result in the offence. In the case of a person assaulted by
+"many accused, the criminal act is the offence which finally results, though the"
+achievement of that criminal act may be the result of the action of several persons.
+"In another celebrated case Mehbub Shah v King-Emperor,189. the court held that:"
+Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section
+"does not say ""the common intentions of all,"" nor does it say ""an intention common to all."""
+"Under the section, the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common"
+intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
+"intention. To invoke the aid of s.34 successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act"
+complained against was done by one of the accused persons in the furtherance of the
+"common intention of all; if this is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any"
+one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being the
+"principle, it is clear to their Lordships that common intention within the meaning of the"
+"section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an offence applying the"
+section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-
+arranged plan.
+Approving the judgments of the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (Barendra
+"Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor,190. and Mahbub Shah cases191 a three-Judge Bench of"
+"Supreme Court in Pandurang v State of Hyderabad,192. held that to attract the"
+applicability of section 34 of the Code the prosecution is under an obligation to
+establish that there existed a common intention which requires a pre-arranged plan
+"because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the"
+act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of all. The Court had
+in mind the ultimate act done in furtherance of the common intention
+[s 34.6] Common intention and mens rea.—
+"Under section 34, every individual offender is associated with the criminal act which"
+constitutes the offence both physically as well as mentally i.e. he is a participant not
+only in what has been described as a common act but also what is termed as the
+"common intention and, therefore, in both these respects his individual role is put into"
+serious jeopardy although this individual role might be a part of a common scheme in
+which others have also joined him and played a role that is similar or different. But
+"referring to the common intention, it needs to be clarified that the courts must keep in"
+"mind the fine distinction between ""common intention"" on the one hand and mens rea as"
+understood in criminal jurisprudence on the other. Common intention is not alike or
+identical to mens rea. The latter may be coincidental with or collateral to the former but
+they are distinct and different.193.
+[s 34.7] Participation.—
+Participation of several persons in some action with the common intention of
+"committing a crime is an essential ingredient; once such participation is established,"
+"section 34 is at once attracted.194. Thus, the dominant feature of section 34 is the"
+element of intention and participation in action. This participation need not in all cases
+be by physical presence.195. The Supreme Court has held that it is the essence of the
+section that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the
+"crime. He need not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by a"
+gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a
+"car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present"
+at the scene of the occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the
+offence in some way or other at the time crime is actually being committed.196.
+The Supreme Court has emphasised that proof of participation by acceptable evidence
+may in circumstances be a clue to the common intention and that it would not be fatal
+to the prosecution case that the culprits had no community of interests.197.
+"Sometimes, however, absence of actual participation may serve an important purpose"
+"as it happened, for example, where in a love triangle the paramour killed the woman's"
+husband and she remained sitting with the dead body inside the house without opening
+"the door. The main accused having been acquitted, the Supreme Court held that the"
+woman alone could not be convicted under section 302 read with section 34
+particularly in view of the fact that the nature of the injuries (gandasa blows with a
+heavy hand) made it explicit that they were the handiwork of masculine power and not
+that of feminine hands.198. It is also necessary to remember that mere presence of the
+offender at the scene of murder without any participation to facilitate the offence is not
+enough.199. By merely accompanying the accused one does not become liable for the
+"crime committed by the accused within the meaning of section 34, IPC, 1860.200. The"
+degree of participation is also an important factor.201. The court restated the two
+ingredients for application of the section which are:
+(i)
+"common intention to commit a crime, and"
+(ii) participation by all the accused in the act or acts in furtherance of the common
+intention. These two things establish their joint liability.202.
+Where one of the accused persons focussed light on the victim with a torch so as to
+"enable others to assault him, otherwise it is a dark night. The court said that his"
+conduct prior and subsequent to the occurrence clearly showed that he shared the
+"common intention so far as the assault on the deceased was concerned. Hence, he"
+was rightly roped in under section 34.203. If participation is proved and common
+"intention is absent, section 34 cannot be invoked.204. The co-accused was standing"
+"outside the house, where the incident took place, while the others committed the"
+murder. There is no evidence of his having played any part in the crime. He did not even
+act as a guard; he did not prevent the witness from entering the house. There is no
+evidence of the formation or sharing of any common intention with the other accused.
+"No weapon was seized from him, nor was any property connected with the crime,"
+"confiscated from him. It was therefore, held that, it was not safe to convict the co-"
+accused of the offence of murder with the aid of sub-sections 34 and 120(B).205.
+[s 34.8] Physical Presence not sine qua non.—
+Physical presence at the very spot is not always a necessary ingredient to attract the
+"action. The Supreme Court decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya v State of Bombay,206. is"
+"the authority for the aforesaid proposition. Vivian Bose, J, speaking for the Bench of"
+three Judges stated thus:
+"He need not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by a gate"
+outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a
+nearby road ready to facilitate their escape.
+What is required is his actual participation in the commission of the offence in some
+way or other at the time when the crime is actually being committed. The participation
+"need not in all cases be by physical presence. In offence involving physical violence,"
+"normally presence at the scene of offence may be necessary, but such is not the case"
+in respect of other offences when the offence consists of diverse acts which may be
+done at different times and places. The physical presence at the scene of offence of
+the offender sough to be rendered liable under this section is not one of the conditions
+of its applicability in every case.207. Even the concept of presence of the co-accused at
+"the scene is not a necessary requirement to attract section 34 of the IPC, 1860, e.g., the"
+co-accused can remain a little away and supply weapons to the participating accused
+either by throwing or by catapulting them so that the participating accused can inflict
+"injuries on the targeted person. There may be other provisions in the IPC, 1860 like sub-"
+sections 120B or 109 which could be invoked then to catch such non-participating
+"accused. Thus, participation in the crime in furtherance of the common intention is sine"
+"qua non for section 34 IPC, 1860. Exhortation to other accused, even guarding the"
+"scene etc. would amount to participation. Of course, when the allegation against an"
+accused is that he participated in the crime by oral exhortation or by guarding the
+scene the court has to evaluate the evidence very carefully for deciding whether that
+person had really done any such act.208.
+"The absence of any overt act of assault, exhortation or possession of weapon cannot"
+be singularly determinative of absence of common intention.209.
+[s 34.9] In furtherance of common intention.—
+The Supreme Court referred to the Oxford English Dictionary where the word
+"""furtherance"" is defined as an ""action of helping forward."" Russell, in his book on"
+Criminal Law adopted this definition and said:
+It indicates some kind of aid or assistance proceeding an effect in future and that any act
+may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally
+"taken for the purpose of effecting the felony."" The Supreme Court has also construed the"
+"word ""furtherance"" as ""advancement or promotion.210."
+1. 'Common intention'.—The phrase 'common intention' means a pre-oriented plan and
+acting in pursuance to the plan. The common intention to give effect to a particular act
+may even develop at the spur of moment between a number of persons with reference
+to the facts of a given case.211. In Amrik Singh's case it has further been held that
+though common intention may develop in course of the fight but there must be clear
+and unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference.212. Before a Court can convict a
+"person for any offence read with section 34, it should come to a definite conclusion"
+"that the said person had a prior concert with one or more other persons, named or"
+"unnamed, for committing the said offence.213. Where the act of murder by the main"
+accused was facilitated by two others by catching hold of the victim but without
+"knowing nor having the intention of causing death, it was held that the only common"
+intention that could be inferred was that of causing grievous hurt.214. Where the
+accused had inflicted lathi blows causing injuries only on the eyewitness and not on the
+"deceased, he could not be said to have shared the common intention of committing"
+murder of the deceased. He was acquitted for the charge of murder and was convicted
+under section 325.215.
+Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute
+common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to
+the rest of them and shared by them.216.
+What to speak of similar intention even same intention without sharing each other's
+intention is not enough for this section.217. In a case like this each will be liable for
+whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of
+"the others.218. In fine, if common intention cannot be inferred from the evidence of"
+"facts and circumstances of the case, section 34, IPC, 1860, cannot be invoked.219. A"
+party of farmers was cutting their crop. The deceased took away a portion of the
+harvested crop. That night when he was returning from a barat 16 persons waited for
+him on the way. They came towards him and the convict who was carrying a knife gave
+him a stab wound on the neck which proved fatal. The others did not know that he had
+"a knife and all of them being with bare hands, it could not be said that they had the"
+common intention of causing death. They could as well have thought that after
+surrounding the accused he would be called upon to return or pay for the harvest taken
+away by him.220.A person gifted his land to one of his grandsons. His other son along
+"with his wife fully armed, the man with a lathi and the woman with a gandasa came to"
+protest. The man lost control and both grandson and his father intervened to save the
+situation but they received lathi blows and died. The woman struck only her brother-in-
+law with the gandasa causing a non-fatal injury. Her husband was convicted for murder
+but her punishment was reduced to causing grievous hurt because it appeared that the
+whole thing was a spot happening and not a planned affair.221.
+"Where the genesis of the verbal wrangle between the neighbours was not known, but it"
+"appeared to have arisen suddenly, there being no chance for common intention to be"
+"formulated, each attacker was held to be punishable for his individual acts.222."
+Where common intention was established the mere fact that one of the culprits
+distanced himself from the scene could not absolve him from liability.223.
+It is not necessary for bringing a case within the scope of section 34 to find as to who
+in fact inflicted the fatal blow. A conviction under the section read with the relevant
+substantive provision can be made when the ingredients required by the section are
+satisfied and it is not necessary to mention the section number in the judgment.224.
+Death of two persons was caused by unprovoked firing by appellants who are police
+officials and grievous gunshot injuries to another person. It was not necessary to
+assign a specific role to each individual appellant as the firing at the Car was
+undoubtedly with a clear intent to annihilate those in it and was resorted to in
+furtherance of common intention of all the appellants. The accused were liable to
+"conviction under section 302/34 IPC, 1860.225. The acts of all the accused need not be"
+the same or identically similar. All that is necessary is that they all must be actuated by
+the one and the same common intention. The fact that two of them caused injuries at
+the back of their victim and the injury at the head which proved to be fatal was caused
+"by the third person, the two co-accused could not claim to be absolved of liability for"
+murder.226.
+It is not necessary for bringing about the conviction of the co-accused to show that he
+also committed an overt act for the achievement of their object. The absence of any
+overt act or possession of weapon cannot be singularly determinative of absence of
+common intention. If common intention by meeting of minds is established in the facts
+and circumstances of the case there need not be an overt act or possession of weapon
+"required, to establish common intention.227."
+The accused caught hold of the victim and exhorted the main accused to strike him. On
+such exhortation the main accused inflicted a Kirpan wound. The victim died. It was
+held that the instigation was only to strike. It could not be said that the accused shared
+the intention of the main accused to kill. The conviction was altered from under
+sections 202/34 to one under section 324.228. The victim woman was murdered by her
+father-in-law and brother-in-law. The third person helped them to conceal the dead body
+to screen them. The conviction of the two accused for murder was upheld but that of
+the third one only for concealment of evidence under sections 201/34.229.
+[s 34.10] Common Intention: How Proved.—
+The common intention can be inferred from the circumstances of the case and that the
+intention can be gathered from the circumstances as they arise even during an
+incident.230. Common intention is a state of mind. It is not possible to read a person's
+mind. There can hardly be direct evidence of common intention. The existence or non-
+existence of a common intention amongst the accused has to be deciphered
+cumulatively from their conduct and behaviour in the facts and circumstances of each
+"case. Events prior to the occurrence as also after, and during the occurrence, are all"
+relevant to deduce if there existed any common intention. There can be no straight
+jacket formula.231. The Court has to examine the prosecution evidence in regard to
+"application of section 34 cumulatively and if the ingredients are satisfied, the"
+consequences must follow. It is difficult to state any hard and fast rule which can be
+applied universally to all cases. It will always depend on the facts and circumstances of
+the given case whether the person involved in the commission of the crime with a
+common intention can be held guilty of the main offence committed by them
+"together.232. Courts, in most cases, have to infer the intention from the act(s) or"
+"conduct of the accused or other relevant circumstances of the case. However, an"
+inference as to the common intention shall not be readily drawn; the criminal liability
+can arise only when such inference can be drawn with a certain degree of
+assurance.233. In most cases it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other
+relevant circumstances of the case in hand.234. This inference can be gathered by the
+"manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the"
+determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused by
+"one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the"
+"concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence, for instance all of"
+them left the scene of the incident together and other acts which all or some may have
+"done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of"
+the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion
+whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence of which they
+could be convicted.235. Manner of attack shows the common intention of accused.236.
+The Supreme Court has reiterated:
+"We reiterate that for common intention, there could rarely be direct evidence. The ultimate"
+"decision, at any rate would invariably depend upon the inference deducible from the"
+circumstances of each case. It is settled law that the common intention or the intention of
+the individuals concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved either
+from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending circumstances of the case
+and conduct of the parties.237.
+[s 34.11] Complaint.—
+"In order to attract section 34 of the IPC, 1860, the complaint must, prima facie, reflect a"
+common prior concert or planning amongst all the accused.238.
+[s 34.12] Effect of no charge under section 34.—
+Even if section 34 has not been included in a charge framed for the offence under
+"section 302 IPC, 1860 against the accused, a conviction for the offence under section"
+302 with the aid of section 34 is not bad as no prejudice would be caused to him.239.
+Where the appellants caused injuries not enough to cause the death but the same were
+"caused by another, in the absence of a charge under section 34, they were found to be"
+"guilty under section 326 of IPC, 1860.240."
+"Sections 34, 114 and 149 of the IPC, 1860 provide for criminal liability viewed from"
+"different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a"
+common object or a common intention; and as explained by five Judge Constitution
+"Bench of in Willie Slavey v The State of MP,241. the charge is a rolled-up one involving"
+the direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable
+and who are sought to be made constructively liable.242. But before a court can convict
+"a person under section 302, read with section 34, of the Indian Penal Code, it should"
+come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more
+"other persons, named or unnamed, for committing the said offence. A few illustrations"
+will bring out the impact of section 34 on different situations.
+"(1) A, B, C and D are charged under section 302, read with section 34, of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, for committing the murder of E. The evidence is directed to establish that"
+the said four persons have taken part in the murder.
+"(2) A, B, C and D and unnamed others are charged under the said sections. But"
+"evidence is adduced to prove that the said persons, along with others, named or"
+"unnamed, participated jointly in the commission of that offence."
+"(3) A, B, C and D are charged under the said sections. But the evidence is directed to"
+"prove that A, B, C and D, along with 3 others, have jointly committed the offence. As"
+"regards the third illustration, a Court is certainly entitled to come to the conclusion that"
+"one of the named accused is guilty of murder under section 302, read with section 34,"
+"of the Indian Penal Code, though the other three named accused are acquitted, if it"
+"accepts the evidence that the said accused acted in concert along with persons,"
+"named or unnamed, other than those acquitted, in the commission of the offence. In"
+the second illustration the Court can come to the same conclusion and convict one of
+the named accused if it is satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the accused
+by the defect in the charge. But in the first illustration the Court certainly can convict
+two or more of the named accused if it accepts the evidence that they acted conjointly
+in committing the offence. But what is the position if the Court acquits 3 of the 4
+accused either because it rejects the prosecution evidence or because it gives the
+"benefit of doubt to the said accused? Can it hold, in the absence of a charge as well as"
+"evidence, that though the three accused are acquitted, some other unidentified persons"
+"acted conjointly along with one of the named persons? If the Court could do so, it"
+would be making out a new case for the prosecution: it would be deciding contrary to
+the evidence adduced in the case. A Court cannot obviously make out a case for the
+prosecution which is not disclosed either in the charge or in regard to which there is no
+basis in the evidence. There must be some foundation in the evidence that persons
+other than those named have taken part in the commission of the offence and if there
+is such a basis the case will be covered by the third illustration.243. Absence of charge
+under section 34 is not fatal by itself unless prejudice to the accused is shown.244.
+[s 34.13] Alternative Charge.—
+"The trial Court framed charges under sections 302/307 r/w 120B IPC, 1860 and an"
+"alternative charge under sections 302/307 r/w section 34 IPC, 1860 without opining on"
+"the alternative charge, convicted the accused under sections 302/307 r/w 120B, The"
+contention that accused is deemed to be acquitted for charges under sections
+"302/307/34 IPC, 1860 of the charge of common intention of committing murder and"
+"there was no appeal by the State against the deemed acquittal against that charge, it"
+was not open to the High Court to alter or modify the conviction under sections
+"302/307/34 IPC, 1860, repelled by holding that charges had indeed been framed in the"
+alternative and for cognate offences having similar ingredients as the main allegation
+of murder.245.
+"[s 34.14] Distinction between sections 34 and 149, IPC, 1860.—"
+Though both these sections relate to the doctrine of vicarious liability and sometimes
+overlap each other there are substantial points of difference between the two. They are
+as under:—
+"(i) Section 34 does not by itself create any specific offence, whereas section 149,"
+"IPC, 1860, does so (see discussion under sub-para ""principle"" ante)."
+"(ii) Some active participation, especially in a crime involving physical violence is"
+"necessary under section 34 but section 149, IPC, 1860, does not require it and"
+the liability arises by reason of mere membership of the unlawful assembly with
+a common object and there may be no active participation at all in the
+preparation and commission of the crime.
+"(iii) Section 34 speaks of common intention but section 149, IPC, 1860,"
+contemplates common object which is undoubtedly wider in its scope and
+amplitude than intention. If the offence committed by a member of an unlawful
+assembly is in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or
+such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
+"prosecution of the common object, all other members of the unlawful assembly"
+"would be guilty of that offence under section 149, IPC, 1860, although they may"
+not have intended to do it or participated in the actual commission of that
+offence.246.
+(iv) Section 34 does not fix a minimum number of persons who must share the
+"common intention, whereas section 149, IPC, 1860, requires that there must be"
+at least five persons who must have the same common object (see also
+"discussion under sub-head ""Sections 34 and 149"" under section 149, IPC, 1860,"
+infra).247.
+[s 34.15] Effect of conviction or acquittal of one or more or others.—
+Several persons involved in a criminal adventure may be guilty of different offences
+depending upon their respective acts. If the act is done in furtherance of their common
+"intention, all of them become equally liable for the act. Similarly, if they are members of"
+"an unlawful assembly, an act done by any one in prosecution of the common object or"
+"any act which the members knew could happen in such prosecution, every member"
+would be liable for the act. If any one of them happens to be wrongly acquitted and no
+"appeal has been filed against it, it would not ipso facto impede the conviction of others."
+"Likewise, the conviction of any one or more them does not automatically result in the"
+conviction of others.248.
+[s 34.16] Substitution of conviction from section 149 to section 34.—
+"Following some earlier rulings,249. the Supreme Court has stated the law in the"
+following terms:250.
+It is true that there was no charge under s. 302 read with s. 34... but the facts of the case
+are such that the accused could have been charged alternatively either under s. 302 read
+"with s. 149 or under s. 302 read with s. 34 and one of the accused having been acquitted,"
+the conviction under s. 302/149 can be substituted with one under s. 302/34. No prejudice
+is likely to be caused to the accused whose appeal is being dismissed.251.
+[s 34.17] Robbery.—
+Provision under section 397 inevitably negates the use of the principles of constructive
+or vicarious liability engrafted under section 34. The sentence for offence under section
+"397 of the IPC, 1860 cannot be awarded to those of the members of the group of"
+"dacoits who did not use any deadly weapon. A plain reading of section 397 of the IPC,"
+1860 would make it clear that such guilt can be attributed only to that offender who
+uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person during course of the
+commission of the robbery. The provision postulates that only the individual act of
+"accused will be relevant to attract section 397 of the IPC, 1860.252. In a sudden quarrel"
+"over payment, person sitting inside the car pulled the petrol pump attendant into the"
+car and drove away. The occupants of the car escaped punishment. It was held that the
+driver alone could not be held guilty of the offence of robbery and abduction with the
+aid of section 34.253. In a serial highway robbery and murder in which same persons
+"were involved, it was found as a fact that the self-same two persons were seen by a"
+witness together in a different town before the occurrence. One of their victims
+survived and he also testified that he saw both of them together. Both of them were
+held to be guilty of successive crimes and convicted for murder with the aid of section
+34 without any need of knowing who played what part.254.
+[s 34.18] Mob action.—
+A mob of 200 persons armed with different weapons came to the field with the object
+of preventing the prosecution party from carrying on transplantation operations. Some
+of them caused death of a person at the spur of the moment for some spot reason.
+The whole mob could not be convicted for it.255 A mob chased the members of the
+rival community up to their locality. A part of the mob started burning their houses and
+the other part kept on chasing and caused deaths. The court said that the two parts of
+the mob could not be said to have shared the intention of burning or causing death.256.
+[s 34.19] Misappropriation.—
+Where the accused the Sarpanch and Secretary of a Gram Panchayat misappropriated
+the funds of the Panchayat and the circumstances and evidence showed patent
+"dishonest intention on the part of the accused persons, the conviction and sentence of"
+"the accused under section 409/34, was not interfered with.257."
+[s 34.20] Rape cases.—
+In Gang Rape it is not necessary that the intention should exists from the beginning. It
+can be developed at the last minute before the commission of the offence.258.
+[s 34.21] Exhortation.—
+One of the accused exhorted while the other immobilised the deceased and the third
+accused delivered the fatal injuries. It was held that each one shared a common
+intention.259. Section 34 was held to have been rightly applied where two of the
+accused persons caught hold of the deceased and on their exhortation the third
+accused shot him on the right temple resulting in death.260.
+Mere exhortation by one of the accused persons saying that they would not leave the
+victim till he died was held to be not a basis for roping into the common intention of the
+others.261. The only allegation against the appellant was her exhortation. Enmity
+"between the family of the deceased and that of the accused proved. In such a situation,"
+"where the eye witnesses have not narrated any specific role carried by the appellant,"
+rather the specific role of assaulting with the sword has been attributed to the co-
+"accused, it cannot be ruled out that the name of the appellant has been added due to"
+enmity with the main accused.262.
+[s 34.22] Pre-conceived common intention.—
+Only when a court with some certainty holds that a particular accused must have pre-
+conceived or pre-meditated the result which ensued or acted in concert with others in
+"order to bring about that result, that section 34 may be applied.263."
+[s 34.23] Common intention and private defence.—
+If two or more persons had common intention to commit murder and they had
+"participated in the acts done by them in furtherance of that common intention, all of"
+"them would be guilty of murder. Section 96 IPC, 1860 says that nothing is an offence"
+which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. Though all the accused
+would be liable for committing the murder of a person by doing an act or acts in
+"furtherance of the common intention, they would not be liable for the act or acts if they"
+had the right of private defence to voluntarily cause death of that person. Common
+"intention, therefore, has relevance only to the offence and not to the right of private"
+defence. What would be an offence by reason of constructive liability would cease to
+be one if the act constituting the offence was done in exercise of the right of private
+defence.
+If the voluntary causing of death is not permissible under the right of private defence
+"under section 96, then the common intention in regard thereto will lead to the result"
+that the accused persons must be held guilty by reason of constructive liability under
+"the relevant section (in this case section 304 Part I IPC, 1860). If, however, the common"
+intention was only to commit an act which was permissible within the confines of s. 96
+"read with s. 98, then constructive liability under section 34 cannot be said to have been"
+"accrued to the accused. If the right of private defence was exceeded by some persons,"
+the guilt of each of the accused proved to have exceeded the right of private defence
+would have to be dealt with separately. The instant case came under the former
+"situation, and hence, such persons were guilty under section 304, Part I IPC, 1860."
+"They, therefore, must be held to have had a common object for causing death of P."
+They were sentenced to undergo ten years' rigorous imprisonment each.264.
+"170. Subs. by Act 27 of 1870, section 1, for section 34."
+"171. Goudappa v State of Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 675 [LNIND 2013 SC 177] ; Satyavir Singh"
+"Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011SC 1748 : (2011) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ."
+"2908 ; Abdul Sayeed v State of MP, 2010 (10) SCC 259 [LNIND 2010 SC 872] : 2010(9) Scale 379"
+: (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1262.
+"172. Kuria v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1085 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] : (2012) 10 SCC 433"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 678] : 2012 Cr LJ 4707 (SC).
+"173. Queen v Gora Chand Gope, (1866) 5 South WR (Cr) 45."
+"174. Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 109 : (1977)1 SCC 746 ."
+175. Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v State Of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 1460 [LNIND 2004 SC
+1203] : (2005) 10 SCC 404 [LNIND 2004 SC 1203] .
+"176. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 [LNIND 1924 BOM 206] ."
+"177. Lallan Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 333 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] : 2003 Cr LJ 465 : (2003)"
+1 SCC 268 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] .
+"178. Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 .
+"179. Garib Singh v State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 1286 : AIR 1973 SC 460 [LNIND 1972 SC 187] ."
+"See also Yogendra v State of Bihar, 1984 Cr LJ 386 (SC)."
+"180. Ram Tahal v State of UP, 1972 Cr LJ 227 : AIR 1972 SC 254 [LNIND 1971 SC 579] relied in"
+"Thoti Manohar v State of AP,2012, (7) Scale 215 : (2012) 7 SCC 723 [LNIND 2012 SC 365] : 2012"
+"Cr LJ 3492 ; see also Amar Singh v State of Haryana, 1973 Cr LJ 1409 : AIR 1973 SC 2221 ;"
+"Dharam Pal v State of UP, 1975 Cr LJ 1666 : AIR 1975 SC1917 [LNIND 1975 SC 314] ; Amir"
+"Hussain v State of UP, 1975 Cr LJ 1874 : AIR 1975 SC 2211 State of Rajasthan v ArjunSingh,"
+(2011) 9 SCC 115 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : AIR 2011 SC 3380 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] .
+"181. BN Srikantiah v State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 672 [LNIND 1958 SC 49] : 1958 Cr LJ 1251 ."
+"182. Killer Thiayagu v. State, AIR 2017 SC 612 [LNINDORD 2017 SC 1134] ."
+"183. Killer Thiayagu v. State, AIR 2017 SC 612 [LNINDORD 2017 SC 1134] ."
+"184. Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 :"
+"AIR 2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] ; NandKishore v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 2775 [LNIND"
+"2011 SC 622] : (2011) 12 SCC 120 [LNIND 2011 SC 622] ; Baldeo Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1972"
+"SC 464 : 1972 Cr LJ 262 ; Rana Pratap v State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680 [LNIND 1983 SC 157]"
+": 1983 Cr LJ 1272 : (1983) 3 SCC 327 [LNIND 1983 SC 157] ,"
+"185. Syed Yousuf Hussain v State of AP, AIR 2013 SC 1677 [LNIND 2013 SC 275] : 2013 Cr LJ"
+"2172 : 2013 (5) Scale 346 [LNIND 2013 SC 275] , (2013)4 SCC 517 [LNIND 2013 SC 275] ; Suresh"
+"v State of UP, 2001 (3) SCC 673 [LNIND 2001 SC 623] ; Lallan Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC"
+333 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] : 2003 Cr LJ 465 : (2003) 1 SCC 268 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] .
+"186. Sudip Kr. Sen v State of WB, AIR 2016 SC 310 [LNIND 2016 SC 10] : 2016 Cr LJ 1121 ."
+"187. Nagesar v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 2948 ."
+"188. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 [LNIND 1924 BOM 206] ."
+"189. Mehbub Shah v King-Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 148 ."
+190. Supra.191.Supra.
+"192. Pandurang v State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 [LNIND 1954 SC 171] : 1955 Cr LJ 572 ."
+"193. Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 :"
+"AIR 2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] NandKishore v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 2775 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 622] : (2011) 12 SCC 120 [LNIND 2011 SC 622] .
+"194. Vijendra Singh v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 860 [LNIND 2017 SC 16] ; Bharwad Mepa Dana v"
+"State of Bombay, AIR 1960SC 289."
+"195. Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 .
+"196. Shreekantiah Ramayya, (1954) 57 Bom LR 632 (SC); Shiv Prasad, AIR 1965 SC 264 [LNIND"
+1964 SC 51] : (1965) 1 CrLJ 249 .
+"197. Baba Lodhi v State of UP, (1987) 2 SCC 352 : AIR 1987 SC 1268 : 1987 Cr LJ 1119 ; MA"
+"AbdullaKunhi v State of Kerala, AIR 1991 SC 452 [LNIND 1991 SC 24] : 1991 Cr LJ 525 : (1991) 2"
+"SCC 225 [LNIND 1991 SC 24] ; Noor v State ofKarnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 84 [LNIND 2007 SC 639]"
+: (2008) 2 SCC Cr 221 : 2007 Cr LJ 4299 .
+"198. Tara Devi v State of UP, (1990) 4 SCC 144 : AIR 1991 SC 342 . See also Hem Raj v State"
+"Delhi Admn., 1990 Cr LJ 2665 : 1990 Supp SCC 291 : AIR 1990 SC 2252 , one of the accused"
+"alone proved to have given the fatal blow, the participation of others not proved, others not"
+convicted under section 302/34.
+"199. Bishan Singh v State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 973 : AIR 1983 SC 748 : 1983 Cr LJ (SC) 327 :"
+"1983 SCC (Cr) 578; Ghanshyam v State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 439 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 293 : (1982) 2"
+SCC 400 .
+"200. Dasrathlal v State of Gujarat, 1979 Cr LJ 1078 (SC) : AIR 1979 SC 1342 . See further"
+"Rangaswami v State of TN, AIR 1989 SC 1137 : 1989 Cr LJ 875 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 617 : 1989 Supp"
+"(1) SCC 686 . Gulshan v State of Punjab, 1989 Cr LJ 120 : AIR 1988 SC 2110 : 1990 Supp SCC"
+682 .
+"201. Jarnail Singh v State of Punjab, (1996) 1 SCC 527 [LNIND 1995 SC 1172] : AIR 1996 SC 755"
+[LNIND 1995 SC 1172] : 1996 Cr LJ 1139 .
+202. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd (2010) 10 SCC 479
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 Cr LJ 8 ; Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani v State of Maharashtra,"
+"1998 SCC (Cr) 698; Hamlet @ Sasi. v State of Kerala, (2003) 10 SCC 108 [LNIND 2003 SC 688] ;"
+"Surendra Chauhan v State of MP, (2000) 4 SCC 110 [LNIND 2000 SC 515] : AIR 2000 SC 1436"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 515] ; Ramjee Rai v State of Bihar, (2006) 13 SCC 229 [LNIND 2006 SC 647] :"
+"2006 Cr LJ 4630 ; Prakash v State of MP, (2006) 13 SCC 508 [LNIND 2006 SC 1071] : 2007 Cr LJ"
+"798 ; Sham Shankar Kankaria v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165 [LNIND 2006 SC 684] ;"
+"Manik Das v State of Assam, (2007) 11 SCC 403 [LNIND 2007 SC 769] : AIR 2007 SC 2274"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 769] , participation proved."
+"203. Chacko v State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 269 [LNIND 2004 SC 86] : AIR 2004 SC 2688"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 86] ; Abdul Wahid v State of Rajasthan, (2004) 11 SCC 241 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+"1454] : AIR 2004 SC 3211 [LNIND 2004 SC 1454] : 2004 Cr LJ 2850 ; Janak Singh v State of UP,"
+(2004) 11 SCC 385 [LNIND 2004 SC 515] : AIR 2004 SC 2495 [LNIND 2004 SC 515] : 2004 Cr LJ
+"2533 ; Parsuram Pandey v State of Bihar, 2005 SCC (Cr) 113 : AIR 2004 SC 5068 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+1075] .
+"204. Suresh Sakharam Nangare v State of Maharashtra, 2012 (9) Scale 245 [LNIND 2012 SC 574]"
+: (2012) 9 SCC 249 [LNIND 2012 SC 574] .
+"205. Raju v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 4425 ."
+"206. Shreekantiah Ramayya v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] : 1955"
+SCR (1) 1177 .
+"207. Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v State of AP, (2003) 12 SC 306 : AIR 2004 SC 132 [LNIND 2003"
+"SC 888] : 2004 Cr LJ 390 ; Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] :"
+"(2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 ; Jaikrishnadas Desai, (1960) 3 SCR 319 [LNIND 1960 SC"
+"79] : AIR 1960 SC 889 [LNIND 1960 SC 79] : 1960 Cr LJ 1250 ; Dani Singh v State of Bihar, AIR"
+2004 SC 4570 [LNIND 2004 SC 1490] : (2004) 13 SCC 203 [LNIND 2004 SC 1490] .
+"208. Suresh v State of UP, 2001 (3) SCC 673 [LNIND 2001 SC 623] : AIR 2001 SC 1344 [LNIND"
+"2001 SC 623] ; Ramaswami Ayyangar v State of TN, AIR 1976 SC 2027 [LNIND 1976 SC 128] :"
+1976 Cr LJ 1536 (the presence of those who in one way or the other facilitate the execution of
+"the common design itself tantamounts to actual participation in the ""criminal act"")."
+"209. Rajkishore Purohit v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2017 SC 3588 [LNIND 2017 SC 362] ."
+"210. Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v State of AP, (2003) 12 SC 306 : AIR 2004 SC 132 [LNIND 2003"
+"SC 888] : 2004 Cr LJ 390 , citing Shankarlal Kacharabhai, AIR 1965 SC 1260 [LNIND 1964 SC"
+230] : 1965 (2) Cr LJ 226 .
+"211. Dharnidhar v State of UP, (2010) 7 SCC 759 [LNIND 2010 SC 584] : 2010 (7) Scale 12 ;"
+"Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 : AIR"
+2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] .
+"212. Amrik Singh v State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 465 (SC) : (1972) 4 SCC (N) 42 (SC)."
+"213. Krishna Govind Patil v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 [LNIND 1963 SC 12] : 1964"
+(1) SCR 678 [LNIND 1963 SC 12] : 1963 Cr LJ 351 (SC); State of Maharashtra v Jagmohan Singh
+"Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659 [LNIND 2004 SC 862] : AIR 2004 SC 4412 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+"862] , the prosecution is not required to prove in every case a pre-arranged plan or prior concert."
+"Preetam Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 594 , prior concert can be inferred, common"
+intention can develop on the spot.
+"214. Harbans Nonia v State of Bihar, AIR 1992 SC 125 : 1992 Cr LJ 105 ."
+"215. Dharam Pal v State of UP, AIR 1995 SC 1988 [LNIND 1995 SC 198] : 1995 Cr LJ 3642 ."
+"216. Hanuman Prasad v State of Rajasthan, (2009) 1 SCC 507 [LNIND 2008 SC 2256] : (2009) 1"
+"SCC Cr 564, the Supreme Court distinguishes common intention from similar intention and also"
+explains the meaning and applicability of the expression.
+"217. Dajya Moshaya Bhil v State of Maharashtra, 1984 Cr LJ 1728 : AIR 1984 SC 1717 : 1984"
+Supp SCC 373 . The Supreme Court applied the distinction between common intention and
+"similar intention in State of UP v Rohan Singh, (1996) Cr LJ 2884 (SC) : AIR 1996 SCW 2612 . In"
+"Mohan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 [LNIND 1962 SC 118] it was held that persons"
+having similar intention which is not the result of pre-concerted plan cannot be held guilty for
+"the ""criminal act"" with the aid of Section 34."
+"218. Parichhat v State of MP, 1972 Cr LJ 322 : AIR 1972 SC 535 ; Amrik Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"1972 Cr LJ 465 (SC). Followed in Khem Karan v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 2138 All where each"
+"accused hit differently at the behest of one of them, hence, no common intention."
+"219. Mitter Sen v State of UP, 1976 Cr LJ 857 : AIR 1976 SC 1156 ; see also Gajjan Singh v State"
+"of Punjab, 1976 Cr LJ 1640 : AIR 1976 SC 2069 [LNIND 1976 SC 72] ; Jarnail Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, 1982 Cr LJ 386 : AIR 1982 SC 70 (SC)."
+"220. Rambilas Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1593 [LNIND 1989 SC 216] : (1989) 3 SCC 605"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 216] : 1989 Cr LJ 1782 . The conviction under sub-sections 34/149 and 34/302
+was set aside.
+"221. Tripta v State of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 948 : 1992 Cr LJ 3944 . See also Major Singh v State"
+"of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 342 [LNIND 2002 SC 742] : 2003 Cr LJ 473 : (2002) 10 SCC 60 [LNIND"
+"2002 SC 742] ; Balram Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 2213 [LNIND 2003 SC 514] : (2003)"
+SCC 286 .
+"222. Devaramani v State of Karnataka, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1534 SC. See also Gopi Nath v State of UP,"
+"AIR 2001 SC 2493 : 2001 Cr LJ 3514 ; Pal Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 2548 [LNIND"
+"1999 SC 604] : 1999 Cr LJ 3962 ;Prem v Daula, AIR 1997 SC 715 [LNIND 1997 SC 64] : 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 838 ; Muni Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 3640 ;Mahesh Mahto v State of Bihar, AIR 1997"
+SC 3567 [LNIND 1997 SC 1103] : 1997 Cr LJ 4402 .
+"223. Lallan Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 333 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] : 2003 Cr LJ 465 : (2003)"
+1 SCC 268 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] .
+"224. Narinder Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2212 [LNIND 2000 SC 615] : 2000 Cr LJ 3462"
+", Sheelam Ramesh v State ofAP, AIR 2000 SC 118 [LNIND 1999 SC 926] : 2000 Cr LJ 51 ; State of"
+"Haryana v Bhagirath, AIR 1999 SC 2005 [LNIND 1999 SC 541] : 1999 CrLJ 2898 ; Asha v State of"
+"Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2828 [LNIND 1997 SC 844] : 1997 Cr LJ 3561 ."
+"225. Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : (2011) 6 SCC"
+1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ 2908 .
+"226. Krishnan v State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 [LNIND 2003 SC 587] : AIR 2003 SC 2978 [LNIND 2003"
+SC 587] : 2003 Cr LJ 3705 .
+"227. Rajkishore Purohit v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 3588 [LNIND 2017 SC 362] ."
+"228. Ajay Sharma v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 SC 2798 [LNIND 1998 SC 879] : 1998 Cr LJ"
+"4599 . See also State of Karnatakav Maruthi, AIR 1997 SC 3797 : 1997 Cr LJ 4407 ; Bhupinder"
+"Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC642 : 1997 Cr LJ 958 ."
+"229. State of UP v Balkrishna Das, AIR 1997 SC 225 [LNIND 1996 SC 1753] : 1997 Cr LJ 73 ."
+"230. State of AP v M Sobhan Babu, 2011 (3) Scale 451 [LNIND 2010 SC 1219] : 2011 Cr LJ 2175"
+(SC).
+"231. Rajkishore Purohit v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 3588 [LNIND 2017 SC 362] ; State of AP v M."
+"Sobhan Babu, 2011 (3) Scale 451 [LNIND 2010 SC 1219] : 2011 Cr LJ 2175 (SC)."
+"232. Kuria v State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] : 2012 Cr LJ 4707 (SC);"
+"Hemchand Jha v State of Bihar, (2008) 11 SCC 303 [LNIND 2008 SC 1299] : (2008) Cr LJ 3203 ;"
+"Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 : AIR"
+"2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] ; Nand Kishore v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 2775 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 622] : (2011) 12 SCC 120 [LNIND 2011 SC 622] .
+"233. Bengai Mandal v State of Bihar, AIR 2010 SC 686 [LNIND 2010 SC 39] : (2010) 2 SCC 91"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 39] .
+"234. Maqsoodan v State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 218 : AIR 1983 SC 126 [LNIND 1982 SC 199] : (1983)"
+"1 SCC 218 [LNIND 1982 SC 199] ; Aizaz v State of UP, (2008) 12 SCC 198 [LNIND 2008 SC 1621]"
+": 2008 Cr LJ 4374 , Lala Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 10 SCC 225 [LNIND 2007 SC 803] :"
+"(2007) 3 SCC Cr 634, Harbans Kaur v State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 2989 [LNIND 2005 SC 211] :"
+"2005 Cr LJ 2199 (SC), Dani Singh v State of Bihar, 2004 (13) SCC 203 [LNIND 2004 SC 1490] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 3328 (SC).
+"235. Ram Tahal v State of UP, 1972 Cr LJ 227 : AIR 1972 SC 254 [LNIND 1971 SC 579] ; see also"
+"Nitya Sen v State of WB, 1978 Cr LJ 481 : AIR 1978 SC 383 ; Sivam v State of Kerala, 1978 Cr LJ"
+"1609 : AIR 1978 SC 1529 ; Jagdeo Singh v State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cr LJ 166 : AIR 1981 SC"
+"648 (SC); Aher Pitha Vajshi v State of Gujarat, 1983 Cr LJ 1049 : AIR 1983 SC 599 [LNIND 1983"
+"SC 98] : 1983 SCC (Cr) 607; Manju Gupta v MS Paintal, AIR 1982 SC 1181 [LNIND 1982 DEL 128] :"
+1982 Cr LJ 1393 : (1982) 2 SCC 412 . Another instance of failed prosecution under the Act is
+"Harendra Narayan Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 1842 [LNIND 1991 SC 307] : 1991 Cr LJ"
+"2666 . Ghana Pradhan v State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1133 : 1991 Cr LJ 1178 . Common intention"
+not established even when the two accused were striking the same person in their own ways.
+"236. Raju @ Rajendra v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 1248 (SC) : (2013) 2 SCC 233 [LNIND"
+2013 SC 25] .
+"237. Jhinku Nai v State of UP, AIR 2001 SC 2815 [LNIND 2001 SC 1587] at p. 2817. See also"
+"Jagga Singh v State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 137 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 288] : AIR 2011 SC 960"
+[LNINDORD 2011 SC 288] .
+"238. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd, (2010) 10 SCC 479"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 Cr LJ 8 : (2010) 12 SCR 551 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 68.
+"239. Darbara Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 (8) Scale 649 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] : (2012) 10 SCC"
+"476 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] ; Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2006 SC 191 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+887] : (2005) 12 SCC 615 [LNIND 2005 SC 887] .
+"240. Vijay Singh v State of MP, 2014 Cr LJ 2158 ."
+"241. Willie Slavey v The State of MP, 1955 (2) SCR 1140 [LNIND 1955 SC 90] at p 1189 : AIR"
+1956 SC 116 [LNIND 1955 SC 90] .
+"242. Santosh Kumari v State of J&K, (2011) 9 SCC 234 [LNIND 2011 SC 901] : AIR 2011 SC 3402"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 901] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 657.
+"243. Krishna Govind Patil v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 [LNIND 1963 SC 12] : 1963"
+Cr LJ 351 relied in Chinnam Kameswara Rao v State of AP 2013 Cr LJ 1540 : JT 2013 (2) SC 398
+[LNIND 2013 SC 57] : 2013 (1) Scale 643 [LNIND 2013 SC 57] .
+"244. Anil Sharma v State of Jharkhand, (2004) 5 SCC 679 [LNIND 2004 SC 590] : AIR 2004 SC"
+2294 [LNIND 2004 SC 590] : 2004 Cr LJ 2527 .
+"245. Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : (2011) 6 SCC"
+1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ 2908 .
+"246. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v Emp., AIR 1925 PC 1 [LNIND 1924 BOM 206] (7) : 26 Cr LJ 431;"
+"Nanak Chand v State of Punjab, 1955 Cr LJ 721 (SC); Anam Pradhan v State, 1982 Cr LJ 1585"
+"(Ori). Chittaramal v State of Rajasthan, (2003) 2 SCC 266 [LNIND 2003 SC 14] : AIR 2003 SC 796"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 14] : 2003 Cr LJ 889 , points of similarity and distinction explained in the case."
+"247. Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 .
+"248. Surinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2003) 10 SCC 66 [LNIND 2003 SC 652] ."
+"249. Lachman Singh v The State, 1952 SCR 839 [LNIND 1952 SC 21] : AIR 1952 SC 167 [LNIND"
+"1952 SC 21] : 1952 Cr LJ 863 and Karnail Singh vState of Punjab, 1954 SCR 904 [LNIND 1953 SC"
+126] : AIR 1954 SC 204 [LNIND 1953 SC 126] : 1954 Cr LJ 580 .
+250. Sangappa Sanganabasappa v State of Karnataka (2010) 11 SCC 782 [LNIND 2010 SC 866] :
+"(2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 256; BaitalSingh v State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 1982 : 1990 Cr LJ 2091 : 1990"
+"Supp SCC 804 ; Ramdeo RaoYadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1990 SC 1180 [LNIND 1990 SC 126] :"
+1990 Cr LJ 1983 .
+"251. Dahari vState of UP, AIR 2013 SC 308 2012 (10) Scale 160, (2012)10 SCC 256 [LNIND 2012"
+"SC 638] ; Jivan Lal v State ofMP, 1997 (9) SCC 119 [LNIND 1996 SC 2679] ; and Hamlet @ Sasi v"
+"State of Kerala, AIR 2003 SC 3682 [LNIND 2003 SC 688] ; Gurpreet Singh vState of Punjab, AIR"
+"2006 SC 191 [LNIND 2005 SC 887] ; Sanichar Sahni v State of Bihar, AIR 2010 SC 3786 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 1350] ; S Ganesan vRama Raghuraman, 2011 (2) SCC 83 [LNIND 2011 SC 5] ; Darbara"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 (8) Scale 649 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] : (2012)10 SCC 476 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 545] : JT 2012 (8) SC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] .
+"252. Manik Shankarrao Dhotre v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1505 (Kar); State of"
+"Maharashtra vMahipal Singh Satyanarayan Singh, 1996 Cr LJ 2485 ."
+"253. Brahmjit Singh v State, 1992 Cr LJ 408 (Del)."
+"254. Prem v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 1608 (Bom).255.Dukhmochan Pandey v State of"
+"Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 40 [LNIND 1997 SC 1255] : 1998 Cr LJ 66 ."
+"256. State of Gujarat v Chandubhai Malubhai Parmar, AIR 1997 SC 1422 [LNIND 1997 SC 627] :"
+1997 Cr LJ 1909 (SC).
+"257. Ghoura Chandra Naik v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 275 (Ori). See Rameshchandra Bhogilal"
+"Patel vState Of Gujarat, 2011 Cr LJ 1395 (Guj) (Section 420/34)."
+"258. Dev Cyrus Colabawala v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 758 (Bom)."
+"259. Atambir Singh v State of Delhi, 2016 Cr LJ 568 (Del)."
+"260. Vinay Kumar Rai v State of Bihar, (2008) 12 SCC 202 [LNIND 2008 SC 1646] : 2008 Cr LJ"
+4319 : AIR 2008 SC 3276 [LNIND 2008 SC 1646] .
+"261. Nagaraja v State of Karnataka, (2008) 17 SCC 277 [LNIND 2008 SC 2484] : AIR 2009 SC"
+"1522 [LNIND 2008 SC 2484] : one accused struck onthe road with an iron rod, two others used"
+"fists and kicks, there was nothing more common, the twocould be convicted under section 323."
+See also Mohan Singh v State of MP AIR 1999 SC 883 [LNIND 1999 SC 69] : (1999) 2 SCC 428
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 69] , Abdul Wahid v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 3211 [LNIND 2004 SC 1454]"
+": (2004) 11 SCC 241 [LNIND 2004 SC 1454] ; AjaySharma v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 SC 2798"
+[LNIND 1998 SC 879] : (1999) 1 SCC 174 [LNIND 1998 SC 879] .
+"262. Chandra Kaur v State of Rajasthan, 2016 Cr LJ 3346 : AIR 2016 SC 2926 [LNINDU 2015 SC"
+139] .
+263. Suresh v State of UP AIR 2001 SC 1344 [LNIND 2001 SC 623] : (2001) 3 SCC 673 [LNIND
+"2001 SC 623] quoted from Shatrughan Patar vEmperor. See also Sewa Ram v State of UP, 2008"
+"Cr LJ 802 : AIR 2008 SC682 [LNIND 2007 SC 1452] ; Abaram v State of MP, (2007) 12 SCC 105"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 546] : (2008) 2 SCC Cr 243 : 2007 Cr LJ 2743 .
+"264. Bhanwar Singh v State of MP, (2008) 16 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : AIR 2009 SC 768"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1246] ; Vajrapu Sambayya Naidu vState of AP, AIR 2003 SC 3706 [LNIND 2003"
+SC 176] : (2004) 10 SCC 152 [LNIND 2003 SC 176] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+170.[[s 34] Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.
+When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common
+"intention 1 of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it"
+were done by him alone.]
+COMMENT—
+"Introduction.—Ordinarily, no man can be held responsible for an independent act and"
+"wrong committed by another. However, section 34 of the IPC, 1860 makes an exception"
+to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act.
+"The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention,"
+animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
+"intention. It deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or adverse by several"
+"persons, if all are done in furtherance of common intention. In such situation, each"
+person is liable for the result of that as if he had done that act himself.171. The soul of
+"section 34, IPC, 1860 is the joint liability in doing a criminal act.172."
+[s 34.1] History.—
+"Section 34 IPC, 1860 is part of the original Code of 1860 as drafted by Lord Macaulay."
+"The original section as it stood was ""When a criminal act is done by several persons,"
+each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by
+"him alone."" However, on account of certain observations made by Sir Barnes Peacock,"
+"CJ, in Queen v Gora Chand Gope,173. it was necessary to bring about a change in the"
+"wordings of the section. Accordingly, in the year 1870 an amendment was brought"
+"which introduced the following words after ""when a criminal act is done by several"
+"persons..."" ""…in furtherance of the common intention..."". After this change, the section"
+has not been changed or amended ever.
+[s 34.2] Object.—
+The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish
+between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common
+intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The true
+"contents of the section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly,"
+the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by
+"himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab,174. the existence of a common"
+intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of
+this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with
+commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may
+"be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common"
+"intention in order to attract the provision.175. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor,176."
+stated the true purport of section 34 as:
+The words of s.34 are not to be eviscerated by reading them in this exceedingly limited
+"sense. By s.33 a criminal act in s.34 includes a series of acts and, further, 'act' includes"
+"omission to act, for example, an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being"
+"done before one's very eyes. By s.37, when any offence is committed by means of several"
+acts whoever intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence by doing any one
+"of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence. Even if the"
+"appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in crimes as"
+in other things 'they also serve who only stand and wait'.177.
+[s 34.3] Principle.—
+This section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
+"Section 34 IPC, 1860 lays down the principle of constructive liability. The essence of"
+"section 34 IPC, 1860 is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of the persons"
+"participating in criminal action to bring about a particular result. Section 34 IPC, 1860"
+stipulates that the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. In
+"fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a number of persons act together"
+and on the facts of the case it is not possible for the prosecution to prove as to which
+of the persons who acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction
+exists between a charge for an offence under a particular section and a charge under
+"that section read with section 34.178. Therefore, section 34, IPC, 1860, would apply"
+even if no charge is framed under that section provided of course from the evidence it
+becomes clear that there was pre-arranged plan to achieve the commonly intended
+"object.179. Thus, where six persons were charged under sections 148, 302/149 and"
+"307/149, IPC, 1860, but two were acquitted, the remaining four accused could be"
+convicted on the charges of murder and attempt to murder with the aid of section 34 of
+the Penal Code.180. This section really means that if two or more persons intentionally
+"do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually.181. If the"
+criminal act was a fresh and independent act springing wholly from the mind of the
+"doer, the others are not liable merely because when it was done they were intending to"
+be partakers with the doer in a different criminal act.
+"[s 34.4] Scope, ambit and applicability.—"
+Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code recognises the principle of vicarious liability in
+criminal jurisprudence. The said principle enshrined under Section 34 of the Code
+would be attracted only if one or more than one accused person act conjointly in the
+commission of offence with others. It is not necessary that all such persons should be
+named and identified before the liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code can
+be invoked. So long as the evidence brought by the prosecution would disclose that
+one or more accused persons had acted in concert with other persons not named or
+"identified, the liability under Section 34 of the Code would still be attracted. Once the"
+"other accused stands acquitted in absence of said evidence, the vicarious liability"
+under section 34 of the Code would not be attracted so as to hold the accused liable
+"for the offence with the aid of Section 34 of the Code. However, the accused would still"
+be liable for the offence if the injury or injuries leading to offence can be attributed to
+him.182. A bare reading of this section shows that the section could be dissected as
+follows:
+(a) Criminal act is done by several persons;
+(b) Such act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all; and
+(c) Each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done
+by him alone.
+"(d) But, it is not necessary that all such persons should be named and identified"
+before the liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code can be invoked.183.
+"In other words, these three ingredients would guide the court in determining whether an"
+accused is liable to be convicted with the aid of section 34. While first two are the acts
+"which are attributable and have to be proved as actions of the accused, the third is the"
+"consequence. Once the criminal act and common intention are proved, then by fiction"
+"of law, criminal liability of having done that act by each person individually would arise."
+"The criminal act, according to section 34 IPC, 1860 must be done by several persons."
+"The emphasis in this part of the section is on the word ""done"".184. The section does not"
+envisage the separate act by all the accused persons for becoming responsible for the
+"ultimate criminal act. If such an interpretation is accepted, the purpose of section 34"
+"shall be rendered infructuous.185. Under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, a pre-"
+concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved.186. It is a
+well settled law that mere presence or association with other members is not per se
+sufficient to hold each of them criminally liable for the offences committed by the other
+"members, unless there is sufficient evidence on record to show that one such member"
+also intends to or knows the likelihood of commission of such an offending act.187.
+[s 34.5] Three leading Cases.—
+"The case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor,188. is a locus classicus and has"
+been followed by number of High Courts and the Supreme Court in a large number of
+"cases. In this case, the Judicial Committee dealt with the scope of section 34 dealing"
+"with the acts done in furtherance of the common intention, making all equally liable for"
+the results of all the acts of others. It was observed that section 34 when it speaks of a
+"criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, has"
+"regard not to the offence as a whole, but to the criminal act, that is to say, the totality of"
+the series of acts which result in the offence. In the case of a person assaulted by
+"many accused, the criminal act is the offence which finally results, though the"
+achievement of that criminal act may be the result of the action of several persons.
+"In another celebrated case Mehbub Shah v King-Emperor,189. the court held that:"
+Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section
+"does not say ""the common intentions of all,"" nor does it say ""an intention common to all."""
+"Under the section, the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common"
+intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
+"intention. To invoke the aid of s.34 successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act"
+complained against was done by one of the accused persons in the furtherance of the
+"common intention of all; if this is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any"
+one of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. This being the
+"principle, it is clear to their Lordships that common intention within the meaning of the"
+"section implies a pre-arranged plan, and to convict the accused of an offence applying the"
+section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-
+arranged plan.
+Approving the judgments of the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh (Barendra
+"Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor,190. and Mahbub Shah cases191 a three-Judge Bench of"
+"Supreme Court in Pandurang v State of Hyderabad,192. held that to attract the"
+applicability of section 34 of the Code the prosecution is under an obligation to
+establish that there existed a common intention which requires a pre-arranged plan
+"because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the"
+act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of all. The Court had
+in mind the ultimate act done in furtherance of the common intention
+[s 34.6] Common intention and mens rea.—
+"Under section 34, every individual offender is associated with the criminal act which"
+constitutes the offence both physically as well as mentally i.e. he is a participant not
+only in what has been described as a common act but also what is termed as the
+"common intention and, therefore, in both these respects his individual role is put into"
+serious jeopardy although this individual role might be a part of a common scheme in
+which others have also joined him and played a role that is similar or different. But
+"referring to the common intention, it needs to be clarified that the courts must keep in"
+"mind the fine distinction between ""common intention"" on the one hand and mens rea as"
+understood in criminal jurisprudence on the other. Common intention is not alike or
+identical to mens rea. The latter may be coincidental with or collateral to the former but
+they are distinct and different.193.
+[s 34.7] Participation.—
+Participation of several persons in some action with the common intention of
+"committing a crime is an essential ingredient; once such participation is established,"
+"section 34 is at once attracted.194. Thus, the dominant feature of section 34 is the"
+element of intention and participation in action. This participation need not in all cases
+be by physical presence.195. The Supreme Court has held that it is the essence of the
+section that the person must be physically present at the actual commission of the
+"crime. He need not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by a"
+gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a
+"car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present"
+at the scene of the occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the
+offence in some way or other at the time crime is actually being committed.196.
+The Supreme Court has emphasised that proof of participation by acceptable evidence
+may in circumstances be a clue to the common intention and that it would not be fatal
+to the prosecution case that the culprits had no community of interests.197.
+"Sometimes, however, absence of actual participation may serve an important purpose"
+"as it happened, for example, where in a love triangle the paramour killed the woman's"
+husband and she remained sitting with the dead body inside the house without opening
+"the door. The main accused having been acquitted, the Supreme Court held that the"
+woman alone could not be convicted under section 302 read with section 34
+particularly in view of the fact that the nature of the injuries (gandasa blows with a
+heavy hand) made it explicit that they were the handiwork of masculine power and not
+that of feminine hands.198. It is also necessary to remember that mere presence of the
+offender at the scene of murder without any participation to facilitate the offence is not
+enough.199. By merely accompanying the accused one does not become liable for the
+"crime committed by the accused within the meaning of section 34, IPC, 1860.200. The"
+degree of participation is also an important factor.201. The court restated the two
+ingredients for application of the section which are:
+"(i) common intention to commit a crime, and"
+(ii) participation by all the accused in the act or acts in furtherance of the common
+intention. These two things establish their joint liability.202.
+Where one of the accused persons focussed light on the victim with a torch so as to
+"enable others to assault him, otherwise it is a dark night. The court said that his"
+conduct prior and subsequent to the occurrence clearly showed that he shared the
+"common intention so far as the assault on the deceased was concerned. Hence, he"
+was rightly roped in under section 34.203. If participation is proved and common
+"intention is absent, section 34 cannot be invoked.204. The co-accused was standing"
+"outside the house, where the incident took place, while the others committed the"
+murder. There is no evidence of his having played any part in the crime. He did not even
+act as a guard; he did not prevent the witness from entering the house. There is no
+evidence of the formation or sharing of any common intention with the other accused.
+"No weapon was seized from him, nor was any property connected with the crime,"
+"confiscated from him. It was therefore, held that, it was not safe to convict the co-"
+accused of the offence of murder with the aid of sub-sections 34 and 120(B).205.
+[s 34.8] Physical Presence not sine qua non.—
+Physical presence at the very spot is not always a necessary ingredient to attract the
+"action. The Supreme Court decision in Shreekantiah Ramayya v State of Bombay,206. is"
+"the authority for the aforesaid proposition. Vivian Bose, J, speaking for the Bench of"
+three Judges stated thus:
+"He need not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by a gate"
+outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a
+nearby road ready to facilitate their escape.
+What is required is his actual participation in the commission of the offence in some
+way or other at the time when the crime is actually being committed. The participation
+"need not in all cases be by physical presence. In offence involving physical violence,"
+"normally presence at the scene of offence may be necessary, but such is not the case"
+in respect of other offences when the offence consists of diverse acts which may be
+done at different times and places. The physical presence at the scene of offence of
+the offender sough to be rendered liable under this section is not one of the conditions
+of its applicability in every case.207. Even the concept of presence of the co-accused at
+"the scene is not a necessary requirement to attract section 34 of the IPC, 1860, e.g., the"
+co-accused can remain a little away and supply weapons to the participating accused
+either by throwing or by catapulting them so that the participating accused can inflict
+"injuries on the targeted person. There may be other provisions in the IPC, 1860 like sub-"
+sections 120B or 109 which could be invoked then to catch such non-participating
+"accused. Thus, participation in the crime in furtherance of the common intention is sine"
+"qua non for section 34 IPC, 1860. Exhortation to other accused, even guarding the"
+"scene etc. would amount to participation. Of course, when the allegation against an"
+accused is that he participated in the crime by oral exhortation or by guarding the
+scene the court has to evaluate the evidence very carefully for deciding whether that
+person had really done any such act.208.
+"The absence of any overt act of assault, exhortation or possession of weapon cannot"
+be singularly determinative of absence of common intention.209.
+[s 34.9] In furtherance of common intention.—
+The Supreme Court referred to the Oxford English Dictionary where the word
+"""furtherance"" is defined as an ""action of helping forward."" Russell, in his book on"
+Criminal Law adopted this definition and said:
+It indicates some kind of aid or assistance proceeding an effect in future and that any act
+may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally
+"taken for the purpose of effecting the felony."" The Supreme Court has also construed the"
+"word ""furtherance"" as ""advancement or promotion.210."
+1. 'Common intention'.—The phrase 'common intention' means a pre-oriented plan and
+acting in pursuance to the plan. The common intention to give effect to a particular act
+may even develop at the spur of moment between a number of persons with reference
+to the facts of a given case.211. In Amrik Singh's case it has further been held that
+though common intention may develop in course of the fight but there must be clear
+and unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference.212. Before a Court can convict a
+"person for any offence read with section 34, it should come to a definite conclusion"
+"that the said person had a prior concert with one or more other persons, named or"
+"unnamed, for committing the said offence.213. Where the act of murder by the main"
+accused was facilitated by two others by catching hold of the victim but without
+"knowing nor having the intention of causing death, it was held that the only common"
+intention that could be inferred was that of causing grievous hurt.214. Where the
+accused had inflicted lathi blows causing injuries only on the eyewitness and not on the
+"deceased, he could not be said to have shared the common intention of committing"
+murder of the deceased. He was acquitted for the charge of murder and was convicted
+under section 325.215.
+Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute
+common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to
+the rest of them and shared by them.216.
+What to speak of similar intention even same intention without sharing each other's
+intention is not enough for this section.217. In a case like this each will be liable for
+whatever injury he caused but none could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of
+"the others.218. In fine, if common intention cannot be inferred from the evidence of"
+"facts and circumstances of the case, section 34, IPC, 1860, cannot be invoked.219. A"
+party of farmers was cutting their crop. The deceased took away a portion of the
+harvested crop. That night when he was returning from a barat 16 persons waited for
+him on the way. They came towards him and the convict who was carrying a knife gave
+him a stab wound on the neck which proved fatal. The others did not know that he had
+"a knife and all of them being with bare hands, it could not be said that they had the"
+common intention of causing death. They could as well have thought that after
+surrounding the accused he would be called upon to return or pay for the harvest taken
+away by him.220.A person gifted his land to one of his grandsons. His other son along
+"with his wife fully armed, the man with a lathi and the woman with a gandasa came to"
+protest. The man lost control and both grandson and his father intervened to save the
+situation but they received lathi blows and died. The woman struck only her brother-in-
+law with the gandasa causing a non-fatal injury. Her husband was convicted for murder
+but her punishment was reduced to causing grievous hurt because it appeared that the
+whole thing was a spot happening and not a planned affair.221.
+"Where the genesis of the verbal wrangle between the neighbours was not known, but it"
+"appeared to have arisen suddenly, there being no chance for common intention to be"
+"formulated, each attacker was held to be punishable for his individual acts.222."
+Where common intention was established the mere fact that one of the culprits
+distanced himself from the scene could not absolve him from liability.223.
+It is not necessary for bringing a case within the scope of section 34 to find as to who
+in fact inflicted the fatal blow. A conviction under the section read with the relevant
+substantive provision can be made when the ingredients required by the section are
+satisfied and it is not necessary to mention the section number in the judgment.224.
+Death of two persons was caused by unprovoked firing by appellants who are police
+officials and grievous gunshot injuries to another person. It was not necessary to
+assign a specific role to each individual appellant as the firing at the Car was
+undoubtedly with a clear intent to annihilate those in it and was resorted to in
+furtherance of common intention of all the appellants. The accused were liable to
+"conviction under section 302/34 IPC, 1860.225. The acts of all the accused need not be"
+the same or identically similar. All that is necessary is that they all must be actuated by
+the one and the same common intention. The fact that two of them caused injuries at
+the back of their victim and the injury at the head which proved to be fatal was caused
+"by the third person, the two co-accused could not claim to be absolved of liability for"
+murder.226.
+It is not necessary for bringing about the conviction of the co-accused to show that he
+also committed an overt act for the achievement of their object. The absence of any
+overt act or possession of weapon cannot be singularly determinative of absence of
+common intention. If common intention by meeting of minds is established in the facts
+and circumstances of the case there need not be an overt act or possession of weapon
+"required, to establish common intention.227."
+The accused caught hold of the victim and exhorted the main accused to strike him. On
+such exhortation the main accused inflicted a Kirpan wound. The victim died. It was
+held that the instigation was only to strike. It could not be said that the accused shared
+the intention of the main accused to kill. The conviction was altered from under
+sections 202/34 to one under section 324.228. The victim woman was murdered by her
+father-in-law and brother-in-law. The third person helped them to conceal the dead body
+to screen them. The conviction of the two accused for murder was upheld but that of
+the third one only for concealment of evidence under sections 201/34.229.
+[s 34.10] Common Intention: How Proved.—
+The common intention can be inferred from the circumstances of the case and that the
+intention can be gathered from the circumstances as they arise even during an
+incident.230. Common intention is a state of mind. It is not possible to read a person's
+mind. There can hardly be direct evidence of common intention. The existence or non-
+existence of a common intention amongst the accused has to be deciphered
+cumulatively from their conduct and behaviour in the facts and circumstances of each
+"case. Events prior to the occurrence as also after, and during the occurrence, are all"
+relevant to deduce if there existed any common intention. There can be no straight
+jacket formula.231. The Court has to examine the prosecution evidence in regard to
+"application of section 34 cumulatively and if the ingredients are satisfied, the"
+consequences must follow. It is difficult to state any hard and fast rule which can be
+applied universally to all cases. It will always depend on the facts and circumstances of
+the given case whether the person involved in the commission of the crime with a
+common intention can be held guilty of the main offence committed by them
+"together.232. Courts, in most cases, have to infer the intention from the act(s) or"
+"conduct of the accused or other relevant circumstances of the case. However, an"
+inference as to the common intention shall not be readily drawn; the criminal liability
+can arise only when such inference can be drawn with a certain degree of
+assurance.233. In most cases it has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other
+relevant circumstances of the case in hand.234. This inference can be gathered by the
+"manner in which the accused arrived on the scene and mounted the attack, the"
+determination and concert with which the beating was given or the injuries caused by
+"one or some of them, the acts done by others to assist those causing the injuries, the"
+"concerted conduct subsequent to the commission of the offence, for instance all of"
+them left the scene of the incident together and other acts which all or some may have
+"done as would help in determining the common intention. In other words, the totality of"
+the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion
+whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence of which they
+could be convicted.235. Manner of attack shows the common intention of accused.236.
+The Supreme Court has reiterated:
+"We reiterate that for common intention, there could rarely be direct evidence. The ultimate"
+"decision, at any rate would invariably depend upon the inference deducible from the"
+circumstances of each case. It is settled law that the common intention or the intention of
+the individuals concerned in furtherance of the common intention could be proved either
+from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending circumstances of the case
+and conduct of the parties.237.
+[s 34.11] Complaint.—
+"In order to attract section 34 of the IPC, 1860, the complaint must, prima facie, reflect a"
+common prior concert or planning amongst all the accused.238.
+[s 34.12] Effect of no charge under section 34.—
+Even if section 34 has not been included in a charge framed for the offence under
+"section 302 IPC, 1860 against the accused, a conviction for the offence under section"
+302 with the aid of section 34 is not bad as no prejudice would be caused to him.239.
+Where the appellants caused injuries not enough to cause the death but the same were
+"caused by another, in the absence of a charge under section 34, they were found to be"
+"guilty under section 326 of IPC, 1860.240."
+"Sections 34, 114 and 149 of the IPC, 1860 provide for criminal liability viewed from"
+"different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a"
+common object or a common intention; and as explained by five Judge Constitution
+"Bench of in Willie Slavey v The State of MP,241. the charge is a rolled-up one involving"
+the direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable
+and who are sought to be made constructively liable.242. But before a court can convict
+"a person under section 302, read with section 34, of the Indian Penal Code, it should"
+come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more
+"other persons, named or unnamed, for committing the said offence. A few illustrations"
+will bring out the impact of section 34 on different situations.
+"(1) A, B, C and D are charged under section 302, read with section 34, of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, for committing the murder of E. The evidence is directed to establish that"
+the said four persons have taken part in the murder.
+"(2) A, B, C and D and unnamed others are charged under the said sections. But"
+"evidence is adduced to prove that the said persons, along with others, named or"
+"unnamed, participated jointly in the commission of that offence."
+"(3) A, B, C and D are charged under the said sections. But the evidence is directed to"
+"prove that A, B, C and D, along with 3 others, have jointly committed the offence. As"
+"regards the third illustration, a Court is certainly entitled to come to the conclusion that"
+"one of the named accused is guilty of murder under section 302, read with section 34,"
+"of the Indian Penal Code, though the other three named accused are acquitted, if it"
+"accepts the evidence that the said accused acted in concert along with persons,"
+"named or unnamed, other than those acquitted, in the commission of the offence. In"
+the second illustration the Court can come to the same conclusion and convict one of
+the named accused if it is satisfied that no prejudice has been caused to the accused
+by the defect in the charge. But in the first illustration the Court certainly can convict
+two or more of the named accused if it accepts the evidence that they acted conjointly
+in committing the offence. But what is the position if the Court acquits 3 of the 4
+accused either because it rejects the prosecution evidence or because it gives the
+"benefit of doubt to the said accused? Can it hold, in the absence of a charge as well as"
+"evidence, that though the three accused are acquitted, some other unidentified persons"
+"acted conjointly along with one of the named persons? If the Court could do so, it"
+would be making out a new case for the prosecution: it would be deciding contrary to
+the evidence adduced in the case. A Court cannot obviously make out a case for the
+prosecution which is not disclosed either in the charge or in regard to which there is no
+basis in the evidence. There must be some foundation in the evidence that persons
+other than those named have taken part in the commission of the offence and if there
+is such a basis the case will be covered by the third illustration.243. Absence of charge
+under section 34 is not fatal by itself unless prejudice to the accused is shown.244.
+[s 34.13] Alternative Charge.—
+"The trial Court framed charges under sections 302/307 r/w 120B IPC, 1860 and an"
+"alternative charge under sections 302/307 r/w section 34 IPC, 1860 without opining on"
+"the alternative charge, convicted the accused under sections 302/307 r/w 120B, The"
+contention that accused is deemed to be acquitted for charges under sections
+"302/307/34 IPC, 1860 of the charge of common intention of committing murder and"
+"there was no appeal by the State against the deemed acquittal against that charge, it"
+was not open to the High Court to alter or modify the conviction under sections
+"302/307/34 IPC, 1860, repelled by holding that charges had indeed been framed in the"
+alternative and for cognate offences having similar ingredients as the main allegation
+of murder.245.
+"[s 34.14] Distinction between sections 34 and 149, IPC, 1860.—"
+Though both these sections relate to the doctrine of vicarious liability and sometimes
+overlap each other there are substantial points of difference between the two. They are
+as under:—
+"(i) Section 34 does not by itself create any specific offence, whereas section 149,"
+"IPC, 1860, does so (see discussion under sub-para ""principle"" ante)."
+"(ii) Some active participation, especially in a crime involving physical violence is"
+"necessary under section 34 but section 149, IPC, 1860, does not require it and"
+the liability arises by reason of mere membership of the unlawful assembly with
+a common object and there may be no active participation at all in the
+preparation and commission of the crime.
+"(iii) Section 34 speaks of common intention but section 149, IPC, 1860,"
+contemplates common object which is undoubtedly wider in its scope and
+amplitude than intention. If the offence committed by a member of an unlawful
+assembly is in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or
+such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
+"prosecution of the common object, all other members of the unlawful assembly"
+"would be guilty of that offence under section 149, IPC, 1860, although they may"
+not have intended to do it or participated in the actual commission of that
+offence.246.
+(iv) Section 34 does not fix a minimum number of persons who must share the
+"common intention, whereas section 149, IPC, 1860, requires that there must be"
+at least five persons who must have the same common object (see also
+"discussion under sub-head ""Sections 34 and 149"" under section 149, IPC, 1860,"
+infra).247.
+[s 34.15] Effect of conviction or acquittal of one or more or others.—
+Several persons involved in a criminal adventure may be guilty of different offences
+depending upon their respective acts. If the act is done in furtherance of their common
+"intention, all of them become equally liable for the act. Similarly, if they are members of"
+"an unlawful assembly, an act done by any one in prosecution of the common object or"
+"any act which the members knew could happen in such prosecution, every member"
+would be liable for the act. If any one of them happens to be wrongly acquitted and no
+"appeal has been filed against it, it would not ipso facto impede the conviction of others."
+"Likewise, the conviction of any one or more them does not automatically result in the"
+conviction of others.248.
+[s 34.16] Substitution of conviction from section 149 to section 34.—
+"Following some earlier rulings,249. the Supreme Court has stated the law in the"
+following terms:250.
+It is true that there was no charge under s. 302 read with s. 34... but the facts of the case
+are such that the accused could have been charged alternatively either under s. 302 read
+"with s. 149 or under s. 302 read with s. 34 and one of the accused having been acquitted,"
+the conviction under s. 302/149 can be substituted with one under s. 302/34. No prejudice
+is likely to be caused to the accused whose appeal is being dismissed.251.
+[s 34.17] Robbery.—
+Provision under section 397 inevitably negates the use of the principles of constructive
+or vicarious liability engrafted under section 34. The sentence for offence under section
+"397 of the IPC, 1860 cannot be awarded to those of the members of the group of"
+"dacoits who did not use any deadly weapon. A plain reading of section 397 of the IPC,"
+1860 would make it clear that such guilt can be attributed only to that offender who
+uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt to any person during course of the
+commission of the robbery. The provision postulates that only the individual act of
+"accused will be relevant to attract section 397 of the IPC, 1860.252. In a sudden quarrel"
+"over payment, person sitting inside the car pulled the petrol pump attendant into the"
+car and drove away. The occupants of the car escaped punishment. It was held that the
+driver alone could not be held guilty of the offence of robbery and abduction with the
+aid of section 34.253. In a serial highway robbery and murder in which same persons
+"were involved, it was found as a fact that the self-same two persons were seen by a"
+witness together in a different town before the occurrence. One of their victims
+survived and he also testified that he saw both of them together. Both of them were
+held to be guilty of successive crimes and convicted for murder with the aid of section
+34 without any need of knowing who played what part.254.
+[s 34.18] Mob action.—
+A mob of 200 persons armed with different weapons came to the field with the object
+of preventing the prosecution party from carrying on transplantation operations. Some
+of them caused death of a person at the spur of the moment for some spot reason.
+The whole mob could not be convicted for it.255 A mob chased the members of the
+rival community up to their locality. A part of the mob started burning their houses and
+the other part kept on chasing and caused deaths. The court said that the two parts of
+the mob could not be said to have shared the intention of burning or causing death.256.
+[s 34.19] Misappropriation.—
+Where the accused the Sarpanch and Secretary of a Gram Panchayat misappropriated
+the funds of the Panchayat and the circumstances and evidence showed patent
+"dishonest intention on the part of the accused persons, the conviction and sentence of"
+"the accused under section 409/34, was not interfered with.257."
+[s 34.20] Rape cases.—
+In Gang Rape it is not necessary that the intention should exists from the beginning. It
+can be developed at the last minute before the commission of the offence.258.
+[s 34.21] Exhortation.—
+One of the accused exhorted while the other immobilised the deceased and the third
+accused delivered the fatal injuries. It was held that each one shared a common
+intention.259. Section 34 was held to have been rightly applied where two of the
+accused persons caught hold of the deceased and on their exhortation the third
+accused shot him on the right temple resulting in death.260.
+Mere exhortation by one of the accused persons saying that they would not leave the
+victim till he died was held to be not a basis for roping into the common intention of the
+others.261. The only allegation against the appellant was her exhortation. Enmity
+"between the family of the deceased and that of the accused proved. In such a situation,"
+"where the eye witnesses have not narrated any specific role carried by the appellant,"
+rather the specific role of assaulting with the sword has been attributed to the co-
+"accused, it cannot be ruled out that the name of the appellant has been added due to"
+enmity with the main accused.262.
+[s 34.22] Pre-conceived common intention.—
+Only when a court with some certainty holds that a particular accused must have pre-
+conceived or pre-meditated the result which ensued or acted in concert with others in
+"order to bring about that result, that section 34 may be applied.263."
+[s 34.23] Common intention and private defence.—
+If two or more persons had common intention to commit murder and they had
+"participated in the acts done by them in furtherance of that common intention, all of"
+"them would be guilty of murder. Section 96 IPC, 1860 says that nothing is an offence"
+which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence. Though all the accused
+would be liable for committing the murder of a person by doing an act or acts in
+"furtherance of the common intention, they would not be liable for the act or acts if they"
+had the right of private defence to voluntarily cause death of that person. Common
+"intention, therefore, has relevance only to the offence and not to the right of private"
+defence. What would be an offence by reason of constructive liability would cease to
+be one if the act constituting the offence was done in exercise of the right of private
+defence.
+If the voluntary causing of death is not permissible under the right of private defence
+"under section 96, then the common intention in regard thereto will lead to the result"
+that the accused persons must be held guilty by reason of constructive liability under
+"the relevant section (in this case section 304 Part I IPC, 1860). If, however, the common"
+intention was only to commit an act which was permissible within the confines of s. 96
+"read with s. 98, then constructive liability under section 34 cannot be said to have been"
+"accrued to the accused. If the right of private defence was exceeded by some persons,"
+the guilt of each of the accused proved to have exceeded the right of private defence
+would have to be dealt with separately. The instant case came under the former
+"situation, and hence, such persons were guilty under section 304, Part I IPC, 1860."
+"They, therefore, must be held to have had a common object for causing death of P."
+They were sentenced to undergo ten years' rigorous imprisonment each.264.
+"170. Subs. by Act 27 of 1870, section 1, for section 34."
+"171. Goudappa v State of Karnataka, (2013) 3 SCC 675 [LNIND 2013 SC 177] ; Satyavir Singh"
+"Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011SC 1748 : (2011) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ."
+"2908 ; Abdul Sayeed v State of MP, 2010 (10) SCC 259 [LNIND 2010 SC 872] : 2010(9) Scale 379"
+: (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1262.
+"172. Kuria v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1085 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] : (2012) 10 SCC 433"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 678] : 2012 Cr LJ 4707 (SC).
+"173. Queen v Gora Chand Gope, (1866) 5 South WR (Cr) 45."
+"174. Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 109 : (1977)1 SCC 746 ."
+175. Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v State Of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 1460 [LNIND 2004 SC
+1203] : (2005) 10 SCC 404 [LNIND 2004 SC 1203] .
+"176. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 [LNIND 1924 BOM 206] ."
+"177. Lallan Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 333 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] : 2003 Cr LJ 465 : (2003)"
+1 SCC 268 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] .
+"178. Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 .
+"179. Garib Singh v State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 1286 : AIR 1973 SC 460 [LNIND 1972 SC 187] ."
+"See also Yogendra v State of Bihar, 1984 Cr LJ 386 (SC)."
+"180. Ram Tahal v State of UP, 1972 Cr LJ 227 : AIR 1972 SC 254 [LNIND 1971 SC 579] relied in"
+"Thoti Manohar v State of AP,2012, (7) Scale 215 : (2012) 7 SCC 723 [LNIND 2012 SC 365] : 2012"
+"Cr LJ 3492 ; see also Amar Singh v State of Haryana, 1973 Cr LJ 1409 : AIR 1973 SC 2221 ;"
+"Dharam Pal v State of UP, 1975 Cr LJ 1666 : AIR 1975 SC1917 [LNIND 1975 SC 314] ; Amir"
+"Hussain v State of UP, 1975 Cr LJ 1874 : AIR 1975 SC 2211 State of Rajasthan v ArjunSingh,"
+(2011) 9 SCC 115 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : AIR 2011 SC 3380 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] .
+"181. BN Srikantiah v State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 672 [LNIND 1958 SC 49] : 1958 Cr LJ 1251 ."
+"182. Killer Thiayagu v. State, AIR 2017 SC 612 [LNINDORD 2017 SC 1134] ."
+"183. Killer Thiayagu v. State, AIR 2017 SC 612 [LNINDORD 2017 SC 1134] ."
+"184. Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 :"
+"AIR 2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] ; NandKishore v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 2775 [LNIND"
+"2011 SC 622] : (2011) 12 SCC 120 [LNIND 2011 SC 622] ; Baldeo Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1972"
+"SC 464 : 1972 Cr LJ 262 ; Rana Pratap v State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680 [LNIND 1983 SC 157]"
+": 1983 Cr LJ 1272 : (1983) 3 SCC 327 [LNIND 1983 SC 157] ,"
+"185. Syed Yousuf Hussain v State of AP, AIR 2013 SC 1677 [LNIND 2013 SC 275] : 2013 Cr LJ"
+"2172 : 2013 (5) Scale 346 [LNIND 2013 SC 275] , (2013)4 SCC 517 [LNIND 2013 SC 275] ; Suresh"
+"v State of UP, 2001 (3) SCC 673 [LNIND 2001 SC 623] ; Lallan Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC"
+333 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] : 2003 Cr LJ 465 : (2003) 1 SCC 268 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] .
+"186. Sudip Kr. Sen v State of WB, AIR 2016 SC 310 [LNIND 2016 SC 10] : 2016 Cr LJ 1121 ."
+"187. Nagesar v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 2948 ."
+"188. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 [LNIND 1924 BOM 206] ."
+"189. Mehbub Shah v King-Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 148 ."
+190. Supra.191.Supra.
+"192. Pandurang v State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216 [LNIND 1954 SC 171] : 1955 Cr LJ 572 ."
+"193. Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 :"
+"AIR 2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] NandKishore v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 2775 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 622] : (2011) 12 SCC 120 [LNIND 2011 SC 622] .
+"194. Vijendra Singh v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 860 [LNIND 2017 SC 16] ; Bharwad Mepa Dana v"
+"State of Bombay, AIR 1960SC 289."
+"195. Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 .
+"196. Shreekantiah Ramayya, (1954) 57 Bom LR 632 (SC); Shiv Prasad, AIR 1965 SC 264 [LNIND"
+1964 SC 51] : (1965) 1 CrLJ 249 .
+"197. Baba Lodhi v State of UP, (1987) 2 SCC 352 : AIR 1987 SC 1268 : 1987 Cr LJ 1119 ; MA"
+"AbdullaKunhi v State of Kerala, AIR 1991 SC 452 [LNIND 1991 SC 24] : 1991 Cr LJ 525 : (1991) 2"
+"SCC 225 [LNIND 1991 SC 24] ; Noor v State ofKarnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 84 [LNIND 2007 SC 639]"
+: (2008) 2 SCC Cr 221 : 2007 Cr LJ 4299 .
+"198. Tara Devi v State of UP, (1990) 4 SCC 144 : AIR 1991 SC 342 . See also Hem Raj v State"
+"Delhi Admn., 1990 Cr LJ 2665 : 1990 Supp SCC 291 : AIR 1990 SC 2252 , one of the accused"
+"alone proved to have given the fatal blow, the participation of others not proved, others not"
+convicted under section 302/34.
+"199. Bishan Singh v State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 973 : AIR 1983 SC 748 : 1983 Cr LJ (SC) 327 :"
+"1983 SCC (Cr) 578; Ghanshyam v State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 439 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 293 : (1982) 2"
+SCC 400 .
+"200. Dasrathlal v State of Gujarat, 1979 Cr LJ 1078 (SC) : AIR 1979 SC 1342 . See further"
+"Rangaswami v State of TN, AIR 1989 SC 1137 : 1989 Cr LJ 875 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 617 : 1989 Supp"
+"(1) SCC 686 . Gulshan v State of Punjab, 1989 Cr LJ 120 : AIR 1988 SC 2110 : 1990 Supp SCC"
+682 .
+"201. Jarnail Singh v State of Punjab, (1996) 1 SCC 527 [LNIND 1995 SC 1172] : AIR 1996 SC 755"
+[LNIND 1995 SC 1172] : 1996 Cr LJ 1139 .
+202. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd (2010) 10 SCC 479
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 Cr LJ 8 ; Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani v State of Maharashtra,"
+"1998 SCC (Cr) 698; Hamlet @ Sasi. v State of Kerala, (2003) 10 SCC 108 [LNIND 2003 SC 688] ;"
+"Surendra Chauhan v State of MP, (2000) 4 SCC 110 [LNIND 2000 SC 515] : AIR 2000 SC 1436"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 515] ; Ramjee Rai v State of Bihar, (2006) 13 SCC 229 [LNIND 2006 SC 647] :"
+"2006 Cr LJ 4630 ; Prakash v State of MP, (2006) 13 SCC 508 [LNIND 2006 SC 1071] : 2007 Cr LJ"
+"798 ; Sham Shankar Kankaria v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 165 [LNIND 2006 SC 684] ;"
+"Manik Das v State of Assam, (2007) 11 SCC 403 [LNIND 2007 SC 769] : AIR 2007 SC 2274"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 769] , participation proved."
+"203. Chacko v State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 269 [LNIND 2004 SC 86] : AIR 2004 SC 2688"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 86] ; Abdul Wahid v State of Rajasthan, (2004) 11 SCC 241 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+"1454] : AIR 2004 SC 3211 [LNIND 2004 SC 1454] : 2004 Cr LJ 2850 ; Janak Singh v State of UP,"
+(2004) 11 SCC 385 [LNIND 2004 SC 515] : AIR 2004 SC 2495 [LNIND 2004 SC 515] : 2004 Cr LJ
+"2533 ; Parsuram Pandey v State of Bihar, 2005 SCC (Cr) 113 : AIR 2004 SC 5068 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+1075] .
+"204. Suresh Sakharam Nangare v State of Maharashtra, 2012 (9) Scale 245 [LNIND 2012 SC 574]"
+: (2012) 9 SCC 249 [LNIND 2012 SC 574] .
+"205. Raju v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 4425 ."
+"206. Shreekantiah Ramayya v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] : 1955"
+SCR (1) 1177 .
+"207. Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v State of AP, (2003) 12 SC 306 : AIR 2004 SC 132 [LNIND 2003"
+"SC 888] : 2004 Cr LJ 390 ; Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] :"
+"(2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 ; Jaikrishnadas Desai, (1960) 3 SCR 319 [LNIND 1960 SC"
+"79] : AIR 1960 SC 889 [LNIND 1960 SC 79] : 1960 Cr LJ 1250 ; Dani Singh v State of Bihar, AIR"
+2004 SC 4570 [LNIND 2004 SC 1490] : (2004) 13 SCC 203 [LNIND 2004 SC 1490] .
+"208. Suresh v State of UP, 2001 (3) SCC 673 [LNIND 2001 SC 623] : AIR 2001 SC 1344 [LNIND"
+"2001 SC 623] ; Ramaswami Ayyangar v State of TN, AIR 1976 SC 2027 [LNIND 1976 SC 128] :"
+1976 Cr LJ 1536 (the presence of those who in one way or the other facilitate the execution of
+"the common design itself tantamounts to actual participation in the ""criminal act"")."
+"209. Rajkishore Purohit v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2017 SC 3588 [LNIND 2017 SC 362] ."
+"210. Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v State of AP, (2003) 12 SC 306 : AIR 2004 SC 132 [LNIND 2003"
+"SC 888] : 2004 Cr LJ 390 , citing Shankarlal Kacharabhai, AIR 1965 SC 1260 [LNIND 1964 SC"
+230] : 1965 (2) Cr LJ 226 .
+"211. Dharnidhar v State of UP, (2010) 7 SCC 759 [LNIND 2010 SC 584] : 2010 (7) Scale 12 ;"
+"Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 : AIR"
+2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] .
+"212. Amrik Singh v State of Punjab, 1972 Cr LJ 465 (SC) : (1972) 4 SCC (N) 42 (SC)."
+"213. Krishna Govind Patil v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 [LNIND 1963 SC 12] : 1964"
+(1) SCR 678 [LNIND 1963 SC 12] : 1963 Cr LJ 351 (SC); State of Maharashtra v Jagmohan Singh
+"Kuldip Singh Anand, (2004) 7 SCC 659 [LNIND 2004 SC 862] : AIR 2004 SC 4412 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+"862] , the prosecution is not required to prove in every case a pre-arranged plan or prior concert."
+"Preetam Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 594 , prior concert can be inferred, common"
+intention can develop on the spot.
+"214. Harbans Nonia v State of Bihar, AIR 1992 SC 125 : 1992 Cr LJ 105 ."
+"215. Dharam Pal v State of UP, AIR 1995 SC 1988 [LNIND 1995 SC 198] : 1995 Cr LJ 3642 ."
+"216. Hanuman Prasad v State of Rajasthan, (2009) 1 SCC 507 [LNIND 2008 SC 2256] : (2009) 1"
+"SCC Cr 564, the Supreme Court distinguishes common intention from similar intention and also"
+explains the meaning and applicability of the expression.
+"217. Dajya Moshaya Bhil v State of Maharashtra, 1984 Cr LJ 1728 : AIR 1984 SC 1717 : 1984"
+Supp SCC 373 . The Supreme Court applied the distinction between common intention and
+"similar intention in State of UP v Rohan Singh, (1996) Cr LJ 2884 (SC) : AIR 1996 SCW 2612 . In"
+"Mohan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 [LNIND 1962 SC 118] it was held that persons"
+having similar intention which is not the result of pre-concerted plan cannot be held guilty for
+"the ""criminal act"" with the aid of Section 34."
+"218. Parichhat v State of MP, 1972 Cr LJ 322 : AIR 1972 SC 535 ; Amrik Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"1972 Cr LJ 465 (SC). Followed in Khem Karan v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 2138 All where each"
+"accused hit differently at the behest of one of them, hence, no common intention."
+"219. Mitter Sen v State of UP, 1976 Cr LJ 857 : AIR 1976 SC 1156 ; see also Gajjan Singh v State"
+"of Punjab, 1976 Cr LJ 1640 : AIR 1976 SC 2069 [LNIND 1976 SC 72] ; Jarnail Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, 1982 Cr LJ 386 : AIR 1982 SC 70 (SC)."
+"220. Rambilas Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1593 [LNIND 1989 SC 216] : (1989) 3 SCC 605"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 216] : 1989 Cr LJ 1782 . The conviction under sub-sections 34/149 and 34/302
+was set aside.
+"221. Tripta v State of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 948 : 1992 Cr LJ 3944 . See also Major Singh v State"
+"of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 342 [LNIND 2002 SC 742] : 2003 Cr LJ 473 : (2002) 10 SCC 60 [LNIND"
+"2002 SC 742] ; Balram Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 2213 [LNIND 2003 SC 514] : (2003)"
+SCC 286 .
+"222. Devaramani v State of Karnataka, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1534 SC. See also Gopi Nath v State of UP,"
+"AIR 2001 SC 2493 : 2001 Cr LJ 3514 ; Pal Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 2548 [LNIND"
+"1999 SC 604] : 1999 Cr LJ 3962 ;Prem v Daula, AIR 1997 SC 715 [LNIND 1997 SC 64] : 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 838 ; Muni Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 3640 ;Mahesh Mahto v State of Bihar, AIR 1997"
+SC 3567 [LNIND 1997 SC 1103] : 1997 Cr LJ 4402 .
+"223. Lallan Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 333 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] : 2003 Cr LJ 465 : (2003)"
+1 SCC 268 [LNIND 2002 SC 705] .
+"224. Narinder Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2212 [LNIND 2000 SC 615] : 2000 Cr LJ 3462"
+", Sheelam Ramesh v State ofAP, AIR 2000 SC 118 [LNIND 1999 SC 926] : 2000 Cr LJ 51 ; State of"
+"Haryana v Bhagirath, AIR 1999 SC 2005 [LNIND 1999 SC 541] : 1999 CrLJ 2898 ; Asha v State of"
+"Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2828 [LNIND 1997 SC 844] : 1997 Cr LJ 3561 ."
+"225. Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : (2011) 6 SCC"
+1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ 2908 .
+"226. Krishnan v State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 [LNIND 2003 SC 587] : AIR 2003 SC 2978 [LNIND 2003"
+SC 587] : 2003 Cr LJ 3705 .
+"227. Rajkishore Purohit v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 3588 [LNIND 2017 SC 362] ."
+"228. Ajay Sharma v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 SC 2798 [LNIND 1998 SC 879] : 1998 Cr LJ"
+"4599 . See also State of Karnatakav Maruthi, AIR 1997 SC 3797 : 1997 Cr LJ 4407 ; Bhupinder"
+"Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC642 : 1997 Cr LJ 958 ."
+"229. State of UP v Balkrishna Das, AIR 1997 SC 225 [LNIND 1996 SC 1753] : 1997 Cr LJ 73 ."
+"230. State of AP v M Sobhan Babu, 2011 (3) Scale 451 [LNIND 2010 SC 1219] : 2011 Cr LJ 2175"
+(SC).
+"231. Rajkishore Purohit v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 3588 [LNIND 2017 SC 362] ; State of AP v M."
+"Sobhan Babu, 2011 (3) Scale 451 [LNIND 2010 SC 1219] : 2011 Cr LJ 2175 (SC)."
+"232. Kuria v State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] : 2012 Cr LJ 4707 (SC);"
+"Hemchand Jha v State of Bihar, (2008) 11 SCC 303 [LNIND 2008 SC 1299] : (2008) Cr LJ 3203 ;"
+"Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr LJ 3825 : AIR"
+"2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] ; Nand Kishore v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 2775 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 622] : (2011) 12 SCC 120 [LNIND 2011 SC 622] .
+"233. Bengai Mandal v State of Bihar, AIR 2010 SC 686 [LNIND 2010 SC 39] : (2010) 2 SCC 91"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 39] .
+"234. Maqsoodan v State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 218 : AIR 1983 SC 126 [LNIND 1982 SC 199] : (1983)"
+"1 SCC 218 [LNIND 1982 SC 199] ; Aizaz v State of UP, (2008) 12 SCC 198 [LNIND 2008 SC 1621]"
+": 2008 Cr LJ 4374 , Lala Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 10 SCC 225 [LNIND 2007 SC 803] :"
+"(2007) 3 SCC Cr 634, Harbans Kaur v State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 2989 [LNIND 2005 SC 211] :"
+"2005 Cr LJ 2199 (SC), Dani Singh v State of Bihar, 2004 (13) SCC 203 [LNIND 2004 SC 1490] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 3328 (SC).
+"235. Ram Tahal v State of UP, 1972 Cr LJ 227 : AIR 1972 SC 254 [LNIND 1971 SC 579] ; see also"
+"Nitya Sen v State of WB, 1978 Cr LJ 481 : AIR 1978 SC 383 ; Sivam v State of Kerala, 1978 Cr LJ"
+"1609 : AIR 1978 SC 1529 ; Jagdeo Singh v State of Maharashtra, 1981 Cr LJ 166 : AIR 1981 SC"
+"648 (SC); Aher Pitha Vajshi v State of Gujarat, 1983 Cr LJ 1049 : AIR 1983 SC 599 [LNIND 1983"
+"SC 98] : 1983 SCC (Cr) 607; Manju Gupta v MS Paintal, AIR 1982 SC 1181 [LNIND 1982 DEL 128] :"
+1982 Cr LJ 1393 : (1982) 2 SCC 412 . Another instance of failed prosecution under the Act is
+"Harendra Narayan Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 1842 [LNIND 1991 SC 307] : 1991 Cr LJ"
+"2666 . Ghana Pradhan v State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1133 : 1991 Cr LJ 1178 . Common intention"
+not established even when the two accused were striking the same person in their own ways.
+"236. Raju @ Rajendra v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 1248 (SC) : (2013) 2 SCC 233 [LNIND"
+2013 SC 25] .
+"237. Jhinku Nai v State of UP, AIR 2001 SC 2815 [LNIND 2001 SC 1587] at p. 2817. See also"
+"Jagga Singh v State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 137 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 288] : AIR 2011 SC 960"
+[LNINDORD 2011 SC 288] .
+"238. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd, (2010) 10 SCC 479"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 Cr LJ 8 : (2010) 12 SCR 551 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 68.
+"239. Darbara Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 (8) Scale 649 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] : (2012) 10 SCC"
+"476 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] ; Gurpreet Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2006 SC 191 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+887] : (2005) 12 SCC 615 [LNIND 2005 SC 887] .
+"240. Vijay Singh v State of MP, 2014 Cr LJ 2158 ."
+"241. Willie Slavey v The State of MP, 1955 (2) SCR 1140 [LNIND 1955 SC 90] at p 1189 : AIR"
+1956 SC 116 [LNIND 1955 SC 90] .
+"242. Santosh Kumari v State of J&K, (2011) 9 SCC 234 [LNIND 2011 SC 901] : AIR 2011 SC 3402"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 901] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 657.
+"243. Krishna Govind Patil v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 1413 [LNIND 1963 SC 12] : 1963"
+Cr LJ 351 relied in Chinnam Kameswara Rao v State of AP 2013 Cr LJ 1540 : JT 2013 (2) SC 398
+[LNIND 2013 SC 57] : 2013 (1) Scale 643 [LNIND 2013 SC 57] .
+"244. Anil Sharma v State of Jharkhand, (2004) 5 SCC 679 [LNIND 2004 SC 590] : AIR 2004 SC"
+2294 [LNIND 2004 SC 590] : 2004 Cr LJ 2527 .
+"245. Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : (2011) 6 SCC"
+1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ 2908 .
+"246. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v Emp., AIR 1925 PC 1 [LNIND 1924 BOM 206] (7) : 26 Cr LJ 431;"
+"Nanak Chand v State of Punjab, 1955 Cr LJ 721 (SC); Anam Pradhan v State, 1982 Cr LJ 1585"
+"(Ori). Chittaramal v State of Rajasthan, (2003) 2 SCC 266 [LNIND 2003 SC 14] : AIR 2003 SC 796"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 14] : 2003 Cr LJ 889 , points of similarity and distinction explained in the case."
+"247. Virendra Singh v State of MP, (2010) 8 SCC 407 [LNIND 2010 SC 723] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+893 : 2011 Cr LJ 952 .
+"248. Surinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2003) 10 SCC 66 [LNIND 2003 SC 652] ."
+"249. Lachman Singh v The State, 1952 SCR 839 [LNIND 1952 SC 21] : AIR 1952 SC 167 [LNIND"
+"1952 SC 21] : 1952 Cr LJ 863 and Karnail Singh vState of Punjab, 1954 SCR 904 [LNIND 1953 SC"
+126] : AIR 1954 SC 204 [LNIND 1953 SC 126] : 1954 Cr LJ 580 .
+250. Sangappa Sanganabasappa v State of Karnataka (2010) 11 SCC 782 [LNIND 2010 SC 866] :
+"(2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 256; BaitalSingh v State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 1982 : 1990 Cr LJ 2091 : 1990"
+"Supp SCC 804 ; Ramdeo RaoYadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1990 SC 1180 [LNIND 1990 SC 126] :"
+1990 Cr LJ 1983 .
+"251. Dahari vState of UP, AIR 2013 SC 308 2012 (10) Scale 160, (2012)10 SCC 256 [LNIND 2012"
+"SC 638] ; Jivan Lal v State ofMP, 1997 (9) SCC 119 [LNIND 1996 SC 2679] ; and Hamlet @ Sasi v"
+"State of Kerala, AIR 2003 SC 3682 [LNIND 2003 SC 688] ; Gurpreet Singh vState of Punjab, AIR"
+"2006 SC 191 [LNIND 2005 SC 887] ; Sanichar Sahni v State of Bihar, AIR 2010 SC 3786 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 1350] ; S Ganesan vRama Raghuraman, 2011 (2) SCC 83 [LNIND 2011 SC 5] ; Darbara"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 (8) Scale 649 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] : (2012)10 SCC 476 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 545] : JT 2012 (8) SC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] .
+"252. Manik Shankarrao Dhotre v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1505 (Kar); State of"
+"Maharashtra vMahipal Singh Satyanarayan Singh, 1996 Cr LJ 2485 ."
+"253. Brahmjit Singh v State, 1992 Cr LJ 408 (Del)."
+"254. Prem v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 1608 (Bom).255.Dukhmochan Pandey v State of"
+"Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 40 [LNIND 1997 SC 1255] : 1998 Cr LJ 66 ."
+"256. State of Gujarat v Chandubhai Malubhai Parmar, AIR 1997 SC 1422 [LNIND 1997 SC 627] :"
+1997 Cr LJ 1909 (SC).
+"257. Ghoura Chandra Naik v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 275 (Ori). See Rameshchandra Bhogilal"
+"Patel vState Of Gujarat, 2011 Cr LJ 1395 (Guj) (Section 420/34)."
+"258. Dev Cyrus Colabawala v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 758 (Bom)."
+"259. Atambir Singh v State of Delhi, 2016 Cr LJ 568 (Del)."
+"260. Vinay Kumar Rai v State of Bihar, (2008) 12 SCC 202 [LNIND 2008 SC 1646] : 2008 Cr LJ"
+4319 : AIR 2008 SC 3276 [LNIND 2008 SC 1646] .
+"261. Nagaraja v State of Karnataka, (2008) 17 SCC 277 [LNIND 2008 SC 2484] : AIR 2009 SC"
+"1522 [LNIND 2008 SC 2484] : one accused struck onthe road with an iron rod, two others used"
+"fists and kicks, there was nothing more common, the twocould be convicted under section 323."
+See also Mohan Singh v State of MP AIR 1999 SC 883 [LNIND 1999 SC 69] : (1999) 2 SCC 428
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 69] , Abdul Wahid v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 3211 [LNIND 2004 SC 1454]"
+": (2004) 11 SCC 241 [LNIND 2004 SC 1454] ; AjaySharma v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 SC 2798"
+[LNIND 1998 SC 879] : (1999) 1 SCC 174 [LNIND 1998 SC 879] .
+"262. Chandra Kaur v State of Rajasthan, 2016 Cr LJ 3346 : AIR 2016 SC 2926 [LNINDU 2015 SC"
+139] .
+263. Suresh v State of UP AIR 2001 SC 1344 [LNIND 2001 SC 623] : (2001) 3 SCC 673 [LNIND
+"2001 SC 623] quoted from Shatrughan Patar vEmperor. See also Sewa Ram v State of UP, 2008"
+"Cr LJ 802 : AIR 2008 SC682 [LNIND 2007 SC 1452] ; Abaram v State of MP, (2007) 12 SCC 105"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 546] : (2008) 2 SCC Cr 243 : 2007 Cr LJ 2743 .
+"264. Bhanwar Singh v State of MP, (2008) 16 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : AIR 2009 SC 768"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1246] ; Vajrapu Sambayya Naidu vState of AP, AIR 2003 SC 3706 [LNIND 2003"
+SC 176] : (2004) 10 SCC 152 [LNIND 2003 SC 176] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 35] When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal
+knowledge or intention.
+"Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal"
+"knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in"
+the act with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if
+the act were done by him alone with that knowledge or intention.
+COMMENT—
+The preceding section provided for a case in which a criminal act was done by several
+persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. Under this section several
+persons who actually perform the act must be shown to have the particular intent or
+"knowledge, if the act is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal"
+"knowledge or intention. If several persons, having one and the same criminal intention"
+"or knowledge, jointly commit murder or an assault, each is liable for the offence as if he"
+"has acted alone; but if several persons join in an act, each having a different intention"
+"or knowledge from the others, each is liable according to his own criminal intention or"
+"knowledge, and he is not liable further. If an act which is an offence in itself and"
+without reference to any criminal knowledge or intention on the part of the doers is
+"done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for the offence."
+Neither section 34 nor this section provides that those who take part in the act are
+jointly liable for the same offence. They merely provide that each of the performers
+shall be liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone. In
+"this section also, the responsibility is shared by each offender individually if the act"
+which is criminal only by reason of certain criminal knowledge or intention is done by
+each person sharing that knowledge or intention.265. A mere look at that section shows
+that if the act alleged against these accused becomes criminal on account of their
+sharing common knowledge about the defective running of Plant at Bhopal by the
+remaining accused who represented them on the spot and who had to carry out their
+directions from them and who were otherwise required to supervise their activity.
+Section 35 of the Indian Penal Code could at least prima facie be invoked against
+"accused 2, 3, 4 and 12 to be read with section 304-A Indian Penal Code.266."
+"265. Afrahim Sheikh v State of WB, AIR 1964 SC 1263 [LNIND 1964 SC 1] : 1964 Cr LJ 350 ; State"
+"v Bhimshankar Siddannappa Thobde, 1968 Cr LJ 898 (Bom)."
+"266. Keshub Mahindra v State of MP, (1996) 6 SCC 129 [LNIND 1996 SC 2462] : JT 1996 (8) SC"
+136 [LNIND 1996 SC 2462] (1996) 1 SCC (Cri) 1124 (Bhopal Gas Tragedy case) against which a
+curative petition was filed by the CBI and it was dismissed by the Constitution bench in CBI v
+"Keshub Mahindra, AIR 2011 SC 2037 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 209] : (2011) 6 SCC 216 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 514] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 36] Effect caused partly by act and partly by omission.
+"Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that effect, by an act"
+"or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood that the causing of that effect"
+partly by an act and partly by an omission is the same offence.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A intentionally causes Z's death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by"
+beating Z. A has committed murder.
+COMMENT—
+This section follows as a corollary from section 32. The legal consequences of an 'act'
+"and of an 'omission' being the same, if an offence is committed partly by an act and"
+partly by an omission the consequences will be the same as if the offence was
+committed by an 'act' or by an 'omission' alone. Fire in the transformer installed in a
+cinema hall led to multiple deaths but was not the causa causans of the tragedy. The
+"absence of rapid dispersal facilities, various acts of omission and commission,"
+violation of rules and bye-laws meant for public safety were other causes which
+contributed to the tragedy in equal proportion. A charge under this section was held to
+be justifiable.267.
+"267. Sushil Ansal v State, 2002 Cr LJ 1369 . Also see Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v"
+"Gopal Ansal, (2008) 14 SCC 611 [LNIND 2008 SC 1818] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cr) 878."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 37] Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence.
+"When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-"
+"operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either"
+"singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small
+doses of poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with
+intent to murder Z. Z dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so
+administered to him. Here A and B intentionally co-operate in the commission of
+"murder and as each of them does an act by which the death is caused, they are"
+both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.
+"(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner,"
+"alternatively for six hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z's death,"
+"knowingly co-operate in causing that effect by illegally omitting, each during the"
+"time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food supplied to them for that purpose,"
+Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.
+"(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z's death, illegally"
+omits to supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in
+"strength, but the starvation is not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed"
+"from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without collusion or co-operation with A,"
+"illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely thereby to cause"
+"Z's death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not co-operate"
+with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.
+COMMENT—
+This section follows as a corollary from section 35 as appears from the illustrations. It
+"provides that, when several acts are done so as to result together in the commission of"
+"an offence, the doing of any one of them, with an intention to co-operate in the offence"
+"(which may not be the same as an intention common to all), makes the actor liable to"
+be punished for the commission of the offence.268. By co-operating in the doing of
+"several acts which together constitute a single criminal act, each person who co-"
+operates in the commission of that offence by doing any one of the acts is either singly
+"or jointly liable for that offence.269. If common intention is the hub of section 34,"
+intentional cooperation is the spindle of section 37 of the Penal Code. One who shares
+common intention can as well cooperate in the commission of the offence
+intentionally. In that sense the two sections are not contradictory to each other. The
+former does not necessarily exclude the latter. Co-operation in the commission of the
+offence need not be for the entire gamut of the offence committed. It is enough if he
+cooperates in one of the several acts which constitute the offence. Sections 34–38 of
+the Penal Code delineate the parameters of constructive or vicarious penal liability in
+"different situations. Therefore, it is not imperative that the charge should contain the"
+particular section of the Penal Code with which constructive liability is fastened.270.
+"268. Barendra Kumar Ghosh, (1924) 52 IA 40 : 52 Cal 197 : 211, 27 Bom LR 148."
+"269. Afrahim Sheikh v State of WB, AIR 1964 SC 1263 [LNIND 1964 SC 1] : 1964 (6) SCR 172"
+[LNIND 1964 SC 1] : 1964 Cr LJ 350 .
+"270. Justus v State, 1987 (2) KLT 330 [LNIND 1987 KER 337] : ILR 1988 (1) Ker 98 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+[s 38] Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences.
+"Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act,"
+they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would
+"be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and"
+"intending to kill him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing"
+"Z. Here, though A and B are both engaged in causing Z's death, B is guilty of murder,"
+and A is guilty only of culpable homicide.
+COMMENT—
+Section 38 provides that the responsibility for the completed criminal act may be of
+different grades according to the share taken by the different accused in the
+completion of the criminal act and this section does not mention anything about
+intention common or otherwise or knowledge.271.
+Sections 34–38 lay down principles similar to the English law of 'principals in the first
+and second degrees.' See Comment on section 107.
+The basic principle which runs through sections 32 to 38 is that in certain
+circumstances an entire act is attributed to a person who may have performed only a
+fractional part of it. This axiom is laid down in section 34 in which emphasis are on the
+act. Sections 35–38 take up this axiom as the basis of a further rule by which the
+criminal liability of the doer of a fractional part (who is to be taken as the doer of the
+entire act) is to be adjudged in different situations of mens rea. Without the axiom
+"itself, however, the other sections would not work, inasmuch as it is the foundation on"
+which they all stand.272.
+This section provides for different punishments for different offences as an alternative
+"to one punishment for one offence, whether the persons engaged or concerned in the"
+commission of a criminal act are set in motion by the one intention or by the other.273.
+The section applies where a criminal act jointly done by several persons and the several
+persons have different intentions or states of knowledge in doing the joint act.274.
+Where three accused assaulted the deceased but only two used their weapons in a
+determined manner which clearly showed their common intention to kill the deceased
+and the third accused who had a lathi in his hand did not even use it to cause any injury
+"to the victim, it was held that the former two were liable to be convicted under section"
+"302 read with section 34, IPC, 1860, and the third accused was only liable under"
+"section 304, Part II read with section 38, IPC, 1860, as he had intentionally joined the"
+other two in the commission of the act with the knowledge that the assault was likely
+to cause death of the deceased even though he did not have the intention to kill
+him.275.
+"271. Afrahim Sheikh v State of WB, AIR 1964 SC 1263 [LNIND 1964 SC 1] : 1964 (6) SCR 172"
+[LNIND 1964 SC 1] : 1964 Cr LJ 350 .
+"272. Ibra Akanda, (1944) 2 Cal 405 ."
+"273. Barendra Kumar Ghosh, (1924) 52 IA 40 : 52 Cal 197 211 : 27 Bom LR 148."
+"274. State v Bhimshankar Siddannappa Thobde, 1968 Cr LJ 898 (Bom)."
+"275. Bhaba Nanda v State of Assam, 1977 Cr LJ 1930 : AIR 1977 SC 2252 [LNIND 1977 SC 291] ."
+"Mano Dutt v State of UP, JT 2012 (2) SC 573 : 2012 (3) Scale 219 [LNIND 2012 SC 160] : (2012) 4"
+SCC 79 [LNIND 2012 SC 160] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 39] ""Voluntarily.""."
+"A person is said to cause an effect ""voluntarily"" when he causes it by means whereby"
+"he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he"
+knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A sets fire, by night, to an inhabited house in a large town, for the purpose of facilitating"
+"a robbery and thus causes the death of a person. Here, A may not have intended to"
+"cause death; and may even be sorry that death has been caused by his act; yet, if he"
+"knew that he was likely to cause death, he has caused death voluntarily."
+COMMENT—
+Bare reading of this section shows that a person need not intend to cause a certain
+"effect. If an act is the probable consequence of the means used by him, he is said to"
+have caused it voluntarily whether he really means to cause it or not. Section implicitly
+lays down the principle that a man is presumed to intend the probable consequences
+of his act.276. Following this it has been held that if the accused was not aware that the
+"person whom they confined was a public servant, section 332 (voluntarily causing hurt"
+to deter public servant from his duty) would not be attracted. The accused would be
+guilty of causing hurt under section 323.277. The Supreme Court has given a new
+"meaning to the word ""voluntary"" by holding in Olga Tellis v Bombay MC,278. that the act"
+of slum dwellers putting up their huts on public footpaths and pavements cannot be
+"described to be ""voluntary"" for the purposes of the definition of ""criminal trespass"" in"
+"section 441, it being the result of utter helplessness and their moral right of survival."
+"276. Dr.Meenu Bhatia Prasad v State, 2002 Cr LJ 1674 (Del)."
+"277. Abdul Majeed v State of Kerala, (1994) 2 Cr LJ 1404 (Ker)."
+"278. Olga Tellis v. Bombay MC, (1985) 3 SCC 545 [LNIND 1985 SC 215] : 1986 CrLR (SC) 23 : AIR"
+1986 SC 180 [LNIND 1985 SC 215] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"279.[[s 40] ""Offence""."
+"Except in the 280.[Chapters] and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section,"
+"the word ""offence"" denotes a thing made punishable by this Code."
+"In Chapter IV, 281.[Chapter VA] and in the following sections, namely, sections 282.[64,"
+"65, 66, 283.[67], 71], 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 284.[118, 119, 120] 187, 194,"
+"195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348,"
+"388, 389 and 445, the word ""offence"" denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or"
+under any special or local law as hereinafter defined.
+"And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word ""offence"" has the"
+same meaning when the thing punishable under the special or local law is punishable
+"under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards, whether with"
+or without fine.]
+COMMENT—
+"""Offence"" means 'an act or instance of offending'; 'commit an illegal act' and illegal"
+"means, 'contrary to or forbidden by law'. ""Offence"" has to be read and understood in the"
+"context as it has been prescribed under the provisions of sub-section 40, 41 and 42"
+"IPC, 1860 which cover the offences punishable under IPC, 1860 or under special or"
+"local law or as defined under section 2(n) Cr PC, 1973 or section 3(38) of the General"
+Clauses Act 1897. There is no statutory offence that takes place when adults willingly
+"engage in sexual relations outside the marital setting, with the exception of 'adultery' as"
+"defined under section 497 IPC, 1860.285. In Joseph Shine v UOI286. a five judge"
+Constitution bench of the Supreme Court struck down section 497 of the Indian Penal
+"Code as manifestly discriminatory and arbitrary. Section 2(n) of Cr PC, 1973 defines"
+offence as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force
+and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be under section 20 of the
+"Cattle Trespass Act 1871 (1 of 1871). Thus, the definition of 'offence' under section"
+"2(n), Cr PC, 1973, is wider enough to enable the police to investigate into offences"
+"under other enactments also, apart from those under the IPC, 1860.287. An offence"
+"seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a"
+rule; a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established.288. There is a
+basic difference between the offences under the Penal Code and acts and omissions
+which have been made punishable under different Acts and statutes which are in
+nature of social welfare legislations. For framing charges in respect of those acts and
+"omissions, in many cases, mens rea is not an essential ingredient; the concerned"
+"statute imposes a duty on those who are in charge of the management, to follow the"
+"statutory provisions and once there is a breach or contravention, such persons become"
+"liable to be punished. But for framing a charge for an offence under the Penal Code, the"
+traditional rule of existence of mens rea is to be followed.289. In the absence of a
+"definition in a special act, the term 'offence' should be understood in the context of"
+section 40 of the Indian Penal Code as an act that is criminally punishable and section
+3(38) of the General Clauses Act as an act made punishable by any law and the
+essential ingredient is that it should be a criminal act as understood.290. In Naz
+"Foundation v NCT Delhi.291. section 377 of IPC, 1860 in so far it criminalised"
+"consensual sexual acts of adults in private, was held violative of Article 21, Article 14"
+and Article 15 of the Constitution by the Delhi High Court.292. This judgement of the
+Delhi High Court was later overruled by the Supreme Court on 12 December 2013 in
+"Suresh Kumar Koushal case.293. Finally in Navtej Singh Johar v UOI,294. a five-judge"
+bench of the Supreme Court declared section 377 of the Indian Penal Code
+"unconstitutional, insofar as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults of same"
+"sex in private. However, other parts of Section 377 relating to sex with minors and"
+bestiality remain in force.
+[s 40.1] Offences under Special law.—
+A plain reading of this provision of law makes it crystal clear that the effect of clause
+(2) of section 40 is to make everything punishable under the special law as an offence
+"within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. The offences under the NDPS Act thus,"
+"become offences under the Indian Penal Code as the term ""offence"" in certain cases is"
+extended to the things made punishable under any special or local law.295.
+[s 40.2] Article 20(1).—
+The word 'offence' under Article 20 sub-clause (1) of the Constitution has not been
+defined under the Constitution. But Article 367 of the Constitution states that unless
+"the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act 1897 shall apply for the"
+interpretation of the Constitution as it does for the interpretation of an Act.296.
+[s 40.3] Offence and breach of duty distinguished.—
+"Offence generally implies infringement of public, as distinguished from mere private"
+rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it
+should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under
+the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The
+enquiry in departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
+delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory
+rules or law.297.
+[s 40.4] Suicide.—
+"Suicide by itself is not an offence under either English or Indian Criminal Law, though at"
+one time it was a felony in England.298.
+[s 40.5] Euthanasia.—
+In India active euthanasia is illegal and a crime under section 302 or at least section
+"304 IPC, 1860. Physician assisted suicide is a crime under section 306 IPC, 1860"
+"(abetment to suicide).299. But in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI,300. the Supreme"
+Court held that passive euthanasia can be allowed under exceptional circumstances
+"under the strict monitoring of the Court. In March 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench"
+"of the Supreme Court gave legal sanction to passive euthanasia, permitting 'living will'"
+by patients.301.
+"[s 40.6] Sections 40 and 141 IPC, 1860.—"
+Section 40 specifically mentions as to how the term 'offence' will have to be construed.
+"In the main clause of the said section it has been clearly set out that the word ""offence"""
+denotes a thing made punishable by this Code except the chapters and sections
+"mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of the said section. Therefore, going by the main clause"
+"of section 40, the word ""offence"" since denotes the thing made punishable under the"
+"Code, 'other offence' mentioned in section 141 'third', can only denote to offences,"
+"which are punishable under any of the provisions of the Code. Therefore, by applying"
+"the main clause of section 40, it can be straight away held that all offences referred to"
+in any of the provisions of the Code for which the punishment is provided for would
+"automatically fall within the expression ""other offence"", which has been used in section"
+"141 'third'. Therefore, a conspectus reading of section 40 makes the position"
+"abundantly clear that for all offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the main"
+"clause of section 40 would straight away apply in which event the expression ""other"
+"offence"" used in section 141 'third', will have to be construed as any offence for which"
+"punishment is prescribed under the Code. To put it differently, whosoever is proceeded"
+"against for any offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code,"
+section 40 sub-clause 1 would straight away apply for the purpose of construing what
+the offence is and when it comes to the question of offence under any other special or
+"local law, the aid of sub-clause 2 and 3 will have to be applied for the purpose of"
+"construing the offence for which the accused is proceeded against. Therefore, having"
+"regard to sub-clause 1 of section 40 of the Code read along with section 141 'third', the"
+argument of learned senior counsel for the Appellants will have to be rejected. Only
+such a construction would be in tune with the purport and intent of the law makers
+while defining an unlawful assembly for commission of an offence with a common
+"object, as specified under section 141 of the Code.302."
+"279. Subs. by Act 27 of 1870, section 1, for section 40."
+"280. Subs. by Act 8 of 1930, section 2 and Sch I, for ""Chapter""."
+"281. Ins. by Act 8 of 1913, section 2."
+"282. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882, section 1."
+"283. Ins. by Act 10 of 1886, section 21(1)."
+"284. Ins. by Act 10 of 2009, section 51(b) (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)."
+"285. S Khushboo v Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : AIR 2010 SC 3196"
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 2 SCC (Cr) 1299; VijaySingh v State of UP, (2012) 5 SCC 242"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 1216] : AIR 2012 SC 2840 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 356] .
+"286. Joseph Shine v UOI, decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India."
+"287. Dharma Reddy v State, 1990 Cr LJ 1476 . (AP); Director of Enforcement v MCT M"
+"Corporation PvtLtd, AIR 1996 SC 1100 [LNIND 1996 SC 63] : (1996) 2 SCC 471 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+63] .
+"288. Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] :"
+1955 (1) SCR 1177 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] : 1955Cr LJ 857.
+"289. Radhey Shyam Khemka v State of Bihar, (1993) 3 SCC 54 [LNIND 1993 SC 276] : 1993 Cr LJ"
+2888 .
+"290. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2006 SC 1301 [LNIND 2006 SC"
+145] : (2006) 4 SCC 278 [LNIND 2006 SC 145] .
+"291. Naz Foundation v NCT Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 94 (Del)."
+"292. Naz Foundation v NCT Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 94 (Del)."
+"293. Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1 [LNIND 2013 SC 1059] ."
+"294. Navtej Singh Johar v UOI, 2018 (10) Scale 386 [LNIND 2018 SC 451] ."
+"295. Daulat Raghunath Derale v State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 817 (Bom)."
+"296. SEBI v Ajay Agarwal, AIR 2010 SC 3466 [LNIND 2010 SC 203] : (2010) 3 SCC 765 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 203] .
+"297. Depot Manager, AP State Road Transport Corporation v Mohd. Yousuf Miya, AIR 1997 SC"
+2232 [LNINDORD 1996 SC 4] : (1997) 2 SCC 699 [LNINDORD 1996 SC 4] .
+"298. Gangula Mohan Reddy v State of AP, AIR 2010 SC 327 [LNIND 2010 SC 3] : (2010) 1 SCC"
+"327 ; Gian Kaur v State ofPunjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] : AIR 1996 SC 946"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 653] .
+"299. The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+"653] held that both euthanasiaand assisted suicide are not lawful in India, overruling the two"
+"Judge Bench decision of the SupremeCourt in P Rathinam v UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND 1994"
+SC 1533] : 1994 (3) SCC 394 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] . The Court held that the right tolife under
+Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right to die.
+"300. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"301. Common Cause (A Registered Society) v UOI, (2018) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2018 SC 87] ."
+"302. Manga @ Man Singh v State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 629 [LNIND 2013 SC 529] : 2013"
+Cr LJ 3332 (SC).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"279.[[s 40] ""Offence""."
+"Except in the 280.[Chapters] and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section,"
+"the word ""offence"" denotes a thing made punishable by this Code."
+"In Chapter IV, 281.[Chapter VA] and in the following sections, namely, sections 282.[64,"
+"65, 66, 283.[67], 71], 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 284.[118, 119, 120] 187, 194,"
+"195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348,"
+"388, 389 and 445, the word ""offence"" denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or"
+under any special or local law as hereinafter defined.
+"And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word ""offence"" has the"
+same meaning when the thing punishable under the special or local law is punishable
+"under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards, whether with"
+or without fine.]
+COMMENT—
+"""Offence"" means 'an act or instance of offending'; 'commit an illegal act' and illegal"
+"means, 'contrary to or forbidden by law'. ""Offence"" has to be read and understood in the"
+"context as it has been prescribed under the provisions of sub-section 40, 41 and 42"
+"IPC, 1860 which cover the offences punishable under IPC, 1860 or under special or"
+"local law or as defined under section 2(n) Cr PC, 1973 or section 3(38) of the General"
+Clauses Act 1897. There is no statutory offence that takes place when adults willingly
+"engage in sexual relations outside the marital setting, with the exception of 'adultery' as"
+"defined under section 497 IPC, 1860.285. In Joseph Shine v UOI286. a five judge"
+Constitution bench of the Supreme Court struck down section 497 of the Indian Penal
+"Code as manifestly discriminatory and arbitrary. Section 2(n) of Cr PC, 1973 defines"
+offence as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force
+and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be under section 20 of the
+"Cattle Trespass Act 1871 (1 of 1871). Thus, the definition of 'offence' under section"
+"2(n), Cr PC, 1973, is wider enough to enable the police to investigate into offences"
+"under other enactments also, apart from those under the IPC, 1860.287. An offence"
+"seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a"
+rule; a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established.288. There is a
+basic difference between the offences under the Penal Code and acts and omissions
+which have been made punishable under different Acts and statutes which are in
+nature of social welfare legislations. For framing charges in respect of those acts and
+"omissions, in many cases, mens rea is not an essential ingredient; the concerned"
+"statute imposes a duty on those who are in charge of the management, to follow the"
+"statutory provisions and once there is a breach or contravention, such persons become"
+"liable to be punished. But for framing a charge for an offence under the Penal Code, the"
+traditional rule of existence of mens rea is to be followed.289. In the absence of a
+"definition in a special act, the term 'offence' should be understood in the context of"
+section 40 of the Indian Penal Code as an act that is criminally punishable and section
+3(38) of the General Clauses Act as an act made punishable by any law and the
+essential ingredient is that it should be a criminal act as understood.290. In Naz
+"Foundation v NCT Delhi.291. section 377 of IPC, 1860 in so far it criminalised"
+"consensual sexual acts of adults in private, was held violative of Article 21, Article 14"
+and Article 15 of the Constitution by the Delhi High Court.292. This judgement of the
+Delhi High Court was later overruled by the Supreme Court on 12 December 2013 in
+"Suresh Kumar Koushal case.293. Finally in Navtej Singh Johar v UOI,294. a five-judge"
+bench of the Supreme Court declared section 377 of the Indian Penal Code
+"unconstitutional, insofar as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults of same"
+"sex in private. However, other parts of Section 377 relating to sex with minors and"
+bestiality remain in force.
+[s 40.1] Offences under Special law.—
+A plain reading of this provision of law makes it crystal clear that the effect of clause
+(2) of section 40 is to make everything punishable under the special law as an offence
+"within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. The offences under the NDPS Act thus,"
+"become offences under the Indian Penal Code as the term ""offence"" in certain cases is"
+extended to the things made punishable under any special or local law.295.
+[s 40.2] Article 20(1).—
+The word 'offence' under Article 20 sub-clause (1) of the Constitution has not been
+defined under the Constitution. But Article 367 of the Constitution states that unless
+"the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act 1897 shall apply for the"
+interpretation of the Constitution as it does for the interpretation of an Act.296.
+[s 40.3] Offence and breach of duty distinguished.—
+"Offence generally implies infringement of public, as distinguished from mere private"
+rights punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal offence is conducted it
+should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under
+the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The
+enquiry in departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
+delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory
+rules or law.297.
+[s 40.4] Suicide.—
+"Suicide by itself is not an offence under either English or Indian Criminal Law, though at"
+one time it was a felony in England.298.
+[s 40.5] Euthanasia.—
+In India active euthanasia is illegal and a crime under section 302 or at least section
+"304 IPC, 1860. Physician assisted suicide is a crime under section 306 IPC, 1860"
+"(abetment to suicide).299. But in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI,300. the Supreme"
+Court held that passive euthanasia can be allowed under exceptional circumstances
+"under the strict monitoring of the Court. In March 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench"
+"of the Supreme Court gave legal sanction to passive euthanasia, permitting 'living will'"
+by patients.301.
+"[s 40.6] Sections 40 and 141 IPC, 1860.—"
+Section 40 specifically mentions as to how the term 'offence' will have to be construed.
+"In the main clause of the said section it has been clearly set out that the word ""offence"""
+denotes a thing made punishable by this Code except the chapters and sections
+"mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of the said section. Therefore, going by the main clause"
+"of section 40, the word ""offence"" since denotes the thing made punishable under the"
+"Code, 'other offence' mentioned in section 141 'third', can only denote to offences,"
+"which are punishable under any of the provisions of the Code. Therefore, by applying"
+"the main clause of section 40, it can be straight away held that all offences referred to"
+in any of the provisions of the Code for which the punishment is provided for would
+"automatically fall within the expression ""other offence"", which has been used in section"
+"141 'third'. Therefore, a conspectus reading of section 40 makes the position"
+"abundantly clear that for all offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the main"
+"clause of section 40 would straight away apply in which event the expression ""other"
+"offence"" used in section 141 'third', will have to be construed as any offence for which"
+"punishment is prescribed under the Code. To put it differently, whosoever is proceeded"
+"against for any offence punishable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code,"
+section 40 sub-clause 1 would straight away apply for the purpose of construing what
+the offence is and when it comes to the question of offence under any other special or
+"local law, the aid of sub-clause 2 and 3 will have to be applied for the purpose of"
+"construing the offence for which the accused is proceeded against. Therefore, having"
+"regard to sub-clause 1 of section 40 of the Code read along with section 141 'third', the"
+argument of learned senior counsel for the Appellants will have to be rejected. Only
+such a construction would be in tune with the purport and intent of the law makers
+while defining an unlawful assembly for commission of an offence with a common
+"object, as specified under section 141 of the Code.302."
+"279. Subs. by Act 27 of 1870, section 1, for section 40."
+"280. Subs. by Act 8 of 1930, section 2 and Sch I, for ""Chapter""."
+"281. Ins. by Act 8 of 1913, section 2."
+"282. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882, section 1."
+"283. Ins. by Act 10 of 1886, section 21(1)."
+"284. Ins. by Act 10 of 2009, section 51(b) (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)."
+"285. S Khushboo v Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : AIR 2010 SC 3196"
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 2 SCC (Cr) 1299; VijaySingh v State of UP, (2012) 5 SCC 242"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 1216] : AIR 2012 SC 2840 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 356] .
+"286. Joseph Shine v UOI, decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India."
+"287. Dharma Reddy v State, 1990 Cr LJ 1476 . (AP); Director of Enforcement v MCT M"
+"Corporation PvtLtd, AIR 1996 SC 1100 [LNIND 1996 SC 63] : (1996) 2 SCC 471 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+63] .
+"288. Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] :"
+1955 (1) SCR 1177 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] : 1955Cr LJ 857.
+"289. Radhey Shyam Khemka v State of Bihar, (1993) 3 SCC 54 [LNIND 1993 SC 276] : 1993 Cr LJ"
+2888 .
+"290. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2006 SC 1301 [LNIND 2006 SC"
+145] : (2006) 4 SCC 278 [LNIND 2006 SC 145] .
+"291. Naz Foundation v NCT Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 94 (Del)."
+"292. Naz Foundation v NCT Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 94 (Del)."
+"293. Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation, (2014) 1 SCC 1 [LNIND 2013 SC 1059] ."
+"294. Navtej Singh Johar v UOI, 2018 (10) Scale 386 [LNIND 2018 SC 451] ."
+"295. Daulat Raghunath Derale v State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 817 (Bom)."
+"296. SEBI v Ajay Agarwal, AIR 2010 SC 3466 [LNIND 2010 SC 203] : (2010) 3 SCC 765 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 203] .
+"297. Depot Manager, AP State Road Transport Corporation v Mohd. Yousuf Miya, AIR 1997 SC"
+2232 [LNINDORD 1996 SC 4] : (1997) 2 SCC 699 [LNINDORD 1996 SC 4] .
+"298. Gangula Mohan Reddy v State of AP, AIR 2010 SC 327 [LNIND 2010 SC 3] : (2010) 1 SCC"
+"327 ; Gian Kaur v State ofPunjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] : AIR 1996 SC 946"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 653] .
+"299. The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+"653] held that both euthanasiaand assisted suicide are not lawful in India, overruling the two"
+"Judge Bench decision of the SupremeCourt in P Rathinam v UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND 1994"
+SC 1533] : 1994 (3) SCC 394 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] . The Court held that the right tolife under
+Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right to die.
+"300. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"301. Common Cause (A Registered Society) v UOI, (2018) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2018 SC 87] ."
+"302. Manga @ Man Singh v State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 629 [LNIND 2013 SC 529] : 2013"
+Cr LJ 3332 (SC).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 41] ""Special law""."
+"A ""special law"" is a law applicable to a particular subject."
+COMMENT—
+Laws dealing with special subjects are called special laws. The special laws
+"contemplated in section 40 and this section are only laws, such as the Excise, Opium,"
+"Cattle Trespass, Gambling and Railway Acts, creating fresh offences, that is, laws"
+making punishable certain things which are not already punishable under the Penal
+Code. Negotiable Instruments Act being a special statute has overriding effect over the
+"provisions of Cr PC, 1973.303. Since nothing in Factories Act (Special Law) which"
+prescribes punishment for rash and negligent act of occupier or manager of factory
+"which resulted into death of any worker or any other person, the general Law, i.e., IPC,"
+1860 will apply.304.
+"303. Rajan K Moorthy v M Vijayan, 2008 Cr LJ 1254 (Mad)."
+"304. Ejas Ahmed v State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ 1953 (Jha) also see the comments under"
+"Section 5 of IPC, 1860."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 42] ""Local law""."
+"A ""local law"" is a law applicable only to a particular part of 305.[306.[***]307.[India]]."
+COMMENT—
+"Laws applicable to a particular locality only are termed local laws, e.g., Port Trust Acts."
+"305. Subs. by the A.O. 1948, for ""British India""."
+"306. The words ""the territories comprised in"" omitted by Act 48 of 1952, section 3 and Sch II"
+(w.e.f. 2-8- 1952).
+"307. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, for ""the States"" (w.e.f. 3-4-1951). Earlier the"
+"words ""the States"" were substituted by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Provinces""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 43] ""Illegal."" ""Legally bound to do.""."
+"The word ""illegal"" is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is"
+"prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action; and a person is said to"
+"be ""legally bound to do"" whatever it is illegal in him to omit."
+COMMENT—
+The word `illegal' in the section has been given a very wide meaning. It consists of
+three ingredients: (1) everything which is an offence; (2) everything which is prohibited
+"by law and (3) everything which furnishes ground for civil action.308. The words ""legally"
+"bound"" do not necessarily only mean the law made by the legislature or statutory law."
+"Section 43 IPC, 1860 contains a definition of a person being legally bound to do, that is,"
+a person is stated to be legally bound to do whatever it is illegal in him to omit.309.
+"The expression ""legally bound to do"" carries very wide meaning where any ground for"
+"civil action can be founded on the basis of any act or omission on the part of a person,"
+his act may be held to be illegal or it may be held that he was legally bound to do an act
+"which he had omitted to do. If a person breaches a departmental order, he may be held"
+guilty as he was legally bound to act in terms of the order.310.
+Sexual contact between two persons with consent but out of marriage does not
+amount to an illegal act.311.
+"[s 43.1] ""Ground for civil action.""—"
+In order to constitute a ground for a civil action there must be the right in a party which
+can be enforced. It may be breach of a contract or a claim for damages or any such
+similar right accruing under the law. There is no law which debars the Chief Minister
+from participating in a sale conducted by any Government Department or any of the
+corporation or any public sector undertaking affording a cause for civil action
+particularly when no fraud or illegal gain is involved. There was nothing in the charge to
+"indicate, nor did the prosecution take a specific stand that the purchase of the property"
+of the Government company furnished a ground for a civil action. The nature of the civil
+action should not be left to a guess work. The accused could not be expected to meet
+such a case at any subsequent stage.312.
+"[s 43.2] ""Illegal"" and ""unlawful"".—"
+"The expression ""illegal"" and ""unlawful"" are synonymous and convey the same idea in"
+language - ordinary and legal. But when a statute employs an expression with intention
+of conveying a special meaning and with the said purpose defines the expression in
+"such statute as the expression ""illegal"" is defined in section 43 of the IPC, 1860, such"
+meaning is to be ascertained for that expression specially and specifically for such a
+statute and for the purpose of such statute. Merely because two expressions mean the
+"same ordinarily in language and law, both cannot be held to have the same meaning"
+when one of them is specially and specifically defined and explained in one statute. So
+"reckoned, it cannot be accepted that the definition of the expression ""illegal"" in section"
+"43 of the IPC, 1860 must straightaway be mechanically imported into section 98 of the"
+"Cr PC, 1973 when we consider the ambit and play of the expression ""unlawful"" in"
+"section 98 of the Cr PC, 1973.313."
+"308. R Venkatakrishnan v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+1653] : AIR 2010 SC 1812 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 164.
+"309. R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, AIR 2004 SC 692 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : (2004) 2 SCC 9"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : JT 2003 (9) SC 343 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] .
+"310. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 646"
+: AIR 2009 SC 480 [LNIND 2008 SC 2235] .
+"311. S Khushboo v Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 Cr LJ 2828 : AIR"
+"2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 2 SCC(Cr) 1299; Mailsami v State, (1994) 2 Cr LJ"
+2238 (Mad).
+"312. R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, (2004) 2 SCC 9 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : AIR 2004 SC 692"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : 2004 Cr LJ 286 .
+"313. Zeenath v Khadeeja, 2007 Cr LJ 600 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 44] ""Injury.""."
+"The word ""injury"" denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body,"
+"mind, reputation or property."
+COMMENT—
+'Injury' is an act contrary to law.314. It will include any tortious act.
+A Magistrate imposed a fine in addition to a sentence of imprisonment on a conviction
+for the offence of causing death by a rash and negligent act and gave compensation to
+the widow of the deceased out of the fine imposed. It was held that compensation
+"could not be given to her for she did not suffer any injury as here defined.315. It may,"
+"however, be argued that nothing could be more harmful to the mind of a woman than"
+"the death of her husband, and the section speaks of harm to the mind as 'injury'. The"
+former Chief Court of the Punjab held that loss of her husband's support affected a
+"widow prejudicially in a legal right, and was therefore, an injury as defined in the Penal"
+Code.316. The context of section 125(1)(c) does not require reference to the definition
+"of 'injury' rendered in section 44 IPC, 1860. The words ""physical or mental abnormality"""
+will prima facie take in congenital defects while 'injury' leading to inability to maintain
+"itself can have reference, be at any point of time even after the attaining of majority. It"
+may even be possible to take in all cases of physical or mental abnormality which need
+"not necessarily be congenital.317. As defined in section 44 IPC, 1860, ""injury"" denotes"
+"any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property."
+"Now, if a person wants to save himself from injury, such as conviction in a criminal"
+"case, it does not mean that he caused injury to another.318. Harm caused to a"
+"reputation has been held to constitute an injury, within the purview of section 44.319."
+"314. Svami Nayudu v Subramania Mudali, (1864) 2 MHC 158 ."
+"315. Yalla Gangulu v Mamidi Dali, (1897) 21 Mad 74 (FB)."
+"316. Saif Ali v State, (1989) PR No. 17 of 1898 (FB)."
+"317. TPSH Selva Saroja v TPSH Sasinathana, 1989 Cr LJ 2032 (Mad)."
+"318. Prayag Das v State, 1963 (1) Cr LJ 279 ."
+"319. Subramanian Swamy v UOI, 2016 Cr LJ 3214 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 45] ""Life""."
+"The word ""life"" denotes the life of a human being, unless the contrary appears from"
+the context.
+COMMENT—
+"Section 45 of the IPC, 1860 defines life as denoting the life of a human being, unless"
+"the contrary appears from the context. Therefore, when a punishment for murder is"
+"awarded under section 302 of the IPC, 1860, it might be imprisonment for life, where"
+life denotes the life of the convict or death. The term of sentence spanning the life of
+"the convict, can be curtailed by the appropriate Government for good and valid reasons"
+"in exercise of its powers under section 432 of the Cr PC, 1973.320. Life imprisonment"
+"cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years or even 30 years, rather"
+it always means the whole natural life.321. The expression 'imprisonment for life' must
+"be read in the context of section 45, IPC, 1860.322. The Court may feel that the"
+"punishment more just and proper, in the facts of the case, would be imprisonment for"
+life with life given its normal meaning and as defined in section 45 of the Indian Penal
+Code.323.
+[s 45.1] Imprisonment for the remainder of Accused's natural life.—
+As per the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013324. the punishment for rape (section
+"376) is rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but"
+"which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the"
+"remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. In sub-sections 370,"
+"376(A), 376(D), 376(E) also it is specifically mentioned that 'Life' shall mean"
+imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life. Parliament has enacted
+"the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 which provides for enhanced punishment in"
+rape cases. The Amendment Act provides stringent punishment for perpetrators of
+rape particularly of girls below 12 years. Gang rape of a girl under 12 years of age is
+now made punishable with a jail term for remainder of guilty person's natural life or
+death. 325.
+"The right to claim remission, commutation, reprieve, etc., as provided under Article 72"
+"or Article 161 of the Constitution will always be available, being guaranteed"
+"Constitutional remedies, which are untouchable by the Court.326."
+"320. Sangeet v State Of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : 2013 Cr LJ 425 ."
+"321. Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294 [LNIND 2013 SC 71] : 2013 Cr LJ 1559"
+"(SC); Life Convict Bengal @Khoka @Prasanta Sen v BK Srivastava, 2013 Cr LJ 1446 (SC) : AIR"
+"2013 SC 1163 , JT 2013 (3) SC20 : 2013 (2) Scale 467 : (2013) 3 SCC 425 [LNINDORD 2013 SC"
+"6760] ; Zahid Hussein v State of WB, AIR 2001 SC 1312 [LNIND 2001 SC 692] : (2001)3 SCC 750"
+"[LNIND 2001 SC 692] ; Munna v UOI, AIR 2005 SC 3440 [LNIND 2005 SC 701] : (2005) 7 SCC 417"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 701] - A plea for premature release after21 years of imprisonment rejected.
+"322. Ashok Kumar v UOI, (1991) 3 SCC 498 [LNIND 1991 SC 288] : 1991 SCC (Cr) 845 (3 Judge"
+"Bench); Gopal VinayakGodse v State of Maharashtra, 1961 (3) SCR 440 [LNIND 1961 SC 11] : AIR"
+"1961 SC (Const. Bench) : But a two judgebench in Ramraj v State of Chhattisgarh, (2010) 1 SCC"
+573 [LNIND 2009 SC 2093] : AIR 2010 SC 420 [LNIND 2009 SC 2093] held that lifeimprisonment
+is not to be interpreted as being imprisonment for the whole of a convict's natural lifewithin the
+scope of Section 45.
+"323. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, 2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :"
+AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 CrLJ 3911 .
+324. Act No. 13 of 2013 w.e.f 2-4-2013.
+325. Refer Chapter XVI infra.
+"326. UOI v V Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 [LNIND 2015 SC 677] : 2016 Cr LJ 845 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 46] ""Death.""."
+"The word ""death"" denotes the death of a human being, unless the contrary appears"
+from the context.
+COMMENT—
+A present day understanding of death as the irreversible end of life must imply total
+"brain failure, such that neither breathing, nor circulation is possible any more.327."
+"327. Aruna ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 47] ""Animal.""."
+"The word ""animal"" denotes any living creature, other than a human being."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 48] ""Vessel.""."
+"The word ""vessel"" denotes anything made for the conveyance by water of human"
+beings or of property.
+COMMENT—
+"The word ""vessel"" has been defined in section 48 of the Indian Penal Code to denote"
+anything made for the conveyance by water of human beings or of property. The train
+"compartment is not a building, tent or vessel used as a human building neither a place"
+for worship nor a place used for the custody of property.328.
+"328. P Balaraman v The State, 1991 Cr LJ 166 (Mad)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 49] ""Year."" ""Month.""."
+"Wherever the word ""year"" or the word ""month"" is used, it is to be understood that the"
+year or the month is to be reckoned according to the British calendar.
+COMMENT—
+A person sentenced to imprisonment for the space of one calendar month is entitled to
+be discharged on the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day
+corresponding to that from which his sentence takes effect.329. The day on which a
+sentence is passed on a prisoner is calculated as a whole day.
+"329. Migotti v Colvill, (1879) 4 CPD 233 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 50] ""Section.""."
+"The word ""section"" denotes one of those portions of a Chapter of this Code which are"
+distinguished by prefixed numeral figures.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 51] ""Oath.""."
+"The word ""oath"" includes a solemn affirmation substituted by law for an oath, and any"
+declaration required or authorized by law to be made before a public servant or to be
+"used for the purpose of proof, whether in a Court of Justice or not."
+COMMENT—
+"An oath is a religious asseveration, by which a person renounces the mercy, and"
+"imprecates the vengeance of heaven, if he does not speak the truth.330. The form of"
+oath differs according to the religious persuasion of the swearer. A Christian swears on
+"the Bible, a Jew upon the Pentateuch, a Mahommedan upon the Koran, and a Hindu on"
+the Gita. A Hindu or a Mahommedan has the statutory right to be affirmed instead of
+taking an oath.
+"330. White v White, (1786) 1 Leach 430; U Vali Basha v Mohd. Bashu, (2008) Cr LJ 1011 (Karn)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"[s 52] ""Good faith.""."
+"Nothing is said to be done or believed in ""good faith"" which is done or believed without"
+due care and attention.
+COMMENT—
+"The expression ""good faith"" in criminal jurisprudence has a definite connotation. Its"
+import is totally different from saying that the person concerned has honestly believed
+the truth of what is said. See the language of the law in this regard. It starts in the
+negative tone excluding all except what is allowed to be within its amplitude. Insistence
+"sought to be achieved through the commencing words of the definition ""nothing is said"
+"to be done or believed in good faith"" is that the solitary item included within the purview"
+"of the expression ""good faith"" is what is done with ""due care and attention"". Due care"
+denotes the degree of reasonableness in the care sought to be exercised. In Black's
+"Law Dictionary, ""reasonable care"" is explained as ""such a degree of care, precaution, or"
+"diligence as may fairly and properly be expected or required, having regard to the"
+"nature of the action, or of the subject matter and the circumstances surrounding the"
+transaction. It is such care as an ordinary prudent person would exercise under the
+"conditions existing at the time he is called upon to act"".331. The element of honesty"
+which is introduced by the definition prescribed by the General Clauses Act is not
+introduced by the definition of the Penal Code; and we are governed by the definition
+prescribed by section 52 of that Code.332. Nothing is an offence which is done by any
+"person who is justified by law, or who by reason of mistake of fact and not by reason of"
+"mistake of law, in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.333."
+Some parents made poisonous propaganda against an educational institution. The
+"court said that this could not have been done by them in good faith. Hence, the"
+exception to section 499 was not attracted. The complaint of defamation against them
+could not be quashed.334.
+[s 52.1] Burden of proof.—
+The burden is on the accused to prove this fact. Whether a person took due care and
+attention before he made the imputation is a matter most often within the personal
+knowledge of that person himself. The accused must prove that he made due enquiries
+before he published the imputation. It is not enough to say that he made a formal
+enquiry in a slipshod manner. The words 'due care and attention' imply that the accused
+must have made the enquiry in a reasonable manner with all circumspection. It is true
+that the accused is not bound to prove that the enquiry made by him was fool-proof or
+"without the possibility of any error or chance of mistake. However, the accused must"
+show that he got the information from proper source and he had reasonable grounds to
+believe the truth of the statement he made. The accused must prove by preponderance
+of probability that there was good faith on his part. The accused also should show that
+"there was no malice on his part, that is to say, that there was no ill-will or spite towards"
+the person against whom he made the imputation. What must ultimately be decided is
+the honesty of the accused in publishing the words complained of. So also the accused
+"are not entitled to exception 9 of section 499, IPC, 1860 merely on the reason that the"
+publications were not made in good faith.335.
+Good faith is a question of fact to be considered and decided on the facts of each
+case. Section 52 of the Penal Code emphasizes due care and attention in relation to
+the good faith. In the General Clauses Act emphasis is laid on honesty.336. The
+"meaning of the expression ""good faith"" is what is done with ""due care and attention""."
+"Due care denotes the degree of reasonableness in the care sought to be exercised. So,"
+"before a person proposes to make an imputation, he must first make an enquiry into"
+the factum of the imputation which he proposes to make. It is not enough that he does
+just a make believe show for an enquiry. The enquiry expected of him is of such a depth
+as a reasonable and prudent man would make with the genuine intention in knowing
+the real truth of the imputation. If he does not do so he cannot claim that what he did
+"was bona fide i.e. done in good faith. Thus, a contemner, if he is to establish ""good"
+"faith"" has to say that he conducted a reasonable and proper enquiry before making an"
+imputation.337. The question of good faith must be considered with reference to the
+position of the accused and the circumstances under which he acted. 'Good faith'
+requires not logical infallibility but due care and attention.338.
+"331. Re: SK Sundaram, AIR 2001 SC 2374 [LNIND 2000 KER 575] : (2001) 2 SCC 171 [LNIND"
+2000 SC 1889] .
+"332. Harbhajan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1966 SC 97 [LNIND 1965 SC 65] : 1966 Cr LJ 82 ."
+"333. Section 79 IPC, 1860."
+"334. Dogar Singh v Shobha Gupta, 1998 Cr LJ 1541 (P&H)."
+"335. Damodra Shenoi v Public Prosecutor, Ernakulam, 1989 Cr LJ 2398 at 2400 (Ker). A"
+declaration in newspapers 2½ months; after selling land by registered sale deed that the sale
+was under compulsion was held to be not made in good faith. The defence of exception 9 to
+"section 499 (defamation) was not available. P Swaminathan v Lakshmanan, 1992 Cr LJ 990"
+(Mad).
+"336. R K Mohammed Ubaidullah v Hajee C Abdul Wahab, AIR 2001 SC 1658 [LNIND 2000 SC 924]"
+: (2000) 6 SCC 402 [LNIND 2000 SC 924] See Assistant Commissioner Anti Evasion Commercial
+"Taxes Bharatpur v Amtek India Ltd, (2007) 11 SCC 407 [LNIND 2007 SC 210] : JT 2007 (4) SC 297"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 210] for definition of ""good faith"" in various enactments."
+"337. In the matter of RKaruppan, 2004 Cr LJ 4284 (Mad)(FB)."
+"338. State of Orissa v Bhagaban Barik, AIR 1987 SC 1265 [LNIND 1987 SC 366] : (1987) 2 SCC"
+"498 [LNIND 1987 SC 366] ; Chaman Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 1372 [LNIND 1970 SC"
+106] : 1970 Cr LJ 1266 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"339.[[s 52A] ""Harbour."""
+"Except in section 157, and in section 130 in the case in which the harbour is given by"
+"the wife or husband of the person harboured, the word ""harbour"" includes the"
+"supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or"
+"means or conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the same"
+"kind as those enumerated in this section or not, to evade apprehension.]"
+COMMENT—
+"There are two hurdles in the way to adopt the IPC, 1860 definition of the word ""harbour"""
+as for TADA. First is that TADA permits reliance to be made only on the definitions
+"included in the Procedure Code and not on the definitions in the IPC, 1860. Second is,"
+"the word ""harbour"" as such has not been used in the Procedure Code and hence, the"
+question of side-stepping to Penal Code definitions does not arise. Sections 136 and
+"312 of IPC, 1860 are the provisions incorporating two of the offences involving"
+"""harbour"" in which the common words used are ""whoever knowing or having reason to"
+"believe. Another offence in the Penal Code involving ""harbour"" is section 157 wherein"
+"also the words ""whoever harbours knowing that such person etc."" are available. It was"
+contended that mens rea is explicitly indicated in the said provisions in the Penal Code
+"whereas no such indication is made in section 3(4) of TADA and therefore, the element"
+of mens rea must be deemed to have been excluded from the scope of section 3(4) of
+"TADA. The word ""harbours"" used in TADA must be understood in its ordinary meaning"
+as for penal provisions.340.
+"339. Ins. by Act 8 of 1942, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-2-1942)."
+"340. Kalpnath Rai v State, AIR 1998 SC 201 [LNIND 1997 SC 1396] : (1997) 8 SCC 732 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER II GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
+THIS Chapter is for the most part an elaborate interpretation clause. It is a key to the
+interpretation of the whole Code. The leading terms used are here defined and
+"explained and the meanings thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the"
+subsequent chapters.
+"339.[[s 52A] ""Harbour."""
+"Except in section 157, and in section 130 in the case in which the harbour is given by"
+"the wife or husband of the person harboured, the word ""harbour"" includes the"
+"supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition or"
+"means or conveyance, or the assisting a person by any means, whether of the same"
+"kind as those enumerated in this section or not, to evade apprehension.]"
+COMMENT—
+"There are two hurdles in the way to adopt the IPC, 1860 definition of the word ""harbour"""
+as for TADA. First is that TADA permits reliance to be made only on the definitions
+"included in the Procedure Code and not on the definitions in the IPC, 1860. Second is,"
+"the word ""harbour"" as such has not been used in the Procedure Code and hence, the"
+question of side-stepping to Penal Code definitions does not arise. Sections 136 and
+"312 of IPC, 1860 are the provisions incorporating two of the offences involving"
+"""harbour"" in which the common words used are ""whoever knowing or having reason to"
+"believe. Another offence in the Penal Code involving ""harbour"" is section 157 wherein"
+"also the words ""whoever harbours knowing that such person etc."" are available. It was"
+contended that mens rea is explicitly indicated in the said provisions in the Penal Code
+"whereas no such indication is made in section 3(4) of TADA and therefore, the element"
+of mens rea must be deemed to have been excluded from the scope of section 3(4) of
+"TADA. The word ""harbours"" used in TADA must be understood in its ordinary meaning"
+as for penal provisions.340.
+"339. Ins. by Act 8 of 1942, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-2-1942)."
+"340. Kalpnath Rai v State, AIR 1998 SC 201 [LNIND 1997 SC 1396] : (1997) 8 SCC 732 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"[s 53] ""Punishments.""."
+The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are—
+First.—Death;
+1. [Secondly.—Imprisonment for life;]
+2. [***]
+"Fourthly.—Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:—"
+"(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;"
+(2) Simple;
+Fifthly.—Forfeiture of property;
+Sixthly.—Fine.
+COMMENT—
+The object of punishment in the scheme of modern social defence is correction of the
+wrongdoer and not wrecking gratuitous punitive vengeance on the criminal. Some
+attempts have been made to modernise our penal system through piecemeal
+"legislation at best for the first offenders, the children and the juvenile delinquents"
+"example the Probation of Offenders Act 1958, the Juvenile Justice (Care and"
+"Protection of Children) Act 2000, Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,"
+"2015 etc. In the Indian Penal Code, there is no scope for individualising the punishment;"
+rather these five forms of punishment have to be doled out to the offenders irrespective
+of their psycho-social problems and needs of individual offenders. Commenting on this
+"unhappy aspect of our penal system Krishna iyer, J, observed in Shivaji's case'.3."
+Two men in their twenties thus stand convicted of murder and have to suffer imprisonment
+for life because the punitive strategy of our Penal Code does not sufficiently reflect the
+modern trends in correctional treatment and personalised sentencing. When accused
+persons are of tender age then even in a murder case it is not desirable to send them
+beyond the high prison walls and forget all about their correction and eventual reformation.
+In Inder Singh's case4. the Supreme Court issued directions to the State Government to
+see that the young accused of the case are not given any degrading work and they are
+given the benefit of liberal parole every year if their behaviour shows responsibility and
+"trustworthiness. Moreover, the Sessions Judge was directed to make jail visits to"
+ensure compliance with these directions.
+[s 53.1] Object of Punishment.—
+"One of the prime objectives of criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just"
+and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and
+the manner in which the crime is done.5. Undue sympathy by means of imposing
+inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system and undermine the
+public confidence in the efficacy of law.6. The object should be to protect the society
+and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object to law by imposing appropriate
+sentence. It is expected that the Courts would operate the sentencing system so as to
+impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing
+process has to be stern where it should be.7. The main purpose of the sentence broadly
+stated is that the accused must realise that he has committed an act which is not only
+harmful to the society of which he forms an integral part but is also harmful to his own
+"future, both as an individual and as a member of the society. Punishment is designed"
+to protect society by deterring potential offenders as also by preventing the guilty party
+from repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform the offender and re-claim him
+"as a law-abiding citizen for the good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent"
+and punitive aspects of punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking while
+"determining this question. In modern civilized societies, however, reformatory aspect is"
+being given somewhat greater importance. Too lenient as well as too harsh sentences
+both lose their efficaciousness. One does not deter and the other may frustrate thereby
+making the offender a hardened criminal.8.
+[s 53.2] Different Approaches.—
+Punishment in criminal cases is both punitive and reformative. The purpose is that the
+person found guilty of committing the offence is made to realise his fault and is
+"deterred from repeating such acts in future. On the commission of crime, three types of"
+reactions may generate; the traditional reaction of universal nature which is termed as
+punitive approach. It regards the criminal as a notoriously dangerous person who must
+be inflicted severe punishment to protect the society from his criminal assaults. The
+other approach is the therapeutic approach. It regards the criminal as a sick person
+"requiring treatment, while the third is the preventive approach, which seeks to eliminate"
+"those conditions from the society, which were responsible for crime causation. Under"
+"the punitive approach, the rationalisation of punishment is based on retributive and"
+"utilitarian theories. Deterrent theory, which is also part of the punitive approach,"
+proceeds on the basis that the punishment should act as a deterrent not only to the
+"offender, but also to others in the community. The therapeutic approach aims at curing"
+"the criminal tendencies, which were the product of a diseased psychology. Therapeutic"
+"approach has since been treated as an effective method of punishment, which not only"
+satisfies the requirements of law that a criminal should be punished and the
+"punishment prescribed must be meted out to him, but also reforms the criminal"
+"through various processes, the most fundamental of which is that in spite of having"
+"committed a crime, may be a heinous crime, he should be treated as a human being"
+"entitled to all the basic human rights, human dignity and human sympathy. It was under"
+"this theory that this Court in a stream of decisions, projected the need for prison"
+"reforms, the need to acknowledge the vital fact that the prisoner, after being lodged in"
+"jail, does not lose his fundamental rights or basic human rights and that he must be"
+treated with compassion and sympathy.9. Imposing a hard punishment on the accused
+"serves a limited purpose, but at the same time, it is to be kept in mind that relevance of"
+deterrent punishment in matters of serious crimes affecting society should not be
+undermined. Within the parameters of the law an attempt has to be made to afford an
+"opportunity to the individual to reform himself and lead life of a normal, useful member"
+of society and make his contribution in that regard.10. In Dhannajoy Chatterjee v State of
+"WB,11. the Supreme Court has observed that shockingly large number of criminals go"
+"unpunished, thereby increasingly encouraging the criminals and ultimately making"
+justice suffer by weakening the system's credibility. Realising that it is not the brutality
+"of punishment but its surety that serves as a greater deterrent, our Supreme Court held"
+that a barbaric crime does not have to be visited with a barbaric penalty such as public
+hanging which will be clearly violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.12. With regards
+"the question of punishment, it should be noted that punishment in one matter cannot"
+be the guiding factor for punishment in another. Punishment has a co-relation with
+"facts and in each case where punishment is imposed, the same must be the resultant"
+"effect of the acts complained of. More serious the violation, more severe is the"
+"punishment and that has been the accepted norm, in matters though, however, within"
+the prescribed limits.13.
+[s 53.3] Reformation Theory.—
+The reformative aspect is meant to enable the person concerned to relent and repent
+for his action and make himself acceptable to the society as a useful social being.14.
+Theory of reformation through punishment is grounded on the sublime philosophy that
+every man is born good but circumstances transform him into a criminal. The aphorism
+"that ""if every saint has a past every sinner has a future"" is a tested philosophy"
+"concerning human life. VR Krishna Iyer, J, has taken pains to ornately fresco the"
+reformative profile of the principles of sentencing in Mohammad Giasuddin v State of
+AP.15. Reformation should hence be the dominant objective of a punishment and
+"during incarceration, every effort should be made to recreate the good man out of"
+convicted prisoner. An assurance to him that his hard labour would eventually snowball
+into a handsome saving for his own rehabilitation would help him to get stripped of the
+moroseness and desperation in his mind while toiling with the rigours of hard labour
+"during the period of his jail life. Thus, reformation and rehabilitation of a prisoner are of"
+"great public policy. Hence, they serve a public purpose.16. Punishment is also to reform"
+such wrongdoers not to commit such offence in future.17.
+[s 53.4] Deterrence.—
+Deterrence is one of the vital considerations of punishment. Law demands that the
+"offender should be adequately punished for the crime, so that it can deter the offender"
+and other persons from committing similar offences. Nature and circumstances of the
+offence; the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offence; to
+afford adequate deterrence to the conduct and to protect the public from such crimes
+are certain factors to be considered while imposing the sentence.18. Any liberal attitude
+by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of
+lapse of time or personal inconveniences in respect of such offences will be result-wise
+counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared
+for and strengthened by string of deterrence built in the sentencing system.19. For
+"instance, a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not"
+"call for penalty of death. However, an organised crime or mass murders of innocent"
+people would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence.20. Protection of
+society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and is required to be
+achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing Courts are expected to
+consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and
+proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts
+must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in cases of heinous crimes like rape on
+"innocent helpless girls of tender years, as in this case, and respond by imposition of"
+proper sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of
+appropriate sentence by the Court. To show mercy in the case of such a heinous crime
+would be a travesty of justice.21. To give a lesser punishment to the appellants would
+be to render the justice system of this country suspect. The common man will lose
+"faith in the Courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of"
+deterrence more than the reformative jargon.22. Punishment to an accused in criminal
+jurisprudence is not merely to punish the wrongdoer but also to strike warning to those
+who are in the same sphere of crime or to those intending to join in such crime.23.
+[s 53.5] Principles of sentencing.—
+Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime. There is no straitjacket
+"formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. In practice, there is much"
+"variance in the matter of sentencing. In many countries, there are laws prescribing"
+"sentencing guidelines, but there is no statutory sentencing policy in India.24. The Indian"
+Penal Code provides discretion to Indian Judges while awarding the sentence.25.
+Courts have wide discretion in awarding sentence within the statutory limits.26. The
+Courts have evolved certain principles: twin objective of the sentencing policy is
+deterrence and correction.27. There are many philosophies behind sentencing justifying
+"penal consequences. The philosophical/jurisprudential justification can be retribution,"
+"incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, or restoration."
+"Anyone or a combination thereof can be the goal of sentencing. However, when it"
+"comes to sentencing a person for committing a heinous crime, the deterrence theory"
+"as a rationale for punishing the offender becomes more relevant. In such cases, the"
+"role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion becomes secondary and while determining"
+"the quantum of sentence, discretion lies with the Court. While exercising such a"
+"discretion, the Court has to govern itself by reason and fair play, and discretion is not to"
+be exercised according to whim and caprice. It is the duty of the Court to impose
+"adequate sentence, for one of the purposes of imposition of requisite sentence is"
+protection of the society and a legitimate response to the collective conscience. While
+"considering as to what would be the appropriate quantum of imprisonment, the Court"
+"is empowered to take into consideration mitigating circumstances, as well as"
+aggravating circumstances.28. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends
+on the facts and circumstances of each case and the Court must keep in mind the
+"gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant"
+circumstances.29. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality
+in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It
+ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in
+"each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of"
+culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm
+"that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice, sentences are"
+determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of
+"the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence, sometimes the desirability of"
+"keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime."
+"Inevitably, these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of"
+punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.30.
+"Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite"
+"of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The"
+practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilized
+"societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has"
+"disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction,"
+drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for
+any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and
+"unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment"
+"unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate"
+punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences.31. The principle of
+proportionality in sentencing a crime doer is well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence.
+"As a matter of law, proportion between crime and punishment bears most relevant"
+influence in determination of sentencing the crime doer. The Court has to take into
+consideration all aspects including social interest and consciousness of the society for
+award of appropriate sentence.32. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence
+would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the
+efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats.
+Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases
+may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime e.g. where it relates to
+"offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money,"
+treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have
+"great impact on social order and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se"
+require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or
+taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such
+offences will be result wise counterproductive in the long run and against societal
+interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by a string of deterrence inbuilt
+in the sentencing system.33. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do
+more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of
+"law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the"
+duty of every Court to award proper sentence keeping in mind the nature of the offence
+"and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. Thus, it is evident that"
+Criminal Law requires strict adherence to the rule of proportionality in providing
+punishment according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct keeping in
+mind the effect of not awarding just punishment on the society.34. An undeserved
+indulgence or liberal attitude in not awarding adequate sentence in such cases would
+amount to allowing or even to encouraging 'potential criminals'. The society can no
+longer endure under such serious threats. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by
+society in cases of heinous crime of rape and impose adequate sentence. Public
+abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence
+by the Court.35.
+[s 53.6] Factors to be considered.—
+These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before
+awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in
+character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective.
+The relevant factors are as under:
+(a) Motive or previous enmity;
+(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;
+(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;
+(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;
+"(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;"
+(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;
+(g) Whether the injury was caused without pre-meditation in a sudden fight;
+(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which
+the blow was inflicted;
+(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;
+(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
+cause death but the death was because of shock;
+(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;
+(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;
+(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused
+had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she
+gets proper medical treatment?
+These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an
+appropriate sentence to the accused.
+The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In
+"our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded"
+obligation and duty of the Court. The endeavour of the Court must be to ensure that the
+"accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according"
+to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required
+to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.36. The facts and given
+"circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was"
+"planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the"
+"accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are"
+relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.37.
+[s 53.7] Judicial Discretion:38. Cases.—
+A Judge has wide discretion in awarding the sentence within the statutory limits. Since
+"in many offences, only the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offences"
+"the minimum punishment is prescribed, each Judge exercises his discretion"
+"accordingly.39. In case where for an offence, maximum imprisonment is prescribed and"
+"there is no provision for minimum imprisonment, the Court can exercise wide"
+discretion imposing any imprisonment which may be from one day (or even till the
+"rising of the court) to ten years/life.40. However, the Courts will have to take into"
+"account certain principles while exercising their discretion in sentencing, such as"
+"proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation. In a proportionality analysis, it is"
+necessary to assess the seriousness of an offence in order to determine the
+commensurate punishment for the offender.41. Though punishment is the discretion of
+"the Court, yet it must be exercised judicially and where circumstances call for a"
+"deterrent punishment, it ought to be awarded in an appropriate case.42. Thus where the"
+"accused, a young man of 22 committed multiple murders for sheer gain in a most"
+"cruel, callous and fiendish fashion, there was no way to show him any mercy as it was"
+rarest of the rare cases where a sentence of death was fully justified.43. In exercising
+"this discretion, the Court must consider the gravity of the offence, the mitigating or the"
+extenuating circumstances of the case which may justify the award of the lesser or
+"maximum sentence.44. Where the accused was a youth of 19, the Supreme Court while"
+"upholding conviction under section 304-Part I, Indian Penal Code, 1860, (IPC, 1860)"
+reduced his sentence to the period already undergone which was 18 and a half months
+"in the instant case. The accused, a Government servant, who will lose pensionary"
+"benefits due to conviction, deserves to be treated leniently."
+The Supreme Court has laid down that in cases of death in custody on account of third
+"degree methods, deterrent punishment should be awarded.45. Where certain police"
+"officials, who took a man illegally in their custody and gave him beating due to which he"
+"died, were convicted under section 342, it was held that the facts that one of the"
+"accused was recipient of a medal from the President for saving a life, was awarded Rs."
+"5,000 by the State Government also and was suffering from T.B. and the other accused"
+"had acted on the direction of his superior, were not mitigating circumstances and the"
+accused were liable to be punished with the maximum sentence.46.
+"Where due to dire poverty the accused killed his ailing wife, as he could not provide"
+"money for her operation and thereafter killed his two children, as they would be"
+"neglected after their mother's death, it was held the accused deserved to be awarded"
+life imprisonment and not capital punishment.47. Where the murder in question showed
+"signs of ruthless, unrelenting and determined vindictiveness and though the accused"
+"was 55 at the time of occurrence and 70 at the time of this appeal, the Supreme Court"
+"did not think it necessary to modify his sentence of life imprisonment.48. Similarly,"
+"where murders were committed for gain, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with"
+death sentence only because the condemned prisoners were very young and their
+"wives and children and aged parents were dependent on them. Such considerations,"
+"the Court said, are present in most cases.49. Where, for the offence of dacoity under"
+"section 395, the trial Court awarded three years' R.I., the High Court acquitted the"
+"offenders, but the Supreme Court restored the conviction after a long gap during which"
+"they got married and had resumed normal life, the period already undergone was"
+"considered to be sufficient, but a fine of Rs. 3,000 was imposed on each of them.50."
+"Where a conviction under section 16I, IPC, 1860 read with section 5(2) of the"
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was confirmed, the Gujarat High Court modified the"
+sentence of R.I. for one year and ordered that the appellant shall undergo sentence of
+R.I. for six months only. This was done in view of his age of 60 years and a number of
+illnesses he was suffering from.51. The accused had been out of job for nearly 16 years
+and had undergone the trial for a number of years. He was 65 years old but had
+"received no pension and had a large family to maintain. Hence, the Supreme Court"
+"while confirming the conviction, reduced the sentence of one year R.I. each under"
+section 161 and the Prevention of Corruption Act to 15 days R.I. on each count. The
+sentence of fine was however confirmed.52. Where the accused had accepted a very
+small amount of Rs. 30 as bribe about 16 years back and underwent the agony of trial
+"for a long time and had to support his family, he had been in jail for some time during"
+"trial, considering these facts his sentence of imprisonment was reduced from three"
+months R.I. to the period already undergone.53.
+Imposition of proper and appropriate sentence is bounded obligation and duty of the
+Court. The endeavour of the Court must be to ensure that the accused received
+appropriate sentence. The sentence must be accorded to the gravity of the offence.54.
+[s 53.8] Minimum Sentence.—
+In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence the statutory requirement is
+"that the Court has to record ""adequate and special reasons"" in the judgment and not"
+"fanciful reasons, which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the"
+prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What is
+adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no straitjacket formula
+can be indicated.55. Mere absence of provisions for minimum sentence is no reason or
+justification to treat the offence under the Act (NDPS) as any less serious.56.
+"For the offence of murder, minimum sentence is 'life imprisonment'. Thus, the High"
+Court cannot modify the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court to
+the one already undergone.57.
+"To the five kinds of punishments in the section, two more were added by subsequent"
+"enactments, viz., whipping (now abolished) and detention in reformatories."
+1. Death.—Death punishment is awarded for murder in rarest of the rare cases.58. It
+may be awarded as punishment for the following offences:—
+(1) Waging war against the Government of India (section 121).
+(2) Abetting mutiny actually committed (section 132).
+(3) Giving or fabricating false evidence upon which an innocent person suffers death
+(section 194).
+(4) Threatening or inducing any person to give false evidence- if innocent person is
+"convicted and sentenced in consequence of such false evidence, with death (195A-Part"
+II)
+(5) Murder (section 302).
+"(6) Abetment of suicide of a minor, or an insane or an intoxicated person (section 305)."
+(7) Attempt to murder by life convicts (section 307-PartII)
+"(8) Kidnapping for ransom, etc. (section 364A)"
+(9) Causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of rape victim (section
+376A)
+(10) Repeat offenders of offences punishable under section 376 or section 376A or
+section 376D (section 376E)
+(11) Dacoity accompanied with murder (section 396).
+"(12) Attempt to murder by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life, if hurt is"
+caused (section 307). [For the detailed discussion on Death Penalty See Comments
+under section 302 IPC].
+"In addition to this, Death penalty can be imposed by virtue of section 34, 149,109 and"
+120B of IPC.
+"2. Imprisonment for life is now substituted for transportation. ""Imprisonment for life"" in"
+"the Code means ""rigorous imprisonment for life"" and not ""simple imprisonment for"
+"life"".59."
+3. Imprisonment.—Imprisonment is of two kinds: (a) rigorous and (b) simple. In the
+"case of rigorous imprisonment, the offender is put to hard labour such as grinding corn,"
+"digging earth, drawing water, cutting firewood, bowing wool, etc. In the case of simple"
+"imprisonment, the offender is confined to jail and is not put to any kind of work."
+Imposition of hard labour on prisoners undergoing rigorous imprisonment has been
+held to be legal.60.
+"The minimum term of imprisonment, however, is fixed in the following two cases: (1) If,"
+"at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or"
+"causes grievous hurt to any person, he is punished with imprisonment of not less than"
+seven years (section 397).
+"(2) If, at the time of attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, the offender is armed"
+"with any deadly weapon, he is punished with imprisonment of not less than seven years"
+(section 398).
+The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 [Act No. 13 of 2013 w.e.f 2 April 2013]
+provides minimum punishment for the following offences:
+"(1) Public servant disobeying direction under law- Imprisonment for a term, which"
+shall not be less than six months. (section 166A)
+"(2) Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc.- Imprisonment for not less"
+than ten years. (section 326A)
+(3) Outraging the modesty of a woman- Imprisonment of either description for a
+term which shall not be less than one year (section 354)
+(4) Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe- Imprisonment
+of not less than three years. (section 354B)
+(5) Voyeurism- Imprisonment of not less than one year. (section 354C)
+"(6) Trafficking of person- Seven years [section 370(2)], ten years [sections 370(3),"
+"(4)], 14 years [section 370(5)],"
+(7) Exploitation of a trafficked child- Imprisonment of not less than five years but
+which may extend to seven years and with fine. (section 370A)
+"(8) Rape- Seven years [section 376(1)], ten years [section 376(2)]."
+(9) Causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of victim- Imprisonment
+for a term which shall not be less than 20 years (section 376A)
+(10) Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation- Imprisonment
+of either description for a term which shall not be less than two years (section
+376B)
+(11) Sexual intercourse by a person in authority- Imprisonment of either description
+for a term which shall not be less than five years. (section 376C)
+"(12) Gang rape- Imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than 20 years."
+(section 376D).
+"The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 has further amended the Indian Penal Code"
+"1860. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 has increased the minimum sentence"
+in section 376(1) from seven years to ten years. The 2018 Amendment Act has inserted
+"sections 376AB, 376DA and 376DB which provide for enhanced punishment in certain"
+aggravated forms of rape. Refer Chapter XVI infra.
+An offender is punished with rigorous imprisonment without the alternative of simple
+"imprisonment, in the cases of—"
+"(1) Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of an offence,"
+which is capital by this Code (section 194).
+"(2) Rape (sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB and 376E)"
+(3) House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with death
+(section 449).
+The following offences are punishable with simple imprisonment only:—
+(1) Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade; or unlawfully buying or bidding for
+"property (sections 168, 169)."
+(2) A person absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceedings from a
+"public servant or preventing service of summons or other proceedings, or preventing"
+publication thereof; or not attending in obedience to an order from a public servant
+"(sections 172, 173, 174)."
+(3) Intentional omission to produce a document to a public servant by a person legally
+bound to produce such document; or intentional omission to give notice or information
+to a public servant by a person legally bound to give; or intentional omission to assist a
+"public servant when bound by law to give assistance (sections 175, 176, 187)."
+(4) Refusing oath when duly required to take oath by a public servant; or refusing to
+answer a public servant authorised to question or refusing to sign any statement made
+"by a person himself before a public servant (sections 178, 179, 180)."
+(5) Disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant if such disobedience
+"causes obstruction, annoyance, or injury (section 188)."
+(6) Escape from confinement negligently suffered by a public servant; or negligent
+"omission to apprehend, or negligent sufferance of escape, on the part of a public"
+"servant in cases not otherwise provided for (sections 223, 225-A)."
+(7) Intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of a judicial
+proceeding (section 228).
+(8) Continuance of nuisance after injunction to discontinue (section 291).
+(9) Wrongful restraint (section 341).
+"(10) Defamation: printing or selling defamatory matter known to be so (sections 500,"
+"501, 502)."
+"(11) Uttering any word, or making any sound or gesture, with an intention to insult the"
+modesty of a woman (section 509).
+(12) Misconduct in a public place by a drunken person (section 510).61.
+[s 53.9] Imprisonment for the remainder of the Accused's natural life.—
+"As per the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013,62. the punishment for rape (section"
+"376) is rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but"
+"which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the"
+"remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. In sections 370,"
+"376(A), 376(D), 376(E) it is also specifically mentioned that 'Life' shall mean"
+imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life. The Criminal Law
+"(Amendment) Act, 2018 has increased the minimum sentence in section 376(1) from"
+"seven years to ten years as well as inserted sections 376AB, 376DA and 376DB which"
+provide for enhanced punishment in certain aggravated forms of rape. Refer Chapter
+XVI infra.
+Spending 13 and half years in jail does not mean that the petitioner has undergone a
+sentence for life.63.
+4. Forfeiture.—The punishment of absolute forfeiture of all property of the offender is
+"now abolished. Sections 61 and 62 of the IPC, 1860 dealing with such forfeiture are"
+repealed by Act XVI of 1921.
+"There are, however, three offences in which the offender is liable to forfeiture of"
+"specific property. They are sections 126, 127 and 169 of the Code.64."
+5. Fine.—Fine is the only punishment in the following cases:—
+"(1) A person in charge of a merchant vessel, negligently allowing a deserter from the"
+"Army or Navy or Air Force to obtain concealment in such vessel, is liable to a fine not"
+exceeding Rs. 500 (section 137).
+(2) The owner or occupier of land on which a riot is committed or an unlawful assembly
+"is held, and any person having or claiming any interest in such land, and not using all"
+"lawful means to prevent such riot or unlawful assembly, is punishable with a fine not"
+"exceeding Rs. 1,000 (section 154)."
+(3) The person for whose benefit a riot has been committed not having duly
+endeavoured to prevent it (section 155).
+(4) The agent or manager of such person under like circumstances (section 156).
+(5) False statements in connection with an election (section 171-G).
+(6) Illegal payments in connection with an election (section 171-H).
+(7) Failure to keep election accounts (section 171-I).
+"(8) Voluntarily vitiating the atmosphere so as to render it noxious to the public health, is"
+punishable with a fine up to Rs. 500 (section 278).
+"(9) Obstructing a public way or line of navigation, is punishable with a fine not"
+exceeding Rs. 200 (section 283).
+(10) Committing of a public nuisance not otherwise punishable is punishable with a
+fine not exceeding Rs. 200 (section 290).
+"(11) Publication of a proposal regarding a lottery, is punishable with a fine not"
+"exceeding Rs. 1,000 (section 294-A)."
+Where the accused partners of a firm were acquitted on a charge under section 420 of
+making substantial gains for themselves and an appeal against their acquittal was
+"decided against them 15 years after the acquittal, fine and not imprisonment was"
+considered proper punishment.65. Where the murder accused remained in prison for
+"sometime and was on bail for 13 years, he was not committed to prison; a fine of Rs."
+"50,000 in addition to the imprisonment already undergone was imposed, he being a"
+young man.66. Where the accused along with others convicted under section 323 for
+"six months' imprisonment had already undergone an imprisonment of one year and,"
+"looking at his good conduct inside jail and lest he should lose his service, he was given"
+the benefit of section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 so to assure that his
+conviction should not affect his service.67.
+[s 53.10] Rigorous and Simple imprisonment.—
+"Section 53 of the IPC, 1860 defines five kinds of punishment which includes"
+"punishment for life and two other kinds of imprisonment, i.e., rigorous and simple"
+imprisonment. Rigorous imprisonment is one which is required by law to be completed
+with hard labour. There are principally two categories of prisoners: (1) under trial
+prisoners and (2) convicted prisoners (Besides them there are those detained as
+"preventive measure, and those undergoing detention for default of payment of fine). A"
+person sentenced to simple imprisonment cannot be required to work unless he
+"volunteers himself to do the work. However, the Jail officer who requires a prisoner"
+sentenced to rigorous imprisonment to do hard labour would be doing so as enjoined
+"by law and mandated by the Court.68. Thus, while a person sentenced to simple"
+"imprisonment has the option of choosing to work, a person sentenced to rigorous"
+imprisonment is required by law to undergo hard labour. The under trials are not
+required to work in Jail.69. Section 60 of the Indian Penal Code confers power on a
+"sentencing Court to direct that ""such imprisonment shall be wholly rigorous or that"
+"such imprisonment shall be wholly simple, or that any part of such imprisonment shall"
+"be rigorous and the rest simple."" The sentence of ""imprisonment for life"" tagged along"
+"with a number of offences delineated in the IPC, 1860 is interpreted as ""rigorous"
+"imprisonment for life"" and not simple imprisonment.70."
+Supreme Court Guidelines regarding employment of prisoners and wages.—
+(1) It is lawful to employ the prisoners sentenced to rigorous imprisonment to do hard
+labour whether he consents to do it or not.
+(2) It is open to the jail officials to permit other prisoners also to do any work which
+they choose to do provided such prisoners make a request for that purpose.
+(3) It is imperative that the prisoner should be paid equitable wages for the work done
+by them. In order to determine the quantum of equitable wages payable to prisoners
+the State concerned shall constitute a wage fixation body for making
+recommendations. We direct each State to do so as early as possible.
+(4) Until the State Government takes any decision on such recommendations every
+prisoner must be paid wages for the work done by him at such rates or revised rates as
+the Government concerned fixes in the light of the observations made above. For this
+purpose we direct all the State Governments to fix the rate of such interim wages within
+six weeks from today and report to this Court of compliance of this direction.
+(5) We recommend to the State concerned to make law for setting apart a portion of
+the wages earned by the prisoners to be paid as compensation to deserving victims of
+the offence the commission of which entailed the sentence of imprisonment to the
+"prisoner, either directly or through a common fund to be created for this purpose or in"
+any other feasible mode.
+[State of Gujarat v Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat.71.]
+[s 53.11] Rights of Convicts.—
+"Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental"
+"rights which they otherwise possess. A compulsion under the authority of law,"
+"following upon a conviction, to live in a prison house entails by its own force the"
+deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the
+"territory of India or the right to ""practise"" a profession. A man of profession would thus"
+stand stripped of his right to hold consultations while serving out his sentence. But the
+"Constitution guarantees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and dispose of"
+"property for the exercise of which incarceration can be no impediment, likewise, even a"
+convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution that
+he shall not be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
+established by law.72.
+[s 53.12] Cases of Leniency.—
+"In a given situation, where it is demonstrated that during the pendency of the"
+proceedings the accused has undergone a lot of suffering such as where the accused
+"was in custody or for that matter, in situations where the accused is suspended and is"
+on a subsistence allowance or where as a result of the prosecution the consequences
+"have been so disastrous that the accused has suffered virtual ruination, these aspects"
+alone would be valid justification on which a plea for leniency could be based. On the
+"other hand, one needs to bear in mind that the consequences of criminal acts catch up"
+with the accused particularly when the crimes are against the society the ethical
+concept of forgive and forget merely because the incident took place in the distant past
+will not hold good in a Court of Law.73. Where there was acquittal in the same year in
+which the crime was committed but the acquittal was reversed after eight years and
+conviction and jail terms were awarded and appeal against this order was disposed of
+"in the 20th year of the crime, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the period"
+"already undergone and imposed a fine which if not paid, the original sentence was to"
+be restored.74. Where the guilt of the accused under sections 406 and 120-B were
+"established beyond all reasonable doubt, the Supreme Court did not interfere with their"
+"conviction. However, in view of the fact that the accused had undergone proceedings"
+"for a period of two decades, their sentence was reduced to one already undergone.75."
+Where the accused was convicted for criminal conspiracy and breach of trust and
+"about 48 years had elapsed since the accused was charged for the offences, keeping in"
+view his advanced age he was sentenced to imprisonment till rising of the Court with a
+"fine of Rs. 5,000.76. Where a man of 20 was convicted under section 324 and"
+sentenced to undergo imprisonment for four months whereas he had already
+"undergone imprisonment of one year and two months, his sentence was reduced to"
+one already undergone.77. Where the accused were convicted under section 326 for
+"causing grievous hurt to the victim, considering the lapse of about six years from the"
+"incident, accused not being habitual criminals or previous convicts and there being no"
+"misuse of liberty during bail, the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone"
+"with a fine of Rs. 5,000 each.78. Where the accused convicted and sentenced under"
+"sections 379 and 411, were found to be the sole earning member of their families and"
+"they had no past criminal records, the Court directed that one year's rigorous"
+imprisonment instead of two would meet the ends of justice.79. Where the accused
+seeing his wife in a compromising position with a man assaulted both of them as a
+"result of grave and sudden provocation resulting in the death of both, his conviction"
+"under section 304, Part II was upheld but the sentence of five years' R.I. was reduced to"
+one years' R.I. with the recommendation that the State Government might remit such a
+portion of sentence as it deemed fit and proper.80.
+[s 53.13] Offences against women.—
+"Where the accused had outraged the modesty of a woman, his conviction under"
+"section 354 was upheld but considering the lapse of eight years, it was not found"
+desirable to send him back to jail to be in midst of hardened criminals. He was
+sentenced to sit in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class for five days
+"continuously, during the entire working hours.81. Where the accused, in his late fifties,"
+"betraying the confidence of the prosecutrix committed rape on her, it was held that he"
+"deserved no sympathy. However, as the accused remained in jail for eight years, the"
+Court took a liberal view and considering his age and helplessness sentenced him to
+the period for which he had already been in jail.82. Where the victim of rape belonged to
+a tribal (Bhilla) community and the act of the accused did not cast any serious stigma
+on the girl and she was married to a different person sometime after the incident by her
+"father, it was held that sentence much below the minimum sentence prescribed could"
+be inflicted on the accused.83. Where the conviction and sentence of the accused
+husband to rigorous imprisonment for six months under section 498-A was substituted
+"with a fine of Rs. 6,000, taking into consideration the age, occupation and family"
+"conditions of the husband, it was held that though the appellate Court was justified in"
+"substituting the jail sentence, the Court ought not have awarded a modest fine. The fine"
+"was raised to Rs. 30,000.84. Where a person was married in childhood and was"
+subjected to a second marriage under the pressure exerted by his parents as well as
+"the woman who became his second wife, it was held that a lesser sentence of six"
+"months instead two years' R.I. and a fine of Rs. 2,000 to the accused husband and"
+"imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 1,500 to the accused parents"
+and the second wife in place of the original sentence of six months' R.I. and a fine of
+"Rs. 1,000 would meet the ends of justice.85."
+[s 53.14] Conversion of death sentence into life imprisonment.—
+"Where the accused, being dissatisfied with the partition of family property, committed"
+ghastly murders of four members of his family and there was no evidence that the
+crime was pre-planned and the circumstances indicated that he was under the
+influence of some kind of extreme mental or emotional disturbance which impaired his
+"capacity to appreciate criminality of his conduct, death sentence awarded to him was"
+converted into imprisonment for life.86. Where three accused persons conspired to kill
+the wife and two minor children of one of the accused but one of the accused was not
+a party to actual commission of murder and the part played by the other accused was
+"not definitely proved, the sentence of death imposed on both the accused was"
+"commuted to that of life imprisonment. The death sentence of the main accused, the"
+"father, was not interfered with.87. Where the accused shot his two younger brothers"
+"dead on a petty quarrel, as there was no pre-plan to commit murder, the death sentence"
+"awarded to the accused was altered into life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 30,000.88."
+[s 53.15] Award of compensation.—
+Power of Courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in
+addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that
+he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a measure of responding
+"appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some"
+"extent, a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal"
+justice system.89. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant of compensation to a
+great extent must be considered having the relevant factors therefore in mind. It may
+be compensating the person in one way or the other.90.
+"In the BMW Case, the Supreme Court directed the accused to pay an amount of Rs. 50"
+lakh to the Union of India which will be utilized within for providing compensation to the
+"victims of motor accidents, where the vehicles owner, driver etc. could not be traced,"
+like victims of hit and run cases.91. Where a doctor was convicted for an attempt to
+cause miscarriage and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and
+"pay a fine of Rs. 5,000, the sentence of imprisonment was found to be excessive and"
+"was set aside but the fine was enhanced to Rs. 15,000 out of which, if realised Rs."
+"10,000 was to be paid to the mother of the deceased for the maintenance of the"
+"children of the deceased shown to be living with her.92. The accused, an agriculturist,"
+assaulted his sister's husband with a knife giving a blow in his abdomen resulting in
+death. The accused was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life under
+"section 302. However, on overall appraisal of material on record and the accused"
+"having no criminal antecedents, his conviction under section 302 was set aside and he"
+was convicted under section 304 and directed to undergo 10 years' R.I. But on special
+"facts of the case an option was given to the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 40,000 in all"
+"and in default to undergo R.I. for seven years and, if the fine was paid within 12 weeks,"
+"jail sentence was to be reduced to three years' R.I. Out of the fine, if paid, Rs. 10,000"
+"were to be given to the mother of the deceased and Rs. 30,000 utilised for the benefit"
+"of the three minor children of the deceased in sum of Rs. 10,000 each.93. Where the"
+accused caused a serious injury in the abdomen of a man and was convicted under
+section 307 but considering that he had a widowed mother and two children and was
+"willing to compensate the victim substantially, sentence imposed upon him was"
+modified into one of fine in the way of compensation of Rs. One lakh.94. Where in a
+"case under section 304, Part II the accused remained in custody for over a year after"
+"conviction by the High Court and also for sometime during investigation, the Apex"
+Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone but imposed a fine of Rs.
+"20,000 payable to the widow of the deceased as compensation.95."
+[s 53.16] Reform and rehabilitation.—
+"Where the accused caused several incised injuries to a man, he was convicted under"
+section 326 but as there was no previous enmity between the accused and the injured
+"person and it was the first offence committed by him, besides 14 years had lapsed"
+"since the commission of the offence, he was given an opportunity to reform and"
+rehabilitate in society and his sentence was reduced to the period already
+undergone.96. Where the accused convicted under section 302 was only 15 years old at
+"the time of offence and at the time of appeal he was over 30, he could not be sent to"
+approved school or jail. His conviction was upheld but the sentence was quashed.97.
+[s 53.17] Separate trial for child offender.—
+One of the members of an unlawful assembly was of 13 years at the time of the
+incident. His trial was conducted along with other members who were not children.
+This was held to be illegal. The plea of child offender was not raised before the trial
+"court or the High Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, confirmed the conviction but set"
+aside the sentence imposed on him.98.
+[s 53.18] Cases of no leniency.—
+"In a multiple murder case, it was argued that the accused had donated to the social"
+organisations and that he was not a hardened criminal and not a menace to the society
+and at any rate by wiping him out the crime cannot be wiped out. The Supreme Court
+"observed that the accused was involved in ""organised criminal activity"" and he had"
+acquired social status through crime. The accused had no regard for the value of
+human life. It was held that there were no mitigating circumstances. The main cause of
+his conviction was illicit arrack business and brothel. The fact that for this reason he
+became the victim of police cruelty was also considered to be not a mitigating
+"circumstance.99. In a double murder case, the accused was awarded death sentence"
+"but the execution was postponed. It was held that pain, agony and horror suffered by"
+the prisoner after he was informed about execution was no ground for substituting
+death sentence.100. Where the accused constructed a water tank which collapsed due
+to use of low quality material resulting in the death of several persons and the accused
+"was sentenced to the maximum of two years of R.I. provided under section 304A, it"
+was held that the sentence could not be reduced merely because the matter was more
+than seven years old and that it would also be a grave injustice to the victims of the
+crime.101. Where the accused formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of
+killing three members of a family and one of the accused killed all the three on the spot
+"one after the other in few minutes while others caught hold of the victims, the sentence"
+of life imprisonment awarded to them under sections 302/149 was confirmed but the
+High Court observed that it was a fit case to award the maximum penalty of death
+sentence as the accused had acted like a butcher in a slaughter house.102. Where the
+accused were convicted under section 328 r/w. section 34 for robbing a simple
+"innocent lady of 50 years by administering a stupefying drug through sugarcane juice,"
+the Court refused to take a lenient view and reduce the sentence.103. Where the
+"accused committed a high-handed and broad daylight robbery on a public road, the"
+Court declined to take a lenient view.104. Voluntary intoxication by itself neither
+absolves the offender of the consequences of his act nor does it makes him liable for
+lesser offence.105. The mere fact that the accused inflicted a single injury resulting in
+"death is not sufficient in itself to convert the offence from one under sections 300–304,"
+Part II.106. When the victim has sustained a grievous injury on a vital portion of the
+body and the injury is life-threatening imposition of sentence of six days only which
+was the period already undergone by the accused in confinement is too lenient.
+"However, as the parties have forgotten their differences and are living peacefully since"
+"25 years, the Court taking into consideration the aggravating as well as mitigating"
+"factors under the facts of this case, imposed a sentence of six months' R.I. and a fine"
+"of Rs. 25,000/- against the accused.107."
+[s 53.19] No leniency—Offences against women.—
+Where the accused committed rape on a woman and killed her and it was found that he
+"had behaved like an animal, it was held that it was not a fit case for showing"
+"leniency.108. Where in a case of bride burning, the mother-in-law of the victim was"
+"sentenced to life imprisonment, the Supreme Court refused to show any leniency on"
+the ground that the accused mother-in-law had remained in jail for more than a decade.
+The Court observed that it would be a travesty of justice if sympathy was shown when
+a cruel act like bride burning is committed. It is rather strange that the mother-in-law
+who herself is a woman should resort to killing another woman. Undue sympathy
+would be harmful to the cause of justice.109. Where the accused himself killed his wife
+"by burning and made his two children motherless, no lenient view could be taken on the"
+ground that he had two children.110.
+[s 53.20] Enhancement of sentence.—
+"Where in a group clash due to old enmity, the accused killed ten persons of a"
+community indiscriminately within a span of two hours and accused took the leading
+"part, sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him was enhanced to death penalty"
+in the facts and circumstances of the case but life imprisonment awarded to the co-
+accused under sections 302/149 was confirmed.111.
+[s 53.21] Guidelines for sentencing policy.—
+"Currently, India does not have a structured sentencing guidelines that have been issued"
+"either by the legislature or the judiciary. However, the Courts have framed certain"
+guidelines in the matter of imposition of sentence. The Courts will have to take into
+"account certain principles while exercising their wide discretion in sentencing, such as"
+"proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation. In a proportionality analysis, it is"
+necessary to assess the seriousness of an offence in order to determine the
+commensurate punishment for the offender.112. Justice demands that Courts should
+impose punishment befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence of
+"the crime.113. Law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demand."
+"Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the"
+new challenges and the Courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet
+the challenges.114.
+The principle governing the imposition of punishment will depend upon the facts and
+"circumstances of each case. However, the sentence should be appropriate, adequate,"
+"just, proportionate and commensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and the"
+"manner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime, motive for the crime,"
+nature of the crime and all other attending circumstances have to be borne in mind
+"while imposing the sentence.115. An offence, which affects the morale of the society,"
+"should be severely dealt with. Socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of"
+"the accused and the victim although may not be wholly irrelevant, should be eschewed"
+"in a case of this nature (abduction and rape of minor), particularly when Parliament"
+itself has laid down minimum sentence.
+One of the principles that the judiciary had all along kept in its mind that rape being a
+"violation with violence of the private person of a woman causes mental scar, thus, not"
+only a physical injury but also a deep sense of some deathless shame is also
+inflicted.116.
+"The Court cannot afford to be casual while imposing the sentence, inasmuch as both"
+the crime and the criminal are equally important in the sentencing process. The Courts
+must see that the public does not lose confidence in the judicial system. Imposing
+inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justice system and may lead to a state
+where the victim loses confidence in the judicial system and resorts to private
+vengeance.117.
+6. Whipping.—This form of punishment is now abolished.
+7. Detention in reformatories.—Juvenile offenders sentenced to imprisonment may be
+"sentenced to, and detained in, a Reformatory School for a period of three–seven"
+years.118.
+[s 53.22] Detention during trial.—
+Every confinement of a person and every restraint of the liberty of a free man is
+"imprisonment. Thus, ""imprisonment"" would include under trial detention. ""Under trial"
+"detention of a prisoner is undoubtedly an imprisonment.""119."
+[s 53.23] Postponement of sentence.—
+Where all the members of the family of the deceased were convicted and nobody was
+"left to take care of his daughter, the Court upheld the sentence of the daughter's"
+grandmother but granted her six months' time to arrange for the daughter and then to
+surrender to serve the sentence.120.
+[s 53.24] Community Service for Avoiding Jail Sentence.—
+"Convicts in various countries, now, voluntarily come forward to serve the community,"
+especially in crimes relating to motor vehicles. Graver the crime greater the sentence.
+"But, serving the society actually is not a punishment in the real sense where the"
+convicts pay back to the community which he owes. Conduct of the convicts will not
+"only be appreciated by the community, it will also give a lot of solace to him, especially"
+"in a case where because of one's action and inaction, human lives have been lost. In"
+"the facts and circumstances of the case, where six human lives were lost, Court felt to"
+adopt this method would be good for the society rather than incarcerating the convict
+"further in jail. The Court ordered to do community service for two years, which will be"
+arranged by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment within two months. On
+"default, the convict will have to undergo simple imprisonment for two years.121."
+[s 53.25] Probation.—
+"Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 ('PO Act') is a milestone in the progress of the"
+modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition
+of the doctrine that the object of the criminal law is more to reform the individual
+offender than to punish him. Broadly stated that the PO Act distinguishes offenders
+"below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are not guilty of"
+having committed an offence punishable with death or that imprisonment for life and
+those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above
+the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the Court to release them after
+"admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the"
+"appropriate provisions of the PO Act. In case of offender below the age of 21 years, an"
+injunction is issued to the Court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is
+"satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of"
+"the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them"
+under sections 3 and 4 of the PO Act.122. The PO Act introduced a very basic change in
+"the criminal law of the country. At the same time, Courts were also to be careful about"
+the impact on the society consequent on letting offenders on probation. Indiscriminate
+application of provisions of the PO Act to anti-social and white collar offenders may
+have an adverse effect on the security of the society. Application of the PO Act is
+specifically barred in some cases.123. Provisions of the PO Act should be applied
+"having regard to the nature of offence and age, character and antecedents of the"
+offender.124.
+"1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""Secondly—Transportation"" (w.e.f. 1-1-"
+1956).
+"2. Clause ""Thirdly"" omitted by Act 17 of 1949, section 2 (w.e.f. 6-4-1949)."
+"3. Shivaji v State of Maharashtra, 1973 Cr LJ 1783 : AIR 1973 SC 2622 [LNIND 1973 SC 249] ."
+"4. Inder Singh v State, AIR 1978 SC 1091 : 1978 Cr LJ 766 (SC), see also Ram Prasad, 1980 Cr LJ"
+"10 : AIR 1980 SC 83 [LNIND 1979 SC 404] ; Ashok Kumar, 1980 Cr LJ 444 : AIR 1980 SC 636"
+[LNIND 1980 SC 36] .
+"5. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 : (2012) 2 SCC 648 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 15] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 953 : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"6. State of Punjab v Bawa Singh, 2015 Cr LJ 1701 ."
+"7. UOI v Kuldeep Singh, AIR 2004 SC 827 [LNIND 2003 SC 1056] : (2004) 2 SCC 590 [LNIND"
+"2003 SC 1056] ; State of MP v Ghanshyan Singh, JT 2003 (Supp.1 ) SC 129 : 2003 (8) SCC 13"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 772] ; Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil v State of Gujarat, JT 1994 (3) SC 250 [LNIND"
+1994 SC 415] : 1994 (4) SCC 353 [LNIND 1994 SC 415] .
+"8. BG Goswami v Delhi Administration, 1974 (3) SCC 85 [LNIND 1973 SC 194] : AIR 1973 SC"
+1457 [LNIND 1973 SC 194] : 1973 SCC (Cr) 796 1974 Cr LJ 243 .
+"9. TK Gopal alias Gopi v State of Karnataka, AIR 2000 SC 1669 [LNIND 2000 SC 826] : (2000) 6"
+SCC 168 [LNIND 2000 SC 826] : JT 2000 (6) SC 177 [LNIND 2000 SC 826] : 2000 Cr LJ 2286 :
+"Sunil Batra (I) v Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 [LNIND 1978 SC 215] : (1978) 4 SCC 494"
+[LNIND 1978 SC 215] : 1979 (1) SCR 392 [LNIND 1978 SC 215] : ( 1978 Cr LJ 1741 ); Sunil Batra
+"(II) v Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579 : (1980) 3 SCC 488 [LNIND 1978 SC 215] : 1980 (2)"
+"SCR 557 [LNIND 1978 SC 215] : ( 1980 Cr LJ 1099 ); Charles Sobraj v Superintendent, Central Jail,"
+"Tihar, AIR 1978 SC 1514 [LNIND 1978 SC 218] : ( 1978 Cr LJ 1534 ) and Francis Coralie Mullin v"
+"The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 [LNIND 1981 SC 27] : AIR 1981 SC"
+746 [LNIND 1981 SC 27] : 1981 (2) SCR 516 [LNIND 1981 SC 27] : ( 1981 Cr LJ 306 ) etc.
+"10. Karamjit Singh v State, AIR 2000 SC 3467 [LNIND 2000 SC 707] : (2001) 9 SCC 161 [LNIND"
+2000 SC 707] .
+"11. Dhannajoy Chatterjee v State of WB, (1994) (2) SCC 220 [LNIND 1994 SC 34] : 1994 (3) RCR"
+(Cr) 359 (SC).
+"12. Attorney General of India v Lachma Devi, 1986 Cr LJ 364 : AIR 1986 SC 467 ."
+"13. Murray and Co v Ashok Kr Newatia, AIR 2000 SC 833 [LNIND 2000 SC 159] : (2000) 2 SCC"
+367 [LNIND 2000 SC 159] .
+"14. Karamjit Singh v State, AIR 2000 SC 3467 [LNIND 2000 SC 707] : (2001) 9 SCC 161 [LNIND"
+2000 SC 707] .
+"15. Mohammad Giasuddin v State of AP, (1977) 3 SCC 287 [LNIND 1977 SC 211] : AIR 1977 SC"
+1926 [LNIND 1977 SC 211] .
+"16. State of Gujarat v Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392 [LNIND 1998 SC 920] : AIR"
+1998 SC 3164 [LNIND 1998 SC 920] : JT 1998 (6) SC 530 : 1998 Cr LJ 4561 .
+"17. Gurdeep Singh alias Deep v State, AIR 1999 SC 3646 [LNIND 1999 SC 837] : (2000) 1 SCC"
+498 [LNIND 1999 SC 837] : JT 1999 (7) SC 191 [LNIND 1999 SC 837] : 1999 Cr LJ 4573 .
+"18. State Tr PS Lodhi Colony New Delhi v Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 [LNIND 2012 SC 459]"
+: 2012 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2012 SC 3104 [LNIND 2012 SC 459] .
+"19. UOI v Kuldeep Singh, AIR 2004 SC 827 [LNIND 2003 SC 1056] : (2004) 2 SCC 590 [LNIND"
+2003 SC 1056] .
+"20. Sahdev v Jaibar, (2009) 11 SCC 798 [LNIND 2009 SC 476] : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 215."
+"21. State of Karnataka v Krishnappa, 2000 Cr LJ 1793 : AIR 2000 SC 147 ."
+"22. Mahesh v State of MP, AIR 1987 SC 1346 ; State of Punjab v Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2009 SC 391"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1729] .
+"23. Gurdeep Singh alias Deep v State, AIR 1999 SC 3646 [LNIND 1999 SC 837] : (2000) 1 SCC"
+498 [LNIND 1999 SC 837] : JT 1999 (7) SC 191 [LNIND 1999 SC 837] : 1999 Cr LJ 4573 .
+"24. Mohd Arif v The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, 2014 Cr LJ 4598 ."
+"25. State of HP v Nirmala Devi, AIR 2017 SC 1981 [LNIND 2017 SC 189] ."
+"26. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"27. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] :"
+(2012) 2 SCC 648 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 953 : 2012 Cr LJ 1160 .
+"28. State of HP v Nirmala Devi, AIR 2017 SC 1981 [LNIND 2017 SC 189] ."
+"29. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 : (2012) 2 SCC 648 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 15] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 953 : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"30. Sahdev v Jaibar, (2009) 11 SCC 798 [LNIND 2009 SC 476] : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 215."
+"31. Sahdev v Jaibar, (2009) 11 SCC 798 [LNIND 2009 SC 476] : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 215."
+"32. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 : (2012) 2 SCC 648 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 15] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 953 : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"33. State of MP v Saleem alias Chamaru, 2005 (5) SCC 554 [LNIND 2005 SC 1070] 61."
+"34. C Muniappan v State of TN, (2010) 9 SCC 567 [LNIND 2010 SC 809] : AIR 2010 SC 3718"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 809] : (2010) 10 SCR 262 [LNIND 2010 SC 809] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1402.
+"35. Dinesh v State of Rajasthan, 2006 (3) SCC 771 [LNIND 2006 SC 151] : AIR 2006 SCW 1123 :"
+AIR 2006 SC 1267 [LNIND 2006 SC 151] .
+"36. Gurmukh Singh v State of Haryana, JT 2009 (11) SC 122 : 2009 (11) Scale 688 [LNIND 2009"
+SC 1725] .
+"37. Jameel v State of UP, 2010 Cr LJ 2106 : (2010) 12 SCC 532 [LNIND 2009 SC 1960] : AIR"
+2010 SC (Supp) 303 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 582.
+"38. UOI v Kuldeep Singh, AIR 2004 SC 827 [LNIND 2003 SC 1056] : (2004) 2 SCC 590 [LNIND"
+2003 SC 1056] . Meaning of Judicial discretion explained.
+"39. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"40. State of HP v Nirmala Devi, AIR 2017 SC 1981 [LNIND 2017 SC 189] ."
+"41. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"42. State v Narayan Bisoi, 1975 Cr LJ 1399 (Ori)."
+"43. Javed Ahmed, 1983 Cr LJ 960 : AIR 1983 SC 594 [LNIND 1983 SC 119] : (1983) 3 SCC 39"
+"[LNIND 1983 SC 119] : 1983 SCC (Cr) 559; see also Henry Westmuller, 1985 Cr LJ 1079 : AIR"
+"1985 SC 823 [LNIND 1985 SC 105] : (1985) 3 SCC 291 [LNIND 1985 SC 105] ; Lok Pal Singh,"
+1985 Cr LJ 1134 (SC) : AIR 1985 SC 823 [LNIND 1985 SC 105] .
+"44. Munnalal, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 108 (MP)."
+"45. Gauri Shanker Sharma v State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 709 [LNIND 1990 SC 8] : 1990 (2) SCC 502"
+"[LNIND 1990 SC 100] , the acquittal granted by the High Court was set aside and the sentence of"
+7-year RI restored.
+"46. State v Balkrishna, 1992 Cr LJ 1872 (Mad)."
+"47. State of UP v MK Anthony, 1985 Cr LJ 493 : AIR 1985 SC 48 . For an account of the"
+"perplexities of criminal justice, see S Venugopal Rao, Perplexities of Criminal Justice, (1985) 27"
+"JILI 458. See also Pandurang Dhondu Bhuwad v State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 3177 Bom,"
+domestic servants committing day-light robberty in an apartment resulting in the death of an
+"inmate, life imprisonment, no concession for young age or poverty."
+"48. Guvala China Venkatesu v State of AP, AIR 1991 SC 1926 : 1991 Cr LJ 2326 ."
+"49. Sevaka Perumal v State of TN, AIR 1991 SC 1463 [LNIND 1991 SC 269] : 1991 Cr LJ 1845 ."
+"50. State of Rajasthan v Sukhpal Singh, (1983) 1 SCC 393 [LNIND 1982 SC 206] : 1983 SCC (Cr)"
+"213 : AIR 1984 SC 207 [LNIND 1982 SC 206] ; Philip Bhimsen Aind v State, (1995) Cr LJ 1694"
+(Bom).
+"51. Babarali Ahmedali Sayed v State of Gujarat, 1991 Cr LJ 1269 Guj."
+"52. TM Joseph v State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 1922 : 1992 Cr LJ 3166 . The court referred to its"
+"own decision in BC Goswami v Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC 1457 [LNIND 1973 SC 194] :"
+1974 Cr LJ 243 .
+"53. Ajit Kumar Vasantlal Zaveri v State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 2064 : 1992 Cr LJ 3593 ."
+"54. Gurmukh Singh v State of Haryana, 2010 Cr LJ 450 : AIR 2009 SC 2697 [LNIND 2009 SC 847]"
+.
+"55. State of MP v Sheikh Shahid, AIR 2009 SC 2951 [LNIND 2009 SC 867] : (2009) 12 SCC 715"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 867] : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 704.
+"56. UOI v Kuldeep Singh, AIR 2004 SC 827 [LNIND 2003 SC 1056] : (2004) 2 SCC 590 [LNIND"
+2003 SC 1056] .
+"57. Jitendra v State of Govt of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2018 SC 5253 [LNIND 2018 SC 537] ."
+"58. Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, 1980 Cr LJ 636 : AIR 1980 SC 898 [LNIND 1980 SC 260] ."
+"The minimum sentence awardable under section 302 being life imprisonment, it has been held"
+"that the sentence cannot be reduced. Dori v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 3139 (All); Dadasaheb Misal"
+"v State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cr LJ 1512 (Bom). See Triveniben v State of Gujarat, 1990 Cr LJ 273"
+"(Guj); Sham Sunder v Puran, (1990) 4 SCC 731 [LNIND 1990 SC 994] : 1991 SCC (Cr) 38 : 1990 Cr"
+"LJ 2600 ; Kannan v State of TN, 1989 Cr LJ 825 : AIR 1989 SC 396 [LNIND 1982 SC 73] : 1989"
+Supp (1) SCC 81 .
+"59. Laxman Naskar v State of WB, 2000 Cr LJ 4017 : AIR 2000 SC 2762 [LNIND 2000 SC 1180] ."
+"60. State of Gujarat v Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, 1998 Cr LJ 4561 : AIR 1998 SC 3164 [LNIND"
+1998 SC 920] .
+"61. For an example of early release see Iqbal Singh v State of Punjab, 1990 Cr LJ 1460 ."
+62. Act No. 13 of 2013 w.e.f 2 April 2013.
+"63. Mohd Arif v The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, 2014 Cr LJ 4598 : (2014) 9 SCC 737"
+[LNIND 2014 SC 769] .
+"64. R S Joshi v Ajit Mills, AIR 1977 SC 2279 [LNIND 1977 SC 260] : 1977 SCC (Tax) 536 : (1978)"
+1 SCJ 239 .
+"65. State of Maharashtra v Chandra Prakash Keshavdeo, 1991 Cr LJ 3187 (Bom)."
+"66. Kapoor Lal v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 2159 (All)."
+"67. Rajbir v State of Haryana, 1985 Cr LJ 1495 : 1985 Guj LH 117 : AIR 1985 SC 1278 . Referred"
+"to in Dhansukh Chhotalal Joshi v State of Gujarat, 1990 Cr LJ 2333 to reduce the sentence of a"
+19 year- old boy convicted under section 304-II to that already undergone who was a member of
+a party which caused death without any intention to do so.
+"68. State of Gujarat v Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392 [LNIND 1998 SC 920] : AIR"
+1998 SC 3164 [LNIND 1998 SC 920] See the box.
+"69. Phool Kumari v Office of the Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar New Delhi, (2012) 8 SCC 183"
+[LNINDORD 2012 SC 410] : 2012 Cr LJ 4261 : AIR 2012 SC 3198 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 410] .
+"70. Constitution Bench in GV Godse v State, AIR 1961 SC 600 [LNIND 1961 SC 11] and Naib"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 855 [LNIND 1983 SC 116] ."
+"71. State of Gujarat v Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, (1998) 7 SCC 392 [LNIND 1998 SC 920] : AIR"
+1998 SC 3164 [LNIND 1998 SC 920] : JT 1998 (6) SC 530 : 1998 Cr LJ 4561 .
+"72. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v State of AP, (1975) 3 SCC 185 [LNIND 1974 SC 269] : AIR 1974 SC"
+2092 [LNIND 1974 SC 269] .
+"73. State of Maharashtra v Jethmat Himatmal Jain, 1994 Cr LJ 2613 (Bom)."
+"74. Chanda Lal v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1992 SC 597 : 1992 Cr LJ 523 ."
+"75. Ramanlal Baldevdas Shah v State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 3164 : AIR 1992 SC 1916 . See also"
+"State of Karnataka v Bhojappa Hanamanthappa, 1994 Cr LJ 1543 ."
+"76. Sushil Kumar Sanghi v State, 1995 Cr LJ 3457 (Del)."
+"77. Babloo v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ 3534 (MP). Jaya Mala v Home Secy, Govt of J&K, AIR 1982"
+SC 1297 [LNIND 1982 SC 109] : 1982 Cr LR (SC) 441 relied upon.
+"78. Pratapsingh Rathod v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 790 (Bom). Incident of causing stab"
+"wound taking place 24 years back and the injury being of simple nature, the sentence was"
+"reduced into one already undergone, Pritam Singh v State, 1996 Cr LJ 7 (Del)."
+"79. Rasananda Bindhani v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 121 (Ori)."
+"80. BY Deshmukh v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 1108 (Bom), relying on in Re Vadivel"
+"Padayachi, 1972 Cr LJ 1641 (Mad)."
+"81. Panchu Parida v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 953 (Ori). The court referred to Ippili Trinadha"
+"Rao v State of AP, 1984 Cr LJ 1254 ."
+"82. State of Orissa v Gangadhar Behuria, 1992 Cr LJ 3814 (Ori)."
+"83. Dayaram v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 3154 (MP)."
+"84. Madhuri Mukund Chitnis v Mukund Martand Chitnis, 1992 Cr LJ 111 (Bom)."
+"85. Kashiram v Sonvati, 1992 Cr LJ 760 (MP)."
+"86. MS Sheshappa v State of Karnataka, 1994 Cr LJ 3372 (Kant)."
+"87. SC Bahri v State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2020 : 1994 Cr LJ 3271 ."
+"88. State v Banwari Lal, 1996 Cr LJ 1078 (Raj)."
+"89. Manish Jalan v State of Karnataka, JT 2008 (7) SC 643 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] ."
+"90. Dilip S Dahanukar v Kotak Mahindra Co Ltd, ((2007) 6 SCC 528 [LNIND 2007 SC 451] 65) See"
+"also Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 : (2012) 2 SCC 648 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 15] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 953 : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"91. State Tr PS Lodhi Colony New Delhi v Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 [LNIND 2012 SC 459]"
+: 2012 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2012 SC 3104 [LNIND 2012 SC 459] .
+"92. Akhil Kumar v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 2029 (MP)."
+"93. Madhukar Chandar v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 3281 (Bom)."
+"94. Joshi v State of Kerala, 1996 Cr LJ 143 (Ker)."
+"95. Sarup Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 2452 : 1995 Cr LJ 4168 ."
+"96. Raja Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr LJ 1016 (Raj)."
+"97. Lal Diwan v State of UP, 1995 Cr LJ 3899 (All)."
+"98. Umesh Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2111 [LNIND 2000 SC 871] : 2000 Cr LJ 6167 ."
+"99. Shankar v State of TN, (1994) 4 SCC 478 [LNIND 1994 SC 377] : 1994 Cr LJ 3071 ."
+"100. Sharomani Akali Dal (Mann) v State of JK, 1993 Cr LJ 927 (J&K)."
+"101. Bhimabhai Kalabhai v State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 2585 (Guj)."
+"102. Arjunan v State, 1993 Cr LJ 3113 (Mad)."
+"103. Madhukar Damu Patil v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 1062 (Bom)."
+"104. Jaivir Singh v State of UP, 1996 Cr LJ 1494 (All)."
+"105. Dedekula Khabala Saheb v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 2196 (AP)."
+"106. Gochipathula Samudralu v State of AP, 1992 Cr LJ 2488 (AP)."
+"107. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"108. Jagat Bahadur v State of HP, 1994 Cr LJ 3396 (HP)."
+"109. Paniben v State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1817 [LNIND 1992 SC 248] : 1992 Cr LJ 2919 ."
+"110. Venkappa K Chowdari v State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 15 (Kant)."
+"111. Jodha Khoda Rabari v State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 3298 (Guj)."
+"112. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"113. Jameel v State of UP, 2010 Cr LJ 2106 : (2010) 12 SCC 532 [LNIND 2009 SC 1960] : AIR"
+2010 SC (Supp) 303 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 582.
+"114. UOI v Kuldeep Singh, AIR 2004 SC 827 [LNIND 2003 SC 1056] : (2004) 2 SCC 590 [LNIND"
+2003 SC 1056] .
+"115. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"116. State of MP v Babu Natt, (2009) 2 SCC 272 [LNIND 2008 SC 2471] : (2009) 1 SCC (Cr) 713 :"
+AIR 2009 SC 1810 [LNIND 2008 SC 2471] : (2009) 1 Ker LJ 686 : 2009 Cr LJ 1722 .
+"117. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"118. Act VIII of 1897, section 8. Where the accused was a child of 14 at the time of the incident"
+"and, therefore, the benefit of being sent to an approved school under the U.P. Children Act (1 of"
+1952) would have been available to him but he became a man of 28 by the time of the final
+"judgment, and, therefore, not fit for the school, his conviction was sustained and the sentence"
+"reduced to already undergone. Pachrangi v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 3232 (All), relying on Bhoop"
+"Ram v State of UP, 1989 All Cr R 276 : 1990 Cr LJ 2671 : AIR 1990 SC 1329 [LNIND 1990 SC 277]"
+.
+"119. Prahlad G Gajbhiye v State of Maharashtra, (1994) 2 Cr LJ 2555 at p 2561 (Bom)."
+"120. Harkori v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 814 : AIR 1998 SC 2821 [LNIND 1997 SC 1368] ."
+"121. State Tr PS Lodhi Colony New Delhi v Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+459] : 2012 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2012 SC 3104 .
+"122. Rattan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444 [LNIND 1964 SC 135] : 1964 (7) SCR 676"
+"[LNIND 1964 SC 135] : 1965 (1) Cr LJ 360 ; DalbirSingh v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1677"
+[LNIND 2000 SC 810] : 2000 (5) SCC 82 [LNIND 2000 SC 810] : 2000 Cr LJ 2283 .
+"123. Nalinakshan v Rameshan, 2009 Cr LJ 1703 (Ker)."
+"124. MCD v State of Delhi, 2005 (4) SCC 605 [LNIND 2005 SC 445] : AIR 2005 SC 2658 [LNIND"
+"2005 SC 445] : 2005 SCC (Cr) 1322 : 2005 Cr LJ3077; Sitaram Paswan v State of Bihar, 2005 (13)"
+SCC 110 [LNIND 2005 SC 703] : AIR 2005 SC 3534 [LNIND 2005 SC 703] : 2005 Cr LJ 4135 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+125.[[s 53A] Construction of reference to transportation.
+"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), any reference"
+"to ""transportation for life"" in any other law for the time being in force or in any"
+instrument or order having effect by virtue of any such law or of any enactment
+"repealed shall be construed as a reference to ""imprisonment for life""."
+(2) In every case in which a sentence of transportation for a term has been passed
+before the commencement of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment)
+"Act, 126.[1955] (26 of 1955), the offender shall be dealt with in the same"
+manner as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term.
+(3) Any reference to transportation for a term or to transportation for any shorter
+term (by whatever name called) in any other law for the time being in force
+shall be deemed to have been omitted.
+"(4) Any reference to ""transportation"" in any other law for the time being in force"
+"shall,—"
+"(a) if the expression means transportation for life, be construed as a"
+reference to imprisonment for life;
+"(a) if the expression means transportation for any shorter term, be deemed"
+to have been omitted.]
+COMMENT—
+This section has been inserted by Act XXVI of 1955. It deals with a sentence of
+transportation wherever it occurs in a statute. After this amendment of the Code
+'transportation' as a sentence has been done away with as a punishment.
+"125. Ins. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"126. Subs. by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch. II, for ""1954"" (w.e.f. 17-9-1957)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+125.[[s 53A] Construction of reference to transportation.
+"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3), any reference"
+"to ""transportation for life"" in any other law for the time being in force or in any"
+instrument or order having effect by virtue of any such law or of any enactment
+"repealed shall be construed as a reference to ""imprisonment for life""."
+(2) In every case in which a sentence of transportation for a term has been passed
+before the commencement of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment)
+"Act, 126.[1955] (26 of 1955), the offender shall be dealt with in the same"
+manner as if sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the same term.
+(3) Any reference to transportation for a term or to transportation for any shorter
+term (by whatever name called) in any other law for the time being in force
+shall be deemed to have been omitted.
+"(4) Any reference to ""transportation"" in any other law for the time being in force"
+"shall,—"
+"(a) if the expression means transportation for life, be construed as a"
+reference to imprisonment for life;
+"(a) if the expression means transportation for any shorter term, be deemed"
+to have been omitted.]
+COMMENT—
+This section has been inserted by Act XXVI of 1955. It deals with a sentence of
+transportation wherever it occurs in a statute. After this amendment of the Code
+'transportation' as a sentence has been done away with as a punishment.
+"125. Ins. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"126. Subs. by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch. II, for ""1954"" (w.e.f. 17-9-1957)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 54] Commutation of sentence of death.
+"In every case in which sentence of death shall have been passed, 127.[the appropriate"
+"Government] may, without the consent of the offender, commute the punishment for"
+any other punishment provided by this Code.
+COMMENT—
+"The law governing suspension, remission and commutation of sentence is both"
+statutory and constitutional.128. The stage for the exercise of this power generally
+"speaking is post-judicial, i.e., after the judicial process has come to an end. After the"
+"judicial function ends, the executive function of giving effect to the judicial verdict"
+commences. Constitutional power under Article 72/161 would override the statutory
+power contained in sections 432 and 433 and the limitation of section 433A of the
+"Code as well as the power conferred by sections 54 and 55, IPC, 1860.129. No convict"
+has a fundamental right of remission or shortening of sentence. The State in exercise
+of its executive power of remission must consider each individual case keeping in view
+"the relevant factors. The power of the State to issue general instructions, so that no"
+"discrimination is made, is also permissible in law.130. Exercise of executive clemency is"
+a matter of discretion and yet subject to certain standards. It is not a matter of
+"privilege.131. A right to be considered for remission, keeping in view the constitutional"
+"safeguards of a convict under Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India, must be"
+held to be a legal one. Such a legal right emanates from not only the Prisons Act but
+also from the Rules framed thereunder.132. The power of remission vested in the
+"Government under section 433A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973) is not"
+in conflict with Articles 72 and 162 of the Constitution.133. Granting of pardon is in no
+"sense an overturning of a judgment of conviction, but rather it is an executive action"
+that mitigates or sets aside the punishment for a crime. It eliminates the effect of
+conviction without addressing the defendant's guilt or innocence.134. It is open to the
+President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Article 72 of the Constitution to
+scrutinize the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different
+"conclusion from that recorded by the Court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence"
+"imposed on, the accused.135."
+[s 54.1] Delay in Execution whether entitle commutation of Death sentence to
+Life Imprisonment.—
+"In TV Vatheeswaran's case, AIR 1983 SC 361 [LNIND 1983 SC 43] : 1983 SCR (2) 348136."
+"a two-Judge Bench of SC considered whether the accused, who was convicted for an"
+"offence of murder and sentenced to death, kept in solitary confinement for about eight"
+years was entitled to commutation of death sentence. It was held that delay exceeding
+two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to
+entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the
+quashing of the sentence of death.137. But a three-Judge in Sher Singh v State of
+"Punjab,138. held that though prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence is"
+unquestionably an important consideration for determining whether the sentence
+"should be allowed to be commuted, no hard and fast rule that ""delay exceeding two"
+years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle
+the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of
+"the sentence of death"" can be laid down as has been done in Vatheeswaran Javed"
+"Ahmed v State of Maharashtra,139. re-iterated the proposition laid down in Vatheeswaran"
+(supra) case and doubted the competence of the three-Judge Bench to overrule the
+Vatheeswaran Case. The conflicting views are finally settled by the Constitution Bench
+in Triveni Ben v State of Gujarat.140. It overruled Vatheeswaran (supra) holding that
+undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned
+person to approach this Court under Article 32 but the Court will only examine the
+nature of delay caused and circumstances that ensued after sentence was finally
+confirmed by the judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to reopen the
+conclusions reached by the Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death.
+"Court, however, may consider the question of inordinate delay in the light of all"
+circumstances of the case to decide whether the execution of sentence should be
+carried out or should be altered into imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay
+could be held to make the sentence of death inexecutable and to this extent the
+decision in Vatheeswaran case cannot be said to lay down the correct law. In Madhu
+"Mehta v UOI,141.,142. Supreme Court commuted the death sentence on the ground that"
+the mercy petition was pending for eight years after disposal of the criminal appeal by
+Supreme Court.
+[s 54.1.1] Devender Singh Bhullar and Mahendra Das.—
+"In Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v State of NCT of Delhi,143. the convict appealed to the"
+"President for clemency in 2003. The President, after a lapse of over eight years,"
+dismissed his mercy plea in 2011. Bhullar had sought commutation of his death
+penalty to life sentence by the Supreme Court on the ground that there was inordinate
+delay by the President over his plea for clemency. A two-Judge Bench144. by order
+"dated 12 April 2013 dismissed his plea, by holding that the rule enunciated in Sher"
+"Singh's case (supra), Triveniben's case (supra) and some other judgments that long"
+delay may be one of the grounds for commutation of the sentence of death into life
+imprisonment cannot be invoked in cases where a person is convicted for offence
+"under TADA or similar statutes. Two weeks later in Mahendra Nath Das v UOI,145. the"
+same Bench held that the convict's death sentence could be commuted to life
+imprisonment because much of the inordinate delay of 12 years in the rejection of his
+"mercy petition by the President was unexplained, and therefore, inexcusable."
+[s 54.2] Modification of death sentence to a particular period with the further
+direction that the convict must not be released from prison for the rest of his
+life or before actually serving out the term.—
+"It was in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka,146. the three-Judge Bench held"
+that there is a good and strong basis for the Court to substitute a death sentence by life
+imprisonment or by a term in excess of 14 years and further to direct that the convict
+must not be released from the prison for the rest of his life or for the actual term as
+"specified in the order, as the case may be. But a two-Judge Bench in Sangeet v State of"
+Haryana147. in which it was held that:
+a reading of some recent decisions delivered by this Court seems to suggest that the
+remission power of the appropriate Government has effectively been nullified by awarding
+"sentences of 20 years, 25 years and in some cases without any remission. Is this"
+permissible? Can this Court (or any Court for that matter) restrain the appropriate
+Government from granting remission of a sentence to a convict? What this Court has done
+"in Swamy Shraddananda and several other cases, by giving a sentence in a capital offence"
+"of 20 years or 30 years imprisonment without remission, is to effectively injunct the"
+appropriate Government from exercising its power of remission for the specified period. In
+"our opinion, this issue needs further and greater discussion, but as at present advised, we"
+are of the opinion that this is not permissible. The appropriate Government cannot be told
+"that it is prohibited from granting remission of a sentence. Similarly, a convict cannot be"
+"told that he cannot apply for a remission in his sentence, whatever the reason. In this case,"
+though the Division Bench raised a doubt about the decision of a three-Judge Bench in
+"Swamy Shraddananda (supra), yet the same has not been referred to a larger Bench."
+"In Sahib Hussain @ Sahib Jan v State of Rajasthan,148. another two-Judge Bench re-"
+iterated the position held in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) by holding that the
+observations in Sangeet (supra) are not warranted. In Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of
+"Punjab,149. another two Judge also termed the remarks in Sangeet (supra) were"
+'unwarranted' and opined that if the two-Judge Bench was of the opinion that earlier
+"judgments, even of a larger Bench were not justified, the Bench ought to have referred"
+the matter to the larger Bench.
+[s 54.3] Cases where the death sentence was modified to a particular period
+(or life) with further direction to avoid premature release
+1. Subhash Chander v Krishan Lal 150.
+2. Shri Bhagwan v State of Rajasthan 151.
+3. Ram Anup Singh v State of Bihar 152.
+4. Mohd. Munna v UOI 153.
+5. Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao v State of Maharashtra 154.
+6. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi 155.
+7. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka 156.
+8. Haru Ghosh v State of WB 157.
+9. Ramraj v State of Chattisgarh 158.
+10. Neel Kumar @ Anil Kumar v The State of Haryana 159.
+11. Sandeep v State of UP 160.
+12. Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of Punjab 161.
+13. Brajendra Singh v State of MP 162.
+14. State of UP v Sanjay Kumar 163.
+"127. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Central Government or the Provincial Government of the"
+"Provincewithin which the offender shall have been sentenced"". The words in italics were"
+"substituted by theA.O. 1937, for ""the Government of India or the Government of the place""."
+"128. The Law Commission of India in its 41st report proposed that sections 54, 55 and 55A"
+may be omittedfrom the IPC and their substance incorporated in Section 402 Criminal
+"Procedure Code- See State(Govt of NCT of Delhi) v Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+632] : JT 2003 (8) SC 17 [LNIND 2003 SC 632] .
+"129. Ashok Kumar v UOI, AIR 1991 SC 1792 [LNIND 1990 SC 319] : (1991) 3 SCC 498 [LNIND"
+1991 SC 288] .
+"130. State of Haryana v Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606 [LNIND 2007 SC 1295] : 2008 Cr LJ"
+444 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cr) 221.
+"131. Epuru Sudhakar v Govt of AP, (2006) 8 SCC 161 [LNIND 2006 SC 807] : AIR 2006 SC 3385"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 807] .
+"132. State of Mysore v H Srinivasmurthy, (1976) 1 SCC 817 [LNIND 1976 SC 29] : AIR 1976 SC"
+1104 [LNIND 1976 SC 29] .
+"133. Maru Ram v UOI, AIR 1980 SC 2147 [LNIND 1980 SC 446] : 1981 SCR (1)1196."
+"134. Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 1975 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+1281] : (2013) 6 SCC 195 [LNIND 2008 SC 2975] .
+"135. Kehar Singh v UOI, AIR 1989 SC 653 [LNIND 1988 SC 586] : (1989) 1 SCC 204 [LNIND 1988"
+SC 586] .
+"136. Overruled in Triveni Ben v State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1335 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] : (1989)"
+1 SCC 678 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] .
+"137. In Ediga Annamma's case, (1974 (3) SCR 329), two years was considered sufficient to"
+"justifyinterference with the sentence of death. In Bhagwan Baux's case ( AIR 1978 SC 34 ), two"
+"and a halfyears and in Sadhu Singh's case ( AIR 1978 SC 1506 ), three and a half years were"
+"taken as sufficientto justify altering the sentence of death into one of imprisonment for life, See"
+"also KP Mohammed vState of Kerala, (1985) 1 SCC (Cr) 142 : 1984 Supp SCC 684."
+"138. Sher Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465 [LNIND 1983 SC 89] : (1983) 2 SCC 344"
+[LNIND 1983 SC 89] .
+"139. Javed Ahmed v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1985 SC 231 [LNIND 1984 SC 310] : (1985) 1 SCC"
+275 [LNIND 1984 SC 310] .
+"140. Triveni Ben v State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1335 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] : (1989) 1 SCC 678"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 885] : JT 1989 (1) SC 314 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] : 1990Cr LJ 1810 : (1989) 1
+SCC (Cr) 248.
+"141. Madhu Mehta v UOI, (1989) 3 SCR 775 [LNIND 1989 SC 390] ."
+"142. See also Daya Singh v UOI, (1991) 3 SCC 61 [LNIND 1991 SC 231] ."
+"143. Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2013 SC 1975 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+1281] : (2013) 6 SCC 195 [LNIND 2008 SC 2975] .
+"144. GS Singhvi and S J Mukhopadhaya, JJ."
+"145. Mahendra Nath Das v UOI, (2013) 6 SCC 253 [LNIND 2013 SC 522] : 2013 (6) Scale 591"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 522] .
+"146. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, 2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :"
+"AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008Cr LJ 3911; Also see State of UP v Sanjay Kumar,"
+(2012) 8 SCC 537 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 416] .
+"147. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] : 2013 Cr LJ 425 .
+"148. Sahib Hussain @ Sahib Jan v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 2359 : 2013 (6) Scale 219"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 474] .
+"149. Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of Punjab, 2013 (10) Scale 671 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 1147] ."
+"150. Subhash Chander v Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 458 [LNIND 2001 SC 853] ."
+"151. Shri Bhagwan v State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296 [LNIND 2001 SC 1234] ."
+"152. Ram Anup Singh v State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 686 [LNIND 2002 SC 482] ."
+"153. Mohd Munna v UOI, (2005) 7 SCC 417 [LNIND 2005 SC 701] ."
+"154. Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao v State of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 109 [LNIND 2001 SC"
+2510] .
+"155. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] ."
+"156. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :"
+2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 Cr LJ 3911 .
+"157. Haru Ghosh v State of WB, (2009) 15 SCC 551 [LNIND 2009 SC 1734] ."
+"158. Ramraj v State of Chattisgarh, (2010) 1 SCC 573 [LNIND 2009 SC 2093] ."
+"159. Neel Kumar @ Anil Kumar v The State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 [LNIND 2012 SC 298] ."
+"160. Sandeep v State of UP, (2012) 6 SCC 107 [LNIND 2012 SC 306] ."
+"161. Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of Punjab, (2013) 2 SCC 713 [LNIND 2013 SC 94] ."
+"162. Brajendra Singh v State of MP, (2012) 4 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 159] ."
+"163. State of UP v Sanjay Kumar, (2013)8 SCC 537 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 55] Commutation of sentence of imprisonment for life.
+"In every case in which sentence of 164.[imprisonment] for life shall have been passed,"
+"165.[the appropriate Government] may, without the consent of the offender, commute"
+the punishment for imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding
+fourteen years.
+COMMENT—
+"In the absence of an order under section 55 IPC, 1860 or section 433(b) Cr PC, 1973 a"
+"life convict cannot be released even after expiry of 14 years, for a sentence of life"
+imprisonment means rigorous imprisonment for the rest of convict's life.166. It is now
+conclusively settled by a catena of decisions that the punishment of imprisonment for
+life handed down by the Court means a sentence of imprisonment for the convict for
+"the rest of his life.167. However, Supreme Court has been, for quite some time,"
+"conscious of the liberal approach and sometimes discriminatory too, taken by the"
+"States in exercise of their power under sections 432 and 433 of Cr PC, 1973 in"
+"remitting or commuting sentences. In Jagmohan Singh v State of UP,168. Court had"
+expressed concern about such approach made by the States in remitting life sentences
+that led to the amendment in Cr PC introducing section 433A by Act 45 of 1978. Under
+"section 433A of Cr PC, 1973 a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed for an"
+offence for which death is one of the punishments or where a death sentence is
+"commuted to life under section 433, he shall not be released unless he has served 14"
+years of imprisonment.
+It appears that the provision has been generally understood to mean that life sentence
+"would only be 14 years of incarceration. Taking judicial notice of such a trend, the"
+"Supreme Court has, in cases where imposition of death sentence would be too harsh"
+"and imprisonment for life (the way it is understood as above) too inadequate, in several"
+"cases, has adopted different methods to ensure that the minimum term of life"
+"imprisonment ranges from at least 20 years to the end of natural life. However, in some"
+"cases, the Court had also been voicing concern about the statutory basis of such"
+"orders.169. In the case of State of Rajasthan v Jamil Khan,170. the Supreme Court opined"
+that:
+We are of the view that it will do well in case a proper amendment under section 53 of IPC is
+"provided, introducing one more category of punishment - life imprisonment without"
+"commutation or remission. Dr. VS Malimath, J, in the Report on 'Committee of Reforms of"
+"Criminal Justice System', submitted in 2003, had made such a suggestion but so far no"
+serious steps have been taken in that regard. There could be a provision for imprisonment
+till death without remission or commutation.
+[s 55.1] The power of High Court to commute.—
+Exercise of power under section 433 is an executive discretion. The High Court in
+exercise of its revisional jurisdiction had no power conferred on it to commute the
+sentence imposed where a minimum sentence was provided for offence. The mandate
+"of section 433 Cr PC, 1973 enables the Government in an appropriate case to commute"
+the sentence of a convict and to prematurely order his release before expiry of the
+"sentence as imposed by the Courts.171. In State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v Prem Raj,172."
+Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether in a case involving conviction
+"under section 7 read with section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, the"
+High Court could commute the sentence of imprisonment on deposit of a specified
+amount by the convict and direct the State Government to pass appropriate order under
+"section 433(c) Cr PC, 1973. It was held that the question of remission lay within the"
+domain of the appropriate government and it was not open to the High Court to give a
+"direction of that kind even if the High Court could give such a direction, it could only"
+direct consideration of the case of premature release by the Government and could not
+have ordered the premature release of the respondent itself. The right to exercise the
+"power under section 433 Cr PC, 1973 vests in the Government and has to be exercised"
+by the Government in accordance with the rules and established principles. The
+"impugned order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and is hereby set"
+aside.173.
+"[s 55.2] Power to commute, when minimum sentence is provided in the"
+Statute.—
+"Punishment has a penological purpose. Reformation, retribution, prevention, and"
+deterrence are some of the major factors in that regard. Parliament is the collective
+"conscience of the people. If it has mandated a minimum sentence for certain offences,"
+"the Government being its delegate, cannot interfere with the same in exercise of their"
+"power for remission or commutation. Neither section 432 nor section 433 of Cr PC,"
+"1973 hence contains a non-obstante provision. Therefore, the minimum sentence"
+provided for any offence cannot be and shall not be remitted or commuted by the
+"Government in exercise of their power under sections 432 or 433 of the Cr PC, 1973."
+Wherever the Indian Penal Code or such penal statutes have provided for a minimum
+"sentence for any offence, to that extent, the power of remission or commutation has to"
+be read as restricted; otherwise the whole purpose of punishment will be defeated and
+it will be a mockery on sentencing.174.
+"164. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for transportation (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"165. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Provincial Government of the Province within which the"
+"offender shall have been sentenced"". The words in italics were substituted by the A.O. 1937, for"
+the Government of India or the Government of the place.
+"166. Naib Singh v State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 1345 : AIR 1983 SC 855 [LNIND 1983 SC 116] :"
+1983 Cr LR (SC) 348 : (1983) 2 SCC 454 [LNIND 1983 SC 116] : 1983 SCC (Cr) 536. The
+provisions of these sections are subject to the overriding power conferred by Articles 72 and
+"161 of the Constitution of India. Ashok Kumar v UOI, AIR 1991 SC 1792 [LNIND 1990 SC 319] :"
+"1991 Cr LJ 2483 , where the court also emphasised that imprisonment for life means"
+"imprisonment for the full span of life. Affirming, Gopal Vinayak Godse v State of Maharashtra,"
+AIR 1961 SC 600 [LNIND 1961 SC 11] : (1961) 3 SCR 440 [LNIND 1961 SC 11] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ
+736 . In the absence of an order the section is not applicable because there can be no order by
+"inference or implication, Sat Pal v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1218 [LNIND 1992 SC 526] :"
+1993 Cr LJ 314 : (1992) 4 SCC 172 [LNIND 1992 SC 526] .
+"167. Gopal Vinayak Godse v The State of Maharashtra, (1961) 3 SCR 440 [LNIND 1961 SC 11]"
+"(Constitution Bench); Dalbir Singh v State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745 [LNIND 1979 SC 281] ;"
+"Maru Ram v UOI, (1981) 1 SCC 107 [LNIND 1980 SC 446] (Constitution Bench); Naib Singh v"
+"State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 454 [LNIND 1983 SC 116] ; Ashok Kumar alias Golu v UOI, (1991) 3"
+"SCC 498 [LNIND 1991 SC 288] ; Laxman Naskar (Life Convict) v State of WB, (2000) 7 SCC 626"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 1180] ; Zahid Hussein v State of WB, (2001) 3 SCC 750 [LNIND 2001 SC 692] ;"
+"Kamalanantha v State of TN, (2005) 5 SCC 194 [LNIND 2005 SC 337] ; Mohd Munna v UOI, (2005)"
+"7 SCC 416 [LNIND 2005 SC 701] and CA Pious v State of Kerala, (2007) 8 SCC 312) [LNIND 2007"
+SC 1070] .
+"168. Jagmohan Singh v State of UP, (1973) 1 SCC 20 [LNIND 1972 SC 477] ."
+"169. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] : 2013 Cr LJ 425 .
+"170. State of Rajasthan v Jamil Khan, 2013 (12) Scale 200 [LNIND 2013 SC 883] ."
+"171. Delhi Administration (Now NCT of Delhi) v Madan Lal, 2002 (6) Supreme 77 [LNIND 2002 SC"
+533] .
+"172. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) v Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 [LNIND 2003 SC 632] ."
+"173. State of Punjab v Kesar Singh, 1996 (5) SCC 495 [LNIND 1996 SC 1091] ."
+"174. State of Rajasthan v Jamil Khan, 2013 (12) Scale 200 [LNIND 2013 SC 883] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"175.[[s 55A] Definition of ""appropriate Government""."
+"In sections 54 and 55 the expression ""appropriate Government"" means,—"
+(a) in cases where the sentence is a sentence of death or is for an offence against
+"any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends,"
+the Central Government; and
+(b) in cases where the sentence (whether of death or not) is for an offence against
+"any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends,"
+the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced.]
+COMMENT—
+This section was substituted for the old section by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950.
+The appropriate Government empowered to remit the sentence of a person convicted
+"of offences under sections 489-A to 489-D of the IPC, 1860 is the Central Government"
+not the State Government.176.
+"175. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for section 55A. Earlier section 55A was inserted by the A.O. 1937."
+"176. GV Ramanaiah v Superintendent of Central Jail, Rajahmundry, AIR 1974 SC 31 [LNIND 1973"
+"SC 300] : (1974) 3 SCC 531 [LNIND 1973 SC 300] ; Hanumant Dass v Vinay Kumar, AIR 1982 SC"
+1052 : (1982) 2 SCC 177 -the appropriate Government is the Government of the State where the
+conviction took place and not the Government of the State where the offence was committed
+(Section 432(7) Cr PC).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"175.[[s 55A] Definition of ""appropriate Government""."
+"In sections 54 and 55 the expression ""appropriate Government"" means,—"
+(a) in cases where the sentence is a sentence of death or is for an offence against
+"any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends,"
+the Central Government; and
+(b) in cases where the sentence (whether of death or not) is for an offence against
+"any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends,"
+the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced.]
+COMMENT—
+This section was substituted for the old section by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950.
+The appropriate Government empowered to remit the sentence of a person convicted
+"of offences under sections 489-A to 489-D of the IPC, 1860 is the Central Government"
+not the State Government.176.
+"175. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for section 55A. Earlier section 55A was inserted by the A.O. 1937."
+"176. GV Ramanaiah v Superintendent of Central Jail, Rajahmundry, AIR 1974 SC 31 [LNIND 1973"
+"SC 300] : (1974) 3 SCC 531 [LNIND 1973 SC 300] ; Hanumant Dass v Vinay Kumar, AIR 1982 SC"
+1052 : (1982) 2 SCC 177 -the appropriate Government is the Government of the State where the
+conviction took place and not the Government of the State where the offence was committed
+(Section 432(7) Cr PC).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 56] Sentence of Europeans and Americans to penal servitude. Proviso as to
+sentence for term exceeding ten years but not for life.
+"[Rep. by the Criminal Law (Removal of Racial Discriminations) Act, 1949 (17 of 1949),"
+sec. 2 (w.e.f. 6-4-1949).]
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 57] Fractions of terms of punishment.
+"In calculating fractions of terms of punishment, 177.[imprisonment] for life shall be"
+reckoned as equivalent to 178.[imprisonment] for twenty years.
+COMMENT—
+"Section 57 of the IPC, 1860 does not in any way limit the punishment of imprisonment"
+for life to a term of 20 years. Section 57 is only for calculating fractions of terms of
+punishment and provides that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to
+imprisonment for 20 years. The object and purpose of section 57 will be clear by simply
+"referring to sections 65, 116, 119, 129 and 511 of the IPC, 1860.179. The accused has"
+thus no right to be released after a period of 20 years. The remissions granted under
+the rules made under the Prison Act or under the Jail Manual are merely administrative
+orders of the appropriate Government and fall exclusively within the discretion of the
+"Government under section 401 (now section 432) Cr PC, 1973. In the case of a prisoner"
+who is convicted in one State but transferred to the jail of another State to serve out the
+"sentence, the appropriate Government to grant remission would be the Government of"
+the State where the accused was convicted and not that of the transferee
+Government.180.
+[s 57.1] Life imprisonment.—
+Life imprisonment means imprisonment for the whole of a convict's natural life. It does
+"not automatically expire on his serving sentence of 14 years or 20 years, unless, of"
+"course, the sentence is remitted or commuted by the Government in accordance with"
+the law181. The Court said that life imprisonment means imprisonment for the whole of
+the remaining period of the convict's life. The fact that the West Bengal Correctional
+"Services Act 1992, equates life imprisonment with imprisonment for 20 years does not"
+entitle the convict to automatic release on expiry of such term of imprisonment
+including remission.182.
+[s 57.2] Punishment for attempt Under Section 511 when the offence
+attempted is punishable with Life imprisonment.—
+"Section 57 of the IPC, 1860 provides that in calculating fractions of terms of"
+"punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for"
+"20 years. In view of this, for the offence of attempt to commit rape punishable under"
+section 376(2)(a) read with section 511 maximum sentence would be rigorous
+imprisonment for ten years.183.
+"177. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, sec. 117 and Sch., for ""transportation"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"178. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"179. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, 2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :"
+AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 Cr LJ 3911 .
+"180. State of MP v Ratan Singh, 1976 Cr LJ 1192 : AIR 1976 SC 1552 [LNIND 1976 SC 215] ; see"
+"also Naib Singh v State ofPunjab, (1983) 2 SCC 454 [LNIND 1983 SC 116] : AIR 1983 SC 855"
+"[LNIND 1983 SC 116] : 1983 Cr LJ 1345 ; Gopal Vinayak Godse, AIR 1961SC 600 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ"
+736 : (1961) 63 Bom LR 517 [LNIND 1961 SC 11] SC.
+"181. Life Convict, Laxman Naskar v State of WB, AIR 2000 SC 2762 [LNIND 2000 SC 1180] : 2000"
+Cr LJ 4017 .
+182. See the comments under section 45 and section 55.
+"183. Chandrakant Vithal Pawar v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 4900 (Bom); Syed Ghouse"
+"Alias Babu v State of AP, 2009 Cr LJ 311 (AP)(DB)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 58] Offenders sentenced to transportation how dealt with until transported.
+"[Rep. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (26 of 1955), sec."
+117 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).]
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 59] Transportation instead of imprisonment.
+"[Rep. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (26 of 1955), sec."
+117 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).]
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 60] Sentence may be (in certain cases of imprisonment) wholly or partly
+rigorous or simple.
+In every case in which an offender is punishable with imprisonment which may be of
+"either description, it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender"
+"to direct in the sentence that such imprisonment shall be wholly rigorous, or that such"
+"imprisonment shall be wholly simple, or that any part of such imprisonment shall be"
+rigorous and the rest simple.
+COMMENT—
+Life imprisonment means rigorous imprisonment for life.184. A distinction between
+'imprisonment for life' and 'imprisonment for a term' has been maintained in the Indian
+"Penal Code in several of its provisions. Second, by its very terms section 60 is"
+applicable to a case where 'an offender is punishable with imprisonment which may be
+of either description' and it is only in such case that it is competent for the Court to
+direct that 'such imprisonment shall be either wholly rigorous or wholly simple or that
+any part of such imprisonment shall be rigorous and the rest simple'. And it is clear that
+whenever an offender is punishable with 'imprisonment for life' he is not punishable
+"with 'imprisonment which may be of either description', in other words section 60"
+would be inapplicable. The position in law as regards the nature of punishment
+involved in a sentence of imprisonment for life is well settled and the sentence of
+imprisonment for life has to be equated to rigorous imprisonment for life.185.
+"184. Mohd Munna v UOI, (2005) 7 SCC 417 [LNIND 2005 SC 701] : AIR 2005 SC 3440 [LNIND"
+2005 SC 701] .
+"185. Naib Singh case, (1983 (2) SCC 454 [LNIND 1983 SC 116] : 1983 SCC (Cr) 536."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 61] Sentence of forfeiture of property.
+"[Rep. by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921 (XVI of 1921), sec. 4.]"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"[s 62] Forfeiture of property in respect of offenders punishable with death,"
+transportation or imprisonment.
+"[Rep. by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1921 (XVI of 1921), sec. 4.]"
+COMMENT—
+These sections were deleted by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act of 1921. They
+imposed the sentence of forfeiture of property. The Court recommended reintroduction
+of these sections because they have become necessary to combat the cancerous
+growth of corruption. These provisions would have a determined effect on those who
+are bent upon to accumulate wealth at the cost of the society by misusing their
+position of power.186.
+"186. Shobha Suresh Jumani v Appellate Tribunal, Forfeited Property, AIR 2001 SC 2288 [LNIND"
+2001 SC 1184] : 2001 Cr LJ 2583 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 63] Amount of fine.
+"Where no sum is expressed to which a fine may extend, the amount of fine to which"
+"the offender is liable is unlimited, but shall not be excessive."
+COMMENT—
+A fine is fixed with due regard to circumstances of the case in which it is imposed and
+the condition of life of the offender. When the legislature has not fixed any upper limit
+"for the quantum of fine in respect of a particular offence, the Court has freedom to fix"
+any amount but then the Court must see that the fine imposed is not excessively high
+"or repulsively low. Financial capacity of the accused, enormity of the offence and extent"
+of damage caused to the victim of the offences etc. are relevant considerations in
+fixing up the amount.187.
+[s 63.1] Fine not to be harsh or excessive.—
+The general principle of law running through sections 63 to 70 is that the amount of
+fine should not be too harsh or excessive. Where a substantial term of imprisonment is
+"inflicted, an excessive fine should not be imposed except in exceptional cases.188."
+"Section 63 does not prescribe any limit to the amount of fine, but it should not be"
+excessive. In the present case having regard to the gravity of the offence and the illegal
+"gains made by the accused, the fine imposed to the tune of Rs. 60 crores was held to"
+be not excessive.189.
+[s 63.2] Applicability in other Statutes.—
+"Sections 63–70 IPC, 1860 and provision of Cr PC, 1973 relating to the award of"
+imprisonment in default of payment of fine would apply to all cases wherein fines have
+"been imposed on an offender unless 'the Act, Regulation, Rules or Bye-law contains an"
+express provision to the contrary'.190.
+"187. Sebastian v State of Kerala, 1992 Cr LJ 3642 (Ker) : 1992 (3) Crimes 864 (Ker)"
+"188. Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v State of Gujarat, JT 2012 (10) SC 8 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+630] : 2012 (10) Scale 21 [LNIND 2012 SC 630] : AIR 2012 (SCW) 5875 (In this judgment the SC
+"quoted the previous edition of this book). See also Shantilal v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 243"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1171] : 2008 Cr LJ 386 .
+"189. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v Sushil Ansal, AIR 2017 SC 976 ."
+"190. Shantilal v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 243 [LNIND 2007 SC 1171] : 2008 Cr LJ 386 : (2008)"
+1 SCC (Cr) 1.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 64] Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine.
+"191. [In every case, of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, 1 in"
+"which the offender is sentenced to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment, and"
+"in every case of an offence punishable 192.[with imprisonment or fine, or] with fine"
+"only, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine,] it shall be competent to the Court"
+"which sentences such offender to direct by the sentence that, in default of payment of"
+"the fine, the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a certain term, in which"
+imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have
+been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence.
+COMMENT—
+The term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence. It is a penalty
+which a person incurs on account of non-payment of fine. The sentence is something
+which an offender must undergo unless it is set aside or remitted in part or in whole
+"either in appeal or in revision or in other appropriate judicial proceedings or ""otherwise""."
+A term of imprisonment ordered in default of payment of fine stands on a different
+footing. A person is required to undergo imprisonment either because he is unable to
+"pay the amount of fine or refuses to pay such amount. He, therefore, can always avoid"
+"to undergo imprisonment in default of payment of fine by paying such amount. It is,"
+"therefore, not only the power, but also the duty of the Court to keep in view the nature"
+"of offence, circumstances under which it was committed, the position of the offender"
+and other relevant considerations before ordering the offender to suffer imprisonment
+in default of payment of fine.193. A default sentence is no punishment under law. It is
+only a method of enforcement of the direction for payment of amounts directed to be
+paid as fine. Wherever the Criminal Court has the jurisdictional competence to impose
+"a fine, sections 64–70, IPC, and section 30 Cr PC, 1973 stipulate that the Court can"
+recover the same by imposition of a default sentence. The jurisdiction to impose a
+default sentence is only incidental to the power to impose a fine and the duty of the
+"Court to recover the same.194. The wording of the section is not happy, but the"
+Legislature intended by it to provide for the award of imprisonment in default of
+payment of fine in all cases in which fine can be imposed to induce the offender to pay
+the fine.
+The cases falling under this section are:—
+"Where the offence is punishable with (a) imprisonment with fine, or (b) imprisonment"
+"or fine, or (c) fine only, and the offender is sentenced to (i) imprisonment, or (ii) fine, or"
+"both, the Court may sentence the offender to a term of imprisonment in default of"
+payment of fine. A term of imprisonment for non-payment of fine is not a substantive
+sentence. It is only a penalty for the default. It cannot be added to the substantive
+sentence so as to see whether the maximum imprisonment that could be awarded for
+the offence is not being exceeded.195.
+1. 'Imprisonment as well as fine.'—Magistrates cannot award compensation in addition
+to fine.196.
+The full Bench of Madras High Court held that imprisonment in default of payment of
+fine cannot be directed to run concurrently with substantive sentence because both the
+"sentences are distinct in view of sections 53 and 64 IPC, 1860.197."
+[s 64.1] Sentence and penalty distinguished.—
+The term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence. It is penalty
+"incurred for non-payment of fine. A sentence is a term of imprisonment, which the"
+offender has to undergo unless it is remitted in a further judicial proceeding or
+otherwise. A term of imprisonment on default in payment of fine stands on a different
+footing. The further imprisonment is due to non-payment by refusal or otherwise. The
+convict can pay the amount and get rid of further imprisonment.198.
+[s 64.2] Fine and Compensation.—
+"There exists a distinction between fine and compensation, although, in a way it seeks"
+to achieve the same purpose. An amount of compensation can be directed to be
+"recovered as a 'fine' but the legal fiction raised in relation to recovery of fine only, it is in"
+that sense 'fine' stands on a higher footing than compensation awarded by the
+Court.199.
+[s 64.3] Power of Magistrate to impose Sentence of imprisonment in default of
+fine.—
+"As per section 30 of Cr PC, 1973 the Court of a Magistrate may award such term of"
+imprisonment in default of payment of fine as is authorised by law: provided that the
+"term is not in excess of the powers of the Magistrate under section 29 Cr PC, 1973; and"
+"shall not, where imprisonment has been awarded as part of the substantive sentence,"
+exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which the Magistrate is competent to
+inflict as punishment for the offence otherwise than as imprisonment in default of
+payment of the fine. The imprisonment awarded may be in addition to a substantive
+sentence of imprisonment for the maximum term awardable by the Magistrate under
+"section 29 of Cr PC, 1973. The default sentence is not to be in excess to the limitations"
+"imposed under section 30 Cr PC, 1973.200."
+[s 64.4] Default sentence on non-payment of Compensation.—
+"Undoubtedly, there is no specific provision in the Code which enables the Court to"
+sentence a person who commits breach of the order of payment of compensation. But
+"in Hari Singh v Sukhbir Singh,201. Supreme Court held that since the imposition of"
+"compensation under section 357(3) Cr PC, 1973 was on account of social concern, the"
+"Court could enforce the same by imposing sentence in default, particularly when no"
+mode had been prescribed in the Code for recovery of sums awarded as compensation
+in the event the same remained unpaid. The position is re-iterated in Sugnathi Suresh
+"Kumar v Jagdeeshan.202. The provisions of sections 357(3) and 431 Cr PC, 1973 when"
+"read with section 64 IPC, 1860 empower the Court, while making an order for payment"
+"of compensation, to also include a default sentence in case of non-payment of the"
+same.203.
+"191. Subs. by Act 8 of 1882, section 2, for ""In every case in which an offender is sentenced to a"
+"fine""."
+"192. Ins. by Act 10 of 1886, section 21(2)."
+"193. Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v State of Gujarat, 2012 (10) Scale 21 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+630] : (2013) 1 SCC 570 [LNIND 2012 SC 630] : JT 2012 (10) SC 8 [LNIND 2012 SC 630] :
+"Shantilal v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 243 [LNIND 2007 SC 1171] : 2008 Cr LJ 386 : (2008) 1"
+SCC (Cr) 1.
+"194. C Ganga v Lakshmi Ammal, 2008 Cr LJ 3359 (Ker)."
+"195. P Balaraman v State of TN, 1991 Cr LJ 166 Mad at pp 176-177."
+"196. Dilip S Dahanukar v Kotak Mahindra Co Ltd, (2007) 6 SCC 528 [LNIND 2007 SC 451] : 2007"
+Cr LJ 2417 : 2007 (4) SCR1122 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cr) 209.
+"197. Donatus Tony Ikwanusi v The Investigating Officer, NCB 2013 Cr LJ 1938 (Mad FB) : 2013"
+"(2) CTC1. See also Sukumaran v State, 1993 Cr LJ 3228 (Ker) ; Madappen Muhassin v State of"
+"Kerala, 2016Cr LJ 4792 (Ker)."
+"198. Shantilal v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 243 [LNIND 2007 SC 1171] : (2008) 1 SCC Cri 1"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1171] .
+"199. Dilip S Dahanukar v Kotak Mahindra Co Ltd, (2007) 6 SCC 528 [LNIND 2007 SC 451] : 2007"
+Cr LJ 2417 : 2007 (4) SCR1122 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cr) 209.
+"200. Kuna Maharana v State, 1996 Cr LJ 170 (Ori)."
+201. AIR 1988 SC 2127 [LNIND 1988 SC 411] : (1988) 4 SCC 551 [LNIND 1988 SC 411] .
+"202. Sugnathi Suresh Kumar v Jagdeeshan, AIR 2002 SC 681 [LNIND 2002 SC 1622] : (2002) 2"
+SCC 420 [LNIND 2002 SC 1622] .
+"203. Vijayan v Sadanandan, (2009) 6 SCC 652 [LNIND 2009 SC 1119] : 2009 Cr LJ 2957 : (2009)"
+"3 SCC (Cr) 296; C Ganga v Lakshmi Ammal, 2008 Cr LJ 3359 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"[s 65] Limit to imprisonment for non-payment of fine, when imprisonment and"
+fine awardable.
+The term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned in default of
+payment of a fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is
+"the maximum fixed for the offence, if the offence be punishable with imprisonment as"
+well as fine.
+COMMENT—
+This section applies to all cases where the offence is 'punishable with imprisonment as
+"well as fine,' i.e., cases where fine and imprisonment can be awarded, and also those"
+"where the punishment may be either fine or imprisonment, but not both. The only cases"
+that it does not apply to are those dealt with in section 67 where fine only can be
+"awarded.204. Section 33 (now 30) of the Cr PC, 1973 acts as a corollary to this section."
+"Thus under section 65, IPC, 1860 the imprisonment in default of fine cannot exceed"
+one-fourth of the maximum term of imprisonment that can be awarded for the offence.
+"Thus, where the High Court altered the conviction of the appellant to one under section"
+"419 read with section 109 IPC, from a conviction recorded by the trial Court under"
+"sections 420/511, 467, 468 and 471 read with section 120B IPC, and awarded a"
+"sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine of Rs. 3,000"
+"and by implication the default imprisonment of two years as awarded by the trial Court,"
+"it was held that, though the trial Court's order regarding two years' imprisonment in"
+default of payment of fine was quite in order in view of the fact that the five offences
+for which the trial Court recorded a conviction were each punishable with seven years'
+"imprisonment and the fine of Rs. 3,000 was only a part of the cumulative sentence for"
+"the commission of those five offences, yet the sentence of three years' imprisonment"
+in default of payment of fine became illegal the moment the High Court altered the
+"conviction to one under section 419 read with section 109 IPC, as under these sections"
+"the accused could be sentenced to a maximum of three years' imprisonment and,"
+"therefore, the default imprisonment could under no circumstance exceed nine months,"
+"that is, one-fourth of the maximum sentence of three years that could be awarded"
+"under section 419, IPC.205. While a Magistrate's powers are specifically limited by"
+section 33(old) Cr PC they must also be exercised so as not to contravene section 65
+"IPC.206. Section 326, IPC is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable"
+"to fine. However, because of section 29(2), Cr PC the learned Magistrate, First Class,"
+cannot impose the maximum amount of imprisonment prescribed by this section; he
+"also cannot, by resorting to section 65, IPC, award a period of imprisonment, in default"
+"of payment of fine, on the erroneous assumption that he has the power to award the"
+"maximum sentence prescribed by section 326, IPC.207. Section 65 IPC that puts a limit"
+"of imprisonment for default sentence upto one-fourth of the term of imprisonment, the"
+"grievance against higher default sentence, if any, can be only by the accused and not by"
+the State.208.
+"204. Yakoob Sahib v State, (1898) 22 Mad 238."
+"205. Ram Jas v State of UP, 1974 Cr LJ 1261 : AIR 1974 SC 1811 [LNIND 1970 SC 363] ; see also"
+"Partap Kumar, 1976 Cr LJ 818 (P&H)."
+"206. Chhajulal v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 1809 [LNIND 1972 SC 179] : (1972) 3 SCC 411"
+"[LNIND 1972 SC 179] . See Shantilal v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 243 [LNIND 2007 SC 1171] :"
+2008 Cr LJ 386 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr) 1 in which the period of three years imprisonment for default
+of fine was reduced to six months.
+"207. Bidhan Bisoi v State of Orissa, 1989 Cr LJ 1038 (Ori)."
+"208. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v Sushil Ansal, AIR 2017 SC 976 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 66] Description of imprisonment for non-payment of fine.
+The imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of a fine may be of
+any description to which the offender might have been sentenced for the offence.
+COMMENT—
+The imprisonment in default of payment of a fine may be either rigorous or simple.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 67] Imprisonment for non-payment of fine when offence punishable with
+fine only.
+"If the offence be punishable with fine only,209. [the imprisonment which the Court"
+"imposes in default of payment of the fine shall be simple, and] the term for which the"
+"Court directs the offender to be imprisoned, in default of payment of fine, shall not"
+"exceed the following scale, that is to say, for any term not exceeding two months"
+"when the amount of the fine shall not exceed fifty rupees, and for any term not"
+"exceeding four months when the amount shall not exceed one hundred rupees, and"
+for any term not exceeding six months in any other case.
+COMMENT—
+This section refers solely to cases in which the offence is punishable with fine only and
+"has no application to an offence punishable either with imprisonment or with fine, but"
+not with both. Such offences are governed by section 65. For a consideration under this
+"section of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (61 of 1985), section"
+"21 of which imposes a fine and imprisonment in default, see Daulat Raghunath Derale v"
+State of Maharashtra.210.
+[s 67.1] Default sentence on non-payment of Maintenance.—
+"The sentence is imposed under section 125(3) of Cr PC, 1973 only as a mode of"
+enforcement of the direction to pay the amount of maintenance and not as a
+punishment. The Supreme Court was considering the question whether the default
+"sentence, if undergone shall wipe off the liability.211. It is impermissible to impose a"
+"sentence of rigorous imprisonment on a defaulter under section 125(3) Cr PC, 1973."
+Only a sentence of simple imprisonment can be imposed under section 125(3) of Cr
+"PC, 1973.212."
+"209. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882, section 3."
+"210. Daulat Raghunath Derale v State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 817 ."
+"211. Kuldip Kaur v Surinder Singh, ( AIR 1989 SC 232 [LNIND 1988 SC 987] ) : 1989 Cr LJ 794 . It"
+was held that the purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which he has
+refused to discharge. A sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of
+monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears.
+"212. Moideenkutty Kunhankutty Haji v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 3402 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 68] Imprisonment to terminate on payment of fine.
+The imprisonment which is imposed in default of payment of a fine shall terminate
+whenever that fine is either paid or levied by process of law.
+COMMENT—
+"The person sentenced to pay a fine must deposit the fine forthwith, but may be,"
+permitted to deposit it after some time in the discretion of the Court. Even in that event
+he must deposit the amount before the period specifically fixed by the Court and if he
+"does not do so, he immediately incurs the liability of being sent to prison. It would be"
+the duty of the Court to arrest him and confine him into the prison. Only when such
+confinement in the prison has commenced that the accused can have a legal right to
+"deposit the amount whereupon section 68 IPC, 1860 would come into operation and"
+his imprisonment would terminate.213. The time given by the High Court or the
+Sessions Judges in appeal or revision for payment of fine merely means that the
+"realisation is deferred till the time granted. However, this cannot take away the rights of"
+"the convicts as provided under section 68 and section 69 of the IPC, 1860. If the"
+"convict offers to deposit the fine imposed on him beyond the period provided, the"
+Courts cannot refuse to accept the same. It must apply the provisions of section 68
+"and section 69 of the IPC, 1860.214. The period to deposit the amount of fine cannot be"
+"extended by the High Court under section 482 Cr PC, 1973 and the petitioners can avail"
+"the remedy of provisions of section 68 of IPC, 1860.215."
+"213. Ram Lakhan v State, 1986 Cr LJ 617 (All); Usman v State of UP, 2007 Cr LJ 3868 (All)."
+"214. State of Assam v Bir Bahadur Singh, 2005 Cr LJ 4345 (Gau)."
+"215. Prahalad Singh v State of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 3161 (MP); Ram Lakhan v State, 1986 Cr LJ 617"
+(All).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 69] Termination of imprisonment on payment of proportional part of fine.
+"If, before the expiration of the term of imprisonment fixed in default of payment, such"
+a proportion of the fine be paid or levied that the term of imprisonment suffered in
+"default of payment is not less than proportional to the part of the fine still unpaid, the"
+imprisonment shall terminate.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A is sentenced to a fine of one hundred rupees and to four months' imprisonment in
+"default of payment. Here, if seventy-five rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the"
+"expiration of one month of the imprisonment, A will be discharged as soon as the first"
+month has expired. If seventy-five rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration
+"of the first month, or at any later time while A continues in imprisonment, A will be"
+immediately discharged. If fifty rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the expiration
+"of two months of the imprisonment, A will be discharged as soon as the two months"
+are completed. If fifty rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of those two
+"months, or at any later time while A continues in imprisonment, A will be immediately"
+discharged.
+COMMENT—
+If the fine imposed on an accused is paid or levied while he is imprisoned for default of
+"payment, his imprisonment will immediately terminate: and if a proportion of the fine"
+"be paid during the imprisonment, a proportional abatement of the imprisonment will"
+"take place. The Court has, however, no power to refund fine. If the time limit had been"
+set by the Court for payment of fine and the fine amount is not paid within the time so
+"fixed, then it goes without saying that the petitioner-accused has to either surrender"
+before the Court or the prosecuting agency will be in a position to arrest him and
+produce before Court for his detention in prison for undergoing the default
+sentence.216. In case of default in payment of fine accused not obeying specific
+directions as to making payment and postponing payment without surrendering into
+Court. Accused is guilty of abuse of process of Court.217.
+"216. Prahalad Singh v State of M P, 2009 Cr LJ 3161 (MP)."
+"217. Ram Lakhan v The State, 1986 Cr LJ 617 (All)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"[s 70] Fine leviable within six years, or during imprisonment. Death not to"
+discharge property from liability.
+"The fine, or any part thereof which remains unpaid, may be levied at any time within"
+"six years after the passing of the sentence, and if, under the sentence, the offender be"
+"liable to imprisonment for a longer period than six years, then at any time previous to"
+the expiration of that period; and the death of the offender does not discharge from
+"the liability any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts."
+COMMENT—
+Imprisonment in default of fine does not liberate the offender from his liability to pay
+the full amount of fine imposed on him. Such imprisonment is not a discharge or
+satisfaction of the fine but is imposed as a punishment for non-payment or contempt
+or resistance to the due execution of the sentence. The offender cannot be permitted
+to choose whether he will suffer in his person or his property. His person will cease to
+"be answerable for the fine. Nevertheless, his property will for a time continue to do so."
+The bar of six years may save the property of the accused but not his personal arrest.
+The liability for any sentence of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine
+continues after the expiration of six years.218. Any proceeding taken after six years to
+recover the fine by sale of immoveable property of the offender is time-barred.219. The
+limitation starts from the date of passing of the sentence of conviction by the trial
+Court and not the date of dismissal of the appeal or revision preferred by the
+accused.220. The property of the accused is liable for the payment of fine even if he has
+undergone imprisonment in default of fine and as such even on death of the offender
+"does not discharge any property which would after his death, be legally liable for his"
+debts due from him (including liability) to discharge the fine.221.
+"The expression ""levy"" in this section means ""to seize"" for the purpose of collecting the"
+fine or to enforce execution for a certain sum and not actual realisation.222. Any stay or
+suspension obtained from the higher Court has to be excluded in computing the period
+of six years' limitation under section 70 IPC.223. Section 70 says that State shall levy
+fine within six years from the date of sentence. What is contemplated is that the State
+"shall commence recovery proceedings within six years; and, need not be completed it"
+"within six years of the sentence. Therefore, once a distress warrant is issued within six"
+"years of the sentence, the plea of limitation is out of bounds for the sentence.224."
+"218. Ganu Sakharam, (1884) Unrep. Cr C 207."
+"219. Collector of Broach v Ochhavlal Bhikalal, (1940) 43 Bom LR 122 , (1941) Bom 147. State v"
+"Krishna Pillai Madhavan Pillai, 1953 Cr LJ 1265"
+"220. Palakdhari Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1145 [LNIND 1962 SC 17] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 256 ."
+"221. P R Anjanappa v Yurej Agencies Pvt Ltd, 2004 Cr LJ 2565 (Kar)."
+"222. Ramaswamy, (1962) 64 Bom LR 440 : 1963 (1) Cr LJ 152"
+"223. Mahtab Singh v State of UP, 1979 Cr LJ 1077 : AIR 1979 SC 1263 [LNIND 1978 SC 186] ."
+"224. Mahtab Singh, Supra; see also Brahameshwar Prasad Sinha, 1983 Cr LJ 8 (Pat)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 71] Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences.
+"Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an"
+"offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of"
+"such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided."
+225. [Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of
+"any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or"
+"where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves"
+"constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence,"
+the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court
+which tries him could award for any one of such offences.]
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence of
+"voluntarily causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows"
+"which make up the whole beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow,"
+"he might be imprisoned for fifty years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to"
+one punishment for the whole beating.
+"(b) But if, while A is beating Z, Y interferes, and A intentionally strikes Y, here, as the"
+"blow given to Y is no part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to Z, A is"
+"liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to Z, and to another for the"
+blow given to Y.
+COMMENT—
+"The section says that where an offence is made up of parts, each of which constitutes"
+"an offence, the offender should not be punished for more than one offence unless"
+expressly provided. Where an offence falls within two or more separate definitions of
+"offences; or where several acts of which one or more than one would, by itself or"
+"themselves, constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the"
+offender should not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which
+tries him could award for any one of such offences. The section governs the whole
+Code and regulates the limit of punishment in cases in which the greater offence is
+"made up of two or more minor offences. It is not a rule of adjective law or procedure,"
+"but a rule of substantive law regulating the measure of punishment, and it does not,"
+"therefore, affect the question of conviction, which relates to the province of procedure."
+"Section 71 IPC, 1860 as well as section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 talk only of"
+"punishment and not of conviction. Thus, conviction of the accused in respect of the"
+same act for two different offences is quite legal.226. The section contemplates
+separate punishments for an offence against the same law and not under different
+"laws. Where offences are committed under two separate enactments, section 71 IPC,"
+"1860 is not helpful to the accused and as such, two separate sentences cannot be"
+questioned by pressing section 71 into service.227. In order to attract provisions of
+"Article 20(2) of the Constitution, i.e., doctrine of autrefois acquit or section 300 Cr PC,"
+"1973 or section 71 IPC, 1860 or section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897"
+ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the
+same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is
+not identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence.228.
+The rules for assessment of punishment are laid down in sections 71 and 72 of the
+"IPC, 1860 and section 31 of the Cr PC, 1973. Section 31 of the Code of Criminal"
+Procedure provides that when a person is convicted at one trial of two or more
+"offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the IPC, 1860,"
+"sentence him, for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which"
+"such Court is competent to inflict; and in the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not"
+"be necessary for the Court, by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several"
+offence being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction
+"of a single offences, to send the offender for trial before a higher Court. It, therefore,"
+"enhances the ordinary powers of sentences given to Magistrates by section 29, Cr PC,"
+"1973; but in order to bring a case within the purview of this section, the accused must"
+"have been convicted of two or more offences in the same trial, and the sentence for"
+any one of these offences should not exceed the limits of their ordinary powers. The
+"limits fixed by this section refer to sentences passed simultaneously, or upon charges"
+which are tried simultaneously. Sentences of imprisonment passed under it may run
+"concurrently. When an accused is convicted at one trial of two or more offences,"
+"section 31(1) of Cr PC, 1973 vests discretion in Court to direct that punishment shall"
+run concurrently. Court may sentence the accused for such offences to several
+"punishments prescribed therefor, and such punishment would consist of imprisonment"
+"to commence, one after expiration of other in such order as the Court may direct,"
+"subject to limitation contained in section 71 of IPC, 1860.229."
+[s 71.1] Illustration (a).—
+"""A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have committed the offence of"
+"voluntarily causing hurt to Z by the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which"
+"make up whole beating. If A were liable to punishment for every blow, he might be"
+"imprisoned for 50years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to one punishment for"
+"the whole beating."" It is to be noted that the whole beating is considered to constitute"
+one offence while each of the blows also amounted to the offence of voluntarily
+"causing hurt. It can be said, therefore, that while the obtaining of money by cheating on"
+the presentation of an individual bill did constitute the offence of cheating the
+obtaining of the entire money in pursuance of the terms of the single contract and the
+single conspiracy entered into also constituted the offence of cheating. When the
+accused could not be punished with the punishment for more than one such offence it
+"cannot be the intention of law that the accused be charged with each of the offences,"
+which were in a way included in the complete offence made up by the entire course of
+conduct of the accused in pursuance of the conspiracy.230.
+[s 71.2] Section 71 IPC and section 220 Cr PC.—
+"Section 71 of the IPC, 1860 has to be read in conjunction with section 220 of the Cr PC,"
+"1973. It should, however, be remembered that section 220 Cr PC, 1973 contains only"
+rules of criminal pleading in regard to joinder of charges and does not deal with the
+sentence to be passed on the charges of the offences mentioned in the several
+"illustrations thereunder. Sub-section (5) of section 220 Cr PC, 1973 makes this position"
+"abundantly clear. A joint reading of section 71 IPC, 1860 and section 220 Cr PC, 1973"
+"clearly shows that clause (2) of section 71 IPC, 1860 approximates sub-section (3) of"
+"section 220 Cr PC, 1973 and clause (3) of section 71 IPC, 1860 corresponds to sub-"
+"section (4) of section 220 Cr PC, 1973. It, therefore, follows that the embargo on"
+"separate sentence under section 71 IPC, 1860 applies only to cases falling within sub-"
+"sections (3) and (4) of section 220 Cr PC, 1973 and not under, for example, sub-section"
+"(1) of that section.231. Thus in cases covered by illustrations (i), (j) and (k) to sub-"
+"section (3) and illustration (m) to sub-section (4) of section 220 Cr PC, though the"
+offences mentioned therein could be tried together and conviction recorded in regard
+"to each one of them, yet no separate sentences could be passed in view of the"
+"embargo contained in section 71 IPC, 1860. Similarly, where the accused was"
+"convicted and sentenced under section 147 IPC, 1860 a separate sentence under"
+"section 143 IPC, 1860 could not be passed.232. In the same way when an accused is"
+"convicted for a more serious offence, e.g., under section 148 IPC, 1860 a separate"
+"sentence under section 147 IPC, 1860 is not only uncalled for but illegal.233. It,"
+"therefore, means that cases falling under sub-section (1) of section 220 Cr PC, 1973"
+"where several distinct offences are committed in course of the same transaction, the"
+accused cannot only be tried and convicted of all of them at one trial but even separate
+"sentences can be passed in regard to each one of them. Thus, where a person"
+"commits lurking house-trespass by night (section 457 IPC, 1860) and also commits"
+"theft (section 380 IPC, 1860) in course of the same transaction, he can be convicted"
+"and sentenced separately for both of them.234. Though the offence under section 420,"
+"IPC, 1860 and offence under section 138, N.I. Act are very distinct and their ingredients"
+"are different, still both the offences were committed during the same transaction;"
+accused could have been charged and tried for both the offences during single trial as
+"per section 220, Cr PC, 1973. However, from the language of section 220, it appears to"
+be enabling provision whereby two or more different offences may be tried together by
+the Court and not mandatory.235.
+[s 71.3] CASES.—
+1.It was contended that the accused having caused the evidence of the two offences
+"under sections 330 and 348 to disappear, committed two separate offences under"
+"section 201 and are punishable accordingly. Taking a strict view of the matter, it must"
+be said that by the same act the appellants committed two offences under section 201.
+"The case is not covered either by section 71 of the IPC, 1860 or by section 26 of the"
+"General Clauses Act, and the punishment for the two offences cannot be limited under"
+"those sections. But, normally, no Court should award two separate punishments for the"
+same act constituting two offences under section 201. The appropriate sentence under
+section 201 for causing the evidence of the offence under section 330 to disappear
+"should be passed, and no separate sentence need be passed under section 201 for"
+causing the evidence of the offence under section 348 to disappear.236. Where death
+was caused by rash and negligent driving of a truck and the accused could be
+"convicted under sections 279 and also under sections 304A, it was held that a separate"
+sentence under sections 279 could not be imposed.237.
+[s 71.4] Rioting and grievous hurt.—
+The illustration (a) to section 71 IPC makes it clear that where only an offence is made
+"up of many parts, and then only, the offender shall not be punished for more than one"
+such offence. When the offences are separate and distinct and do not constitute parts
+"of one offence, the accused can be convicted separately for each one of the offences."
+"Therefore, the argument that the sentence both under sections 148 and 324, IPC is"
+"opposed to section 71, IPC is not acceptable.238."
+The provisions of section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have to be read subject
+to the provisions of this section and that where anything is an offence falling within two
+or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences
+"are defined or punished, the offender shall not be punished with more severe"
+punishment than the Court which tries him could award for anyone of such
+offences.239.
+3. Same facts constituting different offences.—It has been held that although the act
+"of the petitioner is only one, namely plying of overloaded vehicle on the public road, he"
+"had committed two distinct offences punishable under two different enactments,"
+namely (i) violation of the terms of permit and certificate of registration granted by the
+"authorities which is punishable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and (ii) causing"
+damage to the public property which is punishable under the Prevention of Damage to
+"Public Property Act, 1984. Hence, the claim of the petitioner that he is being punished"
+more than once for the same offence violating Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India
+is neither factually correct nor legally tenable as he is being proceeded against for two
+distinct offences punishable under two separate Acts and no parallel procedure for the
+same offence is being adopted.240. Prosecution under sections 5 and 6 of Rajasthan
+Sati (Prevention) Act 1987 not barred since section 5 makes the commission of an act
+an offence and punishes the same while the provisions of section 6 are preventive in
+nature and make provision for punishing contravention of prohibitory order so as to
+make the prevention effective. The two offences have different ingredients.241.
+4. An act giving rise to an offence and an aggravated form of the same offence.—
+Section 457 makes punishable lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by
+night in order to the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment and if
+"the offence intended to be committed is theft, the punishment is higher. Section 380"
+"makes punishable a theft committed in a dwelling house. The two offences do not, in"
+"our opinion, fall under section 71 and, therefore, the conviction under both the sections"
+is not illegal.242.
+"225. Added by Act 8 of 1882, sec. 4."
+"226. Ramanaya v State, 1977 Cr LJ 467 (Pat)."
+"227. Re Natarajan, 1976 Cr LJ 1502 (Mad); see also Sukhnandan v State, (1917) 19 Cr LJ 157 ."
+"228. Mahendrabhai v State of Gujarat, AIR 2012 SC 2844 [LNIND 2012 SC 1473] : (2012) 7 SCC"
+621 [LNIND 2012 SC 1473] : 2012 Cr LJ 2432 .
+"229. Satnam Singh Puransing Gill v State of Maharashtra, 2009 Cr LJ 3781 ."
+"230. Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala v UOI, AIR 1963 SC 1620 [LNIND 1962 SC 382] : 1963 (Supp2)"
+SCR 338 : 1963 Cr LJ 529 .
+"231. Nirichan, 12 M. 36; Kalidas, 38 C 453 : Wazir, 10A 58."
+"232. Poovappa, 1981 Cr LJ NOC 107 (Kant)."
+"233. Re Thangavelu, 1972 Cr LJ 390 (Mad)."
+"234. Udai Bhan, 1962 (2) Cr LJ 251 : AIR 1962 SC 1116 [LNIND 1962 SC 37] ; see also Ramanaya"
+"v State, 1977 Cr LJ 467 (Pat)."
+"235. Sharan P Khanna v Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd, 2010 Cr LJ 4256 (Bom)."
+"236. Roshan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] : 1965 (2) Cr LJ 426 ."
+"See also Nafe Singh v State of Haryana, (1971) 3 SCC 934 : (1972) 1 SCC (Cr) 182; Kharkan v"
+"State of UP, AIR 1965 SC 83 [LNIND 1963 SC 205] : 1965 (1) Cr LJ 116 ."
+"237. Kantilal Shivabhai v State of Gujarat, 1990 Cr LJ 2500 (Guj)."
+"238. Angadi Chennaiah v State of AP, 1985 Cr LJ 1366 (AP)."
+"239. Puranmal, AIR 1958 SC 935 [LNIND 1958 SC 89] : 1958 Cr LJ 1432 ."
+"240. Vikash Kumar Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2011 Pat 72 [LNINDORD 2011 PAT 7073] ."
+"241. State of Rajasthan v Hat Singh, 2003 (2) SCC 152 [LNIND 2003 SC 7] : AIR 2003 SC 791"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 7] .
+"242. Udai Bhan v State of UP, AIR 1962 SC 1116 [LNIND 1962 SC 37] : 1962 Cr LJ 251 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+"[s 72] Punishment of person guilty of one of several offences, the judgment"
+stating that it is doubtful of which.
+In all cases in which judgment is given that a person is guilty of one of several
+"offences specified in the judgment, but that it is doubtful of which of these offences,"
+"he is guilty, the offender shall be punished for the offence for which the lowest"
+punishment is provided if the same punishment is not provided for all.
+COMMENT—
+This provision is intended to prevent an offender whose guilt is fully established from
+eluding punishment on the ground that the evidence does not enable the tribunal to
+pronounce with certainty under what penal provision his case falls. The section applies
+to cases in which the law applicable to a certain set of facts is doubtful. The doubt
+"must be as to which of the offences the accused has committed, not whether he has"
+"committed any. Moreover, this rule would apply even if one of the alternatives were an"
+offence of murder.243.
+"243. Sahel Singh, 3 Cr LJ 364; see also Nesti Mondal, AIR 1940 Pat 289 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 73] Solitary confinement.
+Whenever any person is convicted of an offence for which under this Code the Court
+"has power to sentence him to rigorous imprisonment, the Court may, by its sentence,"
+order that
+the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or portions of the
+"imprisonment to which he is sentenced, not exceeding three months in the whole,"
+"according to the following scale, that is to say—"
+a time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall not exceed six
+months;
+a time not exceeding two months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed six months
+and 244.[shall not exceed one] year;
+a time not exceeding three months if the term of imprisonment shall exceed one year.
+COMMENT—
+Solitary confinement amounts to keeping the prisoner thoroughly isolated from any
+kind of contact with the outside world. It is inflicted in order that a feeling of loneliness
+may produce wholesome influence and reform the criminal. This section gives the
+"scale according to which solitary confinement may be inflicted. Where the petitioner, an"
+"undertrial prisoner, who was arrested in connection with the assassination of a former"
+"Prime Minister was put in a separate cell only as a precautionary measure, to ensure"
+"his non-mingling with other prisoners and for his security, it was held that it did not"
+amount either to solitary confinement or cellular confinement.245. The well-known
+principle of law is that the convict carrying death punishment is not deemed to be
+"'prisoner under sentence of death' unless death sentence becomes final, conclusive"
+and beyond judicial scrutiny. Such convict is handed over to the jail authority to be kept
+in safe and protected custody with purpose that he may be available for execution of
+the sentence eventually confirmed. This custody is different from custody of a convict
+"suffering from simple or rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, he cannot be kept in Cell or"
+solitary confinement which itself is a separate punishment.246.
+[s 73.1] Convicts on death row.—
+The question about solitary confinement or keeping condemned prisoner alone under
+strict guard as provided in various jail manual has been considered in depth by the
+Constitution Bench in Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration247. and Triveniben v State of
+"Gujarat.248. In Batra's case, it has been held that if the prisoner under sentence of death"
+"is held in jail custody, punitive detention cannot be imposed upon him by jail authorities"
+except for prison offences. When a prisoner is committed under a warrant for jail
+"custody under section 366(2) Cr PC, 1973 and if he is detained in solitary confinement"
+"which is a punishment prescribed by section 73, IPC, 1860 it will amount to imposing"
+punishment for the same offence more than once which would be violative of Article
+20(2). Practice of keeping prisoners in condemned cell before confirmation is a pre-
+"constitutional practice and such practices should be avoided. Therefore, practice"
+adopted in the jail until now cannot be a ground of putting the petitioners in solitary
+confinement or separate condemned cells.249.
+The Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v UOI250. held that to be 'under sentence of
+"death' means 'to be under a finally executable death sentence'. The Court, in this case"
+also issued guidelines for safeguarding the rights of the death row convicts.
+"244. Subs. by Act 8 of 1882, section 5, ""for be less than a""."
+"245. Perrarivalan v IG of Prisons, Madras, 1992 Cr LJ 3125 (Mad)."
+"246. Anand Mohan v State of Bihar, 2008 Cr LJ 1273 (Pat)."
+"247. Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 [LNIND 1978 SC 215] : 1978 Cr LJ"
+1741 .
+"248. Triveniben v State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1335 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] : 1990 Cr LJ 1810 ."
+"Also see Kishor Singh Ravinder Dev v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1981 SC 625 [LNIND 1980 SC 436] :"
+(1981) 1 SCC 503 [LNIND 1980 SC 436] .
+"249. Acharaparambath Pradeepan v State of Kerala, 2004 Cr LJ 755 (Ker)."
+"250. Shatrughan Chauhan v UOI, 2014 Cr LJ 1327 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+[s 74] Limit of solitary confinement.
+"In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such confinement shall in no case"
+"exceed fourteen days at a time, with intervals between the periods of solitary"
+confinement of not less duration than such periods; and when the imprisonment
+"awarded shall exceed three months, the solitary confinement shall not exceed seven"
+"days in any one month of the whole imprisonment awarded, with intervals between"
+the periods of solitary confinement of not less duration than such periods.
+COMMENT—
+Solitary confinement if continued for a long time is sure to produce mental
+derangement.
+"The section limits the solitary confinement, when the substantive sentence exceeds"
+"three months, to seven days in any one month. Solitary confinement must be imposed"
+at intervals. A sentence inflicting solitary confinement for the whole imprisonment is
+"illegal, though not more than 14 days is awarded.251."
+"251. Nyan Suk Mether, (1869) 3 Beng LR 49."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+252.[[s 75] Enhanced punishment for certain offences under Chapter XII or
+Chapter XVII after previous conviction.
+"Whoever, having been convicted, 1 —"
+"(a) by a Court in 253.[India], of an offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter"
+XVII of this Code with imprisonment of either description for a term of three
+"years or upwards, 254.[***]"
+255. [***]
+shall be guilty of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like
+"imprisonment for the like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to"
+"256.[imprisonment for life], or to imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+may extend to ten years.]
+COMMENT—
+Principle.—This section does not constitute a separate offence but only imposes a
+"liability to enhanced punishment. What section 75 IPC, 1860 contemplates is that"
+"where a person who has been, previously convicted of an offence punishable under"
+Chapter XII (which deals with offences relating to coin and Government stamps) or
+Chapter XVII. (which relates to offences against property) with imprisonment of either
+"description for a term of three years or up-wards, is once again found guilty of a similar"
+"offence, he shall be liable to enhanced punishment which may extend to imprisonment"
+for life or to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
+years. The section is concerned with a previous conviction for a similar offence but it
+"does not postulate that in respect of the previous conviction, the punishment imposed"
+should have been one of not less than three years. All that it posits is that the previous
+conviction should have been in respect of an offence punishable with a term of
+"imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards, but it does not lay down that the"
+offender should have been actually punished with such a term of imprisonment.257. It
+does not apply to offences under other Acts.258.
+1. 'Having been convicted'.—A plain reading of this provision goes to show that the
+previous conviction ought to be for offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter
+XVII and the sentence imposed is three years or more than that. If the sentence is less
+than three years or the offence does not fall within any of the two Chapters then
+"section 75, IPC, 1860 would not be applicable. If any authority is required then"
+"reference may be made to Re Kamya,259. wherein it has been held that the minimum"
+"required for enhancement of punishment under section 75, IPC, 1860 is that the"
+previous conviction of the accused should have resulted in punishment of three years
+or more.260. Section 75 is invoked for enhancement of the sentence and that can come
+only at the time the sentence is to be imposed. The fact that the accused is an old
+offender is not to be taken note of by the Court at the trial. Only at the conclusion of the
+"trial after entering the conviction, that question can be taken up for imposing the"
+sentence.261. Simply because the provisions of section 75 of the Indian Penal Code are
+"attracted in a particular case, is no ground for inflicting the extreme punishment"
+provided in that section. The provisions of this section are only permissive and not
+obligatory. They do confer jurisdiction on the Courts to inflict enhanced punishment but
+then that jurisdiction is to be exercised in a judicial manner after taking into
+"consideration the circumstances and the factors narrated above.262. Section 75, IPC,"
+1860 does not prescribe that a severe sentence should be imposed for repetition of any
+crime by an offender. It does not prescribe a minimum sentence for any event. It does
+not say that a convict of a petty theft committed without any violence should be given a
+severe sentence if he had half a dozen previous convictions for like offences to his
+credit.263.
+[s 75.1] Clause (a).—
+For the application of this section it is not necessary to show that the previous
+sentence was for three years or upwards. What is required is that the previous
+"conviction was for an offence punishable under Chapter XII or XVII, for which sentence"
+of imprisonment could have been three years or upwards. The key word being
+"""punishable"" the actual sentence awarded for the first offence is not of any"
+consequence so long the offence was punishable with imprisonment for three years or
+upwards.264. It is also necessary to remember that the conviction for the earlier
+offence must remain in operation on the date of conviction for second offence. Thus if
+"the previous conviction is set aside on appeal, the accused cannot be awarded"
+"enhanced punishment under this section.265. Non-applicability of section 75, IPC has"
+"nothing to do with the proof or guilt of the main offence. If section 75, IPC is found to"
+be inapplicable then it would not mean that the finding of guilt for certain offences
+recorded by the Magistrate will also go away. The conviction for the offences would
+stand and the accused would be liable to be sentenced for the main offence and the
+"sentence cannot be enhanced with the aid of section 75, IPC, 1860.266."
+[s 75.2] Section 75 and Section 236 of Cr PC.—
+Under section 236 (310 of old Code) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and under
+"section 75 of the Indian Penal Code, it is enough if the person concerned has been"
+earlier convicted. It is not necessary that the sentence should be in force. Bearing in
+mind that section 75 of the IPC and section 236 (310 of old code) of the Code of
+Criminal Procedure deal with persons with previous conviction and the previous
+sentence need not necessarily be in force when the subsequent offence is committed–
+it would be clear that the latter section is intended to be applicable only to cases to
+which section 75 of the Indian Penal Code applies.267.
+"252. Subs. by Act 3 of 1910, section 2, for section 75."
+"253. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"254. The word ""or"" omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"255. Clause (b) omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"256. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"257. Re Sugali Nage Naik, 1965 (1) Cr LJ 508 ."
+"258. Manaklal Jhamaklal v State, 1966 Cr LJ 1139 (MP)."
+"259. Re Kamya, AIR 1960 AP 490 [LNIND 1959 AP 115] : 1960 Cr LJ 1302 ."
+"260. Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr LJ 2989 (Raj)."
+"261. State v Tampikannu, AIR 1970 Ker 251 [LNIND 1969 KER 110] ."
+"262. Daulat Singh v The State of HP, 1981 Cr LJ 1347 (HP)."
+"263. Kalarikkal Narayana Panicker Accused v State of Kerala, 1976 Cr LJ 410 ."
+"264. Ghisulal v State of MP, 1977 Cr LJ 88 (MP)."
+"265. Dilip Kumar Sharma, AIR 1976 SC 133 [LNIND 1975 SC 412] : 1976 Cr LJ 184 ."
+"266. Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr LJ 2989 (Raj)."
+"267. Pratap v State of UP, AIR 1973 SC 786 [LNIND 1972 SC 595] : (1973) 3 SCC 690 [LNIND"
+1972 SC 595] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER III OF PUNISHMENTS
+252.[[s 75] Enhanced punishment for certain offences under Chapter XII or
+Chapter XVII after previous conviction.
+"Whoever, having been convicted, 1 —"
+"(a) by a Court in 253.[India], of an offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter"
+XVII of this Code with imprisonment of either description for a term of three
+"years or upwards, 254.[***]"
+255. [***]
+shall be guilty of any offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like
+"imprisonment for the like term, shall be subject for every such subsequent offence to"
+"256.[imprisonment for life], or to imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+may extend to ten years.]
+COMMENT—
+Principle.—This section does not constitute a separate offence but only imposes a
+"liability to enhanced punishment. What section 75 IPC, 1860 contemplates is that"
+"where a person who has been, previously convicted of an offence punishable under"
+Chapter XII (which deals with offences relating to coin and Government stamps) or
+Chapter XVII. (which relates to offences against property) with imprisonment of either
+"description for a term of three years or up-wards, is once again found guilty of a similar"
+"offence, he shall be liable to enhanced punishment which may extend to imprisonment"
+for life or to imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
+years. The section is concerned with a previous conviction for a similar offence but it
+"does not postulate that in respect of the previous conviction, the punishment imposed"
+should have been one of not less than three years. All that it posits is that the previous
+conviction should have been in respect of an offence punishable with a term of
+"imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards, but it does not lay down that the"
+offender should have been actually punished with such a term of imprisonment.257. It
+does not apply to offences under other Acts.258.
+1. 'Having been convicted'.—A plain reading of this provision goes to show that the
+previous conviction ought to be for offence punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter
+XVII and the sentence imposed is three years or more than that. If the sentence is less
+than three years or the offence does not fall within any of the two Chapters then
+"section 75, IPC, 1860 would not be applicable. If any authority is required then"
+"reference may be made to Re Kamya,259. wherein it has been held that the minimum"
+"required for enhancement of punishment under section 75, IPC, 1860 is that the"
+previous conviction of the accused should have resulted in punishment of three years
+or more.260. Section 75 is invoked for enhancement of the sentence and that can come
+only at the time the sentence is to be imposed. The fact that the accused is an old
+offender is not to be taken note of by the Court at the trial. Only at the conclusion of the
+"trial after entering the conviction, that question can be taken up for imposing the"
+sentence.261. Simply because the provisions of section 75 of the Indian Penal Code are
+"attracted in a particular case, is no ground for inflicting the extreme punishment"
+provided in that section. The provisions of this section are only permissive and not
+obligatory. They do confer jurisdiction on the Courts to inflict enhanced punishment but
+then that jurisdiction is to be exercised in a judicial manner after taking into
+"consideration the circumstances and the factors narrated above.262. Section 75, IPC,"
+1860 does not prescribe that a severe sentence should be imposed for repetition of any
+crime by an offender. It does not prescribe a minimum sentence for any event. It does
+not say that a convict of a petty theft committed without any violence should be given a
+severe sentence if he had half a dozen previous convictions for like offences to his
+credit.263.
+[s 75.1] Clause (a).—
+For the application of this section it is not necessary to show that the previous
+sentence was for three years or upwards. What is required is that the previous
+"conviction was for an offence punishable under Chapter XII or XVII, for which sentence"
+of imprisonment could have been three years or upwards. The key word being
+"""punishable"" the actual sentence awarded for the first offence is not of any"
+consequence so long the offence was punishable with imprisonment for three years or
+upwards.264. It is also necessary to remember that the conviction for the earlier
+offence must remain in operation on the date of conviction for second offence. Thus if
+"the previous conviction is set aside on appeal, the accused cannot be awarded"
+"enhanced punishment under this section.265. Non-applicability of section 75, IPC has"
+"nothing to do with the proof or guilt of the main offence. If section 75, IPC is found to"
+be inapplicable then it would not mean that the finding of guilt for certain offences
+recorded by the Magistrate will also go away. The conviction for the offences would
+stand and the accused would be liable to be sentenced for the main offence and the
+"sentence cannot be enhanced with the aid of section 75, IPC, 1860.266."
+[s 75.2] Section 75 and Section 236 of Cr PC.—
+Under section 236 (310 of old Code) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and under
+"section 75 of the Indian Penal Code, it is enough if the person concerned has been"
+earlier convicted. It is not necessary that the sentence should be in force. Bearing in
+mind that section 75 of the IPC and section 236 (310 of old code) of the Code of
+Criminal Procedure deal with persons with previous conviction and the previous
+sentence need not necessarily be in force when the subsequent offence is committed–
+it would be clear that the latter section is intended to be applicable only to cases to
+which section 75 of the Indian Penal Code applies.267.
+"252. Subs. by Act 3 of 1910, section 2, for section 75."
+"253. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"254. The word ""or"" omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"255. Clause (b) omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"256. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"257. Re Sugali Nage Naik, 1965 (1) Cr LJ 508 ."
+"258. Manaklal Jhamaklal v State, 1966 Cr LJ 1139 (MP)."
+"259. Re Kamya, AIR 1960 AP 490 [LNIND 1959 AP 115] : 1960 Cr LJ 1302 ."
+"260. Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr LJ 2989 (Raj)."
+"261. State v Tampikannu, AIR 1970 Ker 251 [LNIND 1969 KER 110] ."
+"262. Daulat Singh v The State of HP, 1981 Cr LJ 1347 (HP)."
+"263. Kalarikkal Narayana Panicker Accused v State of Kerala, 1976 Cr LJ 410 ."
+"264. Ghisulal v State of MP, 1977 Cr LJ 88 (MP)."
+"265. Dilip Kumar Sharma, AIR 1976 SC 133 [LNIND 1975 SC 412] : 1976 Cr LJ 184 ."
+"266. Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr LJ 2989 (Raj)."
+"267. Pratap v State of UP, AIR 1973 SC 786 [LNIND 1972 SC 595] : (1973) 3 SCC 690 [LNIND"
+1972 SC 595] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+"[s 76] Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself"
+"bound, by law."
+"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake"
+"of fact 1 and not by reason of a mistake of law 2 in good faith believes himself to be,"
+bound by law 3 to do it.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with"
+the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
+"(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and,"
+"after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence."
+COMMENT.—
+Sections 76 and 79 are based on the maxim ignorantia facti doth excusat and ignorantia
+"juris non excusat. Section 76 excuses a person who has done what by law is an offence,"
+"under a misconception of facts, leading him to believe in good faith that he was"
+"commanded by law to do it. See Comment on section 79, infra."
+"This section and sections 77, 78 and 79 deal with acts of a person bound or justified by"
+law. This section as well as sections 78 and 79 deal with acts of a person under a
+mistake.
+"1. 'Mistake of fact'.—See Comment under section 79, infra."
+"2. 'Mistake of law'.—See Comment under section 79, infra."
+"3. 'In good faith believes himself to be, bound by law'.—In order to entitle a person to"
+claim the benefit of this section it is necessary to show the existence of a state of facts
+"which would justify the belief in good faith, interpreting the latter expression with"
+"reference to section 52, that the person to whom the order was given was bound by law"
+"to obey it. Thus, in the case of a soldier, the Penal Code does not recognize the mere"
+duty of blind obedience to the commands of a superior as sufficient to protect him
+from the penal consequences of his act. But in certain circumstances a soldier
+"receives absolute protection under section 132 of the Cr PC, 1973."
+"For illegal acts, however, neither the orders of a parent nor a master nor a superior will"
+furnish any defence. Nothing but fear of instant death is a defence for a policeman who
+tortures anyone by order of a superior. The maxim respondeat superior has no
+application to such a case.6. The net position appears to be that if superior order is in
+conformity with the law no further question arises and the subordinate officer is
+"protected by section 76 IPC, 1860, if he carries out that order. It is only when the order"
+is not in accordance with the law but the subordinate officer who carries out that order
+"in good faith, on account of a mistake of fact and not on ground of mistake of law,"
+"believes himself to be bound by law to carry out such an order, that a further question"
+arises as to whether the subordinate officer will not still get protection of section 76
+"IPC, 1860, because of his mistake of fact. Thus, where the order was legal in the"
+"circumstances of the case, e.g., where the police patrol party opened fire under the"
+order of the Deputy Commissioner of Police after it had been attacked on a dark night
+"and an Assistant Commissioner of Police had been injured as a result of such attack,"
+"really no question arose for the application of section 76 IPC, 1860, as the order was"
+both legal and justified by the circumstances of the case.7. The Indian law as contained
+in sections 76 and 79 of the Penal Code appears to be the same as in England. This
+"point has, however, not been clearly decided in any case including the decision of the"
+"Supreme Court in Shew Mangal Singh's case.8. There are, however, enough indications"
+"in Shew Mangal Singh's case and in sections 76 and 79 IPC, 1860, that if the"
+subordinate due to a mistake of fact and not due to a mistake of law honestly believed
+that he was bound or justified by law in carrying out the superior order which though
+"not manifestly illegal was nevertheless illegal, perhaps he would still get the benefit of"
+superior order. Obedience to an illegal order can only be used in mitigation of
+punishment but cannot be used as a complete defence.9. If on account of any
+"abnormal reaction, the employee has committed suicide, the conduct of the"
+complainant or of higher officer of taking departmental action by way of resorting to
+"legal remedy or enforcement of law, cannot be termed as leaving no option to the"
+"delinquent employee but to commit suicide and, therefore, cannot be said as abetment"
+or incitement to suicide under such circumstances. In any case any action for resorting
+to legal remedy for grievances or for enforcement of law in exercise of powers or
+purported exercise of power cannot be said to contain any element of criminality
+"unless such action is ex facie without any competence, authority or jurisdiction.10."
+[s 76.1] Protection of private persons assisting police.—
+"Private persons who are bound to assist the police under section 42 of the Cr PC, 1973"
+will be protected under this section.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"6. Latifkhan v State, (1895) 20 Bom 394; Gurdit Singh, (1883) PR No. 16 of 1883."
+"7. State of WB v Shew Mangal Singh, 1981 Cr LJ 1683 : AIR 1981 SC 1917 [LNIND 1981 SC 355]"
+: (1981) 4 SCC 2 [LNIND 1981 SC 355] .
+"8. Shew Mangal Singh, Supra."
+"9. Chaman Lal, (1940) 21 Lah 521."
+"10. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 77] Act of Judge when acting judicially.
+Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise
+"of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law."
+COMMENT.—
+Under this section a Judge is exempted not only in those cases in which he proceeds
+"irregularly in the exercise of a power which the law gives him, but also in cases where"
+"he, in good faith, exceeds his jurisdiction and has no lawful powers. It protects judges"
+"from criminal process just as the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, saves them"
+from civil suits. Judicial Officers' Protection Act affords protection to two broad
+categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in his judicial
+capacity. In the first category fall those acts which are within the limits of his
+jurisdiction. The second category encompasses those acts which may not be within
+"the jurisdiction of the judicial officer, but are, nevertheless, done or ordered to be done"
+"by him, believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be"
+done.11.
+"A Collector who exercises powers of enquiry and award under the Land Acquisition Act,"
+1894 is not acting judicially because he is not a judge. He is not entitled to the
+protection of section 77.12. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner while passing order
+under section 7-A of 1952 Act is entitled to get protection as envisaged under section
+"77 of IPC, 1860 and section 3(1) of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.13."
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"11. Rachapudi Subba Rao v Advocate General, (1981) 2 SCC 577 [LNIND 1980 SC 481] : AIR"
+1981 SC 755 [LNIND 1980 SC 481] .
+"12. Surendera Kumar Bhatia v Kanhaiya Lal, (2009) 12 SCC 184 [LNIND 2009 SC 209] : AIR 2009"
+SC 1961 [LNIND 2009 SC 209] .
+"13. E S Sanjeeva Rao v CBI, Mumbai, 2012 Cr LJ 4053 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 78] Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court.
+"Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order"
+"of, a Court of Justice; if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an"
+"offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such"
+"judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the"
+Court had such jurisdiction.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is merely a corollary to section 77. It affords protection to officers acting
+"under the authority of a judgment, or order of a Court of Justice. It differs from section"
+"77 on the question of jurisdiction. Here, the officer is protected in carrying out an order"
+"of a Court which may have no jurisdiction at all, if he believed that the Court had"
+jurisdiction; whereas under section 77 the Judge must be acting within his jurisdiction
+to be protected by it.
+Mistake of law can be pleaded as a defence under this section.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 79] Act done by a person justified or by mistake of fact believing himself
+"justified, by law."
+"Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law1, or who by"
+"reason of a mistake of fact2 and not by reason of a mistake of law3 in good faith,"
+"believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his"
+"judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons of"
+"apprehending murderers in the fact, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper"
+"authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in"
+self-defence.
+COMMENT.—
+Distinction between Sections 76 and 79.—The distinction between section 76 and this
+"section is that in the former a person is assumed to be bound, and in the latter to be"
+"justified, by law; in other words, the distinction is between a real or supposed legal"
+"obligation and a real or supposed legal justification, in doing the particular act. Under"
+"both (these sections) there must be a bona fide intention to advance the law,"
+manifested by the circumstances attending the act which is the subject of charge; and
+"the party accused cannot allege generally that he had a good motive, but must allege"
+specifically that he believed in good faith that he was bound by law (section 76) to do
+"as he did, or that being empowered by law (section 79) to act in the matter, he had"
+acted to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith.14.
+"1. Any person who is justified by law.—Jurisprudentially viewed, an act may be an"
+"offence, definitionally speaking but a forbidden act may not spell inevitable guilt if the"
+law itself declares that in certain special circumstances it is not to be regarded as an
+offence. The chapter on General Exceptions operates in this province. Section 79
+makes an offence a non-offence. When? Only when the offending act is actually
+justified by law or is bona fide believed by mistake of fact to be so justified.15. It is easy
+"to see that if the act complained of is wholly justified by law, it would not amount to an"
+"offence at all in view of the provisions of section 79 of the IPC, 1860. Many cases may"
+however arise wherein acting under the provisions of the Police Act or other law
+"conferring powers on the police, the police officer or some other person may go beyond"
+"what is strictly justified in law. Though section 79 of the IPC, 1860 will have no"
+"application to such cases, section 53 of the Police Act will apply. But section 53 applies"
+"to only a limited class of persons. So, it becomes the task of the Court, whenever any"
+question whether this section applies or not arises to bestow particular care on its
+"decision. In doing this it has to ascertain first, what act is complained of and then to"
+"examine, if there is any provision of the Police Act or other law conferring powers on"
+"the police, under which it may be said to have been done or intended to be done. The"
+"Court has to remember in this connection that an act is not ""under"" a provision of law"
+merely because the point of time at which it is done coincides with the point of time
+when some act is done in the exercise of the powers granted by the provision or in
+"performance of the duty imposed by it. To be able to say that an act is done ""under"" a"
+"provision of law, one must discover the existence of a reasonable relationship between"
+the provisions and the act. In the absence of such a relation the act cannot be said to
+"be done ""under"" the particular provision of law.16. But unless there is a reasonable"
+"connection between the act complained of and the powers and duties of the office, it"
+cannot be said that the act was done by the accused officer under the colour of his
+"office.17. In Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave's case,18. wherein the allegations against the"
+police officer was of taking advantage of his position and attempting to coerce a
+person to give him a bribe. The plea of colour of duty was negatived by the Supreme
+"Court. In Prof. Sumer Chand v UOI, 1994 (1) SCC 64 [LNIND 1993 SC 665] Supreme"
+Court on facts endorsed the opinion of the High Court that the act of the Police Officer
+complained of fell within the description of `colour of duty'. The argument is irresistible
+"that if the performance of the act which constitutes the offence is justified by law, i.e.,"
+"by some other provision, then section 79 exonerates the doer because the act ceases"
+"to be an offence. Likewise, if the act were done by one 'who by reason of a mistake of"
+"fact in good faith believes himself to be justified by law in doing it' then also, the"
+"exception operates and the bona fide belief, although mistaken, eliminates the"
+culpability. If the offender can irrefutably establish that he is actually justified by law in
+"doing the act or, alternatively, that he entertained a mistake of fact and in good faith"
+"believed that he was justified by law in committing the act, then, the weapon of section"
+79 demolishes the prosecution.19.
+"2. 'Mistake of fact'.—Under this section, although an act may not be justified by law, yet"
+"if it is done under a mistake of fact, in the belief in good faith that it is justified by law it"
+will not be an offence. Such cases are not uncommon where the Courts in the facts
+and circumstances of the particular case have exonerated the accused under section
+"79 on the ground of having acted in good faith under the belief, owing to a mistake of"
+fact that he was justified in doing the act which constituted an offence. As laid down in
+"section 52 of the IPC, 1860, nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is"
+done or believed without due care and attention. The question of good faith must be
+considered with reference to the position of the accused and the circumstances under
+which he acted. 'Good faith' requires not logical infallibility but due care and attention.
+The question of good faith is always a question of fact to be determined in accordance
+with the proved facts and circumstances of each case.20.
+"'Mistake' is not mere forgetfulness.21. It is a slip ""made, not by design, but by"
+"mischance.""22. Under sections 76 and 79 a mistake must be one of fact and not of law."
+"At common law an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances,"
+"which, if true, would make the act for which a prisoner is indicted an innocent act has"
+always been held to be a good defence. Honest and reasonable mistake stands in fact
+"on the same footing as absence of the reasoning faculty, as in infancy, or perversion of"
+"that faculty, as in lunacy.23. It may be laid down as a general rule that an alleged"
+offender is deemed to have acted under that state of facts which he in good faith and
+on reasonable grounds believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an
+"offence.24. Ignorantia facti doth excusat, for such ignorance many times makes the act"
+"itself morally involuntary.25. Where a man made a thrust with a sword at a place where,"
+"upon reasonable grounds, he supposed a burglar to be, and killed a person who was"
+"not a burglar, it was held that he had committed no offence.26. In other words, he was"
+in the same situation as far as regards the homicide as if he had killed a burglar. The
+accused while guarding his maize field shot an arrow at a moving object in the bona
+fide belief that it was a bear and in the process caused the death of a man who was
+hiding there. It was held that he could not be held liable for murder as his case was
+"fully covered by section 79 as well as section 80 IPC, 1860.27. Similarly, where the"
+accused while helping the police stopped a cart which they in good faith believed to be
+"carrying smuggled rice but ultimately their suspicion proved to be incorrect, it was held"
+that they could not be prosecuted for wrongful restraint under section 341 as their case
+"was covered by section 79 IPC, 1860.28. Section 79 makes an offence a non-offence."
+"Thus, where the Board of Censors, acting within their jurisdiction and on an application"
+"made and pursued in good faith sanctions the public exhibition of a film, the producer"
+and the connected agencies do enter the statutory harbour and are protected from
+"prosecution under section 292 IPC, 1860, because section 79 of the Code exonerates"
+them at least in view of their bona fide belief that the certificate is justificatory.29.
+3. 'Mistake of law'.—Mistake in point of law in a criminal case is no defence. Mistake of
+law ordinarily means mistake as to the existence or otherwise of any law on a relevant
+subject as well as mistake as to what the law is.30.
+"Ignorance of the municipal law of the Kingdom, or of the penalty thereby inflicted upon"
+"offenders, doth not excuse any, that is of the age of discretion and compos mentis, from the"
+penalty of the breach of it; because every person of the age of discretion and compos
+"mentis is bound to know the law, and presumed so to do.31."
+If any individual should infringe the statute law of the country through ignorance or
+"carelessness, he must abide by the consequences of his error; it is not competent to"
+"him to aver in a Court of Justice that he was ignorant of the law of the land, and no"
+Court of Justice is at liberty to receive such a plea.32.
+"The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat, in its application to criminal offences, admits of"
+"no exception, not even in the case of a foreigner who cannot reasonably be supposed"
+in fact to know the law of the land.33. The legal presumption that everyone knows the
+law of the land is often untrue as a matter of fact. But then why such a presumption
+subsists? The reason for this seems to be nothing but expediency; otherwise there is
+no knowing of the extent to which the excuse of ignorance of law might be carried.
+"Indeed, it might be urged almost in every case.34. This rule of expediency has been put"
+to use even in a case where the accused could not have possibly known the law in the
+"circumstances in which he was placed. Thus, a person who was on the high seas and"
+as such could not have been cognizant of a recently passed law might be convicted for
+contravening it.35.
+Whenever the question of justification of an offence either due to mistake of fact or
+"mistake of law arises, the guiding rules are: (1) that when an act is in itself plainly"
+"criminal, and is more severely punishable if certain circumstances co-exist, ignorance"
+of the existence of such circumstances is no answer to a charge for the aggravated
+"offence. (2) That where an act is prima facie innocent and proper, unless certain"
+"circumstances co-exist, then ignorance of such circumstances is an answer to the"
+charge. (3) That the state of the defendant's mind must amount to absolute ignorance
+"of the existence of the circumstance which alters the character of the act, or to a belief"
+"in its non-existence. (4) Where an act which is in itself wrong is, under certain"
+"circumstances, criminal, a person who does the wrong act cannot set up as a defence"
+that he was ignorant of the facts which turned the wrong into a crime. (5) Where a
+"statute makes it penal to do an act under certain circumstances, it is a question upon"
+"the wording and object of the particular statute, whether the responsibility of"
+ascertaining that the circumstances exist is thrown upon the person who does the act
+or not. In the former case his knowledge is immaterial.36.
+[s 79.1] Ignorance of statute newly passed.—
+Although a person commits an act which is made an offence for the first time by a
+statute so recently passed as to render it impossible that any notice of the passing of
+"the statute could have reached the place where the offence has been committed, yet"
+his ignorance of the statute will not save him from punishment.37. For an Indian law to
+"operate and be effective in the territory where it operates namely, the territory of India, it"
+"is not necessary that it should either be published, or be made known outside the"
+country.38.
+[s 79.2] Act of State.—
+An act of State is an act injurious to the person or to the property of some person who
+is not at the time of that act a subject of the Government; which act is done by any
+"representative of the Government's authority, civil or military, and is either previously"
+sanctioned or subsequently ratified by the Government. The doctrine as to acts of State
+"can apply only to acts which affect foreigners, and which are done by the orders or with"
+the ratification of the Government. As between the State and its subjects there can be
+no such thing as an act of State. Courts of law are established for the express purpose
+of limiting public authority in its conduct towards individuals.
+Persons carrying out an act of State under proper orders will be protected by the Penal
+"Code, in the same way as if they were carrying out a lawful order under the municipal"
+law. To support a plea of this nature two things are essential:—
+(1) that the defendant had authority to act on behalf of the State in the matter; and
+"(2) that in so acting, he was professing to act as a matter of policy, outside the law,"
+and not as a matter of right within the law.
+[s 79.3] Protection of private persons.—
+"Private persons acting under sections 38, 43, 72 and 73 of the Cr PC, 1973 will be"
+protected under this section.
+[s 79.4] Fake Encounters. —
+Unprovoked firing by appellants who were police officials caused death of two persons
+and grievous gun-shot injuries to another person. Seven police officers admitted firing
+into the vehicle. But the defence case was that they had done so only on the direction
+"of ACP, a superior officer. The Supreme Court held that it cannot, by any stretch of"
+"imagination, be claimed by anybody that a case of murder would fall within the"
+expression 'colour of duty'.39.
+[s 79.5] CASES.—Mistake of fact.—
+Good Defence.—Where an accused owing to a defect in his vision and the effect of a
+fall bona fide believed that his son of whom he was very fond was a tiger and caused
+"fatal injuries to him with an axe in a moment of delusion, he was protected under this"
+"section, and his act being done under a bona fide mistake, he could not be convicted of"
+"an offence of murder.40. Once the Board of Censors, acting within their jurisdiction and"
+"on an application made and pursued in good faith, sanctions the public exhibition of a"
+"film, the producer and connected agencies enter the statutory harbour and are"
+protected because section 79 exonerates them in view of the bona fide belief that the
+certificate is justificatory.41.
+[s 79.6] English case.—
+"The accused was convicted of bigamy, having gone through the ceremony of marriage"
+within seven years after she had been deserted by her husband. She believed in good
+faith and on reasonable grounds that her husband was dead. It was held that a bona
+fide belief on reasonable grounds in the death of the husband at the time of the second
+"marriage afforded a good defence to the indictment, and that the conviction was"
+wrong.42. Where the question was whether the accused was to be held liable for
+injuring a person whom he thought was belabouring another when in fact he was only
+"trying to immobilise a person who had attempted to rob a woman, the Court said that if"
+W was labouring under a mistake of fact as to the circumstances when he committed
+"the alleged offence, he was to be judged according to his mistaken view of the facts"
+regardless of whether his mistake was reasonable or unreasonable. The
+reasonableness or otherwise of the belief was only material to the question of whether
+the belief was in fact held by the defendant at all.43.
+[s 79.7] Bad defence.—
+Deceased attempted to steal coconut from the garden of which accused was a
+"watchman. Accused contended that, he while discharging his duties as a watchman in"
+good faith and under mistake of fact inflicted an injury which unfortunately resulted in
+"the death of the victim. Explaining the applicability of section 79, Supreme Court held"
+that there was no mistake of fact which could even if existed or found true could
+"warrant or justify in law, the imposition of such a serious injury as found inflicted on the"
+victim.44. A police-officer saw a horse tied up in B's premises and because it happened
+"to resemble one which his father had lost a short time previously, he jumped at once to"
+"the conclusion that B had either stolen the horse himself, or purchased it from the thief,"
+and compelled B to account for his possession. The officer found that B had bought
+"the animal from one S; so he sent for S, charged him with the theft, and compelled him"
+to give bail whilst an investigation was pending. The officer never sent for the
+"supposed owner of the horse, or took the trouble of getting any credible information as"
+to whether it was his father's horse or not. It was held that the police-officer had not
+"acted in good faith, that is, with due care and attention and that this section did not"
+protect him.45. The accused struck a person with a full force lathi blow thinking that he
+was a thief and he had to do so to safeguard his property. The incident took place
+outside the house near a pond. The place was away from the house. There being no
+occasion for private defence of property and the blow being given on the head with
+"severity, it was held that the accused was liable to be convicted under section 304 Part"
+II. He was sentenced to three years RI.46.
+[s 79.8] English case.—
+"The accused took an unmarried girl under the age of 16 years out of the possession,"
+"and against the will, of her father. The defence of the accused was that he was bona"
+fide and reasonably believed that the girl was older than 16. It was held that the taking
+of the girl was unlawful the defence was bad.47. This case may be distinguished from
+"Tolson's case, in which a woman married believing her husband to be dead. There the"
+"conduct of the woman was not in the smallest degree immoral, but was, on the other"
+"hand, perfectly natural and legitimate."
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"14. 1st Rep. section 114, p 219."
+"15. Raj Kapoor v Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : (1980) 2 SCC 175 [LNIND"
+1979 SC 492] : 1980 (2) SCR 512 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : 1980 Cr LJ 436 ; Jayantilal K Katakia v P
+"Govindan Nair, AIR 1981 SC 1196 : (1981) 2 SCC 423 ."
+"16. State of AP v N Venugopal, AIR 1964 SC 33 [LNIND 1963 SC 159] ."
+"17. State of Maharashtra v Narhar Rao, AIR 1966 SC 1783 [LNIND 1966 SC 85] ; State of"
+"Maharashtra v Atma Ram, AIR 1966 SC 1786 [LNIND 1978 SC 193] ."
+"18. Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 1323 [LNIND 1968 SC 119] ."
+"19. Raj Kapoor v Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : (1980) 2 SCC 175 [LNIND"
+1979 SC 492] : 1980 (2) SCR 512 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : 1980 Cr LJ 436 .
+"20. State of Orissa v Bhagaban Barik, AIR 1987 SC 1265 [LNIND 1987 SC 366] : (1987) 2 SCC"
+498 [LNIND 1987 SC 366] .
+"21. Per Lord Esher, MR, in Barrow v Isaacs, (1891) 1 QB 417 , 420."
+"22. Per Lord Russell, CJ, in Sandford v Beal, (1899) 65 LJQB 73 , 74, 73 LT 406."
+"23. Per Cave, J, in Tolson, (1889) 23 QBD 168 , 181."
+"24. Per Stephen, J, in Ibid., p 188."
+"25. 1 Hale PC pp 42, 43."
+"26. Levett, (1839) Cro Car 538."
+"27. State of Orissa v Khora Ghasi, 1978 Cr LJ 1305 (Ori)."
+"28. Keso Sahu v Saligram, 1977 Cr LJ 1725 (Ori)."
+"29. Rajkapoor v Laxman, 1980 Cr LJ 436 : AIR 1980 SC 605 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] ."
+"30. Tustipada Mandal, (1950) Cut 75."
+31. 1 Hale PC 42.
+"32. Fischer, (1891) 14 Mad 342, 354, FB."
+"33. Esop, (1836) 7 C & P 456."
+"34. Bilbie v Lumley, (1802) 2 East 469."
+"35. Bailey v Bailey, (1800) Russ & Ry 1; C & J cases, see also State of Maharashtra v MH George,"
+1965 (1) Cr LJ 641 : AIR 1965 SC 722 [LNIND 1964 SC 208] .
+"36. Tustipada Mandal, (1950) Cut. 75."
+"37. Bailey's Case, (1800) Russ. & Ry 1."
+"38. Mayer Hans George, (1964) 67 Bom LR, 583 : AIR 1965 SC 722 [LNIND 1964 SC 208] : (1965)"
+1 Cr LJ 641 .
+"39. Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr. CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : (2011) 6 SCC"
+1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ 2908 : (2011) 2 SCC(Cr) 782 : (2011) 6 SCR 138 [LNIND
+2011 SC 475] .
+"40. Chirangi, (1952) Nag 348."
+"41. Raj Kapoor v Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : (1980) 2 SCC 175 [LNIND"
+1979 SC 492] : 1980 (2) SCR 512 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : 1980 Cr LJ 436 .
+"42. Tolson, (1889) 23 QBD 168 ."
+"43. R. v Williams, (1987) 3 All ER 411 Ch, following dictum of LAWTON LJ in R. v Kimber, (1983)"
+"1 All ER 320 . See also Beckford v R, (1987) 3 All ER 425 PC, where the same test was applied in"
+"a situation in which a person acted in self defence under a mistaken, but honestly held belief,"
+that the person whom he shot dead was a dangerous gunman.
+"44. Pitchai v State, (2004) 13 SCC 579 : (2006) 1 SCC(Cr) 505 See also Nagraj v State of Mysore,"
+AIR 1964 SC 269 [LNIND 1963 SC 153] : 1964 (3) SCR 671 [LNIND 1963 SC 153] : 1964 Cr LJ
+161 .
+"45. Sheo Surun Sahai v. Mohomed Fazil Khan, (1868) 10 WR (Cr) 20."
+"46. State of Orissa v Bhagbhan Barik, (1987) 2 SCC 498 [LNIND 1987 SC 366] : AIR 1987 SC"
+"1265 [LNIND 1987 SC 366] : 1987 Cr LJ 1115 . The Court relied on Russel On Crimes, 76 (vol 1)."
+"47. Prince, (1875) LR 2 CCR 154."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 80] Accident in doing a lawful act.
+"Nothing is an offence which is done by accident 1 or misfortune, and without any"
+criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by
+lawful means and with proper care and caution.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing by. Here, if"
+"there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an"
+offence.
+COMMENT.—
+This section exempts the doer of an innocent or lawful act in an innocent or lawful
+manner and without any criminal intention or knowledge from any unforeseen evil
+result that may ensue from accident or misfortune.48. To claim the benefit of this
+provision it has to be shown:
+(1) that the act in question was without any criminal intention or knowledge;
+(2) that the act was being done in a lawful manner by lawful means; and
+(3) that act was being done with proper care and caution.49.
+1. 'Accident'.—An effect is said to be accidental when the act by which it is caused is
+"not done with the intention of causing it, and when its occurrence as a consequence of"
+"such act is not so probable that a person of ordinary prudence ought, under the"
+"circumstances in which it is done, to take reasonable precautions against it.50. An"
+accident is something that happens out of the ordinary course of things.51. The idea of
+something fortuitous and unexpected is involved in the word 'accident.'52. Where two
+brothers were sleeping together and one of them while in a state of semi-sleep felt that
+"somebody was throttling him, picked up the dao, kept on the head of the bed, and"
+"administered a blow which was received by his sleeping brother who died, there being"
+"neither intention nor motive, the accused was let off under this section. His act was not"
+voluntary.53.
+An injury is said to be accidentally caused whensoever it is neither wilfully nor
+negligently caused.54. Where the accused fired a shot at his assailant who escaped but
+"four other persons were injured and one of them unfortunately expired, it was held that"
+the accused was not liable for the fatal injury to an innocent person as his case fell
+"within the scope of section 80 read with sections 96 and 100, IPC, 1860.55. Shooting"
+with an unlicensed gun does not debar an accused from claiming immunity under this
+section.56.
+[s 80.1] Medical Negligence.—
+To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law it must be
+shown that the accused did something or failed to do something which in the given
+facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence
+would have done or failed to do. The hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of
+such a nature that the injury which resulted was most likely imminent.57. In Dr. Suresh
+"Gupta v Govt. of NCT of Delhi,58. the Apex Court held that where the medical practitioner"
+"failed to take appropriate steps, viz., ""not putting a cuffed endotracheal tube of proper"
+"size"" so as to prevent aspiration of blood blocking respiratory passage, the act"
+attributed to him may be described as negligent act but not so reckless as to make him
+"criminally liable. In Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre,59. the"
+Supreme Court reiterated the legal position after taking survey of catena of case law. In
+"the context of issue pertaining to criminal liability of a medical practitioner, it is laid"
+down that the prosecution of a medical practitioner would be liable to be quashed if the
+evidence on record does not project substratum enough to infer gross or excessive
+degree of negligence on his/her part. The criminal liability cannot be fastened on the
+Medical Practitioner unless the negligence is so obvious and of such high degree that it
+would be culpable by applying the settled norms.60.
+[s 80.2] CASES.—
+Deceased allegedly dashed by offending tractor and crushed by its wheels. The
+Steering bolt of steering wheel was evidently broken all of a sudden. Offending vehicle
+became free and was out of control. Incident was merely an accident and not an act of
+rashness or negligence on the part of the accused.61. Where the act of the accused is
+"itself of criminal nature, the protection of this section cannot be availed. In this case,"
+"the accused picked up his gun, unlocked it, loaded it with cartridges, aimed at the chest"
+of the victim from a close range of 4–5 feet and shot it. Quite naturally this section was
+held to be not applicable. There could be no suggestion of an accident.62. Where the
+Death is caused by shooting an arrow under bona fide belief that object aimed at was
+"an animal, accused is entitled to the benefit under sections 79 or 80.63. The accused"
+was attacked when he was asleep at night by his brother who tried to strangulate him.
+"Apprehending imminent death, the accused aimed a blow at his assailant brother with"
+a piece of bamboo on which he could lay hand and the blow accidentally struck the
+head of his intervening father as a result of which he ultimately died. It was held that
+the accused exercised his lawful right of self- defence and the blow fell on the head of
+his father by accident and misfortune and he was fully protected by sections 80 and
+106. His conviction under section 304 Part II was set aside.64.
+[s 80.3] Burden of Proof.—
+The prosecution alleges that the accused intentionally shot the deceased; but the
+"accused pleads that, though the shots emanated from his revolver and hit the"
+"deceased, it was by accident, that is, the shots went off from the revolver in the course"
+"of a struggle in the circumstances mentioned in section 80 of the IPC, 1860 and hit the"
+deceased resulting in his death. The Court then shall presume the absence of
+"circumstances bringing the case within the provisions of section 80 of the IPC, 1860,"
+"that is, it shall presume that the shooting was not by accident, and that the other"
+circumstances bringing the case within the exception did not exist. But this
+presumption may be rebutted by the accused by adducing evidence to support his plea
+of accident in the circumstances mentioned therein. This presumption may also be
+rebutted by admissions made or circumstances elicited by the evidence led by the
+prosecution or by the combined effect of such circumstances and the evidence
+adduced by the accused. But the section does not in any way affect the burden that lies
+on the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offence with which the accused is
+charged and that burden never shifts.65.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"48. Sukhdev Singh v Delhi State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 7 SCC 441 [LNIND 2003 SC 728] :"
+"AIR 2003 SC 3716 [LNIND 2003 SC 728] , if either of these elements is missing, the act is not to"
+be excused on the ground of accident.
+"49. Atmendra v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 2838 : AIR 1998 SC 1985 [LNIND 1998 SC 386]"
+(SC).
+"50. Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, 9th Edn, Article 316."
+"51. Fenwick v Schmalz, (1868) LR 3 CP 313, 316. Atmendra v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"2838 : AIR 1998 SC 1985 [LNIND 1998 SC 386] (SC); Sita Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"287 (Raj), the accused labourer was digging earth by spade, another labourer came close to him"
+to remove the soil and became the victim of one spade blow of which he died. It was held that
+the act of the accused came neither within section 302 nor section 304. It fell within section
+304A being an act of criminal negligence. Sentence imposed upon him was reduced to the
+period already undergone.
+"52. Per Lord Halsbury in Hamilton, Fraser & Co v Pandorf & Co, (1887) 12 AC 518 , 524."
+"53. Patreswar Basumatary v State of Assam, 1989 Cr LJ 196 (Gau)."
+54. 10th Parl Rep 16.
+"55. Raja Ram, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 85 (All); see also Khora Ghasi, 1978 Cr LJ 1305 (Ori) under"
+section 79 ante.
+"56. Rangaswamy, (1952) Nag 93."
+"57. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC 3180 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] : 2005 (6) SCC 1"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 587] in this case SC issued guidelines regarding the prosecution of Doctors for
+medical Negligence; See comments in section 304A.
+"58. Dr. Suresh Gupta v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 422 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] : 2004 AIR"
+SCW 4442 : AIR 2004 SC 4091 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] .
+"59. Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre, 2010 (3) SCC 480 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 164] .
+"60. Dr. Saroja Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1060 (Bom)."
+"61. Mahadev v State of MP, 2006 Cr LJ 4246 (MP)."
+"62. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370]"
+: 2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"63. State of Orissa, v Khora Ghasi, 1978 Cr LJ 1305 ; State of MP v Rangaswami 1952 Cr LJ 1191"
+.
+"64. Girish Saikia v State of Assam, 1993 Cr LJ 3808 (Gau)."
+"65. K M Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : 1962 (Supp1)"
+"SCR 567 : 1962 Cr LJ 521 ; Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1370] : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+"[s 81] Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent"
+other harm.
+Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is
+"likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention1 to cause harm, and"
+in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or
+property.
+Explanation.—It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented
+or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of
+doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence"
+"on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel,"
+"he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or thirty passengers on board,"
+"unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course, he"
+"must incur risk of running down a boat C with only two passengers on board,"
+"which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to"
+run down the boat C and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to
+"the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run"
+"down the boat C by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if"
+it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was
+such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C.
+"(b) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from"
+spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or
+"property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature"
+and so imminent as to excuse A's act. A is not guilty of the offence.
+COMMENT.—
+An act which would otherwise be a crime may in some cases be excused if the person
+accused can show that it was done only in order to avoid consequences which could
+"not otherwise be avoided, and which, if they had followed, would have inflicted upon"
+"him or upon others whom he was bound to protect inevitable and irreparable evil, that"
+"no more was done than was reasonably necessary for that purpose, and that the evil"
+inflicted by it was not disproportionate to the evil avoided.66. As in self-defence so in
+the prevention of harm the accused is faced with two choices both resulting in some
+harm and of sheer necessity to avoid a greater harm he has to commit an act which
+would otherwise be an offence. The test really is like this: there must be a situation in
+which the accused is confronted with a grave danger and he has no choice but to
+"commit the lesser harm may be even to an innocent person, in order to avoid the"
+greater harm. Here the choice is between the two evils and the accused rightly chooses
+the lesser one.67.
+1. 'Without any criminal intention'.—Under no circumstances can a person be justified
+"in intentionally causing harm; but if he causes the harm without any criminal intention,"
+"and merely with the knowledge that it is likely to ensue, he will not be held responsible"
+"for the result of his act, provided it be done in good faith to avoid or prevent other harm"
+to person or property.
+'Criminal intention' simply means the purpose of design or doing an act forbidden by
+the criminal law without just cause or excuse. An act is intentional if it exists in idea
+"before it exists in fact, the idea realizing itself in the fact because of the desire by which"
+it is accompanied. The motive for an act is not a sufficient test to determine its criminal
+"character. By a motive is meant anything that can contribute to give birth to, or even to"
+"prevent, any kind of action. Motive may serve as a clue to the intention; but although"
+"the motive is pure, the act done under it may be criminal. Purity of motive will not purge"
+an act of its criminal character.
+Where an offence depends upon proof of intention the Court must have proof of facts
+sufficient to justify in coming to the conclusion that the intention existed. No doubt one
+"has usually to infer intention from conduct, and one matter that has to be taken into"
+account is the probable effect of the conduct. But that is never conclusive.68.
+"Where the positive evidence against the accused is clear, cogent and reliable, the"
+question of motive is of no importance.69.
+[s 81.1] Mens rea.—
+It is a well settled principle of common law that mens rea is an essential ingredient of
+"criminal offence. A statute can exclude that element, but it is a sound rule of"
+construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory
+provision creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against it
+unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes mens rea. There is a
+presumption that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a statutory offence; but this
+may be rebutted by the express words of a statute creating the offence or by necessary
+implication. But the mere fact that the object of a statute is to promote welfare
+activities or to eradicate grave social evils is in itself not decisive of the question
+whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of the offence. It is
+also necessary to enquire whether a statute by putting a person under strict liability
+helps him to assist the State in the enforcement of the law; can he do anything to
+promote the observance of the law? Mens rea by necessary implication can be
+excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the
+object of a statute would otherwise be defeated and its exclusion enables those put
+under strict liability by their act or omission to assist the promotion of the law. The
+nature of mens rea that will be implied in a statute creating an offence depends upon
+the object of the Act and the provisions thereof.70.
+"It is, however, held that mens rea is an essential ingredient in every offence except in"
+three cases:
+(1) cases not criminal in any real sense but which in the public interest are
+prohibited under a penalty;
+(2) public nuisance; and
+(3) cases criminal in form but which are really only a summary mode of enforcing a
+civil right.
+"The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea has, however, no application in its"
+"technical sense to the offences under the Penal Code, as the definitions of various"
+offences contain expressly a proposition as to the state of mind of the accused. In
+"other words, each offence under the Code except offences like waging war (section"
+"121), sedition (section 124A), kidnapping and abduction (sections 359, 363) and"
+counterfeiting coins (section 232) prescribes a mens rea of a specific kind which is not
+exactly the same as mens rea in the sense of being a guilty mind under the common
+"law. Thus, throughout the web of the IPC, 1860 the doctrine of mens rea runs as a"
+"running thread in the form of ""intentionally"", ""voluntarily"", ""knowingly"", ""fraudulently"","
+"""dishonestly"" and the like. It is, therefore, not entirely correct to say that the doctrine of"
+mens rea is inapplicable to the offence under the Penal Code. What the Code requires
+is not negation of mens rea but mens rea of a specific kind and this may differ from
+offence-to-offence.
+"In this section and in sections 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 95, 100, 104 and 106, 'harm' can"
+only mean physical injury.71.
+"As to the doctrine of compulsion and necessity, see comment on section 94, infra."
+[s 81.2] CASES.—
+Where a Chief Constable not in his uniform came to a fire and wished to force his way
+"past the military sentries placed round it, was kicked by a sentry, it was held that as the"
+"sentry did not know who he was, the kick was justifiable for the purpose of preventing"
+much greater harm under this section and as a means of acting up to the military
+"order.72. A person placed poison in his toddy pots, knowing that if taken by a human"
+"being it would cause injury, but with the intention of thereby detecting an unknown thief"
+who was in the habit of stealing the toddy from his pots. The toddy was drunk by and
+caused injury to some soldiers who purchased it from an unknown vendor. It was held
+"that the person was guilty under section 328, and that this section did not apply.73."
+Where a Village Magistrate arrested a drunken person whose conduct was at the time a
+"grave danger to the public, it was held that he was not guilty of an offence by reason of"
+the provisions of this section or sections 96 or 105.74.
+[s 81.3] English cases.—
+"A man who, in order to escape death from hunger, kills another for the purpose of"
+"eating his flesh, is guilty of murder; although at the time of the act he is in such"
+circumstances that he believes and has reasonable ground for believing that it affords
+the only chance of preserving his life. At the trial of an indictment for murder it
+"appeared that the prisoners D and S, seamen, and the deceased, a boy between 17 and"
+"18, were cast away in a storm on the high seas, and compelled to put into an open"
+"boat; that the boat was drifting on the ocean and was probably more than 1,000 miles"
+"from land; that on the 18th day, when they had been seven days without food and five"
+"days without water, D proposed to S that lots should be cast who should be put to"
+"death to save the rest, and that they afterwards thought it would be better to kill the boy"
+"that their lives should be saved; that on the 20th day, D with the assent of S, killed the"
+"boy, and both D and S fed on his flesh for four days; that at the time of the act there"
+was no sail in sight nor any reasonable prospect of relief; that under these
+circumstances there appeared to the prisoners every probability that unless they then
+"or very soon fed upon the boy, or one of themselves, they would die of starvation. It"
+was held that upon these facts there was no proof of any such necessity as could
+"justify the prisoners in killing the boy, and that they were guilty of murder.75. A and B,"
+"swimming in the sea after shipwreck, get hold of a plank not large enough to support"
+"both; A pushes off B, who is drowned. This, in the opinion of Sir James Stephen, is not a"
+crime as A thereby does B no direct bodily harm but leaves him to his chance of getting
+"another plank. According to Archbold this is not a law now. In R v Martin,76. the"
+"defendant, charged with driving whilst disqualified, sought to raise necessity as a"
+"defence but on the trial judge ruling, in effect, that necessity was no defence to an"
+"'absolute' offence, he changed his plea to guilty. The circumstances on which the"
+defendant sought to rely were that his wife's son (the defendant's stepson) was late for
+"work and accordingly in danger of losing his job, and that this had made his wife so"
+distraught that she threatened to commit suicide unless he drove her son to work.
+There was medical evidence available indicating that it was likely that his wife would
+"have attempted suicide had he not driven her son to work. The Court of Appeal,"
+"quashing the conviction, held that the trial judge should have left the defence to the"
+"jury. The authorities were now clear, said the Court, and established the following"
+"principles. First, the law does recognise a defence of necessity whether arising from"
+wrongful threats of violence to another or from 'objective dangers' (conveniently called
+"duress of circumstances) threatening the defendant or others. Second, the defence is"
+available only if the defendant can be objectively said to be acting reasonably and
+"proportionately to avoid the threat of death or serious injury. Third, it is for the jury to"
+determine whether because of what the defendant reasonably believed he had good
+"cause to fear death or serious injury; and, if so, whether a person of reasonable"
+"firmness, sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would have responded as the"
+defendant did.77.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"66. Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, 9th Edn, Article 11."
+"67. Southwark London Borough Council v Williams, (1971) Ch 734 , (1971) 2 All ER 175 ; Wood v"
+Richards (1971) RTR 201 .
+"68. Ramchandra Gujar, (1937) 39 Bom LR 1184 , (1938) Bom 114."
+"69. Gurcharan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 : 1956 Cr LJ 827 . Kusta Balsu"
+"Kandnekar v State of Goa, 1987 Cr LJ 89 Bom."
+"70. Mayer Hans George, (1964) 67 Bom LR 583 , AIR 1965 SC 722 [LNIND 1964 SC 208] : (1965)"
+"1 Cr LJ 641 . See also Nathulal, AIR 1966 SC 43 [LNIND 1965 SC 97] : 1966 Cr LJ 71 ."
+"71. Veeda Menezes v Yusuf Khan, 1966 Cr LJ 1489 : AIR 1966 SC 1773 [LNIND 1966 SC 107] :"
+68 Bom LR 629.
+"72. Bostan, (1892) 17 Bom 626."
+"73. Dhania Daji, (1868) 5 BHC (Cr C) 59."
+"74. Gopal Naidu, (1922) 46 Mad 605 (FB)."
+"75. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 QBD 273 ."
+"76. R v Martin, (1989) 1 All ER 652 CA."
+77. Reproduced from All ER Annual Review 1989.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 82] Act of a child under seven years of age.
+Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.
+COMMENT.—
+"Under the age of seven years no infant can be guilty of a crime; for, under that age an"
+"infant is, by presumption of law, doli incapax, and cannot be endowed with any"
+"discretion. If the accused were a child under seven years of age, the proof of that fact"
+"would be ipso facto an answer to the prosecution.78. It is, therefore, desirable to bring"
+some evidence regarding the age of the accused on the record.79.
+"The accused purchased for one anna, from a child aged six years, two pieces of cloth"
+"valued at 15 annas, which the child had taken from the house of a third person. It was"
+"held that, assuming that a charge of an offence of dishonest reception of property"
+(section 411) could not be sustained owing to the incapacity of the child to commit an
+"offence, the accused was guilty of criminal misappropriation, if he knew that the"
+property belonged to the child's guardians and dishonestly appropriated it to his own
+use.80.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"78. Lukhini Agradanini, (1874) 22 WR (Cr) 27, 28."
+"79. Hiralal, 1977 Cr LJ 1921 : AIR 1977 SC 2236 [LNIND 1977 SC 254] ."
+"80. Makhulshah v State, (1886) 1 Weir 470."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 83] Act of a child above seven years of age and under twelve of immature
+understanding.
+Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under
+"twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the"
+nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.
+COMMENT.—
+"Where the accused is a child above seven years of age and under twelve, the incapacity"
+to commit an offence only arises when the child has not attained sufficient maturity of
+"understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct, and such non-"
+"attainment would have apparently to be specially pleaded and proved, like the"
+"incapacity of a person who, at the time of doing an act charged as an offence, was"
+alleged to have been of unsound mind under this section it has got to be shown that
+the accused is not only under 12 but has not attained sufficient maturity of
+"understanding. If no evidence or circumstance is brought to the notice of the Court, it"
+"will be presumed that the child accused intended to do what he really did. Thus, where"
+a child of 12 or so used a sharp sword in killing a person along with his two brothers
+"and no evidence either of age or immaturity of understanding was led on his behalf, it"
+"was held that he committed an offence at least under section 326, IPC, 1860.81. The"
+Legislature is manifestly referring in this section to an exceptional immaturity of
+intellect.82. What the section contemplates is that the child should not know the nature
+and physical consequences of his conduct.83. The circumstances of a case may
+disclose such a degree of malice as to justify the maxim malitia supplet octatem.84.
+"Where the accused, a boy over 11 years but below 12 years of age, picked up his knife"
+"and advanced towards the deceased with a threatening gesture, saying that he would"
+"cut him to bits, and did actually cut him, his entire action can only lead to one inference,"
+"namely, that he did what he intended to do and that he knew all the time that a blow"
+inflicted with a kathi (knife) would effectuate his intention.85. In the prosecution of an
+"11-year-old child for throwing a brick at a police vehicle and then running away, the"
+Court said that the justices were not entitled to conclude from his appearance that he
+was normal in respect of incurring criminal responsibility. The test is whether the child
+knew that what he was doing was seriously wrong and went beyond childish mischief.
+Running away was not by itself sufficient to rebut the presumption of doli incapax. A
+naughty child would run away from a parent or teacher even if what he had done was
+not criminal.86.
+[s 83.1] CASE.—Theft by child.—
+"Where a child of nine years of age stole a necklace, worth Rs. 280, and immediately"
+"afterwards sold it to the accused for five annas, the accused could be convicted of"
+"receiving stolen property, because the act of the child in selling the necklace showed"
+that he had attained a sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and
+consequences of his conduct on that occasion within the meaning of this section.87.
+Section 83 provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven
+"years of age and under 12, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to"
+"judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion. The IPC, 1860"
+provides no protection from culpable liability on ground of tender age to one who is
+aged 12 years or more. In a child's life the period between seven and 12 years of age is
+rather the twilight period of transition to a minimal workable level of understanding of
+"things in the firmament of worldly affairs. And that is why both the IPC, 1860 and the"
+Oaths Act have made special provisions for children below 12 years in respect of
+matters dependent on a minimal power of understanding.88.
+A claim of juvenility may be raised before any Court and it shall be recognised at any
+"stage, even after final disposal of the case.89."
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"81. Hiralal, Supra."
+"82. Lukhini Agradanini, (1874) 22 WR (Cr) 27, 28."
+"83. Ulla Mahapatra, (1950) Cut 293."
+"84. Mussamut Aimona, (1864) 1 WR (Cr) 43."
+"85. Ulla Mahapatra, Supra."
+"86. A v DPP, (1991) COD 442 (DC)."
+"87. Krishna, (1883) 6 Mad 373."
+"88. Santosh Roy v State of WB, 1992 Cr LJ 2493 : 1992 (1) Crimes 904 (Cal)."
+"89. Section 7A Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. See also Amit"
+"Singh v State of Maharashtra, 2011 (8) Scale 439 [LNIND 2011 SC 731] : (2011) 9 SCR 890"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 731] : (2011) 13 SCC 744 [LNIND 2011 SC 731] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 84] Act of a person of unsound mind.
+"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, 1 by"
+"reason of unsoundness of mind, 2 is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or"
+that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. 3
+COMMENT.—
+"To commit a criminal offence, mens rea is generally taken to be an essential element of"
+"crime. It is said furiosus nulla voluntus est. In other words, a person who is suffering"
+from a mental disorder cannot be said to have committed a crime as he does not know
+"what he is doing. For committing a crime, the intention and act both are taken to be the"
+constituents of the crime; actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. Every normal and sane
+human being is expected to possess some degree of reason to be responsible for
+his/her conduct and acts unless contrary is proved. But a person of unsound mind or a
+person suffering from mental disorder cannot be said to possess this basic norm of
+human behaviour.90.
+"[s 84.1] McNaughten Rule and the origin of Section 84 of IPC, 1860.—"
+Section 84 clearly gives statutory recognition to the defence of insanity as developed
+by the Common Law of England in a decision of the House of Lords rendered in the
+"case of R v Daniel McNaughten.91. In that case, the House of Lords formulated the"
+"famous Mc Naughten Rules on the basis of the five questions, which had been referred"
+to them with regard to the defence of insanity. The reference came to be made in a
+case where Mc Naughten was charged with the murder by shooting of Edward
+"Drummond, who was the Pvt Secretary of the then Prime Minister of England Sir Robert"
+"Peel. The accused Mc Naughten produced medical evidence to prove that, he was not,"
+"at the time of committing the act, in a sound state of mind. He claimed that he was"
+suffering from an insane delusion that the Prime Minister was the only reason for all
+"his problems. He had also claimed that as a result of the insane delusion, he mistook"
+Drummond for the Prime Minister and committed his murder by shooting him. The plea
+"of insanity was accepted and Mc Naughten was found not guilty, on the ground of"
+insanity. The aforesaid verdict became the subject of debate in the House of Lords.
+"Therefore, it was determined to take the opinion of all the judges on the law governing"
+such cases. Five questions were subsequently put to the Law Lords. A comparison of
+"answers to question no. 2 and 3 and the provision contained in section 84 of the IPC,"
+1860 would clearly indicate that the section is modelled on that answers.92.
+The essential elements of section 84 are as follows:
+"(i) The accused must, at the time of commission of the act be of unsound mind;"
+(ii) The unsoundness must be such as to make the accused at the time when he is
+"doing the act charged as offence, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or"
+that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law.93. Where it is proved that the
+accused has committed multiple murders while suffering from mental
+"derangement of some sort and it is found that there is (i) absence of any motive,"
+"(ii) absence of secrecy, (iii) want of pre-arrangement, and (iv) want of"
+"accomplices, it would be reasonable to hold that the circumstances are"
+sufficient to support the inference that the accused suffered from unsoundness
+of mind.94.
+"Though the onus of proving unsoundness of mind is on the accused,95. yet it has been"
+"held that where during the investigation previous history of insanity is revealed, it is the"
+duty of an honest investigator to subject the accused to a medical examination and
+"place that evidence before the Court and if this is not done, it creates a serious infirmity"
+in the prosecution case and the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused.96.
+Prosecution is duty bound to subject the accused to a medical examination
+"immediately.97. This onus may, however, be discharged by producing evidence as to the"
+conduct of the accused shortly prior to the offence and his conduct at the time or
+"immediately afterwards, also by evidence of his mental condition, his family history and"
+so forth.98. Every person is presumed to know the natural consequences of his act.
+Similarly every person is also presumed to know the law. The prosecution has not to
+establish these facts.99.
+There are four kinds of persons who may be said to be non compos mentis (not of
+sound mind): (1) an idiot; (2) one made non compos by illness; (3) a lunatic or a
+madman; and (4) one who is drunk.
+"An idiot is one who is of non-sane memory from his birth, by a perpetual infirmity,"
+"without lucid intervals; and those are said to be idiots who cannot count twenty, or tell"
+"the days of the week, or who do not know their fathers or mothers, or the like. A person"
+made non compos men-us by illness is excused in criminal cases from such acts as
+are-committed while under the influence of his disorder. A lunatic is one who is afflicted
+"by mental disorder only at certain periods and vicissitudes, having intervals of reason."
+"Madness is permanent. Lunacy and madness are spoken of as acquired insanity, and"
+idiocy as natural insanity.100.
+[s 84.2] Legal insanity vis-a-vis Medical insanity.—
+A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical insanity. A Court is
+"always concerned with legal insanity, and not with medical insanity. What sections 84,"
+"IPC, 1860 provides is defence of legal insanity as distinguished from medical insanity."
+A person is legally insane when he is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that
+what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law.101. Incapacity of the person on
+account of insanity must be of the nature which attracts the operation of section 84
+"IPC, 1860.102. An accused who seeks exoneration from liability of an act under section"
+"84 of the IPC, 1860 is to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. Expression"
+"""unsoundness of mind"" has not been defined in the IPC, 1860 and it has mainly been"
+treated as equivalent to insanity. But the term insanity carries different meaning in
+different contexts and describes varying degrees of mental disorder. Every person who
+is suffering from mental disease is not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability. The
+"mere fact that the accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his brain is not quite all"
+"right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had rendered his"
+"intellect weak and affected his emotions or indulges in certain unusual acts, or had fits"
+of insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to epileptic fits and there was
+abnormal behaviour or the behaviour is queer are not sufficient to attract the
+"application of section 84 of the IPC, 1860.103. The medical profession would"
+"undoubtedly treat the accused as a mentally sick person. However, for the purposes of"
+"claiming the benefit of the defence of insanity in law, the appellant would have to prove"
+"that his cognitive faculties were so impaired, at the time when the crime was"
+"committed, as not to know the nature of the act.104. Only legal insanity is contemplated"
+"under section 84 of IPC, 1860.105."
+[s 84.3] 42nd Report of Law Commission of India.—
+"Law Commission of India re-visited section 84 of the IPC, 1860 in view of the criticism"
+to the M'Naughten Rules in various countries including Britain but came to the
+"conclusion that law of insanity under section 84 of the IPC, 1860 needs no changes in"
+Indian circumstances.106.
+Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of
+"mind. There is no definition of ""unsoundness of mind"" in the Penal Code. The Courts"
+"have, however, mainly treated this expression as equivalent to insanity. But the term"
+"""insanity"" itself has no precise definition. It is a term used to describe varying degrees"
+"of mental disorder. So, every person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto"
+exempted from criminal responsibility. A distinction is to be made between legal
+"insanity and medical insanity. A Court is concerned with legal insanity, and not with"
+"medical insanity.107. In this case, the accused was under medical treatment prior to the"
+occurrence. Evidence indicating that he remained mentally fit for about four years after
+treatment. During the trial also he was sent for treatment and his conduct was normal
+"thereafter. On such facts, it was held, that the accused was not entitled to protection"
+under section 84. The Court also added that where previous history of insanity of the
+"accused comes to light during investigation, the accused must be medically examined"
+and report placed before the Court. Any lapse in this respect would create infirmity in
+the prosecution case and the accused may become entitled to benefit of doubt.
+1. 'At the time of doing it'.—It must clearly be proved that at the time of the committing
+"of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from"
+"disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if"
+"he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.108. If he did know it,"
+he is responsible.109.
+"In Sheralli Wali Mohammed v State of Maharashtra,110. it was held that:"
+"... it must be proved clearly that, at the time of the commission of the acts, the appellant, by"
+"reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of either knowing the nature of the act or"
+"that the acts were either morally wrong or contrary to law. The question to be asked is, is"
+"there evidence to show that, at the time of the commission of the offence, he was labouring"
+"under any such incapacity? On this question, the state of his mind before and after the"
+commission of the offence is relevant.
+The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit of this section should be
+given or not is the material time when the offence takes place. If at that moment a man
+is found to be labouring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of the
+"act he was doing or that, even if he knew it, he did not know it was either wrong or"
+"contrary to law then this section must be applied. In coming to that conclusion, the"
+"relevant circumstances, like the behaviour of the accused before the commission of"
+"the offence and his behaviour after the commission of the offence, should be taken"
+into consideration.111. The accused pushed a child of four years into fire resulting in his
+death but there was nothing to show that there was any deliberateness or preparation
+to commit the crime. His act was accompanied by manifestations of unnatural brutality
+and was committed openly. He neither concealed nor ran away nor tried to avoid
+detection which showed that he was not conscious of his guilt. It was held that the
+accused was entitled to benefit of section 84 and his conviction under section 302 was
+"set aside.112. The accused, a young boy brought up by his grandfather, went abroad for"
+further studies. When his parents visited abroad they did not care to see him. His
+"grandfather's death was communicated to him much later. On return to India, he"
+committed offences of brutal nature at random. During the pendency of the session's
+"case, he again continued and completed his engineering course and started a printing"
+press and later he managed a garage and allied industries employing nearly 30
+persons. His behaviour before and after the offences was that of a normal man. It was
+held that he was insane at the time of the offence and was given benefit of section
+84.113. Where the accused was examined by two doctors who certified him to be
+schizophrenic and his abnormal behaviour was also apparent from the evidence on the
+"record, the Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the accused by the High Court was"
+proper.114.
+"In other words, to get the benefit of section 84 IPC, 1860, it must be shown that at the"
+time of the commission of the act the accused by reason of unsoundness of mind was
+incapable of either knowing the nature of the act or that the act was either morally
+wrong or contrary to law and for determining this his state of mind before and after the
+commission of the offence is most relevant. It would be dangerous to admit the
+defence of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime.115.
+"Thus, the fact that the accused committed the murder over a trifling matter and made a"
+clean breast of his crime would not go to show that he was insane.116.
+[s 84.4] Lucid intervals.—
+A lucid interval of an insane person is not merely a cessation of the violent symptoms
+"of the disorder, but a restoration of the faculties of the mind sufficiently to enable the"
+person soundly to judge the act; but the expression does not necessarily mean
+"complete or perfect restoration of the mental faculties to their original condition. So, if"
+"there is such a restoration, the person concerned can do the act with such reason,"
+memory and judgment as to make it a legal act; merely a cessation of the violent
+symptoms of the disorder is not sufficient.117.
+"2. 'Unsoundness of mind.'—Whether the want of capacity is temporary or permanent,"
+"natural or supervening, whether it arises from disease, or exists from the time of birth,"
+it is included in this expression. It is only 'unsoundness of mind' which naturally impairs
+the cognitive faculties of the mind that can form a ground of exemption from criminal
+responsibility.118. The nature and extent of the unsoundness of mind required being
+"such as would make the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he"
+"is doing what is wrong or contrary to law.119. Thus, as Stephen says that if a person"
+cuts off the head of a sleeping man because 'it would be great fun to see him looking
+"for it when he woke up', it would obviously be a case where the perpetrator of the act"
+would be incapable of knowing the physical effects of his act.120. The accused had
+killed his wife and his minor children and assaulted his neighbour and the police officer.
+The evidence showed that he had a history of insanity with at random assault on
+strangers but his relations with his wife were cordial. It was held that the accused was
+"a man of unsound mind and his conviction under sections 302, 332 and 323 was set"
+aside.121. The accused caught hold of the legs of a girl of two years of age on the road
+and struck her on the ground. She sustained head injury and died in the hospital. On the
+basis of the ocular evidence about the conduct of the accused at the time of the
+"offence and the opinion of the doctor about his state of mind, the accused was"
+"acquitted on the ground of insanity.122. The accused, a labourer, killed his brother's wife"
+and attempted to kill his mother in a quarrel over money deposited with his mother.
+"Accused assaulted with axe on the vital parts of the victim's body, absconded for three"
+months and immediately after the incident worked as a labourer in another village for
+"15 days. It was held that the conduct of the accused immediately before, at the time of"
+"and after the incident, was wholly inconsistent with the plea of insanity raised by him."
+The history of earlier mental derangement was not by itself sufficient to bring the case
+within section 84.123. Where on the day of the crime the accused was seen dancing
+"with a dog on his head and with a broken bottle, but the medical evidence showed that"
+"he was a normal man, it was held that defence of insanity was an afterthought.124. The"
+mere fact that the accused attempted to escape from the scene of occurrence after
+"killing his wife, belied his plea of insanity.125. Where a father and his relatives sacrificed"
+"a four-year-old son to propitiate the deity, the Supreme Court held that this does not by"
+itself constitute insanity. Such primitive and inhuman actions must be punished
+severely so as to deter others from resorting to such barbaric practices.126.
+[s 84.5] Partial delusion.—
+Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion affords no protection under section 84
+"IPC, 1860.127. Whether a person who, under an insane delusion as to the existing facts,"
+"commits an offence in consequence thereof, is to be, therefore, excused depends upon"
+"the nature of the delusion. If he labours under a partial delusion only, and is not in other"
+"respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if"
+"the facts, with respect to which the delusion exists, were real.128. If a person afflicted"
+"with insane delusion, in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons, commits"
+"a crime, knowing that he was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with"
+"a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some"
+"supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless"
+punishable according to the nature of the crime committed.129. Where the accused
+after killing his daughter tried to commit suicide and there was no evidence of
+"psychiatric treatment but only major depression, he was held liable to be convicted.130."
+"3. 'Nature of the act, or...what is either wrong or contrary to law.'—If the accused were"
+conscious that an act was done which he ought not to do and if the act was at the
+"same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable. His liability will not be"
+diminished if he did the act complained of with a view under the influence of insane
+delusion of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury or of producing
+"some public benefit, if he knew that he was acting contrary to law.131. Where the"
+"accused, a young man, took a girl of four years on a bicycle to a lonely place near a"
+"canal, sexually assaulted her and threw her into the canal, it was held that it was a"
+carefully thought out action and not an act of an insane person.132.
+"Mere absence of motive for a crime, howsoever atrocious it may be, cannot, in the"
+"absence of plea and proof of legal insanity, bring the case within this section.133. The"
+mere fact that an act of murder is committed by the accused on a sudden impulse and
+there is no discoverable motive for the act will not generally afford the Court sufficient
+"basis for accepting the plea of insanity.134. Thus, in SW Mohammed's case the"
+Supreme Court held that the mere fact that no motive has been proved why the
+accused murdered his wife and child or the fact that he made no attempt to run away
+when the door was broken open would not indicate that he was insane or that he did
+"not have the necessary mens rea for the offence.135. In a Madras case, however, the"
+Madras High Court has held that where the accused was insane for some months prior
+to occurrence and on cordial terms with his wife but suddenly killed the wife in the
+open courtyard without any ostensible motive and did not even attempt to run away or
+"secret his crime, he had to be given the benefit of section 84, IPC, 1860.136. This case"
+"can, of course, be distinguished from the above mentioned Supreme Court case on the"
+ground that in the instant case the accused had previous history of insanity which was
+not fully cured. Prior or subsequent treatment for schizophrenia coupled with the
+evidence of the doctor that the accused was schizophrenic would entitle the accused
+to the benefit of section 84 in a charge of murder.137. But where the doctor in his
+evidence merely said unsoundness of mind may have existed from before and that
+evidence was contradicted by evidence of close relations about sanity of the accused
+"at the time of the occurrence, it was held that the accused could not get the benefit of"
+"section 84, IPC, 1860.138. There is a difference between medical insanity and legal"
+insanity. By medical insanity is meant the prisoner's consciousness of the bearing of
+his act on those affected by it and by legal insanity is meant the prisoner's
+consciousness in relation to himself.139. There can be no legal insanity unless the
+cognitive faculties of the accused are as a result of unsoundness of mind completely
+impaired. In order to constitute legal insanity unsoundness of mind must be such as to
+"make the offender incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what"
+"is wrong or contrary to law.140. Thus, mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion,"
+irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection
+"under section 84 of the IPC, 1860 as the law contained in that section is still squarely"
+"based on the outdated M'Naughten Rules of 19th Century England. Thus, in"
+Siddheswari's case141. where the accused killed her ailing child of three and there was
+also some evidence elicited in cross-examination to show that the accused had
+"suffered from some mental derangement two years prior to the incident, it was held"
+"that the mere fact the murder was committed on a sudden impulse or as a ""mercy"
+"killing"" was no ground to give her the benefit of section 84 IPC, 1860, even though both"
+euthanasia (mercy killing) and irresistible impulse would entitle the accused in England
+to get the benefit of diminished responsibility and her crime would be treated as
+manslaughter (i.e. culpable homicide not amounting to murder). In a latter case too the
+Gauhati High Court felt that where the accused has made out a prima facie case of
+irresistible impulse the plea has to be taken into consideration in deciding the question
+"of giving benefit of section 84, IPC, 1860, to the accused.142."
+"The position, however, has undergone a sea change in England where the right or"
+wrong test of the M'Naughten Rules no longer dominate this branch of criminal law to
+the exclusion of mental abnormality falling short of complete insanity as a limited
+"defence establishing a claim to diminished responsibility. Thus, under section 2 of the"
+"Homicide Act, 1957 if two Psychiatrists certify that the homicidal act of the accused"
+was influenced by abnormal condition of his mind though not amounting to legal
+"insanity within the meaning of M'Naughten Rules, still he cannot be convicted of"
+murder but his offence will be regarded only as a manslaughter which is equivalent to
+"culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the IPC, 1860. It is hoped that the"
+Indian law too would be changed on this score with due regard to the modern
+developments in the field of psychology of criminal behaviour.
+[s 84.6] CASES.—
+"Accused, who was a mentally challenged person before the incident, killed three"
+persons and caused injuries to others with an axe. He did not know the implication of
+"his act and indiscriminately went on wielding axe blows, be it a child or a woman and"
+there after he did not even attempt to hide the weapon which he used for committing
+crime. He was found of unsound mind in his medical examination. Case of accused
+"comes within the four corners of section 84 IPC, 1860.143. Where an accused, who was"
+suffering from fever which caused him while suffering from its paroxysms to be
+"bewildered and unconscious, killed his children at being annoyed at their crying, but he"
+"was not delirious then, and there was no evidence to show that he was not conscious"
+"of the nature of his act, it was held that he was not entitled to protection under this"
+section.144. But where the accused labouring under a delusion believed his two-month-
+"old infant child to be a devil and danger to himself, his family and to the whole world"
+"and, therefore, killed the child with unusual ferocity almost reducing it to a pulp and"
+thereafter without making any attempt to escape told the police party that he had
+"removed a devil from the world, it was held that the accused did not know that what he"
+"had done was wrong and as such was entitled to get protection of section 84, IPC,"
+"1860, even when he did not plead insanity in his defence as the prosecution itself"
+"disclosed that he was insane.145. IPC, 1860Allegation that accused appellant had cut"
+"his son, aged about one and a half years, to death and he was intercepted while he was"
+preparing to bury the dead body by digging a pit. Medical evidence shows that the
+accused was suffering from schizophrenia. Accused was reticent by nature and used
+to keep himself indoors and interact only when he was compelled to do so. He was not
+in a normal state of mind at the time of alleged crime. Appellant is entitled to the
+"benefits under section 84 of IPC, 1860.146. The accused killed three persons and"
+caused injuries to others and there was no previous enmity or motive established. The
+witnesses stated that he ran from one place to other and on his way he assaulted five
+persons indiscriminately without any rhyme or reason. The evidence shows that
+appellant had developed insanity since long and entitled to the benefit of this
+"section.147. Accused chopped off his wife's head, with a chopper. After the occurrence,"
+"in a very unusual and abnormal manner, holding the head and the chopper in each of"
+"his hands, he walked down the road and ultimately reached the police station. Though"
+"this, by itself, would not be sufficient to come to any conclusion but taken along with"
+the other circumstances of the case would clearly point to the validity of the defence
+put forward on behalf of the accused.148.
+"[s 84.7] Epilepsy, Epileptic fits and Section 84.—"
+"Epilepsy usually occurs from early infancy, though it may occur at any period of life."
+"Individuals, who have had epileptic fits for years, do not necessarily show any mental"
+"aberration, but quite a few of them suffer from mental deterioration. Religiosity is a"
+"marked feature in the commencement, but the feeling is only superficial. Such patients"
+"are peevish, impulsive and suspicious, and are easily provoked to anger on the slightest"
+cause. Epileptic psychosis is that which is associated with epileptic fits. This may
+"occur before or after the fits, or may replace them, and is known as pre- epileptic, post-"
+epileptic and masked or psychic phases (psychomotor epilepsy).149.
+Where the accused committed the murder without any motive under the influence of an
+"epileptic fits, he was entitled to get the benefit under section 84, IPC, 1860.150. But if at"
+"the time of the crime he was not acting under epileptic automatism, mere past history"
+of epilepsy will not absolve the accused from liability.151.
+[s 84.8] Irresistible impulse.—
+"Mere abnormality of mind or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive"
+behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under section 84 as the law contained
+in that section is still squarely based on the outdated M'Naughten Rules of 19th
+Century. The provisions of section 84 are in substance the same as those laid down in
+"the answers of the Judges to the questions put to them by the House of Lords, in"
+"M'Naughten's case. Behaviour, antecedent, attendant and subsequent to the event, may"
+"be relevant in finding the mental condition of the accused at the time of the event, but"
+not that remote in time.152.
+[s 84.9] Nervousness.—
+The fact that the accused became nervous after raping a six-year-old girl and in that
+"state of mind killed her, was held to be not sufficient to establish insanity. The Court"
+reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment and added that nervous psychosis
+may become in circumstances a kind of insanity.153.
+[s 84.10] Homicide by ' ganja ' smoker.—
+"In a case of ganja addict before the Supreme Court, the accused had killed his wife and"
+children ranging one –16 years with knife. Death sentence was confirmed by the High
+Court. The accused had not raised the defence of unsoundness in Courts below. The
+Supreme Court got the enquiry conducted by police after a plea was raised at the SLP
+stage. The enquiry report and evidence of family members and other witnesses
+revealed the addiction and on-going treatment. He was not allowed the benefit of
+section 84. The state of mind on the day of the incident is the crucial factor. The State
+of mind on other days is relevant only if such evidence would help determining the
+state of mind at the crucial moment.154.
+[s 84.11] Insane delusion.—
+The accused killed two women by cutting their necks with an axe without any reason.
+Evidence showed that he suffered from similar attacks of disorder earlier too. After the
+incident he was heard saying that he was haunted by a God to do what he did. The plea
+of insanity was accepted and the accused was directed to be kept in a mental
+hospital.155. The accused killed seven persons including his wife and two children with
+an axe. He also killed the cattle which came his way. There was no provocation. It was
+brutality simpliciter. The evidence on record showed that he was not of sound mind.
+The death sentence awarded to him was set aside. He was acquitted under the benefit
+"of this section.156. Mere abnormality or partial delusion, irresistible impulse or"
+compulsive behaviour of a psychopath affords no protection under section 84 of the
+Penal Code.157.
+[s 84.12] Paranoid schizophrenia.—
+"Paranoid schizophrenia, in the vast majority of cases, starts in the fourth decade and"
+develops insidiously. Suspiciousness is the characteristic symptom of the early stage.
+"Ideas of reference occur, which gradually develop into delusions of persecution."
+"Auditory hallucinations follow which in the beginning, start as sounds or noises in the"
+"ears, but afterwards change into abuses or insults.158. In paranoid schizophrenia, the"
+person affected lives in a state of constant fear being haunted by the belief that he is
+"being poisoned, some noxious gases are blown into his room and that all are plotting"
+against him to ruin him. The patient gets very irritated and excited owing to equally
+painful and disagreeable hallucinations and delusions.159. The accused was convicted
+for having murdered his wife in a brutal manner. He raised the plea of insanity. It came
+out from evidence that he was suffering from leprosy and insanity from sometime past.
+The medical opinion was that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia which is a
+form of paranoid psychosis. The plea was allowed. But he being not in a fit state of
+"mind to judge his own welfare or take care of himself without medical aid, the Court"
+directed him to be detained in safe custody under medical supervision and not to be
+released till medical evidence of social fitness.160. The evidence on record shows that
+"on the day of the incident, when the appellant was examined by doctors, he was found"
+to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. He had delusions and persecutory ideas
+"with no insight in his illness. From this, an inference can reasonably be drawn that the"
+accused was under paranoid delusions at the time that he committed the offence.161.
+[s 84.13] Burden of proof.—
+The Supreme Court defined the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of
+insanity in the following propositions:-
+"""(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had"
+committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving
+that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.
+"(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the appellant was not insane, when he"
+"committed the crime, in the sense laid down by section 84 of the IPC, 1860: the"
+"appellant may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence - oral,"
+"documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher"
+than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.
+(3) Even if the appellant was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane
+"at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the court by"
+the appellant or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of
+"the court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including"
+mens rea of the appellant and in that case the court would be entitled to acquit
+the appellant on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the
+"prosecution was not discharged"".162."
+"It has been held that merely because an injured witness, who may legitimately be"
+"classified as an interested witness for obvious reasons, may have stated that the"
+"appellant was not of unsound mind, cannot absolve the primary duty of the prosecution"
+to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubt explaining why the plea for
+unsoundness of mind taken by the accused was untenable.163.
+The burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the
+purview of section 84 lies upon the accused under section 105 of the Indian Evidence
+"Act. Under the said section, the Court shall presume the absence of such"
+circumstances.164. But the burden on the accused cannot be equivalent with the
+burden of proof on the prosecution and cannot be rated higher than the burden on a
+party to a civil proceeding where a finding can be based upon preponderance of
+probabilities. There is no conflict between the general burden which is always on the
+prosecution and which never shifts and the special burden which rests on the accused
+to make out the defence of insanity.165. Sometimes the facts may in themselves be
+sufficient to discharge the burden which lies on the accused. This possibility was
+recognised by the Supreme Court in Ratan Lal v State of MP.166. The accused-appellant
+was kept in police custody for ten days and only then it was felt that he needed medical
+examination. There was no evidence on record to show what his condition was during
+those ten days and why he was not examined earlier. This conduct on the part of the
+"police, neither to arrange his examination nor permit him to do so, brought about such"
+a gap of time between the incident and examination that his condition at the time of
+the incident was no longer capable of being precisely determined. As against this
+"police inaction, the defence pointed towards the conduct of the accused before the"
+incident and some statements of witnesses which supported the instable condition of
+the accused. This was held to be sufficient to discharge the burden which lies on the
+accused and his acquittal was upheld by the Supreme Court. Going by this case in
+"Tukappa Tamanna Lingardi v State of Maharashtra,167. the Bombay High Court found"
+evidence of insanity from a narration of the facts themselves. Mere oral statements of
+witnesses cannot give rise to an inference that the appellant was of unsound mind at
+the time of commission of offence. Plea of the accused does not come within
+"exception contemplated under section 84 of IPC, 1860.168. IPC, 1860"
+Where there was no satisfactory evidence of the previous history of the accused or his
+subsequent conduct and the only fact on record was that ghastly murders were
+"committed without motive, it was held that the burden of proof as to plea of insanity"
+"was not discharged. However, because of the absence of motive, premeditation and"
+"any weapon, killings being done with stone pieces, death sentence was converted into"
+"life imprisonment.169. Where, on the other hand, a father killed his son and then danced"
+"around, moving towards his house threatening others, facts spoke for themselves so"
+"as to discharge the burden of proof as to insanity, the accused was acquitted and"
+ordered to be detained in a mental home.170.
+"Mere eccentric behaviour, like drowning one's own two and a half-year-old child to"
+"death, does not discharge this burden which is essentially on the accused and requires"
+him to show all the ingredients of the defence to the extent at least of making them
+probable at the time of the commission of the act. Previous history and subsequent
+conduct are only relevant facts in the determination of the condition at the material
+time.171.
+The mere absence of motive is not sufficient to bring the case within the scope of
+section 84.172.
+[s 84.14] Sentencing.—
+"The accused was charged with offences under sections 427, 302, 307, 451, etc."
+Medical evidence showed that he was a person of unsound mind at the time when the
+"offences were committed. The accused, therefore, could not be detained in prison. He"
+was directed to be put in a mental hospital. The authorities were further directed to
+"follow the procedure prescribed by section 335, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr"
+"PC, 1973).173."
+[s 84.15] Sentencing.—Battered woman syndrome.—
+The accused woman pleaded guilty to manslaughter on an indictment for murder. She
+was a young woman aged 20. She began a sexual relationship with the deceased when
+she was 14 and began to live with him when she was 16. She had a miscarriage and on
+two occasions took overdoses. The deceased became violent towards her two or three
+times each week. She sought psychiatric help and on two occasions came to the
+attention of the police. In 1998 she decided to end the relationship and there was an
+argument which developed into a fight. She picked up a knife and waved it at the
+"deceased, telling him to leave. There was a further struggle during the course of which"
+the deceased received a fatal knife wound to his back. She immediately shouted for
+"help and was found in an extremely distressed condition. When she was examined, she"
+was found to be extensively bruised. A psychiatrist who examined her found that she
+"exhibited a number of features of the ""battered woman's syndrome"", including chronic"
+"depressive illness, a feeling of hopelessness and despair, and inability to act effectively"
+"or to see an escape from her situation, and feelings of self-blame, shame and a poor"
+sense of self-worth. A second psychiatrist found a degree of clinical depression which
+amounted to abnormality of mind. She was sentenced to four years' detention in a
+young offender institution. Her appeal against the sentence was allowed. In the light of
+"the evidence, the Court reached the conclusion that there were in the present case"
+those exceptional circumstances which would allow the Court to take the unusual
+course of passing a sentence other than custody. The accused woman had been
+subject from a young age to persistent and prolonged violence from a man older than
+herself who was domineering and demanding. Since her arrest she had made
+"remarkable progress, and a custodial sentence would be likely to damage and possibly"
+bring to an end that rehabilitation. She had served the equivalent of a sentence of 12
+months and it was appropriate to give her the opportunity to continue her progress. The
+Court accordingly quashed the sentence of four years' detention in a young offender
+institution and substituted a probation order.174.
+[s 84.16] CASES.—Defence not made out.—
+"Accused came to the house one day prior to the occurrence, demanded money and"
+"threatened the deceased of grave consequences and on the next day, when the"
+"demand was not fulfilled, he trespassed into the house, pushed away PWs 1 and 2,"
+bolted the door from inside and inflicted repeated aruval blows on the deceased that
+"resulted into her death. All these aspects also show that at the relevant time, he was"
+not insane as claimed by him.175. Accused committed murder of two persons
+andcaused injuries to another. Testimony of witnesses was found cogent and reliable
+and there was no material on the basis of which it could be inferred that at the time of
+commission of offence the accused was of unsound mind to such an extent that by
+"reason of such unsoundness, he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or"
+"knowing that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law, plea of insanity"
+rejected.176. Mere taking treatment earlier in Mental Hospital itself is not sufficient
+proof of total insanity of person.177.
+The accused killed his wife and daughter with an axe. He attended Kirtan (rendering of
+religious hymns) a night before. He carried the corpses in a hand-cart and made his
+statement before the police. His confessional statement was recorded by a competent
+judicial magistrate. He found no noticeable abnormality of mind or mental
+"disorderliness. Even on his examination under section 313, Cr PC, 1973, he showed a"
+soundness of mind. It was held that he was not entitled to the benefit of section 84.178.
+[s 84.17] When to be pleaded.—
+The plea cannot be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court for which no
+foundation was established before.179.
+[s 84.18] Investigation of offence vis-à-vis the general exceptions–
+The duty cast upon the investigating officer to investigate into the mental condition of
+"the accused is very important. The Supreme Court held that, where during the"
+"investigation previous history of insanity is revealed, it is the duty of an honest"
+investigator to subject the accused to a medical examination and place that evidence
+"before the Court and if this is not done, it creates a serious infirmity in the prosecution"
+case and the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused.180. The Division Bench of
+High Court of Kerala observed that even if all the acts constituting an offence as per
+"definition in IPC, 1860 are committed by a person, if an investigating officer finds on"
+"investigation that by reason of unsoundness of mind, accused was incapable of"
+"knowing the nature of the act, or that he was doing what is either wrong or contrary to"
+"law, as stated in Section 84 IPC, 1860, he shall not file a charge sheet against such"
+person.181. The Court also held that the investigating officer is bound to investigate
+"and confirm that despite what is contained in the ""General Exceptions"", acts committed"
+"by accused shall constitute offence under IPC, 1860.182. But the Single Bench of the"
+"High Court of Kerala, later, held that the ingredients of section 84 can only be taken as"
+a defence during trial and it is not possible to throw out the Final Report in a case on
+the ground that the concerned accused was suffering from legal insanity.183.
+[s 84.19] Procedure.—
+"Chapter XXV of Cr PC, 1973 deals with provisions as to accused persons of unsound"
+mind.184.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"90. State of Rajasthan v Shera Ram, (2012) 1 SCC 602 [LNIND 2011 SC 1192] : AIR 2012 SC 1"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 1192] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 406.
+"91. R v Daniel McNaughten, 1843 RR 59 : 8ER 718 (HL)."
+"92. Sudhakaran v State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582 [LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : AIR 2011 SC 265"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : 2011 Cr LJ 292 .
+"93. State of Maharashtra v Govind Mhatarba Shinde, 2010 Cr LJ 3586 (Bom)."
+"94. State of Orissa v Duleswar Barik, 2008 Cr LJ 1065 (Ori) relied on ShamaTudu v State, 1987 Cr"
+LJ 618 (Ori).
+"95. Dahyabhai, 1964 (2) Cr LJ 472 (SC); Lonimohon Das, 1974 Cr LJ 1186 (Gau); Gunadhar"
+"Mondal, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 178 (Cal); Kesheorao, 1979 Cr LJ 403 (Bom); Lala Sk., 1983 Cr LJ 1675"
+"(Cal); Balu Ganpat, 1983 Cr LJ 1769 (Bom); Paramal Raman v State of Kerala, 1992 Cr LJ 176 Ker;"
+"Bai Bamilaben v State of Gujarat, 1991 Cr LJ 2219 Guj; Shama Tudu v State, 1987 Cr LJ 618"
+"Orissa; Sheralli Walli Md v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 2443 : 1972 Cr LJ 1523 ; Qyami"
+"Ayatu v State of MP, AIR 1974 SC 216 [LNIND 1973 SC 242] : 1974 Cr LJ 305 . In Shama Tudu v"
+"State, 1987 Cr LJ 618 , the Orissa High Court cited the following cases in which the plea of"
+"insanity was accepted : Mitu Khadia v State of Orissa, 1983 Cr LJ 385 : 1983 Cut LR (Cr) 108;"
+"Khageshwar Pujari v State of Orissa, 1984 Cr LJ 1108 : 1984 (1) Ori LR 142 ; Sundar Bairagi v"
+"State, 1984 Cr LJ 124 ; Bata v State, 1985 (2) Ori LR 398 . The plea was negatived in the"
+"following cases; Nakul Chandra v State of Orissa, 1982 Cr LJ 2158 : (1982) 54 Cut LJ 195; Kusa"
+"Majhi v State, (1985) 59 Cut LT 203 : 1985 (1) Crimes 520 : 1985 Cr LJ 1460 : AIR 1985 SC 1409"
+"[LNIND 1985 SC 227] . State of MP v Digvijay Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1740 [LNIND 1978 SC 324] :"
+"1981 Cr LJ 1278 , prosecution case proved."
+"96. Siddhapal Kamala Yadav, AIR 2009 SC 97 [LNIND 2008 SC 1992] : (2009) 1 SCC 124 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 1992] ; Sanna Eranna, 1983 Cr LJ 619 (Kant); M Parvaiah, 1985 Cr LJ 1824 (AP);"
+"Kuttappan, 1986 Cr LJ 271 (Ker)."
+"97. State of Maharashtra v Govind Mhatarba Shinde, 2010 Cr LJ 3586 (Bom)."
+"98. State of Maharashtra v Govind Mhatarba Shinde, 2010 Cr LJ 3586 (Bom)."
+"99. Bhikari, AIR 1966 SC 1 [LNIND 1965 SC 57] . Absence of motive is one of the factors to be"
+"taken into account. Subbigadu v Emperor, AIR 1925 Mad 1238 [LNIND 1925 MAD 157] : 1926"
+"(27) Cr LJ 46 ; Ujagar Singh v State, AIR 1954 PEPSU 4 : 1953 Cr LJ 1859 . But this is only one"
+"factor among others. See Amrit Bhushan Gupta v UOI, AIR 1977 SC 608 [LNIND 1976 SC 458] :"
+"1977 Cr LJ 376 ; Ram Bharose v State of MP, 1974 Jab LJ 348 ; Peeru Singh v State of MP, 1987"
+Cr LJ 1781 MP.
+"100. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : JT 2007 (9) SC 110 :"
+2007 AIR (SCW) 3808 : 2007 (7) SCR 917 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : (2007) 8 Scale 455 [LNIND
+2007 SC 774] : (2007) 3 SCC (Cr) 509.
+"101. Kuttappan v State of Kerala, 1986 Cr LJ 271 (Ker)."
+"102. Siddhapal Kamala Yadav, AIR 2009 SC 97 [LNIND 2008 SC 1992] : (2009) 1 SCC 124"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1992] .
+"103. Surendra Mishra v State of Jharkhand, AIR 2011 SC 67 : (2011) 11 SCC 495 [LNIND 2011 SC"
+27] : (2011) 3 SCC(Cr.) 232.
+"104. Sudhakaran v State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582 [LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : AIR 2011 SC 265"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : 2011 Cr LJ 292 .
+"105. State of Maharashtra v Govind Mhatarba Shinde, 2010 Cr LJ 3586 (Bom)."
+106. Available at : http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/1-50/Report42.pdf (last accessed in July
+2019).
+"107. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : (2007) 3 SCC (Cr) 509 :"
+(2007) 4 KLT 63 [LNIND 1985 KER 300] .
+"108. Third question and answer in M'Naughton's case, (1843) 4 St Tr (NS) 847, 10 Cl & F 200;"
+"Tola Ram, (1927) 8 Lah 684. Jaganath Das v State, 1991 Cr LJ (NOC) 32 Cal."
+"109. Harka v State, (1906) 26 AWN 193. Hari Singh Gond v State of MP, (2008) 16 SCC 109"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1728] : AIR 2009 SC 31 [LNIND 2008 SC 1728] : 2009 Cr LJ 346 : (2008) 3 KLT
+"969 [LNIND 2008 SC 1728] , Mere abnormality of mind, partial delusion, irresistable impulse or"
+compulsive psychopathic behaviour affords no protection under section 84. It is only
+unsoundness of mind which naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of mind which can justify
+"exemption under section 84. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] ,"
+"time factor, time of the offence is crucial."
+"110. Sheralli Wali Mohammed v State of Maharashtra, (1973) 4 SCC 79 : 1972 Cr LJ 1523 ."
+"111. Govindaswami Padayachi, (1952) Mad 479; Ahmadullah, (1961) 3 SCR 583 [LNIND 1961 SC"
+"29] : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 43 : AIR 1961 SC 998 [LNIND 1961 SC 29] ; Dahyabhai, AIR 1964 SC 1563"
+"[LNIND 1964 SC 88] : 1964 (2) Cr LJ 472 ; followed in Narain v State, 1991 Cr LJ 1610 All, the"
+"accused murdering the Imam of a masjid, acquitted because of proven insanity. AG Bhagwat v"
+"UT Chandigarh, 1989 Cr LJ 214 P&H, no insanity at the time of attack."
+"112. Ajaya Mahakud v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 1201 (Ori)."
+"113. S Sunil Sandeep v State of Karnataka, 1993 Cr LJ 2554 (Kant)."
+"114. State of Punjab v Mohinder Singh, (1983) 2 SCC 274 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 402 : 1983 Cr LR (SC)"
+"187 . In a similar acquittal, the HP High Court ordered that the accused be confined to mental"
+"hospital so that he would pose no danger to public. Krishan Dutt v State of HP, 1992 Cr LJ 1065"
+HP.
+"115. SW Mohammed, 1972 Cr LJ 1523 : AIR 1972 SC 2443 ."
+"116. Oyami Ayatu, 1974 Cr LJ 305 : AIR 1974 SC 216 [LNIND 1973 SC 242] . See also Gunadhar"
+"Mondal, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 178 (Cal), Kesheorao 1979 Cr LJ 403 (Bom). Basanti v State, 1989 Cr LJ"
+"415 (Ori), woman jumped into well with her children, rescued, voluntarily explaining her conduct,"
+"no insanity. Parapuzha Thamban v State of Kerala, 1989 Cr LJ 1372 (Ker); Munilal Gupta v State,"
+"1988 Cr LJ 627 (Del); Meh Ram v State, 1994 Cr LJ 1897 (Raj)."
+"117. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : (2007) 3 SCC (Cr) 509 :"
+(2007) 4 KLT 63 [LNIND 1985 KER 300] .
+"118. Kader Hasyer Shah, (1896) 23 Cal 604 , 607; Kalicharan, (1947) Nag 226."
+"119. Gedka Goala, (1937) 16 Pat 333."
+"120. Stephen : History of the Criminal Law, vol II, p 166."
+"121. Raghu Pradhan v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 1159 (Ori)."
+"122. Brushabha Digal v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 3149 (Ori)."
+"123. Ashok Dattatraya v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 3450 (Bom)."
+"124. Amruta v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 1416 (Bom)."
+"125. Tola Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 8 (Raj). For a case of pretended insanity, see"
+"Nathu Bapu Mhaskar v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 2121 (Bom)."
+"126. Paras Ram v State of Punjab, (1981) 2 SCC 508 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 516. Gulab Manik Surwase v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 2001 Cr LJ 4302 (Bom) the conduct of assaulting his wife in broad day"
+"light within the sight of his relatives and leaving behind the blood stained axe on the spot, the"
+"Court said, was a sign of abnormalcy. The accused was given the benefit of doubt. Laxmandas"
+"Mangaldas Manikpuri v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 950 (Bom), no trace of insanity in the"
+conduct of the accused either before or after killing his wife. Defence under section 84 not
+available.
+"127. Marimuthu v State, 2009 Cr LJ 3633 (Mad)."
+"128. Fourth question and answer in M'Naughton's case (1843) 4 St Tr (NS) 847; Ghatu Pramanik,"
+(1901) 28 Cal 613 .
+"129. First question and answer in M'Naughton's case, sup. Durga Domar v State of MP, (2002) 10"
+"SCC 193 , the accused killed in ferocious manner 5 children belonging to his close relatives,"
+"Courts below sentenced him to death, he could not engage a counsel. In this state of things, the"
+judicial conscience of the Supreme Court compelled it to seek medical opinion regarding the
+mental condition of the accused.
+"130. Madesh v State by The Inspector of Police, 2014 Cr LJ 96 (Mad)."
+"131. M'Naughton's case, (1843) 4 St Tr (NS) 847, 10 Cl & F 200."
+"132. State of Maharashtra v Umesh Krishna Pawar, 1994 Cr LJ 774 (Bom)."
+"133. Kalicharan, (1947) Nag 226."
+"134. Ganesh Shrawan, (1969) 71 Bom LR 643 ."
+"135. SW Mohammed, 1972 Cr LJ 1523 : AIR 1972 SC 2443 . See also Mitu Khadia, 1983 Cr LJ"
+1385 (Ori).
+"136. In the matter of Lakshman, 1973 Cr LJ 110 (Mad)."
+"137. Prakash, 1985 Cr LJ 196 (Bom). Krishan Dutt v State of HP, 1992 Cr LJ 1065 (HP), medical"
+"evidence and manner of commission showed insanity, acquittal."
+"138. Velusamy, 1985 Cr LJ 981 (Mad)."
+"139. Baswant Rao, (1948) Nag 711."
+"140. Sukru Sa, 1973 Cr LJ 1323 (Ori); Kesheorao, 1979 Cr LJ 403 (Bom); Lala Sk, 1983 Cr LJ"
+"1675 (Cal); Rajan v State, 1984 Cr LJ 874 (Ker); Kusa Majhi, 1985 Cr LJ 1460 (Ori). Sudhir Ch"
+"Biswas v State, 1987 Cr LJ 863 Cal."
+"141. Siddheswari Bora, 1981 Cr LJ 1005 (Gau)."
+"142. State of Assam v Inush Ali, 1982 Cr LJ 1044 (Gau)."
+"143. Sita Ram v State, 2011 Cr LJ 1082 (All); Leena Balkrishna Nair v State of Maharashtra, 2010"
+Cr LJ 3292 (Bom).
+"144. Lakshman Dagdu, (1886) 10 Bom 512."
+"145. Nivrutti, 1985 Cr LJ 449 (Bom)."
+"146. Debeswar Bhuyan v State of Assam, 2012 Cr LJ 274 (Gau). See also Laxman Gagarai v State"
+"of Orissa, 2012 Cr LJ 44 (Ori)."
+"147. State of Orissa v Kalia Alias Debabrata Maharana, 2008 Cr LJ 3107 (Ori)."
+"148. Kuttappan v State of Kerala, 1986 Cr LJ 271 (Ker)."
+"149. State of Rajasthan v Shera Ram, (2012) 1 SCC 602 [LNIND 2011 SC 1192] : AIR 2012 SC 1"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 1192] : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 406 relied on Modi, Medical Jurisprudence and"
+"Toxicology, 24th Edn, 2011."
+"150. Satwant Singh, 1975 Cr LJ 1605 (P & H). R v Sullivan, (1983) 2 All ER 673 , epilepsy is a"
+"disease of the mind, but it is not that of madness, though the effect produced on the mind is the"
+same because it is difficult to convict a person who is himself a victim of psychomotor epilepsy.
+"151. State of MP v Ahamadulla, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 43 : AIR 1961 SC 998 [LNIND 1961 SC 29] ."
+"152. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : JT 2007 (9) SC 110 :"
+2007 AIR (SCW) 3808 : 2007 (7) SCR 917 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : (2007) 8 Scale 455 [LNIND
+"2007 SC 774] : (2007) 3 SCC(Cr) 509; Lok Bahadur Dahal v State of Sikkim, 2012 Cr LJ 4996 (Sik);"
+"Marimuthu v State, 2009 Cr LJ 3633 (Mad); Siddhapal Kamala Yadav, AIR 2009 SC 97 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 1992] : (2009) 1 SCC 124 [LNIND 2008 SC 1992] ; Ramadhin v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ"
+3708 (MP).
+"153. Riyasat v State of UP, 1993 Cr LJ 2834 (All)."
+"154. Jagdish v State of MP, (2009) 9 SCC 495 [LNINDORD 2009 SC 210] : (2010) 1 SCC(Cr) 21 :"
+AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 373.
+"155. Niman Sha v MP, 1996 Cr LJ 3395 (MP); Venugopalan Venu v Kerala, 1996 Cr LJ 3363 (Ker)."
+"Raval Mohanbhatt v State, 1998 Cr LJ 4325 (Guj)."
+"156. State of Jharkhand v Madras Nayak, 2003 Cr LJ NOC 197 : 2003 AIR Jhar HCR 653."
+"157. Siddhapal Kamala Yadav, AIR 2009 SC 97 [LNIND 2008 SC 1992] : (2009) 1 SCC 124"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1992] .
+"158. Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3399 [LNIND 2002 SC 606]"
+: (2002) 7 SCC 748 [LNIND 2002 SC 606] .
+"159. Debeswar Bhuyan v State of Assam, 2012 Cr LJ 274 (Gau)."
+"160. Jagannath Das v State, 1991 Cr LJ (NOC) 32 (Cal). SK Nair v State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC"
+"1537 [LNIND 1996 SC 1829] : 1997 Cr LJ 772 : (1997) 1 SCC 141 [LNIND 1996 SC 1829] , the"
+"plea of paranoid, facts established that he understood the implications of the acts at the time of"
+"the incident plea not sustainable. Ram Swarup Thakur v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 426 (Pat), the"
+"accused killed his own son of 3 years old for no reason. He was in mental hospital for two years,"
+not a normal man at the time. No evidence from prosecution as to his state of mind. Acquitted.
+"Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3399 [LNIND 2002 SC 606] :"
+"(2002) 7 SCC 748 [LNIND 2002 SC 606] , another case of paranoid schizophrenia, the accused"
+"killed his wife in day light, made no attempt to hide or run away, mental unsoundness before or"
+after occurrence was proved. The benefit of section 84 was granted. Also see Sudhakaran v
+"State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582 [LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : AIR 2011 SC 265 [LNIND 2010 SC"
+1046] : 2011 Cr LJ 292 .
+"161. Tikaram Krishnalal Pandey v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr LJ 2410 (Bom)."
+"162. Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 [LNIND 1964 SC 88] ;"
+"Sudhakaran v State of Kerala, (2010) 10 SCC 582 [LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : AIR 2011 SC 265"
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 1046] : 2011 Cr LJ 292 ; In State of H v Gian Chand, AIR 2001 SC 2075 [LNIND"
+2001 SC 1124] : (2001) 6 SCC 71 [LNIND 2001 SC 1124] : 2001 Cr LJ 2548 : (2001) 1 SCC(Cr)
+"980, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court Judgment by holding that the High Court"
+misapplied the Dahyabhai Judgment (Supra).
+"163. Devidas Loka Rathod v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2018 SC 3093 [LNIND 2018 SC 311] ."
+164. Gelsing Pida Pawar v State of Maharashtra. 2010 Cr LJ 4097 (Bom); Leena Balkrishna Nair v
+"State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 3292 (Bom); Sarat Chandra Sahoo v State of Orissa, 2010 Cr LJ"
+3084 (Ori)].
+"165. Shivraj Singh v State of MP, 1975 Cr LJ 1458 , the accused failed to make out his defence."
+"Similar observations occur in State v E Lemon, AIR 1970 Goa 1 : 1970 Cr LJ 36 ; Balagopal Re,"
+"1976 Cr LJ 1978 ; Dulal Nayak v State of WB, 1987 Cr LJ 1561 Cal, striking twice on head with"
+"the leg of cot, intention clear. Omkarlal v State of MP, 1987 Cr LJ 1289 MP. TN Lakshmaiah v"
+"State of Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 219 [LNIND 2001 SC 2360] , the Court has to examine the"
+accused's claim having regard to his entire conduct up to commencement of the proceedings
+before the trial Court. The accused murdered his wife and son and took the plea that he acted
+under a spell of insanity. He led no evidence to that effect. Also his conduct was that of a fully
+"conscious man. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] , explanation"
+"of the type of burden of proof which lies on the accused; Bihari Lal v State of HP, 2006 Cr LJ"
+"3832 HP, the accused has to prove his mental condition of insanity. He cannot draw any benefit"
+from adverse medical opinion.
+"166. Ratan Lal v State of MP, AIR 1971 SC 778 [LNIND 1970 SC 487] : 1971 Cr LJ 654 ."
+"167. Tukappa Tamanna Lingardi v State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 2375 (Bom)."
+"168. Kirtanram Mansai Uranv v State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 4658 (Chh)."
+"169. Bhan Singh v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1861 (MP)."
+"170. Elkari Shankari v State of AP, 1990 Cr LJ 97 AP. See also Uchhab Sahoo v State of Orissa,"
+"1989 Cr LJ 168 (Ori), evidence created a doubt that the accused might have been under a spell"
+of madness.
+"171. Narayan Chandra Dey v State, 1988 Cr LJ 387 (Cal). See also Santosh Kumar Sarkar v State,"
+1988 Cr LJ 1828 Cal.
+"172. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : (2007) 4 KLT 63 [LNIND"
+1985 KER 300] . There has to be absence of mens rea and not mere absence of motive.
+"173. Chandrashekar v State, 1998 Cr LJ 2237 (Kant). See also Raval Mohanbhai Laxmanbhai v"
+"State, 1998 Cr LJ 4325 ."
+"174. R v Feel (Taramary), (2000) 2 Cr App R (S) 464, [CA (Crim Div)]."
+"175. Mariappan vState of TN, 2013 Cr LJ 2334 (SC) : 2013 (6) Scale 18 ."
+"176. Turam Sundi v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 1872 (Jha); Madhusudan v State of"
+"Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 215 (Kar); C T Raveenran v State of Kerala, 2011 Cr LJ 14089 (Ker)."
+"177. Nand Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 3686 (Raj); Babasaheb Thombre v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 2935 (Bom)]."
+"178. Dhaneswar Pradhan v State of Assam, 2003 Cr LJ 733 (Gau)."
+"179. PSVLN Sastry v Advocate General HC of AP, (2007) 15 SCC 271 ."
+"180. Apu @ Gajraj Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND 2007 SC 774] : 2007 (3)"
+RCR (Criminal) 343.
+"181. Shibu v State of Kerala, 2013 (4) KLJ 300 : 2013 (4) KLT 323 [LNIND 2012 KER 968] (Ker"
+DB).
+182. Ibid.
+"183. Ashok Kumar R v State of Kerala, 2016 Cr LJ 4765 (Ker) : 2016 (4) KHC 232 ."
+184. Section 328-339.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 85] Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused
+against his will.
+"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by"
+"reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing"
+"what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the thing which intoxicated him"
+was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
+COMMENT.—
+Under this section a person will be exonerated from liability for doing an act while in a
+"state of intoxication if he at the time of doing it, by reason of intoxication, was"
+"(1) incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or"
+(2) that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law;
+Provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his
+knowledge or against his will.185.
+Voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for the commission of a crime.186. A person
+cannot become himself drunk with liquor and commit an offence and then come and
+"say that he had consumed the liquor and, therefore, the benefit of section 85 should be"
+given to him.187. The law pronounces that the obscuration and divestment of that
+judgment and human feeling which in a sober state would have prevented the accused
+"from offending, shall not, when produced by his voluntary act, screen him from"
+"punishment, although he be no longer capable of self-restraint.188. It is also no excuse"
+to say that because of it he failed to resist the impulse to act in a certain way189. or
+that because of it he acted like an automaton.190.
+[s 85.1] Voluntary drunkenness.—when an excuse.—
+Nevertheless voluntary drunkenness is a factor which has to be taken into
+"consideration at least in two types of cases, viz.,"
+(i) where a specific intent is an essential element of an offence charged and the
+evidence shows that the state of intoxication of the accused is such that he is
+incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime.191. In the
+"Indian context, for example, it would be intent to kill as in clauses 1, 2, and 3 of section"
+"300, IPC, 1860. In such cases, however, even if the accused fails to actually form the"
+"specific intent, section 86, IPC, 1860, would impute the necessary guilty knowledge to"
+"him and he would, therefore, be liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder"
+"though not of murder.192. Thus, voluntary intoxication amounting to prove incapacity to"
+form the required specific intent would be a limited excuse to reduce an offence of
+"murder (section 302) to one of culpable homicide not amounting murder (section 304,"
+"IPC, 1860). This is, however, a question of fact in each case."
+"In a case of wife-burning, her dying declaration disclosed that her husband consumed"
+"liquor, scolded her and then set her afire after pouring kerosene on her. She fought the"
+fire and tried to run away but the accused again caught hold of her and again poured oil
+and inflamed her. It was held that these circumstances showed that the mental
+faculties of the accused were not impaired to such an extent that he was prevented
+from forming the requisite intention to cause death. He was convicted under section
+"302 and not section 304, Part II.193."
+(ii) where habitual drunkenness has resulted in such a diseased condition of the mind
+that the accused is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what
+"is either wrong or contrary to law. In such a case M'Naughten Rules (section 84, IPC,"
+1860) would come into play and he would be absolved from liability.194. The most
+"common example of such an alcoholic disease is ""Delirium Tremens"" which is"
+produced by prolonged and habitual excessive drinking and results in loss of the
+"faculty of reasoning or serious defect of reasoning. In other words, ""insanity, whether"
+"produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged.""195."
+"Under this section if a man is made drunk through stratagem or the fraud of others, or"
+"through ignorance, or through any other means causing intoxication without the man's"
+"knowledge or against his will, he is excused.196."
+[s 85.2] CASE.—
+"The accused ravished a girl of 13 years of age and, in furtherance of the act of rape,"
+"placed his hand upon her mouth and his thumb upon her throat, thereby causing death"
+by suffocation. The sole defence was a plea of drunkenness. It was held that
+drunkenness was no defence unless it could be established that the accused at the
+time of committing rape was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent to
+"commit it (which was not alleged), inasmuch as the death resulted from a succession"
+"of acts, the rape and the act of violence causing suffocation, which could not be"
+regarded independently of each other; and that the accused was guilty of murder.197.
+Drink is an aggravating feature in the award of sentence. In reference to one of the
+accused persons there was no evidence to establish that the effect of intoxication was
+"such as to cause him to lack the specific intent for murder, particularly in view of the"
+"fact that, on his own admission, he was following instructions given by the other"
+accused and he was able to give the police a lucid account of his actions. The degree
+of intoxication fell far below that which would preclude the formation of specific intent
+required for murder.198.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"185. Bablu v State of Rajasthan, (2006) 13 SCC 116 [LNIND 2006 SC 1134] : AIR 2007 SC 697"
+"[LNIND 2006 SC 1134] : 2007 Cr LJ 1160 , the Court stated three propositions as to the scope of"
+the section:
+(i) the insanity whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise is a defence to the crime
+charged;
+(ii) evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific
+intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into account with the other facts
+proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent; and
+(iii) the evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form
+the intent necessary to constitute the crime and merely establishing that his mind is
+"affected by drink so that he more readily gave to some violent passion, does not rebut"
+the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts.
+"186. Chet Ram vState, 1971 Cr LJ 1246 ; (HP) Bodhee Khan, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 79; Boodh Dass,"
+(1866) PR No. 41 of 1866.
+"187. Venkappa Kannappa Chowdari v State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 15 (Kar)."
+"188. Mobeni Minji, 1982 Cr LJ NOC 39 (Gau)."
+"189. Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard, (1920) AC 479 ; AG for Northern Ireland v Gallagher"
+(1963) AC 349 .
+"190. Brathy v AG for Northern Ireland, (1963) AC 386 ."
+"191. Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard, (1920) AC 479 ; Ramsingh, (1938) Nag 305;"
+"Samman Singh, (1941) 24 Lah 39; DPP v Majewski (1976) 2 All ER 142 ; Shankar Jaiswara v State"
+"of WB, (2007) 9 SCC 360 [LNIND 2007 SC 651] : (2007) 3 SCC Cr 553, the appellant abused the"
+"victim in a filthy language, and when told to leave, stabbed him seven times to his death with a"
+"sharp weapon, so many wounds shows no loss of self control, witnesses did not testify to the"
+"degree of intoxication, in such circumstances it could not be said that there was no intention on"
+the part of the appellant or that he was out of his senses on account of intoxication.
+"192. Mathai Mathew, 1952 Cr LJ 1304 (TC); Basdev v State of PEPSU, 1956 Cr LJ 919 (2) : AIR"
+"1956 SC 488 [LNIND 1956 SC 34] ; see also R. Deb, Principles of Criminology, Criminal Law and"
+"Investigation, 2nd Edn, vol II, pp 604-605."
+"193. Mavari Surya Satyanaraina v State of AP, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 689 ."
+"194. Davis (1881) 14 Cox cc 563; AG for Northern Ireland v Gallagher; DPP v Board, Supra."
+"195. Basdev, 1956 Cr LJ 919 (at p 922-SC)."
+196. 1 Hale PC 32.
+"197. Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard, (1920) AC 479 ."
+"198. Sooklal v Trinidad and Tobago, (1999) 1 WLR 2011 , [Lord Hope of Craighead, PC]."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 86] Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one
+who is intoxicated.
+In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge
+"or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt"
+with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been
+"intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without"
+his knowledge or against his will.
+COMMENT.—
+"Offence requiring particular intent or knowledge.—By reading the above section, it is"
+clear that in the first part of the section the words 'intention or knowledge' are
+"mentioned, but in the latter part of the section the word 'knowledge' is only mentioned"
+"and the word 'intention' is omitted. In case of voluntary drunkenness, knowledge is to"
+be presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness. If really the
+Parliament wanted the word 'intention' also to be presumed even in the case of an act
+"done in a drunken state of mind, the said word could have been mentioned in the"
+"Second part also, but the same is omitted. Therefore, whether the accused was having"
+intention or not while committing an act cannot be presumed as in case of
+knowledge.199. As certain guilty knowledge or intention forms part of the definition of
+"many offences, this section is provided to meet those cases. It says that a person"
+voluntarily intoxicated will be deemed to have the same knowledge as he would have
+had if he had not been intoxicated. There may be cases in which a particular knowledge
+"is an ingredient, and there may be other cases in which a particular intent is an"
+"ingredient, the two not being necessarily always identical. The section does not say"
+that the accused shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same intention as
+"might have been presumed if he had not been intoxicated. Therefore, although there is"
+"a presumption so far as knowledge is concerned, there is no such presumption with"
+"regard to intention.200. Thus, this section attributes to a drunken man the knowledge of"
+a sober man when judging of his action but does not give him the same intention. This
+knowledge is the result of a legal fiction and constructive intention cannot invariably be
+raised.201. Drunkenness makes no difference to the knowledge with which a man is
+"credited and if a man knew what the natural consequences of his acts were, he must"
+be presumed to have intended to cause them.202. But this presumption may be
+"rebutted by his showing that at the time he did the act, his mind was so affected by the"
+drink he had taken that he was incapable of forming the intention requisite for making
+his act the offence charged against him.203.
+So far as knowledge is concerned the Court must attribute to the intoxicated man the
+"same knowledge as if he was quite sober but so far as intent or intention is concerned,"
+the Court must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying
+due regard to the degree of intoxication. If the man was beside his mind altogether for
+"the time being, it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. In other"
+"words, where a man goes so deep into drinking that he becomes really incapable of"
+"forming the requisite specific intent or knowledge for the offence, then in such a case"
+too section 86 of the Code would impute the requisite knowledge to the accused
+"though not the requisite intention. Thus, where the accused in a state of extreme"
+intoxication caused a fatal injury in the abdomen of his friend but by virtue of his highly
+intoxicated state of mind was incapable of knowing then as to what he was doing far
+"less forming the requisite intent to kill as envisaged in section 300, IPC, 1860, he could"
+not be convicted under section 302 as he did not have the requisite intent to kill but he
+"could still be convicted under section 304 Part II, IPC, 1860, by virtue of imputed"
+"knowledge under section 86, IPC, 1860.204. In this connection see also the discussion"
+"under sub-head ""voluntary drunkenness: when an excuse"" under section 85, ante. But if"
+he had not gone so deep in drinking and from the facts it could be found that he knew
+what he was about the Court will apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the
+natural consequences of his act or acts.205.
+[s 86.1] CASES.—
+Accused husband beating his wife and throwing burning lamp on her under influence of
+liquor. Since he himself consumed the liquor he is not entitled to claim benefit under
+"section 86 of IPC, 1860.206. Act of the accused of walking a distance to the house of a"
+witness and concealing the weapon and his wearing apparels showed that he was
+conscious and capable of understanding of his act. No evidence as regards the degree
+of intoxication or any evidence of any attending general circumstances to arrive at a
+conclusion that accused was beside his mind altogether temporarily at time
+"incident.207. On the basis of evidence in this case, it cannot be said that the accused"
+was so much intoxicated at the time of the incident that he was beside his mind
+"altogether for the time being. He did set his wife on fire, but as soon as her sari started"
+burning he realised the folly of his act and started extinguishing the fire. It shows that
+"he was not so much intoxicated that he was besides his mind altogether. Therefore, the"
+rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act can be
+"applied to him also. Conviction under section 302 IPC, 1860 altered to one under"
+"section 304(1) IPC, 1860.208."
+[s 86.2] Sections 85 and 86.—
+The reading of sections 85 and 86 together makes it clear that section 86 is an
+exception to section 85. These provisions show that if the intoxication is induced
+"voluntarily, the act done is an offence even if the person is incapable of knowing the"
+nature of the act or that what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. This section
+obviously covers all offences. That is why; it appears that it became necessary to enact
+section 86 to take care of offences requiring a particular intent or knowledge on the
+part of the intoxicated offender. The section takes care of such offences and states
+"that if intoxication is involuntary, neither knowledge nor intention in committing the"
+"offence will be presumed. If however, it is voluntary only knowledge of the offence on"
+the part of the offender will be presumed but not intention in committing it. What
+section 86 means and no more as compared to section 85. The degree of intoxication
+"demanded by both sections, however, remains the same. In fact, it is instructive to note"
+that section 84 which exempts persons of unsoundness of mind also expects the
+"degree of unsoundness to the same extent, viz., incapability of knowing the nature of"
+the act or of the knowledge that what is being done either wrong or contrary to law.
+"Hence, the conclusion is inescapable that to avail of the exception under section 86,"
+the degree of intoxication of the offender must be such that he is incapable of knowing
+the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
+Intoxication short of this degree will not entitle the offender to the benefit of the
+exception.209.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"199. Mavari Surya Satyanaraina v State of AP, 1995 Cr LJ 689 (AP)."
+"200. Dil Mohammad, (1941) 21 Pat 250; Basdev v State of PEPSU, 1956 Cr LJ 919 (2) : AIR 1956"
+SC 488 [LNIND 1956 SC 34] .
+"201. Pal Singh, (1917) PR No. 28 of 1917."
+"202. Judagi Malah, (1929) 8 Pat 911."
+"203. Samman Singh, (1941) 24 Lah 39."
+"204. Enrique F Rio v State, 1975 Cr LJ 1337 (Goa)."
+"205. Basdev v State of Pepsu, (1956) SCR 363 [LNIND 1956 SC 34] : AIR 1956 SC 488 [LNIND"
+1956 SC 34] .
+"206. Gautam Bhila Ahire v State of Maharashtra,. 2010 Cr LJ 4073 (Bom); Pidika Janu v State of"
+"Orissa, 1989 Cr LJ (NOC) 104 ,"
+"207. Shankar Jaiswara v State of WB, (2007) 9 SCC 360 [LNIND 2007 SC 651] : (2007) 3 SCC"
+(Cr) 553.
+"208. Babu Sadashiv Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 1984 Cr LJ 739 (Bom)."
+"209. State of Maharashtra v Ashok Yashwant, 1987 Cr LJ 1416 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 87] Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous
+"hurt, done by consent."
+"Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is not"
+"known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason"
+"of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person,"
+"above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to"
+suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be
+likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A and Z agrees to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the
+"consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be"
+"caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence."
+COMMENT.—
+Consent.—This section protects a person who causes injury to another person above
+18 years of age who has given his consent by doing an act not intended and not known
+to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt. It appears to proceed upon the maxim
+volenti non fit injuria. He who consents suffers no injury. This rule is founded upon two
+very simple propositions: (1) that every person is the best judge of his own interest and
+(2) that no man will consent to what he thinks hurtful to himself. Every man is free to
+"inflict any suffering or damage he chooses on his own person and property; and if,"
+"instead of doing this himself, he consents to its being done by another, the doer"
+"commits no offence. A man may give away his property, and so another who takes it by"
+his permission does not commit theft. He may inflict self-torture or he may consent to
+suffer torture at the hands of another.
+"The section does not permit a man to give his consent to anything intended, or known"
+to be likely to cause his own death or grievous hurt.
+[s 87.1] Sado-masochistic desires.—
+"In the absence of a good reason, the victim's consent is no defence and the"
+satisfaction of sado-masochistic desires does not constitute such a good reason. A
+group of sado-masochistics participated in consensual acts of violence against each
+other for sexual gratification. They were charged with various offences. They were
+convicted for causing harm to one member. It is not in public interest that a person
+should wound or cause actual bodily harm to another for no good reason and without
+such a reason the victim's consent afforded no defence.210.
+[s 87.2] Injection of heroin on request resulting in death.—
+The accused appealed against a sentence of five years' imprisonment for
+"manslaughter. The deceased, visited him, at his flat. He had previously drunk a"
+significant quantity of alcohol. He took some heroin and demanded more. At his
+"request the accused injected him with more heroin, resulting in his death. The accused"
+contended that weight should have been given to his admission of responsibility and
+"his guilty plea, the fact that the deceased had insisted upon more heroin, that there was"
+no commercial motive involved in the supply and that he had co-operated in naming the
+supplier of the heroin.
+It was held that it was necessary to take into consideration accused's co-operation in
+naming the supplier of the heroin and other mitigating factors. The sentence for
+manslaughter was reduced to three years' imprisonment and the sentence for
+"supplying a Class A drug, from three years' imprisonment to two years.211."
+"Sections 87 and 88 of the IPC, 1860 do not come into play in the cases where interest"
+of the Society is involved.212.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"210. R v Laskey, (1993) 2 WLR 556 (HL)."
+"211. R v Powell (Jason Wayne), (2002) EWCA Crim 661 : (2002) 2 Cr App R (S) 117, [CA (Crim"
+Div)].
+"212. Deepa v SI of Police, 1985 Cr LJ 1120 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+"[s 88] Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for"
+person's benefit.
+"Nothing which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm"
+"which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be"
+"likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has"
+"given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of"
+that harm.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who"
+"suffers under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z's death and intending in"
+"good faith, Z's benefit performs that operation on Z, with Z's consent. A has committed"
+no offence.
+COMMENT.—
+The preceding section allows any harm to be inflicted short of death or grievous hurt.
+This section sanctions the infliction of any harm if it is for the benefit of the person to
+whom it is caused. No consent can justify an intentional causing of death. But a person
+"for whose benefit a thing is done may consent that another shall do that thing, even if"
+death may probably ensue. If a person gives his free and intelligent consent to take the
+"risk of an operation which, in a large proportion of cases, has proved fatal, the surgeon"
+who operates cannot be punished even if death ensues.213. Again; if a person attacked
+"by a wild beast should call out to his friends to fire, though with imminent hazard to"
+"himself, and they were to obey the call, we do not conceive that it would be expedient"
+"to punish them, though they might by firing cause his death, and though when they fired"
+they knew themselves to be likely to cause his death.214.
+This section differs from the last section in two particulars—(1) under it any harm
+except death may be inflicted; (2) the age of the person consenting is not mentioned
+(but see section 90 under which the age of the consenting party must at least be 12
+years).
+Persons not qualified as medical practitioners cannot claim the benefit of this section
+as they can hardly be deemed to act in 'good faith' as that expression is defined in
+section 52.215.
+[s 88.1] Criminal liability on doctor or surgeon.—
+Prosecution has to come out with a case of high degree of negligence on part of
+"doctor. Thus, when a patient agrees to go for medical treatment or surgical operation,"
+every careless act of the medical man cannot be termed as 'criminal.' It can be termed
+'criminal' only when the medical man exhibits a gross lack of competence or inaction
+and wanton indifference to his patient's safety and which is found to have arisen from
+gross ignorance or gross negligence. Where a patient's death results merely from error
+"of judgment or an accident, no criminal liability should be attached to it. Mere"
+inadvertence or some degree of want of adequate care and caution might create civil
+liability but would not suffice to hold him criminally liable.216. Even if the surgery was
+"done without the consent of the patient or his/her guardian, if it is for the benefit of the"
+patient he is not liable. Section 98 deals with harm caused with the consent of the
+person injured or someone competent under law to give such consent on his behalf
+excludes causing of such harm from the category of offence. Here the complainant has
+"given her consent. Section 88 IPC, 1860 provides that harm done for the benefit of the"
+person injured and with his consent will not make the person causing harm liable for
+criminal offence.217.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"213. RP Dhanda (Dr.) v Bhurelal, 1987 Cr LJ 1316 MP, eye-operation for cataract by qualified"
+doctor with patient's consent resulting in loss of sight.
+214. The Works of Lord Macaulay-On the Chapter of General Exceptions Note B.
+"215. Juggankhan, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 296 (MP)."
+"216. Suresh Gupta v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2004 SC 4091 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] : (2004) 6"
+"SCC 422 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] ; Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC 3180 [LNIND 2005"
+SC 587] : 2005 (6) SCC 1 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] .
+"217. Dr. Gopinatha Pillai T M v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ 3682 (Ker); Katcherla Venkata Sunil v"
+"Vanguri Seshumamba, 2008 Cr LJ 853 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+"[s 89] Act done in good faith for benefit of child or insane person, by or by"
+consent of guardian.
+Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of
+"age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian"
+"or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any"
+"harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause or be known by the doer"
+to be likely to cause to that person:
+Provided—
+Provisos.
+"First.—That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or"
+to the attempting to cause death;
+Secondly.—That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the
+"person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the"
+"preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or"
+infirmity; Thirdly.—That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of
+"grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the"
+"purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous"
+disease or infirmity;
+"Fourthly.—That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to"
+the committing of which offence it would not extend.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, in good faith, for his child's benefit without his child's consent, has his child cut"
+for the stone by a surgeon. Knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the
+"child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is within the exception,"
+inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child.
+COMMENT.—
+This section empowers the guardian of an infant under 12 years or an insane person to
+"consent to the infliction of harm to the infant or the insane person, provided it is done"
+in good faith and is done for his benefit. Persons above 12 years are considered to be
+"capable of giving consent under section 88. The consent of the guardian of a sufferer,"
+"who is an infant or who is of unsound mind, shall have the same effect which the"
+"consent of the sufferer himself would have, if the sufferer were of ripe age and sound"
+mind.
+[s 89.1] Corporal punishment to children.—
+"Corporal punishment to child, in present days, is not recognized by law. It is an archaic"
+"notion that to maintain discipline, child can be punished physically by the teaching staff"
+because of implied consent by the parents or guardian. Now it is recognized social
+principle that even parents of the child are made to understand the basic human rights
+"of the child and instead of corporal punishment, correctional methods are recognized"
+"in law.218. But the applicability of sections 88 and 89, IPC, 1860 and administering of"
+"corporal punishments on students by the teachers for their benefit, came up for"
+consideration in M Natesan v State of Madras.219. It was a case where a boy of 15 years
+was sent with the progress report to get the signature of his parents in it. But he
+"returned it with a thumb impression of another person, stating that the said thumb"
+"impression was that of his mother, which was proved to be wrong. The teacher got"
+"agitated and he beat the boy on his right palm with a stick. He did not cry. He, therefore,"
+"beat him again, asking him why he did not cry. This resulted in causing three injuries,"
+two superficial and one contusion. The Madras High Court held that:
+It cannot be denied that having regard to the peculiar position of a school teacher he must
+in the nature of things have authority to enforce discipline and correct a pupil put in his
+charge. To deny that authority would amount to a denial of all that is desirable and
+"necessary for the welfare, discipline and education of the pupil concerned. It can therefore"
+"be assumed that when a parent entrusted a child to a teacher, he on his behalf impliedly"
+"consents for the teacher to exercise over the pupil such authority. Of course, the person of"
+the pupil is certainly protected by the penal provisions of the Indian Penal Code. But the
+same code has recognised exceptions in the form of ss. 88 and 89. Where a teacher
+exceeds the authority and inflicts such harm to the pupil as may be considered to be
+"unreasonable and immoderate, he would naturally lose the benefit of the exceptions."
+Whether he is entitled to the benefit of the exceptions or not in a given case will depend
+"upon the particular nature, extent and severity of the punishment inflicted."
+"220.In K A Abdul Vahid v State of Kerala,221. the Kerala High Court considered the"
+"question when a school teacher, beats a student with a cane, who created commotion"
+"in the school or showed disobedience to the Rules, whether he could be proceeded"
+"against under the provisions of the IPC, 1860 and found that the teacher has acted"
+"within the exception conferred on him, under section 88 of IPC, 1860."
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"218. Hasmukhbhai Gokaldas Shah v State of Gujarat, 2009 Cr LJ 2919 (Guj)."
+"219. M Natesan v State of Madras, AIR 1962 Madras 216 [LNIND 1961 MAD 136] : 1962 (1) Cr"
+LJ 727 .
+"220. Also see Ganesh Chandra Saha v. Jiw Raj Somani, AIR 1965 Calcutta 32 : (1965 (1) Cr LJ"
+24) .
+"221. K A Abdul Vahid v State of Kerala, 2004 Cr LJ 2054 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 90] Consent known to be given under fear or misconception.
+"A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the"
+"consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, 1"
+"and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was"
+given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or
+Consent of insane person.
+"if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or"
+"intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which"
+he gives his consent; or
+Consent of child.
+"unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person"
+who is under twelve years of age.
+COMMENT.—
+This section does not define 'consent' but describes what not consent is.
+This section says that consent is not a true consent if it is given—
+(1) by a person under fear of injury; and the person obtaining the consent knows or
+has reason to believe this.
+(2) by a person under a misconception of fact;
+(3) by a person of unsound mind; and who is unable to understand the nature
+(4) by a person who is intoxicated; and consequence of that to which he gives his
+consent.
+(5) by a person under 12 years of age
+"Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in"
+"balance, the good and evil on each side.222. Consent means an active will in the mind"
+"of a person to permit the doing of the act complained of, and knowledge of what is to"
+"be done, or of the nature of the act that is being done, is essential to consent to an"
+act.223. An act of helplessness on the face of inevitable compulsions is not consent in
+law.224. It requires voluntary participation by victim not only after exercise of
+"intelligence based on knowledge of significance and moral quality of act, but after"
+having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent.225. A mere act of
+"helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, non-resistance and passive"
+giving in cannot be deemed to be consent.226. The Supreme Court in a long line of
+cases has given wider meaning to the word 'consent' in the context of sexual offences
+as explained in various judicial dictionaries. In Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law
+"(Second Edn), vol (1) 1977 at p 422 the word 'consent' has been explained as an act of"
+"reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good or"
+evil on either side. It is further stated that consent supposes three things–a physical
+"power, a mental power, and a free and serious use of them and if consent be obtained"
+"by intimidation, force, meditated imposition, circumvention, surprise, or undue"
+"influence, it is to be treated as a delusion, and not as a deliberate and free act of the"
+mind.227. Section 90 cannot be considered as an exhaustive definition of consent for
+"the purposes of IPC, 1860. The normal connotation and concept of consent is not"
+intended to be excluded.228. For determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix
+"was voluntary or under a misconception of fact, no straitjacket formula can be laid"
+down.229.
+The factors set out in the first part are from the point of view of the victim. The second
+part enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused. It
+envisages that the accused too has the knowledge or reason to believe that the
+consent was given by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or misconception of
+fact. The requirements of both the parts have to be cumulatively satisfied.230.
+Submission of the body under the fear of terror cannot be construed as a consented
+sexual act. Consent for the purpose of section 375 requires voluntary participation not
+only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and
+moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance
+"and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful"
+study of all relevant circumstances.231. Consent can be obtained under various
+methods and always necessarily need not be a one which is given voluntarily. For
+"example, if a victim is intoxicated without her knowledge or consent and if the rape is"
+"committed while the victim was intoxicated or drunken, it cannot be said that she had"
+"voluntarily given the consent. Therefore, such passive consent cannot be treated as a"
+"consent as contemplated by section 90 of IPC, 1860.232. Obtaining consent by"
+exercising deceit cannot be legitimate defence to exculpate an accused.233.
+[s 90.1] Submission to Rape.—
+An act of submission does not involve consent- Consent cannot be equated to inability
+"to resist or helplessness.234. Every consent involves a submission, but every"
+submission is not consent and the mere fact that a woman had submitted to the
+promise of the accused does not necessarily indicate that her consent existed unless
+"the evidence on record establishes that the sexual act, which the prosecutrix had"
+"allowed, was accompanied with deliberation after the mind had weighed, as in a"
+"balance, the good and the evil on each side with the existing capacity and power to"
+"withdraw the assent according to one's will or pleasure.235. Where, the accused had"
+sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by giving false assurance to her that he would
+"marry her and when she became pregnant, he refused to do so, it was evident that he"
+never intended to marry her and procured her consent only for the reason of having
+"sexual relations with her, therefore, the act of the accused fell squarely under the"
+definition of rape as her consent was obtained under a misconception of fact.236.
+"1. 'Misconception of fact'.—The expression ""under a misconception of fact"" is broad"
+enough to include all cases where the consent is obtained by misrepresentation; the
+misrepresentation should be regarded as leading to a misconception of the facts with
+reference to which the consent is given. In section 3 of the Evidence Act Illustration (d)
+"states that a person has a certain intention is treated as a fact. So, here the fact about"
+which the second and third prosecution witnesses were made to entertain a
+misconception was the fact that the second accused intended to get the girl married...
+"""thus... if the consent of the person from whose possession the girl is taken is obtained"
+"by fraud, the taking is deemed to be against the will of such a person…"" Although in"
+cases of contracts a consent obtained by coercion or fraud is only voidable by the party
+"affected by it, the effect of section 90 IPC, 1860 is that such consent cannot, under the"
+"criminal law, be availed of to justify what would otherwise be an offence.237. Consent"
+"may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit."
+"Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a"
+"balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and"
+"consensual sex and in a case like this, the Court must very carefully examine whether"
+"the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had"
+"made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the"
+ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
+"promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the Court must examine whether there"
+"was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether"
+"the consent involved was given after wholly, understanding the nature and"
+consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees
+"to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not"
+"solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an"
+"accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were"
+"beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so."
+Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if
+"the Court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and"
+that he had clandestine motives.238. In order to come within the meaning of
+"misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance. If a fully grown-up"
+girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues
+"to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant, it is an act of promiscuity on her"
+part and not an act induced by misconception of fact and it was held that section 90
+"IPC, 1860 cannot be invoked unless the Court can be assured that from the inception"
+"the accused never intended to marry her. Therefore, it depends on case to case that"
+what is the evidence led in the matter. If it is a fully grown-up girl who gave the consent
+then it is a different case but a girl whose age is very tender and she is giving a consent
+after persuasion of three months on the promise that the accused will marry her which
+he never intended to fulfil right from the beginning which is apparent from the conduct
+"of the accused, in our opinion, section 90 can be invoked.239. A promise to marry"
+"without anything more will not give rise to ""misconception of fact"" within the meaning"
+"of section 90, it needs to be clarified that a representation deliberately made by the"
+accused with a view to elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or
+"inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is established that at"
+"the very inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the"
+"intention of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax,"
+the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to
+exculpate him from the ambit of section 375 clause second.240.
+[s 90.2] CASES.—
+The prosecutrix had sexual intercourse with the accused on the representation made
+by the accused that he would marry her. This was a false promise held out by the
+"accused. Had this promise not been given perhaps, she would not have permitted the"
+"accused to have sexual intercourse. It appears that the intention of the accused was,"
+"right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till"
+she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to
+be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused
+"intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him.241. In"
+"Uday v State of Karnataka,242. the Court considered the following facts: (i) where a girl"
+was of 19 years of age and had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance
+and moral quality of the act she was consenting to; (ii) she was conscious of the fact
+that her marriage was difficult on account of caste considerations; (iii) it was difficult to
+"impute to the appellant, knowledge that the prosecutrix had consented in consequence"
+of a misconception of the fact arising from his promise; and (iv) there was no evidence
+to prove conclusively that the appellant never intended to marry the prosecutrix. On the
+"basis of the above factors, Court held that it did not feel persuaded to hold that consent"
+was obtained by misconception of facts on the part of the victim.
+"In a case, the prosecutrix had left her home voluntarily, of her own free will to get"
+"married to the accused. She was 19 years of age at the relevant time and was, hence,"
+capable of understanding the complications and issues surrounding her marriage to
+"the appellant. According to the version of events provided by her, the prosecutrix had"
+"called the accused on a number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her"
+"at the place that had been pre-decided by them. She also waited for him for a long time,"
+and when he finally arrived she went with him to the Karna Lake where they indulged in
+sexual intercourse. She did not raise any objection at this stage and made no
+"complaints to anyone. Thereafter, she also went to Kurukshetra with the accused,"
+"where she lived with his relatives. Here to, the prosecutrix voluntarily became intimate"
+"with the accused. She then, for some reason, went to live in the hostel at Kurukshetra"
+"University illegally, and once again came into contact with the accused at the Birla"
+"Mandir. Thereafter, she even proceeded with the accused to the old bus-stand in"
+"Kurukshetra, to leave for Ambala so that the two of them could get married. However,"
+they were apprehended by the police. If the prosecutrix was in fact going to Ambala to
+"marry the accused, as stands fully established from the evidence on record, the"
+"Supreme Court held it fails to understand on what basis the allegation of ""false"
+"promise of marriage"" has been raised by the prosecutrix.243."
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"222. Story, section 222."
+"223. Lock, (1872) LR 2 CCR 10, 11."
+"224. Satpal Singh v State of Haryana, 2010 AIR (SCW) 4951 : (2010) 8 SCC 714 [LNIND 2010 SC"
+666] : 2010 Cr LJ 4283 .
+"225. Md. Jakir Ali v The State of Assam, 2007 Cr LJ 1615 (Gau)."
+"226. Re, ( AIR 1960 Madras 308 ), Gopi Shanker v State of Rajasthan, ( AIR 1967 Rajasthan 159 ),"
+"Bhimrao v State of Maharashtra, ( 1975 Mah. LJ 660 ) and Vijayan Pillai v State of Kerala, (1989"
+"(2) KLJ 234) quoted from R v Day, (173 ER 1026) in 1841 approved in Pradeep Kumar v State of"
+"Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] : (2007) 7 SCC 413 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] : 2007"
+Cr LJ 4333 : (2007) 3 SCC(Cr) 407.
+"227. State of UP v Chhoteylal, AIR 2011 SC 697 [LNIND 2011 SC 73] : (2011) 2 SCC 550 [LNIND"
+"2011 SC 73] in this case, SC elaborately discussed the meaning of consent and quoted from"
+various Indian and foreign authorities.
+"228. Pradeep Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] : (2007) 7 SCC 413"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 965] : 2007 Cr LJ 4333 : (2007) 3 SCC(Cr) 407.
+229. Uday v State of Karnataka AIR 2003 SC 1639 [LNIND 2003 SC 228] : (2003) 4 SCC 46
+[LNIND 2003 SC 228] : 2003 SCC (Cr) 775.
+"230. Deelip Singh v State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 [LNIND 2004 SC 1123] : AIR 2005 SC 203"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1123] .
+"231. State of HP v Mango Ram, (2000 (7) SCC 224 [LNIND 2000 SC 1144] : 2000 Cr LJ 4027"
+(SC).
+"232. KCPeter v State of Kerala, 2011 Cr LJ 3488 (Ker)."
+"233. Karthi @ Karthick v State, 2013 Cr LJ 3765 (SC)."
+"234. Laddoo Singh Alias Harjit Singh v State of Punjab, 2008 Cr LJ 2885 (PH)."
+"235. Bipul Medhi v State of Assam, 2008 Cr LJ 1099 (Gau)."
+"236. State of UP v Naushad, 2014 Cr LJ 540 ."
+"237. Pradeep Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] : (2007) 7 SCC 413"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 965] : 2007 Cr LJ 4333 : (2007) 3 SCC(Cr) 407 relied on N Jaladu, Re ( ILR"
+(1913) 36 Madras 453 .
+"238. Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] : 2013 (7) Scale"
+383 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] .
+"239. Jayanti Rani Panda v State of WB, 1984 Cr LJ 1535 (Cal)."
+"240. Pradeep Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] : (2007) 7 SCC 413"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 965] : 2007 Cr LJ 4333 : (2007) 3 SCC(Cr) 407 relied on N Jaladu, Re ( ILR"
+(1913) 36 Madras 453 ).
+"241. Yedla Srinivasa Rao v State of AP, (2006) 11 SCC 615 [LNIND 2006 SC 785] : (2007) 1"
+"SCC(Cr) 557; Bipul Medhi v State of Assam, 2008 Cr LJ 1099 (Gau); Abhoy Pradhan v State of WB,"
+1999 Cr LJ 3534 (Cal).
+"242. Uday v State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639 [LNIND 2003 SC 228] : (2003) 4 SCC 46"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 228] : 2003 SCC (Cr) 775.
+"243. Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] : 2013 (7) Scale"
+"383 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] . See also Swapan Chatterjee v State of WB, 2009 Cr LJ 16 (Cal); Karthi"
+"@ Karthick v State, 2013 Cr LJ 3765 (SC); Ravi v State, 2010 Cr LJ 3493 (Mad); Vinod Mangilal v"
+"State of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 1204 (MP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 91] Exclusion of acts which are offences independently of harm caused.
+"The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences"
+"independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be"
+"known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the"
+consent is given.
+ILLUSTRATION
+Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of
+the woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended
+"to cause to the woman. Therefore, it is not an offence ""by reason of such harm""; and"
+the consent of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does
+not justify the act.
+COMMENT.—
+"The section serves as a corollary to sections 87, 88 and 89. It says in explicit terms that"
+consent will only condone the act causing harm to the person giving the consent which
+will otherwise be an offence. Acts which are offences independently of any harm which
+"they may cause will not be covered by consent given under sections 87, 88 and 89, e.g.,"
+"causing miscarriage, public nuisance, offences against public safety, morals, etc. It"
+may be stated here that the illustration given under this section has become somewhat
+inappropriate as pregnancy can now be terminated under section 3 of Medical
+"Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, on a number of grounds and not only on the"
+ground of saving the life of the woman.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 92] Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent.
+Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose
+"benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent, if the"
+"circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if"
+"that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in"
+lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing
+to be done with benefit: Provided—
+Provisos.
+"First.—That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or"
+the attempting to cause death;
+Secondly.—That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the
+"person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the"
+"preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or"
+infirmity;
+"Thirdly.—That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or"
+"to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of"
+death or hurt;
+"Fourthly.—That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to"
+the committing of which offence it would not extend.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z"
+"requires to be trepanned. A, not intending Z's death, but in good faith, for Z's"
+"benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for"
+himself. A has committed no offence.
+(b) Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the
+"shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z's"
+benefit. A's ball gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
+"(c) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal"
+unless an operation be immediately performed. There is no time to apply to
+the child's guardian. A performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of
+"the child, intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. A has committed no"
+offence.
+"(d) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a"
+"blanket. A drops the child from the house-top, knowing it to be likely that the"
+"fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and intending, in"
+"good faith, the child's benefit. Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A"
+has committed no offence.
+Explanation.—Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of
+"sections 88, 89 and 92."
+COMMENT.—
+Acts done in good faith.—This section is designed to meet those cases which do not
+"come either under section 88 or under section 89. The principal object of sections 88,"
+89 and 92 is protection of medical practitioners. Illustrations (a) and (b) exemplify
+"cases in which it is impossible to give consent; illustrations (c) and (d), where legal"
+capacity to consent is wanting.
+The author of the Code observes:
+There yet remains a kindred class of cases which are by no means of rare occurrence. For
+"example, a person falls down in an apoplectic fit. Bleeding alone can save him, and he is"
+unable to signify his consent to be bled. The surgeon who bleeds him commits an act falling
+"under the definition of an offence. The surgeon is not the patient's guardian, and has no"
+"authority from any such guardian, yet it is evident that the surgeon ought not to be"
+"punished. Again, a house is on fire. A person snatches up a child too young to understand"
+"the danger, and flings it from the house-top, with a faint hope that it may be caught on a"
+"blanket below, but with the knowledge that it is highly probable that it will be dashed to"
+"pieces. Here, though the child may be killed by the fall though the person who threw it down"
+"knew that it would very probably be killed, and though he was not the child's parent or"
+"guardian, he ought not to be punished."
+In these examples there is what may be called a temporary guardianship justified by the
+exigency of the case and by the humanity of the motive. This temporary guardianship bears
+a considerable analogy to that temporary magistracy with which the law invests every
+"person who is present when a great crime is committed, or when the public peace is"
+"concerned. To acts done in the exercise of this temporary guardianship, we extend by"
+clause 72 a protection very similar to that which we have given to the acts of regular
+guardians.244.
+"This section speaks of 'hurt', whereas section 89 speaks of 'grievous hurt', otherwise"
+the terminology of both the sections is almost identical.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"244. The Works of Lord Macaulay- 'On the Chapter of General Exceptions', Note B."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 93] Communication made in good faith.
+No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm1 to the
+"person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live."
+"The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he"
+knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient's death.
+COMMENT.—
+This section protects the innocent without unduly cloaking the guilty.
+The communication under this section must be
+(1) made in good faith; and
+(2) for the benefit of the person to whom it is made.
+"The illustration to this section does not say, however, whether the communication was"
+made to the patient for his benefit.
+1. 'Harm'.—In this section 'harm' means an injurious mental reaction.245.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"245. Veeda Menezes v Yusuf Khan, 1966 Cr LJ 1489 : AIR 1966 SC 1773 [LNIND 1966 SC 107] :"
+68 Bom LR 629.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 94] Act to which a person is compelled by threats.
+"Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an"
+"offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the"
+"time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person"
+will otherwise be the consequence : Provided the person doing the act did not of his
+"own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant"
+"death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint."
+"Explanation 1.—A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being"
+"beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit"
+"of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do"
+anything that is an offence by law.
+"Explanation 2.—A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant"
+"death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take"
+"his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is"
+entitled to the benefit of this exception.
+COMMENT.—
+"By this section a person is excused from the consequences of any act, except (1)"
+"murder and (2) offences against the State punishable with death, done under fear of"
+instant death; but fear of hurt or even of grievous hurt is not a sufficient justification.
+Mere menace of future death will not be sufficient.
+Murder committed under a threat of instant death is not excused under this section.
+But 'murder' does not include abetment of murder and such abetment will be
+excused.246. Abetment of murder and of the offence of causing disappearance of the
+evidence of murder was excused under this section when it was done under fear of
+instant death at the hands of the murderers.247.
+[s 94.1] Doctrine of compulsion and necessity.—
+No one can plead the excuse of necessity or compulsion as a defence of an act
+"otherwise penal, except as provided in this section. No man from a fear of"
+consequences to himself has a right to make himself a party to committing mischief
+on mankind.248.
+"Except where unsoundness of mind is proved or real fear of instant death is proved, the"
+"burden of proof being on the prisoner, pressure of temptation is not an excuse for"
+breaking the law.249. Under the English law the defence of duress is available not only
+in case of fear of instant death but also in case of serious bodily harm.250.
+"Furthermore, such a threat need not be always against the person of the accused.251."
+This defence was not allowed to a person who voluntarily joined a criminal
+organisation or gang with knowledge that the gang used loaded firearms to carry out
+robberies on sub-post offices and also that the leader of the gang might bring pressure
+upon him to participate in such offences. He had accordingly to participate in a robbery
+under pressure in which the leader shot dead the sub-post master. His appeal against
+conviction for man slaughter was rejected.252.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"246. Umadasi Dasi, (1924) 52 Cal 112 : Karu, (1937) Nag 524. But see R v Howe, (1987) 1 All ER"
+"770 HL, where it was noted that the defence of duress is not available to a person charged with"
+murder whether as a principal in the first degree (the actual killer) or as principal in the second
+degree (the aider and abettor).
+"247. Bachchan Lal, 1957 Cr LJ 344 ."
+"248. Maganlal and Motilal, (1889) 14 Bom 115."
+"249. Devji Govindji, (1895) 20 Bom 215, 222, 223."
+"250. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch, (1975) 1 All ER 913 -Per House"
+of Lords.
+251. Hurley (1967) VR 526.
+"252. R v Sharp, (1987) 3 All ER 103 CA. Following Lynch v DPP for Northern Ireland, (1975) 1 All"
+ER 913 : (1975) AC 653 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+[s 95] Act causing slight harm.
+"Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it"
+"is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of"
+ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
+COMMENT.—
+slight harm or trifles.—The maxim de minimis non curat lex (the law takes no account
+of trifles) is the foundation of this section. The authors of the Code observe:
+"Clause 73 [this section] is intended to provide for those cases which, though, from the"
+"imperfections of language, fall within the letter of the penal law, are yet not within its spirit,"
+"and are all over the world considered by the public, and for the most part dealt with by the"
+"tribunals, as innocent. As our definitions are framed, it is theft to dip a pen in another man's"
+"ink, mischief to crumble one of his wafers, an assault to cover him with a cloud of dust by"
+"riding past him, hurt to incommode him by pressing against him in getting into a carriage."
+"There are innumerable acts without performing which men cannot live together in society,"
+"acts which all men constantly do and suffer in turn, and which it is desirable that they"
+"should do and suffer in turn, yet which differ only in degree from crimes. That these acts"
+"ought not to be treated as crimes is evident, and we think it far better expressly to except"
+them from the penal clauses of the Code than to leave it to the judges to except them in
+practice.253.
+The expression 'harm' has been used in this section in a wide sense including physical
+"injury and hence, this section applies in cases of actual physical injury also. This"
+section applies not only to acts which are accidental but also to deliberate acts which
+cause harm or are intended to cause harm or known to be likely to cause harm.254. In a
+"campaign by Sarvodaya workers to educate people about the evil of alcohol, liquor"
+shops were picketed to prevent people from going there even if it was at the cost of
+slight harm; their prosecution under section 341 for causing wrongful restraint was
+quashed.255. Where the accused locked the complainant inside the factory by pulling
+"down the shutter, it was held that ingredients of the offence under section 342"
+(wrongful confinement) were established but as the complainant regained his freedom
+"within a very short time and only a minimal harm was caused, the case was clearly"
+covered by section 95.256.
+[s 95.1] CASES.—Acts regarded as trivial.—
+"This section was applied where a person was convicted for taking pods, almost"
+"valueless, from a tree standing on Government waste land;257. where the accused"
+committed theft of a cheque of no value258. and where the plaintiff complained of the
+harm caused to his reputation by the imputation that he was travelling with a wrong
+ticket.259. So also an offence of misbranding260. and the conduct of a lawyer in using
+filthy language in course of cross-examination261. were treated as trivial.
+"Where the record of the trial Court showed that the injury caused was very simple,"
+"being in the nature of a scratch, the Court said that the act was so trivial that no person"
+of a sound common sense would regard it as an offence. The prayer of the
+complainant for conviction of the accused for causing simple hurt under section 323
+was liable to be rejected.262.
+[s 95.2] Acts not regarded as trivial.—
+"The top most official of the State Police, indecently behaved with a senior lady IAS"
+"Officer, in the presence of gentry and in spite of her raising objections continued with"
+"such behaviour. The Supreme Court observed that if it is held, on the face of such"
+"allegations that, the ignominy and trauma to which, she was subjected to was so slight"
+"that the lady IAS Officer, as a person of ordinary sense and temper, would not complain"
+"about the same, sagacity will be the first casualty. In that view of the matter section 95,"
+"IPC, 1860 cannot have any manner of application to an offence relating to modesty of"
+woman as under no circumstances can it be trivial.263. Where the Accused caused the
+"deceased to fall down and co-accused threw down a heavy stone on head of deceased,"
+act attributed to accused formed part of a joint yet a murderous assault on deceased.
+"Hence, it is not covered by exception in section 95.264. Where a blow was given across"
+the chest with an umbrella by a dismissed policeman to a District Superintendent of
+Police because his application to reconsider his case was rejected;265. where the
+accused tore up a paper which showed a money debt due from him to the prosecutor
+"though it was unstamped, and therefore, not a legal security;266. and where a"
+"respectable man was taken by the ear,267. it was held that this section did not apply. An"
+"offence under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 cannot be regarded as"
+trivial.268.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"253. The Works of Lord Macaulay- 'On the Chapter of General Exceptions', Note B, pp. 109, 110."
+"254. Veeda Menezes v Yusuf Khan, 1966 Cr LJ 1489 : AIR 1966 SC 1773 [LNIND 1966 SC 107] :"
+68 Bom LR 629.
+"255. Narayanan v State of Kerala, 1987 Cr LJ 741 Ker; following Attappa Re, AIR 1951 Mad 759"
+"[LNIND 1950 MAD 178] : 1951 (2) Cr LJ 716 , where it was observed that even if obstruction is"
+"caused, if the harm caused is slight, section 95 would apply."
+"256. Anoop Krishan Sharma v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 1861 (Bom)."
+"257. Kasyabin Ravji, (1868) 5 BHC (Cr C) 35."
+"258. Ethirajan, 1955 Cr LJ 816 ."
+"259. South Indian Railway Co v Ramakrishna, (1889) 13 Mad 34."
+"260. Public Prosecutor v K Satyanarayana, 1975 Cr LJ 1127 (AP)."
+"261. Bheema, 1964 (2) Cr LJ 692 (AP)."
+"262. State of Karnataka v M Babu, 2002 Cr LJ 2604 (Kant), the Court discussed the doctrine of"
+triviality.
+"263. Rupan Deol Bajaj v Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] : (1995) 6"
+SCC 194 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] : JT 1995 (7) SC 299 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] : (1995) 5 Scale 670 :
+1996 Cr LJ 381 .
+264. Athai v State of MP 2010 Cr LJ 995 (MP).
+"265. Sheo Gholam Lalla, (1875) 24 WR (Cr) 67."
+"266. Ramasami v State, (1888) 12 Mad 148."
+"267. Shoshi Bhusan Mukerjee v Walmsley, (1897) 1 CWN."
+"268. Dist Food Inspector v Kedarnath, 1981 Cr LJ 904 (Gau).; State of Kerala v Vasudevan Nair"
+(Ker) (FB) 1975 FAJ 36 : ( 1975 Cr LJ 97 ); M/s. Razak Rice And Oil Mills v Bharat Narayan
+"Patnaik, Food Inspector, Berhampur Municipality 1989 Cr LJ 648 (Ori)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 96] Things done in private defence.
+Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.
+COMMENT.—
+In a civilised society the defence of person and property of every member thereof is the
+"responsibility of the State. Consequently, there is a duty cast on every person faced"
+with apprehension of imminent danger of his person or property to seek the aid of the
+"machinery provided by the State but if immediately such aid is not available, he has the"
+right of private defence. Right to private defence is a very valuable right and it has been
+recognized in all civilized and democratic societies within certain reasonable limits.
+"Sections 96–106 of IPC, 1860 codify the entire law relating to right of private defence"
+of person and property including the extent of and the limitation to exercise of such
+"right. When enacting sections 96 to 106 of the IPC, 1860, excepting from its penal"
+"provisions, certain classes of acts, done in good faith for the purpose of repelling"
+"unlawful aggressions, the Legislature clearly intended to arouse and encourage the"
+"manly spirit of self-defence amongst the citizens, when faced with grave danger.269."
+[s 96.1] Principle.—
+The basic principle underlying the doctrine of the right of private defence is that when
+an individual or his property is faced with a danger and immediate aid from the State
+"machinery is not readily available, that individual is entitled to protect himself and his"
+property.270. The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly
+confronted with the necessity of averting an impending danger not of self-creation.
+"That being so, the necessary corollary is that the violence which the citizen defending"
+himself or his property is entitled to use must not be unduly disproportionate to the
+injury which is sought to be averted or which is reasonably apprehended and should
+not exceed its legitimate purpose. The law does not require a law abiding citizen to
+behave like a coward when confronted with an imminent unlawful aggression. There is
+nothing more degrading to the human spirit than to run away in face of danger. The
+"right of private defence is thus, designed to serve a social purpose and deserves to be"
+"fostered within the prescribed limits. The IPC, 1860 defines homicide in self-defence as"
+"a form of substantive right, and therefore, save and except the restrictions imposed on"
+"the right of the Code itself, it seems that the special rule of English Law as to the duty"
+of retreating will have no application to this country where there is a real need for
+defending oneself against deadly assaults. The right to protect one's own person and
+property against the unlawful aggressions of others is a right inherent in man. The duty
+of protecting the person and property of others is a duty which man owes to society of
+"which he is a member and the preservation of which is both his interest and duty. It is,"
+"indeed, a duty which flows from human sympathy."
+As Bentham said:
+"It is a noble movement of the heart, that indignation which kindles at the sight of the feeble"
+injured by the strong. It is noble movement which makes us forget our danger at the first cry
+of distress..... It concerns the public safety that every honest man should consider himself
+as the natural protector of every other.
+But such protection must not be extended beyond the necessities of the case;
+"otherwise it will encourage a spirit or lawlessness and disorder. The right has,"
+"therefore, been restricted to offences against the human body and those relating to"
+aggression on property. Right of private defence of person and property is recognized
+"in all free, civilised, democratic societies within certain reasonable limits. Those limits"
+are dictated by two considerations: (1) that the same right is claimed by all other
+members of the society and (2) that it is the State which generally undertakes the
+"responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The citizens, as a general rule, are"
+neither expected to run away for safety when faced with grave and imminent danger to
+"their person or property as a result of unlawful aggression, nor are they expected, by"
+"use of force, to right the wrong done to them or to punish the wrong doer of"
+commission of offences.271.
+[s 96.2] Scope.—
+"Section 96 IPC, 1860 provides that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise"
+"of the right of private defence. The section does not define the expression ""right of"
+"private defence"". It merely indicates that nothing is an offence which is done in the"
+"exercise of such right.272. While providing for exercise of the right, care has been taken"
+"in IPC, 1860 not to provide and has not devised a mechanism whereby an attack may"
+be a pretence for killing. A right to defend does not include a right to launch an
+"offensive, particularly when the need to defend no longer survived.273. Just because"
+"one circumstance exists amongst the various factors, which appears to favour the"
+"person claiming right of self-defence, does not mean that he gets the right to cause the"
+death of the other person. Even the right of self-defence has to be exercised directly in
+proportion to the extent of aggression.274.
+[s 96.3] Test.—
+"Whether in a particular set of circumstances, a person legitimately acted in the"
+exercise of the right of private defence is a question of fact to be determined on the
+facts and circumstances of each case. No test in the abstract for determining such a
+"question can be laid down. In determining this question of fact, the Court must"
+consider all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to
+plead in so many words that he acted in self-defence. If the circumstances show that
+"the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to the Court to"
+consider such a plea.275. The means and the force a threatened person adopts at the
+spur of the moment to ward off the danger and to save himself or his property cannot
+be weighed in golden scales. It is neither possible nor prudent to lay down abstract
+parameters which can be applied to determine as to whether the means and force
+adopted by the threatened person was proper or not. Answer to such a question
+depends upon host of factors like the prevailing circumstances at the spot; his feelings
+at the relevant time; the confusion and the excitement depending on the nature of
+"assault on him etc. Nonetheless, the exercise of the right of private defence can never"
+be vindictive or malicious. It would be repugnant to the very concept of private
+defence.276. A person who is apprehending death or bodily injury cannot weigh in
+"golden scales in the spur of moment and in the heat of circumstances, the number of"
+injuries required to disarm the assailants who were armed with weapons. In moments
+of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium it is often difficult to expect the parties
+to preserve composure and use exactly only so much force in retaliation
+commensurate with the danger apprehended to him where assault is imminent by use
+"of force, it would be lawful to repel the force in self-defence and the right of private"
+"defence commences, as soon as the threat becomes so imminent. Such situations"
+have to be pragmatically viewed and not with high powered spectacles or microscopes
+"to detect slight or even marginal overstepping. Due weightage has to be given to, and"
+hyper technical approach has to be avoided in considering what happens on the spur of
+"the moment on the spot and keeping in view normal human reaction and conduct,"
+"where self-preservation is the paramount consideration. But, if the fact situation shows"
+"that in the guise of self-preservation, what really has been done is to assault the"
+"original aggressor, even after the cause of reasonable apprehension has disappeared,"
+the plea of right of private defence can legitimately be negatived. The Court dealing
+with the plea has to weigh the material to conclude whether the plea is acceptable. It is
+"essentially, as noted above, a finding of fact.277. Situations have to be judged from the"
+subjective point of view of the accused concerned in the surrounding excitement and
+"confusion of the moment, confronted with a situation of peril and not by any"
+microscopic and pedantic scrutiny. In adjudging the question as to whether more force
+than was necessary was used in the prevailing circumstances on the spot it would be
+"inappropriate, as held by this Court, to adopt tests by detached objectivity which would"
+"be so natural in a Court room, or that which would seem absolutely necessary to a"
+perfectly cool bystander. The person facing a reasonable apprehension of threat to
+himself cannot be expected to modulate his defence step-by-step with any arithmetical
+exactitude of only that much which is required in the thinking of a man in ordinary
+times or under normal circumstances.278.
+"Mere use of abusive language does not give rise to private defence. Thus, where the"
+deceased about a month before the murder had tried to outrage the modesty of the
+wife of the accused and thereafter on the day of the incident cut a rustic joke enquiring
+whether the accused had not kept buffaloes for drinking milk which lead the accused
+"to beat the deceased mercilessly resulting in his death, it was held that giving the most"
+charitable interpretation one could not find a single circumstance which will give the
+accused the benefit of the right of private defence and the interval between the attempt
+to outrage the modesty of the accused's wife and the murder being too long he was
+also not entitled to get the benefit of grave and sudden provocation within the meaning
+"of exception 1 to section 300, IPC, 1860.279. Giving a general view of all the provisions"
+"on this right in Munney Khan v State,280. the Supreme Court observed:"
+"The right of private defence is codified in sections 96 to 106, IPC, which have all to be"
+read together in order to have a proper grasp of the scope and limitations of this right.
+By enacting the sections the authors of the Code wanted to except from the operation
+of its penal clauses acts done in good faith for the purpose of repelling unlawful
+aggression.281.
+Summary of Principles regarding Private defence
+(i) Self-preservation is the basic human instinct and is duly recognized by the
+"criminal jurisprudence of all civilized countries. All free, democratic and civilized"
+countries recognize the right of private defence within certain reasonable limits.
+(ii) The right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted
+with the necessity of averting an impending danger and not of self-creation.
+(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of self-defence into
+"operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be an actual"
+commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence. It
+is enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence is contemplated
+and it is likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.
+(iv) The right of private defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension
+arises and it is co-terminus with the duration of such apprehension.
+(v) It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to modulate his defence step by
+step with any arithmetical exactitude.
+(vi) In private defence the force used by the accused ought not to be wholly
+disproportionate or much greater than necessary for protection of the person or
+property.
+"(vii) It is well settled that even if the accused does not plead self-defence, it is open"
+to consider such a plea if the same arises from the material on record.
+(viii) The accused need not prove the existence of the right of private defence
+beyond reasonable doubt.
+"(ix) The IPC, 1860 confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or"
+wrongful act is an offence.
+(x) A person who is in imminent and reasonable danger of losing his life or limb
+may in exercise of self-defence inflict any harm even extending to death on his
+assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened.
+[Darshan Singh v State of Punjab.282.]
+All the sections would have to be read together to ascertain whether in the facts and
+circumstances of the case the accused were entitled to the defence or they exceeded
+it. Only then one can get a comprehensive view of the scope and limitations of the
+right.283.
+1. Availability or Non-availability of private defence.—Factors to be kept in view.— In
+"order to find whether right of private defence is available or not, the entire incident"
+must be examined with care and viewed in its proper setting. The injuries received by
+"the accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries caused by the accused"
+and the circumstances whether the accused had time to have recourse to public
+authorities are all relevant factors to be considered on a plea of private defence.284.
+The right of private defence is a defence right. It is neither a right of aggression nor a
+right of reprisal. There is no right of private defence where there is no apprehension of
+danger. Right of private defence is available only to one who is suddenly confronted
+with the necessity of averting an impending danger not of self-creation. The necessity
+must be a present necessity whether real or only apparent.285. It remains a question of
+"fact whether the right has been legitimately exercised.286. Thus, running to house,"
+fetching a sword and assaulting the deceased are by no means a matter of chance.
+These acts bear stamp of a design to kill and take the case out of the purview of
+private defence.287. But where the accused was dispossessed of his land by a party of
+men and he ran to his residence from where he fetched his gun and came back within
+"15 minutes to fire at and injure them, he was held to be within his rights, but when he"
+went further still and chased and injured a person who was just standing by there and
+"who died, in reference to him the accused had no right of private defence.288. Along"
+with the above factors one has also to remember the following limitations on the right
+of private defence of person or property:
+"(i) that if there is sufficient time for recourse to public authorities, the right are not"
+available;
+(ii) that more harm than that is necessary should not be caused;
+(iii) that there must be a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt or hurt
+to the person or damage to the property concerned.289. Where on account of
+"some incident, the accused was confronted by three persons; it was held that"
+the superiority in numbers in itself could in all probability have been construed
+"by the accused as an imminent danger to himself thus, giving him the signal to"
+act in exercise of the right of private defence.290.
+The need to act must not have been created by the conduct of the accused in the
+immediate context of the incident which was likely or intended to give rise to that
+need.291. The Supreme Court reiterated the various principles governing the law of
+private defence and observed that it was essentially a defensive right and did not
+"include the right to launch an offensive attack, particularly when the need for defence"
+no longer existed.292. A right of private defence given by the Penal Code is essentially
+one of defence or self-protection and not a right of reprisal or punishment. It is subject
+to the restrictions indicated in section 99 which are as important as the right itself.293.
+[s 96.4] CASES.—Plea of Private Defence rejected.—
+"After inflicting injuries on person of first deceased, accused persons ran towards"
+"second deceased, who was standing ten steps away from place of incident. Further"
+"after seeing incident relating to death of first deceased, second deceased started"
+running towards Durga-ki-Dhani and was chased by accused persons and they inflicted
+lathi blows on his person. Accused had no right to invoke right of self-defence by
+chasing second deceased and to cause fatal injuries upon him.294. Where the accused
+were in fact the aggressors and being members of the aggressors party none of the
+accused can claim right of self-defence.295. Merely because there was a quarrel and
+"some of the accused person sustained injuries, that does not confer a right of private"
+defence extending to the extent of causing death. It has to be established that the
+accused person were under such grave apprehension about the safety of their life and
+property that retaliation to the extent done was absolutely necessary. Right of private
+defence has been rightly discarded.296.
+"The defence claimed that the place of occurrence was the house of the accused and,"
+"therefore, they had acted in self-defence but that was not proved through any leading"
+"evidence despite the examination of the accused under section 313 of the Cr PC, 1973,"
+it was held that the right of self-defence was not available to them.297.
+[s 96.5] Social nature of defence.—
+The right of private defence is not restricted to the particular person who is under
+attack. It extends to the society as a whole. It is available to any member of the society
+who rises to the occasion. But it is wholly a social obligation without any legal
+overtones.298.
+[s 96.6] Material that accused may rely on.—
+An accused entitled to rely for constructing his private defence on the material on
+"record brought by the prosecution.299. Without formally taking a plea of self-defence,"
+the accused has a right to probabilise such defence on the basis of the prosecution
+"evidence and if he succeeds in his effort, the Court can give him such a benefit.300."
+"2. Duty to retreat, if any.—It is now well settled that the rule of retreat which Common"
+"Law Courts espoused is not relevant under the IPC, 1860. If a man's property is in"
+imminent danger of being impaired or attacked he has the right to resort to such
+measures as would be reasonably necessary to thwart the attempt to protect his
+property.301. Under the common law the doctrine of necessity permitted one to defend
+one's person or property or the person or property of others against an unjustified
+"attack by the use of reasonable force. In determining what was reasonable force, which"
+"in the Indian context means minimum force under section 99, IPC, 1860, the common"
+law Courts always insisted if the accused could prevent the commission of crime
+against him by retreating. On this rule of retreat one would like to ask: if a person is
+"attacked by an armed burglar in his own room, he is expected to run away leaving the"
+"burglar to act as he liked.302. In Jaidev's case303. Gajendragadkar, J, as he then was,"
+specifically held that in India there is no rule which expects a man first to run away or at
+least try to do so before he can exercise his right of private defence. Rather he has
+every right to stand his own ground and defend himself if there is no time to have
+recourse to official help. Law does not expect a citizen to be a rank coward or leave his
+own house at the mercy of the burglar.304. In spite of this clear exposition of the law in
+"Jaidev's case Sarkaria, J, held in Yogendra Morarji's case305. that one must first try to"
+avoid the attack by retreating otherwise one would not be entitled to get the benefit of
+private defence. It appears that Jaidev's case was not canvassed before the learned
+judges who decided the latter case. It is submitted with utmost respect that the former
+"view as held in Jaidev's case, appears to be more reasonable and has to be preferred."
+3. No Private defence in a free fight.—Where both sides can be convicted for their
+"individual acts, normally no right of private defence is available to either party and they"
+will be guilty of their respective acts.306. Where two parties come armed with
+determination to measure their strength and to settle a dispute by force and in the
+"ensuing fight both sides receive injuries, no question of right of private defence arises."
+In such a case of free fight both parties are aggressors and none of them can claim
+right of private defence.307. In a free fight between two groups resulting in the death of
+"one and injuries to several others both grievous and simple, all the accused"
+participated in the fight. The plea of one of the accused that he joined the fight later
+and acted in defence of other co-accused was held to be not tenable. The Court
+observed that his case could not be separated by giving him right of private defence
+under the benefit of doubt.308. In a sudden fight between two groups in heat of passion
+death of a man was caused and several others on both the sides were injured. The
+deceased opened the assault first. It was held that in such fights the question that
+which party opened attack first is immaterial. Plea of right of self-defence was not
+allowed to the accused.309. Where two groups forming an unlawful assembly over the
+"possession of land in dispute which was in peaceful possession of neither group,"
+"indulged in free fight resulting in the death of two persons of a group, it was held that"
+right of private defence was not available to either group.310.
+The right to voluntary causing of death or any other harm is available against the
+assailant and not against any other person.311.
+4. Injury to accused.—If makes out private defence.—Number of injuries on the
+accused by itself may not be sufficient to establish the right of private defence.312. The
+number of injuries is not always considered to be a safe criterion for determining who
+the aggressor was. It can also not be laid down as an unqualified proposition of law
+"that whenever injuries are on the body of the accused person, the presumption must"
+necessarily be raised that the accused person had caused injuries in exercise of the
+right of private defence. The defence has to further establish that the injury so caused
+on the accused probabilise the version of the right of private defence.313. Non-
+explanation of injuries on the person of the accused is a factor of great importance and
+this fact may induce the Court in judging the veracity of prosecution witnesses with
+considerable care.314. The right of private defence cannot justifiably be raised by
+showing that one of the accused had suffered some minor injuries and the prosecution
+had not explained the same.315. In a given case it may strengthen the plea of private
+defence set up by the accused or may create genuine doubt regarding the prosecution
+case. At the same time it cannot be laid down as an invariable proposition of law that
+as soon as it is found that the accused had received injuries in the same transaction in
+"which the complainant party was assaulted, the plea of private defence would stand"
+prima facie established and burden would shift on to the prosecution to prove that
+those injuries were caused to the accused in self-defence by the complainant party.316.
+"When the accused turned back from the house of the deceased whom they had visited,"
+the deceased followed them along with his brother and mother and tried to attack them
+from behind. The accused turned back and shot at him causing death. It was held that
+the conduct of the accused was justifiable. His acquittal was not interfered with.317.
+Where the deceased along with his father was putting up a fence which was protested
+"by the accused resulting in an altercation, and the accused suddenly dealt a lathi blow"
+"on the head of the deceased which proved fatal, it was held that since the accused"
+"received injuries as a result of assault by the deceased and his father, the accused had"
+justifiably exercised his right of private defence.318. In a case of murder some of the
+serious injuries found on the person of the accused were not explained and some of
+"the prosecution witnesses also were injured, it was held that it could be said that the"
+accused party had acted in exercise of right of private defence and confirmation of the
+acquittal of all the accused but one by the High Court was not proper.319. Where
+serious injuries inflicted on the person of the accused could not be explained by the
+"prosecution, the accused could be said to be entitled to the right of private defence."
+Their conviction under section 300 was held to be not proper.320.
+"In State of UP v Mukunde,321. the Supreme Court observed that merely on the ground"
+"that the prosecution witnesses have not explained the injuries on the accused, their"
+evidence ought not to be rejected if the Court finds it probable that the accused might
+have acted in exercise of the right of private defence. The Supreme Court also
+observed in a subsequent case322. that:
+it cannot be held as a matter of law or invariably a rule that whenever an accused sustained
+an injury in the same occurrence the prosecution is obliged to explain the injury and on the
+"failure of the prosecution to do so, the prosecution case should be disbelieved. Before non-"
+explanation of injuries on the person of the accused by the prosecution witnesses may
+"affect the prosecution case, the court has to be satisfied of the existence of two conditions:"
+(1) that the injuries on the person of the accused were of a serious nature and (ii) such
+injuries must have been received at the time of the occurrence in question. Non-explanation
+of injuries assumes greater significance when the evidence consists of interested or
+partisan witnesses or where the defence gives a version which completes in probability with
+that of the prosecution.323.
+These rulings were followed in Kashi Ram v State of MP324. The accused persons were
+"alleged to have assaulted the prosecution party, but the prosecution witnesses failed to"
+explain serious injuries including injuries on the vital parts of the body sustained by one
+of the accused in the same incident. The Court said that this could not be a ground for
+discarding the prosecution story and for acquittal of all accused persons.
+Where the accused had some trivial injuries on non-vital parts but the victim had
+suffered as many as 19 injuries including some on vital parts which resulted in his
+"death, it could not be believed that the accused had acted in self-defence especially"
+when he was arrested five or six days after the incident but in the intervening time did
+not care to get himself medically examined. A plea of private defence cannot be based
+on surmises and speculation.325.
+The Supreme Court has also observed that merely because there was a quarrel and the
+"accused persons also sustained injuries, it did not confer a right of private defence to"
+"the extent of causing death. Though such right cannot be weighed in golden scales, it"
+has at least to be shown that the accused persons were under such grave
+apprehension about the safety of their life and property and that the retaliation to the
+extent actually done was absolutely necessary.326.
+The number of injuries is not always a safe criterion for determining as to who was the
+aggressor. It cannot be stated as a universal rule that whenever injuries are on the body
+"of the accused person, a presumption must necessarily be raised that the accused"
+persons had caused injuries in the exercise of the right of private defence. The defence
+has further to show that injuries on the accused probabilise the version of the right of
+"private defence.327. In moments of excitement and disturbed mental equilibrium,"
+parties cannot be expected to preserve composure and use exactly only so much in
+retaliation as is commensurate with the apprehended danger. Due weightage has to be
+given to what happened at the spur of the moment at the spot. Things have to be
+"judged pragmatically keeping in view, the normal human reactions and behaviour, self-"
+preservation being the paramount consideration. Microscopic and pedantic scrutiny
+has to be avoided.328.
+[s 96.7] Retaliation.—
+The Supreme Court observed:
+From a plain reading of the sections (Ss. 96–106) it is manifest that such a right can be
+"exercised only to repel unlawful aggression and not to retaliate. To put it differently, the right"
+"is one of defence and not of requital or reprisal. Such being the nature of the right, the High"
+Court could not have exonerated the accused persons of the charges levelled against them
+by bestowing on them the right to retaliate and attack the complainant party.329.
+[s 96.8] Where private defence not pleaded.—
+"If circumstances show that the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is"
+"open to the Court to consider such a plea, even if accused had not taken it. A right of"
+private defence need not specifically be taken and in the event the Court on the basis of
+"the materials placed on record is in a position to come to such a conclusion, the Court"
+may act thereupon.330. Where the right of private defence was not pleaded by the
+"accused, but it appeared that the complainant was the aggressor, the Bombay High"
+Court held that the benefit of such defence could still be given to the accused.331. Fact
+that accused pleaded alibi-itself will not preclude the Court from giving him also the
+right of private defence if on proper appraisal of evidence and other material on
+"records, Court finds it to be available to him.332. The right of private defence cannot be"
+denied merely because the accused adopted a different line of defence particularly
+when the evidence adduced by the prosecution would indicate that they were put under
+a situation where they could reasonably have apprehended grievous hurt even to one of
+them.333. The Supreme Court endorsed this principle by saying that it is not necessary
+that the plea of private defence must always be taken by the accused person. Even if
+"the accused does not do so, the Court can consider it if the circumstances show that"
+the right of private defence was legitimately exercised.334.
+The accused has not to plead self-defence by examining some witnesses or by making
+any statement. But there has to be some material available on record to indicate that
+the accused had attacked the deceased in exercise of the right of self-defence.335.
+[s 96.9] In appeal.—
+It is permissible for accused to raise that plea at the stage of appeal as the settled
+"legal position is that even if the accused does not plead self-defence, it is open to"
+consider such a plea if the same arises from the material on record.336.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"269. Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333 [LNIND 2010 SC 70] : (2010) 1 SCR 642"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 70] : AIR 2010 SC 1212 [LNIND 2010 SC 70] : 2010 Cr LJ 1393 : (2010) 2
+SCC(Cr) 1037.
+270. Dharam v State of Haryana. JT 2007 (1) SC 299 [LNIND 2006 SC 1108] : AIR 2007 SC 397
+[LNIND 2006 SC 1108] : 2006 AIR SCW 6298.
+"271. Darshan Singh v State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333 : (2010) 1 SCR 642 [LNIND 2010 SC 70]"
+: AIR 2010 SC 1212 [LNIND 2010 SC 70] : 2010 Cr LJ 1393 : (2010) 2 SCC(Cr) 1037.
+"272. V Subramani v State of TN, (2005) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] : AIR 2005 SC 1983"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 224] .
+"273. Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 1460 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+1203] : (2005) 10 SCC 404 [LNIND 2004 SC 1203] .
+"274. Mano Dutt v State of UP, JT 2012 (2) SC 573 : 2012 (3) Scale 219 [LNIND 2012 SC 160] :"
+(2012) 4 SCC 79 [LNIND 2012 SC 160] .
+"275. V Subramani v State of TN, (2005) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] : AIR 2005 SC 1983"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 224] .
+276. Dharam v State of Haryana. JT 2007 (1) SC 299 [LNIND 2006 SC 1108] : AIR 2007 SC 397
+[LNIND 2006 SC 1108] : 2006 AIR SCW 6298.
+"277. Buta Singh v The State of Punjab, 1991 (2) SCC 612 [LNIND 1991 SC 177] : 1991 SCC (Cr)"
+"494 : AIR 1991 SC 1316 [LNIND 1991 SC 177] : 1991 Cr LJ 1464 ; Satya Narain Yadav v Gajanand,"
+(2008) 16 SCC 609 [LNIND 2008 SC 2782] : (2008) 10 Scale 728 [LNIND 2008 SC 2782] .
+"278. Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC 1460 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+1203] : (2005) 10 SCC 404 [LNIND 2004 SC 1203] .
+"279. Dattu Genu, 1974 Cr LJ 446 : AIR 1974 SC 387 [LNIND 1973 SC 357] ."
+"280. Munney Khan v State, AIR 1971 SC 1491 [LNIND 1970 SC 338] : (1970) 2 SCC 480 [LNIND"
+"1970 SC 338] . On the same point, Narasimha Raju v State, 1971 Cr LJ 1066 : (1970) 3 SCC 481 :"
+"AIR 1971 SC 1232 ; Mohammad Hameed v State, AIR 1980 SC 108 : 1980 Cr LJ 192 : (1979) 4"
+"SCC 708 . An illustrative situation is Jagdish Chandra v State of Rajasthan, 1987 Cr LJ 649 Raj, in"
+"consequence of enimical terms and intemperate nature, one fired at the other, the other"
+"returning the fire resulting in death. In the prosecution of the other, this defence was allowed."
+281. Plea of self-defence was rejected where the evidence showed that the deceased was
+"unarmed and was not the aggressor. Kuduvakuzinyil Sudhakaran v State, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 721"
+(Ker). Defence that a stab wound causing death was inflicted on the chest of the deceased with
+a pen-knife was found to be apparently false because such instrument would not have caused
+"that kind of wound, plea of self defence rejected, Sellamuthu v State of TN, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2143"
+"(Mad). Hakim Singh v State of MP, (1994) 2 Cr LJ 2463 (MP), the deceased was unarmed when"
+"fired at, he caused injury only after receiving the gun-shot wound, right of private defence in"
+"shooting at him not available. Hukam Chand v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 3671 [LNIND 2002"
+"SC 652] , theory of self-defence, not supported by facts. Jham Singh v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ"
+"2847 , no injury found on the person of the accused, nor any report made. The plea of private"
+defence was rejected.
+"282. Darshan Singh v State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333 : (2010) 1 SCR 642 [LNIND 2010 SC 70]"
+: AIR 2010 SC 1212 [LNIND 2010 SC 70] : 2010 Cr LJ 1393 : (2010) 2 SCC(Cr) 1037.
+"283. Kashi Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 3 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 187] : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr)"
+"608 : AIR 2008 SC 1172 [LNIND 2008 SC 187] . Narain Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 11 SCC"
+"540 [LNIND 2008 SC 864] : AIR 2008 SC 2006 [LNIND 2008 SC 864] : 2008 Cr LJ 2613 ,"
+"principles imbibed in sections 96-106 restated. Manubhai Atabhai v State of Gujarat, (2007) 10"
+"SCC 358 [LNIND 2007 SC 822] : AIR 2007 SC 2437 [LNIND 2007 SC 822] , once the right of"
+"private defence is established, conviction is not permissible."
+"284. Sikandar Singh v State of Bihar, (2010) 7 SCC 477 [LNIND 2010 SC 603] : (2010) 8 SCR 373"
+: AIR 2010 SC 44023 : 2010 Cr LJ 3854 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 417.
+"285. Bhanwar Singh v State of MP, (2008) 16 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : AIR 2009 SC 768"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : (2008) 67 AIC 133 . Dharam v State of Haryana, (2007) 15 SCC 241"
+"[LNIND 2006 SC 1108] , nature and scope of the right explained. Haren Das v State of Assam,"
+2012 Cr LJ 1467 (Gau).
+"286. Thankachan v State of Kerala, (2008) 17 SCC 760 ."
+"287. Biran Singh, 1975 Cr LJ 44 : AIR 1975 SC 87 ."
+"288. Krishanlal v State, 1988 Cr LJ 990 (J&K)."
+"289. Puran Singh, 1975 Cr LJ 1479 : AIR 1975 SC 1674 [LNIND 1975 SC 174] ."
+"290. Shivappa Laxman Savadi v State, 1992 Cr LJ 2845 (Kant). Hari Singh v State of Rajasthan,"
+"AIR 1997 SC 1505 [LNIND 1996 SC 1592] : 1997 Cr LJ 733 ; State of Haryana v Mewa Singh, AIR"
+"1997 SC 1407 : 1997 Cr LJ 1906 ; Ram Dhani v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2286 (All); Rizwan v State of"
+"Chhatisgarh, AIR 2003 SC 976 [LNIND 2003 SC 72] : 2003 Cr LJ 1226 : (2003) 2 SCC 661 [LNIND"
+2003 SC 72] .
+"291. Triloki Nath v State of UP, AIR 2006 SC 321 [LNIND 2005 SC 867] : (2005) 13 SCC 323"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 867] .
+"292. Shajahan v State of Kerala, (2007) 12 SCC 96 [LNIND 2007 SC 243] : (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 234"
+": 2007 Cr LJ 229 , extreme enmity between parties result in attacks."
+"293. Bathu Singh v State of MP, AIR 2004 SC 4279 [LNIND 2004 SC 835] : (2004) 7 SCC 206 ."
+"294. Gopal vState of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 1297 , JT 2013 (1) SC 639 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] ,"
+"2013 (1) MLJ (Crl) 617 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] , 2013 (1) Scale 445 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] , (2013) 2"
+"SCC 188 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] ; Mukesh Rathore v State of Chhattisgarh, 2010 Cr LJ 1289 (Chh);"
+"State of Rajasthan v Brijlal, 2010 Cr LJ 1000 (Raj)."
+295. Sikandar Singh v State of Bihar (2010) 7 SCC 477 [LNIND 2010 SC 603] : AIR 2010 SC
+44023 : (2010) 3 SCC(Cr) 417.
+"296. Raj Pal v State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 678 [LNIND 2006 SC 282] : (2006) 3 SCC(Cr) 361."
+"297. Raj Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 2803 : (2015) 6 SCC 268 [LNIND 2015 SC 283] :"
+2015 (5) Scale 492 [LNIND 2015 SC 283] .
+"298. Kashi Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 3 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 187] : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr)"
+608 : AIR 2008 SC 1172 [LNIND 2008 SC 187] .
+"299. Ravishwar Manjhi v State of Jharkhand, (2008) 16 SCC 261 : AIR 2009 SC 1262 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 2423] .
+"300. Janardan Singh v State of Bihar, (2009) 16 SCC 269 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 253."
+"301. Mahabir Choudhary v State of Bihar, 1996 AIR(SC) 1998, 1996 Cr LJ 2860 : 1996 (5) SCC"
+107 [LNIND 1996 SC 891] .
+"302. Glanville Williams : Text book on Criminal Law, 1979 Edn, p 460."
+"303. Jaidev, 1963 (1) Cr LJ 495 : AIR 1963 SC 612 [LNIND 1962 SC 249] ."
+"304. Jaidev, Supra; see also Mohd Khan, 1972 Cr LJ 661 : (1971) 3 SCC 683 [LNIND 1971 SC"
+"540] ; Puran Singh, 1975 Cr LJ 1479 : AIR 1975 SC 1674 [LNIND 1975 SC 174] ."
+"305. Yogendra Morarji, 1980 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1980 SC 660 . This case is against all previous"
+authorities and is wrongly decided (MH Editor).
+"306. Dr. Mohammad Khalil Chisti v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 637 (SC) : 2013 (1) MLJ (Crl)"
+"198 [LNIND 2012 SC 801] : (2013) 2 SCC 541 [LNIND 2012 SC 801] ; Gopal v State of Rajasthan,"
+(2013) 2 SCC 188 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] : 2013 Cr LJ 1297 .
+"307. Onkarnath Singh v State of UP, 1974 Cr LJ 1015 : AIR 1974 SC 1550 [LNIND 1974 SC 154] ;"
+"Vishvas v State, 1978 Cr LJ 484 : AIR 1978 SC 414 [LNIND 1978 SC 17] ; Sikhar Behera, 1982 Cr"
+"LJ 1167 (Orissa); Munir Ahmad v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC 705 : 1989 Cr LJ 845 : (1989)"
+26 ACC 115 : 1989 Supp SCC 377 ; reiterated by the Supreme Court in Paras Nath Singh v State
+"of Bihar, and Hari Krishna Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 863 [LNIND 1988 SC 139] : (1988) 2"
+"SCC 95 [LNIND 1988 SC 139] : 1988 Cr LJ 925 . Gajanand v State, 1954 Cr LJ 1746 , AIR 1954 SC"
+"695 , followed, Abdul Hamid v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 431 . See also State of Assam v Upendra"
+"Das, 1991 Cr LJ 2930 Gau, relying upon Lakshmisingh v State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 2263 : 1976"
+"Cr LJ 1736 . For other cases of free fight and, therefore, acquittal. See Ram Nath v State, 1991 Cr"
+"LJ 1825 All; Sonpal v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 1597 All, prosecution not explaining how the event"
+"sparked off and how the accused suffered injuries. Nityanand Pasayat v State, 1989 Cr LJ 1547"
+"(Ori), quarrel between two groups. Amir Ali v State of Assam, 1989 Cr LJ 1512 , a case of mutual"
+fight over possession of land in which both sides were injured. The Court added that if a group
+"of 5 assembles in private defence, they are not an unlawful assembly; but if they persist in use"
+"of force even after their right is over, they become an unlawful assembly. Chandrasekharan v"
+"State of Kerala, 1987 Cr LJ 1715 (Ker); State of Rajasthan v. Sughad Singh, AIR 1994 SC 1593 :"
+1994 Cr LJ 2188 .
+"308. Amrik Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 Cr LJ 2857 : 1993 AIR SCW 2482 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC"
+320.
+"309. Rohtash v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 3303 (P&H)."
+"310. Sikhar Behera v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 3664 : 1993 AIR SCW 3162 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC"
+"493. Amerika Rai v State of Bihar, AIR 2011 SC 1379 [LNIND 2011 SC 220] : (2011) 3 SCR 176"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 220] : (2011) 2 SCC(Cr) 429 : (2011) 4 SCC 677 [LNIND 2011 SC 220] Ram
+"Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 1437 [LNIND 1998 SC 231] : 1998 Cr LJ 2049 ; Pammi v"
+"Govt. of MP, AIR 1998 SC 1185 [LNIND 1998 SC 200] : 1998 Cr LJ 1617 ; Periasami v State of TN,"
+1997 Cr LJ 219 : (1996) 6 SCC 457 [LNIND 1996 SC 1552] .
+"311. Mohammad Iqbal v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 337 (Chh)."
+"312. Ranbir Singh v State of Haryana, 2009 Cr LJ 3051 (SC) : (2009) 16 SCC 193 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+1053] .
+313. Sikandar Singh v State of Bihar (2010) 7 SCC 477 [LNIND 2010 SC 603] : (2010) 8 SCR 373 :
+"AIR 2010 SC 44023 : 2010 Cr LJ 3854 : (2010) 3 SCC(Cr) 417; Dashrath Singh v State of UP,"
+"(2004) 7 SCC 408 [LNIND 2004 SC 798] ; Bishna v State of WB, AIR 2006 SC 302 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+"873] : (2005) 12 SCC 657 [LNIND 2005 SC 873] , Shriram v State of MP, (2004) 9 SCC 292 [LNIND"
+2003 SC 1026] .
+"314. Lacchiram v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 2229 MP, unexplained injuries on the person of the"
+"accused. But such injuries do not by themselves afford a defence. Govardhan v State, 1987 Cr LJ"
+"541 (Raj). Ram Kumar v State of Haryana, 1994 Cr LJ 1450 P&H, dispute over water course,"
+"accused entered field to divert water, caused innumerable injuries to those who objected and"
+"also himself received a few injuries, he was held to be an aggressor having no right of private"
+"defence; Velummei v State, 1994 Cr LJ 1738 (Ker), a person entering the house of another for"
+"crime is an aggressor, he has no right of private defence. Man Bharan Singh v State of MP, 1996"
+"Cr LJ 2707 (MP), every minor injury on the person of the accused does not require explanation."
+"315. State of Punjab v Gurlabh Singh, (2009) 13 SCC 556 [LNIND 2009 SC 1262] : AIR 2009 SC"
+"2469 [LNIND 2009 SC 1262] ; Radhe v State of Chhattisgarh, (2008) 11 SCC 785 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+"1333] : AIR 2008 SC 2878 [LNIND 2008 SC 1333] : 2008 Cr LJ 3520 , the mere fact of a quarrel"
+and the accused sustaining injuries does not in itself create the right of self-defence to the
+"extent of causing death, there has to be an attack creating apprehension of fatal injury. Such"
+was not the case here.
+"316. Onkarnath, supra. Injuries to the accused not caused during the course of the same"
+"incident, no right of private defence, Munna v State of UP, AIR 1992 SC 278 : 1993 Cr LJ 45 : 1993"
+"Supp (2) SCC 757 ; State of Kerala v Mavila Thamban Nambiar, 1993 Cr LJ 1817 (Ker), the"
+"accused fell off during the course of struggle and injured himself, those injuries could not give"
+him the right of killing in private defence.
+"317. State of Punjab v Sohan Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1247 : 1992 Cr LJ 2514 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC"
+312 .
+"318. Sridhar Das v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 2907 (Ori)."
+"319. Makwana Takhat Singh Ratan Singh v State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1989 : 1992 Cr LJ 3596"
+". No explanation of injuries on the person of the accused made, no difference to the acceptance"
+"of their plea of self-defence, Hardeep Singh v State, 1996 Cr LJ 3091 (Raj)."
+"320. Arjun v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ 3797 (MP)."
+"321. State of UP v Mukunde, (1994) 2 SCC 191 [LNIND 1994 SC 71] : 1994 SCC (Cr) 473. Also to"
+"the same effect Kasam Abdulla v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1422 : AIR 1998 SC 1013"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 157] , injuries on the person of a accused explained."
+"322. Thakhaji Hiraji v Thakore Kuber Singh Chaman Singh, (2001) 6 SCC 145 [LNIND 2001 SC"
+1150] : AIR 2001 SC 2326 : 2001 AIR SCW 2077.
+"323. The Court also noted the decision in Chandu v State of Maharashtra, (2001) 4 Scale 590"
+"[LNIND 2009 NGP 319] : (2001) 5 Supreme 672; Dev Raj v State of HP, AIR 1994 SC 523 : 1993"
+"AIR SCW 3966 : (1994) Supp 2 SCC 552, such injuries cannot be lightly ignored; Tara Chand v"
+"State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1891 : 1971 Cr LJ 1411, the circumstance can also be taken into"
+account in the mitigation of sentence.
+"324. Kashi Ram v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 2902 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] . See also State of"
+"Rajasthan v Pura, 2000 Cr LJ 2615 (Raj); Dharminder v State of HP, AIR 2002 SC 3097 [LNIND"
+"2002 SC 537] ; Jesu Asir Singh v State, AIR (2007) SC 3015 [LNIND 2007 SC 977] : (2007) Cr LJ"
+4310 : (2007) 12 SCC 19 [LNIND 2007 SC 977] : (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 192.
+"325. Poosaram, 1984 Cr LJ 1848 (Raj); See also State of Gujarat v Bai Fatima, 1975 Cr LJ 1079 :"
+"AIR SC 1478; Rizwan v State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2003 SC 976 [LNIND 2003 SC 72] , non-"
+explanation of injuries on the accused persons was not taken by itself to give them the benefit
+of the right of private defence. The Court considered the factors to be taken into account for
+examining whether the right of private defence must have existed.
+"326. Radhe v State of Chhatisgarh, (2008) 11 SCC 785 [LNIND 2008 SC 1333] : AIR 2008 SC"
+2878 [LNIND 2008 SC 1333] .
+"327. Laxman Singh v Poonam Singh, (2004) 10 SCC 94 [LNIND 2003 SC 767] : (2004) 1 MPLJ 93"
+": (2004) 1 Mah LJ 317 . James Martin v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097]"
+: (2004) 1 KLT 513 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] : (2004) 2 MPLJ 231 : 2004 Mah LJ 358 . Shriram v
+"State of MP, (2004) 9 SCC 292 [LNIND 2003 SC 1026] : AIR 2004 SC 491 [LNIND 2003 SC 1026] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 610 .
+"328. James Martin v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] ."
+"329. Rajesh Kumar v Dharmavir, AIR 1997 SC 3769 [LNIND 1997 SC 445]: 1997 Cr LJ 2242."
+330. Ranveer Singh v State of MP (2009) 3 SCC 384 [LNIND 2009 SC 123] : AIR 2009 SC 1658
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 123] ; Bishna Alias Bhiswadeb Mahato v State of WB, (2005) 12 SCC 657 [LNIND"
+"2005 SC 873] Also see Ravishwar Manjhi v State of Jharkhand, AIR 2009 SC 1262 [LNIND 2008"
+SC 2423] : (2008) 16 SCC 561 [LNIND 2008 SC 2423] .
+"331. State v Tanaji Dagadu Chawan, 1998 Cr LJ 4515 (Bom)."
+"332. State of Rajasthan v Shiv Singh Haren Das v State of Assam, 2011 Cr LJ 580 (Raj)."
+"333. Moti Singh v State of Maharashtra, (2002) 9 SCC 494 ."
+"334. V Subramani v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 1727 SC : AIR 2005 SC 1983 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] :"
+(2005) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] .
+"335. Nagaraj v State, 2006 Cr LJ 3724 (Mad—DB)."
+"336. Mehi Lal v State of UP, 2011 Cr LJ 1440 (All)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 97] Right of private defence of the body and of property.
+"Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend"
+—
+"First.—His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting"
+the human body;
+"Secondly.—The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other"
+"person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft,"
+"robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft,"
+"robbery, mischief or criminal trespass."
+COMMENT.—
+This section broadly specifies the offences against which the right of private defence
+can be exercised. Section 99 provides the limitations. These two sections combined
+together lay down the principles of the right of private defence.
+The first clause of this section provides for the defence of body against any offence
+affecting the human body. The second provides for the defence of property against an
+act which amounts to the commission of certain offences.
+There is no obligation upon a person entitled to exercise the right of private defence
+"and to defend his person or property, to retire merely because his assailant threatens"
+him with violence.337.
+"Explaining the genesis of the rule, the Supreme Court has observed:338."
+"""It is important to bear in mind that self-preservation of one's life is the necessary"
+"concomitant of the right of life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India, fundamental"
+"in nature, sacred, precious and inviolable. The importance and validity of the duty and right"
+to self-preservation has a species in the right of self-defence in criminal law. Centuries ago
+"thinkers of this great land conceived of such right and recognised it."""
+[s 97.1] Aggressor has no right of private defence.—
+The right to defend does not include a right to launch an offensive or aggression.339.
+The right of private defence does not arise where the accused were the aggressors and
+the question of exceeding such right also does not arise.340. The Supreme Court
+"added, in this case, that the right of self-defence arises when there is unexpected"
+"apprehension and one is taken unawares, or the accused happens to kill accidentally"
+"while using reasonable force private defence can be used to ward off unlawful force, or"
+"to prevent it, to avoid unlawful detention and to escape from such detention.341."
+When the father of the accused was trying to forcibly remove the gate of the thrashing
+"ground of the deceased which was situated on the land of the deceased, his act"
+"amounted to an offence of 'mischief'. And, if the deceased while protecting his own"
+"property assaulted the father of the accused with a lathi, and the accused killed him in"
+"return, the accused could not claim the right of private defence of body of his"
+father.342. In another case of the same kind the father of the accused was trying to pull
+out the gate of the deceased thrashing mill and on the deceased assaulting him in
+"protection, the accused struck him dead. The right of private defence was not available"
+in the circumstances.343. Where the parties went away from the property over which
+"they were fighting, the death caused at that shifted place was not a justifiable exercise"
+of the right of private defence.344. Where the accused succeeded in establishing their
+right to the property in dispute through the Court and then went to the field with a view
+"to ask the other party to vacate the premises, it was held that it by itself did not render"
+them to be aggressors for the purpose of denying them the benefit of right of self-
+defence.345.
+Number of injuries is not always the safe criterion for determining who the aggressor
+is. The fact of injuries on the body of the accused does not by itself create the
+presumption that the accused was entitled to the right of private defence.346.
+[s 97.2] Unlawful assembly.—
+So long as an assembly of persons is acting in exercise of the right of private defence it
+"cannot be an unlawful assembly. An assembly though lawful to begin with, may in the"
+course of events become unlawful. So long as the accused persons were acting in
+"exercise of right of private defence, their object was not unlawful and so there was no"
+"unlawful assembly but once they exceeded the right, the assembly ceased to be lawful"
+and became an unlawful assembly. There too only such of the members of the
+assembly who shared the object of doing anything in excess of the exercise of right of
+"private defence, alone would be liable to be punished for the acts committed in"
+prosecution of the common object or for their individual unlawful acts.347.
+[s 97.3] Right of private defence to be pleaded.—
+"In a Supreme Court case it is stated,"
+"It is well settled that even if an accused does not plead self-defence, it is open to the Court"
+to consider such a plea if the same arises from materials on record.348.
+But if no plea was entered on behalf of the accused and there were also no
+"circumstances to show that the accused had probably the right of private defence,"
+such a right could not be presumed on behalf of the accused on mere conjectures and
+surmises.349. A mere bald assertion without any evidence of facts and circumstances
+"does not make out a case of private defence.350. The accused can, however, make out"
+his plea by mere preponderance of probabilities from materials already on record and
+need not prove it to the hilt.351. Where by preponderance of probabilities the plea of
+"private defence of the accused is plausible, benefit should be extended to the"
+accused.352. Failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that the injuries on the
+"person of the accused were not caused in self-defence, makes the defence of the"
+accused probable and he is entitled to its benefit because he has not to prove his
+defence beyond reasonable doubt.353. Where the accused set up the plea of self-
+"defence only during trial and not during investigation, it was held that this was not a"
+ground for rejecting the plea.354. The accused on the observation of the High Court
+"that the deceased was stabbed by the appellant, not in pursuance of any pre-planned"
+"attack, but being under the impression that the deceased was coming to attack him."
+The said observation cannot be read out of context to make out a case that the
+accused acted in self-defence. Such a plea is neither put forth in the statement under
+section 313 nor brought out in the cross examination of any of the prosecution
+witnesses.355. It is true that the right of private defence need not specifically be taken
+and in the event the Court on the basis of the materials on record is in a position to
+"come to such a conclusion, despite some other plea having been raised, that such a"
+"case had been made out, it may act thereupon.356."
+[s 97.4] CASES.—Defence of person.—
+Under circumstances which might have induced the belief that a man was cutting the
+"throat of his wife, their son shot and killed his father. It was held that if the son had"
+reasonable ground for believing and honestly believed that his act was necessary for
+"the defence of his mother, the homicide was excusable.357. Where a girl was being"
+"sexually molested and her father hit the assailant resulting in consequential death, it"
+was held that the father was entitled to the right of private defence irrespective of the
+fact whether the affair was with or without consent because of the girl being a
+minor.358. Where a man found his wife in compromising position with a person who
+"sprang at the husband and caused him multiple injuries, some of them grievous, the"
+"husband thereafter gave a chopper blow resulting in the death of that person, it was"
+held that the husband had not exceeded his right of private defence and was entitled to
+acquittal.359. Where the father of the accused was being given lathi blows by the
+"complainant party, the accused fired from the licensed gun of his father to defend his"
+"father, it was held that he had acted in the exercise of the right of private defence"
+whether the injuries caused to his father were simple or grievous.360. Trespassers on
+the property of another cannot get any benefit of right of private defence if they are
+attacked by the person in possession of the property.361. However no one including the
+true owner has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in
+settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in due course of
+"law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. Such"
+possession of the trespasser must extend over a sufficiently long period and
+acquiesced in by the true owner.362. Though law permits even a trespasser in settled
+"possession to defend his possession but, it does not permit a person to take the law in"
+his own hand to take forcible possession merely because he has obtained a favourable
+"order under section 145 Cr PC, 1973. Such a person cannot claim private defence.363."
+Settled possession means such clear and effective physical possession that under the
+"criminal law he, even if he is a trespasser, gets the right to defend his possession of the"
+property against an attack even by the true owner.364. If no party is proved to be in
+"settled possession, the question of exercise of right of private defence does not"
+arise.365. Where the accused were in possession of the property and had grown the
+"paddy, they were entitled to defend their possession by using reasonable force which in"
+the instant case went up to causing of death as the party in possession was attacked
+and grievous blows were given to them.366. Where the prosecution party attacked the
+"accused, his brothers and others with sharp edged weapons and lathis and when they"
+"tried to enter the latter's house, the accused fired at the crowd resulting in the death of"
+"a man and injuries to others, it was held that the accused had acted only in the exercise"
+of the right of private defence and he was entitled to complete acquittal.367. Where the
+accused was fired at to dispel his party from attempting to rescue their friend from
+illegal police detention and an informer accompanying the police who tried to prevent
+"them from snatching the police gun received fatal injuries, it was held that they were"
+entitled to the right of private defence.368. Where a fatal injury was caused in
+"consequence of hot exchange of words, the right of private defence was held to be not"
+available.369. The Supreme Court has suggested that the number and nature of injuries
+"sustained by the accused and the deceased in any case, may furnish good evidence to"
+"consider whether the accused was acting in private defence and, if so, whether he had"
+exceeded his right. In the state of the evidence on record in that case and the number
+"of injuries suffered by the accused, the Court did not accede to the contention that the"
+right was not properly exercised.370.
+[s 97.5] Defence of another person.—
+The right of private defence need not necessarily be exercised for the defence of one's
+own person; it can be exercised for the defence of the person of another one.371.
+[s 97.6] Defence of property.—
+Every person in possession of land is entitled to defend his possession against anyone
+"who tries to eject him by force,372. or to steal from it;373. or to do an act which will have"
+"the effect of causing injury to it, e.g., cutting of a bund.374. Even if a trespass has been"
+"committed, in certain situations, right of private defence can be used to eject the"
+"trespassers.375. Where the accused had no right, title, interest or possession of the"
+"land in issue, right of private defence of property did not vest in him.376."
+Where the complainant party was about 300 feet away from the disputed land and it
+was further found that the accused had not shown that there was any injury on the
+"person of the accused, it was held that no right of private defence arose in favour of the"
+accused. 377.
+[s 97.7] Open space.—
+Though private defence is available in respect of criminal trespass or mischief as
+"against the property owned by himself or of any other person, but criminal trespass is"
+"not enumerated as one of the offences under section 103 IPC, 1860. Therefore, the"
+right of private defence of property will not extend to the causing of death of the
+"person who committed such acts, if the act of trespass is in respect of an open land."
+Only a house-trespass committed under such circumstances as may reasonably cause
+apprehension that death or grievous hurt would be the consequence is enumerated as
+one of the offences under section 103.378. But in another judgment Supreme Court
+held that there is no law that right of self-defence cannot be exercised in relation to a
+dispute over an open space.379. Where the trespasser was in settled possession of the
+"field in question, and the party who claimed ownership started ploughing the field, it"
+was held that the trespasser (accused) had the right of private defence of his
+"possession over property and offer resistance, but that he exceeded that right in"
+causing death. His act fell under exception 2 to section 300 and punishable under
+"section 304, Part I.380. Where a goat of the accused entered the field of another and he"
+"was trying to take it way, the other struck him with lathi blows and also his companion"
+who came to his rescue. Only then the accused retaliated with lathi blows resulting in
+death. Supreme Court upheld the acquittal.381. The right is subject to restrictions
+"imposed by section 99, the accused party was in possession of the land, the deceased"
+party wanted to enter into possession forcibly. One of the aggressors was killed and
+another grievously hurt. The accused that caused the death was held to be guilty of
+exceeding the right of private defence. The acquittal of the person who caused
+grievous hurt with a spear was held to be not proper. He was liable to be convicted
+under section 326.382. Accused having not been in settled possession had no right to
+self-defence to defend the possession of the property.383. Occurrence took place on
+the land which was in possession of deceased. Accused cannot take the plea of private
+defence.384. No right of private defence of property to a person who was not in
+possession of the property.385.
+Where the accused to a certain stage acted in defence of their property but exceeded it
+"in breaking into the room of their victim, striking him with a lathi blow and also his wife"
+"and daughter who were also there in the room, the victim subsequently dying, their"
+conviction was shifted from under section 302 to that under section 304 Part 1.386.
+The right of private defence of property (share in land) was held to have been exceeded
+"when the deceased's side being armed with lathis only, the accused party fired at them"
+"with a gun, killing one and injuring others. The right of private defence was not available"
+to them.387.
+Where the finding of the Courts below was that the accused and his companions were
+aggressors because they assaulted the victim and his children when they came out to
+"protest against cutting of their by the accused, it was held that the benefit of the right"
+of private defence was not available to the accused.388.
+Defence of property may create circumstances ripening into the right of defence of
+"person. This is so because even in defending property, the attack and counter-attack is"
+likely to be on person. This was the situation in a case in which the accused while
+defending land over which they had possession; they became the victim of attack on
+person with sharp cutting weapons. It became their right to repel the danger of
+grievous hurt or even death and to use for that purpose reasonably appropriate force.
+Their right extended to cause death of the aggressors if that could be the only way of
+saving themselves.389.
+[s 97.8] CASES.—Exceeding private defence.—
+The father of the accused was attacked by the deceased with a lathi and suffered a
+"simple injury on his head, whereupon the accused in order to protect his father"
+administered a fatal blow on the chest of the deceased with a ballam. It was held that
+"though the accused had the right of private defence, he had obviously exceeded it and"
+"was, therefore, liable under section 304-Part I, IPC, 1860.390. A somewhat contrary view"
+"has, however, been taken by the Supreme Court in a later case where too the accused"
+"had exercised his right of private defence against a lathi blow on the head. Thus, in Deo"
+Narain's case it has been held that the accused was justified in using his spear though
+"the other party had aimed only a lathi blow on the head, which being a vulnerable part"
+"even a lathi blow could prove dangerous.391. It thus, appears that the part of the body"
+against which the attack is directed is more important than the weapon used. Where
+the deceased attacked the accused with a stick and the accused retaliated by stabbing
+"the former to death his offence fell under section 304-Part I, IPC, 1860, as he had"
+exceeded the right of private defence.392. Evidence on record showed that accused had
+"received many injuries on his person, and exercised right of private defence of person"
+in good faith. He had sustained four injuries on various parts of his body including on
+"vital parts, thus, case would be covered by Exception 2 to section 300 of IPC, 1860. The"
+"nature of weapon used, circumstances in which incident took place, injuries on body of"
+"accused as well as deceased, showed that there was no premeditation. He had"
+exercised his right of self-defence but having regard to the injuries inflicted by him on
+"deceased, he exceeded same.393. Where the accused, a person with only one hand was"
+attacked with a bamboo and sustained several injuries and then to ward off further
+attack gave only one blow with a pen-knife on the aggressor which unfortunately fell on
+"a vital part resulting in his death, it could not be said that he had exceeded his right of"
+"private defence. For the accused it was a case of life or death struggle and his case,"
+"therefore, squarely fell within the ambit of clauses (1) and (2) of section 100, IPC, 1860,"
+and he could not be held guilty of any offence.394. In a sudden group clash over a
+house both sides received injuries and one person was killed. There was no prior
+enmity between two groups and the whole incident developed suddenly. Accused
+"persons received quite a number of injuries, some on vital parts, and the prosecution"
+was not able to explain those injuries. It was held that the accused could not be said to
+have exceeded the right of private defence. Their conviction was set aside.395. Two
+armed bullies of a locality raided a flat in a drunken state and demanded money from
+the inmates with the use of force. This amounted to the crime of extortion giving the
+inmates the right to defend themselves against the raiders. Both the raiders met their
+"death in the process of the ensuing scuffle, it being not known nor capable of being"
+ascertained who played what roll in the combat. The Supreme Court held that it could
+"not be said of any one of them that he exceeded the right of private defence. Hence,"
+they could not be convicted under section 302 read with section 34.396. The accused
+using his licenced gun fired only one shot after receiving a severe blow on his head
+fracturing his skull. It was held that he did not exceed his right of self-defence.397. A
+person had a lurking suspicion about illicit relations between his elder brother's wife
+and the accused and he caught hold of the accused when the latter visited their house
+to meet her. The accused inflicted knife injuries on him to extricate himself but did not
+inflict any further injury after freeing himself. It was held that the accused had not
+exceeded the right of private defence and was not guilty under section 307 for
+attempted murder.398. Where the accused fired a single gunshot at the deceased party
+to save his uncle who had received serious injuries in the attack made by the deceased
+"party, the gun shot unfortunately proved fatal, the accused could not be said to have"
+exceeded his right of self- defence.399. Where in a murder case over obstruction of
+"water course, the victim assaulted the accused twice and injured him whereupon the"
+"accused inflicted a blow on him which proved fatal, the accused could not be said to"
+have exceeded his right of private defence.400.
+A police party was looking for the accused to affect their arrest. The complainant party
+"was helping the police. On being located, the accused party opened fire. The police"
+withdrew after receiving injuries. Two members of the complainant party were killed.
+Even a runaway complainant was shot down. This showed that the attack continued
+"even when all danger to the accused party had ceased. Thus, they exceeded the right of"
+private defence. Conviction for murder was upheld.401.
+"Where the death occurred due to the firing resorted to as part of the self-defence, the"
+"same would amount to 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', which was"
+"committed without any pre-meditation in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion and"
+upon a sudden quarrel and that the offender could not be said to have taken undue
+"advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, which would normally fall under"
+"Exception 4 of section 300 IPC, 1860.402."
+[s 97.9] Burden on accused to probablise his defence.—
+It is for the accused to establish the plea of private defence. He is not required to prove
+it beyond reasonable doubt. The Court has only to examine probabilities in appreciating
+"the plea. In the present case, the accused had miserably failed to establish or even to"
+probablise his defence. The deceased persons had merely asked them why they had
+"cut the mature crop, when they became the victim of attack. They were unarmed.403."
+The accused need not take the plea of private defence explicitly. He can succeed in his
+plea if he is able to bring out from the evidence of the prosecution witness or other
+evidence of the prosecution witness or other evidence that the apparent criminal act
+was committed by him in exercise of private defence. The burden on the accused is not
+as onerous as that which lies on the prosecution. While the prosecution is required to
+"prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused can discharge his onus by"
+establishing preponderance of probabilities.404.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"337. Nareshi Singh, (1923) 2 Pat 595."
+"338. Surjit Singh v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 336 [LNIND 1996 SC 233] at 342 : AIR 1996 SC"
+1388 [LNIND 1996 SC 233] .
+"339. Sikandar Singh v State of Bihar, (2010) 7 SCC 477 [LNIND 2010 SC 603] : AIR 2010 SC"
+44023 : (2010) 3 SCC(Cr) 417.
+"340. Kashi Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 3 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 187] : AIR 2008 SC 1172"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 187] .
+"341. Ibid, See also Narain Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 11 SCC 540 [LNIND 2008 SC 864] :"
+"AIR 2008 SC 2006 [LNIND 2008 SC 864] : 2008 Cr LJ 2613 , for restatement of principles."
+"342. State of MP v Mohandas, 1992 Cr LJ 101 (MP)."
+"343. State of MP v Mohandas, 1991 Cr LJ 101 (MP)."
+"344. Bhagat Singh v The State, 1992 Cr LJ 221 (All)."
+"345. Jarnail Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 72 : 1992 Cr LJ 3863 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 588"
+". See also Jaipal v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 1271 [LNIND 2000 SC 448] : 2000 Cr LJ 1778 ;"
+"Murali v State of TN, 2001 Cr LJ 470 (SC)."
+"346. V Subramani v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 1727 SC : AIR 2005 SC 1983 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] :"
+(2005) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] .
+"347. Kashi Ram v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 2902 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] : (2002) 1 SCC 71"
+[LNIND 2001 SC 2369] .
+"348. Munshi Ram v Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702 [LNIND 1967 SC 347]: 1968 Cr LJ 806;"
+"Rajanikant, (1970) 2 SCC 866 [LNIND 1970 SC 401] : 1970 SCC (Cr) 575 ; State of Rajasthan v"
+"Manoj Kumar, 2014 Cr LJ 2420."
+"349. State of Gujarat v Bai Fatima, 1975 Cr LJ 1079 : AIR 1975 SC 1478 [LNIND 1975 SC 130] ."
+"350. Raza Pasha, 1983 Cr LJ 977 : AIR 1983 SC 575 [LNIND 1983 SC 79] . Sekar v State of TN,"
+"2003 Cr LJ 93 : AIR 2002 SC 3667 [LNIND 2002 SC 628] , the plea of self-defence cannot be"
+based upon surmises and speculation. The Court noted the relevant factors in order to find out
+whether the right is available or not.
+"351. Salim Zia, 1979 Cr LJ 323 : AIR 1979 SC 319 ; Yogendra Morarji, 1980 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1980"
+"SC 660 . Mohd. Ramzani v State of Delhi, 1980 Cr LJ 1010 : 1980 SCC (Cr) 907 : AIR 1980 SC"
+1341 . The burden is on the accused. The Court does not presume the existence of the
+"circumstances which entitle the accused to his defence. Subodh Tewari v State of Assam, 1988"
+"Cr LJ 223 Gau. To the same effect, Savita Kumari v UOI, 1993 AIR SCW 1174 : 1993 Cr LJ 1590 :"
+(1993) 2 SCC 357 [LNIND 1993 SC 87] .
+"352. Jharmal v State of Haryana, 1995 Cr LJ 3212 : 1994 (2) SCC 551 [LNIND 1994 SC 256] ;"
+"Rizwan v State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2003 SC 976 [LNIND 2003 SC 72] , burden of proof is on the"
+accused is to establish his plea. It is discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in
+favour of his plea.
+"353. Debraj v State of UP, (1993) Supp 2 SCC 552 followed in Maskandar Ali v Assam, (1995) 2"
+Cr LJ 1900 Gau. Where the Court said that the burden is on the accused to prove his plea. But
+he has not to establish his right beyond all doubt. It is enough that he is able to show on a
+"preponderance of probability that he acted in private defence. Also to the same effect, Dwarka"
+"Pd. v State of UP, (1993) AIR SCW 1122 : (1993) Supp. 3 SCC 141."
+"354. Bahadur Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 70 : 1992 Cr LJ 3709 : (1992) 4 SCC 503 ."
+"355. Pulicherla Nagaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 3010 [LNIND 2006 SC 621] :"
+(2006) 11 SCC 444 [LNIND 2006 SC 621] .
+"356. Hafiz v State of UP, (2005) 12 SCC 599 [LNIND 2005 SC 773] ."
+"357. Rose, (1884) 15 Cox 540. Kashiram v State of MP, (2002) 1 SCC 71 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] ,"
+incident of gun shot injuries took place near the house of the accused persons. One of them
+sustained gun shot and other wounds. This created an apprehension of further grievious hurt
+being caused to the victims. This entitled them to exercise private defence even to the extent of
+causing death.
+"358. Yeshwant Rao v State of MP, AIR 1992 SC 1633 : 1992 Cr LJ 2779 ."
+"359. Raghavan Achari v State of Kerala, AIR 1993 SC 203 : 1992 Cr LJ 3857 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC"
+719 .
+"360. Bhagwan Swaroop v State of MP, AIR 1992 SC 675 [LNIND 1992 SC 112] : 1992 Cr LJ 777 :"
+(1992) 2 SCC 406 [LNIND 1992 SC 112] .
+"361. Hukam Singh, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 711 : AIR 1961 SC 1541 [LNIND 1961 SC 136] ."
+"362. Munshi Ram, AIR 1968 SC 702 [LNIND 1967 SC 347] : 1968 Cr LJ 806 ."
+"363. Buduka Kalita, 1972 Cr LJ 1627 (Gau)."
+"364. Puran Singh, 1975 Cr LJ 1479 : AIR 1975 SC 1674 [LNIND 1975 SC 174] ."
+"365. State of Orissa v Bhagabat, 1978 Cr LJ 1566 (Orissa)."
+"366. Abdul Kadir v State of Assam, 1985 Cr LJ 1898 : AIR 1986 SC 305 : 1985 SCC (Cr) 501. See"
+"also Mehruddin Sheikh v State of WB, 1985 SCC (Cr) 241 : (1985) 2 SCC 448 where the Court"
+said that a factual study of the respective position of the parties is necessary.
+"367. Nagendra Pal Singh v State of UP, AIR 1993 SC 950 : 1993 Cr LJ 190 : (1993) Supp (3) SCC"
+197 .
+"368. State of UP v Niyamat, (1987) 3 SCC 434 [LNIND 1987 SC 391] : AIR 1987 SC 1652 [LNIND"
+1987 SC 391] : 1987 Cr LJ 1881 .
+"369. Ramesh Laxman Pardesi v State of Maharashtra, 1987 SCC (Cr ) 615 : 1987 Supp SCC 1 ."
+"370. Patori Devi v Amar Nath, (1988) 1 SCC 610 : AIR 1988 SC 560 : 1988 Cr LJ 836 ."
+"371. Kashi Ram v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 2902 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] : (2002) 1 SCC 71"
+"[LNIND 2001 SC 2369] Also see B Parichhat v State of MP, AIR 1972 SC 535 : (1972) 4 SCC 694 :"
+1972 Cr LJ 322 .
+"372. Sachee, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 76 (112). Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 244"
+"(P&H) an attempt to take forcible possession of land resisted, resistance held justified, the"
+Court explained when the right of resistance can extend to causing death. Tanaji Govind Misal v
+"State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 174 [LNIND 1997 SC 1211] : 1998 Cr LJ 340 , evidence"
+"showed that the property belonged to the complainant party and not to attackers, the owners"
+"suffered 51 wounds whereas the attackers received 15 wounds, which were also insignificant."
+The Court held that the conviction of the accused could not be altered from under section 300
+"to section 304. Pohap Singh v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 1564 : AIR 1998 SC 1554 [LNIND"
+"1997 SC 1658] , the accused party received more injuries than those suffered by the deceased's"
+party. The Court said that not the accused but the deceased was the aggressor and the accused
+acted in self defence.
+"373. Mokee, (1869) 12 WR (Cr) 15."
+"374. Birjoo Singh v Khub Lall, (1873) 19 WR (Cr) 66."
+375. Triloki Nath v State of UP AIR 2006 SC 321 [LNIND 2005 SC 867] : (2005) 13 SCC 323
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 867] ; in this case, occurrence took place 300 paces away from the disputed"
+plot - Plea of self defence against property held not available to the accused.
+"376. AR Yelve v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 1718 : AIR 1996 SC 2945 [LNIND 1996 SC 336]"
+"; Ram Pal v State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 614 [LNIND 2009 SC 1264] : AIR 2009 SC 2847"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 1264] , appellants were not in settled possession of property and as such had"
+no right of private defence to defend possession of that property. They were aggressors coming
+"to place of occurrence fully armed, reversal of acquittal of accused by the High Court was"
+upheld.
+"377. Panna Lal v State of MP, 2015 Cr LJ 3286 ."
+"378. Jassa Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 520 [LNIND 2002 SC 13] : (2002) 2 SCC 481"
+[LNIND 2002 SC 13] .
+"379. Kishan Chand v State of UP, (2007) 14 SCC 737 [LNIND 2007 SC 1190] : AIR 2008 SC 133"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1190] .
+"380. Adhimoolam v State, 1995 Cr LJ 1051 (Mad) following Puran Singh v State of Punjab, AIR"
+1975 SC 1674 [LNIND 1975 SC 174] : (1975) Cr LJ 1479 (SC) where the court cited AIR 1968 SC
+702 [LNIND 1967 SC 347] : 1968 Cr LJ 806 as defining the concept of settled possession.
+"381. Satya Narain Yadav v Gajanand, (2008) 16 SCC 609 [LNIND 2008 SC 2782] : AIR 2008 SC"
+3284 [LNIND 2008 SC 2782] .
+"382. State of Haryana v Sher Singh, AIR 2002 SC 3223 [LNIND 2002 SC 1215] ."
+"383. Ram Pat v State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 614 [LNIND 2009 SC 1264] : (2009) 8 SCR 1115"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1264] : AIR 2009 SC 2847 [LNIND 2009 SC 1264] .
+"384. Ashok Kumar v State of TN, AIR 2006 SC 2419 [LNIND 2006 SC 360] : (2006) 10 SCC 157"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 360] .
+"385. Daulat Trimbak Shewale v State of Maharashtra, (2004) 10 SCC 715 [LNIND 2004 SC 586] :"
+AIR 2004 SC 3140 [LNIND 2004 SC 586] : 2004 Cr LJ 2825 .
+"386. Madam v State of MP, (2008) 11 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1390] : AIR 2008 SC 3083"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1390] : 2008 Cr LJ 3950 .
+"387. Narain Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 11 SCC 540 [LNIND 2008 SC 864] : AIR 2008 SC"
+2006 [LNIND 2008 SC 864] : 2008 Cr LJ 2613 . Following principles stated in James Martin v
+"State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] : (2004) 1 KLT 513 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+"1097] . Salim v State of Haryana, (2008) 12 SCC 705 [LNIND 2008 SC 1613] : (2008) Cr LJ 4327 ,"
+"finding that one of the parties used force and fire causing death to take possession of land,"
+"private defence not available. The Court said that even if the right was there, it was exceeded."
+"388. AC Gangadhar v State of Karnataka, (2009) 14 SCC 710 [LNIND 1998 SC 506] : AIR 1998 SC"
+2381 [LNIND 1998 SC 506] .
+"389. Vajrapu Sambayya Naidu v. State of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 152 [LNIND 2003 SC 176] : AIR"
+2003 SC 3706 [LNIND 2003 SC 176] .
+"390. Parichhat, 1972 Cr LJ 322 : AIR 1972 SC 535 . Dilip Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1994) 2 Cr"
+"LJ 2439 (Raj) in a dispute over possession of property, one party tried to take forcible"
+"possession by committing criminal trespass, they possessed only an agricultural implement,"
+not capable of causing apprehension of death but even so the other party fired at them killing
+"one, held, they exceeded private defence, punishable under section 304-I. Telantle v State of AP,"
+(1994) 2 Cr LJ 2302 (AP) number of injuries (18 in this case caused by son on his father)
+"indicated excess of the right of private defence. Thomas George v State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC"
+"3497 : 2000 Cr LJ 3475 , right of private defence of person, punishment altered from under"
+"section 302 to that under section 304, Part II. Sekar v State of TN, 2003 Cr LJ 53 (SC) quarrel"
+"over sheeping damaging crop of the victim, owner of the sheep struck him, he fell down and"
+"was struck in the neck even after that. Right of private defence exceeded; Madan v State of MP,"
+(2008) 11 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1390] : AIR 2008 SC 3083 [LNIND 2008 SC 1390] : 2008 Cr
+"LJ 3950 , accused persons forced open the wooden door and entered the place where the wife"
+and daughter of one of them were sleeping. They caught hands of the householder and
+assaulted him with lathis. He later died. The wife and daughter were also assaulted when they
+"tried to intervene. The attackers were also injured to a certain extent and therefore, had the right"
+of private but they exceeded it. Their punishment was altered from under section 302 to section
+304 Pt. I.
+"391. Deo Narain, 1973 Cr LJ 677 (SC) : (1973) 3 SCR 57 [LNIND 1972 SC 572] : AIR 1973 SC 473"
+"[LNIND 1972 SC 572] . See further Laxman Sahu v State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 188 : AIR 1988 SC"
+83 : 1986 Supp SCC 555 : 1987 SCC (Cr) 173 where a lathi blow inflicted on the forehead caused
+"death without any apparent need for it, the accused was convicted under section 304 part I and"
+"the above case was distinguished.See also Sukumar Roy v State of WB, AIR 2006 SC 3406"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 882] : (2006) 10 SCC 635 [LNIND 2006 SC 882] .
+"392. Rafiq, 1979 Cr LJ 706 : AIR 1979 SC 1179 ; Yogendra Morarji, 1980 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1980 SC"
+"660 ; see also VC Cheriyan v State, 1982 Cr LJ 2071 (Ker). The accused receiving gun shot"
+"injuries, opened fire at the other party killing two persons, entitled to right of private defence but"
+"exceeded, convicted under scetion 304 Part I and not for murder Jagtar Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"AIR 1993 SC 2448 [LNIND 1993 SC 11] : 1993 Cr LJ 306 . See also Jasbir Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"AIR 1993 SC 968 : 1993 Cr LJ 301 : (1993) Supp (2) SCC 760 , diversion of flow of tubewell"
+"water by the deceased, accused fired killing him on the spot."
+"393. Beersingh Jagatsingh v State of Maharashtra, 2013Cr LJ2248 (Bom)."
+"394. Bayadas Bawri, 1982 Cr LJ 213 (Gau)."
+"395. Ram Phal v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1979 : 1993 Cr LJ 2603 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 740"
+". Contra : see Kulwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 1271 : 1994 Cr LJ 1109 , group clash,"
+"injuries on both sides, one died, circumstances did not entitle the exercise of right of self-"
+defence to the accused.
+"396. Kishore Shambudatta Mishra v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 1173 : 1989 Cr LJ 1149 :"
+1989 Supp (1) SCC 399 .
+"397. Kamal Singh v State of MP, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1834 MP."
+"398. Krushna Chandra Bisoi v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 1766 (Ori)."
+"399. Sukhdev Singh v State of Punjab, 1995 Cr LJ 3227 (SC)."
+"400. Gurdev Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 1270 (Raj). State v Bhuri, 1997 Cr LJ 708"
+"(Raj), mother of accused attacked and an injury caused with a sharp weapon, the accused hit"
+"back with grand force a lathi blow which fell on the head of the aggressor causing his death,"
+right of private defence exceeded.
+"401. Ram Avtar v State of UP, 2003 Cr LJ 480 (SC)."
+"402. Rajinder Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1330 ."
+"403. Abid v State of UP, (2009) 14 SCC 701 [LNIND 2009 SC 1395] ."
+"404. Krishnan v State of TN, AIR 2006 SC 3037 [LNIND 2006 SC 612] : (2006) 11 SCC 304"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 612] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+"[s 98] Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind,"
+etc.
+"When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by"
+"reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind"
+"or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on"
+"the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against"
+that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z is guilty of no offence. But A"
+has the same right of private defence which he would have if Z were sane.
+"(b) A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter Z, in good faith, taking"
+"A for a house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under this misconception,"
+"commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z, which he"
+would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
+COMMENT.—
+The right of private defence would have lost most of its value if it was not allowed to be
+exercised against persons suffering from the incapacities mentioned in this section.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 99] Acts against which there is no right of private defence.
+There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause
+"the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a"
+"public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not"
+be strictly justifiable by law.
+There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause
+"the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the"
+"direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that"
+direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.
+There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to
+the protection of the public authorities.
+Extent to which the right may be exercised.
+The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than
+it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
+Explanation 1.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an
+"act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows"
+"or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant."
+Explanation 2.—A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an
+"act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant, unless he"
+"knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such"
+"direction, or unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he"
+"has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, if demanded."
+COMMENT.—
+This section indicates the limits within which the right of private defence should be
+exercised.
+[s 99.1] First clause.—
+This clause applies to those cases in which the public servant is acting in good faith
+"under colour of his office, though the particular act being done by him may not be"
+justifiable by law.405. Where officers of Delhi Municipal Corporation acting in good faith
+by virtue of powers delegated to them by the Commissioner attempted to seize the
+"buffalo of the accused with a view to recover arrears of milk tax, the mere fact that no"
+prior notice was issued to the accused as required by the Municipal Act would not
+make their act entirely outside the law and as such accused had no private defence
+under section 99 of the Code. The officers had merely erred in exercise of their
+"powers.406. The clause applies to a case where an official has done wrongly, what he"
+"might have done rightly, but not to cases where the act could not have been done"
+rightly at all by the official concerned.407. The clause applies where a public servant
+"acts irregularly in the exercise of his powers, and not where he acts outside the scope"
+of his powers.408. Where a police officer acting bona fide under colour of his office
+"arrests a person but without authority, the person so arrested has no right of self-"
+defence against the officer.409. If the act of a public servant is ultra vires the right of
+"private defence may be exercised against him.410. A police-officer, holding a search,"
+"without a written authority, cannot be said to be acting 'under colour of his office'.411."
+[s 99.2] CASES.—Resistance to officer acting without warrant.—
+A police-officer attempted without a search-warrant to enter a house in search of
+"property alleged to have been stolen and was obstructed and resisted. It was held that,"
+even though the officer was not strictly justified in searching the house without a
+"warrant, the person obstructing and resisting could not set up the illegality of the"
+"officer's proceeding as a justification of his obstruction, as it was not shown that the"
+officer was acting otherwise than in good faith and without malice.412. Where a raiding
+party organized by the official of the Municipal Corporation to round up stray cattle
+"within the limits of the Corporation, was attacked when it had rounded up some cattle"
+"and was leading the cattle to the cattle pound, it was held that the act of the raiding"
+party was fully justifiable by law and that the accused had no right of private
+defence.413. Where a party was fired at to dispel them from their attempt to rescue
+"their friend from an illegal police detention, it was held that this was sufficient to cause"
+reasonable apprehension in their mind of death or grievous injury.414.
+[s 99.3] Illegal attachment does not justify resistance.—
+"Where articles protected from attachment were attached, it was held that this act did"
+not justify resistance.415. Where the property of a person was wrongfully attached as
+"the property of certain absconders, it was held that the rightful owner had no right of"
+"private defence of his property, as the police-officer was acting in good faith under"
+"colour of his office, and that even supposing the order of attachment might not have"
+"been properly made, that would in itself not be sufficient ground for such a defence.416."
+[s 99.4] Second clause.—
+"The first clause speaks of acts done by a public servant, this clause, of acts done under"
+the direction of a public servant. It is not necessary that the doer should be a public
+servant. Explanation 2 must be read conjointly with this clause.
+[s 99.5] CASE.—Resistance to execution of warrant.—
+"Where a police-officer attempted to execute a warrant the issue of which was illegal, it"
+was held that the accused were justified in their resistance.417.
+[s 99.6] Third clause.—
+The third clause of this section must be read with the first clause of section 105.418. It
+places an important restriction on the exercise of the right of defence. The right of
+"private defence being granted for defence only, it must not and cannot legally be"
+exercised when there is time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities.
+The right of private defence does not take the place of the functions of those public
+servants who are especially charged with the protection of life and property and the
+"apprehension of offenders, and where the assistance of the public authorities can be"
+"procured, the right cannot be lawfully exercised. But the law does not intend that a"
+person must run away to have recourse to the protection of public authorities when he
+is attacked instead of defending himself.419. A person in possession cannot be
+expected to leave his property at the mercy of armed trespassers. Where there is
+imminent danger to the property and the person in possession apprehends substantial
+"damage thereto, he is entitled to raise his own arms in defence and retaliate to keep"
+away the attack without applying for State aid.420. Where the accused was in rightful
+"possession of the property by virtue of a Court order; under section 145 Cr PC, 1973, he"
+had every right to throw out the complainant party from the land and demolish the
+construction stealthily put up thereon.421. The important considerations which always
+arise in order to determine whether the action of the accused is covered by the right of
+"private defence are, first, what is the nature of the apprehended danger, and, second,"
+"whether there was time to have recourse to the police authorities, always remembering"
+that when both the parties are determined to fight and go up to the land fully armed in
+full expectation of an armed conflict in order to have a trial of strength the right of
+private defence disappears.422.
+[s 99.7] CASES.—Time to obtain protection of public authorities.—
+The accused received information one evening that the complainants intended to go on
+"his land on the following day, and uproot the corn sown in it. At about three o'clock next"
+morning he was informed that the complainants had entered on his land and were
+"ploughing up the corn. Thereupon he at once proceeded to the spot, followed by the"
+"remaining accused, and remonstrated with the complainants, who commenced an"
+"attack on the accused. In the fight which ensued, both sides received serious injuries,"
+and the leader of the complainants' party was killed. It was held that the complainants
+"being the aggressors, the accused had the right of private defence and that they were"
+not bound to act on the information received on the previous evening and seek the
+"protection of the public authorities, as they had no reason to apprehend a night attack"
+"on their property.423. In a case involving an old land dispute, one party (accused)"
+offered resistance to prevent the other from ploughing the land and on refusal went up
+to the place where the other was sitting without arms and inflicted stick blows causing
+"death, it was held that the accused was rightly convicted. The Court said that a rightful"
+"owner can defend his possession against any attempt to dislodge him, but that once a"
+trespasser has established his foothold; resort should be had to public authorities.424.
+The right of private defence does not extend to inflicting of more harm than necessary
+"for the purpose of defence. The prosecution party, in this case, had gone to plough the"
+land which was in the possession of the accused (appellant). The latter had time to go
+and report the matter to appropriate authorities constituted under the law. But instead
+"of so doing, they brutally attacked the other party resulting in the death of three"
+"persons. Thus, there was no right of private defence. It was held that there was no"
+warrant for converting the conviction from u/section 302 to section 304 Part II.425.
+[s 99.8] Fourth clause.—
+The right of private defence is restricted to not inflicting more harm than it is necessary
+to inflict for the purpose of defence. The amount of force necessarily depends on the
+"circumstances of the case, and there is no protection if the harm is caused by"
+"excessive violence quite unnecessary to the case.426. For example, a person set by his"
+"master to watch a garden or yard is not at all justified in shooting at, or injuring in any"
+"way, persons who may come into those premises, even in the night. He ought first to"
+see whether he could not take measures for their apprehension.427. The measure of
+self-defence must always be proportionate to the quantum of force used by the
+attacker and which it is necessary to repel.428. In dealing with the question as to
+whether more force is used than is necessary or than was justified by the prevailing
+"circumstances, it would be inappropriate to adopt tests of detached objectivity of a"
+Court room. The means which a threatened person adopts or the force which he uses
+should not be weighed in golden scales.429. Though a person exercising his right of
+"private defence is not expected to modulate his defence step by step or tier by tier, yet"
+it is necessary to see that it is not totally disproportionate to the injury sought to be
+"averted, e.g., to ward off a slap one cannot fire a gun. Thus, where the father of the"
+"accused was allegedly assaulted with lathis which resulted in simple injuries, the"
+accused was not justified in firing his gun and thereby killing the attacker. In such a
+case it could not be said that there was a reasonable apprehension of death or
+"grievous hurt within the meaning of clause (1) of section 100, IPC, 1860.430. But at the"
+same time it should also be remembered that if a man has real justification to exercise
+"his right of private defence, he cannot be held liable if he slightly exceeds his right of"
+"private defence, e.g., where face to face with a murderous attack he fires two shots in"
+"quick succession, for these things cannot be weighed in golden scales.431. The right of"
+private defence should not be allowed to be pleaded or availed of as pretext for a
+"vindictive, aggressive or retributive purpose.432."
+[s 99.9] CASES.—Justifiable harm.—
+A party attempted to rescue a friend from unlawful police detention. Three rounds were
+fired to dispel them. This caused in their mind a reasonable apprehension of death or
+injury. They tried to snatch the police gun. A police informer intervened and died of
+injuries received in the process. The right of private defence was held to be not
+exceeded.433. In another case the Supreme Court accepted the defence version that
+there were four assailants who had come well prepared to assault at the door of their
+house. In such a situation accused persons could have a reasonable apprehension of
+death or at least of grievous hurt. It was a case of single gunshot which was not
+"repeated. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused persons had exceeded their"
+right of private defence in any manner.434.
+"In view of the fact that the accused was pursued, that he only picked up the weapon"
+"when he was chased and that he used it only once, his sentence was reduced to three"
+years and nine months.435.
+[s 99.10] Attack on unarmed persons.—
+No right of private defence can exist against an unarmed and unoffending
+individual;436. where the injury was caused to the victim on the vital parts of the body
+"even though he and the witnesses present at the spot were all unarmed, it was held"
+that the question of acting in self-defence did not arise.437.
+[s 99.11] Sudden quarrel.—
+The right of private defence was held to be not available where the incident of lathi
+blows causing death took place in the course of a sudden fight.438.
+[s 99.12] More harm caused than necessary.—
+"Where a person killed a weak old woman found stealing at night,439. where a person"
+caught a thief in his house at night and deliberately killed him with a pick-axe to prevent
+his escape;440. where a number of persons apprehending a thief committing house-
+breaking strangled him and subjected him to gross maltreatment when he was fully in
+"their power,441. and where a heavy and mechanically propelled vehicle like a jeep was"
+"used as a means or weapon for the exercise of the right of private defence,442. the right"
+of private defence was negatived.443. Where the injuries suffered by the accused were
+of simple nature than those caused by him to the deceased persons and he went even
+"to the extent of preventing a witness from carrying the victim to a hospital, it was held"
+"that the accused was an aggressor and was, therefore, not entitled to the right of"
+"private defence.444. Where, on the other hand, two drunk and armed raiders demanded"
+money from the residents of a flat and in face to face with the inmates who resisted
+"them, lost their lives, it being not known which inmate played what role, the Supreme"
+Court held that it could not be said that more harm was caused than was
+necessary.445. Where the accused caused death in order to repel an attack by a party
+"armed with lethal weapons and which had already caused injuries to the accused, it"
+was held that the accused did not exceed his rights as it was not possible for him to
+have weighed in golden scales in the heat of the moment the number of injuries
+required to overcome the attack.446. Where the accused continued to assault the
+"deceased even after he fell to the ground, the possibility of causing injuries in exercise"
+of his right of private defence was ruled out.447.
+"Where the accused received an injury on his neck first, the right of private defence was"
+held to have arisen. But it was shown that three injuries were caused in return one of
+them entering deep into the chest and causing death. The right of private defence was
+held to have been exceeded. The conviction was modified to one under section
+304(1).448.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"405. Dalip, (1896) 18 All 246 , 252."
+"406. Kesho Ram, 1974 Cr LJ 814 : AIR 1974 SC 1158 [LNIND 1974 SC 130] ."
+"407. Bhairo v State, 1941 Kar 324 ; Pagla Baba, (1957) Cr LJ 769 ; Ouseph Varkey, (1964) 1 Cr LJ"
+592 .
+"408. Deoman Shamji, (1958) 61 Bom LR 30 ."
+"409. Mohamed Ismail v State, (1935) 13 Ran 754."
+"410. Jogendra Nath Mukerjee, (1897) 24 Cal 320 ; Tulsiram v State, (1888) 13 Bom 168; Haq Dad,"
+"(1925) 6 Lah 392; Achhru Ram, (1925) 7 Lah 104."
+"411. Ram Parves, (1944) 23 Pat 328."
+"412. Pukot Kotu, (1896) 19 Mad 349."
+"413. Kanwar Singh, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 1 : AIR 1965 SC 871 [LNIND 1964 SC 194] ."
+"414. State of UP v Niyamat, 1987 3 SCC 434 [LNIND 1987 SC 391] : AIR 1987 SC 1652 [LNIND"
+"1987 SC 391] : 1989 Cr LJ 1881 . See also Ramji Lal v State of Rajasthan, 1990 Cr LJ 392 Raj,"
+"police party arriving at a village at night to recover a woman and to hand her over to her father,"
+"the act being illegal and without jurisdiction, this section did not give protection to the police"
+against resistance by villagers.
+"415. Poomalai Udayan, (1898) 21 Mad 296."
+"416. Bhai Lal Chowdhry, (1902) 29 Cal 417 ."
+"417. Jogendra Nath Mukerjee, (1897) 24 Cal 320 ."
+"418. Narsang Pathabhai, (1890) 14 Bom 441."
+"419. Alingal Kunhinayan, (1905) 28 Mad 454."
+"420. State of Orissa v Rabindranath, 1973 Cr LJ 1686 (FB-Ori)."
+"421. Akonti Bora, 1980 Cr LJ 138 (Gau)."
+"422. Satnarain Das, (1938) 17 Pat 607."
+"423. Narsang Pathabhai, (1890) 14 Bom 441; Pachkauri, (1897) 24 Cal 686 ."
+"424. Maguni Charan Pradhan v State of Orissa, (1991) 71 Cut LT 710 : (1991) 3 SCC 352 [LNIND"
+1991 SC 191] : 1991 SCC (Cr) 580 : 1991 Cr LR (SC) 463 .
+"425. Ritaram Besra v State of Bihar, (2007) 15 SCC 383 ."
+"426. Gokool Bowree, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 33."
+"427. John Scutty v State, (1824) 1 C & P 319."
+"428. Ram Prasad Mahton, (1919) 4 PLJ 289 , 20 Cr LJ 375."
+"429. Jai Dev, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 495 : AIR 1963 SC 612 [LNIND 1962 SC 249] ; Amjad Khan, 1952 Cr"
+LJ 648 : AIR 1952 SC 165 [LNIND 1952 SC 20] ; Puran Singh; 1975 Cr LJ 1479 : AIR 1975 SC
+"1674 [LNIND 1975 SC 174] ; followed in Pattu v State of MP, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1970 MP, father and"
+son were entitled to ward off an attack on them while they were digging a water channel on their
+"ground. Hira, 1972 Cr LJ 225 : AIR 1972 SC 244 ."
+"430. State of UP. v Ram Swarup, 1974 Cr LJ 1035 : AIR 1974 SC 1570 [LNIND 1974 SC 472] ."
+"Where both parties raised guns in a quarrel but one of them lowered his gun, even so the other"
+"fired at him. No occasion for private defence. Conviction for murder upheld, Mohd. Yusuf v State"
+"of UP, AIR 1994 SC 1542 [LNIND 1994 SC 126] : (1994) 1 Cr LJ 1631 : 1994 Supp (2) SCC 32 ."
+"431. Amjad Khan, supra; See also Jaidev, supra and Yogendra Morarji, 1980 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1980"
+SC 660 .
+"432. Munney Khan, (1970) 2 SCC 480 [LNIND 1970 SC 338] : AIR 1971 SC 1491 [LNIND 1970 SC"
+338] .
+"433. State of UP v Nyama, (1987) 3 SCC 434 [LNIND 1987 SC 391] . State of MP v Mishrilal, 2003"
+"Cr LJ 2312 (SC) : (2003) 9 SCC 426 [LNIND 2003 SC 390] , the prosecution party and the"
+"accused party cause to be engaged in firing against each other. The father, who was one of the"
+"accused, received five injuries dangerous to life. The firing accused apprehended danger to the"
+life of his father and fired in self-defence. The accused did not exceed the right of private
+defence.
+"434. State of UP v Gajey Singh, 2009 Cr LJ 2274 : (2009) 11 SCC 414 [LNIND 2009 SC 437] :"
+(2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 1412.
+"435. R v Thompson, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S) 72 [CA (Crim Div)]."
+"436. Gurbachan Singh, 1974 Cr LJ 463 : AIR 1974 SC 496 ."
+"437. Baitullah v State of UP, AIR 1997 SC 3946 [LNIND 1997 SC 1322] : 1997 Cr LJ 4644 , Rukma"
+"v Jala, AIR 1997 SC 3207 : 1997 Cr LJ 4641 , a case which hanged on appreciation of evidence."
+"Mavila Thamban Nambiar v State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 687 [LNIND 1997 SC 24] : (1997) 1 JT"
+"367 private defence not available because the deceased was unarmed, accused persons armed"
+"with a pair of scissors. Vishal Singh v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 505 : AIR 1998 SC 308 [LNIND"
+"1997 SC 1362] , land dispute, revenue record not clear, accused in possession were fully armed,"
+"others came in wholly unarmed and became the victim of attack, private defence not allowed to"
+accused.
+"438. Bihari Rai v State of Bihar, (2008) 15 SCC 778 [LNIND 2008 SC 1927] : AIR 2009 SC 18"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1927] : 2009 Cr LJ 340 .
+"439. Gokool Bowree, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 33."
+"440. Durwan Geer, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 73. See Bag, (1902) PR No. 29 of 1902; Mammun, (1916)"
+PR No. 35 of 1916.
+"441. Dhununjai Poly, (1870) 14 WR (Cr) 68."
+"442. Marudevi Avva, 1958 Cr LJ 33 ."
+"443. See also Madan Mohan Pandey v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 769 ; 1991 Cr LJ 467 : 1991"
+"Supp (2) SCC 603 , where the Supreme Court emphasised that the nature of the weapon and the"
+number of shots fired are helpful circumstances in determining excessive use of the right of
+"private defence. Indiscriminate firing here, held right exceeded. For a general study of the"
+"subject see, Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, Rethinking Goodfaith in Excessive Private Defence, (1988)"
+JILI 443.
+"444. Kanhiyalal v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC 1515 : 1989 Supp. 2 SCC 263 : 1989 Cr LJ"
+1482 : 1989 BBCJ 117 : 1990 SCC (Cr) 168.
+"445. Kishore Shambudatta Mishra v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 1173 : 1989 Cr LJ 1149 :"
+1989 SCC (Cr) 464.
+"446. Buta Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 1316 [LNIND 1991 SC 177] : 1991 Cr LJ 1464 :"
+"(1991) 2 SCC 612 [LNIND 1991 SC 177] . Vidya Saran Sharma v Sudarshan Lal, AIR 1993 SC 2476"
+": 1993 Cr LJ 3135 (SC), accused injured by the deceased, apprehending further danger he hit"
+"back with a single blow which proved fatal, acquittal on the ground of private defence; Thakarda"
+"Hamirji Gajuji v State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 3966 (Guj)."
+"447. Harabailu Kariappa v State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 321 (Kant). Man Bharan Singh v State"
+"of MP, 1996 Cr LJ 2707 (MP) injuries disproportionately severe as against minor injuries, right"
+"exceeded, conviction under section 304 Pt. I. Naranjan Singh v Kuldip Singh, 1998 Cr LJ 845 : AIR"
+"1998 SC 1490 [LNIND 1997 SC 1574] , the accused was not shown to be present on the spot"
+"and, therefore, the question of his exceeding the right of private defence did not arise. Achhaibar"
+"Prasad v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2666 : 1997 All LJ 705, the accused attacked and fired at a police"
+constable in his bid to arrest him. Right of private defence not available to him.
+"448. Udaikumar Pandharinath Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, (2008) 5 SCC 214 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+1007] : AIR 2008 SC 2064 [LNIND 2008 SC 1007] : 2008 Cr LJ 2627 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 100] When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.
+"The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in"
+"the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to"
+"the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the"
+"descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—"
+First.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will
+otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
+Secondly.—Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous
+hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
+Thirdly.—An assault with the intention of committing rape;
+Fourthly.—An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
+Fifthly.—An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
+"Sixthly.—An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under"
+circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable
+to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
+449.[Seventhly.—An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or
+administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will
+otherwise be the consequence of such act.]
+COMMENT.—
+The law authorizes a man who is under a reasonable apprehension that his life is in
+danger or his body in risk of grievous hurt to inflict death upon his assailant either
+"when the assault is attempted or directly threatened, but the apprehension must be"
+reasonable and the violence inflicted must not be greater than is reasonably necessary
+for the purpose of self-defence. It must be proportionate to and commensurate with
+the quality and character of the act it is intended to meet and what is done in excess is
+not protected. Where the accused was attacked by three persons and sustained an
+"injury on the forehead, a vital part, he had reasonable apprehension of some hurt to be"
+caused to him and had the right of self-defence but had exceeded by causing more
+"harm to his assailants than needed. He was liable under section 304, Part I, and not"
+"under section 302.450. Where after receiving nine injuries, two on vital parts, the"
+"accused fired one shot from his gun which hit fatally an innocent person, the right of"
+private defence extending to cause death was still available to the accused. His
+"conviction under section 304, Part I was set aside.451. Where the complainant's party"
+had deliberately gathered near the house of the accused and scolded them and caused
+"injuries to his father, the accused was held justified in exercising the right of private"
+defence to defend his father and his conviction under section 300 was set aside.452. It
+is the reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt that gives rise to the right of
+"private defence under clauses (1) and (2) of section 100, IPC, 1860., and it has got"
+nothing to do with the actual injury that the person exercising the right of private
+"defence has suffered, which may or may not be grievous.453. Where the accused fails"
+"to make out a case of reasonable apprehension, he cannot claim the right of private"
+defence.454. Where the life of the accused was not endangered by the ladies armed
+"with broom sticks and 'chappals', the accused was not entitled to stab one of the ladies"
+to death in exercise of right of private defence.455.
+The extended right of private defence to the extent of causing death of the assailant
+arises only if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right is of one of the
+"kinds mentioned in this section.456. Following some earlier rulings, the Supreme Court"
+has re-emphasised that the mere fact of the accused sustaining some injuries in the
+course of the same transaction does not make it out conclusively that the accused had
+the occasion to cause death in private defence.457. Where the attacking party chanced
+to get at the wife of the accused and the latter pounced upon them with a weapon
+"attacking one of them which was warded off, another came forward and the accused"
+"successfully struck him and he died, the accused was held to be within his rights.458."
+"As against this where two were fighting with lathis and the brother of one of them, who"
+"was outside the danger, struck a lathi blow to the other killing him, he was held to be"
+"guilty under section 304-I.459. In a communal tension, both sides pelted stones. The"
+accused fired a gun shot causing death of a person of the other group though no one
+had sustained any injury as a result of pelting of stones by the other group. It was held
+that the accused had no occasion to act under the right of private defence.460.
+"In order to justify the act of causing death of assailant, the accused has simply to"
+satisfy the Court that there was reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
+Question whether the apprehension was reasonable or not is a question of fact
+depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula
+"can be prescribed in this regard. Weapon used, the manner and nature of assault and"
+other surrounding circumstances should be taken into account while evaluating
+"whether the apprehension was justified or not. In the instant case, accused G was"
+assaulted on head by a sharp-edged weapon which caused a bone-deep injury. As per
+the defence version there were four assailants who had come well prepared at the door
+of accused's house to commit assault. Reasonable apprehension of death or at least of
+"grievous hurt, therefore, could not be ruled out. In such a situation, if single gunshot"
+was fired it could not be said that the accused persons had exceeded their right of
+private defence in any manner.461.
+[s 100.1] 'Abducting'.—
+"On a plain reading of clause fifth of this section, there does not seem to be any reason"
+for holding that the word 'abducting' used in the clause means anything more than
+"what is defined as ""abduction"" in section 362. All that the clause requires is that there"
+should be an assault which is an offence against the human body and that assault
+"should be with the intention of abducting, and whenever these elements are present the"
+"clause will be applicable.462. Thus, a woman could not be taken away by force even by"
+her own husband from a paramour's house and if in these circumstances the paramour
+"and his brother killed the husband to prevent her abduction by the husband, they would"
+be protected by sub-clause (5) of section 100 of the Penal Code.463. Here law seems to
+"be contrary to our social conscience, but this interpretation is perfectly in accord with"
+"the language of section 100, IPC, 1860, and the decision of the Supreme Court in"
+Viswanath's case464. where too the husband was put to death by a clean stab by his
+brother-in-law as he was trying to take away his wife by force from his father-in-law's
+house and in the process had merely dragged his unwilling wife to some distance.
+[s 100.2] Rescuing woman-folk from attack on modesty.—
+The accused heard the cries for help of his widowed sister-in-law. He ran to her house
+with gandasa. He found the attacker grappling with her and trying to outrage her
+modesty. The accused saved her from his clutches and inflicted a gandasa blow while
+he was going to run away. The act of the accused was held to have been done in the
+exercise of the right of private defence. The accused was acquitted.465.
+[s 100.3] CASES.—Exceeding the right.—
+The accused was being chased. He assaulted the chaser. The latter died. The injuries
+found on the person of the deceased were more grievous than those on the body of the
+accused. It was held that the accused exceeded his right of private defence his
+"conviction was altered from under section 300 to one under section 304, Part I.466."
+Whenever accused-party sustains injuries in the same occurrence and when the
+injuries are grievous in nature it is incumbent upon the prosecution to explain the
+injuries on the person of the accused.467. Where the accused might have acted on self-
+"defence in the beginning, but once the deceased was. The prosecution party consisted"
+of four members. They carried blunt weapons. They assembled in front of the house of
+the accused. They came as aggressors. The accused suffered a bone deep injury on
+his head. The accused fired a single gunshot which caused death of one of the
+members on the prosecution side. The Court held that the right of private defence was
+not exceeded. The accused was given the benefit of doubt.468.
+Where the victim was throwing broken bricks at the accused who received simple
+"injuries and the accused fired at him with his gun, it was held that he exceeded the right"
+of private defence. There was no justification for using the gun in such as to cause
+death. Conviction under section 304 Part I was restored.469. The right of private
+defence was not allowed to be claimed merely on the ground that there was a quarrel
+and the accused sustained injuries in the course of it.470.
+[s 100.4] No danger.—
+Two friends were sitting together and consuming liquor. They quarrelled and
+exchanged blows. One of them inflicted two knife wounds on vital parts of the body of
+"the other. The victim had posed no danger to the attacker, nor did he have any weapons"
+with him. The plea of self-defence was held to be not available. The accused was
+convicted for murder.471. The deceased came to his land and asked the accused party
+to get the land measured and also tried to dislodge a pole fixed by them. There was no
+imminent danger to person on property from any act of the deceased. No injuries
+caused to anybody. It was held that there was no right of self-defence in the exercise of
+which the deceased could have been killed.472.
+[s 100.5] Private defence.—
+The accused was without any arms when the quarrel started. His action of picking up a
+stick lying on the ground and hitting the deceased on his head with it showed that he
+was trying to save himself from the attack by the deceased and his son. The accused
+was acquitted because the circumstances made it obvious that he was acting in self-
+defence.473.
+[s 100.6] Burden of proof.—
+The right of private defence is a plea which is available to the accused by the burden of
+proving the same is on him.474. Proof by preponderance of probabilities is
+sufficient.475. The burden of proving the right of private defence is not as onerous as
+that of the prosecution to prove its case. Preponderance of probabilities in favour of
+the defence is enough to discharge the burden.476. While the prosecution is required to
+"prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need not establish his plea of"
+self-defence to the hilt and may discharge onus by showing preponderance of
+"probabilities in favour of that plea on basis of material on record, injuries received by an"
+"accused, imminence of threat to his safety, injuries caused by accused and"
+circumstances whether accused had time to have recourse to public authorities were
+held to relevant factors. But number of injuries is not always considered to be a safe
+criterion for determining who the aggressor was. Whenever injuries are on the body of
+"the accused person, presumption need not necessarily be raised that accused person"
+had caused injuries in his defence. Defence has to further to show that injuries so
+caused on accused probabilise version of private defence. Non-explanation of injuries
+sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or in course of the
+altercation is a very important circumstance but mere non-explanation may not affect
+prosecution case in all cases.477.
+The burden stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of
+the plea of the accused either by himself adducing positive evidence or by referring to
+circumstances transpiring from prosecution evidence itself. Proof beyond reasonable
+doubt is not required. The Court can consider the plea even if not taken by the accused
+if the material on record makes it available for consideration.478.
+[s 100.7] Acid Attack (Clause 7).—
+"The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in"
+"section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant if the"
+offence which occasions the exercise of the right against an act of throwing or
+administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably
+cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such
+act. This new category of offence (acid attacks) to which a right to private defence is
+"inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013479. on the recommendation of"
+Justice Verma Committee.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"449. Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, section 2 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"450. Scaria v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 2342 : 1995 Cr LJ 3990 ."
+"451. Wassan Singh v State of Punjab, 1996 Cr LJ 878 : (1996) 1 SCC 458 [LNIND 1995 SC 1195] ;"
+"Ghurey Lal v State of UP, (2008) 10 SCC 450 [LNIND 2008 SC 1535] ; Dattu Shamrao Valake v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 2005 Cr LJ 2555 : AIR 2005 SC 2331 [LNIND 2005 SC 383] : (2005) 11 SCC"
+261 [LNIND 2005 SC 383] .
+"452. Shive Chand v State of UP, 1995 Cr LJ 3869 (All)."
+"453. Raja Ram, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 85 (All); See also Abdul Kadir v State of Assam, 1985 Cr LJ 1898"
+: AIR 1986 SC 305 : 1985 Supp SCC 603 .
+"454. Vishvas v State, 1978 Cr LJ 484 : AIR 1978 SC 414 [LNIND 1978 SC 17] . Where there is no"
+"right of private defence, e.g. causing death of a person in order to prevent him from exercising"
+"lawful rights on lawfully held land, it would be punishable as murder, Asha Ram v State of"
+"Rajasthan, (1994) 2 Cr LJ 2431 (Raj)."
+"455. Vishnu Narayan Moger v State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 1121 (Kant). Right of self-defence"
+"not available where the accused came prepared for fight and attack on unarmed victim, Baj"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1953 : 1995 Cr LJ 3605 ."
+"456. Ram Saiya, (1948) All 165 . See also Kishore Shambudatta Mishra v State of Maharashtra,"
+"AIR 1989 SC 1173 : 1989 Cr LJ 1149 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 399 , discussed under the preceding"
+"section. Also Raza Pasha v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1793 [LNIND 1984 SC 255] :"
+"(1984) 4 SCC 441 [LNIND 1984 SC 255] : 1984 SCC (Cr) 605, the person shot at from house top"
+"and killed was outside the house at that time, held that there was no occasion for private"
+"defence, conviction under section 302. Wassan Singh vState of Punjab, (1996) 1 SCC 458 [LNIND"
+"1995 SC 1195] : 1996 Cr LJ 878 , the accused surrounded by a number of assailants who were"
+"all inflicting injuries on him, he shot at them hitting an innocent person who died, right of private"
+defence not lost thereby.
+"457. Paras Nath Singh v State of Bihar and Hare Krishna Singh v State of Bihar, 1988 Cr LJ 925 :"
+"AIR 1988 SC 863 [LNIND 1988 SC 139] : (1988) 2 SCC 95 [LNIND 1988 SC 139] , relying on"
+"Onkar Nath Singh v State of UP, AIR 1974 SC 1550 [LNIND 1974 SC 154] : 1974 Cr LJ 1015 :"
+(1975) 3 SCC 276 [LNIND 1974 SC 154] : 1975 SCC (Cr) 884. But injuries suffered by the
+accused must be explained to be not caused in the same episode and if the information as to
+"injuries on the accused is suppressed by the prosecution, the case becomes doubtful. Prem"
+"Singh v State of HP, 1989 Cr LJ 1903 HP. Dispute over turn for irrigation, both sides injured, the"
+"fact of injuries on the accused suppressed and FIR also filed after delay, acquittal, Desa Singh v"
+"Punjab, 1996 Cr LJ 3381 (P&H). Another similar dispute and death in mutual fight, State of"
+"Haryana v Karan Singh, 1996 Cr LJ 3698 (P&H)."
+"458. Purna Chandra Barik v State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 731 Orissa. Where the finding of the High"
+"Court was that the accused, a police sub-inspector, was assaulted by the deceased and his"
+companions and he used firearms causing death under the apprehension that otherwise he
+"would be killed, this finding was held by the Supreme Court to be neither perverse nor palpably"
+"erroneous, State of Punjab v Ajaib Singh, AIR 1995 SC 975 [LNIND 1995 SC 136] : (1995) 2 Cr LJ"
+1456 : (1995) 2 SCC 486 [LNIND 1995 SC 136] . Warding off two successive attacks by the
+"complainant party, clause 'firstly' and 'secondly' were held to be attracted, Raj Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 680 P&H."
+"459. Sudhir Mahanta v State of Orissa, 1980 Cr LJ 1918 Orissa. Kesha v State of Rajasthan, AIR"
+"1993 SC 2651 : 1993 Cr LJ 3674 : 1995 Supp (3) SCC 743 , accused causing death without any"
+"reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to himself, punishment for exceeding the"
+"right of private defence. Baijnath Mahton v State of Bihar, 1993 Cr LJ 2833 : AIR 1993 SC 2323 :"
+"1993 Supp (3) SCC 1 , right of private defence exceeded in a group clash. Dular Mahto v State of"
+"Bihar, AIR 1993 SC 927 : 1993 Cr LJ 165 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 467 , excesses in a group clash."
+"Babu Ram v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 3788 (P&H), the case is of doubtful validity because"
+aggressors were given the benefit of the right of private defence.
+"460. Parshottam Lal Ji Waghela v State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 2521 : 1992 Supp (3) SCC 194 . In"
+"a direct confrontation, there was the possibility of the accused becoming apprehensive of"
+"danger to himself and his family, he fired only one round, plea of private defence sustained,"
+"Harish Kumar v MP, 1996 Cr LJ 3511 : AIR 1996 SC 3433 [LNIND 1996 SC 1027] ."
+"461. State of UP v Gajey Singh, (2009) 11 SCC 414 [LNIND 2009 SC 437] : 2009 Cr LJ 2274 :"
+(2009) 3 All LJ 647.
+"462. Vishwanath v State of UP, 1960 Cr LJ 154 , (1960) 1 SCR 646 [LNIND 1959 SC 150] : AIR"
+1960 SC 67 [LNIND 1959 SC 150] .
+"463. Nankau v State, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 116 (All)."
+"464. Vishwanath, supra."
+"465. Bhadar Ram v State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 1174 (Raj). Badan Nath v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1999 Cr LJ 2268 (Raj), causing injury to save daughter from being raped."
+"466. Suresh Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1773 [LNIND 1999 SC 324] : 1999 Cr LJ 2585"
+"; Shankar Balu Patil v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 450 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 591, the"
+nature of injuries upon the accused and those upon the deceased clearly showed that the
+accused exceeded the right of private defence. Conviction under section 304 Pt. I and seven
+years imprisonment justified.
+"467. Manphool Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2018 SC 3995 ."
+"468. Gajey Singh v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 2838 (All); State of UP v Laeeq, 1999 Cr LJ 2877 at p"
+"2879 : AIR 1999 SC 1742 [LNIND 1999 SC 476] , no allegation of any fear, no right of private"
+"defence. Ram Dhani v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2286 (All), the accused exceeded the right of private"
+defence in causing death in circumstances in which justification for causing death was not
+available to him.
+"469. Shingara Singh v State of Haryana, (2003) 12 SCC 758 [LNIND 2003 SC 945] : AIR 2004 SC"
+"124 [LNIND 2003 SC 945] : 2004 Cr LJ 828 . Anil Kumar v State of UP, 2004 All LJ 3779 : 2005"
+"SCC (Cr) 178, the accused receiving minor injuries fired at the deceased to cause death, private"
+defence exceeded.
+"470. Chacko v State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 269 [LNIND 2004 SC 86] : AIR 2004 SC 2688"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 86] : (2004) 1 KLT 884 [LNIND 2004 SC 86] .
+"471. Inacio Manual Miranda v State of Goa, 1999 Cr LJ 422 (Bom); State of MP v Ramesh, 2005"
+Cr LJ 652 SC : AIR 2006 SC 204 [LNIND 2005 SC 881] : (2005) 13 SCC 247 [LNIND 2005 SC 881]
+", the plea of private defence cannot be based on surmises and conjectures, and guess work."
+"Father asked his son to get his gun and shoot because they were irresponsive, death and"
+"injuries caused, conviction for murder because there was no danger which could create the right"
+of private offence.
+"472. Dhaneswar Mahakud v State of Orissa, 2006 Cr LJ 2113 SC : AIR 2006 SC 1727 [LNIND"
+2006 SC 252] : (2006) 9 SCC 307 [LNIND 2006 SC 252] .
+"473. Krishanan v State of TN, 2006 Cr LJ 3907 : AIR 2006 SC 3037 [LNIND 2006 SC 612] : (2006)"
+11 SCC 304 [LNIND 2006 SC 612] .
+"474. Kishan Chand v State of UP, (2007) 14 SCC 737 [LNIND 2007 SC 1190] : AIR 2008 SC 133"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1190] : (2007) 6 All LJ 658.
+"475. V Subramani v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 1727 : AIR 2005 SC 1983 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] :"
+(2005) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] .
+"476. Dharminder v State of HP, AIR 2002 SC 3097 [LNIND 2002 SC 537] ."
+"477. Dharam v State of Haryana, (2007) 15 SCC 241 [LNIND 2006 SC 1108] . Raghbir Singh v"
+"State of Haryana, (2008) 16 SCC 33 [LNIND 2008 SC 2228] : AIR 2009 SC 1223 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+"2228] : (2009) 73 AIC 93 , right of private defence not made out on facts."
+"478. James Martin v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] , Laxman Singh v"
+"Poonam Singh, (2004) 10 SCC 94 [LNIND 2003 SC 767] : AIR 2003 SC 3204 [LNIND 2003 SC 767]"
+", Kulwant Singh v State of Punjab, (2004) 9 SCC 257 [LNIND 2004 SC 105] : AIR 2004 SC 2875"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 105] , right of private defence could not be proved. Bagdi Ram v State of MP,"
+(2004) 12 SCC 302 [LNIND 2003 SC 1047] : AIR 2004 SC 387 [LNIND 2003 SC 1047] : 2004 Cr LJ
+"632 , no right of private defence to use dangerous arms when the other side was absolutely"
+unarmed.
+"479. Act 13 of 2013, section 2 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 101] When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.
+If the offence be not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding
+"section, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary"
+"causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restrictions mentioned in"
+"section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death."
+COMMENT.—
+Any harm short of death can be inflicted in exercising the right of private defence in any
+"case which does not fall within the provisions of section 100. Thus, where only some"
+mischief was caused to the factory and some brickbats were thrown by agitating
+"workers, the owner of the factory was not justified in killing a worker by firing a shot"
+"from his revolver. As there was no apprehension of death or grievous hurt to his person,"
+the accused could not get the benefit of clauses (1) and (2) of section 100 or section
+"103, IPC, 1860. He had only a limited right of private defence to cause any other harm"
+"than death within the meaning of section 101, IPC, 1860, and as such having exercised"
+"his right of private defence he was liable to be convicted under section 304-Part I, IPC,"
+1860.480. The accused was hit by a single brickbat or a stone piece and suffered a
+simple head-injury. After sometime he fired at the unarmed assailant causing grievous
+injury to his abdomen. The Supreme Court held that keeping in mind his simple hurt
+"and the time gap between that and the gunshot wound caused by him, his action was a"
+retaliation rather than act of private defence. His conviction under section 326 was
+accordingly upheld.481. The right of private defence was held to have been exceeded
+where a member of the opposite side was killed after snatching his pistol.482. The
+person who died came along with his brothers to stage a fight with the accused
+because of an earlier act of insult on the part of the accused. A single stab wound was
+"administered to him, which fell upon his lower abdomen, of which he died. The accused"
+and his wife were also injured in the process. It was held that the accused had not
+exceeded his right of private defence.483.
+When dealing with questions relating to right of private defence of the body this section
+and section 100 should be read together.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"480. Mahinder Paul v State, 1979 Cr LJ 584 : AIR 1979 SC 577 [LNIND 1978 SC 389] ; See also"
+"Yogendra Morarij, 1980 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1980 SC 660 ."
+"481. State of J&K v Hazara Singh, 1980 Cr LJ 1501 : 1981 SCC (Cr) 537 : AIR 1981 SC 451 ."
+"482. Ghunnu v State of UP, 1980 Cr LJ (NOC) 15 : AIR 1980 SC 864 : 1980 All LJ 397 : 1979 SCC"
+"(Cr) 438. See also Chuhar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 1052 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 455 :"
+"1991 SCC (Cr) 1066, where the circumstances did not justify causing death by gun shot injuries."
+"Bandlamuddi Atchuta Ramaiah v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 496 : 1996 Cr LJ 4463 death of"
+neighbour caused at a time when there was no apprehension of loss of life or property. Right
+exceeded. Conviction under section 304 Part I.
+"483. Ramchandran v State, 1994 Cr LJ 2741 (Mad); Sri Kumar Sharma v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr"
+"LJ 2258 (Pat), right of private defence found justified, hence, acquittal."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 102] Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the
+body.
+The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable
+apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the
+offence though the offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as
+such apprehension of danger to the body continues.
+COMMENT.—
+This section indicates when the right of private defence of the body commences and
+till what time it continues. The right commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension
+"of danger to the body arises from an attempt, or threat, or commit the offence,"
+"although the offence may not have been committed, but not until that there is that"
+reasonable apprehension. The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of
+the danger to the body continues.484. It commences and continues as long as danger
+to body lasts. The extent to which the exercise of the right will be justified will depend
+not on the actual danger but on whether there was reasonable apprehension of such
+danger. There must be an attempt or threat and consequent thereon an apprehension
+"of danger; but it is not a mere idle threat, or every apprehension of a rash or timid mind,"
+that will justify the exercise of the right. Reasonable ground for the apprehension is
+requisite. Suppose the threat to proceed from a woman or child and to be addressed to
+"a strong man, in such a case there could hardly be a reasonable apprehension. Present"
+and imminent danger seems to be meant.485. The person exercising a right of private
+defence must consider whether the threat to his person or his property is real and
+immediate. If he reaches the conclusion reasonably that the threat is immediate and
+"real, he is entitled to exercise his right. In the exercise of his right, he must use force"
+necessary for the purpose and he must stop using the force as soon as the threat has
+disappeared. So long as the threat lasts and the right of private defence can be
+"legitimately exercised; if the danger is continuing, the right is there; if the danger or the"
+apprehension about it has ceased to exist there is no longer the right of private
+"defence.486. Right commences, as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the"
+"body arises from an attempt, or threat, or commit the offence, although the offence"
+may not have been committed but not until that there is that reasonable apprehension.
+The right lasts so long as the reasonable apprehension of the danger to the body
+continues.487. There is no right to inflict punishment on the wrong-doer for his past act
+after the apprehension has ceased to exist. The right of defence ends with the
+"necessity for it. So where the deceased was fleeing for his life, there was no"
+justification to shoot him down. This would be a sheer case of murder and nothing
+else.488. Where the testimony of the independent witness showed that the accused
+chased one of the deceased who fled away from the scene of occurrence and killed
+"him, they could not be said to have right of private defence as regards the killing of"
+such deceased.489. Though the nature of apprehension depends upon the nature of
+"weapon intended to be used or used, it cannot be said that as the complainant's party"
+"had only used lathis, the accused was not justified in using his spear especially when a"
+blow with a lathi was aimed at a vulnerable part like the head.490.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"484. Sekar v State, AIR 2002 SC 3667 [LNIND 2002 SC 628] : (2002) 8 SCC 354 [LNIND 2002 SC"
+628] .
+"485. M&M 78; James Martin v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] : (2004)"
+"1 KLT 513 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] , explanation of the starting point of the right and its end point."
+"486. Jai Dev v State of Punjab, 1963 (1) Cr LJ 495 : AIR 1963 SC 612 [LNIND 1962 SC 249] ."
+"487. Laxman Singh v Poonam Singh, AIR 2003 SC 3204 [LNIND 2003 SC 767] : (2004) 10 SCC 94"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 767] ; Bishna v State of WB, AIR 2006 SC 302 [LNIND 2005 SC 873] : (2005) 12"
+"SCC 657 [LNIND 2005 SC 873] ; Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2005 SC"
+1460 [LNIND 2004 SC 1203] : (2005) 10 SCC 404 [LNIND 2004 SC 1203] .
+"488. State of UP v Ramswarup, 1974 Cr LJ 1035 : AIR 1974 SC 1570 [LNIND 1974 SC 472] ;"
+"Onkarnath, 1974 Cr LJ 1015 : AIR 1974 SC 1550 [LNIND 1974 SC 154] ."
+"489. State of UP v Roop Singh, AIR 1996 SC 215 : 1996 Cr LJ 410 ."
+"490. Deo Narain, 1973 Cr LJ 677 : AIR 1973 SC 473 [LNIND 1972 SC 572] . See also Sarejerac"
+"Sahadeo Gaikwad v State, 1997 Cr LJ 3839 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 103] When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death.
+"The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in"
+"section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if"
+"the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions"
+"the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter"
+"enumerated, namely:—"
+First.—Robbery;
+Secondly.—House-breaking by night;
+"Thirdly.—Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building,"
+"tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property;"
+"Fourthly.—Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may"
+"reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if"
+such right of private defence is not exercised.
+State Amendments
+"Karnataka.—The following amendments were made by Karnataka Act No. 8 of 1972, s. 2"
+(w.e.f. 7-10-1972).
+In its application to the State of Karnataka in s. 103(1) in clause Thirdly—
+"(i) after the words ""mischief by fire"", insert the words ""or any explosive substance"";"
+"(ii) after the words ""as a human dwelling, or"", insert the words ""as a place of worship"
+"or""."
+"(2) after clause Fourthly, insert the following clause, namely:—"
+Fifthly.—Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on any property used or
+"intended to be used for the purpose of Government or any local authority, statutory"
+body or company owned or controlled by Government or railway or any vehicle used or
+adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward.
+Maharashtra.—The following amendments were made by Maharashtra Act No. 19 of
+"1971, s. 26 (w.e.f. 31-12-1971)."
+"In its application to the State of Maharashtra, In section 103, add the following at the"
+"end, namely:—"
+"""Fifthly.—Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on any property used"
+"or intended to be used for the purposes of Government or any local authority, statutory"
+"body, company owned or controlled by Government, railway or tramway, or on any"
+"vehicle used or adapted to be used, for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward."""
+"Uttar Pradesh.—The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 29 of 1970, s. 2,"
+w.e.f. 17-7-1970.
+"In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, In section 103, after clause Fourthly, add"
+"the following clause, namely:—"
+Fifthly.—Mischief by fire or any explosive substance committed on—
+"(a) Any property used or intended to be used for the purpose of Government, or any"
+"local authority or other corporation owned or controlled by the Government, or"
+"(b) any railway as defined in clause (4) of section 3 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 or"
+"railways stores as defined in the Railways Stores (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1955;,or"
+(c) any transport vehicle as defined in clause (33) of section 2 of the Motor Vehicles
+"Act, 1939."
+COMMENT.—
+Death caused in defence of property.—Section 100 enumerates the cases in which the
+right of private defence of the body extends to the causing of death; this section
+enumerates the cases in which it extends to the causing of death in defence of
+property.
+"A person employed to guard the property of his employer is protected by sections 97,"
+"99, 103 and 105 if he causes death in safeguarding his employer's property when there"
+is reason to apprehend that the person whose death has been caused was about to
+commit one of the offences mentioned in this section or to attempt to commit one of
+those offences. A person whose duty it is to guard a public building is in the same
+"position, that is to say, it is his duty to protect the property of his employer and he may"
+take such steps for this purpose as the law permits. The fact that the property to be
+"guarded is public property does not extend the protection given to a guard. Therefore, a"
+police constable on guard duty at a magazine or other public building is not entitled to
+fire at a person merely because the latter does not answer his challenge.491. The
+"deceased, none of whom was in possession of any dangerous weapons, were"
+harvesting crop on a plot of land with peaceful intention under the protection of police.
+"The accused who claimed the crops did not approach the authorities for redress,"
+"although they had time to do so, sent away the police constables by a ruse and then"
+attacked the deceased with guns and other dangerous weapons and shot them down
+at close range. It was held by the Supreme Court that the acts of the deceased did not
+amount to robbery and that the accused had no right of private defence of property.492.
+The accused was in possession of the plots which were under litigation. Finding his
+"opponent, a blind man, getting the plots ploughed, the accused asked him to stop"
+"ploughing. On this, 8–10 persons armed with spears and 'lathis' proceeded towards"
+"him. The accused fired a shot from his gun causing death of his opponent, the blind"
+man. The Court observed that a blind villager could not be thought of going to take
+possession of the plots without mobilising enough man power to deal with resistance
+likely to be put up by his adversary. It was held that in the circumstances the right of
+private defence of the person became available to the accused.493.
+"In the words of the Supreme Court, the High Court committed an error in relation to the"
+plea of self-defence raised on behalf of the accused to the effect that the incident took
+place at an open space. There is no law that the right of self-defence cannot be
+exercised in relation to an open space.494. Reasonable force may be used in defence of
+property. It would not in general be reasonable to kill in defence of property alone.495.
+[s 103.1] Trespasser.—
+The right of private defence of property extending to causing of death is not available in
+cases of trespass on open land.496.
+[s 103.2] Causing death while on patrol duty.—
+The accused constable killed his head constable. The accused was doing his patrolling
+duty at the time on a bridge. He claimed to have fired at somebody whom he saw with
+"firearm near the value tower, which was neither used for human dwelling nor for"
+custody of property. He did not plead that he entertained apprehension of death or
+grievous hurt. The Court said that the plea of private defence extending to the causing
+of death was not tenable.497.
+[s 103.3] CASES.—
+"The accused did not close his flour mill on the day of ""Bharat Bandh"", organized by"
+some political parties. The activists entered the mill and demanded closure. They were
+armed with sharp-edged weapons. They threatened and assaulted the person who was
+operating the mill. He fired at them resulting in death of two persons and also injuring
+some innocent people. His property was set on fire. It was held that the acts of the
+accused were within the reasonable limits of the right of private defence. His
+conviction was set aside.498.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"491. Jamuna Singh, (1944) 23 Pat 908."
+"492. Gurdatta Mal, AIR 1965 SC 257 [LNIND 1964 SC 30] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 242 . Champer v State"
+"of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 1882 Orissa, wherein a land dispute, death was caused in excess of the"
+"right of private defence. Mahabir Choudhary v State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 1998 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+"891] : 1996 Cr LJ 2860 , causing death in response to mischief to property, there being no fear"
+"of death or grievous hurt, held right exceeded. Ram Bilas Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 530"
+"[LNIND 2001 SC 2789] , irrigation dispute, appellants came with pre-determination and also"
+more armed and did more harm than necessary. They were not entitled to any benefit under the
+"section or to the benefit of section 300, exception 2."
+"493. Chandra Shekhar Tiwari v State, 1993 Cr LJ 2159 (All)."
+"494. Kishan Chand v State of UP, (2007) 14 SCC 737 [LNIND 2007 SC 1190] : AIR 2008 SC 133"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1190] : (2007) 6 All LJ 658.
+"495. Kashi Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 3 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 187] : AIR 2008 SC 1172"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 187] .
+"496. Jassa Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 520 [LNIND 2002 SC 13] : 2002 Cr LJ 563 ;"
+"Puttan v State of TN, AIR 2000 SC 3405 (2) : 2000 SCC (Cr) 1504, the circumstances showed"
+that the accused were entitled to private defence of property. But procurement of a lethal
+"weapon, and the number of injuries inflicted by him showed that the accused crossed all"
+frontiers of private defence. Conviction was altered to one under section 304 Part I. Gokula v
+"State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 4053 : AIR 1998 SC 3016 [LNIND 1998 SC 743] , two persons"
+"seen on the land were not shown to be trespassers, there was no question of any justification"
+for casuing their death in defence of property. The accused convicted for murder. Another
+"similar case, Jotram v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1492 (Raj); Arjunan v State of TN, 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 2327 (Mad), in a sudden quarrel over the right to cut a tree, the accused gave a blow of the"
+"wooden reaper on the head of the deceased causing death, the tree stood on the land of the"
+"deceased and was in his actual physical possession, the right of private defence not available to"
+"the accused. See also Govind Singh v State of Rajsthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1562 (Raj), no proof of"
+"trespassing cattle, yet attack and killing, conviction under section 304, Part II."
+"497. Bhupendra Singh A Chudasama v State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 3790 [LNIND 1997 SC 1378]"
+: 1998 Cr LJ 57 .
+"498. James Martin v State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203 [LNIND 2003 SC 1097] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 104] When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.
+"If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions"
+"the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass,"
+"not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right"
+"does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the"
+"restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of"
+any harm other than death.
+COMMENT.—
+This section applies in cases where an injury (but not death) is inflicted on the offender
+"in the course of his committing the offences of theft, mischief, or criminal trespass by"
+the person exercising the right of private defence. But the section does not apply to a
+case where death has been caused in exercise of the supposed right of private
+defence.499. Even so where the accused had killed a person by exceeding his right of
+"private defence of property under this section, his case would fall within the ambit of"
+"Exception-II to section 300 IPC, 1860, and his offence would amount to culpable"
+"homicide not amounting to murder. He could not, therefore, be punished with a"
+sentence of death. In the instant case the sentence was altered to one of life
+imprisonment.500.
+Sections 101 and 104 restrict the right of private defence in certain cases to voluntarily
+"causing hurt or grievous hurt. Section 101 is a corollary to section 100, and this section"
+tosection 103.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"499. Ramram Mahton, (1947) 26 Pat 550."
+"500. Jai Bhagwan v State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1083 [LNIND 1999 SC 116] : 1999 Cr LJ 1634"
+accused party was in possession of the land into which the other party entered for tilling it. The
+mother of the accused exhorted them and they murderously assaulted the deceased. The act
+amounted to criminal trespass within the meaning of section 411. The right of self-defence to
+the extent of causing death did not exist. The offence of murder was made out. State of UP v
+"Laeeq, AIR 1999 SC 1942 [LNIND 1999 SC 447] : 1999 Cr LJ 2879 exceeding the right of private"
+"defence, punishment under section 304."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 105] Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of
+property.
+The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension
+of danger to the property commences.
+The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has
+effected his retreat with the property or either
+"the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been"
+recovered.
+The right of private defence of property against robbery continues as long as the
+offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint
+or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal restraint
+continues.
+The right of private defence of property against criminal trespass or mischief
+continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or
+mischief.
+The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night continues as
+long as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.
+COMMENT.—
+This section indicates when the right of defence of property commences and till what
+period it continues. It is similar to section 102.
+[s 105.1] First clause.—
+The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension
+of danger to property commences. Before such apprehension commences the owner
+of the property is not called upon to apply for protection to the public authorities. The
+right commences not when the actual danger to the property commences but when
+there is reasonable apprehension of danger.501.
+[s 105.2] Second clause.—
+The right of private defence of property against theft continues till (1) the offender has
+"affected his retreat with the property, or (2) the assistance of public authorities is"
+"obtained, or (3) the property has been recovered.502. An offender is to be considered as"
+having affected his retreat when he has once got off having escaped immediate pursuit
+"not having been made. A recapture of the plundered property, while it is in course of"
+"being carried away, is authorized, for the taking and retaking is one transaction. But"
+"when the offence has been committed and the property removed, a recapture after an"
+"interval of time by the owner or by other persons on his behalf, however justifiable,"
+cannot be deemed an exercise of the right of defence of property. The recovery which
+the section contemplates seems to be a recovery either immediate or made before the
+offender has reached his final retreat.503. Where the appellants followed up tracks
+"purporting to be those of their stolen cattle, and prior to the arrival of the police (for"
+whose assistance one of their party had ridden away) proceeded to the complainants'
+"village and fired at them, it was held that the appellants' right of private defence of their"
+"property had been put an end to by the successful retreat of the thieves, and that their"
+alleged rediscovery of the cattle in the complainants' possession could not revive that
+right.504.
+[s 105.3] Third clause.—
+A rightful owner in peaceful possession of his land is entitled to defend his property
+against any person or persons who threaten to dispossess him. The law does not
+expect any cowardice on his part when there is real and imminent danger to his
+"property from outside sources. Thus, a rightful owner is entitled to throw out, by using"
+such force as would in the circumstances of the case appear to be reasonable
+"necessary, any person who tries to invade his right to peaceful possession of his"
+"properly. But if the trespasser has settled in the possession of the property, the"
+recourse which the rightful person must adopt. is to recover possession in accordance
+with law and not by force. In such a case the trespasser would be entitled to defend his
+possession even against a rightful owner if the latter tries to evict him by use of force.
+But no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf because much would depend
+on the facts of each case.505.
+[s 105.4] Fourth clause.—
+In the case of criminal trespass and mischief the right of private defence ceases to
+exist as soon as the commission of these offences ceases.506.
+[s 105.5] Fifth clause.—
+The right of private defence against house-breaking continues only so long as the
+"house-trespass continues; hence, where a person followed a thief and killed him in the"
+"open, after the house-trespass had ceased, it was held that he could not plead the right"
+of private defence.507.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"501. Chakradhar, (1964) 2 Cr LJ 696 ."
+"502. Punjabrao, (1945) Nag 881."
+"503. M & M 81; Amar Singh, AIR 1968 Raj 11 [LNIND 1966 RAJ 160] ."
+"504. Mir Dad, (1925) 7 Lah 21."
+"505. Maguni Charan Pradhan v State of Orissa, (1991) 3 SCC 352 [LNIND 1991 SC 191] : 1991 (2)"
+Crimes 261 (SC).
+"506. Rajesh Kumar v Dharamvi, 1997 Cr LJ 2242 : AIR 1997 SC 3769 [LNIND 1997 SC 445] , the"
+accused came to the place of occurrence and attacked the complainant after the latter had
+already damaged the outer door of the house. It was held that the accused had no right of
+private defence.
+"507. Balakee Jolahed, (1868) 10 WR (Cr) 9; Gulbadan v State, (1885) PR No. 25 of 1885."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
+THIS chapter has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every
+penal clause a considerable number of limitations.
+The word 'offence' in this chapter denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under
+any special or local law when it satisfied the conditions laid down in section 40 of the
+Code.
+"The ""general exceptions"" contained in sections 76–106 make an offence a non-offence."
+"The ""general exceptions"" enacted by Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) are of"
+"universal application and for the sake of brevity of expression, instead of repeating in"
+"every section that the definition is to be taken subject to the exceptions, the Legislature"
+"by section 6 IPC, 1860 enacted that all the definitions must be regarded as subject to"
+"the general exceptions. Therefore, general exceptions are part of definition of every"
+"offence contained in IPC, 1860, but the burden to prove their existence lied on the"
+accused.1.
+The following acts are exempted under the Code from criminal liability:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a Court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm
+(section 81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+"8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years, but of immature understanding"
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85) and partially exempted (section 86).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of
+the sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person by or by the
+consent of guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Act causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Act done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"The above exceptions, strictly speaking, come within the following seven categories:—"
+"1. Judicial acts (section. 77, 78)."
+"2. Mistake of fact (sections 76, 79)."
+3. Accident (section 80).
+"4. Absence of criminal intent (sections 81–86, 92–94)."
+"5. Consent (sections 87, 90)."
+6. Trifling acts (section 95).
+7. Private defence (sections 96–106).
+"Onus of proving exception lies on accused.—When a person is accused of any offence,"
+the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
+"the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso"
+"contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is"
+"upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.2."
+Although the law lays down that the onus of proving circumstances which give the
+"benefit of a general exception to an accused person lies on him, and in the absence of"
+"evidence the presumption is against the accused, this does not mean that the accused"
+"must lead evidence. If it is apparent from the evidence on the record, whether produced"
+"by the prosecution or by the defence, that a general exception would apply, then the"
+presumption is removed and it is open to the Court to consider whether the evidence
+proves to its satisfaction that the accused comes within the exception.3.
+Applicability of General exceptions during investigation.—In considering that whether
+"accusation made in the complaint makes out a case for commission of offence or not,"
+the police while reaching the prima facie satisfaction of suspecting the commission of
+"cognizable offence, cannot ignore the general exception as provided under IPC, 1860"
+"as per Chapter IV of IPC, 1860. If on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint,"
+"the case is falling in general exceptions, it can be said that the action cannot be termed"
+as an offence.4. Investigating officer is bound to investigate and confirm that despite
+"what is contained in the ""General Exceptions""; acts committed by accused shall"
+"constitute offence under IPC, 1860. This shall be done, by virtue of section 6 of IPC,"
+"1860. In the light of section 6 of IPC, 1860, definition of every offence is to be"
+"understood subject to the ""General Exceptions"". Therefore, investigation shall not"
+confine merely to the acts committed by a person. Depending on facts and
+"circumstances of each case, many other relevant facts also have to be investigated"
+"into, in the light of the provisions contained in ""General Exceptions"". It is only then that"
+an investigating officer will be able to confirm whether the act committed by a person
+"is an offence or not, as defined in IPC, 1860 subject to what is contained in ""General"
+"Exceptions"". Further, the category of self-defence falling in general exception would fall"
+"in a different category than the general exceptions, which are provided in the very"
+chapter for exercise of the statutory duty or lawful power either under the mistake of
+law or fact or mistaken belief of law or fact.5.
+Of the Right of Private Defence
+[s 106] Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of
+harm to innocent person.
+If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably
+"causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot"
+"effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of"
+private defence extends to the running of that risk.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder him. He cannot effectually exercise his
+"right of private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of"
+harming young children who are mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if by so
+firing he harms any of the children.
+COMMENT.—
+This section should be read in the light of section 100. Injury to innocent persons in the
+exercise of the right of defence is excusable under it.508.
+"1. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] :"
+2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+"2. The Indian Evidence Act, I of 1872, section 105."
+"3. Musammat Anandi, (1923) 45 All 329 ; Babulal, 1960 Cr LJ 437 (All)."
+"4. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"5. A K Chaudhary v State of Gujarat, 2006 Cr LJ 726 (Guj)."
+"508. State of Karnataka v Madesha, (2007) 7 SCC 35 [LNIND 2007 SC 918] : AIR 2007 SC 2917"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 921] , risk of harm to an innocent person in the exercise of the right of private"
+defence. The court examined whether the right could be available to a person who caused the
+death of a man who had no role to play in the dispute.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 107] Abetment of a thing.
+"A person abets the doing of a thing, who—"
+First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
+Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for
+"the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that"
+"conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or"
+"Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing."
+"Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of"
+"a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or"
+"attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that"
+thing.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, a public officer is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B,"
+"knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and"
+thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the
+apprehension of C.
+"Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act,"
+"does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates"
+"the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
+COMMENTS.—
+"In common parlance, the word 'abet' means assistance, co-operation and"
+"encouragement and includes wrongful purpose. In Corpus Juris Secundum, vol I at p"
+"306, the meaning of the word 'abet' is given as follows:"
+"'To abet' has been defined as meaning to aid; to assist or to give aid; to command, to"
+"procure, or to counsel; to countenance; to encourage, counsel, induce, or assist; to"
+encourage or to set another on to commit.
+Used with 'aid'. The word 'abet' is generally used with the word 'aid' and similar words.
+"In order to bring a person abetting the doing of a thing, under any one of the clauses"
+"enumerated under section 107, it is not only necessary to prove that the person who"
+has abetted has taken part in the steps of the transactions but also in some way or
+other he has been connected with those steps of the transactions which are criminal.
+"The offence of abetment depends upon the intention of the person who abets, and not"
+upon the act which is actually done by the person whom he abets.1.
+For the purposes of the first two clauses of this section it is immaterial whether the
+person instigated commits the offence or not or the persons conspiring together
+actually carry out the object of the conspiracy.2. It is only in the case of a person
+abetting an offence by intentionally aiding another to commit that offence that the
+charge of abetment against him would be expected to fail when the person alleged to
+have committed the offence is acquitted of that offence.3. The Court noted that in
+Faguna Kanta Nath v State of Assam4. the appellant was tried for an offence under
+"section 165A for having abetted the commission of an offence by an officer, who was"
+"acquitted, and it was held that the appellant's conviction for abetment was also not"
+"maintainable. But subsequently in Jamuna Singh v State of Bihar,5. it was considered"
+not desirable to hold that an abettor cannot be punished if the person actually
+committing the offence is acquitted. The Court said that the abettor's guilt depends
+upon the nature of the offence abetted and the manner of abetment. It is only in cases
+of intentional aiding that the abettor would have to be acquitted with the principal
+offender.6. Following this state of the rulings the Supreme Court ordered the acquittal
+of the single abettor when the main offender as also all other abettors already stood
+acquitted.
+The Supreme Court has reiterated that before anybody can be punished for abetment
+"of suicide, it must be proved that the death in question was a suicidal death.7."
+The Supreme Court held that the offence of abetment is a separate and independent
+offence. Where the offence is committed in consequence of the abetment but there is
+"no provision for punishment of such abetment, the abettor is to be punished along with"
+the offender for the original offence.8.
+Abetment is constituted by:
+(1) instigating a person to commit an offence; or
+(2) engaging in a conspiracy to commit it; or
+(3) intentionally aiding a person to commit it.
+The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who
+abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The
+"abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under section"
+"107, Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or"
+omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation.9.
+[s 107.1] Mens rea.—
+"In order to proceed against a person for criminal offence under section 107,"
+prosecution must prove the element of mens rea. Negligence or carelessness or the
+facilitation cannot be termed to be abetment so as to punish the guilty as per the
+"provision of penal laws.10. In order to constitute abetment, the abettor must be shown"
+"to have ""intentionally"" aided to commission of the crime. Mere proof, that the crime"
+charged could not have been committed without involvement and/or interposition of
+the alleged abettor is not enough compliance with the requirements of section 107. It is
+not enough that an act on the part of the alleged abettor happens to facilitate the
+commission of the crime. Intentional aiding and therefore active complicity is the gist
+of the offence of abetment under the third paragraph of section 107.11.
+"[s 107.2] Sting operation, mens rea and abetment.—"
+"In typical sting operations, though the operation is carried in the public interest, the"
+"same is generally done by instigating the accused. Hence the victim, who is otherwise"
+"innocent, is lured into committing a crime on the assurance of absolute secrecy and"
+confidentiality of the transaction raising the potential question as to how such a victim
+can be held responsible for the crime which he would not have committed but for the
+"enticement. In such circumstances, should the individual, i.e., the sting operator be held"
+criminally liable for commission of the offence that is inherent and inseparable from
+the process by which commission of another offence is sought to be established?
+What about the operator who has mens rea or guilty intention to commit the offence?
+These are puzzling questions when there is an allegation that the sting operator is
+alleged to have committed the abetment of the offence. The Supreme Court in Rajat
+"Prasad v CBI,12. observed that a crime does not stand obliterated or extinguished"
+"merely because its commission is claimed to be in public interest. At the same time,"
+the criminal intent (mens rea) behind the commission of the act will have to be
+established before the liability of the person charged with the commission of crime can
+be adjudged. The Court held that the questions whether the sting operation is a
+journalistic exercise and any criminal intent can be imputed are to be answered by the
+evidence of the parties.
+(1) Abetment by instigation.—First clause.—A person is said to 'instigate' another to an
+"act, when he actively suggests or stimulates him to the act by any means of language,"
+"direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints,"
+insinuation or encouragement.13.
+"[s 107.3] ""Instigate"" Meaning.—"
+"Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do ""an act"". To"
+"satisfy the requirement of ""instigation"", though it is not necessary that actual words"
+"must be used to that effect or what constitutes ""instigation"" must necessarily and"
+specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the
+"consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts"
+"or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the"
+"deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case,"
+"""instigation"" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without"
+"intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation. Thus, to"
+"constitute 'instigation', a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or"
+"encourage the doing of an act by the other by ""goading"" or 'urging forward'. The"
+"dictionary meaning of the word ""goad"" is ""a thing that stimulates someone into action;"
+provoke to action or reaction … to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he
+"reacts"".14. The word ""instigate"" literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about"
+"by persuasion to do anything. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or"
+intentional aid as provided in the three clauses of the section.15. Instigate means the
+active role played by a person with a view to stimulate another person to do the thing.
+In order to hold a person guilty of abetting it must be established that he had
+intentionally done something which amounted to instigating another to do a thing.16.
+Instigation may be of an unknown person.17. A mere acquiescence or permission does
+not amount to instigation.18.
+[s 107.4] Wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment.—
+"Explanation 1 to this section says that a person who (1) by wilful misrepresentation, or"
+"(2) by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily"
+"causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done, is said to"
+instigate the doing of that thing. The illustration is an example of instigation by 'wilful
+misrepresentation'. Instigation by 'wilful concealment' is where some duty exists which
+obliges a person to disclose a fact. The explanation to section 107 says that any wilful
+misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to
+"disclose, may also come within the contours of ""abetment"".19."
+[s 107.5] CASES.—Direct instigation.—
+"Where, of several persons constituting an unlawful assembly, some only were armed"
+"with sticks, and A, one of them, was not so armed, but picked up a stick and used it, B"
+"(the master of A), who gave a general order to beat, was held guilty of abetting the"
+assault made by them.20.
+[s 107.6] Suicide.—
+Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a
+person in doing a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or
+"aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.21. Deceased committed"
+suicide by hanging himself because of alleged illicit relationship between his wife and
+the accused. Accused took the wife of deceased away from the house of her brother
+and kept her with him for four days. There is definitely a proximity and nexus between
+the conduct and behaviour of the accused and wife of deceased with that of suicide
+committed by the deceased.22. Where a married girl committed suicide by burning
+"herself in her in-law's house, her in-laws were held guilty of abetment because they"
+were persistently torturing her for inadequate dowry and had gone to the extent of
+"accusing her of illegitimate pregnancy.23. ""All these tortures and taunts"", Ray J said,24."
+"""Caused depression in her mind and drove her to take the extreme step of putting an"
+"end to her life by sprinkling kerosene oil on her person and setting it afire."" In another"
+"case of the same kind a husband persistently demanded more money from his wife,"
+quarrelling with her everyday. On the fateful day when she happened to say that death
+"would have been better than this, she heard only this in reply that her husband would"
+feel relieved if she ended her life. Immediately thereafter she set herself on fire. The
+husband was held guilty of instigating her to commit suicide.25. Mere harassment of
+wife by husband due to differences per se does not attract section 306 read with
+"section 107, IPC, 1860.26."
+Demand of loan amount by accused from deceased itself does not come within the
+scope of abetment as defined under section 107.27. Goading and intimidating a debtor
+with a view to pressurising him for repayment of the loan which brought about a
+"suicide by the debtor immediately thereafter, was held as not amounting to abetment"
+"of suicide and, therefore, no case under section 306 read with section 34 was made"
+out.28.
+"The accused told the other person ""to go and die"". It was held that this would not in"
+itself satisfy the ingredients of instigation. Instigation has to be with mens rea. The
+suicide was committed two days after the quarrel between the accused and the
+deceased. This also showed that the suicide was not the direct result of the quarrel.
+The suicide note indicated that her husband was a frustrated man and given to drinking
+and suffered from great stress and depression.29.
+"The accused, a Motor Vehicle Inspector, beat up and abused a driver for not being able"
+to produce necessary papers. The driver committed suicide. The Court said that it was
+not shown that he was guilty of any act of abetment within the meaning of section 107.
+The charge against him under section 107 was quashed.30.
+[s 107.7] Proof.—
+"In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),31. the Supreme Court"
+reiterated the legal position laid down in its earlier three judge bench judgment in the
+"case of Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh,32. and held that where the accused by"
+his acts or continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased
+"was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may be inferred."
+"In order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to"
+be established that:
+"(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful"
+omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased
+"reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission"
+or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward
+direction; and
+(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke urge or encourage the deceased
+"to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly,"
+presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.33.
+[s 107.8] Threats.—
+Mere threats of involving the family in a false and frivolous case cannot be held to
+tantamount to instigation. By such threats it cannot be held that the accused instigated
+the deceased to commit suicide.34.
+[s 107.9] Test.—
+No straight-jacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular
+case there has been instigation which force the person to commit suicide. In a
+"particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may"
+"have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn"
+from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been
+such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and
+committed suicide.35.
+(2) Abetment by conspiracy.—Second clause.—'Conspiracy' consists in the agreement
+of two or more [persons] to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.
+"So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When two agree to"
+"carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties,"
+"promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, is"
+punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means.36. It is not
+necessary that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits it.
+It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is
+"committed.37. Where parties concert together, and have a common object, the act of"
+"one of the parties, done in furtherance of the common object and in pursuance of the"
+"concerted plan, is the act of all.38."
+"Before the introduction of Chapter V-A, conspiracy, except in cases provided for by"
+"sections 121A, 311, 400, 401 and 402 of the Code, was a mere species of abetment"
+"when an act or an illegal omission took place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and"
+amounted to a distinct offence for each distinct offence abetted by conspiracy.39. For
+an offence under the second clause of this section a mere combination of persons or
+agreement is not enough; an act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of
+the conspiracy. But for an offence under section 120A a mere agreement is enough if
+the agreement is to commit an offence.40.
+[s 107.10] Abetment and Conspiracy-Difference between.—
+"Criminal conspiracy postulates an agreement between two or more persons to do, or"
+"cause to be done, an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal, means. It differs"
+from other offences because mere agreement is made an offence even if no step is
+taken to carry out that agreement. Though there is close association of conspiracy with
+incitement and abetment the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy is somewhat
+"wider in amplitude than abetment by conspiracy as contemplated under section 107,"
+"IPC, 1860.41. There is no analogy between section 120B and section 109, IPC, 1860."
+"There may be an element of abetment in a conspiracy, but conspiracy is something"
+"more than an abetment. Offences created by sections 109 and 120B, iPC, 1860 are"
+quite distinct and there is no warrant for limiting the prosecution to only one element of
+"conspiracy, that is, abetment when the allegation is that what a person did was"
+something over and above that.42.
+"(3) Abetment by aid.—Third clause.—By act.—A person, it is trite, abets by aiding, when"
+"by any act done either prior to, or at the time of the commission of an act, he intends to"
+"facilitate and does in fact facilitate the commission thereof, would attract the third"
+"clause of section 107 of the IPC, 1860. Doing something for the offender is not"
+abetment. Doing something with knowledge so as to facilitate him to commit the crime
+or otherwise would constitute abetment.43. In order to constitute abetment by aiding
+"within the meaning of the third paragraph of section 107, IPC, 1860 the abettor must be"
+shown to have intentionally aided the commission of the crime. A person may invite
+another casually or for a friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the
+invitee. But unless it is shown that the invitation was extended with a view to facilitate
+"the commission of the murder, it cannot be said that the person extending the"
+"invitation had abetted the murder. The language used in the section is ""intentionally"
+"aids"" and therefore, active complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the"
+"third paragraph of section 107, IPC, 1860.44. Abetment includes instigating any person"
+to do a thing or engaging with one or more persons in any conspiracy for the doing of a
+"thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy and in"
+"order to the doing of that thing, or intentional aid by any act or illegal omission to the"
+"doing of that thing. On facts held, in the instant case, there was no direct evidence to"
+establish that the appellant either aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide
+or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide.45. Where the principal
+offender killed the victim with a knife provided by the defendant who later claimed that
+"he thought the knife would be used only to threaten, the defendant's conviction for"
+"murder was upheld, the Court of Appeal saying that the trial judge was correct to direct"
+the jury that the defendant could be so convicted if he contemplated that the principal
+offender might kill or cause serious bodily harm to the victim as part of their joint
+enterprise.46. It is not necessary that the abettor should be present at the place of the
+occurrence. It is also not necessary to show that the secondary party to a conspiracy to
+murder intended the victim to be killed provided it is proved that he contemplated or
+foresaw the event as a real or substantial risk. Mere absence from the scene of the
+crime cannot amount to unequivocal communication of withdrawal from the
+enterprise. The accused was recruited with certain others by a person to kill his wife. At
+a predetermined time she was taken to the agreed place and killed. The accused was
+not present when the killing took place. It was held that he was rightly convicted in that
+he had lent encouragement and assistance before the commission of the crime.47.
+[s 107.11] By illegal omission.—
+"The definition of abetment as given in section 107, IPC, 1860 not only includes"
+instigation but also intentional aiding by an illegal omission.48. A lady advocate was
+"attending the chamber of her senior advocate, the accused. On the day of the incident"
+"she was talking with the accused at her residence. At that moment in his presence, she"
+poured kerosene on her and set herself on fire. The accused did nothing to save her. It
+"was held that this did not amount to ""illegal omission"". He was held not guilty of"
+abetment of suicide.49.
+[s 107.12] Abetment of offences under other laws.—
+The offence of aiding and abetting is applicable to all statutory offences unless
+specifically excluded by statute and accordingly it was held to apply to offences
+"created by the [English] Public Order Act, 1986.50. An abetment of an offence under the"
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 can be made by a non-public servant. Abettors are"
+to be prosecuted through trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act.51.
+[s 107.13] CASES.—By act.—Presence at bigamous marriage.—
+Mere presence at the scene of a bigamous marriage without any evidence of
+instigation aiding or conspiring would not amount to abetment.52. Where the accused
+held the antarpat (screen) during the performance of a marriage which he knew was a
+"void marriage under section 494, it was held that his act amounted to an act of"
+intentional aid and fell within the purview of the explanation.53.
+[s 107.14] Presence at exhibition of blue film.—
+While entering into the parlour the accused was not aware of the type of film under
+"exhibition. Immediately after his entry, the police raided the parlour and charge-sheeted"
+"him as an abettor of offences under sections 292, 293 and 294 because blue films"
+were under exhibition. Following the Supreme Court decision in Shri Ram v State of
+"UP,54. the Court held that something more must be shown than mere presence."
+[s 107.15] Rape-Abetment.—
+"In a case of custodial rape, husband and wife, taken into police custody, were kept in"
+separate rooms. The wife was raped by the head constable while the accused
+constable kept watch over the husband and did nothing hearing the shrieks of the
+victim wife. Conviction of the accused constable for abetting commission of rape was
+upheld.55.
+[s 107.16] Humiliation.—
+The accused persons caused constant humiliation to the deceased by accusing him of
+theft of things belonging to relatives at a marriage occasion. He committed suicide
+after returning from marriage. The humiliation caused by the accused was held to be
+not such as to amount to instigation which could have induced the deceased to
+commit suicide.56.
+[s 107.17] Attempt.—
+"Merely because the section opens with the words ""if any person commits suicide"" it"
+cannot be held that in a case of unsuccessful suicide there is no attempt to abet the
+commission of suicide. Suicide and its attempt on the one hand and abetment of
+commission of suicide and its attempt on the other are treated differently by law and
+"therefore, the one who abets the commission of an unsuccessful attempt to commit"
+suicide cannot be held to be punishable merely under section 309 read with section
+"116, IPC, 1860. To implement the scheme of law he has got to be held to be punishable"
+"under section 306 read with section 511, IPC, 1860. The Supreme Court has never laid"
+down in Satvir Singh57. that under no circumstance an offence under section 306 read
+"with section 511, IPC, 1860 can be committed. The Supreme Court did not have"
+occasion to consider whether a conviction for an offence of attempt to abet the
+"commission of suicide is punishable under section 306 read with section 511, IPC,"
+1860.58.
+"1. Kartar Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 Cr LJ 3139 : (1994) 1 SCC (Cr) 899."
+"2. Faguna Kanto, 1959 Cr LJ 917 : AIR 1959 SC 673 [LNIND 1959 SC 2] ."
+"3. Jamuna Singh v State of of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 553 [LNIND 1966 SC 202] : 1967 Cr LJ 541 ."
+"4. Faguna Kanta Nath v State of Assam, AIR 1959 SC 673 [LNIND 1959 SC 2] : 1959 Supp 2 SCR"
+1 : 1959 Cr LJ 917 .
+"5. Jamuna Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 553 [LNIND 1966 SC 202] : 1967 Cr LJ 541 ."
+"6. Citing Madan Raj Bhandari v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1970 SC 436 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] : 1970"
+Cr LJ 519 where the abettor of inducing miscarriage was acquitted when the person causing
+"miscarriage was acquitted. In Ex-Sepoy Haradhan Chakrabarty v UOI, AIR 1990 SC 1210 [LNIND"
+"1990 SC 57] : (1990) 2 SCC 143 [LNIND 1990 SC 57] , it was held that abetment fails when"
+substantive offence is not established against the principal offender.
+"7. Wazir Chand v State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 378 [LNIND 1988 SC 569] : 1989 Cr LJ 809 :"
+(1989) 1 SCC 244 [LNIND 1988 SC 569] .
+"8. Kishori Lal v State of MP, (2007) 10 SCC 797 [LNIND 2007 SC 800] : AIR 2007 SC 2457"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 800] : (2007) 3 Ker LT 259 .
+"9. State of Punjab v Iqbal Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1532 [LNIND 1991 SC 279] ; Surender v State of"
+"Hayana, (2006) 12 SCC 375 [LNIND 2006 SC 1015] ; Kishori Lal v State of MP, AIR 2007 SC 2457"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 800] ; and Sonti Rama Krishna v Sonti Shanti Sree, AIR 2009 SC 923 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 2319] .
+"10. B Ammu v State of TN, 2009 Cr LJ 866 (Mad); Chitresh Kumar Chopra v State (Government of"
+"NCT of Delhi), AIR 2010 SC 1446 [LNIND 2009 SC 1663] ."
+"11. Shri Ram v State of UP, AIR 1975 SC 175 [LNIND 1974 SC 349] : 1975 Cr LJ 240 (SC) quoted"
+"in Jasobant Narayan Mohapatra v State of Orissa, 2009 Cr LJ 1043 (Ori); Benupani Behera v State,"
+1992 (1) Ori LR 571 .
+"12. Rajat Prasad v CBI, 2014 Cr LJ 2941 : 2014 (5) Scale 574 [LNIND 2014 SC 467] ."
+"13. Amiruddin, (1922) 24 Bom LR 534 [LNIND 1922 BOM 98] , 542."
+"14. Chitresh Kumar Chopra v State (Government of NCT of Delhi), AIR 2010 SC 1446 [LNIND 2009"
+"SC 1663] ; Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v State of Gujarat, (2009) 4 SCC 52 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+193] : (2009) 1 SCR 672 [LNIND 2009 SC 193] : AIR 2009 SC 1808 2009 Cr LJ 1720.
+"15. Goura Venkata Reddy v State of AP, (2003) 12 SCC 469 [LNIND 2003 SC 1004] ."
+"16. Rajib Neog v State of Assam, 2011 Cr LJ 399 (Gau)."
+"17. Ganesh D Savarkar, (1909) 12 Bom LR 105 ."
+"18. Ram Singh v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1406 (P&H), the complainant (wife) alleged that her in-laws"
+incited her husband to marry over again. There was no evidence to show that they negotiated or
+"arranged the second marriage, nor of their presence at the time of performance of second"
+"marriage. Complaint quashed. See also Darbar Singh v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 1612"
+(Chh).
+"19. Netai Dutta v State of WB, AIR 2005 SC 1775 [LNIND 2005 SC 208] : (2005) 2 SCC 659"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 208] ; Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, JT 2012 (9) SC 312 [LNIND 2012 SC 564]"
+: 2012 (9) Scale 58 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] .
+"20. Rasookoollah, (1869) 12 WR (Cr) 51. Where the accused had instigated three persons to"
+"commit murder, his conviction under sections 307/109 was upheld. Hemant Kumar Mondal v"
+"State of WB, 1993 Cr LJ 82 (Cal)."
+"21. M Mohan v State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2011) 3 SCC 626"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 246] : 2011 (3) Scale 78 [LNIND 2011 SC 246] : AIR 2011 SC 1238 [LNIND 2011
+"SC 246] : 2011 Cr LJ 1900 ; Amalendu Pal v State of WB, (2010) 1 SCC 707 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"1978] ; Rakesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 [LNIND 2001 SC 2368] , Gangula"
+"Mohan Reddy v State of AP, (2010) 1 SCC 750 [LNIND 2010 SC 3] ; Thanu Ram v State of MP,"
+2010 (10) Scale 557 [LNIND 2010 SC 962] : (2010) 10 SCC 353 [LNIND 2010 SC 962] : (2010) 3
+"SCC (Cr) 1502; SS Chheena v Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 [LNIND 2010 SC 746] :"
+"(2010 AIR SCW 4938); Sohan Raj Sharma v State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 2108 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+845] : (2008) 11 SCC 215 [LNIND 2008 SC 845] .
+"22. Dammu Sreenu v State of AP, AIR 2009 SC 3728 : (2009) 14 SCC 249 [LNIND 2009 SC 1356]"
+.
+"23. Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 445 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] : AIR 1990 SC 209"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 475] : 1990 Cr LJ 562 .
+"24. Ibid, (1990) 1 SCC 445 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] at p 458 : AIR 1990 SC 209 [LNIND 1989 SC"
+475] : 1990 Cr LJ 562 .
+"25. Brijlal v Prem Chand, AIR 1989 SC 1661 [LNIND 1989 SC 243] : (1989) Supp 2 SCC 680. But"
+"where there was no evidence of dowry demands, self immolation by the married woman within"
+"two years of marriage was held to be her personal act. Padmabai v State of MP, 1987 Cr LJ 1573"
+(MP).
+"26. Bhagwan Das v Kartar Singh, AIR 2007 SC 2045 [LNIND 2007 SC 650] ; Dayalan Babu v State,"
+2011 Cr LJ 359 (Mad).
+"27. Paramjeetsingh Chawala v State of MP, 2007 Cr Lj 3343 (MP)."
+"28. Vedprakash Bhaiji v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ 893 (MP). Netai Dutta v State of WB, 2005 Cr LJ"
+"1737 , no averment that the employer had withheld salary, or of aiding or instigating suicide,"
+proceedings against employer to be quashed.
+"29. Sanju v State of MP, 2002 Cr LJ 2796 : AIR 2002 SC 1998 [LNIND 2002 SC 357] (Supp)."
+"30. Bura Manohar v State of AP, 2002 Cr LJ 3322 (AP); Central Bureau of Investigation v VC"
+"Shukla, 1998 Cr LJ 1905 : AIR 1998 SC 1406 [LNIND 1998 SC 272] ; Bapurao v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 2181 (Bom)."
+"31. Chitresh Kumar Chopra v State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2009 (16) SCC 605 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+1663] : AIR 2010 SC 1446 [LNIND 2009 SC 1663] .
+"32. Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2001 SC 3837 [LNIND 2001 SC 2368] : (2001) Cr"
+LJ 4724 .
+"33. State of MP v Shrideen Chhatri Prasad Suryawanshi, 2012 Cr LJ 2106 (MP); Jetha Ram v"
+"State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 2459 (Raj); Kailash Baburao Pandit v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr"
+LJ 4044 (Bom).
+"34. Vijay Kumar Rastogi v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 2342 (Raj)."
+"35. Praveen Pradhan v State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 9 SCC 734 [LNIND 2012 SC 612] : 2012 (9)"
+Scale 745 : 2012 Cr LJ 4925 .
+"36. Per Willes J, in Mulcahy, (1868) LR 3 HL 306, 317. See Quinn v Leathem, (1901) AC 495 ,"
+529.
+"37. Explanation 5 to section 108; Kalil Munda, (1901) 28 Cal 797 ."
+"38. Ameer Khan, (1871) 17 WR (Cr) 15."
+"39. Tirumal Reddi, (1901) 24 Mad 523, 546."
+"40. Pramatha Nath v Saroj Ranjan, AIR 1962 SC 876 [LNIND 1961 SC 400] : 1962 (1) Cr LJ 770 ."
+"See CBI v VC Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406 [LNIND 1998 SC 272] : (1998) 3 SCC 410 [LNIND 1998"
+SC 272] ; Abetment by conspiracy not made out.
+"41. Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 885 [LNIND 1970"
+SC 155] : (1970) 1 SCC 696 [LNIND 1970 SC 155] .
+"42. State of AP v Kandimalla Subbaiah, AIR 1961 SC 1241 [LNIND 1961 SC 95] : 1962 (1) SCR"
+194 [LNIND 1961 SC 95] .
+"43. State of MP v Mukesh, (2006) 13 SCC 197 [LNIND 2006 SC 844] : (2007) 2 SCC (Cr) 680."
+"44. Shri Ram, 1975 Cr LJ 240 : AIR 1975 SC 175 [LNIND 1974 SC 349] ; See also Trilokchand,"
+1977 Cr LJ 254 : AIR 1977 SC 666 [LNIND 1975 SC 278] .
+"45. Rajbabu v State of MP, (2008) 17 SCC 526 [LNIND 2008 SC 1499] : AIR 2008 SC 3212"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1499] : 2008 Cr LJ 4301 : (2008) 69 AIC 65 .
+"46. R v State, (1989) 3 All ER 90 CA. The Court considered the decisions in Chan Wing Sui v R,"
+"(1984) 3 All ER 877 and Hyam v DPP, (1974) 2 All ER 41 . Krishan Lal v UOI, 1994 Cr LJ 3472 ,"
+intentional aiding.
+"47. R v Rook, (1993) 1 WLR 1005 (CA)."
+"48. Jamnalal Pande v State of MP, 2010 Cr LJ 538 (MP)."
+"49. Surendra Agnihotri v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 4443 (MP)."
+"50. R v Jefferson, The Times, 22 June 1993 (CA)."
+"51. P Nallammal v State, AIR 1999 SC 2556 [LNIND 1999 SC 660] : 1999 Cr LJ 3967 ."
+"52. Muthammal, 1981 Cr LJ 833 (Mad) : 1981 Mad LW (Cr) 80 ; Karuppiah v Nagawalli, 1982"
+Mad LJ (Cr) 19 : 1982 Cr LJ 1362 : 2004 Cr LJ 4272 (Kar).
+"53. Malan, (1957) 60 Bom LR 428 ."
+"54. Shri Ram v State of UP, AIR 1975 SC 175 [LNIND 1974 SC 349] : 1975 Cr LJ 240 ."
+"55. Ram Kumar v State of HP, AIR 1995 SC 1965 : 1995 Cr LJ 3621 : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 67 ."
+"56. Neelam v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 160 (AP) : (2002) 2 Andh LT (Cr) 186 ."
+"57. Satvir Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2828 [LNIND 2001 SC 2168] : (2001) 8 SCC 633"
+[LNIND 2001 SC 2168] .
+"58. Berin P Varghese v State, 2008 Cr LJ 1759 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 108] Abettor.
+"A person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the"
+"commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by"
+law of committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the
+abettor.
+Explanation 1.—The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to an
+offence although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act.
+Explanation 2.—To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act
+"abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence"
+should be caused.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A instigates B to murder C. B refuses to do so. A is guilty of abetting B to
+commit murder.
+(b) A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D recovers
+from the wound. A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
+Explanation 3.—It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law
+"of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or"
+"knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, with a guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to commit an act which would"
+"be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of committing an"
+"offence, and having the same intention as A. Here A, whether the act be"
+"committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence."
+"(b) A, with the intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of"
+"age, to do an act which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the abetment,"
+does the act in the absence of A and thereby causes Z's death. Here though B
+"was not capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable to be punished in"
+"the same manner as if B had been capable by law of committing an offence, and"
+"had committed murder, and he is therefore subject to the punishment of death."
+"(c) A instigates B to set fire to a dwelling-house. B, in consequence of the"
+"unsoundness of his mind, being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or"
+"that he is doing what is wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the house in"
+"consequence of A's instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is guilty of"
+"abetting the offence of setting fire to a dwelling-house, and is liable to the"
+punishment provided for that offence.
+"(d) A, intending to cause a theft to be committed, instigates B to take property"
+belonging to Z out of Z's possession. A induces B to believe that the property
+"belongs to A. B takes the property out of Z's possession, in good faith, believing"
+"it to be A's property. B, acting under this misconception, does not take"
+"dishonestly, and therefore does not commit theft. But A is guilty of abetting"
+"theft, and is liable to the same punishment as if B had committed theft."
+"Explanation 4.—The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such"
+an abetment is also an offence.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and C"
+commits that offence in consequence of B's instigation. B is liable to be punished for
+"his offence with the punishment for murder; and, as A instigated B to commit the"
+"offence, A is also liable to the same punishment."
+Explanation 5.—It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by
+conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits
+it. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is
+committed.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A shall administer the poison.
+"B then explains the plan to C mentioning that a third person is to administer the poison,"
+"but without mentioning A's name. C agrees to procure the poison, and procures and"
+delivers it to B for the purpose of its being used in the manner explained. A administers
+"the poison; Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have not conspired together,"
+yet C has been engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered.
+C has therefore committed the offence defined in this section and is liable to the
+punishment for murder.
+COMMENTS.—
+"Abetment under the IPC, 1860 involves active complicity on the part of the abettor at a"
+"point of time prior to the actual commission of the offence,59. and it is of the essence"
+of the crime of abetment that the abettor should substantially assist the principal
+"culprit towards the commission of the offence. Nowhere, concurrence in the criminal"
+acts of another without such participation therein as helps to give effect to the criminal
+"act or purpose, is punishable under the Code."
+"'Abettor', under this section, means the person who abets (1) the commission of an"
+"offence, or (2) the commission of an act, which would be an offence if committed by a"
+person not suffering from any physical or mental incapacity. In the light of the
+preceding section he must be an instigator or a conspirator or an intentional helper.
+"Merely because the accused's brother was carrying on criminal activities in her house,"
+the appellant cannot be held guilty unless there is some material to show her
+complicity.60.
+Explanation 1.—If a public servant is guilty of an illegal omission of duty made
+"punishable by the Code, and a private person instigates him, then he abets the offence"
+"of which such public servant is guilty, though the abettor, being a private person, could"
+not himself have been guilty of that offence.
+Explanation 2.—The question regarding abettor's guilt depends on the nature of the act
+abetted and the manner in which abetment was made. Commission of the act abetted
+is not necessary for the offence of abetment.61. The offence of abetment is complete
+"notwithstanding that the person abetted refuses to do the thing, or fails involuntarily in"
+"doing it, or does it and the expected result does not follow. The offence of abetment by"
+"instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets, and not upon the act"
+which is actually done by the person whom he abets.
+Explanation 3.—This explanation makes it clear that the person abetted need not have
+any guilty intention in committing the act abetted. It applies to abetment generally and
+there is nothing to indicate that it applies only to abetment by instigation and not to
+other kinds of abetment.62. The offence of abetment depends upon the intention of the
+person who abets and not upon the knowledge or intention of the person he employs to
+act for him.
+"Explanation 4.—This Explanation is to be read as follows: ""When the abetment of an"
+"offence is an offence the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence"". In view of"
+"Explanation 4 appended under section 108 of the IPC, 1860 the contention of accused"
+that there cannot be any abetment of an abetment and it is unknown to criminal
+"jurisprudence, holds no water and merits no consideration.63."
+[s 108.1] Abetment of attempt to commit suicide.—
+Section 306 prescribes punishment for abetment of suicide while section 309 punishes
+attempt to commit suicide. Abetment of attempt to commit suicide is outside the
+purview of section 306 and it is punishable only under section 309 and read with
+"section 107, IPC, 1860.64."
+[s 108.2] Euthanasia.—
+Assisted suicide and assisted attempt to commit suicide are made punishable for
+cogent reasons in the interest of society. Such a provision is considered desirable to
+also prevent the danger inherent in the absence of such a penal provision.65. But in
+"Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI,66. the Supreme Court held that passive euthanasia"
+can be allowed under exceptional circumstances under the strict monitoring of the
+"Court. In March 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court gave legal"
+"sanction to passive euthanasia, permitting 'living will' by patients.67."
+[s 108.3] Political murder.—
+The accused were poor villagers who were brainwashed and became tools for
+committing crimes. The leaders who called for revenge were not charge sheeted and
+they got off scot-free. Even their names were not revealed as they were political head-
+weight. Such leaders who prompt the followers to commit crimes should be charge
+sheeted for abetment of offence for murder.
+[s 108.4] Abetment is substantive offence.—
+"The offence of abetment is a substantive one and the conviction of an abettor is,"
+"therefore, in no way dependent on the conviction of the principal.68. It cannot be held in"
+law that a person cannot ever be convicted of abetting a certain offence when the
+person alleged to have committed that offence in consequence of the abetment has
+been acquitted. The question of the abettor's guilt depends on the nature of the act
+"abetted and the manner in which the abetment was made. Under section 107, IPC,"
+1860 a person abets the doing of an act in either of three ways which can be:
+instigating any person to do an act; or engaging with one or more person in any
+conspiracy for the doing of that act; or intentionally aiding the doing of that act. If a
+person instigates another or engages with another in a conspiracy for the doing of an
+"act which is an offence, he abets such an offence and would be guilty of abetment"
+"under section 115 or section 116, IPC, 1860 even if the offence abetted is not"
+committed in consequence of the abetment. The offence of abetment is complete
+when the alleged abettor has instigated another or engaged with another in a
+conspiracy to commit the offence. It is not necessary for the offence of abetment that
+the act abetted must be committed. This is clear from Explanation 2 and illustration (a)
+"thereto, to section 108, IPC, 1860. It is only in the case of a person abetting an offence"
+by intentionally aiding another to commit that offence that the charge of abetment
+against him would be expected to fail when the person alleged to have committed the
+offence is acquitted of that offence.69.
+"59. Molazim Tewari, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 266 ."
+"60. Marry Perara Lilly v State, (1987) Supp1 SCC 182 : (1988) 1 SCC (Cr) 56."
+"61. Sundar v State of UP, 1995 Cr LJ 3481 (All), relying on Sukh Ram v State of MP., 1989 SCC"
+(Cr) 357 : AIR 1989 SC 772 [LNIND 2016 MP 593] .
+"62. Chaube Dinkar Rao, (1933) 55 All 654 ."
+"63. Gundala Reddeppa Naidu v State of AP, 2005 Cr LJ 4702 (AP)."
+"64. Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 946 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] : (1996) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 653] .
+"65. The Constitution Bench Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC 653]"
+held that both euthanasia and assisted suicide are not lawful in India which overruled the two
+"Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in P Rathinam v UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND"
+1994 SC 1533] : 1994 (3) SCC 394 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] . The Court held that the right to life
+under Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right to die.
+"66. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"67. Common Cause (A Registered Society) v UOI, (2018) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2018 SC 87] ."
+"68. Gallu Saheb v State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 813 [LNIND 1958 SC 76] ; Maruti Dada, (1875) 1"
+"Bom 15; Sahib Ditta, (1885) PR No. 20 of 1885."
+"69. Jamuna Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1967 SC 553 [LNIND 1966 SC 202] : 1967 Cr LJ 541 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+70.[s 108A] Abetment in India of offences outside India.
+"A person abets an offence within the meaning of this Code who, in 71.[India], abets the"
+commission of any act without and beyond 72.[India] which would constitute an
+offence if committed in 73.[India].
+ILLUSTRATION74.
+"A, in 75.[India], instigates B, a foreigner in Goa, to commit a murder in Goa. A is guilty of"
+abetting murder.]
+COMMENTS.—
+This section makes an abetment in India by a citizen of India of an act committed in a
+"foreign territory an offence punishable under the IPC, 1860 if it would constitute an"
+offence if committed in India. This illustration has become somewhat obsolete as Goa
+is now a part of Indian territory and not a foreign country as it was when this illustration
+was formulated.
+"70. Added by Act 4 of 1898, section 3."
+"71. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1–4–1951), to read as above."
+"72. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1–4–1951), to read as above."
+"73. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"74. This Illustration is inappropriate as Goa, which was a Portuguese colony at the time of the"
+British imperial enactment now forms part of the Union Territory.—Ed.
+"75. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+70.[s 108A] Abetment in India of offences outside India.
+"A person abets an offence within the meaning of this Code who, in 71.[India], abets the"
+commission of any act without and beyond 72.[India] which would constitute an
+offence if committed in 73.[India].
+ILLUSTRATION74.
+"A, in 75.[India], instigates B, a foreigner in Goa, to commit a murder in Goa. A is guilty of"
+abetting murder.]
+COMMENTS.—
+This section makes an abetment in India by a citizen of India of an act committed in a
+"foreign territory an offence punishable under the IPC, 1860 if it would constitute an"
+offence if committed in India. This illustration has become somewhat obsolete as Goa
+is now a part of Indian territory and not a foreign country as it was when this illustration
+was formulated.
+"70. Added by Act 4 of 1898, section 3."
+"71. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1–4–1951), to read as above."
+"72. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1–4–1951), to read as above."
+"73. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"74. This Illustration is inappropriate as Goa, which was a Portuguese colony at the time of the"
+British imperial enactment now forms part of the Union Territory.—Ed.
+"75. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 109] Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in
+consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment.
+"Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of"
+"the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of"
+"such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence."
+"Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment,"
+"when it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the"
+"conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in"
+the exercise of B's official functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the
+offence defined in section 161.
+"(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation,"
+"commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the"
+same punishment as B.
+"(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the"
+"poison and delivers it to B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance"
+"of the conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A's absence and thereby causes"
+Z's death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence by
+"conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for murder."
+COMMENTS.—
+Under this section the abettor is liable to the same punishment as that which may be
+"inflicted on the principal offender, (1) if the act of the latter is committed in"
+"consequence of the abetment, and (2) no express provision is made in the Code for the"
+"punishment of such an abetment. Section 109, IPC, 1860 becomes applicable even if"
+the abettor is not present when the offence abetted is committed provided that he has
+instigated the commission of the offence or has engaged with one or more other
+persons in a conspiracy to commit an offence and pursuant to that conspiracy some
+act or illegal omission takes place or has intentionally aided the commission of an
+offence by an act or illegal omission.76.
+[s 109.1] Scope.—
+"This section lays down nothing more than that if the IPC, 1860 has not separately"
+provided for the punishment of abetment as such then it is punishable with the
+punishment provided for the original offence. Law does not require instigation to be in
+a particular form or that it should only be in words. The instigation may be by conduct.
+"Whether there was instigation or not, is a question to be decided on the facts of each"
+case. It is not necessary in law for the prosecution to prove that the actual operative
+"cause in the mind of the person abetting was instigation and nothing else, so long as"
+there was instigation and the offence has been committed or the offence would have
+been committed if the person committing the act had the same knowledge and
+intention as the abettor. The instigation must be with reference to the thing that was
+done and not to the thing that was likely to have been done by the person who is
+instigated. It is only if this condition is fulfilled that a person can be guilty of abetment
+"by instigation. Further, the act abetted should be committed in consequence of the"
+abetment or in pursuance of the conspiracy as provided in the Explanation to section
+109. Under the Explanation an act or offence is said to be committed in pursuance of
+abetment if it is done in consequence of (a) instigation (b) conspiracy or (c) with the
+aid constituting abetment. Instigation may be in any form and the extent of the
+influence which the instigation produced in the mind of the accused would vary and
+depend upon facts of each case. The offence of conspiracy created under section
+120A is bare agreement to commit an offence. It has been made punishable under
+section 120B. The offence of abetment created under the second clause of section 107
+requires that there must be something more than mere conspiracy. There must be
+some act or illegal omission in pursuance of that conspiracy. That would be evident by
+"section 107 (second), ""engages in any conspiracy … for the doing of that thing, if an act"
+"or omission took place in pursuance of that conspiracy"". The punishment for these two"
+"categories of crimes is also quite different. Section 109, IPC, 1860 is concerned only"
+with the punishment of abetment for which no express provision has been made in the
+"IPC, 1860. The charge under section 109 should, therefore, be along with charge for"
+murder which is the offence committed in consequence of abetment. An offence of
+"criminal conspiracy is, on the other hand, an independent offence. It is made"
+punishable under section 120B for which a charge under section 109 is unnecessary
+and inappropriate.77. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in
+consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such
+abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the
+"original offence. ""Act abetted"" in section 109 means the specific offence abetted."
+"Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the"
+abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.78. The commission of the offence
+of rape in a hut then in possession of the accused was held to be not sufficient in itself
+to show that the accused abetted the offence.79.
+[s 109.2] Distinct offence.—
+Section 109 is by itself creative of an offence though it is punishable in the context of
+other offences. The accused was charged under sections 300 and 149. The Court said
+that he could not be convicted under section 300 with the aid of section 109. That
+would cause great prejudice to the accused in his defence.80. The offence for the
+abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the
+"proved offence.81. A plain reading of sections 107–109 of the IPC, 1860 would show"
+that act complained of in order to amount to abetment has to be committed either prior
+to or at the time of commission of the offences.82.
+"Where the appellant, the wife of a co-accused asked the prosecutrix, aged 15 years to"
+"go to the house of the accused and to bring lassi, and when the prosecutrix reached"
+"there, the co-accused, who were two in number, bolted the house from inside and"
+"committed rape on her, it was held that the appellant was guilty of the offence of"
+abetment. 83.
+[s 109.3] Failure to prevent is not abetment.—
+It has been held by the Supreme Court that a failure to prevent the commission of an
+offence is not an abetment of that offence. The Court said:
+Where a person aids and abets the perpetrator of a crime at the very time when the crime is
+"committed, he is a principal of the second degree and section 109 applies. But mere failure"
+to prevent the commission of an offence is not by itself an abetment of that offence.
+"Considering the definition in section 109 strictly, the instigation must have reference to the"
+thing that was done and not to the thing that was likely to have been done by the person
+who is instigated. It is only if this condition is fulfilled that a person can be guilty of
+abetment by instigation. Section 109 is attracted even if the abettor is not present when the
+offence abetted is committed provided that he had instigated the commission of the
+offence or had engaged with one or more other persons in a conspiracy to commit an
+offence and pursuant to the conspiracy some act or illegal omission takes place or
+intentionally induced the commission of an offence by an act or illegal omission. In the
+"absence of direct involvement, conviction for abetment is not sustainable. Section 109"
+provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no
+provision for the punishment of such abetment then the offender is to be punished with the
+punishment provided for the original offence. Section 109 applies even where the abettor is
+not present. Active abetment at the time of committing the offence is covered by section
+109.
+The words 'act abetted' as used in section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Mere
+help in the preparation for the commission of an offence which is not ultimately committed
+is not abetment within the meaning of section 109. 'Any offence' in section 109 means
+offence punishable under IPC or any special or local law. The abetment of an offence under
+"the special or local law, therefore, is punishable under section 109. For constituting offence"
+"of abetment, intentional and active participation by the abettor is necessary.84."
+"When a person is charged with the abetment of an offence, it is normally linked with an"
+offence which has been proved.85.
+[s 109.4] Procedure.—Failure to frame Charge.—
+"Section 109, IPC, 1860 is a distinct offence. Accused having faced trial for being a"
+member of an unlawful assembly which achieved the common object of killing the
+"deceased, could in no event be substitutedly convicted for offence under section 302,"
+"IPC, 1860 with the aid of section 109, IPC, 1860. There was obviously thus, not only a"
+legal flaw but also a great prejudice to the appellant in projecting his defence.86.
+"Section 109, IPC, 1860 is by itself an offence though punishable in the context of other"
+offences.87.
+[s 109.5] Sentence.—
+"When the act abetted is committed as a consequence of abetment, the abettor should"
+be punished with the punishment provided for the main offence with the help of section
+"109, IPC, 1860 and even if a charge under section 120B, IPC, 1860 had been framed, no"
+separate sentence under that section is called for.88. No distinction should be made in
+the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the principal offender and that awarded to
+the abettor.89.
+[s 109.6] Compoundable.—
+"When an offence is compoundable under section 320 of the Cr PC, 1973, the abetment"
+of such may be compounded in like manner.90.
+[s 109.7] CASES.—
+"Where the accused instigated others to assault with deadly weapons and not to kill, he"
+"should be convicted under section 324 read with section 109, IPC, 1860 and not under"
+"section 307 read with section 109, IPC, 1860.91. Where the accused did not participate"
+"in the act of rape but kept watch while others were committing the offence, and thereby"
+"aided and abetted the commission of the crime instead of preventing it, he was held"
+liable to be convicted under section 376 read with this section and not under section
+376 read with section 34.92.
+[s 109.8] Distinction between sections 109 and 114.—
+There is a distinction between section 109 and section 114. Section 114 applies where
+"a criminal first abets an offence to be committed by another person, and is"
+subsequently present at its commission. Active abetment at the time of committing the
+offence is covered by section 109 and section 114 is clearly intended for an abetment
+"previous to the actual commission of the crime, that is, before the first steps have been"
+taken to commit it.93.
+"76. NMMY Momin, 1971 Cr LJ 793 : AIR 1971 SC 885 [LNIND 1970 SC 155] . Where the accused"
+suffered trial for the substantive offences of causing hurt under sections 328 and 272 by mixing
+"ethyl and methyl alcohol but his direct involvement was not established, section 109 was not"
+"permitted to be pushed into service for convicting him for abetment; Joseph v State of Kerala,"
+AIR 1994 SC 34 : 1994 Cr LJ 21 : 1995 SCC (Cr) 165.
+"77. Arjun Singh v State of HP, AIR 2009 SC 1568 [LNIND 2009 SC 252] : (2009) 4 SCC 18 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 252] : (2009) 1 SCR 983 [LNIND 2009 SC 252] : 2009 (2) Scale 302 [LNIND 2009 SC
+"252] : 2009 Cr LJ 1332 . See Kehar Singh v The State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883 [LNIND"
+"1988 SC 887] ; Kulwant Singh v State of Bihar, (2007) 15 SCC 670 [LNIND 2007 SC 820] ."
+"78. Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, JT 2012 (9) SC 312 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : 2012 (9) Scale"
+58 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] .
+"79. Ashok Nivruti Desai v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 826 (Bom). Jag Narain Prasad v State"
+"of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 2553 : AIR 1998 SC 2879 [LNIND 1998 SC 387] , the accused charged with"
+exhorting his son to kill the victim. The court said that it was not believable that an aged person
+would involve his son into crime for a trivial reason. Mere presence at the spot is not sufficient
+"to involve all the family members who were there. See also Manjula v Muni, 1998 Cr LJ 1476"
+(Mad).
+"80. Wakil Yadav v State of Bihar, 1999 Cr LJ 5000 (SC). Arjun Singh v State of HP, (2009) 4 SCC"
+"18 [LNIND 2009 SC 252] : AIR 2009 SC 1568 [LNIND 2009 SC 252] : 2009 Cr LJ 1332 ,"
+"ingredients restated, the offence was not made out in this case."
+"81. Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, JT 2012 (9) SC 312 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : 2012 (9) Scale"
+58 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] ; Kishangiri Mangalgiri Swami
+"v State of Gujarat, 2009 (4) SCC 52 [LNIND 2009 SC 193] ."
+"82. Jasobant Narayan Mohapatra v State of Orissa, 2009 Cr LJ 1043 (Ori)."
+"83. Om Prakash v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 586 : (2015) 2 SCC 84 [LNIND 2014 SC 887] ."
+"84. Kulwant Singh v State of Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 670 [LNIND 2007 SC 820] ."
+"85. Goura Venkata Reddy v State of AP, (2003) 12 SCC 469 [LNIND 2003 SC 1004] , the appellant"
+(accused) who instigated the other accused was convicted under section 304/109 and not
+under section 302/109.
+"86. Wakil Yadav v State of Bihar, (2000) 10 SCC 500 : 1999 AIR SCW 4694."
+"87. Joseph Kurian Philip Jose v State, (1994) 6 SCC 535 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] : AIR 1995 SC 4"
+[LNIND 1994 SC 927] : 1995 Cr LJ 502 .
+"88. State of TN v Savithri, 1976 Cr LJ 37 (Mad)."
+"89. Ashok Nivruti Desai v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 826 (Bom). Vinit v State of"
+"Maharashtra, (1994) 2 Cr LJ 1791 (Bom)."
+"90. Section 320(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
+"91. Jai Narain, 1972 Cr LJ 469 : AIR 1972 SC 1764 ."
+"92. Nawabkhan v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1179 MP; Jai Chand v State of HP, 2002 Cr LJ 2301"
+"(HP); Munuswamy v State of TN, 2002 Cr LJ 3916 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 2994 [LNIND 2002 SC 500]"
+.
+"93. Kulwant Singh v State of Bihar, (2007) 15 SCC 670 [LNIND 2007 SC 820] ; Mathurala Adi"
+"Reddy v State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 177 : 1956 Cr LJ 341 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 110] Punishment of abetment if person abetted does act with different
+intention from that of abettor.
+"Whoever abets the commission of an offence shall, if the person abetted does the act"
+"with a different intention or knowledge from that of the abettor, be punished with the"
+punishment provided for the offence which would have been committed if the act had
+been done with the intention or knowledge of the abettor and with no other.
+COMMENTS.—
+This section provides that though the person abetted commits the offence with a
+different intention or knowledge yet the abettor will be punished with the punishment
+provided for the offence abetted. The liability of the person abetted is not affected by
+this section.
+Explanation 3 to section 108 should be read in conjunction with this section. See
+illustration (d) to that section.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 111] Liability of abettor when one act abetted and different act done.
+"When an act is abetted and a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act"
+"done, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had directly abetted it:"
+Proviso.
+"Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the abetment, and was"
+"committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the aid or in pursuance"
+of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A instigates a child to put poison into the food of Z, and gives him poison"
+"for that purpose. The child, in consequence of the instigation, by mistake"
+"puts the poison into the food of Y, which is by the side of that of Z. Here, if"
+"the child was acting under the influence of A's instigation, and the act done"
+"was under the circumstances a probable consequence of the abetment, A is"
+liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had instigated the
+child to put the poison into the food of Y.
+(b) A instigates B to burn Z's house. B sets fire to the house and at the same
+"time commits theft of property there. A, though guilty of abetting the"
+"burning of the house, is not guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a"
+"distinct act, and not a probable consequence of the burning."
+(c) A instigates B and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the
+"purpose of robbery, and provides them with arms for that purpose. B and C"
+"break into the house, and being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z."
+"Here, if that murder was the probable consequence of the abetment, A is"
+liable to the punishment provided for murder.
+COMMENTS.—
+Liability of abettor when different act done.—This section proceeds on the maxim
+"""every man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act"". If one man"
+"instigates another to perpetrate a particular crime, and that other, in pursuance of such"
+"instigation, not only perpetrates that crime, but, in the course of doing so, commits"
+"another crime in furtherance of it, the former is criminally responsible as an abettor in"
+"respect of such last-mentioned crime, if it is one which, as a reasonable man, he must,"
+"at the time of the instigation, have known would, in the ordinary course of things,"
+probably have to be committed in order to carry out the original crime. B and C
+instigated A to rob the deceased on his return to home after receiving a sum of money;
+whereupon A killed the deceased. A was convicted of murder and B and C of offences
+"under sections 109, 302.94. Where the act contemplated and instigated was no more"
+"than a thrashing with a lathi, but one of the assailants suddenly took out a spearhead"
+"from his pocket and fatally stabbed the person who was to be thrashed, the others"
+were not held liable for murder or abetment of murder.95.
+"94. Mathura Das, (1884) 6 All 491 , 494."
+"95. Girja Prasad, (1934) 57 All 717 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 112] Abettor when liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for
+act done.
+If the act for which the abettor is liable under the last preceding section is committed
+"in addition to the act abetted, and constitutes a distinct offence, the abettor is liable"
+to punishment for each of the offences.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A instigates B to resist by force a distress made by a public servant. B, in consequence,"
+"resists that distress. In offering the resistance, B voluntarily causes grievous hurt to the"
+officer executing the distress. As B has committed both the offences of resisting the
+"distress, and the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment"
+"for both these offences; and, if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous"
+hurt in resisting the distress A will also be liable to punishment for each of the
+offences.
+COMMENTS.—
+This section extends the principle enunciated in the preceding section. Under it the
+abettor is punished for the offence abetted as well as the offence committed. A joint
+"reading of sections 111, 112 and 133 make it abundantly clear that if a person abets"
+another in the commission of an offence and the principal goes further thereafter and
+does something more which has a different result from that intended by the abettor
+"and makes the offence an aggravated one, the abettor is liable for the consequences of"
+the acts of his principal. The crux of the problem in an enquiry of this sort is whether
+the abettor as reasonable man at the time of his instigation or intentionally aiding the
+principal would have foreseen the probable consequences of his abetment.96.
+"96. Re Irala Palle Ramiah, 1957 Cr LJ 815 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 113] Liability of abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted different
+from that intended by the abettor.
+When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the abettor of causing a
+"particular effect, and an act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the"
+"abetment, caused a different effect from that intended by the abettor, the abettor is"
+"liable for the effect caused, in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had"
+"abetted the act with the intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act"
+abetted was likely to cause that effect.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z. B, in consequence of the instigation causes"
+"grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt"
+"abetted was likely to cause death, A is liable to be punished with the punishment"
+provided for murder.
+COMMENTS.—
+This section should be read in conjunction with section 111. Section 111 provides for
+"the doing of an act different from the one abetted, whereas this section deals with the"
+case when the act done is the same as the act abetted but its effect is different.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 114] Abettor present when offence is committed.
+"Whenever any person who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is"
+present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of
+"the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or"
+offence.
+COMMENTS.—
+This section:
+is only brought into operation when circumstances amounting to abetment of a particular
+"crime have first been proved, and then the presence of the accused at the commission of"
+"that crime is proved in addition … Section 114 deals with the case, where there has been the"
+"crime of abetment, but where also there has been actual commission of the crime abetted"
+"and the abettor has been present thereat, and the way in which it deals with such a case is"
+"this. Instead of the crime being still abetment with circumstances of aggravation, the crime"
+becomes the very crime abetted. The section is evidently not punitory. Because
+"participation de facto. … may sometimes be obscure in detail, it is established by the"
+presumption Juris et de jure that actual presence plus prior abetment can mean nothing else
+but participation. The presumption raised by s. 114 brings the case within the ambit of s.
+34.97.
+"The meaning of this section is that if the nature of the act done constitutes abetment,"
+"then, if present, the abettor is to be deemed to have committed the offence, though in"
+point of fact another actually committed it. The abetment must be complete apart from
+"the mere presence of the abettor.98. The words ""who if absent would be liable to be"
+"punished as an abettor"" clearly show that abetment must be one prior to the"
+"commission of the offence and complete by itself.99. Where, for instance, a blow is"
+"struck by A, in the presence of, and by the order of, B, both are principals in the"
+"transaction. If A instigates B to murder, he commits abetment; if absent, he is"
+"punishable as an abettor, and if the offence is committed, then under section 109; if"
+"present, he is by this section deemed to have committed the offence and is punishable"
+as a principal. This section applies to cases where a person abets the commission of
+the offence sometime before at a different place and also remains present at the time
+the offence is committed.100. But where a person is charged with abetment under this
+"section for aiding in the Commission of an offence, e.g., section 300 IPC, 1860 and the"
+person charged as the principal offender is acquitted on the ground that he had not
+"committed the offence in question, no further question arises regarding abettor's"
+liability.101.
+Section 114 is not applicable in every case in which the abettor is present at the
+commission of the offence abetted. While section 109 is a section dealing generally
+"with abetment, section 114 applies to those cases only in which not only is the abettor"
+present at the time of the commission of the offence but abetment has been
+committed prior to and independently of his presence.102.
+[s 114.1] Sections 34 and 114.—
+The distinction between sections 34 and 114 is a very fine one. According to section
+"34, where a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common"
+"intention of all, each of them is liable as if it were done by himself alone; so that if two"
+"or more persons are present, aiding and abetting in the commission of a murder each"
+"will be tried and convicted as a principal, though it might not be proved which of them"
+"actually committed the act. Section 114 refers to the case where a person by abetment,"
+"previous to the commission of the act, renders himself liable as an abettor, is present"
+"when the act is committed, but takes no active part in the doing of it.103. A mere"
+direction from one person to another and the carrying out of that direction by the other
+may be only instigation of the latter's act and may not be a case of a joint act falling
+under section 34.104. Accused provided an axe to his son who assaulted the victim
+leading to his death. It was not a pre-meditated action on the part of main accused and
+appellant supplied axe instantaneously without considering its pros and cons.
+Conviction of appellant on charge of abetment (section 114) is not maintainable.105.
+"1. 'Present'.—It is not necessary that the party should be actually present, an ear or eye"
+"witness of the transaction; he is, in construction of law, present, aiding and abetting, if,"
+"with the intention of giving assistance, he be near enough to afford it, should occasion"
+"arise. A conspirator, who, while his friends enter into a house and loot it, stands and"
+"watches outside in pursuance of the common design, does not escape liability under"
+"the section.106. Where, therefore, a person watched at the door of a house while a"
+murder was being committed inside he would be guilty of murder.107.
+[s 114.2] Section 376 read with Section 114.—
+"In order to bring home such conviction under section 376, IPC, 1860 read with section"
+"114, IPC, 1860 there must be evidence on record to show: (a) that there was abetment"
+of rape to be committed; (b) that the abettors have factually abetted the commission of
+rape; and (c) that they were present at the time when the commission of rape took
+place.108.
+"97. Barendra Kumar Ghosh, (1924) 52 IA 40 , 53 : 27 Bom LR 148, 159 : 52 Cal 197."
+"98. Krishnaswami Naidu, (1927) 51 Mad 263. See Malanrama v State of Maharashtra, ILR 1958"
+Bom 700 [LNIND 1957 BOM 189] : 1960 Cr LJ 1189 where it was held in the circumstances of
+the case that the mere presence of the accused at the ceremony knowing that the offence of
+bigamy was being committed and the throwing the holy rice over the couple did not amount to
+abetment of bigamy notwithstanding that one of the accused persons distributed pan after the
+"ceremony. Followed in CS Vardachari v CS Shanti, 1987 Cr LJ 1048 over similar facts."
+"99. Sital, (1935) 11 Luck 384 ."
+"100. Nanboo v Kedar, AIR 1962 MP 91 [LNIND 1961 MP 109] ."
+"101. Mahommed Jasimuddin, 1982 Cr LJ 1510 (Gau). See also State v Naroshbhai Haribhai"
+"Tandel, 1997 Cr LJ 2783 (Guj)."
+"102. Kulwant Singh v State of Bihar, (2007) 15 SCC 670 [LNIND 2007 SC 820] ."
+"103. Jan Mahomed, (1864) 1 WR (Cr) 49; Nga Po Kyone, (1933) 11 Ran 354."
+"104. MA Reddy v State, AIR 1956 SC 177 : 1956 Cr LJ 341 ."
+"105. Muklesur Rahaman v State, 2010 Cr LJ 4488 . Also see, Kalubhai Maganbhai Vaghela v State"
+"of Gujarat, 2009 Cr LJ 2317 (Guj)."
+"106. Khandu v State, (1899) 1 Bom LR 351 , 355."
+"107. Sidharth v State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 4352 [LNIND 2005 SC 752] : (2005) 12 SCC 545"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 752] : 2005 Cr LJ 4499 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cr) 175. Also see Mukati Prasad Rai
+"alias Mukti Rai v State IR, 2005 SC 1271 : (2004) 13 SCC 144 : (2005) 1 SCC (Cr) 69; Awadh"
+"Mahto v State of Bihar, 2007 Cr LJ 342 (Pat)."
+"108. Mangiya v State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 4814 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 115] Abetment of offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life—if
+offence not committed.
+Whoever abets the commission of an offence punishable with death or 109.
+"[imprisonment for life] shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence of the"
+"abetment, and no express provision1 is made by this Code for the punishment of such"
+"abetmnt,2 be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+If act causing harm be done in consequence.
+"and if any act for which the abettor is liable in consequence of the abetment, and"
+"which causes hurt to any person, is done, the abettor shall be liable to"
+imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A instigates B to murder Z. The offence is not committed. If B had murdered Z, he"
+would have been subject to the punishment of death or 110.[imprisonment for life].
+Therefore A is liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years
+"and also to a fine; and if any hurt be done to Z in consequence of the abetment, he"
+"will be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years, and"
+to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes the abetment of certain offences which are either not committed
+"at all, or not committed in consequence of abetment or only in part committed."
+When more than ten persons are instigated to commit an offence punishable with
+"death, the offence comes under this section as well as under section 117. Abetment"
+under this section need not necessarily be abetment of the commission of an offence
+by a particular person against a particular person.111.
+1. 'Express provision'.—This refers to sections in which specific cases of abetment of
+offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life are dealt with.112.
+2. 'Such abetment'.—These words refer to the abetment of the offence specified in the
+"section itself, namely an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and"
+only sections 121 and 131 provide for the punishment of the abetment of such
+offence.113.
+"109. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"110. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"111. Dwarkanath Goswami, (1932) 60 Cal 427 ; Lavji Mandan v State, (1939) 41 Bom LR 980 ."
+112. Ibid.
+"113. Lavji Mandan, (1939) 41 Bom LR 980 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 116] Abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment— if offence be not
+committed.
+"Whoever abets an offence punishable with imprisonment shall, if that offence be not"
+"committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this"
+"Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of any"
+description provided for that offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part
+"of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for that"
+"offence, or with both;"
+If abettor or person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to prevent
+offence.
+"and if the abettor or the person abetted is a public servant, whose duty it is to"
+"prevent the commission of such offence, the abettor shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of any description provided for that offence, for a term which may"
+"extend to one-half of the longest term provided for that offence, or with such fine"
+"as is provided for the offence, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some"
+favour in the exercise of B's official functions. B refuses to accept the bribe.
+A is punishable under this section.
+"(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence,"
+"A has nevertheless committed the offence defined in this section, and is"
+punishable accordingly.
+"(c) A, a police-officer, whose duty it is to prevent robbery, abets the commission"
+"of robbery. Here, though the robbery be not committed, A is liable to one-"
+"half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, and also"
+to fine.
+"(d) B abets the commission of a robbery by A, a police-officer, whose duty it is"
+"to prevent that offence. Here, though the robbery be not committed, B is"
+liable to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the
+"offence of robbery, and also to fine."
+COMMENT—
+Where abetted offence not committed.—This section provides for the abetment of an
+offence punishable with imprisonment. There is no corresponding provision in the
+Code relating to abetment of an offence punishable with fine only.
+Three different states of fact may arise after an abetment—
+(1) No offence may be committed. In this case the offender is punishable under
+sections 115 and 116 for the mere abetment to commit a crime.
+"(2) The very act at which the abetment aims may be committed, and will be punishable"
+under sections 109 and 110.
+"(3) Some act different but naturally flowing from the act abetted may be perpetrated, in"
+"which case the abettor will fall under the penalties of sections 111, 112 and 113."
+[s 116.1] Section 116 and Section 306.—
+"Section 116, IPC, 1860 is ""abetment of offence punishable with imprisonment if"
+"offence be not committed"". But the crux of the offence under section 306 itself is"
+"abetment. In other words, if there is no abetment there is no question of the offence"
+under section 306 coming into play. It is inconceivable to have abetment of an
+"abetment. Hence, there cannot be an offence under section 116 read with section 306,"
+"IPC, 1860.114. The Supreme Court has never laid down in Satvir Singh115. that under no"
+"circumstance an offence under section 306 read with section 511 IPC, 1860 can be"
+committed. The Supreme Court did not have occasion to consider whether a conviction
+for an offence of attempt to abet the commission of suicide is punishable under
+"section 306 read with section 511, IPC, 1860. Merely because the section opens with"
+"the words ""if any person commits suicide"" it cannot be held that in a case of"
+unsuccessful suicide there is no attempt to abet the commission of suicide. Suicide
+and its attempt on the one hand and abetment of commission of suicide and its
+"attempt on the other are treated differently by law and, therefore, the one who abets the"
+commission of an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide cannot be held to be
+"punishable merely under section 309 read with section 116, IPC, 1860. To implement"
+the scheme of law he has got to be held to be punishable under section 306 read with
+"section 511, IPC, 1860.116."
+"114. Satvir Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2828 [LNIND 2001 SC 2168] : (2001) 8 SCC 633"
+[LNIND 2001 SC 2168] : 2001 Cr LJ 4625 : (2002) 1 SCC (Cr) 48.
+115. Supra.
+"116. Berin P Varghese v State, 2008 Cr LJ 1759 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 117] Abetting commission of offence by the public or by more than ten
+persons.
+Whoever abets the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any
+"number or class of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A affixes in a public place a placard instigating a sect consisting of more than ten
+"members to meet at a certain time and place, for the purpose of attacking the"
+"members of an adverse sect, while engaged in a procession. A has committed the"
+offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT—
+Abetting by public or more than ten persons.—Abetment has a reference both to the
+"person or persons abetted, and to the offence or offences the commission of which is"
+"abetted. This section deals with former, whatever may be the nature of the offence"
+"abetted, while section 115 deals with the latter without having regard to the person or"
+persons abetted.117.
+Under this section it will be sufficient to show any instigation or other mode of
+"abetment, though neither the effect intended, nor any other effect follows from it. The"
+"gravamen of a charge under this section is the abetment itself, the instigation to"
+"general lawlessness, not the particular offence of which the commission is"
+instigated.118. The section covers all offences and is a general provision for abetment
+of any number of persons exceeding ten. When more than ten persons are instigated to
+"commit an offence punishable with death, the offence comes under section 115 as"
+"well as this section.119. Abetment of the commission of murder, whether by a single"
+"individual or by a class of persons exceeding ten, falls under section 115. In the latter"
+"case, it may fall under this section also, but as this section prescribes a lesser"
+"punishment, section 115 is the more appropriate provision for such an offence."
+"Although both the sections are applicable, there cannot be separate sentences under"
+"the two sections for the same criminal act, and the conviction should properly be under"
+that section which inflicts the higher punishment.120.
+[s 117.1] Instigation is essential.—
+A mere intention or preparation to instigate is neither instigation nor abetment. In order
+to constitute an offence under this section by pasting leaflets it is necessary that either
+the public should have read the leaflets or they should have been exposed to public
+gaze.121.
+"117. Lavji Mandan v State, (1939) 41 Bom LR 980 ."
+"118. Konda Satyavtamma v State, (1931) 55 Mad 90."
+"119. Dwarkanath Goswami, (1932) 60 Cal 427 ."
+"120. Lavji Mandan, (1939) 41 Bom LR 980 ."
+"121. Parimal Chatterji, (1932) 60 Cal 327 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 118] Concealing design to commit offence punishable with death or
+imprisonment for life.
+Whoever intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate
+"the commission of an offence punishable with death or 122.[imprisonment for life],"
+123.[voluntarily conceals by any act or omission or by the use of encryption or any
+"other information hiding tool, the existence of a design] to commit such offence or"
+"makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design,"
+If offence be committed — if offence be not committed.
+"shall, if that offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, or, if the offence be not"
+"committed, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend"
+to three years; and in either case shall also be liable to fine.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, knowing that dacoity is about to be committed at B, falsely informs the Magistrate"
+"that a dacoity is about to be committed at C, a place in an opposite direction, and"
+thereby misleads the Magistrate with intent to facilitate the commission of the offence.
+The dacoity is committed at B in pursuance of the design. A is punishable under this
+section.
+COMMENT—
+"Concealing design to commit offence.—Sections 118, 119 and 120 all contemplate the"
+concealment of a design by persons other than the accused to commit the offence
+charged. These sections apply to the concealment of all offences except those which
+are merely punishable with fine. Under section 107 concealment of a design to commit
+an offence constitutes an abetment. There must be an obligation on the person
+"concealing the offence to disclose.124. The Cr PC, 1973 creates such obligation in"
+"respect of several offences of a serious nature (sections 39 and 40 Cr PC, 1973). The"
+concealment to be criminal must be intentional or at least with knowledge that it will
+facilitate the commission of an offence.
+"122. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"123. Subs. by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (10 of 2009), section 51"
+(w.e.f. 27 October 2009).
+"124. Bahadur, (1882) PR No. 34 of 1882."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 119] Public servant concealing design to commit offence which it is his duty
+to prevent.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that"
+he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence which it is his duty as such
+public servant to prevent;
+125.[voluntarily conceals by any act or omission or by the use of encryption or any
+"other information hiding tool, the existence of a design] to commit such offence, or"
+makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design;
+If offence be committed.
+"shall, if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of any"
+"description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of"
+"the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for that"
+"offence, or with both;"
+"If offence be punishable with death, etc."
+"or, if the offence be punishable with death or 126.[imprisonment for life], with"
+imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years;
+If offence be not committed.
+"or if the offence be not committed, shall be punished with imprisonment of any"
+"description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth"
+part of the longest term of such imprisonment or with such fine as is provided for
+"the offence, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, an officer of police, being legally bound to give information of all designs to commit"
+"robbery which may come to his knowledge, and knowing that B designs to commit"
+"robbery, omits to give such information, with intent to so facilitate the commission of"
+"that offence. Here A has by an illegal omission concealed the existence of B's design,"
+and is liable to punishment according to the provisions of this section.
+COMMENT—
+Public servant concealing design to commit offence.—Section 118 deals with persons
+who are not public servants. In this section the same principle is extended to public
+servants but with severe penalty.
+"125. Subs. by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (10 of 2009), section 51"
+(w.e.f. 27 October 2009).
+"126. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER V OF ABETMENT
+[s 120] Concealing design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment.
+"Whoever, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate"
+"the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment,"
+If offence be committed—if offence be not committed.
+"voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to"
+"commit such offence, or makes any representation which he knows to be false"
+"respecting such design,"
+"shall, if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of the"
+"description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth,"
+"and, if the offence be not committed, to one-eighth, of the longest term for such"
+"imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Punishment for concealing design.—The basic principle of this section and section
+118 is one and the same. Section 118 deals with offences punishable with death or
+imprisonment for life; this section deals with offences punishable with imprisonment.
+All offences except those punishable only with fine are included in these two sections.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+CHAPTER V-A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
+[s 120A] Definition of criminal conspiracy.
+"When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—"
+"(1) an illegal act, or"
+"(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a"
+criminal conspiracy:
+Providedthat no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall
+amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is
+done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
+Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such
+"agreement, or is merely incidental to that object."
+COMMENT—
+Criminal conspiracy.—This chapter has introduced into the criminal law of India a new
+"offence, viz., the offence of criminal conspiracy. It came into existence by the"
+"Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1913. Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception"
+to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to
+commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention.2. Law
+making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief
+which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support
+"which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left"
+"to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting"
+conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is held to be
+continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of
+the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. Offence of criminal
+conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy
+"consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or"
+more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means.3. A criminal conspiracy must be put to
+"action inasmuch as so long a crime is generated in the mind of an accused, it does"
+"not become punishable. What is necessary is not thoughts, which may even be"
+"criminal in character, often involuntary, but offence would be said to have been"
+committed thereunder only when that take concrete shape of an agreement to do or
+cause to be done an illegal act or an act which although not illegal by illegal means
+and then if nothing further is done the agreement would give rise to a criminal
+conspiracy.4.
+[s 120A.1] Ingredients.—
+The ingredients of this offence are—
+(1) that there must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to
+conspire; and
+(2) that the agreement should be
+"(i) for doing of an illegal act, or"
+(ii) for doing by illegal means an act which may not itself be illegal.5.
+Meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done
+an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal
+conspiracy.6.
+"The most important ingredient of the offence being, the agreement between two or"
+"more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the"
+court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end
+or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render
+them as conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of
+physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express
+agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts
+sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which
+continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity.
+During its subsistence whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of
+"acts, he would be held guilty under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC,"
+1860).7.
+[s 120A.2] Elements of Criminal Conspiracy.—
+"(a) an object to be accomplished,"
+"(b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object,"
+(c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons
+"whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the"
+"accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by"
+"any effectual means, and"
+(d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act.8.
+1. Two or more persons needed.—To constitute the offence of conspiracy there must
+be an agreement of two or more persons to do an act which is illegal or which is to be
+done by illegal means for one cannot conspire with oneself. In Topandas v State of
+"Bombay,9. which has been cited by the Supreme Court with approval in Haradhan"
+"Chakrabarty v UOI,10. it was laid down that ""two or more persons must be parties to"
+such an agreement and one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal
+"conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself."" The question"
+of a single person being convicted for an offence of conspiracy was considered in
+"Bimbadhar Pradhan v The State of Orissa,11.,12. and held that It is not essential that"
+more than one person should be convicted of the offence of criminal conspiracy. It is
+enough if the court is in a position to find that two or more persons were actually
+concerned in the criminal conspiracy. In the Red fort Attack Case13. the Supreme Court
+"found that it was nothing but a well-planned conspiracy, in which apart from sole"
+"appellant, some others were also involved and convicted the sole appellant for criminal"
+conspiracy.14. Under the common law since husband and wife constitute one person
+there cannot be any conspiracy to commit an offence if husband and wife are the only
+"parties to an agreement.15. ""It seems rather odd that though husband and wife by"
+themselves alone cannot be convicted of an offence of conspiracy for agreeing to
+commit an offence but if two of them commit the self-same substantive offence they
+"can be convicted of that offence"".16. Fortunately this state of law does not exist in"
+"India, where husband and wife by themselves alone can be parties to a criminal"
+conspiracy. Where the husband is a party with some others in a conspiracy and his wife
+joined him in that with knowledge that he was involved with others to commit an
+"unlawful act, she would be guilty of the conspiracy.17. Since conspiracy requires at"
+"least two persons, where two or more named persons only were charged and all but"
+"one of them were acquitted, the remaining accused could not be convicted under"
+"section 120B, IPC, 1860, as he could not have conspired with himself.18. In a similar"
+"case before the Supreme Court, a military major was tried for theft of military goods"
+along with nine others who were supposed to have abetted him. He was found guilty
+"along with one more accused and the rest were acquitted. On his appeal, the High"
+Court quashed the judgment of the Court martial because there was no proof that he
+had removed the wheel drums. He was reinstated. In view of the acquittal and
+"reinstatement of the main accused, the matter of his co-accused came before the"
+Supreme Court. He too was ordered to be acquitted and reinstated.19. The same rule
+obtained under the English common law provided two named persons were tried
+"together.20. This rule has now been abolished by section 5(8) of the Criminal Law Act,"
+1977 which provides that unless conviction of one becomes inconsistent with the
+"acquittal of the other even one of the two conspirators can be convicted, e.g., where"
+one was acquitted for want of sanction or on ground of being an exempted person. The
+"Bombay High Court has taken the same view in a case. Thus, where of the two accused"
+one was a public servant and he had to be acquitted as he was prosecuted without
+"obtaining sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973),"
+the other could still be convicted on a charge of conspiracy as the acquittal of the other
+accused was not on facts but on technical ground and in spite of evidence establishing
+the factum of conspiracy.21.
+"The circumstances in which a single person can be tried and convicted have been thus,"
+"stated in Kenny:22. ""But though there must be plurality of conspirators, it is not"
+"necessary that all should be brought to trial together. One person may be indicted,"
+"alone, for conspiring with other persons who are not in custody, or who are even"
+"unknown to the indictors. Indeed, some of the conspirators may be unknown to the"
+"rest, provided all are acting under the directions of one leader. There need not be"
+"communication between each conspirator and every other, provided there be a design"
+"common to all.""23. Thus, a wife knowing that her husband was involved with others in a"
+"conspiracy, agreed with him that she would join the conspiracy and play her part, it was"
+held that she thereby became guilty of conspiracy notwithstanding that the only person
+with whom she actually concluded the agreement was her husband.24.
+2. Agreement is gist of the offence.—The gist of the offence is the bare engagement
+"and association to break the law, whether any act be done in pursuance thereof by the"
+conspirators or not.25. Meeting of minds is essential. Mere knowledge or discussion is
+not sufficient.26. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having
+the same intention. Not only the intention but the presence of an agreement to carry
+"out the object of the intention, is an offence. The question for consideration in a case is"
+did all the accused had the intention and did they agree that the crime be committed. It
+would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely
+"entertained a wish, howsoever, horrendous it may be, that offence be committed.27. In"
+"the absence of an agreement, a mere thought to commit a crime does not constitute"
+the offence.28. The offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence. It renders the mere
+agreement to commit an offence punishable even if no offence takes place pursuant to
+"the illegal agreement.29. The object in view or the methods employed should be illegal,"
+"as defined in section 43, (supra). A distinction is drawn between an agreement to"
+commit an offence and an agreement of which either the object or the methods
+"employed are illegal but do not constitute an offence. In the case of the former, the"
+"criminal conspiracy is completed by the act of agreement; in the case of the latter,"
+there must be some act done by one or more of the parties to the agreement to give
+"effect to the object thereof, that is, there must be an overt act. An express agreement"
+need not be proved. Evidence relating to transmission of thoughts leading to sharing of
+thought relating to the unlawful act is sufficient.30. A wrong judgment or an inaccurate
+"or incorrect approach or poor management by itself, even after due deliberations"
+"between Ministers or even with Prime Minister, by itself cannot be said to be a product"
+of criminal conspiracy.31. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution
+relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission
+of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and
+illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The
+circumstances relied for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point
+of time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged
+conspiracy.32.
+The meeting of the minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to be proved by adducing
+"substantive evidence, in cases where the circumstantial evidence is incomplete or"
+vague.33.
+[s 120A.3] Actus reus.—
+"The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the"
+execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful
+object at the same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of
+"minds, a consensus to give effect to an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary"
+that each conspirator should have been in communication with every other.34.
+[s 120A.4] Participation.—
+It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the
+end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention
+was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the
+conspiracy. All of them cannot be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the
+agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do
+"a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for"
+such offences even if some of them have not actively participated in the commission
+"of those offences.35. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more"
+persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary
+condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every
+detail of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary that every one of the conspirators takes
+active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial act.36. Even if some
+steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the
+others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the
+object of the conspiracy.37. The rationale is that criminal acts done in furtherance of a
+conspiracy may be sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and support of the
+group as a whole to warrant treating each member as a causal agent to each act.
+"Under this view, which of the conspirators committed the substantive offence would be"
+less significant in determining the defendant's liability than the fact that the crime was
+performed as a part of a larger division of labour to which the accused had also
+contributed his efforts.38.
+[s 120A.5] Overt act.—
+No overt act is necessary.39. Where the allegation against the third accused was that
+"he was merely standing nearby when the other accused committed the murder, he"
+"cannot be charged for an offence under sections 302/120B, IPC, 1860, in the absence"
+of any other reliable evidence.40. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment
+"of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event, unless the Statute so"
+"requires, no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a"
+fact-situation criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement.41.
+"When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each"
+"of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced,"
+"if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means.42. Where the"
+conspiracy alleged is with regard to the commission of a serious crime as
+contemplated by section 120-B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of section
+"120A, then the mere proof of an agreement is enough to bring about conviction under"
+section 120B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any of them would not
+"be necessary.43. The illegal act may or may not be done in pursuance of agreement, but"
+the very agreement is an offence and is punishable.44.
+It is not an ingredient of the offence under this section that all the parties should agree
+to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Where
+"the accused are charged with having conspired to do three categories of illegal acts,"
+the mere fact that all of them could not be convicted separately in respect of each of
+the offences has no relevancy in considering the question whether the offence of
+conspiracy has been committed. They can all be held guilty of the offence of
+"conspiracy to do illegal acts, though for individual offences all of them may not be"
+liable.45. Where the agreement between the accused is a conspiracy to do or continue
+"to do something which is illegal, it is immaterial whether the agreement to do any of"
+the acts in furtherance of the commission of the offence do not strictly amount to an
+offence. The entire agreement must be viewed as a whole and it has to be ascertained
+as to what in fact the conspirators intended to do or the object they wanted to
+achieve.46. It is not necessary that each member of a conspiracy must know each other
+or all the details of the conspiracy.47. It is also not necessary that every conspirator
+"must have taken part in each and every act done in pursuance of a conspiracy.48. It is,"
+"however, necessary that a charge of conspiracy should contain particulars of the"
+"names of the place or places where it was hatched, persons hatching it, how was it"
+hatched and what the purpose of the conspiracy was.49.
+"In the matter50. of the assassination of the then Prime Minister of India, Smt. Indira"
+"Gandhi, one of the two actual killers and two conspirators were brought to trial. Both"
+the conspirators were away from the scene of the crime. One of them was acquitted by
+the Supreme Court. His movements after the incident were not properly proved. The
+documents recovered from his custody did not indicate any agreement between him
+and the other accused. They only showed his agitated mind which was in the grip of an
+avenging mood. This is not enough to establish an agreement with anybody. On the
+"other hand, about Kehar Singh, it was shown that he was having secret talks with one of"
+"the actual killers, that they were trying all the time to keep themselves away from their"
+"wives and children, they avoided the company of the other members of the family and"
+"on being asked what they were talking about, they remained mysterious. These facts"
+were sufficient to show that they were planning something secret. This was enough to
+constitute a prima facie evidence of conspiracy within the meaning of section 10 of the
+"Evidence Act, 1872 and to bring them within the jacket of punishment of all for the act"
+of one.
+"Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion"
+in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is
+seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial
+evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the
+"formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation"
+"of the conspiracy, about the object, which the objectors set before themselves as the"
+"object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be"
+"carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference.51. Thus, a conspiracy is an"
+inference from circumstances. There cannot always be much direct evidence about it.
+Conspiracy can be inferred even from the circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or
+irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an
+offence.52. It is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more persons is a sine
+qua non but it may not be possible to establish by direct evidence. Its existence and
+objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and parties conduct. It is
+"necessary that the incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events, from"
+which a conclusion about the accused's guilt could be drawn. The help of
+circumstantial evidence is necessary because a conspiracy is always hatched in
+secrecy. It becomes difficult to locate any direct evidence.53. A businessman was in
+great need of money for completing the construction of a theatre complex. He was
+approached by a person who told him that his financier friend would help him with
+money. This was followed by a number of meetings between him and the team of
+financiers during which documents were executed and money released in cash which
+cash was found to be counterfeit currency. Every member of the team was held to be
+guilty of conspiracy and of cheating under section 420.54. Seizure of unexplained
+currency notes from the possession of a person who claimed to be the owner of the
+money was held to be not sufficient to connect him with the person who was the main
+"accused of smuggling currency, though he was a relative of the main accused.55."
+Where a bank accountant dishonestly agreed with others to conceal dishonour of
+"cheques purchased by the bank and thus, causing risk to the economic interests of the"
+"bank, he was held guilty of conspiring to defraud whatever his motive or underlying"
+purpose might have been (he contended that he acted in the interest of the bank) and
+even though he had no desire to harm the victim and no loss was actually caused.56.
+"Officials of a nationalised bank, in violation of departmental instructions, allowing"
+advance credits on banker's cheques to the account of a customer dealing in
+securities. Advance credits were allowed before the cheques were sent for clearance
+and in some cases even before the cheques were received. This allowed the customer
+to take pecuniary advantage by overdrawing money from his account which he was not
+"entitled to. Public funds were thus, misused. It was held that a criminal conspiracy"
+between bank officials and the customer stood proved. One of them was acquitted
+because no conclusive evidence could be found against him.57.
+A criminal conspiracy can be proved by circumstantial evidence or by necessary
+implication. A smaller conspiracy may be the part of a larger conspiracy. It was held on
+facts that a criminal conspiracy was established when officials of two public sector
+banks acted in such a way that the transaction appeared to be an inter-banking
+transaction relating to call money which the borrowing bank was supposed to retain
+with itself but the transaction was in fact meant to help a private party to use public
+"funds for private purpose.58. Where the accused, an LIC agent, was charged with"
+"cheating the LIC by entering into conspiracy with the co-accused, a Development"
+"Officer, on the allegation that insurance policies were got issued on the basis of fake"
+and forged documents and he received premium commission and bonus in respect of
+"those policies, the accused was entitled to be acquitted because the forging was done"
+"by the co-accused without the knowledge and consent of the accused. Bonus,"
+"Commission, etc., in respect of those policies were credited to his account only in the"
+"normal course.59. A 'vaid' and an 'up-vaid' who, in conspiracy with others made bogus"
+medical bills for government servants and got them duly passed through their
+"Ayurvedic Aushadhalaya for payment of 30 per cent of the amount of the bills, were"
+caught in a trap and the tainted money was recovered from the accused. One of the
+accused died during the pendency of appeal. Conviction of the other under sections
+120B/468 was held to be proper.60.
+A group of friends went to a club for fun and frolic. One of them (the main accused)
+suddenly fired at the bar mate for her refusal to serve drinks. The others were unaware
+of the accused carrying a loaded pistol. They had stayed at the club for about two and
+a half hours. The Court said that this could not constitute an evidence of conspiracy.
+The Court also said that the fact that the group members dispersed separately and
+also helped to retrieve the murder weapon would not suggest conspiracy for murder.61.
+[s 120A.6] Same verdict in respect of each not necessary.—
+It has been held that the rule that both parties to a conspiracy had to be convicted or
+"acquitted has been abrogated by the Criminal Law Act, 1977 (English). The important"
+question is whether there is a material difference in the evidence against the two.62.
+[s 120A.7] Sections 34 and 120A.—
+There is not much substantial difference between conspiracy as defined in section
+"120A and acting on a common intention, as contemplated in section 34. While in the"
+"former, the gist of the offence is bare engagement and association to break the law"
+"even though the illegal act does not follow, the gist of the offence under section 34 is"
+the commission of a criminal act in furtherance of a common intention of all the
+"offenders, which means that there should be unity of criminal behaviour resulting in"
+"something, for which an individual would be punishable, if it were all done by himself"
+alone.63. Another point of difference is that a single person cannot be convicted under
+"section 120A and, therefore, where all the accused except one were acquitted, the"
+"Supreme Court ordered his acquittal also,64. whereas under section 34, read with some"
+"other specific offence, a single person can be convicted because each is responsible"
+for the acts of all others.
+[s 120A.8] Sections 107 and 120A.—
+For an offence under this section a mere agreement is enough if the agreement is to
+"commit an offence. But, for an offence under the second clause of section 107 an act"
+or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and a mere
+agreement is not enough.65.
+"3. How proved (section 120A IPC, 1860 and section 10 Evidence Act, 1872-Doctrine"
+of agency).—There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of
+"conspiracy and that of any other offence, it can be established by direct evidence or by"
+circumstantial evidence. But section 10 of the Evidence Act introduces the doctrine of
+"agency and if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the acts done by one are"
+admissible against the coconspirators. When men enter into an agreement for an
+"unlawful end, they become ad-hoc agents for one another and have made a partnership"
+"in crime. The said section reads: ""Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two"
+"or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong,"
+"anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common"
+"intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them is"
+"a relevant fact against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well as for"
+the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing
+"that any such person was party to it."""
+"The section can be analysed as follows: ""(1) There shall be a prima facie evidence"
+affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are
+"members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or"
+written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence
+"against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done"
+or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also
+be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it
+"was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it"
+"can only be used against a coconspirator and not in his favour.""66."
+Since conspiracy is often hatched up in utmost secrecy it is mostly impossible to prove
+"conspiracy by direct evidence. It has, oftener than not, to be inferred from the acts,"
+statements and conduct of the parties to the conspiracy.67. The circumstances proved
+"before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the"
+"complicity of the accused.68. If it is proved that the accused pursued, by their acts, the"
+"same object often by the same means, one performing one part of the act and the"
+other another part of the same act so as to complete it with a view to attainment of the
+"object which they were pursuing, the Court is at liberty to draw the inference that they"
+"conspired together to effect that object.69. It should, however, be remembered that"
+"where there is no direct evidence, for example through the evidence of an approver, and"
+"the case for the prosecution is dependent on circumstantial evidence alone, it is"
+necessary for the prosecution to prove and establish such circumstances as would
+lead to the only conclusion of existence of a criminal conspiracy and rule out the theory
+"of innocence.70. Thus, chairman of a large cooperative society cannot be punished"
+vicariously for the acts of others as mens rea cannot be excluded in a criminal case. As
+a chairman he had to deal with various matters and it would have been impossible for
+him to look into every detail to find out if someone was committing any criminal breach
+"of trust.71. Similarly, a case of conspiracy to misappropriate cash entrusted to the"
+accused is not made out merely from the audit report without any evidence of shortage
+on actual verification of cash as mistakes and even double entries may be made bona
+fide while preparing the account.72. The onus is on the prosecution to prove the charge
+"of conspiracy by cogent evidence, direct or circumstantial.73. One more principle which"
+deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be
+taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an
+"isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the"
+"circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the"
+"appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that"
+the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their
+concurrence as to the common design and its execution.74.
+[s 120A.9] Inference of conspiracy.—
+It is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely
+"available.75. Thus, it is extremely difficult to adduce direct evidence to prove"
+conspiracy. Existence of conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the
+"surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. In some cases, indulgence"
+in the illegal act or legal act by illegal means may be inferred from the knowledge
+itself.76. It can be a matter of inference drawn by the Court after considering whether
+the basic facts and circumstances on the basis of which inference is drawn have been
+proved beyond all reasonable doubts and that no other conclusion except that of the
+"complicity of Accused to have agreed to commit an offence is evident.77. Accordingly,"
+the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to
+decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been
+"committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement"
+made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy.
+Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only
+when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. An
+offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion
+and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.
+Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only
+when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. To
+establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or
+"a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being"
+made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge
+"itself.78. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use"
+"was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful"
+"use. Finally when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be"
+"necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that"
+each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do.79.
+"One of the accused persons, a foreign national, was found staying in the country"
+without valid passport and visa. His movement to various places with the main
+accused was established. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was recovered
+from the place occupied by the main accused. The Court said that an inference of
+criminal conspiracy could be drawn.80. The Court also said that the appeal against
+conviction of the main accused was dismissed would not be sufficient to say that the
+charge of conspiracy against other accused would be deemed to be proved.81.
+"Circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence of the crime have to be"
+considered together to decide about the complicity of the accused.82. Circumstantial
+evidence was based on the recovery of the scooter used by the executant and alleged
+"to have been owned by a co-conspirator, but the recovery was not based on any"
+"information given by the accused, but by one witness. The Supreme Court held that no"
+circumstantial evidence was proved against any of the conspirators.83.
+"[s 120A.10] Circumstantial evidence, inference must be backed by evidence.—"
+Most of the circumstances stated as against the accused were not proved. Merely
+based on the circumstance that the accused had filed a civil suit against the deceased
+"for restraining him from doing a business he cannot be convicted. Moreover, there was"
+"no specific evidence as to who the conspirators were, where and when the conspiracy"
+"was hatched, what the specific purpose of such a conspiracy was and whether it was"
+relating to the elimination of the deceased.84. The law is well established that
+conspiracy cannot be proved merely on the basis of inferences. The inferences have to
+be backed by evidence.85.
+The Court for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the said offence has
+been committed or not may take into consideration the circumstantial evidence.
+"However, while doing so, it must bear in mind that the meeting of minds is essential"
+and mere knowledge or discussion would not be sufficient.86. In Mukesh v State for
+"NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal Nos. 607–608 of 2017, (popular as Nirbhaya Case) the"
+criminal conspiracy was proved by the sequence of events and the conduct of the
+accused.
+In the conspiracy for assassination of the former PM (Rajiv Gandhi) one of the accused
+persons at one point of time in his confessional statement said that he had a strong
+suspicion that Rajiv Gandhi was the target of the accused persons. The Court said that
+"this suspicion did not make him a member of the conspiracy. His association, however"
+strong with the main conspirators would not make him a member of the conspiracy by
+"itself. But those who were in the thick of the conspiracy, for example, one who"
+"purchased the battery for explosion of human body, their conviction for the main"
+offence was proper. But mere association with LTTE was not sufficient nor the fact that
+messages about arrests were sent by certain persons.87.
+[s 120A.11] Contacts through telephone.—
+Where the case against the appellants A2 to A4 is that they had hatched a conspiracy
+with appellant A1 to kill the deceased and the case against A1 was proved as per the
+"'last seen theory', and to prove the conspiracy the prosecution relied on the"
+circumstance that there were frequent phone calls among the accused some days
+"around the date of murder, and the recovery of some vehicles; the Supreme Court held"
+that the telephonic calls and the recovery may raise suspicion against the accused but
+mere suspicion by itself cannot take the place of proof.88.
+[s 120A.12] Between bank officials.—
+Criminal conspiracy was taken to be established when officials of two public sector
+banks acted in such a way that the transaction in question appeared to be an inter-
+banking transaction relating to call money which the borrowing bank was supposed to
+retain with itself. The transaction was in fact formalised for the purpose of helping a
+private party to use public funds for a private purpose.89.
+[s 120A.13] Approval of television serial.—
+The accused was the director of Doordarshan. The allegation against him was that he
+continued a serial which was approved at lower rates by an earlier director. Each
+director worked at different point of time. They did not work together. Their postings
+were official postings. It was difficult to infer any conspiracy between them for
+continuing the telecast. The investigation launched against the director was liable to be
+quashed.90.
+"1. Chapter VA (containing sections 120A and 120B) inserted by Act 8 of 1913, section 3."
+"2. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253 [LNIND"
+1999 SC 526] .
+"3. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] :"
+2012 (10) Scale 237 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] relying on Ram Narayan Popli v Central Bureau of
+"Investigation, (2003) 3 SCC 641 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] ."
+"4. State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, 2009 Cr LJ 4436 : (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 901."
+"5. Yogesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 2991 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] : 2008 Cr LJ 3872 :"
+"(2008) 10 SCC 394 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] ; S Arul Raja v State of TN, reported in, 2010 (8) SCC"
+"233 [LNIND 2010 SC 689] ; Mohan Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2011 SC 3534 [LNIND 2011 SC 820]"
+: 2011 Cr LJ 4837 : (2011) 9 SCC 272 [LNIND 2011 SC 820] ; Central Bureau of Investigation
+"Hyderabad v K Narayana Rao, 2012 AIR SCW 5139 : 2012 Cr LJ 4610 : JT 2012 (9) SC 359"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 569] : (2012) 9 SCC 512 [LNIND 2012 SC 569] : 2012 (9) Scale 228 [LNIND 2012
+"SC 569] ; Ajay Aggarwal v UOI, (AIR 1993 SC 1637 [LNIND 1993 SC 431] : 1993 AIR SCW 1866 :"
+1993 Cr LJ 2516 ) : (1993) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1993 SC 431] .
+"6. Rajiv Kumar v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 3772 [LNIND 2017 SC 367] ."
+"7. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] :"
+2012 Mad LJ (Cr) 532 : 2012 (10) Scale 237 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] ; Damodar v State of
+"Rajasthan, (2004) 12 SCC 336 [LNIND 2003 SC 803] ; Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Admn), (1988) 3"
+"SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] ; State of Maharashtra v Somnath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 776] .
+"8. Ram Narayan Popli v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2003) 3 SCC 641 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] ."
+"9. Topandas v State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] : 1956 Cr LJ 138 : (1955) 2"
+"SCR 881 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] . The ruling in Topandas case, AIR 1956 SC 33 [LNIND 1955 SC 78]"
+"and Fakhruddin case, AIR 1967 SC 1326 [LNIND 1966 SC 307] were not followed in Sanichar"
+"Sahni v State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 198 [LNIND 2009 SC 1350] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 347, because"
+"here only one person was charged under section 120-B and for no other offence, and his co-"
+"accused was charged with another offence but not under section 120-B, the court said that the"
+"charge was not properly framed. In the earlier cases, more than one were charged with"
+"conspiracy, all but one were acquitted, the single one could not be convicted. He was convicted"
+for murder which was proved against him.
+"10. Haradhan Chakrabarty v UOI, AIR 1990 SC 1210 [LNIND 1990 SC 57] : 1990 Cr LJ 1246 :"
+(1990) 2 SCC 143 [LNIND 1990 SC 57] .
+"11. See also Thakur H v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 1704 (HP)."
+"12. Bimbadhar Pradhan v The State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469 [LNIND 1956 SC 25] ."
+"13. Mohd Arif v State of NCT of Delhi, JT 2011 (9) SC 563 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 13 SCC"
+621 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 10 SCR 56 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : 2011 (8) Scale 328 [LNIND
+2011 SC 753] .
+"14. McDowell, (1966) 1 All ER 193 : (1965) 3 WLR 1138 ; Rex v IRC Haulage, (1944) KB 551 :"
+"(1944) 1 All ER 691 . Central Bureau of Investigation v VC Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406 [LNIND 1998"
+"SC 272] : 1998 Cr LJ 1905 ; Ajay Kumar Rana v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 3837 (Pat)."
+"15. Mowji, (1957) All ER 385 : (1957) 2 WLR 277 . See Glanville Williams, Legal Unity of Husband"
+"and Wife, 10 Modern LR 16 (1947). ""But either spouse may be convicted of inciting the other to"
+"commit a crime if such be proved."" See Kenny, 450, p 428, Outlines Of Criminal Law, 19th Edn"
+1966.
+"16. Cross & Jones : Introduction To Criminal Law, 9th Edn, p 343."
+"17. R v Charstny, (1991) 1 WLR 1381 (CA)."
+"18. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1972 SC 1502 [LNIND 1972 SC 72] : 1972 Cr LJ 909 ; Tapandas, AIR 1956"
+"SC 33 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] : (1955) 2 SCR 881 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] ; Fakhruddin, AIR 1967 SC"
+"1326 [LNIND 1966 SC 307] : 1967 Cr LJ 1197 ; See also State v Dilbagh Rai, 1986 Cr LJ 138"
+(Delhi).
+"19. Relying upon Faguna Kanta Nath v State of Assam, AIR 1959 SC 673 [LNIND 1959 SC 2] :"
+"1959 Cr LJ 90 : 1959 Supp 2 SCR 1, where also the acquittal of the co-accused automatically"
+"followed the acquittal of the main accused; Madan Lal Bhandari v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1970"
+SC 436 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] : 1970 Cr LJ 519 : (1969) 2 SCC 385 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] : (1970)
+"1 SCR 688 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] , the nurse causing miscarriage acquitted, the conspirator also"
+acquitted.
+"20. Plummer v State, (1902) 2 KB 339 ; Coughlan (1976) 64 Cr App Rep 11 ."
+"21. Pradumna, 1981 Cr LJ 1873 (Bom)."
+"22. JE Cecil Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 428, 19th Edn, 1966."
+"23. Citing R v Myrick and Ribuffi, (1929) 21 Cr App R 94 TAC."
+"24. Regina v Chrastry, (1991) 1 WLR 1381 (CA). Kuldeep Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ"
+"479 (SC), the only evidence against one of the accused conspirators was that he was seen"
+moving with others to the house of the deceased. This was held to be not sufficient to make him
+a part of the conspiracy or participant in murder.
+"25. Mohammad Ismail, (1936) Nag 152; Bimbadhar Pradhan, (1956) Cut 409 SC; EG Barsay, AIR"
+1961 SC 1762 [LNIND 1961 SC 196] : 1962 (2) SCR 195 [LNIND 1961 SC 196] ; Chaman Lal v
+"State of Punjab, (2009) 11 SCC 721 [LNIND 2009 SC 721] AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"721] , requisites of the offence restated."
+"26. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 646 :"
+"Baldev Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 6 SCC 564 [LNIND 2009 SC 1151] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 66."
+"27. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253 [LNIND"
+"1999 SC 526] Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se enough; Russell on"
+"Crimes, 12th Edn, vol I, quoted in Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Administration), 1988 (3) SCC 609"
+[LNIND 1988 SC 887] at 731.
+"28. R Venkatakrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"29. Yogesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 2991 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] : 2008 Cr LJ 3872 :"
+(2008) 10 SCC 394 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] .
+"30. Esher Singh v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 3030 [LNIND 2004 SC 329] : (2004) 11 SCC 585"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 329] . K Hashim v State of TN, AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005)"
+"1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] , the court enumerated four elements of criminal conspiracy,"
+the essence is an unlawful agreement and it is complete when the agreement is framed. A
+design resting in mind only does not make out the offence.
+"31. Subramanian Swamy v A Raja, AIR 2012 SC 3336 [LNIND 2012 SC 498] : 2012 Cr LJ 4443 :"
+(2012) 9 SCC 257 [LNIND 2012 SC 498] (Involvement of finance minister in 2G Spectrum Case) -
+Criminal conspiracy cannot be inferred on the mere fact that there were official discussions
+"between the officers of the MoF and that of DoT and between two Ministers, which are all"
+"recorded. Suspicion, however, strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and the meeting"
+between Shri P Chidambaram and Shri A Raja would not by itself be sufficient to infer the
+existence of a criminal conspiracy so as to indict Shri P. Chidambaram.
+"32. Esher Singh v State of AP, 2004 (11) SCC 585 [LNIND 2004 SC 329] ."
+"33. Gulam Sarbar v State of Bihar, 2014 Cr LJ 34 : (2014 ) 3 SCC 401."
+"34. Chaman Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2009) 11 SCC 721"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2010) 1 SCC(Cr) 159.
+"35. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253"
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 526] ; State of HP v Krishan Lal Pardhan, ( AIR 1987 SC 773 [LNIND 1987 SC"
+131] : 1987 Cr LJ 709 ) : (1987) 2 SCC 17 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] .
+"36. K R Purushothaman v State, AIR 2006 SC 35 [LNIND 2005 SC 842] : (2005) 12 SCC 631"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 842] ; approved in John Pandian v State Rep by Inspector of Police, TN, AIR 2011"
+SC (Supp) 531 : (2011) 3 SCC(Cr) 550 : 2010 (13) Scale 13.
+"37. Yash Pal Mittal v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] : 1978 Cr LJ 189 :"
+(1977) 4 SCC 540 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] .
+"38. Firozuddin Basheeruddin v State, 2001 (7) SCC 596 [LNIND 2001 SC 1755] ."
+"39. K Hasim v State of TN, AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : 2005 Cr LJ 143 ."
+"40. Raju v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 4425 : 2014 (9) SCJ 453 [LNINDORD 2014 SC 19031]"
+.
+"41. Sushil Suri v CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1713 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] : (2011) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 494] : (2011) 2 SCC(Cr) 764 : (2011) 8 SCR 1 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] .
+"42. Chaman Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2009) 11 SCC 721"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2010) 1 SCC(Cr) 159.
+"43. SC Bahri v State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2020 : 1994 Cr LJ 3271 ."
+"44. Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] : 1989 Cr"
+LJ 1 : (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] .
+"45. EG Barsay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 [LNIND 1961 SC 196] : 1962 (2) SCR 195 [LNIND 1961 SC 196]"
+.
+"46. Lennart v State, AIR 1970 SC 549 [LNIND 1969 SC 396] : 1970 Cr LJ 707 ."
+"47. RK Dalmia, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 805 ; Yashpal v State,"
+AIR 1977 SC 2433 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] SC : 1978 Cr LJ 189 .
+"48. State of HP v Krishanlal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 773 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] : 1987 Cr LJ 709 :"
+(1987) 2 SCC 17 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] .
+"49. KS Narayanan, 1982 Cr LJ 1611 (Mad); Krishnalal Naskar, 1982 Cr LJ 1305 (Cal). Mahabir"
+"Prasad Akela v State of Bihar, 1987 Cr LJ 1545 Pat, no meeting of minds."
+50. (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] : AIR 1988 SC 1883 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] : 1989 CR
+"LJ 1 . AS AGAINST THIS SEE, Param Hans Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 955 [LNIND 1987"
+"SC 253] : 1987 Cr LJ 789 : (1987) 2 SCC 197 [LNIND 1987 SC 253] , murder of Collector by a"
+"person whose connection with the jailed co-accused not proved, though the latter had a grudge"
+against the collector for demolishing his temple and detaining him. Reversing the High Court
+"decision, 1986 Pat LJR 688 ."
+"51. Mohd Arif v State of NCT of Delhi, JT 2011 (9) SC 563 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 13 SCC"
+621 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : 2011 (8) Scale 328 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 10 SCR 56 [LNIND
+"2011 SC 753] ; NV Subba Rao v State, (2013) 2 SCC 162 [LNIND 2012 SC 1350] : 2013 Cr LJ 953 ."
+"52. MS Reddy v State Inspector of Police ACB Nellore, 1993 Cr LJ 558 (AP). Ammuni v State of"
+"Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 280 : 1998 Cr LJ 481 , the accused administered poison and caused death"
+"of the woman and her two children, there was evidence to show that all the four entered into a"
+conspiracy to murder the woman. They were seen hanging around her house. One of the glass
+tumblers recovered from her place carried the finger prints of one of them. One of them also
+"confessed. Conspiracy proved conviction under sections 300/34, confirmed. Kuldeep Singh v"
+"State of Rajasthan, AIR 2000 SC 3649 [LNIND 2000 SC 724] , accused persons entered into"
+"conspiracy to cause death, circumstantial evidence coupled with recoveries. Guilt established."
+Conviction for murder and conspiracy.
+"53. Yogesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 2991 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] : 2008 Cr LJ 3872 :"
+(2008) 10 SCC 394 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] .
+"54. Nellai Ganesan v State, 1991 Cr LJ 2157 . See also Khalid v. State, 1990 Cr LJ (NOC) Raj,"
+where the court inferred the fact of agreement from transmission of thoughts sharing the
+"unlawful design, the court observing that neither proof of actual words of communication nor"
+actual physical meeting of persons involved is necessary.
+"55. KTMS Mohd v UOI, AIR 1992 SC 1831 [LNIND 1992 SC 362] : 1992 Cr LJ 2781 ."
+"56. Wai Yu-Tsang v The Queen, (1991) 3 WLR 1006 PC, applying Welham v DPP, (1961) AC 103"
+"HL(E) and Reg v Allsop, (1976) 64 Cr App R; CA. Shambhu Singh v State of UP, AIR 1994 SC 1559"
+": 1994 Cr LJ 1584 , the Supreme Court did not interfere in the concurrent finding of the lower"
+courts as to the involvement of the accused in the conspiracy.
+"57. Mir Naqvi Askari v CBI, AIR 2010 SC 528 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : (2009) 15 SCC 643 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1651] . The court also explained the nature of the crime.
+"58. R Venkatakrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] , under the National"
+"Housing Bank Act, 1987. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] :"
+(2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 646; criminal conspiracy by bank officials in relation to Harshad Mehta
+"Securities Scam, illegally extending discounting/ rediscounting facility for bills of exchange by"
+"bank officials, conspiracy in relation to persons liable to be convicted, role/conduct necessary to"
+fasten liability.
+"59. Nand Kumar Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1992 SC 1939 : 992 Cr LJ 3587 : (1992) Supp (2)"
+SCC 111 .
+"60. Narain Lal Nirala v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1993 SC 118 : 1993 Cr LJ 3911 ."
+"61. State v Siddarth Vashisth (alias Manu Sharma), 2001 Cr LJ 2404 (Del)."
+"62. R v Ashton, (1992) Cr LR 667 (CA)."
+"63. Dinanath, 1939 Nag 644."
+"64. Vinayak v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1793 [LNIND 1984 SC 255] : (1984) 4 SCC 441"
+[LNIND 1984 SC 255] : 1984 SCC (Cr) 605.
+"65. Pramatha Nath v Saroj Ranjan, AIR 1962 SC 876 [LNIND 1961 SC 400] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 770 ."
+"Further explained by the Supreme Court in Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1988 SC 1883"
+[LNIND 1988 SC 887] : 1989 Cr Lj 1 : (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] .
+"66. State of TN through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT v Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND"
+1999 SC 1584] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 : JT 1999 (4) SC 106 [LNIND 1999 SC 526] : (1999) 5 SCC 253
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 526] ; Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1965 SC 682"
+[LNIND 1963 SC 67] : 1965 (1) Cr LJ 608 ) : (1964) 2 SCR 378 [LNIND 1963 SC 67] See also.
+"67. Bhagwandas, AIR 1974 SC 898 : 1974 Cr LJ 751 ; Ashok Datta Naik, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 95"
+"(Goa); V Shivanarayan, AIR 1980 SC 439 : 1980 Cr LJ 388 ; Mohd Usman Mohd Hussain, AIR 1981"
+SC 1062 [LNIND 1981 SC 127] : 1981 Cr LJ 588 : (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] ; State
+"of UP v Girijashankar Misra, 1985 Cr LJ NOC 79 (Delhi); Subhas, 1985 Cr LJ 1807 (Cal)."
+"68. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] :"
+2012 Mad LJ (Cr) 532 : 2012 (10) Scale 237 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] ; An offence of criminal
+"conspiracy can also be proved by circumstantial evidence. State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, 2009 Cr"
+"LJ 4436 : (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 901]. In S Arul Raja v State of TN, 2010 (8) SCC"
+233 [LNIND 2010 SC 689] in which it is held that mere circumstantial evidence to prove the
+involvement of the appellant is not sufficient to meet the requirements of criminal conspiracy
+"under Section 120A of the (IPC, 1860) A meeting of minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to"
+be proved by placing substantive evidence.
+"69. Re MD Mendekar, 1972 Cr LJ 978 (Mysore); See also Bhagwandas, supra."
+"70. DB Naik, 1982 Cr LJ 856 (Bom); Hari Ram, 1982 Cr LJ 294 (HP)."
+"71. Jethsur Surangbhai, AIR 1984 SC 151 [LNIND 1983 SC 329] : 1984 Cr LJ 162 (SC) : (1984)"
+SCC (Cr) 474.
+72. Ajoyadha PrashadI 1985 Cr LJ 1401 (Ori).
+"73. State v VC Shukla, 1980 Cr LJ 965 : 1980 Cr LR (SC) 301 . Also VC Shukla v State (Delhi"
+"Admn), AIR 1980 SC 1382 [LNIND 1980 SC 179] : 1980 SCC (Cr) 561 and 849 (1980) 2 SCC 665"
+"[LNIND 1980 SC 179] . State of HP v Gian Chand, 2000 Cr LJ 949 (HP); Sardari Lal v State of"
+"Punjab, 2003 Cr LJ 383 (P&H), State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"901; Baldev Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 6 SCC 564 [LNIND 2009 SC 1151] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"66; Y Venkaiah v State of AP, AIR 2009 SC 2311 [LNIND 2009 SC 513] : (2009) Cr LJ 2834 :"
+"(2009) 12 SCC 126 [LNIND 2009 SC 513] . State of MP v Paltan Mallah, 2005 AIR 2005 SC 733"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 64] : Cr LJ 918 SC : (2005) 3 SCC 169 [LNIND 2005 SC 64] .
+"74. State (NCT) of Delhi v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580]"
+.
+"75. Charandas Swami v State of Gujarat, 2017 (4) Scale 403 ."
+"76. Rajiv Kumar v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 3772 [LNIND 2017 SC 367] ."
+"77. Charandas Swami v State of Gujarat, 2017 (4) Scale 403 ."
+"78. State of Maharashtra v Som Nath Thapa, AIR 1996 SC 1744 [LNIND 1996 SC 776] : 1996 AIR"
+SCW 1977 : 1996 Cr LJ 2448 : (1996) 4 SCC 649 .
+"79. State through Central Bureau of Investigation v Dr Anup Kumar Srivastava, AIR 2017 SC 3698"
+[LNIND 2017 SC 371] .
+"80. Lal Singh v State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 746 [LNIND 2001 SC 98] : 2001 Cr LJ 978 . The"
+"case under the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Saju v State of Kerala,"
+"AIR 2001 SC 175 [LNIND 2000 SC 1552] , no inference of conspiracy to murder from"
+"circumstances proved in the case, Suman Sood v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2007 SC 2774 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 647] : (2007) Cr LJ 4080 : (2007) 5 SCC 634 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] , inference regarding"
+conspiracy can be drawn from surrounding circumstances because normally no direct evidence
+is available.
+"81. Ibid. The court followed the ruling in Babu Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 3250 [LNIND"
+"1996 SC 860] : 1996 Cr LJ 2503 ; Vijayan v State of Kerala, AIR 1999 SC 1086 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+"159] : 1999 Cr LJ 1638 , it is difficult to establish conspiracy by direct evidence. But there should"
+be material evidence showing the connection between the alleged conspiracy and the act done
+"pursuant to that conspiracy. Firozuddin Basheerudin v State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 3488 [LNIND"
+"2001 SC 1755] : 2001 Cr LJ 4215 , conspiracy to eliminate a police informer on whose"
+"information contraband gold was seized from the accused persons, chain of circumstances to"
+"the point of murder, complete, conviction. State of Kerala v P Suganthan, AIR 2000 SC 3323"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 1298] : 2000 Cr LJ 4584 , conspiracy to murder the earlier paramour of the"
+"concubine, not proved. Hira Lal Hari Lal v CBI, AIR 2003 SC 2545 [LNIND 2003 SC 499] : 2003 Cr"
+"LJ 3041 : (2003) 5 SCC 257 [LNIND 2003 SC 499] , difficult to prove conspiracy by direct"
+evidence. An agreement between the parties to do something unlawful has to be proved. The
+allegation here was that of evasion of customs duty.
+"82. Chandra Prakash v State of Rajasthan, 2014 Cr LJ 2884 : (2014) 8 SCC 340 [LNIND 2014 SC"
+346] .
+"83. Indra Dalal v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 3174 : 2015 (6) SCJ 501 [LNIND 2015 SC 358] ."
+"84. Balkar Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 901 : (2015) 2 SCC 746 [LNIND 2014 SC 950] ."
+"85. Satyavir Singh v State of UP, 2016 Cr LJ 4863 (All), 2015 (91) ALLCC 892."
+"86. State v Nitin Gunwant Shah, 2015 Cr LJ 4759 : 2016 (1) SCJ 30 [LNIND 2015 SC 529] ."
+"87. State of TN v Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC 1584] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 ."
+"88. Kiriti Pal v State of WB, 2015 Cr LJ 3152 : 2015 (3) Crimes 11 (SC)."
+"89. R Venkatkrishanan v CBI, 2010 1 SCC (Cr) 164 : (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"90. Mahesh Joshi v State, (CBI), 2002 Cr LJ 97 (Kant)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+CHAPTER V-A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
+[s 120B] Punishment of criminal conspiracy.
+(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
+"with death, 91.[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of"
+"two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code"
+"for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if"
+he had abetted such offence.
+(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to
+commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with
+"imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or"
+with fine or with both.]
+COMMENT—
+"Earlier to the introduction of sections 120A and B, conspiracy per se was not an"
+"offence under IPC, 1860, except in respect of the offence mentioned in section 121A."
+"However, abetment by conspiracy was and still remains to be an ingredient of"
+"abetment under the second clause of section 107 of IPC, 1860. The punishment"
+"therefore, is provided under various sections, viz., sections 108–117. Whereas under"
+"section 120A, the essence of the offence of criminal conspiracy is a bare agreement to"
+"commit the offence, the abetment under section 107 requires the commission of some"
+act or illegal omission pursuant to the conspiracy.92. Criminal conspiracy is an
+independent offence. It is punishable separately.93. The punishment for conspiracy is
+the same as if the conspirator had abetted the offence.94. The punishment for a
+criminal conspiracy is more severe if the agreement is one to commit a serious
+offence; it is less severe if the agreement is one to commit an act which although
+"illegal is not an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous"
+imprisonment for more than two years.
+Conspiracy to commit an offence is itself an offence and a person can be separately
+charged with respect to such a conspiracy. There may be an element of abetment in a
+conspiracy; but conspiracy is something more than abetment. The offences created by
+section 109 and section 120A are quite distinct and where offences are committed by
+several persons in pursuance of a conspiracy it is usual to charge them with those
+offences as well as conspiracy to commit those offences.95.
+This section applies to those who are the members of the conspiracy during its
+continuance. Conspiracy has to be treated as a continuing offence and whoever is a
+party to the conspiracy during the period for which he is charged is liable under this
+section.96. A conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to encompass all its
+members wherever and whenever any member of it acts in furtherance of the common
+design.97. The most important ingredient of a criminal conspiracy is an agreement for
+"an illegal act, conspiracy continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or"
+frustrated by choice or necessity.98. The conspirators' connection with the conspiracy
+would get snapped after he is nabbed by the police and kept in custody. He would then
+cease to be the agent of others. In this case (Rajiv assassination) the prosecution could
+not establish that the accused persons who were under detention continued their
+conspiratorial contact with those who remained outside. A statement which
+constitutes prima facie evidence of a conspiracy may amount to an act for which all the
+members can be held liable.99.
+"Where the accused conspired with others in awarding a contract when he was in job, he"
+could be held liable for subsequent acts of other conspirators even after his retirement
+as he contributed his part for furtherance of the conspiracy.100.
+"For the purpose of establishing or proving the charge of conspiracy, it is not necessary"
+that there should be knowledge of who are other conspirators and of the detailed
+stages of the conspiracy. The necessary requisite is knowledge of the main object and
+purpose of the conspiracy.101. A fraud was alleged to have been committed by
+Government officers in processing and verifying fake bills. It was held that all the
+officers who dealt with the relevant files at one point of time or the other could not be
+considered to have taken part in the conspiracy or that they would be guilty of aiding
+and abetting the offence. Individual acts of criminal misconduct would have to be
+considered for fastening liability.102.
+An accused can be convicted for substantive offence even where he has been
+acquitted of the charge of conspiracy.103.
+"[s 120B.1] Sanction for prosecution (section 120B IPC, 1860 and section 196"
+"(Cr PC, 1973)).—"
+"This section has to be read along with section 196(1-A) (2) (Cr PC, 1973), which"
+requires previous sanction of the State Government or the District Magistrate to launch
+prosecution in respect of a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with
+"less than two years imprisonment. Thus, where the object of the conspiracy was"
+"cheating by false personation under section 419, IPC, 1860, which is an offence"
+"punishable with a three-year imprisonment, the mere fact that there were other non-"
+cognizable offences for which too the accused had been charged would not vitiate the
+"trial in absence of sanction under section 196(1A)(2), (Cr PC, 1973), as that section is"
+meant to be applicable to a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit an
+offence punishable with less than two years' imprisonment.104. Where the act in
+"question was not done by the army officer in the discharge of his official duties, it was"
+held that a sanction for his prosecution was not necessary.105.
+[s 120B.2] Can a company be prosecuted for Criminal conspiracy.—
+A corporation is virtually in the same position as any individual and may be convicted
+of common law as well as statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. The
+criminal liability of a corporation would arise when an offence is committed in relation
+to the business of the corporation by a person or body of persons in control of its
+"affairs. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the degree and"
+control of the person or body of persons is so intense that a corporation may be said to
+think and act through that person or the body of persons.106.
+[s 120B.3] Signing differently in vakalatnama.—
+The fact was that the accused put their signatures in vakalatnama differently from their
+original ones. It has been alleged by the complainant that the accused petitioners have
+deliberately and wilfully put their signatures on the vakalatnama in collusion with each
+other like irresponsible persons in order to gain wrongfully and with a view to cheat and
+mislead the complainant. It was held that the alleged action of the petitioners in
+signing their own name on the vakalatnama and filing the same in the Court through
+their counsel is neither an offence nor prohibited by any law. When the alleged act itself
+"was not illegal, it cannot be said that there was any 'criminal conspiracy' and in"
+"absence of the basis for a charge for criminal conspiracy, the petitioners cannot be"
+"prosecuted or punished for the offence under section 120-B of the IPC, 1860.107."
+[s 120B.4] Seeking opinion.—
+"Merely taking someone's opinion, who is an outsider to litigation, before filing the reply"
+in the Court would not undermine the administration of justice in any way and it is not
+indicative of criminal conspiracy.108.
+[s 120B.5] Hooch Tragedy case.—
+"In a case, the allegation was that all the accused persons hatched a criminal"
+conspiracy and they created a well-oiled machinery for importing methyl alcohol to
+make spurious liquor. Accused diluted the spirit by adding water and sold it through
+their outlets. Many persons died due to the consumption of spurious liquor. Some
+persons lost their eyesight and number of others sustained grievous injuries. Supreme
+Court said that the whole business itself was a conspiracy. It may not be the
+conspiracy to mix the noxious substance but the fact of the matter is that in order to
+"succeed in the business, which itself was a conspiracy, they mixed or allowed to be"
+mixed methanol and used it so freely that ultimately resulted in the tragedy. Conviction
+is upheld.109.
+[s 120B.6] Corruption cases.—
+The prosecution asserted that the appellants A1 to A4 had entered into a conspiracy
+"and in furtherance thereof, A1 who was a public servant, had come to possess assets"
+"to the tune of Rs. 66.65 crores, disproportionate to her known sources of income,"
+"during the period from 1991 to 1996, when she held the office of the Chief Minister of"
+the State. The Supreme Court in respect to the charge of criminal conspiracy observed
+"that the free flow of money from one account to the other of the respondent's,"
+firms/companies also proved beyond reasonable doubt that all the accused persons
+had actively participated in the criminal conspiracy to launder the ill-gotten wealth of
+A1 for purchasing properties in their names.110.
+[s 120B.7] Previous sanction.—
+No Court shall take cognizance of the offence of any criminal conspiracy punishable
+"under section 120B of the IPC, 1860, (45 of 1860), other than a criminal conspiracy to"
+"commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous"
+"imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the State Government or the"
+District Magistrate has consented in writing to the initiation of the proceeding: Provided
+"that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of section 195 apply,"
+no such consent shall be necessary.111.
+2. Sentence.—Where the accused is charged both under section 109 as well as section
+"120B, IPC, 1860, and the offence abetted is shown to have been committed as a result"
+"of the abetment, the abettor should be punished with the imprisonment provided for"
+"the principal offence under section 109, IPC, 1860, and no separate sentence need be"
+"recorded under section 120B IPC, 1860.112. Where the charge of conspiracy fails, the"
+individual accused could still be convicted for the offences committed by them and
+sentenced accordingly.113. Where no jail term was awarded to the principal accused in
+"a conspiracy and he was let off with fine alone, it was held that substantive sentence of"
+"imprisonment awarded to the other accused was wrongful and, therefore, they also"
+were ordered to pay fine only.114. Where six of the seven persons accused of criminal
+"conspiracy were acquitted, remaining one accused could not be convicted merely for"
+being the head of the section of the branch where fraud was alleged to have been
+committed.115. Where the appellant-accused was one of the active members of the
+criminal conspiracy along with other accused and hatched the plan to kill/eliminate the
+deceased and in furtherance thereof other accused persons successfully
+killed/eliminated the deceased and it was not the case of the appellant-accused and
+nor was urged also that his case fell under Section 120(2) so as to be awarded less
+"sentence as prescribed therein, the conviction and award of life sentence as prescribed"
+"under Section 302 read with Section 120B, IPC, 1860 was held proper.116. The accused"
+pleaded guilty to conspiring to cause a public nuisance. He conspired with others to
+interfere with a premier division football match by means of extinguishing the
+floodlights while the match was in progress. The object of doing so was to affect bets
+"placed on the match abroad, which depended on the score at the time when the lights"
+were switched off and the match was abandoned. The plan was not put into effect and
+the accused and others were arrested before the match was due to take place. The
+accused would have received substantial reward for his role. He was sentenced to four
+years' imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed. The Court said that the practice of
+interfering with such an important sporting fixture was something which should be
+actively discouraged by severe sentences. The sentence could not be described as
+manifestly excessive.117.
+Law relating to Conspiracy as summarised by the Supreme Court in State of TN
+"through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, (AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+1584] : (1999) 5 SCC 253 [LNIND 1999 SC 526] : JT 1999 (4) SC 106 [LNIND 1999 SC
+526] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 ).
+"1. Under Section 120A, IPC, 1860, offence of criminal conspiracy is committed"
+when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal
+act by illegal means. When it is legal act by illegal means overt act is necessary.
+Offence of criminal conspiracy is exception to the general law where intent alone
+does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with
+"persons having the same intention. Not only the intention, but there has to be"
+"agreement to carry out the object of the intention, which is an offence. The"
+question for consideration in a case is did all the accused had the intention and
+did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for the
+"offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish,"
+"howsoever, horrendous it may be, that offence be committed."
+2. Acts subsequent to the achieving of object of conspiracy may tend to prove that
+a particular accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy
+"has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make"
+the accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder.
+3.
+Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a
+"conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and"
+its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the
+accused.
+"4. Conspirators may, for example, be enrolled in chain A enrolling B, B enrolling C,"
+and so on and all will be members of the single conspiracy if they so intend and
+"agree, even though each member knows only the person who enrolled him and"
+"the person whom he enrols. There may be a kind of umbrella-spoke enrolment,"
+where a single person at the centre doing the enrolling and all the other members
+"being unknown to each other, though they know that there are to be other"
+members. These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell whether the
+"conspiracy in a particular case falls into which category. It may, however, even"
+overlap. But then there has to be present mutual interest. Persons may be
+members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of
+many others who may have diverse role to play. It is not a part of the crime of
+conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active
+role.
+"5. When two or more persons agree to commit a crime of conspiracy, then"
+"regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission, and despite"
+the fact that no step is taken by any such person to carry out their common
+"purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who joins in the"
+"agreement. There has thus, to be two conspirators and there may be more than"
+that. To prove the charge of conspiracy it is not necessary that intended crime
+was committed or not. If committed it may further help prosecution to prove the
+charge of conspiracy.
+6. It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at
+the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the
+"consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What"
+part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to
+when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left.
+7. A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it is forced them into
+a joint trial and the Court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every
+accused. Prosecution has to produce evidence not only to show that each of the
+accused has knowledge of object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the
+charge of conspiracy Court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness to
+the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction
+"of all, which is to be avoided. By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is"
+otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive offence prosecution
+tries to implicate the accused not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the
+substantive crime of the alleged conspirators. There is always difficult in tracing
+the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there has to
+be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged
+"with the offence of conspiracy. As observed to Judge Learned Hand that ""this"
+distinction is important today when many prosecutors seek to sweep within the
+dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree
+"whatever with the main offenders""."
+"8. As stated above it is the unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which"
+is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy
+is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the
+"purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the"
+gravamen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to
+"a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and inferred"
+"from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the"
+conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at
+"the same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining"
+of the conspiracy.
+"9. It has been said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and that"
+there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the prosecution of a
+"common plan. Thus, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done"
+"by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of"
+each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that
+"everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or"
+"furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or"
+written by each of them. And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is
+done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to
+collateral acts incident to and growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator
+"is not responsible, however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of"
+the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member does not create a
+"new conspiracy nor does it change the status of the other conspirators, and the"
+mere fact that conspirators individually or in groups perform different tasks to a
+common end does not split up a conspiracy into several different conspiracies.
+"10. A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However, criminal"
+responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude
+towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge
+of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a
+"conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while"
+"the other but the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no"
+active part in the crime.
+"1. Chapter VA (containing sections 120A and 120B) inserted by Act 8 of 1913, section 3."
+"91. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for transportation for life (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"92. State (NCT) of Delhi v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, 2005 Cr LJ 3950 : (2005) 11 SCC 600"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 580] .
+"93. State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, 2009 Cr LJ 4436 : (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 901."
+"94. Alim Jan Bibi, (1937) 1 Cal 484 . It is not necessary that each and every conspirator must"
+"have taken part in the commission of the act. State of HP v Krishanlal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 773"
+[LNIND 1987 SC 131] : 1987 Cr LJ 709 : (1987) 2 SCC 17 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] . Govt of NCT of
+"Delhi v Jaspal Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 586 [LNIND 2003 SC 649] , essential requirements of charge"
+"under the section. Ram Narayan Popli v CBI, AIR 2003 SC 2748 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] : (2003) 3"
+"SCC 641 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] , statement of ingredients. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC"
+"4427 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] : (2003) 8 SCC 461 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] , statement of ingredients"
+and matters of proof.
+"95. Subbaiah, AIR 1961 SC 1241 [LNIND 1961 SC 95] . See also Mohd Hussain v KS Dalipsinghji,"
+AIR 1970 SC 45 [LNIND 1969 SC 147] : (1970) 1 SCR 130 [LNIND 1969 SC 147] . See also
+"Jagdish Prasad v State of Bihar, 1990 Cr LJ 366 Pat, conspiracy with railway employees to"
+procure allotment of wagons under cover of fake letters. State of Rajasthan v Govind Ram
+"Bagdiya, 2003 Cr LJ 1169 (Raj), the prosecution has to prove the elements of conspiracy. No"
+proof was forthcoming in this case in the matter of allotment of house of any conspiracy among
+officials to manipulate the system.
+"96. Abdul Kadar v State, (1963) 65 Bom LR 864 . For an example of a failed prosecution under"
+"this section see State of UP v Pheru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205 : 1989 Cr LJ 1135 . In Darshan"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 554 [LNIND 1983 SC 95] : 1983 Cr LJ 985 : (1983) 2 SCC"
+"411 [LNIND 1983 SC 95] , the Supreme Court considered it to be unbelievable that the accused"
+hatched their plot while taking drinks in the presence of a stranger. For proof of conspiracy it
+often becomes necessary to convert one of the conspirators into an approver witness and this
+"may require corroboration. See Balwant Kaur v UT Chandigarh, AIR 1988 SC 139 [LNIND 1987 SC"
+738] : 1988 Cr LJ 398 . The absence of one of the conspirators at one of their meetings does not
+by itself rule out his complicity. Conspiracies are hatched under cover of secrecy. They are
+"generally proved by circumstantial evidence, EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC"
+"1066 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] : 1995 Cr LJ 1445 ; Aniceto Lobo v State (Goa, Daman and Diu), AIR"
+"1994 SC 1613 : 1994 Cr LJ 1582 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 311 , conspiracy of three persons, one of"
+"whom, being bank employee, took out blank drafts, the other forged signatures and third opened"
+"accounts in fictitious names to encash the drafts, all of them were held to be equally guilty of"
+the offence.
+"97. Esher Singh v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 3030 [LNIND 2004 SC 329] : (2004) 11 SCC 585"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 329] .
+"98. Damodar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414 [LNIND 2003 SC 803] : 2003 Cr LJ 5014 :"
+"(2004) 12 SCC 336 [LNIND 2003 SC 803] . R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, AIR 2004 SC 692 [LNIND"
+"2003 SC 1023] : 2004 Cr LJ 286 : (2004) 2 SCC 9 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] , alleged conspiracy"
+"was to dispose of by auction the property of a Govt Co at a low price, but the bids made by the"
+alleged conspirators reflected a fair price. Ingredients of the section not made out. Hardeep
+"Singh Sohal v State of Punjab, AIR 2004 SC 4716 [LNIND 2004 SC 902] : (2004) 11 SCC 612"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1006] conspiracy for murder not proved. Another charge of conspiracy for
+"murder was rejected in Hem Raj v State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 4259 [LNIND 2003 SC 759] :"
+"2003 Cr LJ 4987 : (2003) 12 SCC 241 [LNIND 2003 SC 759] . State of HP v Satya Dev Sharma,"
+"(2002) 10 SCC 601 , criminal conspiracy between timber merchants and private landowners and"
+Government officials for falling and misappropriating trees standing on Government land.
+"99. State of TN v Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC 1584] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 . Under"
+"TADA (repealed) such confession had the status of evidence. Ram Singh v State of HP, AIR 1997"
+"SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : 1997 AIR SCW 1331 : 1997 Cr LJ 4091 , in a murder by some"
+"persons, the accused persons assisted them in causing disappearance of the dead body"
+"secretly in furtherance of their conspiracy, their conviction under sections 201-120B was held to"
+"be proper. Subhash Harnarayanji Laddha v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC 545 [LNIND 2006"
+"SC 1088] , conspiracy not proved. Mallanna v State of Karnataka, (2007) 8 SCC 523 [LNIND 2007"
+"SC 1526] , conspiracy not proved."
+"100. R Balkrishna Pillai v State of Kerala, 1996 Cr LJ 757 (Ker); Devender Pal Singh v State (NCT)"
+"of Delhi, 2002 Cr LJ 2034 (SC), acquittal of a co-accused on the ground of non-corroboration of"
+the confessional statement did not have the effect of demolishing the prosecution regarding
+"conspiracy Saju v State of Kerala, 2001 Cr LJ 102 (SC), no evidence to show that the accused"
+was responsible for pregnancy or insisted upon its termination. The accused and co-accused
+were fellow workers and seemed to be hired killers. They were seen together at the place of the
+incident both before and after it. That was held to be not sufficient to prove charge of
+"conspiracy against them. State of HP v Jai Lal, AIR 1999 SC 3318 [LNIND 1999 SC 798] : 1999 Cr"
+LJ 4294 State Government scheme of purchasing infected apples from growers and destroying
+them. Allegations that some of them over charged by inflating weight. But no evidence of
+"experts about overweight, etc., charge not proved. Premlata v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1430 (Raj), a charge-sheet was not quashed where there was evidence to believe that the two"
+accused persons had conspired to produce a document for fulfilling the eligibility criteria for an
+"appointment. Central Bureau of Investigation v VC Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406 [LNIND 1998 SC"
+"272] : 1998 Cr LJ 1905 , the prosecution could not prove that one of the two accused was a"
+"party to the conspiracy. Arun Gulab Gawli v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 4481 (Bom) mere"
+inference cannot invite punishment.
+"101. Mohd Amin v CBI, (2008) 15 SCC 49 [LNIND 2008 SC 2255] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 693."
+"102. Soma Chakravarty v State, AIR 2007 SC 2149 [LNIND 2007 SC 632] : (2007) 5 SCC 403"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 632] .
+"103. T Shankar Prasad v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 1242 [LNIND 2004 SC 41] : 2004 Cr LJ 884 :"
+(2004) 3 SCC 753 [LNIND 2004 SC 41] .
+"104. Yashpal v State, AIR 1977 SC 2433 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] : 1978 Cr LJ 189 . See also Vinod"
+"Kumar Jain v State through CBI, 1991 Cr LJ 669 (Del); State of Bihar v Simranjit Singh Mann, 1987"
+Cr LJ 999 (Pat).
+"105. Nirmal Puri (Lt Gen Retd) v UOI, 2002 Cr LJ 158 (Del)."
+"106. Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Incorporated, AIR 2011 SC 20 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] :"
+2010 AIR (SCW) 6738 : JT 2010 (11) SC 492 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] : (2011) 1 SCC 74 [LNIND
+2010 SC 1012] : (2010) 3 SCC(Cr) 1201 : 2010 (11) Scale 417 ; relied on Standard Chartered Bank
+"v Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2005 SC 2622 [LNIND 2005 SC 476] : (2005) 4 SCC 530 [LNIND"
+2005 SC 476] : 2005 SCC (Cr) 961.
+"107. Padam Chand v The State of Bihar, 2016 Cr LJ 4998 (Pat) : 2016 (3) PLJR 258 ."
+"108. Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt v UOI, 2016 Cr LJ 185 : (2016) 1 SCC 1 [LNIND 2015 SC 596] ."
+"109. Chandran v State, AIR 2011 SC 1594 [LNIND 2011 SC 358] : (2011) 5 SCC 161 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 358] : (2011) 2 SCC(Cr) 551 : (2011) 8 SCR 273 [LNIND 2011 SC 358] ; Also see Ravinder
+"Singh @ Ravi Pavar v State of Gujarat, AIR 2013 SC 1915 2013 Cr Lj 1832."
+"110. State of Karnataka v Selvi J Jayalalitha, 2017 (2) Scale 375 [LNIND 2017 SC 72] : 2017 (1)"
+RCR (Criminal) 802.
+"111. Section 196(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
+"112. State of TN v Savithri, 1976 Cr LJ 37 (Mad)."
+"113. State of Orissa v Bishnu Charan Muduli, 1985 Cr LJ 1573 (Ori)."
+"114. CR Mehta v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 2863 (Bom). The Court referred to"
+"Rameshwar Dayal v State of UP, 1971 (3) SCC 924 : 1972 SCC (Cr) 172."
+"115. BN Narasimha Rao v Govt of AP, 1995 Cr LJ 4181 (SC), reversing AP High Court. See also"
+"Sayed Mohd Owais v State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 303 (Bom)."
+"116. Bilal Hajar v State, AIR 2018 SC 4780 [LNIND 2018 SC 520] ."
+"117. R v Chee Kew Ong, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S) 117 [CA (Crim Div)]."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+CHAPTER V-A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
+[s 120A] Definition of criminal conspiracy.
+"When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—"
+"(1) an illegal act, or"
+"(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a"
+criminal conspiracy:
+Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall
+amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is
+done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
+Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such
+"agreement, or is merely incidental to that object."
+COMMENT—
+Criminal conspiracy.—This chapter has introduced into the criminal law of India a new
+"offence, viz., the offence of criminal conspiracy. It came into existence by the"
+"Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1913. Offence of criminal conspiracy is an exception"
+to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to
+commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention.2. Law
+making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do mischief
+which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and support
+"which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible which, if left"
+"to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground for visiting"
+conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is held to be
+continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any member of
+the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design. Offence of criminal
+conspiracy has its foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy
+"consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or"
+more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means.3. A criminal conspiracy must be put to
+"action inasmuch as so long a crime is generated in the mind of an accused, it does"
+"not become punishable. What is necessary is not thoughts, which may even be"
+"criminal in character, often involuntary, but offence would be said to have been"
+committed thereunder only when that take concrete shape of an agreement to do or
+cause to be done an illegal act or an act which although not illegal by illegal means
+and then if nothing further is done the agreement would give rise to a criminal
+conspiracy.4.
+[s 120A.1] Ingredients.—
+The ingredients of this offence are—
+(1) that there must be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to
+conspire; and
+(2) that the agreement should be
+"(i) for doing of an illegal act, or"
+(ii) for doing by illegal means an act which may not itself be illegal.5.
+Meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done
+an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal
+conspiracy.6.
+"The most important ingredient of the offence being, the agreement between two or"
+"more persons to do an illegal act. In a case where criminal conspiracy is alleged, the"
+court must inquire whether the two persons are independently pursuing the same end
+or they have come together to pursue the unlawful object. The former does not render
+them as conspirators but the latter does. For the offence of conspiracy some kind of
+physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established. The express
+agreement need not be proved. The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts
+sharing the unlawful act is not sufficient. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which
+continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity.
+During its subsistence whenever any one of the conspirators does an act or series of
+"acts, he would be held guilty under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC,"
+1860).7.
+[s 120A.2] Elements of Criminal Conspiracy.—
+"(a) an object to be accomplished,"
+"(b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object,"
+(c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons
+"whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the"
+"accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by"
+"any effectual means, and"
+(d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act.8.
+1. Two or more persons needed.—To constitute the offence of conspiracy there must
+be an agreement of two or more persons to do an act which is illegal or which is to be
+done by illegal means for one cannot conspire with oneself. In Topandas v State of
+"Bombay,9. which has been cited by the Supreme Court with approval in Haradhan"
+"Chakrabarty v UOI,10. it was laid down that ""two or more persons must be parties to"
+such an agreement and one person alone can never be held guilty of criminal
+"conspiracy for the simple reason that one cannot conspire with oneself."" The question"
+of a single person being convicted for an offence of conspiracy was considered in
+"Bimbadhar Pradhan v The State of Orissa,11.,12. and held that It is not essential that"
+more than one person should be convicted of the offence of criminal conspiracy. It is
+enough if the court is in a position to find that two or more persons were actually
+concerned in the criminal conspiracy. In the Red fort Attack Case13. the Supreme Court
+"found that it was nothing but a well-planned conspiracy, in which apart from sole"
+"appellant, some others were also involved and convicted the sole appellant for criminal"
+conspiracy.14. Under the common law since husband and wife constitute one person
+there cannot be any conspiracy to commit an offence if husband and wife are the only
+"parties to an agreement.15. ""It seems rather odd that though husband and wife by"
+themselves alone cannot be convicted of an offence of conspiracy for agreeing to
+commit an offence but if two of them commit the self-same substantive offence they
+"can be convicted of that offence"".16. Fortunately this state of law does not exist in"
+"India, where husband and wife by themselves alone can be parties to a criminal"
+conspiracy. Where the husband is a party with some others in a conspiracy and his wife
+joined him in that with knowledge that he was involved with others to commit an
+"unlawful act, she would be guilty of the conspiracy.17. Since conspiracy requires at"
+"least two persons, where two or more named persons only were charged and all but"
+"one of them were acquitted, the remaining accused could not be convicted under"
+"section 120B, IPC, 1860, as he could not have conspired with himself.18. In a similar"
+"case before the Supreme Court, a military major was tried for theft of military goods"
+along with nine others who were supposed to have abetted him. He was found guilty
+"along with one more accused and the rest were acquitted. On his appeal, the High"
+Court quashed the judgment of the Court martial because there was no proof that he
+had removed the wheel drums. He was reinstated. In view of the acquittal and
+"reinstatement of the main accused, the matter of his co-accused came before the"
+Supreme Court. He too was ordered to be acquitted and reinstated.19. The same rule
+obtained under the English common law provided two named persons were tried
+"together.20. This rule has now been abolished by section 5(8) of the Criminal Law Act,"
+1977 which provides that unless conviction of one becomes inconsistent with the
+"acquittal of the other even one of the two conspirators can be convicted, e.g., where"
+one was acquitted for want of sanction or on ground of being an exempted person. The
+"Bombay High Court has taken the same view in a case. Thus, where of the two accused"
+one was a public servant and he had to be acquitted as he was prosecuted without
+"obtaining sanction under section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973),"
+the other could still be convicted on a charge of conspiracy as the acquittal of the other
+accused was not on facts but on technical ground and in spite of evidence establishing
+the factum of conspiracy.21.
+"The circumstances in which a single person can be tried and convicted have been thus,"
+"stated in Kenny:22. ""But though there must be plurality of conspirators, it is not"
+"necessary that all should be brought to trial together. One person may be indicted,"
+"alone, for conspiring with other persons who are not in custody, or who are even"
+"unknown to the indictors. Indeed, some of the conspirators may be unknown to the"
+"rest, provided all are acting under the directions of one leader. There need not be"
+"communication between each conspirator and every other, provided there be a design"
+"common to all.""23. Thus, a wife knowing that her husband was involved with others in a"
+"conspiracy, agreed with him that she would join the conspiracy and play her part, it was"
+held that she thereby became guilty of conspiracy notwithstanding that the only person
+with whom she actually concluded the agreement was her husband.24.
+2. Agreement is gist of the offence.—The gist of the offence is the bare engagement
+"and association to break the law, whether any act be done in pursuance thereof by the"
+conspirators or not.25. Meeting of minds is essential. Mere knowledge or discussion is
+not sufficient.26. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having
+the same intention. Not only the intention but the presence of an agreement to carry
+"out the object of the intention, is an offence. The question for consideration in a case is"
+did all the accused had the intention and did they agree that the crime be committed. It
+would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely
+"entertained a wish, howsoever, horrendous it may be, that offence be committed.27. In"
+"the absence of an agreement, a mere thought to commit a crime does not constitute"
+the offence.28. The offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence. It renders the mere
+agreement to commit an offence punishable even if no offence takes place pursuant to
+"the illegal agreement.29. The object in view or the methods employed should be illegal,"
+"as defined in section 43, (supra). A distinction is drawn between an agreement to"
+commit an offence and an agreement of which either the object or the methods
+"employed are illegal but do not constitute an offence. In the case of the former, the"
+"criminal conspiracy is completed by the act of agreement; in the case of the latter,"
+there must be some act done by one or more of the parties to the agreement to give
+"effect to the object thereof, that is, there must be an overt act. An express agreement"
+need not be proved. Evidence relating to transmission of thoughts leading to sharing of
+thought relating to the unlawful act is sufficient.30. A wrong judgment or an inaccurate
+"or incorrect approach or poor management by itself, even after due deliberations"
+"between Ministers or even with Prime Minister, by itself cannot be said to be a product"
+of criminal conspiracy.31. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution
+relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission
+of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and
+illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The
+circumstances relied for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point
+of time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged
+conspiracy.32.
+The meeting of the minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to be proved by adducing
+"substantive evidence, in cases where the circumstantial evidence is incomplete or"
+vague.33.
+[s 120A.3] Actus reus.—
+"The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the"
+execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful
+object at the same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of
+"minds, a consensus to give effect to an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary"
+that each conspirator should have been in communication with every other.34.
+[s 120A.4] Participation.—
+It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the
+end of the conspiracy; some may join the conspiracy after the time when such intention
+was first entertained by any one of them and some others may quit from the
+conspiracy. All of them cannot be treated as conspirators. Where in pursuance of the
+agreement the conspirators commit offences individually or adopt illegal means to do
+"a legal act which has a nexus to the object of conspiracy, all of them will be liable for"
+such offences even if some of them have not actively participated in the commission
+"of those offences.35. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more"
+persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary
+condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every
+detail of conspiracy. Neither is it necessary that every one of the conspirators takes
+active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial act.36. Even if some
+steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the knowledge of the
+others it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated with the
+object of the conspiracy.37. The rationale is that criminal acts done in furtherance of a
+conspiracy may be sufficiently dependent upon the encouragement and support of the
+group as a whole to warrant treating each member as a causal agent to each act.
+"Under this view, which of the conspirators committed the substantive offence would be"
+less significant in determining the defendant's liability than the fact that the crime was
+performed as a part of a larger division of labour to which the accused had also
+contributed his efforts.38.
+[s 120A.5] Overt act.—
+No overt act is necessary.39. Where the allegation against the third accused was that
+"he was merely standing nearby when the other accused committed the murder, he"
+"cannot be charged for an offence under sections 302/120B, IPC, 1860, in the absence"
+of any other reliable evidence.40. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment
+"of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event, unless the Statute so"
+"requires, no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a"
+fact-situation criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement.41.
+"When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and an act of each"
+"of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced,"
+"if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for use of criminal means.42. Where the"
+conspiracy alleged is with regard to the commission of a serious crime as
+contemplated by section 120-B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of section
+"120A, then the mere proof of an agreement is enough to bring about conviction under"
+section 120B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any of them would not
+"be necessary.43. The illegal act may or may not be done in pursuance of agreement, but"
+the very agreement is an offence and is punishable.44.
+It is not an ingredient of the offence under this section that all the parties should agree
+to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Where
+"the accused are charged with having conspired to do three categories of illegal acts,"
+the mere fact that all of them could not be convicted separately in respect of each of
+the offences has no relevancy in considering the question whether the offence of
+conspiracy has been committed. They can all be held guilty of the offence of
+"conspiracy to do illegal acts, though for individual offences all of them may not be"
+liable.45. Where the agreement between the accused is a conspiracy to do or continue
+"to do something which is illegal, it is immaterial whether the agreement to do any of"
+the acts in furtherance of the commission of the offence do not strictly amount to an
+offence. The entire agreement must be viewed as a whole and it has to be ascertained
+as to what in fact the conspirators intended to do or the object they wanted to
+achieve.46. It is not necessary that each member of a conspiracy must know each other
+or all the details of the conspiracy.47. It is also not necessary that every conspirator
+"must have taken part in each and every act done in pursuance of a conspiracy.48. It is,"
+"however, necessary that a charge of conspiracy should contain particulars of the"
+"names of the place or places where it was hatched, persons hatching it, how was it"
+hatched and what the purpose of the conspiracy was.49.
+"In the matter50. of the assassination of the then Prime Minister of India, Smt. Indira"
+"Gandhi, one of the two actual killers and two conspirators were brought to trial. Both"
+the conspirators were away from the scene of the crime. One of them was acquitted by
+the Supreme Court. His movements after the incident were not properly proved. The
+documents recovered from his custody did not indicate any agreement between him
+and the other accused. They only showed his agitated mind which was in the grip of an
+avenging mood. This is not enough to establish an agreement with anybody. On the
+"other hand, about Kehar Singh, it was shown that he was having secret talks with one of"
+"the actual killers, that they were trying all the time to keep themselves away from their"
+"wives and children, they avoided the company of the other members of the family and"
+"on being asked what they were talking about, they remained mysterious. These facts"
+were sufficient to show that they were planning something secret. This was enough to
+constitute a prima facie evidence of conspiracy within the meaning of section 10 of the
+"Evidence Act, 1872 and to bring them within the jacket of punishment of all for the act"
+of one.
+"Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud discussion"
+in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a conspiracy is
+seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct or circumstantial
+evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence about the date of the
+"formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who took part in the formation"
+"of the conspiracy, about the object, which the objectors set before themselves as the"
+"object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which the object of conspiracy is to be"
+"carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of inference.51. Thus, a conspiracy is an"
+inference from circumstances. There cannot always be much direct evidence about it.
+Conspiracy can be inferred even from the circumstances giving rise to a conclusive or
+irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an
+offence.52. It is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more persons is a sine
+qua non but it may not be possible to establish by direct evidence. Its existence and
+objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and parties conduct. It is
+"necessary that the incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events, from"
+which a conclusion about the accused's guilt could be drawn. The help of
+circumstantial evidence is necessary because a conspiracy is always hatched in
+secrecy. It becomes difficult to locate any direct evidence.53. A businessman was in
+great need of money for completing the construction of a theatre complex. He was
+approached by a person who told him that his financier friend would help him with
+money. This was followed by a number of meetings between him and the team of
+financiers during which documents were executed and money released in cash which
+cash was found to be counterfeit currency. Every member of the team was held to be
+guilty of conspiracy and of cheating under section 420.54. Seizure of unexplained
+currency notes from the possession of a person who claimed to be the owner of the
+money was held to be not sufficient to connect him with the person who was the main
+"accused of smuggling currency, though he was a relative of the main accused.55."
+Where a bank accountant dishonestly agreed with others to conceal dishonour of
+"cheques purchased by the bank and thus, causing risk to the economic interests of the"
+"bank, he was held guilty of conspiring to defraud whatever his motive or underlying"
+purpose might have been (he contended that he acted in the interest of the bank) and
+even though he had no desire to harm the victim and no loss was actually caused.56.
+"Officials of a nationalised bank, in violation of departmental instructions, allowing"
+advance credits on banker's cheques to the account of a customer dealing in
+securities. Advance credits were allowed before the cheques were sent for clearance
+and in some cases even before the cheques were received. This allowed the customer
+to take pecuniary advantage by overdrawing money from his account which he was not
+"entitled to. Public funds were thus, misused. It was held that a criminal conspiracy"
+between bank officials and the customer stood proved. One of them was acquitted
+because no conclusive evidence could be found against him.57.
+A criminal conspiracy can be proved by circumstantial evidence or by necessary
+implication. A smaller conspiracy may be the part of a larger conspiracy. It was held on
+facts that a criminal conspiracy was established when officials of two public sector
+banks acted in such a way that the transaction appeared to be an inter-banking
+transaction relating to call money which the borrowing bank was supposed to retain
+with itself but the transaction was in fact meant to help a private party to use public
+"funds for private purpose.58. Where the accused, an LIC agent, was charged with"
+"cheating the LIC by entering into conspiracy with the co-accused, a Development"
+"Officer, on the allegation that insurance policies were got issued on the basis of fake"
+and forged documents and he received premium commission and bonus in respect of
+"those policies, the accused was entitled to be acquitted because the forging was done"
+"by the co-accused without the knowledge and consent of the accused. Bonus,"
+"Commission, etc., in respect of those policies were credited to his account only in the"
+"normal course.59. A 'vaid' and an 'up-vaid' who, in conspiracy with others made bogus"
+medical bills for government servants and got them duly passed through their
+"Ayurvedic Aushadhalaya for payment of 30 per cent of the amount of the bills, were"
+caught in a trap and the tainted money was recovered from the accused. One of the
+accused died during the pendency of appeal. Conviction of the other under sections
+120B/468 was held to be proper.60.
+A group of friends went to a club for fun and frolic. One of them (the main accused)
+suddenly fired at the bar mate for her refusal to serve drinks. The others were unaware
+of the accused carrying a loaded pistol. They had stayed at the club for about two and
+a half hours. The Court said that this could not constitute an evidence of conspiracy.
+The Court also said that the fact that the group members dispersed separately and
+also helped to retrieve the murder weapon would not suggest conspiracy for murder.61.
+[s 120A.6] Same verdict in respect of each not necessary.—
+It has been held that the rule that both parties to a conspiracy had to be convicted or
+"acquitted has been abrogated by the Criminal Law Act, 1977 (English). The important"
+question is whether there is a material difference in the evidence against the two.62.
+[s 120A.7] Sections 34 and 120A.—
+There is not much substantial difference between conspiracy as defined in section
+"120A and acting on a common intention, as contemplated in section 34. While in the"
+"former, the gist of the offence is bare engagement and association to break the law"
+"even though the illegal act does not follow, the gist of the offence under section 34 is"
+the commission of a criminal act in furtherance of a common intention of all the
+"offenders, which means that there should be unity of criminal behaviour resulting in"
+"something, for which an individual would be punishable, if it were all done by himself"
+alone.63. Another point of difference is that a single person cannot be convicted under
+"section 120A and, therefore, where all the accused except one were acquitted, the"
+"Supreme Court ordered his acquittal also,64. whereas under section 34, read with some"
+"other specific offence, a single person can be convicted because each is responsible"
+for the acts of all others.
+[s 120A.8] Sections 107 and 120A.—
+For an offence under this section a mere agreement is enough if the agreement is to
+"commit an offence. But, for an offence under the second clause of section 107 an act"
+or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and a mere
+agreement is not enough.65.
+"3. How proved (section 120A IPC, 1860 and section 10 Evidence Act, 1872-Doctrine"
+of agency).—There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of
+"conspiracy and that of any other offence, it can be established by direct evidence or by"
+circumstantial evidence. But section 10 of the Evidence Act introduces the doctrine of
+"agency and if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the acts done by one are"
+admissible against the coconspirators. When men enter into an agreement for an
+"unlawful end, they become ad-hoc agents for one another and have made a partnership"
+"in crime. The said section reads: ""Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two"
+"or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong,"
+"anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common"
+"intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them is"
+"a relevant fact against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well as for"
+the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing
+"that any such person was party to it."""
+"The section can be analysed as follows: ""(1) There shall be a prima facie evidence"
+affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are
+"members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or"
+written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence
+"against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done"
+or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also
+be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it
+"was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it"
+"can only be used against a coconspirator and not in his favour.""66."
+Since conspiracy is often hatched up in utmost secrecy it is mostly impossible to prove
+"conspiracy by direct evidence. It has, oftener than not, to be inferred from the acts,"
+statements and conduct of the parties to the conspiracy.67. The circumstances proved
+"before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the"
+"complicity of the accused.68. If it is proved that the accused pursued, by their acts, the"
+"same object often by the same means, one performing one part of the act and the"
+other another part of the same act so as to complete it with a view to attainment of the
+"object which they were pursuing, the Court is at liberty to draw the inference that they"
+"conspired together to effect that object.69. It should, however, be remembered that"
+"where there is no direct evidence, for example through the evidence of an approver, and"
+"the case for the prosecution is dependent on circumstantial evidence alone, it is"
+necessary for the prosecution to prove and establish such circumstances as would
+lead to the only conclusion of existence of a criminal conspiracy and rule out the theory
+"of innocence.70. Thus, chairman of a large cooperative society cannot be punished"
+vicariously for the acts of others as mens rea cannot be excluded in a criminal case. As
+a chairman he had to deal with various matters and it would have been impossible for
+him to look into every detail to find out if someone was committing any criminal breach
+"of trust.71. Similarly, a case of conspiracy to misappropriate cash entrusted to the"
+accused is not made out merely from the audit report without any evidence of shortage
+on actual verification of cash as mistakes and even double entries may be made bona
+fide while preparing the account.72. The onus is on the prosecution to prove the charge
+"of conspiracy by cogent evidence, direct or circumstantial.73. One more principle which"
+deserves notice is that the cumulative effect of the proved circumstances should be
+taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused rather than adopting an
+"isolated approach to each of the circumstances. Of course, each one of the"
+"circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the"
+"appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that"
+the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their
+concurrence as to the common design and its execution.74.
+[s 120A.9] Inference of conspiracy.—
+It is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely
+"available.75. Thus, it is extremely difficult to adduce direct evidence to prove"
+conspiracy. Existence of conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the
+"surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. In some cases, indulgence"
+in the illegal act or legal act by illegal means may be inferred from the knowledge
+itself.76. It can be a matter of inference drawn by the Court after considering whether
+the basic facts and circumstances on the basis of which inference is drawn have been
+proved beyond all reasonable doubts and that no other conclusion except that of the
+"complicity of Accused to have agreed to commit an offence is evident.77. Accordingly,"
+the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to
+decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been
+"committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement"
+made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy.
+Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only
+when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. An
+offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion
+and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.
+Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only
+when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. To
+establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or
+"a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being"
+made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge
+"itself.78. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use"
+"was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful"
+"use. Finally when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be"
+"necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that"
+each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do.79.
+"One of the accused persons, a foreign national, was found staying in the country"
+without valid passport and visa. His movement to various places with the main
+accused was established. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was recovered
+from the place occupied by the main accused. The Court said that an inference of
+criminal conspiracy could be drawn.80. The Court also said that the appeal against
+conviction of the main accused was dismissed would not be sufficient to say that the
+charge of conspiracy against other accused would be deemed to be proved.81.
+"Circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence of the crime have to be"
+considered together to decide about the complicity of the accused.82. Circumstantial
+evidence was based on the recovery of the scooter used by the executant and alleged
+"to have been owned by a co-conspirator, but the recovery was not based on any"
+"information given by the accused, but by one witness. The Supreme Court held that no"
+circumstantial evidence was proved against any of the conspirators.83.
+"[s 120A.10] Circumstantial evidence, inference must be backed by evidence.—"
+Most of the circumstances stated as against the accused were not proved. Merely
+based on the circumstance that the accused had filed a civil suit against the deceased
+"for restraining him from doing a business he cannot be convicted. Moreover, there was"
+"no specific evidence as to who the conspirators were, where and when the conspiracy"
+"was hatched, what the specific purpose of such a conspiracy was and whether it was"
+relating to the elimination of the deceased.84. The law is well established that
+conspiracy cannot be proved merely on the basis of inferences. The inferences have to
+be backed by evidence.85.
+The Court for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the said offence has
+been committed or not may take into consideration the circumstantial evidence.
+"However, while doing so, it must bear in mind that the meeting of minds is essential"
+and mere knowledge or discussion would not be sufficient.86. In Mukesh v State for
+"NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal Nos. 607–608 of 2017, (popular as Nirbhaya Case) the"
+criminal conspiracy was proved by the sequence of events and the conduct of the
+accused.
+In the conspiracy for assassination of the former PM (Rajiv Gandhi) one of the accused
+persons at one point of time in his confessional statement said that he had a strong
+suspicion that Rajiv Gandhi was the target of the accused persons. The Court said that
+"this suspicion did not make him a member of the conspiracy. His association, however"
+strong with the main conspirators would not make him a member of the conspiracy by
+"itself. But those who were in the thick of the conspiracy, for example, one who"
+"purchased the battery for explosion of human body, their conviction for the main"
+offence was proper. But mere association with LTTE was not sufficient nor the fact that
+messages about arrests were sent by certain persons.87.
+[s 120A.11] Contacts through telephone.—
+Where the case against the appellants A2 to A4 is that they had hatched a conspiracy
+with appellant A1 to kill the deceased and the case against A1 was proved as per the
+"'last seen theory', and to prove the conspiracy the prosecution relied on the"
+circumstance that there were frequent phone calls among the accused some days
+"around the date of murder, and the recovery of some vehicles; the Supreme Court held"
+that the telephonic calls and the recovery may raise suspicion against the accused but
+mere suspicion by itself cannot take the place of proof.88.
+[s 120A.12] Between bank officials.—
+Criminal conspiracy was taken to be established when officials of two public sector
+banks acted in such a way that the transaction in question appeared to be an inter-
+banking transaction relating to call money which the borrowing bank was supposed to
+retain with itself. The transaction was in fact formalised for the purpose of helping a
+private party to use public funds for a private purpose.89.
+[s 120A.13] Approval of television serial.—
+The accused was the director of Doordarshan. The allegation against him was that he
+continued a serial which was approved at lower rates by an earlier director. Each
+director worked at different point of time. They did not work together. Their postings
+were official postings. It was difficult to infer any conspiracy between them for
+continuing the telecast. The investigation launched against the director was liable to be
+quashed.90.
+"1. Chapter VA (containing sections 120A and 120B) inserted by Act 8 of 1913, section 3."
+"2. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253 [LNIND"
+1999 SC 526] .
+"3. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] :"
+2012 (10) Scale 237 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] relying on Ram Narayan Popli v Central Bureau of
+"Investigation, (2003) 3 SCC 641 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] ."
+"4. State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, 2009 Cr LJ 4436 : (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 901."
+"5. Yogesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 2991 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] : 2008 Cr LJ 3872 :"
+"(2008) 10 SCC 394 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] ; S Arul Raja v State of TN, reported in, 2010 (8) SCC"
+"233 [LNIND 2010 SC 689] ; Mohan Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2011 SC 3534 [LNIND 2011 SC 820]"
+: 2011 Cr LJ 4837 : (2011) 9 SCC 272 [LNIND 2011 SC 820] ; Central Bureau of Investigation
+"Hyderabad v K Narayana Rao, 2012 AIR SCW 5139 : 2012 Cr LJ 4610 : JT 2012 (9) SC 359"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 569] : (2012) 9 SCC 512 [LNIND 2012 SC 569] : 2012 (9) Scale 228 [LNIND 2012
+"SC 569] ; Ajay Aggarwal v UOI, (AIR 1993 SC 1637 [LNIND 1993 SC 431] : 1993 AIR SCW 1866 :"
+1993 Cr LJ 2516 ) : (1993) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1993 SC 431] .
+"6. Rajiv Kumar v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 3772 [LNIND 2017 SC 367] ."
+"7. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] :"
+2012 Mad LJ (Cr) 532 : 2012 (10) Scale 237 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] ; Damodar v State of
+"Rajasthan, (2004) 12 SCC 336 [LNIND 2003 SC 803] ; Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Admn), (1988) 3"
+"SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] ; State of Maharashtra v Somnath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 776] .
+"8. Ram Narayan Popli v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2003) 3 SCC 641 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] ."
+"9. Topandas v State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] : 1956 Cr LJ 138 : (1955) 2"
+"SCR 881 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] . The ruling in Topandas case, AIR 1956 SC 33 [LNIND 1955 SC 78]"
+"and Fakhruddin case, AIR 1967 SC 1326 [LNIND 1966 SC 307] were not followed in Sanichar"
+"Sahni v State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 198 [LNIND 2009 SC 1350] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 347, because"
+"here only one person was charged under section 120-B and for no other offence, and his co-"
+"accused was charged with another offence but not under section 120-B, the court said that the"
+"charge was not properly framed. In the earlier cases, more than one were charged with"
+"conspiracy, all but one were acquitted, the single one could not be convicted. He was convicted"
+for murder which was proved against him.
+"10. Haradhan Chakrabarty v UOI, AIR 1990 SC 1210 [LNIND 1990 SC 57] : 1990 Cr LJ 1246 :"
+(1990) 2 SCC 143 [LNIND 1990 SC 57] .
+"11. See also Thakur H v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 1704 (HP)."
+"12. Bimbadhar Pradhan v The State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469 [LNIND 1956 SC 25] ."
+"13. Mohd Arif v State of NCT of Delhi, JT 2011 (9) SC 563 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 13 SCC"
+621 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 10 SCR 56 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : 2011 (8) Scale 328 [LNIND
+2011 SC 753] .
+"14. McDowell, (1966) 1 All ER 193 : (1965) 3 WLR 1138 ; Rex v IRC Haulage, (1944) KB 551 :"
+"(1944) 1 All ER 691 . Central Bureau of Investigation v VC Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406 [LNIND 1998"
+"SC 272] : 1998 Cr LJ 1905 ; Ajay Kumar Rana v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 3837 (Pat)."
+"15. Mowji, (1957) All ER 385 : (1957) 2 WLR 277 . See Glanville Williams, Legal Unity of Husband"
+"and Wife, 10 Modern LR 16 (1947). ""But either spouse may be convicted of inciting the other to"
+"commit a crime if such be proved."" See Kenny, 450, p 428, Outlines Of Criminal Law, 19th Edn"
+1966.
+"16. Cross & Jones : Introduction To Criminal Law, 9th Edn, p 343."
+"17. R v Charstny, (1991) 1 WLR 1381 (CA)."
+"18. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1972 SC 1502 [LNIND 1972 SC 72] : 1972 Cr LJ 909 ; Tapandas, AIR 1956"
+"SC 33 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] : (1955) 2 SCR 881 [LNIND 1955 SC 78] ; Fakhruddin, AIR 1967 SC"
+"1326 [LNIND 1966 SC 307] : 1967 Cr LJ 1197 ; See also State v Dilbagh Rai, 1986 Cr LJ 138"
+(Delhi).
+"19. Relying upon Faguna Kanta Nath v State of Assam, AIR 1959 SC 673 [LNIND 1959 SC 2] :"
+"1959 Cr LJ 90 : 1959 Supp 2 SCR 1, where also the acquittal of the co-accused automatically"
+"followed the acquittal of the main accused; Madan Lal Bhandari v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1970"
+SC 436 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] : 1970 Cr LJ 519 : (1969) 2 SCC 385 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] : (1970)
+"1 SCR 688 [LNIND 1969 SC 230] , the nurse causing miscarriage acquitted, the conspirator also"
+acquitted.
+"20. Plummer v State, (1902) 2 KB 339 ; Coughlan (1976) 64 Cr App Rep 11 ."
+"21. Pradumna, 1981 Cr LJ 1873 (Bom)."
+"22. JE Cecil Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, 428, 19th Edn, 1966."
+"23. Citing R v Myrick and Ribuffi, (1929) 21 Cr App R 94 TAC."
+"24. Regina v Chrastry, (1991) 1 WLR 1381 (CA). Kuldeep Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ"
+"479 (SC), the only evidence against one of the accused conspirators was that he was seen"
+moving with others to the house of the deceased. This was held to be not sufficient to make him
+a part of the conspiracy or participant in murder.
+"25. Mohammad Ismail, (1936) Nag 152; Bimbadhar Pradhan, (1956) Cut 409 SC; EG Barsay, AIR"
+1961 SC 1762 [LNIND 1961 SC 196] : 1962 (2) SCR 195 [LNIND 1961 SC 196] ; Chaman Lal v
+"State of Punjab, (2009) 11 SCC 721 [LNIND 2009 SC 721] AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"721] , requisites of the offence restated."
+"26. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 646 :"
+"Baldev Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 6 SCC 564 [LNIND 2009 SC 1151] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 66."
+"27. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253 [LNIND"
+"1999 SC 526] Mere knowledge, or even discussion, of the plan is not, per se enough; Russell on"
+"Crimes, 12th Edn, vol I, quoted in Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Administration), 1988 (3) SCC 609"
+[LNIND 1988 SC 887] at 731.
+"28. R Venkatakrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"29. Yogesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 2991 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] : 2008 Cr LJ 3872 :"
+(2008) 10 SCC 394 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] .
+"30. Esher Singh v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 3030 [LNIND 2004 SC 329] : (2004) 11 SCC 585"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 329] . K Hashim v State of TN, AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005)"
+"1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] , the court enumerated four elements of criminal conspiracy,"
+the essence is an unlawful agreement and it is complete when the agreement is framed. A
+design resting in mind only does not make out the offence.
+"31. Subramanian Swamy v A Raja, AIR 2012 SC 3336 [LNIND 2012 SC 498] : 2012 Cr LJ 4443 :"
+(2012) 9 SCC 257 [LNIND 2012 SC 498] (Involvement of finance minister in 2G Spectrum Case) -
+Criminal conspiracy cannot be inferred on the mere fact that there were official discussions
+"between the officers of the MoF and that of DoT and between two Ministers, which are all"
+"recorded. Suspicion, however, strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and the meeting"
+between Shri P Chidambaram and Shri A Raja would not by itself be sufficient to infer the
+existence of a criminal conspiracy so as to indict Shri P. Chidambaram.
+"32. Esher Singh v State of AP, 2004 (11) SCC 585 [LNIND 2004 SC 329] ."
+"33. Gulam Sarbar v State of Bihar, 2014 Cr LJ 34 : (2014 ) 3 SCC 401."
+"34. Chaman Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2009) 11 SCC 721"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2010) 1 SCC(Cr) 159.
+"35. State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 253"
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 526] ; State of HP v Krishan Lal Pardhan, ( AIR 1987 SC 773 [LNIND 1987 SC"
+131] : 1987 Cr LJ 709 ) : (1987) 2 SCC 17 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] .
+"36. K R Purushothaman v State, AIR 2006 SC 35 [LNIND 2005 SC 842] : (2005) 12 SCC 631"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 842] ; approved in John Pandian v State Rep by Inspector of Police, TN, AIR 2011"
+SC (Supp) 531 : (2011) 3 SCC(Cr) 550 : 2010 (13) Scale 13.
+"37. Yash Pal Mittal v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] : 1978 Cr LJ 189 :"
+(1977) 4 SCC 540 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] .
+"38. Firozuddin Basheeruddin v State, 2001 (7) SCC 596 [LNIND 2001 SC 1755] ."
+"39. K Hasim v State of TN, AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : 2005 Cr LJ 143 ."
+"40. Raju v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 4425 : 2014 (9) SCJ 453 [LNINDORD 2014 SC 19031]"
+.
+"41. Sushil Suri v CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1713 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] : (2011) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 494] : (2011) 2 SCC(Cr) 764 : (2011) 8 SCR 1 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] .
+"42. Chaman Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2009) 11 SCC 721"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 721] : (2010) 1 SCC(Cr) 159.
+"43. SC Bahri v State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2020 : 1994 Cr LJ 3271 ."
+"44. Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1988 SC 1883 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] : 1989 Cr"
+LJ 1 : (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] .
+"45. EG Barsay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 [LNIND 1961 SC 196] : 1962 (2) SCR 195 [LNIND 1961 SC 196]"
+.
+"46. Lennart v State, AIR 1970 SC 549 [LNIND 1969 SC 396] : 1970 Cr LJ 707 ."
+"47. RK Dalmia, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 805 ; Yashpal v State,"
+AIR 1977 SC 2433 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] SC : 1978 Cr LJ 189 .
+"48. State of HP v Krishanlal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 773 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] : 1987 Cr LJ 709 :"
+(1987) 2 SCC 17 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] .
+"49. KS Narayanan, 1982 Cr LJ 1611 (Mad); Krishnalal Naskar, 1982 Cr LJ 1305 (Cal). Mahabir"
+"Prasad Akela v State of Bihar, 1987 Cr LJ 1545 Pat, no meeting of minds."
+50. (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] : AIR 1988 SC 1883 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] : 1989 CR
+"LJ 1 . AS AGAINST THIS SEE, Param Hans Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 955 [LNIND 1987"
+"SC 253] : 1987 Cr LJ 789 : (1987) 2 SCC 197 [LNIND 1987 SC 253] , murder of Collector by a"
+"person whose connection with the jailed co-accused not proved, though the latter had a grudge"
+against the collector for demolishing his temple and detaining him. Reversing the High Court
+"decision, 1986 Pat LJR 688 ."
+"51. Mohd Arif v State of NCT of Delhi, JT 2011 (9) SC 563 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 13 SCC"
+621 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : 2011 (8) Scale 328 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 10 SCR 56 [LNIND
+"2011 SC 753] ; NV Subba Rao v State, (2013) 2 SCC 162 [LNIND 2012 SC 1350] : 2013 Cr LJ 953 ."
+"52. MS Reddy v State Inspector of Police ACB Nellore, 1993 Cr LJ 558 (AP). Ammuni v State of"
+"Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 280 : 1998 Cr LJ 481 , the accused administered poison and caused death"
+"of the woman and her two children, there was evidence to show that all the four entered into a"
+conspiracy to murder the woman. They were seen hanging around her house. One of the glass
+tumblers recovered from her place carried the finger prints of one of them. One of them also
+"confessed. Conspiracy proved conviction under sections 300/34, confirmed. Kuldeep Singh v"
+"State of Rajasthan, AIR 2000 SC 3649 [LNIND 2000 SC 724] , accused persons entered into"
+"conspiracy to cause death, circumstantial evidence coupled with recoveries. Guilt established."
+Conviction for murder and conspiracy.
+"53. Yogesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 2991 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] : 2008 Cr LJ 3872 :"
+(2008) 10 SCC 394 [LNIND 2008 SC 979] .
+"54. Nellai Ganesan v State, 1991 Cr LJ 2157 . See also Khalid v. State, 1990 Cr LJ (NOC) Raj,"
+where the court inferred the fact of agreement from transmission of thoughts sharing the
+"unlawful design, the court observing that neither proof of actual words of communication nor"
+actual physical meeting of persons involved is necessary.
+"55. KTMS Mohd v UOI, AIR 1992 SC 1831 [LNIND 1992 SC 362] : 1992 Cr LJ 2781 ."
+"56. Wai Yu-Tsang v The Queen, (1991) 3 WLR 1006 PC, applying Welham v DPP, (1961) AC 103"
+"HL(E) and Reg v Allsop, (1976) 64 Cr App R; CA. Shambhu Singh v State of UP, AIR 1994 SC 1559"
+": 1994 Cr LJ 1584 , the Supreme Court did not interfere in the concurrent finding of the lower"
+courts as to the involvement of the accused in the conspiracy.
+"57. Mir Naqvi Askari v CBI, AIR 2010 SC 528 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : (2009) 15 SCC 643 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1651] . The court also explained the nature of the crime.
+"58. R Venkatakrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] , under the National"
+"Housing Bank Act, 1987. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] :"
+(2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 646; criminal conspiracy by bank officials in relation to Harshad Mehta
+"Securities Scam, illegally extending discounting/ rediscounting facility for bills of exchange by"
+"bank officials, conspiracy in relation to persons liable to be convicted, role/conduct necessary to"
+fasten liability.
+"59. Nand Kumar Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1992 SC 1939 : 992 Cr LJ 3587 : (1992) Supp (2)"
+SCC 111 .
+"60. Narain Lal Nirala v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1993 SC 118 : 1993 Cr LJ 3911 ."
+"61. State v Siddarth Vashisth (alias Manu Sharma), 2001 Cr LJ 2404 (Del)."
+"62. R v Ashton, (1992) Cr LR 667 (CA)."
+"63. Dinanath, 1939 Nag 644."
+"64. Vinayak v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1793 [LNIND 1984 SC 255] : (1984) 4 SCC 441"
+[LNIND 1984 SC 255] : 1984 SCC (Cr) 605.
+"65. Pramatha Nath v Saroj Ranjan, AIR 1962 SC 876 [LNIND 1961 SC 400] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 770 ."
+"Further explained by the Supreme Court in Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1988 SC 1883"
+[LNIND 1988 SC 887] : 1989 Cr Lj 1 : (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] .
+"66. State of TN through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT v Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND"
+1999 SC 1584] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 : JT 1999 (4) SC 106 [LNIND 1999 SC 526] : (1999) 5 SCC 253
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 526] ; Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar v State of Maharashtra, ( AIR 1965 SC 682"
+[LNIND 1963 SC 67] : 1965 (1) Cr LJ 608 ) : (1964) 2 SCR 378 [LNIND 1963 SC 67] See also.
+"67. Bhagwandas, AIR 1974 SC 898 : 1974 Cr LJ 751 ; Ashok Datta Naik, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 95"
+"(Goa); V Shivanarayan, AIR 1980 SC 439 : 1980 Cr LJ 388 ; Mohd Usman Mohd Hussain, AIR 1981"
+SC 1062 [LNIND 1981 SC 127] : 1981 Cr LJ 588 : (1988) 3 SCC 609 [LNIND 1988 SC 887] ; State
+"of UP v Girijashankar Misra, 1985 Cr LJ NOC 79 (Delhi); Subhas, 1985 Cr LJ 1807 (Cal)."
+"68. Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] :"
+2012 Mad LJ (Cr) 532 : 2012 (10) Scale 237 [LNIND 2012 SC 1033] ; An offence of criminal
+"conspiracy can also be proved by circumstantial evidence. State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, 2009 Cr"
+"LJ 4436 : (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 901]. In S Arul Raja v State of TN, 2010 (8) SCC"
+233 [LNIND 2010 SC 689] in which it is held that mere circumstantial evidence to prove the
+involvement of the appellant is not sufficient to meet the requirements of criminal conspiracy
+"under Section 120A of the (IPC, 1860) A meeting of minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to"
+be proved by placing substantive evidence.
+"69. Re MD Mendekar, 1972 Cr LJ 978 (Mysore); See also Bhagwandas, supra."
+"70. DB Naik, 1982 Cr LJ 856 (Bom); Hari Ram, 1982 Cr LJ 294 (HP)."
+"71. Jethsur Surangbhai, AIR 1984 SC 151 [LNIND 1983 SC 329] : 1984 Cr LJ 162 (SC) : (1984)"
+SCC (Cr) 474.
+72. Ajoyadha PrashadI 1985 Cr LJ 1401 (Ori).
+"73. State v VC Shukla, 1980 Cr LJ 965 : 1980 Cr LR (SC) 301 . Also VC Shukla v State (Delhi"
+"Admn), AIR 1980 SC 1382 [LNIND 1980 SC 179] : 1980 SCC (Cr) 561 and 849 (1980) 2 SCC 665"
+"[LNIND 1980 SC 179] . State of HP v Gian Chand, 2000 Cr LJ 949 (HP); Sardari Lal v State of"
+"Punjab, 2003 Cr LJ 383 (P&H), State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"901; Baldev Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 6 SCC 564 [LNIND 2009 SC 1151] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"66; Y Venkaiah v State of AP, AIR 2009 SC 2311 [LNIND 2009 SC 513] : (2009) Cr LJ 2834 :"
+"(2009) 12 SCC 126 [LNIND 2009 SC 513] . State of MP v Paltan Mallah, 2005 AIR 2005 SC 733"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 64] : Cr LJ 918 SC : (2005) 3 SCC 169 [LNIND 2005 SC 64] .
+"74. State (NCT) of Delhi v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580]"
+.
+"75. Charandas Swami v State of Gujarat, 2017 (4) Scale 403 ."
+"76. Rajiv Kumar v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 3772 [LNIND 2017 SC 367] ."
+"77. Charandas Swami v State of Gujarat, 2017 (4) Scale 403 ."
+"78. State of Maharashtra v Som Nath Thapa, AIR 1996 SC 1744 [LNIND 1996 SC 776] : 1996 AIR"
+SCW 1977 : 1996 Cr LJ 2448 : (1996) 4 SCC 649 .
+"79. State through Central Bureau of Investigation v Dr Anup Kumar Srivastava, AIR 2017 SC 3698"
+[LNIND 2017 SC 371] .
+"80. Lal Singh v State of Gujarat, AIR 2001 SC 746 [LNIND 2001 SC 98] : 2001 Cr LJ 978 . The"
+"case under the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Saju v State of Kerala,"
+"AIR 2001 SC 175 [LNIND 2000 SC 1552] , no inference of conspiracy to murder from"
+"circumstances proved in the case, Suman Sood v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2007 SC 2774 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 647] : (2007) Cr LJ 4080 : (2007) 5 SCC 634 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] , inference regarding"
+conspiracy can be drawn from surrounding circumstances because normally no direct evidence
+is available.
+"81. Ibid. The court followed the ruling in Babu Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 3250 [LNIND"
+"1996 SC 860] : 1996 Cr LJ 2503 ; Vijayan v State of Kerala, AIR 1999 SC 1086 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+"159] : 1999 Cr LJ 1638 , it is difficult to establish conspiracy by direct evidence. But there should"
+be material evidence showing the connection between the alleged conspiracy and the act done
+"pursuant to that conspiracy. Firozuddin Basheerudin v State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 3488 [LNIND"
+"2001 SC 1755] : 2001 Cr LJ 4215 , conspiracy to eliminate a police informer on whose"
+"information contraband gold was seized from the accused persons, chain of circumstances to"
+"the point of murder, complete, conviction. State of Kerala v P Suganthan, AIR 2000 SC 3323"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 1298] : 2000 Cr LJ 4584 , conspiracy to murder the earlier paramour of the"
+"concubine, not proved. Hira Lal Hari Lal v CBI, AIR 2003 SC 2545 [LNIND 2003 SC 499] : 2003 Cr"
+"LJ 3041 : (2003) 5 SCC 257 [LNIND 2003 SC 499] , difficult to prove conspiracy by direct"
+evidence. An agreement between the parties to do something unlawful has to be proved. The
+allegation here was that of evasion of customs duty.
+"82. Chandra Prakash v State of Rajasthan, 2014 Cr LJ 2884 : (2014) 8 SCC 340 [LNIND 2014 SC"
+346] .
+"83. Indra Dalal v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 3174 : 2015 (6) SCJ 501 [LNIND 2015 SC 358] ."
+"84. Balkar Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 901 : (2015) 2 SCC 746 [LNIND 2014 SC 950] ."
+"85. Satyavir Singh v State of UP, 2016 Cr LJ 4863 (All), 2015 (91) ALLCC 892."
+"86. State v Nitin Gunwant Shah, 2015 Cr LJ 4759 : 2016 (1) SCJ 30 [LNIND 2015 SC 529] ."
+"87. State of TN v Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC 1584] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 ."
+"88. Kiriti Pal v State of WB, 2015 Cr LJ 3152 : 2015 (3) Crimes 11 (SC)."
+"89. R Venkatkrishanan v CBI, 2010 1 SCC (Cr) 164 : (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"90. Mahesh Joshi v State, (CBI), 2002 Cr LJ 97 (Kant)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+CHAPTER V-A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
+[s 120B] Punishment of criminal conspiracy.
+(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable
+"with death, 91.[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of"
+"two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code"
+"for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if"
+he had abetted such offence.
+(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to
+commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with
+"imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or"
+with fine or with both.]
+COMMENT—
+"Earlier to the introduction of sections 120A and B, conspiracy per se was not an"
+"offence under IPC, 1860, except in respect of the offence mentioned in section 121A."
+"However, abetment by conspiracy was and still remains to be an ingredient of"
+"abetment under the second clause of section 107 of IPC, 1860. The punishment"
+"therefore, is provided under various sections, viz., sections 108–117. Whereas under"
+"section 120A, the essence of the offence of criminal conspiracy is a bare agreement to"
+"commit the offence, the abetment under section 107 requires the commission of some"
+act or illegal omission pursuant to the conspiracy.92. Criminal conspiracy is an
+independent offence. It is punishable separately.93. The punishment for conspiracy is
+the same as if the conspirator had abetted the offence.94. The punishment for a
+criminal conspiracy is more severe if the agreement is one to commit a serious
+offence; it is less severe if the agreement is one to commit an act which although
+"illegal is not an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous"
+imprisonment for more than two years.
+Conspiracy to commit an offence is itself an offence and a person can be separately
+charged with respect to such a conspiracy. There may be an element of abetment in a
+conspiracy; but conspiracy is something more than abetment. The offences created by
+section 109 and section 120A are quite distinct and where offences are committed by
+several persons in pursuance of a conspiracy it is usual to charge them with those
+offences as well as conspiracy to commit those offences.95.
+This section applies to those who are the members of the conspiracy during its
+continuance. Conspiracy has to be treated as a continuing offence and whoever is a
+party to the conspiracy during the period for which he is charged is liable under this
+section.96. A conspiracy is held to be continued and renewed as to encompass all its
+members wherever and whenever any member of it acts in furtherance of the common
+design.97. The most important ingredient of a criminal conspiracy is an agreement for
+"an illegal act, conspiracy continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or"
+frustrated by choice or necessity.98. The conspirators' connection with the conspiracy
+would get snapped after he is nabbed by the police and kept in custody. He would then
+cease to be the agent of others. In this case (Rajiv assassination) the prosecution could
+not establish that the accused persons who were under detention continued their
+conspiratorial contact with those who remained outside. A statement which
+constitutes prima facie evidence of a conspiracy may amount to an act for which all the
+members can be held liable.99.
+"Where the accused conspired with others in awarding a contract when he was in job, he"
+could be held liable for subsequent acts of other conspirators even after his retirement
+as he contributed his part for furtherance of the conspiracy.100.
+"For the purpose of establishing or proving the charge of conspiracy, it is not necessary"
+that there should be knowledge of who are other conspirators and of the detailed
+stages of the conspiracy. The necessary requisite is knowledge of the main object and
+purpose of the conspiracy.101. A fraud was alleged to have been committed by
+Government officers in processing and verifying fake bills. It was held that all the
+officers who dealt with the relevant files at one point of time or the other could not be
+considered to have taken part in the conspiracy or that they would be guilty of aiding
+and abetting the offence. Individual acts of criminal misconduct would have to be
+considered for fastening liability.102.
+An accused can be convicted for substantive offence even where he has been
+acquitted of the charge of conspiracy.103.
+"[s 120B.1] Sanction for prosecution (section 120B IPC, 1860 and section 196 (Cr PC,"
+1973)).—
+"This section has to be read along with section 196(1-A) (2) (Cr PC, 1973), which"
+requires previous sanction of the State Government or the District Magistrate to launch
+prosecution in respect of a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with
+"less than two years imprisonment. Thus, where the object of the conspiracy was"
+"cheating by false personation under section 419, IPC, 1860, which is an offence"
+"punishable with a three-year imprisonment, the mere fact that there were other non-"
+cognizable offences for which too the accused had been charged would not vitiate the
+"trial in absence of sanction under section 196(1A)(2), (Cr PC, 1973), as that section is"
+meant to be applicable to a case where the object of the conspiracy is to commit an
+offence punishable with less than two years' imprisonment.104. Where the act in
+"question was not done by the army officer in the discharge of his official duties, it was"
+held that a sanction for his prosecution was not necessary.105.
+[s 120B.2] Can a company be prosecuted for Criminal conspiracy.—
+A corporation is virtually in the same position as any individual and may be convicted
+of common law as well as statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. The
+criminal liability of a corporation would arise when an offence is committed in relation
+to the business of the corporation by a person or body of persons in control of its
+"affairs. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to ascertain that the degree and"
+control of the person or body of persons is so intense that a corporation may be said to
+think and act through that person or the body of persons.106.
+[s 120B.3] Signing differently in vakalatnama.—
+The fact was that the accused put their signatures in vakalatnama differently from their
+original ones. It has been alleged by the complainant that the accused petitioners have
+deliberately and wilfully put their signatures on the vakalatnama in collusion with each
+other like irresponsible persons in order to gain wrongfully and with a view to cheat and
+mislead the complainant. It was held that the alleged action of the petitioners in
+signing their own name on the vakalatnama and filing the same in the Court through
+their counsel is neither an offence nor prohibited by any law. When the alleged act itself
+"was not illegal, it cannot be said that there was any 'criminal conspiracy' and in"
+"absence of the basis for a charge for criminal conspiracy, the petitioners cannot be"
+"prosecuted or punished for the offence under section 120-B of the IPC, 1860.107."
+[s 120B.4] Seeking opinion.—
+"Merely taking someone's opinion, who is an outsider to litigation, before filing the reply"
+in the Court would not undermine the administration of justice in any way and it is not
+indicative of criminal conspiracy.108.
+[s 120B.5] Hooch Tragedy case.—
+"In a case, the allegation was that all the accused persons hatched a criminal"
+conspiracy and they created a well-oiled machinery for importing methyl alcohol to
+make spurious liquor. Accused diluted the spirit by adding water and sold it through
+their outlets. Many persons died due to the consumption of spurious liquor. Some
+persons lost their eyesight and number of others sustained grievous injuries. Supreme
+Court said that the whole business itself was a conspiracy. It may not be the
+conspiracy to mix the noxious substance but the fact of the matter is that in order to
+"succeed in the business, which itself was a conspiracy, they mixed or allowed to be"
+mixed methanol and used it so freely that ultimately resulted in the tragedy. Conviction
+is upheld.109.
+[s 120B.6] Corruption cases.—
+The prosecution asserted that the appellants A1 to A4 had entered into a conspiracy
+"and in furtherance thereof, A1 who was a public servant, had come to possess assets"
+"to the tune of Rs. 66.65 crores, disproportionate to her known sources of income,"
+"during the period from 1991 to 1996, when she held the office of the Chief Minister of"
+the State. The Supreme Court in respect to the charge of criminal conspiracy observed
+"that the free flow of money from one account to the other of the respondent's,"
+firms/companies also proved beyond reasonable doubt that all the accused persons
+had actively participated in the criminal conspiracy to launder the ill-gotten wealth of
+A1 for purchasing properties in their names.110.
+[s 120B.7] Previous sanction.—
+No Court shall take cognizance of the offence of any criminal conspiracy punishable
+"under section 120B of the IPC, 1860, (45 of 1860), other than a criminal conspiracy to"
+"commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous"
+"imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, unless the State Government or the"
+District Magistrate has consented in writing to the initiation of the proceeding: Provided
+"that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of section 195 apply,"
+no such consent shall be necessary.111.
+2. Sentence.—Where the accused is charged both under section 109 as well as section
+"120B, IPC, 1860, and the offence abetted is shown to have been committed as a result"
+"of the abetment, the abettor should be punished with the imprisonment provided for"
+"the principal offence under section 109, IPC, 1860, and no separate sentence need be"
+"recorded under section 120B IPC, 1860.112. Where the charge of conspiracy fails, the"
+individual accused could still be convicted for the offences committed by them and
+sentenced accordingly.113. Where no jail term was awarded to the principal accused in
+"a conspiracy and he was let off with fine alone, it was held that substantive sentence of"
+"imprisonment awarded to the other accused was wrongful and, therefore, they also"
+were ordered to pay fine only.114. Where six of the seven persons accused of criminal
+"conspiracy were acquitted, remaining one accused could not be convicted merely for"
+being the head of the section of the branch where fraud was alleged to have been
+committed.115. Where the appellant-accused was one of the active members of the
+criminal conspiracy along with other accused and hatched the plan to kill/eliminate the
+deceased and in furtherance thereof other accused persons successfully
+killed/eliminated the deceased and it was not the case of the appellant-accused and
+nor was urged also that his case fell under Section 120(2) so as to be awarded less
+"sentence as prescribed therein, the conviction and award of life sentence as prescribed"
+"under Section 302 read with Section 120B, IPC, 1860 was held proper.116. The accused"
+pleaded guilty to conspiring to cause a public nuisance. He conspired with others to
+interfere with a premier division football match by means of extinguishing the
+floodlights while the match was in progress. The object of doing so was to affect bets
+"placed on the match abroad, which depended on the score at the time when the lights"
+were switched off and the match was abandoned. The plan was not put into effect and
+the accused and others were arrested before the match was due to take place. The
+accused would have received substantial reward for his role. He was sentenced to four
+years' imprisonment. His appeal was dismissed. The Court said that the practice of
+interfering with such an important sporting fixture was something which should be
+actively discouraged by severe sentences. The sentence could not be described as
+manifestly excessive.117.
+Law relating to Conspiracy as summarised by the Supreme Court in State of TN
+"through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v Nalini, (AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+1584] : (1999) 5 SCC 253 [LNIND 1999 SC 526] : JT 1999 (4) SC 106 [LNIND 1999 SC
+526] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 ).
+"1. Under Section 120A, IPC, 1860, offence of criminal conspiracy is committed"
+when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal
+act by illegal means. When it is legal act by illegal means overt act is necessary.
+Offence of criminal conspiracy is exception to the general law where intent alone
+does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with
+"persons having the same intention. Not only the intention, but there has to be"
+"agreement to carry out the object of the intention, which is an offence. The"
+question for consideration in a case is did all the accused had the intention and
+did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for the
+"offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish,"
+"howsoever, horrendous it may be, that offence be committed."
+2. Acts subsequent to the achieving of object of conspiracy may tend to prove that
+a particular accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy
+"has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make"
+the accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder.
+3. Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a
+"conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and"
+its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the
+accused.
+"4. Conspirators may, for example, be enrolled in chain A enrolling B, B enrolling C,"
+and so on and all will be members of the single conspiracy if they so intend and
+"agree, even though each member knows only the person who enrolled him and"
+"the person whom he enrols. There may be a kind of umbrella-spoke enrolment,"
+where a single person at the centre doing the enrolling and all the other members
+"being unknown to each other, though they know that there are to be other"
+members. These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell whether the
+"conspiracy in a particular case falls into which category. It may, however, even"
+overlap. But then there has to be present mutual interest. Persons may be
+members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of
+many others who may have diverse role to play. It is not a part of the crime of
+conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active
+role.
+"5. When two or more persons agree to commit a crime of conspiracy, then"
+"regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission, and despite"
+the fact that no step is taken by any such person to carry out their common
+"purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who joins in the"
+"agreement. There has thus, to be two conspirators and there may be more than"
+that. To prove the charge of conspiracy it is not necessary that intended crime
+was committed or not. If committed it may further help prosecution to prove the
+charge of conspiracy.
+6. It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at
+the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the
+"consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What"
+part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to
+when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left.
+7. A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it is forced them into
+a joint trial and the Court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every
+accused. Prosecution has to produce evidence not only to show that each of the
+accused has knowledge of object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the
+charge of conspiracy Court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness to
+the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction
+"of all, which is to be avoided. By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is"
+otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive offence prosecution
+tries to implicate the accused not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the
+substantive crime of the alleged conspirators. There is always difficult in tracing
+the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there has to
+be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged
+"with the offence of conspiracy. As observed to Judge Learned Hand that ""this"
+distinction is important today when many prosecutors seek to sweep within the
+dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree
+"whatever with the main offenders""."
+"8. As stated above it is the unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which"
+is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy
+is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the
+"purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the"
+gravamen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to
+"a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and inferred"
+"from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the"
+conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at
+"the same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining"
+of the conspiracy.
+"9. It has been said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and that"
+there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the prosecution of a
+"common plan. Thus, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done"
+"by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of"
+each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that
+"everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or"
+"furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or"
+written by each of them. And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is
+done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to
+collateral acts incident to and growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator
+"is not responsible, however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of"
+the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member does not create a
+"new conspiracy nor does it change the status of the other conspirators, and the"
+mere fact that conspirators individually or in groups perform different tasks to a
+common end does not split up a conspiracy into several different conspiracies.
+"10. A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However, criminal"
+responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude
+towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge
+of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a
+"conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while"
+"the other but the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no"
+active part in the crime.
+"1. Chapter VA (containing sections 120A and 120B) inserted by Act 8 of 1913, section 3."
+"91. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for transportation for life (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"92. State (NCT) of Delhi v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, 2005 Cr LJ 3950 : (2005) 11 SCC 600"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 580] .
+"93. State of MP v Sheetla Sahai, 2009 Cr LJ 4436 : (2009) 8 SCC 617 : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 901."
+"94. Alim Jan Bibi, (1937) 1 Cal 484 . It is not necessary that each and every conspirator must"
+"have taken part in the commission of the act. State of HP v Krishanlal Pradhan, AIR 1987 SC 773"
+[LNIND 1987 SC 131] : 1987 Cr LJ 709 : (1987) 2 SCC 17 [LNIND 1987 SC 131] . Govt of NCT of
+"Delhi v Jaspal Singh, (2003) 10 SCC 586 [LNIND 2003 SC 649] , essential requirements of charge"
+"under the section. Ram Narayan Popli v CBI, AIR 2003 SC 2748 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] : (2003) 3"
+"SCC 641 [LNIND 2003 SC 26] , statement of ingredients. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC"
+"4427 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] : (2003) 8 SCC 461 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] , statement of ingredients"
+and matters of proof.
+"95. Subbaiah, AIR 1961 SC 1241 [LNIND 1961 SC 95] . See also Mohd Hussain v KS Dalipsinghji,"
+AIR 1970 SC 45 [LNIND 1969 SC 147] : (1970) 1 SCR 130 [LNIND 1969 SC 147] . See also
+"Jagdish Prasad v State of Bihar, 1990 Cr LJ 366 Pat, conspiracy with railway employees to"
+procure allotment of wagons under cover of fake letters. State of Rajasthan v Govind Ram
+"Bagdiya, 2003 Cr LJ 1169 (Raj), the prosecution has to prove the elements of conspiracy. No"
+proof was forthcoming in this case in the matter of allotment of house of any conspiracy among
+officials to manipulate the system.
+"96. Abdul Kadar v State, (1963) 65 Bom LR 864 . For an example of a failed prosecution under"
+"this section see State of UP v Pheru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205 : 1989 Cr LJ 1135 . In Darshan"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 554 [LNIND 1983 SC 95] : 1983 Cr LJ 985 : (1983) 2 SCC"
+"411 [LNIND 1983 SC 95] , the Supreme Court considered it to be unbelievable that the accused"
+hatched their plot while taking drinks in the presence of a stranger. For proof of conspiracy it
+often becomes necessary to convert one of the conspirators into an approver witness and this
+"may require corroboration. See Balwant Kaur v UT Chandigarh, AIR 1988 SC 139 [LNIND 1987 SC"
+738] : 1988 Cr LJ 398 . The absence of one of the conspirators at one of their meetings does not
+by itself rule out his complicity. Conspiracies are hatched under cover of secrecy. They are
+"generally proved by circumstantial evidence, EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC"
+"1066 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] : 1995 Cr LJ 1445 ; Aniceto Lobo v State (Goa, Daman and Diu), AIR"
+"1994 SC 1613 : 1994 Cr LJ 1582 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 311 , conspiracy of three persons, one of"
+"whom, being bank employee, took out blank drafts, the other forged signatures and third opened"
+"accounts in fictitious names to encash the drafts, all of them were held to be equally guilty of"
+the offence.
+"97. Esher Singh v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 3030 [LNIND 2004 SC 329] : (2004) 11 SCC 585"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 329] .
+"98. Damodar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 SC 4414 [LNIND 2003 SC 803] : 2003 Cr LJ 5014 :"
+"(2004) 12 SCC 336 [LNIND 2003 SC 803] . R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, AIR 2004 SC 692 [LNIND"
+"2003 SC 1023] : 2004 Cr LJ 286 : (2004) 2 SCC 9 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] , alleged conspiracy"
+"was to dispose of by auction the property of a Govt Co at a low price, but the bids made by the"
+alleged conspirators reflected a fair price. Ingredients of the section not made out. Hardeep
+"Singh Sohal v State of Punjab, AIR 2004 SC 4716 [LNIND 2004 SC 902] : (2004) 11 SCC 612"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1006] conspiracy for murder not proved. Another charge of conspiracy for
+"murder was rejected in Hem Raj v State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 4259 [LNIND 2003 SC 759] :"
+"2003 Cr LJ 4987 : (2003) 12 SCC 241 [LNIND 2003 SC 759] . State of HP v Satya Dev Sharma,"
+"(2002) 10 SCC 601 , criminal conspiracy between timber merchants and private landowners and"
+Government officials for falling and misappropriating trees standing on Government land.
+"99. State of TN v Nalini, AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC 1584] : 1999 Cr LJ 3124 . Under"
+"TADA (repealed) such confession had the status of evidence. Ram Singh v State of HP, AIR 1997"
+"SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : 1997 AIR SCW 1331 : 1997 Cr LJ 4091 , in a murder by some"
+"persons, the accused persons assisted them in causing disappearance of the dead body"
+"secretly in furtherance of their conspiracy, their conviction under sections 201-120B was held to"
+"be proper. Subhash Harnarayanji Laddha v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC 545 [LNIND 2006"
+"SC 1088] , conspiracy not proved. Mallanna v State of Karnataka, (2007) 8 SCC 523 [LNIND 2007"
+"SC 1526] , conspiracy not proved."
+"100. R Balkrishna Pillai v State of Kerala, 1996 Cr LJ 757 (Ker); Devender Pal Singh v State (NCT)"
+"of Delhi, 2002 Cr LJ 2034 (SC), acquittal of a co-accused on the ground of non-corroboration of"
+the confessional statement did not have the effect of demolishing the prosecution regarding
+"conspiracy Saju v State of Kerala, 2001 Cr LJ 102 (SC), no evidence to show that the accused"
+was responsible for pregnancy or insisted upon its termination. The accused and co-accused
+were fellow workers and seemed to be hired killers. They were seen together at the place of the
+incident both before and after it. That was held to be not sufficient to prove charge of
+"conspiracy against them. State of HP v Jai Lal, AIR 1999 SC 3318 [LNIND 1999 SC 798] : 1999 Cr"
+LJ 4294 State Government scheme of purchasing infected apples from growers and destroying
+them. Allegations that some of them over charged by inflating weight. But no evidence of
+"experts about overweight, etc., charge not proved. Premlata v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1430 (Raj), a charge-sheet was not quashed where there was evidence to believe that the two"
+accused persons had conspired to produce a document for fulfilling the eligibility criteria for an
+"appointment. Central Bureau of Investigation v VC Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406 [LNIND 1998 SC"
+"272] : 1998 Cr LJ 1905 , the prosecution could not prove that one of the two accused was a"
+"party to the conspiracy. Arun Gulab Gawli v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 4481 (Bom) mere"
+inference cannot invite punishment.
+"101. Mohd Amin v CBI, (2008) 15 SCC 49 [LNIND 2008 SC 2255] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 693."
+"102. Soma Chakravarty v State, AIR 2007 SC 2149 [LNIND 2007 SC 632] : (2007) 5 SCC 403"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 632] .
+"103. T Shankar Prasad v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 1242 [LNIND 2004 SC 41] : 2004 Cr LJ 884 :"
+(2004) 3 SCC 753 [LNIND 2004 SC 41] .
+"104. Yashpal v State, AIR 1977 SC 2433 [LNIND 1977 SC 304] : 1978 Cr LJ 189 . See also Vinod"
+"Kumar Jain v State through CBI, 1991 Cr LJ 669 (Del); State of Bihar v Simranjit Singh Mann, 1987"
+Cr LJ 999 (Pat).
+"105. Nirmal Puri (Lt Gen Retd) v UOI, 2002 Cr LJ 158 (Del)."
+"106. Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Incorporated, AIR 2011 SC 20 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] :"
+2010 AIR (SCW) 6738 : JT 2010 (11) SC 492 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] : (2011) 1 SCC 74 [LNIND
+2010 SC 1012] : (2010) 3 SCC(Cr) 1201 : 2010 (11) Scale 417 ; relied on Standard Chartered Bank
+"v Directorate of Enforcement, AIR 2005 SC 2622 [LNIND 2005 SC 476] : (2005) 4 SCC 530 [LNIND"
+2005 SC 476] : 2005 SCC (Cr) 961.
+"107. Padam Chand v The State of Bihar, 2016 Cr LJ 4998 (Pat) : 2016 (3) PLJR 258 ."
+"108. Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt v UOI, 2016 Cr LJ 185 : (2016) 1 SCC 1 [LNIND 2015 SC 596] ."
+"109. Chandran v State, AIR 2011 SC 1594 [LNIND 2011 SC 358] : (2011) 5 SCC 161 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 358] : (2011) 2 SCC(Cr) 551 : (2011) 8 SCR 273 [LNIND 2011 SC 358] ; Also see Ravinder
+"Singh @ Ravi Pavar v State of Gujarat, AIR 2013 SC 1915 2013 Cr Lj 1832."
+"110. State of Karnataka v Selvi J Jayalalitha, 2017 (2) Scale 375 [LNIND 2017 SC 72] : 2017 (1)"
+RCR (Criminal) 802.
+"111. Section 196(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
+"112. State of TN v Savithri, 1976 Cr LJ 37 (Mad)."
+"113. State of Orissa v Bishnu Charan Muduli, 1985 Cr LJ 1573 (Ori)."
+"114. CR Mehta v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 2863 (Bom). The Court referred to"
+"Rameshwar Dayal v State of UP, 1971 (3) SCC 924 : 1972 SCC (Cr) 172."
+"115. BN Narasimha Rao v Govt of AP, 1995 Cr LJ 4181 (SC), reversing AP High Court. See also"
+"Sayed Mohd Owais v State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 303 (Bom)."
+"116. Bilal Hajar v State, AIR 2018 SC 4780 [LNIND 2018 SC 520] ."
+"117. R v Chee Kew Ong, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S) 117 [CA (Crim Div)]."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+"[s 121] Waging, or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war, against"
+the Government of India.
+"Whoever, wages war1. against the 1[Government of India]2., or attempts, to wage such"
+"war, or abets the waging of such war3., shall be punished with death, or"
+2[imprisonment for life] 3[and shall also be liable to fine].
+4.[ILLUSTRATIONS]
+5.[***] (a) A joins an insurrection against the 6.[Government of India]. A has
+committed the offence defined in this section.
+7.
+[***]COMMENT—
+"Earlier the word used in section 121 was ""Queen"". After the formation of the republic"
+"under the Constitution it was substituted by the expression ""Government of India"" by"
+"the Adaption of Laws Order of 1950. In a republic, sovereignty vests in the people of the"
+country and the lawfully elected government is simply the representative and a
+"manifestation of the sovereign, that is, the people. Thus, the expression ""Government of"
+"India"", as appearing in section 121, must be held to mean the State or interchangeably"
+the people of the country as the repository of the sovereignty of India which is
+manifested and expressed through the elected Government.8.
+[s 121.1] Waging war against Government.—
+The concept of war embedded in section 121 is not to be understood in the
+international law sense of inter-country war involving military operations by and
+between two or more hostile countries. Section 121 is not meant to punish prisoners of
+war of a belligerent nation. Apart from the legislative history of the provision and the
+understanding of the expression by various High Courts during the pre-independence
+"days, the Illustration to section 121 itself makes it clear that ""war"" contemplated by"
+section 121 is not conventional warfare between two nations. Organising or joining an
+insurrection against the Government of India is also a form of war.9.
+Neither the number of persons nor the manner in which they are assembled or armed is
+material to constitute an offence under this section. The true criterion is the purpose or
+intention with which the gathering is assembled. The object of the gathering must be to
+attain by force and violence an object of a general public nature thereby striking directly
+against the Government's authority.10.
+"In Md Jamiluddin Nasir v State of WB,11. while enumerating what principles are to be"
+"kept in mind in cases, involving application of sections 121, 122, 121A read with"
+"section 120B IPC, 1860 as well as section 302 IPC, 1860, the Supreme Court, observed"
+inter alia that not all violent behaviour would fall within the prescription of waging war
+"as contemplated under sections 121, 121A, 122 read with section 120B. It was also"
+found that the object sought to be achieved to make a case for the application of
+"section 121, should be directed against the sovereignty of the State and not merely"
+"commission of a crime, even if that happens to be of higher magnitude. The concept of"
+'waging war' should not be stretched too far. A balanced and realistic approach should
+"be maintained while construing the offence committed, to find out whether it amounts"
+to waging of war against the State.
+"1. 'Wages war'.—The expression ""waging war"" means and can only mean waging war in"
+"the manner usual in war. In other words, in order to support a conviction on such a"
+charge it is not enough to show that the persons charged have contrived to obtain
+"possession of an armoury and have, when called upon to surrender it, used the rifles"
+and ammunition so obtained against the Government troops. It must also be shown
+that the seizure of the armoury was part and parcel of a planned operation and that
+their intention in resisting the troops of the Government was to overwhelm and defeat
+these troops and then to go on and crush any further opposition with which they might
+meet until either the leaders of the movement succeeded in obtaining the possession
+of the machinery of Government or those in possession of it yielded to the demands of
+"their leaders.12. An illuminating discussion on the issue of ""Waging war against the"
+"Government of India"" is to be found in this Court's decision in State (NCT of Delhi) v"
+"Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru.13. In para 272 of the judgment P Venkatarama Reddi, J,"
+"speaking for the Court, referred to the report of the Indian Law Commission that"
+examined the draft Penal Code in 1847 and quoted the following passage from the
+report:
+We conceive the term 'wages war against the Government' naturally to import a person
+arraying himself in defiance of the Government in like manner and by like means as a
+"foreign enemy would do, and it seems to us, we presume it did to the authors of the Code"
+that any definition of the term so unambiguous would be superfluous.
+"The expression, ""in like manner and by like means as a foreign enemy"", is very"
+significant to understand the nature of the violent acts that would amount to waging
+"war. In ""waging war"", the intent of the foreign enemy is not only to disturb public peace"
+or law and order or to kill many people. A foreign enemy strikes at the sovereignty of
+"the State, and his conspiracy and actions are motivated by that animus.14."
+"[s 121.2] New concept of ""Waging war"" and Caution against using old"
+authorities.—
+The concept of war in section 121 which includes insurrection or a civilian uprising
+should not be understood in the sense of conventional war between two nations or
+sovereign entities. The normative phenomenon of war as understood in the
+international sense does not fit into the ambit and reach of section 121. In the
+"Parliament attack case,15. the Supreme Court held as follows:"
+"while these are the acceptable criteria of waging war, we must dissociate ourselves from"
+the old English and Indian authorities to the extent that they lay down a too general test of
+attainment of an object of general public nature or a political object. The Supreme Court
+expressed reservations in adopting this test in its literal sense and construing it in a manner
+out of tune with the present day. The court must be cautious in adopting an approach which
+has the effect of bringing within the fold of S.121 all acts of lawless and violent acts
+"resulting in destruction of public properties, etc., and all acts of violent resistance to the"
+armed personnel to achieve certain political objectives. The moment it is found that the
+"object sought to be attained is of a general public nature or has a political hue, the offensive"
+violent acts targeted against the armed forces and public officials should not be branded as
+"acts of waging war. The expression ""waging war"" should not be stretched too far to hold"
+that all the acts of disrupting public order and peace irrespective of their magnitude and
+repercussions could be reckoned as acts of waging war against the Government. A
+"balanced and realistic approach is called for in construing the expression ""waging war"""
+irrespective of how it was viewed in the long past. An organised movement attended with
+violence and attacks against the public officials and armed forces while agitating for the
+repeal of an unpopular law or for preventing burdensome taxes were viewed as acts of
+treason in the form of levying war. We doubt whether such construction is in tune with the
+modern day perspectives and standards.
+[s 121.3] Terrorist Acts.—
+"Though every terrorist act does not amount to waging war, certain terrorist acts can"
+also constitute the offence of waging war and there is no dichotomy between the two.
+Terrorist acts can manifest themselves into acts of war. According to the learned
+"Senior Counsel for the State, terrorist acts prompted by an intention to strike at the"
+"sovereign authority of the State/Government, tantamount to waging war irrespective of"
+"the number involved or the force employed. However, the degree of animus or intent"
+and the magnitude of the acts done or attempted to be done would assume some
+"relevance in order to consider whether the terrorist acts give rise to a state of war. Yet,"
+"the demarcating line is by no means clear, much less transparent. It is often a"
+difference in degree. The distinction gets thinner if a comparison is made of terrorist
+acts with the acts aimed at overawing the Government by means of criminal force.
+Conspiracy to commit the latter offence is covered by section 121A.16. The
+"incorporation of Chapter IV of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, shall not"
+"be viewed as deemed repeal of section 121 of the IPC, 1860. As explained in Navjot"
+"Sandhu (supra), a ""terrorist act"" and an act of ""waging war against the Government of"
+"India"" may have some overlapping features, but a terrorist act may not always be an act"
+"of waging war against the Government of India, and vice-versa. The provisions of"
+Chapter IV of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and those of Chapter VI of the
+"Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 including section 121, basically cover different areas.17."
+[s 121.4] Foreign nationals not excluded.—
+"The word ""whoever"" is a word of broad import. Advisedly such language was used"
+departing from the observations made in the context of the Treason Statute. Supreme
+Court finds no good reason why foreign nationals stealthily entering into Indian territory
+with a view to subverting the functioning of the Government and destabilising the
+society should not be held guilty of waging war within the meaning of section 121. The
+section on its plain term need not be confined only to those who owe allegiance to the
+established Government.18.
+The explanation to the section makes it clear that the offence is complete even without
+any act or illegal omission occurring in pursuance of the conspiracy.19. It is not
+necessary that any act or illegal omission should have taken place in pursuance of a
+"conspiracy. An action of waging war, attempt to wage war or abetment to wage war are"
+also covered by section 121-A.20.
+"2. Government of India.—The expression ""Government of India"" is surely not used in the"
+"narrow and restricted sense in section 121. In our considered view, the expression"
+"""Government of India"" is used in section 121 to imply the Indian State, the juristic"
+embodiment of the sovereignty of the country that derives its legitimacy from the
+"collective will and consent of its people. The use of the phrase ""Government of India"" to"
+signify the notion of sovereignty is consistent with the principles of Public International
+"Law, wherein sovereignty of a territorial unit is deemed to vest in the people of the"
+territory and exercised by a representative government.21.
+3. 'Abets the waging of such war'.—Such abetment is made a special offence. It is not
+essential that as a result of the abetment the war should in fact be waged. The main
+purpose of the instigation should be 'the waging of war'. It should not be merely a
+remote and incidental purpose but the thing principally aimed at by the instigation.
+There must be active suggestion or stimulation to the use of violence.22. As criminal
+"acts took place pursuant to the conspiracy, the appellant, as a party to the conspiracy,"
+"shall be deemed to have abetted the offence. In fact, he took an active part in a series"
+of steps taken to pursue the objective of conspiracy. The offence of abetting the
+"waging of war, having regard to the extraordinary facts and circumstances of this case,"
+"justifies the imposition of capital punishment and, therefore, the judgment of the High"
+"Court in regard to the conviction and sentence of Afzal under section 121 IPC, 1860"
+shall stand.23.
+[s 121.5] Principles relating to Section 121.—
+(i) No specific number of persons is necessary to constitute an offence under
+"S.121, Penal Code."
+(ii) The number concerned and the manner in which they are equipped or armed is
+not material.
+(iii) The true criterion is quo animo did the gathering assemble?
+(iv) The object of the gathering must be to attain by force and violence an object of
+"a general public nature, thereby striking directly against the King's authority."
+(v) There is no distinction between principal and accessory and all who take part in
+the unlawful act incur the same guilt.24.
+[s 121.6] CASES.—Mumbai Terror Attack Case.—
+The primary and the first offence that the appellant and his co-conspirators committed
+was the offence of waging war against the Government of India. What matters is that
+the attack was aimed at India and Indians. It was by foreign nationals. People were
+"killed for no other reason than they were Indians; in case of foreigners, they were killed"
+"because their killing on Indian soil would embarrass India. The conspiracy, in"
+"furtherance of which the attack was made, was, inter alia, to hit at India; to hit at its"
+financial centre; to try to give rise to communal tensions and create internal strife and
+insurgency; to demand that India should withdraw from Kashmir; and to dictate its
+"relations with other countries. Nothing could have been more ""in like manner and by"
+"like means as a foreign enemy would do"". The appellant was rightly held guilty of"
+"waging war against the Government of India and rightly convicted under sections 121,"
+"121A and 122 of the IPC, 1860.25."
+[s 121.7] Red Fort Attack Case.—
+The evidence as to the transmission of thoughts sharing the unlawful design would be
+sufficient for establishing the conspiracy. Again there must have been some act in
+pursuance of the agreement. The offence under section 121 of conspiring to wage a
+"war is proved to the hilt against the appellant, for which he has been rightly held guilty"
+"for the offence punishable under sections 121 and 121-A, IPC, 1860.26."
+[s 121.8] Parliament Attack Case.—
+The single most important factor which impels to think that this is a case of waging or
+attempting to wage war against the Government of India is the target of attack chosen
+by the slain terrorists and conspirators and the immediate objective sought to be
+achieved thereby. The battlefront selected was the Parliament House complex. The
+target chosen was Parliament – a symbol of the sovereignty of the Indian republic.
+"Huge and powerful explosives, sophisticated arms and ammunition carried by the slain"
+"terrorists who were to indulge in fidayeen operations with a definite purpose in view, is a"
+clear indicator of the grave danger in store for the inmates of the House. The planned
+"operations if executed, would have spelt disaster for the whole nation. The undoubted"
+objective and determination of the deceased terrorists was to impinge on the sovereign
+authority of the nation and its Government. Even if the conspired purpose and objective
+falls short of installing some other authority or entity in the place of an established
+"Government, it does not detract from the offence of waging war.27."
+"[s 121.9] Charge under Section 121, conviction under Section 123.—"
+In the case the Court has specifically dealt with the question whether the offence under
+"section 123, IPC, 1860 of which the accused was not charged, is a minor offence falling"
+"under the charges framed, and held that the fact that there was no charge against the"
+"accused under this particular section, does not, in any way, result in prejudice to him"
+because the charge of waging war and other allied offences are the subject matter of
+charges. It was held that the accused is not in any way handicapped by the absence of
+"charge under section 123, IPC, 1860. The case which he had to meet under section 123"
+is no different from the case relating to the major charges which he was confronted
+"with. In the face of the stand he had taken and his conduct even after the attack, he"
+could not have pleaded reasonable excuse for not passing on the information. It was
+"held that viewed from any angle, the evidence on record justifies his conviction under"
+"section 123, IPC, 1860.28."
+[s 121.10] Previous Sanction.—
+"No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Chapter VI of IPC,"
+1860 except with the previous sanction of Central Government or of the State
+"Government.29. Where sanction was obtained only after cognizance, yet no prejudice"
+was caused because the matter was not proceeded any further and charge was also
+not yet framed. The Court remitted the matter for disposal after the date of sanction.30.
+"1. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"2. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1"
+January1956).
+"3. Subs. by Act 16 of 1921, section 2, for ""and shall forfeit all his property""."
+"4. Subs. by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch. II, for ""Illustrations"" (w.e.f. 17 September 1957)."
+"5. The brackets and letter ""(a)"" omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch. II (w.e.f. 17"
+September 1957).
+"6. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+7. Illustration (b) omitted by the A.O. 1950.
+"8. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"9. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"10. Maganlal v State, (1946) Nag 126."
+"11. Md Jamiluddin Nasir v State of WB, 2014 Cr LJ 3589 : AIR 2014 SC 2587 [LNIND 2014 SC"
+138] .
+"12. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] : 2003 AIR SCW 5068 :"
+AIR 2003 SC 4427 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] : 2003 Cr LJ 5021 .
+"13. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"14. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"15. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"16. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"17. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"18. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"19. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"20. Adnan Bilal Mulla v State of Bombay, 2006 Cr LJ (NOC) 406 Bom : (2006) 5 AIR Bom R 11"
+DB.
+"21. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"22. Hasrat Mohani, (1922) 24 Bom LR 885 [LNIND 1922 BOM 136] ."
+"23. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"24. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715 relied on Maganlal
+"Radhakrishan, AIR 1946 Ngp 173 ."
+"25. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"26. Mohd. Arif v State of NCT of Delhi, JT 2011 (9) SC 563 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : 2011 (8) Scale"
+328 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 10 SCR 56 [LNIND 2011 SC 753] : (2011) 13 SCC 621 [LNIND
+"2011 SC 753] relied on Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883 [LNIND 1988 SC"
+"887] . See also State of Gujarat v Jaman Haji Mamad Jat, 2007 Cr LJ 1584 (Guj)."
+"27. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"28. Shaukat Hussain Guru v State (NCT) Delhi, AIR 2008 SC 2419 : (2008) 6 SCC 776 : 2008 Cr LJ"
+3016 : 2008 (8) SCR 391 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cr) 137.
+"29. Section 196(1)(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
+"30. Jamil Akhtar v State of WB, 2001 Cr LJ 4529 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+31.[[s 121A] Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 121.
+Whoever within or without 32.[India] conspires to commit any of the offences
+"punishable by section 121, 33.[***]or conspires to overawe,1 by means of criminal"
+"force or the show of criminal force, 34.[the Central Government or any 35.[State]"
+"Government 36.[***]], shall be punished with 37.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years, 38.[and shall also"
+be liable to fine].
+"Explanation.—To constitute a conspiracy under this section, it is not necessary that"
+any act or illegal omission shall take place in pursuance thereof.]
+COMMENT—
+Conspiracy to wage war.—This section provides for the offence of conspiring to wage
+war against the Government of India. It was thought right to make the offence of
+"conspiring by criminal force, or by show of criminal force, more severely penal than the"
+"offence of actually taking part in an unlawful assembly, having for its object the"
+overawing of the Government. The reason was this that persons who by conspiring to
+"bring about such a result, set the whole matter in motion, seemed more criminal and"
+"far more deserving of punishment than those who were their mere tools, and only took"
+part in such an assembly.
+The Explanation to section 121A clarifies that it is not necessary that any act or illegal
+"omission should take place pursuant to the conspiracy, in order to constitute the said"
+"offence. Thus, the criminal act done by the deceased terrorists in order to capture the"
+Parliament House is an act that amounts to waging or attempting to wage war. The
+conspiracy to commit either the offence of waging war or attempting to wage war or
+"abetting the waging of war is punishable under section 121A IPC, 1860 with the"
+"maximum sentence of imprisonment for life. In the circumstances of the case, the"
+imposition of maximum sentence is called for and the High Court is justified in holding
+"the appellant Afzal guilty under section 121A IPC, 1860 and sentencing him to life"
+imprisonment.39.
+The words 'conspires to overawe by means of criminal force or the show of criminal
+"force, the Central Government, or any State Government' in this section clearly embrace"
+"not merely a conspiracy to raise a general insurrection, but also a conspiracy to"
+overawe the Central Government or any State Government by the organisation of a
+serious riot or a large and tumultuous unlawful assembly.40.
+[s 121A.1] Ingredients.—
+The section deals with two kinds of conspiracies:—
+1. Conspiring within or without India to commit any of the offences punishable by
+section 121.
+"2. Conspiring to overawe by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, the"
+Government.
+1. 'Overawe'.—The word 'overawe' clearly imports more than the creation of
+apprehension or alarm or even perhaps fear. It appears to connote the creation of a
+situation in which the members of the Central or State Government feel themselves
+compelled to choose between yielding to force or exposing themselves or members of
+the public to a very serious danger. It is not necessary that the danger should be a
+danger of assassination or of bodily injury to themselves. The danger might well be a
+danger to public property or to the safety of members of the general public.25 The word
+'overawe' clearly imports more than the creation of apprehension or alarm or fear. A
+slogan that Government can be changed by an armed revolution does not mean that
+there is a conspiracy to change the Government by criminal force. At best it means that
+the petitioners want to educate the people that by force only the Government could be
+changed.41.
+Explanation.—The Explanation to this section says that to constitute a conspiracy under
+"this section, it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission should take place in"
+pursuance thereof.
+"31. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 4."
+"32. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"33. The words ""or to deprive the Queen of the sovereignty of the Provinces or of any part"
+"thereof"" omitted by the A.O. 1950."
+"34. Subs. by the A.O. 1937, for ""the Government of India or any Local Government""."
+"35. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Provincial""."
+"36. The words ""or the Government of Burma"" omitted by the A.O. 1948."
+"37. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life or any shorter"
+"term"" (w.e.f. 1 January 1956)."
+"38. Ins. by Act 16 of 1921, section 3."
+"39. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"40. Ramanand v State, (1950) 30 Pat 152."
+"41. Aravindan, 1983 Cr LJ 1259 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+31.[[s 121A] Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 121.
+Whoever within or without 32.[India] conspires to commit any of the offences
+"punishable by section 121, 33.[***]or conspires to overawe,1 by means of criminal"
+"force or the show of criminal force, 34.[the Central Government or any 35.[State]"
+"Government 36.[***]], shall be punished with 37.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years, 38.[and shall also"
+be liable to fine].
+"Explanation.—To constitute a conspiracy under this section, it is not necessary that"
+any act or illegal omission shall take place in pursuance thereof.]
+COMMENT—
+Conspiracy to wage war.—This section provides for the offence of conspiring to wage
+war against the Government of India. It was thought right to make the offence of
+"conspiring by criminal force, or by show of criminal force, more severely penal than the"
+"offence of actually taking part in an unlawful assembly, having for its object the"
+overawing of the Government. The reason was this that persons who by conspiring to
+"bring about such a result, set the whole matter in motion, seemed more criminal and"
+"far more deserving of punishment than those who were their mere tools, and only took"
+part in such an assembly.
+The Explanation to section 121A clarifies that it is not necessary that any act or illegal
+"omission should take place pursuant to the conspiracy, in order to constitute the said"
+"offence. Thus, the criminal act done by the deceased terrorists in order to capture the"
+Parliament House is an act that amounts to waging or attempting to wage war. The
+conspiracy to commit either the offence of waging war or attempting to wage war or
+"abetting the waging of war is punishable under section 121A IPC, 1860 with the"
+"maximum sentence of imprisonment for life. In the circumstances of the case, the"
+imposition of maximum sentence is called for and the High Court is justified in holding
+"the appellant Afzal guilty under section 121A IPC, 1860 and sentencing him to life"
+imprisonment.39.
+The words 'conspires to overawe by means of criminal force or the show of criminal
+"force, the Central Government, or any State Government' in this section clearly embrace"
+"not merely a conspiracy to raise a general insurrection, but also a conspiracy to"
+overawe the Central Government or any State Government by the organisation of a
+serious riot or a large and tumultuous unlawful assembly.40.
+[s 121A.1] Ingredients.—
+The section deals with two kinds of conspiracies:—
+1. Conspiring within or without India to commit any of the offences punishable by
+section 121.
+"2. Conspiring to overawe by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, the"
+Government.
+1. 'Overawe'.—The word 'overawe' clearly imports more than the creation of
+apprehension or alarm or even perhaps fear. It appears to connote the creation of a
+situation in which the members of the Central or State Government feel themselves
+compelled to choose between yielding to force or exposing themselves or members of
+the public to a very serious danger. It is not necessary that the danger should be a
+danger of assassination or of bodily injury to themselves. The danger might well be a
+danger to public property or to the safety of members of the general public.25 The word
+'overawe' clearly imports more than the creation of apprehension or alarm or fear. A
+slogan that Government can be changed by an armed revolution does not mean that
+there is a conspiracy to change the Government by criminal force. At best it means that
+the petitioners want to educate the people that by force only the Government could be
+changed.41.
+Explanation.—The Explanation to this section says that to constitute a conspiracy under
+"this section, it is not necessary that any act or illegal omission should take place in"
+pursuance thereof.
+"31. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 4."
+"32. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"33. The words ""or to deprive the Queen of the sovereignty of the Provinces or of any part"
+"thereof"" omitted by the A.O. 1950."
+"34. Subs. by the A.O. 1937, for ""the Government of India or any Local Government""."
+"35. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Provincial""."
+"36. The words ""or the Government of Burma"" omitted by the A.O. 1948."
+"37. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life or any shorter"
+"term"" (w.e.f. 1 January 1956)."
+"38. Ins. by Act 16 of 1921, section 3."
+"39. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR 2005 SC 3820 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] :"
+(2005) 11 SCC 600 [LNIND 2005 SC 580] : (2005) 2 SCC (Cr) 1715.
+"40. Ramanand v State, (1950) 30 Pat 152."
+"41. Aravindan, 1983 Cr LJ 1259 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+"[s 122] Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against the"
+Government of India.
+"Whoever collects men, arms or ammunition or otherwise prepares to wage war with"
+the intention of either waging or being prepared to wage war against the 42.
+"[Government of India], shall be punished with 43.[imprisonment for life] or"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten years, 44.[and shall"
+also be liable to fine].
+COMMENT—
+This section is intended to put down with a heavy hand any preparation to wage war
+against the Government of India. The act made punishable by this section cannot be
+considered attempts; they are in truth preparations made for committing the offence of
+waging war. Preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures
+necessary for the commission of the offence. It differs widely from attempt which is
+the direct movement towards the commission after preparations are made. Preparation
+to commit an offence is punishable only when the preparation is to commit offences
+under section 122 (waging war against the Government of India) and section 399
+(preparation and an attempt is sometimes thin and has to be decided on the facts of
+each case). There is a greater degree of determination in attempt as compared with
+preparation.45.
+"42. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"43. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"44. Ins. by Act 16 of 1921, section 3."
+"45. Koppula Venkat Rao v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 1874 [LNIND 2004 SC 301] : (2004) 3 SCC"
+602 [LNIND 2004 SC 301] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+[s 123] Concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war.
+"Whoever, by any act, or by any illegal omission, conceals the existence of a design to"
+"wage war against the 46.[Government of India], intending by such concealment to"
+"facilitate, or knowing it to be likely that such concealment will facilitate, the waging of"
+"such war, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+"This section reiterates the principle enunciated in section 118, the only difference being"
+that the penalty under it is more severe. Section 39 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr
+"PC), 1973 read with section 176 of the IPC, 1860 makes it an offence for any person"
+"who is aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any person to commit, an"
+"offence under sections 121–126, both inclusive (that is, offences against the State"
+"specified in Chapter VI of the Code), to omit giving any notice or furnishing any"
+"information to any public servant. Moreover, section 123 of IPC, 1860 makes it an"
+"offence to conceal, whether by act or omission, the existence of a design to ""wage war"""
+"against the Government of India, when intending by such concealment to facilitate, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that such concealing will facilitate, the waging of such war.47."
+[s 123.1] Section 121 and Section 123.—
+"To prove an offence under section 121, IPC, 1860, the prosecution is required to prove"
+that the accused is guilty of waging war against the Government of India or attempts to
+"wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, whereas for proving the offence under"
+"section 123, IPC, 1860 against the accused, the prosecution is required to prove that"
+there was a concealment by an act or by illegal omission of existence of a design to
+wage war against the Government of India and he intended by such concealment to
+"facilitate, or he knew that such concealment will facilitate, the waging of war. In the"
+"present case, the accused was charged under section 121, IPC, 1860, for waging war"
+against the Government of India or attempting to wage such war or abetting the
+waging of such war. The concealment of such fact by an act or illegal omission with an
+"intention to facilitate, or knowing that such concealment will facilitate, waging of war,"
+even in the absence of proof of his involvement in waging of war against the
+"Government of India, will constitute an offence and an accused can always be"
+"convicted for the concealment of such fact under section 123, IPC, 1860. The"
+prosecution having been successful in proving the necessary ingredients of section
+"123, IPC, 1860, it would constitute a minor offence of a major offence and, therefore,"
+"the petitioner was convicted under section 123, IPC, 1860 which is a minor offence of"
+the offences he faced trial.48.
+"46. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"47. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 1215] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4942 : AIR 2012 SC 3565 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 Cr LJ
+4770 : JT 2012 (8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] : 2012 (7) Scale 553 .
+"48. Shaukat Hussain Guru v State (NCT) Delhi, AIR 2008 SC 2419 : (2008) 6 SCC 776 : 2008 Cr LJ"
+3016 : 2008 (8) SCR 391 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cr) 137.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+"[s 124] Assaulting President, Governor, etc., with intent to compel or restrain"
+the exercise of any lawful power.
+"Whoever, with the intention of inducing or compelling the 49.[President] of India, or the"
+"50.[Governor 51.[***]] of any 52.[State], 53.[***] 54.[***] 55.[***] to exercise or refrain"
+from exercising in any manner any of the lawful powers of such 56.[President] or 57.
+"[Governor 58.[***]],"
+"assaults or wrongfully restrains, or attempts wrongfully to restrain, or overawes, by"
+"means of criminal force or the show of criminal force, or attempts so to overawe, such"
+"59.[President or 60.[Governor 61.[***]],"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+This section is an amplification of the third clause of section 121A. It punishes severely
+"assaults, etc., made on high officers of Government."
+"49. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Governor General""."
+"50. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""Governor"" (w.e.f. 1 April 1951)."
+"51. The words ""or Rajpramukh"" omitted by the A.O. (No. 2) 1956."
+"52. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Province"". Earlier the word ""Province"" was subs. by the A.O."
+"1937, for the word ""Presidency""."
+"53. The words ""or a Lieutenant-Governor"" omitted by the A.O. 1937."
+"54. The words ""or a Member of the Council of the Governor General of India"" omitted by the A.O."
+1948.
+"55. The words ""or of the Council of any Presidency"" omitted by the A.O. 1937."
+"56. The words ""Governor General, Governor, Lieutenant-Governor or Member of Council"" have"
+"successfully been amended by the A.O. 1937, the A.O. 1948 and the A.O. 1950 to read as above."
+"57. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""Governor"" (w.e.f. 1 April 1951)."
+"58. The words ""or Rajpramukh"" omitted by the A.O. (No. 2) 1956."
+"59. The words ""Governor General, Governor, Lieutenant-Governor or Member of Council"" have"
+"successfully been amended by the A.O. 1937, the A.O. 1948 and the A.O. 1950 to read as above."
+"60. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""Governor"" (w.e.f. 1 April 1951)."
+"61. The words ""or Rajpramukh"" omitted by the A.O. (No. 2) 1956."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+62.[[s 124A] Sedition.
+"Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by"
+"signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts"
+"to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards,"
+"63.[***] the Government established by law in 64.[India], 65.[***] shall be punished with"
+"66.[imprisonment for life], to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which"
+"may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine."
+"Explanation 1.—The expression ""disaffection"" includes disloyalty and all feelings of"
+enmity.
+Explanation 2.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the
+"Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or"
+"attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence"
+under this section.
+Explanation 3.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other
+"action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or"
+"disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.]"
+COMMENT—
+The offence under section 124A captioned as 'Sedition' is closely allied to treason – an
+offence against the State. Many personalities including the Father of the Nation and
+several freedom fighters have been tried and punished during the imperial rule under
+the above section. How far in a democratic set-up publishing or preaching of protest
+even questioning the foundation of the form of Government could be imputed as
+"causing disaffection towards the Government and thus, committing of any offence"
+"under Chapter VI of the IPC, 1860 has to be examined within the letter and spirit of the"
+Constitution and not as previously done under the imperial rule.67.
+"Sedition in itself is a comprehensive term, and it embraces all those practices, whether"
+"by word, deed, or writing, which are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State,"
+and lead ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the Government and laws of the
+"country. The objects of sedition generally are to induce discontent and insurrection,"
+"and stir up opposition to the Government, and bring the administration of justice into"
+contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and
+rebellion.
+"Sedition has been described as disloyalty in action, and the law considers as sedition all"
+"those practices which have for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create"
+"public disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or"
+"the Government, the laws or constitutions of the realm, and generally all endeavours to"
+promote public disorder.68.
+[s 124A.1] Constitutional Validity.—
+"The Supreme Court, in Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar,69. held that this section is not"
+"unconstitutional and opined that only when it is construed that the words, written or"
+"spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder"
+or disturbance of law and order the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest
+"of public order, then only the section strikes the correct balance between individual"
+fundamental rights and the interest of public order. The Court also held that a citizen
+"has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by"
+"way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to violence against"
+the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder.
+The Supreme Court in a later Order in Common Cause v UOI70. ordered that the
+"authorities while dealing with the offences under section 124A of the IPC, 1860 shall be"
+guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh.
+Section 124A]
+[s 124A.2] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two essentials:—
+"1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt, or exciting or attempting to"
+excite disaffection towards the Government of India.
+"2. Such act or attempt may be done (i) by words, either spoken or written; or (ii) by"
+signs; or (iii) by visible representation.
+"1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt, or exciting or attempting to"
+excite disaffection towards the Government of India.—A plain reading of the section
+would show that its application would be attracted only when the accused brings or
+attempts to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite disaffection
+"towards the Government established by law in India, by words either written or spoken"
+"or visible signs or representations, etc.71. Necessary ingredient to attract punishment"
+"under section 124A, IPC, 1860, appears to be the effort of bringing or attempting to"
+bring into hatred or contempt to excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards the
+"Government established by law in India by words, either spoken or written or by signs"
+or by visible representation or otherwise.72. The offence does not consist in exciting or
+"attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or"
+small. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by the publication of seditious
+articles is absolutely immaterial. If the accused intended by the articles to excite
+"rebellion or disturbance, his act would doubtless fall within this section, and would"
+"probably fall within other sections of the IPC, 1860. If he tried to excite feelings of"
+"hatred or contempt towards the Government, that is sufficient to make him guilty under"
+"this section.73. The Federal Court of India had, however, held that the gist of the"
+offence of sedition is incitement to violence; mere abusive words are not enough.74.
+"The view of the Federal Court was subsequently overruled by the Privy Council,75. as"
+being opposed to the view expressed in several cases.76.
+"In appreciating whether the act done by the accused by words ""either spoken or written"
+"or by signs or by misrepresentation or otherwise"" one cannot shut one's eyes to"
+changes in political consumptions which have taken place over the course of time after
+"the aforesaid penal provision section 124A was included in the IPC, 1860 and the"
+"declared objective of the Government of the day. Very often, the demarcating line"
+between political criticism of the Government and those causing disaffection against
+the Government is thin and waving.77.
+It is not an essential ingredient of sedition that the act done should be an act which is
+intended or likely to incite to public disorder.78. But this view of the law does no longer
+"seem to be correct, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath's"
+"case,79. wherein Sinha, CJ observed:"
+"comments, however strongly worded expressing, disapprobation of actions of Government,"
+without exciting those feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by
+"acts of violence, would not be penal. In other words, disloyalty to Government established"
+by law is not the same thing as commenting in strong terms upon the measures or acts of
+"Government, or its agencies, so as to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure the"
+"cancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means, that is to say, without"
+exciting those feelings of enmity or disloyalty which imply excitement to public disorder or
+the use of violence.
+In this very case it was further held that viewed in the context of antecedent history of
+"the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress the provisions of"
+"section 124A and section 505 of the IPC, 1860 should be limited in their application to"
+acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder or disturbance of law and order
+or incitement to violence. Where the propaganda secretary of a Gurdwara addressed a
+"gathering of Sikhs, some of whom were wearing black clothes and turbans, and in"
+course of his speech though he did not give direct incitement to violence but he
+"nevertheless gave exaggerated figures of casualties following Army action in Punjab, it"
+was held that it would be quite proper to infer from the text and tenor of the speech
+made by the accused that the same was intended to bring the Government into
+contempt with the likelihood of eruption of violence and public disorder contemplated
+"in Kedarnath's case. In the circumstances, his petition for quashing the criminal"
+"proceedings against him under section 482, Cr PC, 1973 was rejected.80. The decisive"
+"ingredient for establishing the offence of Sedition under section 124A, IPC, 1860 is the"
+doing of certain acts which would bring the Government established by law in India into
+"hatred or contempt, etc. In this case, there is not even a suggestion that appellant did"
+anything as against the Government of India or any other Government of the State. The
+charge framed against the accused contains no averment that accused did anything as
+against the Government.81. The prosecution evidence shows that the slogans were
+raised a couple of times only by the accused and that neither the slogans evoked a
+response from any other person of the Sikh community nor reaction from people of
+other communities. Supreme Court found it difficult to hold that upon the raising of
+"such casual slogans, a couple of times without any other act whatsoever, the charge of"
+sedition can be founded.
+"The casual raising of the slogans, once or twice by two individuals alone cannot be"
+said to be aimed at exciting or attempt to excite hatred or disaffection towards the
+"Government as established by law in India. Section 124A IPC, 1860 would in the facts"
+and circumstances of the case have no application whatsoever and would not be
+attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case.82. The prosecution case is that
+the accused has delivered a speech creating ill will and promoting enmity among
+different retail and linguistic groups of Indian people and thereby committed the
+"offences punishable under sections 124(A) and 153(A) of the IPC, 1860. A perusal of"
+the First Information Report and the charge sheet laid by the respondent police would
+"make it abundantly clear that the allegations mentioned therein, if proved, would"
+"naturally attract the provisions of sections 124(A) and 153(A) of IPC, 1860.83. State of"
+"Punjab and Union Territory, Chandigarh, had been declared Disturbed Area and the"
+extremists activities were going on a large scale in September 1984. The law and order
+"situation had so deteriorated that the Army had to spread out. In this background, it will"
+be proper to infer from the text and tenor of the speech made by the accused that the
+same was intended and it did tend to bring the Government into contempt with the
+likelihood of eruption of violence and public disorder.84.
+"2. Such act, attempt, etc., may be done by words, either spoken or written or by signs"
+or by visible representation.—Not only the writer of seditious articles but whoever uses
+in any way words or printed matter for the purpose of exciting feelings of disaffection
+"to the Government is liable under the section, whether he is the actual author or not.85."
+[s 124A.3] 'Written'.—
+"In Raghubir Singh,86. it has been held that for establishing the charge of sedition, it is"
+not necessary that the accused must be the author of the seditious material and that
+distribution or circulation of seditious material may also be sufficient on the facts and
+circumstances of the case and even the act of courier is sometimes enough in a case
+of conspiracy and further that it is also not necessary that a person should be the
+participant in the conspiracy from start to finish. Disaffection may be excited in a
+"thousand different ways. A poem, an allegory, a drama, a philosophical or historical"
+"discussion, may be used for the purpose of exciting disaffection. Seditious writing,"
+"while it remains in the hands of the author unpublished, will not make him liable."
+Publication of some kind is necessary.87. Sending of seditious matter by post
+addressed to a private individual not by name but by designation as the representative
+of a large body of students amounts to publication if it is opened by anybody.88.
+[s 124A.4] Advise to kill members of police force.—
+"The Government established by law acts through human agency and admittedly, the"
+police service or force is itself a principal agency for the administration and
+maintenance of the law and order in the State. When a person makes a statement or
+"gives an advice to resort to violence by killing four to five police officers, he could be"
+said to have criticised the police force or the service en bloc. In such circumstances a
+prima facie case of waging war against the Government could be said to have been
+made out.89.
+[s 124A.5] 'Visible representation'.—
+Sedition does not necessarily consist of written matter: it may be evidenced by a wood-
+cut or engraving of any kind.90.
+[s 124A.6] Explanations 2 and 3.—
+Both these Explanations have a strictly defined and limited scope. They have no
+"application unless the article in question criticises ""the measures of Government"" or"
+"""administrative or other action of the Government"" without exciting or attempting to"
+"excite hatred, contempt or disaffection."
+[s 124A.7] Membership in a banned organization.—
+Mere membership of a banned organization will not incriminate a person unless he
+resorts to violence or incites people to violence or does an act intended to create
+disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.91.
+[s 124A.8] 'Disapprobation'.—
+This means simply disapproval. It is quite possible to disapprove of a man's sentiments
+or actions and yet to like him.92.
+[s 124A.9] Liability for extracts from other papers.—
+The law does not excuse the publication in newspapers of writings which are in
+"themselves seditious libels, merely because they are copied from foreign newspapers"
+as items of news.93.
+[s 124A.10] Liability for letters of correspondents.—
+The editor of a newspaper is liable for unsigned seditious letters appearing in his
+paper.94.
+[s 124A.11] Publication of seditious exhibits.—
+Republication of a seditious article used as an exhibit in a case of sedition is not
+justifiable.95.
+[s 124A.12] Listening to cassettes.—
+Certain accused persons were convicted for listening to some cassettes containing
+speeches of seditious nature. There was no other evidence to show that they either
+committed or conspired or attempted to commit or advocated or advised or knowingly
+facilitated commission of disruptive activities under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
+"(Prevention) Act (TADA), 1987. Their conviction was set aside.96."
+[s 124A.13] Previous Sanction.—
+No sanction has been obtained to prosecute the petitioner/ accused for the offence
+"under section 124A of the IPC, 1860 which is a mandatory requirement for the Court to"
+"take cognizance of such offence. When that be so, whether the contents of the poster"
+"and its publication by the accused, even if it is at his instance, to determine whether"
+"any offence of sedition is made out thereof is not called for. Section 196 of the Cr PC,"
+1973 mandates that a complaint for such offence should be expressly authorised by
+"the Government, and if not, the Court cannot take cognizance of such offence against"
+the accused person. Committal proceedings taken over the final report laid before the
+Court without production of order of sanction satisfying the statutory mandate is
+clearly unsustainable.97.
+"62. Subs. by Act 4 of 1898, section 4, for section 124A. Earlier section 124A was inserted by"
+"Act 27 of 1870, section 5."
+"63. The words ""Her Majesty or"" omitted by the A.O. 1950. The words ""or the Crown"
+"Representative"" ins. after the word ""Majesty"" by the A.O. 1937 were omitted by the A.O. 1948."
+"64. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"65. The words ""or British Burma"" omitted by the A.O. 1948. Earlier the words ""or British Burma"""
+were inserted by the A.O. 1937.
+"66. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life or any shorter"
+"term"" (w.e.f. 1 January1956)."
+"67. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 ."
+"68. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] : (2003) 8 SCC 461"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 696] : JT 2003 (1) SC 200 : 2003 Cr LJ 5021 .
+"69. Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 [LNIND 1962 SC 21] : [1962] Supp 2 SCR"
+76.
+"70. Common Cause v UOI, Writ Petitions Civil No. 683/2016."
+"71. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 3 SCC"
+214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] .
+"72. Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v State of Chhattisgarh, 2012 (NOC) Cr LJ 384 (Chh)."
+"73. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 112, 528, (PC); BG Tilak, (1908) 10 Bom LR 848 [LNIND"
+"1908 BOM 85] ; Amba Prasad, (1897) 20 All 55 , 69, FB; Luxman, (1899) 2 Bom LR 286 ; Shankar,"
+(1910) 12 Bom LR 675 [LNIND 1910 BOM 66] .
+"74. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, (1942) FCR 38 ."
+"75. Sadashi v Narayan v State, (1947) 49 Bom LR 526 , (1947) Bom 110, 74 IA 89."
+"76. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 528, PC; Besant v Advocate-General of Madras, (1919)"
+"43 Mad 146 : 21 Bom LR 867 PC; Wallace-Johnson, (1940) AC 231 ."
+"77. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 ."
+"78. Pratap ""Urdu Daily of New Delhi"", (1949) 2 Punj 348."
+"79. Kedar Nath, AIR 1962 SC 955 [LNIND 1962 SC 21] : 1962 (2) Cr LJ 103 ."
+"80. Naurang Singh, 1986 Cr LJ 846 (P&H)."
+"81. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : (1997) 7 SCC"
+431 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : 1997 Cr LJ 4091 : (1997) 1 SCC (Cr) 1094.
+"82. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 3 SCC"
+214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] .
+"83. P Nedumaran v State, 2003 Cr LJ 4388 (Mad)."
+"84. Naurang Singh v Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1986 Cr LJ 846 (PH)."
+"85. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 112, 129; Jogendra Chunder Bose, (1891) 19 Cal 35 , 41."
+"86. Raghubir Singh, 1987 Cr LJ 157 : AIR 1987 SC 149 [LNIND 1986 SC 336] : (1986) 4 SCC 481"
+[LNIND 1986 SC 336] .
+"87. Foster, 198."
+"88. Suresh Chandra Sanyal, (1912) 39 Cal 606 . Recovery of seditious material in the shape of"
+letters is enough though they were not written by the person carrying them. Raghubir Singh v
+"State of Bihar, 1987 Cr LJ 157 : AIR 1987 SC 149 [LNIND 1986 SC 336] : (1986) 4 SCC 481"
+[LNIND 1986 SC 336] .
+"89. Hardik Bharatbhai Patel v State of Gujarat, 2016 Cr LJ 225 (Guj) : 2016 (1) RCR (Criminal)"
+542.
+"90. Alexander M Sullivan, (1868) 11 Cox 44, 51."
+"91. Indra Das v State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380 [LNIND 2011 SC 164] : 2011 Cr LJ 1646 :"
+"(2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 1150 : (2011) 4 SCR 289 [LNIND 2011 SC 164] ; State v Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC"
+784 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : AIR 2011 SC 340 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : 2011 Cr LJ 982 .
+"92. Jogendra Chunder Bose, (1891) 19 Cal 35 , 44; Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 112, 137."
+"93. Alexander M Sullivan, (1886) 11 Cox 44."
+"94. Apurba Krishna Bose, (1907) 35 Cal 141 ."
+95. Ibid.
+"96. Balbir Singh v State of UP, AIR 2000 SC 464 : 2000 Cr LJ 590 ."
+"97. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+62.[[s 124A] Sedition.
+"Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by"
+"signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts"
+"to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards,"
+"63.[***] the Government established by law in 64.[India], 65.[***] shall be punished with"
+"66.[imprisonment for life], to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which"
+"may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine."
+"Explanation 1.—The expression ""disaffection"" includes disloyalty and all feelings of"
+enmity.
+Explanation 2.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the
+"Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or"
+"attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence"
+under this section.
+Explanation 3.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other
+"action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or"
+"disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.]"
+COMMENT—
+The offence under section 124A captioned as 'Sedition' is closely allied to treason – an
+offence against the State. Many personalities including the Father of the Nation and
+several freedom fighters have been tried and punished during the imperial rule under
+the above section. How far in a democratic set-up publishing or preaching of protest
+even questioning the foundation of the form of Government could be imputed as
+"causing disaffection towards the Government and thus, committing of any offence"
+"under Chapter VI of the IPC, 1860 has to be examined within the letter and spirit of the"
+Constitution and not as previously done under the imperial rule.67.
+"Sedition in itself is a comprehensive term, and it embraces all those practices, whether"
+"by word, deed, or writing, which are calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State,"
+and lead ignorant persons to endeavour to subvert the Government and laws of the
+"country. The objects of sedition generally are to induce discontent and insurrection,"
+"and stir up opposition to the Government, and bring the administration of justice into"
+contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to insurrection and
+rebellion.
+"Sedition has been described as disloyalty in action, and the law considers as sedition all"
+"those practices which have for their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create"
+"public disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or"
+"the Government, the laws or constitutions of the realm, and generally all endeavours to"
+promote public disorder.68.
+[s 124A.1] Constitutional Validity.—
+"The Supreme Court, in Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar,69. held that this section is not"
+"unconstitutional and opined that only when it is construed that the words, written or"
+"spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder"
+or disturbance of law and order the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest
+"of public order, then only the section strikes the correct balance between individual"
+fundamental rights and the interest of public order. The Court also held that a citizen
+"has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by"
+"way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to violence against"
+the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder.
+The Supreme Court in a later Order in Common Cause v UOI70. ordered that the
+"authorities while dealing with the offences under section 124A of the IPC, 1860 shall be"
+guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Kedar Nath Singh.
+Section 124A]
+[s 124A.2] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two essentials:—
+"1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt, or exciting or attempting to"
+excite disaffection towards the Government of India.
+"2. Such act or attempt may be done (i) by words, either spoken or written; or (ii) by"
+signs; or (iii) by visible representation.
+"1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt, or exciting or attempting to"
+excite disaffection towards the Government of India.—A plain reading of the section
+would show that its application would be attracted only when the accused brings or
+attempts to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to excite disaffection
+"towards the Government established by law in India, by words either written or spoken"
+"or visible signs or representations, etc.71. Necessary ingredient to attract punishment"
+"under section 124A, IPC, 1860, appears to be the effort of bringing or attempting to"
+bring into hatred or contempt to excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards the
+"Government established by law in India by words, either spoken or written or by signs"
+or by visible representation or otherwise.72. The offence does not consist in exciting or
+"attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or"
+small. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by the publication of seditious
+articles is absolutely immaterial. If the accused intended by the articles to excite
+"rebellion or disturbance, his act would doubtless fall within this section, and would"
+"probably fall within other sections of the IPC, 1860. If he tried to excite feelings of"
+"hatred or contempt towards the Government, that is sufficient to make him guilty under"
+"this section.73. The Federal Court of India had, however, held that the gist of the"
+offence of sedition is incitement to violence; mere abusive words are not enough.74.
+"The view of the Federal Court was subsequently overruled by the Privy Council,75. as"
+being opposed to the view expressed in several cases.76.
+"In appreciating whether the act done by the accused by words ""either spoken or written"
+"or by signs or by misrepresentation or otherwise"" one cannot shut one's eyes to"
+changes in political consumptions which have taken place over the course of time after
+"the aforesaid penal provision section 124A was included in the IPC, 1860 and the"
+"declared objective of the Government of the day. Very often, the demarcating line"
+between political criticism of the Government and those causing disaffection against
+the Government is thin and waving.77.
+It is not an essential ingredient of sedition that the act done should be an act which is
+intended or likely to incite to public disorder.78. But this view of the law does no longer
+"seem to be correct, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath's"
+"case,79. wherein Sinha, CJ observed:"
+"comments, however strongly worded expressing, disapprobation of actions of Government,"
+without exciting those feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by
+"acts of violence, would not be penal. In other words, disloyalty to Government established"
+by law is not the same thing as commenting in strong terms upon the measures or acts of
+"Government, or its agencies, so as to ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure the"
+"cancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means, that is to say, without"
+exciting those feelings of enmity or disloyalty which imply excitement to public disorder or
+the use of violence.
+In this very case it was further held that viewed in the context of antecedent history of
+"the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress the provisions of"
+"section 124A and section 505 of the IPC, 1860 should be limited in their application to"
+acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder or disturbance of law and order
+or incitement to violence. Where the propaganda secretary of a Gurdwara addressed a
+"gathering of Sikhs, some of whom were wearing black clothes and turbans, and in"
+course of his speech though he did not give direct incitement to violence but he
+"nevertheless gave exaggerated figures of casualties following Army action in Punjab, it"
+was held that it would be quite proper to infer from the text and tenor of the speech
+made by the accused that the same was intended to bring the Government into
+contempt with the likelihood of eruption of violence and public disorder contemplated
+"in Kedarnath's case. In the circumstances, his petition for quashing the criminal"
+"proceedings against him under section 482, Cr PC, 1973 was rejected.80. The decisive"
+"ingredient for establishing the offence of Sedition under section 124A, IPC, 1860 is the"
+doing of certain acts which would bring the Government established by law in India into
+"hatred or contempt, etc. In this case, there is not even a suggestion that appellant did"
+anything as against the Government of India or any other Government of the State. The
+charge framed against the accused contains no averment that accused did anything as
+against the Government.81. The prosecution evidence shows that the slogans were
+raised a couple of times only by the accused and that neither the slogans evoked a
+response from any other person of the Sikh community nor reaction from people of
+other communities. Supreme Court found it difficult to hold that upon the raising of
+"such casual slogans, a couple of times without any other act whatsoever, the charge of"
+sedition can be founded.
+"The casual raising of the slogans, once or twice by two individuals alone cannot be"
+said to be aimed at exciting or attempt to excite hatred or disaffection towards the
+"Government as established by law in India. Section 124A IPC, 1860 would in the facts"
+and circumstances of the case have no application whatsoever and would not be
+attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case.82. The prosecution case is that
+the accused has delivered a speech creating ill will and promoting enmity among
+different retail and linguistic groups of Indian people and thereby committed the
+"offences punishable under sections 124(A) and 153(A) of the IPC, 1860. A perusal of"
+the First Information Report and the charge sheet laid by the respondent police would
+"make it abundantly clear that the allegations mentioned therein, if proved, would"
+"naturally attract the provisions of sections 124(A) and 153(A) of IPC, 1860.83. State of"
+"Punjab and Union Territory, Chandigarh, had been declared Disturbed Area and the"
+extremists activities were going on a large scale in September 1984. The law and order
+"situation had so deteriorated that the Army had to spread out. In this background, it will"
+be proper to infer from the text and tenor of the speech made by the accused that the
+same was intended and it did tend to bring the Government into contempt with the
+likelihood of eruption of violence and public disorder.84.
+"2. Such act, attempt, etc., may be done by words, either spoken or written or by signs"
+or by visible representation.—Not only the writer of seditious articles but whoever uses
+in any way words or printed matter for the purpose of exciting feelings of disaffection
+"to the Government is liable under the section, whether he is the actual author or not.85."
+[s 124A.3] 'Written'.—
+"In Raghubir Singh,86. it has been held that for establishing the charge of sedition, it is"
+not necessary that the accused must be the author of the seditious material and that
+distribution or circulation of seditious material may also be sufficient on the facts and
+circumstances of the case and even the act of courier is sometimes enough in a case
+of conspiracy and further that it is also not necessary that a person should be the
+participant in the conspiracy from start to finish. Disaffection may be excited in a
+"thousand different ways. A poem, an allegory, a drama, a philosophical or historical"
+"discussion, may be used for the purpose of exciting disaffection. Seditious writing,"
+"while it remains in the hands of the author unpublished, will not make him liable."
+Publication of some kind is necessary.87. Sending of seditious matter by post
+addressed to a private individual not by name but by designation as the representative
+of a large body of students amounts to publication if it is opened by anybody.88.
+[s 124A.4] Advise to kill members of police force.—
+"The Government established by law acts through human agency and admittedly, the"
+police service or force is itself a principal agency for the administration and
+maintenance of the law and order in the State. When a person makes a statement or
+"gives an advice to resort to violence by killing four to five police officers, he could be"
+said to have criticised the police force or the service en bloc. In such circumstances a
+prima facie case of waging war against the Government could be said to have been
+made out.89.
+[s 124A.5] 'Visible representation'.—
+Sedition does not necessarily consist of written matter: it may be evidenced by a wood-
+cut or engraving of any kind.90.
+[s 124A.6] Explanations 2 and 3.—
+Both these Explanations have a strictly defined and limited scope. They have no
+"application unless the article in question criticises ""the measures of Government"" or"
+"""administrative or other action of the Government"" without exciting or attempting to"
+"excite hatred, contempt or disaffection."
+[s 124A.7] Membership in a banned organization.—
+Mere membership of a banned organization will not incriminate a person unless he
+resorts to violence or incites people to violence or does an act intended to create
+disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.91.
+[s 124A.8] 'Disapprobation'.—
+This means simply disapproval. It is quite possible to disapprove of a man's sentiments
+or actions and yet to like him.92.
+[s 124A.9] Liability for extracts from other papers.—
+The law does not excuse the publication in newspapers of writings which are in
+"themselves seditious libels, merely because they are copied from foreign newspapers"
+as items of news.93.
+[s 124A.10] Liability for letters of correspondents.—
+The editor of a newspaper is liable for unsigned seditious letters appearing in his
+paper.94.
+[s 124A.11] Publication of seditious exhibits.—
+Republication of a seditious article used as an exhibit in a case of sedition is not
+justifiable.95.
+[s 124A.12] Listening to cassettes.—
+Certain accused persons were convicted for listening to some cassettes containing
+speeches of seditious nature. There was no other evidence to show that they either
+committed or conspired or attempted to commit or advocated or advised or knowingly
+facilitated commission of disruptive activities under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
+"(Prevention) Act (TADA), 1987. Their conviction was set aside.96."
+[s 124A.13] Previous Sanction.—
+No sanction has been obtained to prosecute the petitioner/ accused for the offence
+"under section 124A of the IPC, 1860 which is a mandatory requirement for the Court to"
+"take cognizance of such offence. When that be so, whether the contents of the poster"
+"and its publication by the accused, even if it is at his instance, to determine whether"
+"any offence of sedition is made out thereof is not called for. Section 196 of the Cr PC,"
+1973 mandates that a complaint for such offence should be expressly authorised by
+"the Government, and if not, the Court cannot take cognizance of such offence against"
+the accused person. Committal proceedings taken over the final report laid before the
+Court without production of order of sanction satisfying the statutory mandate is
+clearly unsustainable.97.
+"62. Subs. by Act 4 of 1898, section 4, for section 124A. Earlier section 124A was inserted by"
+"Act 27 of 1870, section 5."
+"63. The words ""Her Majesty or"" omitted by the A.O. 1950. The words ""or the Crown"
+"Representative"" ins. after the word ""Majesty"" by the A.O. 1937 were omitted by the A.O. 1948."
+"64. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"65. The words ""or British Burma"" omitted by the A.O. 1948. Earlier the words ""or British Burma"""
+were inserted by the A.O. 1937.
+"66. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life or any shorter"
+"term"" (w.e.f. 1 January1956)."
+"67. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 ."
+"68. Nazir Khan v State of Delhi, AIR 2003 SC 4427 [LNIND 2003 SC 696] : (2003) 8 SCC 461"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 696] : JT 2003 (1) SC 200 : 2003 Cr LJ 5021 .
+"69. Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 [LNIND 1962 SC 21] : [1962] Supp 2 SCR"
+76.
+"70. Common Cause v UOI, Writ Petitions Civil No. 683/2016."
+"71. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 3 SCC"
+214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] .
+"72. Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v State of Chhattisgarh, 2012 (NOC) Cr LJ 384 (Chh)."
+"73. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 112, 528, (PC); BG Tilak, (1908) 10 Bom LR 848 [LNIND"
+"1908 BOM 85] ; Amba Prasad, (1897) 20 All 55 , 69, FB; Luxman, (1899) 2 Bom LR 286 ; Shankar,"
+(1910) 12 Bom LR 675 [LNIND 1910 BOM 66] .
+"74. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, (1942) FCR 38 ."
+"75. Sadashi v Narayan v State, (1947) 49 Bom LR 526 , (1947) Bom 110, 74 IA 89."
+"76. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 528, PC; Besant v Advocate-General of Madras, (1919)"
+"43 Mad 146 : 21 Bom LR 867 PC; Wallace-Johnson, (1940) AC 231 ."
+"77. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 ."
+"78. Pratap ""Urdu Daily of New Delhi"", (1949) 2 Punj 348."
+"79. Kedar Nath, AIR 1962 SC 955 [LNIND 1962 SC 21] : 1962 (2) Cr LJ 103 ."
+"80. Naurang Singh, 1986 Cr LJ 846 (P&H)."
+"81. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : (1997) 7 SCC"
+431 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : 1997 Cr LJ 4091 : (1997) 1 SCC (Cr) 1094.
+"82. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 3 SCC"
+214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] .
+"83. P Nedumaran v State, 2003 Cr LJ 4388 (Mad)."
+"84. Naurang Singh v Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1986 Cr LJ 846 (PH)."
+"85. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 112, 129; Jogendra Chunder Bose, (1891) 19 Cal 35 , 41."
+"86. Raghubir Singh, 1987 Cr LJ 157 : AIR 1987 SC 149 [LNIND 1986 SC 336] : (1986) 4 SCC 481"
+[LNIND 1986 SC 336] .
+"87. Foster, 198."
+"88. Suresh Chandra Sanyal, (1912) 39 Cal 606 . Recovery of seditious material in the shape of"
+letters is enough though they were not written by the person carrying them. Raghubir Singh v
+"State of Bihar, 1987 Cr LJ 157 : AIR 1987 SC 149 [LNIND 1986 SC 336] : (1986) 4 SCC 481"
+[LNIND 1986 SC 336] .
+"89. Hardik Bharatbhai Patel v State of Gujarat, 2016 Cr LJ 225 (Guj) : 2016 (1) RCR (Criminal)"
+542.
+"90. Alexander M Sullivan, (1868) 11 Cox 44, 51."
+"91. Indra Das v State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380 [LNIND 2011 SC 164] : 2011 Cr LJ 1646 :"
+"(2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 1150 : (2011) 4 SCR 289 [LNIND 2011 SC 164] ; State v Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC"
+784 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : AIR 2011 SC 340 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : 2011 Cr LJ 982 .
+"92. Jogendra Chunder Bose, (1891) 19 Cal 35 , 44; Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) 22 Bom 112, 137."
+"93. Alexander M Sullivan, (1886) 11 Cox 44."
+"94. Apurba Krishna Bose, (1907) 35 Cal 141 ."
+95. Ibid.
+"96. Balbir Singh v State of UP, AIR 2000 SC 464 : 2000 Cr LJ 590 ."
+"97. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+[s 125] Waging war against any Asiatic Power in alliance with the Government
+of India.
+Whoever wages war against the Government of any Asiatic Power in alliance or at
+"peace with the 98.[Government of India] or attempts to wage such war, or abets the"
+"waging of such war, shall be punished with 99.[imprisonment for life], to which fine"
+"may be added, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to seven years, to which fine may be added, or with fine."
+COMMENT—
+Waging war against Asiatic power.—This section restrains a person from making India
+the base of intrigues and enterprise for the restoration of deposed rulers or other like
+purposes. The fulfilment of the obligations of the State to allies and friendly Powers
+requires that the abetment of such schemes by its subjects whether by furnishing
+"supplies or otherwise should be forbidden.100. ""One Sovereign power is bound to"
+respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own
+"territory"".101. This section, however, does not affect India's right as sovereign nation to"
+offer political asylum to a deposed ruler.
+"98. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"99. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+100. M & M 105.
+"101. Jameson, (1896) 2 QB 425 , 430."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+[s 126] Committing depredation on territories of power at peace with the
+Government of India.
+"Whoever commits depredation, or makes preparations to commit depredation, on the"
+"territories of any power in alliance or at peace with the 102.[Government of India], shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, and shall also be liable to fine and to forfeiture of any property used or"
+"intended to be used in committing such depredation, or acquired by such depredation."
+COMMENT—
+Depredation.—The preceding section provides for waging war against any Asiatic
+"Power in alliance with the Government of India, this section prevents the commission"
+of depredation or plunder on territories of States at peace with the Government of
+"India. The scope of this section is much wider than the preceding section, for it applies"
+to a Power which may or may not be Asiatic.
+"102. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+31[s 127] Receiving property taken by war or depredation mentioned in
+sections 125 and 126.
+Whoever receives any property knowing the same to have been taken in the
+"commission of any of the offences mentioned in sections 125 and 126, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, and shall also be liable to fine and to forfeiture of the property so"
+received.
+COMMENT—
+This section applies to those persons who knowingly receive any property obtained by
+waging war with a Power at peace with the Government of India or by committing
+depredation on its territories.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+[s 128] Public servant voluntarily allowing prisoner of State or war to escape.
+"Whoever, being a public servant and having the custody of any State prisoner1 or"
+"prisoner of war2, voluntarily allows such prisoner to escape from any place in which"
+"such prisoner is confined, shall be punished with 103.[imprisonment for life], or"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+Allowing escape to prisoners.—This section and section 225A provide for one kind of
+offence. In both sections the public servant who has the custody of the prisoner is
+punished if he voluntarily allows such prisoner to escape. In this section the prisoner
+must be a State prisoner or a prisoner of war; under section 225A the prisoner may be
+"an ordinary criminal. The offence under this section is thus, an aggravated form of the"
+offence than under section 225A.
+1. 'State prisoner' is one whose confinement is necessary in order to preserve the
+"security of India from foreign hostility or from internal commotion, and who has been"
+confined by the order of the Government of India.104.
+"2. 'Prisoner of war' is one who in war is taken in arms. Those who are not in arms, or"
+"who being in arms submit and surrender themselves, are not to be slain but to be made"
+prisoners. But it seems those only are prisoners of war who are taken in arms.105.
+"103. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+104. Beng Reg III of 1818; Bom Reg VIII of 1818; Mad Reg II of 1819.
+105. M & M 107.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+[s 129] Public servant negligently suffering such prisoner to escape.
+"Whoever, being a public servant and having the custody of any State prisoner or"
+"prisoner of war, negligently suffers such prisoner to escape from any place of"
+"confinement in which such prisoner is confined, shall be punished with simple"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT—
+Negligently suffering prisoners to escape.—The offence under this section is like the
+one provided in section 128. Under it the escape of the prisoner should be owing to the
+negligence of the public servant. Section 128 punishes a public servant who voluntarily
+allows a State prisoner to escape. Section 223 punishes the escape of an ordinary
+prisoner under similar circumstances.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VI OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE
+The offences against the State fall into the following groups:—
+"I. Waging, or attempting or conspiring to wage, or collecting men and ammunition to"
+"wage war against the Government of India (sections 121, 121A, 122, 123)."
+"II. Assaulting President, or Governor of a State with intent to compel or restrain the"
+exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+III. Sedition (section 124A).
+IV. War against a power at peace with the Government of India (section 125) or
+committing depredations on the territories of such power (sections 125–126).
+"V. Permitting or aiding or negligently suffering the escape of, or rescuing or harbouring,"
+"a State prisoner (sections 128, 129, 130)."
+"[s 130] Aiding escape of, rescuing or harbouring such prisoner."
+Whoever knowingly aids or assists any State prisoner or prisoner of war in escaping
+"from lawful custody, or rescues or attempts to rescue any such prisoner, or harbours"
+"or conceals any such prisoner who has escaped from lawful custody, or offers or"
+"attempts to offer any resistance to the recapture of such prisoner, shall be punished"
+"with 106.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation.—A State prisoner or prisoner of war, who is permitted to be at large on his"
+"parole within certain limits in 107.[India], is said to escape from lawful custody if he"
+goes beyond the limits within which he is allowed to be at large.
+COMMENT—
+"Aiding escape, harbouring escapees.—This section uses words more extensive than"
+those in the two preceding ones which contemplate an escape only from some prison
+or actual place of custody. Again in the last two sections the offender is a public
+servant; under this section he may be any person. The scope of this section is much
+narrower than section 129. This section requires that the rescue or assistance be given
+"""knowingly""."
+"106. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f."
+1January1956).
+"107. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 131] Abetting mutiny, or attempting to seduce a soldier, sailor or airman"
+from his duty.
+"Whoever abets the committing of mutiny by an officer, soldier, 1.[sailor or airman], in"
+"the Army, 2.[Navy or Air Force] of the 3.[Government of India] or attempts to seduce"
+"any such officer, soldier, 4.[sailor or airman] from his allegiance or his duty, shall be"
+"punished with 5.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for"
+"a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"6.[Explanation.—In this section the words ""officer"", 7.[""soldier"", 8.[""sailor""] and ""airman""]"
+"include any person subject to 9.[the Army Act, 10.[the Army Act, 195011.], 12.[the Naval"
+"Discipline Act, 13.[***] the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 (34 of 1934)14.], 15.[the"
+"Air Force Act or 16.[the Air Force Act, 1950]], as the case may be].]"
+COMMENT—
+"Aiding mutiny, seduction from duty.—The first part of this section relates to the offence"
+of abetting mutiny. The offence contemplated is an abetment which is not followed by
+"actual mutiny, or which, supposing actual mutiny follows, is not the cause of that"
+mutiny.
+"The offence of 'mutiny' consists in extreme insubordination, as if a soldier resists by"
+"force, or if a number of soldiers rise against or oppose their military superiors, such"
+acts proceeding from alleged or pretended grievances of a military nature. Acts of a
+riotous nature directed against the government or civil authorities rather than against
+military superiors seem also to constitute mutiny.17.
+"1. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor"""
+"2. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"3. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"4. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"5. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"6. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 6."
+"7. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""and soldier""."
+"8. Ins. by Act 35 of 1934, section 2 and Sch."
+"9. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""Articles of War for the better government"
+"of Her Majesty's Army, or to the Articles of War contained in Act No. 5 of 1869""."
+"10. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""the Indian Army Act, 1911"" (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"11. Now see the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957)."
+"12. Ins. by Act 35 of 1934, section 2 and Sch."
+"13. The words ""or that Act as modified by"" omitted by the A.O. 1950."
+"14. Now see the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957)."
+"15. Subs. by Act 14 of 1932, section 130 and Sch., for ""or the Air Force Act""."
+"16. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""the Indian Air Force Act, 1932"" (w.e.f. 1-4-"
+1951).
+17. M&M 112.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+[s 132] Abetment of mutiny if mutiny is committed in consequence thereof.
+"Whoever abets the committing of mutiny by an officer, soldier, 18.[sailor or airman] in"
+"the Army, 19.[Navy or Air Force] of the 20.[Government of India], shall, if mutiny be"
+"committed in consequence of that abetment, be punished with death or with 21."
+"[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"18. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"19. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"20. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"21. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 133] Abetment of assault by soldier, sailor or airman on his superior officer,"
+when in execution of his office.
+"Whoever abets an assault by an officer, soldier, 22.[sailor or airman], in the Army, 23."
+"[Navy or Air Force] of the 24.[Government of India], on any superior officer being in the"
+"execution of his office, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+"Abetment of assault, etc.—This section punishes the abetment of an assault which is"
+not committed. The next section punishes similar abetment where the offence is
+committed.
+"22. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"23. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"24. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 134] Abetment of such assault, if the assault is committed."
+"Whoever abets an assault by an officer, soldier, 25.[sailor or airman], in the Army, 26."
+"[Navy or Air Force] of the 27.[Government of India], on any superior officer being in the"
+"execution of his office, shall, if such assault be committed in consequence of that"
+abetment be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+Where abetted assault committed.—This section punishes the abetment of an assault
+when such assault is committed in consequence of that abetment. It stands in the
+same relation to section 133 as section 132 does to section 131.
+"25. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"26. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"27. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 135] Abetment of desertion of soldier, sailor or airman."
+"Whoever abets the desertion of any officer, soldier, 28.[sailor or airman], in the Army,"
+"29.[Navy or Air Force] of the 30.[Government of India], shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Abetment of desertion.—The desertion abetted under this section need not take place.
+Mere abetment is made punishable.
+"28. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"29. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"30. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+[s 136] Harbouring deserter.
+"Whoever, except as hereinafter expected, knowing or having reason to believe that an"
+"officer, soldier, 31.[sailor or airman], in the Army, 32.[Navy or Air Force] of the 33."
+"[Government of India], has deserted, harbours such officer, soldier, 34.[sailor or"
+"airman], shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+Exception.—This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is given
+by a wife to her husband.
+COMMENT—
+Harbouring deserter.—A person harbouring a deserter is an 'accessory after the fact'.
+The gist of the offence is concealment of a deserter to prevent his apprehension.
+Exception is made only in the case of a wife.
+The word 'harbour' is defined in section 52A.
+"31. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"32. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"33. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"34. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 137] Deserter concealed on board, merchant vessel through negligence of"
+master.
+"The master or person in charge of a merchant vessel, on board of which any deserter"
+"from the Army, 35.[Navy or Air Force] of the 36.[Government of India] is concealed,"
+"shall, though ignorant of such concealment, be liable to a penalty not exceeding five"
+"hundred rupees, if he might have known of such concealment but for some neglect of"
+"his duty as such master or person in charge, or but for some want of discipline on"
+board of the vessel.
+COMMENT—
+Concealment on board.—This section punishes the master or person in charge of a
+merchant ship on board of which a deserter has concealed himself. The master is
+liable even though he is ignorant of such concealment. But some negligence or laxity in
+the maintenance of discipline on the part of the master has to be made out.
+"35. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"36. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 138] Abetment of act of insubordination by soldier, sailor or airman."
+"Whoever abets what he knows to be an act of insubordination by an officer, soldier, 37."
+"[sailor or airman], in the Army, 38.[Navy or Air Force] of the 39.[Government of India],"
+"shall, if such act of insubordination be committed in consequence of that abetment,"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"six months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Abetment of insubordination.—In this section it is expressed as part of the definition of
+"the offence that the abettor knows the quality of the act abetted, that is, he knows it to"
+be an act of insubordination.
+"37. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"38. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"39. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+[s 138A] [Repealed]
+[Application of foregoing sections to the Indian Marine Service.] Repealed by s. 2 and
+Sch. of Act XXXV of 1934.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+[s 139] Persons subject to certain Acts.
+"No person subject to 40.[the Army Act, 41.[the Army Act, 1950, the Naval Discipline"
+"Act, 42.[43.[***] the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, 193444.], 45.[the Air Force Act or 46."
+"[the Air Force Act, 1950]]], is subject to punishment under this Code for any of the"
+offences defined in this Chapter.
+COMMENT—
+Persons subject to these special Acts are punishable under those Acts and not under
+the Penal Code.
+"40. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""any Article of War for the Army or Navy"
+"ofthe Queen, or for any part of such Army or Navy""."
+"41. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""the Indian Army Act, 1911"" (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"42. Ins. by Act 35 of 1934, section 2 and Sch."
+"43. The words ""or that Act as modified"" omitted by the A.O. 1950."
+"44. Now see the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957)."
+"45. Subs. by Act 14 of 1932, section 130 and Sch., for ""or the Air Force Act""."
+"46. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""the Indian Air Force Act, 1932"" (w.e.f. 1-4-"
+1951).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER VII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR"
+FORCE
+"[s 140] Wearing garb or carrying token used by soldier, sailor or airman."
+"Whoever, not being a soldier, 47.[sailor or airman], in the Military, 48.[Naval or Air]"
+"service of the 49.[Government of India], wears any garb or carries any token"
+"resembling any garb or token used by such a soldier, 50.[sailor or airman] with the"
+"intention that it may be believed that he is such a soldier, 51.[sailor or airman], shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Wearing garb or carrying token.—The gist of the offence herein made penal is the
+intention of the accused wearing the dress of a soldier for the purpose of inducing
+others to believe that he is in service at the present time. Merely wearing a soldier's
+garb without any specific intention is no offence. Cast-off uniforms of soldiers are worn
+by many men. Actors put on different military uniforms.
+"47. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"48. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or Navy""."
+"49. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen""."
+"50. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+"51. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch. I, for ""or sailor""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 141] Unlawful assembly.
+"An assembly of five or more1 persons is designated an ""unlawful assembly"", if the"
+common object2 of the persons composing that assembly is—
+"First.—To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1.[the Central or any"
+"State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant"
+in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant; or
+"Second.—To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or Third.—To"
+"commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or"
+"Fourth.—By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take"
+"or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a"
+"right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in"
+"possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or"
+"Fifth.—By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to"
+"do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do."
+"Explanation.—An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may"
+subsequently become an unlawful assembly.
+"1. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for The Central or any Provincial Government or Legislature."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 142] Being member of unlawful assembly.
+"Whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly,"
+"intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a member of an"
+unlawful assembly.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 143] Punishment.
+"Whoever is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT—
+Unlawful assembly.—An 'assembly' is a company of persons assembled together in a
+"place, usually for a common purpose. Court is concerned with an 'unlawful assembly'."
+"Wherever five or more persons commit a crime with a common object and intent, then"
+"each of them would be liable for commission of such offence, in terms of sections 141"
+"and 149, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860). It is not possible to define the"
+constituents or dimensions of an offence under section 149 simpliciter with regard to
+dictionary meaning of the words 'unlawful assembly' or 'assembly'.2. An assembly of
+five or more persons having as its common object any of the five objects enumerated
+under section 1 41 of IPC is deemed to be an unlawful assembly. Membership of an
+"unlawful assembly is itself an offence punishable under section.143, whereas other"
+"species of the said offence are dealt with under section 143–145 of IPC. Similarly,"
+sections 146–148 of IPC deals with the offence of rioting which is defined to be use of
+force or violence by any member thereof. Section 149 makes every member of an
+unlawful assembly liable for offence that may be committed by any member of the
+unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or for
+commission of any offence that the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be
+committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly.3. To bring a case
+"within section 149 of IPC some essential features must be present. First, there must be"
+an existence of an unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 141 of IPC. This is
+a mixed question of fact and law.4.
+The underlying principle of section 141 is that law discourages tumultuous assemblage
+of men to preserve the public peace. Section 141 defines what an 'unlawful assembly'
+is. Section 142 gives the connotations of 'a member of an unlawful assembly'. Section
+143 punishes tumultuous assemblies as they endanger public peace. It does not
+require that the purpose of the unlawful assembly should have been fulfilled.
+The essence of an offence under this section is the combination of five or more
+"persons, united in the purpose of committing a criminal offence, and the consensus of"
+purpose is itself an offence distinct from the criminal offence which these persons
+"agree and intend to commit.5. Unlike the Indian law contained in section 141, IPC, 1860,"
+an unlawful assembly at common law need to have only three or more persons who
+must assemble together for the common purpose of committing an offence involving
+"use of violence, or for achieving a lawful or unlawful object in such a manner so as to"
+lead to a reasonable apprehension of a breach of peace as a direct result of their
+"conduct.6. Thus, under section 141, IPC, especially under sub-section (3) thereof, use of"
+violence or likelihood of breach of the peace is not at all a sine qua non for an offence
+"of unlawful assembly but this is so under the common law. So under the common law,"
+"even if the purpose of the assembly is unlawful, the offence of being an unlawful"
+assembly would not be committed if there is no likelihood of breach of the peace and
+this would be so even if the unlawful common purpose is carried out.
+[s 143.1] Ingredients.—
+An 'unlawful assembly' is an assembly of five or more persons if their common object
+is—
+1. to overawe by criminal force
+"(a) the Central Government, or"
+"(b) the State Government, or"
+"(c) the Legislature, or"
+(d) any public servant in the exercise of lawful power;
+2. to resist the execution of law or legal process;
+"3. to commit mischief, criminal trespass, or any other offence;"
+4. by criminal force—
+"(a) to take or obtain possession of any property, or"
+"(b) to deprive any person of any incorporeal right, or"
+(c) to enforce any right or supposed right;
+5. by criminal force to compel any person—
+"(a) to do what he is not legally bound to do, or"
+(b) to omit what he is legally entitled to do.
+1. 'Five or more'.— The Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh's case7. held that it is only
+"where five or more persons constituted an assembly that an unlawful assembly is born,"
+"provided, of course, the other requirements of the said section as to the common"
+"object of the persons composing that assembly are satisfied. In other words, it is an"
+essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its membership must be five or more.
+The Supreme Court has endorsed the view that the number of injuries caused and the
+"number of persons who were inflicted with those injuries, (in this case, three persons"
+"were attacked and they sustained 13, 12 and 7 injuries respectively) can give a clue to"
+the fact that more than three persons must necessarily have participated in the
+attack.8.
+[s 143.2] Effect of acquittal of some accused:
+"In Mohan Singh v State of Punjab,9. the Supreme Court considered the question of"
+acquittal of two of the accused charged for the offence under section 302 read with
+"section 149, on the conviction of the remaining three accused. If five or more persons"
+are named in the charge as forming an unlawful assembly and the evidence adduced
+by the prosecution proves that charge against all of them that is a very clear case
+"where section 149 could be invoked. ""It is however not necessary that five or more"
+persons must be convicted before a charge under section 149 could be successfully
+brought home to any members of the unlawful assembly. It may be that less than five
+"persons may be charged and convicted under section 302 read with section 149, if the"
+"charge is that persons before the court along with others named, constituted an"
+unlawful assembly. Other persons so named may not be available for trial along with
+"their companions for the reason that they have absconded. In such a case, the fact that"
+less than five persons are before the court does not make section 149 inapplicable.
+"Therefore, in order to bring home a charge under section 149, it is not necessary that"
+"five or more persons must necessarily be brought before the court and convicted …"" In"
+"view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh's case,10. even after"
+"acquittal of the two accused from all the charges levelled against them, if there is any"
+"material that they were members of the unlawful assembly, the conviction under"
+section 302 can be based with the aid of section 149.11.
+Where two of the six accused persons were acquitted without any finding that some
+"other known or unknown persons also were involved in the assault, the remaining four"
+accused persons could not be said to be members of an unlawful assembly.12. Where
+"a group of persons, differently armed, assaulted a man with the common object of"
+"killing him and all the assailants accused except one were acquitted, it was held that"
+the remaining sole accused could not be convicted and sentenced under section 302
+with the aid of section 149. The court cannot carve out a new case.13. If out of an
+"unlawful assembly consisting of seven named persons four are acquitted, the other"
+"three cannot be convicted of rioting as members of an unlawful assembly.14. They may,"
+"however, be convicted of the principal offence with the aid of section 34, IPC, 1860.15."
+"Where presence of eight persons in the course of assault was established, four of them"
+were given benefit of doubt but there was no finding anywhere to the effect that only
+"four persons had taken part in the assault, conviction of the remaining four on the"
+charge of forming unlawful assembly was not illegal.16.
+2. 'Common object'.— The common object of an unlawful assembly depends firstly on
+whether such object can be classified as one of those described in section 141;
+"secondly, such common object need not be the product of prior concert but may form"
+"on spur of the moment, finally, nature of such common object is a question of fact to"
+"be determined by considering the nature of arms, nature of assembly, behaviour of"
+"members, etc.17. Mere presence in an assembly does not make a person a member of"
+an unlawful assembly unless it is shown that he had done something or omitted to do
+something which would make him a member of the unlawful assembly or unless the
+"case falls under section 142.18. Thus, merely because some persons assembled, all of"
+them cannot be condemned 'ipso facto' as being members of that unlawful
+assembly.19. At the same time it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law
+"that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of"
+"unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only"
+thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and
+was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of section 141.20.
+Further the prosecution has to prove that the commission of the offence was by any
+member of an unlawful assembly and such offence must have been committed in
+prosecution of the common object of the unlawful assembly or such that the members
+of the assembly knew that it was likely to be committed.21. The word 'object' means the
+"purpose or design and, in order to make it 'common', it must be shared by all. In other"
+"words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that"
+"is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be"
+"formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means"
+necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and
+"the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be"
+the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage.22.
+"Section 142 postulates that whoever, being aware of facts which render any assembly"
+"an unlawful one, intentionally joins the same would be a member thereof. Whether an"
+"assembly is unlawful one or not, would depend on various factors, the principal"
+amongst them being a common object formed by the members thereof to commit an
+offence specified in one or the other clauses contained in section 141.23. In a free fight
+between two groups resulting in death of one person and injuries to several others on
+"both the sides, it was held that the formation of an unlawful assembly was not"
+impossible but the common object of such an assembly cannot be determined on the
+basis of serious injury by one of them.24. The accused along with about six–eight
+others forcibly entered into the office of a union leader and assaulted him but the victim
+did not receive any serious injury inside the union office and managed to escape. Later
+on in the open space some members of the crowd surrounded and attacked him and
+dealt fatal blows. It was held that the accused who entered the union office did not
+share the common object of committing murder of the deceased. They were convicted
+under sections 326/149.25. Where the accused forming an unlawful assembly
+assaulted the deceased but the injury caused by only one accused proved to be fatal
+"and the injuries caused by the others were found to be simple, it was held that the"
+common object of the unlawful assembly was only to cause grievous hurt and only the
+accused who caused fatal injury was liable to be convicted for murder and others
+under section 326/149.26.
+The Supreme Court observed on the facts of a case that given the circumstances in
+which the assembly came together and given that all parties were aware that among
+"them, certain members carried weapons like guns and spear, even if it was held that"
+"common object of assembly was not to cause death, it would not be an unreasonable"
+inference that all accused knew that the offence of culpable homicide was likely to be
+committed in prosecution of such an armed assault on another group which was not
+"prepared to withstand such an attack, bringing about application of second portion of"
+"section 149. Therefore, it was held, that any of the accused found to have participated"
+in the assault should be held guilty under section 141 and 149.27.
+[s 143.3] Determination of Common object:
+Determination of the common object of an unlawful assembly or the determination of
+the question whether a member of the unlawful assembly knew that the offence that
+was committed was likely to be committed is essentially a question of fact that has to
+"be made keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members"
+and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene and a host of similar or
+connected facts and circumstances that cannot be entrapped by any attempt at an
+"exhaustive enumeration.28. It is difficult indeed, though not impossible, to collect direct"
+evidence of such knowledge. An inference may be drawn from circumstances such as
+"the background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the"
+"arms carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour"
+"of the members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime.29."
+[s 143.4] Second clause—Resisting Law or Legal Process.—
+"Resistance to some law, or legal process, connotes some overt act, and mere words,"
+"when there is no intention of carrying them into effect, are not sufficient to prove an"
+"intention to resist.30. When an order is lawfully made under the provisions of a statute,"
+"that order is law, and resistance to the execution of that law is an offence.31."
+Under this clause the act resisted must be a legal act. Where a number of persons
+"resisted an attempt to search a house which was being made by officers, who had not"
+"the written order investing them with the power to do so, it was held that the persons"
+resisting the attempted search were not guilty of this offence.32. Assembling together
+for the common object of rescuing a friend from unlawful police detention has been
+held by the Supreme Court as not constituting an unlawful assembly.33.
+"[s 143.5] Third clause.—Committing Criminal Trespass, Mischief, other"
+offence.—
+"This clause specifies only two offences, viz., mischief and criminal trespass, but the"
+words 'or other offence' seem to denote that all offences are included though only two
+"are enumerated in a haphazard way. In Manga @ Man Singh v State of Uttarakhand, the"
+Supreme Court while considering the application of principle of 'ejusdem generis' to
+"section 141 'third' clause, observed that:"
+We fail to appreciate as to how simply because the offences mischief or criminal trespass
+"are used preceding the expression ""other offence"" in Section 141 'third', it should be taken"
+that such offence would only relate to a minor offence of mischief or trespass and that the
+"expression ""other offence"" should be restricted only to that extent. As pointed out by us"
+"above, the offence of mischief and trespass could also be as grave as that of an offence of"
+"murder, for which the punishment of life imprisonment can be imposed as provided for"
+"under Sections 438, 449, 450 etc. Therefore, we straight away hold that the argument of"
+learned senior counsel for the Appellants to import the principle of 'ejusdem generis' to
+"Section 141 'third', cannot be accepted.34."
+[s 143.6] Suleman Bakery Case:
+It is a case related to the communal riots of Mumbai in early 1993. Government
+imposed curfew and the Special Operation Squad (SOS) was called to control the
+"communal riots on information of stone pelting, throwing of glass bottles, acid bulbs"
+and firing from the terrace of Suleman Bakery. It was argued that at any rate SOS was
+"an unlawful assembly on account of the third clause of section 141 of IPC, 1860, and"
+"hence, all the discharged accused persons were members of the unlawful assembly"
+and had to be at least charged and inquired into by the courts below. It was argued that
+the assembly of the police at least till the time they broke open the door was a lawful
+"move, as it was their duty but they should not have broken open the door and"
+trespassed the Suleman bakery; and all those who entered Suleman bakery formulated
+"an unlawful assembly as they illegally trespassed into the Suleman bakery. Since A-1,"
+"Shri Tyagi, had ordered them to break open the doors and he was a part of that unlawful"
+assembly who had the common object. The Supreme Court held that they were all the
+members of the SOS and had the duty to quell the riots. They were not doing anything
+illegal in coming out and trying to control the riots. Court rejected the argument by
+holding that a trespass becomes a criminal trespass if it is with an intention to annoy
+or to do something illegal which is not the case here. There was no question of the so-
+called entry amounting to criminal trespass.35.
+[s 143.7] Fourth clause—Application of Criminal Force.—
+The act falling within the purview of this clause is made punishable owing to the
+injurious consequences which it is likely to cause to the public peace. This clause does
+not take away the right of private defence of property. It does not affect clause 2 of
+"section 105, which allows a person to recover the property carried away by theft. It is"
+meant to prevent the resort to force in vindication of supposed rights. It makes a
+distinction between an admitted claim or an ascertained right and a disputed claim.36.
+Where five or more persons assemble for maintaining by force or show of force a right
+"which they bona fide believe they possess, and not for enforcing by such force or show"
+"of force a right or supposed right of theirs, they do not constitute an unlawful"
+assembly.37. An assembly of five or more persons cannot be designated as an unlawful
+assembly under this section if its object is to defend property by the use of force within
+the limits prescribed by law.38. But when a body of men are determined to vindicate
+"their rights, or supposed rights, by unlawful force, and when they engage in a fight with"
+"men who, on the other hand, are equally determined to vindicate, by unlawful force,"
+"their rights or supposed rights, no question of self-defence arises. Neither side is trying"
+"to protect itself, but each side is trying to get the better of the other.39."
+[s 143.8] Fifth clause—Compelling persons to act or omission.—
+"This clause is very comprehensive and applies to all the rights a man can possess,"
+whether they concern the enjoyment of property or not. There is no reference to 'any
+right or supposed right' as in the preceding clause.
+[s 143.9] Explanation.—
+An assembly which is lawful in its inception may become unlawful by the subsequent
+act of its members.40. It may turn unlawful all of a sudden and without previous
+"concert among its members.41. But illegal acts of one or two members, not acquiesced"
+"in by the others, do not change the character of the assembly.42. The law on the point"
+as stated above is approved by the Supreme Court in Moti Das.43.
+[s 143.10] Being member of unlawful assembly.—
+Section 142 shows that it is sufficient for the offence of riot to be proved against an
+individual that the individual should remain in an unlawful assembly as soon as he is
+"aware that the assembly is unlawful. The word ""continues"" in the section means"
+"physical presence as a member of the unlawful assembly, that is, to be physically"
+"present in the crowd.44. This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that mere"
+presence as a curious onlooker or bystander at the scene of the unlawful assembly
+"without sharing its common object would make a person liable under section 142, IPC,"
+"1860, for being a member of an unlawful assembly.45. Thus common object cannot be"
+attributed to a person from his mere presence at the scene of the occurrence. There
+must be some other direct or circumstantial evidence to justify that inference.46.
+For being a member of unlawful assembly it is not necessary that a person must
+commit some overt act towards the commission of the crime. The test is whether he
+knows of its common object and continues to keep its company due to his own free
+"will.47. Thus, where a large procession of Kannadigas, taken out to voice protest"
+"against Maharashtrians, turned violent, started pelting stones and attacking police"
+officers; the procession turned into an unlawful assembly the moment it developed the
+common object of causing damage to property and injuries to police officers.
+"Thereafter, every person who continued as a member of the assembly became liable"
+"for the offence committed by the processionalists by virtue of section 149 of IPC,"
+1860.48. If some unidentified members of an unlawful assembly behaved in an unruly
+"manner, the other members in the procession cannot be held guilty of the offence by"
+"foisting vicarious liability, merely because they were in the procession.49."
+[s 143.11] CASES.—Enforcement of right by use of criminal force.—Dispute
+regarding possession of land.—
+Where there was a dispute of long standing between the accused and certain other
+"parties regarding possession of certain land, and the accused went to sow the land"
+"with indigo, accompanied by a body of men armed with sticks who kept off the"
+"opposite party by brandishing their weapons while the land was sowed, it was held that"
+"they were guilty of this offence.50. Where the accused, who were in possession of the"
+"disputed land, went upon it in a large body armed with sticks, prepared in anticipation"
+"of a fight, and were reaping the paddy grown by them, when the complainant's party"
+"came up and attempted to cut the same, whereupon a fight ensued and one man was"
+"seriously wounded and died subsequently, it was held that the common object was not"
+to enforce a right but to maintain undisturbed the actual enjoyment of a right and that
+the assembly was not therefore unlawful.51.
+"2. State of Haryana v Shakuntla, (2012) 5 SCC 171 [LNIND 2012 SC 1259] : JT 2012 (4) SC 287 :"
+AIR 2012 (SCW) 2952 : 2012 Cr LJ 2850 .
+"3. Bharat Soni v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 486 (SC) : 2013 (1) Mad LJ (Cr) 94 : 2013 (1)"
+Crimes 66 .
+"4. Gurmail Singh v State of Pumjab, 2013 (4) SCC 228 [LNIND 2012 SC 864] : 2013 (2) SCC (Cr)"
+369.
+"5. Matti Venkanna, (1922) 46 Mad 257."
+"6. Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law, Article 90."
+"7. Mohan Singh's case, AIR 1963 SC 174 [LNIND 1962 SC 118] : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 100 ."
+"8. Suresh Pal v State of UP, AIR 1981 SC 1161 : 1981 Cr LJ 624 : 1981 All LJ 562 : 1981 Supp"
+SCC 6 .
+"9. Mohan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174 [LNIND 1962 SC 118] : 1963 (1) Cr LJ 100"
+10. Supra.
+"11. Shaji v State, (2011) 5 SCC 423 [LNIND 2011 SC 481] : AIR 2011 SC 1825 [LNIND 2011 SC"
+"481] : 2011 Cr LJ 2935 (SC). See also Roy Fernandes v State of Goa, (2012) 3 SCC 221 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 86] : 2012 Cr LJ 1542 (SC).
+"12. Subran v State of Kerala, 1993 Cr LJ 1387 (SC) : AIR 1993 SCW 1014 : (1993) 3 SCC 32"
+"[LNIND 1993 SC 162] , 39."
+"13. Ram Chandra Chaudhary v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 1488 (All). Over a dozen persons"
+"prosecuted, others acquitted, only two convicted of whom one died, the remaining one convict"
+"entitled to acquittal on the same grounds, see Malkiat Singh v State of Punjab, 1994 Cr LJ 623 :"
+AIR 1993 SCW 4071 .
+"14. Motiram, (1960) 62 Bom LR 514 ; Kartar Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1787 [LNIND 1961 SC 210] :"
+1961 (2) Cr LJ 853 .
+"15. Ram Tahal, 1972 Cr LJ 227 (SC); Amir Hussain, 1975 Cr LJ 1874 : AIR 1975 SC 2211 ;"
+"Methala Potturaju v State of AP, (1992) 1 SCC 49 [LNIND 1991 SC 448] : AIR 1991 SC 2214"
+[LNIND 1991 SC 448] : 1991 Cr LJ 3133 : AIR 1991 SC 2214 [LNIND 1991 SC 448] .
+"16. Sahebrao Kisan Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 339 (Bom) : 1992 (1) Bom CR 423"
+[LNIND 1991 BOM 410] .
+"17. Bhanwar Singh v State of MP, (2008) 16 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : AIR 2009 SC 768"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : (2008) 67 AIC 133 .
+"18. KM Ravi v State of Karnataka, (2009) 16 SC 337 ; Baladin, AIR 1956 SC 181 : 1956 Cr LJ 345 ."
+"See also Masalti v State of UP, AIR 1965 SC 202 [LNIND 1964 SC 173] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 226 ; and"
+"Bishambar, AIR 1971 SC 2381 : 1971 Cr LJ 1700 ; followed in Babu Hamidkhan Mestry v State of"
+"Maharashtra, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2355 (Bom) cited in Binay Kumar Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC"
+322 [LNIND 1996 SC 2707] : 1997 AIR SCW 78 : (1997) 1 SCC 283 [LNIND 1996 SC 2707] : 1997
+"Cr LJ 362 , to the effect that where a larger number of persons are accused of committing a"
+"crime and are charged with the aid of section 149, the court should be extremely careful in"
+"scrutinising the evidence and there should be two, three or more witness who should be"
+"consistent. This ruling was applied in Kamaksha Rai v State of UP, AIR 2000 SC 53 [LNIND 1999"
+"SC 885] : 2000 Cr LJ 178 . See also Thankappan Mohanan v State of Kerala, 1990 Cr LJ 1477 ;"
+"Chinu Patel v State of Orissa, 1990 Cr LJ 248 (Ori)."
+"19. Uday Singh v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 393 ."
+"20. Raj Nath v State of UP, AIR 2009 SC 1422 [LNIND 2009 SC 59] : (2009) 4 SCC 334 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 59] : (2009) 1 SCR 336 : JT 2009 (1) SC 373 [LNIND 2009 SC 85] ; (2009) 2 SCC (Cr)
+289.
+"21. Uday Singh v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 393 ."
+"22. Raj Nath v State of UP, AIR 2009 SC 1422 [LNIND 2009 SC 59] : (2009) 4 SCC 334 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 59] : (2009) 1 SCR 336 : JT 2009 (1) SC 373 [LNIND 2009 SC 85] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cr)
+289.
+"23. Akbar Sheikh v State of WB, (2009) 7 SCC 415 [LNIND 2009 SC 1106] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+431.
+"24. Amrik Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 AIR SCW 2482 : 1993 Cr LJ 2857 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC"
+320 .
+"25. SP Sinha v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 SC 1791 : 1992 Cr LJ 2754 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC"
+658 .
+"26. Thakore Dolji Vanvirji v State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 209 : 1992 Cr LJ 3953 ."
+"27. Bhanwar Singh v State of MP, (2008) 16 SCC 657 [LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : AIR 2009 SC 768"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1246] : (2008) 67 AIC 133 . There was no right of private defence in the
+"circumstances, the accused persons were aggressors and such persons cannot claim benefit of"
+private defence.
+"28. Bharat Soni v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 486 (SC) 2013 (1) Mad LJ (Cr) 94 : 2013 (1)"
+Crimes 66 .
+"29. Rajendra Shantaram Todankar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 1110 [LNIND 2003 SC 4] :"
+2003 (2) SCC 257 [LNIND 2003 SC 4] .
+"30. Abdul Hamid, (1922) 2 Pat 134 (SB)."
+"31. Ramendrachandra Ray, (1931) 58 Cal 1303 ."
+"32. Narain, (1875) 7 NWP 209."
+"33. State of UP v Niyamat, (1987) 1 SCC 434 : AIR 1987 SC 1652 [LNIND 1987 SC 391] : 1987 Cr"
+LJ 1881 .
+"34. Manga @ Man Singh v State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 629 [LNIND 2013 SC 529] : 2013"
+Cr LJ 3332 .
+"35. Noorul Huda Maqbool Ahmed v Ram Deo Tyagi, (2011) 7 SCC 95 [LNIND 2011 SC 570] : 2011"
+Cr LJ 4264 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 31.
+"36. Gulam Hoosein, (1909) 11 Bom LR 849 ."
+"37. Veerabadra Pillai v State, (1927) 51 Mad 91."
+"38. Mathu Pandey, (1970) 1 SCR 358 [LNIND 1969 SC 516] : AIR 1970 SC 27 [LNIND 1969 SC"
+516] .
+"39. Prag Dat, (1898) 20 All 459 ; Kabiruddin, (1908) 35 Cal 368 ; Maniruddin, (1908) 35 Cal 384 ."
+"See also Onkarnath, 1974 Cr LJ 1015 : AIR 1974 SC 1550 [LNIND 1974 SC 154] ; Vishvas v State,"
+1978 Cr LJ 484 : AIR 1978 SC 414 [LNIND 1978 SC 17] .
+"40. Khemee Singh, (1864) 1 WR (Cr) 18; Lokenath Kar, (1872) 18 WR (Cr) 2."
+"41. Ragho Singh, (1902) 6 Cal WN 507."
+"42. Dinobundo Rai, (1868) 9 WR (Cr) 19."
+"43. Moti Das, AIR 1954 SC 657 at p 659."
+"44. Sheo Dayal v State, (1933) 55 All 689 ."
+"45. Baladin, 1956 Cr LJ 345 : AIR 1956 SC 181 ; Hanuman Singh, 1969 Cr LJ 359 (All); Md"
+"Shariff, 1969 Cr LJ 1351 (Bom); Musakhan, 1976 Cr LJ 1987 : AIR 1976 SC 2566 ; Muthu Naicker"
+"v State of WB, 1978 Cr LJ 1713 (SC). To the same effect, State of Karnataka v Mallu Kallappa"
+"Patil, 1994 Cr LJ 952 : AIR 1994 SC 784 : 1994 Supp (3) SCC 352 ."
+"46. R Deb, Principles of Criminology, Criminal Law and Investigation, 2nd Edn, vol II, p 862. See"
+"also Akbar Sheikh v State of WB, (2009) 7 SCC 415 [LNIND 2009 SC 1106] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"431; Rattiram v State of MP, through Inspector of Police, 2013 Cr LJ 2353 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW)"
+2456.
+"47. Apren Joseph, 1972 Cr LJ 1162 (Ker); See also Balwant Singh, 1972 Cr LJ 645 : AIR 1972 SC"
+860 [LNIND 1972 SC 94] .
+"48. Kutubuddin Hasansab Mahat, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 155 (Kant); See also Moti Das, 1954 Cr LJ"
+"1708 : AIR 1954 SC 657 ; Sukha, 1956 Cr LJ 923 : AIR 1956 SC 513 [LNIND 1956 SC 30] ;"
+"Chandrika Prasad, 1972 Cr LJ 22 : AIR 1972 SC 109 [LNIND 1971 SC 453] ."
+"49. Jayendra Shantaram Dighe v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 2796 (Bom)."
+"50. Peary Mohun Sircar, (1883) 9 Cal 639 ."
+"51. Silajit Mahto, (1909) 36 Cal 865 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 144] Joining unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapon.
+"Whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything which, used as a"
+"weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an unlawful assembly,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Armed with deadly weapons.—This is an aggravated form of the offence mentioned in
+the last section. The risk to public tranquillity is aggravated by the intention of using
+force evinced by carrying arms. The enhanced punishment under this section can only
+be inflicted on that member of an unlawful assembly who is armed with a weapon of
+offence.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+"[s 145] Joining or continuing in unlawful assembly, knowing it has been"
+commanded to disperse.
+"Whoever joins or continues in an unlawful assembly, knowing that such unlawful"
+"assembly has been commanded in the manner prescribed by law to disperse, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Joining or continuing with unlawful assembly.—
+"This section is connected with section 151, infra. Section 188 of IPC, 1860 provides for"
+the disobedience of any lawful order promulgated by a public servant. Sections 145
+and 151 deal with special cases as the disobedience may cause serious breach of the
+"peace. As to the powers of the police to disperse an unlawful assembly, see section"
+"129, Criminal Procedure Code."
+[s 145.1] CASES.—
+Where an assembly did not by its own conduct become an unlawful assembly by
+"developing common object within the meaning of section 141, IPC, 1860, its members"
+"could not be convicted under section 145, IPC, by merely joining or continuing as its"
+"members.52. It may, however, be added here that members of such an assembly, even"
+"though not unlawful, could be prosecuted under section 151, IPC, if the order of"
+dispersal had been lawfully given in the bona fide exercise of police powers under
+"section 129, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973), with a view to preventing"
+a breach of the peace.53.
+"52. Jagmohan, 1977 Cr LJ 1394 (Ori)."
+"53. R Deb, Op Cit, vol II, pp 834–835; See also Duncan, supra."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 146] Rioting.
+"Whenever force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly,1 or by any member"
+"thereof, in prosecution of the common object2 of such assembly, every member of"
+such assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 147] Punishment for rioting.
+"Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"Rioting.—A riot is an unlawful assembly in a particular state of activity, which activity is"
+accompanied by the use of force or violence. It is only the use of force that
+distinguishes rioting from an unlawful assembly.54. Under the Common law when
+members of an unlawful assembly actually carry out their unlawful common purpose
+"with violence, so as to cause alarm, they are guilty of riot. For a successful prosecution"
+of a riot case the prosecution must prove:—
+(i) that there were five or more persons;
+(ii) that they had a common purpose;
+(iii) that they had begun to execute such purpose;
+"(iv) that they intended to help one another by force, if necessary;"
+(v) that they had shown such degree of violence which would alarm at least one
+person of reasonable courage.
+"This last mentioned fact need not be proved by calling a person, who has been so"
+alarmed but it may be made out from facts and circumstances of the case in hand.55.
+The ingredients mentioned in item numbers (iv) and (v) above are not to be found at all
+"in section 146 of IPC, 1860. Where some youths exceeding three were found"
+demolishing a wall but disappeared the moment the caretaker of the building appeared
+"at the scene, it was held that they could not be convicted of the offence of riot under"
+the common law as there was no evidence of show of violence sufficient to alarm one
+person of reasonable firmness and courage.56. In the Indian context in this very case
+the offence of rioting was complete the moment the youths used force to demolish the
+"wall for it was not necessary in the Indian law to use force or violence against a person,"
+far less to cause alarm to a person of reasonable courage and firmness. Force or
+"violence against an inanimate object too comes within the purview of section 146, IPC,"
+1860.57.
+[s 147.1] Ingredients.—
+The following are the essentials of the offence of rioting:—
+"(1) That the accused persons, being five or more in number, formed an unlawful"
+assembly.
+(2) That they were animated by a common object.
+(3) That force or violence was used by the unlawful assembly or any member of it in
+prosecution of the common object.
+1. 'Force or violence is used by an unlawful assembly'.—The word 'violence' is not
+"restricted to force used against persons only, but extends also to force against"
+inanimate objects.58. The words 'force' and 'violence' in this section connote different
+and distinct concepts. 'Force' is narrowed down by the definition under section 350 to
+persons while the word 'violence' includes violence to property and other inanimate
+objects.59.
+"The use of any force, even though it be of the slightest possible character, by any one"
+"of an assembly once established as unlawful, constitutes rioting.60. Where a member"
+of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of the assembly throws
+"down a man and then causes him bodily hurt, the offence of rioting under this section"
+is complete as soon as the man is thrown down by using force and the hurt
+subsequently caused would come under section 323 or section 325.61. The essential
+question in a case under section 147 is whether there was an unlawful assembly of five
+or more persons. The identity of the persons comprising the assembly is a matter
+relating to the determination of the guilt of the individual accused and even when it is
+"possible to convict less than five persons only, section 147 still applies, if upon the"
+evidence in the case the Court is able to hold that the person or persons who have been
+"found guilty were members of an assembly of five or more persons, known or unknown,"
+identified or unidentified.62. It has been held by the Supreme Court that this section is
+not attracted where the act in question was done in pursuit of a lawful object. In this
+case the investigating police party was being led by the witness to a spot for recovering
+the dead-body. The witness tried to run away and was beaten up with a lathi. He died
+shortly thereafter. The Supreme Court did not sustain the conviction of the police
+personnel under this section.63.
+2. 'In prosecution of the common object'.—Acts done by some members of an unlawful
+assembly outside the common object of the assembly or of such a nature as the
+members of the assembly could not have known to be likely to be committed in
+prosecution of that object are only chargeable against the actual perpetrators of those
+acts.64. It is obligatory on the part of the court to examine that if the offence
+"committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object, it yet may fall under"
+"second part of section 149, IPC, 1860, if the offence was such as the members knew"
+was likely to be committed. Further inference has to be drawn as what was the number
+of persons; how many of them were merely passive witnesses; what were their arms
+and weapons. Number and nature of injuries is also relevant to be considered.65.
+[s 147.2] 'Resistance to illegal warrant'.—
+Resistance to the execution of an illegal warrant within reasonable bounds does not
+"amount to rioting; but when the right of resistance is exceeded and a severe injury, not"
+"called for, is inflicted, the person who inflicts the injury may be convicted of such"
+injury.66.
+[s 147.3] 'Sudden quarrel'.—
+If a number of persons assembled for any lawful purpose suddenly quarrel without any
+"previous intention or design, they do not commit 'riot' in the legal sense of the word.67."
+[s 147.4] 'Fundamental principles in cases of mammoth rioting'.—
+(1) Notwithstanding the large number of rioters or of the persons put up in Court for
+"rioting, and the consequent difficulty for the prosecution to name the specific acts"
+"attributed to each of the accused, the Court must see to it that all the ingredients"
+required for unlawful assembly and rioting are strictly proved by the prosecution before
+"convicting the particular accused persons.68.(2) Spectators, wayfarers, etc., attracted"
+"to the scene of the rioting by curiosity, should not be, by reason of their mere presence"
+"at the scene of rioting and with the rioters, held to be members of the unlawful"
+"assembly or rioters. But of course, if they are proved to have marched with the rioters"
+"for a long distance, when the rioters were shouting tell-tale slogans and pelting stones,"
+it will be for them to prove their innocence under section 106 of the Indian Evidence
+"Act, 1872. (3) It will be very unsafe, in the case of such a large mob of rioters, to rely on"
+the evidence of a single witness speaking to the presence of an accused in that mob for
+"convicting him, especially when no overt act of violence, or shouting of slogan, or"
+"organising the mob, or giving orders to it or marching in procession with it, or other"
+"similar thing is proved against him. In a big riot by hundreds of persons, it is very easy"
+"even to mistake one person for another, and to implicate honestly really innocent"
+"persons, and even, to mistake persons seen elsewhere as having been seen there. An"
+ordinary rule of caution and prudence will require that an accused person identified
+"only by one witness, and not proved to have done any overt act, etc., as described"
+"above, should be acquitted, by giving him the benefit of the doubt. (4) Where there are"
+acute factions based on either agrarian disputes and troubles or on political wrangling
+"and rivalry or on caste divisions or on divisions of the ""haves"" and the ""have-nots,"" the"
+greatest care must be exercised before believing the evidence of a particular witness
+belonging to one of these factions against an accused of the opposite view. This
+"principle becomes of special importance when there are no overt acts, etc., proved, and"
+when there are only one or two witnesses speaking to the presence of the accused
+"among the rioters, and they belong to the classes or factions opposed to the accused."
+"(5) Mere followers in rioting deserve a much more lenient sentence than leaders, who"
+"mislead them into such violent acts, by emotional appeals, slogans and cries.69."
+[s 147.5] Offence Compoundable:
+"When an offence is compoundable under section 320 of Cr PC, 1973, and where the"
+accused is liable under section 34 or 149 of IPC (45 of 1860) it may be compounded in
+like manner.70.
+[s 147.6] CASES.—
+"Where several Hindus, acting in concert, forcibly removed an ox and two cows from the"
+"possession of a Mohammedan, not for the purpose of causing 'wrongful gain' to"
+"themselves or 'wrongful loss' to the owner of the cattle, but for the purpose of"
+"preventing the killing of the cows, it was held that they were guilty of rioting.71. There"
+was a dispute about the possession of a certain land between the complainant and the
+accused. The complainant dug a well with a view to cultivate the said land. The
+accused forcibly entered on the land and damaged the well. It was held that the
+accused were guilty under this section as an accused person is not entitled to go upon
+"his own land and by violence destroy the property of the complainant, even though a"
+trespasser.72.
+[s 147.7] No unlawful assembly.—
+The accused on receiving information that the complainant's party were about to take
+"forcible possession of a plot of their land, collected a number of men, some of whom"
+"were armed, and went to the land. While they were engaged in ploughing, the"
+"complainant's party came up and interfered with the ploughing. A fight ensued, in the"
+course of which one of the complainant's party was grievously wounded and
+"subsequently died, and two of the accused's party were hurt. It was held that the"
+accused were justified in taking such precautions as they thought were required to
+"prevent the aggression, and that they were not members of an unlawful assembly.73."
+[s 147.8] Free fight.—
+In a free fight there cannot be said to be any formation of an unlawful assembly and
+common intention. Each accused will be responsible for his individual act.74.
+[s 147.9] Separate trials.—
+"Where two opposite factions commit a riot, it is illegal to treat both parties as"
+"constituting one unlawful assembly and to try them together, as they cannot have one"
+common object within the meaning of section 141; each party should be tried
+separately.75.
+"54. Rasul, (1888) PR No. 4 of 1889."
+"55. Sharp, Johnson, (1957) 1 QB 522 , per Lord Goddard, CJ."
+"56. Field v Metropolitan Police Receiver, (1907) 2 KB 853 ."
+"57. Kalidas, 48 Cr LJ 351 (Cal)."
+"58. Samaruddi, (1912) 40 Cal 367 ."
+"59. Lakshmiammal v Samiappa, AIR 1968 Mad 310 [LNIND 1967 MAD 171] ; Kalidas, 48 Cr LJ"
+351 (Cal).
+"60. Koura Khan v State, (1868) PR No. 34 of 1868; Ramadeen Doobay, (1876) 26 WR (Cr) 6."
+"61. Parmeshwar, (1940) 16 Luck 51 ."
+"62. Kapildeo Singh, (1949–1950) FCR 834 : 52 Bom LR 512."
+"63. Maiku v State of UP, AIR 1989 SC 67 : 1989 Cr LJ 360 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 25 ."
+"64. Agra, (1914) PR No. 37 of 1914. Vishal Singh v State of MP, AIR 1998 SC 308 [LNIND 1997"
+"SC 1362] : 1998 Cr LJ 505 . See also Kania v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 50 (Raj). Bhanwarlal"
+"v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 3489 (Raj), fight between main accused and deceased over"
+"possession of land, other persons who were present at the spot and played no role could not be"
+roped in.
+"65. Ramachandran v State, (2011) 9 SCC 257 [LNIND 2011 SC 854] : AIR 2011 SC 3581 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 854] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 677.
+"66. Uma Charan Singh, (1901) 29 Cal 244 ."
+"67. Khajah Noorul Hoossein v C Fabre-Tonnerre, (1875) 24 WR (Cr) 26; State of UP v Jodha Singh,"
+"AIR 1989 SC 1822 : 1989 Cr LJ 2113 : (1989) 3 SCC 465 , a verbal quarrel converting itself into"
+"armed group conflict, held not punishable under this section or section 108."
+"68. See Sherey v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 3289 : AIR 1991 SC 2246 , where the Supreme Court"
+observed that it would be safe to convict only those whose presence was consistently
+established by the evidence appearing from the stage of the First Information Report and to
+whom covert acts of violence were attributed. Kutumbaka Krishna Mohan Rao v Public
+"Prosecutor, AIR 1991 SC 314 : 1991 Cr LJ 1711 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 509 , how presence is to be"
+"established. Budhwa v State of MP, AIR 1991 SC 4 [LNIND 1990 SC 580] : 1990 Cr LJ 2597 ,"
+where the conviction of only four out of fifteen accused was upheld because evidence
+established only their participation in the attack.
+"69. Arulanandu, (1952) Mad 728. See also Toseswar Chutia v State of Assam, 2002 Cr LJ 1465"
+"(Gau); Bhima v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3086 [LNIND 2002 SC 528] (Bom)."
+"70. Section 320 (3), Cr PC, 1973."
+"71. Raghunath Rai v State, (1892) 15 All 22 ."
+"72. Abdul Hussain, (1943) Kar 7 . See Ajab v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 827 : 1989 Cr LJ"
+954 : (1989) Supp (1) SCC 601 .
+"73. Pachkauri, (1897) 24 Cal 686 ; Fateh Singh, (1913) 41 Cal 43 . K Ashokan v State of Kerala,"
+"AIR 1998 SC 1974 [LNIND 1998 SC 223] : 1998 Cr LJ 2834 , names of miscreants not mentioned"
+"by eye-witnesses in the FIR, miscreants mentioned in the investigation report which included"
+certain names in different ink. False implication could not be ruled out. Benefit of doubt to
+"accused persons. State of UP v Dan Singh, 1997 Cr LJ 1159 : AIR 1997 SC 1654 [LNIND 1997 SC"
+"162] , the members of marriage party of a scheduled caste, were assaulted by villagers by sticks"
+and stones. Some of them were burnt alive inside the house of the victims. The accused
+"persons were held liable to be convicted under sections 147, 302/149, 436/149, 323/149 and"
+"sections 307/149. Lakhu Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 3638 (Raj), lathi is not a deadly"
+"weapon, lathi bearing accused could not be convicted under section 148. Conviction altered to"
+one under section 147.
+"74. Mangal Singh v State of MP, 1996 Cr LJ 1908 (MP)."
+"75. Hossein Buksh, (1880) 6 Cal 96 ; Bachu Mullah v Sia Ram Singh, (1886) 14 Cal 358 ; Chandra"
+"Bhuiya, (1892) 20 Cal 537 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 148] Rioting armed with deadly weapon.
+"Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything"
+"which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"Rioting with deadly weapons.—Similar to section 144, this section is an aggravated"
+form of the offence mentioned in the previous section. Enhanced punishment is
+provided for the person who is armed with a deadly weapon while committing the
+offence of rioting. This section cannot be read with section 149.76.
+Where out of the 45 accused persons convicted by the High Court 36 had been
+"identified as members of the assembly by a solitary witness, the Supreme Court said"
+that it was not safe to place reliance in reference to the accused about whom no other
+witness said that they were a part of the assembly. Their conviction was held to be
+"unsustainable. So far as the remaining accused were concerned, the prosecution had"
+proved the charge against them under section 148 and therefore their acquittal by the
+High Court was not justified.77.
+"Where several persons assaulted the victim, the court said that it was not necessary"
+that the death of the victim must be attributed to a particular injury or to a particular
+assailant. All of them are liable for conviction for causing death of the victim with the
+common object of the unlawful assembly.78.
+[s 148.1] Charge under section 147/148; Conviction under section 149.—
+"The Constitution Bench in Mahadev Sharma v State of Bihar,79. held that if a charge had"
+been framed under section 147 or section 148 and that charge had failed against any
+of the accused then section 149 could not have been used against him. The area which
+is common to sections 147 and 149 is the substratum on which different degrees of
+liability are built and there cannot be a conviction with the aid of section 149 when
+there is no evidence of such substratum. The accused have been expressly charged for
+"the offence punishable under section 148, IPC, 1860, and have been acquitted"
+"thereunder, they cannot be legally convicted for the offence punishable under section"
+"302 read with section 149, IPC. It is so because the offence of rioting must occur when"
+members are charged with murder as the common object of the unlawful assembly.
+"The offences under sections 147 and 148 are distinct offences.80. Section 148, IPC"
+creates liability on persons armed with deadly weapons and is a distinct offence and
+there is no requirement in law that members of unlawful assembly have also to be
+"charged under section 148, IPC for legally recording their conviction under section 302"
+"read with section 149, IPC. However, where an accused is charged under section 148,"
+"IPC and acquitted, conviction of such accused under section 302 read with section"
+"149, IPC could not be legally recorded.81."
+"76. Vasu Pillai v State, 1956 Cr LJ 1358 ; Nand Kishore v State, AIR 1961 Ori. 29 [LNIND 1959 ORI"
+"52] ; Re VS Reddy, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 70 ."
+"77. State of AP v Rayaneedi Sitharamaiah, (2008) 16 SCC 179 [LNIND 2008 SC 2492] . Mohd"
+"Ishaq v S Kazam Pasha, (2009) 12 SCC 748 [LNIND 2009 SC 1173] : 2009 Cr LJ 3063 , a mob"
+60–70 persons armed with deadly weapons entered a house and forcibly removed household
+"articles and took them away on a lorry, person at whose instance they acted, held liable."
+"78. Nand Kishore v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 5079 (Pat). See also Raju v State of Rajasthan,"
+(2007) 10 SCC 289 [LNIND 2007 SC 591] .
+"79. Mahadev Sharma v State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 302 [LNIND 1965 SC 143] : 1965 (1) SCR 18 :"
+1966 Cr LJ 1971 .
+"80. Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, AIR 2018 SC 2472 [LNIND 2018 SC"
+300] .
+"81. Ankoos v Public Prosecutor High Court of AP, (2010) 1 SCC 94 [LNIND 2010 SC 713] : JT"
+2009 (14) SC 6 [LNIND 2009 SC 1959] : AIR 2010 SC 566 [LNIND 2009 SC 1959] : 2010 Cr LJ
+861 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 460.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 149] Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in
+prosecution of common object.
+If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of
+"the common object1 of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew"
+"to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the"
+"time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of"
+that offence.
+COMMENT—
+Liability of every member.—The Supreme Court has held that this section does not
+create a separate offence but only declares the vicarious liability of all the members of
+an unlawful assembly for acts done in prosecution of the common object of that
+assembly or for such offences as the members of the unlawful assembly knew to be
+"likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.82. However, Benches of a smaller"
+strength in some cases83. have observed that section 149 creates a specific and
+distinct offence. Thus the law declared therein by the Benches of a smaller strength
+cannot be taken as correct legal position.84. This section creates a specific and distinct
+offence.85. It is not the intention of the legislature in enacting section 149 to render
+every member of unlawful assembly liable to punishment for every offence committed
+"by one or more of its members. In order to attract section 149, it must be shown that"
+the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common object of unlawful
+assembly and it must be within the knowledge of other members as one likely to be
+committed in prosecution of the common object.86. A plain reading of the section
+shows that the provision is in two parts. The first part deals with cases in which an
+"offence is committed by any member of the assembly ""in prosecution of the common"
+"object"" of that assembly. The second part deals with cases where the commission of a"
+given offence is not by itself the common object of the unlawful assembly but
+members of such assembly 'knew that the same is likely to be committed in
+prosecution of the common object of the assembly'.87. This section makes both the
+"categories of persons, those who have committed the offence as also those who were"
+"members of the same assembly liable for the offences under section 149, IPC, 1860,"
+"provided the other requirements of the section are satisfied. That is to say, if an offence"
+"is committed by any person of an unlawful assembly, which the members of that"
+"assembly knew to be likely to be committed, every member of such an assembly is"
+guilty of the offence. The law is clear that membership of unlawful assembly is
+sufficient to hold such participating members vicariously liable. For mulcting liability on
+"the members of an unlawful assembly under section 149, it is not necessary that every"
+member of the unlawful assembly should commit the offence in prosecution of the
+common object of the assembly. Mere knowledge of the likelihood of commission of
+such an offence by the members of the assembly is sufficient.88. Whenever the court
+"convicts any person or persons of any offence with the aid of section 149, a clear"
+finding regarding the common object of the assembly must be given and the evidence
+disclosed must show not only the nature of the common object but also that the object
+was unlawful. If members of the assembly knew or were aware of the likelihood of a
+"particular offence being committed in prosecution of a common object, they would be"
+liable for the same under section 149.89. In the absence of such finding as also any
+"overt act on the part of the accused persons, mere fact that they were armed would not"
+be sufficient to prove common object.90. Where the moot question as to common
+objective is proved all the members of unlawful assembly would be vicariously liable
+for the acts done by the said assembly and thus the separate roles played by all the
+accused persons need not be examined.91. Section 149 makes it abundantly clear that
+if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of
+"the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew"
+"to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time"
+"of the committing of that offence is a member of such an assembly, is guilty of that"
+"offence, however if a person is a mere bystander, and no specific role is attributed to"
+"him, he may not come under the wide sweep contemplated under section 149.92."
+Further where the member had no knowledge of the unlawful object of the assembly or
+"after having gained knowledge, he attempted to prevent the assembly from"
+"accomplishing the unlawful object, and after having failed to do so, he disassociated"
+"himself from the assembly, the mere participation of him in such an assembly would"
+not be made him liable.93.
+The section constitutes a substantive offence.94.
+The Supreme Court reiterated the ambit and scope of this principle of liability as
+follows:
+Section 149 IPC provides for vicarious liability. If an offence is committed by any member of
+an unlawful assembly in prosecution of a common object thereof or such as the members
+of that assembly knew that the offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of that
+"object, every person who at the time of committing that offence was member would be"
+guilty of the offence committed. The common object may be commission of one offence
+"while there may be likelihood of commission of yet another offence, the knowledge whereof"
+is capable of being safely attributable to the members of the unlawful assembly. Whether a
+member of such unlawful assembly was aware as regards likelihood of commission of
+another offence or not would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
+"Background of the incident, the motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms"
+"carried by the members of the assembly, their common object and the behaviour of the"
+"members soon before, at or after the actual commission of the crime would be relevant"
+"factors for drawing an inference in that behalf.""95. ""Common object"" means the purpose or"
+design shared by all the members which may be formed at any stage. It has to be
+ascertained from the acts and conduct of the individuals concerned and surrounding
+circumstances.96. Common object to commit a murder cannot be inferred only on the basis
+that the weapons carried by the accused were dangerous.97.
+[s 149.1] Ingredients.—
+The section has the following essentials—
+1. There must be an unlawful assembly.
+2. Commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful assembly.
+3. Such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of
+the assembly; or must be such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be
+"committed. If these three elements are satisfied, then only a conviction under section"
+"149, IPC, 1860, may be substantiated, and not otherwise.98. Section 149 shall not apply"
+"to a person who is merely present in any unlawful assembly, unless he actively"
+participates in offence or does some overt act with the necessary criminal intention or
+shares the common object of the unlawful assembly.99.
+[s 149.2] Sudden action of one of the member in the assembly; all are not
+liable:
+To the question whether the sudden action of one of the members of the unlawful
+assembly constitutes an act in prosecution of the common object of the unlawful
+assembly namely preventing of erection of the fence in question and whether the
+members of the unlawful assembly knew that such an offence was likely to be
+committed by any member of the assembly Supreme Court answered in the
+"negative.100. As a consequence, the effect of section 149 of IPC, 1860, may be"
+different on different members of the same unlawful assembly. Decisions of the
+Supreme Court in Gangadhar Behera v State of Orissa and Bishnaalias
+"BhiswadebMahato v State of WB,101. similarly explained and reiterated the legal position"
+on the subject.
+[s 149.3] Sections 34 and 149.—
+"There is a difference between object and intention, for though their object is common,"
+the intention of the several members may differ and indeed may be similar only in
+"respect that they are all unlawful, while the element of participation in action, which is"
+"the leading feature of section 34, is replaced in section 149 by membership of the"
+assembly at the time of the committing of the offence. Both sections deal with
+"combinations of persons, who become punishable as sharers in an offence. Thus they"
+"have a certain resemblance and may to some extent overlap, but section 149 cannot at"
+any rate relegate section 34 to the position of dealing only with joint action by the
+"commission of identically similar criminal acts, a kind of case which is not in itself"
+"deserving of separate treatment at all"".102. Section 34 of IPC, 1860 refers to cases in"
+which several persons both do an act and intend to do that act: it does not refer to
+cases where several persons intend to do an act and some one or more of them do an
+entirely different act. In the latter class of cases section 149 of the Code may be
+"applicable but section 34 is not.103. On the other hand, if five or more persons both do"
+"an act and intend to do it, both section 34 and section 149, may apply, since the term"
+"""member"" in the singular includes the plural also (section 9). In this connection see"
+"detailed discussion and cases under sub-head ""Distinction between section 34 and"
+"section 149, IPC, 1860,"" under section 34 ante."
+[s 149.4] Scope.—
+This section is not intended to subject a member of an unlawful assembly to
+punishment for every offence which is committed by one of its members during the
+time they are engaged in the prosecution of the common object. It is divided into two
+parts: (1) an offence committed by a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution
+of the common object of that assembly; and (2) an offence such as the members of
+that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object
+"of the unlawful assembly, is one which the accused knew would be likely to be"
+committed in prosecution of the common object.104. The section applies equally in
+cases where offences are committed by single member of the assembly and in cases
+where offences are committed by two or more members of the assembly acting in
+furtherance of a common intention.105.
+Once the Court can find that an offence has been committed by some member or
+"members of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object, then whether"
+"the principal offender has been convicted for that offence or not, upon the plain"
+"wording of this section, the other members may be constructively convicted of that"
+"offence, provided they are found to have had the necessary intention or knowledge. It is"
+not correct to say that when a member of an unlawful assembly is to be found
+"constructively guilty of an offence under this section, it must be the same offence of"
+which the principal is convicted and not some other offence.106.
+Members of an unlawful assembly may have a community of object only up to a certain
+"point, beyond which they may differ in their objects, and the knowledge possessed by"
+each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object
+"will vary, not only according to the information at his command, but also according to"
+"the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this"
+the effect of this section may be different on different members of the same unlawful
+assembly.107.
+"Before this section can be called in aid, the Court must find with 'certainty' that there"
+were at least five persons sharing the common object. A finding that three of them
+'may or may not have been there' betrays uncertainty on this vital point and it
+consequently becomes impossible to allow the conviction to rest on this uncertain
+foundation. This is not to say that five persons must always be convicted before this
+section can be applied. It is possible in some cases for Judges to conclude that though
+"five were unquestionably there the identity of one or more is in doubt. In that case, the"
+conviction of the rest with the aid of this section would be good.108. Non-applicability
+"of section 149, IPC, 1860, is no bar in convicting the accused persons under section"
+"302, IPC read with section 34 of IPC, if the evidence discloses commission of offence"
+in furtherance of common intention of them all. It would depend on the facts of each
+case as to whether section 34 or section 149 of IPC or both the provisions are
+"attracted.109. Where the accused, forming an unlawful assembly, chased and killed a"
+"man by inflicting multiple injuries on his body with sharp edged weapons, it was held"
+that circumstances and transaction taken as a whole were sufficient to invoke section
+34 or section 149.110.
+No judgment can be cited as a precedent however similar the facts may be. Each case
+must rest on its own facts.111.
+The persons acting in self-defence of property cannot be members of an unlawful
+assembly.112.
+"1. 'In prosecution of the common object'.—The expression ""in prosecution of common"
+"object"" has to be strictly construed as equivalent to ""in order to attain the common"
+"object"". There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a"
+"particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have"
+community of object up to certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects
+"and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in"
+prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at
+"his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of"
+"object, and as a consequence of this the effect of section 149, IPC, 1860, may be"
+"different on different members of the same assembly.113. The word ""knew"" as used in"
+"the second branch of section 149 implied something more than ""possibility"" and it"
+"cannot bear the sense of ""might have known"". An offence committed in prosecution of"
+common object would generally be the offence which the members of the assembly
+knew was likely to be committed.114. This phrase means that the offence committed
+"was immediately connected with the common object of the unlawful assembly, of"
+which the accused were members. The act must be one which must have been done
+with a view to accomplish the common object attributed to the members of the
+"unlawful assembly. Where the common object is established, the unlawful assembly"
+does not cease to be so by merely splitting itself into two groups for launching the
+"attack. Section 149, IPC, 1860, would be clearly applicable to such a case.115."
+"The words ""in prosecution of the common object"" do not mean ""during the prosecution"
+"of the common object of the assembly"". It means that the offence committed was"
+immediately connected with the common object of the assembly or the act is one
+which upon the evidence appears to have been done with a view to accomplish the
+"common object attributed to the members of the assembly. The words ""in prosecution"
+"of the common object"" have to be strictly construed as equivalent to ""in order to attain"
+"common object"".116. In the present case,117. the common object of unlawful assembly"
+was to kill a particular person. Two members of the assembly went after him. Sensing
+"danger, he ran into the adjoining room to fetch a spear to defend himself. His wife"
+"blocked his way and he could not come out. Frustrated, as they were, the two members"
+of the assembly gunned down two young girls of their intended victim who were then
+playing in the courtyard outside the house. The conviction of the rest of the members
+"for this murder was set aside as this was neither their common object, nor incidental to"
+"that, nor necessary for its attainment."
+Vicarious responsibility can be fastened only on proof that the ultimate act was done in
+pursuance of common object.118.
+"Even where the common object is not developed at the initial stage, it may develop on"
+"the spot, eoinstanti. Thus, where it appeared that members of a party divided"
+themselves into small groups and waited for the victim and simultaneously pounced
+"upon him and jointly removed his body, the fact that they did not assemble at one place"
+"under any plan, but came there separately, was considered by the Supreme Court to be"
+not of much importance because at the sensitive moment they seemed to be acting in
+"an organised way.119. Where, however, the agreement specifically was only to give a"
+"thrashing to the victim, but one of them pulled out a knife and stabbed the victim, it was"
+"held that neither at the initial stage nor at the execution stage, could it be said that"
+there was the object to cause a fatal injury so as to make all others liable for the
+death.120.
+[s 149.5] Change of object.—
+Members who shared the original common intention may not be liable when some
+members adopted a subsequently developed and aggravated common object and
+acted on it.121.
+[s 149.6] CASES.—Prosecution of common object.—
+"While membership of an unlawful assembly itself is an offence under section 143, IPC,"
+"1860, use of force by members of the unlawful assembly gives rise to the offence of"
+"rioting which is punishable either under section 147 or section 148, IPC. Membership"
+of the 4 accused in the unlawful assembly and use of force with dangerous weapons is
+borne out by the evidence on record. The said facts would make the acquitted accused
+"liable for the offence under section 148 of IPC, 1860.122. Where a small compact body"
+"of men armed with clubs, and headed by a man carrying a gun, endeavoured to take"
+"forcible possession of certain lands, and one of the opponents was shot by their leader,"
+it was held that they were guilty of murder.123.
+Where in a faction- ridden village the members of one party seeing someone of the
+"other party alighting from a bus emerged together to attack him, it could be easily said"
+that they shared the common object to assault one of their enemies and at that stage
+the assembly turned into an unlawful assembly.124. Where several persons assaulted
+"and caused injuries to the deceased, however except one incised injury on the head, all"
+"were lacerated injuries on legs, common object of the unlawful assembly was held to"
+cause grievous hurt and not murder and conviction of the accused was altered from
+"sections 302/ 149 to sections 326/149.125. Where the accused, being members of an"
+"unlawful assembly and being armed with sharp edged weapons, used only the blunt"
+"sides of their weapons, they were held to share the common object of causing grievous"
+hurt and not murder.57 Accused persons variously armed entered a police wireless
+station after breaking open doors and windows and assaulted inmates. Their individual
+acts were not known. It was held that all the accused persons must be deemed to have
+shared the common object of lurking house trespass and could be convicted under
+sections 149/455.126. Where two innocent young girls were killed in a very gruesome
+"manner just only to teach a lesson to their mother over a property dispute, every"
+member of the killing team was held to be equally guilty deserving the maximum
+"penalty of death, it being a case of the ""rarest of rare"" category.127. Where the death of"
+a police officer was caused while he was arresting the accused and those who caught
+"hold of him intended only to prevent him from performing his duty, but the main"
+"accused suddenly killed him, it was held that the common object of the unlawful"
+assembly was to deter police from performing their duty and not to commit murder.
+Their conviction was altered from one under sections 302/149 to one under section
+353/149.128. Several persons entered into a conspiracy to commit dacoity during the
+course of which one of the accused fired a shot which missed the target and hit one of
+his accomplices who died. The other accused fired a shot and killed one of the inmates
+of the house. The accused killing the inmate was convicted under sections 302 and
+"398. The three others were punished under section 398/149, their common object"
+being dacoity and not murder.129.
+The accused persons were armed with lathis and guns. They declared on entry into the
+"threshing floor mill that they had come to take away the paddy and, if the owner"
+"resisted, they would take life out of him. In these circumstances they caused death. s"
+conviction under section 300 read with section 149 was held to be not illegal.130.
+There is no requirement for conviction under the section of assigning definite roles to
+the accused persons.131.
+[s 149.7] Identification of all the five not necessary.—
+The section does not require that all the five persons must be identified. Presence of
+five persons is required to be established with the common object of doing an act. The
+fact that all of them could not be identified would not affect the application of the
+section. The eye-witnesses identified only four of them but testified that others were
+present with weapons at the time and place of occurrence.
+[s 149.8] Unlawful assembly and the right of private defence.—
+"As long as the accused persons exercised their right of private defence, their assembly"
+could not be described as unlawful. But only those accused persons who shared the
+object of doing something in excess of the right of private defence were liable to
+conviction with the help of section 149.132. Where the accused persons were acting in
+"the exercise of the right of private defence, the Supreme Court said that they could not"
+be said to have constituted an unlawful assembly. Only one of them caused an injury
+after the right of private defence had ceased to be available to them. They could not be
+convicted under section 148 with the aid of section 149.133.
+[s 149.9] Overt act on the part of each and every member not necessary.—
+The presence of the accused as a part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for his
+conviction. The fact that the accused was present at the place of occurrence as a part
+of the unlawful assembly was not disputed. That was held to be sufficient to hold him
+guilty even if no overt act was attributed to him.134. This principle may not apply where
+the presence is such that merely by its reason the person concerned does not become
+a member of the assembly. This happened in a case in which the names of only 4
+persons were mentioned in the complaint. Five other persons were not mentioned
+because they kept standing at the back without any participation in the incident. But
+they were also roped in under section 149. The Supreme Court held that they could not
+be regarded as members of the assembly. Their conviction was impermissible.135.
+Once a membership of an unlawful assembly is established it is not incumbent on the
+prosecution to establish whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any
+accused. Mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient and every member is
+vicariously liable for the acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common
+object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of the unlawful assembly
+knew were likely to be committed.136.
+[s 149.10] Inference of common object.—
+"The common object of the unlawful assembly has to be inferred from the membership,"
+the weapons used and the nature of the injuries as well as other surrounding
+"circumstances. Intention of members of unlawful assembly can be gathered by nature,"
+"number and location of injuries inflicted. In the instant case, repeated gun shots fired"
+by one of accused person on the person of deceased and the injuries caused by lathis
+"by other accused persons on the complainant and his second brother on their heads,"
+clearly demonstrate the objective to cause murder of these persons.137. Common
+object to commit a murder cannot be inferred only on the basis that the weapons
+carried by the accused were dangerous.138. The common object of assembly is
+normally to be gathered from the circumstances of each case such as the time and
+"place of the gathering of the assembly, the conduct of the gathering as distinguished"
+from the conduct of the individual members are indicative of the common object of the
+gathering. Assessing the common object of an assembly only on the basis of the overt
+acts committed by such individual members of the assembly is impermissible.139.
+[s 149.11] Identification of common object.—
+The identification of the common object essentially requires an assessment of the
+state of mind of the members of the unlawful assembly. Proof of such mental
+condition is normally established by inferential logic. If a large number of people gather
+at a public place at the dead of night armed with deadly weapons like axes and fire
+"arms and attack another person or group of persons, any member of the attacking"
+group would have to be a moron in intelligence if he did not know murder would be a
+likely consequence.140.
+[s 149.12] No common object.—
+A large body of men belonging to one faction waylaid another body of men belonging
+"to a second faction, and a fight ensued, in the course of which a member of the first"
+"mentioned faction was wounded and retired to the side of the road, taking no further"
+active part in the affray. After his retirement a member of the second faction was killed.
+It was held that the wounded man had ceased to be a member of the unlawful
+"assembly when he retired wounded, and that he could not, under this section, be made"
+liable for the subsequent murder.141. Where the accused persons rushed to the house
+"of K with a view to injure K or inmates of his house but one of the accused attacked M,"
+"a woman working in the house causing grievous injuries to her, the other accused"
+"persons could not be held vicariously liable with the help of section 149, IPC, 1860, as it"
+was not their common object nor had they any animus against M.142. An unlawful
+assembly of 50 persons was alleged to have caused two deaths. There were no
+"specific allegations against some of them, or that any criminal act was done by them in"
+furtherance of common intention. It was held that they could not be convicted with the
+aid of either section 34 or section 149.143. When an accused leaves the place of
+"occurrence and thus ceases to be a member of the unlawful assembly, he cannot be"
+"convicted vicariously with the aid of section 149, IPC, for the murder which is"
+committed subsequent to his leaving the scene of crime.144. Where one member fired
+on being supplied with a bullet by another only the member supplying the bullet was
+held liable under section 302/149 and others were convicted only under section
+"325/194, IPC.145. After a heated exchange of words, the accused went home and came"
+back with a gun accompanied by others who also armed and immediately opened fire
+at the victim causing his death. Others did not fire at the victim. They fired
+indiscriminately at others injuring some people. Things happened in a very short span
+of time. It was held that the others could not have formed an unlawful assembly with
+the main accused with a common object. The main culprit alone was convicted of
+murder.146. Where people collected outside a police-station to voice their protest over
+"police- inaction in connection with the murder of a child, such an assembly could not"
+"possibly have any common object to commit criminal trespass, arson, looting, etc., and"
+"as such none could be convicted with the aid of section 149, IPC, 1860.147. All the"
+"accused, armed only with lathis, caused multiple injuries to a man who died. All the"
+injuries caused were simple in nature and were on non-vital parts of the body of the
+"deceased, it could not be said that their common object was to kill the deceased. They"
+"were held liable to be convicted under section 304, Part II/149 and not under section"
+302/149.148.
+Where the common object of an unlawful assembly was to cause hurt to prosecution
+"witnesses, and the daughter of a witness who came out from inside the house only to"
+"save her father sustained an injury at the hands of one of the accused and died, it was"
+held that there could be no common object in the circumstances to commit murder.
+They were held to be guilty under section 323 read with section 149.149.
+[s 149.13] Unlawful assembly and single witness.—
+"In a case involving an unlawful assembly with a large number of persons, there is no"
+rule of law that states that there cannot be any conviction on the testimony of sole
+eyewitness unless that the court is of the view that testimony of such eye witness is
+not reliable. The rule of requirement of more than one witness applies only in a case
+where a witness deposes in a general and vague manner or in the case of a riot.150.
+Direct evidence is generally not available. The existence of common object has to be
+gathered from the act committed and results flowing from them.151.
+"[s 149.14] Conviction for section 302 simpliciter, when the charge was for"
+"section 302 read with section 149 of IPC, 1860:"
+"The Supreme Court in Nanak Chand v State of Punjab,152. considered the question"
+"whether there could be a conviction for the offence under section 302 simpliciter, when"
+the charge was for the offence under section 302 read with section 149 of IPC. It was
+held that when there is no separate charge for the offence under section 302 simpliciter
+"and charge is only for the offence under section 302 read with 149, the conviction for"
+the offence under section 302 simpliciter is not sustainable. In Suraj Pal v State of
+"UP,153. 19 accused were tried for the offences under sections 148, 307 and 302 read"
+with section 149 of IPC. Sessions Court convicted all the accused. In appeal to the
+"High Court, ten accused were acquitted. Conviction and sentence of one accused was"
+"affirmed for the offence under sections 148, 307 and 302. Holding that absence of"
+"specific charges against the appellant under sections 307 and section 302, IPC in"
+respect of which he was sentenced is a very serious lacuna as framing of a specific
+and distinct charge in respect of every distinct head of criminal liability constituting an
+offence is the foundation for a conviction and sentence. The question was referred to
+"the Five Judge Constitution Bench, to determine whether there was a conflict of view"
+between Nanak Chand's case (supra) and Suraj Pal's case (supra) and if so to determine
+it in Willie Slaney v State of Madhya Pradesh.154. The Constitution Bench held that there
+was no conflict of views in the two decisions. It was held that the observations in
+"Nanak Chand (supra), have to be appreciated on close examination of facts. Their"
+Lordships considered the effect of a charge for constructive liability and its difference
+with a charge for the offence simpliciter and held that there was no prejudice and that
+the conviction is not invalid because of the nature of the charge. A three Judge Bench
+"in Subran v State,155. held that when the charge is under section 302 read with section"
+"149 of IPC, without a specific charge having been framed for the offence under section"
+"302 of IPC, as envisaged in law, an accused cannot be convicted for the substantive"
+"offence under section 302 of IPC, their Lordships did not consider the Constitution"
+"Bench decision in Willie Slaney's case (supra). Later in the review judgment, Subran v"
+"State, 1993 (3) SCC 722 , their lordships reviewed the same as follows:"
+"On a review of the judgment, we find that the opinion expressed is capable of being"
+misinterpreted. The opinion expressed therein was required to be confined to the peculiar
+"facts of the case, but it tends to give an impression as if it is a general exposition of law,"
+which it was not meant to be.
+The legal position in the light of the Constitution Bench decision in Willie Slaney156. is
+"clear. If the charge framed discloses the overt act committed by a particular accused,"
+"though the charge is for the offence under section 302 read with section 149 of IPC,"
+"1860, and the accused faced trial with the knowledge that the prosecution case is that"
+"he committed the particular overt act which caused the death, non-framing of a distinct"
+"charge for the offence under section 302 will not cause prejudice to the accused, even"
+"though the charge framed was under section 302 read with section 149, IPC. In such a"
+"case, even though the charge is for the offence under section 302 read with section"
+149 of IPC and there is not even an alternate charge for the offence under section 302
+"simpliciter, when the charge discloses the overt act by a particular accused which"
+"caused the death of the victim, if the evidence establishes that, that particular accused"
+"inflicted that particular injury which caused the death, he could definitely be convicted"
+for the offence under section 302 simpliciter. Even though there is no specific charge
+for section 302 simpliciter and the charge is for the offence under section 302 read
+"with 149 of IPC, there could be a conviction under section 302 simpliciter."
+[s 149.15] Where no charge framed as substantive offence with aid of either
+section 34 and section 149.—
+Where participation of all the ten accused in the alleged assault on the deceased has
+"been proved by the evidence of witnesses, but no charge insofar as the substantive"
+"offence under section 302, IPC, 1860, or under section 307, IPC with the aid of either"
+"section 34, IPC and section 149, IPC had been framed and also the evidence on record"
+is not sufficient to attribute any specific injury suffered by the deceased to any
+"particular accused, acquittal of the accused of the offences under section 302, IPC or"
+"under section 307, IPC is perfectly justified.157."
+[s 149.16] Free fight and overt act.—
+"It has been held by the Supreme Court that in a case involving free fight, a conviction by"
+resorting to section 149 is not permissible. No particular accused person can be
+convicted under section 149 unless it can be shown that he caused injuries.158.
+[s 149.17] Sentencing.—
+The presence of the appellant accused and their participation in the incidence was
+"established. Their conviction under section 326 read with sections 149, 148 was"
+confirmed. But considering their age and the fact that their participation in the incident
+"was minimal, the sentence of six years R1 was reduced to two years R1, confirming the"
+sentence of one year under section 148.159.
+[s 149.18] Group rivalries.—
+"In the case of group rivalries and enmities, there is a general tendency to rope in as"
+"many persons as possible as having participated in the assault. In such situations, the"
+courts are called upon to be very cautious and sift the evidence with care. Where after
+"a close scrutiny of the evidence, a reasonable doubt arises in the mind of the court with"
+"regard to the participation of any of those who have been roped in, the court would be"
+"obliged to give the benefit of doubt to them.160. However, when there are eyewitnesses"
+including injured witness who fully support the prosecution case and proved the roles
+"of different accused, prosecution case cannot be negated only on the ground that it"
+was a case of group rivalry. Group rivalry is double edged sword.161.
+[s 149.19] Inference from dangerous weapon.–
+Common object to commit a murder cannot be inferred only on the basis that the
+weapons carried by the accused were dangerous.162.
+"82. Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, AIR 2018 SC 2472 [LNIND 2018 SC"
+300] .
+"83. Sheo Mahadeo Singh v State of Bihar, (1970) 3 SCC 46 ; Lalji v State of UP, 1989 (1) SCC 437"
+"[LNIND 1989 SC 26] ; Lakhan Mahto, AIR 1966 SC 1742 [LNIND 1966 SC 61] ."
+"84. Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, AIR 2018 SC 2472 [LNIND 2018 SC"
+300] .
+"85. Lakhan Mahto, AIR 1966 SC 1742 [LNIND 1966 SC 61] : 1966 Cr LJ 1349 ."
+"86. Kuldip Yadav v State of Bihar, 2011 (5) SCC 324 [LNIND 2011 SC 403] : AIR 2011 SC 1736"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 403] : 2011 Cr LJ 2640 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 632.
+"87. Roy Fernandes v State of Goa, (2012) 3 SCC 221 [LNIND 2012 SC 86] : 2012 Cr LJ 1542 ."
+"88. Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, AIR 2018 SC 2472 [LNIND 2018 SC"
+300] .
+"89. Waman v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 7 SCC 295 [LNIND 2011 SC 564] : AIR 2011 (SCW)"
+4973 : 2011 Cr LJ 4827 : AIR 2011 SC 3327 [LNIND 2011 SC 564] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 83; Bhudeo
+"Mandal v State of Bihar, (1981) 2 SCC 755 [LNIND 1981 SC 177] : 1981 SCC (Cr) 595, Ranbir"
+"Yadav v State of Bihar, (1995) 4 SCC 392 [LNIND 1995 SC 389] : 1995 SCC (Cr) 728, Allauddin"
+"Mian v State of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 5 [LNIND 1989 SC 236] : 1989 SCC (Cr) 490, Rajendra"
+"Shantaram Todankar v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 2 SCC 257 [LNIND 2003 SC 4] : 2003 SCC"
+"(Cr) 506 and State of Punjab v Sanjiv Kumar, (2007) 9 SCC 791 [LNIND 2007 SC 797] : (2007) 3"
+SCC (Cr) 578.
+"90. Kuldip Yadav v State of Bihar, 2011 (5) SCC 324 [LNIND 2011 SC 403] : AIR 2011 SC 1736"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 403] : 2011 Cr LJ 2640 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 632.
+"91. Iqbal v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 1127 [LNIND 2017 SC 73] ."
+"92. Vyas Ram @ Vyas Kahar v State of Bihar, 2014 Cr LJ 50 : (2013) 12 SCC 349 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+861] .
+"93. Kattukulangara Madhavan v Majeed, AIR 2017 SC 2004 [LNIND 2017 SC 158] ."
+"94. Sunil Balkrishna Bheir v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 598 [LNIND 2007 SC 669] :"
+2007 Cr LJ 3277 .
+"95. Munivel v State of TN, 2006 Cr LJ 2133 ."
+"96. Hori Lal v State of UP, (2006) 13 SCC 79 [LNIND 2006 SC 1086] : 2007 Cr LJ 1181 . See also"
+"State of Punjab v Sanjeev Kumar, (2007) 9 SCC 791 [LNIND 2007 SC 797] : AIR 2007 SC 2430"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 797] ; Purusuram Pandey v State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+"1075] : 2005 SCC (Cr) 113, restatement of ingredients and principle on which the provision is"
+based.
+"97. Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh v Valerabhai Deganbhai Vagh, 2017 (1) Crimes 270 (SC), (2017) 3"
+SCC 261 [LNIND 2017 SC 46] .
+"98. Vijay Pandurang Thakre v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 SC 897 . Gurmail Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, 2013 (4) SCC 228 [LNIND 2012 SC 864] : 2013 (2) SCC (Cr) 36; State of Maharashtra v"
+"Kashiram, (2003) 10 SCC 434 [LNIND 2003 SC 716] : AIR 2003 SC 3901 [LNIND 2003 SC 716] ,"
+"two parts of sections 149 explained and distinguished, the expression ""in prosecution of"
+"common object"" and the word ""knew"" in section 149, their meaning also explained. Rajendra"
+"Shantaram Todankar v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 2 SCC 257 [LNIND 2003 SC 4] : AIR 2003 SC"
+"1110 [LNIND 2003 SC 4] : 2003 Cr LJ 1277 , two clauses of the section explained, inference"
+"about knowledge of likelihood of crime, when can be drawn, explained."
+"99. Vijay Pandurang Thakre v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 SC 897 ."
+"100. Roy Fernandes v State of Goa, 2012 (2) Scale 68 [LNIND 2012 SC 86] : JT 2012 (2) SC 457 :"
+AIR 2012 (SCW) 1238 : (2012) 3 SCC 221 [LNIND 2012 SC 86] : 2012 Cr LJ 1542 .
+"101. Gangadhar Behera v State of Orissa, 2002 (8) SCC 381 [LNIND 2002 SC 645] and"
+"Bishnaalias BhiswadebMahato v State of WB, 2005 (12) SCC 657 [LNIND 2005 SC 873]"
+"102. Barendra Kumar Ghosh, (1924) 52 IA 40 , 52 : 27 Bom LR 148 : 52 Cal 197."
+"103. Aniruddha Mana, (1924) 26 Cr LJ 827 , 829. Where the purpose was to show force and not"
+"to cause death, common intention was ruled out and the conviction was converted from under"
+"sections 302/34 to one under 302/149, Jai Narain v State of UP, 1995 Cr LJ 2335 (All)."
+"104. Sabid Ali, (1873) 20 WR (Cr) 5 : 11 Beng LR 347, approved by the Supreme Court in Mazaji,"
+"AIR 1959 SC 572 [LNIND 1958 SC 169] ; Krishnarao, (1903) 5 Bom LR 1023 ; Fatnaya, (1941) 23"
+Lah 470.
+"105. Legal Remembrancer, Bengal v Golok Tikadar, (1943) 1 Cal 181 ."
+"106. UN Singh v State, (1946) 25 Pat 215."
+"107. Jahiruddin, (1894) 22 Cal 306 , approved by the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath, AIR 1960"
+SC 725 : 1960 Cr LJ 1114 .
+"108. Dalip Singh, AIR 1953 SC 364 [LNIND 1953 SC 61] : 1953 Cr LJ 1465 ; See also Dharam Pal,"
+"1975 Cr LJ 1666 : AIR 1975 SC 1917 [LNIND 1975 SC 314] ; State of UP v Ranjha Ram, AIR 1986"
+SC 1959 [LNIND 1986 SC 271] : 1986 Cr LJ 1906 : (1986) 4 SCC 99 [LNIND 1986 SC 271] ; Amar
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 826 : 1987 Cr LJ 706 : (1987) 1 SCC 679 , see further"
+"Gopeteshwar Nath Ojha v State of Bihar, AIR 1986 SC 1649 : 1986 Cr LJ 1242 . Hoshiar Singh v"
+"State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 191 [LNIND 1991 SC 568] : 1992 Cr LJ 510 , the acquittal of some"
+"would not warrant the acquittal of the rest; Sahebrao Kisan Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 1992"
+"Cr LJ 339 , presence of eight in the course of an assault was established but four were"
+"acquitted due to weak evidence, conviction of the rest for unlawful assembly not illegal. The"
+"cases of Amar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 826 ; and Maina Singh v State of Punjab, AIR"
+"1976 SC 1084 [LNIND 1976 SC 97] : (1976) 3 SCR 651 [LNIND 1976 SC 97] , were followed by"
+"the Supreme Court in K Nagamalleswara Rao v State of AP, 1991 Cr LJ 1365 : AIR 1991 SC 1075"
+"[LNIND 1991 SC 150] : (1991) 2 SCC 532 [LNIND 1991 SC 150] , so as to come to the conclusion"
+that where all others were acquitted and the evidence against the remaining four was also not
+"reliable as to any overt acts done by them, their conviction was not sustainable. Darshan Singh v"
+"State of Punjab, 1990 Cr LJ 2684 : AIR 1991 SC 66 , prosecution theory that an 80-year-old man"
+"went in advance to hold the deceased, not acceptable. State of Assam v Bhelu Sheikh, 1989 Cr"
+"LJ 879 : AIR 1989 SC 1097 , no evidence to show that the accused caused injury, even dying"
+declaration not recorded when the injured lived for seven days. Saudagar Singh v State of
+"Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 28 [LNIND 1997 SC 890] : 1998 Cr LJ 62 , persons not named in the FIR as"
+"members of unlawful assembly were let off, the gun wielding accused persons fired gun shots,"
+"convicted for murder. Komal v State of HP, AIR 2002 SC 3057 [LNIND 2002 SC 518] , prosecution"
+"case of murder with common object proved, conviction. See also Sajjan Sharma v State of Bihar,"
+(2011) 2 SCC 206 [LNIND 2011 SC 33] : AIR 2011 SC 632 [LNIND 2011 SC 33] : 2011 Cr LJ 1169
+: (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 660.
+"109. Birbal Choudhary v State of Bihar, AIR 2017 SC 4866 [LNIND 2017 SC 2898] ."
+"110. Bolineedi Venkataramaiah v State of AP, AIR 1994 SC 76 : 1994 Cr LJ 61 : 1994 Supp (3)"
+"SCC 732 . Chanda v State of UP, (2004) 5 SCC 141 [LNIND 2004 SC 582] : AIR 2004 SC 2451"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 582] : 2004 All LJ 1871 : 2004 Cr LJ 2536 , common object as specified in"
+"section 141 must be proved for inflicting constructive liability, but proof of any overt act is not"
+"necessary. The court stated consideration for ascertaining common object, when and how it"
+comes into existence and when it becomes modified or abandoned. Madan Singh v State of
+"Bihar, (2004) 4 SCC 622 [LNIND 2004 SC 427] : AIR 2004 SC 3317 [LNIND 2004 SC 427] . Dani"
+"Singh v State of Bihar, 2004 Cr LJ 3328 , there must be common object as stated in section 141"
+"and person actuated by it. Charan Singh v State of UP, (2004) 4 SCC 205 [LNIND 2004 SC 308] :"
+AIR 2004 SC 2828 [LNIND 2004 SC 308] .
+"111. Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v State of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 [LNIND 2004 SC 738] :"
+"AIR 2004 SC 4148 [LNIND 2004 SC 738] . Amzad Ali v State of Assam, 2003 Cr LJ 3545 : (2003)"
+"6 SCC 270 [LNIND 2003 SC 570] , applicability in the context of section 302."
+"112. Shyam Singh v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 1632 (All). Ram Dhani v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2286 (All)"
+"dispute over land, complainant party resorted to cutting crop grown by the accused party. The"
+latter were more than five in number and assembled to prevent the cutting. The court held that
+they could not be said to form an unlawful assembly.
+"113. Raj Nath v State of UP, AIR 2009 SC 1422 [LNIND 2009 SC 59] : (2009) 4 SCC 334 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 59] : (2009) 1 SCR 336 : JT 2009 (1) SC 373 [LNIND 2009 SC 85] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cr)
+289.
+"114. Gangadhar Behera v State of Orissa, 2003 Cr LJ 41 : AIR 2002 SC 3633 [LNIND 2002 SC"
+"645] . Chanda v State of UP, (2004) 3 SCC 141 : AIR 2004 SC 2836 [LNIND 2004 SC 1556] , the"
+"expression ""in prosecution of common object"" and the word ""knew"" as used in section 149 were"
+explained and distinguished.
+"115. Jagdeo Singh, 1981 Cr LJ 166 : AIR 1981 SC 648 ."
+"116. Jit Singh v State, (1957) Pun 950; Mizaji, (1959) Supp (1) SCR 940 : AIR 1959 SC 572"
+"[LNIND 1958 SC 169] : 1959 Cr LJ 777 . Satbir Singh v State of UP, (2009) 13 SCC 790 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 450] : AIR 2009 SC 2163 [LNIND 2009 SC 450] : (2009) 3 All LJ 786; Ashok Kumar v
+"State of TN, 2006 Cr LJ 2931 : AIR 2006 SC 2419 [LNIND 2006 SC 360] : (2006) 10 SCC 157"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 360] .
+"117. Ibid, and see Lalji v State of UP, AIR 1989 SC 754 [LNIND 1989 SC 26] : (1989) 1 SCR 130"
+"[LNIND 1989 SC 26] : 1989 Cr LJ 850 , the members cannot be acquitted only because of lack of"
+"evidence of precise participation. Earlier to this, in Ram Bilas Singh v State of Bihar, 1964 (1) Cr"
+"LJ 573 : (1963) 1 SCWR 743 : (1964) 1 SCR 775 [LNIND 1963 SC 22] , the Supreme Court"
+"observed: ""It is true that in order to convict persons vicariously under section 34 or section 149"
+"it is not necessary to prove that each and every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even so,"
+there must be material to show that the overt act or acts of one or more was or were done in
+furtherance of the common intention of all the accused or in prosecution of the common object
+of the members of the unlawful assembly. Following this and the above cited Supreme Court
+"cases in Nagina Sharma v State of Bihar, 1991 Cr LJ 1195 , the Patna High Court held that the"
+gang of persons who came fully armed to capture a booth and to prevent voters from voting and
+causing eight deaths in the process were all responsible for the deaths in question. See at pp
+1231–1233.
+"118. Allauddin Mian v State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1456 [LNIND 1989 SC 236] : 1989 Cr LJ 1466 ."
+"Ramappa Halappa Pujar v State of Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 31 [LNIND 2007 SC 561] , the fact"
+of benefit of doubt to some accused person could not give advantage to others on whose part
+some other act was evident.
+"119. Vithal Bhimshah Koli v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 179 [LNIND 1982 BOM 340] :"
+"1983 Cr LJ 340 : (1983) 1 SCC 431 . See also Jawahar v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 273 : 1991 Cr"
+"LJ 376 , equal conviction of the accused who was only holding the deceased by the neck while"
+others struck.
+"120. Suratlal v State of MP, AIR 1982 SC 1224 [LNIND 1980 SC 121] : 1982 Cr LJ 1577 : (1982) 1"
+"SCC 488 [LNIND 1980 SC 121] . Mohamed Arif v State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 105 [LNIND 1996"
+SC 1604] : 1997 Cr LJ 65 ; conviction of all the accused except one who was not identified by
+"the eye-witness and given benefit of doubt. Ganga Singh v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 1695 (All),"
+"unlawful assembly, fodder belonging to informant burnt, death ensued from lathi blows, incident"
+21 years old. Accused persons grew into men of 55–60 years. They were sentenced to three
+"years RI and fine of Rs. 5,000 each. Vikram v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 332 [LNIND"
+2007 SC 617] : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr) 362 : AIR 2007 SC 1893 [LNIND 2007 SC 617] : 2007 Cr LJ
+"3193 , whether in a given case common object has been made out depends upon facts and"
+"circumstances, conduct of the parties and the manner in which the occurrence had taken place"
+has some bearing on the question.
+"121. Bhimrao v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 3 SCC 37 [LNIND 2003 SC 167] : AIR 2003 SC 1493"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 167] : 2003 Cr LJ 1204 .
+"122. Raju v State of Rajasthan, 2013 (2) SCC 233 [LNIND 2013 SC 25] : 2013 Cr LJ 1248 (SC)."
+"See also Shyam Babu v State of UP, JT 2012 (8) SC 377 [LNIND 2012 SC 536] : AIR 2012 (SCW)"
+4846 : (2012) 8 SCC 651 [LNIND 2012 SC 536] : AIR 2012 SC 3311 [LNIND 2012 SC 536] : 2012
+Cr LJ 4550 : 2012 (8) Scale 535 [LNIND 2012 SC 536] .
+"123. Hari Singh, (1878) 3 CLR 49 . Haricharan v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 SC 244 [LNIND"
+"1997 SC 1350] : 1998 Cr LJ 398 , accused appeared armed with weapons. They stopped the"
+"bus, put the gun on the chest of the driver threatening him if he tried to move. They caught hold"
+of the deceased. One of them fired two shots and the other attacked with his weapon. Their
+conviction under section 300 read with section 149 was held to be proper. Mahantappa v State
+"of Karnataka, AIR 1999 SC 314 [LNIND 1998 SC 1018] : 1999 Cr LJ 450 , the accused persons"
+"assaulted their victim with a sword, threw his body into a hut and set it on fire. Their conviction"
+under section 300 read with section 149 was held to be proper. Some others who were also
+"tried with them did not seem to have been members, they could have been bystanders. They"
+"were given the benefit of doubt. Bhagwan Singh v State of UP, (1992) 4 SCC 85 , the accused"
+"persons were on inimical terms with the complainant party, came to the spot armed with deadly"
+"weapons and attacked claiming three lives, it was held that they shared common object."
+"Rachapalliabulu v State of AP, (2002) 4 SCC 208 [LNIND 2002 SC 267] : 2000 Cr LJ 2527 : AIR"
+"2002 SC 1805 [LNIND 2002 SC 267] , assailants came together as fully armed, caused two"
+"deaths, held to have shared common object. Pratapaneni Ravi Kumar v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC"
+"2810 [LNIND 1997 SC 892] : 1997 Cr LJ 3505 , all those who assaulted the victim were members"
+"of unlawful assembly and death was caused in prosecution of common object, all of them guilty"
+irrespective of the fact whether they had participated in beating the deceased. State of
+"Rajasthan v Ani, AIR 1997 SC 1023 [LNIND 1997 SC 35] , armed accused person killed two and"
+"attempted to cause one more death, they were earlier involved in other riots. Conviction, but two"
+accused were acquitted because evidence showed no connection with the incident. Satbir v
+"Surat Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1160 : (1997) 4 SCC 192 , two accused persons, though present, could"
+"not be said with certainty to have shared the common intention to commit murder, benefit of"
+"doubt. Siddique v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 3829 (All), unlawful assembly causing death in"
+"business rivalry, conviction. State of Rajasthan v Nathu, (2003) 5 SCC 537 [LNIND 2003 SC 479] ,"
+"murder, vicarious liability."
+"124. Muthu Naicker v State of WB, 1978 Cr LJ 1713 : AIR 1978 SC 1647 [LNIND 1978 SC 188] ."
+"From numbers, situs and nature of wounds it could be hold that all five accused persons had"
+"definite intention to commit murder of victim. State of Assam v Golbar Hussain, 2012 Cr LJ 4649"
+(Gau).
+"125. Kartar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 1406 [LNIND 1996 SC 307] : 1996 Cr LJ 1722 ."
+"In Ramesh v State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 169 [LNIND 2010 SC 1016] : 2011 Cr LJ 80 : (2010)"
+"12 SCR 799 : (2010) 13 SCC 409 [LNIND 2010 SC 1016] : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 1176, the evidence"
+"show that the appellants variously armed, including the firearms assembled at one place and,"
+"thereafter, came to the place of occurrence and started assault together and when protested by"
+"the deceased, one of the members of the unlawful assembly shot the deceased dead and some"
+"of them caused injury by firearm, gandasa, lathi, etc., to others. All of them have come and left"
+the place of occurrence together. Appellant held to be members of the unlawful assembly and
+offence have been committed in pursuance of the common object. Each of them shall be liable
+for the offence committed by any other member of the assembly. Also see Ranjit Singh v State of
+"MP, AIR 2011 SC 255 [LNIND 2010 SC 1057] : 2011 Cr LJ 283 : (2011) 4 SCC 336 [LNIND 2010"
+SC 1057] : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 227.
+"126. C Chellappan, 1979 Cr LJ 1335 : AIR 1979 SC 1761 ."
+"127. Asharfi Lal v State of UP, AIR 1987 SC 1721 [LNIND 1987 SC 346] : 1987 Cr LJ 1885 : (1987)"
+"3 SCC 224 [LNIND 1987 SC 346] . See also Lalji Singh v State of UP, AIR 1985 SC 1266 : 1985 Cr"
+"LJ 1488 , charges under sections 302, 147, 148 and 149; and Dalip Singh v State of UP, 1985 SCC"
+"(Cr) 486 : 1985 Supp SCC 471 : AIR 1986 SC 316 , charges under the same sections,"
+"established. Kishan Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LJ 2027 (Raj), circumstances of the case"
+"established unlawful assembly as well as common object. Poonma Ram v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1995 Cr LJ 359 (Raj), unlawful assembly, death caused, but requisite intention for murder not"
+"proved, conviction for culpable homicide and for forming unlawful assembly. Luku Pulke v State"
+"of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1207 (Ori), acquittal because of contradictory statements of witnesses as"
+"to participation. Gajanan v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 2887 : AIR 1996 SC 3332 , the"
+"accused persons caused death by assault and beating, also beating others who came to rescue,"
+showed common object of causing death.
+"128. Sheikh Ajyub v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 420 : 1994 Supp (2) SCC 269 ."
+"129. Joseph v State of Karnataka, 1993 Cr LJ 3538 : 1993 AIR SCW 2900. State of UP v Man"
+"Singh, AIR 2003 SC 62 [LNIND 2002 SC 657] , seven persons were variously armed, they"
+attacked and killed their victim whose severed body was thrown by them into river. The
+witnesses recovered the body immediately after the attackers left. This established their
+presence at the spot. The reversal of conviction by the High Court because of poor visibility
+"caused by fog was held to be improper. Shrawan Bhadaji Bhirad v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003"
+"SC 199 [LNIND 2002 SC 701] : 2003 Cr LJ 398 , seven persons armed with swords, attacked"
+"their victim causing multiple injuries which were found to be sufficient to cause death, but saved"
+by a team of doctors. Conviction of the accused under the section was held to be proper. Alla
+"Chinna Apparao v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ 17 : AIR 2002 SC 3648 [LNIND 2002 SC 647] , the"
+victim was attacked by accused persons who hacked his neck on two sides with coconut
+cutting knives. Eye-witnesses. Conviction under section 300
+"130. Umesh Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2111 [LNIND 2000 SC 871] : 2000 Cr LJ 3167 ."
+"131. Ram Dular Rai v State of Bihar, (2003) 12 SCC 352 [LNIND 2003 SC 1032] : AIR 2004 SC"
+"1043 [LNIND 2003 SC 1032] : 2004 Cr LJ 635 ; Chand v State of UP, (2004) 5 SCC 141 [LNIND"
+"2004 SC 582] : AIR 2004 SC 2451 [LNIND 2004 SC 582] : 2004 All LJ 1871 : 2004 Cr LJ 2536 ,"
+number of convicted persons less than five. Eight persons were named. Two of them held
+pistols. Shot fired but did not hit the victim. The other's shot proved fatal. Unlawful assembly
+was there. Acquittal of some of them on a technical ground did not wipe out application of
+section 149.
+"132. Kashirma v State of MP, (2002) 1 SCC 71 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] ."
+"133. Kashi Ram v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 2902 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] ; Siyaram v State of MP,"
+"(2009) 4 SCC 792 [LNIND 2009 SC 577] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cr) 602 : 2009 Cr LJ 2071 , statement of"
+principles to be followed by the appellate court in considering an appeal against acquittal. See
+"also State of Maharashtra v Tulshiram Bhanudas Kamble, (2007) 14 SCC 627 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+3167] : AIR 2007 SC 3042 [LNIND 2007 SC 3167] : (2007) Cr LJ 4319 .
+"134. Yunis v State of MP, AIR 2003 SC 539 [LNIND 2002 SC 784] : 2003 Cr LJ 817 ; Re Ram"
+"Pravesh Sharma, 2003 Cr LJ NOC 180 (Jhar) : 2003 AIR Jhar HCR 220."
+"135. State of MP v Mishrilal, 2002 Cr LJ 2312 (SC)."
+"136. State of UP v Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73 [LNIND 2008 SC 1608] . Akbar Sheikh v State of"
+"WB, (2009) 7 SCC 415 [LNIND 2009 SC 1106] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 431, rule of prudence should"
+be applied. Something more than the persons concerned being cited as accused in a witness
+box would be necessary. The court must have before it some materials to form an opinion that
+"they had shared the common object. Sheo Prasad Bhor v State of Assam, (2007) 3 SCC 120"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 19] : AIR 2007 SC 918 [LNIND 2007 SC 19] : 2007 Cr LJ 1423 , assignment of"
+"independent parts to each member not necessary; if one is a member of the assembly, assault"
+and death caused by any one of them would make others liable.
+"137. Ganga Ram Sah v State of Bihar, AIR 2017 SC 655 [LNINDU 2017 SC 31] ."
+"138. Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh v Valerabhai Deganbhai Vagh, (2017) 3 SCC 261 [LNIND 2017 SC"
+46] : 2017 (1) Crimes 270 (SC).
+"139. Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, AIR 2018 SC 2472 [LNIND 2018"
+SC 300] .
+"140. Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel, AIR 2018 SC 2472 [LNIND 2018"
+SC 300] .
+"141. Kabil Singh, (1869) 3 Beng LR (A Cr J) 1. See also State of Gujarat v Bharwad, 1990 Cr LJ"
+"2531 (Guj), common object to belabour the members of a particular community, all liable under"
+"sections 324 and 326 and not for murder. Teja v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 262 , common object to"
+"insult, guilty under section 326 and not under section 302 though death was caused. Ramesh"
+"Baburao Devaskar v State of Maharashtra, (2008) Cr LJ 372 : (2007) 13 SCC 501 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+"1213] , name of only one accused mentioned in the FIR, PWs did not attribute any overt act to"
+"the remaining accused persons, thus, there was some substance in the contention that others"
+did not share the common object.
+"142. Kshudiram, 1972 Cr LJ 756 : AIR 1972 SC 1221 . See also Bharwad Bhikha Natha, 1977 Cr"
+"LJ 1160 : AIR 1977 SC 1768 ; K Neelakanthee, 1978 Cr LJ 780 : AIR 1978 SC 1021 [LNIND 1978"
+"SC 55] ; Bhudeo Mondla v State of Bihar, 1981 Cr LJ 725 : AIR 1981 SC 219 : (1981) 2 SCC 755"
+[LNIND 1981 SC 177] .
+"143. Jhapsa Kabari v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 312 [LNIND 2001 SC 2762] . Jadu Sahani v"
+"State, 1999 Cr LJ 593 : 1999 AIR SCW 3985, no enmity between the conflicting groups, death"
+"caused by one of them as an individual act, only he was convicted for murder. State of Punjab v"
+"Harjit Singh, AIR 2002 SC 3040 [LNIND 2002 SC 501] , mere participation in the crime with others"
+is not sufficient to attribute common object or common intention to one of them of the others
+involved in the incident. One accused person can be made liable criminally for the acts and
+deeds of others only on proof of the subjective elements in common intention by the objective
+test.
+"144. Nawab Ali, 1974 Cr LJ 921 : AIR 1974 SC 1228 [LNIND 1974 SC 117] . See also Ram Anjore,"
+"1975 Cr LJ 249 : AIR 1975 SC 185 [LNIND 1975 SC 87] ; Badruddin v State, 1981 Cr LJ 729 : AIR"
+1981 SC 1223 .
+"145. Fatte, 1980 Cr LJ 829 : AIR 1979 SC 1504 . In a similar case, the assailant giving the fatal"
+"blow was convicted under section 302 but co-accused under sections 326/149, Ram Swarup v"
+"State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 2436 [LNIND 1993 SC 487] : 1993 Cr LJ 3540 : 1993 Supp (4) SCC"
+"344 . Sukhbir Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 1168 [LNIND 2002 SC 134] , a sweeper while"
+working in a street happened to throw splashes of mud on the face of the accused. He abused
+the sweeper. The latter's father slapped the accused. He went away threatening and came back
+"with others, but fatal injuries to the sweeper's father were inflicted by him alone, others kept only"
+"standing. Held individual act and not a common object: Kajal Sen v State of Assam, AIR 2002 SC"
+"617 [LNIND 2002 SC 31] , fatal blows given by main accused. Others could not be convicted for"
+offences punishable under section 302 read with sections 148 and 149. Tamaji Govind Misal v
+"State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 174 [LNIND 1997 SC 1211] : 1998 Cr LJ 340 , the motive of"
+the accused party was to remove babul trees from the land of the complainant party whatever
+be the cost and cause injuries which might become necessary. But some of them started
+assaulting immediately on reaching the spot. Others might not have known that the matter
+"would go to the extent of murder, they were punished under sections 326/149 and not 300/149."
+"Atmaram Zongarazi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 3573 [LNIND 1997 SC 1079] : 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 4406 , proof showed only one man striking and not others, others acquitted. Chandubhai"
+"Malubhai Parmar v State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 1422 [LNIND 1997 SC 627] : 1997 Cr LJ 1909 ,"
+"inter-community riot, accused armed with guns causing deaths, convicted under sections"
+"300/149, but those who were busy only in burning property could not be convicted with others"
+"under section 300/149. Naurangi Mahto v State, 2001 Cr LJ 1525 (Jhar), no common object"
+attributed to those who were just only present at the moment and had done no overt act.
+"Incident took place at the spur of the moment. Naththoo Ram v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 3870"
+"(All), injuries caused with blunt side of the weapon. It could not be said that the common object"
+of the unlawful assembly was to cause death. Conviction was altered from under sections
+302/149 to section 326/149.
+"State of UP v Rasid, AIR 2003 SC 1243 [LNIND 2003 SC 295] , accused persons who entered the"
+"house and caused death, convicted for murder, but those remained posted outside given benefit"
+"of doubt. Basisth Roy v State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 1439 [LNIND 2003 SC 162] , witnesses"
+"attributed overt act only to two out of 13 accused persons, convicted, others given benefit of"
+"doubt and acquitted. Jayantibhai Bhankarbhai v State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 3569 [LNIND 2002"
+"SC 565] , five convicted, only one appealed, he was acquitted, the Supreme Court allowed the"
+conviction of the non-appealing convicts to stand.
+"146. Parusuram Pandey v State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068 [LNIND 2004 SC 1075] : (2004) 13"
+SCC 189 [LNIND 2004 SC 1075] .
+"147. Mohan Lal, 1982 Cr LJ 1898 (All)."
+"148. Sarman v State of MP, AIR 1993 SC 400 : 1993 Cr LJ 63 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 356 . Where"
+"the only common object discovered on evidence was to beat the victim and not to cause death,"
+others were held not liable to be convicted for murder but only under section 149/324; Gopa
+"Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 2987 (Raj)."
+"149. State of Karnataka v Bhojappa, 1994 Cr LJ 1543 (Kant). See also Anant Kumar v State of MP,"
+"AIR 1994 SC 1639 : (1994) 2 Cr LJ 1585 , no specific acts were attributed to two of the accused"
+persons who also had no knowledge whether the others carried knives or that they were likely to
+"cause injuries, such two accused acquitted. Bhimrao v State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 1204 :"
+"AIR 2003 SC 1493 [LNIND 2003 SC 167] , the accused came to the house of the victim with a"
+"common object, those who entered the house executed a different, held, their act could not be"
+"attributed to those who were standing outside. State of Rajasthan v Sheo Singh, 2003 Cr LJ 1569"
+": AIR 2003 SC 1783 [LNIND 2003 SC 231] , a joint project of murder could not be proved. Basisth"
+"Roy v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 1301 : AIR 2003 SC 1439 [LNIND 2003 SC 162] : (2003) 9 SCC 52"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 162] , murder on account of land dispute between the complainant and"
+"deceased party, specific overt acts of lathi blows and gun shots were attributed only to two of"
+"the accused persons, others could not be convicted for the same because there was no proof of"
+"a shared common object to that effect. Bharosi v State of MP, AIR 2002 SC 3299 [LNIND 2002"
+"SC 567] , six accused persons armed with lathis attacked the victim, death was due to one head"
+"injury attributed to the main accused, others did not intend nor had any knowledge. They were"
+held to be not guilty of murder. They were guilty under section 147 for their individual acts.
+"Kishan Pal v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 2875 (All), unlawful assembly, eight members of a family"
+slaughtered in a day light attack. Witnesses untrustworthy. Acquittal.
+"Cases of no proof.—Baikunth Mahto v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 2135 (Jhar), the accused"
+persons attacked the deceased at midnight while he was asleep along with three other persons.
+Two of them became hostile. The medical report was that death must have been instantaneous
+with injury and so the deceased could not have named anybody. The persons sleeping there
+"could not have identified the assailants because of dark night. Evidence doubtful, acquittal."
+"Sunil Balkrishna Bhoil v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 398 : 2007 Cr LJ 3277 , unlawful"
+"assembly originally formed to assault the victim, all of sudden accused two stabbed him"
+"causing death, common object held to be not applicable, rest of them guilty of only house"
+trespass under section 452. They had been in custody for a long period. They were set at liberty.
+"Munna Chanda v State of Assam, 2006 Cr LJ 1632 : AIR 2006 SC 3555 [LNIND 2006 SC 128] :"
+"(2006) 3 SCC 752 [LNIND 2006 SC 128] , prior concert is not required, common object can"
+"develop at the spur of the moment, the deceased in this case, on being assaulted, fled, he was"
+chased by some members of the party but who gave the fatal blow was not clear. Membership
+of two of the accused could not be proved nor any overt act could be attributed to them. They
+could not have been convicted under sections 302/149.
+"150. Ranjit Singh v State of MP, AIR 2011 SC 255 [LNIND 2010 SC 1057] : 2011 Cr LJ 283 :"
+(2011) 4 SCC 336 [LNIND 2010 SC 1057] : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 227. See also Jhapsa Kabari v State
+"of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 312 [LNIND 2001 SC 2762] at p 314, where YK Sabharwal, J explained the"
+position of a solitary witness.
+"151. Charan Singh v State of UP, (2004) 4 SCC 205 [LNIND 2004 SC 308] : AIR 2004 SC 2828"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 308] .
+"152. Nanak Chand v State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 274 [LNIND 1955 SC 3] : 1955 (1) SCR 1201"
+[LNIND 1955 SC 3] : 1955 Cr LJ 721 .
+"153. Suraj Pal v State of UP, AIR 1955 SC 419 [LNIND 1955 SC 17] : 1955 (1) SCR 1332 [LNIND"
+1955 SC 17] : 1955 Cr LJ 1004 .
+"154. Willie Slaney v State of MP, AIR 1956 SC 116 [LNIND 1955 SC 90] : 1955 (2) SCR 1140"
+[LNIND 1955 SC 90] : 1956 Cr LJ 291 .
+"155. Subran v State, 1993 (3) SCC 32 [LNIND 1993 SC 162] : 1993 SCC (Cr) 583 : 1993 Cr LJ"
+1387 : 1993 (2) Crimes 15 [LNIND 1993 SC 162] .
+156. (supra).
+"157. State of Rajasthan v Hazi Khan, AIR 2017 SC 4001 ."
+"158. Kanwarlal v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ 62 : AIR 2002 SC 3690 [LNIND 2002 SC 558] ."
+"159. Shri Krishan v State of UP, (2007) 15 SCC 557 ."
+"160. Eknath Ganpat Aher v State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 519 [LNIND 2010 SC 466] ."
+"161. Sudha Renukaiah v State of AP, AIR 2017 SC 2124 [LNIND 2017 SC 197] ."
+"162. Najabhai Desurbhai Wagh v Valerabhai Deganbhai Vagh, (2017) 3 SCC 261 [LNIND 2017 SC"
+46] : 2017 (1) Crimes 270 (SC).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+"[s 150] Hiring, or conniving at hiring, of persons to join unlawful assembly."
+"Whoever hires or engages or employs, or promotes, or connives at the hiring,"
+engagement or employment of any person to join or become a member of any
+"unlawful assembly, shall be punishable as a member of such unlawful assembly, and"
+for any offence which may be committed by any such person as a member of such
+"unlawful assembly in pursuance of such hiring, engagement or employment, in the"
+"same manner as if he had been a member of such unlawful assembly, or himself had"
+committed such offence.
+COMMENT—
+This section brings within the reach of the law those who are really the originators and
+instigators of the offences committed by hired persons. It deals with the case of those
+who are neither abettors of nor participators in the offence committed by an unlawful
+assembly.
+"The section creates a specific offence. It intends to embrace all those who hire,"
+promote or connive at the employment of persons and render them punishable as
+"principal participators. Under the section, a person, though not actually a member of an"
+"unlawful assembly himself, may be held guilty of being a member of the assembly and"
+may be held liable for the offence which may be committed by the assembly to the
+same extent as if he had himself committed that offence. But this is possible only
+when it is found that he hired or engaged or employed or promoted or connived at the
+"hiring, engagement or employment by any other person to join or become a member of"
+the assembly. There must have been an unlawful assembly which was composed of
+"persons so hired, etc., and an offence committed in the course of that assembly for"
+"which he becomes equally liable. The word ""promotes"" denotes acceleration or"
+"inducement. Though the word ""employ"" or ""employment"" is used, it does not mean"
+recruitment. It would mean calling of the service of the hired person without any
+recruitment as a servant or agent to commit the offence.163.
+"163. Vinit v State of Maharashtra, 1994 Cr LJ 1791 at pp 1804–1805, certain persons, who"
+"constituted an unlawful assembly, were hired to eliminate a particular person. The eliminators"
+and their procurer were both held equally liable.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 151] Knowingly joining or continuing in assembly of five or more persons
+after it has been commanded to disperse.
+Whoever knowingly joins or continues in any assembly of five or more persons likely
+"to cause a disturbance of the public peace, after such assembly has been lawfully"
+"commanded to disperse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both."
+Explanation.—If the assembly is an unlawful assembly within the meaning of section
+"141, the offender will be punishable under section 145."
+COMMENT—
+Effect of command to disperse.—Section 145 punishes the continuance in an unlawful
+assembly after it has been commanded to disperse. In this section the assembly need
+not be an 'unlawful assembly' but if it is likely to cause a disturbance of the public
+"peace, then joining or continuing in such assembly after it has been commanded to"
+disperse is punishable. Section 129 of the Criminal Procedure Code confers on a
+Magistrate and an officer in charge of a police-station the power to disperse an
+unlawful assembly or any assembly of five or more persons likely to cause a
+"disturbance of the public peace. A bare reading of section 129, Cr PC, 1973, would"
+make it abundantly clear that a lawful procession or assembly cannot be regarded as
+likely to cause a breach of the peace when it is admitted that not they but some other
+body of persons is bent on attacking them. Whether an assembly is likely to cause a
+disturbance of public peace has to be judged from its own acts and behaviour and not
+from the behaviour of another hostile group whose physical opposition may cause a
+"breach of the peace.164. ""Thus, if an assembly other than an unlawful assembly"
+behaves in such a manner as to provoke a breach of the peace by its own conduct or
+"action, there would be a justification to order it to disperse under the powers given by"
+section 129 of the Criminal Procedure Code. But if a religious assembly or procession
+"remains peaceful in the enjoyment of its legitimate rights and privileges under the law,"
+it should not be ordered to disperse merely because a body of antagonistic persons
+"take it into their heads to attack it with a view to provoke a riot. In such a case, it is"
+rather that body of aggressive persons that constitutes an unlawful assembly and
+"requires to be sternly dealt with under the law"".165. So where a peaceful group of"
+persons who were cutting crop on their own land refused to disperse on being
+commanded to do so by an Inspector of Police merely because another hostile group
+"objected to the harvesting of the crop, it was held that as these persons were not"
+"commanded lawfully to disperse under section 129, Cr PC, 1973, they could not be"
+"convicted under section 151, IPC, 1860.166. In order to bring a case within the mischief"
+of this section there must be clear evidence to show that the assembly had been
+"""lawfully commanded"" to disperse. Thus where the police officers in their evidence said"
+"that they had merely warned the two warring factions, it could not be said that the"
+assembly had been commanded to disperse and as such there was no question of
+"invoking section 151, IPC, to prosecute the members of the assembly.167."
+"164. Yeshwant v State, 34 Cr LJ 705; See also Bealty v Gillbanks, (1882) 9 QBD 308 ; Kempe"
+"Gowda, 1954 Cr LJ 490 (Mysore)."
+"165. R Deb, Principles of Criminology, Criminal Law and Investigation, 2nd Edn, vol II, p 834. See"
+"also Re P Abdul Sattar, 1961 (1) Cr LJ 291 (Mysore)."
+"166. Kempe Gowda, 1954 Cr LJ 490 (Mysore), supra."
+"167. Komma Neelakantha Reddy v State of AP, AIR 1978 SC 1021 [LNIND 1978 SC 55] : (1978) 2"
+SCC 473 [LNIND 1978 SC 55] : 1978 (3) SCR 75 [LNIND 1978 SC 55] : 1978 Cr LJ 780 : (1978) 1
+SCC (Cr) 285.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+"[s 152] Assaulting or obstructing public servant when suppressing riot, etc."
+"Whoever assaults or threatens to assault, or obstructs or attempts to obstruct, any"
+"public servant in the discharge of his duty as such public servant, in endeavouring to"
+"disperse an unlawful assembly, or to suppress a riot or affray, or uses, or threatens, or"
+"attempts to use criminal force to such public servant, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Assault or obstruction of public servant.—The last section punished disobedience to
+the order of a public servant commanding an assembly to disperse. This section
+punishes more severely persons who assault a public servant endeavouring to disperse
+an unlawful assembly. It is intended to prevent the use of force on a public servant in
+order to prevent him from discharging his duty.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 153] Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot—.
+"Whoever malignantly,1 or wantonly,2 by doing anything which is illegal, gives"
+provocation to any person intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation
+"will cause the offence of rioting to be committed, shall, if the offence of rioting be"
+"committed in consequence of such provocation, be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both;"
+if rioting be committed;if not committed.
+"and if the offence of rioting be not committed, with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"Provocation for rioting.—A person, who maliciously or recklessly gives provocation to"
+another by doing an illegal act knowing that such provocation will incite the other to
+"rioting, is punishable under this section. The offence under this section involves some"
+act of origination of a riot by doing an illegal act infuriating to the feelings of those who
+"ultimately come to riot. The expression ""gives provocation"" connotes such idea. This"
+section is intended to apply to such provocative words or acts as do not amount
+directly to instigation or abetment.168. A mere chance provocation is not sufficient to
+justify conviction under this section.169. The section is divided into two parts. If rioting
+is committed the punishment is more severe.
+[s 153.1] Essential Ingredients:
+"(a) The 'act' imputed against the accused is illegal,"
+"(b) He has done such act malignantly or wantonly, and,"
+(c) He has given provocation to any person intending or knowing that such
+provocation will cause the offence of rioting.170.
+1. 'Malignantly'.— implies a sort of general malice.171. The adverbs 'maliciously' and
+"'malignantly' are synonymous. Malice is not, as in ordinary speech, only an expression"
+"of hatred or ill-will to an individual, but means an unlawful act done intentionally"
+without just cause or excuse.172. Malignant means extreme malevolence or enmity;
+violently hostile or harmful.
+"2. 'Wantonly'.— means recklessly, thoughtlessly, without regard for right or"
+"consequences. This word gives to the offence contained in this section a far larger,"
+"vaguer and more comprehensive scope, than would be implied by the word"
+"'malignantly' standing alone. It occurs only in this section of the Code, while the word"
+'malignantly' occurs once again in section 270.
+[s 153.2] CASES.—
+"The affixing of the poster exhorting for boycotting the election, even if it is"
+"objectionable, is not sufficient to show that by such affixture provocation is given to any"
+person for causing the offence of rioting. Howsoever deplorable be the act of affixing
+"the poster, to constitute the offence under section 153 of IPC, 1860, over and above the"
+"provocation that is likely to give cause for rioting, it has to be shown that the act —"
+affixing of the poster —is illegal.173.
+Where the accused wrote a pamphlet in praise of a person who was opposed to the
+"High Priest of the Borah community in certain matters, but his real intention appeared"
+"to be to show a grave insult to the High Priest, an insult which was likely to inflame the"
+"feelings of the followers of the High Priest and to lead to a riot, it was held that he was"
+guilty under this section.174. Where a bride and bridegroom belonging to depressed
+classes rode in palanquins through a village in spite of the protests of high caste
+"Hindus, it was held that this was not an illegal act for which they could be convicted"
+under this section.175. Where the accused unfastened the string of the National flag
+"after flag-hoisting ceremony and tried to trample on it, it was held that the accused was"
+guilty under this section as the act of the accused was deliberately insulting to the flag
+and thereby the accused intended to wound the feelings and sentiments of the other
+persons present.176.
+"168. Ahmed Hasham, (1932) 35 Bom LR 240 , 57 Bom 329."
+"169. Dr RC Chowala, AIR 1966 Ori 192 [LNIND 1965 ORI 73] . Aroon Purie v HL Varma, 1999 Cr LJ"
+"983 (Bom), in a debate on secularism, remarks were passed by some speakers touching"
+sentiments of others. It was held that a true publication of such remarks would not come within
+"the ambit of section 153, though they might constitute defamation. See also Baragur Ram"
+"Chandrappa v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 3639 (Kant—DB)."
+"170. Raju Thomas @ John Thomas v State, 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 240 (Ker) : 2012 (4) Ker LT 499 ;"
+"See also Manzar Sayeed Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : AIR"
+2007 SC 2074 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : 2007 Cr LJ 2959 .
+"171. Kahanji, (1893) 18 Bom 758, 775.[2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 240 (Ker) : 2012 (4) Ker LT 499 ]."
+"172. Bromage v Prosser, (1825) 4 B&C 247. [ 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 240 (Ker) : 2012 (4) Ker LT 499 ]."
+"173. Advocate Manuel PJ v State, 2012 (4) Ker LT 708 . See also Raju Thomas @ John Thomas v"
+"State, 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 240 (Ker) : 2012 (4) Ker LT 499 ."
+"174. Rahimatalli Mahomedalli, (1919) 22 Bom LR 166 ."
+"175. Jasnami, (1936) 58 All 934 ."
+"176. Indra Singh v State, AIR 1962 MP 292 [LNIND 1957 MP 82] . Rajendra v State of Rajasthan,"
+2006 Cr LJ 173 (Raj).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+177.[[s 153A] Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of
+"religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts"
+prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.
+(1) Whoever—
+"(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible"
+"representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on"
+"grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or"
+"community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of"
+"enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or"
+"regional groups or castes or communities, or"
+(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
+"between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or"
+"castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the"
+"public tranquillity, 178.[or]"
+"179.[(c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity"
+intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained
+to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the
+participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal
+"force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or"
+be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely
+that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use
+"criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or"
+regional group or caste or community and such activity for any
+reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a
+"feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial,"
+"language or regional group or caste or community,]"
+shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+"(2) Offence committed in place of worship, etc."
+Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of
+worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or
+"religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend"
+to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT—
+Promoting enmity.—This section replaces the old section. Sub-section (1)(c) has been
+newly inserted by Act 31 of 1972. This section provides for enhanced punishment for
+offences committed in a place of worship and making offences under this section
+cognisable. Under this section promoting enmity between different groups on grounds
+"such as, place of birth, or residence are included and it also makes promotion of"
+disharmony or feelings of ill-will an offence punishable under it. The provision in clause
+(b) of sub-section (1) to the section includes acts prejudicial to the maintenance of
+harmony between different regional groups and sub-section (2) provides for enhanced
+punishment for any offence specified in sub-section (1) when it is committed in a place
+"of worship, etc. With communal and fissiparous tendencies on the increase this section"
+has now gained an added importance. The object of section 153-A is to prevent
+breaches of the public tranquillity which might result from excited feelings of enmity
+between classes of people. Absence of malicious intention is a relevant factor to judge
+whether the offence is committed.180.
+"Section 153A of IPC, 1860, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or"
+"written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to"
+"promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious,"
+"racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the"
+maintenance of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of the
+offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different
+classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the
+sine qua non of the offence under section 153A of IPC and the prosecution has to prove
+prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused.181. The intention to
+cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under
+section 153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order
+"to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea"
+"on the part of the appellants as envisaged by the provisions of section 153A IPC, by"
+their raising casually the slogans a couple of times. The offence under section 153A
+"IPC is, therefore, not made out.182."
+"There must either be the intention to promote such feelings, or such feelings should be"
+promoted as the result of words spoken or written. The words promotes or tends to
+promote feelings of enmity are to be read as connoting a successful or unsuccessful
+attempt to promote feelings of enmity. It must be the purpose or parts of the purpose
+"of the accused to promote such feelings, and, if it is no part of his purpose, the mere"
+circumstance that there may be a tendency is not sufficient.183. The word classes
+includes any definite and ascertainable class of people. Capitalists do not constitute a
+class within the meaning of this section.184. To bring any body of persons within the
+"description of a class of people, the body of persons must possess a certain degree of"
+"importance numerically, and must be ascertained with certainty and distinguished from"
+any other class. Every group of persons cannot be designated as a class.185. The
+classes contemplated must be not merely clearly defined and separable but also
+numerous. A small and limited group of Zamindars cannot be regarded as constituting
+"a class.186. Petitioner published a sentence ""Oriya is a younger sister of Bengal"" in his"
+book. Subsequently petitioner published an apology in newspaper and deleted the
+controversial statement. In view of this it cannot be said that alleged sentence
+published to defame Oriya language or promote hatred between different linguistic
+groups. Criminal proceeding are quashed.187.
+The police force of the State cannot be brought within the purview of the term
+"""community"".188."
+[s 153A.1] Political Thesis.—
+This section cannot be used even if an article causes or tends to cause hatred or
+enmity between different political classes like the capitalists and the labour class or
+"between persons believing in different forms of Government, e.g., a democratic or"
+totalitarian rule. A bare reading of clause (a) of section 153A will show that a person
+"will be guilty under this section only where by words, either spoken or written, he"
+promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different
+"religious, racial, linguistic groups or castes or communities on grounds of religion, race,"
+"language, caste or community, etc., and not otherwise.189. But where the author in the"
+guise of presenting a political thesis or historical truth wrote two articles describing the
+Muslims as a basically violent race and further described today's Muslims as the
+"descendants of foul Moghuls rulers who were lustful perverts, rapists and murderers, it"
+was held that both the articles promoted feelings of enmity between Hindus and
+"Muslims and came within the mischief of section 153A IPC, 1860, whether or not the"
+"Moghuls were really so.190. In fine, this section does not contemplate the penalising of"
+"political doctrines, even though of the extreme kind like communism, but only such"
+writings as directly promote feelings of hatred or enmity between classes. But if a
+"publication advocates forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions, and aims at"
+"promoting class hatred and enmity, it comes under the purview of this section.191."
+1. Historical Account.—If the writing is calculated to promote feelings of enmity or
+"hatred, it is no defence to a charge under section 153-A of IPC, 1860, that the writing"
+contains a truthful account of past events or is otherwise supported by good authority.
+Adherence to the strict path of history is not by itself a complete defence to a charge
+under section 153-A. It is no defence to a charge under section 153-A of IPC that the
+writing contains a truthful account of past events or is otherwise supported by good
+authority.192.
+"But it would be no offence if the author adheres to the historical part of his narrative,"
+"however unpalatable it may be to the members of the other community, but if he uses"
+language which shows malice and is bound to annoy the members of the other
+"community so as to degrade them in the eyes of the other classes, he is promoting"
+feelings of enmity and hatred and is liable to be dealt with under this section and
+"section 295- A.193. It is, therefore, important to remember that criminality under section"
+153A does not attach to the thing said or done but to the manner in which it is said or
+done. If the words spoken or written are couched in temperate language and do not
+have the tendency to insult the feelings or the deepest religious convictions of any
+"section of the people, penal consequences do not follow.194. This appears also to be"
+"the law in England in regard to blasphemous libel. Thus, in Lemon's case Lord Diplock"
+observed:
+To publish opinion denying the truth of the established church or even of Christianity itself
+was no longer held to amount to the offence of blasphemous libel so long as such opinions
+"were expressed in temperate language and not in terms of offence, insult or ridicule.195."
+So what is said or written is not so important as how it is said or written or with what
+"intent it is said or written. Where, therefore, the article did not intend or exhibit any"
+insult to any religion but read as a whole projected a scholarly historical thesis showing
+as to how in pre-Islamic times the ancient Hindu culture and Hindu religion were in
+"vogue in Arabia and how Islamic culture, religion and art were greatly influenced by"
+"Indian culture and religion, it could not be said that the article came within the mischief"
+"of section 153A, IPC, 1860, or section 95, Cr PC, 1973. The scope of section 153A, IPC,"
+cannot be enlarged to such an extent with a view to thwart history or historical
+events.196.
+Where an article in a newspaper bears a meaning that is calculated to produce hatred
+"and enmity between two classes, the natural inference from the publication of such an"
+article is that the person who published it had the malicious intention that it should
+"produce such hatred and enmity.197. A Hindu, who ridicules the Prophet of the"
+Mohammedans not out of any eccentricity but in the prosecution of a propaganda
+"started by a class of persons who are not Mohammedans, promotes feelings of enmity"
+"and hatred between Hindus and Mohammedans, and is liable to punishment under the"
+"section.198. In order to ascertain the intention of the accused, the offending article"
+must be read as a whole and the circumstances attending that publication must also
+be taken into account.199.
+"An FIR was filed against the author, publisher and printer of the book ""Shivaji: Hindu"
+"King in Islamic India"" on the ground that certain passage were objectionable. This led"
+"to blackening of the face of a local scholar, ransacking of a research institute and"
+"destruction of manuscripts, etc. The members of the institute had helped the author"
+made contributions to enable the author to complete the work. The author was an
+"American professor based in the USA. He tendered apology, by fax and the publishers"
+immediately withdrew all the copies from the market. In proceedings against the
+"author, etc., it was held that the book was purely a scholarly pursuit. There was no"
+intention or motive to create trouble for the author and others. The State was directed
+not to proceed against them. The Supreme Court explained the gist of the offence
+under the section as follows:
+The gist of the offence under section 153-A is the intention to promote feelings of
+enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder
+or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under section 153-A
+"IPC, 1860, and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on"
+the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the
+book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter
+complained of to fall within the ambit of section 153-A must be read as a whole. One
+cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passage for proving the charge nor indeed
+can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous
+process of inferential reasoning.
+"The effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-"
+"minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of"
+those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. It is the standard of the ordinary
+"reasonable man or as they say in English law ""the man on the top of a Clapham"
+"omnibus""."
+"The common feature in both the sections, viz., sections 153-A and 505(2), being"
+"promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will ""between different"" religious or racial or"
+"linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is necessary that at least"
+two such groups or communities should be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one
+community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot
+attract either of the two sections.200. In State of Maharashtra v Sangharaj Damodar
+"Rupawate,201. the Supreme Court again considered the question whether a notification"
+"issued by the Maharashtra Government to forfeit the book ""Shivaji: Hindu King in"
+"Islamic India"". It was held that the notification does not identify the communities"
+between which the book had caused or is likely to cause enmity. It cannot be found out
+from the notification as to which communities got outraged by the publication of the
+book or it had had caused hatred and animosity between the particular communities or
+groups—statement in the notification to the effect that the book is 'likely to result in
+breach of peace and public tranquillity and in particular between those who revere Shri
+Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and those who may not' is too vague a ground to satisfy the
+aforesaid tests. The order quashing the notification was upheld by the Supreme Court.
+"In Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v UOI,202. the Court held that TV serial ""Tamas"" did not depict"
+"communal tension and violence and the provisions of section 153A of IPC, 1860, would"
+not apply to it. It was also not prejudicial to the national integration falling under
+"section 153B of IPC. Approving the observations of Vivian Bose, J in Bhagvati Charan"
+"Shukla v Provincial Government,203. the Court observed that the effect of the words"
+"must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous"
+"men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in"
+every hostile point of view. It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say
+"in English Law, ""the man on the clapham omnibus"". Again in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State"
+"of AP,204. it was held that the common feature in both the sections, viz., sections 153A"
+"and 505 (2), being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will ""between different"""
+"religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is"
+"necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Further, it"
+was observed that merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any
+reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections.
+2. Scurrilous attack on basic religious books.—Section 153A certainly affords
+protection to the basic religious books of all the religions against scurrilous attacks. In
+"Chandanmal Chopra v State of WB,205. it was alleged that the Koran, the basic religious"
+book of Muslim religion promotes religious disharmony by advocating destructions of
+"idols, etc., and thereby outrages not only the religious feelings of non-Muslims but also"
+"encourages hatred, disharmony, feeling of enmity between different religious"
+"communities in India, and the petitioner sought for directing the State of West Bengal"
+to forfeit every copy of Koran. It was also alleged that the publication of Koran amounts
+"to commission of offences punishable under sections 153A and 295A of IPC, 1860. In"
+support of their contention the petitioners quoted some isolated passages from the
+Koran. In rejecting this contention the High Court of Calcutta held that sections 153A
+and 295A of the Code have no application in the present case. The book is the basic
+text book of the Mohammedans and is held sacred by them like Bible to Christians and
+"Gita, Ramayana and Mahabharata to Hindus. Because of Koran no public tranquillity"
+has been disturbed up to now and there is no reason to apprehend such disturbance in
+future. On the other hand the action of the petitioners may be said to have attempted to
+"promote, on grounds of religion, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will"
+"amongst different religions, i.e., Muslims on the one hand and non-Muslims on the"
+"other within the meaning of section 153A, IPC, 1860. Forfeiture of Koran would go"
+against the Preamble of the Constitution and violate Article 25 of the Constitution
+which guarantees freedom of conscience and religion to one and all.
+"3. Evidence of hatred, etc., not needed.—A Special Bench of the Bombay High Court"
+has held that under this section it is not necessary to prove that as a result of the
+"objectionable matter, enmity or hatred was in fact caused between the different"
+"classes. Intention to promote enmity or hatred, apart from the writing itself, is not a"
+necessary ingredient of the offence. It is enough to show that the language of the
+writing is of a nature calculated to promote feelings of enmity or hatred for a person
+must be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. If a writing is
+"calculated to promote feelings of enmity or hatred, it is no defence to a charge under"
+this section that the writing contains a truthful account of past events or is otherwise
+supported by good authority. Adherence to the strict path of history is not by itself a
+complete defence to a charge under this section.206.
+"Immediately after the demolition of Babri masjid and violent riots in Bombay, editorials"
+appeared in the Marathi newspaper 'Samna' which were in high flown and caustic
+language but were not directed against the Muslim Community as a whole but only
+"against anti-national elements amongst them and also against the attitude of police,"
+army and Government. The articles were held to be not coming within the mischief of
+section 153-A and section 153-B.207.
+[s 153A.2] Previous Sanction:
+"Previous sanction under section 196 Cr PC, 1973, is a must before taking cognizance"
+"of the offences under section 153 and 153B IPC, 1860.208."
+"177. Subs. by Act 35 of 1969, sec. 2, for section 153A (w.e.f. 4-9-1969). Earlier section 153A"
+"was substituted by Act 41 of 1961, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 12-9-1961)."
+"178. Ins. by Act 31 of 1972, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-6-1972)."
+"179. Ins. by Act 31 of 1972, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-6-1972)."
+"180. The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt of Nct of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3689 (Del)."
+"181. Manzar Sayeed Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : AIR"
+2007 SC 2074 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : 2007 Cr LJ 2959 .
+"182. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 3 SCC"
+214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 1 SCC (Cr) 432.
+"183. Ram, (1924) Kant 31. Mens rea is a necessary requirement of this offence. State (Delhi"
+"Admn) v Shrikanth Shastri, 1987 Cr LJ 1583 ."
+"184. Maniben Kara, (1932) 34 Bom LR 1642 ; Nepal Chandra Bhattacharjya, (1939) 1 Cal 299 ."
+"185. Narayan Vasudev Phadke, (1940) 42 Bom LR 861 ."
+"186. Banomali Maharana, (1942) 22 Pat 48."
+"187. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd v State of Orissa, 2006 Cr LJ 2548 (Ori)."
+"188. Hardik Bharatbhai Patel v State of Gujarat, 2016 Cr LJ 225 (Guj) : 2015 (4) Crimes 462 (Guj)."
+"189. Shiv Kumar, 1978 Cr LJ 701 (All)."
+"190. Baburao Patel, 1980 Cr LJ 529 : AIR 1980 SC 763 [LNIND 1980 SC 84] ."
+"191. Gautam, (1937) All 69 (SB)."
+"192. R V Bhasin v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1375 (FB) (Bom); Gopal Godse v UOI, AIR"
+1971 Bom 56 [LNIND 1969 BOM 50] .
+"193. Harnam Das, (1957) 1 All 528 (FB)."
+"194. Azizul Haque, 1980 Cr LJ 448 (SC)."
+"195. Rex v Lemon, (1971) 1 All ER 898 ."
+"196. Varsha Publications Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra, 1983 Cr LJ 1446 (Bom—SB); Nand"
+"Kishore Singh v State of Bihar, 1985 Cr LJ 797 (Pat-SB)."
+"197. Kanchanlal Chunilal, (1930) 32 Bom LR 585 ."
+"198. Shib Sharma, (1941) 16 Luck 674 ."
+"199. Ghulam Sarwar, AIR 1965 Pat 393 ."
+"200. Manzar Sayeed Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : AIR"
+"2007 SC 2074 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : 2007 Cr LJ 2959 ; Sajjan Kumar v CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368"
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 892] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1371 : (2010) 11 SCR 669 : 2011 AIR (SCW) 3730, Anti-"
+"Sikh Riots charges framed against Sajjan Kumar upheld by the SC. In S Khushboo v Kanniammal,"
+JT 2010 (4) SC 478 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 (4) Scale 462 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 5
+"SCR 322 : 2010 Cr LJ 2828 : AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 2 SCC (Cr) 1299, it"
+"is found that section 153A IPC, 1860, have no application to the present case since the"
+appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not
+directed against any particular group either.
+"201. State of Maharashtra v Sangharaj Damodar Rupawate, (2010) 7 SCC 398 [LNIND 2010 SC"
+1557] : 2010 AIR (SCW) 4960 : (2010) 8 SCR 328 [LNIND 2010 SC 1557] : 2010 Cr LJ 4290 :
+"(2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 401. In Anand Chintamani Dighe v State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cr LJ 8 (Bom),"
+the Government of Maharashtra issued notification under section 95(1) of the Code declaring
+"that every copy of the Marathi play entitled ""Mee Nathuram Godse Bolto"" be forfeited to the"
+"Government. The notification, inter alia, stated that the play in question contained derogatory"
+references towards Mahatma Gandhi and certain communities and was likely to disturb public
+tranquillity and that it was written with a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the
+"feelings of the followers of Mahatma Gandhi, The publication would be punishable under"
+"sections 153-A and 295-A of IPC, 1860. The challenge to the notification was repelled by the"
+Bombay High Court.
+"202. Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v UOI, AIR 1988 SC 775 [LNIND 1988 SC 74]"
+"203. Bhagvati Charan Shukla v Provincial Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1 ."
+"204. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP, (1997) 7 SCC 431 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] ."
+"205. Chandanmal Chopra v State of WB, AIR 1986 Cal 104 [LNIND 1985 CAL 180] , 1986 Cr LJ"
+182 (Cal).
+"206. Gopal, (1969) 72 Bom LR 871 (SB)."
+"207. Joseph Bain D'Souza v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 1316 Bom. The court relied on"
+"Varsha Publications Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra, 1983 Cr LJ 1446 but distinguished; Babu Rao"
+"Patel v State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 763 [LNIND 1980 SC 84] : 1980 Cr LJ 529 . Trustees of"
+"Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3689 (Del), the object of the"
+provision is to prevent breaches of public tranquillity which might result from excited feelings of
+enmity between classes of people. Malicious intention or mens rea has to be proved. Mohd
+"Khalid Hussain v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 2949 (AP), offence of promoting enmity between people"
+on the ground of religion. There was nothing to show the actual words uttered or acts
+"committed. There were only vague allegations. FIR quashed. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP,"
+"1997 Cr LJ 4091 : AIR 1997 SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] , inciting the feelings of one group"
+"without any reference to another, attracts neither section 153A nor section 505."
+"208. Swaraj Thackeray v State of Jharkhand, 2008 Cr LJ 3780 (Jhar); Shailbhadra Shah v Swami"
+"Krishna Bharti, 1981 Cr LJ 113 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+177.[[s 153A] Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of
+"religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts"
+prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.
+(1) Whoever—
+"(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible"
+"representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on"
+"grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or"
+"community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of"
+"enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or"
+"regional groups or castes or communities, or"
+(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
+"between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or"
+"castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the"
+"public tranquillity, 178.[or]"
+"179.[(c) organizes any exercise, movement, drill or other similar activity"
+intending that the participants in such activity shall use or be trained
+to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely that the
+participants in such activity will use or be trained to use criminal
+"force or violence, or participates in such activity intending to use or"
+be trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely
+that the participants in such activity will use or be trained to use
+"criminal force or violence, against any religious, racial, language or"
+regional group or caste or community and such activity for any
+reason whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm or a
+"feeling of insecurity amongst members of such religious, racial,"
+"language or regional group or caste or community,]"
+shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+"(2) Offence committed in place of worship, etc."
+Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of
+worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or
+"religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend"
+to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT—
+Promoting enmity.—This section replaces the old section. Sub-section (1)(c) has been
+newly inserted by Act 31 of 1972. This section provides for enhanced punishment for
+offences committed in a place of worship and making offences under this section
+cognisable. Under this section promoting enmity between different groups on grounds
+"such as, place of birth, or residence are included and it also makes promotion of"
+disharmony or feelings of ill-will an offence punishable under it. The provision in clause
+(b) of sub-section (1) to the section includes acts prejudicial to the maintenance of
+harmony between different regional groups and sub-section (2) provides for enhanced
+punishment for any offence specified in sub-section (1) when it is committed in a place
+"of worship, etc. With communal and fissiparous tendencies on the increase this section"
+has now gained an added importance. The object of section 153-A is to prevent
+breaches of the public tranquillity which might result from excited feelings of enmity
+between classes of people. Absence of malicious intention is a relevant factor to judge
+whether the offence is committed.180.
+"Section 153A of IPC, 1860, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or"
+"written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to"
+"promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious,"
+"racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the"
+maintenance of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of the
+offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different
+classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the
+sine qua non of the offence under section 153A of IPC and the prosecution has to prove
+prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused.181. The intention to
+cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under
+section 153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order
+"to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea"
+"on the part of the appellants as envisaged by the provisions of section 153A IPC, by"
+their raising casually the slogans a couple of times. The offence under section 153A
+"IPC is, therefore, not made out.182."
+"There must either be the intention to promote such feelings, or such feelings should be"
+promoted as the result of words spoken or written. The words promotes or tends to
+promote feelings of enmity are to be read as connoting a successful or unsuccessful
+attempt to promote feelings of enmity. It must be the purpose or parts of the purpose
+"of the accused to promote such feelings, and, if it is no part of his purpose, the mere"
+circumstance that there may be a tendency is not sufficient.183. The word classes
+includes any definite and ascertainable class of people. Capitalists do not constitute a
+class within the meaning of this section.184. To bring any body of persons within the
+"description of a class of people, the body of persons must possess a certain degree of"
+"importance numerically, and must be ascertained with certainty and distinguished from"
+any other class. Every group of persons cannot be designated as a class.185. The
+classes contemplated must be not merely clearly defined and separable but also
+numerous. A small and limited group of Zamindars cannot be regarded as constituting
+"a class.186. Petitioner published a sentence ""Oriya is a younger sister of Bengal"" in his"
+book. Subsequently petitioner published an apology in newspaper and deleted the
+controversial statement. In view of this it cannot be said that alleged sentence
+published to defame Oriya language or promote hatred between different linguistic
+groups. Criminal proceeding are quashed.187.
+The police force of the State cannot be brought within the purview of the term
+"""community"".188."
+[s 153A.1] Political Thesis.—
+This section cannot be used even if an article causes or tends to cause hatred or
+enmity between different political classes like the capitalists and the labour class or
+"between persons believing in different forms of Government, e.g., a democratic or"
+totalitarian rule. A bare reading of clause (a) of section 153A will show that a person
+"will be guilty under this section only where by words, either spoken or written, he"
+promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different
+"religious, racial, linguistic groups or castes or communities on grounds of religion, race,"
+"language, caste or community, etc., and not otherwise.189. But where the author in the"
+guise of presenting a political thesis or historical truth wrote two articles describing the
+Muslims as a basically violent race and further described today's Muslims as the
+"descendants of foul Moghuls rulers who were lustful perverts, rapists and murderers, it"
+was held that both the articles promoted feelings of enmity between Hindus and
+"Muslims and came within the mischief of section 153A IPC, 1860, whether or not the"
+"Moghuls were really so.190. In fine, this section does not contemplate the penalising of"
+"political doctrines, even though of the extreme kind like communism, but only such"
+writings as directly promote feelings of hatred or enmity between classes. But if a
+"publication advocates forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions, and aims at"
+"promoting class hatred and enmity, it comes under the purview of this section.191."
+1. Historical Account.—If the writing is calculated to promote feelings of enmity or
+"hatred, it is no defence to a charge under section 153-A of IPC, 1860, that the writing"
+contains a truthful account of past events or is otherwise supported by good authority.
+Adherence to the strict path of history is not by itself a complete defence to a charge
+under section 153-A. It is no defence to a charge under section 153-A of IPC that the
+writing contains a truthful account of past events or is otherwise supported by good
+authority.192.
+"But it would be no offence if the author adheres to the historical part of his narrative,"
+"however unpalatable it may be to the members of the other community, but if he uses"
+language which shows malice and is bound to annoy the members of the other
+"community so as to degrade them in the eyes of the other classes, he is promoting"
+feelings of enmity and hatred and is liable to be dealt with under this section and
+"section 295- A.193. It is, therefore, important to remember that criminality under section"
+153A does not attach to the thing said or done but to the manner in which it is said or
+done. If the words spoken or written are couched in temperate language and do not
+have the tendency to insult the feelings or the deepest religious convictions of any
+"section of the people, penal consequences do not follow.194. This appears also to be"
+"the law in England in regard to blasphemous libel. Thus, in Lemon's case Lord Diplock"
+observed:
+To publish opinion denying the truth of the established church or even of Christianity itself
+was no longer held to amount to the offence of blasphemous libel so long as such opinions
+"were expressed in temperate language and not in terms of offence, insult or ridicule.195."
+So what is said or written is not so important as how it is said or written or with what
+"intent it is said or written. Where, therefore, the article did not intend or exhibit any"
+insult to any religion but read as a whole projected a scholarly historical thesis showing
+as to how in pre-Islamic times the ancient Hindu culture and Hindu religion were in
+"vogue in Arabia and how Islamic culture, religion and art were greatly influenced by"
+"Indian culture and religion, it could not be said that the article came within the mischief"
+"of section 153A, IPC, 1860, or section 95, Cr PC, 1973. The scope of section 153A, IPC,"
+cannot be enlarged to such an extent with a view to thwart history or historical
+events.196.
+Where an article in a newspaper bears a meaning that is calculated to produce hatred
+"and enmity between two classes, the natural inference from the publication of such an"
+article is that the person who published it had the malicious intention that it should
+"produce such hatred and enmity.197. A Hindu, who ridicules the Prophet of the"
+Mohammedans not out of any eccentricity but in the prosecution of a propaganda
+"started by a class of persons who are not Mohammedans, promotes feelings of enmity"
+"and hatred between Hindus and Mohammedans, and is liable to punishment under the"
+"section.198. In order to ascertain the intention of the accused, the offending article"
+must be read as a whole and the circumstances attending that publication must also
+be taken into account.199.
+"An FIR was filed against the author, publisher and printer of the book ""Shivaji: Hindu"
+"King in Islamic India"" on the ground that certain passage were objectionable. This led"
+"to blackening of the face of a local scholar, ransacking of a research institute and"
+"destruction of manuscripts, etc. The members of the institute had helped the author"
+made contributions to enable the author to complete the work. The author was an
+"American professor based in the USA. He tendered apology, by fax and the publishers"
+immediately withdrew all the copies from the market. In proceedings against the
+"author, etc., it was held that the book was purely a scholarly pursuit. There was no"
+intention or motive to create trouble for the author and others. The State was directed
+not to proceed against them. The Supreme Court explained the gist of the offence
+under the section as follows:
+The gist of the offence under section 153-A is the intention to promote feelings of
+enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder
+or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under section 153-A
+"IPC, 1860, and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on"
+the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the
+book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter
+complained of to fall within the ambit of section 153-A must be read as a whole. One
+cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passage for proving the charge nor indeed
+can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous
+process of inferential reasoning.
+"The effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-"
+"minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of"
+those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. It is the standard of the ordinary
+"reasonable man or as they say in English law ""the man on the top of a Clapham"
+"omnibus""."
+"The common feature in both the sections, viz., sections 153-A and 505(2), being"
+"promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will ""between different"" religious or racial or"
+"linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is necessary that at least"
+two such groups or communities should be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one
+community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot
+attract either of the two sections.200. In State of Maharashtra v Sangharaj Damodar
+"Rupawate,201. the Supreme Court again considered the question whether a notification"
+"issued by the Maharashtra Government to forfeit the book ""Shivaji: Hindu King in"
+"Islamic India"". It was held that the notification does not identify the communities"
+between which the book had caused or is likely to cause enmity. It cannot be found out
+from the notification as to which communities got outraged by the publication of the
+book or it had had caused hatred and animosity between the particular communities or
+groups—statement in the notification to the effect that the book is 'likely to result in
+breach of peace and public tranquillity and in particular between those who revere Shri
+Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and those who may not' is too vague a ground to satisfy the
+aforesaid tests. The order quashing the notification was upheld by the Supreme Court.
+"In Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v UOI,202. the Court held that TV serial ""Tamas"" did not depict"
+"communal tension and violence and the provisions of section 153A of IPC, 1860, would"
+not apply to it. It was also not prejudicial to the national integration falling under
+"section 153B of IPC. Approving the observations of Vivian Bose, J in Bhagvati Charan"
+"Shukla v Provincial Government,203. the Court observed that the effect of the words"
+"must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous"
+"men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in"
+every hostile point of view. It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say
+"in English Law, ""the man on the clapham omnibus"". Again in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State"
+"of AP,204. it was held that the common feature in both the sections, viz., sections 153A"
+"and 505 (2), being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill-will ""between different"""
+"religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is"
+"necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Further, it"
+was observed that merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any
+reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections.
+2. Scurrilous attack on basic religious books.—Section 153A certainly affords
+protection to the basic religious books of all the religions against scurrilous attacks. In
+"Chandanmal Chopra v State of WB,205. it was alleged that the Koran, the basic religious"
+book of Muslim religion promotes religious disharmony by advocating destructions of
+"idols, etc., and thereby outrages not only the religious feelings of non-Muslims but also"
+"encourages hatred, disharmony, feeling of enmity between different religious"
+"communities in India, and the petitioner sought for directing the State of West Bengal"
+to forfeit every copy of Koran. It was also alleged that the publication of Koran amounts
+"to commission of offences punishable under sections 153A and 295A of IPC, 1860. In"
+support of their contention the petitioners quoted some isolated passages from the
+Koran. In rejecting this contention the High Court of Calcutta held that sections 153A
+and 295A of the Code have no application in the present case. The book is the basic
+text book of the Mohammedans and is held sacred by them like Bible to Christians and
+"Gita, Ramayana and Mahabharata to Hindus. Because of Koran no public tranquillity"
+has been disturbed up to now and there is no reason to apprehend such disturbance in
+future. On the other hand the action of the petitioners may be said to have attempted to
+"promote, on grounds of religion, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will"
+"amongst different religions, i.e., Muslims on the one hand and non-Muslims on the"
+"other within the meaning of section 153A, IPC, 1860. Forfeiture of Koran would go"
+against the Preamble of the Constitution and violate Article 25 of the Constitution
+which guarantees freedom of conscience and religion to one and all.
+"3. Evidence of hatred, etc., not needed.—A Special Bench of the Bombay High Court"
+has held that under this section it is not necessary to prove that as a result of the
+"objectionable matter, enmity or hatred was in fact caused between the different"
+"classes. Intention to promote enmity or hatred, apart from the writing itself, is not a"
+necessary ingredient of the offence. It is enough to show that the language of the
+writing is of a nature calculated to promote feelings of enmity or hatred for a person
+must be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. If a writing is
+"calculated to promote feelings of enmity or hatred, it is no defence to a charge under"
+this section that the writing contains a truthful account of past events or is otherwise
+supported by good authority. Adherence to the strict path of history is not by itself a
+complete defence to a charge under this section.206.
+"Immediately after the demolition of Babri masjid and violent riots in Bombay, editorials"
+appeared in the Marathi newspaper 'Samna' which were in high flown and caustic
+language but were not directed against the Muslim Community as a whole but only
+"against anti-national elements amongst them and also against the attitude of police,"
+army and Government. The articles were held to be not coming within the mischief of
+section 153-A and section 153-B.207.
+[s 153A.2] Previous Sanction:
+"Previous sanction under section 196 Cr PC, 1973, is a must before taking cognizance"
+"of the offences under section 153 and 153B IPC, 1860.208."
+"177. Subs. by Act 35 of 1969, sec. 2, for section 153A (w.e.f. 4-9-1969). Earlier section 153A"
+"was substituted by Act 41 of 1961, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 12-9-1961)."
+"178. Ins. by Act 31 of 1972, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-6-1972)."
+"179. Ins. by Act 31 of 1972, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-6-1972)."
+"180. The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt of Nct of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3689 (Del)."
+"181. Manzar Sayeed Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : AIR"
+2007 SC 2074 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : 2007 Cr LJ 2959 .
+"182. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 3 SCC"
+214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : (1995) 1 SCC (Cr) 432.
+"183. Ram, (1924) Kant 31. Mens rea is a necessary requirement of this offence. State (Delhi"
+"Admn) v Shrikanth Shastri, 1987 Cr LJ 1583 ."
+"184. Maniben Kara, (1932) 34 Bom LR 1642 ; Nepal Chandra Bhattacharjya, (1939) 1 Cal 299 ."
+"185. Narayan Vasudev Phadke, (1940) 42 Bom LR 861 ."
+"186. Banomali Maharana, (1942) 22 Pat 48."
+"187. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd v State of Orissa, 2006 Cr LJ 2548 (Ori)."
+"188. Hardik Bharatbhai Patel v State of Gujarat, 2016 Cr LJ 225 (Guj) : 2015 (4) Crimes 462 (Guj)."
+"189. Shiv Kumar, 1978 Cr LJ 701 (All)."
+"190. Baburao Patel, 1980 Cr LJ 529 : AIR 1980 SC 763 [LNIND 1980 SC 84] ."
+"191. Gautam, (1937) All 69 (SB)."
+"192. R V Bhasin v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1375 (FB) (Bom); Gopal Godse v UOI, AIR"
+1971 Bom 56 [LNIND 1969 BOM 50] .
+"193. Harnam Das, (1957) 1 All 528 (FB)."
+"194. Azizul Haque, 1980 Cr LJ 448 (SC)."
+"195. Rex v Lemon, (1971) 1 All ER 898 ."
+"196. Varsha Publications Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra, 1983 Cr LJ 1446 (Bom—SB); Nand"
+"Kishore Singh v State of Bihar, 1985 Cr LJ 797 (Pat-SB)."
+"197. Kanchanlal Chunilal, (1930) 32 Bom LR 585 ."
+"198. Shib Sharma, (1941) 16 Luck 674 ."
+"199. Ghulam Sarwar, AIR 1965 Pat 393 ."
+"200. Manzar Sayeed Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : AIR"
+"2007 SC 2074 [LNIND 2007 SC 437] : 2007 Cr LJ 2959 ; Sajjan Kumar v CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368"
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 892] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1371 : (2010) 11 SCR 669 : 2011 AIR (SCW) 3730, Anti-"
+"Sikh Riots charges framed against Sajjan Kumar upheld by the SC. In S Khushboo v Kanniammal,"
+JT 2010 (4) SC 478 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 (4) Scale 462 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 5
+"SCR 322 : 2010 Cr LJ 2828 : AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 2 SCC (Cr) 1299, it"
+"is found that section 153A IPC, 1860, have no application to the present case since the"
+appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not
+directed against any particular group either.
+"201. State of Maharashtra v Sangharaj Damodar Rupawate, (2010) 7 SCC 398 [LNIND 2010 SC"
+1557] : 2010 AIR (SCW) 4960 : (2010) 8 SCR 328 [LNIND 2010 SC 1557] : 2010 Cr LJ 4290 :
+"(2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 401. In Anand Chintamani Dighe v State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cr LJ 8 (Bom),"
+the Government of Maharashtra issued notification under section 95(1) of the Code declaring
+"that every copy of the Marathi play entitled ""Mee Nathuram Godse Bolto"" be forfeited to the"
+"Government. The notification, inter alia, stated that the play in question contained derogatory"
+references towards Mahatma Gandhi and certain communities and was likely to disturb public
+tranquillity and that it was written with a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the
+"feelings of the followers of Mahatma Gandhi, The publication would be punishable under"
+"sections 153-A and 295-A of IPC, 1860. The challenge to the notification was repelled by the"
+Bombay High Court.
+"202. Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v UOI, AIR 1988 SC 775 [LNIND 1988 SC 74]"
+"203. Bhagvati Charan Shukla v Provincial Government, AIR 1947 Nag 1 ."
+"204. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP, (1997) 7 SCC 431 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] ."
+"205. Chandanmal Chopra v State of WB, AIR 1986 Cal 104 [LNIND 1985 CAL 180] , 1986 Cr LJ"
+182 (Cal).
+"206. Gopal, (1969) 72 Bom LR 871 (SB)."
+"207. Joseph Bain D'Souza v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 1316 Bom. The court relied on"
+"Varsha Publications Pvt Ltd v State of Maharashtra, 1983 Cr LJ 1446 but distinguished; Babu Rao"
+"Patel v State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 763 [LNIND 1980 SC 84] : 1980 Cr LJ 529 . Trustees of"
+"Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt of NCT of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3689 (Del), the object of the"
+provision is to prevent breaches of public tranquillity which might result from excited feelings of
+enmity between classes of people. Malicious intention or mens rea has to be proved. Mohd
+"Khalid Hussain v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 2949 (AP), offence of promoting enmity between people"
+on the ground of religion. There was nothing to show the actual words uttered or acts
+"committed. There were only vague allegations. FIR quashed. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP,"
+"1997 Cr LJ 4091 : AIR 1997 SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] , inciting the feelings of one group"
+"without any reference to another, attracts neither section 153A nor section 505."
+"208. Swaraj Thackeray v State of Jharkhand, 2008 Cr LJ 3780 (Jhar); Shailbhadra Shah v Swami"
+"Krishna Bharti, 1981 Cr LJ 113 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+209.[s 153-AA] Punishment for knowingly carrying arms in any procession or
+"organising, or holding or taking part in any mass drill or mass training with"
+arms.
+Whoever knowingly carries arms in any procession or organizes or holds or takes part
+in any mass drill or mass training with arms in any public place in contravention of
+any public notice or order issued or made under section 144-A of the Code of Criminal
+"Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which"
+may extend to six months and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees.
+"Explanation.—""Arms"" means articles of any description designed or adapted as"
+"weapons for offence or defence and includes fire - arms, sharp edged weapons, lathis,"
+dandas and sticks.]
+COMMENT.—
+"Cr PC (Amendment) Act 2005—clause 44.—This clause amends IPC as follows,"
+namely:—
+Clause 16 is intended to enable the District Magistrate to prohibit mass drill (or
+"training) with arms in public places. A new section 153-AA is, therefore, being added to"
+the Indian Penal Code to prescribe punishment with imprisonment upto six months and
+fine upto two thousand rupees for the contravention of the prohibitory order. [Notes on
+Clauses].
+"209. Ins. by Cr PC (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section 44(a)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+209.[s 153-AA] Punishment for knowingly carrying arms in any procession or
+"organising, or holding or taking part in any mass drill or mass training with"
+arms.
+Whoever knowingly carries arms in any procession or organizes or holds or takes part
+in any mass drill or mass training with arms in any public place in contravention of
+any public notice or order issued or made under section 144-A of the Code of Criminal
+"Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which"
+may extend to six months and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees.
+"Explanation.—""Arms"" means articles of any description designed or adapted as"
+"weapons for offence or defence and includes fire - arms, sharp edged weapons, lathis,"
+dandas and sticks.]
+COMMENT.—
+"Cr PC (Amendment) Act 2005—clause 44.—This clause amends IPC as follows,"
+namely:—
+Clause 16 is intended to enable the District Magistrate to prohibit mass drill (or
+"training) with arms in public places. A new section 153-AA is, therefore, being added to"
+the Indian Penal Code to prescribe punishment with imprisonment upto six months and
+fine upto two thousand rupees for the contravention of the prohibitory order. [Notes on
+Clauses].
+"209. Ins. by Cr PC (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section 44(a)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+"210.[[s 153B] Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration."
+"(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible"
+"representations or otherwise,—"
+"(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by"
+"reason of their being members of any religious,"
+"racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith"
+and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or
+"uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, or"
+"(b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes that any class of"
+"persons shall, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial,"
+"language or regional group or caste or community, be denied or"
+"deprived of their rights as citizens of India, or"
+"(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning"
+"the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members"
+"of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or"
+"community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is"
+likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will
+"between such members and other persons,"
+"shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years,"
+"or with fine, or with both."
+"(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1), in any place of"
+worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or
+"religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend"
+to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT—
+Prejudicing national integration.—This section has been newly added by Act 31 of
+1972. This is a cognizable and non-bailable offence.
+[s 153B.1] Sanction for prosecution.—
+The allegation was that of instigating Hindus to convert to Christianity. The Court said
+that the previous sanction of the Central Government was necessary. But it was
+necessary for the court to take cognizance of the offence. The bar of sanction does not
+apply against registration of a criminal case or investigation by a police agency. The
+police asserted the accused and produced him before the Magistrate. The Magistrate
+remanded him to judicial custody. The passing of order of remand did not amount to
+taking of cognizance.211.
+"210. Ins. by Act 31 of 1972, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-6-1972)."
+* Effective date yet to be notified.
+"211. State of Karnataka v Pastor P Raju, 2000 Cr LJ 4045 SC."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+"210.[[s 153B] Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national integration."
+"(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible"
+"representations or otherwise,—"
+"(a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by"
+"reason of their being members of any religious,"
+"racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith"
+and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or
+"uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, or"
+"(b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes that any class of"
+"persons shall, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial,"
+"language or regional group or caste or community, be denied or"
+"deprived of their rights as citizens of India, or"
+"(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning"
+"the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members"
+"of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or"
+"community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is"
+likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will
+"between such members and other persons,"
+"shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years,"
+"or with fine, or with both."
+"(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1), in any place of"
+worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or
+"religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend"
+to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT—
+Prejudicing national integration.—This section has been newly added by Act 31 of
+1972. This is a cognizable and non-bailable offence.
+[s 153B.1] Sanction for prosecution.—
+The allegation was that of instigating Hindus to convert to Christianity. The Court said
+that the previous sanction of the Central Government was necessary. But it was
+necessary for the court to take cognizance of the offence. The bar of sanction does not
+apply against registration of a criminal case or investigation by a police agency. The
+police asserted the accused and produced him before the Magistrate. The Magistrate
+remanded him to judicial custody. The passing of order of remand did not amount to
+taking of cognizance.211.
+"210. Ins. by Act 31 of 1972, section 2 (w.e.f. 14-6-1972)."
+* Effective date yet to be notified.
+"211. State of Karnataka v Pastor P Raju, 2000 Cr LJ 4045 SC."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 154] Owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held.
+"Whenever any unlawful assembly or riot takes place, the owner or occupier of the land"
+"upon which such unlawful assembly is held, or such riot is committed, and any person"
+"having or claiming an interest in such land, shall be punishable with fine not"
+"exceeding one thousand rupees, if he or his agent or manager, knowing that such"
+"offence is being or has been committed, or having reason to believe it is likely to be"
+"committed, do not give the earliest notice thereof in his or their power to the principal"
+"officer at the nearest police-station, and do not, in the case of his or their having"
+"reason to believe that it was about to be committed, use all lawful means in his or"
+"their power to prevent it, and, in the event of its taking place, do not use all lawful"
+means in his or their power to disperse or suppress the riot or unlawful assembly.
+COMMENT—
+Liability of owner or occupier of land used for unlawful assembly.— Many duties of the
+police are by law imposed on land-holders. The present section proceeds apparently
+"upon a presumption that, in addition to any such duty, the owner or occupier of land is"
+"cognizant in a peculiar way of the designs of those who assemble on his land, and is"
+"able not only to give the police notice, but also to prevent and to disperse and suppress"
+the assembly.212.
+"Section 45 of the Cr PC, 1973, casts upon the owners and occupiers of land the duty of"
+preventing a riot on their lands.
+"Knowledge, on the part of the owner or occupier of the land, of the acts or intentions of"
+"the agent, is not an essential element of an offence under this section, and he may be"
+convicted under it though he may be in entire ignorance of the acts of his agent or
+manager.213. According to some Police Regulations the Police are required to serve a
+"warning notice on the landlord, owner, occupier or his agent or other person claiming"
+interest in landed property contemplated in this and the two subsequent sections so
+that they may adopt every means in their power to prevent the unlawful assembly or
+rioting taking place on such property.214. This being a laudable objective there can
+"possibly be no objection to the issuance of such a notice. It should, however, be"
+remembered that a police-officer cannot and should not in the name of serving such a
+"notice injunct the owner or occupier, even temporarily, from enjoying his property.215."
+The police have no such power under the law. To make a person cognizant about his
+duties under the law is one thing and to restrain the owner from enjoying his property is
+entirely a different thing.
+212. M&M 128.
+"213. Kazi Zeamuddin Ahmed, (1901) 28 Cal 504 ; Payag Singh, (1890) 12 All 550 ."
+"214. Rule 252, Bengal Police Regulations, vol I 1943, p 108."
+"215. MK Ibrahim, 1979 Cr LJ 175 (Kant); Indu Bhushan v State, 1995 Cr LJ 1180 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 155] Liability of person for whose benefit riot is committed.
+Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is the
+"owner or occupier of any land, respecting which such riot takes place or who claims"
+"any interest in such land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or"
+"who has accepted or derived any benefit therefrom, such person shall be punishable"
+"with fine, if he or his agent or manager, having reason to believe that such riot was"
+likely to be committed or that the unlawful assembly by which such riot was
+"committed was likely to be held, shall not respectively use all lawful means in his or"
+"their power to prevent such assembly or riot from taking place, and for suppressing"
+and dispersing the same.
+COMMENT—
+Liability of beneficiary of riot.—Under the preceding section the owner of land is
+punishable for the taking place of an unlawful assembly or riot on his land. This section
+requires that the unlawful assembly or riot should take place in the interest of the
+"owner or any person claiming interest in the land. The section, therefore, imposes"
+"unlimited fine. The preceding section refers to an unlawful assembly, as well as a riot;"
+this section refers to riot only.
+The principle on which this and the following sections proceed is to subject to fine all
+"persons in whose interest a riot is committed and the agents of such persons, unless it"
+can be shown that they did what they lawfully could to prevent the offence.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 156] Liability of agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit riot is
+committed.
+Whenever a riot is committed for the benefit or on behalf of any person who is the
+"owner or occupier of any land respecting which such riot takes place, or who claims"
+"any interest in such land, or in the subject of any dispute which gave rise to the riot, or"
+"who has accepted or derived any benefit therefrom,"
+"the agent or manager of such person shall be punishable with fine, if such agent or"
+"manager, having reason to believe that such riot was likely to be committed, or that"
+"the unlawful assembly by which such riot was committed was likely to be held, shall"
+not use all lawful means in his power to prevent such riot or assembly from taking
+place and for suppressing and dispersing the same.
+COMMENT—
+The provisions of the last two sections are made applicable by this section to the agent
+or manager of the owner or occupier of land.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 157] Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly.
+"Whoever harbours, receives or assembles, in any house or premises in his occupation"
+"or charge, or under his control any persons, knowing that such persons have been"
+"hired, engaged, or employed, or are about to be hired, engaged, or employed, to join or"
+"become members of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT—
+Harbouring hired persons.—Section 150 makes the hiring of persons to join an
+"unlawful assembly punishable, whereas this section makes punishable the harbouring"
+of such hired persons. It has a wider application.
+The section clearly refers to some unlawful assembly in the future and provides for an
+"occurrence which may happen, not which has happened. An act of harbouring a"
+"person, with the knowledge that, in some time past, he had joined or was likely to have"
+"been a member of an unlawful assembly, is not an offence under this section.216."
+"216. Radharaman Shaha, (1931) 58 Cal 1401 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 158] Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly or riot;.
+"Whoever is engaged, or hired, or offers or attempts to be hired or engaged, to do or"
+"assist in doing any of the acts specified in section 141, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with"
+"fine, or with both,"
+or to go armed.
+"and whoever, being so engaged or hired as aforesaid, goes armed, or engages or"
+"offers to go armed, with any deadly weapon or with anything which used as a"
+"weapon of offence is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or"
+with both.
+COMMENT—
+This section is intended to punish those persons who hire themselves out as members
+of an unlawful assembly or assist any such members. It is divided into to two parts.
+Higher penalty is awarded where the accused is armed with a deadly weapon.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 159] Affray.
+"When two or more persons1, by fighting in a public place, 2 disturb the public peace,3"
+"they are said to ""commit an affray""."
+COMMENT—
+The offence of affray in essence consists of the following ingredients—
+"(a) fighting by two or more persons,"
+(b) the fighting must take place in a public place
+(c) such fighting must also result in disturbance of the public peace. Only if such
+"ingredients are satisfied, an offence of affray can be said to have occasioned for"
+which the persons causing the same would be responsible. In a prosecution
+"under section 159, IPC, 1860, there must be positive evidence of public peace"
+"having been disturbed which would mean that, by the action of the accused the"
+even tempo of life of the public was disturbed resulting in affecting the peace
+and tranquillity of the locality.217.
+"217. Gadadhar Guru v State of Orissa, 1989 Cr LJ 2080."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER VIII OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC TRANQUILLITY
+The offences in this chapter may be classified in the following four groups:—
+I. Unlawful assembly.
+"(1) Being a member of an unlawful assembly (sections 141, 142, 143)."
+(2) Joining an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons (section 144).
+(3) Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded
+to disperse (section 145).
+(4) Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+(5) Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+(6) Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"II. Rioting (sections 146, 147)."
+(1) Rioting with deadly weapon (section 148).
+(2) Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section
+152).
+(3) Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section 153).
+(4) Liability of the owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held
+or a riot is committed (section 154).
+(5) Liability of the person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(6) Liability of the agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed
+(section 156).
+III. Promoting enmity between different classes (section 153A).
+"IV. Affray (sections 159, 160)."
+[s 160] Punishment for committing affray.
+"Whoever commits an affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one"
+"hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"Affray.—The word 'affray' is derived from the French word affraier, to terrify, and in a"
+legal sense it is taken for a public offence to the terror of the people. The essence of
+the offence consists in the terror it is likely to cause to the public. The Criminal
+"Procedure Code, 1973 has now made it a cognizable offence."
+[s 160.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires three things—
+1. Two or more persons must fight.
+2. They must fight in a public place.
+3. They must disturb the public peace.
+"The first basic ingredient of section 159, IPC, 1860, is fighting between two or more"
+persons. The next ingredient is that the fighting should have been in public place and
+the last ingredient is that the fighting should have disturbed public peace.218.
+1. 'Two or more persons'.—An affray requires two persons at the least. An unlawful
+"assembly requires five. The offence of Affray is a fight, i.e., a bilateral act, in which two"
+parties participate and it will not amount to an affray when the party who is assaulted
+"submits to the assault without resistance. Again, there must be a definite disturbance"
+of the public peace due to the fight in the public place to make the offence affray.219.
+"2. 'Fighting in a public place'.—'Public place' is a place where the public go, no matter"
+whether they have a right to go or not. Many shows are exhibited to the public on
+"private property, yet they are frequented by the public—the public go there.220."
+"The expression 'Fighting' in section 159, IPC, 1860, is used in its ordinary sense and it"
+"means a combat or quarrel involving exchange of some force or violence, if not blows."
+Mere verbal quarrel or vulgarly abusing sans violence cannot be construed as fighting
+which contemplates bilateral use of violence by two competing parties. Even if there is
+"no exchange of blows, there should be exchange of some violence between the two"
+contending parties before it can be said that the parties are fighting. If one person uses
+"violence against another and the other person merely remains passive, it cannot be"
+"said that there is a fighting, so also, if neither person uses violence against the other"
+"but both the persons indulge in verbal abuses, it does not amount to fighting.221. Mere"
+causing inconvenience to the public is not sufficient.222.
+3. 'Disturb the public peace'.—An affray is an offence against the public peace because
+it is committed in a public place and is likely to cause general alarm and disturbance.
+Mere causing public inconvenience is not enough.223. Before a conviction can be
+"entered under section 160, IPC, 1860, there must be a clear finding by the court that the"
+place of occurrence was a public place. If there is no such finding the accused persons
+must be acquitted.224.
+[s 160.2] Affray and riot.—An affray differs from a riot.
+"(1) An affray cannot be committed in a private place, a riot can be."
+"(2) An affray can be committed by two or more persons, a riot, by five or more."
+[s 160.3] Affray and assault.—An affray differs from an assault.—
+(1) The former must be committed in a public place; the latter may take place
+anywhere.
+"(2) The former is regarded as an offence against the public peace; the latter,"
+against the person of an individual. An affray is nothing more than an assault
+"committed in a public place and in a conspicuous manner, and is so called"
+because it affrighteth and maketh men afraid.
+"218. K Ranganna s/o K Narasappa v State, 2010 Cr LJ 1275 (AP)."
+"219. C Subbarayudu v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 1472 (AP)."
+"220. Wellard v State, (1884) 14 QBD 63 , 66, 67."
+"221. Mangam Chinna Subbarayudu v State, SHO, Nandyal Town PS, 1975 All LT, vol 34, p 332."
+"222. C Subbarayudu v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 1472 (AP)."
+"223. Podan, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 339 . See also C Subbarayudu v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 1472 (AP);"
+"and Mahant Kaushalya Das v State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 22 [LNIND 1965 SC 169] : 1966 Cr LJ"
+66 .
+"224. Re Thommeni Nadar, 1974 Cr LJ 1116 (Mad). Gadadhar Guru v State of Orissa, 1989 Cr LJ"
+"2080 (Ori), no positive evidence of disturbance of public peace or annoyance to public though"
+there was a fight between two groups.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+Sections 161 to 165-A.— Repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 49
+"of 1988), section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+"[s 166] Public servant, disobeying law, with intent to cause injury to any"
+person.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the"
+"way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending to cause, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that he will, by such disobedience, cause injury to any person,"
+"shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year,"
+"or with fine, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, being an officer directed by law to take property in execution, in order to satisfy a"
+"decree pronounced in Z's favour by a Court of Justice, knowingly disobeys that"
+"direction of law, with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause injury to Z. A has"
+committed the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT—
+Disobedience of law by public servant.—The offence under this section consists in a
+"wilful departure from the direction of the law, intending to cause injury to any person."
+Mere breach of departmental rules will not bring a public servant within the purview of
+this section.
+[s 166.1] Ingredients.—
+(i) The accused was a public servant at the relevant time;
+(ii) There was a direction of law as to how such public servant should conduct
+himself;
+(iii) The accused had disobeyed such direction;
+(iv) By such disobedience he had intended to cause or knew it would likely cause
+injury to any person.
+The indispensable ingredient of the offence is that the offender should have done the
+"act ""being a public servant"". The next ingredient close to its heels is that such public"
+servant has acted in disobedience of any legal direction concerning the way in which
+he should have conducted as such public servant. For the offences under sections 167
+"and 219 of IPC, 1860 the pivotal ingredient is the same as for the offence under section"
+"166 of IPC, 1860.1. If in carrying out the direction of law the accused gave information"
+"which according to the complainant was untrue, that by itself cannot attract the"
+"offence punishable under section 166 IPC, 1860 unless it is shown that the replies"
+given by the accused were untrue.2. Where an investigating officer recorded his
+satisfaction in writing that the search of a particular premises was necessary because
+"disputed documents might be found there, his entry into such premises was held to be"
+"not in disobedience of law and therefore, he could not be prosecuted without sanction"
+"under section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC, 1973).3. To make out an"
+"offence under this provision, it has to be stated that the public servant knowingly"
+disobeyed any particular direction of the law which he was bound to obey and further
+that such disobedience would cause injury to any person to the knowledge of the
+public servant.
+"1. K K Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2000 SC 3346 [LNIND 2000 SC 889] : 2000 Cr LJ 4592 : JT"
+2000 (7) SC 246 [LNIND 2000 SC 889] : (2000) 6 SCC 195 [LNIND 2000 SC 889] : (2000) 4
+Supreme 160 .
+"2. Prabhakara Panicker M B v State of Kerala, 2010 Cr LJ 4117 (Ker) : 2010 (3) KHC 152 ."
+"3. BS Thind v State of HP, 1992 Cr LJ 2935 ; People's Union for Civil Liberties v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 2138 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+4.[[s 166A] Public servant disobeying direction under law.
+"Whoever, being a public servant,—"
+(a) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which prohibits him from requiring
+the attendance at any place of any person for the purpose of investigation into
+"an offence or any other matter, or"
+"(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any other direction of the"
+"law regulating the manner in which he shall conduct such investigation, or"
+(c) fails to record any information given to him under sub-section (1) of section
+"154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to"
+"cognizable offence punishable under section 326A, section 326B, section 354,"
+"section 354B, section 370, section 370A, section 376, section 376A, 5.[section"
+"376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section"
+"376DB], section 376E or section 509,"
+shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be
+"less than six months but which may extend to two years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.]
+"4. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 3 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"5. Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, section 2, for ""section 376B, section 376C, section 376D"" (w.r.e.f."
+21-4-2018).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+4.[[s 166A] Public servant disobeying direction under law.
+"Whoever, being a public servant,—"
+(a) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which prohibits him from requiring
+the attendance at any place of any person for the purpose of investigation into
+"an offence or any other matter, or"
+"(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any other direction of the"
+"law regulating the manner in which he shall conduct such investigation, or"
+(c) fails to record any information given to him under sub-section (1) of section
+"154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to"
+"cognizable offence punishable under section 326A, section 326B, section 354,"
+"section 354B, section 370, section 370A, section 376, section 376A, 5.[section"
+"376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section"
+"376DB], section 376E or section 509,"
+shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be
+"less than six months but which may extend to two years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.]
+"4. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 3 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"5. Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, section 2, for ""section 376B, section 376C, section 376D"" (w.r.e.f."
+21-4-2018).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+4.[[s 166A] Public servant disobeying direction under law.
+"Whoever, being a public servant,—"
+(a) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which prohibits him from requiring
+the attendance at any place of any person for the purpose of investigation into
+"an offence or any other matter, or"
+"(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any other direction of the"
+"law regulating the manner in which he shall conduct such investigation, or"
+(c) fails to record any information given to him under sub-section (1) of section
+"154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in relation to"
+"cognizable offence punishable under section 326A, section 326B, section 354,"
+"section 354B, section 370, section 370A, section 376, section 376A, 5.[section"
+"376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section"
+"376DB], section 376E or section 509,"
+shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be
+"less than six months but which may extend to two years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.]
+"4. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 3 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"5. Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, section 2, for ""section 376B, section 376C, section 376D"" (w.r.e.f."
+21-4-2018).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+6.[[s 166B] Punishment for non-treatment of victim.
+"Whoever, being in charge of a hospital, public or private, whether run by the Central"
+"Government, the State Government, local bodies or any other person, contravenes the"
+"provisions of section 357C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall"
+be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine
+or with both.]
+COMMENT—
+Sections 166A and 166B are enacted based on the recommendations given by the
+"Justice J.S. Verma Committee, constituted in the aftermath of the December 2012"
+"Delhi Rape Case by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Nirbhaya Act, 2013)."
+"6. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 3 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 6. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of"
+"2013), section 3 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013). [[s 166B] Punishment for non-treatment of victim."
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+6.[[s 166B] Punishment for non-treatment of victim.
+"Whoever, being in charge of a hospital, public or private, whether run by the Central"
+"Government, the State Government, local bodies or any other person, contravenes the"
+"provisions of section 357C of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall"
+be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine
+or with both.]
+COMMENT—
+Sections 166A and 166B are enacted based on the recommendations given by the
+"Justice J.S. Verma Committee, constituted in the aftermath of the December 2012"
+"Delhi Rape Case by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Nirbhaya Act, 2013)."
+"6. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 3 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+[s 167] Public servant framing an incorrect document with intent to cause
+injury.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, and being, as 7.[such public servant, charged with the"
+"preparation or translation of any document or electronic record, frames, prepares or"
+translates that document or electronic record] in a manner which he knows or
+"believes to be incorrect, intending thereby to cause or knowing it to be likely that he"
+"may thereby cause injury to any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+The preceding section deals generally with the disobedience of any direction of law;
+"this section deals with a specific instance, viz., that of framing an incorrect document"
+"with intent to cause injury. It is similar to section 218, which deals also with cases of"
+framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or
+"property from forfeiture, whereas section 167 deals with cases of framing incorrect"
+"document only with intent to cause injury. In a case, the allegation that the accused,"
+"who is a Deputy Superintendent of Police, suppressed the statement recorded under"
+"section 161 of the CrPC, 1973 in a criminal case registered by the police and produced"
+a fabricated statement along with the charge sheet before the Magistrate. The Court
+held that section 167 is attracted only when a public servant prepares a document in a
+"manner which he thinks or believes to be incorrect. Essentially, the petitioner's"
+allegation is that the accused suppressed the real statement prepared under section
+161 of the Criminal Procedure Code and produced along with the charge sheet a
+"fabricated statement. That comes only within the purview of section 193. Therefore,"
+section 167 is not attracted to the allegations raised by the petitioner in his
+complaint.8.
+"7. Subs. by the Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Schedule for"
+"the words ""such public servant, charged with the preparation or translation of any document,"
+"frames or translates that document"", w.e.f. 17-10-2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been"
+defined in section 29A.
+"8. Joseph v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 749 : 2012 (4) KHC 157 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+[s 168] Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, and being legally bound as such public servant not to"
+"engage in trade, engages in trade, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a"
+"term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Public servant engaging in trade.—This section punishes those public servants who
+are legally bound not to engage in trade. If public servants were allowed to trade they
+would fail to perform their duties with undivided attention. Being in official position they
+could easily obtain unfair advantages over other traders.
+"The word 'trade' covers every kind of trade, business, profession, or occupation.9. This"
+proposition of law no longer seems to be correct in view of the Supreme Court's
+decision in Mahesh Kumar Dhirajlal's case10. wherein their Lordships held that trade in
+"its narrow sense means ""exchange of goods for goods or for money with the object of"
+"making profit"" and in its widest sense means ""any business with a view to earn profit""."
+"Thus, where a tracer in the office of Sub-divisional Soil Conservation Officer took"
+earned leave and during that period of leave obtained training as an Electrical Signal
+"Maintainer from the Railway Administration, it was held that he could not be convicted"
+under this section as he had not engaged himself in any trade even though he was
+receiving stipend from the Railways during the period of his training.11. Following this
+"ruling, it has been held that engaging oneself as an agent of an insurance company on"
+commission basis does not amount to engaging in trade.12.
+[s 168.1] Private Practice of Government Doctors.—
+"In Kanwarjit Singh Kakkar v State of Punjab,13. the Supreme Court examined the"
+question whether the indulgence in private practice of Government Doctors would
+"amount to indulgence in 'trade' while holding the post of a government doctor, so as to"
+"constitute an offence under section 168 of the IPC, 1860. The Supreme Court held that"
+"""in our view, offence under Section 168 of the IPC, 1860 cannot be held to have been"
+made out against the appellants even under this Section as the treatment of patients
+by a doctor cannot by itself be held to be engagement in a trade as the doctors' duty to
+treat patients is in the discharge of his professional duty which cannot be held to be a
+"'trade' so as to make out or constitute an offence under Section 168 of the IPC, 1860""."
+"9. Mulshankar Maganlal, (1950) Bom 706 : (1950) 52 Bom LR 648 ."
+"10. State of Gujarat v Mahesh Kumar Dhirajlal, AIR 1980 SC 1167 [LNIND 1980 SC 69] : 1980 Cr"
+LJ 919 .
+"11. State of Gujarat v Mahesh Kumar Dhirajlal, AIR 1980 SC 1167 [LNIND 1980 SC 69] : 1980 Cr"
+"LJ 919 . See also Rasik Behari Mathur v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3108 (Raj)."
+"12. State of Maharashtra v Chandrakant Solanki, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 832 (Bom)."
+"13. Kanwarjit Singh Kakkar v State of Punjab, 2011 CrLJ 3360 : SCC 158 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 805."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+[s 169] Public servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, and being legally bound as such public servant, not"
+"to purchase or bid for certain property, purchases or bids for that property, either in"
+"his own name or in the name of another, or jointly, or in shares with others, shall be"
+"punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both; and the property, if purchased, shall be confiscated."
+COMMENT—
+Buying or holding property.—This section is merely an extension of the principle
+enunciated in the last section. It prohibits a public servant from purchasing or bidding
+for property which he is legally bound not to purchase.
+It is necessary that there should be some statutory law or rules or regulations framed
+under the law and not merely some administrative instructions or guidelines prohibiting
+"public servants from purchasing certain property. In this case, a Code of Conduct was"
+issued by the State Government in the exercise of its executive power under Article 162
+of the Constitution under which Ministers were prohibited from buying Government
+properties. There were no mandatory terms providing for any action in case of non-
+compliance. It was held that the Code of Conduct did not have the effect of law. Its
+violation could not generate legal proceedings there being nothing unlawful illegal
+within the meaning of section 43. The purchase of property of a Government company
+by a firm in which the then Chief Minister was a partner did not constitute an offence
+under section 169 in the absence of any law debarring the Chief Minister from making
+such a purchase.14.
+[s 169.1] TANSI land deal case.—
+"The allegation was that the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Ms. Jayalalithaa, while holding"
+"the chief minister's post, had violated the code of conduct and purchased 3.0786 acres"
+of land and buildings to the state-owned Tamil Nadu State Industries Corporation for
+"Jaya Publications. While reversing the conviction passed by the High Court, the"
+"Supreme Court held that the offence under section 169 IPC, 1860 is incomplete without"
+the assistance of some other enactment which imposes the legal prohibition required.
+"Therefore, in order to come within the clutches of section 169 IPC, 1860, there should"
+be a law which prohibits a public servant from purchasing certain property and if he
+"does it, it becomes an offence under section 169 IPC, 1860. Section 481 of the Criminal"
+"Procedure Code, section 189 of the Railways Act, 1989 and section 19 of the Cattle"
+"Trespass Act, 1871 and instances of that nature in several enactments are available in"
+which persons mentioned therein shall not directly or indirectly purchase any property
+"at a sale under those Acts. Similarly section 136 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882"
+"provides that no Judge, legal practitioner, or officer connected with any Court of Justice"
+"shall buy or traffic in, or stipulate for, or agree to receive any share of, or interest in, any"
+"actionable claim and no Court of Justice shall enforce, at his instance, or at the"
+"instance of any person claiming by or through him, any actionable claims so dealt with"
+"by him as stated above. Thus, in these circumstances where a law has prohibited"
+"purchase of property or to bid at an auction, the prohibition contained therein will be"
+"attracted and will become an offence under section 169 IPC, 1860. The Code of"
+"Conduct not having a statutory force and not enforceable in a Court of law, nor having"
+any sanction or procedure for dealing with a contravention thereof by the Chief
+"Minister, cannot be construed to impose a legal prohibition against the purchase of"
+property of the Government so as to give rise to a criminal offence under section 169
+"IPC, 1860.15."
+"14. R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, AIR 2004 SC 692 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : 2004 Cr LJ 286 :"
+(2004) 2 SCC 9 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] .
+"15. R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, AIR 2004 SC 692 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : (2004) 2 SCC 9"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1023] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+[s 170] Personating a public servant.
+"Whoever pretends to hold any particular office as a public servant,1 knowing that he"
+"does not hold such office or falsely personates any other person holding such office,"
+and in such assumed character does or attempts to do any act 2 under colour of such
+"office,3 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+[s 170.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two things—
+"1. A person (a) pretending to hold a particular office as a public servant, knowing"
+"that he does not hold such office, or (b) falsely personating any other person"
+holding such office.
+2. Such person in such assumed character must do or attempt to do an act under
+colour of such office.
+COMMENT—
+Personating public servant.—Mere personation is not an offence under this section.
+The person personating must do or attempt to do some act under colour of the office
+of the public servant whom he personates. Section 140 punishes the person who
+wears the garb or carries the token used by a soldier. This section punishes a person
+who does any act in the assumed character of a public servant.
+1. 'Pretends to hold any particular office as a public servant'.—It must be an existing
+"office. If it is uncertain who legally fills the office, a person doing an official act, in"
+"pursuance of what he honestly believes to be his lawful title to the office, does not"
+come within this section.
+2. 'Any act'.—It is not necessary that the act done or attempted to be done should be
+such an act as might legally be done by the public servant personated. The accused
+was arrested when he was demanding one anna's worth of fruit from a fruit-seller for
+"one pie on the representation that he was a head constable, which in fact he was not. It"
+was held that if he pretended to be a police-officer and tried as such police-officer to
+"extort money or things from a fruit-seller, he was guilty of an offence under this"
+section.16. A person who poses as a Government servant and by so doing obtains of
+"another's services, which he would not otherwise have obtained and which the other"
+"person was bound to give on demand by a Government officer, commits an offence"
+under this section.17.
+"3. 'Under colour of such office'.—An act is done 'under colour of an office,' if it is an act"
+"having some relation to the office, which the actor pretends to hold. If it has no relation"
+"to the office, as if A pretending to be a servant of Government, travelling through a"
+"district, obtains money, provisions, etc., the offence may amount to cheating under"
+"section 415, but is not punishable under this section.18. The act done under colour of"
+office must be an act which could not have been done without assuming official
+authority.
+Where the accused posed as a police officer and in that garb looted certain articles
+"from the complainant and the stolen articles, one police ballot and monogram were"
+"recovered from him, his conviction under the section was held to be proper.19."
+[s 170.2] Retired IAS officer using IAS with his name.—
+"To constitute an offence under section 170, a person must either pretend to hold a"
+particular office as a public servant knowing that he does not hold such office or falsely
+"personate any other person holding such office. Over and above that, that person in"
+such assumed character must do or attempt to do an act under the colour of such
+"office. There must be pretension or false personation to be a particular person, that too"
+"a public servant, which he is not, and then doing of or attempt to do some act under"
+"colour of such office of that public servant, to proceed against a person under section"
+"170 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, where a retired IAS officer, had used IAS in his"
+letterhead when he continued as Director of CAPE and also corresponded in that
+"manner, is no ground to impute that he has committed an offence under section 170 of"
+the Penal Code.20.
+"16. Aziz-ud-din v State, (1904) All 294 ."
+"17. Bashirullakhan, (1942) Nag 484. Ajitender Singh v State of Punjab, 2000 Cr LJ 1827 (P&H) :"
+"2000 (2) RCR (Criminal) 34, mere assumption of the character of a public servant is not enough,"
+"there must also be an attempt to commit an official act. Jata Shanker Jha v State of Rajasthan,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 2108 (Raj) : 2000 (4) WLC 75 , accused personated as secret ASI in the Education"
+Department used forged papers to divert the salary of others to himself. Conviction. Pratap
+"Singh v State, 1998 Cr LJ 633 (P&H), acting under colour of office as Lambardar, offence under"
+the section made out because the accused identified parties in sale deeds as an officer and also
+had certain sureties arrested.
+18. M&M 142.
+"19. Karuna Krishna Biswas v State of WB, 1996 Cr LJ 2823 (Cal)."
+"20. Premachandra Kurup v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1465 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER IX OF OFFENCES BY OR RELATING TO PUBLIC SERVANTS
+"This chapter deals with two classes of offences, of which one can be committed by"
+"public servants alone, and the other comprises offences which relate to public"
+"servants, though they are not committed by them."
+Deletion of provisions.—Sectio ns 161–165A stand omitted by the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988, section 31 (w.e.f. 9 September 1988)."
+The relevant portion from the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the
+"Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 relating to the omission of sections 161 to 165A of"
+"Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is given below:"
+"3. The Bill inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the definition of the expression"
+"""public servant"", incorporation of offences under sections 161–165A of the Indian"
+"Penal Code, enhancement of penalties provided for these offences and incorporation"
+of a provision that the order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction for
+prosecution would be final if it has not already been challenged and the trial has
+"commenced. In order to expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial of"
+cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay and exercise of powers of
+revision on interlocutory orders have also been included.
+4. Since the provisions of section 165A are incorporated in the proposed legislation
+"with an enhanced punishment, it is not necessary to retain those sections in the Indian"
+"Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary"
+saving provision.
+[s 171] Wearing garb or carrying token used by public servant with fraudulent
+intent.
+"Whoever, not belonging to a certain class of public servants, wears any garb or carries"
+"any token resembling any garb or token used by that class of public servants, with the"
+"intention that it may be believed, or with the knowledge that it is likely to be believed,"
+"that he belongs to that class of public servants, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which"
+"may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"Wearing garb or token of public servant.—Under this section the offence is complete,"
+although no act is done or attempted in the assumed official character. The mere
+"circumstance of wearing a garb, or carrying a token, with the intention or knowledge"
+"supposed, is sufficient. It is not necessary that something should pass in words. If any"
+act is done then the preceding section will apply.
+"Under section 140 IPC, 1860, wearing the garb or carrying the token of a soldier is"
+made punishable.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+"[s 171A] ""Candidate"", ""Electoral right"", defined."
+For the purposes of this Chapter—
+"2.[(a) ""candidate"" means a person who has been nominated as a candidate at an"
+election;1]
+"(b) ""electoral right"" means the right of a person to stand, or not to stand as, or to"
+"withdraw from being, a candidate or to vote or refrain from voting at any"
+election.
+COMMENT—
+"Candidate, electoral right.—This chapter was introduced in the Code by the Indian"
+Elections Offences and Inquiries Act (XXXIX of 1920). It seeks to make punishable
+"under the ordinary penal law, bribery, undue influence, and personation, and certain"
+"other malpractices at elections not only to the Legislative bodies, but also to"
+"membership of public authorities where the law prescribes a method of election; and,"
+"further, to debar persons guilty of malpractices from holding positions of public"
+responsibility for a specific period. 3.This chapter has to be read along with the
+"Representation of the People Act, 1951 as it contains additional penalties for certain"
+"offences under this chapter, e.g., sections 171E and 171F of this Code. Thus, a"
+"conviction under section 171E or section 171F, IPC, 1860, amounts to a disqualification"
+"under section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.4."
+1. 'Election'.—'Election' is defined as including election to all classes of public bodies
+where such a system is prescribed by law (vide Explanation 3 to section 21 supra).
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"2. Subs. by Act 40 of 1975, section 9, for clause (a) (w.e.f. 6-8-1975)."
+"3. Statement of Objects and Reasons. Gazette of India, 1920, Part V, p 135, section 4. Bhupinder"
+"Singh v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1416 (P&H), accused snatched ballot papers from the custody of a"
+polling officer and tore them. This amounted to use of criminal force.
+4. For a comparison between the sections 171A to 171E with the provisions of Representation
+"of People Act, 1950. See Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 [LNIND 1975 SC"
+432] : (1975) Supp SCC 1 : 1976 (2) SCR 347 [LNIND 1975 SC 432] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+"[s 171B] ""Bribery""."
+(1) Whoever—
+(i) gives a gratification to any person with the object of inducing him or any
+other person to exercise any electoral right or of rewarding any person
+for having exercised any such right; or
+(ii) accepts either for himself or for any other person any gratification as a
+reward for exercising any such right or for inducing or attempting to
+induce any other person to exercise any such right; commits the offence
+of bribery:
+Provided that a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action
+shall not be an offence under this section.
+"(2) A person who offers, or agrees to give, or offers or attempts to procure, a"
+gratification shall be deemed to give a gratification.
+(3) A person who obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain a gratification
+"shall be deemed to accept a gratification, and a person who accepts a"
+"gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to do, or as a reward"
+"for doing what he has not done, shall be deemed to have accepted the"
+gratification as a reward.
+COMMENT—
+Bribery.—This section defines the offence of bribery at an election.
+'Bribery' is defined primarily as the giving or acceptance of a gratification either as a
+"motive or as a reward to any person, either to induce him to stand, or not to stand as, or"
+"to withdraw from being, a candidate or to vote or refrain from voting at an election. It"
+also includes offers or agreements to give or offer and attempts to procure a
+gratification for any person. 'Gratification' is already explained in section 161 of the
+Penal Code and is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications
+estimated in money.5. Section 171-B(1)(i) of Indian Penal Code provides that if
+gratification is given to any person inducing him or any other person to exercise any
+"electoral right, then it will amount to bribery. The term ""Electoral right"" defined under"
+clause (b) of section 171-A of Indian Penal Code clearly indicates that the electoral
+"right is of definite nature and it is to be exercised by individual. So, the gratification has"
+"to be given to an individual. Here, the offer is made to the party (RPI) and not to any"
+"individual. Furthermore, there is nothing in the offer which indicates that any influence"
+"is being brought on any individual with respect to exercising his electoral right, that"
+"means, to stand, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being, a candidate or to vote or"
+"to refrain from voting at the election. Seeking support of a political party, during the"
+course of election and making an offer to political party of some share in political
+power for giving such support cannot be called as giving gratification as contemplated
+under section 171-B of Indian Penal Code.6. The word 'gratification' should be deemed
+to refer only to cases where a gift is made of something which gives a material
+advantage to the recipient. There is hardly any need to say that giving of anything
+whose value is estimable in money is bribery. A gun licence gives no material
+advantage to its recipient. It might gratify his sense of importance if he has a gun
+licence in a village where nobody else has a gun licence. So might be the conferment of
+an honour like Padma Bhushan. A praise from a high quarter might gratify the sense of
+vanity of a person. But the word 'gratification' as used in section 123 (1) does not refer
+to such gratification any more than in section 171-B of the Indian Penal Code.7.
+[s 171B.1] Sub-clause (2).—'Offers'.—
+By this clause the attempt to corrupt is made equivalent to the complete act.
+[s 171B.2] Treating.—
+Treating will be bribery if refreshment is given or accepted with the intent required by
+law.8. The gist of the offence of treating is the corrupt inducement to the voter or to
+"refrain from voting, which may be given at any time, although for obvious reasons it is"
+usually given at or shortly before the election. 'Treating' is defined in section 171E.
+[s 171B.3] Supreme Court on 'freebies'.—
+"In S Subramaniam Balaji v Government of Tamil Nadu,9. the Supreme Court held that"
+freebies promised by political parties in their election manifestos shake the roots of
+"free and fair polls, and directed the Election Commission to frame guidelines for"
+regulating contents of election manifestos and undue influence at elections.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"5. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gazette of India, 1920, Part V, p 135, section 8."
+"6. Deepak Ganpatrao v Government of Maharashtra, 1999 Cr LJ 1224 (Bom)."
+"7. Iqbal Singh v Gurdas Singh, AIR 1976 SC 27 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] : (1976) 3 SCC 284 [LNIND"
+1975 SC 354] : 1976 (1) SCR 884 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] .
+8. Ibid.
+"9. S Subramaniam Balaji v Government of Tamil Nadu, 6 Mad LJ 307 : 2013 (8) Scale 249 [LNIND"
+2013 SC 627] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171C] Undue influence at elections.
+(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of
+any electoral right commits the offence of undue influence at an election.
+"(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1),"
+whoever—
+"(a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person in whom a candidate or"
+"voter is interested, with injury of any kind, or"
+(b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or
+any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an
+"object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure,"
+shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right
+"of such candidate or voter, within the meaning of sub-section (1)."
+"(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of public action, or the mere"
+"exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall"
+not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this section.
+COMMENT.—
+Exercise of undue influence.—This section defines 'undue influence at elections'.
+Undue influence at an election is defined as the voluntary interference or attempted
+"interference with the right of any person to stand, or not to stand as, or withdraw from"
+"being, a candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting. This covers all threats of injury to"
+person or property and all illegal methods of persuasion and any interference with the
+liberty of the candidates or the electors. The inducing or attempting to induce a person
+to believe that he will become the object of divine displeasure is also interference.10.
+"Where an attempt or threat is proved, it is unnecessary to prove that any person was in"
+fact prevented from voting because the offence is complete.
+The expression 'free exercise of his electoral right' does not mean that a voter is not to
+be influenced. This expression has to be read in the context of an election in a
+democratic society and the candidates and their supporters must naturally be allowed
+to canvass support by all legal and legitimate means. This exercise of the right by the
+candidate or his supporters to canvass support does not interfere or attempt to
+interfere with the free exercise of an electoral right.11. The Supreme Court has
+accepted the proposition that something more than a mere act of canvassing would be
+necessary and that something more is specified in clauses (a) and (b) of the section.
+"Applying this to the facts, the court laid down that the appeal, even if true, of the"
+Chairman of the Minorities Commission who happened to be the retired judge of the
+"Supreme Court, to the voters to cast their votes in favour of a particular candidate [who"
+"was returned], does not make out the offence enumerated in this section.12. A"
+message sent to the secretary of a party to boycott the election does not amount to
+interference within the meaning of this section as members of the party are still free to
+vote as they like.13.
+[s 171C.1] CASES.—
+A candidate informed the voters that he was Chalanti Vishnu and representative of Lord
+Jagannath himself and that any person who did not vote for him would be a sinner
+against the Lord and the Hindu religion; it was held that such propaganda would
+amount to an offence under section 171F read with this section.14.
+The statement was made by a member of the ruling party to the Republican party of
+"India (RPI) that if it supported the alliance in parliamentary elections, the latter would"
+make one member of the RPI as Deputy Chief Minister of State. It was held that this did
+not amount to giving offer to any individual for inducing him to exercise his electoral
+right in a particular manner.15.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"10. Ram Dial v Sant Lal, AIR 1959 SC 855 [LNIND 1959 SC 73] : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 748 ."
+"11. Shiv Kirpal Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] : (1970) 2 SCC 567"
+"[LNIND 1970 SC 367] . See also M Anbalagan v State, 1981 Cr LJ 1179 (Mad), Babu Rao Patel,"
+AIR 1968 SC 904 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] : 1968 (2) SCR 133 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] .
+"12. Charan Lal Sahu v Giani Zail Singh, AIR 1984 SC 309 [LNIND 1983 SC 371] : (1984) 1 SCC"
+390 [LNIND 1983 SC 371] .
+"13. M Anbalagan, Supra."
+"14. Raj Raj Deb v Gangadhar, AIR 1964 Ori 1 [LNIND 1962 ORI 29] : 1964 Cr LJ 57 ."
+"15. Deepak Ganpatrao v Government of Maharashtra, 1999 Cr LJ 1224 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171D] Personation at elections.
+Whoever at an election applies for a voting paper or votes in the name of any other
+"person, whether living or dead, or in a fictitious name, or who having voted once at"
+"such election applies at the same election for a voting paper in his own name, and"
+"whoever abets, procures or attempts to procure the voting by any person in any such"
+"way, commits the offence or personation at an election:"
+16.[Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who has been
+authorised to vote as proxy for an elector under any law for the time being in force in
+so far as he votes as proxy for such elector.]
+COMMENT.—
+Personation.—This section defines 'personation at elections'. It covers a person who
+"attempts to vote in another person's name or in a fictitious name, as well as a voter"
+"who attempts to vote twice and any person who abets, procures, or attempts to"
+"procure, such voting."
+The accused must have been actuated by a corrupt motive.17.
+What is to be proved in a prosecution for the offence under section 171-D is that the
+"indictee ""applied for voting (ballot) paper"" in the name of any person. It is not the law"
+that it must be proved invariably that he had voted or had attempted to vote in the
+election. All that need be proved is that the indictee had applied for a voting paper. The
+legislature appears to have carefully worded the statutory provision.18. The applicant
+was accused of having abetted the personation of a voter at a Municipal election in
+"that, not being himself acquainted with the person who came forward to vote, he had,"
+"on the advice of others, put his name to a ""signature sheet"" in token that the thumb"
+mark made by the voter was that of the person entitled to vote under a certain name on
+"the electoral roll. It was held that, inasmuch as the acts done by the applicant"
+"apparently constituted the specific offence provided for by section 171F, he could only"
+"be tried for that offence, and could not be tried for abetment of the general offence"
+provided for by section 465.19.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"16. Ins. by the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act 24 of 2003), section 5 (w.e.f. 22-9-"
+2003).
+"17. Venkayya, (1929) 53 Mad 444."
+"18. E Anoop v State, 2007 Cr LJ 2968 : 2006 (3) Ker LJ 50 ."
+"19. Ram Nath, (1924) 47 All 268 . See Achcha Bhoomanna v Court of Distt. Munsif (Election"
+"Court), AIR 1992 AP 157 [LNIND 1991 AP 162] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171E] Punishment for bribery.
+Whoever commits the offence of bribery shall be punished with imprisonment of
+"either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both:"
+Provided that bribery by treating shall be punished with fine only.
+"Explanation.—""Treating"" means that form of bribery where the gratification consists in"
+"food, drink, entertainment, or provision."
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171F] Punishment for undue influence or personation at an election.
+Whoever commits the offence of undue influence or personation at an election shall
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"one year or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"Punishment for bribery, personation.— The Chief Minister of a State was campaigning"
+for himself on a date before elections. He was directed by the Election Commissioner
+under threat of taking drastic action to return to his State headquarters. He was
+prevented by the order from exercising his voting right at the place where he was
+registered as a voter. There was no allegation that he used any violence in the election
+process. Directions were also oral and no reasons were given. It was held that the
+"directions constituted a violation of section 171F.20. The words ""all forms of"
+"entertainment"" in the Explanation to section 123 (1) of the Representation of the"
+People Act apparently refer to offence of treating found in section 171-E of the Indian
+Penal Code.21. Accused entered into a polling booth and handed over a slip showing
+the name of a voter other than himself. He could not give any explanation as to why he
+entered into the polling booth. His conduct of appearing before polling officials and
+"handing over the slip which does not relate to him, is sufficient declaration of his"
+intention to apply vote for him. It was held that offence committed by him required a
+deterrent substantive sentence of imprisonment.22.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"20. Court on its Own Motion v UOI, 2001 Cr LJ 225 (P&H) : (2000) ILR 2 P&H 288. The Court"
+could not direct the Magistrate to take cognizance under section 190 because of the bar under
+section 197. Aggrieved party would have to launch prosecution.
+"21. Iqbal Singh v Gurdas Singh, AIR 1976 SC 27 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] : (1976) 3 SCC 284 [LNIND"
+1975 SC 354] : 1976 (1) SCR 884 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] .
+"22. E Anoop v State, 2007 Cr LJ 2968 : 2006 (3) Ker LJ 50 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171G] False statement in connection with an election.
+Whoever with intent to affect the result of an election makes or publishes any
+statement purporting to be a statement of fact which is false and which he either
+"knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal"
+character or conduct of any candidate shall be punished with fine.
+COMMENT.—
+False statements in elections.—False statements of fact in relation to the personal
+character or conduct of a candidate are penalised by this section. General imputations
+of misconduct unaccompanied by any charges of particular acts of misconduct cannot
+properly be described as statements of fact within the meaning of this section.23.
+An offence under this section is not a species of the more general offence of
+defamation. There may be cases under this section which do not fall under section 499
+and vice versa.24.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+"23. AS Radhakrishna Ayyar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Mad 511 : 1932 Mad WN 1086."
+"24. Bhagolelal Kwalchand Darji v Emperor, AIR 1940 Nag 249 : [1942] ILR Nag 208."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171H] Illegal payments in connection with an election.
+Whoever without the general or special authority in writing of a candidate incurs or
+"authorises expenses on account of the holding of any public meeting, or upon any"
+"advertisement, circular or publication, or in any other way whatsoever for the purpose"
+"of promoting or procuring the election of such candidate, shall be punished with fine"
+which may extend to five hundred rupees:
+Provided that if any person having incurred any such expenses not exceeding the
+amount of ten rupees without authority obtains within ten days from the date on
+"which such expenses were incurred the approval in writing of the candidate, he shall"
+be deemed to have incurred such expenses with the authority of the candidate.
+COMMENT.—
+"Illegal payments in elections.—This section makes it illegal for any one, unless"
+"authorized by a candidate, to incur any expenses in connection with the promotion of"
+the candidate's election.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER IX-A OF OFFENCES RELATING TO ELECTIONS
+[s 171-I] Failure to keep election accounts.
+Whoever being required by any law for the time being in force or any rule having the
+force of law to keep accounts of expenses incurred at or in connection with an
+election fails to keep such accounts shall be punished with fine which may extend to
+five hundred rupees.]
+COMMENT.—
+Failure to keep accounts.—This section punishes failure to keep accounts of expenses
+"incurred in connection with an election, if such accounts are required to be kept by any"
+law or rule having the force of law.
+"1. Chapter IXA (containing of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by Act 39 of 1920, section 2."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 172] Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceeding.
+"Whoever absconds1 in order to avoid being served with a summons, notice or order,2"
+"proceeding from any public servant, legally competent, as such public servant, to"
+"issue such summons, notice or order, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for"
+"a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred"
+"rupees, or with both;"
+"or, if the summons or notice or order is to attend in person or by agent, or to 1."
+"[produce a document or an electronic record in a Court of Justice], with simple"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may"
+"extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Absconding to avoid summons.—Absconding to avoid service of summons or other
+proceeding is similar to non-attendance in obedience to an order from a public servant.
+The object of this section is to punish an offender for the contempt his conduct
+indicates of the authority whose process he disregards.
+The second clause applies where the summons or notice or order is (1) for attendance
+in Court; or (2) for production of a document.
+1. 'Absconds'.—This term is not to be understood as implying necessarily that a person
+leaves the place in which he is. Its etymological and ordinary sense is to hide oneself;
+"and it matters not whether a person departs from a place or remains in it, if he"
+"conceals himself. If a person, having concealed himself before process issues,"
+"continues to do so after it is issued, he absconds.2."
+"2. 'Summons, notice or order'.—The summons, notice or order referred to, should be"
+addressed to the same person whose attendance is required and who absconds to
+"avoid being served with such a 'summons, notice or order'. A warrant is not an order"
+served on an accused; it is simply an order to the police to arrest him.3. It is not an
+offence under this section to abscond to avoid arrest under a warrant.4.
+[s 172.1] Bar to take Cognizance:
+"As per section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, (Cr PC, 1973) No"
+court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under S. 172 to 188 (both
+"inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860, except on the complaint in writing of"
+'the public servant concerned' or of some other public servant to whom he is
+administratively subordinate. When the Court in its discretion is disinclined to
+"prosecute the wrongdoers, no private complainant can be allowed to initiate any"
+criminal proceeding in his individual capacity as it would be clear from the reading of
+the section itself which is to the effect that no Court can take cognizance of any
+"offence punishable under sections 172–188 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC, 1860)"
+except on the written complaint of 'the public servant concerned' or of some other
+public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.5.
+"1. Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I, for ""to produce a document in a Court of"
+"Justice"" (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+"2. Srinivasa Ayyangar, (1881) 4 Mad 393, 397."
+"3. Lakshmi, (1881) Unrep. Cr C 152."
+"4. Annawadin, (1923) 1 Ran 218."
+"5. State of UP v Mata Bhikh, (1994) 4 SCC 95 [LNIND 1994 SC 311] : JT 1994 (2) SC 565 [LNIND"
+1994 SC 311] : (1994) 2 Scale 235 : (1994) 1 SCC (Cr) 831 : 1994 (2) SCR 368 [LNIND 1994 SC
+311] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+"[s 173] Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing"
+publication thereof.
+"Whoever in any manner intentionally prevents the serving on himself, or on any other"
+"person, of any summons, notice or order proceeding from any public servant legally"
+"competent, as such public servant, to issue such summons, notice or order,"
+"or intentionally prevents the lawful affixing to any place of any such summons, notice"
+"or order,"
+"or intentionally removes any such summons, notice or order from any place to which"
+"it is lawfully affixed,"
+"or intentionally prevents the lawful making of any proclamation, under the authority of"
+"any public servant legally competent, as such public servant, to direct such"
+"proclamation to be made,"
+shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
+"month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both;"
+"or, if the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person or by agent, or"
+"6.[to produce a document or electronic record in a Court of Justice], with simple"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may"
+"extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Preventing service of summons.—This section punishes intentional prevention of the
+"service of summons, notice or order."
+"A refusal to sign a summons,7. a refusal to receive a summons8. and the throwing"
+"down of a summons after service,9. do not constitute the offence of intentionally"
+"preventing the service of a summons under this section. Under the Cr PC, 1973 the"
+mere tender of a summons is sufficient and a refusal by a person to receive it does not
+expose him to the penalty of this section. Actual delivery is not necessary to complete
+"the service.10. Chapter X, sections 172–190 of the IPC, 1860 deal with the offences"
+"constituting ""Contempts of the Lawful authority of Public Servants"". A Magistrate could"
+"be covered by the definition of a 'Public Servant' given by section 21 of the IPC, 1860."
+"But the sections given in Chapter X of the IPC, 1860 relate to particular kinds of"
+contempt of the lawful authority of Public Servants and none of these cover the kind of
+acts which were committed by the accused with the object of the stifling a
+prosecution.11.
+"6. Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I, for ""to produce a document in a Court of"
+"Justice"" (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+"7. Kalya Fakir, (1868) 5 BHC (Cr C) 34; Krishna Gobinda Das, (1892) 20 Cal 358 ."
+"8. Punamatai, (1882) 5 Mad 199."
+"9. Arumuga Nadan, (1882) 5 Mad 200 (n), 1 Weir 79."
+"10. Sahedeo Rai, (1918) 40 All 577 ."
+"11. Waryam Singh v Sadhu Singh, AIR 1972 SC 905 : (1972) 1 SCC 796 : 1972 Cr LJ 635 : (1972)"
+1 SCC (Cr) 477; TN Godavarman Thirumulpad (89) v UOI. (2006) 10 SCC 486 : (2007) 9 Scale 272
+.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 174] Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant.
+"Whoever, being legally bound to attend in person or by an agent at a certain place and"
+"time in obedience to a summons, notice, order or proclamation proceeding from any"
+"public servant legally competent, as such public servant, to issue the same,"
+"intentionally omits to attend at that place or time, or departs from the place where he"
+"is bound to attend before the time at which it is lawful for him to depart,"
+shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one
+"month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both,"
+"or, if the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person or by agent in"
+"a Court of Justice, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six"
+"months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, being legally bound to appear before the 12.[High Court] at Calcutta, in"
+"obedience to a subpoena issuing from that Court, intentionally omits to appear."
+A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+"(b) A, being legally bound to appear before a 13.[District Judge] as a witness, in"
+"obedience to a summons issued by that 14.[District Judge], intentionally omits"
+to appear. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT.—
+Non-attendance.—The offence contemplated by this section is an intentional omission
+to appear—
+"(1) at a particular specified15. place in India,16."
+"(2) at a particular time,"
+"(3) before a specified public functionary,"
+"(4) in obedience to a summons, notice or order (written or verbal),17. not defective"
+"in form,18. and"
+(5) issued by an officer having jurisdiction19. in the matter.
+A conviction cannot be had unless the person summoned
+"(1) was legally bound to attend, and"
+(2) refused or intentionally omitted to attend.20.
+"[s 174.1] CASES.—Wilful departure before, lawful time.—"
+"Where a man in obedience to a summons attended a Magistrate's Court at 10 a.m., but"
+"finding the Magistrate not present at the time mentioned in the summons, departed"
+"without waiting for a reasonable time, it was held that he was guilty of an offence under"
+this section.21.
+[s 174.2] Public servant absent.—
+"Where a public servant was absent on a date fixed in the summons, the person"
+"summoned could not be convicted, though he purposely failed to attend.22."
+[s 174.3] Police Notice.—
+If the accused were not within the jurisdiction of the police station or adjoining police
+"station while being served with an order under section 160, Cr PC, 1973, they were not"
+legally bound to attend before the requisitioning police-officer and as such on their
+"failure to attend, their conviction under section 174, IPC, 1860, could not be"
+maintained.23.
+[s 174.4] Notice by Railway Protection Force.—
+Enquiry conducted by an officer of the Railway Protection Force being in the nature of a
+"judicial proceeding under section 9 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act,"
+"1966, any person summoned by such officer to produce any document or give"
+"evidence, shall be bound to produce such document and to state the truth in course of"
+"his examination. Failure to do so or furnishing of false documents, etc., will entail"
+"prosecution under sections 174, 175, 179, 180 and 193, IPC, 1860, as the case may"
+be.24.
+"12. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Supreme Court""."
+"13. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Supreme Court""."
+"14. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Zila Judge""."
+"15. Ram Saran, (1882) 5 All 7."
+"16. Paranga v State, (1893) 16 Mad 463."
+"17. Guman, (1873) Unrep. Cr C 75 : (1870) 5 MHC (Appx) 15."
+"18. Krishtappa, (1896) 20 Mad 31."
+"19. Venkaji Bhaskar, (1871) 8 BHC (Cr C) 19 : (1865) 1 Weir 87."
+"20. Sreenath Ghose, (1868) 10 WR (Cr) 33."
+"21. Kisan Bapu, (1885) 10 Bom 93."
+"22. Krishtappa, sup."
+"23. Krishan, 1975 Cr LJ 620 (HP)."
+"24. BC Saxena, 1983 Cr LJ 1432 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+25.[[s 174-A] Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82
+of Act 2 of 1974.
+Whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by a
+proclamation published under sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Code of Criminal
+"Procedure, 1973 shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to"
+"three years or with fine or with both, and where a declaration has been made under"
+"sub-section (4) of that section pronouncing him as a proclaimed offender, he shall be"
+punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall
+also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT.—
+"Cr PC (Amendment) Act, 2005—Clause 44.—This clause amends the IPC, 1860 as"
+"follows, namely:—"
+Clause 12 seeks to insert new sub-sections (4) and (5) in section 82 of the Code to
+"provide for the declaration of a person as proclaimed offender, if he fails to appear in"
+spite of the proclamation published under sub-section (1) of that section. In order to
+curb the tendency on the part of criminals not to attend the Court in response to
+proclamation published under sub-section (1) or further proclamation issued under
+"sub-section (4) declaring the accused as ""Proclaimed Offender"" a new section 174-A is"
+being added to the Indian Penal Code to prescribe punishment for such offender.
+[Notes on Clauses.]
+If Investigating Officer submits charge sheet without arresting the accused persons
+"(unless he is on bail), it can be submitted only if he has been declared absconder and"
+"the case under section 174-A IPC, 1860 has also been registered as a result of this"
+proclamation.26.
+"The offence under section 174A IPC, 1860 which arises out of the proceedings"
+conducted during the main case can be tried and disposed of by the same Court.
+"Lodging of separate FIR for commission of offence under section 174 IPC, 1860 is not"
+always required.27.
+"25. Ins. by Cr PC (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section 44(b) (w.e.f. 23-6-2006 vide"
+"Notfn. No. SO 923(E), dated 21 June 2006."
+"26. Iqbal v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 1332 (All)."
+"27. A Krishna Reddy v CBI, 2017 (5) ADR 635."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 175] Omission to produce 28.[document or electric record] to public servant
+by person legally bound to produce it.
+"Whoever, being legally bound to produce or deliver up any 29.[document or electronic"
+"record] of any public servant, as such, intentionally omits so to produce or deliver up"
+"the same, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to"
+"one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both,"
+"or, if the 30.[document or electronic record] is to be produced or delivered up to a"
+"Court of Justice, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six"
+"months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, being legally bound to produce a document before a 31.[District Court], intentionally"
+omits to produce the same. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT—
+This section punishes persons who refuse to produce documents which they are
+legally bound to produce before a public servant. From reading of section 345 of the Cr
+"PC, 1973, it is clear that offences under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 would"
+"constitute contempt, only if they are committed in the view or presence of the Court."
+"This would also show that offences under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 per se do"
+"not amount to contempt. They are contempt only if they are committed ""in the view or"
+"presence of the Court""; otherwise they remain offences under the IPC, 1860"
+simpliciter.32.
+"28. Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I, for ""document"" (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+"29. Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I, for ""document"" (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+"30. Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch. I, for ""document"" (w.e.f. 17-10-2000)."
+"31. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Zila Court""."
+"32. Arun Paswan v State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 721 [LNIND 2003 SC 1085] : (2004) 5 SCC 53"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1085] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 176] Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person
+legally bound to give it.
+"Whoever, being legally bound to give any notice or to furnish information on any"
+"subject to any public servant, as such, intentionally omits to give such notice or to"
+"furnish such information in the manner and at the time required by law, shall be"
+"punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or"
+"with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both;"
+"or, if the notice or information required to be given respects the commission of an"
+"offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or"
+"in order to the apprehension of an offender, with simple imprisonment for a term"
+"which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both;"
+"33.[or, if the notice or information required to be given is required by an order passed"
+"under sub-section (1) of section 565 (now 356) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,"
+1898 (now 1973)34. with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+both.]
+COMMENT.—
+Omission to give notice or information.—This section applies to persons upon whom
+"an obligation is imposed by law to furnish certain information to public servants, and"
+the penalty which the law provides is intended to apply to parties who commit an
+"intentional breach of such obligation,35. and not where the public servants have already"
+obtained the information from other sources.36.
+A doctor is not obliged to inform the police when he treats a patient who has met with
+vehicle accident.37.
+[s 176.1] CASE.—
+It was not within the scope of the Magistrate to hold investigative officer guilty for
+violation of his official duties who had already sought extension to complete the
+investigation. Omission on the part of IO to complete the investigation within 60 days
+"from date of arrest is not covered under provisions of section 176, IPC, 1860.38. Under"
+"section 39 (i)(v) Cr PC, 1973, where a person is aware of commission or an intention to"
+"commit an offence under sections 302, 303 and 304, IPC, 1860, he is bound to give"
+information to the nearest Magistrate or police-officer of such commission or intention
+and failure to do so is punishable under this section. Where the mother of a murder
+suspect merely said that her son and daughter-in-law went to bed at about 10 P.M. and
+"that early next morning, her son came out and ran away and she found her daughter-in-"
+"law lying dead on the bed, it was held that her failure to inform the police did not"
+"constitute an offence under section 176, IPC, 1860, as she was neither aware that a"
+murder was going to be committed nor aware that a murder had been committed.39.
+"33. Added by Act 22 of 1939, section 2."
+"34. Now see section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)."
+"35. Phool Chand Brojobassee, (1871) 16 WR (Cr) 35."
+"36. Sashi Bhusan Chuckrabutty, (1878) 4 Cal 623 ; Pandya, (1884) 7 Mad 436; Gopal Singh,"
+(1982) 20 Cal 316 .
+"37. SN Naik v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 1463 (Bom)."
+"38. Manoj Kumar Gautam v State of UP, 2009 Cr LJ 3176 (Pat)."
+"39. TS John v State, 1984 Cr LJ 753 (Ker). See also Geetha v Sub-Inspector of Excise, Mudigere,"
+2007 Cr LJ 3496 (Kar).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 177] Furnishing false information.
+"Whoever, being legally bound to furnish information on any subject to any public"
+"servant, as such, furnishes, as true, information on the subject which he knows or has"
+"reason to believe to be false, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term"
+"which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both;"
+"or, if the information which he is legally bound to give respects the commission of an"
+"offence, or is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or"
+"in order to the apprehension of an offender, with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, a landholder, knowing of the commission of a murder within the limits of his"
+"estate, wilfully misinforms the Magistrate of the district that the death has"
+occurred by accident in consequence of the bite of a snake. A is guilty of the
+offence defined in this section.
+"(b) A, a village watchman, knowing that a considerable body of strangers has"
+"passed through his village in order to commit a dacoity in the house of Z, a"
+"wealthy merchant residing in a neighbouring place, and being bound under"
+"clause, 5, section VII, Regulation III, 1821,40. of the Bengal Code, to give early"
+and punctual information of the above fact to the officer of the nearest police
+"station, wilfully misinforms the police officer that a body of suspicious"
+characters passed through the village with a view to commit dacoity in a certain
+distant place in a different direction. Here A is guilty of the offence defined in
+the later part of this section.
+"41.[Explanation.—In section 176 and in this section the word ""offence"" includes"
+"any act committed at any place out of 42.[India], which, if committed in 43."
+"[India], would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely, 302,"
+"304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457,"
+"458, 459 and 460; and the word ""offender"" includes any person who is alleged"
+to have been guilty of any such act.]
+COMMENT.—
+Furnishing false information.—Section 176 deals with the omission to give information;
+this section deals with the giving of false information. Persons who are not under a
+legal obligation to furnish information cannot be dealt with under these sections.44.
+Furnishing false information is distinct from omission to give information. Omission to
+mention about a two-wheeler in the statement of assets and liabilities by a public
+"servant is not an offence under section 177 IPC, 1860.45. It is clear that the accused"
+"having been aware of the fact that she belongs to ""Havyak Brahmin"" by caste, furnished"
+false information to the authority and obtained admission by producing false caste
+certificate. The ingredients of section 177 are proved.46. In a case where the allegation
+"was that the complainant filed false information in nomination paper, it was held that a"
+complaint by the Returning officer is mandatory.47.
+The appellant being a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat was legally bound to give
+correct information and issue a correct certificate but he issued a false certificate in
+favour of one Lal Chand that he does not own any land except the land which he has
+"made fit for cultivation, in fact, though Lal Chand owned 13 kanals, 13 marlas and also"
+"his wife owned lands in the village Baruhi. Therefore, the ingredients of section 177 of"
+the Code were proved as against him.48.
+"[s 177.1] Application of Section 195 and 340 Cr PC, 1973.—"
+"Section 195(1), Cr PC, 1973 lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of any"
+"offence punishable under sections 172–188, IPC, 1860 except on the complaint in"
+writing of the public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he is
+"administratively subordinate. The provision of section 195(1), Cr PC, 1973 is"
+mandatory.49.
+40. Rep. by Act 17 of 1862.
+"41. Added by Act 3 of 1894, section 5."
+"42. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"43. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"44. Ashok Kumar Mittal v Ram Kumar Gupta, (2009) 2 SCC 656 [LNIND 2009 SC 33] : (2009) 1"
+SCC (Cr) 836 : (2009) 1 KLT 398 [LNIND 2009 SC 33] : (2009) 1 CHN 184 (SC) : (2009) 234 ELT
+193 .
+"45. Veeranna v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 335 (Kar)."
+"46. State of Karnataka v G M Sumanabai, 2004 Cr LJ 4112 (Kar)."
+"47. Amita Trivedi v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 240 (Raj). See also Jayalalithaa v"
+"Kuppusamy, 2013 Cr LJ 839 (SC) : 2012 (11) Scale 432 [LNIND 2012 SC 756] ."
+"48. Bishan Dass v State of Punjab, 2015 Cr LJ 281 : 2014 (9) Scale 690 [LNINDORD 2014 SC"
+"21072] . See also State of Karnataka v G M Sumanabai, 2004 Cr LJ 4112 (Kar)."
+"49. Lakpa Sherpa v State of Sikkim, 2004 Cr LJ 3488 (Sik). See also Ram Dhan v State of UP,"
+2012 (4) Scale 259 [LNIND 2012 SC 1057] : 2012 AIR(SCW) 2500 : 2012 Cr LJ 2419 : (2012) 5
+SCC 536 [LNIND 2012 SC 1057] : AIR 2012 SC 2513 [LNIND 2012 SC 1057] relied on Sachida
+"Nand Singh v State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493) [LNIND 1998 SC 138] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 178] Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to
+make it.
+"Whoever refuses to bind himself by an oath 50.[or affirmation] to state the truth, when"
+required so to bind himself by a public servant legally competent to require that he
+"shall so bind himself, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which"
+"may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or"
+with both.
+COMMENT.—
+Refusal to take oath.—The refusal to take an oath amounts to contempt of Court. The
+"person refusing may be dealt with under section 345 of the Cr PC, 1973 summarily or"
+the Court may proceed under section 195 of the same Code. The penalty of this section
+would not be attracted where the refusal to take oath is justifiable. This observation of
+the Supreme Court occurs in Kiran Bedi and Inder Singh v Committee of Inquiry.51. The
+justification available to the police-officers in question was that they were sought to be
+"cross-examined under oath at the very outset of the inquiry, whereas other officers"
+similarly placed were to figure in the cross-examination at a subsequent stage. This
+"procedure was discriminatory, hence, the justification. The Court accordingly held that"
+the committee should not have directed a complaint to be filed against them under this
+section.
+"50. Ins. by Act 10 of 1873, section 15."
+"51. Kiran Bedi and Inder Singh v Committee of Inquiry, AIR 1989 SC 714 [LNIND 1989 SC 833] :"
+1989 Cr LJ 903 : (1989) 1 SCR 20 [LNIND 1989 SC 833] : (1989) 1 SCC 494 [LNIND 1989 SC 10] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 179] Refusing to answer public servant authorised to question.
+"Whoever, being legally bound to state the truth on any subject to any public servant,"
+refuses to answer any question demanded of him touching that subject by such public
+"servant in the exercise of the legal powers of such public servant, shall be punished"
+"with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine"
+"which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Refusing to answer questions.—The offence under this section consists in the refusal
+to answer a question which is relevant to the subject concerning which the public
+"servant is authorised to inquire, or which at least touches that subject. Under sections"
+121–132 of the Indian Evidence Act a witness is exempted from answering certain
+"questions. If a person gives false answers, then he will be guilty under section 193 and"
+not under this section.
+Refusing to answer the question of a police-officer investigating a case under section
+161 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not an offence under this section.52. This
+"section also applies to the accused as the words used in section 161(1) Cr PC, 1973,"
+"are ""any person acquainted with facts and circumstances of the case"". Thus, the"
+accused too is bound to answer a question put by a police-officer in course of his
+"examination. However, the answer to a question has a tendency to incriminate him; he"
+can claim protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution and refuse to answer. Of
+"course, it is a matter which has to be ultimately decided by the Court.53."
+The matter is entirely different so far the officers of the Railway Protection Force are
+"concerned first, they are not police-officers54. and second, the enquiry conducted by"
+"them under sections 8 and 9 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966"
+is not a police investigation but should be deemed to be a judicial proceeding.55.
+Section 9 of this special Act specifically lays down that during such enquiry by an RPF
+"officer, persons summoned have to obey summons and state the truth and, therefore,"
+"by refusing to answer, such persons would make themselves liable under section 179,"
+"IPC, 1860. The question of invoking Article 20(3) of the Constitution does not arise in"
+"such a case, as till the complaint is filed under section 190(1)(a), Cr PC, 1973 by the"
+"RPF officer, a person cannot be regarded as ""accused of an offence"" within the"
+meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.56.
+"52. Mawzanagyi, (1930) 8 Ran 511."
+"53. Nandini Satpathy v PL Dani, 1978 Cr LJ 968 : AIR 1978 SC 1025 ."
+"54. State of MP v Chandan Singh, 1980 Cr LJ 1024 (MP); R Muthu v Asst. SI, RPF, 1983 Cr LJ"
+"1309 (Mad); State of UP v Durga Prasad, 1974 Cr LJ 1465 : AIR 1974 SC 2136 [LNIND 1974 SC"
+248] .
+"55. Durga Prasad, Supra; BC Saxena, 1983 Cr LJ 1432 (AP)."
+"56. BC Saxena, Supra; Mohd. Dastgir, 1960 Cr LJ 1159 : AIR 1960 SC 758 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 180] Refusing to sign statement.
+"Whoever refuses to sign any statement made by him, when required to sign that"
+statement by a public servant legally competent to require that he shall sign that
+"statement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend"
+"to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+The essential ingredients to constitute the offence under this Section are:—
+(i) The accused made a statement before a public servant.
+(ii) The accused was required by public servant to sign such statement.
+(iii) Public servant was legally empowered or competent to require the accused to
+"sign that statement, and"
+(iv) That the accused refused to sign statement.57.
+[s 180.1] Refusal to sign.—
+"The statement must be such a one as the accused can be legally required to sign, e.g.,"
+"a statement recorded under the provisions of sections 164 and 281(5) of the Cr PC,"
+1973 or a statement under sections 8 and 9 of the Railway Property (Unlawful
+"Possession) Act, 1966.58. To attract the offence under section 180 of IPC, 1860, the"
+person accused of such offence should be under a legal obligation or compulsion to
+sign the statement or submissions.59.
+"57. Basavaraj Shivarudrappa Sirsi v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 4809 (Kar)."
+"58. Durga Prasad, and BC Saxena, Supra."
+59. Basavaraj Shivarudrappa Sirsi v State of Karnataka 2011 Cr LJ 4809 (Kar).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 181] False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person
+authorised to administer an oath or affirmation.
+"Whoever, being legally bound by an oath 60.[or affirmation] to state the truth on any"
+subject to any public servant or other person authorized by law to administer such
+"oath 61.[or affirmation], makes, to such public servant or other person as aforesaid,"
+"touching the subject, any statement which is false, and which he either knows or"
+"believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+False statement on oath.—This section should be compared with section 191. Under it
+"a false statement to any public servant, or other person, authorised to administer oath"
+"or affirmation, is punishable.62. It does not apply where the public servant administers"
+the oath in a case wholly beyond his jurisdiction63. or where he is not competent to
+make a statement on solemn affirmation.64.
+[s 181.1] Failure to administer oath.—
+"In view of sections 4 and 5 of the Oaths Act, 1969, it is always desirable to administer"
+oath or statement may be recorded on affirmation of the witness. The Supreme Court
+"in Rameshwar v State of Rajasthan,65. has categorically held that the main purpose of"
+"administering of oath is to render persons who give false evidence, liable to"
+prosecution and further to bring home to the witness the solemnity of the occasion and
+"to impress upon him the duty of speaking the truth, further such matters only touch"
+"credibility and not admissibility. However, in view of the provisions of section 7 of the"
+"Oaths Act, 1969, the omission of administration of oath or affirmation does not"
+invalidate any evidence.66.
+"60. Ins. by Act 10 of 1873, section 15."
+"61. Ins. by Act 10 of 1873, section 15."
+"62. Niaz Ali, (1882) 5 All 17 ."
+"63. Andy Chetty, (1865) 2 MHC 438 ."
+"64. Subba, (1883) 6 Mad 252."
+"65. Rameshwar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 [LNIND 1951 SC 76] ."
+"66. State of Rajasthan v Darshan Singh, (2012) 5 SCC 789 [LNIND 2012 SC 334] : 2012 AIR"
+(SCW) 3036 : 2012 Cr LJ 2908 : 2012 (5) Scale 570 [LNIND 2012 SC 334] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+"67.[[s 182] False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his"
+lawful power to the injury of another person.
+Whoever gives to any public servant any information 1 which he knows or believes to
+"be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby"
+"cause, such public servant—"
+(a) to do or omit anything2 which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the
+true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by
+"him, or"
+(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any
+"person,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
+"may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both.]"
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A informs a Magistrate that Z, a police-officer, subordinate to such Magistrate,"
+"has been guilty of neglect of duty or misconduct, knowing such information to"
+"be false, and knowing it to be likely that the information will cause the"
+Magistrate to dismiss Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+"(b) A falsely informs a public servant that Z has contraband salt in a secret place,"
+"knowing such information to be false, and knowing that it is likely that the"
+"consequence of the information will be a search of Z's premises, attended with"
+annoyance to Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+(c) A falsely informs a policeman that he has been assaulted and robbed in the
+neighbourhood of a particular village. He does not mention the name of any
+"person as one of his assaitants, but knows it to be likely that in consequence of"
+this information the police will make enquiries and institute searches in the
+village to the annoyance of the villages or some of them. A has committed an
+offence under this section.]
+COMMENT.—
+Object.—The object of this section is that a public servant should not be falsely given
+information with the intent that he should be misled by a person who believed that
+"information to be false, and intended to mislead him. This section does not require that"
+action must always be taken if the person who makes the public servant knows or
+believes that action will be taken.68.
+[s 182.1] Ingredients.—
+(1) Giving of an information to a public servant.
+(2) Information must have been known or believed to be false by the giver.
+"(3) Such false information was given with intention to cause, or knowing that it is likely"
+to cause such public servant (a) to do or omit anything which he ought not to do or
+"omit to do if the true facts were known to him, or (b) to use his lawful power to the"
+injury or annoyance of any person.69.
+1. 'Any information'.—The Bombay and the Patna High Courts have ruled that any 'false
+"information' given to a public servant, with the intent mentioned in the section, is"
+punishable under it whether that information is volunteered by the informant or is given
+in answer to questions put to him by the public servant.70. Where a driver of a motor
+"vehicle, who had no licence with him, on being asked his name by a police-officer, gave"
+"a fictitious name, it was held that he had committed an offence under this section.71."
+The section makes no distinction between information relating to a cognizable offence
+"and one relating to a non-cognizable offence, nor is there anything in the section to"
+justify the conclusion that it applies only to cases in which the information given to any
+public servant relates to a cognizable offence.72.
+2. 'To do or omit anything'.—It is not necessary that the public servant to whom false
+information is given should be induced to do anything or to omit to do anything in
+consequence of such information. The gist of the offence is not what action may or
+"may not be taken by the public servant to whom false information is given, but the"
+intention or knowledge (to be inferred from his conduct) of the person supplying such
+information.73. Section 182 does not require that action must always be taken if the
+person who moves the public servant knows or believes that action would be taken.74.
+Under this clause it is not necessary to show that the act done would be to the injury or
+annoyance of any third person.75.
+[s 182.2] Condition precedent for prosecution.—
+"This section has to be read in conjunction with section 195(1)(a) of the Cr PC, 1973"
+"which requires a complaint for offences under sections 172–188, IPC, 1860, to be filed"
+by the public servant concerned or by some other public servant to whom he is
+administratively subordinate.76. It is mandatory to follow the procedure prescribed
+under section 195 of the Code while initiating action against an accused for an offence
+"punishable under section 182, IPC, 1860 else such action is rendered void ab initio.77."
+"Thus, investigation into an offence under section 182, IPC, 1860 can be done only on"
+the complaint given by a competent public servant; taking note of the fact that the
+"procedure contemplated is not complied within the line with section 195, Cr PC, 1973"
+"as well as the settled legal position evolved through the decisions of the Apex Court,"
+"the cognizance assumed by the Magistrate for the offence under section 182, IPC,"
+1860 is erroneous and not sustainable in law.78. Similar view has been expressed by
+"the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PD Lakhani v State of Punjab,79. relying upon its earlier"
+judgment in Daulat Ram's case (supra) and Mata Bhikh's case.80. It is held that:
+"no complaint, therefore, could be lodged before the learned Magistrate by the Station House"
+"Officer. Even assuming that the same was done under the directions of SP, Section 195, in"
+"no uncertain terms, directs filing of an appropriate complaint petition only by the public"
+"servant concerned or his superior officer. It, therefore, cannot be done by an inferior officer."
+It does not provide for delegation of the function of the public servant concerned81.
+[s 182.3] Private Complaint.—
+"Since the offence under section 182 is covered by the bar of section 195 Cr PC, 1973"
+there is absolutely no scope for filing a private complaint. The embargo in section 195
+"Cr PC, 1973 takes away the right to prosecute in respect of the aforesaid offences by"
+"way of filing a private complaint. Going by section 195 Cr PC, 1973 no Court shall take"
+"cognizance except in the manner contemplated by section 195 Cr PC, 1973 and"
+"consequently, no jurisdiction to refer the case under section 156(3) Cr PC, 1973 to the"
+Police for investigation or to issue a direction to proceed under the aforesaid sections
+to the Police on a private person's complaint.82.
+[s 182.4] Mala fide Prosecution.—
+The Supreme Court has laid down that proceedings can be taken under this section as
+well as under sections 211 and 500 against persons who initiate prosecution against a
+person in high position with a view to wreaking vengeance for a private and personal
+grudge.83.
+[s 182.5] CASES.—Causing public servant to do what he ought not to do.—
+Mere non-mentioning of the complaint already filed in the Court of Chief Judicial
+"Magistrate, in the petition filed under section 156(3) Cr PC, 1973 before the Special"
+"Sessions Judge, would not be enough to attract the section.84. The accused falsely"
+telegraphed to a District Magistrate that the town had been attacked by a gang of 200
+"robbers, but the Magistrate put no faith in the telegram and took no action; it was held"
+that the accused were guilty of an offence under this section.85. A personated B at an
+"examination and passed the examination and obtained a certificate in B's name. B,"
+"thereupon, applied to have his name entered in the list of candidates for Government"
+"service. He attached to this application the certificate issued in his name, and his name"
+was ordered to be entered on the list of candidates. It was held that he was guilty of an
+offence under this section.86. Where the ulterior motive of the accused in making a
+false report of burglary was to suppress certain documents by pleading that they were
+"stolen, it was held that the act of the accused was not punishable under this section.87."
+Where a resolution was passed in a public meeting condemning police inaction in
+regard to an assault case and copies of the said resolution were sent to various
+"authorities including the Superintendent of Police and the officer-in-charge, but the"
+officer-in-charge took exception to it and filed a complaint in Court under sections 182
+"and 211, IPC, 1860, it was held that forwarding of the resolution did not amount to"
+institution of criminal proceeding and no offence either under section 182 or section
+"211, IPC, 1860, was committed. It was further observed that police should not be so"
+sensitive over public criticism.88.
+[s 182.6] Period of Limitation.—
+"Since the offence under section 182 IPC, 1860 is punishable with imprisonment for a"
+"period of six months only, the authority should file the complaint under section 182 IPC,"
+1860 within one year from the date when that authority found that the allegations made
+in the complaint were false. Since more than four years was elapsed from the date
+"when the authority found the allegations were false, no question of filing any complaint"
+"under section 182 IPC, 1860 at this belated stage arises.89."
+"67. Subs. by Act 3 of 1895, section 1, for section 182."
+"68. Daulat Ram, AIR 1962 SC 1206 [LNIND 1962 SC 28] : 1962 (2) Cr LJ 286 ."
+"69. Jiji Joseph v Tomy Ignatius, 2013 Cr LJ 828 (Ker)."
+"70. Ramji Sajabarao, (1885) 10 Bom 124; Lachman Singh, (1928) 7 Pat 715."
+"71. Lachman Singh, (1928) 7 Pat 715."
+"72. Thakuri, (1940) 16 Luck 55 ."
+"73. Budh Sen v State, (1891) 13 All 351 ; Raghu Tiwari, (1893) 15 All 336 ."
+"74. Sham Lal Thukral v State of Punjab, 2009 Cr LJ 189 (PH) relying on AIR 1962 SC1206"
+[LNIND 1962 SC 28] : (1962 (2) Cr LJ 286) .
+"75. Ganesh Khanderao, (1889) 13 Bom 506."
+"76. Daulat Ram, 1962 (2) Cr LJ 286 : AIR 1962 SC 1206 [LNIND 1962 SC 28] ; TS Venkateswaran,"
+"1982 Cr LJ NOC 68 (Ker); See also State of Rajasthan v Chaturbhuj, 1983 Cr LJ NOC 56 (Raj)."
+"77. Saloni Arora v State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2017 SC 391 [LNIND 2017 SC 23] ."
+"78. EK Palanisamy v DySP, 2010 Cr LJ 1802 (Mad); Geetika Batra v OP Batra, 2009 Cr LJ 2687"
+(Del).
+"79. PD Lakhani v State of Punjab, 2008 AIR SCW 3357."
+"80. Mata Bhikh's case, (1994) 4 SCC 95 [LNIND 1994 SC 311] : (1994 AIR SCW 1935)."
+"81. Also see Sham Lal Thukral v State of Punjab, 2009 Cr LJ 189 (PH); Randhir v State of"
+"Haryana, 2004 Cr LJ 479 (PH)."
+"82. Loid Jude Manakkat v State, 2013 (2) KLT 931 : 2013 (3) KLJ 53 ."
+"83. State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cr LJ 527 ."
+"84. Subhash Chandra v State of UP, (2000) 9 SCC 356 [LNIND 1999 SC 1565] : JT 2000 (2) SC 26"
+: 2000 AIR(SCW) 4947.
+"85. Budh Sen, supra."
+"86. Ganesh Khanderao, supra."
+"87. Shambhoo Nath, AIR 1959 All 545 [LNIND 1958 ALL 203] ."
+"88. Shiv Kumar Prasad Singh, 1984 Cr LJ 1417 (Pat)."
+"89. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa v Senior Superintendent of Police, Patiala, 2000 Cr LJ 3297 (PH)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 183] Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a public
+servant.
+Whoever offers any resistance to the taking of any property by the lawful authority of
+"any public servant, knowing or having reason to believe that he is such public servant,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT—
+This section makes it penal to offer resistance to the taking of property by the lawful
+authority of any public servant. The Bombay High Court has held that there are no
+"words in the section as there are in section 99, extending the operation of the section"
+to acts which are not strictly justifiable by law. Resistance to an act of a public officer
+acting bona fide though in excess of his authority may give rise to some charge in the
+"nature of assault, but it cannot afford any foundation for a prosecution under this"
+section.90. The Madras High Court is of opinion that this section should be read in
+"conjunction with section 99. Taking the two together, if an officer acts in good faith"
+"under colour of his office the mere circumstance that his ""act may not be strictly"
+"justifiable by law"" cannot affect the lawfulness of his authority. In this case, property"
+"had been seized in execution by the officer of the Court, and it was held that as the"
+"officer was acting bona fide, though he had wrongly seized the property of the accused,"
+the accused could be convicted under this section for resisting the execution.91. This
+view of the law receives substantial support from the decision of the Supreme Court in
+Keshoram's case92. where too it has been held that merely because no prior notice was
+served on the accused before seizing his cattle under the Delhi Municipal Act for
+"recovering arrears of milk tax, it could not be said that the municipal officer's action"
+was entirely illegal and as such the accused had the right of private defence against
+the bona fide act of the public servant. In the instant case the accused was held to have
+"been rightly convicted under sections 353/332/333, IPC, 1860, for assaulting the public"
+servant. On a parity of reasoning it can be said that had the accused been prosecuted
+"under section 183 of the Code, he could have also been convicted under that section as"
+well.
+[s 183.1] Lawful authority wanted.—
+"Where a person resisted an official in attaching property under a warrant, the term of"
+"which had already expired,93. or which did not specify the date on or before which it"
+"was to be executed,94. it was held that he was not guilty under this section. If the"
+"warrant is executed by a Court official when it is addressed to a peon, resistance to the"
+Court official is not illegal.95.
+If a bailiff breaks open the doors of a third person in order to execute a decree against
+"a judgment-debtor, he is a trespasser if it turns out that the person or goods of the"
+debtor are not in the house; and under such circumstances the owner of the house
+"does not by obstructing the bailiff, render himself punishable under section 183 or"
+section 186.96.
+"90. Sakharam Pawar, (1935) 37 Bom LR 362 ."
+"91. Tiruchitrambala Pathan, (1896) 21 Mad 78."
+"92. Keshoram, 1974 Cr LJ 814 : AIR 1974 SC 1158 [LNIND 1974 SC 130] ."
+"93. Anand Lal Bera v State, (1883) 10 Cal 18 ."
+"94. Mohini Mohan Banerji, (1916) 1 PLJ 550 , 18 Cr LJ 39."
+95. Ibid.
+"96. Gazi Aba Dore, (1870) 7 BHC (Cr C) 83."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 184] Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public
+servant.
+Whoever intentionally obstructs any sale of property offered for sale by the lawful
+"authority of any public servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend"
+"to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section punishes intentional obstruction of the sale of any property conducted
+under the lawful authority of a public servant. No physical obstruction is necessary.
+Use of abusive language by a person at an auction-sale conducted by a public servant
+makes him liable to be convicted of an offence under this section.97.
+"97. Provincial Govt. CP & Berar v Balaram, (1939) Nag 139."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 185] Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of
+public servant.
+"Whoever, at any sale of property1 held by the lawful authority of a public servant, as"
+"such, purchases or bids for any property on account of any person, whether himself or"
+"any other, whom he knows to be under a legal incapacity to purchase that property at"
+"that sale, or bids for such property not intending to perform the obligations under"
+"which he lays himself by such bidding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend"
+"to two hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section makes it penal to bid at a public sale of property on account of a party
+"who is under a legal incapacity to purchase it, or to bid for it not intending to complete"
+the purchase or as it is expressed to perform the obligations under which the bidder
+"lays himself by such ""bidding"".98."
+1. 'Property'.—This word is used in its wide sense. The right to sell drugs is a monopoly
+granted for a certain area and comes within the definition of property. A person who
+bids at an auction of the right to sell drugs within a certain area under a false name
+"and, when the sale is confirmed in his favour, denies that he has ever made any bid at"
+"all, is guilty of an offence under this section.99."
+"98. 2nd Rep., section 110."
+"99. Bishan Prasad, (1914) 37 All 128 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 186] Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.
+Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public
+"functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or"
+with both.
+State Amendment
+Andhra Pradesh.— Offence under section 186 is cognizable.
+"[Vide A.P.G.O. Ms. No. 732, dated 5th December, 1991]."
+COMMENT—
+This section provides for voluntarily obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his
+duties. It must be shown that the obstruction or resistance was offered to a public
+servant in the discharge of his duties or public functions as authorised by law. The
+mere fact of a public servant believing that he was acting in the discharge of his duties
+will not be sufficient to make resistance or obstruction to him amount to an
+offence.100. If the public servant is acting in good faith under colour of his office there
+is no right of private defence against his act.101.
+"The word ""obstruction"" connotes some overt act in the nature of violence or show of"
+"violence.102. To constitute ""obstruction"", it is not necessary that there should be actual"
+criminal force. It is sufficient if there is either a show of force or a threat or any act
+preventing the execution of any act by a public servant.103. Though an offence under
+"this section is a non-cognizable one, by virtue of powers vested in the State"
+"Government under section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, it can be"
+"made a cognizable offence in a specified area by means of a notification, while such"
+notification remains in force.
+[s 186.1] Initiation of Prosecution.—
+To initiate prosecution under this section it is necessary to see that the complaint is
+"filed under section 195(1)(a), Cr PC, 1973, by the concerned public servant or his"
+superior officer to whom he is administratively subordinate (See also discussion under
+"sub-head ""Condition precedent for Prosecution under section 182 ante.) It is also not"
+"possible to bypass the requirements of section 195(1)(a), Cr PC, 1973, by merely"
+"changing the label of the offence, say from section 186 to section 353, IPC, 1860.104."
+"[s 186.2] Offences with bar under section 195 Cr PC, 1973 with some offences"
+without the bar.—
+Where an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from those
+"contained in section 195 of the Cr PC, 1973, section 195 will affect only the offences"
+mentioned therein unless such offences form an integral part so as to amount to
+"offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other"
+offences also would fall within the ambit of section 195 of the Code.105. It is a well-
+accepted proposition of law that when an accused commits some offences which are
+separate and distinct from those contained in section 195; section 195 will affect only
+the offences mentioned therein unless such other offences form an integral part of the
+same so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction. That
+in such case the other offences would also fall within the ambit of section195 of the
+"Code. In other words, the offences charged against the petitioners under section143,"
+"147, 148, 149, 332, 333 and 307 of IPC, 1860, cannot be split from the complaint for a"
+"separate offence in the facts and circumstances of the present case, and thereby"
+cognizance in respect to said offences are also barred under section 195(1)(a)(i) of the
+Code.106.
+[s 186.3] CASES.—Obstruction.—
+A Circle Inspector went into the compound of the accused with a village servant to
+remove a portion of the hedge which was an encroachment. When the servant put his
+"scythe to the hedge to cut it, the accused caught hold of the scythe and threatened"
+"him. It was held that the accused was guilty of an offence under this section, since his"
+"laying hold of the scythe amounted to physical obstruction, and the obstruction offered"
+to the servant was tantamount to obstruction to the Circle Inspector under whose
+orders he was acting.107. The daughter of the tenant of the accused died of
+electrocution. The police-officers entered the premises with permission to check fresh
+wiring and leakage of current. They were prevented from taking photographs by the
+accused and also not allowed to leave the house. The Court said that this amounted to
+obstruction within the meaning of section 186 and wrongful confinement within the
+meaning of section 342.108. Section 186 contemplates obstruction of a public servant
+in the discharge of his public duty and section 332 contemplates voluntarily causing
+hurt to him to deter him from performing his public duty. The gravity of the offences is
+different. Offence under section 332 is cognizable. The requirement of making a
+"complaint in writing as postulated by section 195, Cr PC, 1973, cannot be extended to"
+the case of an offence under section 332.109.
+[s 186.4] Section 186 and Section 353: Distinction between.—
+"Sections 186 and 353, IPC, 1860 relate to two distinct offences and while the offence"
+under the latter section is a cognizable offence the one under the former section is not
+"so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, IPC, 1860 is"
+applicable to a case where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the
+"discharge of his public functions but under section 353, IPC, 1860 the ingredient of"
+assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as such is
+necessary. The quality of the two offences is also different. Section 186 occurs in
+"Chapter X of the IPC, 1860 dealing with Contempts of the lawful authority of public"
+"servants, while section 353 occurs in Chapter XVI regarding the Offences affecting the"
+"human body. It is well established that section 195 of the Cr PC, 1973 does not bar the"
+trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts but
+which is not within the ambit of that section.110. If in truth and substance the offence in
+question falls in the category of sections mentioned in section 195 of the Code and it
+was not open to bypass its provisions even by choosing to prosecute under section
+"353, IPC, 1860 only.111."
+"100. Lilla Singh, (1894) 22 Cal 286 ; Tulsiram v State, (1888) 13 Bom 168."
+"101. Poomalai Udayan, (1898) 21 Mad 296; Pukot Kotu, (1896) 19 Mad 349."
+"102. Phudki, AIR 1955 All 104 [LNIND 1954 ALL 119] ."
+"103. Babulal, (1956) 58 Bom LR 1021 ."
+"104. Oduvil Devaki Amma, 1982 Cr LJ NOC 11 (Ker)."
+"105. State of UP v Suresh Chandra Srivastava, AIR 1984 SC 1108 [LNIND 1984 SC 575] : 1984 Cr"
+LJ 926 .
+"106. Ramji Bhikha Koli v State of Gujarat, 1999 Cr LJ 1244 (Guj)."
+"107. Bhaga Mana, (1927) 30 Bom LR 364 . See also Gyan Bahadur v State of MP, 2013 Cr LJ"
+1729 (MP).
+"108. Veena Ranganekar v State, 2000 Cr LJ 2543 (Del)."
+"109. State of HP v Vidya Sagar, 1997 Cr LJ 3893 (HP)."
+"110. Durgacharan Naik v State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 [LNIND 1966 SC 59] : 1966 Cr LJ"
+1491 (SC).
+"111. Ashok v The State, 1987 Cr LJ 1750 (MP); Mrityunjoy Das v State, 1987 Cr LJ 909 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 187] Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give
+assistance.
+"Whoever, being bound by law to render or furnish assistance to any public servant in"
+"the execution of his public duty, intentionally omits to give such assistance, shall be"
+"punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or"
+"with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both;"
+and if such assistance be demanded of him by a public servant legally competent to
+make such demand for the purposes of executing any process lawfully issued by a
+"Court of Justice, or of preventing the commission of an offence, or of suppressing a"
+"riot, or affray, or of apprehending a person charged with or guilty of an offence, or of"
+"having escaped from lawful custody, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for"
+"a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred"
+"rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"This section provides, first in general terms for the punishment when a person, being"
+bound by law to render assistance to a public servant in the execution of his public
+"duty, intentionally omits to assist; and second, for the punishment when the assistance"
+is demanded for certain specified purposes.112.
+"This section speaks of assistance to be rendered to public servants, just as sections"
+176 and 177 speak of furnishing true information. A case was registered against the
+"accused/ Sub-Inspector of Police under section 187 of the IPC, 1860 for not assisting"
+"the Assisting Sessions Judge, in the service of summons to witnesses and"
+administration of justice. In the light of the language employed in sections 195(1) of Cr
+"PC, 1973, the prosecution initiated at the instance of the Assistant Sessions Judge"
+cannot be sustained for the reason that the Sub-Inspector of Police is not subordinate
+to the said Officer. Unless a complaint is made by the competent officer as specified
+"under section 195(1) of the Code, the prosecution cannot be further proceeded with."
+"Apart from this aspect of the matter, in as much as the service of summons, being in"
+"discharge of the official duties of the Sub-Inspector, sanction under section 197 of the"
+code is also required.113.
+"112. Ramaya Naika, (1903) 26 Mad 419, (FB)."
+"113. Paleti Anil Babu v State, 2006 Cr LJ 3084 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 188] Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.
+"Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully"
+"empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or"
+to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his
+"management, disobeys such direction,"
+"shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury,"
+"or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be"
+punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with
+"fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both;"
+"and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or"
+"safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with"
+"fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+"Explanation.—It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or"
+contemplate his disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows
+"of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience produces, or is likely to"
+"produce, harm."
+ILLUSTRATION
+An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such
+"order, directing that a religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A"
+"knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes danger of riot. A has committed the"
+offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT—
+Ingredients.—To constitute this offence it is necessary to show—
+(1) a lawful order promulgated by a public servant empowered to promulgate it;
+(2) knowledge of the order which may be general or special;
+(3) disobedience of such order; and
+(4) the result that is likely to follow from such disobedience.
+The offence under this section has now been made a cognizable offence under the Cr
+"PC, 1973. Though a bailable offence, it can be made non-bailable by a notification by"
+"the State Government under section 10(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932."
+There must be evidence that the accused had knowledge of the order with the
+disobedience of which he is charged. Mere proof of a general notification promulgating
+"the order does not satisfy the requirements of the section.114. ""Promulgation"" does not"
+require publication in newspapers or by posters.115. Mere disobedience of an order
+does not constitute an offence in itself; it must be shown that the disobedience has or
+"tends to a certain consequence,116. namely, annoyance, obstruction, etc. The"
+annoyance has to be proved as a fact; mere mental annoyance of the authorities
+concerned is not enough.117. It is also necessary to see that the order was not only
+"lawfully made but duly promulgated and the accused had knowledge of the order, else"
+his conviction cannot be sustained.118. Where a standing crop was attached by means
+"of an order under section 145 Cr PC, 1973 and the accused, who had come to know the"
+"order, reaped and removed the crop, an offence under this section was held to have"
+been committed. It was a disobedience packed with a tendency to cause riot or
+affray.119. The complaint of this offence must disclose that the disobedience of the
+"order led to the consequences narrated in clauses (2) and (3) of section 188, IPC, 1860,"
+"otherwise no cognizance can be taken on such a complaint.120. It is not necessary that,"
+"if the order disobeyed was that of a civil Court, a complaint should be received from"
+that Court. A criminal Court can entertain a complaint of disobedience from any other
+source.121.
+"It is open to a person charged under this section to plead in defence that the order,"
+"though made with jurisdiction, was utterly wrong or improper on merits.122."
+[s 188.1] Necessary particulars in the complaint.—
+"In order to attract the provisions of section 186 IPC, 1860, it has to be seen whether the"
+public servant in the discharge of his public functions has been voluntarily obstructed
+or not. It is reiterated that what was mentioned in the complaint was that the
+government administration was disrupted for half an hour. Mere disruption of
+government administration without there being a specific mention that the public
+servants were obstructed from voluntarily discharging their public functions would not
+"attract section 186 IPC, 1860.123."
+Knowledge of orders.—The offence of disobedience of the orders of a public servant is
+not committed where there is nothing to show that the accused person had knowledge
+of the order.124.
+[s 188.2] Curfew Order and Shoot to kill.—
+"Violation of a curfew order under section 144, Cr PC, 1973, is a minor offence"
+"punishable under section 188, IPC, 1860, and as such the executive instruction to"
+"""Shoot to Kill"" for violation of a prohibitory order under section 144 Cr PC, 1973, is ultra"
+"vires section 144 Cr PC, 1973, section 188 IPC, 1860, Articles 20(1) and 21 of the"
+"Constitution and is, therefore, void and unlawful.125."
+"[s 188.3] Prohibitory order under Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006.—"
+Disobedience to a prohibitory order issued by the Food and Safety Commissioner from
+possessing or transporting Gutka or Pan Masala would not cause breach of law and
+order. The Commissioner's order is not an order contemplated under Chapter 10 of the
+"IPC, 1860. Besides, the prohibitory order issued under section 30 of the FSS Act, 2006"
+"and its violation, would amount to offence only under section 55 of the FSS Act, 2006."
+"This specific provision is made in the special enactment, which is a law in itself. It"
+"would not permit any one to apply section 188 of the IPC, 1860 for such breach or"
+violation.126.
+[s 188.4] Complaint.—
+A written complaint by a public servant concerned is sine qua non to initiate a criminal
+"proceeding under section 188 of the IPC, 1860 against those who, with the knowledge"
+that an order has been promulgated by a public servant directing either 'to abstain from
+"a certain act, or to take certain order, with certain property in his possession or under"
+his management' disobey that order.127.
+"114. Ramdas Singh, (1926) 54 Cal 152 ."
+"115. Srimati Tugla, (1955) 2 All 547 ."
+"116. Lachhmi Devi, (1930) 58 Cal 971 ."
+"117. Pradip, AIR 1960 Assam 20 ; DN Ramaiah, 1972 Cr LJ 1158 (Mysore); Saroj Hazra, 48 Cr LJ"
+"747 (Cal); Bharat Raut, 1953 Cr LJ 1787 24.(Pat); Dalganjan, 1956 Cr LJ 1176 (All); Fakir Charan"
+"Das, 1957 Cr LJ 1151 (Ori); Pradip Choudhury, 1960 Cr LJ 251 (Assam); Ram Manohar Lohia;"
+1968 Cr LJ 281 (All).
+"118. K Papayya v State, 1975 Cr LJ 1784 (AP)."
+"119. Bhagirathi Shrichandan v Damodar, 1987 Cr LJ 631 (Ori)."
+"120. Padan Pradhan, 1982 Cr LJ 534 (Pat)."
+"121. Thavasiyappan v Periasamy Nadar, 1992 Cr LJ 283 ."
+"122. Bachuram v State, AIR 1956 Cal 102 [LNIND 1955 CAL 186] ."
+"123. Anurag Thakur v State of HP, 2016 Cr LJ 3363 : I L R 2016 (III) HP 1314."
+"124. Bhoop Singh Tyagi v State, 2002 Cr LJ 2872 (Del)."
+"125. Jayantilal v State, 1975 Cr LJ 661 (Guj); see also R Deb : Op Cit, pp 840-841."
+"126. Ganesh Pandurang Jadhao v The State of Maharashtra, 2016 Cr LJ 2401 : III (2016) CCR"
+334 (Bom).
+"127. State of UP v Mata Bhikh, (1994) 4 SCC 95 [LNIND 1994 SC 311] : JT 1994 (2) SC 565"
+[LNIND 1994 SC 311] : (1994) 2 Scale 235 : (1994) 1 SCC (Cr) 831 : 1994 (2) SCR 368 [LNIND
+"1994 SC 311] . See also C Muniappan v State of TN, (2010) 9 SCC 567 [LNIND 2010 SC 809] : AIR"
+2010 SC 3718 [LNIND 2010 SC 809] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1402 : 2010 (8) Scale 637 : JT 2010 (9)
+SC 95 [LNIND 2010 SC 809] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 189] Threat of injury to public servant.
+"Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any public servant, or to any person in whom"
+"he believes that public servant to be interested, for the purpose of inducing that"
+"public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to do any act, connected with the"
+"exercise of the public functions of such public servant, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+State Amendment
+Andhra Pradesh.— In Andhra Pradesh offence under section 189 is cognizable.
+"[Vide A.P.G.O. Ms. No. 732, dated 5th December, 1991]."
+COMMENT—
+Under this section there must be a threat of injury either to the public servant or to any
+one in whom the accused believes the public servant to be interested. What the section
+deals with are menaces which would have a tendency to induce the public servant to
+alter his action. See section 503 which defines criminal intimidation and applies in all
+cases. This section deals with criminal intimidation of a public servant. Threats of
+violence to a public servant who accepted bribe money but did not do the promised
+"work are not covered by this section. A public servant deserves protection, since in the"
+"performance of his duties, he is likely to cause disappointment to many and invite their"
+"wrath. That is why under sections 189 and 353 and various other sections of the IPC,"
+"1860, a public servant is strongly protected and punishment for offences against him is"
+made deterrent. However if a public servant has gone astray and indulged in
+"malpractices, more especially by way of taking bribe, he would necessarily become"
+subject to public criticism and private accountability. What appears then at the
+"forefront is not the performance of duty by the public servant, but the non-performance"
+of some contract dehors the normal functions of the public servant. If that illegal
+"contract gives rise to any act of violence at any stage, such acts cannot constitute by"
+any stretch of imagination acts contemplated and punished under sections 353 and
+"189, IPC, 1860.128."
+Where workers of Communist Party (Marxist) went to a police station to protest
+against the arrest of their party workers and in the process asked the police-officer to
+"release them on threat of dire consequences, it was held that the accused had"
+committed an offence under this section.129. By a notification under section 10 of the
+"Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932, the State Government can make this section a"
+cognizable offence for a specified area.
+"128. Duraikhannu v State of TN, 1987 Cr LJ 1461 (Mad); Mrityunjoy Das v State, 1987 Cr LJ 909"
+(Cal).
+"129. De Cruz, (1884) 8 Mad 140."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER X OF CONTEMPTS OF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC
+SERVANTS
+This Chapter contains penal provisions intended to enforce obedience to the lawful
+"authority of public servants. Contempt of the lawful authority of Courts of Justice, of"
+"Officers of Revenue, Officers of Police, and other public servants are punishable under"
+this head.
+[s 190] Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for protection
+to public servant.
+Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any person for the purpose of inducing that
+person to refrain or desist from making a legal application for protection against any
+"injury to any public servant legally empowered as such to give such protection, or to"
+"cause such protection to be given, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+State Amendment
+Andhra Pradesh.—Offence under section 190 is cognizable.
+"[Vide A.P.G.O. Ms. No. 732, dated 5th December, 1991]."
+COMMENT—
+The object of this section is to prevent persons from terrorising others with a view to
+deter them from seeking the protection of public servants against any injury. Where a
+"clergyman, knowing that a civil suit was pending against a person for the possession of"
+"certain church property, excommunicated him for withholding it, it was held that the"
+clergyman had committed no offence under this section. By a notification under
+"section 10(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 the State Government can"
+make this offence a cognizable one for a specified area while such notification remains
+in force.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 191] Giving false evidence.
+"Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the"
+"truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject,1 makes any"
+"statement which is false,2. and which he either knows or believes to be false or does"
+"not believe to be true,3. is said to give false evidence."
+"Explanation 1.—A statement is within the meaning of this section, whether it is made"
+verbally or otherwise.
+Explanation 2.—A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the
+"meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by"
+"stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he"
+knows a thing which he does not know.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for one thousand rupees,"
+falsely swears on a trial that he heard Z admit the justice of B's claim. A has
+given false evidence.
+"(b) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he believes a certain"
+"signature to be the handwriting of Z, when he does not believe it to be the"
+"handwriting of Z. Here A states that which he knows to be false, and therefore"
+gives false evidence.
+"(c) A, knowing the general character of Z's handwriting, states that he believes a"
+certain signature to be the handwriting of Z; A in good faith believing it to be so.
+"Here A's statement is merely as to his belief, and is true as to his belief, and"
+"therefore, although the signature may not be the handwriting of Z, A has not"
+given false evidence.
+"(d) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he knows that Z was at"
+"a particular place on a particular day, not knowing anything upon the subject. A"
+gives false evidence whether Z was at that place on the day named or not.
+"(e) A, an interpreter or translator, gives or certifies as a true interpretation or"
+translation of a statement or document which he is bound by oath to interpret or
+"translate truly, that which is not and which he does not believe to be a true"
+interpretation or translation. A has given false evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+Ingredients.—The offence under this section involves three ingredients:—
+(1) A person must be legally bound;
+"(a) by an oath, or any express provision of law, to state the truth; or"
+(b) to make a declaration upon any subject.
+(2) He must make a false statement.
+(3) He must;
+"(a) know or believe it to be false, or"
+(b) not believe it to be true.
+"1. 'Legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law, etc.'— In case the"
+"recourse to a false plea is taken with an oblique motive, it would definitely hinder,"
+hamper or impede the flow of justice and prevent the Courts from performing their
+legal duties.2 The Courts have to follow the procedures strictly and cannot allow a
+witness to escape the legal action for giving false evidence before the Court on mere
+explanation that he had given it under the pressure of the police or for some other
+"reason. Whenever the witness speaks falsehood in the Court, and it is proved"
+"satisfactorily, the Court should take a serious action against such witnesses.3 It is"
+necessary that the accused should be legally bound by an oath before a competent
+authority. If the Court has no authority to administer an oath the proceeding will be
+"coram non judice and a prosecution for false evidence will not stand.4. Similarly, if the"
+Court is acting beyond its jurisdiction it will not be sustained.5. For the essentiality of
+"section 191, petitioner must have been legally bound to speak truth or make a"
+declaration and he must have stated or declared what is false. He must also know or
+believe what he has stated or declared is false or he has believed it true. If there is no
+"compulsion to make any declaration as required by law, Section 191 will not have any"
+application. The information given by him is not on any oath nor was he bound to give
+such information under any provision of Law.6.
+[s 191.1] 'By an oath'.—
+An oath or a solemn affirmation is not a sine qua non in the offence of giving false
+evidence.7. The offence may be committed although the person giving evidence has
+been either sworn or affirmed.8. Whenever in a Court of law a person binds himself on
+"oath to state the truth, he is bound to state the truth and he cannot be heard to say that"
+he should not have gone into the witness box or should not have made an affidavit. It is
+no defence to say that he was not bound to enter the witness box.9.
+[s 191.2] 'By an express provision of law'.—
+Under this clause sanction of an oath is not necessary; there must be a specific
+provision of law compelling a person to state the truth. Where the accused is not bound
+by an express provision of law to state the truth he cannot be charged with giving false
+evidence.10.
+[s 191.3] 'Declaration upon any subject'.—
+In certain cases the law requires a declaration from a person of verification in a
+pleading—and if such a declaration is made falsely it will come under this clause. The
+words 'any subject' denote that the declaration must be in connection with a subject
+regarding which it was to be made.
+2. 'Any statement which is false'.—It is not necessary that the false evidence should be
+"material to the case in which it is given.11. If the statement made is designedly false,"
+the accused is liable whether the statement had a material bearing or not upon the
+matter under enquiry before the Court.12.
+3. 'Knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true'.—The matter sworn to
+"must be either false in fact, or, if true, the accused must not have known it to be so. The"
+"making of a false statement, without knowledge as to whether the subject-matter of"
+"the statement is false or not, is legally the giving of false evidence.13. Where a man"
+"swears to a particular fact, without knowing at the time whether the fact be true or"
+"false, it is as much perjury as if he knew the fact to be false, and equally indictable.14."
+"However, a man cannot be convicted of perjury for having acted rashly, or for having"
+failed to make reasonable inquiry with regard to the facts alleged by him to be true.15.
+[s 191.4] Two Contradictory Statements.—
+"Merely because a person makes two contradictory statements, one of which must be"
+"false, it does not make out a case of perjury unless the falsity of one of the two"
+statements as charged in the indictment is positively proved to be so.16. In India a
+prosecution for perjury seems to be possible in such a case by virtue of illustration (e)
+"of section 221, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it has been held to be"
+"inexpedient to do so in the interest of justice. Thus, where a person made one"
+"statement under section 164 Cr PC, 1973 and a diametrically opposite statement in"
+"Court during the enquiry or trial, he could in view of this illustration be charged in the"
+"alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence, although it cannot be"
+proved which of these contradictory statements was false. But to do so may be to tie
+"him down to his previous false statement under section 164 Cr PC, 1973, and"
+preventing him from telling the truth even belatedly at the later stage of enquiry or trial.
+The Supreme Court too has felt that a witness whose statement has been recorded
+"under section 164 Cr PC, 1973, feels tied to his previous statement and as such his"
+evidence has to be approached with caution.17. In the instant case as it could not be
+"shown that the earlier statements of the witnesses recorded under section 164 Cr PC,"
+1973 were true and those given before the Magistrate in course of the enquiry were
+"false, the complaints of perjury filed against the witnesses were directed to be"
+withdrawn.18.
+[s 191.5] As to expert opinion.—
+"A scientific expert was asked to give his opinion regarding two cartridges, whether"
+"those were fired from one firearm or from two different ones, without sending the"
+"suspected firearm to him. He gave opinion, inter alia, that no definite opinion could be"
+offered in order to link the firearm unless the firearm was made available to him. During
+"the examination, the Court insisted him to give a definite opinion that too without"
+"examining the firearm. At that time, he opined that the cartridges appeared to have"
+been fired from two separate firearms. Considering that there was a deliberate
+deviation in his opinion the High Court initiated proceedings against him under section
+"340 Cr PC, 1973 for perjury. The Supreme Court held that it is unjust, if not unfair, to"
+attribute any motive to the appellant that there was a somersault from his original
+stand in the written opinion.19.
+[s 191.6] Written statements and applications.—
+"A person filing a written statement in a suit is bound by law to state the truth, and if he"
+"makes a statement which is false to his knowledge or belief, or which he believes not"
+"be to true, he is guilty of this offence.20. Signing and verifying an application for"
+"execution containing false statements is an offence under this section, and it makes no"
+difference that at the time when the signature and verification were appended the
+"application was blank.21. But the verification of an application, in which the applicant"
+"makes a false statement, does not subject him to punishment for this offence, if such"
+application does not require verification.22.
+[s 191.7] Incriminating statement no justification.—
+"When a party makes a false statement while legally bound by solemn affirmation, the"
+fact that the statement was one tending to incriminate himself will not justify his
+acquittal on a charge of giving false evidence.23.
+[s 191.8] Illegality of trial does not purge perjury.—
+The fact that the trial in which false evidence is given is to be commenced de novo
+owing to irregularity does not exonerate the person giving false evidence in that trial
+"from the obligation to speak the truth, and he is liable for giving false evidence.24."
+[s 191.9] Prosecution for perjury.—
+It has been held by the Supreme Court that the courts should sanction the prosecution
+for perjury only in those cases where perjury appears to be deliberate and where it
+would be expedient in the interest of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely
+because there is some inaccuracy in the statement.25.
+[s 191.10] Accused not liable for giving false evidence.—
+The authors of the Code observe:
+We have no punishment for false evidence given by a person when on his trial for an
+"offence, though we conceive that such a person ought to be interrogated... If A stabs Z,"
+"and afterwards on his trial denies that he stabbed Z, we do not propose to punish A as"
+a giver of false evidence.26.
+The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer questions
+put by the Court or by giving false answers to them.27.
+[s 191.11] CASES.—
+"In a case, where the allegation was that the Attorney General and Chief Vigilance"
+Officer gave consent to prosecute the Complainant without due care and without
+proper application of mind. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be said that the
+document conveying consent was a 'false document' or that giving of 'consent'
+amounted to giving of 'false evidence' or 'fabricating false evidence' at any stage of
+judicial proceeding.28. A person could only be held guilty of an offence under section
+191 if false evidence is knowingly given or when the statement is believed to be not
+true.29. A witness falsely deposing in another's name;30. and a person falsely verifying
+"his plaint;31. and an official making a false return of the service of summons,32. were"
+held guilty of giving false evidence. The Supreme Court has held that where a false
+affidavit is sworn by a witness in a proceeding before a Court the offence would fall
+under this section and section 192. It is the offence of giving false evidence or of
+fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding.33.
+Where a notice of perjury was issued to certain eye-witnesses but it could not be
+"shown with certainty that they were liars, it was held that the issue of notices was not"
+proper. The Court used its inherent powers and quashed the notices. The challenge
+was presented by only one of the witnesses on his own behalf as well as that of
+others.34.
+[s 191.12] Affidavit.—
+"An affidavit is evidence within the meaning of section 191 of the IPC, 1860. It was"
+alleged about an affidavit filed in a Court that it contained false statements. The
+affidavit was filed by the party suo motu and not under direction from the Court. Such
+"an affidavit could not be termed as evidence. Hence, no action could be taken against"
+"him under the IPC, 1860.35. Process Server while he takes information from the"
+neighbours is not expected to get a sworn statement from them. It is neither an
+"affidavit nor a sworn statement. It is only an information, which he has collected to"
+show his bona fides that he made attempts to serve the notice on the party. If on the
+request of process server if any such information is given that information cannot be
+treated as false evidence or fabricating evidence nor it could be treated as certificate
+nor a declaration under any of the provisions of this section.36.
+[s 191.13] Abetment.—
+Where an accused asked a witness to suppress certain facts in giving his evidence
+"against him (accused), it was held that he was guilty of abetment of giving false"
+evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding.37. Where C falsely represented himself to
+"be U, and the writer of a document signed by U, and T, knowing that C was not U and"
+"had not written such document, adduced C as U, the writer of that document, it was"
+held that T was guilty of abetment of giving false evidence.38.
+"[s 191.14] Bar under section 195 Cr PC, 1973.—"
+Section 195 of the Code lays down the procedure for prosecution for contempt of
+lawful authority of public servants for offences against public justice and for offences
+"against public documents given in the form of evidence. As per this provision, Court is"
+debarred from taking cognizance of any of the offences punishable under sections
+"193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and section 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceedings in any Court except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+authorise in writing in that behalf or of some other Court to which that Court is
+"subordinate. The term ""Court"" in the section means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court"
+and includes a tribunal. Section 340 of the Code prescribes the procedure to be
+"followed for offences mentioned in section 195 of the Code. Therefore, the summoning"
+"orders of the Magistrate against the petitioners under sections 193/191/209 IPC, 1860"
+are hit by provisions of section 195 of the Code and the cognizance taken by the
+"Magistrate of the offences is, therefore, without jurisdiction.39. Sections 191 and 192 of"
+"the IPC, 1860 are the sections that define offences for which punishment is provided"
+"for in sections 193 and 195 as mentioned in section 195(1)(b) (i), Criminal Procedure"
+Code. So the bar to initiate proceedings is applicable to sections 191 and 192 also.40.
+[s 191.15] Procedure.—
+"A combined reading of the aforequoted provisions of Cr PC, 1973 and IPC, 1860 as"
+"also sub-section (3) of section 195, Cr PC, 1973 makes this legal position quite clear"
+"that they are applicable to any legal proceeding before a Civil Court or a Criminal Court,"
+"including a Tribunal constituted by Central, Provincial or State Acts, if declared by that"
+"particular Act to be a Court for the purpose of section 195, Cr PC, 1973. Therefore, if"
+the Family Court finds that any party to the proceeding or a witness therein has
+intentionally given false evidence at any stage of a judicial proceeding or fabricated
+"false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the proceeding, and the"
+Family Court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an
+enquiry should be made into any evidence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
+"section 195, Cr PC, 1973 it may hold a preliminary enquiry and if it thinks necessary"
+then it may record a finding to that effect and then proceed to make a complaint in
+"respect of the particular offence/offences stipulated in clause (b) of section 195, Cr"
+"PC, 1973 to the concerned Magistrate having jurisdiction against the said person.41."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"2. Chandra Shashi v Anil Kumar Verma, 1995 (1) SCC 421 [LNIND 1994 SC 1604] ."
+"3. Mishrilal v State of MP, (2005)10 SCC 701 [LNIND 2005 SC 1165] : 2005 SCC (Cr) 1712."
+"4. Abdul Majid v Krishna Lal Nag, (1893) 20 Cal 724 ; Niaz Ali, (1882) 5 All 17 ; Mata Dayal (1897)"
+"24 Cal 755 ; Subba, (1883) 6 Mad 252; Fatteh Ali, (1894) PR No. 15 of 1894."
+"5. Chait Ram, (1883) 6 All 103 ; Bharma, (1886) 11 Bom 702 (FB)."
+"6. D Jothi v K P Kandasamy, 2000 Cr LJ 292 (Mad)."
+7. (1865) 2 WR (CrL) 9.
+"8. Gobind Chandra Seal, (1892) 19 Cal 355 ; Shava v State, (1891) 16 Bom 359; contra, Maru,"
+(1888) 10 All 207 .
+"9. Ranjit Singh, 1959 Cr LJ 1124 : AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] ."
+"10. Hari Charan Singh, (1900) 27 Cal 455 ."
+"11. Parbutty Churn Sircar, (1866) 6 WR (Cr) 84; Damodhar P Kulkarni, (1868) 5 BHC (CrC) 68."
+"12. Mohammad Khudabux, (1949) Nag 355."
+"13. Echan Meeah, (1865) 2 WR (Cr) 47. Mohammod Hussein v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ"
+2364 (Bom).
+"14. Mawbey, (1796) 6 TR 619, 637; Schlesinger, (1847) 10 QB 670 ."
+"15. Muhammad Ishaq, (1914) 36 All 362 ."
+"16. Cross & Jones: Introduction to Criminal Law, 9th Edn, p 275."
+"17. Ramcharan, 1968 Cr LJ 1473 : AIR 1968 SC 1267 [LNIND 1968 SC 29] ; Balak Ram, 1974 Cr"
+LJ 1486 : AIR 1974 SC 2165 [LNIND 1974 SC 236] .
+"18. Ibid. Kuriakose v State of Kerala, 1995 Cr LJ 2687 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 602 , contradictory"
+statements as to contents of panchanama by an attesting witness does not make him liable to
+"be prosecuted under the section, gravity of the false statement has also to be taken into"
+account.
+"19. Prem Sagar Manocha v State (NCT of Delhi), 2016 Cr LJ 1090 : (2016) 4 SCC 571 [LNIND"
+2016 SC 9] .
+"20. Mehrban Singh, (1884) 6 All 626 ; Padam Singh, (1930) 52 All 856 ."
+"21. Ratanchand v State, (1904) 6 Bom LR 886 ."
+"22. Kasi Chunder Mozumdar, (1880) 6 Cal 440 ."
+23. (1867) 3 MHC (Appx.) XXXIX.
+"24. Virasami v State, (1896) 19 Mad 375; Batesar Mandal, (1884) 10 Cal 604 ."
+"25. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v Pankaj Chaudhary, AIR 2018 SC 5412 [LNIND 2018 SC 565] ."
+"26. Note G, p 131."
+"27. Criminal Procedure Code, section 313 (3)."
+"28. Buddhi Kota Subbarao v K Parasaran, AIR 1996 SC 2687 [LNIND 1996 SC 1254] : (1996) 5"
+SCC 530 [LNIND 1996 SC 1254] .
+"29. Indian Structural Engineering Company Pvt Ltd v Pradip Kumar Saha, 2009 Cr LJ 4229 (Cal)."
+30. Prema Bhika (1863) 1 BHC 89.
+"31. Luxumandas, (1869) Unrep CrC 25."
+"32. Shama Churn Roy, (1867) 8 WR (Cr) 27."
+"33. Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : 1967 Cr LJ 6 ; MP Paul,"
+1973 Cr LJ 1284 (Ker).
+"34. State v Manoher Yeshwant Paul, 1997 Cr LJ 3114 (Bom)."
+"35. Delhi Lotteries v Rajesh Agarwal, AIR 1998 : 1332 (Del)."
+"36. D Jothi v K P Kandasamy, 2000 Cr LJ 292 (Mad)."
+"37. Andy Chetty, (1865) 2 MHC 438 ."
+"38. Chundi Churn, Nauth, (1867) 8 WR (Cr) 5."
+"39. Kusum Sandhu v Sh Ved Prakash Narang, 2009 Cr LJ 1078 (Del)."
+"40. Premjit Kaur v Harsinder Singh, (1982) 2 SCC 167 : (1982) 1 SCC (Cr) 379 : 1982 CrLR 318."
+"41. Arun Kumar Agarwal v Mrs. Radha Arun, 2001 Cr LJ 3561 (KAR)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 192] Fabricating false evidence.
+Whoever causes any circumstance to exist or 42.[makes any false entry in any book or
+record or electronic record or makes any document or electronic record containing a
+"false statement], intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement"
+"may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding,1 or in a proceeding taken by law"
+"before a public servant2 as such, or before an arbitrator, and that such circumstance,"
+"false entry or false statement so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in"
+"such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous"
+"opinion touching any point material3 to the result of such proceeding, is said ""to"
+"fabricate4 false evidence""."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, puts jewels into a box belonging to Z, with the intention that they may be"
+"found in that box, and that this circumstance may cause Z to be convicted of"
+theft. A has fabricated false evidence.
+(b) A makes a false entry in his shop-book for the purpose of using it as
+corroborative evidence in a Court of Justice. A has fabricated false evidence.
+"(c) A, with the intention of causing Z to be convicted of a criminal conspiracy, writes"
+"a letter in imitation of Z's handwriting, purporting to be addressed to an"
+"accomplice in such criminal conspiracy, and puts the letter in a place which he"
+knows that the officers of the Police are likely to search. A has fabricated false
+evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+"The wording of this section is so general as to cover any species of crime, which"
+consists in the endeavour to injure another by supplying false data upon which to rest a
+judicial decision.
+[s 192.1] Ingredients.—
+The offence defined in this section has three ingredients:—
+"(1) Causing any circumstance to exist, or making any false entry in any book or"
+"record, or making any document containing a false statement."
+(2) Doing one of the above acts with the intention that it may appear in evidence in
+"a judicial proceeding, or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant or"
+an arbitrator.
+"(3) Doing such act with the intention that it may cause any person, who in such"
+"proceeding, is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous"
+opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding.43. From a
+"careful reading of section 192, IPC, 1860, what transpires is that whoever forges"
+"a document, containing false statement or false entry, intending that such false"
+"entry or false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a"
+"proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, so appearing in"
+"evidence, may cause any person, who, in such proceeding, is to form an opinion"
+"upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion in such proceeding, he is"
+said to fabricate false evidence.44.
+1. 'Judicial proceeding'.—The Code of Criminal Procedure says that 'judicial
+proceeding' includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be
+"legally taken on oath [section 2(i)]. The power to take evidence on oath, which includes"
+"affirmation as well,45. is the characteristic test of 'judicial proceeding'. 'Judicial"
+proceeding' means nothing more or less than a step taken by a Court in the course of
+administration of justice in connection with a case.46. Execution proceedings are
+judicial proceedings.47.
+It is not essential that there should be any judicial proceeding pending at the time of
+fabrication. It is enough that there is a reasonable prospect of such a proceeding
+having regard to the circumstances of the case and that the document in question is
+intended to be used in such a proceeding.48.
+2. 'Public servant'.—The provisions of this section are not confined to false evidence to
+"be used in judicial proceedings, but to any proceeding before a public servant. A"
+Government correspondence was stealthily removed by accused No. 1 and handed
+over to the pleader of accused Nos. 2 and 3. The correspondence was replaced by
+accused No. 1. It was afterwards discovered that some papers had disappeared from
+the correspondence whilst others had been either mutilated or altered. It was held that
+accused Nos. 2 and 3 were guilty of offences under sections 466 and 193.49.
+3. 'Material'.—The false evidence under this section should be material to the case in
+which it is given though not so under section 191.50. The word 'material' means of such
+"a nature as to affect in any way, directly or indirectly, the probability of anything to be"
+"determined by the proceeding, or the credit of any witness, and a fact may be material"
+although evidence of its existence was improperly admitted.51.
+4. 'Fabricate'.—The term fabrication refers to the fabrication of false evidence; and if
+"the evidence fabricated is intended to be used in a judicial proceeding, the offence is"
+committed as soon as the fabrication is complete; it is immaterial that the judicial
+"proceeding has not been commenced,52. or that no actual use has been made of the"
+evidence fabricated. The mere fabrication is punishable under section 193; the use of
+the fabricated evidence is punishable under section 196.
+The evidence fabricated must be admissible evidence.53.
+[s 192.2] Liability of accused for fabricating false evidence.—
+It has been held by the High Courts of Calcutta54. and Bombay55. that an offender who
+fabricates false evidence to screen himself from punishment is liable to be convicted
+"under this section. The Allahabad High Court56. has veered round to the same view,"
+after distinguishing an earlier case57. to the contrary.
+[s 192.3] Vicarious liability.—
+"Neither section 192 IPC, 1860 nor section 199 IPC, 1860, incorporate the principle of"
+"vicarious liability, and therefore, it was incumbent on the complainant to specifically"
+aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint.58. Penal Code does not contain
+any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the managing Director or the
+Director for the Company when the accused is the company. Vicarious liability arise
+provided any provision exits in that behalf in the statute. It is obligatory on the part of
+the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provision
+constituting vicarious liability.59.
+[s 192.4] CASES.—Fabrication of evidence to be used in judicial proceeding.—
+The brother of an accused person applied to the Court on behalf of the accused asking
+that the witnesses for the prosecution might first be made to identify the accused. The
+"Court assenting to this request, he produced before the Court ten or twelve men, none"
+of whom could be identified as the accused by any of the witnesses. Upon being asked
+"by the Court where the accused was, he pointed out a man who was not the accused. It"
+"was held that he was guilty of fabricating false evidence.60. The accused, who was in"
+"possession of the complainant's house as a yearly tenant, about the time the tenancy"
+"came to an end, prepared another rent-note for a period of four years and got it"
+registered without the complainant's knowledge. It was held that the accused had
+"fabricated false evidence inasmuch as the rent-note, which contained an admission"
+"against the interest of the accused, could be admitted in evidence on his behalf.61. By"
+swearing a false affidavit the accused makes himself prima facie liable under section
+"193 read with sections 191 and 192 of the IPC, 1860.62. In order to have the value of"
+"CFC excluded for the purpose of excise duty, letters were fabricated and the same were"
+"seized in a raid. Fifteen months later, taking up a notice of motion, High Court directed"
+filing of criminal complaints against the appellant under section 192. While agreeing
+"that the Division Bench was not wrong in making the direction, which it did on the"
+"merits of the case, Supreme Court held that the High Court did not appear to have"
+bestowed sufficient attention while deciding upon the expediency contemplated by
+section 340.63.
+[s 192.5] No fabrication if no erroneous opinion could be formed touching any
+point material to result of proceeding.—
+It is now well settled that prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by the Court
+only in those cases where there is a prima facie case of deliberate and conscious
+falsehood on a matter of substance and the conviction is reasonably probable or
+likely.64. It is also very necessary that the portions of the witness's statement in regard
+"to which he has, in the opinion of the Court, perjured himself, should be specifically set"
+out in or form annexure to the show cause notice issued to the accused so that he is in
+a position to furnish adequate and proper reply in regard thereto and be able to meet
+the charge.65.
+[s 192.6] No fabrication of evidence fabricated is inadmissible.—
+The mere fact that a document would be ultimately inadmissible in evidence does not
+necessarily take it out of the mischief of section 193.66.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"42. Subs. by The Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act 21 of 2000) section 91 and First Sch,"
+"w.e.f. 17 October 2000, for the words ""makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any"
+"document contained on false statement"". The words ""electronic record"" have been defined in"
+section 29A.
+"43. Babu Lal v State of UP, (1964) 1 Cr LJ 555 : AIR 1964 SC 725 [LNIND 1963 SC 218] ."
+"Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd, (2010) 10 SCC 479"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 CR LJ. 8 : (2010) 12 SCR 551 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 68; See State of
+"MP v Asian Drugs, 1990 Cr LJ 105 MP, the defence exposing fabrication by Inspectors under The"
+"Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940)."
+44. Sushanta Sarkar v State of Nagaland 2012 Cr LJ 4467 (Gau).
+"45. The General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), section 3 (37)"
+"46. Venkatachalam Pillai, (1864) 2 MHC 43 ; Tulja v State, (1887) 12 Bom 36, 42."
+"47. Govind Pandurang, (1920) 22 Bom LR 1239 , 45 Bom 668."
+"48. Rajaram, (1920) 22 Bom LR 1229 [LNIND 1920 BOM 119] ; Govind Pandurang, Ibid."
+"49. Vallabhram Ganpatram, (1925) 27 Bom LR 1391 ."
+"50. Tookaram, (1862) Unrep. CrC 2."
+"51. Stephen's Digest, Art 148; SP Kohli, 1978 Cr LJ 1804 : AIR 1978 SC 1753 [LNIND 1978 SC"
+235] .
+"52. Mula, (1879) 2 All 105 ."
+"53. Zakir Husain, (1898) 21 All 159 ."
+"54. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v Taraknath Chatterji, (1935) 62"
+Cal 666 .
+"55. Rama Nana, (1921) 46 Bom 317, 23 Bom LR 987."
+"56. Bhagirath Lal, (1934) 57 All 403 ."
+"57. Ram Khilawan, (1906) 28 All 705 ."
+"58. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd, (2010) 10 SCC 479"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 Cr LJ 8 : (2010) 12 SCR 551 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 68.
+"59. Maksud Saiyed v State of Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 668 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] : JT 2007 (11) SC"
+276 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] : 2008 (5) SCR 1240 : (2008) 6 Scale 81 [LNIND 2008 SC 848] :
+(2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 692.
+"60. Cheda Lal, (1907) 29 All 351 ."
+"61. Rajaram, (1920) 22 Bom LR 1229 [LNIND 1920 BOM 119] ."
+"62. Baban Singh, 1967 Cr LJ 6 : AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] ."
+"63. Phiroze Dinshaw Lam v UOI, 1996) 8 SCC 209 : (1996) 1 SCC (Cr) 575."
+"64. SP Kohli, 1978 Cr LJ 1804 : AIR 1978 SC 1753 [LNIND 1978 SC 235] ."
+65. Ibid.
+"66. Mahesh Chandra Dhupi, (1940) 1 Cal 465 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 193] Punishment for false evidence.
+"Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or"
+fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial
+"proceeding,1 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine, and whoever"
+"intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case,2 shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine.
+Explanation 1.—A trial before a Court-martial; 67. [***] is a judicial proceeding.
+Explanation 2.—An investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a
+"Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not"
+take place before a Court of Justice.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, in an enquiry before a Magistrate for the purpose of ascertaining whether Z ought to"
+"be committed for trial, makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this"
+"enquiry is a stage of a judicial proceeding, A has given false evidence."
+"Explanation 3.—An investigation directed by a Court of Justice according to law, and"
+"conducted under the authority of a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial"
+"proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, in any enquiry before an officer deputed by a Court of Justice to ascertain on the"
+"spot the boundaries of land, makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false."
+As this enquiry is a stage of a judicial proceeding. A has given false evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+Sections 191 and 192 define the offences punishable under this section. The first
+paragraph applies only to cases in which the false evidence is given in a judicial
+"proceeding, the second to all other cases. If the offence is committed in any stage of a"
+judicial proceeding it is more severely punishable than when it is committed in a non-
+judicial proceeding.
+Intention is the essential ingredient in the constitution of this offence. If the statement
+"was false, and known or believed by the accused to be false, it may be presumed that"
+in making that statement he intentionally gave false evidence. In order to make a
+person liable for perjury it is necessary that he should have made a statement on oath
+regarding the facts on which his statement was based and then deny those facts on
+oath on a subsequent occasion.68. The mere fact that a deponent has made
+contradictory statements at two different stages in a judicial proceeding is not by itself
+always sufficient to justify a prosecution for perjury under section 193 but it must be
+established that the deponent has intentionally given false statement in any stage of
+the 'judicial proceeding' or fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in
+any stage of the 'judicial proceeding'.69.
+It is not necessary that the false statement should be material to the case. The gist of
+the offence is the giving or fabrication of false evidence intentionally. Where knowledge
+"of falsity is proved, intention is readily presumed.70."
+1. 'Any stage of a judicial proceeding'.—The recording of a statement under section
+161 itself is a judicial proceeding in view of Explanation 2 to section 193 in so far as
+recording of a statement is part of the investigation directed by law preliminary to a
+proceeding before a Court of justice and therefore is a stage of the judicial
+proceedings. Mere failure to support contention made in said FIR while giving evidence
+"under section 164 Cr PC, 1973, can't conclusively lead to hold that he had given false"
+evidence by departing from contentions made in FIR.71. Where a witness in Sessions
+"trial deposing contrary to what he had said in a statement recorded under section 164,"
+recourse to section 340 cannot be taken without first deciding whether the earlier
+statement was false.72. In the course of proceedings for execution of a decree in a
+Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings the judgment-debtor
+made a false statement and produced a forged receipt. The Court made a complaint
+under section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code for prosecution of the judgment-
+debtor in respect of the said offences; it was held that if during the course of the
+proceedings which were ultra vires and illegal any offence under section 471 of the
+"Code was committed, it could not be said that it was committed in or in relation to, or"
+"by a party to, any judicial proceedings, in which evidence could be legally taken, and"
+therefore the complaint must be dismissed.73. Since enquiry conducted by an officer of
+the Railway Protection Force is a judicial proceeding under section 9 of The Railway
+"Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966, furnishing of false documents in course of"
+"such an enquiry would amount to an offence under section 193, IPC, 1860.74. Giving"
+false evidence in support of the prosecution case during the course of trial falls within
+"the ambit of sections 193 and 195, IPC, 1860, and not under section 211, IPC, 1860, as"
+there is no institution of criminal proceeding in such a case.75. (See Comments under
+"sub-head ""Falsely Charges"" under section 211 infra.) Where the accused abetted the"
+offence of forgery by creating a false document with a view to use it in a suit but did
+"not use it in the suit, it was held that there was no question of prosecuting him under"
+"section 193, IPC, 1860, nor was a Court complaint under section 195(1) (b) (i), Cr PC,"
+"1973, necessary in the case. The accused could be safely prosecuted under section"
+"467 read with section 114, IPC, 1860, on a private complaint.76."
+Where the accused police-officer asked a police official to forge the signature of his
+superior on the carbon copy of the counter-affidavit containing false averments and the
+"same was filed in the Supreme Court with that forged signature, the accused was held"
+guilty of an offence under section 192.77.
+Questions which a person is compelled to answer and the answers which have a
+"tendency to incriminate, cannot be the sole basis of a charge of perjury.78."
+[s 193.1] Court Complaint: When?—
+"In Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah,79. the Constitution Bench held that the"
+"section 195(1)(b)(ii) -Cr PC, 1973 which mandates that 'no Court shall take cognizance"
+of offences relating to documents given in evidence except on the complaint in writing
+"of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate', would be"
+attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been
+committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence
+"in a proceedings in any Court, i.e., during the time when the documents was in custodial"
+"legis.80. Though the Rent Controller discharges quasi-judicial functions, he is not a"
+"Court, as understood in the conventional sense and he cannot, therefore, make a"
+"complaint under section 340 Cr PC, 1973.81."
+[s 193.2] Belated complaint.—
+A witness made false statement before a competent Court and the accused were
+convicted. The appellate Court (Sessions Court) held that the witness had given false
+statement and directed that a notice be issued to him to show cause why a complaint
+"under section 193, IPC, 1860 be not filed against him. The notice was issued and after"
+"hearing him, the Court directed that a complaint be filed. The High Court found that the"
+notice issued to him was no notice because it did not specify the portions that were
+"found to be false, besides the statement was recorded ten years ago. The Court held"
+that it was not proper to file a complaint at that stage. The Court set aside the order of
+the Sessions Judge.82.
+[s 193.3] Supreme Court cannot convert itself into trial Court.—
+The accused filed a forged affidavit before the Supreme Court. It was held by the three
+Judge Bench that the Supreme Court could not try and convict the accused. The order
+of the Supreme Court convicting the accused and sentencing him to three months'
+imprisonment was liable to be set aside because of non-compliance of procedure
+"prescribed by sections 195 and 340, Cr PC, 1973 and also because of lack of original"
+"jurisdiction to try a criminal offence under section 193, IPC, 1860. Directions to the"
+competent authority to proceed in the matter were not issued because the accused
+had already served out the sentence of imprisonment imposed on him.83.
+[s 193.4] False Affidavits.—
+The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of
+causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the tendency
+"to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The due process of"
+law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery by
+such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even while appearing
+as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the
+free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the filing of false evidence
+commits criminal contempt of the Court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in
+"accordance with the Act. On facts, High Court found that apart from committing"
+contempt of Court the accused-1 has also committed an offence of perjury punishable
+"under section 193, IPC, 1860 committed in relation to proceedings of the Court. Court"
+"directed the Registrar (Judicial) under section 340(3)(b), Cr PC, 1973 to file a complaint"
+before the jurisdictional Magistrate in this regard.84.
+[s 193.5] CASES.—
+A father handed over the custody of his minor daughter to the accused woman for
+"household chores, but thereafter his efforts to get back his daughter failed. He filed a"
+habeas corpus petition and the Court directed the respondent to produce the girl in
+response to which the respondent produced some other girl of the same name to
+"mislead the Court. The Court directed that a complaint under sections 193, 196 and"
+199 be lodged against the respondent.85. Declaration in an application filed under
+"section 482 of Cr PC, 1973 that the applicant had not approached the Supreme Court"
+"or the High Court earlier is not perjury, though applicant had filed for anticipatory Bail"
+before the Sessions Court.86.
+[s 193.6] Hostile witness.—
+"In a prosecution under sections 489B and 489C, all prosecution witnesses who were"
+police officials turned hostile. Subsequently they filed affidavits stating that they were
+threatened by higher officers not to support their previous statements during
+"investigation. Court set aside the order of acquittal of the accused, ordered re-trial and"
+"directed to proceed under sections 193 and 195A.87. After a long span of time, the"
+prosecution witnesses filed a false affidavit stating that they were coerced and tutored
+by police. They were held liable for perjury.88.
+2. 'In any other case'.—A statement made in the course of a public investigation under
+section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure comes within these words.89. Whether
+"the accused has really made a false statement or not is a question of fact, which can"
+"be decided at the trial and not in quashing proceeding, when the allegations, which"
+have been made against the accused do make out a prima facie case under section
+"193, IPC, 1860.90. A person married the daughter of his maternal uncle, after converting"
+to Christianity. If they married before conversion this marriage would have come under
+"'Sapindas relations' which is prohibited under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. After"
+conversion into Christianity the marriage does not fall under 'Sapinda' relationship. It
+cannot be said that there was any false declaration. It is held that offence punishable
+"under section 193 of IPC, 1860 is not made out.91."
+"[s 193.7] Section 193 IPC, 1860 and Section 125A of the Representation of"
+"Peoples Act, 1950.—"
+Where a specific penal provision is made under the Act providing a penalty for filing
+"false affidavit under section 125A of the Act, without anything more, for filing such a"
+"false affidavit, that alone, no prosecution under the general penal provision of section"
+"193 of the Penal Code is entertainable. Furthermore, the penal provision under section"
+"193 IPC, 1860 has to be understood giving significance to the expressions 'intentionally"
+"giving or fabricating false evidence', 'in any stage of a judicial proceeding' or 'in any"
+other case.' Giving or fabricating false evidence in the aforesaid section whether it be in
+the judicial proceeding or in any other case must have been intended to form an
+opinion on the evidence erroneously and such forming of opinion should be touching
+the point material to the result of such proceeding. Viewed in that angle the declaration
+to be made by a candidate in his affidavit filed with his nomination paper over the
+"matters prescribed by the election commission when he contests an election, it cannot"
+be stated that the candidate is giving evidence by affidavit but at best only a
+declaration on the particulars sought for. If the candidate fails to furnish information or
+gives false information which he knows or has reason to believe to be false or conceals
+any information he is liable to be prosecuted only for the offence under section 125A of
+"the Act, and not for the penal offence under section 193 IPC, 1860.92."
+"[s 193.8] Section 193 IPC, 1860 and proceedings under section 340 Cr PC,"
+1973.—
+"Power to punish under section 344 Cr PC, 1973 and section 193 Cr PC, 1973 are"
+"distinct. Section 344 Cr PC, 1973 calls for summary trial, whereas under section 193"
+"IPC, 1860 offender is to be tried as warrant case. Section 344 Cr PC, 1973 vests powers"
+in the Courts to summarily try and punish the accused. It is for this reason that section
+"344 Cr PC, 1973 prescribes sentence also. The Judge either should have convicted the"
+"petitioner under section 344 Cr PC, 1973 or ought not to have invoked section 193 IPC,"
+"1860. Once, the Judge opted to try the petitioner for the offence under section 193 IPC,"
+"1860, it was incumbent upon him to hold an inquiry under section 340 Cr PC, 1973 and"
+then to frame a charge and try the offender for a warrant case as minimum sentence
+"prescribed under section 193 IPC, 1860 is three years.93. Before lodging a complaint as"
+"provided by section 340 of the Code, the Court has to record a finding of any (i) prima"
+facie case and deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance; (ii) there is reasonable
+foundation for the charge; and (iii) it is expedient in the interest of justice that a
+"complaint should be filed.94. An enquiry when made, under section 340 (1) Cr PC, 1973,"
+is really in the nature of affording a locus paenitentiae to a person and if at that stage
+"the Court chooses to take action, it does not mean that he will not have full and"
+adequate opportunity in due course of the process of justice to establish his
+"innocence. When the trial of the appellant commences under section 193, IPC, 1860"
+"the reasons given or those in the order passed under section 340 (1), Cr PC, 1973"
+should not weigh with the criminal Court in coming to its independent conclusion
+"whether the offence under section 193, IPC, 1860 has been fully established against"
+the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.95.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"67. The words ""or before a Military Court of Request"" omitted by Act 13 of 1889, section 2 and"
+Sch.
+"68. Ismail Khan v State of Karnataka, 1992 Cr LJ 3566 (Kant)."
+"69. KTMS Mohd v UOI, AIR 1992 SC 2199 : 1992 Cr LJ 2781 ."
+"70. Sadasiba, (1956) Cut 87; Pravinchand v Ibrahim Md, 1987 Cr LJ 1795 (Bom)."
+"71. Bimal Das v The State of Tripura, 2012 Cr LJ 1252 (Gau)."
+"72. Thomman v IInd Addl Sessions Judge, 1994 Cr LJ 48 (Ker)."
+"73. Sumat Prasad v State, (1942) All 42 ."
+"74. BC Saxena, 1983 Cr LJ 1432 (AP)."
+"75. Santosh Singh v Izahar Hussain, 1973 Cr LJ 1176 : AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] ."
+"76. State of Karnataka v Hemareddy, 1981 Cr LJ 1019 : AIR 1981 SC 1417 [LNIND 1981 SC 44] :"
+(1981) 2 SCC 185 [LNIND 1981 SC 44] .
+"77. Afzal v State of Haryana, AIR 1996 SC 2326 [LNIND 1996 SC 130] : 1996 Cr LJ 1679 ."
+"78. NSR Krishna Prasad v Directorate of Enforcement LBK Market, 1992 Cr LJ 1888 (AP). See"
+"section 132, The Indian Evidence Act, 1972."
+"79. Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 [LNIND 2005 SC 261] : AIR 2005"
+SC 2119 [LNIND 2005 SC 261] .
+"80. Sushanta Sarkar v State of Nagaland, 2012 Cr LJ 4467 (Gau)."
+"81. Iqbal Singh Narang v Veeran Narang, AIR 2012 SC 466 [LNIND 2011 SC 1189] : (2012) 2 SCC"
+60 [LNIND 2011 SC 1189] ;2012 AIR (SCW) 730 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cr) 740.
+"82. Jagdish Prasad Singhal v State of Rajasthan, 1994 Cr LJ 759 (Raj)."
+"83. Randhir Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 544 [LNIND 2000 SC 27] : 2000 Cr LJ 755 ."
+"Another ruling to the same effect, MS Ahlawat v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 168 [LNIND 1999"
+"SC 1395] : (2000) Cr LJ 388 ; Mohammed Zahid v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 1998 Cr LJ 2908 : AIR"
+1998 SC 2023 [LNIND 1998 SC 557] .
+"84. Advocate General,Karnataka v Chidambara, 2004 Cr LJ 493 (Kant)."
+"85. R Rathinam v Kamla Vaiduriam, 1993 Cr LJ 2661 (Mad)."
+"86. Rajkumar Dhanuji Bombarde v Madhukar Wankhede, 2008 Cr LJ 661 (Bom)."
+"87. Court on Its Own Motion v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 2240 (PH)."
+"88. State of MP v Badri Yadav, 2006 Cr LJ 2128 : AIR 2006 SC 1769 [LNIND 2006 SC 229] :"
+(2006) 9 SCC 549 [LNIND 2006 SC 229] .
+"89. Purshottam Ishvar, (1920) 23 Bom LR 1 ; 45 Bom 834 (FB). Mohammed Zahid v Govt. of NCT"
+"of Delhi, AIR 1998 SC 2023 [LNIND 1998 SC 557] : 1998 Cr LJ 2908 , false entries in case diary,"
+"interpolations, cooking up false case against the accused, show-cause notices issued against"
+the concerned police officer for the offence.
+"90. Sushanta Sarkar v State of Nagaland, 2012 Cr LJ 4467 (Gau)."
+"91. O P Gogne v State, 2012 Cr LJ 1718 (Del)."
+"92. Ganesh Kumar v PK Raju, 2013 (2) Ker LT 434 : 1 LR 2013 (2) Ker 710 ."
+"93. Jaskaran v State of Haryana, 2008 Cr LJ 4261 (PH)."
+"94. Rit Lai Khatway v State of Bihar, 2007 Cr LJ 593 (Pat). See also State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v"
+"Pankaj Chaudhary, AIR 2018 SC 5412 [LNIND 2018 SC 565] ."
+"95. K Karunakaran v TV Eachara Warrier, AIR 1978 SC 290 [LNIND 1977 SC 319] : (1978) 1 SCC"
+18 [LNIND 1977 SC 319] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 194] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of
+capital offence.
+"Whoever gives or fabricates false evidence, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it"
+"to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which"
+is capital 96.[by the law for the time being in force in 97.[India]] shall be punished with
+"98.[imprisonment for life], or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend"
+"to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+if innocent person be thereby convicted and executed.
+and if an innocent person be convicted and executed in consequence of such
+"false evidence, the person who gives such false evidence shall be punished either"
+with death or the punishment hereinbefore described.
+COMMENT.—
+This is an aggravated form of the offence of giving or fabricating false evidence made
+punishable by section 193.
+To constitute an offence under this section the accused must give false evidence
+intending thereby to cause some person to be convicted of a capital offence. A person
+who brings before a Court a witness whom he has tutored to tell a false story
+"concerning a murder case before it, commits an offence under this section.99."
+[s 194.1] CASE.—
+Where the Investigating Officer fabricated false evidence by manipulating the records in
+large number of documents to get the accused persons convicted and the time was
+not mentioned in documents prepared during investigation conviction under section
+194 was held proper.100. Where the Investigating Inspector concocted false evidence
+with the help of two sarpanchas and villagers to rope in an innocent man in a false
+murder case which led to his conviction by the Sessions Court and during the course of
+hearing of the appeal in the High Court the so-called murdered man appeared in person
+"before the High Court, it was held that the Inspector, the sarpanchas and the other"
+"witnesses were liable to be prosecuted under section 194, IPC, 1860, read with section"
+"340, Cr PC, 1973.101."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"96. Subs. by the A.O. 1948, for ""by the law of British India or England""."
+"97. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, for ""the States"" (w.e.f. 1 April 1951)."
+"98. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"99. Sur Nath Bhaduri, (1927) 50 All 365 ."
+"100. Suresh Chandra Sharma v State of MP, AIR 2009 SC 3196 ; 2009 Cr LJ 4288 (SC)."
+"101. Darshan Singh, 1985 Cr LJ NOC 71 (P&H). See also Baij Nath Dubey v Avas Evam Vikas"
+"Parishad, 1997 Cr LJ 2681 (All)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 195] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of
+offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment.
+"Whoever gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to cause, or knowing it"
+"to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which"
+"102.[by the law for the time being in force in 103.[India]] is not capital, but punishable"
+"with 104.[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for a term of seven years or"
+"upwards, shall be punished as a person convicted of that offence would be liable to be"
+punished.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A gives false evidence before a Court of Justice, intending thereby to cause Z to be"
+"convicted of a dacoity. The punishment of dacoity is 105.[imprisonment for life], or"
+"rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, with or without fine."
+"A, therefore, is liable to 106.[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment, with or without"
+fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is similar to the preceding section except as regards the gravity of the
+offence in respect of which the perjury is committed. The preceding section deals with
+"perjury in the case of an offence punishable with death, this section deals with perjury"
+of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of
+seven years or upwards. In the case of a person who burnt his own house and charged
+"another with the act, it was held that he should not be convicted under this section, but"
+"under section 211,107. but where A, with a view to having B convicted, assisted in"
+"concealing stolen railway pins in his house and field, it was held that A was properly"
+convicted of an offence under this section.108. Giving false evidence in support of the
+"prosecution case amounts to an offence under sections 193 and 195, IPC, 1860, and"
+"not under section 211, IPC, 1860.109. Misstatement of facts and concealment of an"
+essential fact in a writ petition amounts to giving false evidence. The petitioner was
+liable to face proceedings for giving false evidence.110. It is not necessary that
+fabrication of false evidence takes place only inside the Court as it can also be
+fabricated outside the Court though has been used in the Court.111.
+A Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal is not a Court for the purposes of this section. It is
+"not ""a court in the accepted sense of that term, though it may possess some of the"
+"trappings of a court.""112. A party giving an answer to a question put under Order 10 r. 2"
+"of the CPC when not under oath and when not being examined as a witness, cannot"
+"attract section 195 IPC, 1860.113. Police-officers fabricated the evidence in order to"
+"book the appellant under TADA. From the materials on record, Supreme Court was of"
+the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made
+"in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 340, Cr PC, 1973 into the commission of"
+"offences under sections 193, 195 and 211.114."
+[s 195.1] St. Kitts (Chandraswamy) Case.—
+"The respondent, was at the relevant time, serving as Director (Enforcement) with the"
+government of India. The respondent was a public servant at the time of the
+"commission of the alleged offence, no cognizance of the offence could have been"
+taken against him in the absence of sanction under section 197 Criminal Procedure
+Code.115.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"102. Subs. by the A.O. 1948, for ""by the law of British India or England""."
+"103. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch, for ""the States"" (w.e.f. 1 April 1951)."
+"104. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"105. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"106. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""such transportation"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"107. Bhugwan Ahir, (1867) 8 WR (Cr) 65."
+"108. Rameshar Rai, (1877) 1 All 379 ."
+"109. Santokh Singh, 1973 Cr LJ 1176 : AIR 1976 SC 2190 ."
+"110. Dehri Cooperative Development v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 3396 (Pat); Mohommed Zahid v"
+"Govt. NCT of Delhi, 1998 Cr LJ 2908 : AIR 1998 SC 2023 [LNIND 1998 SC 557] : (1998) 5 SCC"
+"419 [LNIND 1998 SC 557] , for note on the case see under section 193. Also see Harrianna"
+"Gowda v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 4756 (Kant)."
+"111. Ram Dhan v State of UP, 2012 (4) Scale 259 [LNIND 2012 SC 1057] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 2500 :"
+2012 Cr LJ 2419 : (2012) 5 SCC 536 [LNIND 2012 SC 1057] : AIR 2012 SC 2513 [LNIND 2012 SC
+"1057] relied on Sachida Nand Singh v State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493) [LNIND 1998 SC 138] ."
+"112. R Venkat Reddy v State of AP, 1992 Cr LJ 414 ."
+"113. Kapil Corepacks Pvt Ltd v Harbans Lal, 2 AIR 2010 SC 2809 [LNIND 2010 SC 697] : 2010 (7)"
+Scale 558 [LNIND 2010 SC 697] : (2010) 9 SCR 500 [LNIND 2010 SC 697] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)
+924.
+"114. Mohd Zahid v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 1998 SC 2023 [LNIND 1998 SC 557] : (1998) 5 SCC"
+419 [LNIND 1998 SC 557] .
+"115. State through Central Bureau of Investigation v B L Verma, (1997) 10 SCC 772 ; See also"
+"Asha Sunder Shivdasani v Aruna Ramesh Kriplani, 2001 Cr LJ 2146 (Bom) - proceedings quashed"
+"as hit by section 195 Cr PC, 1973."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+116.[s 195A] Threatening or any person to give false evidence.
+"[Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property or to"
+"the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to"
+cause that person to give false evidence shall be punished with imprisonment of
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with"
+both;
+and if innocent person is convicted and sentenced in consequence of such false
+"evidence, with death or imprisonment for more than seven years, the person who"
+threatens shall be punished with the same punishment and sentence in the same
+manner and to the same extent such innocent person is punished and sentenced.]
+COMMENTS.—
+"In a prosecution under sections 489B and 489C, all prosecution witnesses who were"
+police officials turned hostile. Subsequently they filed affidavits stating that they were
+threatened by higher officers not to support their previous statements during
+"investigation. Court set aside the order of acquittal of the accused, ordered re-trial and"
+directed to proceed under sections 193 and 195A.117.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"116. New section 195A Ins. by The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Act No. 2 of 2006),"
+"section 2 (w.e.f. 16 April 2006 vide Notfn. No. SO 523(E), dated 12 April 2006."
+"117. Court on Its Own Motion v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 2240 (PH)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 196] Using evidence known to be false.
+Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true or genuine evidence any evidence
+"which he knows to be false or fabricated, shall be punished in the same manner as if"
+he gave or fabricated false evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+This section applies to those who make use of such evidence as is made punishable by
+"sections 193, 194 and 195. It must be read with sections 191 and 192, and can only"
+apply to the use of evidence which was false evidence within the meaning of section
+"191, or fabricated evidence within the definition laid down in section 192.118. Where an"
+expert witness deposing on behalf of the defence claimed to be a diploma holder in
+"criminology from the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London and it was"
+found that the said claim was totally false and the diploma produced by him was a
+"forged document, it was held he committed an offence in relation to Court proceedings"
+"under sections 193 and 196, IPC, 1860, and as such a Court complaint under section"
+"195 (1)(b)(i), Cr PC, 1973, was necessary to prosecute him.119."
+"The word 'corruptly' in this section means something different from ""dishonestly"" or"
+"""fraudulently"". Although the user may not be dishonest or fraudulent, it may"
+"nevertheless be corrupt, if the user is designed to corrupt or prevent the course of"
+justice. A person who files rent receipts alleged to have been granted by one of the
+"landlords, who actually signs the receipts to support a false case of a tenancy under"
+"the landlord, does not commit an offence under section 471, but is guilty of corruptly"
+using as true or genuine evidence which he knows to be false within the meaning of
+this section.120.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"118. Lakshmaji, (1884) 7 Mad 289, 290."
+"119. Dr. S Dutt, 1966 Cr LJ 459 : AIR 1966 SC 595 [LNIND 1965 SC 196] ."
+"120. Bibhuranjan Gupta, (1949) 2 Cal 440 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 197] Issuing or signing false certificate.
+"Whoever issues or signs any certificate required by law to be given or signed, or"
+"relating to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence, knowing"
+"or believing that such certificate is false in any material point, shall be punished in the"
+same manner as if he gave false evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+Several laws require a certificate of some matter to be given. The offence of certifying
+"in any of these, knowing or believing that the certificate is false, is put on the same"
+"footing as the offence of giving false evidence. The certificate must, however, be false"
+in a material point. The issuing or signing must be by the officer or person authorized to
+certify.
+[s 197.1] Ingredients.—
+The section has two essentials:—
+1. Issuing or signing of a certificate—
+"(a) required by law to be given or signed, or"
+(b) relating to a fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in
+evidence.
+2. Such certificate must have been issued or signed knowing or believing that it is
+false in any material point.
+"Before convicting a person for offence under section 197, IPC, 1860 the prosecution"
+must prove the following facts:-—
+(i) that the document in question purports to be a certificate;
+"(ii) that such certificate is required by law to be given or signed, or that it related to"
+some fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence;
+(iii) that such certificate is false;
+(iv) that it is false in a material point;
+(v) that the accused issued or signed the same;
+"(vi) that he, when doing so, knew or believed, such certificate to be false.121."
+[s 197.2] Certificate.—
+"As per section 197, certificate contemplated therein is a certificate, which is required"
+not to be given or signed for the use in the Court's administration of Justice. That
+"means, certificate is issued as required by some law and it has some reference to"
+some statutory requirements. Information given by petitioner to Process Server is that
+he has not heard about the Noticee for the last two years and his whereabouts are not
+"known. That is not a certificate contemplated under any statute. Therefore, section 197"
+"also will have no application.122. The expression ""by law admissible in evidence"""
+means that the certificate should by some provision of law be admissible in evidence
+as such a certificate without further proof.123. A medical certificate is not such a
+certificate and the issue or use of a false medical certificate does not render a person
+liable under this section or section 198.124.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"121. Mangtu Ram v State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cr LJ 4733 (Raj)."
+"122. D Jothi v KP Kandasamy, 2000 Cr LJ 292 (Mad)."
+"123. Mahabir Thakur, (1916) 23 CLJ 423; Kumar Choudhari v State, (1936) 16 Pat 21; Prafulla"
+"Kumar Khara, (1942) 1 Cal 573 . A caste certificate issued by an MLA to a student to enable him"
+to get a pre-matric scholarship has been held to be not a certificate within the meaning of this
+"section. Haladhara Karji v Dileswar Subudhi, 1989 Cr LJ 629 (Ori), no caste was mentioned in the"
+"certificate. Premlata v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1430 (Raj), a statement would become a"
+false certificate if the law requires the issue of such a certificate as a legal proof. In this case
+"the certificate was issued by the headmaster, though he was not authorised to do so. The"
+candidate used the certificate for obtaining an appointment. A prima facie case under section
+198 was made out against the headmaster.
+"124. Prafulla Kumar Khara, Ibid."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 198] Using as true a certificate known to be false.
+"Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use any such certificate as a true certificate,"
+"knowing the same to be false in any material point, shall be punished in the same"
+manner as if he gave false evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is connected with section 197 just as section 196 is connected with
+"sections 193, 194 and 195.125. Appellant used the duplicate certificate with changes,"
+as a true certificate knowing it to be false in material particular and thereby got
+"admission in Polytechnic. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the conviction."
+"However, looking to the nature of the offence and the fact that the appellant's past and"
+present records have been good and the fact that he has already lost his career and is
+"now married, reduced the sentence to that already undergone.126."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"125. Premlata v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1430 (Raj), for notes on the case see under"
+section 197.
+"126. Tulsibhai Jivabhai Changani v State of Gujarat, (2001) 1 SCC 719 [LNIND 2000 SC 2333] :"
+2001 Cr LJ 741 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 199] False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as
+evidence.
+"Whoever, in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any Court"
+"of Justice, or any public servant or other person, is bound or authorised by law to"
+"receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement which is false, and which he"
+"either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any point"
+"material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in"
+the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
+COMMENT.—
+This section makes the penalty attached to the offence of giving false evidence
+"applicable to declarations which, although not compellable, have, on being made, the"
+same effect as the compulsory declarations referred to in sections 51 and 191.127.
+Voluntary declarations are thus placed on the same level as compulsory declarations.
+"The Supreme Court has said that the complaint for an offence under section 199, IPC,"
+"1860, must make out the offence by singling out false averment in the complaint. Thus,"
+where the allegation was that the accused had used a false affidavit before the Rent
+"Controller but the complaint did not set out a single averment from the said affidavit,"
+"which is said to be false, it was held that the complaint was not maintainable.128."
+[s 199.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires three essentials:—
+1. Making of a declaration that a Court or a public servant is bound or authorised by
+law to receive in evidence.
+2. Making of a false statement in such declaration knowing or believing it to be
+false.
+3. Such false statement must be touching any point material to the object for which
+the declaration is made or used.129. Section 199 provides punishment for making
+a false statement in a declaration that is by law receivable in evidence. Rival
+contentions set out in affidavits accepted or rejected by Courts with reference to
+"onus probandi do not furnish foundation for a charge under section 199, IPC,"
+1860.130. A declaration before it could be made the foundation of charge under
+"section 199 of IPC, 1860, it is necessary that it must be admissible in evidence as"
+proof of the fact declared under any law in consequence of which the Court is
+bound or authorised to receive it as such.131.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"127. A Vedamuttu, (1868) 4 MHC 185 ; Asgarali v State, (1943) Nag 547."
+"128. Chandrapal Singh, 1982 Cr LJ 1731 : AIR 1982 SC 1238 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 . Shiv Raman"
+"Gaur v Madan Mohan Kanda, 1990 Cr LJ 1033 P&H."
+"129. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgerar Ltd, (2010) 10 SCC 479"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2011 Cr LJ 8 L : (2010) 12 SCR 551 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 68.
+"130. Chandrapal Singh v Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 (1982) 1 SCC 466 ."
+"131. D Jothi v KP Kandasamy, 2000 Cr LJ 292 (Mad)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 200] Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false.
+"Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the"
+"same to be false in any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he"
+gave false evidence.
+Explanation.—A declaration which is inadmissible merely upon the ground of some
+"informality, is a declaration within the meaning of sections 199 to 200."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is connected with the last section just as section 198 is with section 197
+"or section 196 with sections 193, 194 and 195. The person who uses a false"
+declaration is made liable as one who makes it.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+"[s 201] Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false"
+information to screen offender—.
+"Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,1"
+"causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the"
+"intention of screening the offender2 from legal punishment, or with that intention"
+gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false;
+if a capital offence;
+"shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is"
+"punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+if punishable with imprisonment for life;
+"and if the offence is punishable with 132.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine;
+if punishable with less than ten years' imprisonment.
+and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to
+"ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the"
+"offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the"
+"imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, knowing that B has murdered Z, assists B to hide the body with the intention of"
+screening B from punishment. A is liable to imprisonment of either description for
+"seven years, and also to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+Object.—This section relates to the disappearance of any evidence of the commission
+of an offence and includes also the giving of false information with the intention of
+screening an offender. Sections 202 and 203 relate to the giving or omitting to give
+"such information, and section 204 to the destruction of documentary evidence."
+There are three groups of sections in the Code relating to the giving of information.
+"First, sections 118–120 deal with concealment of a design to commit an offence;"
+"second sections 176, 177, 181 and 182 deal with omission to give information and with"
+"the giving of false information; and, third, sections 201–203 deal with causing the"
+disappearance of evidence.
+[s 201.1] Scope.—
+The Supreme Court has held that this section is not restricted to the case of a person
+who screens the actual offender; it can be applied even to a person guilty of the main
+"offence, though as a matter of practice a Court will not convict a person both of the"
+main offence and under this section.133.
+"But, if the commission of the main offence is not brought home to the accused, then he"
+can be convicted under this section.134. Where it is impossible to say definitely that a
+person has committed the principal offence he cannot escape conviction under this
+section merely because there are grounds for suspicion that he might be the principal
+culprit.135. A woman's husband and in-laws could not be convicted of murdering her
+because there was no evidence whatsoever. They were convicted under this section
+because they gave no reasonable explanation of the unnatural death and had also
+disposed of the body in suspicious circumstances (dead body found near railway
+track).136. The fact that the accused persons cannot be convicted for offence
+"punishable under section 302 IPC, 1860 does not extricate them from the offence"
+"under section 201 IPC, 1860.137. In a case of bride burning, where the post-mortem"
+"report was that death was due to throttling, burning her subsequently was held to be a"
+clear proof of the fact that the evidence of strangulation was sought to be destroyed by
+the accused husband by pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze. The conviction of the
+"husband under sections 201, 302 and 498-A was held to be proper.138."
+A statement given by a person in the course of an investigation by the police cannot
+"amount to an offence under this section and section 203, even if it ultimately turns out"
+"to be false.139. The allegation against the appellant was that, he had deliberately"
+shielded the real offenders in the murder case and was accordingly liable for the
+"offence under section 201 of the IPC, 1860. Supreme Court acquitted the accused"
+"holding that it is not possible on the evidence to ascertain, as to whether the appellant"
+"was, in fact, guilty of the offence alleged against him.140."
+The Supreme Court has held that where the evidence showed that a person had died
+"and his body was found in a trunk and discovered in a well, and that the accused had"
+taken part in the disposal of the body but there was no evidence to show the cause of
+"his death, or the manner or circumstances in which it came about, it was held that the"
+"accused could not be convicted for an offence under this section.141. In other words,"
+the mere secreting of a dead body without first proving that the corpse secreted was
+"the corpus delicti of a murder case is no offence under section 201, IPC, 1860.142."
+[s 201.2] Independent offence.—
+"A charge under section 201 of the IPC, 1860 can be independently laid and conviction"
+"maintained also, in case the prosecution is able to establish that an offence had been"
+"committed, the person charged with the offence had the knowledge or the reason to"
+"believe that the offence had been committed, the said person has caused"
+disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance has been done with the
+intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. Mere suspicion is not
+"sufficient, it must be proved that the accused knew or had a reason to believe that the"
+offence has been committed and yet he caused the evidence to disappear so as to
+screen the offender. The offender may be either himself or any other person.143. It has
+"been held that the offence under the section is of independent nature, though it cannot"
+"be separated from the substance of the main offence. Accordingly, a conviction under"
+the section can be recorded even though the commission of the main offence is not
+"established. The Court, however, pointed out that such cases are likely to be very small"
+"in number. Applying this to the facts of the case, the Court held that the accused was"
+guilty of offence under this section because he had buried the dead body of his wife in
+"his field and misguided the police of her disappearance, though, because of"
+"decomposition, it could not be proved that he was responsible for her death.144."
+[s 201.3] Ingredients.—
+"To bring home a charge under section 201, IPC, the prosecution must prove:—"
+(1) That an offence has been committed.
+(2) That the accused knew or had reason to believe the commission of such an
+offence.
+(3) That with such knowledge or belief he
+"(a) caused any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, or"
+(b) gave any information relating to that offence which he then knew or
+believed to be false.
+(4) That he did so as aforesaid with the intention of screening the offender from
+legal punishment.
+"(5) If the charge be of an aggravated form, it must be further proved that the"
+"offence in respect of which the accused did as in (3) and (4) supra, was"
+punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment extending to ten
+years.145.
+1. 'Knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed'.—It must
+"be proved that an offence, the evidence of which the accused is charged with causing"
+"to disappear, has actually been committed,146. and that the accused knew, or had"
+"information sufficient to lead him to believe, that the offence had been committed.147."
+Unless the prosecution was able to establish that the accused person knew or had
+reason to believe that an offence has been committed and had done something
+"causing the offence of commission of evidence to disappear, he cannot be"
+convicted.148.
+"Where the accused committed rape on a seven-year-old minor girl at his studio, killed"
+her and disposed of her dead body in a carton. The dead body of the deceased was
+"found in the carton, which the accused procured from witness. Conviction under"
+"sections 302, 376 and 201 IPC, 1860 is maintained.149."
+The charge framed was for causing disappearance for evidence. The fact that
+concealment was the likely effect of the Act is not enough. There was no evidence to
+"attribute the knowledge of the death of the victim woman to the accused. Hence, the"
+essential ingredient of the offence was missing.150.
+[s 201.4] Causing disappearance by preventing information from reaching
+police.—
+Where after raping a girl of 11 years the accused persons thrust a stick into her private
+part of which she died and they falsely told the mother of the victim that they had
+already reported the matter to the police and in the meantime there was disappearance
+"of evidence, they were held liable under this section.151. Where the Court has no case"
+"that there is any intentional omission to give information by the accused to the police,"
+the conviction under section 201 cannot be maintained only on the ground that no
+communication was given to the police and that the post-mortem had not been
+performed. It is also no case of the complainant that he had requested for post-
+mortem of the body and that intimation should have been given to the police before the
+"last rites were performed and there is also no charge under section 202 of the IPC,"
+1860 of intentionally omitting to give information of the unnatural death to the
+police.152.
+2. 'Intention of screening offence of offender'.—The intention to screen the offender
+must be the primary and sole object of the accused. The fact that the concealment was
+likely to have that effect is not sufficient.153. The accused person killed his brother and
+his whole family in order to avoid partition of the joint family property. There was no
+evidence to show that his son had common intention with him or participated in the
+commission of the crime. But because he had seen his father commit multiple
+"murders, he tried to destroy the evidence by throwing away certain articles on two"
+occasions from over a bridge. It seemed obvious that he had done that with the
+primary object of saving his father. He was convicted under this section.154.
+"Where a man shot down his wife with his pistol, his companion, who played no other"
+"role, but concealed the authorship of the homicide, he was held guilty under this"
+section.155. Where the co-accused persons told the investigating officer that the
+"deceased was not present in the house at the material time, it was held that this"
+amounted to the offence of screening the offender.156.
+[s 201.5] Cases.—
+In the Jessica Lal murder Case157. the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of co-
+"accused under section 201 read with section 120-B IPC, 1860 considering the evidence"
+"relating to their presence at the time of incident, removal of Tata Safari, his call details"
+etc. as well as the evidence of PWs 30 and 101. In another case where the accused
+committed murder of his wife assaulting on her head with a chopper did cause the
+"evidence to disappear by setting fire to the dead body after pouring kerosene on her, it"
+is found that the accused has committed an offence punishable under sections 302
+"and 201 of IPC, 1860.158. Where unnatural conduct of appellants to dispose of dead"
+body of victim without having awaited for victim's husband who was already on his way
+"to home and the evidence shows that victim died under unnatural circumstances,"
+"conviction under sections 302 and 201 IPC, 1860 is upheld.159. Where the accused"
+husband strangulated his young wife to death and attempted to destroy evidence by
+"burning her dead body, the order of acquittal of the accused of the offence under"
+sections 300 and 201 was reversed by the Apex Court.160.
+[s 201.6] Help rendered to conceal crime.—
+"Where a person through fear did not interpose to prevent the commission of a murder,"
+"and afterwards helped the murderers in concealing the body, it was held that he was"
+not guilty of abetment of murder but was guilty of an offence under this section.161. A
+person who assists the actual murderers in removing the corpse of their victim to a
+distance from the place where the murder was committed is prima facie guilty of an
+"offence under this section, until he can establish that he acted under compulsion.162."
+"Where it appeared from the statement of the accused that he took from the men who,"
+"according to him committed the murder, a jewel which was unquestionably the"
+"property of the deceased and he hid it and produced it later, it was held that the"
+"accused, when he hid the jewel, had the intention of screening the offender, whoever he"
+"was, from legal punishment and so was guilty of an offence under this section.163. The"
+"death of a woman was caused on the first floor of the house and her mother-in-law, the"
+"only other occupant of the house at the time of the occurrence, was residing on the"
+"ground floor. The place of incident was intermeddled and bamboo pieces, rafters, and"
+broken tiles were thrown over the dead body with a view to cause disappearance of
+evidence and to screen the offender. It was held that it was not possible without the
+complicity of the mother-in-law and hence though she could not be held guilty of
+"murder or abetting it, she was guilty of an offence under section 201.164."
+[s 201.7] Death in custody.—
+Where there was death of a person in the police custody while he was detained there
+"for interrogation and his dead body was not traced, however, the evidence of other"
+"witnesses who were also beaten up and injured by the police, categorically established"
+that the deceased became unconscious on receipt of injuries inflicted by the police and
+"died, it was held that an irresistible inference could be drawn that the police personnel"
+"who caused the death, must also have caused the disappearance of the body.165."
+[s 201.8] Bride burning.—
+"In a bride burning case, the victim was murdered and thereafter her body was burnt to"
+screen the offence. The guilt of the accused mother-in-law and that of the husband of
+the victim as particeps criminis was established beyond any shadow of doubt. The
+order of acquittal passed by the High Court from the offence of murder was reversed
+and set aside and that of the trial Court convicting both the accused under section 300
+was upheld. The mother-in-law was also convicted under section 201.166.
+[s 201.9] False explanation by wife of death of husband.—
+The accused wife attempted to explain away the death of her husband by saying that
+"he was attempting suicide and while she attempted to save him, he fell, down to death."
+A search of her house showed evidence of murder. The Court said that even if she had
+"not herself caused death, she was in know of things and attempted to explain away the"
+incident by false explanations. The finding of guilt and her conviction under the section
+could not be interfered with.167.
+"[s 201.10] Kidnapping, murder and concealment.—"
+"The charge was that of Kidnapping the girl, murdering her and then concealing the"
+dead body. The police brought the accused to his house. He himself dug the place from
+where the body was exhumed. The accused admitted that the house belonged to him.
+The accused failed to explain how the body came to be buried in his house. The
+"Supreme Court confirmed his conviction under sections 300, 364 and 201.168."
+[s 201.11] Disposal of dead body by burning.—
+"The fact that the accused, after killing his two minor daughters, threw their dead bodies"
+"in the river, which amounted to causing disappearance of the evidence of murder.169."
+[s 201.12] Failure of doctor to give information.—
+The failure on the part of the doctor to give information to police for six days after the
+admission of a burnt patient has been held not to constitute any offence under section
+201 by itself.170.
+[s 201.13] Threat to approver.—
+Oral threat or inducement given by the two lady lawyers to the approver not to give any
+"statement against the petitioner, cannot amount to commission of an offence under"
+"section 201 IPC, 1860.171."
+"[s 201.14] Sanction under section 197 Cr PC, 1973.—"
+In a case where the allegation was that HIV contaminated blood was supplied to the
+"Government Medical College Hospital and as a result, some patients who were given"
+blood transfusion had tested HIV positive. Accused tampered with the entries made in
+"official register, tearing of pages from the different official registers and stowing them"
+away in house. The acts cannot be related to the discharge of his official duties and
+"hence sanction for prosecution under section 197 Cr PC, 1973 not required.172."
+"[s 201.15] Acquittal for main offence, conviction under section 201.—"
+One Palvinder Kaur was tried for offence under sections 302 and 201 Penal Code and
+"was convicted under section 302 IPC, 1860 but no verdict was recorded regarding the"
+"charge under section 201 Penal Code. In appeal, High Court acquitted her of the charge"
+"of murder, but convicted under section 201 of Penal Code. In the appeal before"
+"Supreme Court, it was held that in order to establish the charge under section 201 IPC,"
+1860 it is essential to prove that substantive offence has been committed and the
+accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence has been committed with
+requisite knowledge and intention of screening the offender from such legal
+"punishment, caused any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear or"
+gave any information respecting such offence or having such knowledge or believed to
+"be false. She is acquitted under section 201 IPC, 1860.173. Conviction for causing"
+disappearance of evidence is possible even if nobody has been convicted for the main
+offence.174. Where the allegation was that the appellant killed his wife with a bamboo
+stick and buried her dead body in dry portion of pond located in his compound and
+there was no mark of injury found on the dead body; Court held that the possibility that
+deceased committed suicide by consuming poison cannot be ruled out. Though he was
+"acquitted under section 302, but was convicted under section 201 IPC, 1860.175."
+[s 201.16] Main accused died during pendency of trial.—
+"Where main accused died during pendency of trial, conviction of co-accused for"
+causing disappearance of evidence is held not proper.176.
+[s 201.17] CASES.—
+"however, submitted with respect that having regard to the decisions of the Supreme"
+"Court in the cases of Om Prakash,177. and Abhayanand,178. where it has been held that"
+to constitute an attempt to commit an offence it is not essential that the last proximate
+"act must be done by the accused, in the instant case too the accused could perhaps be"
+held guilty of an attempt to cause disappearance of the evidence of murder under
+"sections 201/511, IPC, 1860, as they, in fact, did all that lay within their power to do"
+towards causing disappearance of the evidence of murder but the plot failed as the
+police intervened in the matter. Where the members of an unlawful assembly
+"indiscriminately killed five persons, dragged the dead bodies over a distance, beheaded"
+"the victims and threw their limbs and bodies in the raging fire, they not only committed"
+"an offence under section 201, IPC, 1860, but were also liable under sections 302/149,"
+"IPC, 1860.179. If murder of an illegitimate child remains unproved, mere secreting of the"
+"dead body of the child does not constitute an offence under section 201 IPC, 1860.180."
+"Where the complaint filed under section 201, IPC, 1860, besides mentioning the section"
+"did not contain a single word as to how the evidence of the crime was destroyed, it was"
+held that no cognizance could be taken on such a complaint as it did not even contain
+"allegations to constitute the offence under section 201, IPC, 1860.181. Mere removal of"
+dead body from one place to another does not by itself amount to causing
+"disappearance of evidence under section 201, IPC, 1860.182. Where the dead bodies"
+"were disposed of by some of the members of the unlawful assembly, all of them could"
+"be convicted under section 201 read with section 149, IPC, 1860.183. Where the"
+accused cremated the dead body of his wife who had committed suicide without
+"informing the police, the accused was held liable under section 201 in spite of he being"
+acquitted under sections 304-B and 498-A.184.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"132. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"133. Kalawati, (1953) SCR 546 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] , at p 557. Followed in VL Tresa v State of"
+"Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 953 [LNIND 2001 SC 364] , wife of the deceased concealing the real"
+"circumstances of death. Ram Singh v State of HP, 1997 Cr LJ 1829 : 1997 SCC (Cr) 729, for"
+notes see under section 120-B.
+"134. Nebti Mandal, (1939) 19 Pat 369."
+"135. Public Prosecutor v Venkatamma, (1932) 56 Mad 63."
+"136. Bakhora Chowdhary v State of Bihar, 1991 Cr LJ 91 (Pat). A father-in-law convicted for"
+lodging report of suicide of his daughter-in-law when he knew it was murder. Brij Kishore v State
+"of UP, 1989 Cr LJ 616 (All)."
+"137. Asar Mohammad v State of UP, AIR 2018 SC 5264 ."
+"138. Deepak v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2219 (Bom)."
+"139. Markose, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 ."
+"140. Rathinam v State of TN, (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 111 : (2011) 11 SCC 140 [LNIND 2009 SC 1873] :"
+2010 (11) Scale 6 [LNINDORD 2009 SC 542]
+"141. Palvinder Kaur, (1953) SCR 94 [LNIND 1952 SC 54] : 1953 Cr LJ 154 : AIR 1952 SC 354"
+"[LNIND 1952 SC 54] . See Bhupendra Singh v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 1083 [LNIND 1991 SC"
+151] : 1991 Cr LJ 1337 : 1991 All LJ 379 : (1991) 2 SCC 750 [LNIND 1991 SC 151] . See also
+"State of UP v Kapil Deo, AIR 1991 SC 2257 [LNIND 1991 SC 397] : 1991 Cr LJ 3321 : 1991 Supp"
+"(2) SCC 170 ; Suleman Rahiman v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] :"
+"1968 Cr LJ 1013 ; Roshan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] : 1965"
+"(2) Cr LJ 426 ; Batapa Bada Seth v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 1976 (Ori); Sardar Singh v State"
+"(Delhi Admn.), AIR 1993 SC 1696 [LNIND 1993 SC 153] : 1993 Cr LJ 1489 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC"
+"393 . Ram Saran Mahto v State of Bihar, 1999 Cr LJ 4311 : AIR 1999 SC 3435 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+"782] ; Gati Bahera v State of Orissa, 1997 Cr LJ 4331 (Ori)."
+"142. Basanti v State of HP, AIR 1987 SC 1572 : 1987 Cr LJ 1869 : (1987) 3 SCC 227 . For other"
+"examples of acquittals under benefit of doubt, see Kedar Nath v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 1224 :"
+"1991 Cr LJ 989 ; Kishore Chand v State of HP, AIR 1990 SC 2140 [LNIND 1990 SC 468] : 1990 Cr"
+"LJ 2289 . Sudhir Mondal v State of WB, 1988 Cr LJ 569 (Cal); State of Rajasthan v Kamla, AIR"
+1991 SC 967 : 1991 Cr LJ 602 .
+"143. Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2018 SC 951 ."
+"144. Suresh v State of Karnataka, 2002 Cr LJ 3273 (Kant)."
+"145. K Purnachandra Rao, 1975 Cr LJ 1671 : AIR 1975 SC 1925 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] . Sukhram"
+"v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] : AIR 2007 SC 3050 [LNIND 2007"
+"SC 969] , the Supreme Court restated the ingredients of the offence."
+"146. Abdul Kadir v State, (1880) 3 All 279 (FB)."
+"147. Matuki Misser, (1885) 11 Cal 619 . Hanuman v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 1307"
+"[LNIND 1993 SC 992] : (1994) 2 Cr LJ 2092 : 1994 Supp (2) SCC 39 , where it was not proved"
+that the dead body in question was that of the victim of murder or that the accused persons
+"were themselves the assailants or knew the assailants, the Supreme Court held that it was not"
+safe to convict them only on the ground that they performed the ceremonies for cremation of
+"the body and took part in cremation. Arbind Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 1068 : 1994 Cr"
+"LJ 1227 (SC), another case where the participants in a cremation were acquitted because they"
+had no knowledge or reason to believe that the death was homicidal.
+"148. Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2018 SC 951 ."
+"149. Samir Bhowmik v State of Tripura, 200 Cr LJ 3018 (Gau)."
+"150. Vijaya v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 296 [LNIND 2003 SC 739] : AIR 2003 SC 3787"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 739] .
+"151. Ghuraiyaa v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1129 . Naba Kumar Das v State of Assam, 2002 Cr LJ"
+1950 (Gau).
+"152. Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2018 SC 951 ."
+"153. Jamnadas, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 433 ; Dr. Ravindra Kumar v State of Bihar, 1991 Cr LJ 3052 (Pat)."
+"154. Prakash Dhawal Khairnar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 340 [LNIND 2001 SC 2841] at"
+348.
+"155. Bhanu Pratap Tewari v State of UP, 2002 Cr LJ 1243 (All)."
+"156. Vithal Thukaram More v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 2715 [LNIND 2002 SC 449] ;"
+"Hargovindas Devrajbhai Patel v State of Gujarat, 1998 Cr LJ 662 : AIR 1998 SC 370 [LNIND 1997"
+"SC 1443] . In Rabin Mallick v State of West Bengal, 2011 Cr LJ 3801 (Cal) the body of the"
+deceased boy was concealed in a place in the exclusive knowledge of accused. Conviction was
+"held proper but in Udaimanik Jamatia v The State of Tripura, 2011 Cr LJ 4167 (Gau) accused was"
+acquitted though there was recovery of skeleton at the instance of accused.
+"157. Sidhartha Vashisht v State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2010 SC 2352 [LNIND 2010 SC 367] : (2010)"
+2 SCC (Cr) 1385.
+"158. Channaraja v State of Karnataka, 2012 Cr LJ 159 (Kar) Sk Waheed v State of Bihar, 2010 Cr"
+LJ 1870 (Pat).
+"159. Diwan Singh v State of Uttaranchal, 2012 Cr LJ 3256 (Utt) But in Ramakanta Patel v State of"
+"Orissa, 2011 Cr LJ 600 (Ori). See also Netrananda Naik v State of Orissa, 2011 Cr LJ 813 (Ori)."
+"160. Mulakh Raj v Satish Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1175 [LNIND 1992 SC 322] : 1992 Cr LJ 1529 ."
+"Turuku Budha Karkaria v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 552 (Ori), killing a woman, removing her"
+"ornaments, concealing her body in a bush in deep forest, killers guilty under the section,"
+sentenced under section 302.
+"161. Goburdhun Bera, (1866) 6 WR (Cr) 80."
+"162. Autar, (1924) 47 All 306 ; Begu, (1925) 52 IA 191 , 6 Lah 226, 27 Bom LR 707, followed in"
+"Mata Din v State, (1929) 5 Luck 255 . Raveendran v State of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 3562 (Ker), the"
+"accused offered a helping hand to the main accused in disposing of the dead body, conviction"
+under section 201.
+"163. Public Prosecutor v Munisami, (1941) Mad 503."
+"164. Vinod Bhalla v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 3527 (MP). See also Sankarapandian v State of TN,"
+"1992 Cr LJ 3662 (Mad); Budhan Singh v State of Bihar, 2006 Cr LJ 2451 SC : AIR 2006 SC 1959"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 300] .
+"165. Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 1689 [LNIND 1992 SC 396] : 1992 Cr LJ"
+3144 .
+"166. Sarojini v State of MP, 1993 AIR SCW 817 : 1993 Cr LJ 1648 (SC). See also Bhuneshwar Pd"
+"Chaurasia v Bhuneshwar Chaurasia, 2001 Cr LJ 3541 (Pat), a married woman died of poisoning,"
+she was cremated hurriedly during the same night without informing police or her relatives.
+Those who participated in the activity were held guilty under the section; Shambir Gowada v
+"State of WB, 2000 Cr LJ 1602 (Cal); SK Usman v State of Maharashtra, 2000 Cr LJ 3301 (Bom)."
+"167. VL Tresa v State of Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 953 [LNIND 2001 SC 364] ."
+"168. Damodar v State of Karnataka, AIR 2000 SC 50 [LNIND 1999 SC 884] : 2000 Cr LJ 175 ."
+"169. State of West Bengal v Rakesh Singh, (2016)1 CALLT 178 (HC) : 2015 Cr LJ 3847 ."
+"170. KK Patnayak (Dr) v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 4911 (MP)."
+"171. Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal v State of TN, AIR 2006 SC 6 [LNIND 2005 SC 815] :"
+(2005) 8 SCC 771 [LNIND 2005 SC 815] : 2005 Cr LJ 4626 .
+"172. State of Maharashtra v Devahari Devasingh Pawar, AIR 2008 SC 1375 [LNIND 2008 SC 103] :"
+(2008) 2 SCC 540 [LNIND 2008 SC 103] : 2008 AIR (SCW) 815 : 2008 Cr LJ 1593 .
+"173. Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 [LNIND 1952 SC 54] ."
+"174. State of Karnataka v Madesha, (2007) 7 SCC 35 [LNIND 2007 SC 918] : AIR 2007 SC 2917"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 921] ; Sukhram v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 502 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] :"
+"AIR 2007 SC 3050 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] , conviction under section 201 possible despite"
+acquittal from the main offence.
+"175. Suman Rajowar v State of Assam, 2011 Cr LJ 2984 (Gau)."
+"176. Keshave Kishore Sinha v State of Bihar, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC)7 (Pat)."
+"177. Om Prakash, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 848 : AIR 1961 SC 1782 [LNIND 1961 SC 201] ."
+"178. Abhayanand, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 822 ."
+"179. State of UP v Mahendra Singh, 1975 Cr LJ 425 : AIR 1975 SC 455 [LNIND 1974 SC 320] ."
+"180. Re Sumitra Sherpani, 1975 Cr LJ 169 (Gau), See also Mazahar Ali, 1976 Cr LJ 1629 (J&K)."
+"181. Chandrapal Singh, 1982 Cr LJ 1731 : AIR 1982 SC 1238 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 ."
+"182. Bhagaban Kirshani, 1985 Cr LJ 868 (Ori)."
+"183. Ram Avtar, 1985 Cr LJ 1865 (SC) : AIR 1985 SC 880 [LNIND 1985 SC 4] ."
+"184. Sunkara Suri Babu v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 1480 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 202] Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to
+inform.
+"Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,"
+intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally
+"bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes the illegal omission to give information of those who are by
+"some law bound to give information, when such omission is intentional. It is similar to"
+"section 176. See sections 39 and 40, Criminal Procedure Code, as to the persons"
+"legally bound to give information. The word ""whoever"" in section 202, IPC, 1860, refers"
+to persons other than the offender.185. Moreover to compel a criminal to incriminate
+himself would violate the spirit of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Where the duty to
+"inform arises first and is not performed, the liability under this section would arise and"
+it would be no defence that subsequent to the breach of duty there was involvement of
+the accused person in some crimes. The person who knew or had reason to believe
+that death was not natural was obliged under the section to give information.186.
+[s 202.1] Essential Ingredients.—
+"To sustain a conviction under the above quoted section 202 of the Penal Code, it is"
+necessary for the prosecution to prove:
+(1) that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been
+"committed,"
+(2) that the accused had intentionally omitted to give information respecting that
+offence and
+(3) that the accused was legally bound to give that information.187.
+332 The Indian Penal Code [Chapter XI
+[s 202.2] CASES.—
+The accused persons who raped a girl of 11 years and caused her death by thrusting a
+stick into her private part were under no obligation to file information of their own
+"criminality, they became liable under this section because by falsely telling the mother"
+"of the victim that they had already reported the matter, they prevented her from lodging"
+report with the police.188.
+This section has also no application where the principal offence has not been
+established.189.
+[s 202.3] Failure of doctor to give information.—
+"The allegation was the Accused, a dentist treated one of the injured assailants by"
+suturing (stitching) his wound on the back after applying local anaesthesia pursuance
+of a previous plan that if and when any of the assailants got injured in the attack then
+immediate medical treatment would be given by the accused to the injured. The
+"accused stitched the back of an assailant, which is not the job of a dentist. Offence"
+under section 201 prima facie made out.190. The failure on the part of the doctor to give
+information to the police (in this case information was given after a gap of six days)
+has been held not to constitute any offence under section 202. It would have to be
+shown that doctors were duty bound to give such information that there was
+knowledge that in the burning of the lady some offence was involved. Even where this
+"would be so, it would be a separate offence. The doctors cannot be prosecuted jointly"
+with the main accused.191.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"185. HS Rathod, 1979 Cr LJ 1025 : AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] ."
+"186. Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 2062 [LNIND 1991 SC 416] : 1991 Cr LJ"
+3123 .
+"187. HS Rathod, (supra)."
+"188. Ghuraiyaa v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1129 . State of Rajasthan v Chhote Lal, 2012 Cr LJ"
+1214 (SC) : 2011 (6) Scale 526 : 2012 AIR (SCW) 1159.
+"189. HS Rathod, supra."
+"190. State of Kerala v Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC 784 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : AIR 2011 SC 340 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 3] : 2011 Cr LJ 982 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 409.
+"191. KK Patnayak (Dr) v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 4911 (MP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 203] Giving false information respecting an offence committed.
+"Whoever knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed,"
+"gives any information respecting that offence which he knows or believes to be false,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+"192.[Explanation.—In sections 201 and 202 and in this section the word ""offence"","
+"includes any act committed at any place out of 193.[India], which, if committed in 194."
+"[India], would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely, 302, 304,"
+"382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459"
+and 460.]
+COMMENT.—
+The liability under this section attaches to anyone who gives false information whether
+he is legally bound to furnish such information or not. The object of the Legislature is
+to discourage and punish the giving of false information to the police concerning
+"offences which are actually committed and which the person charged with knows, or"
+"has reason to believe, have been actually committed. The section contemplates"
+information volunteered by some person.
+[s 203.1] Ingredients.—
+"To secure a conviction under section 203, IPC, 1860, the prosecution must prove,"
+(1) that an offence has been committed;
+(2) that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been
+committed;
+(3) that he gave the information with respect to that offence;
+(4) that the information so given was false;
+(5) that when he gave such information he knew or believed it to be false.195.
+A complaint against the petitioners/accused for committing an offence under section
+"203 of the IPC, 1860 would lie only in a case where such accused had voluntarily given"
+false information in respect of an offence committed knowing or believing it to be
+false. Statements given by them to police during investigation of the crime and
+"recorded under section 161 of the Code even if it is false, will not constitute an offence"
+"under section 203 of the IPC, 1860.196. Where two nuns died due to fall of bricks lifted"
+by hoist lift without protective measures at construction site. Deed of settlement
+purportedly made in the name of a fictitious person so as to save the culpability of the
+contractor. Offence made out.197. Where the accused were prosecuted for throttling a
+man to death and also for giving for the purpose of screening murder wrong
+"information that he died of excessive drinking, there being no direct evidence for the"
+"offence of murder, the accused were acquitted of the offence of murder and their"
+conviction under section 201 was modified into one under section 203 for giving false
+"information.198. Where petitioners were charged under section 203 and section 211,"
+"IPC, 1860 by the police only to cover up their mishandling of the investigation and their"
+"having falsely charged the petitioners of a crime which never took place, Court ordered"
+compensation to the petitioners.199.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"192. Added by Act 3 of 1894, section 6."
+"193. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"194. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"195. Bhagguram, 1982 Cr LJ 106 (MP)."
+"196. Jiji joseph v Tomy Ignatius, 2013 Cr LJ 828 (Ker)."
+"197. Kumar v State of Kerala, 2012 Cr LJ 3193 (Ker)."
+"198. Nagireddi Siva v State of AP, 1992 Cr LJ 1339 (AP)."
+"199. Peruboyina Satyanarayana v State of AP, 2006 Cr LJ 3027 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 204] Destruction of document to prevent its production as evidence.
+Whoever secretes or destroys any 200.[document or electronic record] which he may
+"be lawfully compelled to produce as evidence in a Court of Justice, or in any"
+"proceeding lawfully held before a public servant, as such, or obliterates or renders"
+illegible the whole or any part of such 201.[document or electronic record] with the
+intention of preventing the same from being produced or used as evidence before
+"such Court or public servant as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully"
+"summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Section 175 deals with omission to produce or deliver up any document to any public
+"servant, this section deals with secretion or destruction of a document which a person"
+may lawfully be compelled to produce in a Court. A person may secrete a document
+not only when the existence of the document is unknown to other persons and for the
+purpose of preventing the existence of the document coming to the knowledge of
+"anybody, but also when the existence of the document is known to others.202."
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence punishable under
+section 175. The section applies whether the proceeding is of a civil or criminal nature.
+[s 204.1] CASES.—Secreting document.—
+"Where the plaintiff in a suit referred to arbitration by consent, with a view to prevent a"
+"witness from referring to an endorsement on a bond, snatched up the bond which was"
+"lying beside the arbitrator, ran away, and refused to produce it, it was held that he had"
+committed this offence.203.
+[s 204.2] Destroying document.—
+Where a police-officer took down at first the report of the commission of a dacoity
+"made to him, but subsequently destroyed that report and framed another and a false"
+"report of the commission of a totally different offence, he was held guilty of this"
+offence.204.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"200. Subs. by The Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch,"
+"w.e.f. 17 October 2000, for the word ""document"". The words ""electronic record"" have been"
+defined in section 29A.
+"201. Subs. by The Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch.,"
+"w.e.f. 17 October 2000, for the word ""document"". The words ""electronic record"" have been"
+defined in section 29A.
+"202. Susenbihari Ray, (1930) 58 Cal 1051 (SB)."
+"203. Subramania Ghanapati, (1881) 3 Mad 261."
+"204. Muhammad Shah Khan, (1898) 20 All 307 . See also Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cr"
+LJ 2171 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 205] False personation for purpose of act or proceeding in suit or
+prosecution.
+"Whoever falsely personates another, and in such assumed character makes any"
+"admission or statement, or confesses judgment, 1 or causes any process to be issued"
+"or becomes bail or security, or does any other act in any suit or criminal prosecution,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The offence punishable under this section is not merely cheating by using a fictitious
+"name, but by falsely assuming to be some other real person and in that character"
+"making an admission, confessing judgment, or causing any process to be issued, etc."
+Any fraudulent gain or a benefit to the offender is not an essential element of this
+"offence.205. Where A personated B at a trial with B's consent, which was given to save"
+"himself from the trouble of making an appearance in person before a Magistrate, it was"
+"held that A was guilty of an offence under this section, and B was guilty of abetment of"
+the offence.206. Act of impersonating another for purpose of giving evidence in Court
+"falls under section 205 IPC, 1860. Section 205, IPC, 1860 is squarely covered under"
+section 195(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and cognizance could be taken
+only by a Court on the complaint in writing of that Court in which such offence was
+committed.207.
+1. 'Confesses judgment'.—Allows a decree to be passed against himself.
+[s 205.1] Personation of imaginary person.—
+There is a conflict of opinion on the point whether a person commits an offence under
+this section by personating a purely imaginary person. The Calcutta High Court has
+held that a person by such personation commits an offence under this section.208. The
+"Madras High Court, dissenting from the above ruling, has held that it is not enough to"
+show the assumption of a fictitious name; it must also appear that the assumed name
+was used as a means of falsely representing some other individual.209.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"205. Suppakon, (1863) 3 MHC 450 ; Kalya, (1903) 5 Bom LR 138 ."
+"206. Suppakon, supra."
+"207. Jawahar Yadav v State of Chhattisgarh, 2006 Cr LJ 2078 (Chh)."
+"208. Bhitto Kahar, (1862) 1 Ind Jur OS 128. See also K M Chitharanjan v P M Kunhunni, 2005 Cr"
+LJ 4434 (Ker).
+"209. Kadar Ravuttan, (1868) 4 MHC 18 . By virtue of the provision in section 195 Cr PC, 1973,"
+cognizance of an offence under this section is barred except on a complaint by the court where
+"the offence is committed. Sardul Singh v State of Haryana, 1992 Cr LJ 354 (P&H)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 206] Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure as
+forfeited or in execution.
+"Whoever fraudulently removes, conceals, transfers or delivers to any person any"
+"property or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property or interest"
+"therein from being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence"
+"which has been pronounced, or which he knows to be likely to be pronounced, by a"
+"Court of Justice or other competent authority, or from being taken in execution of a"
+"decree or order which has been made, or which he knows to be likely to be made by a"
+"Court of Justice in a civil suit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The concealment or removal of property contemplated in this section must be to
+prevent the property from being taken. Where the property is already taken and the
+"removal is subsequent, the offence under this section is not committed.210. The word"
+'taken' has been used in the sense of 'seized' or 'taken possession of'.211. Where the
+"removal was open and without any element of secrecy or deception, it was held that"
+"the removal was not ""fraudulent removal"" and hence this section could not apply.212."
+A creditor commits no fraud who anticipates other creditors and obtains a discharge of
+his debt by the assignment of any property which has not already been attached by
+another creditor.213.
+"Sections 206, 207 and 208 have the effect of rendering criminal all collusive modes by"
+"which creditors, or lawful claimants may be defeated of their just remedies. Sections"
+421–424 deal with fraudulent transfers.
+"Under this and the next section a civil suit must be actually pending before a Court, and"
+not merely intended to be filed.214.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"210. Murli v State, (1888) 8 AWN 237."
+"211. Sahebrao Baburao, (1936) 38 Bom LR 1192 ."
+"212. Kudumban v Dinakaran, 1962 Cr LJ 555 ."
+"213. Appa Mallya, (1876) Unrep CrC 110."
+"214. MS Ponuswami, (1930) 8 Ran 268."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 207] Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in
+execution.
+"Whoever fraudulently accepts, receives or claims any property or any interest therein,"
+"knowing that he has no right or rightful claim to such property or interest, or practices"
+"any deception touching any right to any property or any interest therein, intending"
+thereby to prevent that property or interest therein from being taken as a forfeiture or
+"in satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence which has been pronounced, or which he"
+knows to be likely to be pronounced by a Court of Justice or other competent
+"authority, or from being taken in execution of a decree or order which has been made,"
+"or which he knows to be likely to be made by a Court of Justice in a civil suit, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section deals with the receiver, acceptor, or claimer of property who tries to"
+prevent its seizure as a forfeiture. It punishes the accomplice just as the preceding
+section punishes the principal offender.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 208] Fraudulently suffering decree for sum not due.
+Whoever fraudulently causes or suffers a decree or order to be passed against him at
+the suit of any person for a sum not due or for a larger sum than is due to such person
+"or for any property or interest in property to which such person is not entitled, or"
+fraudulently causes or suffers a decree or order to be executed against him after it
+"has been satisfied, or for anything in respect of which it has been satisfied, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A institutes a suit against Z. Z, knowing that A is likely to obtain a decree against him,"
+"fraudulently suffers a judgment to pass against him for a larger amount at the suit of B,"
+"who has no just claim against him, in order that B, either on his own account or for the"
+"benefit of Z, may share in the proceeds of any sale of Z's property which may be made"
+under A's decree. Z has committed an offence under this section.
+COMMENT.—
+This section prevents the abuse of getting someone to file a collusive suit for recovery
+of the whole property and suffering a decree to be passed. It punishes persons making
+fictitious claims in order to secure the property of the defendant against person to
+whom he may become indebted in future.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 209] Dishonestly making false claim in Court.
+"Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to injure or annoy any person,"
+"makes in a Court of Justice any claim which he knows to be false, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section relates to false and fraudulent claims in a Court of Justice. It is much
+wider than the last section as it applies to a person who is acting fraudulently or
+"dishonestly. Not only must the claim be false to the knowledge of the person making it,"
+"but the object of it must be to defraud, to cause wrongful loss or wrongful gain, to"
+injure or to annoy. The section punishes the making of a false claim. The offence will
+be complete as soon as a suit is filed. If a person applies for the execution of a decree
+which has already been executed his act will be an offence under the next section.215.
+Where the Court took cognizance of a complaint against dishonestly making a false
+"claim in a Court without complaint of the concerned civil judge, the cognizance was"
+"held to be not justified by reason of section 195(b)(ii), Cr PC, 1973 that covers such"
+offences.216. The Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of offence under
+"sections 193/ 209/34 IPC, 1860 without having received any complaint under section"
+195 from the concerned civil Court.217.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"215. Beegum Mahtoon, (1869) 12 WR (Cr) 37; Bismilla Khan v Rambhau, (1946) Nag 686."
+Cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken on a complaint by the court
+"concerned. See section 195 Cr PC, 1973. Sardul Singh v State of Haryana, 1992 Cr LJ 354 P&H."
+"216. Babu Lal v State, 1998 Cr LJ 3595 (Raj). See also Vinod Kumar v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2893"
+(P&H).
+"217. Kusum Sandhu v Sh Ved Prakash Narang, 2009 Cr LJ 1078 (Chh); Babu Lal v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 2009 Cr LJ 3595 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 210] Fraudulently obtaining decree for sum not due.
+Whoever fraudulently obtains 1 a decree or order against any person for a sum not
+"due or for a larger sum than is due, or for any property or interest in property to which"
+"he is not entitled, or fraudulently causes a decree or order to be executed against any"
+person after it has been satisfied 2 or for anything in respect of which it has been
+"satisfied or fraudulently suffers or permits any such act to be done in his name, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section is the counterpart to section 208 in respect of fraudulent decrees, just as"
+section 207 is the counterpart to section 206 in respect of fraudulent transfers and
+"conveyances, the object of the Code being to strike both parties alike with the same"
+"penalty. This section, taken together with section 208, will enable both plaintiff and"
+defendant to a fraudulent or collusive suit or execution to be dealt with alike.
+1. 'Obtains'.—The offence is committed when the decree is fraudulently obtained and
+"the fact that the decree has not been set aside, though admissible to prove that there"
+"was no fraud, is not a bar to a prosecution under the section.218."
+2. 'Causes a decree or order to be executed...after it has been satisfied'.—The mere
+presentation of an application for the execution of a decree already executed will not
+be sufficient. The accused must have caused the decree to be executed against the
+opposite party after it had been satisfied;219. or obtained an order for attachment for a
+sum already paid.220. Where the decree-holder does not want to proceed with the
+execution and gets his execution application dismissed he cannot be convicted of an
+offence under this section.221.
+The fact that the satisfaction is of such a nature that the Court executing the decree
+could not recognize it does not prevent the decree-holder from being convicted of an
+offence under this section.222.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"218. Molla Fuzla Karim, (1905) 33 Cal 193 ."
+"219. Shama Charan Das v Kasi Naik, (1896) 23 Cal 971 ."
+"220. Hikmat-ullah Khan v Sakina Begam, (1930) 53 All 416 ."
+"221. Bismilla Khan v Rambhau, (1946) Nag 686."
+"222. Madhub Chunder Mozumdar v Novodeep Chunder Pandit, (1888) 16 Cal 126 ; Mutturaman"
+"Chetti, (1881) 4 Mad 325; Pillala, (1885) 9 Mad 101."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 211] False charge of offence made with intent to injure.
+"Whoever, with intent to cause injury1 to any person, institutes or causes to be"
+"instituted any criminal proceedings2 against that person, or falsely charges3 any"
+"person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful"
+"ground4 for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted5 on a false charge of"
+"an offence punishable with death, 223.[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for"
+"seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section includes two distinct offences:—
+(1) Actually instituting or causing to be instituted false criminal proceeding against
+a person.224.
+(2) Preferring a false charge against a person.
+"The first assumes the second, but the second may be committed where no criminal"
+proceedings follow.
+The necessary ingredients to constitute either of the above offences are—
+"(1) the criminal proceedings must be instituted, or the false charge made with"
+intent to injure;
+"(2) the criminal proceedings must be instituted, or the false charge must be made,"
+"without just or lawful ground, in other words, it must be made maliciously."
+Difference is made in punishment according as the charge relates to offences
+punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or otherwise.
+The mere making of a false charge is punishable under the first part of the section. If a
+"case gets no further than a police inquiry, it falls within that part. But under the second"
+part there should be an actual institution of criminal proceedings on a false charge.225.
+Two conditions are necessary before the enhanced punishment provided in the second
+paragraph could be inflicted: (1) proceedings on the false charge should have been
+"actually instituted, and (2) the false charge must be in respect of an offence punishable"
+"with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards."
+[s 211.1] Sections 182 and 211.—
+According to the Bombay High Court there is a clear distinction between a false charge
+"that falls under section 211 and false information given to the police, in which latter"
+case the offence falls under section 182. A person prosecuting another under section
+182 need not prove malice and want of reasonable and probable cause except so far
+"as they are implied in the act of giving information known to be false, with the"
+knowledge or likelihood that such information would lead a public servant to use his
+"power to the injury or annoyance of the complainant. In an inquiry under section 211,"
+"on the other hand, proof of the absence of just and lawful ground for making the"
+charge is an important element.226. If the information conveyed to the police amounts
+to the institution of criminal proceedings against a defined person or amounts to the
+"falsely charging of a defined person with an offence, then the person giving such"
+"information is guilty of an offence under section 211. In such a case, section 211 is,"
+"and section 182 is not, the appropriate section under which to frame a charge. Section"
+"182, when read with section 211, must be understood as referring to cases where the"
+information given to the public servant falls short of amounting to institution of
+criminal proceedings against a defined person and falls short of amounting to the
+falsely charging of a defined person with an offence as defined in the Penal Code.227.
+"The Calcutta, the Madras, the Allahabad and the Patna High Courts differ from this"
+view of the Bombay High Court. The Calcutta High Court has ruled that a prosecution
+"for a false charge may be under section 182 or section 211, but if the false charge was"
+"a serious one, the graver section 211 should be applied and the trial should be full and"
+fair.228. Where a false charge is made to the police of a cognizable offence the offence
+committed by the person making the charge falls within the meaning of section 211
+and not section 182.229.
+"The Madras High Court has held that there is no error in a conviction under section 182,"
+when the false charge made before the police was punishable under the final clause of
+section 211. The High Court may quash the conviction and sentence for the minor
+offence and direct a trial before a tribunal having jurisdiction for the graver offence.
+"Whether it will do so, or not, is a question, not of law, but of expediency on the facts of"
+the particular case.230.
+"The Allahabad High Court had held that where a specific false charge is made, the"
+"proper section, for proceedings to be adopted under section 211.231. Although it is"
+difficult to see what case would arise under section 211 to which section 182 could not
+be applied yet section 182 would apply to a case that might not fall under section 211.
+The offence under section 182 is complete when false information is given to a public
+"servant by a person who believes it to be false, but who intends thereby to cause such"
+public servant to institute criminal proceedings against a third person. The offence is
+complete although the public servant takes no steps towards the institution of such
+criminal proceedings. There is no restriction imposed by the Penal Code or by the
+Criminal Procedure Code upon the prosecution of an offence either under section 182
+or section 211. It appears that it has been left to the discretion of the Court to
+determine when and under what circumstances prosecution should be proceeded with
+under sections 182 and 211.232. The soundness of this view is doubted in subsequent
+cases.233.
+The Patna High Court has followed the view of the Calcutta High Court.234.
+The Lahore High Court has held that an offence under section 182 is included in the
+more serious offence under section 211 and a prosecution for a false charge may be
+"either under section 182 or section 211, though clearly if section 211 does apply and"
+"the false charge is serious, the prosecution should be under section 211.235."
+1. 'Intent to cause injury'.—This is an essential part of the offence.236.
+2. 'Institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceedings'.—The word
+"""proceedings"" is used in this section in the ordinary sense of a prescribed mode of"
+action for prosecuting a right or redressing a wrong. It is not used in the technical
+sense of a proceeding taken in a Court of law.237. Neither the proceedings before the
+"Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, is a criminal proceeding nor was the"
+charge in the Disciplinary Proceedings in relation to an offence. Charge in the
+Disciplinary Proceedings before the Bar Council of India is only in respect of
+professional misconduct and not offence as such.238. Under this section 'instituting a
+criminal proceeding' may be treated as an offence in itself apart from 'falsely charging'
+a person with having committed an offence. There are two modes in which a person
+aggrieved may seek to put the criminal law in motion: (1) by giving information to the
+"police (Criminal Procedure Code, section 154) and (2) by lodging a complaint before a"
+"Magistrate (Criminal Procedure Code, sections 190, 200). A person who sets the"
+criminal law in motion by making to the police a false charge in respect of a cognizable
+offence institutes criminal proceedings.239. But as the police have no power to take any
+"proceedings in non-cognizable cases without orders from a Magistrate, a false charge"
+"of such offence, made to the police, is not an institution of criminal proceedings, but"
+merely a false charge.240. The distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable
+"offences relates to the powers of the police only, and it will, therefore, seem that the"
+"false charge of any offence, whether cognizable or non-cognizable, before a Magistrate"
+is an institution of criminal proceedings.
+3. 'Falsely charges'.—The word 'charges' means something different from 'gives
+"information'. The true test seems to be, does the person who makes the statement that"
+is alleged to constitute the 'charge' do so with the intention and object of setting the
+criminal law in motion against the person against whom the statement is directed?
+Such object and intention may be inferred from the language of the statement and the
+"circumstances in which it is made.241. The false charge must be made to a Court, or to"
+an officer who has power to investigate and send it up for trial.242. Where the tribunal
+before whom the complaint is made is not competent to take any action direct or
+"indirect to punish the persons complained against, it cannot be said that the accused"
+'charged' such persons with any offence or that his intention necessarily was that
+action should be taken against them.243. A false petition to the Superintendent of
+"Police, praying for the protection of the petitioners from the oppression of a Sub-"
+"Inspector, which may be effected by some departmental action, does not amount to"
+such a false charge.244. It is enough that a false charge is made though no prosecution
+is instituted thereon.245. Where a person who gives false information as to the
+commission of an offence merely states that he suspected a certain other person to be
+"the offender, it may be that he would not be liable under this section, but where it is"
+clear that the informant's intention was not merely that the police should follow up a
+"clue but that they should put the alleged offender on trial, the informant is guilty of an"
+offence under this section.246. The Calcutta High Court has held that the meaning of
+the expression 'falsely charges' is simply 'falsely accuses' and as the section stands
+there is no necessity of this false accusation being made in connection with a criminal
+proceeding.247.
+[s 211.2] Giving false Evidence: No false charge.—
+"The words ""falsely charges"" in this section cannot mean giving false evidence against"
+"the accused as a prosecution witness during the course of a trial. To ""falsely charge"""
+must refer to the criminal or initial accusation putting or seeking to put in motion the
+machinery of criminal investigation and not when seeking to prove the false charge by
+"making deposition in support of the charge framed in that trial. The words ""falsely"
+"charges"" have to be read along with the expression ""institution of criminal"
+"proceedings"". The false charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in"
+authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by
+appropriate proceedings. In other words it must be embodied either in a complaint or in
+a report of a cognizable offence to the police-officer or to an officer having authority
+over the person against whom the allegations are made. Giving false evidence in
+course of a trial amounts to an offence under sections 193 and 195 and not under
+"section 211, IPC, 1860.248."
+[s 211.3] Bare statement is not false charge.—
+A statement to the police of a suspicion that a particular person has committed an
+"offence is not a charge within the meaning of this section, nor does it amount to"
+institution of criminal proceedings; and a conviction cannot be had on proof that the
+suspicion was unfounded.249. The accused made a report to the police that his buffalo
+had been poisoned and that he suspected two persons whom he named of having
+administered the poison. The police made an inquiry and reported that there was no
+case of poisoning and the charge was struck off. One of the persons then brought a
+complaint under this section against the accused. It was held that the report to the
+police did not amount to a charge of a criminal offence.250.
+"[s 211.4] Statement under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code.—"
+"A statement under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, in answer to questions put by"
+"a police-officer making an investigation under section 161 of the Code, cannot be made"
+the basis of a prosecution under this section.251. False identification in a Test
+Identification Parade is not falsely charging.252.
+4. 'Knowing that there is no just or lawful ground'.—This expression is the equivalent of
+"the English technical phrase ""without reasonable or probable cause,"" which means an"
+"honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon"
+"reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming"
+"them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed"
+"in the position of the accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably"
+guilty of the crime imputed. There must be:
+"First, an honest belief of the accuser in the guilt of the accused;"
+"Second, such belief must be based on an honest conviction of the existence of the"
+circumstances which led the accuser to that conclusion;
+"Third, such belief must be based upon reasonable grounds; that is, such grounds as"
+would lead any fairly cautious man in the defendant's situation so to believe;
+"Fourth, the circumstances so believed and relied on by the accuser must be such as"
+amount to reasonable ground for belief in the guilt of the accused.253.
+"A person may, in good faith, institute a charge that is subsequently found to be false, or"
+"he may, with intent to cause injury to an enemy, institute criminal proceedings against"
+"him, believing there are good grounds for them but in neither case has he committed"
+an offence under this section. To constitute this offence it must be shown that the
+person instituting criminal proceedings knew there was no just or lawful ground for
+such proceedings.254.
+"In the absence of any special circumstances to rebut it, the judgment of one competent"
+tribunal against the complainant affords very strong evidence of reasonable and
+probable cause.255.
+5. 'If such criminal proceeding be instituted'.—There is a divergence of views between
+"the Calcutta, the Madras and the Patna High Courts on the one hand, and the Allahabad"
+"and the Lahore High Courts on the other, on the question whether the latter part of the"
+section applies to such cases of complaints to the police which are disposed of
+without a formal magisterial inquiry. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held
+that the latter part would apply to such cases where the charge related to the more
+serious offence.256. This case is followed by the Madras257. and the Patna258. High
+"Courts. The test to apply is,—did the person who made the charge intend to set the"
+criminal law in motion against the person on whom the charge is made.259.
+"The Allahabad High Court has, on the other hand, held that to constitute the offence"
+"defined in the second paragraph of this section, it is necessary that criminal"
+proceedings should be instituted. Where the offence committed does not go further
+"than the making of a false charge to the police, the making of such charge does not"
+"amount to institution of criminal proceedings, and the offence committed will fall"
+"within the first paragraph, notwithstanding that the offence so falsely charged may be"
+one of those referred to in the second paragraph.260. The former Chief Court of the
+Punjab held likewise.261.
+[s 211.5] Complaint by Court: when.—
+"A complaint alleging commission of an offence punishable under section 211 IPC,"
+"1860, ""in or in relation to any proceedings in any Court"", is maintainable only at the"
+instance of that Court or by an officer of that Court authorized in writing for that
+"purpose or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate, is abundantly clear"
+"from the language employed in the provision.262. When the offence under section 211,"
+"IPC, 1860, is committed in relation to Court proceedings, cognizance without Court's"
+"complaint is barred by section 195 (1)(b)(i), Cr PC, 1973.263. Since an order of a"
+"Magistrate discharging an accused on submission of a police report under section 173,"
+"Cr PC, 1973, is a judicial and not administrative order, a complaint by the Magistrate or"
+"his superior Court under section 195(1)(b)(i), Cr PC, 1973, would be necessary to take"
+"cognizance of an offence under section 211, IPC, 1860.264. Similarly, remand and bail"
+proceedings too have been held to be Court proceedings and as such a complaint by
+"the Court would be necessary to take cognizance of the offence under section 211,"
+"IPC, 1860.265. This view of the law has now been affirmed by the Supreme Court as"
+well.266.
+[s 211.6] Proceedings in any Court.—
+There are three situations that are likely to emerge while examining the question
+"whether there is any proceedings in any Court, namely,"
+"(a) there might not be any proceeding in any Court at all,"
+(b) proceeding in a Court might actually be pending at the relevant time when
+"cognizance is sought to be taken of the offence punishable under section 211, IPC,"
+1860 and
+(c) there might have been proceedings which had already been concluded though there
+might not be any proceedings pending in any Court when cognizance of offence under
+"section 211, IPC, 1860 is taken. It is only in second and third situation that section"
+"195(1), Cr PC, 1973 would apply. The fact that proceedings had been concluded would"
+not be material because section 195(1) does not require that proceedings in any Court
+must actually be pending at the time when the question of applying the bar arises if the
+"offence under section 211, IPC, 1860 is alleged to have been committed in relation to"
+those proceedings.267. A complaint by the concerned Executive Magistrate could be
+"necessary under section 195(1)(a)(i), and there could be no sufficient reason for"
+dispensing with the necessity for a complaint by him for prosecution of an offence
+"under section 211, IPC, 1860 committed in relation to a proceeding before him under"
+"section 144, Cr PC, 1973.268."
+"[s 211.7] Sections 211 and 500 IPC, 1860.—"
+"If we read sections 211 and 500 of IPC, 1860 together, we would find a clear"
+distinction. Section 211 imposes a punishment in case of a false charge or offence
+"made with the intent to injure someone before any Court of law, whereas section 500"
+provides for punishment in case of a defamation of a person by any one. Defamation
+"has been defined under section 499 which provides inter alia whoever, by words either"
+"spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or"
+"publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or"
+"having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person,"
+"is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Making a false"
+complaint before a Court of law would amount to committing fraud on Court. It is for
+the Court to proceed against the erring person. The provision has been made to
+preserve the sanctity of the Court. Section 500 gives right to sue to a person who is
+defamed within the meaning of section 499 by the conduct of the accused. These two
+provisions are totally distinct and can be tried in absence of each other.269.
+[s 211.8] Civil remedy.—
+"A person aggrieved by a false charge may, if he chooses, sue in a civil Court for"
+"damages for malicious prosecution, instead of taking criminal proceedings under this"
+section.
+[s 211.9] CASES.—
+"It was alleged that petitioner's son was kidnapped by opposite party, petitioner's son"
+"himself appeared and made his statement that he was not kidnapped, rather he had"
+himself voluntarily gone to marry with a girl. The girl also had appeared and made her
+statement that petitioner's son and herself have married and for that reason the
+"petitioner threatening to kill them. It was held that the order, taking cognizance of"
+"offences against petitioner for falsely implicating the opposite party, is proper.270."
+[s 211.10] False charge should be made to Court or officer having jurisdiction
+to investigate.—
+A woman appeared before the Station Staff Officer and accused a non-commissioned
+"officer of rape, and, after a military inquiry, the military authority held that the charge"
+was false and directed the complainant to be prosecuted under this section. The
+"conviction was set aside, as the false charge was not made to a Court having"
+"jurisdiction.271. Where the accused laid a charge of mischief by fire at a police station,"
+"which was reported to be false, and the District Magistrate, upon the receipt of a report"
+"to the same effect from the Deputy Magistrate, to whom he had sent the case for a"
+"judicial inquiry, passed an order to prosecute the accused, it was held that the order of"
+"the District Magistrate was bad, as the matter of the false charge had not come before"
+him in the course of judicial proceedings.272.
+Where a letter falsely charging a person with having committed an offence was written
+"and posted at Kumbakonam and was addressed to the Inspector-General of Police,"
+"Madras, an offence under this section could be said to be completed only when the"
+"letter reached the destination, i.e., the office of the Inspector-General of Police, Madras."
+"The communication of the false accusation was, in fact, the laying of the false charge"
+"and, unless the matter was actually communicated to the superior officer, it could not"
+"be said that a false charge had been made. So, the Magistrate at Kumbakonam would"
+have no territorial jurisdiction to try the case.273.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"223. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"224. Jitendra v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 3087 (All), the accused was falsely implicated and"
+convicted for offences under IPC. The court directed the authorities to register case against the
+"prosecutrix and take necessary action; AN Gupta v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 4932 (Raj), FIR"
+"lodged containing false and baseless allegations, intending prima facie to injure the reputation"
+"of the complainant. Falsity was proved by the statements of the accused under section 313, Cr"
+"PC, 1973. The order acquitting the accused under sections 500 and 211 was set aside; Rubin"
+"Roy Chaudhury v State of WB, 1998 Cr LJ 1699 (Cal), order taking cognizance of offence was"
+held to be proper. The office bearers of an Institute hatched a plot to bring about expulsion of
+"the complainant and his wife, prima facie on false basis."
+"225. Karsan Jesang, (1941) 43 Bom LR 858 , (1942) Bom 22."
+"226. Per Ranade, J, in Raghavendra v Kashinathbhat, (1894) 19 Bom 717, 725."
+"227. Apaya, (1913) 15 Bom LR 574 [LNIND 1913 BOM 44] ."
+"228. Sarada Prosad Chatterjee, (1904) 32 Cal 180 , followed in Gati Mandal, (1905) 4 CLJ 88."
+"229. Giridhari Naik, (1901) 5 Cal WN 727."
+230. (1872) 7 MHC (Appx) 5.
+"231. Jugal Kishore, (1886) 8 All 382 ."
+"232. Per Edge, CJ in Raghu Tiwari, (1893) 15 All 336 , 338."
+"233. Kashi Ram, (1924) 22 ALJR 829; Samokhan, (1924) 26 Cr LJ 594 ."
+"234. Daroga Gope, (1925) 5 Pat 33."
+"235. Nota Ram, (1941) 23 Lah 675. See Muthra v Roora, (1870) PR No. 16 of 1870; Todur Mal v"
+"Mussammat Bholi, (1882) PR No. 14 of 1882."
+"236. Gopal Dhanuk, (1881) 7 Cal 96 ."
+"237. Albert, AIR 1966 Kerala 11 [LNIND 1965 KER 172] (FB)."
+"238. Rajkumar Malpani v Akella Sreenivasa Rao, 2011 Cr LJ 2997 (AP)."
+"239. Jijibhai Govind, (1896) 22 Bom. 596; Karim Buksh, (1888) 17 Cal 574 , FB; Parahu, (1883) 5"
+"All 598 ; Nanjunda Rau, (1896) 20 Mad 79; Mst Binia, (1937) Nag 338; Albert, AIR 1966 Kerala 11"
+[LNIND 1965 KER 172] (FB).
+"240. Karim Buksh, supra."
+"241. Rayan Kutti, (1903) 26 Mad 640, 643; Nihala, (1872) PR No. 14 of 1872."
+"242. Jamoona, (1881) 6 Cal 620 ; Sivan Chetti, (1909) 32 Mad 258, overruling Ramana Gowd,"
+"(1908) 31 Mad 506; Mathura Prasad, (1917) 39 All 715 ."
+"243. Bhawani Sahai, (1932) 13 Lah 568."
+"244. Abdul Hakim Khan Chaudhuri, (1931) 59 Cal 334 ."
+"245. Abdul Hasan, (1877) 1 All 497 ; Chenna Malli Gowda, (1903) 27 Mad 129."
+"246. Parmeshwar Lal, (1925) 4 Pat 472."
+"247. Dasarathi Mondal v Hari Das, AIR 1959 Cal 293 [LNIND 1959 CAL 1] . On appeal sub. nom."
+"Hari Das, AIR 1964 SC 1773 [LNIND 1964 SC 84] : 1964 (2) Cr LJ 737 ."
+"248. Santokh Singh, 1973 Cr LJ 1176 : AIR 1976 SC 1489 ."
+"249. Bramanund Bhuttacharjee, (1881) 8 CLR 233 ; Karigowda, (1894) 19 Bom 51; Ganpatram v"
+"Rambai, (1950) Nag 208."
+"250. Abdul Ghafur, (1924) 6 Lah 28."
+"251. Ramana Gowd, (1908) 31 Mad 506."
+252. Ibid.
+"253. Hicks v Faulkner, (1878) 8 QBD 167 , 171; Kapoor v Kairon, 1966 Cr LJ 115 ."
+"254. Chidda, (1871) 3 NWP 327; Murad, (1893) PR No. 29 of 1894."
+"255. Parimi Bapirazu v Venkayya, (1866) 3 MHC 238 ."
+"256. Karim Buksh, (1888) 17 Cal 574 (FB)."
+"257. Nanjunda Rau, (1896) 20 Mad 79."
+"258. Parmeshwar Lal, (1925) 4 Pat 472."
+"259. Mallappa Reddi, (1903) 27 Mad 127, 128."
+"260. Bisheshar, (1893) 16 All 124 ; Pitam Rai v State, (1882) 5 All 215 ."
+"261. Sultan, (1887) PR No. 3 of 1888; Khan Bahadar, (1888) PR No. 26 of 1888; Humayun, (1907)"
+PR No. 26 of 1908.
+"262. Abdul Rehman v K M Anees-Ul-Haq, 2012 Cr LJ 1060 (SC) : 2011 (10)SCC 696 [LNIND 2011"
+"SC 1156] . See also Harish Chandra Pathak v Anil Vats, 2008 Cr LJ 2965 (All)."
+"263. M Devasenapathi, 1984 Cr LJ NOC 34 (Mad); K Ramakrishnan, 1986 Cr LJ 392 (Ker)."
+"264. Narayan, 1972 Cr LJ 1446 (Del—FB)."
+"265. PC Gupta v State, 1974 Cr LJ 945 (All-FB)."
+"266. Kamalapati, 1979 Cr LJ 679 : AIR 1979 SC 777 [LNIND 1978 SC 383] ."
+"267. Geetika Batra v OP Batra, 2009 Cr LJ 2687 (Del). A private complaint cannot be filed for an"
+"offence under section 211-See Subhash Ramchandra Durge v Deepak Annasaheb Gat, 2000 Cr LJ"
+4774 (Bom).
+"268. Rabin Roy Choudhury v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1699 (Cal); Dongari Venkatram v M Tirpathanna S I"
+"of Police, Kodad 2006 Cr LJ 2697 (AP)."
+"269. Bir Chandra Das v Anil Kumar Sarkar, 2011 Cr LJ 3422 (Cal)."
+"270. Chintamani Paul (Kumhar) v State of Jharkhand, 2009 Cr LJ 2283 (Jhar)."
+"271. Jamoona, (1881) 6 Cal 620 ; See also Santokh Singh, 1973 Cr LJ 1176 : AIR 1973 SC 2190"
+[LNIND 1973 SC 160] .
+"272. Haibat Khan, (1905) 33 Cal 30 ."
+"273. Sivaprakasam Pillai, (1948) Mad 893."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 212] Harbouring offender—.
+"Whenever an offence has been committed, whoever harbours or conceals a person"
+"whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the offender, with the intention of"
+screening him from legal punishment;
+If a Capital Offence;
+"shall, if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine;
+"if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment."
+"and if the offence is punishable with 274.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine;
+"and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year,"
+"and not to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description"
+provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the
+"longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both."
+"275.[""Offence"" in this section includes any act committed at any place out of 276."
+"[India], which, if committed in 277.[India], would be punishable under any of the"
+"following sections, namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399,"
+"402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460 and every such act shall, for the"
+"purposes of this section, be deemed to be punishable as if the accused person"
+had been guilty of it in 278.[India].]
+Exception.—This provision shall not extend to any case in which the harbour or
+concealment is by the husband or wife of the offender.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, knowing that B has committed dacoity, knowingly conceals B in order to screen him"
+"from legal punishment. Here, as B is liable to 279.[imprisonment for life], A is liable to"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding three years, and is also"
+liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+"Ingredients.—(i) the offence must have been committed, i.e., completed and there must"
+be an 'offender';
+(ii) there must be harbouring or concealment of a person by the accused;
+(iii) the accused knows or has reason to believe that such harboured or concealed
+person is the offender;
+(iv) there must be an intention on the part of the accused to screen the offender from
+legal punishment.280.
+[s 212.1] Offender.—
+The word used is 'offender' and not 'accused' or a person convicted for that offence.
+"The person who is sheltering, harbouring or concealing that person must have"
+"knowledge or has reason to believe that he is the 'offender'. The word ""offender"" is not"
+"defined under IPC, 1860. ""Offender"" as per the Dictionary, means ""a person who has"
+"committed a crime or offence."" Hence, a person who is convicted or acquitted may be"
+"an offender, for the purpose of section 212. An ""offender"" for the purpose of section"
+"212 is neither a convict nor an accused, but he is a person who has actually committed"
+the offence. The failure of the prosecution to prove the identity of the person who
+"committed the offence does not render the person, who committed the offence, not an"
+offender. He can be said to be an offender whose guilt has not been proved in Court.
+"Yet, he is an offender, if he has committed an offence.281."
+This section applies to the harbouring of persons who have actually committed some
+"offence under the Penal Code or an offence under some special or local law, when the"
+thing punishable under such special or local law is punishable with imprisonment for a
+"term of six months or upwards. It does not apply to the harbouring of persons, not"
+"being criminals, who merely abscond to avoid or delay a judicial investigation.282."
+Where there was no material to show that the accused had the knowledge or that he
+reasonably believed that he was harbouring or concealing a person who was an
+"offender and the essential feature of secrecy was totally absent, it was held that no"
+offence under section 212 was made out.283. It is the knowledge or the reasonable
+"belief of the accused under section.212 that the person whom, he has harboured or"
+"concealed to be the offender, which is relevant. But, such knowledge or belief must be"
+"entertained by the accused, on the date on which he commits the offence by"
+harbouring or concealing him.284.
+In the conspiracy for assassination of the former Prime Minister of India (Mr. Rajiv
+"Gandhi), some of the accused persons appeared at the scene after achievement of the"
+object. They played the role of harbouring and sheltering the main accused persons
+with full knowledge of their involvement in the assassination. They also made efforts to
+destroy evidence. Their conviction under section 212 was held to be proper.285.
+[s 212.2] Exception.—
+The Exception only extends to cases where harbour is afforded by a wife or husband.
+No other relationship can excuse the wilful receipt or assistance of felons; a father
+"cannot assist his child, a child his parent, a brother his brother, a master his servant, a"
+servant his master.
+"[s 212.3] Section 212 IPC, 1860 and section 39 of Code of Criminal Procedure"
+1973.—
+It is the duty of every citizen who is aware of commission of or of the intention of any
+"other person to commit any offence punishable under sections 302, 304, 449, etc., to"
+forthwith give information to the nearest Magistrate or police-officer of such
+commission of offence or intention. This provision is mandatory unless there is a
+reasonable excuse for omission or failure to inform. Section 39 of the Code of Criminal
+"Procedure specifically provides that public ""shall"" give information to the police or the"
+nearest Magistrate regarding commission of certain offences referred to in the said
+"section. Section 39 is only a procedural section, violation of which is not made"
+"punishable under any penal statute, but, if a person who has knowledge or reasonable"
+belief that a person is the offender can be treated as a person who is aware of the
+commission of the offence and even if he is not punishable for violating section 39 of
+"the Code of Criminal Procedure when he harbours or conceals such an offender, he"
+must certainly be guilty for offence under section 212.286.
+[s 212.4] Conviction of the person concealed–whether mandatory.—
+Nowhere in section 212 it is stated that the person concealed should be convicted for
+"an offence. Even if the main offender leaves unpunished by the Court, the object of the"
+provision under section 212 requires that the person who has concealed or harboured
+the offender whom he believes and knows has committed the offence shall not leave
+unpunished if the other ingredients are established. The criminality lies in the act of
+concealment committed with the knowledge or belief that the person who is harboured
+or concealed is the offender and also with the criminal intention of screening him from
+legal punishment.287.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"274. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"275. Ins. by Act 3 of 1894, section 7."
+"276. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+277. Ibid.
+278. Ibid.
+"279. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"280. Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 (Ker), Aleem v State of AP, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 866 (AP)."
+"See also State v Siddarth Vashisth, (alias Manu Sharma), 2001 Cr LJ 2404 (Del), the co-accused"
+"had knowledge that the accused had committed murder, both of them were fellow directors in a"
+company. He sent the car to pick up the accused from the place of occurrence to facilitate his
+escape. Liable to be punished under the section.
+"281. Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 (Ker)."
+"282. Ramraj Choudhury, (1945) 24 Pat 604; Mir Faiz Ali v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 1034"
+(Bom).
+"283. State v Sushil Sharma, 2007 Cr LJ 4008 (Del); Niranjan Ojha v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ"
+"1863 (Ori); Also see Durga Shankar v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 2494 (MP)."
+"284. Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 (Ker)."
+"285. State of TN v Nalini, AIR 1999 Cr LJ 3124 : AIR 1999 SC 2640 [LNIND 1999 SC 1584] ."
+"286. Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 (Ker)."
+"287. Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+"[s 213] Taking gift, etc., to screen an offender from punishment—."
+"Whoever accepts or attempts to obtain, or agrees to accept, any gratification for"
+"himself or any other person, or any restitution of property to himself or any other"
+"person, in consideration of his concealing an offence or of his screening any person"
+"from legal punishment for any offence, or of his not proceeding against any person"
+"for the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment,"
+if a capital offence;
+"shall, if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine;
+"if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment."
+"and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment"
+"which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine;
+"and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment not extending to ten years,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence
+for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of
+"imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"The compounding of a crime, by some agreement not to bring the criminal to justice if"
+"the property is restored or a pecuniary or other gratification is given, is the offence"
+punished by this and the following sections. It is the duty of every State to punish
+"criminals. No individual has, therefore, a right to compound a crime because he himself"
+is injured and no one else.
+[s 213.1] Ingredients.—
+The section has two essentials:
+1. A person accepting or attempting to obtain any gratification or restitution of property
+for himself or any other person.
+2. Such gratification must have been obtained in consideration of (a) concealing an
+"offence, or (b) screening any person from legal punishment for an offence, or (c) not"
+proceeding against a person for the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment. The
+"most important ingredient of the charge, under section 213, viz., is that the payment"
+was in relation to the interference with the course of a judicial proceeding and the
+tampering with the evidence.288.
+[s 213.2] Scope.—
+According to the Calcutta High Court this section applies only where there has been an
+"actual concealment of an offence, or screening of a person from legal punishment, or"
+"abstention from proceeding criminally against a person, and, as consideration for the"
+"same, there has been an acceptance of, or attempt to obtain, or agreement to accept,"
+any gratification or restitution of property. It has no application where only an
+"acceptance of or attempt to obtain, or agreement to accept, any gratification or"
+"restitution on a promise to conceal, screen or abstain, is proved and nothing more.289."
+The Bombay High Court has dissented from this view and has held that this section
+does not require the actual concealment of an offence or the screening of any person
+from legal punishment or the actual forbearing of taking any proceedings. It is
+sufficient if an illegal gratification is received in consideration of a promise to conceal
+an offence or screen any person from legal punishment or desist from taking any
+proceedings.290.
+The section does not apply where the compounding of an offence is legal.
+[s 213.3] Mere suspicion.—
+This section is applicable only when it is proved that the person screened or attempted
+"to be screened from legal punishment has been guilty of an offence, and not when"
+there is merely a suspicion of his having committed some offence.291.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"288. Mir Faizali Shaheen v The State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 1034 (Bom)."
+"289. Hemachandra Mukherjee, (1924) 52 Cal 151 ."
+"290. Biharilal Kalacharan, (1949) 51 Bom LR 564 ."
+"291. Girish Myte, (1896) 23 Cal 420 ; Sanalal; Gordhandas, (1913) 15 Bom LR 694 [LNIND 1913"
+"BOM 68] , 37 Bom 658, there must be knowledge that such person was an offender; Sumativijay"
+"Jain v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 97 (MP)"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 214] Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening
+offender—.
+"Whoever gives or causes, or offers or agrees to give or cause, any gratification to any"
+"person, or 292.[restores or causes the restoration of] any property to any person, in"
+"consideration of that person's concealing an offence, or of his screening any person"
+"from legal punishment for any offence, or of his not proceeding against any person"
+for the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment;
+if a capital offence;
+"shall, if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine;
+"if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment."
+"and if the offence is punishable with 293.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine;
+"and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment not extending to ten years,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence
+for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of
+"imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both."
+294.[Exception.—The provisions of sections 213 and 214 do not extend to any
+case in which the offence may lawfully be compounded.]
+"Illustrations. [Rep. by Act 10 of 1882, section 2 and Sch I.]"
+COMMENT.—
+The preceding section punishes the receiver of a gift in consideration of compromising
+"an offence, whereas this section punishes the offerer of the gift."
+[s 214.1] Ingredients.—
+This section has two essentials—
+1. Offering any gratification or restoration of property to some person.
+2. Such offer must have been in consideration of the person's (a) concealing an
+"offence, or (b) of his screening any person from legal punishment for an offence, or (c)"
+"of his not proceeding against a person, for the purpose of bringing him to legal"
+punishment. The section presupposes the actual commission of an offence or the guilt
+"of the person screened from punishment. Where the accused, an overseer who was"
+charged with preparing false muster rolls and misappropriating Government money
+allegedly tried to bribe someone with a view to prevent action being taken against him
+"and was thus prosecuted under sections 165A and 214, IPC, 1860, but was acquitted of"
+"the offence under section 165A, IPC, 1860, for want of evidence, he could not also be"
+"convicted in view of infirmities of the case of an offence under section 214, IPC,"
+1860.295.
+Section 320(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code enumerates the offences that can be
+lawfully compounded.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"292. Subs. by Act 42 of 1953, section 4 and Sch III, for ""to restore or cause the restoration of"""
+(w.e.f. 23 December 1953).
+"293. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"294. Subs. by Act 8 of 1882, section 6, for Exception."
+"295. Mohd Aslam, 1981 Cr LJ 1285 : AIR 1981 SC 1735 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+"[s 215] Taking gift to help to recover stolen property, etc."
+Whoever takes or agrees or consents to take 1 any gratification under pretence or on
+account of helping any person to recover any movable property of which he shall have
+"been deprived by any offence punishable under this Code, shall, unless he uses all"
+means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended 2 and convicted of the
+"offence, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"Scope.—This section is intended to apply to someone who, being in league with the"
+"thief, receives some gratification on account of helping the owner to recover the stolen"
+"property, without at the same time using all the means in his power to cause the thief"
+to be apprehended and convicted of the offence. There is nothing in this section that
+should exclude an actual thief from liability under it if in addition to committing theft he
+also tried to realise money by a promise to return the stolen article. An actual thief or a
+person suspected to be the thief can be convicted under this section.296.
+[s 215.1] Ingredients.—
+This section has three essentials—
+1. Taking or agreeing or consenting to take any gratification under pretence or on
+account of helping any person to recover any movable property.
+2. The owner of such property must have been deprived of it by an offence
+punishable under the Penal Code.
+3. The person taking the gratification must not have used all means in his power to
+cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted of the offence.
+[s 215.2] Object.—
+"The primary aim of this section is to punish all trafficking by which a person, knowing"
+"that property has been obtained by crime, and knowing the criminal, makes a profit out"
+of the crime while screening the offender from justice. The clear meaning of the
+section is that it is an offence to receive money for helping any person to recover
+property stolen or misappropriated and that there is an exception only in favour of the
+man who can show that he used all means in his power to cause the apprehension of
+the offender.297.
+1. 'Takes or agrees or consents to take'.—These words imply that the person taking the
+gratification and the person giving it have agreed not only as to the object for which the
+"gratification is to be given, but also as to the shape or form the gratification is to"
+take.298.
+2. 'Unless he uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended'.—
+It is not for the prosecution to prove the negative that the accused did not use all his
+power to cause the offender to be apprehended. It is for the defence to establish that
+the accused did all in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended.299.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"296. Mukhtara, (1924) 46 All 915 ; Deo Suchit Rai, (1947) ALJ 48 (FB); overruling Muhammad Ali,"
+"(1900) 23 All 81 and Mangu, (1927) 50 All 186 ."
+"297. Yusuf Mian v State, (1938) All 681 ."
+"298. Hargayan v State, (1922) 45 All 159 ."
+"299. Deo Suchit Rai, 1947 All LJ 48 (FB); DK Balai, 1959 Cr LJ 1438 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 216] Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose
+apprehension has been ordered—.
+"Whenever any person convicted of or charged with an offence, being in lawful custody"
+"for that offence, escapes from such custody;"
+"or whenever a public servant, in the exercise of the lawful powers of such public"
+"servant, orders a certain person to be apprehended for an offence, whoever, knowing"
+"of such escape or order for apprehension, harbours of conceals that person with the"
+"intention of preventing him from being apprehended, shall be punished in the manner"
+"following that is to say,—"
+if a capital offence;
+if the offence for which the person was in custody or is ordered to be
+"apprehended is punishable with death, he shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine;
+"if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment."
+"if the offence is punishable with 300.[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for"
+"ten years, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to three years, with or without fine;"
+and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year
+"and not to ten years, he shall be punished with imprisonment of the description"
+provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the
+"longest term of the imprisonment provided for such offence, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+"301.[""Offence"" in this section includes also any act or omission of which a person"
+"is alleged to have been guilty out of 302.[India], which, if he had been guilty of it in"
+"303.[India], would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under"
+"any law relating to extradition, 304.[***] or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or"
+"detained in custody in 305.[India]; and every such act or omission shall, for the"
+"purposes of this section, be deemed to be punishable as if the accused person"
+had been guilty of it in 306.[India].]
+Exception.—This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour or
+concealment is by the husband or wife of the person to be apprehended.
+COMMENT.—
+"To establish an offence under this section it must be shown, (1) that there has been an"
+order for the apprehension of a certain person as being guilty of an offence; (2)
+"knowledge by the accused party of that order, and (3) the harbouring or concealing by"
+the accused of the person with the intention of preventing him from being
+apprehended.307. It would not be safe to convict the appellant for the offence
+"punishable under section 216 IPC, 1860 in absence of evidence in this regard.308."
+This section may be compared with section 212. The latter deals with the offence of
+harbouring an offender who having committed an offence absconds. This section
+deals with harbouring an offender who has escaped from custody after being actually
+"convicted or charged with the offence, or whose apprehension has been ordered; the"
+"latter offence is in the eye of the law more aggravated, and a heavier punishment is,"
+"therefore, awarded for it. It is thus an aggravated form of the offence punishable under"
+section 212.
+The section only takes into consideration cases where the man who is harboured is
+wanted for an offence for which a maximum sentence of at least one year's
+imprisonment is provided. No provision is made for cases where he is wanted for
+offences for which the maximum sentence is less than one year.309. Where certain
+"persons were apprehended for gaming and they escaped from police custody, it was"
+held by the Supreme Court that this section was not applicable because they were
+neither charged nor convicted of any offence and that the conviction should have been
+under section 224.310.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"300. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"301. Ins. by Act 10 of 1886, section 23."
+"302. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+303. Ibid.
+"304. The words ""or under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881,"" omitted by Act 3 of 1951, section 3"
+and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951).
+"305. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+306. Ibid.
+"307. Easwaramurthi, (1944) 71 IA 83 , 46 Bom LR 844, (1945) Mad 237."
+"308. Anadharaj v State of TN, (2000) 9 SCC 45 : JT 2000 (3) SC 368 : 2000 AIR (SCW) 4957;"
+(2000) 1 SCC (Cr) 1154.
+"309. Deo Baksh Singh, (1942) 18 Luck 617 ."
+"310. Ajab v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 827 : 1989 Cr LJ 954 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 601 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+311.[s 216A] Penalty for harbouring robbers or dacoits.
+"Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that any persons are about to commit"
+"or have recently committed robbery or dacoity, harbours them or any of them, with the"
+intention of facilitating the commission of such robbery or dacoity or of screening
+"them or any of them from punishment, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment"
+"for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+Explanation.—For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether the robbery or
+"dacoity is intended to be committed, or has been committed, within or without 312."
+[India].
+Exception.—This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is by the
+husband or wife of the offender.]
+COMMENT.—
+"This section enables the Court to inflict enhanced punishment, where the persons"
+harboured are robbers or dacoits or where they intended to commit robbery or dacoity.
+Where a person charged with the substantive offence of dacoity or robbery has been
+"acquitted of that offence, another person who is said to have intended to screen him"
+from legal punishment in respect of that offence cannot be held guilty of harbouring
+the alleged offender under this section.313.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"311. Ins. by Act 3 of 1894, section 8."
+"312. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"313. Subramanya Ayyar, (1947) Mad 793.See for acquittal under section 216A, acquitted on"
+"fact, State of Madhya Pradesh v Veeru Singh, 2010Cr LJ 2896 (MP)"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 216B] [Repealed]
+"314.[***] Definition of ""harbour"" in sections 212, 216 and 216A. [Repealed by Indian"
+"Penal Co de (Amendment) Act, 1942 (VIII of 1942), section 3]."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"314. Ins. by Act 3 of 1894, section 8."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 217] Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person
+from punishment or property from forfeiture.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the"
+"way in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant, intending thereby to"
+"save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal"
+"punishment, or subject him to a less punishment than that to which he is liable, or"
+"with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from"
+"forfeiture or any charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section and the three following sections deal with disobedience on the part of
+public servants in respect of official duty.
+This section punishes intentional disobedience of any direction of law on the part of a
+"public servant to save a person from punishment. It is not necessary to show that, in"
+"point of fact, the person so intended to be saved had committed an offence, or was"
+justly liable to legal punishment. A public servant charged under this section is equally
+"liable to be punished, although the intention, which he had of saving any person from"
+"legal punishment, was founded upon a mistaken belief as to that person's liability to"
+punishment.315.
+[s 217.1] 'Legal punishment'
+does not include departmental punishment.316.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"315. Amiruddeen v State, (1878) 3 Cal 412 , 413.See Anup Singh v State of HP, AIR 1995 SC 1941"
+; 1995 Cr LJ 3223 (SC) in which conviction under the section upheld by SC
+"316. Jungle v State, (1873) 19 WR (Cr) 40."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 218] Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save
+person from punishment or property from forfeiture.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, and being as such public servant, charged with the"
+"preparation of any record or other writing, frames that record or writing in a manner"
+"which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he"
+"will thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or to any person, or with intent thereby"
+"to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal"
+"punishment, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any"
+"property from forfeiture or other charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or"
+"with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section deals with intentional preparation by a public servant of a false record with
+the object of saving or injuring any person or property. The correctness of the record is
+of the highest importance to both the State and the public. The intention with which the
+public servant does the act mentioned in the section is an essential ingredient of the
+offence punishable under it.
+[s 218.1] Ingredients.—
+1. Accused was a public servant;
+2. He was entrusted with preparation of any record or writing in his capacity as
+public servant;
+"3. He framed the record and writing incorrectly,"
+"4. He did it intentionally,"
+5. He did so with the intention or knowledge that it will—
+"(i) cause loss or injury to someone,"
+"(ii) Save any person from legal punishment and,"
+(iii) Save from property from forfeiture or other charges.317.
+In order to sustain the conviction for making an incorrect entry in a record it is not
+sufficient that the entries are incorrect but it is essential that the entry should have
+been made with the intention to cause injury.318.
+"It is not necessary that the incorrect document should be submitted to another person,"
+or otherwise used by the writer.
+A public servant commits the offence punishable under this section even if the person
+whom he intends to save from legal punishment is himself.319.
+[s 218.2] Actual commission of offence not necessary.—
+The actual guilt or innocence of the alleged offender is immaterial if the accused
+believes him guilty and intends to screen him.320.
+The Supreme Court has held that if a police-officer has made a false entry in his diary
+and manipulated other records with a view to save the accused from legal punishment
+"that might be inflicted upon him, the mere fact that the accused was subsequently"
+acquitted of the offence cannot make it any the less an offence under this section.321.
+[s 218.3] CASES.—
+Where the accused increased the marks of particular persons for pecuniary benefits
+during the course of preparing final record for appointment of physical education
+"teacher, it is held that the offence alleged is clearly made out.322."
+[s 218.4] Public servant framing incorrect record to save any person from legal
+punishment.—
+"A Superintendent of Police gave a warrant under the Gambling Act, 1867 to D, a Sub-"
+"Inspector, to arrest persons found gambling in a certain house. In order to save the"
+persons from the legal punishment for having committed an offence under the
+"Gambling Act, 1867 in that house, D framed a first information and a special diary"
+"incorrectly. It was held that he was properly charged with, and found guilty of, having"
+committed an offence under this section.323. A report of the commission of a dacoity
+was made at a police station. The police-officer in charge of the station took down the
+"report which was made to him, but subsequently destroyed the report and framed"
+another and a false report of the commission of a totally different offence to which he
+"obtained the signature of the complainant, and which he endeavoured to pass off as"
+the original and correct report made to him by the complainant. It was held that the
+police-officer was guilty of offences punishable under sections 204 and 218.324. Where
+it was proved that the accused's intention in making a false report was to stave off the
+discovery of the previous fraud and save himself or the actual perpetrator of that fraud
+"from legal punishment, it was held that he was guilty of this offence.325. Under this"
+"section, substitution of one leaf by another so as to omit a given entry from the page"
+substituted is penal.326. Where a Sub-Inspector in his capacity as public servant
+wrongly prepared certain notes in order to concoct a false defence for himself and his
+"colleagues, he was to be convicted under section 218, IPC, 1860.327. Where, however,"
+the main offence remains unproved the accused is entitled to have the benefit of doubt
+"in regard to the offence under section 218, IPC, 1860.328."
+[s 218.5] Section 218 and section 192—Difference.—
+"The offence of section 218 IPC, 1860 is not a minor offence included within section"
+"192. There is some resemblance between sections 192 and 218 IPC, 1860, because"
+both deal with the preparation of a false record. There the resemblance ceases.
+Whereas in section 192 the record is prepared for use in a judicial proceeding with the
+"intention that an erroneous opinion be formed regarding a material point, the offence in"
+section 218 is the preparation of a false record by a public servant with the intention of
+saving or injuring any person or property.329.
+"[s 218.6] Bar under section 195 Cr PC, 1973 not applicable, private complaint"
+can be filed.—
+Section 218 is a distinct offence which can be proceeded against without the bar of
+section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There could be a private complaint in
+"respect of an offence under section 218 IPC, 1860.330."
+"[s 218.7] Sanction under section 197 Cr PC, 1973.—"
+Issuing false certificate by the Deputy Civil Surgeon cannot be an official act and as
+such no sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is required.331.
+But in a particular case332. the Calcutta High Court took an opposite view and quashed
+"the proceedings under section 218 IPC, 1860 holding that in the absence of sanction,"
+the proceeding cannot be continued.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"317. Jayanta Mukherjee v State of West Bengal, 2009 Cr LJ 4178 (Cal)."
+"318. Raghubansh Lal, (1957) 1 All 368 : AIR 1957 SC 486 [LNIND 1957 SC 21] : 1957 Cr LJ 595"
+"319. Nand Kishore v State, (1897) 19 All 305 , overruling Gauri Shankar, (1883) 6 All 42 ."
+"320. Hurdut Surma, (1967) 8 WR (Cr) 68."
+"321. Maulud Ahmad, (1964) 2 Cr LJ 71 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 38 ."
+"322. Rakesh Kumar Chhabra v State of H P, 2012 Cr LJ 354 (HP)."
+"323. Deodhar Singh, (1899) 27 Cal 144 ."
+"324. Muhammad Shah Khan, (1898) 20 All 307 ."
+"325. Girdhari Lal, (1886) 8 All 633 ."
+"326. Madan Lal v Inderjit, AIR 1970 P&H 200 ."
+"327. Sarju Singh, 1978 Cr LJ NOC 286 (All)."
+"328. Natarajan Narayan Kurup, 1982 Cr LJ NOC 69 (Ker). See also DV Venkateswara Rao v State"
+"of AP, 1997 Cr LJ 919 (AP)."
+"329. Kamla Prasad Singh v Hari Nath Singh, AIR 1968 SC 19 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] : 1967 (3) SCR"
+828 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] : 1968 Cr LJ 86 .
+"330. Kamla Prasad Singh v Hari Nath Singh, AIR 1968 SC 19 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] : 1967 (3) SCR"
+828 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] : 1968 Cr LJ 86 .
+"331. D V Venkateswara Rao v State of AP, 1997 Cr LJ 919 ; Dr Z U Ahmad v State of UP, 1998 Cr"
+LJ 2100 (All).
+"332. Jayanta Mukherjee v State of West Bengal, 2009 Cr LJ 4178 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 219] Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report etc.
+contrary to law.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces in any"
+"stage of a judicial proceeding, any report, order, verdict, or decision which he knows"
+"to be contrary to law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section should be read in conjunction with section 77. It contemplates some wilful
+"excess of authority, in other words, a guilty knowledge superadded to an illegal act."
+This section and the following one deal with corrupt or malicious exercise of the power
+vested in a public servant for a particular purpose. From the language of section 219
+"IPC, 1860, it is clear that when any public servant corruptly or maliciously makes or"
+"pronounces in any stage of judicial proceeding any report, order, verdict or decision"
+"which he knows to be contrary to law, shall be punished.333."
+[s 219.1] Case against judicial officers.—
+"In the present case, there was no allegation that any of the three respondents had"
+passed concerned orders corruptly or maliciously or knowing that they were contrary to
+law. Merely because the first order passed by the respondent No. 1 was set aside in the
+"revision filed by the petitioner, it cannot be inferred that respondent No. 1 had acted"
+corruptly or maliciously and that too knowing that it was contrary to law.334.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"333. Pravin Niwritti Sawant v Hon'ble Shri J B Anandgaonkar Saheb, 2008 Cr LJ 984 (Bom)."
+"334. Pravin Niwritti Sawant v Hon'ble Shri J B Anandgaonkar Saheb, 2008 Cr LJ 984 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 220] Commitment for trial or confinement by person having authority who
+knows that he is acting contrary to law.
+"Whoever, being in any office which gives him legal authority to commit persons for"
+"trial or to confinement, or to keep persons in confinement, corruptly or maliciously"
+"commits any person for trial or to confinement, or keeps any person in confinement,"
+"in the exercise of that authority knowing that in so doing he is acting contrary to law,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is a further extension of the principle laid down in the preceding section. It
+"is general in its application, whereas the last section applies to judicial officers. In order"
+to bring home the charge under the section it must next be shown that the accused
+corruptly or maliciously committed such person for trial or to confinement or kept him
+in confinement in exercise of that authority knowing that in so doing he was acting
+contrary to law. This analysis of the section by the Supreme Court occurs in a case in
+which a police constable made the victims to alight from a bus and took them to a
+nearby street. The Court said that at best it could amount to wrongful restraint but not
+"to wrongful confinement.335. Under section 220 IPC, 1860 it is necessary to establish"
+"that the officer, who committed any person for trial or to confinement, must have acted"
+corruptly or malicious and knowing that he was doing that act contrary to law.336.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"335. Suryamoorthy v Govindaswamy, 1989 Cr LJ 1451 : AIR 1989 SC 1410 [LNIND 1989 SC 232]"
+at p 1415 : (1989) 3 SCC 24 [LNIND 1989 SC 232] .
+"336. Pravin Niwritti Sawant v Hon'ble Shri J B Anandgaonkar Saheb, 2008 Cr LJ 984 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 221] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound
+to apprehend.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, legally bound as such public servant to apprehend or"
+to keep in confinement any person charged with or liable to apprehended for an
+"offence, intentionally omits to apprehend such person, or intentionally suffers such"
+"person to escape, or intentionally aids such person in escaping or attempting to"
+"escape from such confinement, shall be punished as follows, that is to say:—"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,"
+"with or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been"
+"apprehended, was charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, an offence"
+punishable with death; or
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,"
+"with or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been"
+"apprehended, was charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, an offence"
+punishable with 337.[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment for a term which may
+extend to ten years; or
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years,"
+"with or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been"
+"apprehended, was charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, an offence"
+punishable with imprisonment for a term less than ten years.
+COMMENT.—
+"Sections 221, 222 and 223 provide for intentional omission to apprehend, or negligently"
+"suffering the escape of, offenders on the part of public servant bound to apprehend or"
+to keep in confinement.
+[s 221.1] CASE.—
+Where a constable acting as a Court Moharrir instead of sending the accused to jail
+custody as ordered by the Magistrate directed his release and thus allowed him to
+"escape, it was held that the release being in violation of his legal obligation to have the"
+"accused detained in jail custody, the Moharrir was clearly liable under section 221, IPC,"
+1860.338. Accused was entrusted with escort duty for the convict to the Hospital.
+Convict was the younger brother of accused's wife. Accused allowed him to escape
+"from Custody. The Karnataka High Court upheld the conviction under sections 221, 222"
+and 223.339.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"337. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"338. Rampal, 1979 Cr LJ 711 : AIR 1979 SC 1184 ."
+"339. Younus Khan v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 1040 (Kar)"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 222] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound
+to apprehend person under sentence or lawfully committed.
+"Whoever, being a public servant, legally bound as such public servant to apprehend or"
+to keep in confinement any person under sentence of a Court of Justice for any
+"offence 340.[or lawfully committed to custody], intentionally omits to apprehend such"
+"person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape or intentionally aids such"
+"person in escaping or attempting to escape from such confinement, shall be punished"
+"as follows, that is to say:—"
+with 341.[imprisonment for life] or with imprisonment of either description for a term
+"which may extend to fourteen years, with or without fine, if the person in confinement,"
+"or who ought to have been apprehended, is under sentence of death; or"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,"
+"with or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been"
+"apprehended, is subject, by a sentence of a Court of Justice, or by virtue of a"
+"commutation of such sentence, to 342.[imprisonment for life] 343.[***] 344.[***] 345."
+[***] 346.[***] or imprisonment for a term of ten years or upwards; or
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or"
+"with fine, or with both, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been"
+"apprehended is subject, by a sentence of a Court of Justice, to imprisonment for a"
+term not exceeding to ten years [or if the person was lawfully committed to custody].
+COMMENT.—
+This section is similar to the last section with the exception that the person to be
+apprehended has already been convicted or committed for an offence. It is thus an
+aggravated form of the offence made punishable by the last section.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"340. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 8."
+"341. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 April"
+1956).
+342. Ibid.
+"343. The words ""or penal servitude for life"" omitted by Act 17 of 1949, section 2 (w.e.f. 6 April"
+1949).
+"344. The words ""or to"" omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch II (w.e.f. 17 September"
+1957).
+"345. The word ""transportation"" omitted by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"346. The words ""or penal servitude"" omitted by Act 17 of 1949, section 2 (w.e.f. 6 April 1949)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 223] Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public
+servant.
+"Whoever, being a public servant legally bound as such public servant to keep in"
+confinement any person charged with 347.[or convicted of any offence or lawfully
+"committed to custody], negligently suffers such person to escape from confinement,"
+shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section further extends the principle laid down in the two preceding sections. It
+punishes a public servant who negligently suffers any person charged with an offence
+to escape from confinement. The last two sections deal with intentional omission to
+apprehend such person.
+[s 223.1] Ingredients.—
+"In order to establish the charge under section 223, IPC, 1860 the following facts have to"
+be established:—
+(i) The accused was a public servant.
+(ii) As such public servant he was bound to keep in confinement any person.
+(iii) Such person was charged with or convicted of an offence or lawfully committed
+to custody.
+(iv) The accused suffered such person to escape.
+(v) The escape was due to the negligence of the public servant.348.
+[s 223.2] Lawful custody.—
+Unless the custody is lawful no offence under this section is committed. If a public
+"servant has no right to keep a person in custody, he is not guilty of allowing that person"
+to escape.349. Since the check post officer appointed under section 41(2) Bihar Sales
+Tax Act had no power to detain personnel or driver of a truck which contravened the
+"provisions of the Act, he could not be prosecuted for an offence under section 223, IPC,"
+"1860, for allowing detained person to escape especially because section 223 speaks of"
+"""confinement of persons charged with or convicted of any offence or lawfully"
+"committed to custody"". Even assuming that such a check post officer could detain a"
+"person, still he could not be prosecuted as detention was not synonymous with"
+confinement nor the persons escaping were charged or convicted of any offence.350. A
+constable who moved about in a market place with the prisoner whom he was
+"supposed to bring to the Court and he escaped, the case was held to be fit one for"
+imposing substantive punishment.351.
+This section applies only to cases where the person who is allowed to escape is in
+"custody for an offence, or has been committed to custody, and not to cases where"
+such person has merely been arrested under a civil process.352. The latter case would
+come under section 225A. Due to the negligence and carelessness of the police
+constable one accused escaped from police lock-up. It is proved that the petitioner was
+on duty at lock-up room when the accused escaped. Conviction is held proper.353.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"347. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 8."
+"348. Banshidhar Swain v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 1819 (Ori)."
+"349. Debi, (1907) 29 All 377 ."
+"350. Girja Shankar Sahay, 1972 Cr LJ 988 (Pat)."
+"351. Banshidhar Swain v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 1819 (Ori)."
+"352. Tafaullah v State, (1885) 12 Cal 190 ."
+"353. Gurdeep Singh v State of Punjab, 2009 Cr LJ 3745 (PH)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 224] Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension.
+Whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful
+apprehension of himself for any offence with which he is charged or of which he has
+"been convicted, or escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is"
+"lawfully detained for any such offence, 1 shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+Explanation.—The punishment in this section is in addition to the punishment for
+which the person to be apprehended or detained in custody was liable for the offence
+"with which he was charged, or of which he was convicted."
+COMMENT.—
+This and the section following relate to resistance or illegal obstruction offered to the
+lawful apprehension of any person. Sections 221–223 punish public servants who fail
+to apprehend or confine persons liable to be apprehended or confined.
+"Section 224, IPC, 1860 has two distinct parts. The first relates to resistance to"
+apprehension and the second part relates to escape from custody. In order to bring
+"home the guilt of the accused under first part, the prosecution is to prove the following"
+ingredients:—
+(1) that the accused was charged or convicted;
+(2) that he offered resistance or obstruction to his apprehension;
+(3) that such resistance or obstruction was illegal; and
+(4) that the accused offered such resistance or obstruction illegally.
+"When the offence charged is that of escape or attempt to escape from custody, the"
+prosecution is to prove the following:
+(1) that the accused was taken into custody for commission of an offence;
+(2) that such detention in custody was lawful;
+(3) that the accused escaped from such custody or made an attempt to do so; and
+(4) that the accused did so intentionally.354.
+1. 'Escapes...from any custody in which he is lawfully detained for any such offence'.—
+Escape must be from the custody in which the person escaping has been detained
+"legally. A person of the same name as the offender was arrested, tried and acquitted."
+Whilst under arrest he escaped from custody. It was held that he was not liable to be
+convicted under this section because he was not lawfully detained for any offence.355.
+It is only after a person has been arrested that the question of custody arises merely
+because the person was brought to the thana for the purpose of interrogation it could
+"not be said that he was under lawful custody, even though two constables might be"
+sitting by his side.356. Where certain persons were apprehended for gaming and they
+"escaped from police custody, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that they could"
+have been convicted under this section.357. Where the accused attacked the police
+personnel and rescued a person from the legal custody of the police but the person
+"rescued neither resisted the arrest nor joined in the attack, he could only be convicted"
+under section 224 for taking advantage of his release.358. Where an accused lawfully
+"arrested escaped after causing a knife injury to the Head Constable, he was guilty"
+under section 224 and his friends who pelted stones at the police party with a view to
+"rescue him were guilty under section 225, IPC, 1860.359."
+[s 224.1] Explanation.—
+The Explanation does not require that a sentence of imprisonment must be made to
+run consecutively to a sentence imposed for the main offence of which the accused
+has been convicted.360.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"354. State of Orissa v Purna Chandra Jena, 2005 Cr LJ 505 (Ori)."
+"355. Ganga Charan Singh, (1893) 21 Cal 337 ; People's Union for Civil Liberties v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 2138 (Bom)."
+"356. Maheswar v State of UP, (1953) Cut 751.; 2003 Cr LJ 3663 (Bom)."
+"357. Ajab v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 827 : 1989 Cr LJ 954 : 1989 Supp (1) 601 ."
+"358. Prithvi Nath Pandey v State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 3623 (All)."
+"359. Vaghari Kala Bhikha, 1985 Cr LJ 237 (Guj)."
+"360. Chokhu, (1934) 36 Bom LR 963 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 225] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another person.
+Whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful
+"apprehension of any other person for an offence, or rescues or attempts to rescue any"
+other person from any custody in which that person is lawfully detained for an
+"offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;"
+"or, if the person to be apprehended, or the person rescued or attempted to be rescued,"
+is charged with or liable to be apprehended for an offence punishable with 361.
+"[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+"or, if the person to be apprehended or the person attempted to be rescued, is charged"
+"with or liable to be apprehended for an offence punishable with death, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+"or, if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is liable"
+"under the sentence of a Court of Justice, or by virtue of a commutation of such a"
+"sentence, to 362.[imprisonment for life] 363.[***] 364.[***] 365.[***]or imprisonment, for"
+"a term of ten years or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine;
+"or, if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is under"
+"sentence of death, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+Persons who offer resistance or illegal obstruction to the apprehension of other
+persons who have committed offences are punishable under this section. The
+preceding section punishes the offenders themselves. Section 130 deals with rescuing
+"a prisoner of State or war and section 186, with rescuing in any other case."
+'Rescue' is the act of forcibly freeing a person from custody against the will of those
+who have him in custody.366. It has no application to a person who is in lawful custody
+and who has offered no resistance or obstruction.367. It is also not necessary that the
+rescuing should be done intentionally for in the second part of this section the word
+"""intentionally"" has been deliberately omitted. Thus where a person even in order to"
+pacify a situation released an accused from the lawful custody of the chowkidar by
+"untying the turban with which the accused had been tied, it was held that the person so"
+"releasing the accused was clearly guilty of an offence under section 225, IPC, 1860, for"
+rescuing an offender from lawful custody.368.
+One can be held guilty for an offence under section 225 if he rescues a person who
+"was detained lawfully. Here the word 'rescue' though not defined in the Code, will"
+always mean an act of getting a person free forcibly from custody against the will of
+"person in whose lawful custody he was. Therefore, some overt act needs to be there, if"
+one is said to have rescued a person from the lawful custody.369.
+Where the accused obstructed the lawful apprehension of a person and wrongfully
+confined two police personnel and the evidence of the prosecution was amply
+"corroborated and supported by medical evidence, conviction and sentence of the"
+"accused under sections 225, 332 and 342 was upheld.370. The act for which the person"
+rescued is detained must amount to an offence under the Code. Thus an escape from
+custody when being taken before a Magistrate for the purpose of being bound over to
+"be of good behaviour,371. or an escape from arrest under section 41(2), Criminal"
+"Procedure Code,372. will not fall under this section. If the apprehension is not lawful the"
+person resisting it will not be guilty of any offence.373.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"361. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+362. Ibid.
+"363. The words ""or to"" omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch II (w.e.f. 17 September"
+1957).
+"364. The word ""transportation"" omitted by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"365. The words ""penal servitude"" omitted by Act 17 of 1949, section 2 (w.e.f. 6 April 1949)."
+"366. Vaghari Kala Bhikha, 1985 Cr LJ 237 (Guj)."
+"367. Salim, 1972 Cr LJ 1454 (Guj)."
+"368. Awadhesh Mahato, 1979 Cr LJ 1275 (Pat)."
+"369. Radha Sah v State of Jharkhand, 2007 Cr LJ 2805 (Jha)."
+"370. Prithvi Nath Pandey v State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 3623 (All)."
+"371. Shasti Churn Napit, (1882) 8 Cal 331 ."
+"372. Kandhaia, (1884) 7 All 67 ."
+"373. PB Gosain v State, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 91 ; Kunju Kunju, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 437 . Matha Yadav v State"
+"of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 2819 : AIR 2002 SC 2137 [LNIND 2002 SC 359] , the accused was caught"
+red-handed when he was uprooting the crops of the victim's family. They refused to release him
+"till he was brought before the village panchayat, They were not intending to hand him over to"
+police. It was held that their conviction under section 225 was not possible.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+"[s 225A] Omission to apprehend or sufferance of escape, on part of public"
+"servant, in cases not otherwise provided for."
+"[Whoever, being a public servant legally bound as such public servant to apprehend, or"
+"to keep in confinement, any person in any case not provided for in section 221,"
+"section 222 or section 223, or in any other law for the time being in force, omits to"
+"apprehend that person or suffers him to escape from confinement, shall be punished"
+—
+"(a) if he does so intentionally, with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and"
+"(b) if he does so negligently, with simple imprisonment for a term which may"
+"extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.]"
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes intentional or negligent omission to apprehend on the part of a
+"public servant not coming within the purview of sections 221, 222 or 223."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+"[s 225B] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension, or escape or"
+"rescue, in cases not otherwise provided for."
+"[Whoever, in any case not provided for in section 224 or section 225 or in any other"
+"law for the time being in force, intentionally offers any resistance or illegal"
+"obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself or of any other person, or escapes"
+"or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, or rescues 1"
+or attempts to rescue any other person from any custody in which that person is
+"lawfully detained, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.]"
+COMMENT.—
+This section is intended to meet cases not covered by section 224 or section 225.
+"Under section 225 a person, escaping from custody when being taken before a"
+"Magistrate for the purpose of being bound over to be of good behaviour, or escaping"
+from a jail in which he is confined by reason of his having failed to furnish security to
+"be of good behaviour,374. cannot be punished; under this section he can."
+There must be an overt act of resistance or obstruction. If a person runs away to avoid
+"an arrest, his act does not amount to resistance or obstruction.375."
+The apprehension or detention must be lawful. If the warrant is defective the rescue of
+the person arrested under such warrant is no offence under this section. The liberty of
+"the subject cannot be trifled with, and every person can require by right that the Court"
+ordering his arrest shall observe the law.376.
+1. 'Rescues'.—Rescuing indicates some positive overt act on the part of the accused by
+which the liberation of the person arrested is effected.377.
+[s 225B.1] CASES.—
+"Resistance to arrest without warrant justifiable.—An arrest by a police-officer, without"
+notifying the substance of the warrant to the person against whom the warrant is
+"issued, as required by section 80 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is not a lawful arrest,"
+"and resistance to such an arrest is no offence under this section.378. A person, about to"
+"be arrested, is entitled to know under what power the constable is arresting him and, if"
+"he specifies a certain power which the person knows the constable has not got, he is"
+"entitled to object to such arrest and escape from custody, such custody not being a"
+lawful one. For a charge of escaping from lawful custody the prosecution must first
+establish that the constable who arrested the man had power to act under the specific
+authority that he claimed to have.379.
+[s 225B.2] Resistance to improper warrant justifiable.—
+A person cannot be arrested under sections 225B and 353 when the warrant attempted
+to be executed was addressed to the person with a wrong description to which he did
+"not answer,380. or when it was illegal owing to want of the seal of the Court,381. or"
+"when it did not contain the name of the person to be arrested,382. or for any other"
+"defect.383. But even if a Court has wrongly exercised its discretion in issuing a warrant,"
+an accused escaping from the custody of the peon apprehending him or obstructing
+"his apprehension would be guilty under this section.384. This is, however, not to say"
+"that an outright illegality in issuing the warrant too would have no consequence. Thus,"
+where the warrant was signed by a sheristadar who had no authority to sign the
+"warrant, it was held by offering resistance to arrest under such an illegal warrant the"
+accused did not come under the mischief of this section.385.
+[s 225B.3] Escape must be from lawful custody.—
+"The accused was arrested by a Process-Server, and after the arrest he managed to"
+"escape from custody, went inside his house, shut himself up there, and refused to"
+"come out. It was held that an offence under section 186 was not established, but that"
+the accused was guilty of the offence of escaping from lawful custody under this
+section.386. But when the accused was merely requested by the Amin of the Civil Court
+to accompany him to the Court and the accused was not informed that he was being
+"put under arrest, it was held that the accused committed no offence under this section"
+by refusing to accompany the Amin.387.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"374. Muli v State, (1920) 43 All 185 ."
+"375. Annaudin, (1923) 1 Ran 218."
+"376. Fattu, (1932) 55 All 109 , 111, 112."
+"377. Thangal, AIR 1961 Ker 331 [LNIND 1960 KER 261] ."
+"378. Satish Chandra Rai v Jodu Nandan Singh, (1899) 26 Cal 748 ."
+"379. Appasami Mudaliar, (1924) 47 Mad 442."
+"380. Debi Singh, (1901) 28 Cal 399 ."
+"381. Mahajan Sheikh, (1914) 42 Cal 708 ."
+"382. Jogendra Nath Laskar v Hiralal, (1924) 51 Cal 902 ."
+"383. Gokal v State, (1922) 45 All 142 ; Gaman, (1913) PR No. 16 of 1913; Muhammad Baksh,"
+(1904) PR No. 16 of 1904.
+"384. Puna Mahton, (1932) 11 Pat 743."
+"385. I Venkayya v State, 1973 Cr LJ 245 (AP). See also Subbramaniah, AIR 1934 Mad 206 [LNIND"
+1934 MAD 4] .
+"386. Jamna Das, (1927) 9 Lah 214."
+"387. Heer Singh, AIR 1961 Raj 156 [LNIND 1960 RAJ 162] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 226] [Omitted]
+"[* * *] [Omitted]. [by Act XXVI of 1955, section 117 and Sch.]"
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 227] Violation of condition of remission of punishment.
+"Whoever, having accepted any conditional remission of punishment, knowingly"
+"violates any condition on which such remission was granted, shall be punished with"
+"the punishment to which he was originally sentenced, if he has already suffered no"
+"part of that punishment, and if he has suffered any part of that punishment, then with"
+so much of that punishment as he has not already suffered.
+COMMENT.—
+This section deals with those cases in which remission of punishment is made
+conditional by Government under section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
+"Section 227 of the IPC, 1860 makes it a specific offence on the part of any person who"
+has accepted any conditional remission of punishment if he knowingly violates any
+condition on which such remission was granted. In other words while the Code of
+Criminal Procedure envisages arrest of a person who violates the conditions of
+"remission and remand straightway to jail, section 227 of the IPC, 1860 envisages for"
+"the same act of violation of conditions, prosecution and the punishment, if the"
+"prosecution succeeds, is the same, as the consequence contemplated under section"
+"432 (3), namely, remanding of the person concerned for the rest of his term.388."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"388. Krishnan Nair v State, 1983 Cr LJ 87 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 228] Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial
+proceeding.
+"Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public"
+"servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall"
+"be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or"
+"with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+STATE AMENDMENT
+"Andhra Pradesh.— Offence under section 228 is cognizable. [Vide A.P.G.O. Ms. No. 732,"
+"dated 5th December, 1991]."
+COMMENT.—
+The object of this section is to punish a person who intentionally insults in any way the
+Court administering justice. It lays down the highest sentence that can be inflicted for
+contempt of Court. By a notification under section 10(1) of The Criminal Law
+"Amendment Act, 1932 the State Government can make an offence under section 228,"
+"IPC, 1860, a cognizable offence for a specified area for such time as the notification"
+"remains in force. No Court shall take cognizance of the offence under section 228,"
+"when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any"
+"proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of that Court by such officer"
+"of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court"
+to which that Court is sub-ordinate.389.
+[s 228.1] Ingredients.—
+"The essential ingredients of the offence under this section are— (1) intention, (2) insult"
+or interruption to a public servant and (3) the public servant insulted or interrupted
+must be sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding.390. The fact that the Court feels
+insulted is no reason for holding that any insult is intended.391.
+The whole sitting of a Court for the disposal of judicial work from the opening to the
+"rising of the Court is a judicial proceeding, and the necessary interval between the"
+conclusion of one case and the opening of another is a stage in a judicial
+proceeding.392.
+"Acts, such as rude and contumelious behaviour, obstinacy, perverseness, prevarication,"
+"or refusal to answer any lawful question, breach of the peace or any wilful disturbance"
+"whatever, will amount to contempt of Court."
+If the offence of contempt of Court is summarily dealt with under section 345 of the
+"Criminal Procedure Code, the maximum punishment that can be imposed is fine not"
+exceeding Rs. 200.
+The offence under the section is not punishable as contempt of Court. The definition of
+"""criminal contempt"" in section 2(c) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 includes acts"
+"which constitute an offence under section 228, IPC, 1860 and also goes beyond such"
+"acts, being wider than section 228.393."
+[s 228.2] CASES.—Contempt.—
+A person persisting in putting irrelevant and vexatious questions to a witness after
+"warning;394. a person making an impertinent threat to a witness in the box,395. a"
+person sentenced to two hours' imprisonment and ordered to be kept in custody
+"insulting the Judge in the grossest manner;396. a person calling the trial Judge as ""a"
+"prejudiced judge;""397. a person stating in an application for transfer of a case that the"
+Court had become hostile to him;398. and a person insisting upon staying in the Court
+room after the presiding officer of the Court had asked him to leave the Court and after
+"he had been warned that action for contempt of Court would be taken against him,399."
+were all held guilty of contempt of Court under this section. A Commissioner appointed
+by the Court being a public servant a person who intentionally insults or interrupts him
+"while he is sitting in a judicial proceeding commits an offence under section 228, IPC,"
+"1860, and should be punished under that section and not under section 345, Cr PC,"
+1973.400. Hurling of shoes by an Advocate at the presiding officer of the Court was
+contempt. Where the party to a case shouted inside a Court room in offensive language
+as the presiding officer told that after filing of the rejoinder by the opposite party
+"arguments were closed, summary contempt proceedings under section 480 (now"
+"section 345) Cr PC, 1973, read with section 228, IPC, 1860, were fully justified though in"
+view of the written apology tendered then and there the party should not be convicted
+"under section 228, IPC, 1860.401."
+[s 228.3] Refusal to answer question.—
+Prevarication by a witness and refusal to answer a question amount to intentional
+interruption within the meaning of the section.402.
+[s 228.4] No contempt.—
+A person leaving the Court when ordered to remain;403. or making signs from outside
+to a prisoner on his trial;404. a person listening to evidence after being told to leave the
+Court;405. a person using vulgar language for the purpose of emphasis;406. a person
+walking out of the Court without answering the question whether he had any
+witness;407. a person giving away in marriage a minor girl while she was in the custody
+of a guardian appointed by the Court;408. a person appearing as an assessor in Court
+dressed in a shirt and a cap;409. a person writing a letter to a Judge imputing an
+"unlawful act causing loss to him,410. and a pleader saying that he 'resented' the remark"
+"of the Court and that another remark was 'improper', and that a certain action of the"
+"Court was 'strange',411. were held to have committed no offence under this section."
+[s 228.5] Allocation of sitting accommodation in Court room.—
+"A litigant, conducting his case without the aid of counsel, was occupying the seat in the"
+Court room meant for the advocates while senior advocates were standing. He refused
+to vacate the seat when asked to do so by the presiding officer. His conviction under
+section 228 was upheld.412.
+[s 228.6] Free legal assistance.—
+It was held in Shrichand v State of MP that the right to free legal assistance has to be
+confined to the offences that are punishable with substantive sentence of
+imprisonment. The right to free legal assistance at the State cost could not be
+"extended to an offence under section 228, IPC, 1860 of which the accused was being"
+tried summarily because on conviction he could not have been visited with any
+substantive imprisonment.413.
+[s 228.7] Insult to Court.—
+Several accused persons faced a trial and were found guilty of various offences. One of
+"them, on hearing the judgment, addressed to the Court and uttered filthy abuses and"
+made contemptuous statements. The Court said that it amounted to an insult of the
+Court. The Court had jurisdiction under the section to punish the accused.414. Where
+an accused wrote a letter to the Magistrate asking him for the reasons as to why he
+"had returned the petition filed by him and also requested him, to give a copy of the"
+"document connected with the case, Magistrate found him to be guilty of offence under"
+"section 228, IPC, 1860. But the Madras High Court set aside the judgment by holding"
+that it may not be said that the letter has been received by the judicial officer when he
+"was in any stage of the proceedings in Court and, therefore, the offence under section"
+"228, IPC, 1860 is not be made out.415."
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"389. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10"
+SCC 664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : JT 2009 (12) SC
+485 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : 2009 (11) Scale 658 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"390. Revashankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] : (1958) Cr LJ 251 ."
+"391. Pranlal, 1966 Cr LJ 1087 ."
+"392. Salig Ram v State, (1898) PR No. 16 of 1897."
+"393. Daroga Singh v BK Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26 [LNIND 2004 SC 485] : 2004 Cr LJ 2084 : AIR"
+2004 SC 2579 [LNIND 2004 SC 485] .
+"394. Azeemoola, (1867) PR No. 44 of 1867."
+"395. Allu, (1922) 45 All 272 ."
+"396. Venkatasami, (1891) 15 Mad 131."
+"397. Venkatrao v State, (1922) 24 Bom LR 386 [LNIND 1922 BOM 43] , 46 Bom 973."
+"398. Narotam Das, (1943) All 186 ."
+"399. Rameshwar, 1960 Cr LJ 976 ."
+"400. CK Nanavati, 1978 Cr LJ 1040 (Guj)."
+"401. State of UP v Pateswari Prasad, 1980 Cr LJ NOC 1 (All)."
+"402. Jaimal Shravan, (1873) 10 BHC 69; Gopi Chand, (1917) PR No. 14 of 1918."
+403. (1870) 1 Weir 215.
+404. (1870) 1 Weir 214.
+"405. Papa Naiken, (1882) 1 Weir 217."
+406. (1880) 1 Weir 216.
+"407. Abdul Rahiman, (1899) 1 Weir 218."
+"408. Kaulashia, (1932) 12 Pat 1, the offence committed was disobedience of a lawful order."
+"409. Chhaganlal Ishwardas, (1933) 35 Bom LR 1025 ."
+"410. Subordinate Judge, Hoshangabad v Jawaharlal, (1941) Nag 304."
+"411. Hakumat Rai, (1942) 24 Lah 791."
+"412. Omana v State of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 687 (Ker). Another similar ruling is PC Jose v"
+"Nandakumar, AIR 1997 Ker 243 [LNIND 1993 KER 251] ."
+413. 1993 Cr LJ 495 (MP).
+"414. Ram Vishal Re, 1997 Cr LJ 3736 (MP)."
+"415. C R Rajasekaran, v Judicial Magistrate, Nagapattinam, 2003 Cr LJ 4024 (Mad)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+"416.[s 228A]— Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc."
+(1) Whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make known
+"the identity of any person against whom an 417.[offence under section 376, 418."
+"[section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA,"
+section 376DB] or section 376E] is alleged or found to have been committed
+(hereafter in this section referred to as the victim) shall be punished with
+imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years
+and shall also be liable to fine.
+(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publication of the name or
+any matter which may make known the identity of the victim if such printing or
+publication is—
+(a) by or under the order in writing of the officer-in-charge of the police
+station or the police officer making the investigation into such offence
+acting in good faith for the purposes of such investigation; or
+"(b) by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the victim; or"
+"(c) where the victim is dead or minor or of unsound mind, by, or with the"
+"authorisation in writing of, the next of kin of the victim:"
+Provided that no such authorisation shall be given by the next of kin to anybody
+"other than the chairman or the secretary, by whatever name called, of any"
+recognised welfare institution or organisation.
+"Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, ""recognised welfare"
+"institution or organisation"" means a social welfare institution or organisation"
+recognised in this behalf by the Central or State Government.
+(3) Whoever prints or publishes any matter in relation to any proceeding before a
+court with respect to an offence referred to in sub-section (1) without the
+previous permission of such Court shall be punished with imprisonment of
+either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be
+liable to fine.
+Explanation.—The printing or publication of the judgment of any High Court or
+the Supreme Court does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this
+section.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section has been introduced by The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1983, section 2"
+(43 of 1983) to prevent social victimisation or ostracism of the victim of a sexual
+offence.
+[s 228A.1] Exemption from prosecution.—
+A complaint was filed against the accused (petitioners) for the alleged disclosure of
+identity of the victim of a rape in their newspaper. The reply notice showed that the
+publication was made at the instance of a recognised welfare association. It was held
+that the petitioners were exempt from prosecution.419. Publishing the photographs of
+"rape victims in newspapers, journals and magazines would certainly fall under the"
+category of making disclosure of identity of victim and such act would fall under
+"section 228-A of IPC, 1860.420."
+[s 228A.2] Judgments.—
+"Section 228A IPC, 1860 makes disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences"
+punishable. Printing or publishing name of any matter which may make known the
+"identity of any person against whom an offence under sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C"
+or 376D is alleged or found to have been committed can be punished. Keeping in view
+the social object of preventing social victimisation or ostracism of the victim of a
+"sexual offence for which section 228A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that"
+"in the judgments, be it of the Supreme Court, High Court or lower Court, the name of"
+the victim should not be indicated.421.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"416. Ins. by Act 43 of 1983, section 2 (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"417. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 4 (w.e.f. 3"
+"February 2013) for ""offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C or"
+"section 376D""."
+"418. Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, section 3, for ""section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section"
+"376D"" (w.r.e.f. 21 April 2018)."
+"419. R Lakshmipathi v Ramalingam, 1998 Cr LJ 3683 (Mad)."
+"420. National Federation of Indian Women v Government of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 3385 (Mad)."
+"421. S Ramakrishna v State, (2009) 1 SCC 133 [LNIND 2008 SC 2066] : (2009) 1 SCC Cri 487 :"
+"AIR 2009 SC 885 [LNIND 2008 SC 2066] . See also Om Prakash v State of UP, 2006 Cr LJ 2913 :"
+"AIR 2006 SC 2214 [LNIND 2006 SC 382] : (2006) 9 SCC 787 [LNIND 2006 SC 382] , it would be"
+appropriate that the name of victim of rape should not be disclosed be it a judgment of the
+"Supreme Court, High Court or lower court. This is necessary to prevent victimisation or"
+"ostracism of the victim. To the same effect is Dinesh v State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cr LJ 1679 (SC),"
+"Bhupinder Sharma v State of HP, (2003) 8 SCC 551 . State of Karnataka v Puttaraja, (2004 (1) SCC"
+475) [LNIND 2003 SC 1033] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+[s 229] Personation of a Juror or Assessor.
+"Whoever, by personation or otherwise, shall intentionally cause, or knowingly suffer"
+"himself to be returned, empanelled or sworn as a juryman or assessor in any case in"
+"which he knows that he is not entitled by law to be so returned, empanelled or sworn,"
+"or knowing himself to have been so returned, empanelled or sworn contrary to law,"
+"shall voluntarily serve on such jury or as such assessor, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section was intended to punish personation of a juror or an assessor. It has now
+become obsolete with the abolition of assessor or jury system of trial.
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XI OF FALSE EVIDENCE AND OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC
+JUSTICE
+"Under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 offences relating to false evidence and offences"
+against public justice are contained in Chapter XI. In relation to proceeding in any
+"Court, the offences enumerated are: giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence"
+(sections 191–193); giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure
+conviction (sections 194 and 195); threatening any person to give false evidence
+(section 195A); using evidence known to be false (section 196); using as true a
+certificate known to be false (section 198); making a false statement in a declaration
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199); using as true any declaration
+"receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (section 200); causing disappearance of"
+"evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender (section 201);"
+intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform (section
+202); giving false information in respect of an offence (section 203); destruction of
+document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence (section 204);
+false personation (section 205); fraudulent removal/concealment of property (section
+206); fraudulent claim to property (section 207); fraudulently suffering or obtaining
+decree for sum not due (section 208 and section 210); dishonestly making a false
+claim in Court (section 209); and intentional insult or interruption to public servant
+sitting in judicial proceedings (section 228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure
+provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section
+172–188 (dealing with the contempt of the lawful authority of public servants) or
+"section 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have"
+"been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the"
+complaint in writing of that Court by such officer of the Court as that Court may
+"authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is"
+subordinate.1.
+422.[s 229-A] Failure by person released on bail or bond to appear in Court.
+"[Whoever, having been charged with an offence and released on bail or on bond"
+"without sureties, fails without sufficient cause (the burden of proving which shall lie"
+"upon him), to appear in Court in accordance with the terms of the bail or bond, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"one year, or with fine, or with both."
+Explanation.—The punishment under this section is—
+(a) in addition to the punishment to which the offender would be liable on a
+conviction for the offence with which he has been charged; and
+(b) without prejudice to the power of the Court to order forfeiture of the bond].
+COMMENT.—
+"Cr PC, 1973 (Amendment) Act 2005—clause 44.—This clause amends the IPC, 1860 as"
+"follows, namely:—"
+Under clause 37 an obligation is cast on the person released on bail or on bond to
+"appear and surrender to custody. In order to enforce this obligation, a new section 229-"
+"A is being inserted in the IPC, 1860 to prescribe punishment for those who fail to do so."
+[Notes on clauses.]
+"1. S Palani Velayutham v District Collector Tirunvelveli TN, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 401 : (2009) 10 SCC"
+664 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] : (2009) 12 SCR 1215 [LNIND 2009 SC 1659] .
+"422. Ins. by Cr PC, 1973. (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section 44(c) (w.e.f. 23 June"
+"2006 vide Notfn. No. SO 923(E), dated 21 June 2006."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 230] ""Coin"" defined."
+"1.[Coin is metal used for the time being as money, and stamped and issued by the"
+authority of some State or Sovereign Power in order to be so used.]
+Indian coin.
+2.[Indian coin is metal stamped and issued by the authority of the Government of
+India in order to be used as money; and metal which has been so stamped and
+"issued shall continue to be Indian coin for the purposes of this Chapter,"
+notwithstanding that it may have ceased to be used as money.]
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) Cowries are not coin.
+"(b) Lumps of unstamped copper, though used as money, are not coin."
+"(c) Medals are not coin, in as much as they are not intended to be used as money."
+(d) The coin denominated as the Company's rupee is 3.[Indian coin].
+"4.[(e) The ""Farukhabad rupee"" which was formerly used as money under the"
+authority of the Government of India is 5.[Indian coin] although it is no longer
+so used].
+COMMENT.—
+"In view of the definition of ""Indian coin"" in this section, it is immaterial whether the"
+coins are still current or they have ceased to be used as money.6.
+"1. Subs. by Act 19 of 1872, section 1, for the original first paragraph."
+"2. Subs. by A.O. 1950, for the former paragraph."
+"3. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Queen's coin""."
+"4. Ins. by Act 6 of 1896, section 1."
+"5. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Queen's coin""."
+"6. Ranchhod Mula v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 472 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 231] Counterfeiting coin.
+Whoever counterfeits or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting
+"coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation.—A person commits this offence who intending to practise deception, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised, causes a genuine coin"
+to appear like a different coin.
+COMMENT.—
+It is not necessary under this section that the counterfeit coin should be made with the
+primary intention of its being passed as genuine; it is sufficient if the resemblance to
+genuine coin is so close that it is capable of being passed as such.7. It is not essential
+for coins to be counterfeit that they should be of exact resemblances to genuine coins.
+It is sufficient that they are such as to cause deception and may be passed as
+genuine.8. But where the alleged counterfeit coins are such that none would be
+"deceived, these cannot be counterfeit coins within the meaning of this section.9."
+"7. Qadir Bakhsh, (1907) 30 All 93 ; Premsookh Dass, (1870) PR 38 of 1870."
+"8. Amrit Sonar, (1919) 4 PLJ 525 , 20 Cr LJ 439."
+"9. Ranchhod Mula v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 472 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 232] Counterfeiting Indian coin.
+"Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting"
+"10.[Indian coin], shall be punished with 11.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+The Code provides heavier punishment in cases of offences relating to Indian coin than
+those relating to foreign coins.12.
+The basic requirement for the prosecution to succeed against the accused in respect
+of counterfeiting coins is that the witnesses examined by the prosecution must speak
+of the manufacture of one coin resembling a genuine one. A presumption can also be
+drawn under Explanation 2 of section 28 that a person is counterfeiting coins when he
+causes one coin to resemble another so closely that the person intended to practice
+deception or knew it would be likely to cause deception. Section 232 prescribes the
+punishment for counterfeiting Indian coins. Section 235 prescribes the punishment for
+a person who is in possession of any instrument or material used for counterfeiting
+"coins. Thus, a conviction under sections 232 or 235 would be maintained only if the"
+prosecution satisfactorily proves the ingredients of section 28. The prosecution must
+establish that the coins manufactured resemble the original. It must also establish that
+"there is an intention to deceive, or the knowledge that deception would be caused by"
+such resemblance.13.
+'Counterfeiting' means causing one thing to resemble another.14.
+"10. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Queen's coin""."
+"11. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"12. Note I, p 134."
+"13. Shahid Sultan Khan v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 568 (Bom)."
+"14. Muhammad Husain, (1901) 23 All 420 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 233] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting coin.
+"Whoever makes or mends, or performs any part of the process of making or mending,"
+"or buys, sells or disposes of, any die or instrument, for the purpose of being used, or"
+"knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of"
+"counterfeiting coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.���
+In this as well as in the following sections mere acts of preparation towards the
+"offence of coining are made substantive offences, such as the making of dies or other"
+instruments used in the manufacture of coin.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 234] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting Indian coin.
+"Whoever makes or mends, or performs any part of the process of making or mending,"
+"or buys, sells or disposes of, any die or instrument, for the purpose of being used, or"
+"knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of"
+"counterfeiting 15.[Indian coin], shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+"15. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Queen's coin""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 235] Possession of instrument, or material for the purpose of using the"
+same for counterfeiting coin.
+"Whoever is in possession of any instrument or material, for the purpose of using the"
+"same for counterfeiting coin, or knowing or having reason to believe that the same is"
+"intended to be used for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+If Indian coin.
+"and if the coin to be counterfeited is 16.[Indian coin], shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+'Possession' connotes the intention to exercise power or control over the object
+possessed and therefore necessarily implies that the possessor has been conscious of
+the possibility of exercising that power or control. Mere possession of instruments and
+materials capable of counterfeiting coins is no offence. Possession of such
+instruments should be with the intention of counterfeiting coins and the intention must
+be proved. The onus of proving the fitness of the materials for the purpose of
+counterfeiting coins was upon the prosecution.17. The minimum that would be required
+for prosecution to establish a charge under sections 232 and 235 is that it establishes
+that the coins seized resembled the original and that the resemblance is such that it
+would deceive a person or that the accused knew that if the coin is used it would be
+likely to deceive a person. Unless there is intrinsic evidence on record to show that the
+"coins indeed resemble genuine coins, it is difficult to accept the case of the"
+prosecution.18.
+"16. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Queen's coin""."
+"17. Khadim Hussain, (1924) 5 Lah 392."
+"18. Shahid Sultan Khan v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 568 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 236] Abetting in India the counterfeiting out of India of coin.
+"Whoever, being within 19.[India], abets the counterfeiting of coin out of 20.[India], shall"
+be punished in the same manner as if he abetted the counterfeiting of such coin
+within 21.[India].
+COMMENT.—
+"Any person in India, whether an Indian or a foreigner, who supplied instruments or"
+"materials for the purpose of counterfeiting any coin, or assists in any other way, is"
+punishable under this section. Abetment in India must be complete.
+"19. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+20. Ibid.
+21. Ibid.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 237] Import or export of counterfeit coin.
+"Whoever imports into 22. [India], or exports therefrom, any counterfeit coin, knowing"
+"or having reason to believe that the same is counterfeit, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+"The offence under this and the following section consists in an import or export, of any"
+"coin known by the importer, or which he has reason to believe, to be counterfeit."
+"22. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 238] Import or export of counterfeits of Indian coin.
+"Whoever imports into 23.[India], or exports therefrom, any counterfeit coin, which he"
+"knows or has reason to believe to be a counterfeit of 24.[Indian coin], shall be"
+"punished with 25.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"23. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"24. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""the Queen's coin""."
+"25. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 239] Delivery of coin, possessed with knowledge that it is counterfeit."
+"Whoever, having any counterfeit coin, which at the time when he became possessed"
+"of it knew to be counterfeit, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed,"
+"delivers the same to any person, or attempts to induce any person to receive it shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"five years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section is directed against a person other than the coiner, who procures or obtains"
+"or receives counterfeit coin, and not to the offence committed by the coiner."
+Three classes of offences are created by sections 239–243:
+"(1) Delivery to another of coin, possessed with the knowledge that it is counterfeit"
+"(sections 239, 240)."
+"(2) Delivery to another of coin as genuine, which when first possessed, the deliverer"
+did not know to be counterfeit (section 241).
+(3) Possession of counterfeit coin by a person who knew it to be counterfeit when
+"he became possessed thereof (sections 242, 243)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 240] Delivery of Indian coin, possessed with knowledge that it is counterfeit."
+"Whoever, having any counterfeit coin which is a counterfeit of 26.[Indian coin], and"
+"which, at the time when he became possessed of it, he knew to be a counterfeit of 27."
+"[Indian coin], fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, delivers the"
+"same to any person, or attempts to induce any person to receive it shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence described in the
+last section. This section does not apply to the actual coiner.28. It must be established
+that the accused knew that the coins were counterfeit when he became possessed of
+them.29.
+"26. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen's coin""."
+27. Ibid.
+"28. Ahmad Shah, (1892) PR No. 10 of 1892."
+"29. Dost Mohammad, (1937) Nag 133."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 241] Delivery of coin as genuine, which, when first possessed, the deliverer"
+did not know to be counterfeit.
+"Whoever delivers to any other person as genuine, or attempts to induce any other"
+"person to receive as genuine, any counterfeit coin which he knows to be counterfeit,"
+but which he did not know to be counterfeit at the time when he took it into his
+"possession, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to two years, or with fine to an amount which may extend to ten"
+"times the value of the coin counterfeited, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, a coiner, delivers counterfeit Company's rupees to his accomplice B, for the purpose"
+"of uttering them. B sells the rupees to C, another utterer, who buys them knowing them"
+"to be counterfeit. C pays away the rupees for goods to D, who receives them, not"
+"knowing them to be counterfeit. D, after receiving the rupees, discovers that they are"
+counterfeit and pays them away as if they were good. Here D is punishable only under
+"this section, but B and C are punishable under section 239 or 240, as the case may be."
+COMMENT.—
+This section applies to a casual utterer of base coins. Section 239 deals with
+professional utterers.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 242] Possession of counterfeit coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit
+when he became possessed thereof.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of"
+"counterfeit coin, having known at the time when he became possessed thereof that"
+"such coin was counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+Mere possession of a counterfeit coin is an offence under this and the following
+"section, even though no attempt is made to pass it off, provided it was kept for a"
+fraudulent purpose and was originally obtained with guilty knowledge.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 243] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit when
+he became possessed thereof.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of"
+"counterfeit coin, which is a counterfeit of 30.[Indian coin], having known at the time"
+"when he became possessed of it that it was counterfeit, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+"For an offence under section 243, IPC, 1860, it has to be established by the prosecution"
+"that accused fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, came into"
+"possession of counterfeit coins which were counterfeit of Indian coins, having known"
+at the time he became possessed of them that they were counterfeit.31. Where the
+coins were not counterfeit coins but were in the process of being made counterfeit
+"coins, section 243 has no application.32."
+"30. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Queen's coin""."
+"31. Mohd Ibrahim v State, 1968 Cr LJ 1377 (Del)."
+"32. Ranchhod Mula v State, 1960 Cr LJ 472 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 244] Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law.
+"Whoever, being employed in any mint lawfully established in 33.[India], does any act,"
+"or omits what he is legally bound to do, with the intention of causing any coin issued"
+from that mint to be of a different weight or composition from the weight or
+"composition fixed by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+The object of this section is to secure purity of coinage and its exact conformity to the
+legal standard against the act or omission of person employed in mints. The law has
+fixed the weight and composition of various coins and has declared in what cases they
+shall be a legal tender.
+"33. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 245] Unlawfully taking coining instrument from mint.
+"Whoever, without lawful authority, takes out of any mint, lawfully established in 34."
+"[India], any coining tool or instrument, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+"34. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 246] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering composition
+of coin.
+Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly performs on any coin any operation which
+"diminishes the weight or alters the composition of that coin, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+Explanation.—A person who scoops out part of the coin and puts anything else into
+the cavity alters the composition of that coin.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 247] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering composition
+of Indian coin.
+Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly performs on any 35.[Indian coin] any operation
+"which diminishes the weight or alters the composition of that coin, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine.
+"35. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""any of the Queen's coin""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 248] Altering appearance of coin with intent that it shall pass as coin of
+different description.
+"Whoever performs on any coin any operation which alters the appearance of that coin,"
+"with the intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section refers to any operation which alters the appearance of a coin with the
+"intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description, e.g., gilding,"
+"silvering. If the weight of the coin is diminished, either section 246 or section 247"
+applies.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 249] Altering appearance of Indian coin with intent that it shall pass as coin
+of different description.
+Whoever performs on any 36.[Indian coin] any operation which alters the appearance
+"of that coin, with the intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different"
+"description, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"36. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""any of the Queen's coin""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 250] Delivery of coin possessed with knowledge that it is altered.
+"Whoever, having coin in his possession with respect to which the offence defined in"
+"section 246 or 248 has been committed, and having known at the time when he"
+became possessed of such coin that such offence had been committed with respect
+"to it, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, delivers such coin to any"
+"other person, or attempts to induce any other person to receive the same, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This and the following section are intended to punish persons who are traders in
+spurious or altered coins. They correspond to sections 239 and 240. There must be
+both possession with knowledge and fraudulent delivery.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 251] Delivery of Indian coin possessed with knowledge that it is altered.
+"Whoever, having coin in his possession with respect to which the offence defined in"
+"section 247 or 249 has been committed, and having known at the time when he"
+became possessed of such coin that such offence had been committed with respect
+"to it, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, delivers such coin to any"
+"other person, or attempts to induce any other person to receive the same, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 252] Possession of coin by person who knew it to be altered when he
+became possessed thereof.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of"
+coin with respect to which the offence defined in either of the section 246 or 248 has
+"been committed, having known at the time of becoming possessed thereof that such"
+"offence had been committed with respect to such coin, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+"Possession of debased or altered coin by the professional dealer, with fraudulent"
+intention is made punishable by this section. This and the next section resemble
+sections 242 and 243. Under sections 250 and 251 the accused is punished for
+"uttering, under this section and the next he is punished for possessing a coin in respect"
+of which the offence defined either in section 246 or section 247 has been committed.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 253] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be altered when he
+became possessed thereof.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of"
+coin with respect to which the offence defined in either of the section 247 or 249 has
+"been committed, having known at the time of becoming possessed thereof, that such"
+"offence had been committed with respect to such coin, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 254] Delivery of coin as genuine which, when first possessed, the deliverer"
+did not know to be altered.
+Whoever delivers to any other person as genuine or as a coin of a different description
+"from what it is, or attempts to induce any person to receive as genuine, or as a"
+"different coin from what it is, any coin in respect of which he knows that any such"
+"operation as that mentioned in section 246, 247, 248 or 249 has been performed, but"
+"in respect of which he did not, at the time when he took it into his possession, know"
+"that such operation had been performed, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine to an amount"
+which may extend to ten times the value of the coin for which the altered coin is
+"passed, or attempted to be passed."
+COMMENT.—
+Section 241 corresponds to this section. Where possession is acquired innocently but
+on subsequent knowledge that the coin is counterfeit if a person passes it off or
+"attempts to pass it off as a genuine coin, he will be punished under this section."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 255] Counterfeiting Government stamp.
+"Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of"
+"counterfeiting, any stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be"
+"punished with 37.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+Explanation.—A person commits this offence who counterfeits by causing a genuine
+stamp of one denomination to appear like a genuine stamp of a different
+denomination.
+COMMENT.—
+This and the remaining sections of the Chapter deal with offences relating to
+"Government stamps. These stamps are impressions upon paper, parchment, or any"
+"material used for writing, made by the Government mostly for the purpose of revenue."
+A stamp does not cease to be a stamp because it is cancelled. A person selling a
+"forged stamp, although it bears a cancellation mark commits an offence of selling"
+forged stamps.38.
+"37. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"38. Lowden, (1914) 1 KB 144 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 256] Having possession of instrument or material for counterfeiting
+Government stamp.
+Whoever has in his possession any instrument or material for the purpose of being
+"used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the"
+purpose of counterfeiting any stamp issued by Government for the purpose of
+"revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section resembles section 235.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 257] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting Government stamp.
+"Whoever makes or performs any part of the process of making, or buys, or sells, or"
+"disposes of, any instrument for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having"
+"reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting any"
+"stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section corresponds to section 234.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 258] Sale of counterfeit Government stamp.
+"Whoever, sells, or offers for sale, any stamp which he knows or has reason to believe"
+"to be a counterfeit of any stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 259] Having possession of counterfeit Government stamp.
+Whoever has in his possession any stamp which he knows to be a counterfeit of any
+"stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, intending to use, or dispose"
+"of the same as a genuine stamp, or in order that it may be used as a genuine stamp,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section corresponds to section 243.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 260] Using as genuine a Government stamp known to be counterfeit.
+"Whoever uses as genuine any stamp, knowing it to be counterfeit of any stamp issued"
+"by Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+This section corresponds to section 254.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+"[s 261] Effacing writing from substance bearing Government stamp, or"
+"removing from document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to"
+Government.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the Government, removes or"
+"effaces from any substance, bearing any stamp issued by Government for the"
+"purpose of revenue, any writing or document for which such stamp has been used, or"
+removes from any writing or document a stamp which has been used for such writing
+"or document, in order that such stamp may be used for a different writing or"
+"document, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section may be compared with sections 246 and 248. It punishes (1) the effacing
+"of a writing from a stamp, and (2) removing of a stamp from a document."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 262] Using Government stamp known to have been before used.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the Government, uses for any"
+"purpose a stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, which he knows"
+"to have been before used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Under this section the fraudulent use of a stamp already used is made punishable.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 263] Erasure of mark denoting that stamp has been used.
+"Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to Government, erases or removes"
+"from a stamp issued by the Government for the purpose of revenue, any mark, put or"
+"impressed upon such stamp for the purpose of denoting that the same has been used,"
+or knowingly has in his possession or sells or disposes of any such stamp from which
+"such mark has been erased or removed, or sells or disposes of any such stamp which"
+"he knows to have been used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes (1) erasure or removal of a mark denoting that a stamp has been
+"used, (2) knowingly possessing any such stamp, and (3) selling or disposing of any"
+such stamp.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO COIN AND GOVERNMENT
+STAMPS
+The offences described in this Chapter relate to (I) Coins and (II) Government Stamps.
+(I) Coins.—
+The offences relating to coins may be classified into three divisions:—
+"(1) Counterfeiting, (2) alteration, and (3) acts of mint employees."
+1. Counterfeiting—
+"(1) Counterfeiting coins (sections 231, 232)."
+"(2) Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting (sections 233, 234)."
+(3) Possession of instrument for counterfeiting (section 235).
+(4) Abetting in India the counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236).
+"(5) Importing or exporting of counterfeit coin (sections 237, 238)."
+"(6) Delivering counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 239, 240)."
+(7) Delivering counterfeit coin not known to be so when first possessed
+(section 241).
+"(8) Possession of counterfeit coin knowing it to be so (sections 242, 243)."
+2. Alteration—
+(1) Diminishing the weight or altering the composition of any coin (sections
+"246, 247)."
+(2) Altering appearance of any coin to pass it off as a different coin (sections
+"248, 249)."
+(3) Delivering coin possessed with the knowledge that it is altered (sections
+"250, 251)."
+"(4) Possessing altered coin knowing it to be so (sections 252, 253)."
+(5) Delivering altered coin which the deliverer did not know to be altered when
+first possessed (section 254).
+3. Acts of mint employees—
+(1) Persons employed in a mint causing coin to be of a different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+(2) Unlawful taking from a mint any coining instrument (section 245).
+(II) Government Stamps.—
+(1) Counterfeiting a stamp (section 255).
+(2) Possession of an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 256).
+(3) Making or selling an instrument for counterfeiting a stamp (section 257).
+(4) Sale of a counterfeit stamp (section 258).
+(5) Possession of a counterfeit stamp (section 259).
+(6) Using as genuine a stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+(7) Effacing any writing from a substance bearing a stamp or removing from a
+"document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to Government (section"
+261).
+(8) Using a stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+(9) Erasure of mark denoting that a stamp has been used (section 263).
+"(10) Making, uttering, or dealing in, or selling or using for postal purpose, any"
+fictitious stamp; or possessing any fictitious stamp; or making or possessing
+any instrument for manufacturing fictitious stamps (section 263A).
+[s 263A] Prohibition of fictitious stamps.
+(1) Whoever—
+"(a) makes, knowingly utters, deals in or sells any fictitious stamps, or"
+"knowingly uses for any postal purpose any fictitious stamp, or"
+"(b) has in his possession, without lawful excuse, any fictitious stamp, or"
+"(c) makes or, without lawful excuse, has in his possession any die, plate,"
+"instrument or materials for making any fictitious stamp,"
+shall be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.
+"(2) Any such stamps, die, plate, instrument or materials in the possession of any"
+"person for making any fictitious stamp 39.[may be seized and, if seized] shall"
+be forfeited.
+"(3) In this section ""fictitious stamp"" means any stamp falsely purporting to be"
+"issued by the Government for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, or any"
+"facsimile or imitation or representation, whether on paper or otherwise, of any"
+"stamp issued by Government, for that purpose."
+"(4) In this section and also in sections 255 to 263, both inclusive, the word"
+"""Government"", when used in connection with, or in reference to, any stamp"
+"issued for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, shall, notwithstanding"
+"anything in section 17, be deemed to include the person or persons authorized"
+"by law to administer executive Government in any part of India, and also in any"
+part of Her Majesty's dominions or in any foreign country.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section makes it an offence to manufacture fictitious stamps, which are defined to"
+be stamps purporting to be used for purposes of postage by any foreign Government. It
+was enacted for the purpose of stopping the use of fictitious stamps on letters coming
+from abroad.
+"39. Subs. by Act 42 of 1953, sec. 4 and Sch. III, for ""may be seized and"" (w.e.f. 23-12-1953)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
+[s 264] Fraudulent use of false instrument for weighing.
+"Whoever fraudulently uses any instrument for weighing which he knows to be false,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Intention is an essential part of the offence under this section. The section requires two
+"things: (1) fraudulent use of any false instrument for weighing, and (2) knowledge that"
+it is false. The word 'false' in this and the following sections means different from the
+"instrument, weight, or measure, which the offender and the person defrauded have"
+"fixed upon, expressly or by implication, with reference to their mutual dealings. Where it"
+was agreed between the seller and purchaser that a particular measure was to be used
+"in measuring the commodity sold, it was held that, even though the measure was not of"
+"the standard requirement, it was not 'false' and there was no fraudulent intent within"
+the meaning of this section.1.
+"1. Kanayalal, (1939) 41 Bom LR 977 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
+[s 265] Fraudulent use of false weight or measure.
+"Whoever fraudulently uses any false weight or false measure of length or capacity, or"
+fraudulently uses any weight or any measure of length or capacity as a different
+"weight or measure from what it is, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+It is clear from the above definition that the prosecution must prove three essential
+ingredients amongst others as
+"(1) a weight or measure is a false one,"
+"(2) that the accused used such a weight or measure, and"
+(3) that he did so fraudulently.2.
+"2. Suwalal v State, 1962 (2) Cr LJ 693."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
+[s 266] Being in possession of false weight or measure.
+"Whoever is in possession of any instrument for weighing, or of any weight, or of any"
+"measure of length or capacity, which he knows to be false, 3.intending that the same"
+"may be fraudulently used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes a person who is in possession of a false weight or measure just
+"as sections 235, 239 and 240 punish a person who is in possession of a counterfeit"
+"coin, and section 259 punishes a person who is in possession of a counterfeit stamp."
+A measure is false if it is something other than what it purports to be. If both the
+"purchaser and seller are aware of the actual measure being used, there is no fraudulent"
+intent as required by this section. It is only when the seller purports to sell according to
+"a certain standard, and sells below that standard, that he can be said to be guilty of"
+fraud.4.
+The mere possession of false weights or measures will not in itself raise any strong
+presumption of fraud. It is necessary to show that the accused knew the scales to be
+false and intended to use them fraudulently.5.
+"3. The word and omitted by Act 42 of 1953, section 4 and Sch. III (w.e.f. 23-12-1953)."
+"4. Kanayalal, (1939) 41 Bom LR 977 ."
+"5. Hamirmal, (1890) Unrep Cr C 514."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
+[s 267] Making or selling false weight or measure.
+"Whoever makes, sells or disposes of any instrument for weighing, or any weight, or"
+"any measure of length or capacity which he knows to be false, in order that the same"
+"may be used as true, or knowing that the same is likely to be used as true, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
+"year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"The object of this section is to prevent the circulation of false scales, weights or"
+"measures. It punishes a person who makes, sells, or disposes of a false balance,"
+weight or measure.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 268] Public nuisance.
+"A person is guilty of a public nuisance, who does any act, or is guilty of an illegal"
+"omission, which causes any common injury, danger, or annoyance to the public or to"
+the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity or which must
+"necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger, or annoyance to persons who may have"
+occasion to use any public right.
+A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or
+advantage.
+COMMENT.—
+Nuisance is an inconvenience that materially interferes with the ordinary physical
+comfort of human existence. It may be public or private nuisance. As defined in section
+"268 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) public nuisance is an offence against public"
+either by doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of the whole community in
+general or by neglect to do anything which the common good requires. On the
+"alternative it causes injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have"
+occasion to use public right. It is the quantum of annoyance or discomfort in contra
+distinction to private nuisance which affects an individual is the decisive factor.1.
+Nuisance is of two kinds: (1) public and (2) private.
+(1) Public nuisance or common nuisance is an offence against the public either by
+"doing a thing, which tends to the annoyance of the whole community in general, or by"
+neglecting to do anything that the common good requires. It is an act affecting the
+"public at large, or some considerable portion of them and it must interfere with rights,"
+which members of the community might otherwise enjoy.
+It is not a sine qua non that the annoyance should injuriously affect every member of
+the public within its range of operation. It is sufficient that it should affect people in
+general who dwell in the vicinity.2.
+"As to when an individual can bring a civil action in respect of a public nuisance, see the"
+"authors' Law of Torts, 19th Edn, chapter XXI."
+(2) Private nuisance is defined to be anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the
+"lands, tenements or hereditaments of another, and not amounting to trespass. It is an"
+act affecting some particular individual or individuals as distinguished from the public
+at large. It is in the quantum of annoyance that private nuisance differs from public. It
+"cannot be the subject of an indictment, but may be the ground of a civil action for"
+damages or an injunction or both.3.
+[s 268.1] Liability of owner.—
+Where the use of premises gives rise to a public nuisance it is generally the occupier
+"for the time being who is liable for it, and not the absent proprietor.4."
+[s 268.2] Civil Remedy.—
+'Private nuisance' affects some individuals as distinguished from the public at large.
+The remedies are of two kinds–civil and criminal. The remedies under the civil law are
+"of two kinds. One is under section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under it, a"
+suit lies and the plaintiffs need not prove that they have sustained any special damage.
+The second remedy is a suit by a private individual for a special damage suffered by
+him.5.
+[s 268.3] Criminal remedy.—
+There are three remedies under the criminal law. The first relates to the prosecution
+"under Chapter XIV of IPC, 1860. The second provides for summary proceedings under"
+"sections 133–144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973) and the third"
+relates to remedies under special or local laws. Sub-sections (2) of section 133 of Cr
+"PC, 1973 postulates that no order duly made by a Magistrate under this section shall be"
+"called in question in any civil court. The provisions of Chapter X of the Cr PC, 1973"
+"should be so worked as not to become themselves, a nuisance to the community at"
+large. A lawful and necessary trade ought not to be interfered with unless it is proved to
+be injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community.6.
+[s 268.4] Noise.—
+Any noise which has the effect of materially interfering with the ordinary comforts of
+life judged by the standard of a reasonable man is nuisance. How and when a nuisance
+created by noise becomes actionable has to be answered with reference to its degree
+"and the surrounding circumstances, the place and the time.7."
+"1. Vasant Manga Nikumba v Baburao Bhikanna Naidu, (1995) Supp4 SCC 54 : (1996) 1 SCC (Cr)"
+27.
+2. Ibid.
+"3. vide THE LAW OF TORTS, 19th Edn chapter XXI, by the author of this book."
+"4. Bibhuti Bhusan v Bhuban Ram, (1918) 46 Cal 515 ."
+"5. Kachrulal Bhagirath Agrawal v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 4818 [LNIND 2004 SC 960] :"
+(2005) 9 SCC 36 [LNIND 2004 SC 960] .
+"6. Kachrulal Bhagirath Agrawal v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 4818 [LNIND 2004 SC 960] :"
+(2005) 9 SCC 36 [LNIND 2004 SC 960] .
+"7. Noise Pollution (V), Re v. (2005) 5 SCC 733 : JT 2005 (6) SC 210 : AIR 2005 SC 3136 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 269] Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.
+"Whoever unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has"
+"reason to believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is framed in order to prevent people from doing acts which are likely to
+spread infectious diseases. Welfare of the society is the primary duty of every civilised
+"State. Section 269, IPC, 1860 makes the negligent act likely to spread infection or"
+disease dangerous to life as an offence. The essential ingredients are:
+(1) that the accused does any act unlawfully or negligently; that such act is likely to
+spread infection of any disease dangerous to life; and
+(2) that he knows or had reasons to believe that the act is likely to cause such
+infection.
+"Thus causing infection of the disease, which is dangerous to life, is covered by this"
+"section.8. The expression ""reason to believe"" has been defined under section 26 IPC,"
+"1860 and it lays down that a person said to have ""reason to believe"" a thing, if he has"
+sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise. A person can be supposed to
+know where there is a direct appeal to his senses. Suspicion or doubt cannot be raised
+"to the level of ""reason to believe"".9."
+"8. Dr. Meeru Bhatia Prasad v State, 2001 Cr LJ 1674 (Del)."
+"9. Dr. Prabha Malhotra v State, 1999 Cr LJ 549 (All)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 270] Malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.
+"Whoever malignantly does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to"
+"believe to be, likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence punishable under
+the preceding section.
+"In this section, the use of the word 'malignantly' indicates that the person spreading"
+infection should be actuated by malice.10.
+"There is no provision in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which nullifies"
+"sections 270–273 of the IPC, 1860 or which make them dormant and non-"
+applicable.11.
+[s 270.1] Confrontation with Special Law.—
+"Even if section 270 of IPC, 1860 is invoked for supply of substandard food articles the"
+"special procedure laid down under Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 for testing and"
+declaring the product as substandard should have been followed.12.
+10. 2nd Rep section 226.
+"11. Mahesh Ramchandra Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 1999 Cr LJ 2310 (Bom)."
+"12. Christy Fried Gram Industry v State of Karnataka, 2016 Cr LJ 482 (Kant) : 2016 (1) KCCR 83 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 271] Disobedience to quarantine rule.
+Whoever knowingly disobeys any rule made and promulgated 13.[by the 14.[***]
+"Government 15.[***] for putting any vessel into a state of quarantine, or for regulating"
+the intercourse of vessels in a state of quarantine with the shore or with other
+"vessels, or for regulating the intercourse between places where an infectious disease"
+"prevails and other places, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The motive for disobeying any rule is quite immaterial. The disobedience is punishable
+whether any injurious consequence flows from it or not.
+"13. Subs. by the A.O. 1937, for by the Government of India or by any Government."
+14. The words Central or any Provincial omitted by the A.O. 1950.
+15. The words or the Crown Representative omitted by the A.O. 1948.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 272] Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale.
+"Whoever adulterates any article of food or drink, so as to make such article noxious"
+"as food or drink, intending to sell such article as food or drink, or knowing it to be"
+"likely that the same will be sold as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which"
+"may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.—1. The following amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 3 of 1999, s. 2."
+"In its application to the State of Orissa, in sections 272, 273, 274, 275 and 276, for the"
+"words ""shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+"both"", substitute the following, namely:—"
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life.""—Orissa Act 3 of 1999, section 2."
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session vide Orissa"
+"Act No. 3 of 1999, s. 2."
+"Uttar Pradesh.—1. The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975, s."
+3(1) (w.e.f. 15-9-1975).
+"In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh, in s. 272, for the words ""shall be"
+"punished with imprisonment of either description, for a term which may extend to six"
+"months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both"""
+substitute the following words.—
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life""."
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide U.P. Act"
+No. 47 of 1975.
+"West Bengal.—1. The following amendments were made by W.B. Act No. 42 of 1973, s."
+"3(i), (w.e.f. 29-4-1973)."
+"In its application to the State of West Bengal in s. 272, for the words ""of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend"
+"to one thousand rupees, or with both"", substitute the following words—"
+"""for life with or without fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life""."
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide W.B. Act"
+No. 34 of 1974.
+COMMENT.—
+The mixing of noxious ingredients in food or drink or otherwise rendering it
+unwholesome by adulteration is punishable under this section. Mere adulteration with
+"harmless ingredients for the purpose of getting more profit is not punishable under it,"
+"e.g., mixing water with milk16. or ghee (clarified butter) with vegetable oil.17."
+'Adulteration' means mixing with any other substance whether wholly different or of the
+same kind but of inferior quality.
+The expression 'noxious as food' means unwholesome as food or injurious to health
+and not repugnant to one's feelings.18. It is essential to show that an article of food or
+drink has been adulterated and that it was intended to sell such article or that it was
+known that it would be likely to be sold as food or drink.19.
+[s 272.1] Adulteration of liquor.—
+"In order to establish that the offence under section 272, IPC, 1860 has been committed,"
+the prosecution has to prove that the article involved was food or drink meant to be
+"consumed by live persons, that the accused adulterated it, that such adulteration"
+rendered it noxious as food or drink and that the accused at the time of such
+adulteration intended to sell such article as food or drink or knew it to be likely that
+such article would be sold as food or drink. Now noxious rendering is making it
+poisonous or harmful or both. As is plain the offence is complete on introduction of the
+"adulterant in the food or drink, provided it is meant for the purposes of sale, actual or"
+likely.20.
+[s 272.2] Local Amendments.—
+"In West Bengal, sections 272, 273, 274, 275 and 276 of the Penal Code have been"
+amended by section 3 of West Bengal Act XLII of 1973 so as to provide life
+imprisonment with or without fine for the aforesaid offences. By section 5 of West
+"Bengal Act XXXIV of 1974, all these offences have been made cognizable, non-bailable"
+and triable by Court of Sessions. The State of Uttar Pradesh too has similarly made all
+these offences punishable with life imprisonment and fine with similar discretion of
+Court to award lesser imprisonment by virtue of Uttar Pradesh Act 47 of 1975.
+"There is no bar under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the said Rules"
+made thereunder that the concerned authorities under Prevention of Food Adulteration
+Act have no jurisdiction and/or authority to prosecute the guilty person for the offences
+under the IPC based on the same averments along with the provisions of the special
+statutes. All such authorities have jurisdiction to launch a prosecution by invoking
+"various provisions of the IPC, along with the special statutes.21."
+[s 272.3] Gutka and Pan Masala.—
+"In order to find out whether the food is unsafe, due to an adulterant, the sample is to be"
+sent to an analyst. Violation of the order of the Food Safety Commissioner is not an
+"offence, under section 272 IPC, 1860.22."
+"16. Chinniah, (1897) 1 Weir 228."
+"17. Chokraj Marwari, (1908) 12 Cal WN 608."
+"18. Ram Dayal v State, (1923) 46 All 94 ."
+"19. Suleman Shamji, (1943) 45 Bom LR 895 . Joseph Kurian v State of Kerala, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 502"
+": AIR 1995 SC 4 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] : (1994) 6 SCC 535 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] , conviction for"
+"sale of adulterated arrack, sentence of six months' RI converted to simple imprisonment."
+"20. Joseph Kurian v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 4 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] : (1994) 6 SCC 535"
+"[LNIND 1994 SC 927] Also see EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066 [LNIND"
+1995 SC 88] : (1995) 2 SCC 99 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] .
+"21. Rajiv Kumar Gupta v The State of Maharashtra, 2005 Cr LJ 581 (Bom)."
+"22. Ganesh Pandurang Jadhao v The State of Maharashtra, 2016 Cr LJ 2401 : 2016 (2) Bom CR"
+(Cr) 4 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 273] Sale of noxious food or drink.
+"Whoever sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or drink, any article which has"
+"been rendered or has become noxious, or is in a state unfit for food or drink, knowing"
+"or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
+"months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.—1. Same as in section 272, the amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 3 of"
+"1999, s. 2."
+"Uttar Pradesh.—1. The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975, s."
+"3(ii), (w.e.f. 15-9- 1975)."
+"In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh in S. 273, for the words, ""shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
+"months, or with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both,"
+substitute the following words.—
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide U.P. Act"
+No. 47 of 1975.
+"West Bengal.—1. The following amendments were made by W.B. Act No. 42 of 1973, s."
+3(ii) (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
+"In its application to the State of West Bengal in s. 273, for the words ""of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend"
+"to one thousand rupees, or with both"", substitute the following,—"
+"""for life with or without fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide W.B. Act"
+No. 34 of 1974.
+COMMENT.—
+It is not an offence to sell inferior food cheap if it is not noxious.
+[s 273.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires three things—
+(1) Selling or offering for sale as food or drink some article.
+(2) Such article must have become noxious or must be in a state unfit for food or drink.
+(3) The sale or exposure must have been made with a knowledge or reasonable belief
+"that the article is noxious as food or drink. The word ""noxious"" as stated in Advanced"
+"Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar (3rd Edition Reprint 2009), when used in relation to"
+"article of food is to mean that the article is poisonous, harmful to health or repugnant"
+"to human use. Having regard to language used in section 273, noxious food or drink,"
+"literally would mean article of food or drink which earlier was not noxious, but should"
+have become noxious or had been rendered noxious by lapse of time or by not taking
+proper precaution or for not adding preservatives or the like.23.
+What is punishable under this section is the sale of noxious articles as food or drink
+and not the mere sale of noxious article. Where the owner of a grain pit sold the
+contents of it before it was opened at a certain sum per maund whether the grain was
+"good or bad, and on the pit being opened it was found that a large proportion of the"
+"grain was unfit for human consumption, it was held that the vendor could not be"
+"convicted under this section.24. Similarly, the selling of wheat containing a large"
+"admixture of extraneous matter, such as dirt, wood, matches, charcoal, was held to"
+constitute no offence.25.
+For local amendments see comment under section 272 ante.
+"23. Dilipsinh Ramsinh Bhatia v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 2014 (Bom)."
+"24. Salig Ram v State, (1906) 28 All 312 ."
+"25. Narumal, (1904) 6 Bom LR 520 ; Gunesha v State, (1873) PR No. 15 of 1873."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 274] Adulteration of drugs.
+Whoever adulterates any drug or medical preparation in such a manner as to lessen
+"the efficacy or change the operation of such drug or medical preparation, or to make it"
+"noxious, intending that it shall be sold or used for, or knowing it to be likely that it will"
+"be sold or used for, any medicinal purpose, as if it had not undergone such"
+"adulteration, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both."
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.—1. Same as in section 272, the amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 3 of"
+"1999, s. 2."
+"Uttar Pradesh.—1. The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975, s."
+"3(ii), (w.e.f. 15-9-1975)."
+"In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh in S. 274, for the words, ""shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
+"months, or with a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both,"
+substitute the following words.—
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide U.P. Act"
+No. 47 of 1975.
+"West Bengal.—1. The following amendments were made by W.B. Act No. 42 of 1973, s."
+3(iii) (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
+"In its application to the State of West Bengal, in s. 274, for the words ""of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend"
+"to one thousand rupees, or with both"", substitute the following.—"
+"""for life with or without fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide W.B. Act"
+No. 34 of 1974.
+COMMENT.—
+To preserve the purity of drugs for medicinal purposes this section is enacted. It is
+"sufficient if the efficacy of a drug is lessened, it need not necessarily become noxious"
+to life.
+For local amendment see comment under section 272 ante.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 275] Sale of adulterated drugs.
+"Whoever, knowing any drug or medical preparation to have been adulterated in such a"
+"manner as to lessen its efficacy, to change its operation, or to render it noxious, sells"
+"the same, or offers or exposes it for sale, or issues it from any dispensary for"
+"medicinal purposes as unadulterated, or causes it to be used for medicinal purposes"
+"by any person not knowing of the adulteration, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which"
+"may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.—1. Same as in section 272, the amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 3 of"
+"1999, s. 2."
+"Uttar Pradesh.—1. The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975, s."
+"2(iv), (w.e.f. 15-9-1975)."
+"In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh in S. 275, for the words, ""shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
+"months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both, substitute"
+the following words.—
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide U.P. Act"
+No. 47 of 1975.
+"West Bengal.—1. The following amendments were made by W.B. Act No. 42 of 1973, s."
+3(iv) (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
+"In its application to the State of West Bengal in s. 275, for the words ""of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both"","
+"substitute the words ""for life with or without fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide W.B. Act"
+No. 34 of 1974.
+COMMENT.—
+"The offence under this section consists in selling, or offering, or exposing for sale, or"
+"issuing from any dispensary, an adulterated drug as unadulterated. This section not"
+only prohibits the sale of an adulterated drug but also its issue from any dispensary.
+"For local amendment, see comment under section 272 ante."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 276] Sale of drug as a different drug or preparation.
+"Whoever knowingly sells, or offers or exposes for sale, or issues from a dispensary"
+"for medicinal purposes, any drug or medical preparation, as a different drug or"
+"medical preparation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both."
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.—1. Same as in section 272, the amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 3 of"
+"1999, s. 2."
+"Uttar Pradesh.—1. The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 47 of 1975, s."
+"3(v), (w.e.f. 15-9-1975)."
+"In its application to the State of Uttar Pradesh in S. 276, for the words, ""shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
+"thousand rupees, or with both, substitute the following:—"
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide U.P. Act"
+No. 47 of 1975.
+"West Bengal.—1. The following amendments were made by W.B. Act No. 42 of 1973, s."
+3(v) (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
+"In its application to the State of West Bengal in s. 276, for the words ""of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to, ""six months, or with fine which may extend"
+"to one thousand rupees, or with both"", substitute the following:"
+"""for life with or without fine:"
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for"
+"life."""
+"2. The offence is cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session, vide W.B. Act"
+No. 34 of 1974.
+COMMENT.—
+The offence constituted by this section does not involve the idea of any adulteration or
+inferiority in the substituted medicine. It is sufficient that it is not in fact what it
+"purports to be; for e.g., supplying savin instead of saffron.26."
+This section is connected with section 275 in the same way as section 274 is
+connected with section 273.
+[s 276.1] Possession as evidence of intention.—
+"Dealing with an Act for prevention of drug trafficking, the Privy Council observed in a"
+case in which the accused was found in possession of the banned drug and there was
+nothing in the Act to exclude the common law rule that facts could be established by
+"inference from proven facts; therefore, the judge had applied the appropriate standard"
+of proof. The accused had given no evidence to explain his possession.27.
+"For local amendment, see Comment under section 272 ante."
+"26. Knight v Bowers, (1885) 14 QBD 845 ."
+"27. Sabapathee v State (Mauritius), (1999) 1 WLR 1836 (PC)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 277] Fouling water of public spring or reservoir.
+"Whoever voluntarily corrupts or fouls the water of any public spring or reservoir, so as"
+"to render it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months,"
+"or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The water of a public spring or reservoir belongs to every member of the public in
+"common, and if a person voluntarily fouls it he commits a public nuisance."
+[s 277.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) voluntary corruption or fouling of water;
+(2) the water must be of a public spring or reservoir; and
+(3) the water must be rendered less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily
+used.
+"As a general rule, a place is a public place if people are allowed access to it, though"
+they may have no legal right to it.
+"[s 277.2] Section 277 and Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,"
+1974.—
+The contention that the provisions contained in the Water Act take away the effect of
+section 277 cannot readily be assumed especially when there is nothing in the Water
+Act to hold that the provisions therein are intended to nullify section 277 from the Penal
+Code. The argument that the non-obstante clause in section 60 has the effect of
+"repealing section 277 of IPC, 1860, also is unsustainable. The non-obstante clause in"
+section 60 cannot be assumed to supersede or extinguish such provisions in the
+General Law. If the non-obstante clause in section 60 was intended to exclude or nullify
+"section 277 of IPC, 1860, then there would have been strong indication available in the"
+specific provision itself.28.
+"28. Prasad v State, 2012 (1) Ker LT 861 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 278] Making atmosphere noxious to health.
+Whoever voluntarily vitiates the atmosphere in any place so as to make it noxious to
+the health of persons in general dwelling or carrying on business in the
+"neighbourhood or passing along a public way, shall be punished with fine which may"
+extend to five hundred rupees.
+COMMENT.—
+"Though concepts of air and ecological pollution are rather new, it must be said to the"
+"credit of the first Law Commission that they too, drafting the code as they did in the"
+"first half of the nineteenth century, were not oblivious of these social needs."
+[s 278.1] Smoking in public places.—
+There can be no doubt that smoking in a public place will vitiate the atmosphere to
+"make it noxious to the health of persons who happened to be there. Therefore, smoking"
+"in a public place is an offence punishable under section 278 IPC, 1860.29."
+"29. Ramakrishnan v State, AIR 1999 Ker 385 [LNIND 1999 KER 234] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 279] Rash driving or riding on a public way.
+"Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or"
+"negligent 1 as to endanger human life, 2 or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any"
+"other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Under this section the effect of driving or riding must be either that human life was in
+fact endangered or that hurt or injury was likely to be caused.
+[s 279.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two things—
+1. Driving of a vehicle or riding on a public way.
+2. Such driving or riding must be so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to
+be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person.
+1. 'Rash or negligent'.—Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in light of the
+facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or
+"seen in isolation. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that"
+(a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven;
+(b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and
+(c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life.30. The
+criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness and
+"indifference to the consequences. The words ""rashly and negligently"" are"
+"distinguishable and one is exclusive of the other. The same act cannot be ""rash"" as well"
+"as ""negligent"".31. Where negligence is an essential ingredient of the offence, the"
+negligence to be established by the prosecution must be culpable or gross and not the
+negligence merely based upon an error of judgment. Simple lack of care such as will
+"constitute civil liability, is not enough; for liability under the criminal law, a very high"
+degree of negligence is required to be proved.32.
+There is a distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. A reckless act has to be
+"understood in two different senses—subjective and objective. In the subjective sense, it"
+"means deliberate or conscious taking of an unjustified risk, which could be easily"
+foreseen and in the circumstances of the case was unreasonable to take. In the
+"objective sense, the accused is not conscious of the result though he ought to be"
+"aware that it might follow and in this sense, it is almost equivalent to negligence. In"
+"other words, negligence involves blameworthy heedlessness on the part of the"
+accused which a normal prudent man exercising reasonable care and caution ought to
+"avoid. Negligence is an omission to do something, which a reasonable man, guided"
+"upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,"
+"would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. A"
+culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal
+"consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief"
+that the actor has taken sufficient precaution to prevent their happening. Culpable
+"negligence is acting without the consciousness, that the illegal and mischievous effect"
+"will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the"
+caution incumbent upon him and if he had he would have had the consciousness. As
+"between rashness and negligence, rashness is a graver offence.33. Negligence is not"
+an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to
+"state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence, or lack of"
+"it, can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or"
+the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending
+and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by
+"the Court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute"
+negligence.34. Absence of high speed itself cannot absolve the petitioner from the
+culpability.35.
+There are several offences in the Code in which the element of criminal rashness or
+"negligence occurs, viz.,—sections 279, 280, 283–289, 304A, 336, 337, 338."
+2. 'Endanger human life'.—It must be proved that the accused was driving the vehicle
+on a public way in a manner which endangered human life or was likely to cause hurt or
+injury to any other person.36. It is not necessary that the rash or negligent act should
+result in injury to life or property.37.
+[s 279.2] Reasonable care.—
+"The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., 'reasonable care' in determining the"
+question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care
+"imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for e.g., a driver) to care for the"
+pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrian
+happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle
+"on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving"
+"does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users"
+or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others.38.
+[s 279.3] Mens rea.—
+The essential ingredient of mens rea cannot be excluded from consideration when the
+charge in a criminal Court consists of criminal negligence.39.
+[s 279.4] Res ipsa Loquitur.—
+This doctrine serves two purposes–one that an accident may by its nature be more
+consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is
+"responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the"
+"accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Second, to avoid hardship in"
+cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the
+accident occurred. The Courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in
+cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. Elements of this doctrine may
+be stated as:
+(a) The event would not have occurred but for someone's negligence.
+(b) The evidence on record rules out the possibility that actions of the victim or some
+third party could be the reason behind the event.
+(c) Accused was negligent and owed a duty of care towards the victim.40. The principle
+of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions
+relating to negligence.41. This doctrine operates in the domain of civil law especially in
+the cases of torts and helps in determining the onus of proof in actions relating to
+negligence. It cannot be pressed 'in service for determining per se the liability for
+"negligence within the domain of criminal law. Res ipsa loquitur has, if at all, a limited"
+application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence.42. Where a vehicle was being
+"driven on a wrong side, accident resulting in the death of two persons, the principle of"
+res ipsa loquitur should have been applied.43. In the case of Thakur Singh v State of
+"Punjab,44. the accused drove a bus rashly and negligently with 41 passengers and while"
+"crossing a bridge, the bus fell into the nearby canal resulting in death of all the"
+passengers. The Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since admittedly the
+petitioner was driving the bus at the relevant time and it was going over the bridge
+when it fell down.
+[s 279.5] Abetment.—
+The mere fact that petitioner was the owner of the offending vehicle at the relevant
+"time, ipso facto is not a cogent ground to array him as an accused under section 109"
+"IPC, 1860. In this manner, no offence of abetment is made out against the petitioner.45."
+[s 279.6] Difference between civil and criminal liability.—
+There can be no civil action for negligence if the negligent act or omission has not been
+attended by an injury to any person; but bare negligence involving the risk of injury is
+"punishable criminally, though nobody is actually hurt by it."
+"If actual hurt is caused the case would come under sections 337 or 338, and if death is"
+"caused, under section 304A.46."
+"In a case of collision or injury arising out of rash driving, the actual driver and not the"
+"owner of the carriage is liable under this section;47. whereas, in a civil suit, the injured"
+"party has an option to sue either or both of them. In a criminal case, every man is"
+responsible for his own act; there must be some personal act.48.
+[s 279.7] Mechanical failure.—
+Poor maintenance of vehicle is itself a negligent act.49. In cases where the prosecution
+"alleges that the brakes were defective, it must establish by evidence that the brakes"
+were so defective that the driving of the vehicle endangered human life or was likely to
+cause hurt or injury to any other person. Merely because the vehicle swerved to the
+"right when its brakes were pulled up, it could not be said that there was danger to"
+human life or it was likely to cause hurt or injury to others.50. Failure to apply brakes at
+relevant time does not by itself constitute rash and negligent act for it may as well be
+due to error of judgment.51. A vehicle of which handbrake and speedometer were not in
+working order is a very serious hazard to the public as the driver would never know his
+speed. It is a danger to the traffic in general.52.
+[s 279.8] Contributory negligence.—
+The doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply to criminal actions.53. The
+deceased stood protruding his body out of the vehicle that too having his back towards
+"the driver, which fact suggests that he himself was quite negligent and responsible for"
+the accident.54.
+[s 279.9] CASES.—
+"In a case the allegation was that the accused, car driver, drove car in a rash and"
+negligent manner and caused injury to a child who was playing on side of road. But the
+evidence showed that vehicle was going in middle of road and child was also playing
+"on road. Brake skid marks on road were duly depicted in site plan, acquittal was held"
+proper by the High Court.55. Where a tractor driver was driving the tractor at a speed of
+six miles per hour at night and a man who was sitting on it in a careless fashion
+"unmindful of bumps and jolts fell down and died, it was held that the driver was not"
+"guilty of any rash or negligent act within the meaning of sections 279 and 304A, IPC,"
+1860.56. Where a truck dashed against a cyclist and a cart resulting in injuries to both
+the cyclist and the cartman but there was no evidence to the actual dashing of the
+truck against the cyclist and the cart and no evidence was either available about the
+mechanical fitness or otherwise of the truck as the same had been set on fire by an
+"angry mob, it could not be presumed that the truck must have been driven rashly and"
+"negligently merely because two persons were injured. In the circumstances, the"
+"conviction of the accused under sections 279 and 304A, IPC, 1860 was set aside.57."
+"Merely because the driver ran away from the spot immediately after the incident, it"
+could not be said that he must have been driving rashly and negligently.58. Driving at a
+high speed or non-sounding of horn by itself does not mean that the driver is rash or
+"negligent. Place, time, traffic and crowd are important factors to determine rashness or"
+negligence.59. High speed at a crowded road and pressing a person against a wall in
+order to save accident was held to be negligence within the meaning of this section.60.
+To drive at a high speed on an empty road or at a lonely place is not the same thing as
+driving in a crowded city street.61. Crushing a school child while driving past a school
+was held to be ipso facto rashness. Everybody is expected to slow down and take extra
+precautions near the vicinity of an educational institution.62. The mere fact that there
+are more than two persons in a two-wheeled vehicle will not make out an offence under
+"section 279, IPC, 1860 as it by itself does not amount to so rash and negligent an act"
+"as to endanger human life, section 279, IPC, 1860 is not attracted where the driving is"
+"ordinarily rash or negligent. Moreover, if an offence is really made out, then driver alone"
+"is responsible and not the pillion rider or riders. Therefore, the police practice of"
+apprehending all occupants of the vehicle is deprecated.63.
+[s 279.10] Site plan.—
+"Where in a case of rash and negligent driving, the site plan, recovery memo, inspection"
+report of the offending vehicle were not proved by the prosecution and the investigating
+"officer was also not examined, conviction of the accused was set aside.64. However,"
+Supreme Court in a case held that the site plan only indicates the place where the
+accident happened and nothing more can be read into it.65.
+[s 279.11] Hitting from behind.—
+"Where the truck of the accused, driven rashly and negligently, hit a bullock-cart from"
+"behind killing the buffalo and the cartman, the accused could not be convicted under"
+"section 429 as the mens rea of causing loss was absent. However, his conviction under"
+"sections 279 and 304-A was upheld.66. Where the accused, bus driver when attempted"
+"to overtake a lorry, on seeing one other bus coming in opposite direction swerved the"
+"bus towards the left and came in a violent contact with the victim, a cyclist, the Madras"
+High Court held that the very act of the accused in driving the bus and dashing from
+behind the cyclist clearly constitutes the rashness and negligence on his part.67.
+[s 279.12] Section 279 is not a petty offence.—
+"'Petty offence' within the meaning of section 206 Cr PC, 1973 is an offence which is"
+"punishable only with fine not exceeding Rs1,000 but does not include any offence so"
+"punishable under the Motor Vehicles Act. If so, section 279 IPC, 1860 which is a"
+cognizable offence and which is not an offence punishable only with fine is not a 'petty
+offences'.68.
+[s 279.13] Compounding.—
+"Though the Supreme Court held in Manish Jalan v State of Karnataka,69. that offences"
+"punishable under section 279 and section 304A, IPC, 1860 are not compoundable, in"
+"Puttuswamy v State of Karnataka,70. the Supreme Court while maintaining the"
+"conviction under section 304A IPC, 1860 notwithstanding the agreement arrived at"
+"between the parties, increased the amount of fine from Rs 2,000 to Rs 20,000 to be"
+paid to the parents of the deceased and reduced the sentence to the period already
+"undergone, subject to payment of the fine."
+[s 279.14] Sentence.—
+One of the most effective ways of keeping drivers under mental vigil is to maintain a
+deterrent element in the sentencing sphere. Any latitude shown to them in that sphere
+would tempt them to make driving frivolous and a frolic.71. For lessening the high rate
+"of motor accidents due to careless and callous driving of vehicles, the Courts are"
+expected to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question
+of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the
+offence if the prosecution is able to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt.72.
+"Where the accused dashed the jeep against a tree, as a result of which one person, who"
+"was travelling in the jeep got injured and died, and another person, who was also in the"
+"same vehicle received injuries, the Supreme Court held that the High Court, without"
+"proper appreciation of the evidence and consideration of the gravity of the offence,"
+showed undue sympathy by reducing the sentence.73.
+"[s 279.15] Whether a Court can convict a person under sections 279 and 337,"
+IPC for commission of the same act of offence and accordingly pass sentence
+under both the Sections.—
+"In this case, as the offence having been outcome of the same act, the Court should"
+"punish the accused for one offence and at the same time, while passing the order of"
+"sentence, the Court should also consider that when the sentence prescribed under"
+"section 279, IPC, 1860 is a more severe offence than the offence prescribed under"
+"section 337, IPC, 1860 the accused could be punished under section 279, IPC, 1860"
+"only.74. However, in another case, Madras High Court held that simply because"
+"accused are found guilty under section 304-A IPC, 1860 and sentence is imposed, there"
+"is no embargo for Court to impose separate sentence under section 279 IPC, 1860.75."
+"30. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 Cr LJ 4403 .
+"31. State of HP v Manohar Singh, 2011 Cr LJ 3402 (HP)."
+"32. Kuldeep Singh v State, AIR 2008 SC 3062 [LNIND 2008 SC 1436] : (2008) 14 SCC 795 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 1436] relied on Syed Akbar v State of Kamataka, 1980 (1) SCC 30 [LNIND 1979 SC 297]"
+.
+"33. Bhalchandra, (1967) 71 Bom LR 634 , SC approving Idu Beg v State, (1881) ILR 3 All 766 and"
+"Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, (1872) 7 Mad HCR 119 ."
+"34. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 Cr LJ 4403 .
+"35. Mehnga Singh v State, 2012 Cr LJ 4930 (Del)."
+"36. Braham Das v State of HP, (2009) 7 SCC 353 [LNIND 2009 SC 1130] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 406 :"
+(2009) 81 AIC 265 .
+"37. (1871) 6 Mad HCR (Appx) xxxii. State of Karnataka v Sadanand Parshuram, 2000 Cr LJ 2426"
+(Kant).
+"38. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 Cr LJ 4403 .
+"39. Dr. PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ; In Saroja"
+"Dharmapal Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1060 (Bom), Bombay High Court held that"
+section 304-A or section 279 of the IPC do not require any mens rea. But in view of the Supreme
+"Court Judgment, in Desai's case, it is not relevant."
+"40. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284"
+"[LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 Cr LJ 4403 ; Syad Akbar v State of Kamataka, 1980 SCC (Cr) 59 : ("
+AIR 1979 SC 1848 [LNIND 1979 SC 297] ).
+"41. Mohd. Aynuddin alias Miyam v State of AP, 2000 (7) SCC 72 [LNIND 2000 SC 1014] : AIR"
+2000 SC 2511 [LNIND 2000 SC 1014] : 2000 SCC (Cr) 1281 : 2000 Cr LJ 3508 .
+"42. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SCW 3685 : AIR 2005 SC 3180 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+587] .
+"43. Francis Xavier Rodriguez v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 1374 (Bom); Dwarka Das v State"
+"of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 4601 (Raj)."
+"44. Thakur Singh v State of Punjab, 2003 (9) SCC 208 ."
+"45. Ranjit Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 (4) Crimes 315 ."
+46. No separate sentence would be necessary under this section if the act is punished under
+"section 304A. Nanne Khan v State of MP, 1987 Cr LJ 1403 (MP)."
+"47. AW Larrymore v Pernendoo Deo Rai, (1870) 14 WR (Cr) 32."
+"48. Allen, (1835) 7 C & p 153."
+"49. Binoda Bihari Sharma v State of Orissa, 2011 Cr LJ 1989 (Ori)."
+"50. Ajit Singh v State, 1975 Cr LJ 77 (HP)."
+"51. Padmacharan Naik, 1982 Cr LJ NOC 192 (Ori)."
+"52. Amar Lal v State of Rajasthan, 1988 Cr LJ 1 (Raj)."
+"53. Kew, (1872) 12 Cox 355; Blenkinsop v Ogden, (1898) 1 QB 783 ; Fagu Moharana, AIR 1961 Ori"
+71 [LNIND 1959 ORI 42] .
+"54. Bhupinder Sharma v State of HP, 2016 Cr LJ 3832 : IV (2016) ACC 461 (HP)."
+"55. State of HP v Jawahar Lal Jindal, 2011 Cr LJ 3827 (HP). See also Aleem Pasha v State of"
+"Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 174 (Kant); Ponnusamy v State, 2010 Cr LJ 2656 (Mad); State of HP v"
+"Baljit Singh, 2012 Cr LJ 237 (HP)."
+"56. Penu, 1980 Cr LJ NOC 132 (Ori)."
+"57. Bijuli Swain, 1981 Cr LJ 583 (Ori)."
+"58. Padmacharan Naik, supra."
+"59. P Rajappan, 1986 Cr LJ 511 (Ker)."
+"60. State of HP v Man Singh, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 299 (HP). The court also found that the brakes of"
+"the vehicle were in poor state of maintenance and, therefore, the principle of res ipsa loquitur"
+"applied. The court followed Thomas v State of Kerala, ILR (1971) 1 Ker 318 ; Duli Chand v Delhi"
+"Admn, 1975 Cr LJ 1732 : AIR 1975 SC 1960 [LNIND 1975 SC 258] and Usman Gani Mohd. v State"
+"of Maharashtra, (1979) 3 SCC 362 : 1979 SCC Cr 675, which was a case where a girl was"
+knocked down and the version of the driver was that he did not notice how the impact took
+"place and how the girl came under his lorry, it was, therefore, held that he was inattentive and"
+this would establish negligence on his part.
+"61. Padmacharan, supra; Mahommed Saffique, 1983 Cr LJ 535 (Ori)."
+"62. Praffulla Kumar Rout v State of Orissa, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1277 (Ori)."
+"63. Prabhudas, 1986 Cr LJ 390 (Guj). In State of Karnataka v Krishna, (1987) 1 SCC 538 [LNIND"
+1987 SC 701] : 1987 Cr LJ 776 : AIR 1987 SC 861 [LNIND 1987 SC 701] the Supreme Court
+enhanced the punishment from two months' simple imprisonment being unconscionably low to
+"six months' R. I. for causing death by rash and negligent driving. NP Ganesan Re, 1989 Cr LJ"
+"1160 (Mad). Bus hitting a pedestrian and dragging him for about 76 feet before stopping, the"
+sentence of imprisonment was converted into fine in view of his 55 years of age having sole
+child (daughter) suffering from paralysis but no order about his disability for re-employment.
+"State of Karnataka v SB Marigowda, 1999 Cr LJ 2171 (Kant), the accused, driving a matador"
+suddenly turning to right in order to overtake a vehicle and hitting a person to death who was
+"standing at that side, held guilty under the section Malleshi v State of Karnataka, 1999 Cr LJ"
+"2617 (Kant), the accused car driver hit bullocks and two persons on road and then dashed"
+"against a house 40 feet away from the road. Conviction proper. Ram Singh v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1999 Cr LJ 2622 (Raj) death of a lady caused by rash and negligent driving, no leniency was"
+shown to the accused because the whole family of the victim was upset. Bhagirath Singh v State
+"of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 4237 (Raj), a pedestrian suddenly attempted to cross the road and was"
+hit by a vehicle. It could not be known whether the driver was able to spot him. Negligence on
+"the part of the driver not proved. State v Santanam, 1998 Cr LJ 3045 (Kant), accused, a military"
+"personnel, under influence of alcohol, drove his military truck in a zig zag manner, made three"
+"accidents in one sequence. A moped driver, who was hit, died but it was not known whether"
+"death was due to fatal injury. Others were only injured. Held, liable under section 279, but not"
+"under section 337 or section 304A, IPC, 1860 nor under section 117 of MV Act. Bharat Amratlal"
+"Kothari v Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234 [LNIND 2009 SC 1949] : 2010 Cr LJ"
+"379 , FIR under section 279 for an order to prevent filling of animals in trucks in a cruel manner"
+and carrying them for slaughter contrary to statutory requirements.
+"64. Thana Ram v State of Haryana, 1996 Cr LJ 2020 (P&H), relying on Nageshwar Sh Krishna"
+"Ghobe v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 165 [LNIND 1972 SC 450] : 1973 Cr LJ 235 ."
+"65. Shivanna v State, (2010) 15 SCC 9 : 2010 (9) Scale 87 [LNIND 2010 SC 775] ."
+"66. Pawan Kumar Sharma v State of UP, 1996 Cr LJ 369 (All)."
+"67. K K Mani v State, 2010 Cr LJ 4595 (Mad)."
+"68. Ramesan v State, 2010 Cr LJ 4423 ."
+"69. Manish Jalan v State of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 3074 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] : (2008) 8 SCC"
+225 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] .
+"70. Puttuswamy v State of Karnataka, (2009) 1 SCC 711 [LNIND 2008 SC 2398] : 2008 (15) Scale"
+483 [LNIND 2008 SC 2398] .
+"71. Dalbir Singh v State of Harayana, 2000 (5) SCC 82 [LNIND 2000 SC 810] : AIR 2000 SC 1677"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 810] : 2000 Cr LJ 2283 ; B Nagabhushanam v State of Karnataka, 2008 (5) SCC"
+730 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] : 2008 (7) Scale 716 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] : AIR 2008 SC 2557
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1172] .
+"72. State of Punjab v Balwinder Singh, 2012 (2) SCC 182 [LNIND 2012 SC 8] : 2012 (1) Scale 62"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 8] : AIR 2012 SC 861 [LNIND 2012 SC 8] .
+"73. State of MP v Surendra Singh, 2015 Cr LJ 600 : AIR 2015 SC 398 [LNIND 2014 SC 933] ."
+"74. Hiran Mia v State of Tripura, 2010 Cr LJ 189 (Gau) section 279 is punishable with"
+"imprisonment of either description of a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which"
+"may extend to Rs 1,000, or with both, while section 337 is punishable with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to"
+"Rs 500, or with both."
+"75. Rajaram v State, 2010 Cr LJ 1644 (Mad)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 280] Rash navigation of vessel.
+Whoever navigates any vessel in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human
+"life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with"
+"fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The last section deals with public ways on land: this section deals with waterways. It
+deals with the case of inland navigation. Rash or negligent navigation on the high seas
+is not punished under the Code but under certain special statutes.
+[s 280.1] CASES.—
+"Petitioners, 33 in number were the distressed and marooned seamen belonging to"
+"different nationalities who were the crew of ""ISABELL-III"", wrecked at the reefs of the"
+"sea near the Islet of Suheli Par, part of the Lakshadweep group of Islands. The accident"
+happened when the vessel was passing through the Indian territorial waters by way of
+innocent passage; and immediately the matter was informed to the Indian Coast
+"Guard. The Merchant Shipping (Distressed Seamen) Rules, 1960 prescribes that the"
+derelict seamen should be saved at any cost and repatriated to their return port at the
+cost of the owner of the vessel. The petitioners were forced to enter the Lakshadweep
+"Island and hence they were held protected under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 the"
+"Merchant Shipping (Distressed Seamen) Rules, 1960 and the U.N. Conventions On the"
+"Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS). It was held that at best the offence under section 280 IPC,"
+"1860, i.e., rash navigation of the vessel, would lie only against the first accused, who"
+was the Master of the vessel. Proceedings against the crew was quashed.76.
+"76. Hisa A Sheng v Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep, 2007 Cr LJ 821 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+"[s 281] Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy."
+"Whoever exhibits any false light, mark or buoy, intending or knowing it to be likely that"
+"such exhibition will mislead any navigator, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+"Intentional exhibition of a false light, mark or buoy, with a view to mislead any navigator"
+is punishable under this section.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 282] Conveying person by water for hire in unsafe or overloaded vessel.
+"Whoever knowingly or negligently conveys, or causes to be conveyed for hire, any"
+"person by water in any vessel, when that vessel is in such a state or so loaded as to"
+"endanger the life of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend"
+"to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides against the negligence of common carriers by water. Where a
+"person, with the assistance of two others, plied a ferryboat, which was out of order and"
+"had a crack, and he took in one hundred passengers, and consequently the boat was"
+"upset, and seven persons were drowned, it was held that the accused had committed"
+an offence under this section.77. Where the lessee of a public ferry knew that boats
+were usually overloaded but took no steps against it and allowed his boatmen to
+"overload them as they liked and in consequence, a boat sank with some passengers, it"
+was held that the lessee was guilty of criminal negligence and liable under this
+"section.78. Where a launch, which was overloaded with passengers, capsized at the"
+jetty owing to the onrush of persons waiting at the jetty to get on deck and the
+"passengers on the launch wanting to get down at the jetty, resulting in displacement of"
+"balance of the launch, it was held that the capsizing of the launch was not because of"
+"any negligence of the owners or the master and, therefore, their conviction under this"
+section could not be sustained.79. The owner who knowingly or negligently allows
+overloading of his boat so as to endanger the life of the persons therein will be liable
+"under section 282, Penal Code.80."
+There is no provision in the Code for the negligence of a common carrier by land.
+"77. Khoda Jagta, (1864) 1 BHC (Cr C) 137."
+"78. Tofel Ahmad Miya, (1933) 61 Cal 253 ."
+"79. VR Bhate, AIR 1970 SC 1362 : 1970 Cr LJ 1261 ."
+"80. Re K S M Mohammad Abdul Kadar Marakayar, 1950 Cr LJ 729 (Mad)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 283] Danger or obstruction in public way or line of navigation.
+"Whoever, by doing any act, or by omitting to take order with any property in his"
+"possession or under his charge, causes danger, obstruction or injury to any person in"
+"any public way 1 or public line of navigation, shall be punished with fine which may"
+extend to two hundred rupees.
+COMMENT.—
+"The offence punishable under this section is the nuisance of causing obstruction, in a"
+public way or navigable river or canal:
+[s 283.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two things—
+1. A person must do an act or omit to take order with any property in his possession or
+under his charge.
+"2. Such act or omission must cause danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any"
+public way or line of navigation.
+It is not necessary to prove that any specific individual was actually obstructed.81.
+1. 'Public way'.—Where the privilege of a right of way is enjoyed only by a particular
+section of the community or by the inhabitants of two or three villages and not by
+"others, the way is not a public way within the meaning of this section.82. The section"
+cannot be extended to a case where a party prohibits strangers from passing through
+"its fields, even though they may have been allowed access on earlier occasion.83."
+[s 283.2] CASES.—
+A tractor trolley duly loaded with fertilizers was negligently parked in the middle of the
+road by its driver without there being any signal of its being stationary and as such
+three persons who were proceeding on a motor-cycle collided with the stationary trolley
+and sustained severe injuries. The Rajasthan High Court declined to quash the
+proceedings.84.
+"81. Venkappa v State, (1913) 38 Mad 305."
+"82. Prannath Kundu, (1929) 57 Cal 526 ."
+"83. Nand Ram v State, (1969) Cr LJ 77 ."
+"84. Jai Ram v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 3915 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 284] Negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance.
+"Whoever does, with any poisonous substance, any act in a manner so rash or"
+"negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any"
+"person,"
+or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any poisonous substance in
+his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life
+"from such poisonous substance,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+"Under the second part of this section, a person in possession of a poisonous"
+substance should have negligently omitted to take such order with it as is sufficient to
+guard against any probable danger to human life from such substance. It is not
+necessary that the negligent omission should be followed by any disastrous
+consequences.85.
+"85. Hosein Beg, (1882) PR No. 16 of 1882."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 285] Negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter.
+"Whoever does, with fire or any combustible matter, any act so rashly or negligently as"
+"to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person,"
+or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any fire or any combustible
+matter in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to
+"human life from such fire or combustible matter,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+This section extends the provisions of the preceding section to fire or any other
+combustible matter.
+[s 285.1] Cases.—
+A factory worker allegedly died due to rash and negligent act of occupier or manager. It
+"was argued that section 92 of Factories Act, 1948 prescribes punishment to occupier"
+or manager of factory for contravention of any of the provisions of Factories Act or any
+rules made thereunder. It was held that there is nothing in Factories Act (Special Law)
+which prescribes punishment for rash and negligent act of occupier or manager of
+"factory which resulted into the death of any worker or any other person. Hence,"
+"offences under IPC, 1860 including section 285 will apply.86. Where a factory manager,"
+in breach of conditions in the licence kept naked fire in proximity of stores of turpentine
+"and vanish and the fire caused death of seven workers, the court found that he is guilty"
+"under sections 285 and 304A IPC, 1860.87. The acts of accused in setting fire to the"
+Tobacco Stock inside the house after pouring petrol and further act of throwing petrol
+"on the deceased when he tried to pacify, cannot be held as either rash or negligent act"
+"so as to attract the offence under section 285 of IPC, 1860.88."
+"86. Ejaj Ahmad v State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ 1953 (Jha)."
+"87. Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Bangawalla v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1616 [LNIND"
+1964 SC 355] : 1965 (2) SCR 622 [LNIND 1964 SC 355] .
+"88. Madhusudan v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 215 (Kant)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 286] Negligent conduct with respect to explosive substance.
+"Whoever does, with any explosive substance, any act so rashly or negligently as to"
+"endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person,"
+or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any explosive substance in
+his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life
+"from that substance,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+"The foregoing section deals with 'fire or combustible matter', this with 'explosive"
+"substance'; otherwise, the provisions of both the sections are alike."
+The word 'knowingly' is evidently used in this section advisedly.
+[s 286.1] Limitation.—
+"In a case, the occurrence took place as far back as in the year 1995 and the challan"
+was presented in the year 2006. The prosecution was launched against the petitioners
+beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under the statute. Proceedings under
+"sections 286 and 9-B and 9-C of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, were quashed.89."
+"89. T Amudha Sidhanathan v Union Territory, Chandigarh, 2008 Cr LJ 937 (P&H)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 287] Negligent conduct with respect to machinery.
+"Whoever does, with any machinery, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger"
+"human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person,"
+or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any machinery in his
+possession or under his care as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to
+"human life from such machinery,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+Machinery is dangerous to human life if proper precaution is not taken in its working.
+This section renders any rash or negligent conduct in respect of machinery punishable.
+"Section 284 deals with poison; section 285, with fire or combustible matter, section"
+"286, with explosive substance; and this section, with machinery."
+Death of the victim occurred when his hand got crushed in conveyor belt while
+repairing it. There is no evidence to prove that the accused knowingly or negligently
+failed to take precautions against probable danger. It is held that no offence under
+section 287 or section 304A is made out.90.
+"90. Raj Kumar Bansal v State of Jharkhand, 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 554 (Jha)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 288] Negligent conduct with respect to pulling down or repairing buildings.
+"Whoever, in pulling down or repairing any building, knowingly or negligently omits to"
+take such order with that building as is sufficient to guard against any probable
+"danger to human life from the fall of that building, or of any part thereof, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
+"months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section deals with negligent conduct with respect to pulling down or repairing
+buildings. The injury complained of must be the direct consequence of such negligent
+"conduct.91. section 288, IPC, 1860, concerns itself with a situation where a person, in"
+"pulling down or repairing and building, knowingly or negligently omits to take such"
+order with that building as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human
+"life from the fall of that building, or any part thereof.92."
+"91. Manohar Shriniwas v Avtarsingh, (1969) 72 Bom LR 629 ."
+"92. Abdul Kalam v State, 2006 Cr LJ 3071 (Del)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 289] Negligent conduct with respect to animal.
+Whoever knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any animal in his
+"possession 1 as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life, or"
+"any probable danger of grievous hurt from such animal, 2 shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with"
+"fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section deals with improper or careless management of animals. It does not refer
+"to savage animals alone, but to any 'animal', wild or domestic, e.g., a pony.93."
+"In the case of wild and savage animals, a savage or mischievous temper is presumed"
+to be known to their owner and to all men as a usual accompaniment of such animals;
+and hence a positive duty is cast on the owner to protect the public against the
+mischief resulting from such animals being at large. Anyone who keeps such a wild
+"animal as a tiger or bear, which escapes and does damage, is liable without any proof"
+of notice of the animal's ferocity; in such a case it may be said 'res ipsa loquitur'.
+"In the case of animals, which are tame and mild in their general temper, no mischievous"
+disposition is presumed. It must be shown that the defendant knew that the animal
+was accustomed to do mischief. Some evidence must be given of the existence of an
+"abnormally vicious disposition. A single instance of ferocity, even a knowledge that it"
+"has evinced a savage disposition, is held to be sufficient notice.94."
+1. 'Animal in his possession'. Where the owner knowing that his buffalo was of a
+"savage and vicious disposition vis-a-vis human beings, negligently omitted to take such"
+order with the animal as was sufficient to guard against probable danger to human life
+"or any probable danger of grievous hurt, and the animal attacked the complainant in a"
+"jungle and wounded him with her horn, it was held that he was guilty of an offence"
+under this section.95.
+"2. 'As is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life, or any probable"
+"danger of grievous hurt from such animal'.—Where a pony, which was tied negligently,"
+"got loose and ran through a crowded bazar, it was held that the conviction under this"
+"section was good, because the pony on such an occasion might create danger to the"
+"lives or limbs of men, women and children walking in the bazar.96. The accused, a"
+"horse-keeper, harnessed his master's horse, put him into his carriage, and then went"
+"away, leaving the horse and carriage standing in the road of the compound of his"
+master's house without any justification; it was held that the accused had committed
+"an offence under this section, since the horse was not the less in the actual possession"
+"of the servant, because it was for some purpose in the constructive possession of his"
+master.97.
+"93. Chand Manal, (1872) 19 WR (Cr) 1."
+"94. See the authors' LAW OF TORTS, 19th Edn, chapter XX."
+"95. Moti, (1954) Nag 585."
+"96. Chand Manal, (1872) 19 WR (Cr) 1."
+"97. Natha Reva, (1881) Unrep Cr C 163."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 290] Punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided for.
+Whoever commits a public nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this
+"Code, shall be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees."
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides for the punishment of a nuisance falling within the four corners
+of the definition given in section 268 but not punishable under any other section.
+[s 290.1] CASES.—
+The display of unauthorized hoardings / banners / posters not only result in
+"defacement of public property and any place open to public view, but is an eyesore to"
+"the viewers thereby causing public nuisance. In a given case, it may also result in"
+obstructing the free flow of traffic on the public roads. The same would not only be
+"unlawful but unjust and unreasonable, irrespective of whether it has the effect of"
+advertisement or otherwise. Suffice it to observe that the Authorities have a bounden
+duty to prevent and regulate display of illegal hoardings / banners / posters in the
+interests of amity and public safety.98. Though corporate bodies act through their
+"agents, there is no reason to exempt such bodies when their agents or servants, while"
+"purporting to act on their behalf commit an offence like public nuisance, which is"
+punishable with fine only. So a Municipality could be convicted for not maintaining the
+"cleanliness of the town under section 290, IPC, 1860.99. But in deciding cases of"
+nuisance the rigid standards of urban society cannot be applied to Indian villages.100.
+Where a Coal Depot had been in existence for seven or eight years and only two
+"neighbours complained against its continuance at that site, it could not be said that it"
+"constituted a public nuisance. At best, it was a private nuisance.101. Playing the radio"
+loud at a particular time did not constitute public nuisance and it was too trivial a
+matter for the Court to take notice of it.102.
+"98. SP Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2010 (4) Bom section 548."
+"99. Kurnool Municipality, 1973 Cr LJ 1227 (AP)."
+"100. Chakra Behera, 1974 Cr LJ 423 (Ori)."
+"101. Berhampore Municipality v Oruganti Kondaya, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 279 (Ori)."
+"102. Ivor Heyden v State, 1984 Cr LJ NOC 16 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+[s 291] Continuance of nuisance after injunction to discontinue.
+"Whoever repeats or continues a public nuisance, having been enjoined by any public"
+servant who has lawful authority to issue such injunction not to repeat or continue
+"such nuisance, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may"
+"extend to six months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes a person repeating or continuing a nuisance after he is enjoined
+"by a public servant not to repeat or continue it. Sections 142 and 143 of the Cr PC,"
+1973 empower a Magistrate to forbid an act causing public nuisance.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+"103.[s 292] Sale, of obscene book,"
+"104.[(1) For the purposes of sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper, writing,"
+"drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object, shall be"
+deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest
+"or if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect"
+"of any one of its items, is if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave"
+"and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant"
+"circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.]"
+105.[(2)] Whoever—
+"(a) sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts"
+"into circulation, or for purposes of sale, hire, distribution, public"
+"exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession"
+"any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting,"
+"representation or figure or any other obscene object whatsoever, or"
+"(b) imports, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the"
+"purposes aforesaid, or knowing or having reason to believe that"
+"such object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or publicly exhibited"
+"or in any manner put into circulation, or"
+(c) takes part in or receives profits from any business in the course of
+which he knows or has reason to believe that any such obscene
+"objects are, for any of the purposes aforesaid, made, produced,"
+"purchased, kept, imported, exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or"
+"in any manner put into circulation, or"
+(d) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any
+person is engaged or is ready to engage in any act which is an
+"offence under this section, or that any such obscene object can be"
+"procured from or through any person, or"
+(e) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this
+"section,"
+shall be punished 106.[on first conviction with imprisonment of either
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, and with fine which"
+"may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or"
+"subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to five years, and also with fine which may extend to five"
+thousand rupees].
+107.[Exception.—This section does not extend to—
+"(a) any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting,"
+representation or figure—
+(i) the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the
+"public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing,"
+"drawing, painting, representation or figure is in the interest of"
+"science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general"
+"concern, or"
+(ii) which is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes;
+"(a) any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise"
+represented on or in—
+(i) any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient
+"Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of"
+"1958), or"
+"(ii) any temple, or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept"
+or used for any religious purpose.]]
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.— The following amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 13 of 1962, s. 2 (w.e.f."
+16-5-1962).
+"In its application to the whole State of Orissa, in Section 292, for the words, ""which may"
+"extend to three months"", substitute the words ""which may extend to two years"" and"
+"insert the following proviso before the Exception, namely:—"
+"""Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
+"than six months and not more than two years and with fine""."
+"Tamil Nadu.— The following amendments were made by Tamil Nadu Act No. 25 of 1960,"
+s. 2 (w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
+"In its application to the whole of the State of Tamil Nadu, in Section 292, for the words"
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend"
+"to three months or with fine or with both"", substitute the following, namely:—"
+"""shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend"
+to two years or with fine or with both:
+"Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
+"than six months and not more than two years and with fine""."
+COMMENT.—
+"section 292 IPC, 1860, was enacted by the Obscene Publications Act to give effect to"
+Article I of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Circulation of and
+"Traffic in Obscene Publications to which India is a signatory. By Act 36 of 1969, section"
+292 was amended to give more precise meaning to the word 'obscene' as used in the
+section in addition to creating an exception for publication of matter which is proved to
+"be justified as being for the public good, being in the interest of science, literature, art"
+"or learning or other objects of general concern. Prior to its amendment, section 292"
+contained no definition of obscenity. The amendment also literally does not provide for
+a definition of 'obscenity' in as much as it introduces a deeming provision.108. In order
+"to make the law relating to the publication of obscene matters or objects deterrent, the"
+"section provides for enhanced punishment. The Exception to the original section, which"
+"is now redrafted, exempts from the provisions of the section any representation,"
+"sculptured, engraved or painted on or in any ancient monument. The possession"
+"referred to in this section connotes conscious possession.109. By Act 25 of 1960, the"
+"State of Tamil Nadu has added a new section as section 292A for dealing with printing,"
+of grossly indecent or scurrilous matter or matter intended for blackmail. The State of
+Orissa has followed suit by Act 13 of 1962. The intention of the Legislature while
+amending the provision is to deal with this type of offences which corrupt the mind of
+the people to whom objectionable things can easily reach and need not be emphasized
+that corrupting influence is more likely to be upon the younger generation who has got
+to be protected from being easy prey.110. This section was amended by Act XXXVI
+"when apart from enlarging the scope of the exceptions, the penalty was enhanced"
+which was earlier up to three months or with fine or with both. By the amendment a
+dichotomy of penal treatment was introduced for dealing with the first offenders and
+"the subsequent offenders. In the case of even a first conviction, the accused shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years and with fine which may extend to Rs 2,000.111."
+"1. 'Obscene'.—The word obscenity is not defined in the IPC, 1860. The word 'obscene'"
+"was originally used to describe anything disgusting, repulsive, filthy or foul. The use of"
+the word is now said to be somewhat archaic or poetic; and it is ordinarily restricted to
+"something offensive to modesty or decency, or expressing or suggesting unchaste or"
+"lustful ideas, or being impure, indecent, or lewd.112. The obscene matter in a book must"
+be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it is so gross and its
+"obscenity, so decided, that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are"
+open to influences of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall. In this
+"connection, the interests of our contemporary society and particularly the influence of"
+the book on it must not be overlooked.113. It was further observed in this case that
+merely treating with sex and nudity in art and literature cannot be regarded as evidence
+of obscenity without something more. It was held that where obscenity and art are
+"mixed, art must be so preponderating as to throw the obscenity into the shadow or the"
+obscenity so trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and may be overlooked.
+When treatment of sex becomes offensive to public decency and morality as judged by
+"the prevailing standards of morality in the society, then only the work may be regarded"
+as an obscene production.114. In considering the question of obscenity of a publication
+"what the Court has to see is that whether a class, not an isolated case, into whose"
+"hands the book, article or story falls suffer in their moral outlook or become depraved"
+by reading it or might have impure and lecherous thoughts aroused in their minds.115. It
+was also observed in this case that the question of obscenity may have to be judged in
+the light of the claim that the work has a predominant literary merit. Referring to the
+"impact on the mind of the youth, the Court said:116."
+We do not think that it can be said with any assurance that merely because the adolescent
+"youth read situations of the type presented in the book, they would become deprived,"
+debased and encouraged to lasciviousness. It is possible that they may come across such
+situations in life and may have to face them. But if a narration or description of a similar
+situation is given in a setting emphasising a strong moral to be drawn from it and condemns
+"the conduct of the erring party as wrong and loathsome, it cannot be said that they have a"
+"likelihood of corrupting the morals of, those in whose hands it is likely to fall—particularly"
+the adolescent.
+"In KA Abbas v UOI,117. the Supreme Court has called the test laid down in Mishkin's"
+case118. as 'selective audience obscenity test' and observed as:
+our standards must be so framed that we are not reduced to a level where the protection of
+the least capable and the most depraved amongst us determines what the morally healthy
+cannot view or read ….
+The requirements of art and literature include within themselves a comprehensive view of
+social life and not only in its ideal form and the line is to be drawn where the average moral
+man begins to feel embarrassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the
+redeeming touch of art or genius or social value. If the depraved begins to see in these
+"things more than what an average person would, in much the same way, as it is wrongly"
+"said, a Frenchman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be helped. In our scheme of"
+things ideas having redeeming social or artistic value must also have importance and
+protection for their growth.
+In the case of Samaresh Bose v Amal Mitra119. wherein the Supreme Court provided the
+following guidance:120.
+"In our opinion, in judging the question of obscenity, the judge in the first place should try to"
+place himself in the position of the author and from the view point of the author the judge
+should try to understand what is it that the author seeks to convey and what the author
+conveys has any literary and artistic value. The judge should thereafter place himself in the
+position of a reader of every age group in whose hands the book is likely to fall and should
+try to appreciate what kind of possible influence the book is likely to have in the minds of
+the readers. The judge should thereafter apply his judicial mind dispassionately to decide
+whether the book in question can be said to be obscene within the meaning of the section
+by an objective assessment of the book as a whole and also of the passages complained of
+as obscene separately.
+It is no defence to a charge of obscenity merely to urge that the information has been
+copied from similar works.121.
+"In Promilla Kapur (Dr) v Yash Pal Bhasin, Promilla Kapur (Dr) v Yash Pal Bhasin,122. the"
+Delhi High Court felt123. that there was nothing wrong if a sociologist made a research
+on the subject of call-girls in order to know the reasons as to why and how the young
+girls fall in this profession and what society could do in order to eradicate or at least
+minimise the possibility of young budding girls joining the flesh trade. The book was in
+the form of interviews with the girls in the profession. The portion marked by the
+Magistrate as obscene was a description of their encounters with unscrupulous males
+including a description by some girls of their first experience with sex. But by far the
+bulk of the book dealt with the ways and means of running the profession and the
+"methods of encountering them. Thus, the book was within the scope of clause (a) of"
+"the first exception. In Bobby Art International v Om Pal Singh Hoon,124. while examining"
+"the validity of certificate of exhibition awarded to the film ""Bandit Queen"" it was held"
+"that nakedness does not always arouse the baser instinct. In Director General,"
+"Directorate General of Doordarshan v Anand Patwardhan,125. the Supreme Court again"
+referred to the Hicklin test and observed that the relevant questions are:
+(a) whether the average person applying contemporary community standards would
+"find that the work, taken as a whole appeal to the prurient interest."
+"(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual"
+"conduct specifically, defined by the applicable state law,"
+"(c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or"
+scientific value.
+"In the case of Ajay Goswami v UOI,126. the Supreme Court, while recognizing the right of"
+"adult entertainment, reviewed the position of law on obscenity and summarized the"
+various tests laid down regarding obscenity.
+[s 292.1] A picture of a woman in the nude is not per se obscene.—
+Unless the picture of a nude/semi-nude female is an incentive to sensuality or impure
+"or excite the thoughts in the mind of an ordinary person of normal temperament, the"
+"pictures cannot be regarded as obscene within the meaning of section 292 IPC, 1860."
+But where repetitive photographs without any backdrop content are published in a
+magazine and nearly l/4th of the magazine consists of nothing but repetitive
+"photographs of semi-nude women, prominence being to display their breast, there"
+"being hardly any literary contents in the magazine, the matter loses any literary content"
+and therefore the broad social outlook penned in Ranjit Udeshi's case127. may not be
+available as a defence.128. To fall within the scope of 'obscene' under sections 292 and
+"294 IPC, the ingredients of the impugned matter/art must lie at the extreme end of the"
+spectrum of the offensive matter. The legal test of obscenity is satisfied only when the
+"impugned art/matter can be said to appeal to an unhealthy, inordinate person having"
+perverted interest in sexual matters or having a tendency to morally corrupt and debase
+persons likely to come in contact with the impugned art.129.
+[s 292.2] Hicklin Test and Community Standard Test.—
+One of the tests to be applied to find whether an article possesses the standard of
+"obscenity is the Hicklin Test.130. As per this, the test of obscenity is whether the"
+tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
+minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this
+"sort may fall. The other test is Community Standard Test, whereby the obscenity has to"
+"be judged from the point of view of an average person, by applying contemporary"
+"community standards. In Aveek Sarkar v State of WB,131. the Supreme Court was of the"
+"view that Hicklin test is not the correct test to be applied to determine ""what is"
+"obscenity""."
+"When the name of Mahatma Gandhi is alluded or used as a symbol, speaking or using"
+"obscene words, the concept of ""degree"" comes in. To elaborate, the ""contemporary"
+"community standards test"" becomes applicable with more vigour, in a greater degree"
+and in an accentuated manner.132.
+[s 292.3] Khushboo Case.—
+"In Khushboo v Kanniammal,133. the appellant, a popular actress expressed her personal"
+"opinion wherein she had noted the increasing incidence of pre-marital sex, especially in"
+the context of live-in relationships and called for the societal acceptance of the same.
+"However, appellant had also qualified her remarks by observing that girls should take"
+adequate precautions to prevent unwanted pregnancies and the transmission of
+venereal diseases. The Supreme Court said it failed to see how the appellant's remarks
+"amount to 'obscenity' in the context of section 292 IPC, 1860. It was difficult to"
+appreciate the claim that the statements published as part of the survey were in the
+nature of obscene communications.
+"[s 292.4] Meaning of the word obscene in sections 292, 293 and section"
+294(b).—
+The word 'obscene' is not defined differently in these sections but the punishments
+were prescribed differently in other sections depending upon the effect of 'obscenity'
+that causes on the viewer or hearer as the case may be. That also would sufficiently
+indicate that the said word is to be understood as understood for the purpose of
+section 292.134.
+[s 292.5] Certificate of Censor Board.—
+"Once the film is given a particular certification, no doubt the case of obscenity under"
+"section 292 of the IPC, 1860, cannot be made out when the said film is shown to the"
+"particular category for which the certificate is granted. Again, the pre-condition is that"
+there has to be a certification by the Board of Film Censors. In the absence of any such
+"certificate, the petitioners cannot claim immunity from prosecution under section 292"
+"of the IPC.135. In GP Lamba v Tarun Mehta,136. explaining the role of the Censor Board"
+"certificate,137. the Court said:"
+The law presumes the regular performance of official acts. This is not to suggest that the
+grant of a certificate debars the court from judging the obscenity of a film..... or that the
+certificate is conclusive.... such a certificate is the opinion of a high powered Board
+especially entrusted with power to screen off the silver screen pictures which offensively
+"invade or deprave public morale through over-sex... The rebuttable presumption, which"
+"arises in favour of the statutory certificate, can be negatived by positive evidence. No such"
+evidence was before the court.138.
+"In the matter of sex knowledge, the Court said:"
+"In the present day society in India, a book, picture or a publication which deals with such"
+matter cannot per se be said to be obscene.139.
+The Court further added that in order to satisfy the requirement of mens rea there must
+be a distinct finding that the matter complained of was inserted by the order or owing
+to the negligence of the proprietor.140.
+[s 292.6] Public interest.—
+An obscene advertisement was published in a daily. The advertiser said that the
+publication was intended in good faith to promote sale of condoms. The advertisement
+was withdrawn because of social objections. The advertiser also apologised. The
+complaint filed by a social worker was no doubt maintainable but it was quashed
+because the complainant's interest should give way to the larger public interest as to
+whether prosecution would be proper in the circumstances of the case.141.
+[s 292.7] For sale.—
+Possession of obscene objects is punishable if the possession is for the purpose of
+"sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation. Persons who were found viewing"
+obscene films on television with the help of VCR could not be charged for the offence
+punishable under section 292.142.
+[s 292.8] Effect upon children.—
+The accused could not be convicted of possessing an indecent photograph unless he
+"knew that he had the photograph in his possession. The ""making"" of an indecent"
+"photograph included copying, downloading or storing it on a computer, provided that it"
+was done knowingly.143.
+"[s 292.9] Pornography, incitement for supply of material.—"
+"Act of accused, privately viewing obscene film does not constitute on offence under"
+"section 292 of IPC, 1860.144. Mere possession of an obscene cassette by itself does"
+"not amount to an offence punishable under section 292(2) IPC. In the case on hand, the"
+accused was found managing a video shop wherein obscene cassette containing a
+"blue-film evidently kept for hire to the potential customers, was found. In such"
+"circumstances, it cannot be said that the possession of the cassette was without the"
+requisite mens rea or that it and does not attract the ingredients of the offence
+"punishable under section 292 IPC.145. In another case, it was proved that the accused"
+showed pornographic film on the handicam to the prosecutrix. Though the charge of
+"rape failed, conviction under sections 292 and 506 was upheld.146."
+"Generally, evidence of expert is inadmissible whether an article or book has a tendency"
+"to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, hear or see the matter in"
+question.147. The only exception is where the likely readers belong to a special class
+"such as young children,148. In Samaresh Base's case149. the Supreme Court of India"
+considered the evidence of two eminent Bengali novelists to determine whether the
+"book 'Prajapati', a Bengali novel, has a tendency to deprave and corrupt youth, who are"
+likely to read it and having regard to their evidence decided the case in favour of the
+"accused. It was however held that, though a Court of law may consider the views of"
+"reputed authors or leading literatures, the ultimate duty to make a proper assessment"
+regarding obscenity or otherwise of a book rests only with the Court.150. The
+prosecution need not prove something which the law does not burden it with. As
+"regards the second part of the guilty act (actus reus), i.e. the selling or keeping for sale"
+"an object which is found to be obscene, here of course the ordinary mens rea is"
+"required to be shown before the offence can be said to be complete. Even so, it was"
+held in this case that in criminal prosecution mens rea must necessarily be proved by
+"circumstantial evidence alone unless the accused confesses. Thus, it is not required"
+"that prosecution must prove guilty intention to possess or possess for sale, by positive"
+evidence. The Court will presume that the owner of the shop is guilty if the book is sold
+on his behalf and later found to be obscene unless he can establish that the sale was
+without his knowledge or consent. Thus to escape liability he has to prove his lack of
+"knowledge.151. In India, it is also a defence to plead a certificate given by the Board of"
+"Censors. Thus, a certificate granted by the Board of Censors under section 5A of the"
+"Cinematograph Act 1952, certifying a film to be fit for public exhibition, circulation or"
+"distribution would by virtue of section 79, IPC, 1860, make prosecution under section"
+"292, IPC, unsustainable even if the film be obscene, lascivious or tending to deprave or"
+"corrupt public morale. This is so as section 79, IPC, (justification on ground of bona fide"
+mistake of fact) is exculpatory when read with section 5A of the Cinematograph Act
+and the certificate issued thereunder.152.
+[s 292.10] Obscenity in the internet and other electronic mediums.—
+section 67 of the Information Technology Act 2000 is the first statutory provisions
+"dealing with obscenity on the Internet in India. Sections 67, 67A and 67B of the"
+Information Technology Act 2000 deal with obscenity in electronic sphere.
+"It must be noted that the both under IPC, 1860, and the Information Technology Act,"
+"2000, the test to determine obscenity is similar.153."
+A special law shall prevail over the general and prior laws. Electronic forms of
+"transmission is covered by the IT Act, which is a special law. When the Act in various"
+"provisions deals with obscenity in electronic form, it covers the offence under section"
+"292 IPC, 1860. Once the special provisions having the overriding effect do cover a"
+"criminal act and the offender, he gets out of the net of the IPC and in this case, section"
+"292 IPC, 1860. Though charge has not been made out under section 67 of the IT Act,"
+yet the accused-appellant could not be proceeded under section 292 IPC.154.
+State Amendments
+(Section 292-A insertion)
+"Orissa.— The following amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 13 of 1962, s. 3 (w.e.f."
+16-5-1962).
+"In its application to the whole State of Orissa, after Section 292, insert the following"
+"new section, namely:—"
+"292-A. Printing, etc. of grossly indecent or scurrilous matter or matter intended for"
+blackmail.— Whoever—
+"(a) prints or causes to be printed in any newspaper, periodical or circular, or exhibits or"
+"causes to be exhibited, to public view or distributes or causes to be distributed or in"
+any manner puts into circulation any picture or any printed or written document which
+"is grossly indecent, or is scurrilous or intended for blackmail; or"
+"(b) sells or lets for hire, or for purposes of sale or hire makes, produces or has in"
+"possession, any picture or any printed or written document which is grossly indecent or"
+is scurrilous or intended for blackmail; or
+(c) conveys any picture or any printed or written document which is grossly indecent or
+is scurrilous or intended for blackmail knowing or having reason to believe that such
+"picture or document will be printed, sold, let for hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or"
+in any manner put into circulation; or
+"(d) takes part in, or receives profits from any business in the course of which he knows,"
+"or has reason to believe that any such newspaper, periodical, circular, picture, or other"
+"printed or written document is printed, exhibited, distributed, circulated, sold, let for"
+"hire, made, produced, kept, conveyed or purchased; or"
+(e) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged
+"or is ready to engage in any act which is an offence under this section, or that any such"
+"newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or other printed or written document which is"
+grossly indecent or is scurrilous or intended for blackmail can be procured from or
+through any person; or
+"(f) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both:"
+"Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
+than six months and not more than two years and with fine.
+"Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, the word ""scurrilous"" shall be deemed"
+to include any matter which is likely to be injurious to morality or is calculated to injure
+any person:
+Provided that it is not scurrilous to express in good faith anything whatever respecting
+the conduct of—
+(i) a public servant in the discharge of his public functions or respecting his character
+so far as his character appears in that conduct and no further; or
+"(ii) any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his"
+character appears in that conduct and no further.
+Explanation II.—In deciding whether any person has committed an offence under this
+"section, the Court shall have regard, inter alia, to the following considerations:—"
+"(a) the general character of the person charged, and where relevant, the nature of his"
+business;
+(b) the general character and dominant effect of the matter alleged to be grossly
+indecent or scurrilous or intended for blackmail;
+(c) any evidence offered or called by or on behalf of the accused person as to his
+"intention in committing any of the acts specified in this section""."
+"Tamil Nadu.— The following amendments were made by T.N. Act No. 25 of 1960, s. 2"
+(w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
+"In its application to the whole of the State of Tamil Nadu, after Section 292, insert the"
+"following new section, namely:—"
+"""292-A.Printing, etc., of grossly indecent or scurrilous matter or matter intended for"
+blackmail.— Whoever—
+"(a) prints or causes to be printed in any newspaper, periodical or circular, or exhibits or"
+"causes to be exhibited, to public view or distributes or causes to be distributed or in"
+any manner puts into circulation any picture or any printed or written document which
+"is grossly indecent, or is scurrilous or intended for blackmail; or"
+"(b) sells or lets for hire, or for purposes of sale or hire makes, produces or has in his"
+"possession, any picture or any printed or written document which is grossly indecent or"
+is scurrilous or intended for blackmail; or
+(c) conveys any picture or any printed or written document which is grossly indecent or
+is scurrilous or intended for blackmail knowing or having reason to believe that such
+"picture or document will be printed, sold, let for hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or"
+in any manner put into circulation; or
+"(d) takes part in, or receives profits from, any business in the course of which he knows"
+"or has reason to believe that any such newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or other"
+"printed or written document is printed, exhibited, distributed, circulated, sold, let for"
+"hire, made, produced, kept, conveyed or purchased; or"
+(e) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged
+"or is ready to engage in any act which is an offence under this section, or that any such"
+"newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or other printed or written document which is"
+grossly indecent or is scurrilous or intended for blackmail can be procured from or
+through any person; or
+"(f) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section, 155.[shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both]."
+"Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
+than six months 156.[and not more than two years] and with fine.
+"Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, the word 'scurrilous' shall be deemed to"
+include any matter which is likely to be injurious to morality or is calculated to injure
+any person:
+Provided that it is not scurrilous to express in good faith anything whatever respecting
+the conduct of—
+(i) a public servant in the discharge of his public functions or respecting his character
+so far as his character appears in that conduct and no further; or
+"(ii) any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his"
+character appears in that conduct and no further.
+Explanation II.—In deciding whether any person has committed an offence under this
+"section, the Court shall have regard, inter alia, to the following considerations:—"
+"(a) the general character of the person charged, and where relevant, the nature of his"
+business;
+(b) the general character and dominant effect of the matter alleged to be grossly
+indecent or scurrilous or intended for blackmail;
+(c) any evidence offered or called by or on behalf of the accused person as to his
+"intention in committing any of the acts specified in this section""."
+"103. Subs. by Act 8 of 1925, section 2, for section 292."
+"104. Ins. by Act 36 of 1969, section 2 (w.e.f. 7-9-1969)."
+"105. Section 292 renumbered as sub-section (2) thereof by Act 36 of 1969, section 2 (w.e.f. 7-9-"
+1969).
+"106. Subs. by Act 36 of 1969, section 2, for certain words (w.e.f. 7-9-1969)."
+"107. Subs. by Act 36 of 1969, section 2, for Exception (w.e.f. 7-9-1969)."
+"108. MF Husain v Raj Kumar Pandey, 2008 Cr LJ 4107 (Del)."
+"109. CT Prim, AIR 1961 Cal 177 [LNIND 1959 CAL 81] ."
+"110. Gita Ram v State of HP, AIR 2013 SC 641 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 18666] : (2013) 2 SCC 694"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 82] .
+"111. Uttam Singh v The State (Delhi Administration), (1974) 4 SCC 590 [LNIND 1974 SC 113] :"
+1974 SCC (Cr) 626 : AIR 1974 SC 1230 [LNIND 1974 SC 113] : 1974 (3) SCR 722 [LNIND 1974 SC
+113] : 1974 Cr LJ 423 .
+"112. Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2015 SC 2612 [LNIND 2015"
+SC 338] : 2015 (6) Scale 356 [LNIND 2015 SC 338] .
+"113. Ranjit D Udeshi, (1965) 1 SCR 65 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] SC : (1964) 67 Bom LR 506 : AIR"
+1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : 1965 (2) Cr LJ 8 .
+114. Ibid.
+"115. Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar, (1969) 72 Bom LR 917 SC : AIR 1970 SC 1390 [LNIND"
+1969 SC 293] : 1970 Cr LJ 1273 .
+116. AIR 1970 SC 1390 [LNIND 1969 SC 293] at p 1394 : 1970 Cr LJ 1273 .
+"117. KA Abbas v UOI, 1970 (2) SCC 780 [LNIND 1970 SC 388] : AIR 1971 SC 481 [LNIND 1970"
+SC 388] : 1971 (2) SCR 446 [LNIND 1970 SC 388] .
+"118. Mishkin v New York, 383 US 502."
+"119. Samaresh Bose v Amal Mitra, AIR 1986 SC 967 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] : 1986 Cr LJ 24 :"
+(1985) 4 SCC 289 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] .
+"120. 1986 Cr LJ 24 , at p 38."
+"121. Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] ."
+"122. Promilla Kapur (Dr) v Yash Pal Bhasin, Promilla Kapur (Dr) v Yash Pal Bhasin, 1989 Cr LJ"
+1241 (Del).
+123. At p 1245 per PK Bahri J.
+"124. Bobby Art International v Om Pal Singh Hoon, 1996 (4) SCC 1 [LNIND 1996 SC 2602] : AIR"
+1996 SC 1846 [LNIND 1996 SC 2602] .
+"125. Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v Anand Patwardhan, 2006 (8) SC 255 ."
+"126. Ajay Goswami v UOI, 2007 (1) SCC 143 [LNIND 2006 SC 1133] : AIR 2007 SC 493 [LNIND"
+2006 SC 1133] .
+127. Supra.
+"128. Vinay Mohan Sharma v Administration, 2008 Cr LJ 1672 (Del); Sree Ram Saksena, (1940) 1"
+Cal 581 .
+"129. MF Husain v Raj Kumar Pandey, 2008 Cr LJ 4107 (Del)."
+"130. R v Hicklin, 1868 L.R. 2 Q.B. 360."
+"131. Aveek Sarkar v State of WB, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 : (2014) 4 SCC 257 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] ."
+"132. Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cr LJ 3492 ."
+"133. Khushboo v Kanniammal, 2010 (5) SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 (4) Scale 462"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 411] : AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 Cr LJ 2828 .
+"134. Dhanisha v Rakhi N Raj, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 ."
+"135. R Basu and Etc v National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2007 Cr LJ 4254 (Del). See other SC"
+"cases relating to censorship KA Abbas, AIR 1971 SC 481 [LNIND 1970 SC 388] ; Raj Kapoor,"
+"1980 Cr LJ 436 ; Bobby Art International v Om Pal Singh, AIR 1996 SC 1846 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+"2602] ; S Rangarajan's case, (1989) 2 SCC 574 [LNIND 1986 SC 198] : 1989 (2) JT (SC) 170;"
+"Ramesh v UOI, (1988) 1 SCC 668 [LNIND 1988 SC 74] : 1988 SCC (Cr) 266; Director General,"
+"Directorate General of Doordarshan v Anand Patwardhan, AIR 2006 SC 3346 [LNIND 2006 SC 661]"
+.
+"136. GP Lamba v Tarun Mehta, 1988 Cr LJ 610 (P&H)."
+"137. Issued under the Cinematographic Act, 1952. See also PK Somnath v State of Kerala, 1990"
+"Cr LJ 542 (Ker), Violation of Indecent Representation of Woman (Prohibition) Act, 1986"
+proceedings not quashed and points of difference between obscenity and pornography
+explained.
+"138. GP Lamba v Tarun Mehta, 1988 Cr LJ 610 (P&H)."
+"139. Issued under the Cinematographic Act, 1952. See also PK Somnath v State of Kerala, 1990"
+"Cr LJ 542 (Ker), Violation of Indecent Representation of Woman (Prohibition) Act, 1986"
+proceedings not quashed and points of difference between obscenity and pornography
+explained.
+"140. Ibid, see at p 613."
+"141. Chairman & MD, Hindustan Latex Ltd v State of Kerala, 1999 Cr LJ 808 (Ker)."
+"142. Jagdish Chawla v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 2562 (Raj). Damodar Sarma v State of"
+Assam 2007 Cr LJ 1526 (Gau) - Obscene books.
+"143. Atkins v DPP; Goodland v DPP, (2000) 1 WLR 1427 (QBD)."
+"144. Deepankar Chowdari v State of Karnataka, 2008 Cr LJ 3408 (Kar); Jagdish Chawla v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 2562 (Raj)."
+"145. Abdul Rasheed v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 3480 (Ker)."
+"146. Vijay Sood v State of HP, 2009 Cr LJ 4530 (HP)."
+147. Ibid.
+"148. Ibid; Director of Public Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing, (1967) 2 All ER 504 ."
+"149. Samaresh Bose v Amal Mitra, 1986 Cr LJ 24 : AIR 1986 SC 967 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] :"
+(1985) 4 SCC 289 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] .
+150. Ibid.
+"151. Ibid; See also State of Karnataka v Basheer, 1979 Cr LJ 1183 (Kar)."
+"152. Raj kapoor v Laxman, 1980 Cr LJ 436 : AIR 1980 SC 605 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] ."
+"153. MF Husain v Raj Kumar Pandey, 2008 Cr LJ 4107 (Del)."
+"154. Sharat Babu Digumarti v Govt of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2017 SC 150 [LNIND 2016 SC 616] ."
+"155. Subs. for the words ""shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both, and, in the event"
+of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which
+"may extend to five years and with fine"" by the T.N. Act 30 of 1984, section 2 (w.e.f. 28-6-1984)."
+"156. Ins. by T.N. Act 30 of 1984, section 2 (w.e.f. 28-6-1984)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+"157.[s 293] Sale, of obscene objects to young person."
+"Whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes, exhibits or circulates to any person under the"
+age of twenty years any such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding
+"section, or offers or attempts so to do, shall be punished 2 [on first conviction with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+"with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or"
+"subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to seven years, and also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees].]"
+State Amendments
+"Orissa.—The following amendments were made by Orissa Act No. 13 of 1962, s. 4 (w.e.f."
+16-5-1962).
+"In its application to the whole State of Orissa, in Section 293:—"
+In section 293 of the said Code—
+"(i) for the words ""any such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding"
+"section"", the words, figures and letter ""any such obscene object as is referred to in"
+"section 292 or any such newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or other printed or"
+"written document as is referred to in section 292-A"" shall be substituted;"
+"(ii) for the words ""which may extend to six months"", the words ""which may extend to"
+"three years"" shall be substituted;"
+"(iii) in the marginal note, after the words ""obscene objects"" the words ""and grossly"
+"indecent or scurrilous matter or matter intended for blackmail"", shall be inserted."
+"Tamil Nadu.— The following amendments were made by T.N. Act No. 25 of 1960, s. 4"
+(w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
+"In its application to the whole of the State of Tamil Nadu, in Section 293,—"
+"Amendment of section 293, Central Act XLV of 1860.—In section 293 of the said Code—"
+(i) for the words 'any such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding
+"section', the words, figures and letter ""any such obscene object as is referred to in"
+"Section 292 or any such newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or other printed or"
+"written document as is referred to in Section 292A"", shall be substituted;"
+"(ii) for the words 'which may extend to six months', the words 'which may extend to"
+"three years"" shall be substituted; and"
+"(iii) in the marginal note, after the words ""obscene objects"" the words ""and grossly"
+"indecent or scurrilous matter or matter intended for blackmail"", shall be inserted."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section provides for enhanced sentence where the obscene objects are sold, to"
+persons under the age of 20 years. By Act 36 of 1969 the punishment for the offence is
+"further enhanced. On going through section 293, it is clear that a separate penal"
+"provision was made with regard to the sale, exhibition, of such obscene object to any"
+"person under the age of 20 years where as section 292 (1) deals with sale, exhibition,"
+"of such obscene object to any person. Therefore, in order to make the provision more"
+"stringent and grave insofar as it relates to the sale, of obscene objects to younger"
+"persons–aged less than 20 years, a separate penal provision, made applicable in"
+"section 293, was introduced. It is in that context, the word 'obscene' occurring in"
+section 292(1) is made applicable to section 293 also.158. In a trial for the offences
+"under sections 292 and 293 of the IPC, 1860, a certificate granted under section 6 of"
+the Cinematograph Act by the Board of Censors does not provide an irrebuttable
+"defence to accused who have been granted such a certificate, but it is certainly a"
+relevant fact of some weight to be taken into consideration by the criminal Court in
+deciding whether the offence charged is established. The Court must have regard to
+the fact that the certificate represents the judgment of a body of persons particularly
+selected under the statute for the specific purpose of adjudging the suitability of films
+"for public exhibition, and that judgment extends to a consideration of the principal"
+"ingredients which go to constitute the offences under sections 292 and 293 of the IPC,"
+"1860. At the same time, the Court must remind itself that the function of deciding"
+"whether the ingredients are established is primarily and essentially its own function,"
+"and it cannot abdicate that function in favour of another, no matter how august and"
+qualified be the statutory authority.159.
+[s 293.1] CASE.—
+The allegation is that the petitioner was a spectator of the blue-film and therefore an
+"abettor of the offences under sections 292, 293 and 294 IPC, 1860. This interposition"
+"as a mere spectator to the exhibition of a blue-film without any further complicity, in"
+"view of the above Supreme Court decision, cannot be taken to be amounting to"
+abetment of the main offence.160.
+[s 293.2] Benefit of Probation.—
+Exhibiting a blue-film in which man and woman were shown in the act of sexual
+intercourse to young boys would definitely deprave and corrupt their morals. Their
+"minds are impressionable. On their impressionable minds, anything can be imprinted."
+Things would have been different if that blue-film had been exhibited to mature minds.
+Showing a man and a woman in the act of sexual intercourse tends to appeal to the
+"carnal side of the human nature. Even if he is the first offender, he cannot be given the"
+"benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.161."
+"157. Subs. by Act 8 of 1925, section 2, for section 293."
+"158. Dhanisha v Rakhi N Raj, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 ."
+"159. Raj Kapoor v State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1980 SC 258 [LNIND 1979 SC 428] : (1980) 1"
+SCC 43 [LNIND 1979 SC 428] .
+"160. Dr B Rosaiah v State of AP, 1990 Cr LJ 189 (AP)."
+"161. Gita Ram v State of HP, AIR 2013 SC 641 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 18666] : (2013) 2 SCC 694"
+"[LNIND 2013 SC 82] ; Uttam Singh v The State (Delhi Administration, (1974) 4 SCC 590 [LNIND"
+1974 SC 113] : 1974 SCC (Cr) 626 : AIR 1974 SC 1230 [LNIND 1974 SC 113] : 1974 (3) SCR 722
+"[LNIND 1974 SC 113] : 1974 Cr LJ 423 ; Bharat Bhushan v State of Punjab, reported in 1999 (2)"
+RCR (Cr) 148.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+162.[s 294] Obscene acts and songs.
+"[Whoever, to the annoyance of others—"
+"(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or"
+"(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any"
+"public place,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.]"
+COMMENT.—
+"Ingredients.—(i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung,"
+recited or uttered any obscene songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has
+"so caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is not done"
+"in any public place, or the song recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited"
+"or uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes no annoyance to others, the"
+offence is not committed.163. To fall within the scope of 'obscene' under sections 292
+"and 294 IPC, 1860, the ingredients of the impugned matter/art must lie at the extreme"
+end of the spectrum of the offensive matter. The legal test of obscenity is satisfied only
+"when the impugned art/matter can be said to appeal to an unhealthy, inordinate person"
+having perverted interest in sexual matters or having a tendency to morally corrupt and
+debase persons likely to come in contact with the impugned art. It must also be
+remembered that a piece of art may be vulgar but not obscene. In order to arrive at a
+dispassionate conclusion where it is crucial to understand that art from the perspective
+"of the painter, it is also important to picture the same from a spectator's point of view"
+who is likely to see it.164. The obscene act or song must cause annoyance. Though
+"annoyance is an important ingredient of this offence, it being associated with mental"
+"condition, has often to be inferred from proved facts. Thus, where a Doctor was filthily"
+abused in a public place by dragging the name of his wife and he and some members
+"of the public were impelled to complain to the police, it was held that there was"
+sufficient indication of the fact that they were all annoyed even though it was not stated
+or spoken to by them in their evidence.165.
+[s 294.1] Public Place.—
+Hotels like the one where cabaret dances are performed and entry is restricted by
+"purchase of the tickets, would still be the public places within the meaning of section"
+"294 of the IPC, 1860.166. An offence under the section could not be made out by"
+uttering words in a private garden which was not a public place.167.
+[s 294.2] CASES.—
+"Where the accused addressed openly two respectable girls who were strangers to him,"
+in amorous words suggestive of illicit sex relations with them and asked them to go
+"along with him on his rickshaw, he was held to have committed an obscene act.168."
+Performance of cabaret dance devoid of nudity and obscenity according to Indian
+social standards in hotels and restaurants is not liable to be banned or prevented.169.
+[s 294.3] MF Husain's case.—
+The renowned artist MF Husain challenged the summoning orders against him which
+arose from a contemporary painting celebrating nudity made by petitioner.
+"Subsequently in the year 2006, the said painting entitled 'Bharat Mata' was advertised"
+as part of an online auction for charity for Kashmir earthquake victims organised by a
+non-governmental organisation with which the petitioner claimed to have no
+involvement. It was stated that the petitioner at no point in time had given a title to the
+said painting. There can be no exasperation caused by viewing such painting on the
+website for the reason that a person would first access such a website only if he has
+"some interest in art and that too contemporary art, and in case he does view such a"
+"website, he always would have the option to not to view or close the said web page. It"
+appeared that the complainants are not the types who would go to art galleries or have
+"an interest in contemporary art, because if they did, they would know that there are"
+"many other artists who embrace nudity as part of their contemporary art. Hence, the"
+"offence alleged under section 294 IPC, 1860, could not be made out.170."
+[s 294.4] Cabaret dance.—
+"In Narendra H Khurana v Commissioner,171. a division bench of Bombay High Court"
+examined the question whether the nude cabaret dances which are per se indecent and
+"obscene, held in a restaurant on purchase of tickets would warrant prosecution under"
+"section 294 of the IPC, 1860, in the absence of express evidence of annoyance by any"
+of the persons who attend such shows. It was held that cabaret dances where indecent
+and obscene act per se is involved would not attract the provision of section 294 of the
+"IPC without fulfilment of its essential ingredients, i.e. Evidence pertaining to"
+"""annoyance to others"". In State of Maharashtra v Indian Hotel & Restaurants"
+"Association,172. the Supreme Court lifted the ban on dance bars holding that ""we fail to"
+see how exactly the same dances can be said to be morally acceptable in the
+exempted establishments and lead to depravity if performed in the prohibited
+establishments. Rather it is evident that the same dancer can perform the same dance
+"in the high-class hotels, clubs, and gymkhanas but is prohibited of doing so in the"
+"establishments covered under section 33A of Bombay Police Act, 1951. We see no"
+rationale which would justify the conclusion that a dance that leads to depravity in one
+"place would get converted to an acceptable performance by a mere change of venue""."
+[s 294.5] Moral turpitude.—
+Offence under section 294 does not involve moral turpitude.173.
+[s 294.6] Section 294(b).—
+"To make out an offence under section 294(b) of IPC, 1860, the alleged obscene act"
+must have been committed by the accused in or near a public place. Writing obscene
+letters and sending them to the victim on her personal address and which were
+expected to be read by her privately does not constitute the offence.174.
+"162. Subs. by Act 3 of 1895, section 3, for section 294."
+"163. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1996 SC 3300 [LNIND 1996 SC 2868] : (1996) 4 SCC"
+17 [LNIND 1996 SC 2868] .
+"164. MF Husain v Raj Kumar Pandey, 2008 Cr LJ 4107 (Del)."
+"165. Patel HM v Malle Gowda, 1973 Cr LJ 1047 (Mys)."
+"166. Narendra H Khurana v Commissioner, 2004 Cr LJ 3393 (Bom)."
+"167. Saraswathi v State of TN, 2002 Cr LJ 1420 (Mad); K Jayaramanuja v Kanakraj, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"1623 (Mad), words complained of did not show annoyance to others. Acquittal, no interference"
+in revision.
+"168. Zafar Ahmad, AIR 1963 All 105 [LNIND 1962 ALL 125] ; Sadar Prasad, 1970 Cr LJ 1323"
+(Pat).
+"169. KP Mohammad, 1984 Cr LJ 745 (Ker). See also Chander Kala v Ram Kishan, AIR 1985 SC"
+1268 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] : 1985 Cr LJ 1490 : (1985) 4 SCC 212 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] : 1985
+"SCC (Cr) 491, where the offence was proved with cogent evidence."
+"170. MF Husain v Raj Kumar Pandey, 2008 Cal LJ 4107 (Del)."
+"171. Narendra H Khurana v Commissioner, 2004 Cr LJ 3393 (Bom),"
+"172. State of Maharashtra v Indian Hotel & Restaurants Association, AIR 2013 SC 2582 [LNIND"
+2013 SC 665] : (2013) 8 SCC 519 [LNIND 2013 SC 665] .
+"173. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1996 SC 3300 [LNIND 1996 SC 2868] : (1996) 4 SCC"
+17 [LNIND 1996 SC 2868] .
+"174. MM Haris v State, 2005 Cr LJ 3314 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XIV OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY"
+"CONVENIENCE, DECENCY AND MORALS"
+The following specific instances of nuisance are dealt with in this Chapter:—
+1. Act likely to spread infection (sections 269–271).
+2. Adulteration of food or drink (sections 272–273).
+3. Adulteration of drugs (sections 274–276).
+4. Fouling water of a public spring or reservoir (section 277).
+5. Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278).
+6. Rash driving or riding (section 279).
+7. Rash navigation (sections 280-282).
+"8. Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy (section 281)."
+9. Danger or obstruction in a public way or line of navigation (section 283).
+"10. Negligence in respect of poison (section 284), fire (section 285) or explosive"
+substances (section 286).
+"11. Negligence in respect of machinery (section 287), building (section 288) or"
+animals (section 289).
+"12. Selling obscene literature and pictures (sections 292, 293) or doing obscene"
+acts (section 294).
+13. Keeping a lottery office (section 294A).
+175.[s 294A] Keeping lottery office.
+[Whoever keeps any office or place for the purpose of drawing any lottery 1 176. [not
+"being 177. [a State lottery] or a lottery authorised by the 178. [State] Government], shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"six months, or with fine, or with both."
+"And whoever publishes 2 any proposal to pay any sum, or to deliver any goods, 3 or to"
+"do or forbear from doing anything for the benefit of any person, on any event or"
+"contingency relative or applicable to the drawing of any ticket, lot, number or figure in"
+"any such lottery, shall be punished with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+rupees.]
+State Amendments
+"Andhra Pradesh.—This amendment was made by A.P. Act No. 16 of 1968, s. 27, (w.e.f. 1-"
+2-1969).
+"In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, the provisions of section 294-A are"
+repealed.
+"Gujarat.— The following amendments were made by Bombay Act No. 82 of 1958, s. 33"
+read with Bom.
+"Act No. 11 of 1960, s. 87."
+"In its application to the State of Gujarat, the provisions of section 294A are repealed."
+"Karnataka (Mysore).— The following amendments were made by Mys. Act 27 of 1951, s."
+33.
+"In its application to the whole of the Mysore area except Bellary district, the provisions"
+of section 294A are repealed.
+"Maharashtra.— The following amendments were made by Bom. Act No. 82 of 1958, s. 33"
+(w.e.f.1-5-1959).
+"In its application to the State of Maharashtra, the provisions of section 294A are"
+repealed.
+"Uttar Pradesh.— Section 294A of Indian Penal Code shall be omitted, vide U.P. Act No. 24"
+of 1995.
+COMMENT.—
+Lottery stands on the same footing as gambling because both of them are games of
+"chance. The section does not touch authorized lotteries, but intends to save people"
+from the effects of those not authorised by prohibiting (1) the keeping of offices or
+"places for drawing them, and (2) the publication of any advertisement relating to them."
+"Bombay Lotteries (Control and Tax) and Prize Competitions (Tax) Act 1958, Bombay"
+"Act No. LXXXII of 1958, by section 33 repeals the operation of this section in the State"
+of Maharashtra.
+State Governments can authorise lotteries in any way. No procedure is prescribed.179.
+[s 294A.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two things—
+1. Keeping of any office or place for the purpose of drawing any lottery.
+2. Such lottery must not be authorized by Government.
+1. 'Drawing any lottery'.—A lottery is a distribution of prizes by lot or chance without the
+use of any skill.180. It makes no difference that the distribution is part of a genuine
+mercantile transaction.181.
+2. 'Publishers'.—This word includes both the persons who sends a proposal as well as
+proprietor of a newspaper who prints the proposal as an advertisement.182. The
+proprietor of a Bombay newspaper who published an advertisement in his paper
+relating to a Melbourne lottery was held to be guilty under this section.183.
+3. 'Goods'.—The term 'goods' includes both movable and immovable property. The
+publication of an advertisement of a lottery by which the lucky winner would get a
+factory for less than its real value is an offence under this section.184.
+[s 294A.2] CASES.—
+Agreement for contributions to be paid by lot is not lottery.— An agreement whereby a
+"number of persons subscribe, each a certain sum, by a periodical instalment, with the"
+"object that each in his turn, (to be decided by lot), shall take the whole subscription for"
+"each instalment, all such persons being returned the amount of their contributions, the"
+"common fund being lent to each subscriber in turn, was held to be not illegal.185."
+[s 294A.3] Prize chit.—
+A prize chit was started with the object of creating a fund for a temple. It consisted of
+"625 subscribers, the monthly subscription being Rs 3. The subscription was to be paid"
+"for 50 months. A drawing was to take place every month, one ticket was to be drawn"
+out of 625 tickets and the subscriber who drew the ticket was to be paid Rs 150
+without any liability to pay future instalments. That process was to be repeated every
+month till the 50th month. After the 50th month the remaining 575 subscribers were to
+"be each paid in a particular order Rs 150, and the chit fund was to be closed. It was"
+held that the chit fund was a lottery.186.
+[s 294A.4] Transaction in which prizes are decided by chance amounts to
+lottery.—
+"It has, been held by the High Court of Kerala that lucky draw prize schemes organised"
+by manufacturers as part of promotion of sale of manufactured goods come within the
+"ambit of this section. Government, however, has a discretion to select firms by rotation"
+and such a bona fide selection cannot be attacked as discriminatory under Article 14 of
+the Constitution.187.
+"175. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 10."
+"176. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 10."
+"177. Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch., for ""a lottery organised by the Central"
+"Government or the Government of a Part A State or a Part B State"" (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"178. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""Provincial""."
+"179. Rama Nava Nirman Samithi v State of TN, 1990 Cr LJ 2620 (TN)."
+"180. Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, (1935) 59 Mad 562 : 566 (FB); Taylor v Smetten, (1883) 11"
+"QBD 207 ; Mukandi Lal, (1917) PR No. 35 of 1917."
+"181. GC Chakrabatty, (1915) 9 BLT 124 , 17 Cr LJ 143."
+"182. Mancherji Kavasji, (1885) 10 Bom 97."
+183. Ibid.
+"184. Malla Reddi v State, (1926) 50 Mad 479."
+"185. Vasudevan Namburi v Mammod, (1898) 22 Mad 212."
+"186. Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, (1935) 59 Mad 562 (FB)."
+"187. Tata Oil Mills Co Ltd, 1982 Cr LJ NOC 171 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XV OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION
+The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be
+"desirable that all governments should act, but from which the Government of India"
+"cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is this, that every man should"
+be suffered to profess his own religion and that no man should be suffered to insult the
+religion of another.1.
+[s 295] Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of
+any class.
+"Whoever destroys, damages or defiles 1 any place of worship, or any object2. held"
+sacred by any class of persons3. with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of
+any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to
+"consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be"
+punishble with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The object of this section is to punish those persons who intentionally wound the
+religious feelings of others by injuring or defiling a place of worship. This section is
+intended to prevent wanton insult to the religious notions of a class of persons.2
+[s 295.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two things—
+"1. Destruction, damage or defilement of (a) any place of worship or (b) any object"
+held sacred by a class of persons.
+"2. Such destruction, etc., must have been done (i) with the intention of insulting the"
+"religion of a class of persons, or (ii) with the knowledge that a class of persons is"
+"likely to consider such destruction, etc., as an insult to their religion."
+1. 'Defiles'.—This word is not to be restricted in meaning to acts that would make an
+"object of worship unclean as a material object, but extends to acts done in relation to"
+the object of worship which would render such object ritually impure.3
+2. 'Object'.—The word 'object' does not include animate objects. It refers only to
+"inanimate objects such as churches, mosques, temples, and marble or stone figures"
+"representing gods.4. Killing of a cow by a Mohammedan, within the sight of a public"
+"road frequented by Hindus, is not punishable under this section.5. Similarly, where a bull"
+dedicated and set at large on a ceremonial occasion of Hindus in accordance with a
+religious usage was killed by certain Mohammedans secretly and at night in the
+presence of none but Mohammedans; it was held that no offence was committed.6.
+"Any object, however trivial or destitute of real value in itself, if regarded as sacred by"
+any class of persons would come within the meaning of this section nor is it absolutely
+"necessary that the object, in order to be held sacred, should have been actually"
+worshipped.7.
+3. 'Class of persons'.—In order that a body of persons may form a class there must be
+a principle of classification.8.
+[s 295.2] CASES.—
+"The damaging or destroying of a sacred thread worn by a person, who is not entitled"
+under the Hindu custom to wear it or for whom the wearing of the sacred thread was
+"not part of his ceremonial observance under the Hindu religion, in assertion of a mere"
+"claim to higher rank, was held to be not an insult to his religion.9. Where a pastor of the"
+church who himself was a Christian was running a nursery school and a charitable
+"dispensary in a portion of the Church, it could not be said that by using a portion of the"
+Church property for such secular and non-religious purposes he was insulting the
+"religion of a class of persons within the meaning of section 295, Indian Penal Code,"
+"1860 (IPC, 1860).10."
+"1. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Notes on the chapter of offences relating to religion and caste."
+Note j.
+"2. Gopinath v Ramchandra, (1958) Cut 485."
+"3. Sivakoti Swami, (1885) 1 Weir 253."
+"4. Imam Ali v State, (1887) 10 All 150 (FB); Romesh Chunder Sannyal v Hiru Mondal, (1890) 17"
+Cal 852 .
+"5. Imam Ali, sup; Ali Muhammad, (1917) PR No. 10 of 1918 (FB)."
+"6. Romesh Chunder Sannyal v Hiru Mondal, supra."
+"7. Veerabadran v Ramaswami, AIR 1958 SC 1032 [LNIND 1958 SC 95] : 1958 Cr LJ 1565 . See"
+"also Zac Poonen v Hidden Treasure Literature Incorporated In Canada, 2002 Cr LJ 481 (Kant)."
+"8. Benarashi Lal, (1956) 98 CLJ 139."
+"9. Sheo Shankar, (1940) 15 Luck 696 ."
+"10. DP Titus v LW Lyall, 1981 Cr LJ 68 (All)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XV OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION
+The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be
+"desirable that all governments should act, but from which the Government of India"
+"cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is this, that every man should"
+be suffered to profess his own religion and that no man should be suffered to insult the
+religion of another.1.
+11.[s 295A] Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious
+"feelings of any class, by insulting its religion or religious beliefs."
+"[Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of"
+"any class of 12.[citizens of India], 13.[by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or"
+"by visible representations or otherwise], insults or attempts to insult the religion or"
+"the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to 14.[three years], or with fine, or with both.]"
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh the offence is cognizable vide A.P. G.O. Ms. No. 732,"
+dated 5 December 1991.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section was brought into IPC, 1860 by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1927 (25"
+of 1927) following the wide spread agitations erupting from the decision in Rajpaul v
+"Emperor,15. commonly called as ""Rangila Rasul's case"", rendered by the Lahore High"
+"Court. Interpreting section 153A of IPC, 1860, which alone was there in the Statute"
+"then, it was held that no offence would lie thereunder however indecent be the"
+comments made against a deceased religious leader. In fact a few months before
+"Rangila Rasul's case was decided by the Lahore High Court, a totally dissenting view"
+"over the application of section 153A of IPC, 1860 had been rendered by the Allahabad"
+"High Court in Kali Charan Sharma v Emperor,16. holding that scurrilous and bad taste"
+remarks against a religion or its founder promoting ill feelings between sects of
+"different faith could be proceeded under section 153A of IPC, 1860. It was at that"
+stage; the Legislature stepped in and brought in a new penal provision under section
+"295A in IPC, 1860. Section 295A of IPC, 1860 does not penalise every act of insult but"
+"penalises only deliberate acts of insult, so that even if by any expression insult is in fact"
+"caused, that expression is not an offence if the insult offered is unwilling or"
+"unintended.17. In order to attract the mischief of the provision of section 295A, the"
+"following ingredients are to be satisfied, viz., a person (1) by written words (2) with"
+deliberate and malicious intention (3) of outraging the religious feelings (4) of any
+"class of citizens of India, (5) insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious"
+"beliefs of that class. In other words, (1) the intention has to be deliberate and malicious"
+both and (2) for outraging the religious feelings (3) of a class of citizens of India (4) in
+"order to insult or attempt to insult the religious or religious belief of that class, i.e., in"
+India (5) by written words.18. Insults to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or
+without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that
+class do not come within the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of insult to
+religion when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging
+the religious feelings of that class.19.
+The essence of the offence under this section is that the insult to religion or the
+"outrage to religious feelings must be the sole, or primary, or at least the deliberate and"
+conscious intention. In order to bring the case within this section it is not so much the
+matter of discourse as the manner of it. The words used should be such as are bound
+to be regarded by any reasonable man as grossly offensive and provocative and
+maliciously and deliberately intended to outrage the feeling of any class of citizens of
+India. It is no defence to a charge under this section for anyone to plead that he was
+writing a book in reply to the one written by one professing another religion who has
+attacked his own religion.20. In order to establish malice as contemplated by this
+"section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that, the applicant bore ill will or"
+enmity against specific persons. If the injurious act was done voluntarily without a
+"lawful excuse, malice may be presumed.21. Malice is often not capable of direct and"
+tangible proof and in almost all cases has to be inferred from the surrounding
+"circumstances having regard to the setting, background and connected facts in relation"
+to the offending article.22. The truth of the allegation is not a good defence to a charge
+under this section.23.
+"The Supreme Court, while quashing a complaint observed that section 295A does not"
+stipulate everything to be penalised and any and every act would tantamount to insult
+or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of class of citizens. It penalises
+only those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or
+religious belief of a class of citizens which are perpetrated with the deliberate and
+malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class of citizens. Insults
+to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious
+intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section.
+Further the said provision only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when
+it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious
+feelings of that class.24.
+[s 295A.1] Constitutional validity.—
+This section is well within the protection of clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution
+"and its validity neither is beyond question,25. nor is it inconsistent with the right"
+guaranteed by Article 25(1) of the Constitution.26.
+Where the arrangement of the scenes and the script of the drama outraged the
+"religious feelings of the Christian community, an offence under this section was held to"
+have been committed irrespective of the fact whether the beliefs which were made the
+subject-matter of the attack were rational or irrational. An attack on even an incredible
+belief may be capable of causing hurt to feelings.27. Where the articles published by
+the accused highlighted the ideological differences that existed between the members
+"of a Christian group and the members of the Christian fellowship centre, it was held"
+that an expression of opinion by a person who is having a different religious belief did
+not amount to defamation.28. An offence under this section has been made a
+"cognizable and non-bailable one under new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC,"
+1973).
+[s 295A.2] Sanction.—
+No Court can take cognizance of an offence under this section except with the
+"previous sanction of the concerned Government under section 196(1), Cr PC, 1973.29."
+In the matter of the publication of a book outraging the religious feelings of a section of
+"the society, a Notification was issued directing forfeiture of the book under section 95,"
+"Cr PC, 1973. It was held that the order contained in the Notification was not violative of"
+Article 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.30.
+[s 295A.3] CASES.—
+It is well settled that the offending publication has to be viewed as a whole and the
+malicious intent of the author has to be gathered from a broader perspective and not
+merely from a few solitary lines or quotations.31. The same view of the law was taken
+"in Chandanmal's case by the High Court of Calcutta to say that section 295A, IPC, 1860,"
+does not punish every act of insult to religion. It punishes only aggravated acts of
+"insult, etc., which are deliberate and malicious. And in judging if a publication falls"
+within the mischief of this section the publication has to be judged as a whole.
+"""Isolated passages picked out from here and there and read out of context cannot"
+"change the position"".32."
+A petition was filed to protest against the practice of printing and pasting photographs
+of Gods and Goddesses of Hindu religion on fire crackers. The practice in question had
+been going on since long without any objections. The Court viewed it as a whimsical
+petition and dismissed it.33.
+"In this connection see also sub-para entitled ""Cases"" under section 153A ante."
+"1. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Notes on the chapter of offences relating to religion and caste."
+Note j.
+"11. Ins. by Act 25 of 1927, section 2."
+"12. Subs. by the A.O. 1950, for ""His Majesty's subjects""."
+"13. Subs. by Act 41 of 1961, section 3, for ""by words, either written or spoken, or by"
+"visiblerepresentations"" (w.e.f. 12-9-1961)."
+"14. Subs. by Act 41 of 1961, section 3, for ""two years"" (w.e.f. 12-9-1961)"
+"15. Rajpaul v Emperor, AIR 1927 Lahore 590 ."
+"16. Kali Charan Sharma v Emperor, AIR 1927 Allahabad 649 ."
+"17. Jayamala v State, 2013 Cr LJ 622 ."
+"18. Sujato Bhadra v State of WB, 2006 Cr LJ 368 (Cal)."
+"19. R V Bhasin v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1375 (Bom) (FB); Ramji Lal Modi, AIR 1957 SC"
+620 [LNIND 1957 SC 36] : (1957) SCR 860 [LNIND 1957 SC 36] .
+"20. Shiv Ram Dass v Udasi Chakarvarti, (1954) Pun 1020 (FB)."
+"21. Khalil Ahamad, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] (SB). Trustees of Safdar Hashmi"
+"Memorial Trust v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3689 (Del), the basic requirement of the"
+section is that of deliberate and malicious act. Malice is a negation of bona fides and one who
+alleges it has to prove it.
+"22. Sujato Bhadra v State of WB, 2005 Cr LJ 368 (Cal): 2005 (4) CHN 601 [LNIND 2005 CAL 620]"
+"The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3869 (Del)"
+(FB).
+"23. Henry Rodrigues, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 564 ."
+"24. Mahendra Singh Dhoni v Yerraguntla Shyamsundar, AIR 2017 SC 2392 [LNIND 2017 SC 217] :"
+2017 (2) RCR (Criminal) 746 : 2017 (5) Scale 83 .
+"25. Ramji Lal Modi, (1957) SCR 860 [LNIND 1957 SC 36] ."
+"26. Henry Rodrigues, supra."
+"27. T Parameswaran v Distt. Collector, AIR 1988 Ker 175 [LNIND 1987 KER 607] ."
+"28. Zac Poonen v Hidden Treasure Literature Incorporated in Canada, 2002 Cr LJ 481 (Kant)."
+"29. Shalibhadra Shah, 1981 Cr LJ 113 (Guj). Acharya Rajneesh v Naval Thakur, 1990 Cr LJ 2511"
+"(HP). Manoj Rai v State of MP, AIR 1999 SC 300 : 1999 Cr LJ 470 , proceedings quashed"
+because of no sanction.
+"30. Baragur Ramchandrappa v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 3639 (Kant—FB)."
+"31. Nand Kishore Singh, 1985 Cr LJ 797 (Pat—SB)."
+"32. Chandanmal Chopra, 1986 Cr LJ 182 (Cal)."
+"33. Bhau v State of Maharashtra, 1999 Cr LJ 1230 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XV OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION
+The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be
+"desirable that all governments should act, but from which the Government of India"
+"cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is this, that every man should"
+be suffered to profess his own religion and that no man should be suffered to insult the
+religion of another.1.
+[s 296] Disturbing religious assembly.
+Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the
+"performance of religious worship, or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"Assemblies held for religious worship, or for the performance of religious ceremonies,"
+are hereby protected from intentional disturbance.
+The object of this section is to secure freedom from molestation when people meet for
+"the performance of acts in a quiet spot vested for the time in the assembly exclusively,"
+"and not when they engage in worship in an unquiet place, open to all the public as a"
+thoroughfare.34.
+[s 296.1] Ingredients.—
+To constitute an offence under this section—
+(1) There must be a voluntary disturbance caused.
+(2) The disturbance must be caused to an assembly engaged in religious worship
+or religious ceremonies.
+"(3) The assembly must be lawfully engaged in such worship or ceremonies, i.e., it"
+must be doing what it has a right to do.
+[s 296.2] CASES.—Disturbance caused by saying 'amin'.—
+A mosque is a place where all sects of Mohammedans are entitled to go and perform
+"their devotion as of right, according to their conscience; and a Mohammedan of one"
+"sect pronouncing the word ""amin"" loudly, in the honest exercise of conscience,"
+"commits no offence or civil wrong,35. though he may by such conduct cause"
+annoyance in the mosque to other worshippers of another sect who do not pronounce
+"that word loudly.36. But any person, Mohammedan or not, who goes into a mosque not"
+"bona fide for a religious purpose, but mala fide, for the purpose of disturbing others"
+"engaged in their devotions, will render himself criminally liable.37."
+[s 296.3] Religious procession.—
+Persons of every sect are entitled to take out religious processions with music through
+public streets provided that they do not interfere with the ordinary use of the streets by
+the public or contravene any traffic regulation or lawful directions issued by the
+Magistrate. A religious procession does not change its character merely because the
+music is temporarily stopped in front of a mosque.38.
+"1. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Notes on the chapter of offences relating to religion and caste."
+Note j.
+"34. Vijiaraghava Chariar, (1903) 26 Mad 554, 574 (FB)."
+"35. Ata-Ullah v Azim-Ullah, (1889) 12 All 494 (FB)."
+"36. Jangu v Ahmadullah, (1889) 13 All 419 (FB)."
+37. Ibid.
+"38. Mohamud khan, (1948) Nag 657."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XV OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION
+The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be
+"desirable that all governments should act, but from which the Government of India"
+"cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is this, that every man should"
+be suffered to profess his own religion and that no man should be suffered to insult the
+religion of another.1.
+"[s 297] Trespassing on burial places, etc."
+"Whoever, with the intention of wounding the feelings of any person, or of insulting the"
+"religion of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of any person are likely"
+"to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is likely to be insulted thereby,"
+"commits any trespass in any place of worship 1 or on any place of sepulchre, or any"
+place set apart from the performance of funeral rites 2 or as a depository for the
+"remains of the dead, or offers any indignity to any human corpse, 3 or causes"
+"disturbance to any persons assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section deals more especially with trespasses on places of sepulchre and places
+set apart for the performance of funeral rites and as depositories for the remains of the
+dead. It extends the principle laid down in section 295 to places which are treated as
+"sacred. The essence of the section is an intention, or knowledge of likelihood, to wound"
+feelings or insult religion and when with that intention or knowledge trespass on a
+"place of sepulchre, indignity to a corpse, or disturbance to persons assembled for"
+"funeral ceremonies is committed, the offence is complete.39."
+1. 'Trespass in any place of worship'.—'Trespass' here implies not only criminal
+"trespass but also an ordinary act of trespass, i.e., an entry on another's land without"
+lawful authority with the intention specified in section 441.40. The term 'trespass'
+"means any violent or injurious act, committed in such place and with such knowledge"
+or intention as is defined in this section.41.
+The trespass must be in a place of worship with the knowledge that the religious
+feelings of persons would be wounded thereby. Where some persons had sexual
+"connection inside a mosque, it was held that they were guilty of an offence under this"
+section.42.
+2. 'Funeral rites'.—The section contemplates disturbance of persons engaged in
+performing funeral ceremonies. But a moharram procession is not a funeral ceremony
+within the meaning of this section.43. Obstruction to the performance of obsequies
+comes under this section.44.
+3. Indignity to corpse.—What is indignity to corpse is not defined anywhere. Indignity is
+generally synonymous to humiliation or disgrace. A conduct to be criminal in the sense
+"of section 297, IPC, 1860 should be spiteful to become humiliating or disgraceful. In a"
+"particular situation, an act may not cause disgrace or may not humiliate, but, in other"
+situations that very act may cause disgrace or humiliation. So the intentions of the
+person concerned as well as surrounding circumstances are important factors.45.
+"1. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Notes on the chapter of offences relating to religion and caste."
+Note j.
+"39. Burhan Shah, (1887) PR No. 26 of 1887."
+"40. Subhan, (1896) 18 All 395 ; Jhulan Saib, (1913) 40 Cal 548 ; Ratna Mudali, (1886) 10 Mad"
+"126; Umar Din, (1915) PR No. 23 of 1915."
+"41. Mustan, (1923) 1 Ran 690; Sanoo v State, (1941) Kant 316."
+"42. Maqsud Husain, (1923) 45 All 529 ."
+"43. Ghosita v Kalka, (1885) 5 AWN 49."
+"44. Subramania v Venkata, (1883) 6 Mad 254 : 257. Sudarshan Kumar v Gangacharan Dubey,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 1618 (MP), killing of a criminal in police encounter. His body was roped to a tower"
+for a few minutes in order to show to the public the results of a life in crime. This being not an
+"indignity to the body, no offence under the section was made out."
+"45. Surdarshan Kumar v Gangacharan Dubey, 1999 Cr LJ 1618 (MP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XV OF OFFENCES RELATING TO RELIGION
+The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be
+"desirable that all governments should act, but from which the Government of India"
+"cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is this, that every man should"
+be suffered to profess his own religion and that no man should be suffered to insult the
+religion of another.1.
+"[s 298] Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings."
+"Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any"
+"person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes"
+"any gesture in the sight of that person or places any object in the sight of that person,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+State Amendment
+Andhra Pradesh.— In Andhra Pradesh the offence is cognizable vide A.P. G.O. Ms. No.
+"732, dated 5-12-1991."
+COMMENT.—
+"The authors of the Code observe: ""In framing this clause we had two objects in view:"
+"we wish to allow all fair latitude to religious discussion, and at the same time to prevent"
+"the professors of any religion from offering, under the pretext of such discussion,"
+intentional insults to what is held sacred by others. We do not conceive that any person
+can be justified in wounding with deliberate intention the religious feelings of his
+"neighbours by words, gestures or exhibitions. A warm expression dropped in the heat"
+"of controversy, or an argument urged by a person, not for the purpose of insulting and"
+"annoying the professors of a different creed, but in good faith for the purpose of"
+"vindicating his own will not fall under the definition contained in this clause.""46. This"
+section does not apply to a written article.47.
+This section can be made cognizable by the State Government by a notification in the
+"official Gazette under section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932."
+The malicious intention should either be shown to exist or should be apparent from the
+nature of the act alleged to constitute an offense.48.
+[s 298.1] CASES.—
+Interpolation of forbidden chant.— Interpolation of a forbidden chant in an authorised
+ritual is an offence under this section.49.
+[s 298.2] Exhibiting cow's flesh.—
+Exhibiting cow's flesh by carrying it in an uncovered state round a village with the
+deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of Hindus was held to be an
+offence under this section.50.
+[s 298.3] Killing of cow.—
+"Where on the occasion of Bakr-i-Id, the accused killed a cow at dawn in a semi-private"
+place and the killing was seen by some Hindus walking along the village pathway 50
+"feet away, it was held that no offence under this section was committed.51. The"
+sacrifice of a cow on the Bakr-i-Id day is not an obligatory religious act for a Muslim
+and the protection of Article 25 of the Constitution cannot be claimed for such an
+act.52.
+"1. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Notes on the chapter of offences relating to religion and caste."
+Note j.
+"46. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Notes on the chapter of offences relating to religion and"
+caste. Note j.
+"47. Shalibhadra Shah, 1981 Cr LJ 113 (Guj)."
+"48. Mudassir Ullah Khan v State of UP, 2013 (81) ALLCC 152 : 2013 Cr LJ 3741."
+"49. Narasimha v Shree Krishna, (1892) 2 Mad Jur 236."
+"50. Rahman v State, (1893) 13 AWN 144."
+"51. Sheikh Amjad v State, (1942) 21 Pat 315."
+"52. Kitab Ali v Santi Ranjan, AIR 1965 Tripura 22 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 299] Culpable homicide.
+"Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the"
+"intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the"
+"knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of"
+culpable homicide.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or"
+with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z believing the
+"ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence"
+of culpable homicide.
+"(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A, intending to cause, or"
+"knowing it to be likely to cause Z's death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires"
+and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence; but A has committed the offence
+of culpable homicide.
+"(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a"
+"bush; A not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful"
+"act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to"
+cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.
+Explanation 1.—A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring
+"under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death"
+"of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death."
+"Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes"
+"such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by"
+resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been
+prevented.
+Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of child in the mother's womb is not
+homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a
+"living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child"
+may not have breathed or been completely born.
+COMMENT.—
+"Homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being. It is either (A) lawful, or (B)"
+unlawful.
+"(A) Lawful homicide, or simple homicide, includes several cases falling under the"
+General Exceptions (Chapter IV).
+(B) Unlawful homicide includes—
+(1) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (section 299).
+(2) Murder (section 300).
+(3) Rash or negligent homicide (section 304A).
+"(4) Suicide (sections 305, 306)."
+(A) Lawful or simple homicide.—This is committed where death is caused in one of the
+following ways:—
+"1. Where death is caused by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal"
+"intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act, in a lawful manner, by lawful"
+"means, and with proper care and caution (section 80)."
+"2. Where death is caused justifiably, that is to say,"
+"(i) By a person, who is bound, or by mistake of fact in good faith believes"
+"himself bound, by law (section 76)."
+"(ii) By a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or"
+"which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law (section 77)."
+(iii) By a person acting in pursuance of the judgment or order of a Court of
+Justice (section 78).
+"(iv) By a person who is justified or who by reason of a mistake of fact, in good"
+"faith, believes himself to be justified by law (section 79)."
+(v) By a person acting without any criminal intention to cause harm and in
+"good faith, for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person"
+or property (section 81).
+(vi) Where death is caused in the exercise of the right of private defence of
+"person or property (sections 100, 103)."
+"3. Where death is caused by a child, or a person of unsound mind, or an intoxicated"
+"person as will come under sections 82, 83, 84 and 85."
+4. Where death is caused unintentionally by an act done in good faith for the benefit
+"of the person killed, when—"
+"(i) he or, if a minor or lunatic, his guardian, has expressly or impliedly"
+"consented to such an act (sections 87, 88); or"
+(ii) where it is impossible for the person killed to signify his consent or where
+"he is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian from whom it is"
+"possible to obtain consent, in time for the thing to be done with benefit"
+(section 92).
+(B) Unlawful homicide.—Culpable homicide is the first kind of unlawful homicide. It is
+the causing of death by doing:
+(i) an act with the intention of causing death;
+(ii) an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
+or
+(iii) an act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death.
+"Without one or other of those elements, an act, though it may be in its nature criminal"
+"and may occasion death, will not amount to the offence of culpable homicide.1."
+Culpable homicide may be classified in three categories—(1) in which death is caused
+by the doing of an act with the intention of causing death; (2) when it is committed by
+causing death with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
+death; and (3) where the death is caused by an act done with the knowledge that such
+act is likely to cause death. Knowledge and intention should not be confused. Section
+299 in defining first two categories does not deal with the knowledge whereas it does
+in relation to the third category. It would also be relevant to bear in mind the import of
+"the terms ""likely by such act to cause death"". Herein again lies a distinction as ""likely"""
+"would mean probably and not possibly. When an intended injury is likely to cause death,"
+the same would mean an injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
+cause death which in turn would mean that death will be the most probable result.2.
+[s 299.1] Ingredients.—
+The section has the following essentials:
+1. Causing of death of a human being.
+2. Such death must have been caused by doing an act
+(i) with the intention of causing death; or
+(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
+or
+(iii) with the knowledge that the doer is likely by such act to cause death.
+The fact that the death of a human being is caused is not enough. Unless one of the
+"mental states mentioned in ingredient3. is present, an act causing death cannot"
+amount to culpable homicide.
+[s 299.2] 'Causes death'.—
+Death means the death of a human being (section 46). But this word does not include
+the death of an unborn child (vide Explanation 3). It is immaterial if the person whose
+death has been caused is not the very person whom the accused intended to kill: see
+Illustration (a) and section 301.4. The offence is complete as soon as any person is
+killed. Death occurs when brain dies completely. A person cannot be said dead if some
+brain activity is present.5.
+[s 299.3] Five-step enquiry.—
+"According to the Supreme Court, in case where death is alleged to have been caused"
+"by a person, there shall be a five-step inquiry:"
+"(i) Is there a homicide? (ii) If yes, is it a culpable homicide or a 'not culpable homicide'? (iii) If"
+"it is a culpable homicide, is the offence one of culpable homicide amounting to murder (s."
+300 of the Indian Penal Code) or is it a culpable homicide not amounting to murder (s. 304
+of the Indian Penal Code)? (iv) If it is a 'not culpable homicide' then a case u/s. 304-A of the
+Indian Penal Code is made out. (v) If it is not possible to identify the person who has
+"committed the homicide, the provisions of s. 72 of the Indian Penal Code may be invoked.6."
+[s 299.4] 'By doing an act with the intention of causing death'.—
+None of the endless variety of modes by which human life may be cut short before it
+"becomes in the course of nature extinct, is excluded. Death may be caused by"
+"poisoning, starving, striking, drowning, and by a hundred different ways."
+"Under section 32, words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions, and"
+"the word ""illegal"" is applicable to everything which is an offence or which is prohibited"
+"by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action (section 43). Therefore, death"
+caused by illegal omission will amount to culpable homicide.7.
+[s 299.5] Need for viscera report.—
+"Having noticed that, in several cases, where poisoning is suspected, the prosecuting"
+"agencies are not taking steps to obtain viscera report, the Supreme Court, in Joshinder"
+Yadav v State of Bihar8. issued certain directions in this behalf. It was held:
+"We direct that in cases where poisoning is suspected, immediately after the post-"
+"mortem, the viscera should be sent to the FSL. The prosecuting agencies should ensure"
+"that the viscera is, in fact, sent to the FSL for examination and the FSL should ensure"
+that the viscera is examined immediately and report is sent to the investigating
+"agencies/Courts post-haste. If the viscera report is not received, the concerned Court"
+must ask for explanation and must summon the concerned officer of the FSL to give an
+explanation as to why the viscera report is not forwarded to the investigating
+agency/Court. The criminal Court must ensure that it is brought on record.
+[s 299.6] Death caused by effect of words on imagination or passions.
+"This may sometimes require a complete study of the person of the deceased, her"
+"psychology, nature and disposition. Going by these considerations in a case before it,"
+the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the death of the young married woman
+in her matrimonial home was a case of suicide and not that of murder. A letter of hers
+sensing some foul play against her was neither sufficient for conviction for murder nor
+to dispel the presumption of suicide generated by the type of person she was and her
+mental make-up.9.
+[s 299.7] 'With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
+death'.—
+The connection between the 'act' and the death caused thereby must be direct and
+"distinct; and though not immediate, it must not be too remote.10. Where bodily injury"
+"sufficient to cause death is actually caused, it is immaterial to go into the question as"
+to whether the accused had intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will
+"cause death.11. In finding out whether there was the requisite intention or not, the Court"
+"has not to go merely by the part of the body where the blow fell, but also the"
+circumstances and the background of the offence and also the ferocity of the attack.
+[s 299.8] 'With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death'.—
+'Knowledge' is a strong word and imports a certainty and not merely a probability.12.
+[s 299.9] Beating for exorcising evil spirit.—
+"Where the accused, in exorcising the spirit of a girl whom they believed to be"
+"possessed, subjected her to a beating which resulted in her death, it was held that they"
+were guilty of culpable homicide.13.
+[s 299.10] Clauses 1 and 2.—'Intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely
+to cause death'.—'Knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death'.—
+The practical difference between these two phrases is expressed in the punishment
+provided in section 304. But the phrase 'with the knowledge that he is likely by such act
+"to cause death' includes all cases of rash acts by which death is caused, for rashness"
+imports a knowledge of the likely result of an act which the actor does in spite of the
+risk.
+"Both the expressions ""intent"" and ""knowledge"" occurring in section 299 postulate"
+"existence of a positive mental attitude which is of different degrees. Further, such"
+mental attitude towards consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. If
+"death is caused in any of the circumstances envisaged in section 299, offence of"
+culpable homicide is said to have been committed.14.
+[s 299.11] Distinction between knowledge and intention.—
+Knowledge denotes a bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the
+human mind might itself remain supine or inactive whereas intention connotes a
+conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and summed up into
+action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a particular and specific
+end which the human mind conceives and perceives before itself. Intention need not
+necessarily involve premeditation. Whether there is such an intention or not is a
+question of fact.15.
+[s 299.12] Death caused without 'requisite intention' or 'knowledge' not
+culpable homicide.—
+"If the death is caused under circumstances specified in section 80, the person causing"
+"the death will be exonerated under that section. But, if it is caused in doing an unlawful"
+"act, the question arises whether he should be punished for causing it. The Code says"
+that when a person engaged in the commission of an offence causes death by pure
+"accident, he shall suffer only the punishment of his offence, without any addition on"
+account of such accidental death. See Illustration (c) to this section. The offence of
+"culpable homicide supposes an intention, or knowledge of likelihood of causing death."
+"In the absence of such intention or knowledge, the offence committed may be grievous"
+"hurt,16. or simple hurt.17. It is only where death is attributed to an injury which the"
+offender did not know would endanger life or would be likely to cause death and which
+"in normal conditions would not do so notwithstanding death being caused, that the"
+offence will not be culpable homicide but grievous or simple hurt. Every such case
+depends upon the existence of abnormal conditions unknown to the person who
+inflicts the injury.18. A person who voluntarily inflicts injury such as to endanger life
+"must always, except in the most extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, be taken"
+"to know that he is likely to cause death. If the victim is actually killed, the conviction in"
+such cases ought ordinarily to be of the offence of culpable homicide.19. Once it is
+established that an act was a deliberate act and was not the result of accident or
+"rashness or negligence, it is obvious that the offence would be culpable homicide.20."
+[s 299.13] Death due to diseased spleen.—
+"Where the accused gave a blow with a light bamboo stick, not more than an inch in"
+"diameter, to the deceased who was suffering from diseased spleen on the region of"
+"that organ, it was held that he was guilty of causing grievous hurt.21."
+[s 299.14] CASES.—Knowledge of probable consequence of act.—Beating.—
+"Where a person struck with a heavy stick and killed a man, being at the time under the"
+bona fide belief that the object at which he struck was not a human being but
+"something supernatural, but through terror, having taken no steps to satisfy himself"
+"that it was not a human being, he was held to have committed culpable homicide.22."
+[s 299.15] Explanation 1.—
+"A person causing bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease, or"
+"bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerating the death of that other, is deemed to have"
+'caused his death'. But one of the elements of the offence of culpable homicide must
+be present.23.
+[s 299.16] Explanation 2.—'By resorting to proper remedies death might have
+been prevented'.—
+This Explanation is explicit and gives no room for discussion. The reason for this
+provision is obvious that it is not always that proper remedies and skilful treatment are
+within the reach of a wounded man.24.
+Although proof be given that the wound or other bodily injury if skilfully treated might not
+"have resulted in death, yet, if in fact death is the result, the wound 'causes' death. And it"
+does not avail the offender to prove that the first cause might have been removed or
+rendered inoperative by the application of proper remedies and that death might have been
+prevented. 'Proper remedies and skilful treatment' may not be within the reach of the
+"wounded man; or if they are at hand, he may be unable or unwilling to resort to them. But"
+this is immaterial so far as it relates to the due interpretation of the words 'cause of death'.
+"The primary cause which sets in motion some other cause,—as the severe wound which"
+"induces gangrene or fever, and the ultimate effect, death, are sufficiently connected as"
+"cause and effect, notwithstanding that the supervening sickness or disease might have"
+been cured by medical skill. All that it is essential to establish is that the death has been
+"caused by the bodily injury and, if there be any intervening cause, that it is connected with a"
+sufficient degree of probability with the primary one.25.
+"If death results from an injury voluntarily caused, the person who causes that injury is"
+deemed to have caused death although the life of the victim might have been saved if
+"proper medical attention had been given, and even if medical treatment was given but"
+"was not the proper treatment, provided that it was administered in good faith by a"
+competent physician or surgeon.26.
+[s 299.17] CASES.—
+Where the deceased did not actually die from the injuries but died from the gangrene
+"which set in inconsequence of some dirty substance, such as a bandage or the da with"
+"which the injuries were caused, coming into contact with one injury, although the"
+"injuries were not the direct cause of death, the person causing the injuries was held to"
+have caused death.27. Where the facts were that the acts of the accused were in the
+category of a rash act which brought about dashing against the victim leading to his
+death. There appeared to be no intention or knowledge of bringing about a fatal
+consequence. The liability was under section 304A.28.
+[s 299.18] Explanation 3.—
+The causing of death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide; such an offence
+"is punishable under section 315. But it is homicide to cause the death of a living child,"
+"if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed"
+"or been completely born. The former Chief Court of Punjab has observed that ""if it is"
+"not homicide to kill a child in its mother's womb, it can hardly be urged that it is"
+homicide to kill a child that has breathed in the womb and died while yet in the womb
+"and has been brought forth still-born"".29."
+[s 299.19] Applicability of section 299 whether conviction under section 304
+Part I or Part II.—
+"A plain reading of section 299 will show that it contains three clauses, in two clauses it"
+is the intention of the offender which is relevant and is the dominant factor and in the
+third clause it is the knowledge of the offender which is relevant and is the dominant
+"factor. Analysing section 299 as aforesaid, it becomes clear that a person commits"
+culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done.
+"""(i) with the intention of causing death; or"
+(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or
+"(iii) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death."""
+"If the offence is such which is covered by any one of the clauses, but does not fall"
+"within the ambit of clauses, Firstly–Fourthly of section 300 IPC, 1860, it will not be"
+murder and the offender would not be liable to be convicted under section 302. In such
+"a case, if the offence is such which is covered by clause (i) or (ii), the offender would be"
+"liable to be convicted under section 304 Part I IPC, 1860 as it uses the expression ""if"
+"the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of"
+"causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death"" where intention is the dominant"
+"factor. However, if the offence is such which is covered by clause (iii), the offender"
+"would be liable to be convicted under section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860 because of the use"
+"of the expression ""if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death,"
+"but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to"
+"cause death"" where knowledge is the dominant factor.30."
+"1. Rahee, (1866) Unrep Cr C 6. State v Ram Swarup, 1998 Cr LJ 1067 (All)."
+"2. Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] ."
+"3. Nirbhai Singh, 1972 Cr LJ 1474 (MP)."
+"4. Ballan, 1955 Cr LJ 1448 ."
+"5. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"6. Richhpal Singh Meena v Ghasi, 2014 Cr LJ 4339 : AIR 2014 SC 3595 [LNIND 2014 SC 691] ."
+"7. Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] , the enquiry is"
+"broad-based without going into every detail, whether there was the intention to strike at a vital"
+part of the body with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found on the body. Mohd Asif v
+"State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 11 SCC 497 [LNIND 2009 SC 558] : 2009 Cr LJ 2789 , no hard and"
+"fast rule can be laid down for determining the existence of intention. Sellappan v State of TN,"
+"(2007) 15 SCC 327 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] , death caused by head injury, despite hospitalisation,"
+"plea that proper treatment could have saved, not tenable in view of Explanation 2, section 299."
+"8. Joshinder Yadav v State of Bihar, 2014 Cr LJ 1175 : (2014) 4 SCC 42 [LNIND 2014 SC 34] ."
+"9. Sharad Birdichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 [LNIND 1984 SC 359] :"
+1984 Cr LJ 1738 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 [LNIND 1984 SC 359] : 1984 SCC (Cr) 487. See also Bijoy
+"Kumar Sen v State, 1988 Cr LJ 1818 (Cal); Prabhu v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 1373 : AIR 1991 SC"
+1069 .
+"10. Laxman, 1974 Cr LJ 1271 : AIR 1974 SC 1803 ."
+"11. Re Thangavelu, 1972 Cr LJ 390 (Mad); State of Bihar v Pasupati Singh, 1973 Cr LJ 1832 : AIR"
+"1973 SC 2699 [LNIND 1973 SC 284] ; Nishan Singh v State of Punjab, (2008) 17 SCC 505 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 2718] : AIR 2008 SC 1661 [LNIND 2008 SC 2718] : (2008) 65 AIC 172 .
+"12. Shankar Kondiba Gore v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 93 (Bom), where a stab injury was"
+"inflicted on abdomen but death was caused because the right artery was punctured at ilium, it"
+was held that the accused could only be saddled with knowledge of causing death and could be
+"convicted under section 304, Part II and not under section 302. See also Dharamvir v State of"
+"Haryana, (1994) 2 Cr LJ 1281 (P&H), sudden and unpremeditated fight, there being no previous"
+"enmity, single blow death of one, culpable homicide, not murder. Muniappan v State of TN, 1994"
+"Cr LJ 1309 (Mad), in a fight between brother and sister, the brother hit her and her son with a"
+"crow-bar, the sister died and the son was injured who in anger attacked the accused in reply, the"
+accused was held to be guilty of culpable homicide and not entitled to the plea of private
+"defence. Nizamuddin v State of MP, AIR 1994 SC 1041 : 1994 Cr LJ 1386 : 1995 SCC (Cr) 699,"
+fatal injury caused in exceeding the right of private defence.
+"13. Jamaludin, (1892) Unrep Cr C 603; Haku, (1928) 10 Lah 555; State of MP v Godhe Faguwa,"
+1974 Jab LJ 302 : 1974 MPLJ 203 [LNIND 1973 MP 3] : ILR [1976] MP 361 [LNIND 1973 MP 3] .
+"14. Jagriti Devi v State of HP, (2009) 14 SCC 771 [LNIND 2009 SC 1376] : AIR 2009 SC 2869"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1376] : (2009) 80 AIC 225 (SC) : (2009) 3 AP LJ 52 (SC).
+"15. Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] ; Daya Nand v"
+"State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 717 [LNIND 2008 SC 827] : AIR 2008 SC 1823 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+"827] : 2008 Cr LJ 2975 , murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder, distinction"
+explained and restatement of interpretation of sections 299 and 300. A similar explanation is to
+"be seen in Ghelabhai Jagmalbhai Bhawad v State of Gujarat, (2008) 17 SCC 651 ; Harendra Nath"
+"Borah v State of Assam, (2007) 15 SCC 249 [LNIND 2007 SC 84] and Raj Kumar v State of"
+"Maharashtra, (2009) 15 SCC 292 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] , ingredients and distinction restated."
+"16. O'Brien, (1880) 2 All 766 ; Idu Beg, (1881) 3 All 776 ."
+"17. Safatulla, (1879) 4 Cal 815 ; Fox, (1879) 2 All 522 ; Randhir Singh, (1881) 3 All 597 ."
+"18. Bai Jiba, (1967) 19 Bom LR 823 ."
+"19. Mana, (1930) 32 Bom LR 1143 , 1144."
+"20. Afrahim Sheikh, AIR 1964 SC 1263 [LNIND 1964 SC 1] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 350 ."
+"21. Megha Meeah, (1865) 2 WR (Cr) 39; O'Brien, (1880) 2 All 766 ."
+"22. Kangla v State, (1898) 18 AWN 163."
+"23. Fox, (1879) 2 All 522 ."
+"24. Krishnaswami, AIR 1965 Mad 261 ."
+25. M&M 228. [This is Morgan & Macpherson's Indian Penal Code. Please see 'Explanation of
+Abbreviations' in the Prelim pages]
+"26. Sah Pai, (1936) 14 Ran 643, as explained in Abor Ahmed v State, (1937) Ran 384 (FB)."
+"Pappachan v State of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 1765 (Ker), defence that proper medical attendance"
+was not there was not allowed to be raised.
+"27. Nga Paw v State, AIR 1936 Ran 526"
+"28. Satpal v State of Haryana, (2004) 10 SCC 794 ."
+"29. Mussammat Budho, AIR 1916 Lah 184 ."
+"30. Arun Nivalaji More v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC 613 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] : (2007)"
+2 SCC (Cr) 221 : AIR 2006 SC 2886 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] : 2006 Cr LJ 4057 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 300] Murder.
+"Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by"
+"which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—"
+Secondly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender
+"knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—"
+Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the
+bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
+"cause death, or—"
+Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous
+"that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause"
+"death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing"
+death or such injury as aforesaid.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits
+murder.
+"(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause"
+"his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in"
+"consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not"
+have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a
+"person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under"
+"any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature"
+"kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause"
+"bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such"
+bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
+(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death
+"of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is"
+"guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death."
+(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills
+"one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated"
+design to kill any particular individual.
+When culpable homicide is not murder.
+"Exception 1.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of"
+"the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of"
+the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by
+mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
+First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender
+as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
+Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the
+"law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public"
+servant.
+Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise
+of the right of private defence.
+Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent
+the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z,"
+"intentionally kills Y, Z's child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was"
+"not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or"
+misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
+"(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol"
+"at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him,"
+"but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable"
+homicide.
+"(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by"
+"the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given"
+by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.
+"(d) A appears as witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a"
+"word of A's deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden"
+"passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder."
+"(e) A attempts to pull Z's nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays"
+hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent
+"passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the"
+provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private
+defence.
+"(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander,"
+"intending to take advantage of B's rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife"
+into B's hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have
+"committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder."
+"Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in"
+"good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the"
+power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he
+"is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any"
+intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such
+defence.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A."
+A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he
+"can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z"
+"dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide."
+"Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public"
+"servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice,"
+"exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act"
+"which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due"
+discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the
+person whose death is caused.
+Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without
+premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
+and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
+unusual manner.
+Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation
+or commits the first assault.
+Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is
+"caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk"
+of death with his own consent.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to"
+"commit suicide. Here, on account of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving"
+consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
+COMMENT.—
+"In this section, the definition of culpable homicide appears in an expanded form. Each"
+of the four clauses requires that the act which causes death should be done
+"intentionally, or with the knowledge or means of knowing that death is a natural"
+consequence of the act. An intention to kill is not always necessary to make out a case
+of murder. A knowledge that the natural and probable consequence of an act would be
+"death will suffice for a conviction under section 302, IPC, 1860.31."
+[s 300.1] Scope.—
+An offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable
+homicide; for this section merely points out the cases in which culpable homicide is
+murder. But an offence may amount to culpable homicide without amounting to
+murder.
+"It does not follow that a case of culpable homicide is murder, because it does not fall"
+"within any of the Exceptions to section 300. To render culpable homicide murder, the"
+"case must come within the provisions of clauses 1, 2, 3, or 4 of section 300 and must"
+not fall within any one of the five Exceptions attached thereto.
+[s 300.2] Culpable homicide and murder distinguished.—
+"The distinction between these two offences is very ably set forth by Melvill, J, in"
+"Govinda's case32. and by Sarkaria, J, in Punnayya's case.33. Since the decision of the"
+"Supreme Court is the law of the land by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution,"
+relevant passages from Punnayya's case are reproduced below for the guidance of all
+concerned.
+"In the scheme of the Penal Code, 'culpable homicide' is genus and 'murder' its specie. All"
+'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice versa. Speaking generally 'culpable homicide
+sans 'special characteristics of murder' is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For
+"the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the"
+"Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be"
+"called, culpable homicide of the first degree. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide"
+which is defined in s. 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of
+"the second degree'. This is punishable under the 1st part ofs. 304. Then, there is 'culpable"
+homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the
+punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three
+grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the Second Part of s. 304.
+The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to
+"murder' has vexed the Courts for more than a century. The confusion is caused, if"
+Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature
+in these sections allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest
+way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be
+keeping in focus the key words used in the various clauses of sections 299 and 300.
+The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction
+between the two offences.
+Section 299 Section 300
+"A person commits culpable homicide if the act Subject to certain exceptions, culpable"
+by which the death is caused is done - homicide is murder if the act by which the
+death is caused is done -
+INTENTION
+(a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or
+(b) with the intention of causing such bodily (2) with the intention of causing such bodily
+injury as is likely to cause death; or injury as the offender knows to be likely to
+cause the death of the person to whom the
+harm is caused; or
+(3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to
+any person and the bodily injury intended to be
+inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
+nature to cause death; or
+KNOWLEDGE
+(c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to (4) with the knowledge that the act is so
+cause death. imminently dangerous that it must in all
+probability cause death or such bodily injury as
+"is likely to cause death, and without any excuse"
+or incurring the risk of causing death or such
+injury as is mentioned above.
+Clause (b) of section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of section 300. The
+distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge
+possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar
+"condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal,"
+notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be
+sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that
+the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the
+intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the
+likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim is sufficient to bring
+the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by
+Illustration (b) appended to section 300.
+Clause (b) of section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the
+offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of section 300 can be where the
+assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is
+"suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is"
+"likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or"
+"spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such"
+"knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause"
+"death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the"
+"offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally"
+given.
+"In clause (3) of section 300, instead of the words, 'likely to cause death' occurring in the"
+"corresponding clause (b) of section 299, the words ""sufficient in the ordinary course of"
+"nature"" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to"
+cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
+"death. The distinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of"
+justice. The difference between clause (b) of section 299 and clause (3) of section 300
+is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To
+"put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a"
+"culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word ""likely"" in"
+clause (b) of section 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere
+possibility. The words 'bodily injury... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
+"'death' mean that death will be the most probable result of the injury, having regard to"
+the ordinary course of nature.
+"For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to"
+"cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries"
+sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
+Clause (c) of section 299 and clause (4) of section 300 both require knowledge of the
+probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to
+dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be
+sufficient to say that clause (4) of section 300 would be applicable where the
+knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person in general as
+distinguished from a particular person or persons being caused from his imminently
+"dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the"
+"offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed"
+by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury
+as aforesaid.34.
+"In Ajit Singh v State of Punjab,35. the Supreme Court observed that:"
+"In order to hold whether an offence would fall u/s. 302 or s. 304 Part I of the Code, the"
+Courts have to be extremely cautious in examining whether the same falls u/s. 300 of the
+"Code which states whether a culpable homicide is murder, or would it fall under its five"
+exceptions which lay down when culpable homicide is not murder.
+"In other words, section 300 states both, what is murder and what is not. First finds"
+"place in section 300 in its four stated categories, while the second finds detailed"
+"mention in the stated five Exceptions to section 300. The legislature in its wisdom,"
+"thus, covered the entire gamut of culpable homicide 'amounting to murder' as well as"
+that 'not amounting to murder' in a composite manner in section 300 of the Code.36.
+"From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a Court is confronted with the"
+question of whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to
+"murder' on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in"
+"three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the"
+accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of
+such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death leads to the
+"second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to ""culpable"
+"homicide"" as defined in section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found"
+"in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of section 300, IPC, 1860, is"
+reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts
+proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of
+the definition of 'murder' contained in section 300. If the answer to this question is in
+"the negative, the offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder',"
+"punishable under the first or the second part of section 304, depending, respectively, on"
+whether the second or the third clause of section 299 is applicable. If this question is
+"found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in"
+"section 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder',"
+"punishable under the first part of section 304, IPC, 1860."
+"The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their"
+observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so
+"intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it"
+may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the
+second and third stages.
+To sum up:
+Section 299 is divided into three parts. The first part refers to the act by which the death is
+caused by being done with the intention of causing death. That part corresponds to the first
+"part of the section 300, IPC. The second part of section 299, IPC speaks of the intention to"
+cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. This has corresponding provisions in
+"clauses ""Secondly"" and ""Thirdly"" of section 300, IPC, section 304, Part I, IPC, covers cases"
+"which by reason of the Exceptions under section 300, IPC, are taken out of the purview of"
+"cls. (1), (2) and (3) of section 300, IPC, but otherwise would fall within it and also cases"
+which fall within the second part of section 299 but not within section 300 clauses (2) and
+"(3). The third part of section 299 corresponds to ""fourthly"" of section s. 300. Section 304,"
+"Part-II, IPC, covers those cases which fall within the third part of section 299 but do not fall"
+within the fourth clause of section 300.37.
+"Section 300 states both, what is murder and what is not. First finds place in section"
+"300 in its four stated categories, while the second finds detailed mention in the stated"
+"five Exceptions to section 300. The legislature in its wisdom, thus, covered the entire"
+gamut of culpable homicide 'amounting to murder' as well as that 'not amounting to
+murder' in a composite manner in section 300 of the Code.38.
+[s 300.3] Clause 1.— 'Act by which the death is caused is done with the
+intention of causing death'.—
+The word 'act' includes omission as well (section 33). Any omission by which death is
+"caused will be punishable as if the death is caused directly by an act.39. Thus, where a"
+person neglected to provide his child with proper sustenance although repeatedly
+"warned of the consequences and the child died, it was held to be murder.40. Intention"
+to cause death may be revealed by the whole circumstances of the story.
+[s 300.4] Honour Killing.—
+"In Shakti Vahini v UOI,41. the Supreme Court observed that honour killing is not the"
+singular type of offence. It is a grave one but not the lone one. It is a part of honour
+"crime. Honour crime is the genus and honour killing is the species, although a"
+"dangerous facet of it. In Arumugam Servai v State of TN,42. the Supreme Court strongly"
+deprecated the practice of khap/katta panchayats taking law into their own hands and
+indulging in offensive activities which endanger the personal lives of the persons
+marrying according to their choice.43. Law Commission of India studied the matter and
+submitted the 242nd report to the Government. Some proposals are being mooted
+"proposing amendments to section 300, IPC, 1860 by way of including what is called"
+'Honour Killing' as murder and shifting the burden of proof to the accused. But the
+Commission expressed the view that there is no need for introducing a provision in
+"section 300, IPC, 1860 in order to bring the so called 'honour killings' within the ambit of"
+"this provision. According to the report, the existing provisions in IPC, 1860 are"
+adequate enough to take care of the situations leading to overt acts of killing or
+causing bodily harm to the targeted person who allegedly undermined the honour of
+the caste or community. The commission suggested a new law (instead of amending
+"IPC, 1860) to tackle the problem namely ""Prohibition of Interference with the Freedom"
+"of Matrimonial Alliances Bill 2011"".44."
+"In Shakti Vahini v UOI,45. the Supreme Court observed that torture or torment or ill-"
+treatment in the name of honour that tantamounts to atrophy of choice of an individual
+relating to love and marriage by any assembly is illegal and cannot be allowed a
+"moment of existence. In this case, the Supreme Court issued detailed preventive,"
+remedial and punitive directives to prevent honour killings in the country.
+[s 300.5] Clause 2.—'With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
+offender knows to be likely to cause the death'.—
+This clause applies where the act by which death is caused is done with the intention
+of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the
+person to whom the harm is caused. It applies in special cases where the person
+injured is in such a condition or state of health that his or her death would be likely to
+be caused by an injury which would not ordinarily cause the death of a person in sound
+health and where the person inflicting the injury knows that owing to such condition or
+state of health it is likely to cause the death of the person injured. In a case involving
+"attack with sulphuric acid causing ""grievous injury"" where the doctor testified that such"
+"an attack may also cause death, the Court said that ""the word likely means 'probably'"
+and can easily be distinguished from 'possibly'. When the chances of a thing happening
+"are very high, we say that it will most probably happen"".46."
+[s 300.6] Poisoning.—
+"In a case of murder by poisoning, the prosecution must establish (1) that death took"
+"place by poisoning, (2) that the accused had the poison in his possession, and (3) that"
+the accused had an opportunity to administer poison to the deceased.47. These
+"propositions were laid down by the Supreme Court in Dharambir Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 1958, decided, Nov. 4, 1958 SC48. and were given anxious"
+"consideration by Hidayatullah, J, in Anant Chintaman Lagu v State of Bombay.49. The"
+learned judge (afterwards CJ) did not consider them as invariable criteria of proof to be
+established by the prosecution in every case of murder by poisoning. This is so
+"""because"", as the learned judge said:"
+"evidently if after poisoning the victim, the accused destroyed all traces of the body, the first"
+"proposition would be incapable of being proved except by circumstantial evidence. Similarly,"
+if the accused gave a victim something to eat and the victim died immediately on the
+"ingestion of that food with symptoms of poisoning and poison, found in the viscera, the"
+requirement of proving that the accused was possessed of the poison would follow the
+circumstance that the accused gave the victim something to eat and need not be separately
+proved.
+Following this opinion in the case of Bhupinder Singh v State of Punjab50. and
+"dispensing with the need for proof of possession of poison, the Supreme Court said"
+that:
+we do not consider it necessary that there should be acquittal on the failure of the
+prosecution to prove possession of poison with the accused. Murder by poison is invariably
+committed under the cover and cloak of secrecy. Nobody will administer poison to another
+in the presence of others. The person who administers poison..... will not keep a portion of it
+for the investigating officer to come and collect it.... [He] would naturally take care to
+eliminate and destroy the evidence against him.... It would be impossible for the
+"prosecution to prove possession of poison with the accused. The prosecution may,"
+"however, establish other circumstances consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of"
+the accused. The Court then would not be justified in acquitting the accused on the ground
+that the prosecution has failed to prove possession of poison with the accused.
+"Continuing further, Shetty, J said:"
+The poison murder cases are not to be put outside the rule of circumstantial evidence.
+There may be very many obvious facts and circumstances in which the Court may be
+justified in drawing permissible inference that the accused was in possession of the poison
+in question.... The insistence on proof of possession of poison... invariably in every case is
+neither desirable nor practicable. It would mean to introduce an extraneous ingredient to the
+offence of murder by poisoning.
+"Where, therefore, neither motive nor administration of poison nor its possession by the"
+"accused could be proved, the accused had to be acquitted.51. Where it is proved that"
+"the accused administered poison, the accused must be presumed to have knowledge"
+that his act was likely to cause death.52. If the prosecution failed to prove the cause of
+"death, the fact that the accused failed to explain the cause of death cannot be the"
+basis of conviction. Accused was acquitted where neither post-mortem report nor FSL
+report showed the administration of poison.53. Where the allegation was that the death
+"was caused by poison mixed with alcohol, but no remnants of poisonous substance"
+were found either in the two bottles or in the steel glass but were found only in the
+"earth so collected from the place of occurrence, accused acquitted.54."
+[s 300.7] Possibility of survival of deceased.—
+The Supreme Court has observed that a chance of miraculous survival is not
+contemplated by section 300. The attacker becomes liable if he knew that his victim
+would die as a result of the injuries caused by him. The doctor's opinion that the victim
+could have survived if timely and proper medical aid was provided is a hypothetical
+proposition.55.
+[s 300.8] Clause 3.—'With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person ...
+sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death'.—
+The distinction between this clause and clause 2 of section 299 depends upon the
+degree of probability of death from the act committed. If from the intentional act of
+"injury committed the probability of death resulting is high, the finding will be that the"
+"accused intended to cause death, or injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to"
+cause death; if there was probability in a less degree of death ensuing from the act
+"committed, the finding will be that the accused intended to cause injury likely to cause"
+"death.56. In the case of Mangesh v State of Maharashtra,57. the Supreme Court stated"
+the circumstances from which it may be gathered as to whether there was intention to
+cause death. It included circumstances like nature of the weapon; on what part of the
+body the blow was given; the amount of force; was it a result of a sudden fight or
+quarrel; whether the incident occurred by chance or was pre-meditated; prior animosity;
+grave and sudden provocation; heat of passion; did the accused take any undue
+"advantage; did he act cruelly; number of blows given, etc. Even if none of the injuries by"
+"itself was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, cumulatively such"
+injuries may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.58.
+"[s 300.9] ""Bodily injury"".—"
+"The expression ""bodily injury"" in clause thirdly includes also its plural, so that the clause"
+would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are
+"cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none"
+of those injuries individually measures up to such sufficiency. The sufficiency spoken of
+"in this clause, as already noticed, is the high probability of death in the ordinary course"
+"of nature, and if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injury causing it is"
+"intentional, the case would fall under clause thirdly of section 300. All the conditions"
+which are a prerequisite for the applicability of this clause have been established and
+"the offence committed by the accused, in the instant case was ""murder"".59."
+What is required for the prosecution to prove to bring the case under clause thirdly to
+"section 300? First, it must be established, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is"
+"present; Second, the nature of the injury must be proved and these are purely objective"
+"investigations; third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that"
+"particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that"
+some other kind of injury was intended; and once these three elements are proved to
+"be present, the enquiry proceeds further; and fourth, it must be proved that the injury of"
+the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to
+cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective
+and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. Once these four
+"elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the"
+"prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under section 300 ""thirdly"". Once the"
+"intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the"
+"enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely"
+"objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause"
+"death.60. On this particular point, there is the following pertinent observation of the"
+Supreme Court:61.
+The nature of the offence does not depend merely on the location of the injury caused by
+the accused. The intention of the person causing the injury has to be gathered from a
+careful examination of the facts and circumstances of each given case….
+The Supreme Court also observed that the intention to cause the requisite type of injury
+"is a subjective inquiry, but that once that type of intention is found in the assailant, the"
+further inquiry whether the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
+cause death is of objective nature.62.
+[s 300.10] Principle of exclusion.—
+"In Rampal Singh v State of UP,63. after referring to the pronouncements in Rayavarapu"
+"Punnayya (supra), Vineet Kumar Chauhan v State of UP,64. Ajit Singh v State of Punjab,65."
+"and Mohinder Pal Jolly v State of Punjab,66. the Supreme Court opined thus:"
+The evidence led by the parties with reference to all these circumstances greatly helps the
+Court in coming to a final conclusion as to under which penal provision of the Code the
+accused is liable to be punished. This can also be decided from another point of view i.e. by
+"applying the ""principle of exclusion"". This principle could be applied while taking recourse to"
+"a two- stage process of determination. First, the Court may record a preliminary finding if"
+the accused had committed an offence punishable under the substantive provisions of s.
+"302 of the Code, that is, ""culpable homicide amounting to murder"". Then second, it may"
+proceed to examine if the case fell in any of the Exceptions detailed in s. 300 of the Code.
+This would doubly ensure that the conclusion arrived at by the Court is correct on facts and
+sustainable in law. We are stating such a proposition to indicate that such a determination
+would better serve the ends of criminal justice delivery.67.
+"The third clause of section 300 views the matter from a general standpoint. Here, the"
+emphasis is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of nature to cause
+death. The sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary way of nature.
+When this sufficiency exists and death follows and the causing of such injury is
+"intended, the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature of the weapon used, sometimes"
+the part of the body on which the injury is caused and sometimes both are relevant.68.
+"In some cases, the sufficiency of injury to cause death in the ordinary course of nature"
+must be proved and cannot be inferred from the fact that death has in fact taken place.
+"In such a case, it may not be open to argue backwards from the death to the blow, to"
+hold that the sufficiency is established because death did result. As death can take
+"place from other causes, the sufficiency is required to be proved by other and separate"
+evidence.69.
+[s 300.11] Contradiction between ocular and medical evidence.—
+"Where there is a contradiction between medical evidence and ocular evidence, the"
+position of law can be crystallised to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a
+"witness has greater evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical"
+"evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable, that becomes a relevant factor in the"
+"process of the evaluation of evidence. However, where the medical evidence goes so"
+"far that it completely rules out all possibility of the ocular evidence being true, the"
+ocular evidence may be disbelieved.70. The opinion given by a medical witness need
+not be the last word on the subject. Such opinion shall be tested by the Court. If the
+"opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, Court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After"
+"all, opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one"
+doctor forms one opinion and another doctor forms a different opinion on the same
+"facts, it is open to the judge to adopt the view which is more objective or probable."
+"Similarly, if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability, the Court"
+"has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course,"
+due weight must be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the
+particular subject.71. Where the testimony of eye-witnesses is totally inconsistent with
+"medical evidence, and suffering from improvements, the rule that ocular evidence has"
+precedence over medical evidence cannot be applied.72.
+[s 300.12] Discrepancy between the reports of doctor who examined the
+deceased and the doctor who conducted autopsy.—
+Where the medical certificate showed the age of injuries as 24 hours but in post-
+"mortem report it was mentioned as six hours, it was held that in post-mortem report,"
+the determination of precise duration of the injuries can be possible due to the internal
+examination of the injuries whereas no such advantage is available to the doctor when
+he examines the injuries in the nature of contusions.73.
+[s 300.13] Medical Evidence.—
+"Medical evidence that the death was homicidal, cannot alone be made the basis to"
+connect the accused person with crime. The accused persons are entitled to the
+benefit of doubt.74.
+"[s 300.14] ""Secondly"" and ""Thirdly"" distinguished.—"
+"The two clauses are disjunctive and separate. Clause ""Secondly"" is subjective to the"
+"offender. It must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature"
+"of the injury must be established, that is to say, whether the injury is on the leg or the"
+"arm or the stomach, how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs were cut and so"
+forth. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction: to
+"that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that"
+is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the
+"bodily injury that is found to be present. First part of clause ""Thirdly"" envisages"
+"infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it, i.e., it must be proved that the"
+injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether it
+was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of inference
+or deduction from the proven facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do
+with the question of intention.75.
+[s 300.15] Clause 4.—'Person committing the act knows that it is so imminently
+"dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as"
+is likely to cause death'.—
+Where it is clear that the act by which the death is caused is so imminently dangerous
+"that the accused must be presumed to have known that it would, in all probability,"
+"cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, then unless he can meet"
+"this presumption his offence will be culpable homicide, and it would be murder unless"
+"he can bring it under one of the Exceptions.76. Thus, a man who strikes at the back of"
+another a violent blow with a formidable weapon77. or who strikes another in the throat
+with a knife78. must be taken to know that he is doing an act imminently dangerous to
+the life of the person at whom he strikes and that a probable result of his act will be to
+cause that person's death.79.
+This clause also provides for that class of cases where the acts resulting in death are
+calculated to put the lives of many persons in jeopardy without being aimed at any one
+"in particular, and are perpetrated with a full consciousness of the probable"
+"consequences, e.g., where death is caused by firing a loaded gun into a crowd [vide"
+"Illustration (d)], or by poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw"
+water.
+The Supreme Court has held that although this clause is usually invoked in those cases
+"where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular person, the clause may"
+on its terms be used in those cases where there is such callousness towards the result
+and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the act is
+likely to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.80.
+Where it was shown that the spurious liquor was sold from the local vends belonging to
+"the accused persons coupled with the fact that after the tragedy struck, the accused"
+"persons even tried to destroy remaining bottles, it was held that the accused had full"
+knowledge of the fact that the bottles contained substance methyl and also about the
+"disastrous consequences thereof, thus bringing their case within the four corners of"
+section 300 fourthly.81.
+[s 300.16] As to dying declarations.—
+In spite of all the importance attached and the sanctity given to the piece of dying
+"declaration, Courts have to be very careful while analysing the truthfulness and,"
+genuineness of the dying declaration and should come to a proper conclusion that the
+dying declaration is not a product of prompting or tutoring.82.
+[s 300.16.1] Benefit of doubt.—
+An accused person cannot be given the benefit of doubt only on the ground that
+injuries on his person were not explained particularly when the injuries are of simple
+and superficial nature.83.
+[s 300.16.2] Death in custody.—
+"In State of TN v Balkrishna,84. it was held that merely because the death of the person"
+"occurred in police custody, an immediate inference of murder could not be drawn"
+against the police.
+[s 300.17] Non-explanation of injuries.—
+The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the
+accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested
+or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in
+"probability with that of the prosecution one. However, there may be cases where the"
+non-explanatiosn of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution
+case. This principle would apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused
+"are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, that it"
+outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the
+injuries.85.
+[s 300.18] Exception 1.—Provocation.—
+"Anger is a passion to which good and bad men are both subject, and mere human"
+frailty and infirmity ought not to be punished equally with ferocity or other evil feelings.
+The act must be done whilst the person doing it is deprived of self-control by grave and
+"sudden provocation. That is, it must be done under the immediate impulse of"
+provocation.86.
+"[s 300.19] Meaning of the words ""grave"" and ""sudden"".—"
+The expression 'grave' indicates that provocation be of such a nature so as to give
+cause for alarm to the accused. 'Sudden' means an action which must be quick and
+unexpected so far as to provoke the accused. The question of whether provocation
+was grave and sudden is a question of fact and not one of law. Each case is to be
+considered according to its own facts.87.
+The mode of resentment should bear some proper and reasonable relationship to the
+sort of provocation that has been given. The test to be applied is that of the effect of
+"the provocation on a reasonable man, so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious"
+individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary
+person to act as he did. It is important to consider whether a sufficient interval has
+"elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable person time to cool, and account"
+must be taken of the instrument with which the homicide had been effected.88. The
+mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation.89.
+"Principles relating to ""grave and sudden provocation"" summarised by the Supreme Court"
+"(1) The test of ""grave and sudden"" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging"
+"to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the"
+"accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India,"
+"words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden"
+provocation to an accused so as to bring his act within the First Exception to section
+300 of the Indian Penal Code.
+(3) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into
+consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden
+provocation for committing the offence.
+(4) The fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that
+"provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise"
+giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.
+KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra.90.
+An offence resulting from grave and sudden provocation would normally mean that a
+person placed in such circumstances could lose self-control but only temporarily and
+"that too, in proximity to the time of provocation. The provocation could be an act or"
+series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of injury.91.
+"The test of ""grave and sudden"" provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to"
+"the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused"
+was placed would be so provoked as to lose his self-control. Words and gestures may
+"also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused"
+so as to bring his act within the Exception. The mental background created by the
+previous act of the victim may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the
+subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence. The
+fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that
+"provocation and not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise"
+giving room and scope for premeditation and calculation.92.
+[s 300.20] Self-control.—
+"This term as it appears in section 300, Exception 1 is a subjective phenomenon and"
+can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances in a given case. In order to find out
+whether the last act of provocation on which the offender caused the death was
+"sufficiently grave to deprive the accused of the power of self-control, the previous acts"
+of provocation caused by the person can always be taken into consideration.93.
+[s 300.21] Grave and Sudden: Cases.—
+"Where there is sufficient time for cooling down, there would be no sudden provocation"
+"and the act of the accused would be a deliberate one. Thus, where the accused after"
+"receiving the provocation in a school committee meeting went to his house, brought a"
+"gun and thereafter shot chasing fleeing men, his action did not fall within this exception"
+but was an act of murder.94.
+"What is critical for a case to fall under Exception 1 to section 300, IPC, 1860 is that the"
+provocation must not only be grave but sudden as well. It is only where the following
+ingredients of Exception 1 are satisfied that an accused can claim mitigation of the
+offence committed by him from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder:
+(1) The deceased must have given provocation to the accused.
+(2) The provocation so given must have been grave.
+(3) The provocation given by the deceased must have been sudden.
+(4) The offender by reason of such grave and sudden provocation must have been
+deprived of his power of self-control; and
+(5) The offender must have killed the deceased or any other person by mistake or
+accident during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control.95.
+"[s 300.22] Doctrine of, and acts amounting to, sustained provocation.—"
+What Exception 1 of section 300 contemplates is a grave and sudden provocation
+whereas the ingredient of sustained provocation is a series of acts more or less grave
+"spread over a certain period of time, the last of which acting as the last straw breaking"
+a camel's back may even be a very trifling one. Where the accused had killed an
+innocent woman and an infant of a family merely on the suspicion of illicit intimacy
+between his wife and the father of the deceased infant and his suspicion appeared to
+"be more imaginary than real, it was held that there was practically no ground to invoke"
+"this doctrine. Besides, as there was nothing to support his suspicion and there was no"
+"enmity between the accused and the deceased either, the plea of sustained"
+"provocation was not tenable under section 300, Exception 1.96."
+[s 300.23] Adulterous intercourse.—
+A man in love with a woman who had repulsed his suit might be so angry as to lose
+"control of himself at the sight of her engaged in sexual intercourse with another, but if"
+"he kills one or both of them, he cannot plead grave provocation in mitigation of his"
+"offence. The law that, when a husband discovers his wife in the act of adultery and"
+"thereupon kills her, he is guilty of manslaughter and not murder, has no application"
+where the woman concerned is not the wife of the accused.97.
+[s 300.24] CASES.—
+"Adulterous intercourse has been held, in several cases, to give grave and sudden"
+provocation.98. It is not necessary for the husband to plead seeing of actual
+intercourse between his wife and the paramour.99. Where the accused killed the
+"deceased as he saw the deceased committing sodomy on his son, the case"
+undoubtedly fell within this Exception and he was liable to be convicted only under
+"section 304, Part II and not under section 302, IPC, 1860.100."
+"However, if the death of the adulterer is caused not in a fit of passion but with"
+"subsequent deliberation, this Exception does not apply."
+[s 300.25] Quarrel.—
+Where two friends happened to quarrel suddenly and one inflicted a single knife injury
+to the other which was not aimed at any vital part and the doctor verified that the injury
+"should not have ordinarily caused death, he was punished under section 304, Part"
+II.101.
+[s 300.26] Exception 2.—Exceeding right of private defence.—
+This Exception provides for the case of a person who exceeds the right of private
+defence. The authors of the Code observed:
+"Wherever the limits of the right of private defence may be placed, and with whatever degree"
+"of accuracy they may be marked, we are inclined to think that it will always be expedient to"
+make a separation between murder and... voluntary culpable homicide in defence.
+The chief reason for making this separation is that the law itself invites men to the very
+verge of the crime which we have designated as voluntary culpable homicide in defence. It
+prohibits such homicide indeed; but it authorizes acts which lie very near to such homicide;
+"and this circumstance, we think, greatly mitigates the guilt of such homicide."
+That a man who deliberately kills another in order to prevent that other from pulling his nose
+should be allowed to go absolutely unpunished would be most dangerous. The law
+punishes and ought to punish such killing; but we cannot think that the law ought to punish
+such killing as murder; for the law itself has encouraged the slayer to inflict on the assailant
+any harm short of death which may be necessary for the purpose of repelling the outrage; to
+give the assailant a cut with a knife across the fingers which may render his right hand
+"useless to him for life, or to hurl him downstairs with such force as to break his leg; and it"
+seems difficult to conceive that circumstances which would be a full justification of any
+violence short of homicide should not be a mitigation of the guilt of homicide. That a man
+should be merely exercising a right by fracturing the skull and knocking out the eye of an
+"assailant, and should be guilty of the highest crime in the Code if he kills the same assailant;"
+"that there should be only a single step between perfect innocence and murder, between"
+"perfect impunity and liability to capital punishment, seems unreasonable. In a case in which"
+"the law itself empowers an individual to inflict any harm short of death, it ought hardly, we"
+"think, to visit him with the highest punishment if he inflicts death.102."
+[s 300.27] When the offender is not entitled to get the benefit of this exception.
+—
+"A fortiori in cases where an accused sets up right of private defence, the first and the"
+foremost question that would fall for determination by the Court would be whether the
+accused had the right of private defence in the situation in which death or other harm
+"was caused by him. If the answer to that question is in the negative, Exception 2 to"
+section 300 of the Code would be of no assistance. Exception 2 presupposes that the
+offender had the right of private defence of person or property but he had exceeded
+such right by causing death. It is only in case answer to the first question is in the
+"affirmative, viz., that the offender had the right of defence of person or property, that"
+"the next question, viz., whether he had exercised that right in good faith and without"
+premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm that was necessary for the
+purpose of such defence would arise. Should answer to any one of these questions be
+"in the negative, the offender will not be entitled to the benefit of Exception 2 to section"
+300 of the Code. 103.
+[s 300.28] CASES.—No right of private defence.—
+Where both sides can be convicted for their individual acts and normally no right of
+private defence is available to either party and they will be guilty of their respective
+acts.104. There was no premeditation and the act was committed in a heat of passion
+and the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. There
+was a fight between the parties. The case falls under the fourth exception to section
+"300, IPC, 1860.105. The accused were, in fact, aggressors and being members of the"
+aggressors' party none of the accused can claim right of self-defence.106. Merely
+"because there was a quarrel and some of the accused persons sustained injuries, that"
+does not confer a right of private defence extending to the extent of causing death. It
+has to be established that the accused persons were under such grave apprehension
+about the safety of their life and property that retaliation to the extent done was
+absolutely necessary. Right of private defence has been rightly discarded.107. After an
+"altercation and exchange of abuses, two persons aimed rifles at each other. After one"
+"of them had lowered his rifle, the other fired at him killing him. It was held that the"
+accused was not entitled to the right of private defence and was convicted under
+section 300.108.
+[s 300.29] Exceeding Right of Private Defence.—
+"While exercising his right of private defence of property, the accused exceeded his right"
+of private defence and killed a man. It was held that the case fell within Exception 2 of
+"section 300 and as such he was liable to be punished under section 304, Part I and not"
+"under section 302, IPC, 1860.109. To ward off an attack with a stick, a stab wound"
+"puncturing the heart is not justified. It is a clear case of offence under section 304, Part"
+"I, IPC, 1860.110. So also is the case of killing an unarmed trespasser with chhura blows"
+which punctured both the heart and the lung.111.
+A dispute over lease of agricultural land led to murder. The accused appeared armed
+with deadly weapons. Two persons were killed in separate incidents. The Court said
+that this indicated that there was pre-meditation. The acts done showed that there was
+"intention to do more harm than was necessary for the purposes of self-defence. Hence,"
+the offences were not in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to
+murder.112.
+"The Court found that at some point of time, the accused (appellant) was exercising his"
+"right of private defence, but that had ceased to exist long before the time when the"
+"deadly blow was administered. His conviction was altered to section 304, Part I.113."
+[s 300.30] Causing injury after private defence ceased to be available.—
+There was a scuffle between the accused persons and the complainant party. One of
+the accused persons fired a gunshot of which one member of the complainant party
+died. The injury was caused when members of the complainant party were fleeing
+"away. There was the right of private defence before the retreat. Thus, he exceeded the"
+right of private defence. The Court said that his act was covered by Exception 2 to
+"section 300. He was liable to be punished under section 304, Part II.114."
+[s 300.31] Exception 3.—Public servant exceeding his power.—
+"This Exception protects a public servant, or a person aiding a public servant acting for"
+"the advancement of public justice, if either of them exceeds the powers given to them"
+by law and causes death. It gives protection so long as the public servant acts in good
+"faith, but if his act is illegal and unauthorised by law, or if he glaringly exceeds the"
+"powers entrusted to him by law, the Exception will not protect him. Where death was"
+"caused by a constable under orders of a superior, it being found that neither he nor his"
+superior believed that it was necessary for public security to disperse certain reapers
+"by firing on them, it was held that he was guilty of murder since he was ""not protected"
+"in that he obeyed the orders of his superior officer.""115. Exception 3 to section 300, IPC,"
+1860 pre-supposes that a public servant who causes death must do so in good faith
+and in due discharge of his duty as a public servant and without ill-will towards the
+person whose death is caused. The positive case set up by the defence that firing was
+"in self-defence has been rejected by the trial court, High Court as well by the Supreme"
+"Court, the question of any good faith does not arise. The appellants had fired without"
+provocation at the car killing two innocent persons and injuring one. The obligation to
+prove an exception is on the preponderance of probabilities but it nevertheless lies on
+the defence.116.
+[s 300.32] Exception 4.—Death caused in sudden fight.—
+A perusal of the provision would reveal that four conditions must be satisfied to bring
+the matter within Exception 4:
+(i) it was a sudden fight;
+(ii) there was no premeditation;
+(iii) the act was done in the heat of passion; and that
+(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.117.
+"[s 300.33] ""Fight"": meaning of.—"
+"The 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to section 300, IPC, 1860 is not defined in IPC, 1860."
+It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the
+"passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury"
+on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two
+and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any
+general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact
+and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts
+of each case.118.
+"The language of Exception 4 to section 300 is, thus, clear that culpable homicide is not"
+murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion
+upon a sudden quarrel provided the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted
+in a cruel or unusual manner. In order to bring a case under Exception (4) to section
+"300, IPC, 1860, the evidence must show that the accused without any premeditation"
+and in a heat of passion and without having undue advantage had not acted in cruel
+manner. Every one of these circumstances is required to be proved to attract Exception
+"(4) to section 300, IPC, 1860 and it is not sufficient to prove only some of them. None"
+of the ingredients have been proved in evidence to bring the case under Exception (4)
+"to section 300, IPC, 1860.119. Case comes under Exception 4 where the prosecution"
+evidence sufficiently suggested that a scuffle had taken place on the dingy where the
+appellant and his companions were trying to recover the dingy while the deceased was
+"preventing them from doing so, and in the course of this sudden fight and in the heat of"
+"passion, the appellant assaulted the deceased and pushed him in the sea eventually"
+resulting in his death.120. Where there was no pre-meditation and the act was
+committed in a heat of passion and the appellant had not taken any undue advantage
+"or acted in a cruel manner and there was a fight between the parties, the Supreme"
+"Court found that the case falls under the fourth exception to section 300, IPC, 1860 and"
+"the conviction altered from section 302, IPC, 1860 to section 304, Part I, IPC, 1860.121."
+Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and
+in this case the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal
+altercation in the beginning.122.
+"This Exception was held not to apply to a case where two bodies of men, for the most"
+"part armed with deadly weapons, deliberately entered into an unlawful fight, each being"
+"prepared to cause the death of the other, and aware that his own might follow, but"
+"determined to do his best in self-defence, and in the course of the struggle death"
+ensued.123. An unpremeditated assault (in which death is caused) committed in the
+heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel comes within the Exception.124.
+Exception 4 is attracted only when there is a fight or quarrel which requires mutual
+provocation and blows by both sides in which the offender does not take undue
+advantage.125.
+"A ""sudden fight"" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide"
+"committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such"
+"cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more"
+appropriately applicable would be Exception 1.126.
+The word 'fight' conveys something more than a verbal quarrel.127. It takes two to make
+a fight. It is not necessary that weapons should be used in a fight. In order to constitute
+"fight, it is necessary that blows should be exchanged even if they do not all find their"
+target.128. The fight must be with the person who is killed and not with another
+"person.129. The words ""undue advantage"" in this Exception means ""unfair"
+"advantage"".130. Where a wordy quarrel had taken place and the quarrel had led to the"
+"use of weapons by both the parties against each other, the Supreme Court said that it"
+could not be held to be a kind of case in which the accused had deliberately attacked
+the deceased with an intention to kill them. It is a case which would fall under the
+"Exception 4 to section 300, IPC, 1860.131. Where on account of a sudden impulse and"
+"without any intention or knowledge of the impending consequences, the accused"
+"squeezed the testicles of the other causing shock, cardiac arrest and instant death, the"
+Supreme Court held that the offence in question amounted to grievous hurt punishable
+under section 325 and not under this section.132. Where two cultivating parties working
+in their respective fields picked up a sudden quarrel over the dividing line and death
+"ensued, there was no previous ill-will between them and, therefore, no pre-meditation,"
+"conviction was altered from under section 302 to one under section 304, Part I read"
+"with section 34.133. Where, on the other hand, the incident did take place at the spur of"
+the moment and evidence showed that the accused persons intentionally assaulted the
+"deceased and his family in a brutal manner, their conviction under section 300 was held"
+to be proper.134. The accused persons cannot argue successfully that the incident
+occurred at the spur of the moment where they came to the place of occurrence armed
+"with deadly weapons. In this case, the evidence established that it was a pre-meditated"
+"act, thus their conviction for the offence punishable under section 302, IPC, 1860 was"
+held proper.135. In a sudden fight in heat of passion and without pre-meditation the
+accused armed with deadly weapon inflicted fatal blows on the unarmed deceased
+even when he fell on the ground. It was held that Exception 4 of section 300 was not
+attracted and the conviction of the accused for murder was proper.136.
+"Where the offender took an undue advantage or acted in a cruel and unusual manner, it"
+was held that the benefit of Exception 4 could not be given to him. The Supreme Court
+"observed that the weapon used or the manner of attack is out of all proportion, that"
+fact must be taken into consideration for deciding whether undue advantage was
+taken.137.
+A person opened the door on the call of his uncle who was under assault. He was
+unarmed and came out to see what was happening. He received a gunshot at his chest
+causing death. The Court said that the appellant had taken undue advantage of his
+position at the time. He could not claim the benefit of Exception 4.138.
+"Where though there was a sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased,"
+"there was absolutely no fight between the two as there was no exchange of blows, nor"
+any attack from the side of the deceased who was totally unarmed but nevertheless
+"the accused attacked the deceased with an axe causing his death, it was held that his"
+case did not fall either within Exception 4 or Exception 2 and he was squarely liable
+"under section 302, IPC, 1860.139. A sudden fight developed between the accused and"
+the deceased while the former was telling the latter that he should not carry his cattle
+by the side of the field of the accused. Three brothers of the accused rushed to his
+rescue and belaboured the deceased with whatever weapons they had in their hands.
+The deceased died of multiple injuries and broken bones. The ferocious cruelty
+established intention to cause death and took the case out of the exception.140.
+The accused abused a road sweeper who happened to throw mud on him. The father
+of the sweeper slapped the accused. The infuriated accused went away and came back
+"with others. He alone, however, inflicted the fatal blow. The occurrence was of sudden"
+origin because the gap between the injury and quarrel was that of only a few minutes.
+There was no previous enmity and blows were not repeated as the deceased fell down
+helpless. There was no unusual cruelty. The benefit of Exception 4 was allowed.141. In
+"a quarrel between the accused and his father, the accused attacked his father with a"
+dagger causing death and also attacked the intervener who were his stepmother and
+sisters. No injury was caused to the accused because all others were unarmed. The
+accused took undue advantage of that fact. He acted in a cruel manner. The exception
+was not attracted. He was guilty of murder.142. It cannot be said in all cases of a single
+blow that section 302 would not be attracted. A single blow in some cases may entail
+conviction under section 302 in some cases or under section 304 and in some cases
+under section 326. Acting on this principle in a case where the victim was invited to a
+particular place and there three associates of the accused caught hold of him and the
+"accused delivered a single knife blow on the chest, about which it could not be said"
+"that it was not inflicted without premeditation, the Court said that it could not be said"
+that the accused had not taken undue advantage. Exception 4 was not attracted.143.
+"Where the accused, who had gone along with the deceased and others, picked up a"
+"quarrel with the deceased, entered his house, and came back with a knife and gave"
+"blows to the deceased and others who tried to stop them and then ran away, it was"
+held that Exception 4 to section 300 was not applicable. Conviction under section 302
+was proper.144. A quarrel took place between a son and his father just outside the son's
+house. The son dragged the father into the Courtyard. His other sons came out to his
+"rescue. The son retreated into the room, bolted it from inside and shot at them from the"
+window. One of his brothers received a bullet at his chest and died. The plea of self-
+defence was not accepted. His father and brothers were the eye-witnesses who were
+naturally there for saving the skin of their father. The accused shot at them from the
+bolted security of his room.145.
+A previous quarrel triggered off because of sarcastic remarks made during the
+occasion of a marriage. Three accused started shooting with their respective guns at
+unarmed victims from close range on vital parts of their bodies. The victims had merely
+indulged in verbal duel with them. The accused acted in cruel and unusual manner.
+"Conviction for the offence of murder was held to be proper, Exception 4 being not"
+applicable.146.
+[s 300.34] Comparison of Exception 1 (provocation) with Exception 4 (sudden
+fight).—
+"Exception 4 of section 300, IPC, 1860 covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said"
+"exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the first exception, after"
+which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the
+"same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of"
+"Exception 1, there is total deprivation of self-control, in the case of Exception 4, there is"
+only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds
+which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception
+"1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact,"
+Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been
+"struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the"
+"quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in"
+respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and
+blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral
+"provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it"
+"were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no"
+"previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which"
+"both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if"
+"the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct, it would not have taken the serious"
+"turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to"
+apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4
+can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
+without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
+manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within
+"Exception 4, all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the"
+"'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to section 300, IPC, 1860 is not defined in the IPC, 1860."
+It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the
+"passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury"
+on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two
+and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any
+general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact
+and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts
+"of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there"
+was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that
+the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The
+expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'.147. In
+"both cases, there is absence of premeditation. But in Exception 1 there is total"
+"deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception there is such heat of passion as clouds"
+sober reason and urges the man to do something which he would not otherwise do. A
+sudden fight implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide in such
+"a case is not traceable to unilateral provocation. In such cases, the whole blame cannot"
+be attributed to one side. It may be that a fight was initiated by one side but without
+aggravating provocation from the other side it might not have taken the serious turn. A
+situation of mutual provocation and aggravation develops making it difficult to
+apportion the blame between the two sides.148.
+[s 300.35] Exception 5.—Death caused of the person consenting to it.—
+The following reasons are given for not punishing homicide by consent so severely as
+murder:
+"In the first place, the motives which prompt men to the commission of this offence are"
+generally far more respectable than those which prompt men to the commission of murder.
+"Sometimes it is the effect of a strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense"
+"of honour, not unfrequently of humanity. The soldier who, at the entreaty of a wounded"
+"comrade, puts that comrade out of pain, the friend who supplies laudanum to a person"
+"suffering the torment of a lingering disease, the freed man who in ancient times held out the"
+"sword that his master might fall on it, the highborn native of India who stabs the females of"
+his family at their own entreaty in order to save them from the licentiousness of a band of
+"marauders, would, except in Christian societies, scarcely be thought culpable, and even in"
+"Christian societies would not be regarded by the public, and ought not to be treated by the"
+"law, as assassins.149."
+This exception abrogates the rule of English law that a combatant in a fair duel who
+"kills his opponent is guilty of murder. Under this Exception, the person who is killed in a"
+"duel ""suffers or takes the risk of death by his own choice."" In applying the Exception, it"
+"should first be considered with reference to the act consented to or authorised, and"
+"next with reference to the person or persons authorised, and as to each of those some"
+degree of particularity at least should appear upon the facts proved before the
+Exception can be said to apply. It must be found that the person killed with a full
+"knowledge of the facts, determined to suffer death, or take the risk of death; and that"
+this determination continued up to and existed at the moment of his death.150. The
+consent must have been given unconditionally and without any pre-reservation.151.
+The case supposed in the illustration to Exception 5 is one of the offences expressly
+made punishable by section 305.
+[s 300.36] Death caused by voluntary act of deceased resulting from fear of
+violence.—
+If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes
+"such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who"
+"creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.152. If, for"
+"instance, four or five persons were to stand round a man, and so threaten him and"
+"frighten him as to make him believe that his life was in danger, and he were to back"
+"away from them and tumble over a precipice to avoid them, their act would amount to"
+murder.153.
+[s 300.37] Discovery of body of murdered person not necessary/Absence of
+corpus delicti.—
+"It is well-settled law that in a murder case, to substantiate the case of the prosecution,"
+it is not required that dead bodies must have been made available for the identification
+"and discovery of dead body is not sine qua non for applicability of section 299 of IPC,"
+1860.154. The mere fact that the body of a murdered person has not been found is not
+a ground for refusing to convict the accused of murder. But when the body is not
+"forthcoming, the strongest possible evidence as to the fact of the murder should be"
+insisted on before conviction.155. Such evidence could come from the testimony of
+eye-witnesses or from circumstantial evidence or from both.156. If the prosecution is
+successful in providing cogent and satisfactory proof of the victim having met a
+"homicidal death, absence of corpus delicti will not by itself be fatal to a charge of"
+murder.157.
+[s 300.38] Ascertainment of time of death.—
+Judging the time of death from the contents of the stomach may not always be the
+determinative test. It will require due corroboration from other evidence.158.
+"[s 300.39] Single eye-witness, corroboration needed.—"
+A child witness (aged 13 years at the time of incident) deposed categorically about the
+"gruesome incident he had witnessed. The Supreme Court held that in such situation, it"
+is considered a safe rule of prudence to generally geneally look for corroboration of the
+"sworn testimony of the witness in Court, as to the identity of the accused, who are"
+"strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding.159."
+"[s 300.40] Acquittal of co-accused, effect.—"
+Allegation was that the accused along with the juvenile attacked the deceased. Eye
+witness deposed that the juvenile was not involved. Acquittal of the juvenile has no
+effect on the case of others.160. Benefit of acquittal of co-accused cannot be given to
+the main accused.161.
+[s 300.41] Non-production of FIR book.—
+The incident involved assault on villagers and causing of multiple deaths. The injured
+witness gave written complaint in the hospital duly signed by him. The complaint was
+"immediately sent to the police station. On its basis, a printed FIR was registered and a"
+copy sent to the magistrate. These circumstances completely ruled out the suggestion
+that the FIR was bogus or doctored. Non-production of the book was due to non-
+"availability. This cannot by itself, invite suspicious glance from the Court or be a ground"
+for throwing out the prosecution case.162.
+[s 300.41.1] Ante timed.—
+"The lodging of a First Information Report within 20 minutes of the incident, on the oral"
+dictation at the police station which was four furlongs from the place of incident
+creates some doubt about the actual time of lodging of the FIR.163.
+[s 300.42] Delay in FIR.—
+Whether the delay is so long as to draw a cloud of suspicion on the prosecution case
+"will depend upon a variety of factors, which will vary from case to case.164. Where the"
+occurrence took place in the late night in a remote village and the sufferers of the
+"incident were the widow and her two minor children, apart from the fact that the police"
+"station was one and a half kilometres away, the delay in registering FIR on the next day"
+is proper.165.
+[s 300.43] Strange behaviour of the complainant.—
+"Where the incident of murder occurred inside the forest, while some friends of the"
+complainant were participating in a party and the informant/eye-witness instead of
+going to the police station went to the house of an Advocate. The Supreme Court found
+that it appeared to be a very strange behaviour on the part of the complainant and so
+"many of his friends who were with him to go to an Advocate, that too 15 kms away,"
+rather than approaching the Police Station to report the matter.166.
+[s 300.44] Motive.—
+It is fairly well settled that while motive does not have a major role to play in cases
+"based on eye-witness account of the incident, it assumes importance in cases that rest"
+entirely on circumstantial evidence.167. Where other circumstances lead to the only
+"hypothesis that the accused has committed the offence, the Court cannot acquit the"
+accused of the offence merely because the motive for committing the offence has not
+been established in the case.168. If depositions giving the eye-witness account of
+"incident that led to death of deceased are reliable, absence of a motive would make"
+"little difference.169. When there is an eye-witness account on record, the absence of"
+motive pales into insignificance.170.
+[s 300.45] Last seen together.—
+It is trite law that a conviction cannot be recorded against the accused merely on the
+ground that the accused was last seen with the deceased.171. There may however be
+"cases where, on account of close proximity of place and time between the event of the"
+"accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death, a rational"
+mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the accused
+should explain how and in what circumstances the victim suffered the death or should
+"own the liability for the homicide.172. But in Arabindra Mukherjee v State of WB,173.,174."
+"it was held that once the accused was last seen with the deceased, the onus is upon"
+him to show that either he was not involved in the occurrence at all or that he had left
+the deceased at her home or at any other reasonable place. To rebut the evidence of
+"last seen and its consequences in law, the onus was upon the accused to lead"
+"evidence in order to prove his innocence. In C Perumal v Rajasekaran,175.,176. there was"
+a time lag of two days in last seen together of A2– A5 with the deceased and Court
+found it difficult to connect them with the incident. Where the accused was last seen
+"together with the deceased by his wife, but the prosecution could not establish the"
+"cause of death, the accused was not convicted based on the last seen theory.177."
+The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the
+inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something
+more establishing the connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-
+"explanation on the part of the accused by itself, cannot lead to proof of guilt against"
+the appellant.178. Where it was found that the deceased was in the company of the
+accused prior to one week of the post-mortem of the deceased and it was also found
+"through the post-mortem that the murder was about one week ago, the Court held that"
+the last seen theory applies.179.
+Where there was a clear gap of 51 hours and 45 minutes between the time when the
+"victim was last seen in the company of the accused and the time of his death, it was"
+held that this time gap was too wide to act upon the last seen theory.180.
+[s 300.45.1] Co-accused.—
+Merely because two persons have been acquitted that benefit cannot be extended to
+others in view of the direct evidence establishing their presence and participation in the
+crime.181.
+[s 300.46] Plea of alibi.—
+"While weighing the plea of 'alibi', the same has to be weighed against the positive"
+evidence led by the prosecution.182.
+"31. Santosh v State, 1975 Cr LJ 602 : AIR 1975 SC 654 [LNIND 1975 SC 50] ; See also Sehaj"
+"Ram, 1983 Cr LJ 993 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 614 [LNIND 1983 SC 90] : (1983) 3 SCC 280 [LNIND"
+"1983 SC 90] . There should be causal connection between death and injury, not proved where"
+"death ensued 13 days after the alleged injury by the deceased woman's husband, Imran Khan v"
+"State of MP, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 17 (MP)."
+"32. Govinda, (1876) 1 Bom 342; Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC"
+"1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] : 2004 Cr LJ 1778 , distinguish between culpable homicide and"
+"murder restated, nature of mens rea required in two provisions also explained."
+"33. State of AP v R Punnayya, 1977 Cr LJ 1 : AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] ; Kalaguru"
+"Padma Rao v State of AP, (2007) 12 SCC 48 [LNIND 2007 SC 179] : AIR 2007 SC 1299 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 179] , distinction between sections 299 and 300 restated. Sunder Lal v State of"
+"Rajasthan, (2007) 10 SCC 371 [LNIND 2007 SC 599] ; Abbas Ali v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 2"
+"SCC 129 : AIR 2007 SC 1239 [LNIND 2007 SC 165] : 2007 Cr LJ 1667 , distinction restated."
+"34. Laxminath v State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2009 SC 1383 [LNIND 2009 SC 58] : (2009) 3 SCC"
+"519 [LNIND 2009 SC 58] ; Budhi Lal v State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2009 SC 87 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+1928] : (2008) 14 SCC 647 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] ; Abdul Waheed Khan Waheed v State of
+"Andhra Pradesh, JT 2002 (6) SC 274 [LNIND 2002 SC 530] ; Augustine Saldanha v State of"
+"Karnataka, 2003 (10) SCC 472 [LNIND 2003 SC 709] ; Thangaiya v State of TN, 2005 (9) SCC 650"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 1221] and Sunder Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2007 (10) SCC 371 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+599] .
+"35. Ajit Singh v State of Punjab, (2011) 9 SCC 462 [LNIND 2011 SC 844] ."
+"36. Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3765 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] ."
+"37. State of Orissa v Raja Parida, 1972 Cr LJ 193 199 (Ori). Gurmej Singh v State of Punjab, AIR"
+"1992 SC 214 [LNIND 1991 SC 301] : 1992 Cr LJ 293 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 75 , discussing how"
+evidence in criminal cases is to be appreciated. Other cases giving guidelines for appreciation
+"of evidence for purposes of section 300 are State of UP v Ram Chandra, 1992 Cr LJ 418 All"
+"(doubtful evidence); Anokh Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 598 : 1992 Cr LJ 525 : 1992"
+"Supp (1) SCC 426 (improbable evidence, delay in lodging FIR); State of Karnataka v Venkatesh,"
+AIR 1992 SC 674 : 1992 Cr LJ 707 (prosecution witness not inspiring confidence). See also
+"Sakharam v State of MP, AIR 1992 SC 758 [LNIND 1992 SC 157] : 1992 Cr LJ 861 , a boy of 16–"
+17 years of age lived alone with the deceased woman in a single-room house some eight days
+"before the incident, woman killed by gun-shot injuries, the boy acquitted because there was no"
+"other evidence than that of living together; Peddireddy Subbareddi v State of AP, 1991 Cr LJ 1391"
+": AIR 1991 SC 1356 , gap of 15 hours in lodging FIR, the sole eye-witness not telling the fact to"
+"any of the villagers. Acquittal on benefit of doubt. Gangotri Singh v State of UP, AIR 1992 SC 948"
+": 1992 Cr LJ 1290 , where the dying declaration was clear in reference, but did not even mention"
+"the names of the other accused with whom the deceased was on enmity, conviction of the"
+named accused alone was held to be proper.
+"Acquittals.—Varun Chaudhary v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 675 : AIR 2011 SC 72 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 1067] : (2011) 12 SCC 545 [LNIND 2010 SC 1067] ; the recovered knife was never
+produced before the court and was never shown to the accused; scanty evidence; conviction set
+"aside; State Through CBI v Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109 [LNIND 2011 SC 114] : AIR"
+"2011 SC 1017 [LNIND 2011 SC 114] : 2011 Cr LJ 2177 , circumstances relied on do not connect"
+"the accused, accused acquitted. Allarakha K Mansuri v State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 1051"
+"[LNIND 2002 SC 119] , defective investigation should not be made a ground of acquittal by itself."
+The setting aside of acquittal by the High Court was held to be proper. Chander Pal v State of
+"Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 989 [LNIND 2002 SC 105] , acquittal because of unsatisfactory evidence,"
+"State of Haryana v Ram Singh, AIR 2002 SC 620 [LNIND 2002 SC 32] , largely on matters of"
+"evidence, such as gap between medical and eye-witness account, relative witness not to be"
+"rejected for that reason alone, defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of"
+"the prosecution. Panchdeo Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 526 [LNIND 2001 SC 3070] ,"
+"acquittal because of unreliable dying declaration. Surendra Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC"
+"260 [LNIND 2001 SC 2701] , firing at the inmates of a car, one killed, one injured. The injured eye-"
+witness identified the assailant at the test identification parade but had stated at the stage of
+the FIR that could not recognise him. Conviction of the accused was set aside. Thanedar Singh v
+"State of MP, AIR 2002 SC 175 [LNIND 2001 SC 2451] , killing at night, no moonlight, no"
+"identification of killers, High Court not justified in reversing acquittal. RV Chacko v State of"
+"Kerala, AIR 2001 SC 537 [LNIND 2000 SC 1797] , acquittal because no proper proof. Durbal v"
+"State of UP, (2011) 2 SCC 676 [LNIND 2011 SC 100] : AIR 2011 SC 795 [LNIND 2011 SC 100] :"
+"2011 Cr LJ 1106 ; presence of eyewitness doubtful, acquitted; Prahlad Singh v State of MP, 2011"
+"(8) Scale 105 [LNIND 2011 SC 1086] : 2011 Cr LJ 4366 , possibility that these three accused"
+roped in on account of animosity cannot be ruled out and given them the benefit of doubt on
+"that score. Surendra Pratap Chauhan v Ram Naik, AIR 2001 SC 164 [LNIND 2000 SC 1521] : 2001"
+"Cr LJ 98 , murder in village groupism real killers could not be identified and other failures of"
+"proof, acquittal, Jagdish v State of MP, AIR 2000 SC 2059 [LNIND 2000 SC 842] : 2000 Cr LJ"
+"2955 , acquittal of one accused because of uncertainty in technical as well as general evidence,"
+conviction of the other because of the case proved against him.
+"Shaikh Umar Ahmed Shaikh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 1922 [LNIND 1998 SC 498] :"
+"1998 Cr LJ 2534 , strong possibility of the accused being shown to the witnesses before"
+"identification in court, conviction set aside because the identification was the basis of the"
+"conviction. Bhola Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 767 [LNIND 1998 SC 1050] : 1999 Cr LJ"
+"1132 , acquittal because the presence of the witnesses on the spot became doubtful, their"
+testimony seemed to have been tailored in accordance with the post-mortem report. Delayed
+"test identification parade. Accused acquitted: State of Maharashtra v Syed Umar Sayed Abbas,"
+"2016 Cr LJ 1445 : 2016 (3) SCJ 77 . Vijayan v State of Kerala, AIR 1999 SC 1086 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+"159] : 1999 Cr LJ 1638 , acquittal, because photographs were published and, therefore,"
+identification evidence became useless and dying declaration was also unreliable. Mohd. Zahid
+"v State of TN, AIR 1999 SC 2416 [LNIND 1999 SC 593] : 1999 Cr LJ 2699 , acquittal because eye-"
+witnesses and the doctor both found to be not reliable. Hargovandas Devrajbhai Patel v State of
+"Gujarat, AIR 1998 SC 370 [LNIND 1997 SC 1443] : 1998 Cr LJ 662 (SC), no proof that the police"
+"officer caused death of the deceased in police custody. Acquittal Omwati v Mahendra Singh, AIR"
+"1998 SC 249 [LNIND 1997 SC 91] , 250 : 1998 Cr LJ 401 , acquittal because no proper"
+"investigation and evidence. Daljit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 324 : 1999 Cr LJ 454 ,"
+"acquittal because of false witnesses. Din Dayal v Raj Kumar, AIR 1999 SC 537 : 1999 Cr LJ 487 ,"
+accused acquitted because witnesses not truthful. Tanviben Pankaj Kumar Divetia v State of
+"Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 2193 [LNIND 1997 SC 803] : 1997 Cr LJ 2535 , no evidence to lead to"
+"irresistible conclusion about complicity of the accused in causing murder, conviction on"
+"surmises and conjectures set aside. Mohd Aman v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2960 : 1997"
+"Cr LJ 3567 , not proper handling of finger-print evidence, conviction not proper. Shahbad Pall"
+"Reddy v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 3087 [LNIND 1997 SC 1096] : 1997 Cr LJ 3753 , murder alleged"
+"to be by 26 persons, no proper investigation, acquittal. Harkirat Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1997"
+"SC 3231 [LNIND 1997 SC 988] : 1997 Cr LJ 3954 , material contradictions in statements of"
+"witnesses, other irregularities, acquittal. Sahib Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 3247"
+"[LNIND 1997 SC 1005] : 1997 Cr LJ 3956 , delayed FIR, highly interested witnesses, confession"
+"not truthful, conviction liable to be set aside. State of UP v Bhagwan, AIR 1997 SC 3292 : (1997)"
+"11 SCC 19 , acquittal because of unreliable eye-witnesses. B Subba Rao v Public Prosecutor, AIR"
+"1997 SC 3427 [LNIND 1997 SC 1065] : 1997 Cr LJ 4072 , because the source of light through"
+"which identification was possible not proved Rambilas v State of MP, AIR 1997 SC 3954 [LNIND"
+"1997 SC 1302] : 1997 Cr LJ 4649 , a notorious person murdered on the day of a festival and"
+"body thrown into a tank, eye-witnesses not likely because of the festival, that is why were not"
+"real there could be other possible killers, acquittal. Paramjit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC"
+"1614 [LNIND 1996 SC 2101] : (1997) 4 SCC 156 [LNIND 1996 SC 2101] , two types of evidence,"
+"last seen together and dying declaration, both found not reliable. Acquittal, Jaspal Singh v State"
+"of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 332 [LNIND 1996 SC 1648] : 1997 Cr LJ 370 , confession and"
+"identification evidence week, acquittal. Devinder v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 Sc 454 [LNIND"
+"1996 SC 1460] : 1996 Cr LJ 4461 , acquittal because of benefit of doubt. Chander Pal v State of"
+"Haryana, 2002 Cr LJ 1481 (SC), quarrel in the course of playing game of ludo, murder, no proper"
+"evidence, acquittal. Bijoy Singh v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 2623 : AIR 2002 SC 1949 [LNIND"
+"2002 SC 300] , prosecution for murder and attempt to murder, 12 persons were convicted, but"
+"there was no proper investigation, acquittal. State of AP v Kowthalam Chinna Narasimhulu, 2001"
+"Cr LJ 722 (SC), political rivalry, murder, unreliable witnesses, acquittal. State of MP v Surpa, 2001"
+"Cr LJ 3290 (SC), contradictions in evidence, wife of the victim not disclosing the incident to any"
+"one till the next day, acquittal."
+"Kanhai Mishra v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 1258 (SC), rape and murder, acquittal, Dhanjibhai v"
+"State of Gujarat, 2001 Cr LJ 1587 (Guj), another case of being killed by burns, but no proof of"
+"involvement of the accused husband. Sohan v State of Haryana, 2001 Cr LJ 1707 (SC), only"
+"interested witness examined, no independent witness examined though available, conviction set"
+"aside. State of Rajasthan v Teja Singh, 2001 Cr LJ 1176 (SC), no corroboration of evidence of"
+"interested eye-witness, acquittal proper. Kalyan v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 4677 (SC), acquittal"
+"because of poor state of evidence. State of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 61 (Del) acquittal from the charge"
+"of raping and killing one's daughter poor evidence. Sudama Pandey v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ"
+"582 (SC), acquittal because of no proper evidence. Gurucharan v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 4560"
+"(All), accused persons alleged to have entered a bus, fired at passengers and used knives, death"
+"of two caused, acquitted under benefit of doubt. Ajab Singh v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 1809 :"
+"(2000) 3 SCC 521 [LNIND 2000 SC 2011] , order by Supreme Court of investigation by CBI."
+"Chhannoo Lal v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 2787 (All), killing of wife and children, but prosecution"
+"could prove nothing, husband acquitted. Referring Officer v Tiringhly, 2000 Cr LJ 2569 (AP),"
+"murder of a priest of a temple, and throwing away the body into a pond. The court found it to be"
+a case of no evidence. Conviction of the accused and sentence of death set aside. State of
+"Punjab v Kulwant Singh, 2000 Cr LJ 2692 (P&H), triple murder, accused acquitted because of"
+"prosecution failures. Dinesh v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 3474 : 2002 Cr LJ 2970 (SC),"
+acquittal because of inconsistent evidence and weapons not produced. Mahabir Singh v State of
+"Haryana, 2001 Cr LJ 3945 (SC), sole eye-witness contradicting himself acquittal. State of"
+"Rajasthan v Chhote Lal, 2012 AIR (SCW) 1159 : 2012 Cr LJ 1214 , sole eye witness turned hostile,"
+"acquittal confirmed; Javed Masood v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2010 SC 979 [LNIND 2010 SC 214] :"
+(2010) 3 SCC 538 [LNIND 2010 SC 214] : (2010) 3 SCR 236 [LNIND 2010 SC 214] : 2010 Cr LJ
+"2020 , presence of eye witness doubtful, conviction set aside. Jiten Besra v State of WB, AIR"
+"2010 SC 1294 [LNIND 2010 SC 224] : (2010) 3 SCC 675 [LNIND 2010 SC 224] : 2010 Cr LJ 2032 ,"
+all the alleged incriminating circumstances could not be said to have been established; accused
+"is entitled to benefit of doubt. Gajula Surya Prakasarao v State of AP, (2010) 1 SCC 88 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 1973] : 2010 Cr LJ 2102 : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 181, eye witness did not name the"
+"accused in the statement, accused acquitted; Jaipal v State, 1998 Cr LJ 4085 : AIR 1998 SC"
+"2787 [LNIND 1999 PNH 698] , murder, persons accused not shown to be guilty, acquittal. State"
+"of HP v Dhani Ram, 1997 Cr LJ 214 : 1997 SCC (Cr) 244 (SC), the only proof was that of motive,"
+"but there was no other evidence, acquittal. Gurprit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 2390 ,"
+"TADA offender, murder, charged, not proved, acquittal. Nasim v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 3329"
+"(All), arsenic poison mixed in pulse drink, six persons lost life, but who mixed not clear, act of"
+"persons other than cook not ruled out, acquittal. Deva v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 265 : AIR"
+"1999 SC 214 [LNIND 1998 SC 1402] , murder by accused not proved, acquittal. Surinder Kumar v"
+"State of Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 267 : AIR 1999 SC 215 [LNIND 2012 SC 879] , veterinary surgeon"
+"killed, accused acquitted because his guilt could not be proved. Bhupinder Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 396 (SC), death probably in encounter firing, constable acquitted. State of HP"
+"v Rakesh Kumar, 1999 Cr LJ 564 (HP), acquittal. Ashok Kumar v State of Bihar, 1999 Cr LJ 599"
+"(SC), murder of morning walker, dying declaration, not reliable, no other evidence, acquittal."
+"Paras Yadav v State of Bihar, 1999 Cr LJ 1122 : AIR 1999 SC 644 [LNIND 1999 SC 17] ,"
+"participation of accused in murder not proved, acquittal. Chandregowda v State of Karnataka,"
+"1999 Cr LJ 1719 (Kant), child sacrificed to death by throttling for the purpose of learning black"
+"magic, doctor's certificate of schizophrenia, only evidence was admission of guilt under section"
+"313, Cr PC, 1973. Held, conviction not possible on that basis alone. Ahmed Bin Salam v State of"
+"AP, 1999 Cr LJ 2281 : AIR 1999 SC 1617 , conviction set aside because of failure of evidence;"
+"State of UP v Kapildeo Singh, 1999 Cr LJ 2594 : AIR 1999 SC 1783 [LNIND 1999 SC 140] ,"
+"accused, alleged to have entered Kutia of their victim at mid night to settle land dispute and"
+"assaulted him with sharp instruments to death, but no proof, acquittal. Balbir Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 4076 : AIR 1999 SC 3227 [LNIND 1999 SC 718] , acquittal because of no"
+"proof. Vithal Tukaram More v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 2715 [LNIND 2002 SC 449] :"
+"2002 Cr LJ 3546 , acquittal because of unreliable evidence. Mathura Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR"
+"2002 SC 2707 [LNIND 2002 SC 447] : 2002 Cr LJ 3538 , glaring discrepancies in evidence of eye-"
+"witnesses, acquittal; BL Satish v State of Karnataka, 2002 Cr LJ 3508 (SC), grandson was"
+charged of strangulating his grandmother to death. The only circumstance against him was his
+"statement that ornaments were kept in his maternal grand father's house, acquittal; Thangavelu"
+"v State of TN, 2002 Cr LJ 3558 (SC), false evidence case demolished by medical report as to"
+time of death.
+"Pandit Ram Prakash Sharma v Khairati Lal, 1998 Cr LJ 1410 : AIR 1998 SC 2820 , unreliable"
+"witnesses, acquittal. Prem Prakash Mundra v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1620 : AIR 1998 SC"
+"1189 [LNIND 1998 SC 133] , murder of child, accused could not be connected with it. State of"
+"Rajasthan v Mahaveer, 1998 Cr LJ 2275 (SC), enmity between parties, but nothing could be"
+"proved. Kochu Maitheen Kannu Salim v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 2277 (SC), conduct of eye-"
+"witnesses did not inspire confidence, acquittal. State of Punjab v Karnail Singh, 1998 Cr LJ 2556 :"
+"AIR 1998 SC 1936 [LNIND 1998 SC 307] , death of five persons by gun shots, no evidence as to"
+"who caused whose death, defence version that the accused acted in self-defence was"
+"supported by evidence, acquittal. Jaipal v State (UT of Chandigarh), 1998 Cr LJ 4085 : AIR 1998"
+"SC 2787 [LNIND 1999 PNH 698] , considered acquittal by the trial judge, setting aside by the"
+High Court merely because a different view of the evidence was also possible was not proper;
+"Kaptan Singh v State of MP, acquittal solely on the basis of investigation, held patently wrong;"
+"State of HP v Dhani Ram, 1997 Cr LJ 214 : AIR 1996 SCW 4055 , acquittal upheld; Roshan Singh v"
+"State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 256 (All), acquittal because of benefit of doubt; Darshan Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, 1997 Cr LJ 370 : AIR 1970 SC 332 , accused not properly identified, confession of guilt"
+"not found reliable, acquittal."
+"Kuldip Singh v State of Punjab, 2002 Cr LJ 3944 : AIR 2002 SC 3023 [LNIND 2002 SC 498] ,"
+"murder of the wife and daughter of informant, but the accused could not be connected with it,"
+"acquittal; Dhananjay Shanker Shetty v State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cr LJ 3729 (SC), circumstantial"
+evidence of murder by history sheeter. But no proof. The accused was arrested in injured
+"condition. No explanation, acquittal. Toran Singh v State of MP, 2002 Cr LJ 3732 (SC), material"
+"contradictions and omissions in statements of witness. Muthu v State of Karnataka, 2002 Cr LJ"
+"3782 (SC), no evidence to connect the accused with the murder, close scrutiny of evidence"
+disclosed hollowness of prosecution case. Accused entitled to benefit of doubt. Balu Sonba
+"Shinde v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3137 [LNIND 2002 SC 552] , deposition of a witness"
+"on whom the prosecution story hinged was found partly improbable, the evidence of hostile"
+witness was rather found more normal and natural. Accused entitled to benefit of doubt.
+"Ashish Batham v State of MP, AIR 2002 SC 3206 [LNIND 2002 SC 556] , failure in love affair"
+"alleged to be motive for murder, acquitted because of lack of credibility in evidence. Raghunath v"
+"State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 165 [LNIND 2002 SC 703] : 2003 Cr LJ 401 , group rivalry,"
+"accused persons entered the house of their victim and caused death, but evidence doubtful, the"
+"witnesses, while taking the injured to hospital, did not file report even when they crossed two"
+"police stations, acquittal. Jasbir v State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 554 [LNIND 2002 SC 805] :"
+"2003 Cr LJ 826 , there were lathi injuries on the person of the deceased, lathi wielding accused"
+"were acquitted. State of Karnataka v AB Nagaraj, AIR 2003 SC 666 [LNIND 2002 SC 783] : 2003"
+"Cr LJ 848 , allegation that the daughter was killed by her father and step-mother. Witnesses who"
+saw them in the national park could not be believed because they were working behind bushes.
+The theory of the accused parents that they were looking for their daughter seemed to be
+"probable. There was no history of bad treatment, acquittal; Kantilal v State of Gujarat, AIR 2003"
+"SC 684 [LNIND 2002 SC 789] : 2003 Cr LJ 850 , prosecution case was that the accused stole"
+gold ornaments of the victim woman and murdered her. The facts that he had given the
+ornaments and ingot to a jeweller for melting were not established. Link in the chain of
+"circumstances missing, acquittal. Bhim Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 693 [LNIND 2002"
+"SC 793] : 2003 Cr LJ 857 , acquittal because of uncorroborated and controverted evidence. State"
+"of UP v Arun Kumar Gupta, AIR 2003 SC 801 [LNIND 2003 SC 9] : 2003 Cr LJ 894 , except for"
+"being indebted to the deceased, other evidence to connect the accused with the murder was"
+"nullity, acquittal. Lallu Manjhi v State of Jharkhand, AIR 2003 SC 854 [LNIND 2003 SC 3] : 2003 Cr"
+"LJ 914 , land dispute, but who was in possession not properly proved, interested eye-witness not"
+"corroborated. No conviction on sole testimony. Zafar v State of UP, AIR 2003 SC 931 [LNIND"
+"2003 SC 41] : 2003 Cr LJ 1218 , sole child witness, examined after four to five days probably"
+"because another eye-witness had backed out. Not reliable. No conviction. Jai Pal v State of UP,"
+AIR 2003 SC 1012 [LNIND 2003 SC 134] : 2003 Cr LJ 1243 eye-witness in examination-in-chief
+"did not name the accused, in cross-examination he named him among so many others, but no"
+"overt act attributed, delay in examining witnesses not explained, identification of dead body"
+"doubtful, acquittal. Bhagwan Singh v State of MP, AIR 2003 SC 1088 [LNIND 2003 SC 82] : 2003"
+"Cr LJ 1262 , mother killed by assailants, six-year-old child sleeping with her, testified that after"
+"seeing his mother being assaulted, he went to sleep again, no TI parade held, the conduct of the"
+"father was also unnatural, he did not enquire anything from the child before lodging the FIR,"
+"sending civil disputes between the accused and the deceased was found to be weak cause,"
+"acquittal. Shailendra Pratap v State of UP, AIR 2003 SC 1104 [LNIND 2003 SC 6] : 2003 Cr LJ"
+"1270 , another case of acquittal because of weak links in evidence. Kanwarlal v State of MP,"
+"2003 Cr LJ 82 (SC), the allegation that the victim was assaulted by several accused persons in"
+"free fight with axes and spears. But no cut injuries except one on head, conviction of one"
+"accused for murder not sustainable. Mohan Singh v Prem Singh, 2003 Cr LJ 11 : AIR 2003 SC"
+"3582 , failure of evidence on all points in the trial for murder, defence version more probable,"
+"acquittal. Nabab Khan v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ 94 (MP), sole eye-witness, other factors of"
+"evidence not reliable, casting doubt upon sole-witness account, acquittal. This was an attack on"
+the whole family. Four members were killed. The sole eye-witness who survived with injuries
+was not medically examined and false explanations were submitted for the same. Jai Narain v
+"State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 168 (All), evidence of homemates of the deceased contradictory, no"
+"independent witness, motive that they were working as police informers not proved, unexplained"
+"delay in medical examination of deceased, defence version more probable, acquittal. Narendra"
+"Singh v State of UP, 2003 Cr LJ 205 (All), killing of man's wife, his son and nephew, proof against"
+"the alleged killers not substantiated, acquittal. Moti v State of UP, 2003 Cr LJ 1694 : AIR 2003 SC"
+"1897 [LNIND 2003 SC 302] , serious difference in family evidence and medical evidence,"
+"uncertainty benefit of doubt. Suresh Chaudhary v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 1717 : AIR 2003 SC"
+"1981 [LNIND 2003 SC 289] , presence of eye-witness at the site of three murders, time of death,"
+"time of lodging FIR doubtful, medical evidence showing use of explosive bomb, eye-witness did"
+"not mention it, acquittal. State of Punjab v Sucha Singh, 2003 Cr LJ 1210 : AIR 2003 SC 1471"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 177] , murder in revenge, eye-witness father of the deceased, but rendered no"
+"help at rescue, his presence at the spot became doubtful, other witnesses also not reliable,"
+"conviction set aside. Bharat v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ 1297 (SC), circumstantial evidence, chain"
+"not complete, murder for robbery, recovery of doubtful value, extra-judicial confession, not"
+"reliable, acquittal. State of UP v Dharamraj, 2003 Cr LJ 1522 : AIR 2003 SC 1589 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+"206] , eye-witnesses gave different version of the weapons used, acquittal. Rajeevan v State of"
+"Kerala, 2003 Cr LJ 1572 : AIR 2003 SC 1813 , accusation due to political bitterness, acquittal."
+"Baldev Singh v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ 880 : AIR 2003 SC 2098 [LNIND 2003 SC 2] , improbability"
+"of murder by accused, acquittal. Sambhunath v State of WB, 2003 Cr LJ 975 (Cal), conviction set"
+"aside because the chain of circumstances was not complete. Shankar Singh v State of UP, 2003"
+"Cr LJ 1095 (All), killed with gunshot injury, delay in lodging FIR, conduct of eye-witnesses"
+"unnatural, acquittal. State of UP v Krishna Pal, 2003 Cr LJ 1115 (All), a man and his son killed,"
+"evidence of his wife and daughter found to be self-contradictory, acquittal. Suresh B Nair v State"
+"of Kerala, 2003 Cr LJ 1152 (Ker), the accused killed his victim with a piece of stone, the eye-"
+"witness did not know him before, identification parade not held, the identification by the"
+"witnesses was not corroborated, acquittal. Raghunath v State of Haryana, 2003 Cr LJ 401 (SC),"
+"failure of the prosecution case. Ganga Singh v State of UP, 2003 Cr LJ 653 (All), failure of"
+"prosecution to connect points. Brijpal Singh v State of MP, AIR 2003 SC 2460 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+"485] , confusion caused by witnesses as to killing by gunshots, ballistic opinion contradicted"
+"eye-witnesses, benefit of doubt. State of UP v Dharamraj, AIR 2003 SC 1589 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+"206] , witnesses spoke of different instruments of murder, FIR ante-timed, acquittal. Moti v State"
+"of UP, AIR 2003 SC 1897 [LNIND 2003 SC 302] , time of occurrence of murder, post-mortem"
+report as to state of food in the stomach contradicted by the statements of family members as
+"to time of food intake, time of killing became uncertain and resulted in acquittal. State of MP v"
+"Mishrilal, 2003 Cr LJ 2312 (SC), the prosecution suppressed the true genesis of the incident, in"
+"fact the prosecution party were the aggressors, they did not explain anything about injuries"
+"received by three accused persons, one of whom was seriously injured, every detail of the"
+prosecution case was found to be doubtful. Acquittal of accused persons. Khima Vikamshi v
+"State of Gujarat, 2003 Cr LJ 2025 (SC), allegation that the accused killed the deceased in the"
+"presence of his pardanashin daughter in law, which was itself a doubtful fact and her"
+"statements were also not reliable, there were no blood stains on her clothes, acquittal. Sadhu"
+"Ram v State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cr LJ 2331 (SC), death of woman alongwith her eight-month-old"
+"daughter, two versions possible, accidental burning or intentionally set on fire, witness not clear,"
+"no reliance on such witness, acquittal. State of UP v Bhagwani, 2003 Cr LJ 2337 (SC), blood-"
+"stained earth not collected, independent witnesses not called, doubt about place of happening,"
+acquittal.
+Appeal against acquittal.—Acquittal on the charge of murder of child because of denial of
+"inheritance, conviction by High Court, upheld by Supreme Court; Swami Prasad v State of MP,"
+"(2007) 13 SCC 25 [LNIND 2007 SC 293] ; Shaik China Brahmam v State of AP, (2007) 14 SCC 457"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1388] : AIR 2008 SC 610 [LNIND 2007 SC 1388] , acquittal by the trial court"
+"reversed by the High Court, conviction by High Court upheld by Supreme Court; Malleshappa v"
+"State of Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 399 [LNIND 2007 SC 1112] : AIR 2008 SC 69 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+"1112] , conviction found to be unsustainable in the circumstances of the case; Sunny Kapoor v"
+"State (UT of Chandigarh), 2006 Cr LJ 2920 (SC), circumstantial evidence with glaring"
+"discrepancies, conviction not upheld."
+"Convictions.—State of Punjab v Jugraj Singh, AIR 2002 SC 1083 [LNIND 2002 SC 118] , acquittal"
+"set aside, minor irregularities in evidence not to be over weighed. Prakash Dhawal Khairnar v"
+"State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 340 [LNIND 2001 SC 2841] , the accused wiped out his"
+"brother with family in order to prevent partition, the confessional statement of his son who had"
+"seen multiple murders, alongwith other circumstances, established guilt, conviction. Rama"
+"Mangaruji Chacherkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 283 [LNIND 2001 SC 2771] , dispute"
+"between brothers over distribution of agricultural produce, death of the brother caused by"
+hurling a hand grenade at him. The wife of the deceased testified that she did not see throwing
+of bomb but her evidence showed that she had seen the whole incident. Conviction not
+"interfered with. Brij Lal v State of Haryana, (2002) SC 291 : 2002 Cr LJ 581 , minor difference in"
+"the eye-witness version and medical evidence as to in which part of the head the bullet struck,"
+"conviction maintained. Meharban Singh v State of MP, AIR 2002 MP 299 : 2002 Cr LJ 586 (SC)"
+"villagers taking injured in bullock cart to hospital, death on the way, the injured person before his"
+"death told them about his assailant, reliable, conviction, no interference. Majid v State of"
+"Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 382 [LNIND 2001 SC 2827] , minor son of the deceased found to be"
+"natural and reliable witness, conviction upheld. Sewaka v State of MP, AIR 2002 MP 50 : 2002 Cr"
+"LJ 205 , murder of husband, wife grappled with killers but they escaped, moonlight"
+"identification, conviction maintained. Majju v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 2930 [LNIND 2001 SC"
+"2409] : 2001 Cr LJ 4762 , eye-witness account of the way in which the accused gave farsa (axe)"
+"blows to the deceased found to be wholly trustworthy, post-mortem report that there were no"
+incised wounds was not allowed to overthrow the genuine eye-witness account. Conviction
+"maintained. Harisingh M Vasava v State of Gujarat, 2002 Cr LJ 1771 (SC), another case of"
+"conviction because of good evidence. Rajesh v State of Gujarat, 2002 Cr LJ 1821 (SC),"
+conviction on the strength of technical evidence finger prints expert. Ram Kumar Laharia v State
+"of MP, AIR 2001 SC 556 [LNIND 2001 SC 76] : 2001 Cr LJ 712 , 11-year-old boy put into touch"
+"with live electric wire and then threw into water alongwith the wire, conviction for murder."
+"Sambasivan v State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2107 [LNIND 1998 SC 556] : 1998 Cr LJ 2924 , rival"
+"trade unionists, one of them threw bombs on the members of the other, evidence of the"
+"members of the victim union acceptable, conviction. Umesh Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC"
+"2111 [LNIND 2000 SC 871] : 2000 Cr LJ 6167 , the accused tried to take away paddy from the"
+"thrashing floor. On resistance, came out with lathi blows and gun shots, killing one person,"
+"convicted for murder. Swaran Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2017 [LNIND 2000 SC 734] :"
+"2000 Cr LJ 2780 , enmity between the accused and deceased, eye-witnesses, conviction."
+"Paramjit v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 2038 [LNIND 2000 SC 878] : 2000 Cr LJ 2966 , both the"
+"accused and deceased were armed with double barrel guns, yet it could not be said that the"
+"accused was acting in self-defence, conviction. Manjeet Singh v State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR 2000"
+"SC 1062 [LNIND 2000 SC 305] : 2000 Cr LJ 1439 , murder, natural family witnesses, conviction."
+"SN Dube v NB Bhoir, AIR 2000 SC 776 [LNIND 2000 SC 73] : 2000 Cr LJ 830 , conviction under"
+"section 300 read with sections 120 and 149, eye-witnesses reliable. State of Karnataka v R"
+"Yarappa Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 185 [LNIND 1999 SC 894] : 2000 Cr LJ 400 , conviction because of"
+"clear evidence. In reference to the evidence of eye-witnesses, the court said that criminal courts"
+should not expect set reaction from eye-witnesses who see an incident like murder. State of
+"Maharashtra v Manohar, AIR 1998 SC 166 : 1998 Cr LJ 335 , re-appreciation of evidence,"
+"acquittal of the accused by the High Court set-aside. Surendra Narain v State of UP, AIR 1998 SC"
+"192 [LNIND 1997 SC 1689] : 1998 Cr LJ 359 (SC), a person shot to death while on rickshaw, co-"
+"sitter on the rickshaw, witness, reliable, conviction, rickshaw puller not examined, not material,"
+"evidence has to be weighed, not counted. Proof of motive is not necessary when the accused"
+"being guilty is amply proved by evidence. Another ruling to the same effect, State of UP v Nahar"
+"Singh, AIR 1998 SC 1328 [LNIND 1998 SC 215] : 1998 Cr LJ 2006 , motive proved in reference to"
+"the main accused, also identification evidence and dying declaration, convicted, others"
+"acquitted. Jinnat Mia v State of Assam, AIR 1998 SC 533 [LNIND 1997 SC 1618] : 1998 Cr LJ 851"
+", killing a man while in bed, his wife being also injured. Her testimony led to conviction. Jagdish v"
+"State of Haryana, AIR 1998 Sc 732 : 1998 Cr LJ 1099 , shooting down with gun, conviction, no"
+"interference called for. Atmendra v State of Karnataka, AIR 1998 SC 1985 [LNIND 1998 SC 386] :"
+"1998 Cr LJ 2838 , killing by intentional shooting not accidental. Ram Gopal v State of Rajasthan,"
+"AIR 1998 SC 2598 : 1998 Cr LJ 4066 , death by gunshot injury before home inmates, who being"
+"natural witnesses, conviction."
+"Ram Khilari v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 1002 [LNIND 1999 SC 1347] : 1999 Cr LJ 1450 ,"
+"conviction possible on the basis of a confession. Bhaskaran v State of Kerala, AIR 1998 Sc 476"
+"[LNIND 1997 SC 1562] : 1998 Cr LJ 684 , death caused by stabbing, conviction because of"
+"reliable witnesses. Bharat Singh v State of UP, AIR 1999 SC 717 [LNIND 1998 SC 1112] : 1999 Cr"
+"LJ 829 , accused convicted on the evidence of eye-witnesses, it was immaterial that the"
+"personal body guards of the deceased were not examined. Daleep Singh v State of UP, AIR 1997"
+"SC 2245 : 1997 Cr LJ 2760 , evidence of eye-witnesses supported by FIR and also by medical"
+"evidence, conviction proper, Baitullah v State of UP, AIR 1997 SC 3946 [LNIND 1997 SC 1322] :"
+"1997 Cr LJ 4644 , outspoken murder, proof of motive not necessary. State of Gujarat v"
+"Anirudhsingh, AIR 1997 SC 2780 [LNIND 1997 SCDRCHYD 22] : 1997 Cr LJ 3397 , flag-hoisting"
+"ceremony, hitting the deceased from behind with unlicenced firearm, conviction for murder,"
+"Kailash v State of UP, AIR 1997 SC 2835 [LNIND 1997 SC 1686] : 1997 Cr LJ 3511 , conviction for"
+"murder of three members of family, reliable witnesses. Dalip Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1997"
+"SC 2985 [LNIND 1997 SC 882] : 1997 Cr LJ 3647 , presence of eye-witnesses, not doubtful,"
+"supported by medical evidence, defence version found false, conviction. Baleshwar Mandal v"
+"State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 3471 [LNIND 1997 SC 1067] : 1997 Cr LJ 4084 , conviction because"
+"of reliable eye-witnesses, inspite of irregularities by investigating officer. Nikka Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 3676 [LNIND 1996 SC 1644] : 1977 Cr LJ 4651 , conviction confirmed,"
+"reliable child eye-witness. Sanjeev Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 3717 [LNIND 1997 SC"
+"811] : 1997 Cr LJ 3178 , reliable prosecution witnesses, conviction. Shabir Mohmad Syed v State"
+"of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 3808 [LNIND 1997 SC 820] : 1997 Cr LJ 4416 , one of the accused"
+"persons could not be identified and, therefore, acquitted, others convicted."
+"Murarilal Jivram Sharma v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1593 : 1997 Cr LJ 782 , death"
+"caused with country made pistol, proved by medical, technical and eye-witness account,"
+"conviction. Balbir Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 1704 [LNIND 1997 SC 51] : 1997 Cr LJ"
+"1179 , death caused by inflicting injuries, evidence of approver corroborated by prosecution"
+"witnesses, conviction. Nathuni Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 1808 : (1998) 9 SCC 238 ,"
+"though moonless night, but witnesses identified the assailants because they were known"
+"persons, conviction."
+"Kanta Ramudu v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 2428 [LNINDORD 1997 SC 122] : 1997 SCC (Cr) 573,"
+"causing death by piercing sharp-edged weapon into the heart of the deceased, the accused"
+"declaring his intention to do away with him. Rohtas v State of UP, AIR 1997 SC 2444 [LNIND"
+"1997 SC 772] : 1997 Cr LJ 2981 , accused persons came with a determination to kill their"
+"victims and they did kill them with spears, convicted. Mithilesh Upadhyay v State of Bihar, AIR"
+"1997 SC 2457 [LNIND 1997 SC 714] : 1997 SCC (Cr) 716, eye-witness account that each of the"
+"three accused fired at their victim and each shot hit him, not to be disregarded for the fact that"
+"only bullet wounds were found, one shot could have missed the target, conviction. Manmohan"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1997 Sc 1773 : 1997 Cr LJ 1632 , concurrent finding of guilt by the"
+"trial court and High Court. No interference by the Supreme Court. Bhartu v State of Haryana, AIR"
+"1997 SC 281 [LNIND 1996 SC 1727] : 1997 Cr LJ 242 , conviction for murder. Navakoti Veera"
+"Raghavalu v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 727 [LNIND 1997 SC 61] : 1997 Cr LJ 841 , disabled son"
+"killed by father by setting him on fire, clear dying declaration, motive to grab property gifted to"
+him by grandfather.
+"Raghbir Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 3395 [LNIND 2000 SC 678] : 2000 Cr LJ 2463 ,"
+"gunshot injury gave risk to complications of intervening discussion, conviction for murder,"
+"enhancement of fine from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 10,000 was set aside because there was no apparent"
+"justification for the enhancement. Geeta v State of Karnataka, AIR 2000 SC 3475 [LNIND 1999"
+"SC 1091] : 2000 Cr LJ 3187 , killer of a lady guest found guilty of murder and theft of ornaments."
+"Kothakulava Naga Subba Reddy v Public Prosecutor, AP High Court, AIR 2000 SC 3480 [LNIND"
+"2000 SC 523] : 2000 Cr LJ 3452 , a relative who had come from another village, testified to the"
+assault on the deceased. His testimony became the basis of conviction. Lal Ji Singh v State of
+"UP, AIR 2000 SC 3594 , the accused party indiscriminately fired and assaulted the prosecutor,"
+"killing four, dying declaration of woman deceased, relied upon to convict. Ajay Singh v State of"
+"Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 3538 [LNIND 2000 SC 757] , two motor cycle borne persons shot at the"
+"deceased with their respective weapons, testimony of two eye-witnesses which was"
+"unimpeachable was relied upon for conviction, irrespective of the fact that one pistol was"
+examined by ballistic expert or that medical evidence was different from the eye-witness
+"account. Dharmendra Singh v State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 1937 [LNIND 2002 SC 302] (Supp) :"
+"2002 Cr LJ 2631 (SC), the accused fatally assaulted his two sons after sending his wife away"
+but she returned home and witnessed the incident. Conviction for murder confirmed. Sukhdev
+"Yadav v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 80 (SC), no interference in conviction. Munna v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 4127 (Raj), murder by hitting and running over by station wagon. State of"
+"TN v Kutty, 2001 Cr LJ 4169 (SC), killer of two women for whom he worked, all the details of the"
+"incident captured, conviction. Firozuddin Basheeruddin v State of Kerala, 2001 Cr LJ 4215 (SC),"
+"conspiracy and murder, conviction. Nelabothu v State of AP, 2001 Cr LJ 509 , murder by accused"
+"proved no interference in conviction. Gura Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 487 (SC), the"
+"killer of his father, sufficiently connected by evidence, conviction. State (NCT) of Delhi v Sunil,"
+"2001 Cr LJ 604 (SC), medical report of death by bruises all over the body, murder, conviction."
+"Suryanarayana v State of Karnataka, 2001 Cr LJ 705 (SC), murder witnessed by child, trustworthy,"
+"conviction sustained. Vijay Pal Singh v State (NCT) of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3294 (SC) murder, eye-"
+"witnesses, acquittal not to be set aside. Gade Lakshmi Mangraju v State of AP, 2001 Cr LJ 3317"
+"(SC), complete chain of events formed by circumstances, conviction. Bibhachha v State of"
+"Orissa, 2001 Cr LJ 2895 (SC) : 1998 Cr LJ 1553 (Ori), connection of the accused with murder"
+"proved. Sandeep v State of Haryana, 2001 Cr LJ 1456 : AIR 2001 SC 1103 [LNIND 2001 SC 552] ,"
+"recoveries, reports and witnesses showed the accused to be the culprit, conviction."
+"Pradeep Kumar v State of HP, 2001 Cr LJ 1517 (HP), causing death of the victim woman by"
+"throwing kerosene and setting her on fire. Dhananjaya Reddy v State of Karnataka, 2001 Cr LJ"
+"1712 (SC), killing husband with the help of paramour, wife given benefit of doubt, paramour"
+"convicted. Munshi Prasad v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 4708 (SC), the fact of 400 to 500 yards"
+"away from the place of occurrence, not a good alibi. One could come back after causing death."
+"Manish Dixit v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 133 (SC), conviction for abduction and murder of a"
+"jeweler. Surendra Singh Rautela v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 555 (SC), firing at inmates of a car,"
+"one killed, another injured, identification of the assailants by the injured person could not be"
+discussed only because still another inmate in the car did not support the prosecution case.
+"Rama Mangaruji v State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cr LJ 573 (SC), accused threw crude bomb on his"
+"brother, murder, and not coming under section 304."
+"State of UP v Babu Ram, 2000 Cr LJ 2457 : AIR 2000 SC 1735 [LNIND 2000 SC 647] , the accused"
+"caused death of his father, mother and brother, bodies etc. recovered at his instance, not"
+"entitled to acquittal. Bahadur Naik v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 2466 : AIR 2000 SC 1582 [LNIND"
+"2000 SC 884] , meditation can develop on the spot. Two accused caught hold of their victim,"
+"another accused inflicted five to six dagger blows, conviction was not converted from murder to"
+culpable homicide.
+"Ammini v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 481 (SC), killing a woman and her two children by"
+"administering potassium cyanide, conviction. Darshan v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 2344 ,"
+"murderous assault, plea of self-defence found to be false, conviction. Koli Lakhmanbhai"
+"Chanabhai v State of Gujarat, 2000 Cr LJ 408 : AIR 2000 SC 210 [LNIND 1999 SC 1023] , injuries"
+"caused to death, conviction. Jagdish v State of MP, 2000 Cr LJ 2955 : AIR 2000 SC 2059 [LNIND"
+"2000 SC 842] , injuries inflicted with intention to cause death, conviction. Paramjit Singh v State"
+"of Haryana, 2000 Cr LJ 2966 : AIR 2000 Sc 2038 [LNIND 2000 SC 878] , murder with gun shots"
+"proved, conviction. State of WB v Mir Mohd Omar, 2000 Cr LJ 4047 : AIR 2000 SC 2988 [LNIND"
+"2000 SC 1163] , the victim abducted and killed, conviction for murder. The court said that when"
+"abductors are not able to explain anything about the victim, the court could presume that he"
+"must have been killed. Md Mohiruddin v State of Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 461 : AIR 1999 Sc 307"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 645] , incriminatory circumstances proved guilt of accused, rightly convicted."
+"Amrik Singh v State of Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 463 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 944, conviction for murder. State"
+"of Rajasthan v Major Singh, 1999 Cr LJ 1631 : AIR 1999 SC 1073 [LNIND 1999 SC 168] ,"
+"conviction for deliberate murder by several persons. Nirmal Singh v State of Haryana, 1999 Cr LJ"
+"1836 : AIR 1999 SC 1221 [LNIND 1999 SC 1228] , earlier rape convict, killed five members of the"
+"family of victim, conviction for murder, proper. Siddique v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 2521 : AIR"
+"1999 SC 1690 [LNIND 1999 SC 416] , no interference in conviction of accused because of"
+"proper evidence. Ram Singh v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 2581 : AIR 1999 Sc 1754 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+"1260] , shooting down the victim, conviction despite conflict between ocular and medical"
+"evidence. State of Rajasthan v Teja Ram, 1999 Cr LJ 2588 : AIR 1999 SC 1776 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+"279] , blows to death caused with axes, which were recovered at the instance of the accused,"
+"other evidence, conviction. Surjit Singh v State of Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 3485 : AIR 1999 SC 2855"
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 499] , murder by accused proved, conviction. State of UP v Hem Raj, 1999 Cr LJ"
+"3489 : AIR 1999 Sc 2147 [LNIND 1999 SC 1254] , assault by three, eye-witnesses deposed fatal"
+"blow only by accused, convicted, rest acquitted. State of TN v Rajendran, 1999 Cr LJ 4552 : AIR"
+"1999 SC 3535 [LNIND 1999 SC 857] , burnt two children and their mother alive by putting their"
+"hut on fire, conviction. Ramesh Laxman Gavli v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 4603 : AIR 1999 Sc 3759"
+"[LNIND 1999 SC 825] , conviction not interfered with as the incident was witnessed by reliable"
+"persons. Ramanbhai Naranbhai v State of Gujarat, 1999 Cr LJ 5013 : (2000) 1 SCC 358 [LNIND"
+"1999 SC 1067] , killing by unlawful assembly, conviction. Rachpal Singh v State of Punjab, AIR"
+"2002 Sc 2710 [LNIND 2002 SC 451] : 2000 Cr LJ 2710 , conviction, medical as well as ocular"
+"evidence. Rakesh v State of UP, AIR 2002 Sc 2721 [LNIND 2002 SC 442] : 2002 Cr LJ 3551 ,"
+"conviction, findings of Sessions Judge were described as clearly perverse and unreasonable."
+"Podapati v State of AP, AIR 2002 SC 2724 [LNIND 2002 SC 869] : 2002 Cr LJ 3555 , killed one's"
+"uncle, witnessed by four persons, conviction. Gajula v State of AP, 2002 Cr LJ 3565 (SC), faction"
+"fights among villagers, murders, conviction."
+"Bhupendra Singh v State of Gujarat, 1998 Cr LJ 57 : AIR 1997 SC 3790 [LNIND 1997 SC 1378] ,"
+"police constable shooting down head constable, defence of accident not allowed, conviction."
+"For details, see discussion under section 80. Harcharan Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"398 : AIR 1998 SC 244 [LNIND 1997 SC 1350] , murder of bus-conductor, witness a bus"
+"passenger, his testimony not distrusted for the fact that he named a wrong commodity than that"
+"which he had gone to buy. Saudagar Singh v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 62 : AIR 1998 SC 28"
+"[LNIND 1997 SC 890] , a witness about it was proved that he was won over by the accused, no"
+adverse presumption was drawn against the prosecution. Conviction of the accused who fired
+"the shot, others acquitted. Pakkirisamy v State of TN, 1998 Cr LJ 89 : AIR 1998 SC 107 [LNIND"
+"1997 SC 1291] , said person caused death and took away jewellery and other items,"
+"confessions, conviction. Malkhan v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 96 (All), gun-shot injury leading to"
+"peritonitis, which became cause of death, the liability of the accused not lessened by reason of"
+"intervention of deceased. Ratnakar Dandasena v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 295 (Ori),"
+"misunderstanding over partition of land, hitting with axe causing death of victim, conviction."
+"Charan Singh v State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 657 (SC); Lakha Singh v State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"657 (SC), death caused by gandasa blows, both accused rightly convicted. Bhaskaran v State of"
+"Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 684 : AIR 1998 SC 476 [LNIND 1997 SC 1562] , death by stabbing, reliable"
+"eye-witnesses, conviction. Subhash Bassi v State, 1998 Cr LJ 719 (Del), single witness reliable,"
+"conviction. Vasant v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 844 : AIR 1998 SC 699 [LNIND 1997 SC"
+"1599] , running over by jeep, conviction for murder. Elkur Jameesu v State of AP, 1998 Cr LJ 846 :"
+"AIR 1998 SC 1492 [LNIND 1997 SC 1513] , entry into house and stabbing a person there who"
+"died. His son and wife saw the intruder running away, being told by the injured that the person"
+"seen running away injured him. Conviction. Jagdish v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 1099 : AIR"
+"1998 SC 732 , murder, accused connected with it by eye-witnesses and medical evidence,"
+"conviction not interfered with. Bhola Turha v State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 1102 : AIR 1998 SC 1515"
+"[LNIND 1997 SC 1500] , conviction only on the basis of dying declaration, held proper. Kamlesh"
+"Rani v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 1251 : AIR 1998 SC 1534 [LNIND 1997 SC 1645] , conviction"
+"on the basis of dying declaration of deceased wife. Rajendra Mahton v State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1254 : AIR 1998 SC 1546 [LNIND 1997 SC 1589] , shopkeeper killed at his shop, killers identified"
+"by home people, conviction. Mahipal v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1257 : AIR 1998 SC 864"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 25] , recovery of instrument of murder at the instance of the accused,"
+"conviction. Vinayak Shivajirao Pol v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1558 : AIR 1998 SC 1096"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 96] , extra-judicial confession, recoveries also at the instance of the accused,"
+"conviction. George v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 2034 : AIR 1988 1376, main accused convicted,"
+"others not identified acquitted. Dharmendra Singh v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 2064 (SC),"
+"conviction for multiple murders. Mukut Singh v State, 1998 Cr LJ 2084 (All), murder, two eye-"
+"witnesses naturally at the spot, conviction. Sankara Nagarmalleswara v State of AP, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"2270 (SC), dying declaration, eye-witnesses to murder reliable, conviction; GS Walia v State of"
+"Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 2524 (SC), murder with axes and lathi blows, conviction. Rewa Ram v Teja,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 2558 : AIR 1998 SC 2883 [LNIND 1998 SC 283] , accused persons assaulted"
+"deceased with a variety of weapons. Accused suffered about 8-10 injuries, whereas the"
+deceased suffered 51 injuries. No evidence to show who caused final fatal injury. Conviction
+"under section 326. Nachhattar Singh v State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 2560 : AIR 1998 SC 2884"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 282] , intentional killing of a woman in her house, conviction. Velan Kutty v State"
+"of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ : AIR 1998 SC 2888 [LNIND 1998 SC 250] , assault on victim with chopper,"
+"conviction. State of Rajasthan v Satyanaranyan, 1998 Cr LJ 2911 : AIR 1998 SC 2060 [LNIND"
+"1998 SC 88] , murderous attack, brother of the victim intervened, attack fell on him, death,"
+"conviction under section 304, Part I. Govindsami v State of TN, 1998 Cr LJ 2913 : AIR 1998 SC"
+"2889 [LNIND 1998 SC 471] , boundary dispute, five murders, recoveries, conviction. Sambasivan"
+"v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 2924 : AIR 1998 SC 2017 , trade union rivalry, bombs thrown on rival"
+"union members while they were relaxing, conviction. Rajendra Kumar v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1293 (SC), no adverse inference against prosecution for failure to examine another witness."
+"Gajjan Singh v State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 3609 : AIR 1998 SC 2417 [LNIND 1998 SC 508] , two"
+"accused, both fired, one fire hitting head, the other chest, conviction of both for murder. Brijlala"
+"Pd Sinha v State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 3611 : AIR 1998 SC 2443 [LNIND 1998 SC 598] , police"
+"party firing at a running car, killing inmates, their defence of counter-fire failed because there"
+"were no marks on their vehicle, conviction. Death sentence reduced to life imprisonment"
+because no aggravating circumstances were shown than the mere fact that they were police
+"people. State of HP v Manohar Singh Thakur, 1998 Cr LJ 3630 : AIR 1998 SC 2941 [LNIND 1998"
+"SC 660] , killing for greed, wife witness, conviction. National Commission for Women v State of"
+"UP, 1998 Cr LJ 4044 : AIR 1998 SC 2726 [LNIND 1998 SC 776] , deaths in a hostility between"
+"two neighbouring families, conviction. Adya Singh v State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 4052 : AIR 1998"
+"SC 3011 [LNIND 1998 SC 667] , evidence of eye-witnesses accepted, it seemed that the doctor"
+"was trying to help the accused-compounder. Dule v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 4073 : AIR 1998 SC"
+"2756 [LNIND 1998 SC 839] , assault on head with sword, conviction for murder. Jangeer Singh v"
+"State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 4087 : AIR 1998 SC 2787 [LNIND 1999 PNH 698] , intentional"
+"murder, conviction. Uday Kumar v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 4622 : AIR 1998 SC 3317"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 908] , murder of child of four years, complete chain of circumstances,"
+"conviction. Kommu Vinja Rao v State of AP, 1998 Cr LJ 2523 : AIR 1998 SC 2856 [LNIND 1998"
+"SC 385] , conviction for murder. Bhagirath v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 234 [LNIND 1996 SC"
+"1769] : 1997 Cr LJ 81 , statement taken by head constable for filing report, the woman died, the"
+"statement regarded as a dying declaration. Meharban Singh v State of MP, AIR 1997 SC 1538 :"
+"1997 Cr LJ 766 , dying declaration, recoveries, conviction. Krishan v State of Haryana, AIR 1997"
+"SC 2598 [LNIND 1997 SC 770] : 1997 Cr LJ 3180 , killing jail inmate, conviction. Asha v State of"
+"Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2828 [LNIND 1997 SC 844] : 1997 Cr LJ 3508 , eye-witnesses friends of"
+"the victim, could not be discredited for that reason alone. They gave details of the assault and"
+"the part played by each of the assailants. Shyam v State, 1997 Cr LJ 35 (Del), murder by"
+"poisoning, possession of poison need not be proved in all cases. The accused was seen by"
+"witnesses administering poison, inference could be drawn that he was in possession of poison."
+"Ramkishore Patel v State of MP, 1997 Cr LJ 207 (SC) : 1996 AIR SCW 3939, conviction upheld."
+"Godaharish Mishra v Kuntalal Mishra, AIR 1997 SC 286 [LNIND 1996 SC 1719] : 1997 Cr LJ 246 ,"
+circumstantial evidence was absolutely clinching in establishing complicity of the accused in
+"murder. Acquittal set aside. Suba Singh v Harbhej Singh, 1997 Cr LJ 727 : AIR 1997 SC 1487"
+"[LNIND 1996 SC 1929] , accused formed unlawful assembly and assaulted the victim, the latter's"
+relatives and other eye-witnesses did not intervene to protect him. It could not be a ground for
+acquittal. Finding of the High Court that because of the dark the accused could not have been
+"identified was held to be totally imaginary. Naresh Mohanlal Jaiswal v State of Maharashtra, 1997"
+"Cr LJ 761 : AIR 1997 SC 1523 [LNIND 1996 SC 1658] , witnesses did not disclose for fear, the"
+courts below found that there was sufficient light from the lamp post. State of AP v Gangula
+"Satya Murthy, AIR 1997 SC 1588 [LNIND 1996 SC 2665] : 1997 Cr LJ 774 , finding of dead body,"
+"showing homicidal death, on a cot in the accused's house. In the absence of any explanation by"
+"the accused, an adverse presumption was drawn against him."
+"Mavila Thamban Nambiar v State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 687 [LNIND 1997 SC 24] : 1997 Cr LJ"
+"831 , conviction. Prem v Daula, AIR 1997 SC 715 [LNIND 1997 SC 64] : 1997 Cr LJ 838 ,"
+"conviction for murder, two accused held the victim, the third struck him dead. Lalit Kumar v"
+"State, 1997 Cr LJ 848 (Del), prosecution evidence consistently and conclusively established guilt"
+"of the accused. Nagoor Naifa v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 880 (Mad), sub-tenant set the landlord"
+"family on fire in their room, because they had locked his room, conviction. Rataniya Bhima Bhil v"
+"State of Gujarat, 1997 Cr LJ 891 (Guj), murder, conviction. Rabloo Das v State of WB, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"1025 (Cal), conviction for intentional murder. Sukhadeo v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 1059"
+"(Bom), prosecution not bound to explain injuries of minor nature on the person of the accused."
+"Conviction proper. Pyara v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1065 (Raj), intentional murder,"
+conviction sustained though recoveries of incriminating articles not proved. Sunil Kumar v State
+"of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1081 (Raj), conviction for intentional murder properly proved. State of"
+"UP v Dan Singh, 1997 Cr LJ 1150 : AIR 1997 SC 1654 [LNIND 1997 SC 162] , murder of marriage"
+"party of Scheduled Caste, for details see discussion under section 149. Teja Singh v State"
+"Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 921 : 1997 Cr LJ 1175 , conviction, multiple injuries, theory of accident"
+"ruled out. Yashin v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 869 [LNIND 1997 SC 68] : 1997 Cr LJ 1179 ,"
+"intentional murder, properly proved. D Venkatasan v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 1287 (Mad),"
+"conviction for murder. Subramaniam v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 1359 (Mad), conviction for murder"
+"of wife. Shanker v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1388 (Raj), murder with gunshot, conviction,"
+"non-recovery of empty cartridge not material. Jiya Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1423"
+"(Raj), connection of accused with murder established. State of Rajasthan v Ali (Hanif), 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 1529 : AIR 1997 SC 1023 [LNIND 1997 SC 35] , accused persons, variously armed, killed two"
+"and attempted to kill another, conviction proper, two acquitted because eye-witnesses did not"
+"say anything against them. Narain Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1562 (Raj), main"
+"accused persons convicted, others acquitted. Baijnath v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 1691 (All),"
+"conviction on the basis of dying declaration. Baijnath v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 1691 (All), non-"
+"explanation of injury on deceased, not fatal. Satnamsingh v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1778"
+"(Raj), killing by crushing under wheels of truck, conviction. Mouruddin Choudhury v State of"
+"Assam, 1997 Cr LJ 1801 (Gau), conviction for intentional murder, Laxman v State of Karnataka,"
+"1997 Cr LJ 1806 (Kant), conviction, not mentioning to accused the statement under section 313,"
+"Cr PC, 1973 while recording his statement, not material because no prejudice caused. Gobind"
+"Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1825 (Raj), main accused convicted, co-accused"
+"acquitted. Balachandra v State of Karnataka, 1997 Cr LJ 1883 (Kant), murder of husband"
+"witnessed by wife, sole witness, conviction. Som Nath v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1897 (P&H), murder by"
+"accused proved beyond doubt, in view of clear evidence of time of incident, medical evidence of"
+"rigor mortis, not considered for determining time. State of Haryana v Mewa Singh, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"1906 : AIR 1997 SC 1407 , murder in protest against love affair, injuries on persons of accused"
+"could be self-inflicted, no right of private defence. Gayadhar Naik v State of Orissa, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"(Ori) two-three blows on head, both were in a drunken state, no undue advantage, no cruel"
+"manner, conviction altered to section 304. Pandappa Hanumappa Hanamar v State of Karnataka,"
+"AIR 1997 SC 3663 [LNIND 1997 SC 363] : 1997 Cr LJ 2493 , ghastly murder, order of acquittal"
+"set aside, eye-witnesses, minor discrepancies not damaging their testimony, injuries on person"
+"of accused, superficial. Jit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 3676 [LNIND 1996 SC 1644] :"
+"1997 Cr LJ 2500 , evidence of child witness, conviction."
+"Amit v State of UP, (2012) 4 SCC 107 [LNIND 2012 SC 138] : AIR 2012 SC 1433 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+"138] and State of UP v Iqram, AIR 2011 SC 2296 [LNIND 2011 SC 556] : 2011 8 SCC 80 [LNIND"
+"2011 SC 556] : 2011 Cr LJ 3931 , Non-recovery of weapon insignificant. Katta Kumudu v State of"
+"AP, AIR 1997 SC 2428 [LNINDORD 1997 SC 122] : 1997 Cr LJ 2979 , soon before the incident,"
+the accused uttered words saying what he would do with him (the deceased). The court said
+"that intention to kill him could be inferred from these words. Dwarkanath Tiwary v State of Bihar,"
+"AIR 1997 SC 2457 [LNIND 1997 SC 714] : 1997 Cr LJ 2983 , each of the accused persons fired at"
+"deceased in quick succession and hit, conviction of all though medical evidence was of only"
+"two bullet injuries. State of UP v Abdul, AIR 1997 SC 2512 [LNIND 1997 SC 790] : 1997 Cr LJ"
+"2997 (SC), High Court erred in ordering acquittal, set aside. Razakali Khureshi v State of Gujarat,"
+"AIR 1999 SC 2538 : 1997 Cr LJ 3119 , conviction did not suffer from any infirmity. Pratapaneni"
+"Ravi Kumar v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 2810 [LNIND 1997 SC 892] : 1997 Cr LJ 3505 , murder"
+"caused in furtherance of common object, all members guilty, it being immaterial whether all of"
+"them had beaten the deceased. Asha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2828 [LNIND 1997 SC"
+"844] : 1997 Cr LJ 3508 , three motor-cycle borne accused persons, two of them threw acid on"
+"victim, and caused injuries, their conviction proper. Mangat Rai v State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC"
+"2838 : 1997 Cr LJ 3514 , murder of wife, conviction. Madru Singh v State of MP, 1997 Cr LJ 4398"
+": AIR 1997 SC 3527 [LNIND 1997 SC 1182] , presence and evidence of eye-witnesses could not"
+"be doubted on the basis of some trivial contradictions. State of Punjab v Jaswant Singh, 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 4428 : AIR 1997 SC 3821 [LNIND 1997 SC 1200] , private defence not available because"
+"simple injuries on the person of the accused found to be self-inflicted, conviction under section"
+"302. Rukma v Jala, AIR 1997 SC 3907 [LNIND 1997 SC 1069] : 1997 Cr LJ 4651 , complaint"
+"about investigation not sustained, the complainant party suffering greater number of injuries"
+"than the accused could not be entitled to private defence. Baimullah v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"4644 : AIR 1997 SC 3946 [LNIND 1997 SC 1322] , injury caused on vital part of body of an"
+"unarmed person, plea of private defence negatived. Gopal Madadeo v State of Maharashtra, 1997"
+"Cr LJ 2425 (Bom), the fact that the accused was of 76 years of age was no reason for his not"
+serving his term of life imprisonment when he was squarely guilty of the offence. Amar Malla v
+"State of Tripura, AIR 2002 SC 3052 [LNIND 2002 SC 517] , armed attack at a meeting by accused"
+"persons who were also invited to attend, killings, conviction, non-explanation of injuries on"
+accused persons cannot by itself be a ground for throwing out the prosecution case. Mohibur
+"Rahman v State of Assam, AIR 2002 SC 3064 , accused last seen in the company of deceased,"
+"he gave false explanations about the whereabouts of the deceased, dead body cut into pieces"
+recovered from different places pointed out by the accused. Conviction of the accused was not
+"interfered with. Mahadeo Sahni v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 3032 [LNIND 2002 SC 492] , injuries"
+"caused to deceased by sharp-edged and blunt weapons, concurrent finding that the accused"
+persons inflicted injuries in prosecution of their common object of doing away with the lives of
+the deceased persons. Conviction under section 302 not interfered with.
+"Lakshmi v State of UP, AIR 2002 SC 3119 [LNIND 2002 SC 534] , a charge of murder can be"
+"substantiated even in the absence of identification and cause of death. Bodh Raj v State of J&K,"
+"AIR 2002 SC 3164 [LNIND 2002 SC 539] , conviction for murder, elimination of creditor by"
+"person indebted. Sahadevan v State, AIR 2003 SC 215 [LNIND 2002 SC 688] : 2003 Cr LJ 424 ,"
+"conviction for murder under sections 300, 346, 302 read with section 34. Alamgir v State (NCT,"
+"Delhi), AIR 2003 SC 282 [LNIND 2002 SC 693] : 2003 Cr LJ 456 , staying with wife in guest house"
+"and causing her death, circumstantial evidence been proved the case, conviction. P"
+"Venkateswarlu v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ 837 : AIR 2003 SC 574 [LNIND 2002 SC 782] , whole"
+"village divided on political lines. Death caused by one faction of a person belonging to the other,"
+"conviction because of good evidence. State of UP v Jagdeo, AIR 2003 SC 660 [LNIND 2002 SC"
+"781] : 2003 Cr LJ 844 , ghastly crime, all the eight accused persons, armed with deadly"
+"weapons, attacked unarmed members of the victim's family sleeping in the open at night. The"
+accused could not be acquitted only because the investigation was faulty. Suraj Bhan v State of
+"Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 785 [LNIND 2002 SC 826] , the evidence of the injured eye-witness that"
+"the accused administered total blow on head of his victim, it was corroborated by medical"
+"evidence, the finding of the High Court that the accused was responsible for the death was held"
+"to be proper. State of Karnataka v Panchakshari Gurupadayya Hiranath, AIR 2003 SC 825 [LNIND"
+"2002 SC 856] , land dispute leading to attack on deceased with a murderous weapon"
+"established by evidence. Conviction. State of UP v Man Singh, 2003 Cr LJ 82 , reversal of"
+"conviction held improper, good evidence was there. Amarsingh v Balwinder Singh, 2003 Cr LJ"
+"1282 (SC), conviction for murder was based upon direct testimony of eye-witnesses under the"
+"finding of the trial court that the prosecution case was fully established, the Supreme Court held"
+"that acquittal by the High Court by reversing conviction was not proper. State of UP v Premi,"
+"2003 Cr LJ 1554 : AIR 2003 SC 1750 [LNIND 2003 SC 232] , the accused persons entered the"
+"house of the deceased at midnight armed with country made pistol, inflicted injury on the head"
+with great force and caused death. The court said that the mere fact that only one injury was
+caused was not enough to alter the conviction from section 302 to section 304. Gaya Yadav v
+"State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 1564 : AIR 2003 SC 1759 [LNIND 2003 SC 215] , proper evidence for"
+"conviction. Kanaksingh v State of Gujarat, 2003 Cr LJ 855 (SC), killing of wife, conviction."
+"Ajitsingh Andubha Parmal v State of Gujarat, AIR 2002 SC 3469 [LNIND 2002 SC 609] , there was"
+specific and clear evidence that the accused gave the first two knife blows and further serious
+"injuries by chasing him. Concurrent finding of fact as to guilt, no interference. Mohar v State of"
+"UP, AIR 2003 SC 3279 , conviction because of eye-witnesses. State of Karnataka v David Razario,"
+"AIR 2002 SC 3272 [LNIND 2002 SC 583] , conviction for robbery and murder. Shyam Sunder v"
+"State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2002 SC 3292 [LNIND 2002 SC 1866] , conviction for murder, eye-"
+"witnesses. Dana Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 3325 [LNIND 2002 SC 574] , conviction on"
+"the basis of eye-witnesses. Gyasiram v State of MP, AIR 2003 SC 2097 [LNIND 2003 SC 1] , the"
+"accused party waited for their victim, fired at him, killing witnessed, eye-witnesses reliable,"
+"conviction. State of UP v Ram Sewak, AIR 2003 SC 2141 [LNIND 2002 SC 828] , properly"
+"witnessed case, acquittal was held to be not proper. Rambai v State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2002 SC"
+"3492 [LNIND 2002 SC 635] , conviction on the basis of dying declaration. Shamsher Singh v"
+"State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 3480 [LNIND 2002 SC 605] , eye-witnesses, recoveries of"
+"weapons, etc, conviction. Swaran Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 3652 [LNIND 2002 SC"
+"639] , credit of eye-witnesses could not be shaken, conviction. G Laxmanna v State of AP, AIR"
+"2002 SC 3685 , relative witnesses, outstanding enmity, conviction. Thaman Kumar v State, UT of"
+"Chandigarh, 2003 Cr LJ 3070 (SC), murder charge proved by direct evidence, not allowed to be"
+"shaken by hypothetical medical evidence. State of UP v Rasid, 2003 Cr LJ 2011 (SC), time of"
+"killing, if it were after day-break, identification of the assailants was possible, this was the stand"
+"of the eye-witnesses, but the High Court went by the medical evidence of presence of semi-"
+digested food in the stomach of the deceased which showed that the occurrence must belong
+"to the night. The Supreme Court said that medical evidence was not clear and, therefore, the"
+"eye-witness account had to be preferred. Rajendra Prabhu Chikane v State of Maharashtra, (2007)"
+"13 SCC 511 [LNIND 2007 SC 515] : 2007 Cr LJ 3410 , murder by accused proved beyond"
+"reasonable doubt, conviction upheld. MA Sattar v State of AP, (2008) 11 SCC 201 [LNIND 2008"
+"SC 754] , clear proof of murder by accused. Umar Md v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 14 SCC 711"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1459] : 2008 Cr LJ 816 .
+"38. Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3765 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] ."
+"39. Arjun v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 410 : AIR 1994 SC 2507 [LNIND 1994 SC 604] ,"
+"concurrent finding of courts below as to intentional murder, not interfered with in appeal. Ram"
+"Kumar v State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 248 : 1994 Cr LJ 3836 (SC), conviction on the"
+"evidence of injured eye-witness. Sarbir Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 AIR SCW 807 : 1993 Cr LJ"
+"1395 (SC), circumstantial evidence, conviction; Surjit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 1389"
+"[LNIND 1992 SC 361] : 1992 Cr LJ 1952 ; Lakhwinder Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 87 :"
+"1992 Cr LJ 3958 , testimony of eye-witnesses convincing, conviction upheld. Other such cases"
+"are: Prakash v State of MP, AIR 1993 SC 70 : 1992 Cr LJ 3703 (SC); Mafabhai N Raval v State of"
+"Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 2186 [LNIND 1992 SC 509] : 1992 Cr LJ 3710 and Bir Singh v State of"
+"Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 2211 : 1992 Cr LJ 3845 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 334 ; Ram Kumar v State of"
+"UP, AIR 1992 SC 1602 : 1992 Cr LJ 2421 , acquittal set aside because circumstantial evidence"
+"reliable. Baboo v State of MP, AIR 1994 SC 1712 : 1994 Cr LJ 2249 , several persons attacked"
+"and killed a man in the presence of his wife, whose evidence found support in the testimony of"
+"other witnesses, conviction upheld though no FIR lodged. Ch Madhusudana Reddy v State of AP,"
+"1994 Cr LJ 2203 : AIR 1994 SCW 1453 , only those convicted who actually participated, others"
+"acquitted. PP Karpe v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 2302 (Bom), revengeful killing, conviction"
+"for murder. Balak Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1994 Cr LJ 2451 (Raj), killer of his two daughters,"
+"eye-witnesses, medical evidence, conviction under section 300. Prem Raj v State of Maharashtra,"
+"1996 Cr LJ 2876 : AIR 1996 SC 3294 [LNIND 1996 SC 940] , all the accused constituting an"
+"unlawful assembly came to the shop of the deceased, assaulted him and continued to do so"
+"after dragging him out, conviction under sections 300/149 held proper. Bhagubhai v State of"
+"Gujarat, AIR 1996 SC 2555 [LNIND 1996 SC 1143] : 1996 Cr LJ 3581 , the deceased forcibly"
+"taken from field to Panchayat office and set on fire after pouring kerosene, 75% burns and other"
+"injuries sufficient to cause death, conviction for intention to murder proper."
+"40. Gunga Singh, (1873) 5 NWP 44. Raju Das v State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LJ 25 (Raj), a case of"
+proved intentional murder.
+"41. Shakti Vahini v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 1601 [LNIND 2018 SC 136] : 2018 (7) SCC 192 [LNIND"
+2018 SC 136] .
+"42. Arumugam Servai v State of TN, (2011) 6 SCC 405 [LNIND 2011 SC 435] . See Dandu"
+"Jaggaraju v State of AP, AIR 2011 SC 3387 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 217] : 2011 Cr LJ 4956 , honour"
+"killing, not proved, acquitted the accused."
+"43. Bhagwan Dass v State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR 2011 SC 1863 [LNIND 2011 SC 502] : 2011 Cr LJ"
+"2903 : (2011) 6 SCC 396 [LNIND 2011 SC 502] . In the 242nd report, the Law Commission of"
+"India opined that ""we are constrained to say that such a blanket direction given by the Supreme"
+"Court making death sentence a rule in 'honour killings' cases, makes a departure from the"
+principles firmly entrenched in our criminal jurisprudence by virtue of a series of Supreme Court
+"Judgments.""; In State of UP v Krishna Master, AIR 2010 SC 3071 [LNIND 2010 SC 699] : 2010 Cr"
+"LJ 3889 : (2010) 12 SCC 324 [LNIND 2010 SC 699] , though the killing of six persons and wiping"
+out almost the whole family on flimsy ground of honour saving of the family would fall within
+"the rarest of rare case, keeping in view that the incident took place 20 years ago and High Court"
+acquitted them in the year 2002 accused sentenced to RI for life.
+"44. Law of Commission of India, 242nd Report, Prevention of Interference with the Freedom of"
+"Matrimonial Alliances (in the name of Honour and Tradition): A Suggested Legal Framework,"
+available at : http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report242.pdf (last accessed in July
+2019).
+"45. Shakti Vahini v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 1601 [LNIND 2018 SC 136] : 2018 (7) SCC 192 [LNIND"
+2018 SC 136] .
+"46. AG Bhagwat (Dr) v UT Chandigarh, 1989 Cr LJ 214 (P&H), convicted for grievous hurt. Jabbar"
+"Suleman v State of Gujarat, 1988 Cr LJ 515 (Guj), knife injury on thigh of deceased, knowledge"
+"but not intention to cause death attributed, punishable under section 304 Part II not I. Sudam"
+"Kisan Dhurjad v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 4029 (Bom), the accused assaulted a bed-"
+ridden aged lady of 65 years with an axe on her forehead causing three injuries resulting in
+"fracture of the frontal bone and she died within a couple of hours, his act was held to fall under"
+"section 300, clauses 2, 3 and 4 and not under section 304, Part II. Patel Hiralal Tottaram v State"
+"of Gujarat, (2002) 1 SCC 22 [LNIND 2001 SC 2382] , the woman was set ablaze after soaking her"
+clothes with an inflammable substance. She died 14 days after the incident. The accused was
+not heard to say that the death might have been due to some intervening causes. The act of the
+accused showed his intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to
+"cause death. Sajjan Singh v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 4073 : AIR 1998 SC 2756 [LNIND 1998 SC"
+"839] , head injury caused, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature. Ram Bihari Yadav v State of"
+"Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 2515 : AIR 1999 SC 1850 , the husband set his wife ablaze, conduct showed"
+"guilt, no sign of accident, conviction. Arun Nivalaji More v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 12 SCC"
+"613 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] : AIR 2006 SC 2886 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] : 2006 Cr LJ 4057 , the"
+"clause imports some kind of certainty and not mere probability, there was no such certain"
+knowledge on the facts of this case.
+"47. Anant Chintaman Lagu, (1959) 62 Bom LR 371 (SC); Mohan v State, AIR 1960 SC 659 ;"
+"Kaushalya Devi, AIR 1965 Ori 38 [LNIND 1964 ORI 72] . Swinder Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1952"
+"SC 669 : 1960 Cr LJ 1011 , proof on these points being not available, acquittal."
+"48. Also Chandra Kant Nyalchand v State of Bombay, Criminal Appeal No 120 of 1957, decided,"
+"Feb 19, 1958."
+"49. Anant Chintaman Lagu v State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500 [LNIND 1959 SC 223] : 1960 Cr"
+LJ 682 .
+"50. Bhupinder Singh v State of Punjab, 1988 Cr LJ 1097 : AIR 1988 SC 1011 [LNIND 1988 SC"
+211] : (1988) 3 SCC 513 [LNIND 1988 SC 211] : 1988 SCC (Cr) 694.
+"51. Ramgopal, 1972 Cr LJ 473 (SC) : AIR 1972 SC 656 . Followed in Sher Singh v State, (1995) 2"
+"Cr LJ 2187 (Del), alleged poisoning by mixing in liquor not proved. Abdul Gani v State of"
+"Karnataka, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2248 (Kant), presence of the husband in the room where his wife was"
+"strangulated not proved, conviction on the basis of suspicion was held to be not proper. Mal"
+"Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2279 , acquitted because of no evidence."
+"52. Arundhati, 1968 Cr LJ 848 . Murder by poisoning, the victim found vomitting even two days"
+before the date of purchase of poison and other evidence did not inspire confidence. The
+"accused were given benefit of doubt, acquitted of the charge of murder, Rattni v State of HP,"
+"1993 Cr LJ 1811 (SC). Sanjiv Kumar v State of HP, AIR 1999 SC 782 [LNIND 1999 SC 55] : 1999"
+"Cr LJ 1138 , intentional killing by poisoning proved by circumstantial evidence. State of Bihar v"
+"Ramnath Prasad, AIR 1998 SC 466 [LNIND 1997 SC 1581] : 1998 Cr LJ 679 , poison served as"
+"prasad, the accused had only knowledge that he was administering a poisonous substance"
+"which was likely to cause grievous hurt or even death. Liable to be convicted under section 304,"
+Part II and section 326.
+"53. Joydeb Patra v State of WB, 2013 Cr LJ 2729 (SC) : AIR 2013 SCW 2744 ."
+"54. Nanhar v State of Haryana, 2010 Cr LJ 3450 : (2010) 11 SCC 423 [LNINDORD 2010 SC 229] ."
+"55. State of Rajasthan v Dhool Singh, (2004) 12 SCC 546 [LNIND 2003 SC 1120] : AIR 2004 SC"
+1264 [LNIND 2003 SC 1120] : 2004 Cr LJ 931 .
+"56. Abbas Ali v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 9 SCC 129 [LNIND 2007 SC 165] : AIR 2007 SC 1239"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 165] : 2007 Cr LJ 1667 , the ingredients of clause thirdly restated."
+"57. Mangesh v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 123 [LNIND 2011 SC 20] ."
+"58. Brij Bhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 474 : 1957 Cr LJ 591 ."
+"59. Atmaram v State of MP, (2012) 5 SCC 738 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 403] : 2012 Cr LJ 2882 :"
+"2012 (5) Scale 300 [LNIND 2012 SC 309] relied on Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 148"
+"[LNIND 1965 SC 75] ; State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 [LNIND"
+1976 SC 331] .
+"60. Virsa Singh v State, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] , (1958) SCR 1495 [LNIND 1958"
+"SC 19] ; Rajwant Singh, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] : 1966 Cr LJ 1509 . Khachar Dipu"
+"v State of Gujarat, 2013 (4) SCC 322 [LNIND 2013 SC 278] ."
+"61. Jaspal Singh v State of Punjab, (1986) 2 SCC 100 at p 103 : AIR 1986 SC 683 : 1986 Cr LJ"
+"488 , per Balakrishna Eradi, J. For an example of circumstantial evidence alone failing to prove"
+"an intention, see Padala Veera Reddy v State of AP, 1990 Cr LJ 605 : AIR 1990 SC 79 : 1989 Supp"
+"(2) SCC 706 . In Jagtar Singh v State of Punjab, (1988) 1 SCC 712 [LNIND 1988 SC 65] : AIR 1988"
+"SC 628 [LNIND 1988 SC 65] : 1988 Cr LJ 866 , which was a case of intentional murder, the"
+Supreme Court ignored the fact that FIR did not mention the crucial fact of the accused running
+"away leaving behind his vehicle. In Narendra Singh v State of UP, AIR 1987 SC 1268 : 1987 Cr LJ"
+"1070 : (1987) 2 SCC 236 , repeated blows were inflicted on vital parts of the body. This was held"
+"to be intentional murder. Vinod Kumar v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 300 : 1991 Cr LJ 360 , defence"
+of accidental shooting ruled out.
+"62. Jai Prakash v State (Delhi Admn), (1991) 2 SCC 32 : (1991) 1 Crimes 474 : 1991 SCC (Cri)"
+"299 . Reiterated in Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] , it"
+"does not matter that there was no intention to cause death, or even to cause an injury of a kind"
+that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real
+"distinction between the two), or that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely"
+"to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury is actually found to be proved, the"
+"rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely"
+"objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death."
+"Namdeo v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 [LNIND 2007 SC 316] : 2007 Cr LJ 1819 ,"
+"head injury caused with axe sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, hence"
+"intention was to cause death. Sheikh Rafi v State of AP, (2007) 13 SCC 76 [LNIND 2007 SC 522] :"
+"2007 Cr LJ 2746 , 19 injuries caused in a quick succession and also in a cruel manner, deceased"
+"being unarmed and helpless. Clause (3) applied, punishable under section 302. Settu v State of"
+"TN, 2006 Cr LJ 3889 , no intention to cause death, but injury caused with a knife on a vital part"
+"and which was sufficient to cause death, amounted to murder. One companion was convicted"
+"under section 304, Part I and the other under section 326, because minor injuries on non-vital"
+parts.
+"63. Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 (8) SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] ."
+"64. Vineet Kumar Chauhan v State of UP, 2007 (14) SCC 660 [LNIND 2007 SC 1509] ."
+"65. Ajit Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 (9) SCC 462 [LNIND 2011 SC 844] ."
+"66. Mohinder Pal Jolly v State of Punjab, 1979 (3) SCC 30 [LNIND 1978 SC 389] ."
+"67. Khachar Dipu v State of Gujarat, 2013 (4) SCC 322 [LNIND 2013 SC 278] ."
+"68. Anda, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] : 1966 Cr LJ 171 ."
+"69. Rajwant Singh, supra. Seven-year-old child held by the legs and dashed against the ground"
+"three times in quick succession, held covered by this clause. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State"
+"of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] : 2004 Cr LJ 1778 : (2005) 9 SCC 71"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 1370] , a restatement of the basic approach of the clause. The court also made"
+"a comparison between the statement in clause 2 of section 299 ""bodily injury likely to cause"
+"death"" with ""bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death"" in clause 3 in"
+section 300.
+"70. Umesh Singh v State of Bihar, 2013 (4) SCC 360 [LNIND 2013 SC 227] : 2013 Cr LJ 2116 ;"
+"AIR 2013 SC 1743 [LNIND 2013 SC 227] ; Gajoo v State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cr LJ 88 ; 2012 (9)"
+"SCC; Kuria v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 4707 : (2012) 10 SCC 433 [LNIND 2012 SC 678] ;"
+"Darbara Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 4757 ; 2012 (8) Scale 649 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] ;"
+(2012) 10 SCC 476 [LNIND 2012 SC 545] .
+"71. Abdul Sayeed v State of MP, (2010) 10 SCC 259 [LNIND 2010 SC 872] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)"
+"1262 [LNIND 2010 SC 872] , Ram Narain Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1727 [LNIND 1975"
+"SC 210] ; State of Haryana v Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96 [LNIND 1999 SC 541] ; Thaman Kumar v"
+"State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, (2003) 6 SCC 380 [LNIND 2003 SC 507] ; and Krishnan v"
+"State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 [LNIND 2003 SC 587] ; Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v State of Gujarat, AIR"
+"1983 SC 484 [LNIND 1983 SC 69] ; Mani Ram v State of UP, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 289 ; Khambam"
+"Raja Reddy v Public Prosecutor, High Court of AP, (2006) 11 SCC 239 [LNIND 2006 SC 753] ; and"
+"State of UP v Dinesh, (2009) 11 SCC 566 [LNIND 2009 SC 454] . State of UP v Hari Chand, (2009)"
+"13 SCC 542 [LNIND 2009 SC 1039] ; In Sayed Darain Ahsan v State of WB, (2012) 4 SCC 352"
+"[LNIND 2012 SC 197] : AIR 2012 SC 1286 [LNIND 2012 SC 197] : 2012 Cr LJ 1980 , it is found"
+that the medical evidence does not go so far as to rule out all possibility of the ocular evidence
+being true and hence the ocular evidence cannot be disbelieved.
+"72. Sunil Kundu v State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422 [LNIND 2013 SC 1135] : 2013 Cr LJ"
+"2339 (SC) In Anjani Chaudhary, (2011) 2 SCC 747 [LNIND 2010 SC 1048] , where the medical"
+evidence did not support the appellant's presence as there was no injury on the deceased which
+could be caused by a lathi and the appellant was stated to be carrying a lathi. Since the eye-
+"witnesses therein were not found to be reliable, Supreme Court acquitted the appellant therein."
+"In Kapildeo Mandal, (2008) 16 SCC 99 [LNIND 2007 SC 1390] , all the eye-witnesses had"
+"categorically stated that the deceased was injured by the use of firearm, whereas the medical"
+evidence specifically indicated that no firearm injury was found on the deceased. Court held
+"that, when the evidence of the eye-witnesses is totally inconsistent with the evidence given by"
+"the medical experts, then evidence is appreciated in a different perspective by the courts. It was"
+observed that when medical evidence specifically rules out the injury claimed to have been
+"inflicted as per the eye-witnesses' version, then the court can draw adverse inference that the"
+prosecution version is not trustworthy.
+"73. Bhagwati Prasad v State of MP, (2010) 1 SCC 697 [LNIND 2009 SC 2058] : 2009 (14) Scale"
+314 [LNIND 2009 SC 2058] : AIR 2010 SC 349 [LNIND 2009 SC 2058] : 2010 Cr LJ 528 .
+"74. Kuna v State of Odisha, AIR 2017 SC 5364 [LNIND 2017 SC 2864] ."
+"75. Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] ."
+"76. Lakshman, (1888) Unrep Cr C 411."
+"77. Nga Maung, (1907) 13 Burma LR 330."
+"78. Judagi Mallah, (1929) 8 Pat 911."
+"79. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370]"
+": 2004 Cr LJ 1778 , explanation of importance of knowledge in the context of the clause."
+"80. Ram Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 881 [LNIND 1967 SC 358] : 1968 Cr LJ 1025 . See Dev Raj v State"
+"of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 950 : 1992 Cr LJ 1292 : 1992 Supp (2) SCC 81 , gun-shot injuries, death"
+"occurring one and a half months later, in between surgery and amputation, held accused guilty"
+"of grievous hurt. State of Karnataka v Venkatesh, AIR 1992 SC 674 : 1992 Cr LJ 707 : 1992 (1)"
+Crimes 625 SC : JT 1992 (1) SC 99 : 1992 (1) Scale 31 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 539 .
+"81. State of Haryana v Krishan, AIR 2017 SC 3125 [LNIND 2017 SC 294] ."
+"82. Umakant v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 4078 : 2014 (8) Scale 141 [LNIND 2014 SC 374]"
+.
+"83. DV Shanmugham v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 2583 [LNIND 1997 SC 720] : 1997 Cr LJ 3129 ,"
+"some of the accused persons were, however, given the benefit of doubt because there was no"
+"clear evidence against them. State of UP v Shri Krishan, 2005 Cr LJ 892 : AIR 2005 SC 762"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 1252] : (2005) 10 SCC 399 [LNIND 2004 SC 1252] , the wife was with the man"
+at the time when the husband alone was killed by the assailants. Her FIR was recorded after 13
+"days, this fact alongwith some other details created a doubt about the prosecution case of"
+"which the benefit went to the assailants. State of AP v Patnam Anandam, 2005 Cr LJ 894 : AIR"
+"2005 SC 764 [LNIND 2004 SC 1241] : (2005) 9 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1241] , another similar"
+"case of benefit of doubt. Jagjit Singh v State of Punjab, 2005 Cr LJ 955 : AIR 2005 SC 913 :"
+"(2005) 3 SCC 689 , accused alleged to have killed three persons at the tubewell sight coming"
+there by motor cycle. A girl child of seven years was supposed to be the eye-witness. She had
+"never seen the accused before, her statement was recorded after three days, not reliable,"
+"acquittal on benefit of doubt. Puran Singh v State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 3 SCC 725 : 2008 Cr LJ"
+"1058 : (2008) 1 Ker LJ 875 , benefit of doubt allowed on the basis of technical evidence."
+"84. State of TN v Balkrishna, 1992 Cr LJ 1872 (Mad)."
+"85. Mohammad Khalil Chisti (Dr) v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 637 (SC), 2013 (1) Mad LJ (Cr)"
+"198, (2013) 2 SCC 541 [LNIND 2012 SC 801] ; Waman v State of Maharashtra, 2011 (7) SCC 295"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 564] : AIR 2011 SC 3327 [LNIND 2011 SC 564] : 2011 Cr LJ 4827 ; Lakshmi
+"Singh v State of Bihar, 1976 SCC (Cr) 671 : AIR 1976 SC 2263 : 1976 Cr LJ 1736 , non-"
+explanation of simple injuries of the nature suffered by the accused would not be fatal; Ram
+"Vishambhar v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 1131 : (2013) 2 SCC 71 [LNINDU 2013 SC 5] ; Hari v State"
+"of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 96 [LNIND 2009 SC 642] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 1254."
+"86. Nokul Nushyo, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 27; Akhila Parida v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 609 (Ori),"
+"provocation by cutting the crop of accused. See also Nagar Prasad v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ"
+1580 (All).
+"87. Sukhlal Sarkar v UOI, (2012) 5 SCC 703 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] : 2012 Cr LJ 3032 ."
+"88. Laikhan, (1955) Cut 625."
+"89. Kundarapu, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 261 . Jagjit Singh v State of HP, 1994 Cr LJ 233 : 1994 SCC (Cr)"
+"176, the accused inflicted a number of serious injuries on the vital parts of the body of his victim"
+"causing his death on the spot, held Exception 1 of section 300 not attracted. Pappachan v State"
+"of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 1765 (Ker), the accused delivered a fatal stab wound to the person who"
+"tried to pacify him, no evidence of any sudden and grave provocation or a sudden fight. The"
+offence did not fall under Exception 1 or 2 of section 300.
+"90. KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : 1962 Cr LJ 521"
+(SC).
+"91. Budhi Singh v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 962 (SC) : AIR 2013 (SCW) 547 ."
+"92. KM Nanavati, (1962) Bom LR 488 : AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : 1962 Cr LJ 521"
+"(SC); Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] . Girja Devi v State of HP, 2000 Cr LJ"
+"1528 (HP), the accused wife killed her husband being provoked by his perverse sexual habits,"
+"punished under section 304, Part I."
+"93. Dhandayuthan v State of TN, 1994 Cr LJ 1587 (Mad)."
+"94. Gyanendra Kumar v State, 1972 Cr LJ 308 : AIR 1972 SC 502 [LNIND 1971 SC 601] ; see also"
+"Panchu Kumar Sardar, 1984 Cr LJ (NOC) 142 (Cal); Balerian Minji, 1985 Cr LJ 1394 (MP). Where"
+the accused on being slapped by the deceased ran to his house which was at considerable
+distance and brought several deadly weapons and inflicted various injuries on the deceased two
+"of which proved fatal, his action was indicative of his intention to kill the victim, he was held to"
+be rightly punished for murder
+"95. BD Khunte v UOI, 2015 Cr LJ 243 ."
+"96. Dhandayuthan v State, 1994 Cr LJ 1587 ."
+"97. Murgi Munda, (1938) 18 Pat 101."
+"98. Balku, (1938) All 789 ; Hussain, (1938) 20 Lah 278."
+"99. Re V Padayachi, 1972 Cr LJ 1641 (Mad)."
+"100. Hansa Singh, 1977 Cr LJ 1448 (SC)."
+"101. Ram Prakash Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1190 [LNIND 1998 SC 137] : 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1622 , conduct of accused in the jail being good, his sentence was reduced to the period already"
+"undergone during trial plus jail term. Bishek Mohandas v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 1489 (Ori),"
+"quarrel, one picked up an instrument and struck the other, himself also injured, for the ensuing"
+"death, conviction under section 304, Part II."
+"102. Note M p 147. Kehar Singh v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1753 (Raj), water diverted from the accused"
+"person's field by the victim to his field without justification, the accused had the right to resort to"
+"self-defence of property, but the number of injuries caused was so great as to be sure to cause"
+"death, right exceeded, conviction under section 304, Part I."
+"103. Raj Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 2803 ."
+"104. Mohammad Khalil Chisti (Dr) v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ637 (SC) : 2013 (1) Mad LJ"
+"(Cr) 198, (2013) 2 SCC 541 [LNIND 2012 SC 801] ; Gopal v State of Rajasthan, (2013) 2 SCC 188"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 37] : 2013 Cr LJ 1297 .
+"105. Arjun v State of Maharashtra, JT 2012 (4) SC 447 : 2012 (5) Scale 52 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] :"
+AIR 2012 SC 2181 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] : (2012) 5 SCC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] : 2012 Cr LJ
+"2641 . See also Mohammad Iqbal v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 337 (Chh)."
+"106. Sikandar Singh v State of Bihar, (2010) 7 SCC 477 [LNIND 2010 SC 603] : (2010) 8 SCR 373"
+: AIR 2010 SC 44023 : 2010 Cr LJ 3854 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 417.
+"107. Raj Pal v State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 678 [LNIND 2006 SC 282] : JT 2006 (11) SC 124"
+[LNIND 2006 SC 282] : (2006) 4 Scale 456 [LNIND 2006 SC 282] : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 361 [LNIND
+2006 SC 282] .
+"108. Mohd Yusuf v State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 1631 , 2181."
+"109. PP Sah, 1977 Cr LJ 346 : AIR 1977 SC 704 ."
+"110. Rafiq, 1979 Cr LJ 706 : AIR 1979 SC 1179 ."
+"111. Ghansham Dass, 1979 Cr LJ 28 : AIR 1979 SC 44 ."
+"112. Jassa Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 520 [LNIND 2002 SC 13] . Latel v State of"
+"Chhatisgarh, AIR 2001 SC 3474 , possession of the disputed land was with the accused, but the"
+"deceased was ploughing it at the relevant time, the accused and his son attacked him and"
+"continued to do so even after he had fallen down, held, right of private defence exceeded,"
+"punishment under section 304, Part I. State of Karnataka v Shivappa, (1993) Cr LJ 1253 : AIR"
+"1998 SC 1536 [LNIND 1997 SC 1597] , the right of private defence exceeded, conviction."
+"113. Katta Surendra v State of AP, (2008) 11 SCC 360 [LNIND 2008 SC 1294] : 2008 Cr LJ 3196 ."
+"114. See also Thomas George v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ 3475 : 1999 SCC (Cr) 1308,"
+"exceeding the right of private defence, conviction under section 304, Part II."
+"115. Subba Naik, (1898) 21 Mad 249."
+"116. Satyavir Singh Rathi v State Thr CBI, AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : (2011) 6 SCC"
+1 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] : 2011 Cr LJ 2908 .
+"117. Vijender Kumar v State of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 3851 : (2010) 12 SCC 381 [LNIND 2010 SC 413]"
+: (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 29.
+"118. Santokh Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 1923 [LNIND 2009 SC 328] : (2009) 11 SCC"
+"197 [LNIND 2009 SC 328] ; Arumugam v State Rep by Inspector of Police TN, AIR 2009 SC 331"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1994] : (2008) 15 SCC 590 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994] .
+"119. State of Rajasthan v Islam, (2011) 6 SCC 343 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : AIR 2011 SC 2317"
+"[LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : 2011 Cr LJ 3110 , plea that only one injury of small dimension had"
+been caused by appellant to the deceased in the abdomen and he had himself taken the
+"deceased to hospital, an inference be drawn that there was no intention to kill the deceased"
+"repelled. The case of the appellant cannot fall within Exception 4 of section 300, IPC, 1860."
+"Vijender Kumar v State of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 3851 : (2010) 12 SCC 381 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] :"
+(2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 291.
+"120. Abdul Nawaz v State of WB, 2012 Cr LJ 2901 : (2012) 6 SCC 581 [LNIND 2012 SC 307] :"
+"2012 (5) Scale 357 [LNIND 2012 SC 307] ; Chinnathaman v State, 2007 (14) SCC 690 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 1485] , Muthu v State, 2009 (17) SCC 433 [LNIND 2007 SC 1303] ; Arumugam v State,"
+"2008 (15) SCC 590 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994] ; Ajit Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 (9) SCC 462"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 844] , Vijay Ramkrishan Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra, 2012 (2) Scale 631 ;"
+"Sayaji Hanmat Bankar v State of Maharashtra, 2011 AIR (SCW) 4502 : 2011 (7) Scale 710 [LNIND"
+"2011 SC 653] : 2011 Cr LJ 4338 : (2011) 8 SCR 234 [LNIND 2011 SC 653] ; State of HP v Ram Pal,"
+AIR 2005 SC 4058 .
+"121. Arjun v State of Maharashtra, (2012) 5 SCC 530 [LNIND 2012 SC 283] : 2012 Cr LJ 2641 ,"
+where the accused appeared and entered the house and had some quarrel with his deceased
+wife. He threw water pot and thereafter a kerosene lamp. Burning seems to be more because
+lady was wearing nylon sari. She got burnt to the extent of 70%. The Supreme Court held that it
+"was a case clearly falling under Exception 4 of section 300 of IPC, 1860. Sayaji Hanmat Bankar v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 2011 (7) Scale 710 [LNIND 2011 SC 653] : 2011 Cr LJ 4338 ."
+"122. Nanak Ram v State of Rajasthan, 2014 Cr LJ 1843 : 2014 (I) Supreme 705 ."
+"123. Nayamuddin, (1891) 18 Cal 484 (FB). Where there was no evidence of sudden fight or heat"
+"of passion and the nature, number and situs of injuries showed that there was cruel manner,"
+"conviction for murder, the exception was not attracted, Malkiat Singh v Punjab, AIR 1996 SC"
+2590 [LNIND 1996 SC 1198] : 1996 Cr LJ 3583 .
+"124. Zalim Rai, (1864) 1 WR (Cr) 33; Ameera v State, (1866) PR No 12 of 1866. D Sailu v State of"
+"AP, (2007) 14 SCC 397 [LNIND 2007 SC 1347] : AIR 2008 SC 505 [LNIND 2007 SC 1347] : 2008"
+"Cr LJ 686 , injury to a vital organ in a sudden fight, causing death due to shock and"
+"haemorrhage, punishment under section 304, Part I. Byvarapu Raju v State of AP, (2007) 11 SCC"
+"218 [LNIND 2007 SC 761] : AIR 2007 SC 1904 [LNIND 2007 SC 761] : 2007 Cr LJ 3204 , the"
+"father of the accused came in intoxicated state at night and assaulted the son's wife, a resulting"
+quarrel between father and son in which the son injured his father to death because of the injury
+"to a vital organ, case covered by Exception 4."
+"125. State of MP v Shivshankar, 2015 Cr LJ 155 ."
+"126. Surain Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2017 SC 1904 [LNIND 2017 SC 171] ."
+"127. Sunnumuduli, (1946) 25 Pat 335. Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1001] , it postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged even"
+if they all do not find their target. Provocation per se is not fight. Asking somebody to do
+something again may not be a provocation. Expressing a desire to one's neighbour digging
+foundation that some passage may be left may not be considered to be a demand. In instant
+"case, held, there was no fight, far less sudden fight."
+"128. Atma Singh, AIR 1955 Punj 191 ."
+"129. Narayanan, AIR 1956 SC 99 [LNIND 1955 KER 138] : 1956 Cr LJ 278 . Golla Yelugu Govindu"
+"v State of AP, (2008) 16 SCC 769 [LNIND 2008 SC 751] : AIR 2008 SC 1842 [LNIND 2008 SC 751]"
+": 2008 Cr LJ 2607 : (2008) 2 APLJ 28 , ingredients of the exception restated. Trimbak v State of"
+"Maharashtra, (2008) 17 SCC 213 [LNIND 2008 SC 571] , ingredients for bringing the exception"
+"into operation restated. Similar restatement in Hawa Singh v State of Haryana, (2009) 3 SCC 411"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 77] : (2009) 2 SCC Cri 132 [LNIND 2009 SC 764] : 2009 Cr LJ 1146 . Imtiaz v
+"State of UP, (2007) 15 SCC 299 [LNIND 2007 SC 172] , dispute about drainage of latrine,"
+"neighbour objected but to no effect, the attackers came fully armed, the court found"
+"premeditation, not suddenness. Iqbal Singh v State of Punjab, (2008) 11 SCC 698 [LNIND 2008"
+"SC 1671] , sudden fight over access to agricultural land, death caused, 10 years under this"
+"exception. SK Azim v State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 695 [LNIND 2008 SC 1408] , death"
+"caused in a sudden fight by a single lathi blow on head, 10 years, section 304, Part I. Suresh"
+"Kumar v State of HP, (2008) 13 SCC 459 [LNIND 2008 SC 766] : AIR 2008 SC 1973 [LNIND 2008"
+"SC 766] : 2008 Cr LJ 2247 , single knife blow in sudden fight, death, 10 years, section 304, Part I."
+"Shankar Diwal Wadu v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 518 [LNIND 2007 SC 363] : AIR 2007"
+"SC 1410 [LNIND 2007 SC 363] : 2007 Cr LJ 1802 , attempt to take away brother's wife by the"
+"brother accused to keep her as a mistress, this resulted in killing of the brother in a sudden fit of"
+"anger, held appropriate conviction under section 304, Part II and not section 302, the accused"
+"was already undergoing imprisonment under sentence for 10 years, sentence reduced to the"
+"period already undergone. Chinnathaman v State, (2007) 14 SCC 690 [LNIND 2007 SC 1485] :"
+"AIR 2008 SC 784 [LNIND 2007 SC 1485] : 2008 Cr LJ 1372 , no premeditation or preplan to"
+"cause death, altercation because of entry into the field, injury caused with sickle lying there,"
+"punishment under section 304, Part II. Phulia Tadu v State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 588 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 1071] : AIR 2007 SC 3215 [LNIND 2007 SC 1071] : 2007 Cr LJ 4690 , one blow with a"
+"small stick, section 304, Part II attracted."
+"130. Sarjug Prasad, AIR 1959 Pat 66 ."
+"131. State of UP v Jodha Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1822 : (1989) 3 SCC 465 : 1989 Cr LJ 2113 . See"
+"also Surender Kumar v Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1989 SC 1094 [LNIND 1989 SC 140] :"
+"1989 Cr LJ 883 , where there was no evidence of acting with cruelty following a quarrel,"
+"sentence under section 304, Part I was considered appropriate; V Sreedharan v State of Kerala,"
+"AIR 1992 SC 754 : 1992 Cr LJ 1701 , where the sudden impulse was held not to have ended"
+simply because the accused chased the deceased for some distance before giving fatal blow.
+"132. State of Karnataka v Shivalingaiah, AIR 1988 SC 115 [LNIND 2012 DEL 2078] : 1988 Cr LJ"
+"394 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 881. State of Maharashtra v Suresh, 1989 Cr LJ 1709 (Bom), heat and"
+"passion on cattle grazing leading to one blow on the head with a light stick, the deceased fell"
+"down, blow not repeated, death, punished under section 325 with RI for one year and fine of Rs."
+"2000. Vadivelu, 1989 Cr LJ 2248 (Mad), causing injury with wooden frame endangering life and"
+"resulting in death, guilty under section 326, not section 302. Karan Singh v State, 1988 Cr LJ 315"
+"(Del), death caused in sudden quarrel, conviction under section 304, Part II. Ramanbhai v State"
+"of Gujarat, 1988 Cr LJ 982 (Guj), quarrel at a bus-stop for Rs. 5/-, moved towards a bridge where"
+"as a result of pushing one fell and died, conviction under section 304, Part II."
+"133. Pawan Singh v State of Punjab, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 609 (P&H). Thankachan v State of Kerala,"
+"(2007) 14 SCC 501 [LNIND 2007 SC 1325] : AIR 2008 SC 406 [LNIND 2007 SC 1325] , one of the"
+"accused dragged the victim out of his home, the latter picked up a soda bottle, the accused also"
+"lifted a bottle from a shop and struck him on the head, the victim also hit back with the bottle in"
+"his hand, on this the accused exhorted his companions to carry further the attack with the result"
+"the victim died with multiple injuries. Ten years' imprisonment awarded under section 304, Part"
+"I. Rakesh v State of MP, (2007) 14 SCC 504 [LNIND 2008 SC 298] : AIR 2008 SC 1229 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 298] : 2008 Cr LJ 1646 , comparison of requirements of sections 1 and 4."
+"134. Balwant Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LJ 3856 (Raj)."
+"135. Baleshwar Mahto v State of Bihar, AIR 2017 SC 873 [LNINDU 2017 SC 8] ."
+"136. Kikar Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr LJ 3255 : AIR 1993 SC 2426 [LNIND 1993 SC 456]"
+": (1993) 4 SCC 238 [LNIND 1993 SC 456] . Kudesh Mondal v State of WB, (2007) 8 SCC 578"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1043] : AIR 2007 SC 3228 [LNIND 2007 SC 1043] , a passerby started inquiring"
+into a killing incident originating over a trivial matter. He was dragged by one and struck a fatal
+"blow by the other. The court applied this exception. Conviction under section 304, Part I. Salim"
+"Sahab v State of MP, (2007) 1 SCC 699 [LNIND 2006 SC 1089] : (2007) 103 Cut LT 531, another"
+"similar death caused in a quarrel, conviction under section 304, Part II, seven years RI. Vadla"
+"Chandraiah v State of AP, (2006) 13 SCC 587 [LNIND 2006 SC 1103] : 2007 Cr LJ 770 , quarrel"
+between fruit vendor and a police constable for not paying for fruits consumed. Constable
+"attacked him with his service weapon to death. Punishment under section 304, Part II. Pappu v"
+"State of MP, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 , murder as a result of a single lathi blow in a sudden quarrel, the"
+"accused was not armed with any weapon. Conviction under section 304, Part II, Pulicheria"
+"Nagaraju v State of AP, 2006 Cr LJ 3899 , another similar case with this observation that a single"
+blow injury resulting in death is not a ground in itself for holding that the case would come
+"under section 304 and not under section 302. Khambam Raja Reddy v Public Prosecutor, HC,"
+"Andhra, 2006 Cr LJ 4652 , allegation that on exhortation of the co-accused, the accused picked"
+up a big stone piece and threw it on the head of the deceased. This could not be true because
+he was suffering from polio and could not have picked up the stone. His conviction was set
+aside.
+"137. Suresh Kumar v State of HP, (2008) 13 SCC 459 [LNIND 2008 SC 766] : AIR 2008 SC 1973"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 766] : 2008 Cr LJ 2247 . Bengaru Venkata Rao v State of AP, (2008) 9 SCC 707"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1585] : 2008 Cr LJ 4353 .
+"138. Anil v State of Haryana, (2007) 10 SCC 274 [LNIND 2007 SC 629] : 2007 Cr LJ 4294 ."
+"139. Bhagwan Munjaji, 1979 Cr LJ 49 (SC)."
+"140. Prabhu v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 1069 : 1991 Cr LJ 1373 . Single assault attributed to"
+"each of the accused in the course of sudden quarrel in heat of passion, Exception 4 to section"
+"300 attracted, conviction altered from section 300 to section 304, Part II, Subodh Behera v State"
+"of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 168 (Ori). The accused, seeing his father being beaten by the deceased,"
+caused death of the assailant by inflicting injuries on his head in a heat of passion but the
+"accused did not act in a cruel or unreasonable manner, held Exception 4 to section 300"
+"attracted, the offence covered under section 304, Part I, State of MP v Mohandas, 1992 Cr LJ"
+101 (MP). The accused brother caused a single injury without pre-meditation in a sudden fight
+"and in heat of passion to his brother which proved fatal, he neither took undue advantage nor"
+"acted in a cruel manner, held Exception 4 to section 300 attracted, liable to be punished under"
+"section 304, Part I and not under section 302. Suraj Mal v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 559 :"
+"1992 Cr LJ 520 : 1993 Supp (1) SCC 639 . The accused, over a trivial matter of the next day of"
+"Holi festival and without any pre-meditation or any enmity with the victim, suddenly inflicted a"
+"single knife blow on his chest which proved fatal, held, the offence fell within Exception 4 of"
+"section 300, punishable under section 304, Part I, not under section 302. Prakash v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 1994 Cr LJ 3019 (Raj). See also Pitchaimani v State of T.N., 1994 Cr LJ 2606 (Mad),"
+"wordy duel, sudden quarrel, no pre-meditation, culpable homicide not amounting to murder."
+"141. Sukhbir Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 1168 [LNIND 2002 SC 134] ; Bajjappa v State"
+"of Karnataka, 1999 Cr LJ 958 (Kant), altercation resulting in violent assault at the spur of"
+"moment. The accused was an agriculturist with clean record, had three children, in custody for"
+"considerable period, sentence reduced to five years RI, fine Rs. 1000. Lakhwinder Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 2577 [LNIND 2002 SC 820] , the accused suffered 19 injuries, two of them"
+"grievous, the prosecution could not say that they did not know such extensive injuries or that"
+"they were self-accused, explanation by the prosecution was necessary, failure led to the"
+inference that the true genesis and manner of the incident was not disclosed. Ramesh Krishna
+"Madhusudan Nayar v State of Maharashtra, (2008) 14 SCC 491 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] : (2009) 2"
+"SCC Cri 759 : AIR 2008 SC 927 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 Cr LJ 1023 , two blows with a piece of"
+wood inflicted after quarrel for several hours about putting off the light of the staff room at
+"night. Exception 4 attracted. Arumugan v State, (2008) 115 SCC 490 : AIR 2009 SC 331 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 1994] , fight over panchayat election, the victim dragged out from his home, exchange"
+"of hot words, blows inflicted by the accused and his companions. Exception attracted. Raghbir"
+"Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 16 SCC 33 [LNIND 2008 SC 2228] : AIR 2009 SC 223 : (2009) 73"
+"AIC 93 , lathi blows in the course of a sudden quarrel, exception applied. Parkash Chand v State"
+"of HP, (2004) 11 SCC 381 [LNIND 2004 SC 759] : AIR 2004 SC 4496 [LNIND 2004 SC 759] , one"
+"brother's dogs entered the kitchen of the other, the latter protested, heated altercation ensued,"
+"one went into his room, came out with a gun, shot at the other from a distance of 35 feet, death"
+"ensued. Exception applied. Preetam Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2003) 12 SCC 594 , there being"
+"a background to the struggle, the court did not regard the fight to be sudden. Hence, the"
+"exception not attracted. State of Maharashtra v Manjurrya, (2003) 12 SCC 787 , the attacking"
+"party came fully prepared and caused death as in an organised manner, no feature of a sudden"
+"fight. Sachchey Lal Tiwari v State of UP, (2004) 11 SCC 410 [LNIND 2004 SC 1041] : AIR 2004 SC"
+"5039 [LNIND 2004 SC 1041] , dividing line between two fields dismissed by the attacking party,"
+fired pistol shots at the opponent killing his two sons. The exception not applicable. Umesh Jha
+"v State of Bihar, (2004) 12 SCC 329 , genesis in lands dispute, but murder pre-meditated,"
+Exception 4 not applicable.
+"142. Sikandar v State (Delhi) Admn, AIR 1999 SC 1406 [LNIND 1999 SC 351] : 1999 Cr LJ 2098 ."
+"Hari Shankar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 2629 : 1999 Cr LJ 2902 , exchange of hard words,"
+"burning kerosene stove wick thrown, knowledge of likely death, conviction under section 304."
+"143. Mahesh Balmiki v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 4310 : AIR 1999 SC 3338 [LNIND 1999 SC 755] ;"
+"Rameshraya v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 1229 : 2001 Cr LJ 1452 (SC). Sudden fight, but murder"
+"committed in most brutal manner conviction under section 302. Abdul Kader v State of Gujarat,"
+"1999 Cr LJ 5027 (Guj), police on duty during Muslim festivities tried to prevent gambling, the"
+"accused, who was friendly with gamblers, gave one knife injury to a police constable resulting in"
+"death. The court noted that there was no premeditation, the act was the result of heat of"
+"passion, no undue advantage, Exception 4 attracted, conviction under section 304, Part II, seven"
+"years' imprisonment. Resham Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 2625 : 2002 Cr LJ 3506 , fight"
+"from both sides, Exception 4 attracted, conviction under section 304, Part II. Naresh Janimal"
+"Lohana v State, 1998 Cr LJ 3574 (Guj), domestic quarrel between parties on question of"
+"throwing away some mango waste, male members came out and started taking part in the"
+"sudden fight, the accused gave one blow in the scuffle by wielding a knife in the sudden heat of"
+"passion. No premeditation. Exception 4 attracted. Pawan Kumar v State, 1997 Cr LJ 3631 (P&H),"
+"sudden quarrel over snatching of newspaper, single knife blow, acting at the spur of moment"
+"without premeditation, Exception 4 attracted, conviction under section 304, Part II. Lekh Raj v"
+"State, 1997 Cr LJ 3663 (HP), accused entered into victim's house and inflicted knife blows on"
+"vital parts, conviction under section 302, Exception 4 not attracted. Surinder Kumar v State, 1997"
+"Cr LJ 2872 (P&H), during an altercation, the accused pushed the victim, whose head dashed"
+"against the wall causing death. The accused given benefit of the exception, conviction under"
+"section 304, Part I. Uday Singh v State of UP, AIR 2002 SC 3143 [LNIND 2002 SC 545] , sudden"
+"fight between the accused persons and their victim, both unarmed, both accused held their"
+"victim by his neck with pressure that he died, neither knew about the pressure being put by the"
+"other, no common intention to cause death, only knowledge, conviction under section 304, Part"
+"II. Bala Baine Linga Raju v State of AP, (2009) 6 SCC 706 [LNIND 2009 SC 1104] : (2009) 3 SCC Cr"
+"13 : 2009 Cr LJ 3426 , in the absence of appeal by state, the Supreme Court did not enhance the"
+sentence to that for murder despite the fact that the case was that of murder and not coming
+under the exception.
+"144. Sukhdev v State of Punjab, (2007) 16 SCC 364 . The court considered cases relating to"
+"importance of premeditation and undue or unfair advantage. Rakesh v State of MP, (2007) 14"
+"SCC 504 [LNIND 2008 SC 298] : AIR 2008 SC 1229 [LNIND 2008 SC 298] : 2008 Cr LJ 646 , one"
+"of them assaulted their victim with knife, three others gave him kicks and fists blows. The trial"
+court convicted the main accused under section 302 and also others under sections 302/34.
+The High Court maintained the conviction of main accused under section 302 and convicted
+others under sections 326/34. The Supreme Court convicted and punished all of them under
+"sections 304/34, Part I, 10 years. Gurdev Raj v State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 380 [LNIND 2007"
+"SC 1180] : 2008 Cr LJ 382 , conviction altered from section 302 to section 304, Part I. Shambhao"
+"Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 11 SCC 637 [LNIND 2008 SC 1492] : AIR 2008 SC 3200 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 1492] , quarrel in land dispute, stabbing, one died, other family members injured,"
+"conviction under section 304, Part 1, 10 years, would meet the ends of justice. Baij Nath v State"
+"of UP, (2008) 11 SCC 738 [LNIND 2008 SC 1374] , one lathi blow on head, causing, fracture and"
+"death, seven years under section 304, Part I."
+"145. Sada Ram v State of Haryana, (2006) 13 SCC 528 . Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra,"
+"2006 Cr LJ 2111 SC, landlord demanded rent, the tenant (accused) assaulted him, nephew of"
+"landlord, who tried to intervene was given a knife blow causing death, conviction altered to"
+"section 304, Part II from section 302."
+"146. Suresh Chandra v State of UP, 2005 Cr LJ 3449 : AIR 2005 SC 9 [LNIND 2004 SC 1110] :"
+(2005) 1 SCC 122 [LNIND 2004 SC 1110] .
+"147. Santokh Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 1923 [LNIND 2009 SC 328] : (2009) 11 SCC"
+"197 [LNIND 2009 SC 328] ; Arumugam v State Rep by Inspector of Police TN, AIR 2009 SC 331"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1994] : (2008) 15 SCC 590 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994] ; D Sailu v State of AP, AIR"
+2008 SC 505 [LNIND 2007 SC 1347] : (2007) 14 SCC 397 [LNIND 2007 SC 1347] .
+"148. Sridhar Bhuyan v State of Orissa, (2004) 11 SCC 395 [LNIND 2004 SC 758] : AIR 2004 SC"
+4100 [LNIND 2004 SC 758] : 2004 Cr LJ 3875 .
+"149. Note M, p 145."
+"150. Nayamuddin, (1891) 18 Cal 484 (FB)."
+"151. Ambalathil, AIR 1956 Mad 97 ."
+"152. Halliday, (1889) 61 LT 701 , 702."
+"153. Towers, (1874) 12 Cox 530, 533."
+"154. Lal Bahadur v State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 4 SCC 557 [LNIND 2014 SC 553] ; 2013 Cr LJ"
+2205 : 2013 (2) SCC (Cr) 516.
+"155. Adu Shikdar, (1885) 11Cal 635; Bhairon Lal, (1952) 2 Raj 669 ; Ram Chandra v State, AIR"
+1957 SC 381 : 1957 Cr LJ 559 .
+"156. Rama Nand, 1981 Cr LJ 298 : AIR 1981 SC 738 [LNIND 1981 SC 5] . See further Manguli"
+"Devi v State of Orissa, AIR 1989 SC 483 : 1989 Cr LJ 823 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 161 , where dead"
+body was discovered in decomposed state and no wounds were visible yet the conviction of the
+"widow of the deceased on the basis of her confession was sustained; Rama Nand v State of UP,"
+AIR 1981 SC 738 [LNIND 1981 SC 5] : (1981) 2 SCR 444 [LNIND 1981 SC 5] : 1981 Cr LJ 298 :
+"1981 Mad LJ (Cr) 241. Amar Layek v State of WB, 1988 Cr LJ 1293 (Cal), only skeleton of bones"
+"and other personal articles recovered on lead given by accused, held guilty of murder. Hari"
+"Kishan v State of Haryana, 1990 Cr LJ 385 (P&H), good evidence, though corpus delecti not"
+"traceable. But see Bhupendra Singh v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 1083 [LNIND 1991 SC 151] : 1991"
+"Cr LJ 1337 : (1991) 2 SCC 750 [LNIND 1991 SC 151] , where the body of the deceased was burnt"
+"and pieces of bones which were recovered were not sufficient to establish the age, sex or"
+"identity. Conviction even under section 201 was set aside. Sevaka Perumal v State of TN, AIR"
+"1991 SC 1463 [LNIND 1991 SC 269] : 1991 Cr LJ 1845 , murder charge can be established by"
+"evidence, though dead body may not be traceable. Arun Kumar v State of UP, 1989 Cr LJ 1460 :"
+"AIR 1989 SC 1445 : 1989 Supp (2) 332 , dead body of victim of rape not traceable, conviction"
+under section 366 justified.
+"157. Rishipal v State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cr LJ 1534 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW) 1167; Lakshmi v"
+"State of UP, 2002 (7) SCC 198 [LNIND 2002 SC 534] ; State of Karnataka v MV Mahesh, 2003 (3)"
+SCC 353 [LNIND 2003 SC 270] .
+"158. Jitender Kumar v State of Haryana, 2012 Cr LJ 3085 : AIR 2012 SC 2488 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+331] : (2012) 6 SCC 204 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 412] ; The state of the contents of the stomach
+found at the time of medical examination is not a safe guide for determining the time of the
+"occurrence because that would be a matter of speculation, in the absence of reliable evidence"
+on the question as to when the deceased had his last meal and what that meal consisted of.
+"Masjit Tato Rawool v State of Maharashtra, (1971) SCC (Cr) 732; Gopal Singh v State of UP, AIR"
+"1979 SC 1932 ; Sheo Darshan v State of UP, (1972) SCC (Cr) 394. [The presence of faecal matter"
+"in the intestines is not conclusive, as the deceased might be suffering from constipation. Where"
+"there is positive direct evidence about the time of occurrence, it is not open to the court to"
+speculate about the time of occurrence by the presence of faecal matter in the intestines; Sheo
+"Dershan v State of UP, (1972) SCC (Cr) 394. The question of time of death of the victim should"
+not be decided only by taking into consideration the state of food in the stomach. That may be a
+"factor which should be considered along with other evidence, but that fact alone cannot be"
+"decisive; R Prakash v State of UP, (1969) 1 SCC 48 . Also see Shivappa v State of Karnataka,"
+"(1995) 2 SCC 76 [LNIND 1994 SC 1111] ; Jabbar Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1994) SCC (Cr)"
+"1745. Bijendra Bhagat v State of Uttarakhand, 2015 Cr LJ 3150 , the injuries suffered by the"
+"deceased are incised wounds and one fire arm injury. However, none of the injuries on the"
+person of the deceased could be attributed to the lathi which was supposedly in the hands of
+the appellant. Benefit of doubt given.
+"159. Raju v State of Chhatisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 4425 : 2014 (9) SCJ 453 [LNINDORD 2014 SC"
+19031] .
+"160. Deepa v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 2508 ."
+"161. Jagtar Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 3418 ."
+"162. Alagarsamy v State by DSP, 2010 Cr LJ 29 : AIR 2010 SC 849 [LNIND 2009 SC 1914] . See"
+"also Arun Kumar Sharma v State of Bihar, (2010) 1 SCC 108 [LNIND 2009 SC 1866] : 2010 Cr LJ"
+"428 , where FIR was sent to the Magistrate after five days."
+"163. Awadesh Kumar Shukla v State of UP, 2015 (7) ADJ 530 [LNIND 2015 ALL 190] : 2015 (6)"
+ALJ 665 (All).
+"164. Dilawar Singh v State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 4844 : (2015) 1 SCC 737 [LNIND 2014 SC 823]"
+.
+"165. State of Rajasthan v Chandgi Ram, 2014 Cr LJ 4571 : 2014 (10) Scale 352 [LNIND 2014 SC"
+811] .
+"166. Sudarshan v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ 3232 : 2015 (5) SCJ 358 . See also State of"
+"Karnataka v Sateesh, 2015 Cr LJ 3427 ."
+"167. Rishipal v State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cr LJ 1534 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW) 1167; Sukhram v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 2007 (7) SCC 502 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] ; Sunil Clifford Daniel (Dr) v State of"
+"Punjab, 2012 (8) Scale 670 [LNIND 2012 SC 551] , Pannayar v State of TN by Inspector of Police,"
+2009 (9) SCC 152 [LNIND 2009 SC 1687] .
+"168. Sanaulla Khan v State of Bihar, (2013) 3 SCC 52 [LNIND 2013 SC 120] : 2013 Cr LJ 1527 ;"
+"Ujjagar Singh v State of Punjab, 2007 (13) SCC 90 [LNIND 2007 SC 1486] ."
+"169. Gosu Jairami Reddy v State of AP, AIR 2011 SC 3147 [LNIND 2011 SC 2666] : 2011 Cr LJ"
+"4387 : (2011) 11 SCC 766 [LNIND 2011 SC 2666] ; Abu Thakir v State, (2010) 5 SCC 91 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 366] : AIR 2010 SC 2119 [LNIND 2010 SC 366] : 2010 Cr LJ 2840 .
+"170. Ashok Rai v State of UP, 2014 Cr LJ 3085 : 2014 (10) SCJ 729 [LNINDU 2014 SC 21] ."
+"171. Rambraksh v State of Chhattisgarh, 2016 Cr LJ 2939 : 2016 (5) SCJ 600 ; Dharam Deo"
+"Yadav v State of UP, 2014 Cr LJ 2371 : 2014 (2) ALT (Cr) 322 (SC)."
+"172. Rishipal v State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cr LJ 1534 (SC) : 2013 AIR (SCW) 1167; Mohibur"
+"Rahman v State of Assam, 2002 (6) SCC 715 ; in Arjun Marik v State of Bihar, 1994 Supp (2) SCC"
+"372 , Supreme Court reiterated that the solitary circumstance of the accused and victim being"
+last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances for the Court to record a finding that it is
+consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. No conviction on that basis
+"alone can, therefore, be founded. So also in Godabarish Mishra v Kuntala Mishra, 1996 (11) SCC"
+"264 [LNIND 1996 SC 1719] , the Supreme Court declared that the theory of last seen together is"
+not of universal application and may not always be sufficient to sustain a conviction unless
+"supported by other links in the chain of circumstances; State of Goa v Sanjay Thakran, 2007 (3)"
+"SCC 755 [LNIND 2007 SC 274] ; Bodh Raj @ Bodha v State of Jammu and Kashmir, 2002 (8) SCC"
+"45 [LNIND 2002 SC 539] ; Jaswant Gir v State of Punjab, 2005 (12) SCC 438 ; see Manthuri Laxmi"
+"Narasaiah v State of AP, 2012 Cr LJ 2172 : AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 73, in which the evidence of last"
+seen rejected by the Supreme Court.
+"173. Also see Shyamal Ghosh v State of WB, (2012) 7 SCC 646 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] : 2012 Cr"
+"LJ 3825 : AIR 2012 SC 3539 [LNIND 2012 SC 397] ; Inspector of Police TN v John David, (2011) 5"
+"SCC 509 [LNIND 2011 SC 441] : 2011 Cr LJ 3366 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 647 , 'last seen alive theory"
+"accepted'. See also Mannan v State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 [LNIND 2011 SC 440] : 2011 Cr"
+LJ 3380 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 626 .
+"174. Arabindra Mukherjee v State of WB, 2012 AIR (SCW) 1032 : 2012 Cr LJ 1207 ."
+"175. State Through CBI v Mahender Singh Dahiya, (2011) 3 SCC 109 [LNIND 2011 SC 114] : AIR"
+"2011 SC 1017 [LNIND 2011 SC 114] : 2011 Cr LJ 2177 , last seen evidence would not always"
+mean that the accused had killed the deceased.
+"176. C Perumal v Rajasekaran, 2012 AIR (SCW) 3641 : 2012 Cr LJ 3491 ."
+"177. Rambraksh v State of Chhattisgarh, 2016 Cr LJ 2939 : 2016 (5) SCJ 600 ."
+"178. Kanhaiya Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2014 Cr LJ 1950 : 2014 (4) WLN 299 (SC)."
+"179. Mahavir Singh v State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 3228 : 2014 (7) Scale 477 ."
+"180. Surender Prashad v State, (2014) 209 DLT 461 : 2014 VI AD (Del) 234."
+"181. Bikau Pandey v State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 997 [LNIND 2003 SC 1027] : (2003) 12 SCC 616"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 1027] ; Dalbir Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 2389 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+"1218] : (2008) 11 SCC 425 [LNIND 2008 SC 1218] ; Nishan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC"
+1661 [LNIND 2008 SC 2718] : (2008) 17 SCC 505 [LNIND 2008 SC 2718] . See also Balraje v
+"State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673 [LNIND 2010 SC 487] : 2010 Cr LJ 3443 ; Satvir v State of"
+"UP, AIR 2009 SC 1741 [LNIND 2009 SC 124] : 2009 Cr LJ 1586 : (2009) 4 SCC 289 [LNIND 2009"
+SC 124] .
+"182. Mukesh v State for NCT of Delhi, 2017 (5) Scale 506 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 301] Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose
+death was intended.
+"If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death,"
+"commits culpable homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he"
+"neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the culpable homicide"
+committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he had
+caused the death of the person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely
+to cause.
+COMMENT.—
+"Doctrine of transferred malice.—Section 301 of IPC, 1860 specifies that if a person by"
+"doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits"
+"culpable homicide by causing death of any person whose death he neither intends, nor"
+"knows himself to be likely to cause, culpable homicide committed by the offender is of"
+"the description of which it would have been, if he had caused the death of the person,"
+whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.183. Blow aimed at the
+"intended victim, if alights on another, offence is the same as it would have been if the"
+blow had struck the intended victim.184. This section lays down that culpable homicide
+may be committed by causing the death of a person whom the offender neither
+"intended, nor knew himself to be likely, to kill. This section embodies what the English"
+authors describe as the doctrine of transfer of malice or the transmigration of motive.
+"Under this section, if A intends to kill B but kills C whose death he neither intends nor"
+"knows himself to be likely to cause, the intention to kill C is, by law attributed to"
+him.185.
+If the killing takes place in the course of doing an act which a person intends or knows
+"to be likely to cause death, it ought to be treated as if the real intention of the killer had"
+been actually carried out.
+"Where a mistake is made in respect of the person, as where the offender shoots at A"
+"supposing that he is shooting at B, it is clear that the difference of person can make"
+none in the offence or its consequences; the crime consists in the wilful doing of a
+"prohibited act; the act of shooting at A was wilful, although the offender mistook him"
+for another.
+Where the accused was deliberately trying to shoot at a fleeing man who had criticised
+his father in a School Committee Meeting but unfortunately his own maternal uncle
+"came in between him and the intended victim and thus got killed, it was held that the"
+"act of the accused was nothing but murder under section 302 read with section 301,"
+"IPC, 1860.186. In an altercation between parties, the accused persons fired"
+"indiscriminately upon the fleeing party, one shot hit a person and second caused the"
+death of the complainant's 10-year-old son. The episode took place in a commercial
+locality. The death was held to be intentional murder punishable under sections
+300/301.187. The accused reached his intended victim's house. The latter hid himself
+somewhere else. The accused chased him there and standing before that house fired
+into it. The housewife became prey and fell dead. It was held that under the doctrine of
+"transfer of malice, the accused must be convicted under sections 302 and 307 and"
+sentenced to life imprisonment.188. Where the accused intended to kill a particular
+person by his lorry but another person chanced to come before the lorry and happened
+"to be killed, an offence under this section was committed and the accused was"
+convicted under section 302.189.
+"Similarly, there will be no difference where the injury intended for one falls on another"
+"by accident. If A makes a thrust at B, meaning to kill, and C throwing himself between,"
+"receives the thrust and dies, A will answer for it as if his mortal purpose had taken"
+place on B.
+"The same principle is applicable where, through accident or the mistake of a party not"
+"privy to the criminal design, the mischief falls either on a person not intended, or on the"
+party intended but in a different manner from that intended.190. Accused had entered
+the house of witness to kill him but due to non-availability of electricity and under the
+wrong impression he killed the deceased. Death of deceased can be said to be
+accidental due to mistaken identity rather than any intentional act of accused. Order of
+"conviction of accused under section 302, IPC, 1860 is modified to one under section"
+"304, Part II, IPC, 1860.191."
+"In a scuffle between accused persons and the complainant's party, one member on the"
+accused's side fired a shot at a particular member on the complainant's side but the
+shot actually hit another person who died. The Court held that the doctrine of
+transferred malice was attracted. The act of the accused would be covered by section
+"304 and he was liable to be convicted under Part II of that section, though the"
+deceased was neither aimed at nor intended to be harmed by the accused.192.
+It is not a disputed fact as to whose fire shot resulted in the death of the deceased. The
+only question which is to be examined here is whether the offence committed by the
+"respondent is culpable homicide amounting to murder, punishable under section 302 or"
+"culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under section 304, Part I. Here,"
+the intention on the part of the respondent-accused in causing bodily injury as is likely
+to cause death is also not a disputed fact. The only thing which is to be tested is
+"whether the bodily injury is covered under either of the clauses of section 300 of IPC,"
+1860 (transfer of malice doctrine applied).193.
+[s 301.1] Transfer of malice.—
+The accused intended to cause death of his victim. But the stab aimed at him fell on
+the chest of the deceased resulting in his death. It was held that as per the doctrine of
+"transfer of malice, it must be presumed that the accused intended to cause death of"
+the deceased alone. His act attracted the offence under section 301 read with section
+302.194.
+[s 301.2] CASES.—
+"Four persons were shooting at R in furtherance of their common intention to kill M, in"
+the bona fide belief that R was M. R died as a result of the gunshot wounds. It was held
+by the Supreme Court that the accuseds were guilty under section 302 read with
+section 34 and that section 301 had no application.195.
+"183. Dan Behari v State of UP, 2003 Cr LJ 4959 ."
+"184. Viswanath Pillai v State of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 1037 , the court referred Ballan v The State,"
+"AIR 1955 All 626 [LNIND 1955 ALL 71] , wherein the scope of section 301 was discussed and"
+"Suba v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 344 : 1928 (29) Cr LJ 280 ."
+"185. Shankarlal, AIR 1965 SC 1260 [LNIND 1964 SC 230] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 266 ."
+"186. Gyanendra Kumar v State, 1972 Cr LJ 308 : AIR 1972 SC 502 [LNIND 1971 SC 601] ."
+"187. Abdul v State of Gujarat, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 464 : AIR 1994 SC 1910 [LNIND 1994 SC 209] ."
+"188. Jagpal Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982 : 1991 Cr LJ 597 : 1991 Supp (1) SCC 549"
+.
+"189. Padmanabhan v State of Kerala, 1988 Cr LJ 591 (Ker)."
+"190. 7th Parl Rep 26; Jeoli, (1916) 39 All 161 ."
+"191. Geja Sabar v State of Orissa, 2009 Cr LJ 4685 ."
+"192. Kashi Ram v State of MP, AIR 2001 SC 2902 [LNIND 2001 SC 2369] . Rameshwar v State of"
+"UP, 1997 Cr LJ 2677 (All), a minor killed by gunshot injury, the accused wanted to kill the victim's"
+"father. Conviction under section 304, Part I."
+"193. State of Rajasthan v Ram Kailash, AIR 2016 SC 634 [LNIND 2016 SC 41] : (2016) 4 SCC 590"
+[LNIND 2016 SC 41] .
+"194. Nagaraj v State, 2006 Cr LJ 3724 (Mad—DB)."
+"195. Shankarlal, AIR 1965 SC 1260 [LNIND 1964 SC 230] . See also Balwinder v State of Punjab,"
+(1987) 1 SCC 1 [LNIND 1986 SC 482] : 1987 Cr LJ 330 : AIR 1987 SC 350 [LNIND 1986 SC 482]
+"where a conviction was upheld on the basis of circumstantial evidence only, such as, last seen"
+"together, abscondence, recovery of dead body at his instance, and false pleas. But no such"
+"conviction was upheld in Kansa Bahera v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 1857 : (1987) 1 SCC 480 :"
+"AIR 1987 SC 1507 [LNIND 1987 SC 383] , because the circumstances were not capable of"
+leading to the single point conclusion of the guilt of the accused person. The Supreme Court
+has reiterated that a High Court should not grant anticipatory bail to a person against whom a
+"report of dowry death is under investigation. Samunder Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1987) 1 SCC"
+466 [LNIND 1987 SC 38] : AIR 1987 SC 737 [LNIND 1987 SC 38] . For an example of conviction
+"under the section for bride-burning see Surinder Kumar v State (Delhi Administration, Delhi),"
+(1987) 1 SCC 467 [LNIND 1987 SC 38] : AIR 1987 SC 692 : 1987 Cr LJ 537 . For burning a
+"mistress and conviction on the basis of her dying declaration, see, Suresh v State of MP, (1987) 2"
+"SCC 32 : 1987 Cr LJ 775 : AIR 1987 SC 860 . Unless there is infirmity, illegality, failure of justice"
+"or question of principle, the court does not interfere in a concurrent sentence and conviction by"
+"trial and High Court. Gopal v State of Tamil Nadu, (1986) 2 SCC 93 [LNIND 1986 SC 26] : AIR"
+"1986 SC 702 [LNIND 1986 SC 26] . Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v State of M.P., AIR 1989 SC 1890 :"
+"1989 Cr LJ 2124 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560 ; Death caused by gunshot injuries, remarkable eye-"
+"witness account, conviction, Bikkar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1989 SC 1440 : 1989 Cr LJ 1457"
+", but acquittal where eye-witness's account was doubtful, prosecution version different from"
+dying declaration and no explanation of injuries on the person of the accused; State of U.P. v
+"Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519 : 1989 Cr LJ 1485 : (1989) 3 SCC 390 ; charges of abduction,"
+"murder and rape, trial court acquitting because body was not traceable, High Court convicting"
+"for abduction, conviction sustained, Arun Kumar v State of U.P., AIR 1989 SC 1445 : 1989 Cr LJ"
+"1460 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 322 . Re-appreciation of evidence in the absence of the counsel,"
+"conviction found justified, Daya Ram v State (Delhi) Admn), (1988) 1 SCC 615 [LNIND 1988 SC"
+41] : AIR 1988 SC 613 : 1988 Cr LJ 865 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 302] Punishment for murder.
+"Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or 196.[imprisonment for life],"
+and shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+Section 302 provides the punishment for murder. It stipulates a punishment of death or
+imprisonment for life and fine. Once an offender is found by the Court to be guilty of
+"the offence of murder under section 302, then it has to sentence the offender to either"
+death or for imprisonment for life. The Court has no power to impose any lesser
+sentence.
+[s 302.1] Punishment for murder.—Evolution.—
+"Cr PC, 1898 had section 376(5) which required that if an accused is convicted of an"
+offence punishable with death and the Court sentences him with any punishment other
+"than death, the Court shall, in its judgment, give reasons why death sentence was not"
+passed. The provision of section 367(5) of the 1898 Code reads as follows:
+"(5) If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court"
+"sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state"
+the reason why sentence of death was not passed.
+"In 1955, Cr PC (Amendment) Act, 1955 deleted the aforesaid section 367(5) of the"
+"1898 Code. As a result of this amendment, which came into effect from 1 January"
+"1956, it was no longer necessary for a Court to record in its judgment, in case of"
+"conviction in connection with an offence punishable with death, any reason for not"
+"imposing the death sentence. Thus, in the new Code, the discretion of the judge to"
+"impose death sentence has been narrowed, for the Court has to provide special"
+reasons for imposing a sentence of death. It has made imprisonment for life the rule
+"and death sentence an exception, in the matter of awarding punishment for murder.197."
+Reference to extenuating or mitigating circumstances in a case of death penalty was
+made possibly for the first time by Supreme Court in the case of Nawab Singh v State of
+"UP.198. The Court held that in the facts of that case, murder was a cruel and deliberate"
+"one and there were no extenuating circumstances. After the amendment of 1898 Code,"
+"in the year 1955, the first case relating to death sentence, which came before Supreme"
+"Court was that of Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras,199. in which it was held that the"
+"question of sentence has to be determined, not with reference to the volume or"
+character of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the prosecution
+"case, but with reference to the fact whether there are any extenuating circumstances"
+which can be said to mitigate the enormity of the crime. If the Court is satisfied that
+"there are such mitigating circumstances, only then, it would be justified in imposing the"
+lesser of the two sentences provided by law.
+[s 302.2] Constitutionality of Death penalty.—
+The constitutionality of death sentence was challenged in the case of Jagmohan Singh
+v State of UP.200. The Constitution Bench while upholding the constitutionality of death
+penalty examined whether total discretion can be conferred on the judges in awarding
+"death sentence, when the statute does not provide any guidelines on how to exercise"
+"the same. The decision in Jagmohan Singh (supra) was rendered when Cr PC, 1973"
+"was not in existence. However, the aforesaid position substantially changed with the"
+"introduction of a changed sentencing structure under Cr PC, 1973. In Rajendra Prasad v"
+"State of UP,201. it was held that the special reasons necessary for imposing a death"
+penalty must relate not to the crime but to the criminal. It could be awarded only if the
+"security of the state and society, public order in the interest of the general public"
+compelled that course.
+Proposition laid down by the Constitution Bench in Jagmohan Singh's Case
+"(i) The general legislative policy that underlines the structure of our criminal law,"
+"principally contained in the IPC, 1860 and Cr PC, 1973, is to define an offence"
+"with sufficient clarity and to prescribe only the maximum punishment therefore,"
+and to allow a very wide discretion to the Judge in the matter of fixing the degree
+of punishment.
+"With the solitary exception of section 303, the same policy permeates section"
+"302 and some other sections of IPC, 1860, where the maximum punishment is"
+the death penalty.
+(ii) (a) No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
+"should be considered when sentencing an offender, is possible. ""The infinite"
+variety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards
+either meaningless 'boiler plate' or a statement of the obvious that no Jury
+"(Judge) would need."" (referred to McGoutha v California.202."
+(b) The impossibility of laying down standards is at the very core of the
+criminal law as administered in India which invests the Judges with a
+very wide discretion in the matter of fixing the degree of punishment.
+"(iii) The view taken by the plurality in Furman v Georgia,203. decided by the Supreme"
+"Court of the United States, to the effect, that a law which gives uncontrolled and"
+unguided discretion to the Jury (or the Judge) to choose arbitrarily between a
+"sentence of death and imprisonment for a capital offence, violates the Eighth"
+"Amendment, is not applicable in India. We do not have in our Constitution any"
+"provision like the Eighth Amendment, nor are we at liberty to apply the test of"
+reasonableness with the freedom with which the Judges of the Supreme Court
+"of America are accustomed to apply ""the due process"" clause. There are grave"
+doubts about the expediency of transplanting western experience in our
+country. Social conditions are different and so also the general intellectual level.
+Arguments which would be valid in respect of one area of the world may not
+hold good in respect of another area.
+(iv) (a) This discretion in the matter of sentence is to be exercised by the Judge
+"judicially, after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of"
+the crime.
+(b) The discretion is liable to be corrected by Superior Courts. The
+"exercise of judicial discretion on well-recognised principles is, in the"
+"final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for the accused. In view"
+"of the above, it will be impossible to say that there would be at all any"
+"discrimination, since crime as crime may appear to be superficially"
+"the same, but the facts and circumstances of a crime are widely"
+"different. Thus considered, the provision in section 302, IPC, 1860 is"
+not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that it
+confers on the Judges an unguided and uncontrolled discretion in the
+matter of awarding capital punishment or imprisonment for life.
+(v) (a) Relevant facts and circumstances impinging on the nature and
+circumstances of the crime can be brought before the Court at the
+"preconviction stage, notwithstanding the fact that no formal procedure for"
+producing evidence regarding such facts and circumstances had been
+specifically provided. Where counsel addresses the Court with regard to the
+"character and standing of the accused, they are duly considered by the Court"
+unless there is something in the evidence itself which belies him or the Public
+Prosecutor challenges the facts.
+(b) It is to be emphasised that in exercising its discretion to choose either
+"of the two alternative sentences provided in section 302, IPC, 1860:"
+the Court is principally concerned with the facts and circumstances
+"whether aggravating or mitigating, which are connected with the"
+particular crime under inquiry. All such facts and circumstances are
+capable of being proved in accordance with the provisions of the
+Indian Evidence Act in a trial regulated by the CrPC. The trial does not
+come to an end until all the relevant facts are proved and the counsel
+on both sides have an opportunity to address the Court. The only thing
+that remains is for the Judge to decide on the guilt and punishment
+"and that is whats. 306(2) and s. 309(2), CrPC purport to provide for."
+These provisions are part of the procedure established by law and
+unless it is shown that they are invalid for any other reasons they must
+be regarded as valid. No reasons are offered to show that they are
+constitutionally invalid and hence the death sentence imposed after
+trial in accordance with the procedure established by law is not
+unconstitutional under Art. 21.
+[Jagmohan Singh v State of UP.]204.
+[s 302.3] Evolution of Sentencing Policy
+Capital punishment has been a subject matter of great social and judicial discussion
+"and catechism. From whatever point of view it is examined, one undisputable"
+statement of law follows that it is neither possible nor prudent to state any universal
+formula which would be applicable to all the cases of criminology where capital
+punishment has been prescribed. It shall always depend upon the facts and
+circumstances of a given case.205.
+[s 302.4] Phase-I (Focus on Crime).—
+Jagmohan Singh's Case (supra) laid down that discretion in the matter of sentencing is
+to be exercised by the judge after balancing all the aggravating and mitigating
+"circumstances ""of the crime"". Jagmohan Singh also laid down in proposition that while"
+"choosing between the two alternative sentences provided in section 302 of IPC, 1860"
+"(sentence of death and sentence of life imprisonment), the Court is principally"
+concerned with the aggravating or mitigating circumstances connected with the
+"""particular crime under inquiry""."
+[s 302.5] Legislative Change.—
+The 41st Law Commission Report proposed extensive changes in the 1898 Code. In
+"paragraph 23.2 of the said report, the Law Commission recommended a set of new"
+"provisions for governing ""trials before a Court of sessions"". With regard tosection 309"
+"of the 1898 Code, the Law Commission recommended that hearing of the accused was"
+most desirable before passing any sentence against him. This recommendation was
+"accepted and incorporated while enacting section 235, Cr PC in 1973 Code within"
+"Chapter XVIII of the same under the heading ""Trial before a Court of Sessions"". The"
+most significant change brought about by the incorporation of the recommendation of
+"the Law Commission, is the giving of an opportunity of hearing to the accused on the"
+question of sentence. This opportunity of hearing at the post-conviction stage gives the
+accused an opportunity to raise fundamental issues for adjudication and effective
+determination by Court of its sentencing discretion in a fair and reasonable manner. In
+"Santa Singh v State of Punjab,206. the Supreme Court held that this provision is in"
+consonance with the modern trends in penology and sentencing procedures. It was
+further held that proper exercise of sentencing discretion calls for consideration of
+"various factors like the nature of offence, the circumstances—both extenuating or"
+"aggravating, the prior criminal record, if any, of the offender, the age of the offender, his"
+"background, his education, his personal life, his social adjustment, the emotional and"
+"mental condition of the offender, the prospects for the rehabilitation of the offender, the"
+"possibility of his rehabilitation in the life of community, the possibility of treatment or"
+"training of the offender, the possibility that the sentence may serve as a deterrent to"
+crime by the offender or by others.
+"[s 302.6] Phase-II Doctrine of ""Rarest of rare"" (Shifting the focus from crime to"
+criminal).—
+"In Bachan Singh v State of Punjab,207. another Constitution Bench, while upholding the"
+constitutional validity of death sentence observed that for persons convicted of
+"murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. The principal"
+questions considered in this case were:
+"(i) Whether death penalty provided for the offence of murder in Section 302, Penal Code is"
+unconstitutional.
+"(ii) If the answer to the foregoing question be in the negative, whether the sentencing"
+"procedure provided in Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 (Act 2 of 1974) is unconstitutional"
+on the ground that it invests the Court with unguided and untrammelled discretion and
+allows death sentence to be arbitrarily or freakishly imposed on a person found guilty of
+"murder or any other capital offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code with death or, in"
+"the alternative, with imprisonment for life."
+The conclusion of the Constitution Bench was that the sentence of death ought to be
+given only in the 'rarest of rare cases' [See the Box with 'Supreme Court Guidelines in
+Bachan Singh'] and it should be given only when the option of awarding the sentence of
+"life imprisonment is ""unquestionably foreclosed"". It laid down the framework law on"
+this point. Bachan Singh effectively opened up Phase II of a sentencing policy by
+shifting the focus from the crime to the crime and the criminal.
+Supreme Court Guidelines in Bachan Singh
+(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of
+extreme culpability;
+"(ii) Before opting for the death penalty, the circumstances of the 'offender' also"
+require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the
+'crime';
+(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other
+"words, death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears"
+to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant
+"circumstances of the crime, and only provided, the option to impose sentence"
+of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to
+the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances;
+(iv) A balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn
+up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full
+weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the
+mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.
+[Bachan Singh v State of Punjab.208.]
+"The judgment in Machhi Singh v State of Rajasthan,209. did not only state the above"
+"guidelines in some elaboration, but also specified the mitigating circumstances which"
+could be considered by the Court while determining such serious issues.210. Despite
+the legislative change and Bachan Singh discarding proposition (iv)(a) of Jagmohan
+"Singh, Supreme Court in Machhi Singh revived the ""balancing"" of aggravating and"
+"mitigating circumstances through a balance sheet theory. In doing so, it sought to"
+compare aggravating circumstances pertaining to a crime with the mitigating
+"circumstances pertaining to a criminal. It hardly need be stated, with respect, that"
+these are completely distinct and different elements and cannot be compared with one
+another. A balance sheet cannot be drawn up of two distinct and different constituents
+"of an incident. Nevertheless, the balance sheet theory held the field post Machhi"
+Singh.211.
+Supreme Court Guidelines in Machhi Singh
+"Factors to be considered while determining the ""rarest of rare"" case"
+I. Manner of commission of murder
+"33. When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical,"
+"revolting, or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the"
+community. For instance.
+(i) When the house of the victim is set aflame with the end in view to roast him alive
+"in the house,"
+(ii) When the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of torture or cruelty in order to
+bring about his or her death.
+(iii) When the body of the victim is cut into pieces or his body is dismembered in a
+fiendish manner.
+II. Motive for commission of murder
+34. When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and
+"meanness. For instance, when (a) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of"
+money or reward; (b) a cold-blooded murder is committed with a deliberate design in
+order to inherit property or to gain control over property of a ward or a person under the
+control of the murderer or vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in
+a position of trust; (c) a murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the
+motherland.
+III. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime
+"(a) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community etc., is"
+committed not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath.
+"For instance, when such a crime is committed in order to terrorise such persons and"
+"frighten them into fleeing from a place or in order to deprive them of, or make them"
+"surrender, lands or benefits conferred on them with a view to reverse past injustices"
+and in order to restore the social balance.
+(b) In cases of 'bride burning' and what are known as 'dowry-deaths' or when murder is
+committed in order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry
+another woman on account of infatuation.
+IV. Magnitude of crime
+"35. When the crime is enormous in proportion. For instance, when multiple murders say"
+of all or almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular
+"caste, community, or locality, are committed."
+V. Personality of victim of murder
+36. When the victim of murder is (a) an innocent child who could not have or has not
+"provided even an excuse, much less a provocation, for murder, (b) a helpless woman or"
+"a person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity, (c) when the victim is a person vis-a-"
+"vis whom the murderer is in a position of domination or trust, (d) when the victim is a"
+public figure generally loved and respected by the community for the services rendered
+by him and the murder is committed for political or similar reasons other than personal
+reasons.
+[Machhi Singh v State of Punjab.212.]
+It is always preferred not to fetter the judicial discretion by attempting to make
+"excessive enumeration, in one way or another; and that both aspects namely"
+aggravating and mitigating circumstances have to be given their respective weightage
+and that the Court has to strike the balance between the two and see towards which
+side the scale/balance of justice tilts.213.
+The aggravating and mitigating circumstances required to be taken into consideration
+"while applying the doctrine of ""rarest of rare"" crime"
+39. Aggravating circumstances:
+"1. The offences relating to the commission of heinous crimes like murder, rape,"
+"armed dacoity, etc. by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital"
+felony.
+2. The offence was committed while the offender was committing another serious
+offence.
+3. The offence was committed with the intention to create a fear psychosis in the
+public at large and was committed in a public place by a weapon or device which
+clearly could be hazardous to the life of more than one person.
+4. The offence of murder was committed for ransom or like offences to receive
+money or monetary benefits.
+5. Hired killings.
+6. The offence was committed outrageously for want only while involving inhumane
+treatment and torture to the victim.
+7. The offence was committed by a person while in lawful custody.
+8. The offence was committed to prevent a person lawfully carrying out his duty like
+arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement of himself or another. For
+"instance, murder is of a person who had acted in lawful discharge of his duty"
+"under section 43, Cr PC, 1973."
+9. When the crime is enormous in proportion like making an attempt of murder of
+the entire family or members of a particular community.
+"10. When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person relies upon the trust of"
+"relationship and social norms, like a child, helpless woman, a daughter or a"
+niece staying with a father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime by such a
+trusted person.
+11. When murder is committed for a motive which evidences total depravity and
+meanness.
+12. When there is a cold-blooded murder without provocation.
+13. The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or shocks not only the judicial
+conscience but even the conscience of the society.
+Mitigating circumstances:
+"1. The manner and circumstances in and under which the offence was committed,"
+"for example, extreme mental or emotional disturbance or extreme provocation in"
+contradistinction to all these situations in normal course.
+2. The age of the accused is a relevant consideration but not a determinative factor
+by itself.
+3. The chances of the accused of not indulging in commission of the crime again
+and the probability of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
+4. The condition of the accused shows that he was mentally defective and the
+defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the circumstances of his criminal
+conduct.
+"5. The circumstances which, in normal course of life, would render such a"
+behaviour possible and could have the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance
+"in that given situation like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading to such a"
+"peak of human behaviour that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the"
+accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence.
+6. Where the Court upon proper appreciation of evidence is of the view that the
+crime was not committed in a pre-ordained manner and that the death resulted in
+the course of commission of another crime and that there was a possibility of it
+being construed as consequences to the commission of the primary crime.
+7. Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness
+though prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused.
+"40. While determining the questions relatable to sentencing policy, the Court has to"
+follow certain principles and those principles are the loadstar besides the above
+considerations in imposition or otherwise of the death sentence.
+Principles:
+"(1) The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the 'rarest of rare' case for"
+imposition of a death sentence.
+"(2) In the opinion of the Court, imposition of any other punishment, i.e., life"
+imprisonment would be completely inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice.
+(3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception.
+(4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously
+exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant
+considerations.
+(5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and
+"inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to"
+commission of such heinous crime.
+Ramnaresh v State of Chhattisgarh;214. Brajendra Singh v State of MP.215.
+[s 302.7] Considerations for or against death sentence.—Balance sheet of
+aggravating and mitigating factors.—
+"Both in Bachan Singh and Machhi Singh's cases, guidelines have been indicated by the"
+Supreme Court as to when this extreme sentence should be awarded and when not. In
+"fine, a balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up"
+and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a
+just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
+before the option is exercised to award one sentence or the other.
+The cardinal questions to be asked and answered are:—
+(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of
+imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence?
+(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to
+impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the
+mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?
+"If after taking into consideration all these circumstances, it is felt that death sentence"
+"is warranted, the Court would proceed to do so.216. Thus, where murder is"
+"premeditated217. or is committed in an organised manner,218. or by a hired"
+assassin219. or by a lawyer220. or where it is gruesome221. or is committed with utmost
+"depravity,222. death sentence seems to be the proper sentence in all such cases."
+[s 302.8] Need for flexibility.—
+The Supreme Court has re-examined the categories after a gap of 25 years in Swami
+Shraddananda v State of Karnataka.223. The circumstances and conditions of life have
+"very seriously changed since then and, therefore, even if those categories are to be"
+"observed, some scope for flexibility should always be maintained. Giving a brief view of"
+"the changed scenario, the Supreme Court noted that a careful reading of the Machhi"
+Singh categories makes it clear that the classification was made looking at murder
+"mainly as an act of maladjusted individual criminal(s). In 1983, the country was"
+relatively free from organised and professional crime. Abduction for ransom and gang
+rape and murders committed in course of those offences were yet to become a
+menace for the society compelling the legislature to create special slots for those
+"offences in IPC, 1860. At the time of Machhi Singh, Delhi had not witnessed the"
+infamous Sikh carnage. There had been no attack on the country's Parliament. There
+"were no bombs planted by terrorists killing completely innocent people, men, women"
+"and children in dozens with sickening frequency. There were no private armies, no"
+"mafia cornering huge Government contracts purely by muscle power, no reports of"
+"killings of social activists and ""whistle-blowers"", no reports of custodial deaths and"
+rape and fake encounters by police or even by armed forces. These developments
+would unquestionably find a more pronounced reflection in any classification if one
+"were to be made today. Relying upon the observations in Bachan Singh, therefore, even"
+"though the categories framed in Machhi Singh provide very useful guidelines,"
+"nonetheless those cannot be taken as inflexible, absolute or immutable. Further, even"
+"in those categories, there would be scope for flexibility as observed in Bachan Singh"
+itself.
+[s 302.9] Santosh Bariyar—A landmark.—
+"In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra,224. while sharing"
+"Supreme Court's ""unease and sense of disquiet"" it was observed that:"
+the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances approach invoked on a case
+by case basis has not worked sufficiently well so as to remove the vice of arbitrariness from
+"our capital sentencing system. It can be safely said that the Bachan Singh threshold of ""the"
+"rarest of rare cases"" has been most variedly and inconsistently applied by the various High"
+Courts as also this Court.
+The Judgments which are held to be per incurium in Santhosh Bariyar:
+"(1) Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar Alhat v State of Maharashtra,225."
+"(2) Mohan Anna Chavan v State of Maharashtra,226."
+"(3) Bantu v State of UP,227."
+"(4) Surja Ram v State of Rajasthan,228."
+"(5) Dayanidhi Bisoi v State of Orissa,229. and"
+(6) State of UP v Sattan @ Satyendra.230.
+"In Sangeet v State of Haryana,231. in an unprecedented Judgment, a two-judge bench of"
+the Supreme Court held that the Court has not endorsed the approach of aggravating
+and mitigating circumstances in the Constitution Bench Judgment in Bachan Singh and
+observed that it needs a fresh look. [See the Box with 'Principles summarised in
+Sangeet's Case by Supreme Court'.] The bench observed that even though Bachan Singh
+"intended ""principled sentencing"", sentencing has now really become judge-centric as"
+highlighted in Swamy Shraddananda and Bariyar. This aspect of the sentencing policy in
+Phase II as introduced by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh seems to have been
+lost in transition.
+Principles summarised in Sangeet's Case by Supreme Court
+80. 1. This Court has not endorsed the approach of aggravating and mitigating
+"circumstances in Bachan Singh. However, this approach has been adopted in several"
+"decisions. This needs a fresh look. In any event, there is little or no uniformity in the"
+application of this approach.
+2. Aggravating circumstances relate to the crime while mitigating circumstances relate to
+the criminal. A balance sheet cannot be drawn up for comparing the two. The
+considerations for both are distinct and unrelated. The use of the mantra of aggravating and
+mitigating circumstances needs a review.
+"3. In the sentencing process, both the crime and the criminal are equally important. We"
+"have, unfortunately, not taken the sentencing process as seriously as it should be with the"
+"result that in capital offences, it has become judge-centric sentencing rather than principled"
+sentencing.
+4. The Constitution Bench of this Court has not encouraged standardization and
+categorization of crimes and even otherwise it is not possible to standardize and categorize
+all crimes.
+"5. The grant of remissions is statutory. However, to prevent its arbitrary exercise, the"
+legislature has built in some procedural and substantive checks in the statute. These need
+to be faithfully enforced.
+6. Remission can be granted under Section 432 of the CrPC in the case of a definite term of
+"sentence. The power under this Section is available only for granting ""additional"" remission,"
+"that is, for a period over and above the remission granted or awarded to a convict under the"
+Jail Manual or other statutory rules. If the term of sentence is indefinite (as in life
+"imprisonment), the power under Section 432 of the CrPC can certainly be exercised but not"
+on the basis that life imprisonment is an arbitrary or notional figure of twenty years of
+imprisonment.
+7. Before actually exercising the power of remission under Section 432 of the CrPC the
+appropriate Government must obtain the opinion (with reasons) of the presiding judge of
+"the convicting or confirming Court. Remissions can, therefore, be given only on a case-by-"
+case basis and not in a wholesale manner.
+[Sangeet v State of Haryana.]232.
+"In Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab,233. another two-Judge Bench analysed the various"
+principles laid down in decisions reported in Swamy Shraddananda @ Murali Manohar
+"Mishra v State of Karnataka,234. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of"
+"Maharashtra,235. Mohd Farooq Abdul Gafur v State of Maharashtra,236. Haresh"
+"Mohandas Rajput v State of Maharashtra,237. State of Maharashtra v Goraksha Ambaji"
+"Adsul,238. and the Supreme Court's decision reported in Mohammed Ajmal"
+"Mohammadamir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid v State of Maharashtra,239. and held that a"
+conclusion as to the 'rarest of rare' aspect with respect to a matter shall entail
+identification of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating both to the crime
+and the criminal and the expression 'special reasons' obviously means ('exceptional
+reasons') founded on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case
+relating to the crime as well as the criminal.240.
+Principles summarised in Mohinder Singh's Case by Supreme Court
+(i) A conclusion as to the 'rarest of rare' aspect with respect to a matter shall entail
+identification of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating both to the crime
+and the criminal.
+(ii) The expression 'special reasons' obviously means ('exceptional reasons') founded
+on the exceptionally grave circumstances of the particular case relating to the crime as
+well as the criminal.
+"(iii) The decision in Ravji @ Ram Chandra v State of Rajasthan,241. which was"
+"subsequently followed in six other cases, namely, Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar Alhat v State"
+"of Maharashtra,242. Mohan Anna Chavan v State of Maharashtra,243. Bantu v State of"
+"UP,244. Surja Ram v State of Rajasthan,245. Dayanidhi Bisoi v State of Orissa,246. and"
+"State of UP v Sattan @ Satyendra and Others,247. wherein it was held that it is only"
+"characteristics relating to crime, to the exclusion of the ones relating to criminal, which"
+"are relevant to sentencing in criminal trial, was rendered per incuriam qua Bachan Singh"
+(supra) in the decision reported in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar (supra) at 529.
+(iv) Public opinion is difficult to fit in the 'rarest of rare' matrix. People's perception of
+crime is neither an objective circumstance relating to crime nor to the criminal.
+"Perception of public is extraneous to conviction as also sentencing, at least in capital"
+sentencing according to the mandate of Bachan Singh (supra). [2009 (6) SCC 498
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1278] at p 535.]
+(v) Capital sentencing is one such field where the safeguards continuously take
+strength from the Constitution. [(2009) 6 SCC 498 [LNIND 2009 SC 1278] at 539.]
+(vi) The Apex Court as the final reviewing authority has a far more serious and intensive
+duty to discharge and the Court not only has to ensure that award of death penalty
+does not become a perfunctory exercise of discretion under section 302 after an
+"ostensible consideration of 'rarest of rare' doctrine, but also that the decision-making"
+process survives the special rigours of procedural justice applicable in this regard.248.
+(vii) The 'rarest of rare' case comes when a convict would be a menace and threat to
+the harmonious and peaceful coexistence of the society. The crime may be heinous or
+"brutal but may not be in the category of ""the rarest of the rare case"". There must be no"
+reason to believe that the accused cannot be reformed or rehabilitated and that he is
+likely to continue criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to
+the society.249.
+(viii) Life sentence is the rule and the death penalty is the exception. The condition of
+providing special reasons for awarding death penalty is not to be construed
+linguistically but it is to satisfy the basic features of a reasoning supporting and
+making award of death penalty unquestionable.
+(ix) The circumstances and the manner of committing the crime should be such that it
+pricks the judicial conscience of the Court to the extent that the only and inevitable
+conclusion should be awarding of death penalty.
+State of Maharashtra v Goraksha Ambaji Adsul250. and Mohinder Singh v State of
+Punjab.251.
+"[s 302.10] Crime Test, Criminal Test and RR Test.—"
+"The tests that we have to apply, while awarding death sentence, are ""crime test"","
+"""criminal test"" and the RR Test and not ""balancing test"". To award death sentence, the"
+"""crime test"" has to be fully satisfied, that is 100% and ""criminal test"" 0%, that is no"
+Mitigating Circumstance favouring the accused. If there is any circumstance favouring
+"the accused, like lack of intention to commit the crime, possibility of reformation,"
+"young age of the accused, not a menace to the society, no previous track record, etc.,"
+"the ""criminal test"" may favour the accused to avoid the capital punishment. Even if both"
+"the tests are satisfied, that is the aggravating circumstances to the fullest extent and"
+"no mitigating circumstances favouring the accused, still we have to apply finally the"
+Rarest of Rare Case test (RR Test). RR Test depends upon the perception of the society
+"that is ""society centric"" and not ""Judge centric"", that is, whether the society will approve"
+the awarding of death sentence to certainty types of crimes or not. While applying that
+"test, the Court has to look into variety of factors like society's abhorrence, extreme"
+indignation and antipathy to certain types of crimes like sexual assault and murder of
+"minor girls intellectually challenged, suffering from physical disability, old and infirm"
+"women with those disabilities, etc. Examples are only illustrative and not exhaustive."
+"Courts award death sentence since situation demands so, due to constitutional"
+"compulsion, reflected by the will of the people and not the will of the judges.252."
+Some Cases where the Court applied the Criminal test to avoid Death Penalty:
+"(1) Kumudi Lal v State of UP,253."
+"(2) Raju v State of Haryana,254."
+"(3) Bantu @ Naresh Giri v State of MP,255."
+"(4) State of Maharashtra v Suresh,256."
+"(5) Amrit Singh v State of Punjab,257."
+"(6) Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v State of Gujarat,258."
+"(7) Surendra Pal Shivbalak v State of Gujarat,259."
+(8) Amit v State of Maharashtra.260.
+[s 302.11] Via media between Death Sentence and Life Imprisonment.—
+"It was in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka,261. that a three-Judge Bench of"
+the Supreme Court concluded that there is a good and strong basis for the Court to
+substitute a death sentence by life imprisonment or by a term in excess of 14 years and
+further to direct that the convict must not be released from the prison for the rest of his
+"life or for the actual term as specified in the order, as the case may be. But a two-Judge"
+"Bench in Sangeet v State of Haryana,262. in which it was held that:"
+a reading of some recent decisions delivered by this Court seems to suggest that the
+remission power of the appropriate Government has effectively been nullified by awarding
+"sentences of 20 years, 25 years and in some cases without any remission. Is this"
+permissible? Can this Court (or any Court for that matter) restrain the appropriate
+Government from granting remission of a sentence to a convict? What this Court has done
+"in Swamy Shraddananda and several other cases, by giving a sentence in a capital offence"
+"of 20 years or 30 years imprisonment without remission, is to effectively injunct the"
+appropriate Government from exercising its power of remission for the specified period. In
+"our opinion, this issue needs further and greater discussion, but as at present advised, we"
+are of the opinion that this is not permissible. The appropriate Government cannot be told
+"that it is prohibited from granting remission of a sentence. Similarly, a convict cannot be"
+"told that he cannot apply for a remission in his sentence, whatever the reason. In this case,"
+though the Division Bench raised a doubt about the decision of a three-Judge Bench in
+"Swamy Shraddananda (supra), yet the same has not been referred to a larger Bench."
+"In Sahib Hussain @ Sahib Jan v State of Rajasthan,263. another two-Judge Bench"
+reiterated the position held in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) by holding that the
+observations in Sangeet (supra) are not warranted. In Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of
+"Punjab,264. other two-Judge bench also termed the remarks in Sangeet (supra) as"
+'unwarranted' and opined that if the two-judge bench was of the opinion that earlier
+"judgments, even of a larger Bench were not justified, the Bench ought to have referred"
+"the matter to the larger Bench. However, in some cases, the Court had also been"
+"voicing concern about the statutory basis of such orders.265. In a judgment,266."
+Supreme Court opined that:
+"We are of the view that it will do well in case a proper amendment u/s. 53 of IPC is provided,"
+introducing one more category of punishment—life imprisonment without commutation or
+"remission. Dr. Justice V. S. Malimath in the Report on ""Committee of Reforms of Criminal"
+"Justice System"", submitted in 2003, had made such a suggestion but so far no serious"
+steps have been taken in that regard. There could be a provision for imprisonment till death
+without remission or commutation.
+[s 302.12] Sessions' Court's power.—
+The Session Judges do not have the power to impose the harsher variety of life
+sentence which is recognised by Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka267. as
+"an option available in law for the Courts to avoid the harshest, irreversible and"
+incorrectable sentence of death. That sentencing option is available only to
+Constitutional Courts —the High Courts and the Supreme Court.268.
+[s 302.13] Delay in execution of death sentence.—
+It is well-established that exercising of power under Article 72/161 by the President or
+the Governor is a Constitutional obligation and not a mere prerogative.269. Time taken
+in Court proceedings cannot be taken into account to say that there is a delay which
+"would convert a death sentence into one for life.270. In TV Vatheeswaran,271. overruled"
+"in Triveni Ben v State of Gujarat,272. a two-Judge Bench of Supreme Court considered"
+"whether the accused, who was convicted for an offence of murder and sentenced to"
+"death, kept in solitary confinement for about eight years was entitled to commutation"
+of death sentence. It was held that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a
+sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence
+of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death.273.
+"But a three-Judge bench in Sher Singh v State of Punjab,274. held that though prolonged"
+delay in the execution of a death sentence is unquestionably an important
+"consideration for determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be executed,"
+"no hard and fast rule that ""delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of"
+death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to
+"invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death"" can be laid down as"
+"has been done in Vatheeswaran (supra). Javed Ahmed v State of Maharashtra,275. re-"
+iterated the proposition laid down in Vatheeswaran (supra) case and doubted the
+competence of the three-judge bench to overrule the Vatheeswaran case. The
+conflicting views are finally settled by the Constitution Bench in Triveni Ben v State of
+Gujarat.276. It overruled Vatheeswaran (supra) holding that undue long delay in
+execution of the sentence of death will entitle the condemned person to approach the
+Supreme Court under Article 32 but the Court will only examine the nature of delay
+caused and circumstances that ensued after sentence will finally be confirmed by the
+judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to reopen the conclusions reached by the
+"Court while finally maintaining the sentence of death. Court, however, may consider the"
+question of inordinate delay in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide
+whether the execution of sentence should be carried out or should be altered into
+imprisonment for life. No fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of
+death inexecutable and to this extent the decision in Vatheeswaran's case cannot be
+"said to lay down the correct law. In Madhu Mehta v UOI,277. Supreme Court commuted"
+the death sentence on the ground that the mercy petition was pending for eight years
+after disposal of the criminal appeal by Supreme Court.
+It is well established that exercising of power under Article 72/161 by the President or
+the Governor is a constitutional obligation and not a mere prerogative. Considering the
+"high status of office, the Constitutional framers did not stipulate any outer time limit for"
+"disposing the mercy petitions under the said Articles, which means it should be"
+"decided within reasonable time. However, when the delay caused in disposing the"
+"mercy petitions is seen to be unreasonable, unexplained and exorbitant, it is the duty of"
+the Supreme Court to step in and consider this aspect.278.
+[s 302.13.1] Nirbhaya Case279..—
+"In this case, the Supreme Court analysed all the decisions, where the question of"
+imposing the death penalty was discussed and examined the aggravating and
+"mitigating circumstances and opined that the appetite for sex, the hunger for violence,"
+"the position of the empowered and the attitude of perversity of the accused, to say the"
+"least, are bound to shock the collective conscience which knows not what to do."
+The Supreme Court observed that:
+the casual manner with which she was treated and devilish manner in which they played
+with her identity and dignity is humanly inconceivable. It sounds like a story from different
+world where humanity has been treated with irreverence. Aggravating circumstances
+outweigh mitigating circumstances.
+"The Supreme Court held the accused persons guilty of offences which are brutal,"
+diabolic and barbaric in nature and fall within category of rarest of rare cases. The
+Supreme Court held that the sentence of death penalty was proper; there was no
+reason to differ with same.280.
+[s 302.14] Mitigating factors.
+"At the material time, the accused was under influence of alcohol and the fact that his"
+"mental faculty was not in order, was considered as a relevant mitigating circumstance."
+It was accordingly held that it was not a fit case for extreme penalty. The sentence for
+life imprisonment was confirmed.281.
+There was a conspiracy in the wake of a property dispute in which contract killers were
+"hired and death was caused. Sethi, J, of the Supreme Court said that this was not the"
+rarest of rare case. The accused was a misled youth. He was liable to be sentenced to
+life imprisonment for the major offence of murder.282. In a case arising out of partition
+"between two brothers, one of them (the accused) killed his brother, his wife and"
+children. He was frustrated over his failure to resist partition of joint property. The
+"Court agreed that it was a heinous and brutal crime, but was not in the category of"
+rarest of rare cases. The accused did not have any criminal tendency. He was a State
+Government employee and not a menace to the society. The Court directed his death
+sentence to be reduced to 20 years actual imprisonment including the period already
+undergone.283.
+"In a rape and murder case of an 11-year-old child, there was extra judicial confession"
+made to a senior person to seek his help. He indicated the place where the body of the
+girl was lying. He struck her in the head twice over with a brick and then in the mouth
+only when she threatened to disclose. This showed that he had no intention to commit
+murder and injuries were inflicted only at the spur of the moment. He had no criminal
+record nor he was in any way a danger to the society. Death sentence was commuted
+to life imprisonment.284.
+The Court has to draw a balance between the aggravating and mitigating factors. The
+accused in this case was the member of a para-military force. He killed seven
+members of a family in a pre-planned manner. He was 23 at the time and had no
+criminal record. He and his family members were suffering agony at the hands of the
+victim family. He had a cause to feel aggrieved for the injustice meted out to his family
+members. The Court said that it was not the rarest of rare cases. His death sentence
+was reduced to life imprisonment.285.
+[s 302.14.1] Where attribution of exact role not possible.—
+One of the accused persons was the relative of the deceased family. They not only
+merely robbed the family of valuables but also killed three members of the family who
+were present at the time. They also raped the only female member in the house. The
+mitigating factors which the judge took into account in commuting death sentence into
+life imprisonment were that they were neither too old nor too young to be beyond
+reformation and rehabilitation. It was difficult also to judge as to what part was played
+"by one or the other and, therefore, who among them would come in the ""rarest"""
+category.286.
+[s 302.14.2] Killing of wife and children in frustration.—
+"Though the accused had some suspicion about the character of his wife, the facts"
+showed that he killed his wife and children because of unhappiness and frustration and
+not because of any criminal tendency. The penalty of death was set aside and he was
+sentenced to life imprisonment.287. The accused requested his wife to accompany him
+to his house. She turned it down. This created frustration and anger in his mind. He
+picked up a sharp-edged weapon and mercilessly struck her and also his mother-in-law
+repeatedly. Both of them fell dead. The Court said that the case was not of the rarest
+category. Death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.288.
+[s 302.14.3] Death in custody.—
+The Supreme Court observed as follows:
+There is a rise in incidents of custodial deaths but accused cannot be convicted
+completely de hors the evidence and its admissibility according to law. Court cannot
+act on presumption merely on a strong suspicion or assumption and presumption. A
+presumption can only be drawn when it is permissible under the law. Rushing into
+conclusions without there being any proper link with commission of crime is improper.
+The view taken by the trial Court was just and proper in the given facts and
+circumstances of the case and it was not proper for the High Court to reverse the
+finding. Reasons given by the High Court in reversing the order of acquittal of accused
+persons were not cogent and did not appeal to reason so as to justify conviction of the
+"appellants. Hence, impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside.289."
+[s 302.14.4] Restoration of death penalty after acquittal.—
+The trial Court awarded death sentence. The High Court acquitted the accused in 1982.
+"The Supreme Court said that the accused having enjoyed acquittal, death sentence"
+could not be restored even if the case merited the imposition of death penalty.290.
+[s 302.15] Delay.—
+No hard-and-fast rules can be laid down with respect to the delay which could result as
+"a mitigating circumstance, and each case must depend on its own facts. In the present"
+"case, there was no delay whatsoever that the circumstances necessitated imposition"
+of life sentence instead of death sentence.291.
+[s 302.16] Capital (Death) sentence.—
+The doctrine of rarest of rare case was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bachan
+"Singh v State of Punjab.292. The trial Court, High Courts and even the Supreme Court"
+are duty bound to follow it.293. The Court explained in this case some of the relevant
+factors as follows:
+Not only the doctrine of proportionality but also doctrine of rehabilitation should be
+"taken into consideration, particularly in view of section 354(3), Cr PC, 1973, which must"
+be read with Article 21 of the Constitution. Where there was nothing to show that the
+"appellant-accused could not be reformed and rehabilitated, the mere manner of"
+"disposal of the dead body, howsoever abhorrent, should not by itself be regarded"
+"sufficient to bring the case in the rarest of rare category. In the present case, all the"
+accused including the appellant were unemployed young men in search of job. They
+were not criminals. In exception of a plan proposed by the appellant and accepted by
+"them, they kidnapped a friend of theirs with the motive of procuring ransom from his"
+"family but later murdered him, and after cutting his body into pieces, disposed of the"
+same at different places. One of the accuseds turned approver and prosecution case
+was based exclusively on his evidence. Appellant-accused contradicted the approver's
+"version in respect of his role. In such a case, statement of approver regarding manner"
+"of murder and role of accused and that of approver himself, should be tested on the"
+"basis of prudence doctrine taking into consideration inter alia, evidence produced by"
+"the accused for imposition of lesser punishment. Hence, death penalty awarded by the"
+"Courts below, in the absence of any special reasons to support the same was"
+substituted by penalty of rigorous imprisonment for life.
+Death punishment stands on a very different footing from other types of punishments.
+"It is unique in its total irrevocability. Incarceration, life or otherwise, potentially serves"
+"more than one sentencing aims. Deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and"
+"retribution all ends are capable to be furthered in different degrees, by calibrating this"
+punishment in light of the overarching penal policy. But the same does not hold true of
+death penalty.294.
+One has to observe the global move away from the death penalty. Latest statistics
+show that 138 nations have abolished death penalty in either law or practice (no
+executions for 10 years).
+"Further, on 18 December 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 62/149"
+calling upon countries that retain death penalty to establish a worldwide moratorium on
+"executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty. India is, however, one of the 59"
+nations that retain the death penalty.295.
+"The Law Commission of India in its Report No. 262 titled ""The Death Penalty"" has"
+recommended the abolition of death penalty for all the crimes other than terrorism
+related offences and waging war (offences affecting National Security).
+Where the question of whether death penalty could be imposed in a case which
+"depended upon circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court said:"
+If the circumstantial evidence is found to be of unimpeachable character in
+"establishing the guilt of the accused, that form the foundation for conviction and that"
+has nothing to do with the question of sentence. Mitigating circumstances and the
+aggravating circumstances have to be balanced and in the balance sheet of such
+circumstances. The fact that the case rests on circumstantial evidence has no role to
+"play. In fact, in most of the cases where death sentences are awarded for rape and"
+"murder and the like, there is practically no scope for getting an eyewitness. Such"
+offences are not committed in public view. Only available evidence in such cases is
+"circumstantial. If such evidence is found to be credible, cogent and trustworthy for the"
+"purpose of recording conviction, to treat such evidence as a mitigating circumstance,"
+"would amount to consideration of an irrelevant aspect. Hence, such plea is"
+unsustainable. Instant case fell in category of the rarest of rare cases. Circumstances
+"proved established the depraved acts of the accused, and they called for only one"
+"sentence, that is, death sentence. Judgment of the High Court, confirming the"
+"conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court, does not warrant any"
+interference.296.
+[s 302.16.1] Punishment of terrorists.—
+The prosecution case was that the accused persons came running to a police picket
+and hurled bombs at security personnel. There was good identification evidence.
+Injuries on the persons of the accused were scabbed burn injuries caused by handling
+of explosive substance. The medical evidence showed that abrasions on the body of
+the deceased could have been caused by splinters from bomb explosions. The case
+"being proved beyond any reasonable doubt, the conviction for murder was fully"
+justified.297.
+[s 302.16.2] Hearing before awarding death sentence.—
+The matter was remitted where death sentence was awarded without hearing the
+accused.298. It is necessary to afford opportunity of hearing to the accused on the
+"question of sentence, where life imprisonment or death sentence is awarded.299."
+[s 302.17] Fine.—
+"It has been held that the words ""shall also be liable to fine"" are not to be understood as"
+a legislative mandate that the Court must invariably impose fine also as a part of the
+punishment.300.
+[s 302.18] Appeal against acquittal.—
+Where the prosecution case of homicide and the defence version of suicide were both
+"found to be equally probable, the accused was held to be entitled to the benefit of"
+doubt.301. Where there was a gross enmity between the parties and the medical
+"evidence did not support the ocular version, accused was given benefit of doubt.302."
+[s 302.19] Presumption of murder.—
+"Where the question was whether the death in question was homicidal or suicidal, and"
+"the expert who examined the body was not sure either way, the presumption as to"
+murder was held to be something doubtful.303. Where a person is not proved to be
+"guilty, the presumption of innocence prevails in reference to him.304."
+"[s 302.20] As to the application of section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+"In cases where mere circumstantial evidence exists, the burden of proof as envisaged"
+"under section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, i.e., the burden of proving the fact, which"
+"is especially within the knowledge of a person, plays an important role in several cases."
+"Where the dead body of the deceased was found in the river, the knowledge about that"
+incident was within the special knowledge of the accused. As the deceased was in the
+"custody of the accused and disappeared from their house, the accused did not reveal"
+what happened to the deceased. The Supreme Court held that the accused failed to
+"discharge their duty under section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The prosecution is"
+not expected to give the exact manner in which the deceased was killed. Adverse
+"inference needs to be drawn against the accused, as they failed to explain how the"
+deceased was found dead in the river in one-foot deep water.
+"Referring to section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, it was propounded that the said"
+section was not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of
+"the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but would apply to cases where prosecution"
+had succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn
+"regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused, by virtue of his"
+"special knowledge regarding such facts, succeeds in offering any explanation, to drive"
+the Court to draw a different inference.305.
+"In Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v State of Maharashtra,306. the deceased was found within"
+the company of the accused and on the next day was found dead. Blood stained dress
+of the accused with the blood of the deceased was recovered. The Supreme Court held
+"that when an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial"
+burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution. In view of
+"section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, there will be a corresponding burden on the"
+inmates of the house to give cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed.
+"When the deceased is shown to be abducted, it is for the abductors to explain how they"
+"dealt with the abducted victim. In the absence of an explanation, the Court is to draw"
+inference that the abductors are the murderers.307.
+"In the examination under section 313, Cr PC, 1973, the accused denied any knowledge"
+"of the crime and alleged false implication. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872"
+imposes an obligation on the accused to explain as to what happened after they were
+last seen together.308.
+The mere circumstance that the accused was last seen with the deceased is an unsafe
+hypothesis to find a conviction on a charge of murder. The lapse of time between the
+point when the accused was last seen with the deceased and the time of death has to
+be minimal.309. When the prosecution mainly relies on section 106 of the Evidence
+"Act,1872, the Supreme Court held, in a case where murder took place in a hotel room,"
+"that to invoke that section, the main point to be established by the prosecution is that"
+"the accused persons were present in the hotel room at the relevant time. In this case,"
+the prosecution failed to produce the CCTV footages available at the hotel where the
+"murder took place, the Court further observed that the CCTV footage being a crucial"
+"piece of evidence, it is for the prosecution to have produced the best evidence, which"
+was missing.310.
+In the absence of any persuasive evidence to hold that at the relevant time the
+"appellant was present in the house, it would also be impermissible to cast any burden"
+"on him as contemplated under section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872.311."
+[s 302.21] Expert opinion.—
+Merely because no expert opinion was obtained to prove as to whether bones
+"recovered were human or animal bones, it would not weaken the case of prosecution in"
+the light of the overwhelming evidence available on record to prove the complicity of
+the appellants.312.
+[s 302.22] Circumstantial evidence.—
+The circumstance (that the accused persons were seen in the vicinity of the
+"neighbourhood of the crime little before the same was committed), if coupled with the"
+"recovery of the ornaments of the deceased from the possession of the accused, at"
+"best, create a highly suspicious situation; but beyond a strong suspicion nothing else"
+would follow in the absence of any other circumstance(s) which could suggest the
+involvement of the accused in the offence/offences alleged. Even with the aid of the
+"presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the charge of murder cannot"
+be brought home unless there is some evidence to show that the robbery and murder
+"occurred at the same time, i.e., in the course of the same transaction.313."
+[s 302.23] Section 302 and section 396.—
+The law clearly marks a distinction between culpable homicide amounting to murder
+and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Another distinction between sections
+"302 and 396 is that under the latter, wide discretion is vested in the Courts in relation to"
+"awarding of punishment. The Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction and judicial discretion"
+in consonance with the established principles of law can award sentence of 10 years
+"with fine or even award sentence of life imprisonment or sentence of death, as the case"
+"may be. While under section 302, the Court cannot, in its discretion, award sentence"
+"lesser than life imprisonment. The ingredients of both these offences, to some extent,"
+"are also different inasmuch as to complete an offence of 'dacoity'. Under section 396,"
+"IPC, 1860, five or more persons must conjointly commit the robbery while under section"
+"302 of the IPC, 1860 even one person by himself can commit the offence of murder."
+"But, as already noticed, to attract the provisions of section 396, the offence of 'dacoity'"
+"must be coupled with murder. In other words, the ingredients of section 302 becomes"
+"an integral part of the offences punishable under section 396 of the IPC, 1860.314."
+"[s 302.24] Additional/alternate charge under section 302, prejudice caused.—"
+Charges were framed under sections 306 and 364. After examination of all the
+"witnesses (26) except the investigating officer, an alternate charge was framed under"
+section 302 and the accused convicted thereunder. The witnesses were cross-
+examined as to the allegations related to the offences under sections 306 and 364.
+Conviction under section 302 set aside as prejudiced.315.
+"196. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"197. Ajitsingh Harnamsingh Gujral v State of Maharashtra, 2011 (10) Scale 394 [LNIND 2011 SC"
+"902] : 2011 AIR (SCW) 5448 : AIR 2011 SC 3690 [LNIND 2011 SC 902] ; Rajesh Kumar v State,"
+2011 (11) Scale 182 [LNIND 2011 SC 2734] : 2011 AIR (SCW) 5997 : (2011) 13 SCC 706 [LNIND
+2011 SC 2734] .
+"198. Nawab Singh v State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 278 ."
+"199. Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 [LNIND 1957 SC 41] ."
+"200. Jagmohan Singh v State of UP, (1973) 1 SCC 20 [LNIND 1972 SC 477] ."
+"201. Rajendra Prasad v State of UP, (1979) 3 SCR 646 ."
+"202. McGoutha v California, (1971) 402 US 183."
+203. Furman v Georgia (1972) 408 US 238.
+"204. Jagmohan Singh v State of UP, (1973) 1 SCC 20 [LNIND 1972 SC 477] ."
+"205. Sunder v State, AIR 2013 SC 777 [LNIND 2013 SC 91] : 2013 (3) SCC 215 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+91] .
+"206. Santa Singh v State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190 [LNIND 1976 SC 268] ."
+"207. Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 [LNIND 1980 SC 260] : (1980) 2 SCC 684"
+[LNIND 1980 SC 261] .
+"208. Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 [LNIND 1980 SC 261] : AIR 1980 SC 898"
+[LNIND 1980 SC 260] .
+"209. Machhi Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1983 (3) SCC 470 [LNIND 1983 SC 170] : AIR 1983 SC"
+957 [LNIND 1983 SC 170] .
+210. See the Box with 'Supreme Court Guidelines in Machi Singh'.
+"211. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] .
+"212. Machhi Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 957 [LNIND 1983 SC 170] : 1983 (3) SCC 470"
+[LNIND 1983 SC 170] .
+"213. Vasanta Sampat Dupare v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2017 SC 2530 [LNIND 2017 SC 248] ."
+"214. Ramnaresh v State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2012 SC 1357 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 404] ."
+"215. Brajendra Singh v State of MP, AIR 2012 SC 1552 [LNIND 2012 SC 159] ."
+"216. Machhi Singh v State of Punjab, (1983) 3 SCC 470 [LNIND 1983 SC 170] : AIR 1983 SC 957"
+"[LNIND 1983 SC 170] : 1983 Cr LJ 1457 . See also State of Punjab v Garmej Shing, 2002 Cr LJ"
+"3741 (SC), where also the court counted the factors and gave some illustrations. The accused"
+killed his brother and two members of his family. The incident was the result of a mistrust
+created by a payment made by accused to his brother. The court was of the view that it was not
+a rarest case and death penalty was improper. The court also said that the likelihood of the
+accused being released prematurely was not a ground for imposing death penalty. The amount
+of compensation to the victim should not exceed the fine imposed. The only surviving member
+was the daughter of the deceased. The amount of fine was enhanced from Rs. 5000 to Rs.
+"20,000."
+"217. Jagmohan Singh, 1973 Cr LJ 370 : AIR 1973 SC 947 [LNIND 1972 SC 477] ; Mohinder Singh,"
+"1973 Cr LJ 610 : AIR 1973 SC 697 ; Maghar Singh v State, 1975 Cr LJ 1102 : AIR 1975 SC 1320 ."
+"218. Gopal Chand Srivastava v State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 2863 (All), all the inmates were told to"
+stay away and the victims were then hit by two assailants whom the court awarded death
+sentence but the confirming court reduced the sentence to life imprisonment in view of their
+young years.
+"219. Ramesh, 1979 Cr LJ 902 : AIR 1979 SC 871 ."
+"220. State of UP v Paras Nath, 1973 Cr LJ 850 : AIR 1973 SC 1073 [LNIND 1973 SC 14] ."
+"221. Munawar Harun Shah, 1983 Cr LJ 971 : AIR 1983 SC 585 [LNIND 1983 SC 113] : (1983) 3"
+"SCC 254 . Followed in State v Ashok Kumar, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1789 (Del), where the accused killed"
+the husband of the woman with whom he was in love; the killing was done when he was taken
+"away with the help of his wife and was struck while asleep, both convicted and sentenced to"
+death; fine of one lakh rupees imposed on the lady accused for expenses of prosecution she
+"had gained anything from the offence nor had any means. Suresh Kumar v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1995 Cr LJ 1853 (Raj), a boy of 20 years old, caused death of his wife and daughter, faced"
+"prosecution for seven years, life imprisonment not enhanced to death sentence. James v State"
+"of Kerala, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 55 (Ker), money-lender entered the home of the borrower and killed"
+"him, his wife and his mother, entry could have been for the lawful purpose of seeking repayment,"
+"death sentence reduced to life imprisonment, not rarest of rare case."
+"222. Shankaria, 1978 Cr LJ 1251 : AIR 1978 SC 1248 [LNIND 1978 SC 138] . Raghunathan v State"
+"of Kerala, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1880 (Ker), death of old woman caused by strangulation and robbed of"
+"ornaments, life imprisonment upheld. Sheikh Ayyub v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 420 :"
+"(1994) 2 Supp SCC 269 , accused killed two police officers while they were arresting him, he"
+"snatched police pistol and handled it in confused manner, injuring his companion co-accused"
+"also, death sentence reduced to life imprisonment. Deoraj Deju Suvarna v State of Maharashtra,"
+"1994 Cr LJ 3602 (Bom), it would be most shocking for a judge to hear the accused on the"
+quantum of sentence after awarding him death sentence.
+223. (2008) 13 SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :
+2008 Cr LJ 3911 . The Court also observed that decision would go by comparison of one case
+"with the other, comparison both quantitative and qualitative. The application of the sentencing"
+policy through aggravating and mitigating circumstances came up for consideration in Swamy
+"Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, 2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : AIR 2008 SC"
+"3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 Cr LJ 3911 . On a review, it was concluded in paragraph 48"
+of the Report that there is a lack of evenness in the sentencing process. The rarest of rare
+principle has not been followed uniformly or consistently. Reference in this context was made
+"to Aloke Nath Dutta v State of WB, 2007 (12) SCC 230 [LNIND 2006 SC 1131] : 2007 (51) AIC 429"
+"(SC) : 2008 (2) SCC (Cri) 264 [LNIND 2006 SC 1131] , which in turn referred to several earlier"
+decisions to bring home the point.
+"224. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra, 2009 (6) SCC 498 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1278] : 2009 (2) SCC (Cr) 1149 : 2009 (79) AIC 26 : 2009 (7) Scale 341 [LNIND 2009 SC
+1278] .
+"225. Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar Alhat v State of Maharashtra, 2008 (15) SCC 269 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+1785] .
+"226. Mohan Anna Chavan v State of Maharashtra, 2008 (7) SCC 561 [LNIND 2008 SC 1265] ."
+"227. Bantu v State of UP, 2008 (11) SCC 113 [LNIND 2008 SC 1496] ."
+"228. Surja Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1996 (6) SCC 271 [LNIND 1996 SC 1548] ."
+"229. Dayanidhi Bisoi v State of Orissa, 2003 (9) SCC 310 [LNIND 2003 SC 571] ."
+"230. State of UP v Sattan @ Satyendra, 2009 (4) SCC 736 [LNIND 2009 SC 485] ."
+"231. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] .
+"232. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] .
+"233. Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294 [LNIND 2013 SC 71] : 2013 Cr LJ 1559"
+(SC).
+"234. Swamy Shraddananda @ Murali Manohar Mishra v State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 Cr LJ 3911 .
+"235. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra, 2009 (6) SCC 498 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1278] : 2009 (2) SCC (Cr) 1149 : 2009 (79) AIC 26 : 2009 (7) Scale 341 [LNIND 2009 SC
+1278] .
+"236. Mohd Farooq Abdul Gafur v State of Maharashtra, 2010 (14) SCC 641 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+1641] .
+"237. Haresh Mohandas Rajput v State of Maharashtra, 2011 (12) SCC 56 [LNIND 2011 SC 928] ."
+"238. State of Maharashtra v Goraksha Ambaji Adsul, AIR 2011 SC 2689 [LNIND 2011 SC 627] ."
+"239. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammadamir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid v State of Maharashtra, JT 2012"
+(8) SC 4 [LNIND 2012 SC 1215] .
+240. See the Box with 'Principles summarised in Mohinder Singh's Case by Supreme Court'.
+"241. Ravji @ Ram Chandra v State of Rajasthan, 1996 (2) SCC 175 [LNIND 1995 SC 1247] ."
+"242. Shivaji @ Dadya Shankar Alhat v State of Maharashtra, 2008 (15) SCC 269 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+1785] .
+"243. Mohan Anna Chavan v State of Maharashtra, 2008 (7) SCC 561 [LNIND 2008 SC 1265] ."
+"244. Bantu v State of UP, 2008 (11) SCC 113 [LNIND 2008 SC 1496] ."
+"245. Surja Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1996 (6) SCC 271 [LNIND 1996 SC 1548] ."
+"246. Dayanidhi Bisoi v State of Orissa,246 2003 (9) SCC 310 [LNIND 2003 SC 571] ."
+"247. State of UP v Sattan @ Satyendra and Others, 2009 (4) SCC 736 [LNIND 2009 SC 485] ."
+"248. Mohd Farooq Abdul Gafur v State of Maharashtra, 2010 (14) SCC 641 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"1641] , 692."
+"249. Haresh Mohandas Rajput v State of Maharashtra, 2011 (12) SCC 56 [LNIND 2011 SC 928] at"
+"p 63, para 20."
+"250. State of Maharashtra v Goraksha Ambaji Adsul, AIR 2011 SC 2689 [LNIND 2011 SC 627] ."
+"251. Mohinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294 [LNIND 2013 SC 71] : 2013 Cr LJ 1559"
+(SC).
+"252. Shankar Kisanrao Khade v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr LJ 2595 (SC) : (2013) 5 SCC 546"
+"[LNIND 2013 SC 429] . Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1177 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+94] .
+"253. Kumudi Lal v State of UP, (1994) 4 SCC 108 ."
+"254. Raju v State of Haryana, (2001) 9 SCC 50 [LNIND 2001 SC 1147] ."
+"255. Bantu @ Naresh Giri v State of MP, (2001) 9 SCC 615 [LNIND 2001 SC 2372] ."
+"256. State of Maharashtra v Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 [LNIND 1999 SC 1126] ."
+"257. Amrit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2007 SC 132 [LNIND 2006 SC 944] ."
+"258. Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod v State of Gujarat, (2011) 2 SCC 764 [LNIND 2011 SC 96] ."
+"259. Surendra Pal Shivbalak v State of Gujarat, (2005) 3 SCC 127 ."
+"260. Amit v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 93 [LNIND 2003 SC 642] ."
+"261. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, 2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :"
+AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 Cr LJ 3911 ; also see State of UP v Sanjay
+"Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 537 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 416] ."
+"262. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] : 2013 Cr LJ 425 .
+"263. Sahib Hussain @ Sahib Jan v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 2359 : 2013 (6) Scale 219"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 474] .
+"264. Gurvail Singh @ Gala v State of Punjab, 2013 (10) Scale 671 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 1147] ."
+"265. Sangeet v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 447 [LNIND 2012 SC 719] : (2013) 2 SCC 452"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 719] : 2013 Cr LJ 425 .
+"266. State of Rajasthan v Jamil Khan, 2013 (12) Scale 200 [LNIND 2013 SC 883] ."
+"267. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka, 2008 (13) SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] :"
+AIR 2008 SC 3040 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] : 2008 Cr LJ 3911 .
+"268. Unni v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 2819 (SC)."
+"269. Shatrughan Chauhan v UOI, 2014 Cr LJ 1327 : [2014] 1 SCR 609 [LNIND 2014 SC 40] ."
+"270. Mohd Arif v The Registrar, Supreme Court of India, 2014 Cr LJ 4598 : 2014 (87) All CC 939."
+"271. TV Vatheeswaran, AIR 1983 SC 361 [LNIND 1983 SC 43] , 1983 SCR (2) 348 ."
+"272. Triveni Ben v State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1335 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] : (1989) 1 SCC 678"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 885] .
+"273. In Ediga Annamma's case (1974 (3) SCR 329) [LNIND 1974 SC 34] , two years was"
+considered sufficient to justify interference with the sentence of death. In Bhagwan Baux's case
+"(AI R 1978 SC 34 ), two and a half years and in Sadhu Singh's case ( AIR 1978 SC 1506 ), three"
+and a half years were taken as sufficient to justify altering the sentence of death into one of
+"imprisonment for life; see also KP Mohammed v State of Kerala, (1985) 1 SCC (Cr) 142 : 1984"
+Supp SCC 684.
+"274. Sher Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465 [LNIND 1983 SC 89] : (1983) 2 SCC 344"
+[LNIND 1983 SC 89] .
+"275. Javed Ahmed v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1985 SC 231 [LNIND 1984 SC 310] : (1985) 1 SCC"
+275 [LNIND 1984 SC 310] .
+"276. Triveni Ben v State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1335 [LNIND 1989 SC 885] : (1989) 1 SCC 678"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 885] .
+"277. Madhu Mehta v UOI, (1989) 3 SCR 775 [LNIND 1989 SC 390] ."
+"278. Shatrughan Chauhan v UOI, 2014 Cr LJ 1327 : [2014] 1 SCR 609 [LNIND 2014 SC 40] ."
+"279. Mukesh v State for NCT of Delhi, 2017 (5) Scale 506 ."
+"280. Mukesh v State for NCT of Delhi, AIR 2017 SC 2161 [LNIND 2017 SC 252] ."
+"281. Siraj Khan v State of Gujarat, 1994 Cr LJ 1502 (Guj). Kurale Pullaiah v State, 2003 Cr LJ 1060"
+"(AP), the accused stabbed the victim with knife, snatching the knife from the victim himself,"
+"inflicted only one stab injury, not a cold-blooded or heartless homicide, death sentence"
+converted into life imprisonment.
+"282. State of Maharashtra v Bharat Chaganlal Raghani, AIR 2002 SC 409 [LNIND 2001 SC 1312]"
+at 432.
+"283. Prakash Dhawal Khairnar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 340 [LNIND 2001 SC 2841] at"
+"350, relying on Bhagwan v State of Rajasthan, 2001 AIR SCW 2189 : AIR 2001 SC 2342 [LNIND"
+"2001 SC 1234] : (2001) Cr LJ 2925 : (2001) 6 SCC 2961 , wherein while reducing the death"
+"sentence to imprisonment for life, the court considered section 57, IPC, 1860 and referred to the"
+"following observation in Dalbir Singh v State of Punjab, (1979) 3 SCC 745 [LNIND 1979 SC 281] :"
+AIR 1979 SC 1384 [LNIND 1979 SC 281] : 1979 Cr LJ 1058 .
+"""The sentences of death in the present appeal are liable to be reduced to life imprisonment. We"
+"may add a footnote to the ruling in Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P., (1979) 3 SCC 646 [LNIND"
+"1979 SC 107] .Taking the clue from the English Legislation on abolition, we may suggest that life"
+"imprisonment which strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the man's life, but in practice"
+"amounts to incarceration for a period between 10 and 14 years may, at the option of the"
+"convicting Court, be subject to the conditions that the sentence of imprisonment shall last as"
+long as life lasts where there are exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the
+community cannot run the risk of the convict being at large. This takes care of judicial
+apprehensions that unless physically liquidated the culprit may at some remote time repeat
+"murder."" This should be contrasted with Surja Ram v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 18 [LNIND"
+"1996 SC 1548] : 1997 Cr LJ 51 , the accused killed his real brother, his two minor sons, and aunt"
+"while asleep, also attempted to murder the brother's wife and daughter, deaths caused in cool"
+"and calculated manner, rarest, death sentence justified. Bantu v State of MP, AIR 2002 SC 70"
+"[LNIND 2001 SC 2372] : 2002 Cr LJ 211 , the accused was sentenced to death for rape and"
+murder of six-year-old child. He was of 22 years. There was no criminal record. He was not likely
+"to be a grave danger to the society. His act, though heinous and condemnable, did not come in"
+the category of rarest of rare cases. Death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life.
+"This should be contrasted with Jai Kumar v State of MP, AIR 1999 SC 1860 [LNIND 1999 SC 524]"
+: 1999 Cr LJ 2569 . The accused committed a cold-blooded and gruesome and brutal murder of
+his sister-in-law and her eight-year-old daughter without any provocation. The Court did not
+regard his age of 22 years as any relevant factor. Death penalty was confirmed. Deepak Kumar v
+"Ravi Virmani, 2002 Cr LJ 1781 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 1320 [LNIND 2002 SC 1] , death sentence"
+reduced to life imprisonment in a case in which there was heinous killing of four family
+members. The accused spared a child which showed humane conduct.
+"284. Raju v State of Haryana, AIR 2001 SC 2043 [LNIND 2001 SC 1147] ."
+"285. Om Prakash v State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1332 [LNIND 1999 SC 1282] : 1999 Cr LJ"
+"2044 . Another case stressing the need for balancing process is Anil v State of UP, 2002 Cr LJ"
+"2694 (All), the accused had his shop opposite a house. The house owner had the shop closed"
+because of customer nuisance. The accused in revenge got him killed. Taking all the factors
+"into account, the court said that he would not pose any danger to the society if his life was"
+spared. The death sentence awarded to him was reduced to life imprisonment.
+"286. Ronny v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 1251 [LNIND 1998 SC 302] : 1998 Cr LJ 1638 ."
+"State of UP v Mutahir Mian, (2008) 10 SCC 223 [LNIND 2008 SC 1922] : AIR 2009 SC 839 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 1922] , acquittal because of irreconciliable facts. State of MP v Chamru, (2007) 12 SCC"
+"423 [LNIND 2007 SC 802] : AIR 2007 SC 2400 [LNIND 2007 SC 802] : 2007 Cr LJ 3509 , four"
+"murders, nobody could be punished because witnesses not natural. State of MP v Basodi, (2007)"
+"14 SCC 548 [LNIND 2007 SC 919] , killing alleged by uncle by gunshot, extra-judicial confession"
+"found to be myth, acquittal. Ramappa Halappa Pujar v State of Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 31"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 561] , High Court reversed acquittal, Supreme Court upheld conviction. State of"
+"UP v Atar Singh, (2007) 14 SCC 193 [LNIND 2007 SC 1316] : AIR 2008 SC 411 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+"1316] : (2008) 1 All LJ 227, acquittal justified because of weakness of circumstantial evidence."
+"Jagdish v State of MP, (2007) 13 SCC 12 [LNIND 2007 SC 1091] : 2008 Cr LJ 350 , acquittal"
+"justified on appreciation of evidence. Bhagga v State of MP, (2007) 13 SCC 442 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+"1208] : AIR 2008 SC 175 [LNIND 2007 SC 1208] , accused to whom no overt act could be"
+"attributed, acquitted, no common object. Ajay Singh v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 341"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 438] : AIR 2007 SC 2188 [LNIND 2007 SC 438] , bride burning, prosecution"
+failed to establish charge.
+"287. Shaikh Ayub v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 1285 : 1998 Cr LJ 1656 ; Heera Lal (Dr) v"
+"State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 2849 (All), killed wife and three children because of debt burden and"
+"attempted suicide. He was in great stress, frustration and mentally disturbed. Death sentence"
+reduced to life imprisonment.
+"288. Mani Ram v State of Uttaranchal, 2001 Cr LJ 3403 (Uttaranchal)."
+"289. Sadashio Mundaji Bhalerao v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 15 SCC 421 [LNIND 2006 SC"
+1047] .
+"290. State of MP v Dhirendra Kumar, AIR 1997 SC 318 [LNIND 1996 SC 1830] : (1997) 1 SCC 93"
+"[LNIND 1996 SC 1830] ; Subhash Chander v Krishanlal, 2001 Cr LJ 1825 (SC), refusal to interfere"
+in the commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment by High Court.
+"291. Jagdish v State of MP, (2009) 9 SCC 495 [LNINDORD 2009 SC 210] : (2009) 4 AP LJ 1 ."
+"292. Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898 [LNIND 1980 SC 260] : (1980) 2 SCC 684"
+[LNIND 1980 SC 261] .
+"293. Santosh Kumar SatishBhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1278] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cr) 1149.
+294. Ibid.
+295. Ibid.
+"296. Shivaji v State of Maharashtra, (2008) 15 SCC 269 [LNIND 2008 SC 1785] : AIR 2009 SC 56"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1785] .
+"297. Ayyub v State of UP, AIR 2002 SC 1192 [LNIND 2002 SC 156] ; MA Antony v State of Kerala,"
+(2009) 6 SCC 220 [LNIND 2009 SC 961] : AIR 2009 SC 2549 [LNIND 2009 SC 961] : (2009) 2 SCC
+"(Cr) 959, murder of all the six members of a family at their residence at night, motive of money"
+"was proved, accused present in the house during the night till next morning and his absence"
+"from his home established, important recoveries, judicial and extra-judicial confession,"
+"complete chain of circumstances, death sentence confirmed."
+"298. Sattan v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 676 (All)."
+"299. Ram Deo Chauhan v Raj Nath Chauhan, 2001 Cr LJ 2902 (SC)."
+"300. Bidhan Nagh v State of Assam, 2000 Cr LJ 1144 (Gau)."
+"301. State of Maharashtra v Sanjay, 2003 SCC (Cr) 231. State of Punjab v Ajaib Singh, AIR 2004"
+SC 2466 [LNIND 2004 SC 478] : 2004 Cr LJ 2547 .
+"302. State of UP v Garibuddi, 2012 AIR (SCW) 92 : 2012 Cr LJ 772 ; Kailash Gour v State of"
+"Assam, (2012) 2 SCC 34 : AIR 2012 SC 786 : 2012 Cr LJ 1050 ."
+"303. Dinesh Borthakar v State of Assam, (2008) 3 SCC 6967 : AIR 2008 SC 2205 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+675] .
+"304. Ghurey Lal v State of UP, (2008) 10 SCC 450 [LNIND 2008 SC 1535] ."
+"305. Chaman v State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2016 SC 1912 [LNIND 2016 SC 167] : 2016 Cr LJ 2330 ."
+"306. Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v State of Maharashtra, 2016 Cr LJ 1900 : 2016 (3) SCJ 176 ."
+"307. Paramsivam v State through Inspector of Police, 2014 Cr LJ 4085 : AIR 2014 SC 2936"
+[LNIND 2014 SC 617] .
+"308. Dilip Mallick v State of WB, 2017 (1) Crimes 328 (SC) : 2017 (3) Scale 71 [LNINDU 2017 SC"
+56] .
+"309. Ganpat Singh v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 4839 [LNIND 2017 SC 2956] ."
+"310. Tomaso Bruno v State of UP, (2015) 7 SCC 178 [LNIND 2015 SC 40] : 2015 Cr LJ 1690 ."
+"311. Jose v The Sub-Inspector of Police, Koyilandy, (2016) 10 SCC 519 [LNIND 2016 SC 403] :"
+AIR 2016 SC 4581 [LNIND 2016 SC 403] .
+"312. Ram Chander v State of Haryana, 2017 (1) Scale 73 [LNIND 2017 SC 7] : (2017) 2 SCC 321"
+[LNIND 2017 SC 7] .
+"313. Raj Kumar v State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2017 SC 614 [LNIND 2017 SC 30] : (2017) 237 DLT"
+173 .
+"314. Rafiq Ahmed v State of UP, (2011) 8 SCC 300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : AIR 2011 SC 3114"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 726] : 2011 Cr LJ 4399 .
+"315. R Rachaiah v Home Secretary, Bangalore, AIR 2016 SC 2447 [LNIND 2016 SC 203] : 2016 Cr"
+LJ 2943 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 303] Punishment for murder by life convict.
+"Whoever, being under sentence of 316.[imprisonment for life], commits murder, shall"
+be punished with death.
+COMMENT.—
+This section has been struck down by the Supreme Court as void and unconstitutional
+being violative of both Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. It regards life convict to
+"be a dangerous class without any scientific basis and, thus, violates Article 14 and"
+"similarly by completely cutting out judicial discretion it becomes a law which is not just,"
+fair and reasonable within the meaning of Article 21.317. So all murders are punishable
+"under section 302, IPC, 1860. For the same reasons, Supreme Court declared section"
+"27(3) of Arms Act 1959, ultra vires the Constitution. It was held that by imposing"
+"mandatory death penalty, section 27(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 runs contrary to those"
+statutory safeguards which give judiciary the discretion in the matter imposing death
+penalty. Section 27(3) of the Act is thus ultra vires the concept of judicial review which
+is one of the basic features of our Constitution.318.
+"316. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"317. Mithu, 1983 Cr LJ 811 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 473 [LNIND 1983 SC 105] : 1983 Mad LJ (Cr) 485"
+: (1983) 2 SCC 277 [LNIND 1983 SC 105] : 1983 SCC (Cr) 405 : (1983) 1 SCJ 327 [LNIND 1983
+"SC 105] . See Balkar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 1225 : 1991 Cr LJ 1712 , sentence of"
+participating co-accused found guilty by virtue of section 34 converted into life imprisonment. A
+prosecution under section 302 for causing death by a motor vehicle is not a bar to a civil claim
+arising out of the same accident. The civil proceeding is not likely to prejudice the position of
+"the accused in the criminal proceeding. Raja Ram Garg v Chhanga Singh, AIR 1992 All 28 [LNIND"
+"1991 ALL 397] . See also Bhagwan Bax Singh, 1984 Cr LJ 928 (SC) : AIR 1984 SC 1120 : (1984) 1"
+SCC 278 .
+"318. State of Punjab v Dalbir Singh, AIR 2012 SC 1040 [LNIND 2012 SC 93] : 2012 (3) SCC 346"
+"[LNIND 2012 SC 93] . See also State of Rajasthan v Manoj Yadav, 2012 Cr LJ 456 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 304] Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
+Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with
+"319.[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death"
+"is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury"
+"as is likely to cause death,"
+"or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,"
+"or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause"
+"death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is"
+likely to cause death.
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
+"Under it, there are two kinds of punishments applying to two different circumstances:"
+(1) If the act by which death is caused is done with intention of causing death or such
+"bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the punishment is imprisonment for life, or"
+imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and fine.
+(2) If the act is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any
+"intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the punishment"
+"is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+A conviction under Part II of this section read with section 34 is legal and valid. Part II
+"of this section can be read together with section 34, notwithstanding that Part II speaks"
+only of knowledge while section 34 deals with intention.320.
+Commission of the offence of culpable homicide would require some positive act on
+"the part of the accused as distinguished from silence, inaction or a mere lapse."
+Allegations of not carrying out a prompt search of the missing children; of delay in the
+lodging of formal complaint with the police and failure to take adequate measures to
+"guard the access from the ashram to the river, which are the principal allegations made"
+"in the FIR, cannot make out a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder"
+"punishable under section 304, IPC, 1860.321."
+"[s 304.1] Distinction between the provisions of section 304, Part I and Part II.—"
+Linguistic distinction between the two Parts of section 304 is evident from the very
+"language of this section. There are two apparent distinctions, one in relation to the"
+"punishment while other is founded on the intention of causing that act, without any"
+intention but with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. It is neither
+advisable nor possible to state any straight-jacket formula that would be universally
+applicable to all cases for such determination. Every case essentially must be decided
+on its own merits. The Court has to perform the very delicate function of applying the
+provisions of the Code to the facts of the case with a clear demarcation as to under
+"what category of cases, the case at hand falls and accordingly punish the accused.322."
+"[s 304.2] Is section 304, Part II applicable only when exceptions to section 300"
+cover a case?.—
+"The plea that section 304, Part II applies only when exceptions to section 300 cover a"
+"case is misconceived. The decision in Harendra Mandal's case,323. was rendered in a"
+different context and observations in the same case cannot be read out of context.
+"That was a case where death itself had not been caused and therefore, question of"
+"applying section 304, IPC, 1860 did not arise.324. Section 304, Part II comes into play"
+when the death is caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death
+but there is no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause
+such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.325.
+[s 304.3] Section 302 or section 304.—Judicial dilemma.—
+The Indian Penal Code was enacted in the year 1860 under which the offences within
+the territory of India have been tried ever since it was enacted dealing with countless
+"number of cases leading either to acquittal or conviction. Yet, the task of the decision-"
+making authorities/Courts of whether an offence of culpable homicide is murder or
+culpable homicide does not amount to murder in the prevailing facts and
+circumstances of the case is a perennial question with which the Courts are often
+confronted. When the evidence discloses a clear case of murder or makes out a finding
+"of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the task of the Courts to record"
+conviction or acquittal is generally an easy one. But this task surely becomes an
+undaunted one when the accused commits culpable homicide/murder but the
+circumstances disclose many a times that it is done without premeditation or pre-
+"planning, may be to cause grievous hurt, yet it is so grave in nature that it results into"
+death and the role of the factum causing death without premeditation becomes a
+secondary consideration due to which the decision of the Courts in such cases often
+"hinges on discretion while considering whether the case would fall under section 302,"
+"IPC, 1860 or it would be under section 304, Part I or even Part II, IPC, 1860. On a plain"
+"reading of section 299, section 300, section 302 and section 304 of IPC, 1860, it"
+"appears that given cases can be conveniently classified into two categories, viz.,"
+"culpable homicide amounting to murder which is section 302, IPC, 1860 or culpable"
+"homicide not amounting to murder which is section 304 IPC, 1860. But when it comes"
+"to the actual application of these two sections in a given case, the Courts are often"
+"confronted with a dilemma as to whether a case would fall under section 302, IPC,"
+"1860 or would fall under section 304, IPC, 1860. Many a time, this gives rise to"
+conflicting decisions of one Court or the other giving rise to the popular perception
+among litigants and members of the Bar that a particular Court is an acquitting Court
+or is a convicting one. This confusion or dilemma often emerges in a case when the
+"question for consideration is whether a given case would fall under section 302, IPC,"
+"1860 or section 304, IPC, 1860 when it is difficult to decipher from the evidence"
+whether the intention was to cause merely bodily injury which would not make out an
+offence of murder or there was clear intention to kill the victim making out a clear case
+"of an offence of murder.326. Section 300 states both, what is murder and what is not."
+"First finds place in section 300 in its four stated categories, while the second finds"
+detailed mention in the stated five exceptions to section 300. The legislature in its
+"wisdom, thus, covered the entire gamut of culpable homicide that 'amounting to"
+murder' as well as that 'not amounting to murder' in a composite manner in section 300
+of the Code. It is neither advisable nor possible to state any straightjacket formula that
+would be universally applicable to all cases for such determination. Every case
+essentially must be decided on its own merits. The Court has to perform the very
+delicate function of applying the provisions of the Code to the facts of the case with a
+"clear demarcation as to under what category of cases, the case at hand falls and"
+accordingly punish the accused.327. It has been held that unless the case falls under
+"one of the specified exception in section 300, it cannot be brought under Part I or Part II"
+"of section 304 of IPC, 1860.328."
+[s 304.4] CASES.—
+"Where the accused husband suspecting the fidelity of his wife quarrelled with her,"
+"poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire and subsequently, when she screamed"
+"for help, tried to extinguish fire by pouring water, the Supreme Court held that he was"
+having full knowledge that his act would cause her death and the attempt of
+"extinguishing the fire will not mitigate the offence, hence he was liable under section"
+"302, IPC, 1860 and not under section 304, IPC, 1860.329. The accused followed his"
+daughter into the women's public toilet of the village and assaulted her. The fatal
+"injuries resulted in her instant death. None of the exceptions in section 300 of IPC,"
+1860 was attracted. It would necessarily follow that the accused committed murder of
+his daughter. He was liable to be punished with either imprisonment for life or death
+"under section 302, IPC, 1860 alone.330. The accused killed his stepfather, who was an"
+"infirm old man and an invalid, with the latter's consent, his motive being to get three"
+innocent men (his enemies) hanged. It was held that the offence was covered by
+Exception 5 to section 300 and was punishable under the first Part of this section.331.
+"Where the deceased, an old man with an enlarged and flabby heart, was lifted by the"
+accused during a quarrel and thrown on the ground from some distance with sufficient
+"force and the deceased got his ribs fractured and died of a rupture of the heart, it was"
+"held that the offence fell under section 325 and not under Part II of this section, as the"
+accused had no intention or knowledge to cause death.332. Accused stabbed the
+deceased in a sudden incident during an election fever which resulted in his death four
+days later in hospital where he had been operated upon in a bid to save his life. There
+was no evidence that the accused intended to cause death or cause such bodily injury
+"as was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the circumstances, it"
+was held that the case fell within clause (b) of section 299 but did not fall within clause
+"3 of section 300, IPC, 1860, and as such his conviction under section 302 was set aside"
+"and he was convicted under section 304, Part I of the Code.333. Similarly, where a"
+young lad of 18½ years old gave only one kassi blow to the deceased following an
+"altercation between his father and the deceased, which resulted in latter's death six"
+"days after, it could not be said that he had intended to cause an injury which was"
+sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death within the meaning of clause 3 of
+"section 300, IPC, 1860. He could be at best saddled with knowledge that his act might"
+"result in death. His conviction was, therefore, changed from section 302 to section 304,"
+"Part II, IPC, 1860.334. Accused, in a sudden quarrel gave a blow on the head of his"
+friend with a stick weighing only 210 grams which caused his death. It was held that
+"his conviction under section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860, was improper as it could not be said"
+"that he had knowledge that such a blow would cause death. His conviction was,"
+"therefore, changed to one under section 323, IPC, 1860.335. In a dispute regarding the"
+"right of way, the accused gave a single fist blow on the head of the deceased which"
+"resulted into his death. No weapon was used, nor was there any past enmity between"
+them. The accused was not held to be responsible for the death of the deceased and
+"was sentenced under section 323, IPC, 1860.336. Where a man lifted a four-year-old"
+"child and threw him on the ground and thus caused his death, it was held that"
+"knowledge of death under section 299, IPC, 1860, could be safely attributed to him and"
+"he was therefore liable under section 304, Part-II, IPC, 1860.337. In a sudden quarrel, the"
+"accused, a young man, administered a single knife blow on the chest of the deceased"
+"causing his death, it was held that the case did not fall under clauses 1 and 2 of section"
+"300 but since he had knowledge that death might follow, he was guilty under section"
+"304, Part II, IPC, 1860.338. A police officer was punished under Part II of this section"
+with seven-year RI for causing death in custody by resorting to third-degree
+methods.339. A woman deserted her husband and started living with her paramour six
+"months before the incident. Her fisherman husband, on way back from his work,"
+spotted her sitting among women at outside of a neighbouring house. He approached
+"towards her. On seeing him, she ran inside. He chased and stabbed her to death. His"
+conviction under Part II and sentence of five-year rigorous imprisonment was held to be
+not excessive.340. A group of persons called out the deceased from his home with a
+view to lodging a protest but suddenly one of them inflicted a knife wound which falling
+on the chest killed the deceased. The Supreme Court convicted the single wound-
+causing accused under this section saying that the heat of passion generated at the
+spur of the moment and not any intention to cause death was responsible for the
+"incident.341. In another case of the same kind before the Supreme Court, the finding"
+was that the wrestler-accused had an altercation with the deceased two or three days
+before the incident. The prosecution showed that the accused came to the house of
+"the deceased, but suppressed further knowledge about the incident. Drops of blood in"
+"the house showed that the deceased was injured there, ran out and fell dead. There"
+was only one major injury. Conviction under Part I of this section was considered to be
+appropriate.342. Annoyance was caused by the deceased singing a vulgar song. Quarrel
+and beating in consequence continued for some time. Accused started beating the
+deceased with a stick not thick enough to cause rupture of the spleen. He might not
+have had the intention to cause death but had knowledge that death might result. His
+"conviction under section 300 (second) was converted into one under section 304, Part"
+II.343. Where the victim was dragged for about 120 feet and then struck with a crowbar
+"not using much force, the accused knowing that the assault might cause death but not"
+intending it. Part II was held to be attracted and not Part I.344. A person reaching home
+in a drunken state started beating his wife. Their son intervened and the accused
+hurled stones on him twice. The boy succumbed to the head injury then and there.
+"Conviction was shifted from under section 302 to 304, Part II, knowledge that death"
+might be caused.345.
+"Persons exceeding the right of private defence are punished under section 304, Part I"
+and not under section 302.346. Where the deceased died due to the negligent firing by a
+"person, who came for celebrating a marriage function with a gun, it was held that"
+"though it is not possible to attribute intention, it is equally not possible to hold that the"
+"act was done without the knowledge that it is likely to cause death. Everybody, who"
+carries a gun with live cartridges and even others know that firing a gun and that too in
+"the presence of several people is an act, which is likely to cause death. Hence, the"
+"liability under section 304, Part II. The appellant caused the death of his wife by beating"
+her with a wooden stick. No intention to cause death was proved. He was convicted
+"under section 304, Part II.347."
+Where the death of a player was caused by blowing a cricket stump on him in a friendly
+cricket match and it was found that the accused player did not know that his act would
+"cause an injury which would cause death or which was likely to cause death, it was"
+"held that a conviction under section 304, Part II was not proper, but that an offence"
+under section 325 was made out as the injury was caused by a stump which is a blunt
+weapon.348.
+A married woman (25 years) met a sudden death in her matrimonial home. Her letters
+and complaints spoke of harassment. The medical report put the cause of death as
+"rupture of spleen and pancreas caused by external pressure. Her husband, who was"
+"attempting to escape by resorting to the theory of death by poisoning, was found guilty"
+and his conviction under Part II of this section and sentence of five years of RI was
+"upheld by the Supreme Court. Though he might not have intended to cause death, he"
+did cause an injury about which he must have known that it might cause death.349.
+Where one of the accused came forward and delivered a blow on the head of a man
+"which proved fatal, the Apex Court was of the view that his act did not attract clause (1)"
+or (3) of section 300 because the accused was armed with no deadly weapon and the
+head injury was caused by a farmer with an agricultural instrument which he happened
+to carry with him. Conviction of the accused causing head injury under section 300 was
+"altered to one under section 304, Part II.350. Several persons surrounded a man. Firstly,"
+he was pushed down on the ground and then two injuries were caused to him one each
+by two assailants one of whom was acquitted. Opinion of the doctor was that the
+victim died due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from both the injuries. The one
+injury alone caused by the accused was not individually sufficient to cause death. His
+"conviction was altered from section 300 to that under section 304, Part II.351. Where"
+the accused inflicted a single knife wound in the abdomen of a man which proved fatal
+"and the opinion of the doctor was that, but for complications, the injury was not"
+"sufficient to cause death, it was held that the offence did not attract clause (3) of"
+"section 300. He was convicted under section 304, Part II.352. A husband, without any"
+"history of ill-feeling with his wife, attacked her with the blunt side of an axe and caused"
+"a head injury after she fell down of which she died, his conviction under Part I of this"
+section was held to be proper.353. Where a person killed his wife under grave and
+"sudden provocation, a lenient punishment of two years' imprisonment was awarded to"
+him taking into consideration the welfare of his children.354. Where the accused
+"delivered a single stab blow on the chest of his wife out of sheer frustration,"
+"momentary impulse and anger, on her refusal to oblige him with sex without any"
+"intention to cause her death, his act was held to be culpable homicide not amounting to"
+"murder and his conviction was altered from section 302 to section 304, Part I.355."
+A pregnant woman went to draw water from a well but she was stopped from doing so
+by several persons armed with 'lathis' and started abusing her and one of them dealt a
+"'lathi' blow on her head and another kicked her abdomen, as a result she died on the"
+spot and her son who tried to rescue her was also injured. Looking at the conduct of
+"the accused, it could not be said that they had common object to kill the woman or"
+"cause injury to her son. Both the assailants were convicted under section 304, Part II"
+and others were acquitted.356.
+The death of a young boy was caused in a brutal and cruel manner. The trial Court
+convicted under sections 302/304. The High Court converted it to section 304 without
+specifying whether the case fell within Part I or II. Sentence of seven years'
+imprisonment was imposed. The Supreme Court did not interfere.357.
+[s 304.5] CASES under Part I.—
+Where the accused with the intention of obstructing the marriage of his sister with the
+"deceased, gave only one blow which proved fatal and the accused did not repeat the"
+"blow though there was nothing to stop him, conviction and sentence of the accused"
+"under section 302 was altered to one under section 304, Part I.358. Where the accused"
+under misapprehension that the deceased came to abduct his daughter attacked the
+"deceased with a sharp-edged weapon, without pre-meditation, causing only one injury"
+"and he died after three days, conviction of the accused was altered from under section"
+"300 to one under section 304, Part I.359. Where three accused persons assaulted the"
+"deceased, one of the accused gave the fatal blow on the victim's head, the second"
+"accused caused simple injuries on the knee and arm with spear, and the third gave"
+"simple blows, it was held that the first accused was liable to be convicted under"
+"section 304, Part I, and as section 34 was not applicable, the second was convicted"
+under section 324 and the conviction of the third accused under section 323 was
+upheld.360.
+Where most of the injuries found on the body of the deceased were external and on
+"lower legs and on arms, it was held that intention of the accused was to cause grievous"
+"hurt and not murder. Conviction of the accused was altered from sections 304/34, Part"
+I to sections 325/34.361.
+[s 304.5.1] Death essential to attract section 304.—
+In Harendra Nath Mandal v State of Bihar the accused caused injury on the head of a
+man with back portion of his weapon. The injured survived the injury. Still the accused
+"was convicted under section 304, Part I. It was held by the Supreme Court that the"
+accused could not be convicted under section 304 because for the application of
+"section 304, death must have been caused under any of the circumstances mentioned"
+in five Exceptions of section 300.362.
+[s 304.5.2] Exceeding right of private defence.—
+Whenever accused sustains injuries in the same occurrence and when the injuries are
+"grievous in nature, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to explain the injuries on the"
+person of the accused. The non-explanation of injuries sustained by the accused may
+give rise to a possibility that the accused has acted in self-defence.363. In a murder
+"case, both the parties sustained injuries in a free fight. The accused received a stab"
+wound on his right shoulder. No explanation of this injury was given by the prosecution.
+It was held that the accused had caused injuries to the deceased in right of private
+"defence, but that he exceeded his right. He was punished under section 304, Part I and"
+"not under section 302.364. In a dispute over possession of land, persons belong to both"
+the sides were injured. The accused were in actual possession at the relevant time.
+Two of the accused received gunshot injuries. They were held to be entitled to the right
+of private defence but they exceeded their right. Conviction of the accused under
+sections 302/149 was altered to one under section 304 Part I.365. In a fight between
+"two groups, the accused fired from a distance killing one person of the other group."
+Fighting groups were not close enough so as to apprehend immediate danger to
+"anybody's life, when the firing took place. It was held that the accused had exceeded"
+"the right of private defence. He was convicted under section 304, Part I.366. Where the"
+"accused received injuries at the hands of the deceased and his party, it was held that"
+the accused were entitled to the right of private defence but by using heavy cutting
+"weapons like 'gandasas' and causing serious injuries to the deceased, they had"
+"exceeded the right of private defence and were liable to be punished under section 304,"
+Part I but not for murder.367.
+[s 304.5.3] Sudden quarrel.—
+"Where as a result of provocation caused in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel,"
+the accused chased the deceased to some distance and then gave the single fatal
+"blow, it was held that the whole incident was a continuous sequence. Hence, the"
+"conviction of the accused was shifted from under section 300 to under section 304,"
+"Part I.368. Where the accused came to the house at midnight, went to sleep with the"
+deceased but suddenly a quarrel took place and the death occurred on account of
+"asphyxia, the incident occurred all of a sudden, without any premeditation, the accused"
+"had not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; therefore, his"
+"conviction under section 304, Part I of IPC, 1860 was held proper.369."
+[s 304.6] Single blow.—
+Where a solitary blow was given with a small wooden yoke on the head of the
+"deceased, conviction under section 300 was altered to one under section 304, Part"
+I.370.
+[s 304.6.1] Provocation.—
+The accused suspected the fidelity of his wife who in turn labelled him as impotent. In
+"the resulting quarrel, the husband picked up a sharp weapon and struck on her vital"
+parts causing death. It was held that Exception I to section 300 was attracted and the
+"accused was punishable under section 304, Part I.371."
+[s 304.7] Death after discharging from the hospital.—
+The victim received gunshot injury on head. On the condition of the victim becoming
+"better, he was discharged from the hospital. After two months of the incident, he died"
+due to septicaemia. It was held that having regard to the fact that the victim survived
+for 62 days and that his condition was stable when he was discharged from the
+"hospital, the Court cannot draw an inference that the intended injury caused was"
+sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death so as to attract clause (3) of
+"section 300 of IPC, 1860. But as the accused used firearms and fired at the victim on"
+his head and he had the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
+"death, the conviction was altered to section 304, Part I.372."
+[s 304.8] Suicide pact.—
+The death of the deceased was not premeditated and the act of the accused causing
+death of his wife appeared to be in furtherance of the understanding between them to
+commit suicide and the consent of the deceased and the act of the accused falls under
+"Exception 5 of section 300, IPC, 1860.373."
+[s 304.9] Civil Disputes.—
+"In view of the civil disputes between the families, there was a sudden minor verbal"
+exchange bloated into a sudden physical attack. Several persons of the accused group
+wielding weapons attacked the deceased and inflicted two simple injuries; one such
+simple injury turned out to be fatal sometime later. There was no intention to cause
+"death, though the accused had knowledge that the weapon used by him to inflict injury"
+on the scalp of the deceased might cause death. As there was absence of intention to
+"cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, the accused"
+"persons were held guilty for an offence punishable under section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860"
+"and not for the offence under section 300, IPC, 1860.374."
+[s 304.10] Maximum punishment.—
+"The maximum punishment that is awardable in case of offence under section 304, Part"
+"II, IPC, 1860 is 10 years. In a case, the accused persons were Police Personnel whose"
+duty was to act in accordance with law and caused death when the deceased was in
+police custody. The accused fudged the General Diary Register of the Police Station to
+put up their defence and put up a false plea of alibi. The accused-in-charge of police
+station prepared a false memo sending the deceased to the hospital when he was
+already dead. The accused persons were found guilty of commission of the offence
+"under section 304, Part II read with section 34, IPC, 1860 and were convicted under"
+"section 304, Part II read with section 34, IPC, 1860 and were sentenced to suffer RI for"
+a period of 10 years.375.
+[s 304.11] Probation.—
+"Accused was convicted under sections 304(II)/149, IPC, 1860 and sentenced to three"
+years' RI. He secured a Doctorate and got employed as Senior Assistant Professor in
+"the Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu. Keeping in"
+"view his conduct and attainments after his involvement in the matter, justified his"
+release on probation.376.
+"[s 304.12] Section 304, Part II when attracted in cases of death caused by"
+driving.—
+"In a case where negligence or rashness is the cause of death and nothing more,"
+"section 304A may be attracted, but where the rash or negligent act is preceded with the"
+"knowledge that such act is likely to cause death, section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860 may be"
+attracted and if such a rash and negligent act is preceded by real intention on the part
+"of the wrong doer to cause death, offence may be punishable under section 302, IPC,"
+1860.377. If a person wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and
+"thereby causes death to some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent"
+driving and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill
+a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is
+"culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act,"
+section 304A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable
+homicide.378.
+[s 304.13] BMW CASE.—
+"The accused in an inebriated state, after consuming excessive alcohol, was driving the"
+"vehicle without license, in a rash and negligent manner in a high speed which resulted"
+"in the death of six persons. Trial Court convicted the accused under section 304, Part II,"
+but High Court altered the conviction to section 304A.The Supreme Court held that the
+accused had sufficient knowledge that his action was likely to cause death and such
+"action would, in the facts and circumstances of the case fall under section 304, Part II,"
+"IPC, 1860 and the trial Court has rightly held so.379. In another hit and run case,380."
+"which killed seven persons and caused injuries to eight persons, the Court held that the"
+"case falls under section 304, Part II and not under section 304A by holding that the"
+"person must be presumed to have had the knowledge that, his act of driving the vehicle"
+"without a licence in a high speed after consuming liquor beyond the permissible limit,"
+is likely or sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the pedestrians
+on the road.
+"[s 304.14] Alteration of Charge from section 304A to section 304, Part II.—"
+Permissibility.—
+Neither of the sides would have been in any manner prejudiced in the trial by framing of
+"a charge either under section 304A or section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860 except for the fact"
+"that the forum trying the charge might have been different, which by itself, in our"
+"opinion, would not cause any prejudice. This is because at any stage of the trial, it"
+would have been open to the concerned Court to have altered the charge appropriately
+depending on the material that is brought before it in the form of evidence.381.
+"Permissibility to try and convict a person for the offence punishable under section 304,"
+"Part II, IPC, 1860 and the offence punishable under section 338, IPC, 1860 for a single"
+"act of the same transaction. There is no incongruity, if simultaneous with the offence"
+"under section 304, Part II, a person who has done an act so rashly or negligently"
+endangering human life or the personal safety of the others and causes grievous hurt
+"to any person is tried for the offence under section 338, IPC, 1860. In view of the above,"
+"the Court opined that, there is no impediment in law for an offender being charged for"
+"the offence under section 304, Part II IPC, 1860 and also under sections 337 and 338,"
+"IPC, 1860. The two charges under section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860 and section 338, IPC,"
+1860 can legally co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act where a rash or
+negligent act is done with the knowledge of likelihood of its dangerous
+consequences.382.
+"319. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for transportation for life (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"320. Afrahim Sheikh, AIR 1964 SC 1263 [LNIND 1964 SC 1] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 350 ."
+"321. SJ Vaghela v State of Gujarat, AIR 2013 SC 571 [LNIND 2012 SC 1562] : 2013 Cr LJ 390"
+(SC).
+"322. Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3765 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425]"
+"relied on Mohinder Pal Jolly v State of Punjab, 1979 AIR SC 577."
+"323. Harendra Mandal's case, JT 1993 (3) SC 650 [LNIND 1993 SC 177] : 1993 (1) Crimes 984"
+[LNIND 1993 SC 177] .
+"324. Ruli Ram v State of Haryana, AIR 2002 SC 3360 [LNIND 2002 SC 585] : (2002) 7 SCC 691"
+[LNIND 2002 SC 585] .
+"325. Jagriti Devi v State of HP, (2009) 14 SCC 771 [LNIND 2009 SC 1376] ; Surajit Sarkar v State"
+"of WB, AIR 2013 SC 807 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 361] : 2013 (2) Cr LJ 1137 , when the accused had"
+"knowledge that hitting with iron rod is likely to cause death, he is liable to be convicted under"
+"section 304, Part II; Ranjitham v Basavaraj, (2012) 1 SCC 414 [LNIND 2011 SC 1185] : 2012 Cr LJ"
+2135 : AIR 2012 SC 1856 [LNIND 2011 SC 1185] .
+"326. Ajit Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 (10) Scale 127 [LNIND 2011 SC 844] : (2011) 9 SCC 462"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 844] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 712; on facts, when Justice Gyan Sudha Mishra"
+"concluded that the case falls under section 304, Part II, Justice Bedi held it as a clear case of"
+murder punishable under section 302. The question referred to the larger bench.
+"327. Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 AIR (SCW) 4211 : 2012 Cr LJ 3765 : (2012) 8 SCC 289"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 425] .
+"328. Gandi Doddabasappa v State of Karnataka, AIR 2017 SC 1208 [LNIND 2017 SC 103] ."
+"329. Santosh v State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cr LJ 4880 : (2015) 7 SCC 641 [LNIND 2015 SC 275] ."
+"330. Gandi Doddabasappa v State of Karnataka, AIR 2017 SC 1208 [LNIND 2017 SC 103] ."
+"331. Ujagar Singh, (1917) PR No 45 of 1917."
+"332. Putti Lal, 1969 Cr LJ 531 . Death by single hammer blow falling on head, knowledge but no"
+"intention, conviction under Part II, Swarup Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 2452 : 1995 Cr"
+LJ 4168 . Injury inflicted by the accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
+"death but he had no intention to cause such injury to the victim who came in between, it was"
+"held that section 300, Thirdly, could not be invoked and conviction of the accused was"
+"converted to one under section 304, Part II, Sebastian v State of Kerala, 1992 Cr LJ 3642 (Ker)."
+"333. Jayaraj, 1976 Cr LJ 1186 : AIR 1976 SC 1519 . Public v State of AP, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1738"
+"(AP), murder without motive, conviction based on appreciation of evidence, punished under Part"
+"I. Bhua Singh v State of Punjab, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1531 , 1531 (P&H), in a sudden occurrence and"
+"without pre-meditation, the accused gave a single blow with a blunt weapon which fell upon"
+"head causing death, the accused was held to be punishable under Part I. His sentence of eight-"
+"year term was reduced to four years. Pandurang v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 762"
+"(Bom), in an altercation and fight, one taking out pen-knife from his pocket and inflicting a chest"
+"blow, punished under Part I, section 304. Karnail Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1972 :"
+"1995 Cr LJ 3625 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 749 , the accused causing a number of injuries to the"
+"deceased, his conviction under Part I not disturbed. State of Punjab v Karnail Singh, AIR 1995 SC"
+"1970 : 1995 Cr LJ 3624 , unarmed victims, fired at, one fired at while running away, no danger"
+"from them, conviction under section 300 and section 304, Part I. Devku Bhika v State of Gujarat,"
+AIR 1995 SC 2171 : 1995 Cr LJ 3975 (SC). Where the accused infuriated by the refusal of the
+"deceased to send his daughter to spend one night with him, picked up a stick lying nearby and"
+assaulted him with it without any prior enmity causing injuries on the vital parts of the body but
+"simple in nature, it was held he could be convicted under section 304, Part II and not under"
+"section 302. In the case of Bonda Devesu v State of AP, 1996 (7) SCC 115 , the accused"
+belonged to a tribal community and the deceased had behaved in an obscene way with wife of
+"the accused. Having regard to the socio-economic background of the accused, the Court held it"
+"to be an offence punishable under section 304, Part I and not section 302, IPC, 1860."
+"334. Randhir Singh, 1982 Cr LJ 195 (SC) : AIR 1982 SC 55 : (1981) 4 SCC 484 . See also Gurdip"
+"Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1151 : 1987 Cr LJ 987 : (1987) 2 SCC 14 , where there was"
+"no intention to cause death, but death nevertheless resulted, conviction under section 302 was"
+converted to one under this section with seven-year RI; Ramesh Laxman Pardesi v State of
+"Maharashtra, 1987 SCC (Cr) 615 : 1987 Supp SCC 1 , single blow under heated exchange of"
+"words resulting in death, seven-year RI already undergone, held sufficient."
+"335. Dhyaneshwar, 1982 Cr LJ 1870 (SC)."
+"336. Rupinder Singh Sandhu v State of Punjab, AIR 2018 SC 2395 [LNIND 2018 SC 276] ."
+"337. Sarabjeet, 1983 Cr LJ 961 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 529 [LNIND 1982 SC 173] : (1984) 1 SCC 673"
+"[LNIND 1982 SC 173] . Assault by several persons, injuries, none sufficient to cause death"
+"individually, conviction under sections 326/34 and not 302/34, Ram Meru v State of Gujarat, AIR"
+1992 SC 969 : 1992 Cr LJ 1265 . A woman protested against construction on the adjoining land.
+"The accused abused her, snatched her six-year-old daughter from her hand and threw her away"
+"in order to give a good thrashing to the woman. The baby died, held, no intention, nor knowledge,"
+"punishable under section 325 and not 299, Ram Pal Singh v State of UP, 1993 Cr LJ 2715 (All)."
+"Shankar Kondiba Gore v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 93 (Bom), single stab injury on"
+"abdomen puncturing artery at ilium, death, knowledge attributed, conviction under Part II. NK"
+"Khakre v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 562 (Bom), striking at the head of eight-year-old child"
+"resulting in death, knowledge but not intention, conviction under Part II. Balaur Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1956 : 1995 Cr LJ 3611 , in a free-fight between two parties, the accused"
+caused a single injury by means of a gandasa on the head of the deceased and he died after six
+"days because of complications of coma and asphyxia, caused by the injury, the dimension of"
+"the injury or situs thereof was not found to be calculated or targeted intentionally, besides the"
+"blow was not repeated, conviction of the accused was altered from section 302 to section 304,"
+Part II.
+"338. Jagtar Singh, 1983 Cr LJ 852 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 463 [LNIND 1996 SC 826] : (1983) 2 SCC"
+"342 ; see also Hari Ram, 1983 Cr LJ 346 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 185 ; Jawaharlal, 1983 Cr LJ 429"
+"(SC) : AIR 1983 SC 284 ; Tholan, 1984 Cr LJ 478 : AIR 1984 SC 759 : (1984) 2 SCC 133 ;"
+"Bhabagrahi, 1985 Cr LJ 1847 (Ori). The conviction of an accused who did not come under"
+section 302 and who had no intention to kill converted by the Supreme Court in Gurdip Singh v
+"State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 14 : AIR 1987 SC 1151 : 1987 Cr LJ 987 into one under section"
+"304, Part I; State of UP v Ram Swarup, 1988 SCC (Cr) 552 : AIR 1988 SC 1028 : 1988 All LJ 555 :"
+"1988 Supp SCC 262 ; Manibhai Vithalbai v State of Gujarat, 1988 BLJR 464 : (1988) 25 All CC 223"
+": 1988 Supp SCC 791; Babu Khan v State of MP, 1988 Cr LJ 1441 MP, single blow falling on heart,"
+"conviction under section 304 II, setting aside under section 302; State of UP v Jodha Singh, 1989"
+"Cr LJ 2113 : AIR 1989 SC 1822 : (1989) 3 SCC 465 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 591, punishment for death"
+caused in sudden fight restricted to the period already spent in jail. Sudden heated exchange of
+"words between two fellow-hunters resulting in death of one by gun fire, held punishable under"
+"Part I; Radha Kishan v State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 768 : 1987 Cr LJ 713 : (1987) 2 SCC 652 ;"
+"another case of single blow in a state of drunkenness, Tarsen Singh v State of Punjab, 1987"
+"Supp. SCC 600 : AIR 1987 SC 806 [LNIND 1987 SC 112] ; Kartar Singh v State of Punjab, (1988) 1"
+"SCC 690 : AIR 1988 SC 2122 , accused contended that he acted in self-defence, prosecution"
+"case weak, held punishable under Part II. Kailash Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1368"
+"[LNIND 1987 SC 434] : 1987 Cr LJ 1127 : (1987) 2 SCC 631 [LNIND 1987 SC 434] , life term for"
+"wife burning : Ram Lal v State of Punjab, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 21 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 123 : AIR 1989"
+"SC 1985 [LNIND 1989 SC 471] , conviction for death caused in a sudden fight by one coming to"
+"a shop bare-handed for collection of dues, and sentence under section 302 converted to one"
+"under section 304, Part I, i.e., eight years' RI; Dharam Pal Singh v State (Delhi Administration),"
+"1989 Supp (1) SCC 165 : 1989 SCC (Cr) 319, a matter of the same kind and Supreme Court"
+"holding that death sentence was not called for and also RN Agarwal v Dharam Pal, 1989 Supp (1)"
+SCC 386 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 451.
+"339. Gauri Shanker Sharma v State of UP, AIR 1990 SC 709 [LNIND 1990 SC 8] : 1990 Supp SCC"
+182 .
+"340. Shanmugham v IP Marina Police, 1996 Cr LJ 3702 (Mad)."
+"341. Hem Raj v State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1990 SC 2252 : 1990 Supp SCC 291 : 1990 Cr LJ 2655 ."
+"Anil Ruidas v State, 1988 Cr LJ 1610 , son-in-law struck father-in-law in quarrel, conviction under"
+"section 304, Part II."
+"342. State of Karnataka v Siddappa B Patil, AIR 1990 SC 1047 : 1990 Cr LJ 1116 : 1990 Supp"
+"SCC 257 . See Jayaram Shiva Tagore v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1991 SC 1735 : 1991 Cr LJ"
+"2192 , a plea of earlier release can be considered only when more than 14 years already served."
+"See further, Abdul Hamid v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 339 [LNIND 1990 SC 637] : 1991 Cr LJ 431 ,"
+"where there was no proof who out of the four who were present administered lathi blow,"
+acquittal of all under this section as well as section 149. The court relied upon its own earlier
+"decision in Gajanand v State of UP, AIR 1954 SC 695 : 1954 Cr LJ 1746 . For another case of"
+"acquittal by the Supreme Court on reappreciation of evidence, see Nain Singh v State of UP,"
+"(1991) 2 SCC 432 [LNIND 1991 SC 119] ; State of UP v Suresh Chand Shukla, AIR 1991 SC 968 :"
+"1991 Cr LJ 604 . Another similar conviction on direct evidence, Munir Ahmed v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 1989 Cr LJ 845 : AIR 1989 SC 705 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 377 ."
+"343. Tota v State of MP, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1515 (MP), sentence was reduced to that already"
+"undergone, following Karam Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 Cr LJ 3673 : (1994) SCC (Cr) 64."
+"Where the accused continued to inflict injuries even after the deceased fell down, he exceeded"
+"private defence, conviction under this section."
+"344. Krupasindhu v State of Orissa, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1488 (Ori)."
+"345. Lalya Dharma v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 556 (Bom), conviction on the basis of"
+"the sole evidence of the wife. Sukhram v State of MP, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 595 (MP), a child of tender"
+"years testifying that her father struck her mother's head by a grinding stone, not relied upon, alibi"
+"also proved. Phani Bhushan v State of WB, AIR 1991 SC 317 : 1991 Cr LJ 551 , death by blunt"
+"weapon, conviction for dowry death quashed which was 21 years ago."
+"346. Sundaramurthy v State of TN, 1990 Cr LJ 2198 : AIR 1990 SC 2007 : 1990 Supp SCC 267 ;"
+"BV Danny Mao v State of Nagaland, 1989 Cr LJ 226 (Gau), scuffle. Hanumantappa v State of"
+"Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 599 : 1992 Cr LJ 405 , the owner of a crop tried to prevent a person who"
+came there with his son to cut his crop and bit at his finger. This provoked his son who struck
+"with the back side of the axe which he was carrying, convicted under this Part. State v Harisingh,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 2815 (MP), dispute as to right to cultivable land, right of private defence exceeded,"
+"punishment under Part I. Baburam v State, 1998 Cr LJ 3212 (Raj), single blow on head causing"
+"death, conviction under Part I. Harahari Naik v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 3948 (Ori), no previous"
+"meeting between accused persons, each responsible for his own act under section 304, Part I."
+"See also Vijai Bahadur Singh v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 2358 (All); Jaya Madhavan v State of"
+"Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 2666 (Ker); Ramanna Ku v State of AP, 1998 Cr LJ 2716 (AP); Sukhlal v State"
+"of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 3187 (MP); Malkiat Singh v State, 1998 Cr LJ 4724 (P&H)."
+"347. Kusha Laxman Waghmare v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ 4394 : 2014 (10) Scale 49"
+[LNIND 2014 SC 777] .
+"348. Shailesh v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 914 (Bom)."
+"349. SD Soni v State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 917 [LNIND 1990 SC 807] : 1991 Cr LJ 330 ."
+"Another case which had resulted in five years RI, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to"
+"one year which was already undergone and maintained the sentence of fine, Kuldeep Singh v"
+"State of Haryana, 1996 Cr LJ 1884 : AIR 1996 SC 2988 [LNIND 1996 SC 317] . The accused"
+"religious teacher killed one of his woman disciples with his trishul, held, ought to be punished"
+under section 302 and not under Part I of this section. State of Maharashtra v Vishwas Baburao
+"Desai, 1989 Cr LJ 677 (Bom). Bride died of burns in matrimonial home within seven years of"
+"marriage, there was evidence of cruelty and harassment for dowry, husband convicted under"
+"Part II, Prakash Chander v State, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 368 (Del). A man struck his mother with the blunt"
+"side of an axe all of a sudden because she hurled abuses on him, resulting in death, punishment"
+"under Part I to be proper, Malkami v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1484 (Ori). Two persons armed"
+"with sharp weapons assaulted a man with the blunt side of their weapons till he fell down, they"
+"were held liable to be convicted under Part II, Barkau v State of UP, 1993 Cr LJ 2954 (All). The"
+accused more than once pounced on a lonesome person hitting him with kicks and fist blows
+"intending to assault him severely but not intending to cause death, their conviction under"
+"section 302 reduced to one under section 304, Part II, Ramesh Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 1993"
+SC 2317 [LNIND 1994 SC 1303] : 1993 Cr LJ 3137 .
+"350. Pularu v State of MP, AIR 1993 SC 1375 : 1993 Cr LJ 1809 . Bilai v Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 3171"
+"(Ori), accused persons attacked the deceased with deadly weapons, no injuries caused after the"
+"deceased fell down, conviction under section 304, Part II."
+"351. Bawa Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 Cr LJ 49 ."
+"352. Ramaswamy v State of TN, 1993 AIR SCW 2683 : 1993 Cr LJ 3253 ."
+"353. Brushava Bartha v State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 1916 (Ori); Jagbar Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"AIR 1983 SC 463 [LNIND 1996 SC 826] : 1983 Cr LJ 852 , a person passing across the house of"
+"the accused was injured by a projecting 'parnala' (drain pipe), he protested resulting in scuffle"
+between the young house inmate (the accused) and him whereupon the accused stabbed with
+"knife causing death because the stab cut the chest, held guilty under section 304, Part II and not"
+"section 302. See also Kulwant Rai v State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 126 and Re Sundarpandian,"
+"1988 LW (Cr) 64. Babrubahan Jal v State of Assam, 1991 Cr LJ 279 . Ram Kumar v State of UP,"
+1990 Cr LJ 1973 (All). Accused's wife went away with a friend. Her father brought her from the
+"friend and deposited her for a short while at a relative's. The accused, a boy of 16–17 years of"
+"age came there to persuade her for family life and on her point-blank refusal, he lost himself,"
+"pulled out knife from his pocket, attempted one blow which the relative warded off but"
+succeeded in piercing the stomach in second blow. This injury proved fatal in course of time.
+"Held guilty under section 304, Part II. State v Sunil Biswas, 1990 Cr LJ 2093 (Cal), punished"
+under this section the police who arrested and subsequently beat the prisoner to death. Two
+"friends bathing in river water, one putting the other as a matter of sport into fast flowing water."
+"Thereafter, they tried to save but failed. Sentence of five years' RI was reduced to three months'"
+"RI and a fine of Rs. 5,000. Benny Francis v State of Kerala, 1991 Cr LJ 2411 (Ker). Bishwanath"
+"Dusadh v State of Bihar, 1991 Cr LJ 108 , Sudden quarrel, Maniyan v State of Kerala, 1990 Cr LJ"
+"2515 , poison in toddy mixed on the tree itself. Deceased stealthily consumed from pot, section"
+"304, Part II, not section 304A. Santa Singh v State, 1987 Cr LJ 342 (Del), the accused living in"
+"Gurudwara with his son and daughter, his wife had deserted him and was living with her"
+"paramour, he all of a sudden killed his daughter, convicted under section 304, Part I and not"
+"section 302. Chanda Lal v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1992 SC 597 : 1992 Cr LJ 523 , 20-year long"
+"history of conviction, acquittal and appeal arising out of an episode involving injuries to both"
+"sides but two deaths on one side only, punished under section 304, Part II, sentence reduced to"
+"that already undergone. Sukhdev Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 755 : 1992 Cr LJ 700 ,"
+"where several attacked, the accused-appellant gave blows even after the victim fell, but it could"
+"not be said to be the fatal blow, conviction under Part II of section 304. Murugan v State of TN,"
+"1992 Cr LJ 930 (Mad), accused ran away after causing single knife wound, no enmity, conviction"
+under this Part.
+"354. State of Karnataka v R Varadraju, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1429 (Kant). But see T Anjanamma v State"
+"of AP, AIR 1995 SC 946 : (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1462 , here wife killed her husband by burning him"
+down. The same was fully proved. The Supreme Court felt that scaling down conviction for
+murder to Part I of section 304 was not proper but it was not disturbed because there was no
+"appeal against it by the State. Vedpal v State of Haryana, 1995 Cr LJ 3556 (P&H), single blow on"
+"head with 'Kassi' (spade) without any prior enmity, death caused, knowledge that the act was"
+"likely to cause death, conviction under Part I. State of Punjab v Tejinder Singh, AIR 1995 SC 2466"
+"[LNIND 1995 SC 808] : 1995 Cr LJ 4169 , all the injuries caused with a 'gandasa' were on non-"
+"vital part, except one head-injury, conviction under Part I."
+"355. Ghansham v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 27 (Bom)."
+"356. Roop Ram v State of UP, 1995 Cr LJ 3499 (All)."
+"357. Naval Kishore Singh v State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 502 . Ramu v State of UP, (2004) 12 SCC"
+"250 [LNIND 2004 SC 146] : AIR 2004 SC 1605 [LNIND 2004 SC 146] : 2004 Cr LJ 1407 , fatal"
+"injury by spear, no motive, six persons took part in the melee, conviction under section 326,"
+"three years' RI considered appropriate. Madan v State of Rajasthan, (2003) 11 SCC 756 , right of"
+"private defence exceeded, defence of property, the accused being a sick person, sentence of"
+"seven years' imprisonment was considered appropriate. Bagdi Ram v State of MP, (2004) 12"
+SCC 302 [LNIND 2003 SC 1047] : AIR 2004 SC 387 [LNIND 2003 SC 1047] : (2004) 98 Cut LT 225
+": 2004 Cr LJ 632, one blow with gainti lying nearby in a heat of passion caused by quarrel, no"
+"second attack showed no intention to cause death, conviction under section 304, Part I proper."
+"Bishan Kumar v State of Delhi, (2003) 12 SCC 771 , one holding the victim, the other stabbing in"
+"the abdomen resulting in death, 10 years' RI reduced to seven years' RI, fine of 1000 rupees"
+"maintained, Chanakya Dhibar v State of WB, (2004) 12 SCC 398 [LNIND 2003 SC 1146] , unlawful"
+"assembly, common object, surrounded the victim, assaulted him, acquittal by the High Court set"
+"aside, conviction by the trial judge restored. State of Rajasthan v Maharaj Singh, AIR 2004 SC"
+"4205 [LNIND 2004 SC 1662] : (2004) 98 Cut LT 686 : 2004 Cr LJ 4195, conviction justified"
+"because of overwhelming evidence, sentence reduced from 10 years' RI to five years' RI. N"
+"Somashekar v State of Karnataka, (2004) 11 SCC 334 [LNIND 2004 SC 625] , police officer at a"
+"swimming pool with wife, the victim sniggered at her, the officer administered him three blows"
+"on the mouth, neck and shoulder, he fell dead into the swimming pool, the officer tried to cover it"
+"up as drowning, but found guilty, convicted by the High Court as upheld by the Supreme Court."
+"358. Gulzar Hussain v State of UP, AIR 1992 SC 2027 : 1992 Cr LJ 3659 ."
+"359. Uttam Singh v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 708 (All). Pirthi v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 3517"
+(P&H).
+"360. Kedar Prasad v State of MP, AIR 1992 SC 1629 : 1992 Cr LJ 2520 ."
+"361. Parasuraman v State of TN, AIR 1993 SC 141 [LNIND 1991 SC 447] : 1992 Cr LJ 3939 ."
+"Madhusudan Satpathy v State of Orissa, AIR 1994 SC 474 : 1994 Cr LJ 144 , the sentence of a"
+convict under Part I was reduced because death resulted from a single blow caused with non-
+"deadly weapon, Mohammed Salam v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 1612 (MP), blow with dagger, but"
+"not with much force, conviction under Part I."
+"State of Punjab v Gurcharan Singh, 1998 Cr LJ 4560 : AIR 1998 SC 3115 [LNIND 1998 SC 842] ,"
+"incident at the spur of moment, no intention, only one blow in sudden quarrel. Order of High"
+"Court convicting accused under section 304, Part I was held to be proper. Malkiat Singh v State"
+"of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 4712 (Pat), accused and his victim were under influence of drink, injuries"
+"caused at the spur of moment without any previous enmity, no undue advantage was taken."
+"Conviction under section 304, Part I. Another similar ruling is in Jaya Madhavan v State of Kerala,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 2666 (Ker). See also Sita Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 287 (Raj). Kasam"
+"Abdulla Hafiz v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1422 : AIR 1998 SC 1451 [LNIND 1997 SC 1558]"
+", stabbing moved inside intestines, conviction under Part I. Rameshwar v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"2677 (All), attack in connection with land dispute, unintentional killing, conviction under section"
+"304, Part I. Gopal v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 105 (Mad), killing wife by inflicting indiscriminate"
+"cuts on her neck. His surrender supported the inference of his being the killer, conviction."
+"Paramasivam v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 165 (Mad), one accused committed the offence and the"
+"others, in order only to save him, gave out a false statement before the Village Administrative"
+"Officer, conviction under sections 304, Part I and 201."
+"362. Harendra Nath Mandal v State of Bihar, AIR 1993 SC 1977 [LNIND 1993 SC 177] : 1993 Cr"
+LJ 2830 : (1993) 2 SCC 435 [LNIND 1993 SC 177] .
+"363. Manphool Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2018 SC 3995 ."
+"364. Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 305 : 1993 Cr LJ 66 : 1993 Supp (2) SCC 490 ;"
+"Trilok Singh v State (Delhi Admn.), 1994 Cr LJ 639 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 158 : AIR 1994 SC 654 , the"
+"accused apprehended danger, seeing two enemies approaching him with arms, he went inside,"
+"came back with knife and without move inflicted knife blows on them, one died, the right of"
+"private defence exceeded, conviction under Part I. Savita Kumari v UOI, 1993 AIR SCW 1174 :"
+"1993 Cr LJ 1590 : (1993) 2 SCC 357 [LNIND 1993 SC 87] , clash between two groups, one"
+"causing more than one firearm injuries, right of private defence exceeded, punishable under Part"
+"I. Ranveer Singh v State of MP, (2009) 3 SCC 384 [LNIND 2009 SC 123] : AIR 2009 SC 1658"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 123] : (2009) Cr LJ 1534 , exceeding the right of private defence, the High Court"
+rightly punished under Part I.
+"365. Khuddu v State of UP, AIR 1993 SC 1538 : 1993 Cr LJ 2008 : 1993 Supp (3) SCC 15 ."
+"366. Hari Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1992 Cr LJ 3168 (Raj)."
+"367. Bahadur Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 70 : 1992 Cr LJ 3709 : (1992) 4 SCC 503 ."
+"Pramod v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 925 (All), enmity on account of evidence against the accused,"
+"the latter entered the house, the victim lady told him to go away and turned back, the accused"
+struck her at the back with a knife. The court felt that there was no intention to cause death. He
+"was young boy of 17 years old, no criminal record. Life imprisonment was reduced to five years'"
+"RI. Sekar v State of TN, 2003 Cr LJ 53 (SC), altercation over grazing sheep, owner of sheep"
+struck the other and struck him in the neck again even after he had fallen down. Private defence
+"exceeded conviction under section 302 shifted to section 304, Part I, 10 years' imprisonment"
+instead of life imprisonment.
+"368. V Sreedharan v State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 754 : 1992 Cr LJ 701 : 1992 Supp (3) SCC 21 ."
+"Subramaniam v State of Kerala, 1993 Cr LJ 1387 : 1993 AIR SCW 1014, minor injuries, none on"
+"vital part, conviction under Part I. RC Atodaria v State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC 1060 : 1994 Cr LJ"
+"1425 , sudden quarrel, one stab injury, punished under Part I. State of Rajasthan v"
+"Satyanarayanan, AIR 1998 SC 2060 [LNIND 1998 SC 88] : 1998 Cr LJ 2911 , sudden quarrel"
+between two neighbours over boundary dispute. One came out with a knife. Other's brother
+intervened who chanced to receive the knife wound to death. Punishment under Part I.
+"369. State of MP v Abdul Latif, AIR 2018 SC 1409 [LNINDU 2018 SC 19] ."
+"370. V Subramani v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 1727 : AIR 2005 SC 1983 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] :"
+(2005) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2005 SC 224] .
+"371. Changdeo v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 1240 (Bom). See also Avula Venkateswarlu v"
+"State of AP, 1994 Cr LJ 2232 (AP), quarrel between husband and wife over a petty matter, the"
+"husband caused multiple injuries resulting in death, conviction under Part I; Madaiah v State of"
+"Karnataka, 1992 Cr LJ 502 (Kant)."
+"372. Sanjay v State of UP, 2016 Cr LJ 1117 : AIR 2016 SC 282 [LNINDU 2016 SC 8] ."
+"373. Narendra v State of Rajasthan, 2014 Cr LJ 4396 : 2014 All MR (Cr) 3760."
+"374. Manoj Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 2693 [LNIND 2018 SC 274] ."
+"375. State through CBI, v Sanvlo Naik, AIR 2017 SC 4976 ."
+"376. Monir Alam v State of Bihar, AIR 2010 SC 698 [LNIND 2009 SC 2013] : 2010 Cr LJ 1418 :"
+(2010) 12 SCC 26 [LNIND 2009 SC 2013] .
+"377. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 (SC) : (2012) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 15] : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"378. Naresh Giri v State of MP, (2008) 1 SCC 791 [LNIND 2007 SC 1313] : 2007 (13) Scale 7"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1313] .
+"379. State Tr PS Lodhi Colony New Delhi v Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+459] : 2012 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2012 SC 3104 [LNIND 2012 SC 459] .
+"380. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 (SC) : (2012) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 15] : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"381. State of Maharashtra v Salman Salim Khan, AIR 2004 SC 1189 [LNIND 2003 SC 1122] :"
+(2004) 1 SCC 525 [LNIND 2003 SC 1122] .
+"382. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 (SC) : (2012) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 15] : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+383.[[s 304A] Causing death by negligence
+Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act 1 not
+"amounting to culpable homicide, 2 shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.]"
+COMMENT.—
+"Section 304A was inserted in IPC, 1860 by IPC (Amendment) Act, 1870 (27 of 1870) to"
+cover those cases wherein a person caused the death of another by such acts as are
+rash or negligent but there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act
+will cause death. The case should not be covered by sections 299 and 300 only then it
+will come under this section. The section provides punishment of either description for
+a term which may extend to two years or fine or both in case of homicide by rash or
+negligent act.384.
+Essential ingredients of section 304A are the following:
+(i) Death of a person
+(ii) Death was caused by accused during any rash or negligence act.
+(iii) Act does not amount to culpable homicide.
+"And to prove negligence under Criminal Law, the prosecution must prove:"
+(i) The existence of duty.
+(ii) A breach of the duty causing death.
+(iii) The breach of the duty must be characterised as gross negligence.385.
+[s 304A.1] Scope.—
+"In order that a person may be guilty under this section, the rash or negligent act must"
+be the direct or proximate cause of the death.386. The section deals with homicide by
+negligence.
+[s 304A.2] Concept of Negligence in Civil law and Criminal Law.—
+The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be
+negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For
+"negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist."
+"For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be of a"
+much higher degree. A negligence which is not of such a high degree may provide a
+ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. To prosecute a
+"medical professional for negligence under criminal law, it must be shown that the"
+accused did something or failed to do something which in the given facts and
+circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would
+"have done or failed to do.387. For an act of negligence to be culpable in criminal law,"
+the degree of such negligence must be higher than what is sufficient to prove a case of
+negligence in a civil action. Judicial pronouncements have repeatedly declared that in
+"order to constitute an offence, negligence must be gross in nature.388."
+1. 'Rash or negligent act'.—The term negligence is not defined in the Code. As per
+"Straight, J, the criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness"
+or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable
+neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard
+"against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which,"
+"having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the"
+"imperative, duty of the accused person to have adopted.389. It may be stated that"
+"negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon"
+"those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do,"
+or doing something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.390. The
+"distinction between the ""rashness"" and ""negligence"" is that while in the former, the doer"
+"knows about the consequences, but in the latter, the doer is unaware of the"
+"consequences. A rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. Negligence is the genus,"
+(sic) of which rashness is the species. It has sometimes been observed that in
+rashness the action is done precipitately that the mischievous or illegal consequences
+"may fall, but with a hope that they will not.391. The section explicitly lays down that only"
+"that 'act' which is ""so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal"
+"safety of others, shall be punished..."". Thus, the section itself carves out the standard of"
+criminal negligence intended to distinguish between those whose failure is culpable
+"and those whose conduct, although not up to standard, is not deserving of"
+punishment.392.
+Negligence signifies the breach of a duty to do something which a reasonably prudent
+man would under the circumstances have done or doing something which when judged
+from reasonably prudent standards should not have been done. The essence of
+negligence whether arising from an act of commission or omission lies in neglect of
+care towards a person to whom the Defendant or the accused as the case may be
+owes a duty of care to prevent damage or injury to the property or the person of the
+"victim. The existence of a duty to care is, thus, the first and most fundamental of"
+"ingredients in any civil or criminal action brought on the basis of negligence, breach of"
+such duty and consequences flowing from the same being the other two. It follows that
+in any forensic exercise aimed at finding out whether there was any negligence on the
+"part of the Defendant/accused, the Courts will have to address the above three aspects"
+to find a correct answer to the charge.393.
+Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal
+"consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief"
+that the actor has taken sufficient precaution to prevent their happening. The
+imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness (luxuria). Culpable
+negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect
+"will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the"
+"caution incumbent upon him, and that, if he had, he would have had the consciousness."
+The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection. It is
+"manifest that personal injury, consciously and intentionally caused, cannot fall within"
+"either of these categories, which are wholly inapplicable to the case of an act or series"
+"of acts, themselves intended, which are the direct producers of death. To say that"
+"because, in the opinion of the operator, the sufferer could have borne a little more"
+"without death following, the act amounts merely to rashness because he has carried"
+the experiment too far results from an obvious and dangerous misconception...It is
+"clear, however, that if the words, 'not amounting to culpable homicide,' are a part of the"
+"definition, the offence defined by this section consists of the rash or negligent act not"
+"falling under that category, as much as of its fulfilling the positive requirement of being"
+the cause of death.394.
+A rash act is primarily an overhasty act and is opposed to a deliberate act; even if it is
+"partly deliberate, it is done without due thought and caution.395. Illegal omission is ""act"""
+under this section and may constitute an offence if it is negligent.396. In this
+"connection, see also sub-para entitled ""Rash or Negligent"" under section 279, IPC,"
+"1860, ante."
+"Death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused,"
+and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of
+"another's negligence. It must be the causa causans, it is not enough that it may have"
+been the causa sine qua non.397. This view has been approved by the Supreme
+"Court.398. The Bombay High Court has said that in cases falling under this section, it is"
+dangerous to attempt to distinguish between the approximate and ultimate cause of
+"death.399. Where the accused, a motor driver, ran over and killed a woman, but there"
+was no rashness or negligence on the part of the driver so far as his use of the road or
+"manner of driving was concerned, it was held that the accused could not be convicted"
+under this section on the ground that the brakes of the lorry were not in perfect order
+"and that the lorry carried no horn. The ""rash or negligent act"" referred to in the section"
+"means the act which is the immediate cause of death and not any act or omission,"
+which can at most be said to be a remote cause of death.400. Negligence on the part of
+a motorist cannot be presumed under this section by the mere fact that a man is
+"knocked down and killed by him.401. To render a person liable for neglect of duty, there"
+must be such a degree of culpability as to amount to gross negligence on his part. It is
+not every little slip or mistake that will make a man so liable.402. A passenger was
+standing on the footboard of a bus to the knowledge of the driver and even so the
+driver negotiated a sharp turn without slowing down. The passenger fell off to his
+death. The driver was held to be guilty under the section.403. A woman was boarding
+the bus from the front entrance. The conductor whistled and the driver took off
+"speedily. Either of them could have known whether she had come in or not, but neither"
+cared to do so. She fell off and was crushed by the rear wheel. No doubt remained in
+the mind that the driver and the conductor were guilty of a rash and negligent act.404.
+Intentional shooting at a fleeing person and hitting someone else to death would come
+under section 300 read with section 301. It is not a negligent act so as to come under
+section 304A.405.
+2. 'Not amounting to culpable homicide'.—
+"Section 304A is directed at offences outside the range of ss. 299 and 300, and obviously"
+contemplates those cases into which neither intention nor knowledge enters. For the rash or
+"negligent act which is declared to be a crime is one 'not amounting to culpable homicide',"
+"and it must therefore be taken that intentionally or knowingly inflicted violence, directly and"
+"wilfully caused, is excluded. Section 304A does not say that every unjustifiable or"
+inexcusable act of killing not hereinbefore mentioned shall be punishable under the
+"provisions of this section, but it specifically and in terms limits itself to those rash or"
+negligent acts which cause death but fall short of culpable homicide of either
+description.406.
+[s 304A.3] Doctrine of reasonable care.—
+"The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., 'reasonable care' in determining the"
+question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care
+imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the
+pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when pedestrians happen
+to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a
+"public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not"
+"endanger the life of the right users of the road, maybe either vehicular users or"
+pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others.
+'Negligence' means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person
+guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing
+something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations
+would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a
+comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact
+formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case.
+Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to
+"negligence, will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and"
+"circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the Court. In a given case,"
+even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence.407.
+[s 304A.4] Contributory negligence.—
+"The doctrine of contributory negligence does not apply to criminal liability, that is,"
+where the death of a person is caused partly by the negligence of the accused and
+partly by his own negligence. If the accused is charged with contributing to the death of
+"the deceased by his negligence, it matters not whether the deceased was deaf, or"
+"drunk, or negligent, or in part contributed to his own death.408. In this connection, see"
+"also sub-para entitled ""Contributory negligence"" under section 279, IPC, 1860, ante."
+[s 304A.5] Laying trap by live wire.—
+The accused had connected live wire with his bicycle with a view to ward off mischief
+making children. A child touched the bicycle and got shock and ultimately died. It was
+"held that the act of the accused amounted to negligence as he placed no sign board,"
+caution or warning for not touching the bicycle and was liable to be punished under
+"section 304A and under section 304, Part II.409."
+[s 304A.6] Degree and nature of care expected of an occupier of a cinema building.—
+"The Supreme Court, in Sushil Ansal v State Through CBI,410. (Uphaar Cinema building"
+tragedy case) opined that:
+"Reverting back to the degree and nature of care expected of an occupier of a cinema hall,"
+we must at the outset say that the nature and degree of care is expected to be such as
+would ensure the safety of the visitors against all foreseeable dangers and harm. That is the
+essence of the duty which an occupier owes to the invitees whether contractual or
+"otherwise. The nature of care that the occupier must, therefore, take would depend upon the"
+"fact situation in which duty to care arises. For instance, in the case of a hotel which offers to"
+"its clients the facility of a swimming pool, the nature of the care that the occupier of the"
+hotel would be expected to take would be different from what is expected of an occupier of
+a cinema hall.
+An occupier of a cinema would be expected to take all those steps which are a part of his
+duty to care for the safety and security of all those visiting the cinema for watching a
+cinematograph exhibition. What is important is that the duty to care is not a onetime affair.
+It is a continuing obligation which the occupier owes towards every invitee contractual or
+otherwise every time an exhibition of the cinematograph takes place. What is equally
+"important is that not only under the common law but even under the statutory regimen, the"
+"obligation to ensure safety of the invitees is undeniable, and any neglect of the duty is"
+"actionable both as a civil and criminal wrong, depending upon whether the negligence is"
+simple or gross.
+[s 304A.6.1] Mens rea.—
+The essential ingredient of mens rea cannot be excluded from consideration when the
+charge in a criminal Court consists of criminal negligence.411.
+[s 304A.6.2] Res ipsa Loquitur.—
+This doctrine serves two purposes—one that an accident may by its nature be more
+consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is
+"responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the"
+"accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Second, it is to avoid hardship in"
+cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the
+accident occurred. The Courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in
+cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. Elements of this doctrine may
+be stated as:
+(a) The event would not have occurred but for someone's negligence.
+(b) The evidence on record rules out the possibility that actions of the victim or some
+third party could be the reason behind the event.
+(c) Accused was negligent and owed a duty of care towards the victim.412. In our
+"current conditions, the law under section 304A, IPC, 1860 and under the rubric of"
+"negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy duty"
+"vehicles and of speeding menaces. Thus viewed, it is fair to apply the rule of res ipsa"
+"loquitur, of course, with care. Conventional defences, except under compelling"
+"evidence, must break down before the pragmatic Court and must be given short shrift."
+"Looked at from this angle, the Court held that the present case deserved no"
+consideration on the question of conviction.413. The principle of res ipsa loquitur is only
+a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The
+said principle has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending
+circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence
+the accident would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown
+to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.414. Res ipsa
+loquitur is only a rule of evidence and operates in the domain of civil law specially in
+cases of torts and helps in determining the onus of proof in actions relating to
+negligence. It cannot be pressed in service for determining per se the liability for
+"negligence within the domain of criminal law. Res ipsa loquitur has, if at all, a limited"
+application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence.415. Where a vehicle was being
+driven on a wrong side and an accident took place resulting in the death of two
+"persons, the principle of res ipsa loquitur should have been applied.416. In the case of"
+"Thakur Singh v State of Punjab,417. the accused drove a bus rashly and negligently with"
+"41 passengers and while crossing a bridge, the bus fell into the nearby canal resulting"
+in death of all the passengers. The Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since
+admittedly the petitioner was driving the bus at the relevant time and it was going over
+the bridge when it fell down. Evidence on record discloses that the bus had gone and
+"dashed into a standing tree situated on the right side of the road. Unless, the vehicle"
+"had been driven rashly and/or negligently, the vehicle which had no mechanical defect"
+"would not have dashed to a standing tree, that too, on the right side of the road. The"
+"factum of accident having been admitted in section 313, Cr PC, 1973 statement, the"
+legal doctrine res ipsa loquitur gets attracted.418.
+Where a vehicle driven at a high speed knocked down the deceased who was walking
+"on the left side of the road and breaking the roadside fencing got stuck up in a ditch, it"
+was held that the maxim res ipsa loquitur was applicable and the accused driver could
+be held guilty of rash and negligent driving.419.
+The Supreme Court explained the principle in the following words.420.
+The principle of res ipsa loquitor is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in
+actions relating to negligence. The principle has application only when the nature of the
+accident and attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the
+absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and the thing which caused
+injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.
+"The maxim, however, was not applicable to the present case. The bus moved away"
+while a passenger was trying to board it. He fell down to his injuries. There could be no
+presumption of negligence. It had to be further shown that the driver moved away the
+bus suddenly or before getting signal from the conductor where a car hit a tree
+resulting in the death of one of the passengers and injuries to others and though the
+road was of sufficient width and no obstruction was present and the report of the
+"motor vehicles inspector was that there was no mechanical defect in the car, it was"
+held that a presumption as to negligence could be drawn and the burden was on the
+driver to show that there was no negligence on his part.421.
+[s 304A.7] Accidents.—Defence of mechanical failure.—
+"According to the defence, the vehicle turned turtle due to mechanical failure, i.e., non-"
+functioning of the hydraulic system in a proper manner. The manner in which the
+accident occurred due to detachment of the trailer from the tractor and the distance to
+which the tractor moved vividly reveals that the vehicle in question was driven
+recklessly at a high speed. The plea of mechanical failure as put forth by the accused
+was not even suggested to the Inspector. Plea rejected.422. Accused took the plea that
+accident happened due to bursting of tyre of scooter. Bursting of tyre may happen only
+when the tube and tyre have already spent their lives or in the event of poor
+maintenance of same. Mechanical failure of a vehicle contributing to cause of an
+"accident is also a factor coming under ""poor maintenance"". Rejecting the plea, the"
+Orissa High Court held that poor maintenance of vehicle is itself a negligent act.423.
+[s 304A.8] High Speed.—
+Driving at a high speed is not in itself a negligent act.424. In the case of Ravi Kapur v
+"State of Rajasthan,425. the Apex Court has observed that, a person who drives a vehicle"
+on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result and that
+it may not always be possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle
+whether a person was driving rashly and negligently and that even when one is driving a
+"vehicle at slow speed, but, recklessly and negligently, it would amount to rash and"
+"negligent driving within the meaning of the language of section 279, IPC, 1860. Mere"
+driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that
+negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the
+"complainant. In fact, the speed is no criteria to establish the fact of rash and negligent"
+driving of a vehicle.426. Absence of rash speed itself cannot absolve the petitioner.427.
+Where the accused came driving canter at a very fast speed in rash and negligent
+manner and dashed against victim girls resulting into death of one and injuries to
+"another, relying on the testimony of complainant, Court convicted the accused under"
+"section 304A.428. In a case, the accused drove the vehicle ignoring the signal given to"
+stop the bus by a police officer in uniform. There was absolutely no turn or bend on the
+road which could have prevented the accused from noticing the victim in uniform on
+road. Accident occurred on account of rash and negligent act of applicant/accused and
+led to death of victim. Conviction of accused was held proper by the Bombay High
+Court.429.
+[s 304A.9] Medical negligence.—
+"In PB Desai (Dr) v State of Maharashtra,430.,431. the Supreme Court held that due to the"
+"very nature of the medical profession, the degree of responsibility on the practitioner is"
+"higher than that of any other service provider. To fasten liability in criminal law, the"
+degree of negligence has to be higher than that of negligence enough to fasten liability
+for damages in civil law. The essential ingredient of mens rea cannot be excluded from
+consideration when the charge in a criminal Court consists of criminal negligence.
+"Where negligence is an essential ingredient of the offence, the negligence to be"
+established by the prosecution must be culpable or gross and not the negligence
+merely based upon an error of judgment.
+[s 304A.9.1] Bolam Test.—
+The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in Bolam v Friern Hospital
+"Management Committee,432. holds good in its applicability in India.433. In the Bolam"
+"case, it was held that:"
+"Where you get a situation which involves the use of some special skill or competence, then"
+the test as to whether there has been negligence or not is not the test of the man on the top
+"of a Clapham omnibus, because he has not got this special skill. The test is the standard of"
+the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill... A man need
+not possess the highest expert skill; it is well established law that it is sufficient if he
+exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.
+"In many cases, the Supreme Court approved and applied this test for determining the"
+"negligence. In Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab,434. the Supreme Court observed:"
+"The water of Bolam test has ever since flown and passed under several bridges, having"
+"been cited and dealt with in several judicial pronouncements, one after the other and has"
+"continued to be well received by every shore it has touched as neat, clean and well-"
+condensed one.
+"When a patient agrees to go for medical treatment or surgical operation, every careless"
+act of the medical man cannot be termed as 'criminal.' It can be termed 'criminal' only
+when the medical man exhibits a gross lack of competence or inaction and wanton
+indifference to his patient's safety and which is found to have arisen from gross
+ignorance or gross negligence. Where a patient's death results merely from error of
+"judgment or an accident, no criminal liability should be attached to it. Mere"
+inadvertence or some degree of want of adequate care and caution might create civil
+liability but would not suffice to hold him criminally liable.435. Negligence cannot be
+attributed to a doctor so long as he performs his duties with reasonable skill and
+competence. Merely because the doctor chooses one course of action in preference to
+"the other one available, he would not be liable if the course of action chosen by him"
+was acceptable to the medical profession.436. In Suresh Gupta (Dr) v Govt of NCT of
+"Delhi,437. the Apex Court held that where the medical practitioner failed to take"
+"appropriate steps, viz., ""not putting a cuffed endotracheal tube of proper size"" so as to"
+"prevent aspiration of blood blocking respiratory passage, the act attributed to him may"
+be described as negligent act but not so reckless as to make him criminally liable.
+[s 304A.10] Duty of the Investigating Officer.—
+A doctor accused of rashness or negligence may not be arrested in a routine manner
+(simply because a charge has been levelled against him). Unless his arrest is
+necessary for furthering the investigation or for collecting evidence or unless the
+investigating officer feels satisfied that the doctor proceeded against would not make
+"himself available to face the prosecution unless arrested, the arrest may be"
+withheld.438.
+[s 304A.11] Private Complaint.—
+A private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced
+prima facie evidence before the Court in the form of a credible opinion given by another
+competent doctor to support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the
+accused doctor.439. Complaint alleging Medical Negligence in treatment of husband of
+"complainant. In absence of any expert opinion regarding negligence of doctor, criminal"
+prosecution against him is not maintainable.440.
+[s 304A.12] Burden of proof.—
+"In a case involving medical negligence, once the initial burden has been discharged by"
+the complainant by making out a case of negligence on the part of the hospital or the
+"doctor concerned, the onus then shifts on to the hospital or to the attending doctors"
+and it is for the hospital to satisfy the Court that there was no lack of care or
+diligence.441.
+[s 304A.13] Individual liability of Doctors.—
+"For establishing medical negligence or deficiency in service, the Courts would"
+determine the following:
+(i) No guarantee is given by any doctor or surgeon that the patient would be cured.
+"(ii) The doctor, however, must undertake a fair, reasonable and competent degree of"
+"skill, which may not be the highest skill."
+"(iii) Adoption of one of the modes of treatment, if there are many, and treating the"
+patient with due care and caution would not constitute any negligence.
+"(iv) Failure to act in accordance with the standard, reasonable, competent medical"
+"means at the time would not constitute a negligence. However, a medical"
+practitioner must exercise the reasonable degree of care and skill and
+knowledge which he possesses. Failure to use due skill in diagnosis with the
+result that wrong treatment is given would be negligence.
+"(v) In a complicated case, the Court would be slow in contributing negligence on the"
+"part of the doctor, if he is performing his duties to the best of his ability.442."
+Law relating to medical negligence laid down by the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew
+Case
+(1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a
+reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
+"of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man"
+"would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Ratanlal Ranchhoddas, and"
+"Dhirajlal Keshavlal Thakore, The Law of Torts, 26th Edn, Bombay law reporter Office,"
+"2013 (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence"
+becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting
+to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence
+"are three: 'duty', 'breach' and 'resulting damage'."
+(2) Negligence in the context of medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment
+"with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in"
+"particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence"
+"is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of"
+"judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical"
+professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical
+"profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better"
+alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more
+skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure
+"which the accused followed. When it comes to the failure of taking precautions, what"
+has to be seen is whether those precautions were taken which the ordinary experience
+of men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or extraordinary precautions
+which might have prevented the particular happening cannot be the standard for
+"judging the alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, while assessing the"
+"practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time of the"
+"incident, and not at the date of trial. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises out"
+"of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was"
+"not generally available at that particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which"
+it is suggested it should have been used.
+(3) A professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings: either
+"he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or,"
+"he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he"
+"did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has"
+"been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising"
+ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for every professional to possess the
+highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he practices. A highly skilled
+"professional may be possessed of better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis"
+or the yardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on
+indictment of negligence.
+(4) The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in Bolam v Friern Hospital
+"Management Committee,443. holds good in its applicability in India."
+(5) The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may
+be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. For
+"negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist."
+"For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much"
+"higher, i.e., gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a"
+higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for
+prosecution.
+"(6) The word 'gross' has not been used in section 304A of IPC, 1860, yet it is settled"
+"that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high"
+degree as to be 'gross'. The expression 'rash or negligent act' as occurring in section
+"304A of the IPC, 1860 has to be read as qualified by the word 'grossly'."
+"(7) To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law, it must be"
+shown that the accused did something or failed to do something which in the given
+facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence
+would have done or failed to do. The hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of
+such a nature that the injury which resulted was most likely imminent.
+(8) Res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence and operates in the domain of civil law
+specially in cases of torts and helps in determining the onus of proof in actions relating
+to negligence. It cannot be pressed in service for determining per se the liability for
+"negligence within the domain of criminal law. Res ipsa loquitur has, if at all, a limited"
+application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence.
+[Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab.444. See also PB Desai (Dr) v State of Maharashtra.445.]
+A person sustained fracture injuries in an accident. He died while he was under
+operation. The cause of death was found to be administration of spinal anaesthesia
+which was injected through spinal cord without checking the bearing capacity of the
+patient. It amounted to criminal negligence. The failure of the surgeons to check the
+"state of the patient after anaesthesia might also amount to negligence, the Court said."
+Conviction under the section would have been proper. This would also attract civil
+liability. The quashing of the criminal proceedings was not a bar to institution of a civil
+suit.446.
+The accused was not a qualified doctor. He administered an injection to a patient who
+died because the possible reaction was not tested beforehand. The Court said that the
+accused was guilty of causing death by rash and negligent act.447.
+The degree of negligence sufficient to fasten liability under section 304A is higher than
+that required to fasten liability in civil proceedings. Non-exercise of reasonable care on
+the part of the doctor may suffice to fasten on him civil liability but in order to fasten
+"criminal liability, gross negligence on his part amounting to recklessness has to be"
+proved.448.
+Supreme Court Guidelines in Medical Negligence Cases
+On scrutiny of the leading cases of medical negligence both in our country and other
+"countries, specially United Kingdom, some basic principles emerge in dealing with the"
+cases of medical negligence. While deciding whether the medical professional is guilty
+"of medical negligence, following well-known principles must be kept in view:"
+(I) Negligence is the breach of a duty exercised by omission to do something which a
+"reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct"
+"of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man"
+would not do.
+(II) Negligence is an essential ingredient of the offence. The negligence to be
+established by the prosecution must be culpable or gross and not the negligence
+merely based upon an error of judgment.
+(III) The medical professional is expected to bring a reasonable degree of skill and
+knowledge and must exercise a reasonable degree of care. Neither the very highest nor
+a very low degree of care and competence judged in the light of the particular
+circumstances of each case is what the law requires.
+(IV) A medical practitioner would be liable only where his conduct fell below that of the
+standards of a reasonably competent practitioner in his field.
+"(V) In the realm of diagnosis and treatment, there is scope for genuine difference of"
+opinion and one professional doctor is clearly not negligent merely because his
+conclusion differs from that of another professional doctor.
+(VI) The medical professional is often called upon to adopt a procedure which involves
+"higher element of risk, but which he honestly believes as providing greater chances of"
+"success for the patient, rather than a procedure involving lesser risk but higher chances"
+of failure. Just because a professional looking to the gravity of illness has taken higher
+element of risk to redeem the patient out of his/her suffering which did not yield the
+desired result may not amount to negligence.
+(VII) Negligence cannot be attributed to a doctor so long as he performs his duties with
+reasonable skill and competence. Merely because the doctor chooses one course of
+"action in preference to the other one available, he would not be liable if the course of"
+action chosen by him was acceptable to the medical profession.
+(VIII) It would not be conducive to the efficiency of the medical profession if no Doctor
+could administer medicine without a halter round his neck.
+(IX) It is our bounden duty and obligation of the civil society to ensure that the medical
+professionals are not unnecessarily harassed or humiliated so that they can perform
+their professional duties without fear and apprehension.
+(X) The medical practitioners at times also have to be saved from such a class of
+complainants who use criminal process as a tool for pressurising the medical
+professionals/hospitals particularly private hospitals or clinics for extracting uncalled
+for compensation. Such malicious proceedings deserve to be discarded against the
+medical practitioners.
+(XI) The medical professionals are entitled to get protection so long as they perform
+their duties with reasonable skill and competence and in the interest of the patients.
+The interest and welfare of the patients have to be paramount for the medical
+professionals.
+[Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre.449.]
+[s 304A.14] CASES.—Medical Negligence.—
+Non-providing of ambulance when attendants were shifting the patient to Trauma
+"Centre, even if it was not asked for by them, may be an instance where there is no"
+negligence in the treatment but may be deficiency in service or civil negligence as was
+held in similar circumstances in the case of Pravat Kumar Mukherjee v Ruby General
+"Hospital.450. In a case, a Cardiac surgeon was indicted in a prosecution under section"
+304A on the grounds that he chose to conduct the angioplasty without having a
+surgical standby unit and such failure resulted in delay of five hours in conducting by-
+pass after the angioplasty failed; and he did not consult a cardio anaesthetist before
+"conducting an angioplasty. According to the High Court, both the above-mentioned"
+"'lapses' on the part of the appellant ""clearly show the negligence"" of the accused-"
+"surgeon. While quashing the proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution"
+of the accused is uncalled for as pointed out by the Court in Jacob Mathew's case
+"(supra) that the negligence, if any, on the part of the accused cannot be said to be"
+"""gross"".451."
+[s 304A.15] Delegation of responsibility.—
+Even delegation of responsibility to another may amount to negligence in certain
+circumstances. A consultant could be negligent where he delegates the responsibility
+to his junior with the knowledge that the junior was incapable of performing his duties
+properly.452.
+[s 304A.16] Negligence of nurse.—
+Where the allegation that the accused nurse told the doctor that the vaccine for snake
+"bite was not available, when it was actually available, considering the delay of two and"
+"half hours in bringing the patient to the hospital, it was held that there was no direct"
+nexus between the rash and negligent act and death of deceased.453.
+"The accused, a Homeopathic practitioner, administered to a patient suffering from"
+"guinea worm, 24 drops of stramonium and a leaf of dhatura without studying its effect;"
+the patient died of poisoning. The accused was held guilty under this section.454.
+[s 304A.17] Negligence on the part of the bus driver when a passenger fell down from
+a bus.—
+A passenger might fall down from a moving vehicle due to one of the following causes:
+it could be accidental; it could be due to the negligence of the passenger himself; it
+"could be due to the negligent taking off the bus by the driver. However, to fasten the"
+"liability with the driver for negligent driving in such a situation, there should be the"
+evidence that he moved the bus suddenly before the passenger could get into the
+vehicle or that the driver moved the vehicle even before getting any signal from the rear
+"side. Merely because a passenger fell down from the bus while boarding the bus, no"
+presumption of negligence can be drawn against the driver of the bus.455. When
+"deceased was alighting from the bus, the accused driver suddenly started the bus, as a"
+"result of which, he fell down and sustained injuries. It cannot be said that driver had not"
+seen the deceased alighting from bus—negligence and rashness is writ large. It does
+not require any imagination to hold that it was basic duty of driver to ascertain as to
+whether any passenger was boarding or alighting from bus—Conviction was held
+"proper.456. Prosecution case is that when deceased, a girl studying in the 8th standard"
+"was about to board the offending bus driven by accused/ driver, he took the bus"
+speedily and made her fall down whereby she sustained injuries and ultimately died.
+"Conviction of both the accused driver and conductor is held proper.457. In another case,"
+one person had gone on the roof top of the bus and driver started the vehicle while he
+"was there and by falling from bus, passenger sustained injuries and succumbed in"
+hospital. There was no evidence to show that the driver had knowledge that any
+passenger was on the rooftop of the bus. Supreme Court acquitted the accused.458.
+[s 304A.18] CASES.—Act not rash or negligent.—
+If the driver of a motor vehicle does not blow the horn because the prevailing traffic
+"rules prohibit him from doing so, it cannot be said that he has failed to exercise"
+"reasonable and proper care, nor can it be said that duty to blow the horn was"
+"imperative upon him, so as to hold him guilty of negligence under this section.459. If a"
+"pedestrian suddenly crosses a road without taking note of an approaching bus, and,"
+"thus, gets killed by dashing against the bus, the driver cannot be held responsible for"
+any rash or negligent act.460. Where a bus driver finding a level crossing gate open at a
+"time when there was no train scheduled to pass, tried to cross the railway line and the"
+rear portion of the bus collided with an oncoming goods train resulting in the death of
+"four passengers, the driver cannot be held responsible for an offence under this"
+section.461. A bus with some corrugated sheets on the roof was being driven by the
+"accused. On the way, due to jolting, these sheets got loose and fell down on the heads"
+"of passersby, one of which later died. The investigating officer did not care to seize"
+either those sheets and even ascertain who the owner of the bus was who actually
+loaded those sheets without tying them properly. It was held that the bus driver could
+not be held liable under this section.462. The accused was driving a passenger bus at
+moderate speed along a narrow 12' road which had deep ditches on either side of the
+road. When the bus reached a place where a kaccha road bifurcated for a nearby
+"village, a girl of four years old suddenly ran across the road from left to right. The"
+accused in order to save the girl swerved the bus to the right to the extent possible but
+still the left wheel hit the girl and she died on the spot. In setting aside his conviction
+"under this section, the Supreme Court held that it was a case of pure error of judgment"
+"and not a rash or negligent act. It further held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (i.e.,"
+let thing speak for itself) had no application in a criminal case.463.
+Where the bus conductor whistled the bus to start only after he had seen each and
+"every passenger had got out of the bus, but a passenger was injured because he had"
+"slipped and not because the bus suddenly started moving, the conductor was given the"
+benefit of doubt.464. Where the charge that the driver started the bus without waiting
+for signal from the conductor and as a result a passenger who was still at the roof of
+"the bus for bringing down his luggage fell down to death, the Court was of the opinion"
+"that because the conductor was not examined as a witness and without his evidence,"
+"the case was nothing but a version of the prosecution and, therefore, the conviction of"
+the driver was set aside.465. Accused who was trying to overtake other vehicles and in
+"that process took his vehicle completely on the wrong side of the road, giving a dash to"
+"a scooterist resulting in his death. Conviction of appellant under section 304A of IPC,"
+1860 was held proper.466.
+[s 304A.19] Accidents in Construction sites.
+"Where the Deceased, a labourer sustained injuries at construction site of petitioner"
+"during the course of demolition of house and succumbed to his death, Evidence"
+"showing that in spite of repeated warnings and caution notes, petitioner did not pay"
+any heed and continued the work without care and caution which ought to have been
+exercised by a reasonable and a prudent person. The Delhi High Court confirmed the
+conviction under section 304A.467.
+[s 304A.20] Accidental fire from rifle.—
+Fire occurred from rifle of the accused when he was about to take metal powder kept
+under cot. Deceased sustained bleeding injuries on his head and fell down on the cot
+and the accused being unconscious was lying on his cot. Two versions were given by
+the witnesses. The High Court took the view favouring the acquittal.468.
+[s 304A.21] Death of caddie by player's stroke.—
+A golf-player missed the ball and instead struck the caddie to his death. Two other
+"caddies, who were not around, expressed the opinion that there was negligence in the"
+stroke. This opinion was not accepted because neither they were experts nor they were
+around. The Court felt that the incident must have been due to accidental omission to
+"hit the ball. The charge under section 304A was not likely to succeed and, therefore, it"
+was quashed.469.
+[s 304A.22] Death of child by slipping on school stairs.—
+A child slipped on school stairs and sustained head injury. He was taken to the school
+dispensary where the pharmacist applied ice and ointment and instructed that the child
+be taken home. The Court said it was the duty of the pharmacist to either make proper
+diagnosis or advice for medical check-up by an expert doctor. The child died. The head
+master or class teacher were held not liable for causing death by negligence.470.
+"Where a Maruti van carrying number of children was driven by accused/owner, lid of"
+dicky was open and fire crackers were stored in dicky. Fire crackers stored in dicky
+caught fire resulting to death of children. It was held that the incident took place purely
+by accident. Accused were liable to be charged only under sections 304A and 435 of
+"IPC, 1860.471."
+[s 304A.23] Death of a child in swimming pool.—
+Complainant's son drowned in swimming pool and died due to negligent attitude of
+"owner, supervisor and observer of swimming pool. In the FIR, it was specifically"
+mentioned that proposed accused is owner of Resorts. Accused was present in resort
+at time of admission of deceased boy and on date of incident too. Plea that the
+accused had already leased out the resort is of no consequence. High Court directed
+"the magistrate to proceed against accused under section 319, Cr PC, 1973.472. A boy"
+entered into the swimming pool of a club surreptitiously and without notice of the
+chowkidar. He was lost in drowning. The secretary of the club and chowkidar were
+prosecuted under this section. It was alleged that the club had no caution board and no
+life-saving guard. The Court dismissed the case. If the entry of the boy could be due to
+"want of these precautions, only then there could have been a finding of negligence. The"
+"negligence, if at all, was of civil nature.473. In another case, where death of deceased"
+"boy was due to drowning in swimming pool, the evidence showed that the deceased"
+boy himself had unauthorisedly and surreptitiously entered in pool which was meant
+for adult trained swimmers and drowned. There was no nexus between the death of
+boy with only rash and negligent act of accused. Accused acquitted.474.
+[s 304A.24] Distinction between sections 304 and 304A.—
+The Supreme Court stated as follows: There is distinction between sections 304 and
+304A. Section 304A deals with homicidal death by rash or negligent act. It does not
+create a new offence. It is directed against the offences outside the range of sections
+299 and 300 and covers those cases where death has been caused without intention or
+knowledge. Section 304A carves out cases where death is caused by doing a rash or
+negligent act which does not amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder
+within the meaning of section 299 or culpable homicide amounting to murder under
+"section 300. In other words, section 304A excludes all the ingredients of section 299 as"
+"also of section 300. Where intention or knowledge is the ""motivating force"" of the act"
+"complained of, section 304A will have to make room for the graver and more serious"
+charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder or amounting to murder as the
+"facts disclose. The words ""not amounting to culpable homicide"" in section 304A are"
+significant and clearly convey that the section seeks to embrace those cases where
+there is neither intention to cause death nor knowledge that the act done will in all
+probability result into death. It applies to acts which are rash or negligent and are
+"directly the cause of death of another person.475. Undoubtedly, ""rashness"" does contain"
+"an element of knowledge. But a distinction has to be made between section 304, IPC,"
+"1860, requiring knowledge, with regard to the consequences of the act and section"
+"304A, IPC, 1860, ""rashness"", having an element of knowledge about the consequences,"
+"but with the hope that the consequences would not follow. Furthermore, in order to"
+"understand the distinction between sections 304 and 304A, IPC, 1860, it is pertinent to"
+"note that while the former section deals with an act 'amounting to culpable homicide',"
+the latter section deals with an act 'not amounting to culpable homicide'. Although
+"""rashness"" does contain an element of ""knowledge"", even then the case would not fall"
+"within the ambit of section 304, IPC, 1860. For, in section 304, IPC, 1860, the knowledge"
+is about the consequences as the consequences would naturally and obviously follow
+"from the nature of the act. But in ""rashness"", although there is a knowledge that the"
+"consequences may follow or are likely to follow, the doer hopes that the consequences"
+"would not follow. Thus, even if the element of knowledge is common in sections 304"
+"and 304A, IPC, 1860, the extent and ambit of ""knowledge"" defers in its nature."
+"Therefore, the element of ""knowledge"" should not lead to any confusion between the"
+"scope of section 304, IPC, 1860 and scope of section 304A, IPC, 1860.476. If a person"
+wilfully drives a motor vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death to
+"some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving and the act will"
+amount to culpable homicide. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge
+that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide. When
+"intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act, section 304A, has to make"
+room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide.477.
+[s 304A.25] Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case.—
+"On the night of 2 December 1984, there was a massive escape of lethal gas from the"
+MIC storage tank at the Bhopal plant of the Union Carbide (I) Ltd. (UCIL) into the
+"atmosphere causing the death of 5,295 people, leaving 5,68,292 people suffering from"
+different kinds of injuries ranging from permanent total disablement to less serious
+"injuries. CBI filed the charge for offences under sections 304, 324, 326, 429 read with"
+"section 35 of IPC, 1860. Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal passed an order framing"
+"charges against the accused Nos. 5–9 under sections 304 (Part II), 324, 326 and 429"
+"of IPC, 1860 and against accused Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 12 under the very same sections but"
+"with the aid of section 35 of IPC, 1860. But the Supreme Court in Keshub Mahindra v"
+"State of MP.478. held that on the material led by the prosecution, appropriate charges"
+which are required to be framed against the concerned accused are under section
+"304A, IPC, 1860 so far as the accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are concerned while so far"
+"as accused Nos. 2, 6, 4 and 12 are concerned, charges under section 304A read with"
+"section 35, IPC, 1860 will have to be framed. Ultimately on 7 June 2010, the CJM vide"
+"his judgment convicted accused Nos. 2 to 5, 7 to 9 and 12 under sections 304A, 336,"
+"337, 338 read with section 35, IPC, 1860 and sentenced them to two years'"
+"imprisonment. On 29 June 2010, Criminal Appeal No. 369 of 2010 was filed by State of"
+Madhya Pradesh before the Court of Sessions with a prayer for enhancement of
+"sentences under the existing charges. On the same day, the State of Madhya Pradesh"
+also filed Criminal Revision Application No. 330 of 2010 before the Court of Sessions
+"under section 397, Cr PC, 1973, challenging the alleged failure of the CJM to enhance"
+"the charges to section 304 (Part II) in exercise of his jurisdiction under section 216, Cr"
+"PC, 1973, and to commit the trial of the case to Sessions under section 323, Cr PC,"
+"1973 and inter alia praying for a direction to enhance charges and commit. Meanwhile,"
+CBI filed a curative petition against judgment Keshub Mahindra v State of MP (supra)
+"quashing of charges under sections 304, Part II, 324 and 429, IPC, 1860 and direction"
+"to the trial Court to frame charges under section 304A, IPC, 1860. Dismissing the"
+curative petition which was filed after 14 years of the judgment impugned held that if
+"according to the curative petitioner, the learned Magistrate failed to appreciate the"
+correct legal position and misread the decision dated 13 September 1996 as tying his
+"hands from exercising the power under section 323 or under section 216 of the Code, it"
+can certainly be corrected by the appellate/revisional Court.479.
+[s 304A.26] Three cases.—Death due to drunken driving.—offence under section 304A
+"or section 304, Part II.—"
+"In State of Maharashtra v Salman Salim Khan,480. the allegation was that the accused"
+"drove his car under the influence of alcohol, in a rash manner and caused the death of"
+one person and caused grievous injuries to four others who happened to be sleeping
+"on the footpath. A few days later, the charge-sheet filed came to be modified based on"
+"the additional statement of the complainant, and instead of section 304A, IPC, 1860,"
+"section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860 was substituted. The Sessions Court framed charges"
+"under section 304, Part II. The High Court quashed the order framing charge under"
+"section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860 and directed the appropriate Magistrate's Court to frame"
+de novo charges under various sections mentioned in the said impugned order of the
+"High Court including one under section 304A, IPC, 1860. In the appeal filed by the State,"
+the Supreme Court held that neither of the sides would have been in any manner
+"prejudiced in the trial by framing of a charge either under section 304A or section 304,"
+"Part II, IPC, 1860 except for the fact that the forum trying the charge might have been"
+"different, which by itself, being open to the concerned Court to have altered the charge"
+appropriately depending on the material that is brought before it in the form of
+evidence.
+[s 304A.27] BMW Case.—
+"The accused in an inebriated state, after consuming excessive alcohol, was driving the"
+"vehicle without licence, in a rash and negligent manner in a high speed which resulted"
+"in the death of six persons. Trial Court convicted the accused under section 304, Part II,"
+but High Court altered the conviction to section 304A.The Supreme Court held that the
+accused had sufficient knowledge that his action was likely to cause death and such
+"action would, in the facts and circumstances of the case, fall under section 304, Part II,"
+"IPC, 1860 and the trial Court has rightly held so.481."
+[s 304A.28] Alister Anthony Pareira's case.—
+"In Alister Anthony Pareira's case,482. in which seven persons were killed and injuries"
+"were caused to eight persons, the Court held that the case falls under section 304, Part"
+II and not under section 304A by holding that the person must be presumed to have
+had the knowledge that his act of driving the vehicle without a licence in a high speed
+after consuming liquor beyond the permissible limit is likely or sufficient in the ordinary
+course of nature to cause death of the pedestrians on the road.
+[s 304A.29] Uphaar Cinema Hall Tragedy.—
+Answering the question of whether the negligence of Ansal brothers—the occupiers of
+"the cinema was so gross so as to be culpable under section 304A, of IPC, 1860, the"
+Supreme Court held that its answer to that question was in the affirmative. The reasons
+"were not far to seek. In the first place, the degree of care expected from an occupier of"
+a place which is frequented everyday by hundreds and if not thousands is very high in
+comparison to any other place that is less frequented or more sparingly used for public
+functions. The higher the number of visitors to a place and the greater the frequency of
+"such visits, the higher would be the degree of care required to be observed for their"
+safety. The duty is continuing which starts with every exhibition of cinematograph and
+continues till the patrons safely exit from the cinema complex. That the patrons are
+"admitted to the cinema for a price, makes them contractual invitees or visitors qua"
+whom the duty to care is even higher than others. The need for high degree of care for
+the safety of the visitors to such public places offering entertainment is evident from
+"the fact that the Parliament has enacted the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and the"
+"Cinematograph Rules, 1983, which cast specific obligations upon the"
+owners/occupiers/licensees with a view to ensuring the safety of those frequenting
+such places.483.
+"The Supreme Court observed that in cases of negligence leading to public disaster,"
+imposition of expiatory fine in addition to incarceration serve the penological purpose
+"of deterrence as also public purpose. Under section 304A of IPC, 1860, either"
+"imprisonment only or with fine or fine alone, is the prescribed punishment. The"
+punishment by both imprisonment and exemplary fine would be an appropriate
+punishment in a case like this. The licensee and the person actually running the Uphaar
+cinema are equally responsible for the tragedy. Taking note of the licensee's age-
+"related complications, sentence was reduced to the period already undergone, in case"
+"he pays Rs. 30 crores. The court held that on principle of parity, the same benefit"
+cannot be extended to the person actually running the cinema as he never had a case
+"of any age-related complications. Thus, his sentence of one-year imprisonment was"
+maintained and he was also held liable to a fine of Rs. 30 crores.484.
+[s 304A.30] Sentencing.—
+"The Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v Krishna @ Raju,485. while dealing"
+with the concept of adequate punishment in relation to an offence under section 304A
+"of the IPC, 1860, has held that considerations of undue sympathy in such cases will not"
+only lead to miscarriage of justice but will also undermine the confidence of the public
+in the efficacy of the criminal justice dispensation system. If the accuseds are found
+"guilty of rash and negligent driving, Courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do"
+not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the Courts should
+have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and it should be commensurate with the
+seriousness of the offence.486.
+The Supreme Court relied upon cases emphasising deterrent effect of punishment on
+lax and inattentive drivers. A seven-year-old child was killed due to rash and negligent
+driving. Simple imprisonment for six months plus one month and fine of Rs. 1000 plus
+Rs. 500 was held to be proper.487.
+[s 304A.31] New approach in Sentencing.—Community Service and Contribution to the
+relief fund for victims.—
+"In the BMW Case,488. the Supreme Court issued the following directions instead of"
+enhancing the jail term (1) Accused has to pay an amount of Rs. 50 lakh to the Union of
+"India within six months, which will be utilised for providing compensation to the victim"
+"of motor accidents, where the vehicle owner, driver etc. could not be traced, like victims"
+"of hit and run cases. On default, he will have to undergo simple imprisonment for one"
+year. This amount be kept in a different head to be used for the aforesaid purpose only.
+(2) The accused would do community service for two years which will be arranged by
+"the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment within two months. On default, he will"
+have to undergo simple imprisonment for two years. But it was held that grant of
+compensation under section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be paid to
+person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused
+has been sentenced has a different contour and the same is not to be regarded as a
+substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence.489.
+"[s 304A.32] Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, when to be extended.—"
+Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating
+"consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal Courts cannot treat the"
+"nature of the offence under section 304A, IPC, 1860 as attracting the benevolent"
+"provisions of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. While considering the"
+quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or
+"negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence."
+"This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for"
+lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles.490. It
+is settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to
+"become a good driver, he must have a better training in traffic laws and moral"
+responsibility with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb.
+"Considering the increased number of road accidents, the Court, on several occasions,"
+has reminded the criminal Courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents
+"that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under section 304A, IPC, 1860 as"
+"attracting the benevolent provisions of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act,"
+1958.491.
+"383. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 12."
+"384. State of Punjab v Balwinder Singh, 2012 (2) SCC 182 [LNIND 2012 SC 8] : AIR 2012 SC 861"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 8] .
+"385. Malay Kumar Ganguly v Sukumar Mukherjee, (2009) 9 SCC 221 [LNIND 2009 SC 1647] : AIR"
+2010 SC 1162 [LNIND 2009 SC 1647].
+"386. Kurban Hussain, (1964) 67 Bom LR 447 (SC)."
+"387. Malay Kumar Ganguly v Sukumar Mukherjee, (2009) 9 SCC 221 [LNIND 2009 SC 1647] : AIR"
+2010 SC 1162 [LNIND 2009 SC 1647] .
+"388. Sushil Ansal v State Through CBI, (2014) 6 SCC 173 [LNIND 2014 SC 527] ."
+"389. Empress of India v Idu Beg, (1881) I LR 3 All 776."
+"390. Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v State of UP, (2008) 14 SCC 479 [LNIND 2008 SC 2043] : AIR"
+2009 SC 125 [LNIND 2008 SC 2043] : (2009) 1 All LJ 96.
+"391. Abdul Kalam Musalman v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 2507 (Raj); Prabhakaran v State of"
+"Kerala, (2007) 14 SCC 269 [LNIND 2007 SC 824] : AIR 2007 SC 2376 [LNIND 2007 SC 824] ."
+"392. PB Desai (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+"393. Sushil Ansal v State through CBI, (2014) 6 SCC 173 [LNIND 2014 SC 527] ."
+"394. Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, (1872) 7 Mad HCR 119 , 120; Smith v State, (1925) 53 Cal 333 ;"
+"Rangaswamy, (1952) Nag 93."
+"395. Gaya Prasad, (1928) 51 All 465 ."
+"396. Captain D'Souza v Pashupati Nath Sarkar, 1968 Cr LJ 405 . Raj Karan Singh v State of UP,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 555 (All), the gun of a police constable went off while he was loading it and killed a"
+"person, trigger went off because of positive act of moving belt of the gun. His failure to keep the"
+safety catch in back position was an illegal omission within the meaning of section 22
+"conviction. Sita Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 287 (Raj), the accused labourer was"
+"digging earth by spade, another worker was taking away the soil and was hit by the spade in"
+that process to his death. Criminal negligence. Sentence imposed on him was reduced to the
+period already undergone.
+"397. Omkar, (1902) 4 Bom LR 679 , followed in Akbar Ali, (1936) 12 Luck 336 ; Chinubhai"
+"Haridas, (1959) 61 Bom LR 1309 . Jaunath Sahu v Sasibhusan Rath, 1995 Cr LJ 4070 (Ori)."
+"398. Kurban Hussein, (1965) 2 SCR 622 [LNIND 1964 SC 355] : 67 Bom LR 447; See also AD"
+"Bhatt, 1972 Cr LJ 727 (SC)."
+"399. Khanmahomed, (1936) 38 Bom LR 1111 ."
+"400. Akbar Ali v State, (1936) 12 Luck 336 ."
+"401. Tukaram Sitaram, (1970) 72 Bom LR 492 ."
+"402. Finney, (1874) 12 Cox 625; Sat Narain Pandey, (1932) 55 All 263 . For an example of"
+"unconscionably lenient sentence, i.e., for two months only of simple imprisonment for causing"
+"death by rash and negligent driving, see State of Karnataka v Krishna, (1987) 1 SCC 538 [LNIND"
+"1987 SC 701] : AIR 1987 SC 861 [LNIND 1987 SC 701] : 1987 Cr LJ 776 , the Supreme Court"
+"increased it to six months' RI. Indramani Jena v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 72 (Ori), rash and"
+"negligent driving of a bullock cart, an old man killed by a young man of 30, jail term knocked out,"
+"only fine of Rs. 5,000 imposed. Madhab Bagh v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 116 , speed of the"
+vehicle is not always an important consideration.
+"403. Shivder Singh v State, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2142 (Del), sentence of one year was reduced to that"
+"already undergone in view of the fact that the occurrence was 23 years old, a fine of Rs. 5000."
+"404. Kaliaperumal v State of TN, 1996 Cr LJ 3658 (Mad)."
+"405. Abdul Ise Suleman v State of Gujarat, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 464 (SC)."
+"406. Idu Beg v State, (1881) 3 All 776 , 778, 779. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of"
+"Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966 [LNIND 2004 SC 1370] : 2004 Cr LJ 1778 , no knowledge or"
+"intention should be there, in this case a gun was unlocked, loaded and fired to cause death from"
+"close range, intention or knowledge could not be denied, section not attracted."
+"407. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, 2012 AIR SCW 4659 : AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+"474] ; relied in Shivappa v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1680 (Kant)."
+"408. Swindall, (1846) 2 C & K 230."
+"409. Kalaji v State of Gujarat, 1992 Cr LJ 2397 (Guj)."
+"410. Sushil Ansal v State through CBI, (2014) 6 SCC 173 [LNIND 2014 SC 527]"
+"411. PB Desai (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+"412. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC"
+"284 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 Cr LJ 4403 ; Syed Akbar v State of Karnataka, 1980 SCC (Cr) 59 :"
+"AIR 1979 SC 1848 [LNIND 1979 SC 297] ; B Nagabhushanam v State of Karnataka, 2008 (5) SCC"
+730 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] : AIR 2008 SC 2557 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] .
+"413. Rattan Singh v State of Punjab,1980 SCC (Cr) 17 : AIR 1980 SC 84 [LNIND 1979 SC 388] ."
+"414. Mohd Aynuddin @ Miyam v State of AP, 2000 (7) SCC 72 [LNIND 2000 SC 1014] : AIR 2000"
+SC 2511 [LNIND 2000 SC 1014] : 2000 SCC (Cr) 1281 : 2000 Cr LJ 3508 .
+"415. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, 2005 AIR SCW 3685 : AIR 2005 SC 3180 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+587] .
+"416. Francis Xavier Rodriguez v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 1374 (Bom). The plea of"
+compassion was not taken before the lower court. Confining punishment to fine only was not
+"accepted. Dwarka Das v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 4601 (Raj), bus driven in a wavering"
+"manner and at high speed killing a person, the case being 16 years old, fine was enhanced"
+instead of maintaining the sentence of imprisonment.
+"417. Thakur Singh v State of Punjab, 2003 (9) SCC 208 ."
+"418. Shivappa v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1680 (Kant)."
+"419. State of MP v Jagdish, 1992 Cr LJ 746 (MP). Rajpal v State, 1992 Cr LJ 1470 (Del), wrong"
+"side, high speed, ramming into autorickshaw claiming two lives and injuring a third, convicted, it"
+was immaterial that he would be losing his service.
+"420. Mohammed Aynuddin v State of AP, AIR 2002 SC 2511 at p 2512 : 2000 Cr LJ 3508 ."
+"421. Keshavamurthy v State of Karnataka, 2002 Cr LJ 103 (Kant), the court also said that the"
+report of the motor vehicle inspector is no evidence unless he is examined. Suyambhu v State of
+"TN, 2001 Cr LJ 1577 (Mad), high speed bus, driver losing control, hitting a jeep and killing all the"
+"passengers in it, res ipsa loquitor applied to hold the bus driver liable. Chunnilal v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 2499 (Raj), rash driving, accident, persons in the truck, some killed, some"
+"injured, no probation, one year RI & Rs. 250 fine. Manjit Singh v State, 1997 Cr LJ 331 (P&H),"
+"truck hitting rickshaw from behind, conviction."
+"422. Guru Basavaraj v State of Karnataka, 2012 Cr LJ 4474 : JT 2012 (8) SC 246 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+1561] : 2012 (8) Scale 47 [LNIND 2012 SC 1561] : 2012 AIR (SCW) 4822 : (2012) 8 SCC 734
+"[LNIND 2012 SC 1561] . See also Haradhan Gope v State of Tripura, 2012 Cr LJ 3232 (Gau); State"
+"of HP v Manohar Singh, 2011 Cr LJ 3402 (HP)."
+"423. Binoda Bihari Sharma v State of Orissa, 2011 Cr LJ 1989 (Ori)."
+"424. Pradeep Kumar v State of Haryana, 2000 Cr LJ 2394 (P&H). K Srinivas v State of Karnataka,"
+"2002 Cr LJ 3865 (Kant), bus involved in accident, evidence was inconsistent. The court said that"
+the speed of the bus could not be the sole factor for attribution of rashness or negligence.
+"425. Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, 2012 AIR SCW 4659 : AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+474] .
+"426. State v Parmodh Singh, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 277 ."
+"427. Mehnga Singh v State, 2012 Cr LJ 4930 (Del)."
+"428. Kewal Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 Cr LJ 3004 (P&H)."
+"429. Sanjay Rambhau Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 1407 (Bom)."
+"430. PB Desai (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+"431. See also Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre, (2010) 3 SCC 480"
+"[LNIND 2010 SC 164] ; Suresh Gupta (Dr) v Govt of NCT of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 422 [LNIND 2004"
+SC 744] : AIR 2004 SC 4091 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] .
+"432. Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 1 WLR 582 ."
+"433. Shivanand Doddamani (Dr) v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 230 (Kant)."
+"434. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, 2005 AIR SCW 3685 : AIR 2005 SC 3180 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+587] .
+"435. Suresh Gupta (Dr) v Govt of NCT of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 422 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] : AIR 2004"
+SC 4091 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] .
+"436. Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre, (2010) 3 SCC 480 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 164] .
+"437. Suresh Gupta (Dr) v Govt of NCT of Delhi, (2004) 6 SCC 422 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] : AIR 2004"
+SC 4091 [LNIND 2004 SC 744] .
+"438. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] : AIR 2005 SC 3180"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 587] ; ASV Narayanan Rao v Ratnamala, 2013 (4) Mad LJ (Cr) 67 : 2013 (11)"
+Scale 390 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 19863] .
+"439. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] : AIR 2005 SC 3180"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 587] ; ASV Narayanan Rao v Ratnamala, 2013 (4) Mad LJ (Cr) 67 : 2013 (11)"
+Scale 390 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 19863] .
+"440. Sudesh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 1460 (All)."
+"441. Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v Prasanth S Dhananka, (2009) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009"
+SC 1292] : 2009 Cr LJ 3012 .
+"442. Malay Kumar Ganguly v Sukumar Mukherjee, (2009) 9 SCC 221 [LNIND 2009 SC 1647] : AIR"
+2010 SC 1162 [LNIND 2009 SC 1647] .
+"443. Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 1 WLR 582 , 586."
+"444. Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] : AIR 2005 SC 3180"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 587] .
+"445. PB Desai (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, 2013 (11) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC 815] ."
+"446. Lakshmanan Prakash (Dr) v State of TN, 1999 Cr LJ 2348 (Mad)."
+"447. Ram Niwas v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 615 (All)."
+"448. Martin F D'Souza v Mohd Ishfaq, (2009) 3 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 375] : AIR 2009 SC 2049"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 375] : (2009) 3 All LJ 165 : (2009) 1 CPJ 32 [LNIND 2009 SC 375] . The court
+"cited the concept of gross negligence as stated in Jacob Mathew case, (2005) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+2005 SC 587] : AIR 2005 SC 3180 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] .
+"449. Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre, (2010) 3 SCC 480 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 164] .
+"450. Pravat Kumar Mukherjee v Ruby General Hospital, II 2005 CPJ 35 (NC)."
+"451. ASV Narayanan Rao v Ratnamala, 2013 (4) MLJ (Cr) 67 : 2013 (11) Scale 390 [LNINDORD"
+2013 SC 19863] . Other cases relating to medical negligence—Marwari Maternity Hospital v
+"Praveen Jain, 2013 Cr LJ 307 (Gau); M K Rai (Dr) v State of Chhattisgarh, 2012 Cr LJ 4384 (Chh);"
+"Saroja Dharmapal Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1060 (Bom); A R Srivastava (Dr) v State"
+"of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ 1539 (Jha); Dashavatar Gopalkrishna Bade v State of Maharashtra, 2010"
+Cr LJ 4056 (Bom).
+"452. Spring Meadows Hospital v Harjol Ahluwalia, 1998 (4) SCC 39 [LNIND 1998 SC 357] : AIR"
+1998 SC 1801 [LNIND 1998 SC 357] .
+"453. V Marie v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 3985 (AP)."
+"454. Juggankhan, AIR 1965 SC 831 [LNIND 1964 SC 195] ."
+"455. Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam v State of AP, (2000) 7 SCC 72 [LNIND 2000 SC 1014] : AIR"
+2000 SC 2511 [LNIND 2000 SC 1014] .
+"456. Ram Asra v State of HP, 2011 Cr LJ 1038 (HP)."
+"457. Rajaram v State, 2010 Cr LJ 1644 (Mad)."
+"458. Braham Dass v State of HP, AIR 2009 SC 3181 [LNIND 2009 SC 1130] : (2009) 7 SCC 353"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1130] .
+"459. Tukaram Sitaram, (1970) 72 Bom LR 492 ."
+"460. MH Lokre, 1972 Cr LJ 49 : AIR 1972 SC 214 [LNIND 1971 SC 662] . State of Rajasthan v"
+"Jolta, 2002 Cr LJ 3514 (Raj), a person sitting on the mudguard of a tractor fell off to death,"
+persons sitting on trolley did not speak of negligence on driver's part. Acquittal.
+"461. SN Hussain, 1972 Cr LJ 496 : AIR 1972 SC 700 . See also Renu Kunta Mallaiah v State of AP,"
+AIR 2009 SC 133 [LNIND 2008 SC 2037] : (2008) 10 SCC 220 [LNIND 2008 SC 2037] .
+"462. Baijnath Singh, 1972 Cr LJ 919 : AIR 1972 SC 1485 ."
+"463. Syed Akbar, 1979 Cr LJ 1374 : AIR 1979 SC 1848 [LNIND 1979 SC 297] . Trial on a charge"
+of rash and negligent driving was held to be vitiated by delay of 9½ years in taking cognizance.
+"Srinivas Pal v UT Arunachal Pradesh, 1988 Cr LJ 1803 : AIR 1988 SC 1729 [LNIND 1988 SC 327] ,"
+reversing (1988) 1 Crimes 383 [LNIND 1987 GAU 49] (Gau).
+"464. Altyarkunju & Shahajahan v State of Kerala, 2002 Cr LJ 1981 (Ker). State of Karnataka v"
+"Sharanappa Basnagouda, AIR 2002 SC 1529 [LNIND 2002 SC 234] : 2002 Cr LJ 2020 , no"
+interference in the matter of punishment awarded by the revisional court. The accused was
+sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for offence under section 304A
+"(dashing against car by mini-lorry). Niranjan Singh v State, 1997 Cr LJ 336 (Del), a bus passenger"
+"fell to death but cause of fall, could not be proved, driver acquitted. Sudalaimuthu v State of TN,"
+"1997 Cr LJ 1038 (Mad), there must be direct nexus between death and rash and negligent act. A"
+passenger died because he tried to get down after conductor's whistle and the driver's starting
+of the bus. Negligence not proved.
+"465. Braham Das v State of HP, (2009) 7 SCC 353 [LNIND 2009 SC 1130] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 406"
+": (2009) 81 AIC 265 . State of Haryana v Sher Singh, (2008) 15 SCC 571 [LNIND 2008 SC 2028] :"
+"AIR 2009 SC 823 [LNIND 2008 SC 2028] , another case of failure of evidence, dying declaration"
+"of a passenger did not talk of driver's negligence, nor was there any proof who the driver was."
+"466. Zamir Khan v State, 2011 Cr LJ 4044 (Bom)."
+"467. Ram Karan v State (Delhi Admn), 2010 Cr LJ 966 (Del). See also Kumar v State of Kerala,"
+"2012 Cr LJ 3193 (Ker); Geetha Ramesh v Sub-Inspector of Police, Udagamandalam, 2010 Cr LJ"
+762 (Mad).
+"468. Krushna Mohan Samal v State of Orissa, 2012 Cr LJ 180 (Ori)."
+"469. M Shafi Goroo v State, 2000 Cr LJ 2172 (Del)."
+"470. Ramesh Chandra Mohapatra v State of Orissa, 2002 Cr LJ 3453 (Ori)."
+"471. Suresh Narvekar v State of Goa, 2010 Cr LJ 2007 (Bom)."
+"472. Kolishetty Venkateswarlu v Bandaru Venkat Reddy, 2010 Cr LJ 712 (AP)."
+"473. BP Ram v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 473 , considering Suleman Rahiman v State of"
+"Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] : 1968 Cr LJ 1013 . Joseph v State of Kerala,"
+1990 Cr LJ 56 (Ker). There was the allegation that the accused carried excess passengers than
+capacity in his boat. The boat capsized and some passengers were lost. There was no proof
+that the accused was present in the boat at the time of sailing or that mere overloading was the
+cause of capsization. Mere negligence not sufficient for conviction.
+"474. State of Maharashtra v Dhananjay Laxmanrao Bhagat, 2010 Cr LJ 1987 (Bom)."
+"475. Mahadev Prasad Kaushik v State of UP, (2008) 14 SCC 479 [LNIND 2008 SC 2043] : AIR"
+"2009 SC 125 [LNIND 2008 SC 2043] . See also Madhusudan v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 215"
+(Kant) for difference between sections 304 and 304A.
+"476. Abdul Kalam Musalman v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 2507 (Raj); Prabhakaran v State of"
+"Kerala, JT 2007 (9) SC 346 [LNIND 2007 SC 824] : AIR 2007 SC 2376 [LNIND 2007 SC 824] ."
+"477. Naresh Giri v State of MP, (2008) 1 SCC 791 [LNIND 2007 SC 1313] : 2007 (13) Scale 7"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1313] .
+"478. Keshub Mahindra v State of MP, (1996) 6 SCC 129 [LNIND 1996 SC 2462] : 1999 SCC (Cr)"
+1124.
+"479. CBI v Keshub Mahindra, (2011) 6 SCC 216 [LNIND 2011 SC 514] : AIR 2011 SC 2037"
+[LNINDORD 2011 SC 209] .
+"480. State of Maharashtra v Salman Salim Khan, AIR 2004 SC 1189 [LNIND 2003 SC 1122] :"
+"(2004) 1 SCC 525 [LNIND 2003 SC 1122] ,"
+"481. State Tr PS Lodhi Colony New Delhi v Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+459] : 2012 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2012 SC 3104 [LNIND 2012 SC 459] .
+"482. Alister Anthony Pareira's case, 2012 CLJ 1160 (SC) : (2012) 2 SCC 648 [LNIND 2012 SC 15]"
+: AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"483. Sushil Ansal v State through CBI, (2014) 6 SCC 173 [LNIND 2014 SC 527] ."
+"484. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v Sushil Ansal, AIR 2017 SC 976 ."
+"485. State of Karnataka v Krishna @ Raju, 1987 (1) SCC 538 [LNIND 1987 SC 701] : AIR 1987 SC"
+861 [LNIND 1987 SC 701] .
+"486. State of Karnataka v Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar, 2002 (3) SCC 738 [LNIND 2002"
+SC 234] : AIR 2002 SC 1529 [LNIND 2002 SC 234] .
+"487. B Nagabhushanam v State of Karnataka, (2008) 5 SCC 730 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] : AIR"
+2008 SC 2557 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] .
+"488. State Tr PS Lodhi Colony New Delhi v Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+459] : 2012 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2012 SC 3104 [LNIND 2012 SC 459] .
+"489. Guru Basavaraj v State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734 [LNIND 2012 SC 1561] : 2012 Cr LJ"
+4474 .
+"490. B Nagabhushanam v State of Karnataka, 2008 (5) SCC 730 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] : AIR"
+"2008 SC 2557 [LNIND 2008 SC 1172] ; Dalbir Singh v State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 [LNIND"
+2000 SC 810] .
+"491. State of Punjab v Balwinder Singh, 2012 (2) SCC 182 [LNIND 2012 SC 8] : AIR 2012 SC 86"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 1146] ; Sanjay Rambhau Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 1407 (Bom);"
+"Zamir Khan v State, 2011 Cr LJ 4044 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+492.[[s 304B] Dowry death.
+(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
+otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
+and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
+"harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection"
+"with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ""dowry death"", and such"
+husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
+"Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, ""dowry"" shall have the same"
+"meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)."
+(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
+which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to
+imprisonment for life.]
+COMMENT.—
+"The above provision was inserted by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 1986, (Act 43"
+of 1986) and came into force with effect from 19 November 1986. The necessity for
+insertion of the provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in
+its 21st Report dated 10 August 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform.' Keeping in
+view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related
+"deaths, legislature thought it's wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of"
+"dowry death (section 113B, Evidence Act, 1872) on proof of certain essentials.493."
+[s 304B.1] Object.—
+"Both section 304B, IPC, 1860 and section 113B, Evidence Act, 1872, were inserted by"
+"the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986, for combating the menace of dowry"
+killings. The attempt was to encounter difficulties of proof by creating a
+presumption.494.
+[s 304B.2] Ingredients.—
+"The Supreme Court took occasion in Shanti v State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226"
+"[LNIND 1990 SC 696] : 1991 Cr LJ 1713 ,495.,496. to explain the ingredients of section"
+"304B. K Jayachandra Reddy, J, said;497."
+A careful analysis of s. 304B shows that this section has the following essentials : (1) The
+death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under
+normal circumstances;498. (2) Such death should have occurred within seven years of her
+marriage;499. (3) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
+any relative of her husband soon before her death; (4) Such cruelty or harassment should be
+for or in connection with demand for dowry.500. This section will apply whenever the
+occurrence of death is preceded by cruelty or harassment by husband or in - laws for dowry
+and death occurs in unnatural circumstances. The intention behind the section is to fasten
+guilt on the husband or in - laws though they did not in fact caused the death.501.
+"To establish the offence of dowry death under section 304B, IPC, 1860, the prosecution"
+has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the husband or his relative had subjected
+the deceased to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon
+before her death.502.
+[s 304B.3] Dowry—meaning of.—
+"For the purposes of the section, ""dowry"" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of"
+"the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. ""Dowry"" means any property or valuable security given"
+or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly– (a) by one party to a marriage to the
+other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any
+"other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before 503.[or any"
+"time after the marriage] 504.[in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does"
+not include] dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law
+"(Shariat) applies.505. From the above definition it is clear that, 'dowry' means any"
+property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by
+"one party to another, by parents of either party to each other or any other person at,"
+"before, or at any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the"
+said parties but does not include dower or mahr under the Muslim Personal Law
+"(Shariat) Application Act, 1937. All the expressions used under this section are of a"
+very wide magnitude. The expressions 'or any time after marriage' and 'in connection
+with the marriage of the said parties' were introduced by amending Dowry Prohibition
+"(Amendment) Act 1984, (Act 63 of 1984) and Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act"
+"1986, (Act 43 of 1986) with effect from 2 October 1985 and 19 November 1986,"
+respectively. These amendments appear to have been made with the intention to cover
+"all demands at the time, before and even after the marriage so far they were in"
+connection with the marriage of the said parties. This clearly shows the intent of the
+legislature that these expressions are of wide meaning and scope. The expression 'in
+connection with the marriage' cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. The
+expression 'in connection with the marriage' even in common parlance and in its plain
+language has to be understood generally. The object being that everything which is
+"offending at any time, i.e. at, before or after the marriage, would be covered under this"
+"definition, but the demand of dowry has to be 'in connection with the marriage' and not"
+"so customary that it would not attract, on the face of it, the provisions of this"
+"section.506. The payments which are customary payments, for example, given at the"
+time of birth of a child or other ceremonies as are prevalent in the society or families to
+"the marriage, would not be covered under the expression 'dowry'.507. Furnishing of a"
+"list of ornaments and other household articles, such as refrigerator, furniture and"
+"electrical appliances etc., to the parents or guardians of the bride, at the time of"
+"settlement of the marriage, prima facie amounts to demand of dowry within the"
+meaning of section 2 of the Act.508. The definition of 'dowry' is not restricted to
+agreement or demand for payment of dowry before and at the time of marriage but
+even include subsequent demands.509. It is not necessary for the purposes of the
+offence under the section to show that there was an agreement for payment of
+dowry.510.
+The in-laws of the deceased woman could not be roped in only because they were
+close relatives. The overt-acts which are attributed to them would require to be proved
+beyond reasonable doubt.511.
+"[s 304B.4] ""Husband""—meaning of.—"
+It would be appropriate to construe the expression 'husband' to cover a person who
+enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned
+status of husband and subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any
+manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions–sections
+"304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of"
+"sections 498A and 304B, IPC, 1860. Such an interpretation, known and recognised as"
+purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a
+definition of 'husband' to specifically include such persons who enter into contract
+"marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported exercise of his"
+role and status as 'husband' is no ground to exclude them from the purview of sections
+"304B or 498A, IPC, 1860, viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the"
+legislations introducing those provisions.512.
+[s 304B.5] Relative of the husband.—
+"The word ""relative of the husband"" in section 304B of IPC, 1860 would mean such"
+"persons, who are related by blood, marriage or adoption. The brother of the aunt of the"
+husband is not a relative.513.
+"[s 304B.6] ""Soon before death"".—"
+"To attract the provisions of section 304B, IPC, 1860, one of the main ingredients of the"
+"offence which is required to be established is that ""soon before her death"" she was"
+"subjected to cruelty and harassment ""in connection with the demand for dowry"".514."
+"The provision does not employ the term ""at any time before"" or ""immediately before"""
+"and must be construed according to its true import.515. The expression ""soon before"
+"her death"" cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be"
+understood in their plain language and with reference to their meaning in common
+"parlance. These are the provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore, cannot"
+"be given such a narrower meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the"
+"provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must receive strict"
+"construction. But, even the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions have"
+"to be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further,"
+the interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd results on the one
+hand and would further the object and cause of the law so enacted on the other.516.
+The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words 'soon
+"before her death' is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities,"
+"have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be"
+"a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between her death and the dowry-related cruelty or"
+harassment inflicted on her.517. There was a demand of Maruti Car being pressed by
+the two accused persons after about six months of the marriage of the deceased
+"(which took place about three years before the incident) and of her being pestered,"
+"nagged, tortured and maltreated on non-fulfilment of the said demand which was"
+conveyed by her to her parents from time to time on her visits to her parental home and
+on telephone. She might have thought that things would improve with the passage of
+"time, but it seemed that that did not happen. It, however, cannot be taken to mean that"
+the demand made by the two accused persons had subsided or was given up by them.
+"The test of 'soon before' was held satisfied in the facts, evidence and circumstances of"
+the present case.518. Evidence that the deceased told her mother one month prior to
+"her unnatural death, that the accused husband used to subject her to cruelty, was held"
+to be not within the four corners of time frame.519. Where the death occurred after five
+"days of the demand of dowry, it was considered to be soon before death.520."
+"The expression ""soon before"" is a relative term. It has to be construed in the context of"
+specific circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule of a universal application
+can be laid down by prescribing a time-limit.521. These words are to be understood in a
+relative and flexible sense. There can be no fixed period of time in this regard.522. If the
+"incident alleged of cruelty is remote in time and has become ineffective, so as not to"
+"disturb the mental equilibrium of the victim concerned, it would be of no"
+consequence.523.
+Where the death was due to electrocution and there is evidence that the victim was
+"subjected to cruelty demanding a motor bike, it was held that the harassment made"
+15–20 days before her death was considered to be soon before her death.524. Cruelty
+"caused to her (the deceased) on any day from the date of her marriage, i.e., 20 April"
+"1994 till the date of her death, i.e., 22 July 1994 could be cruelty caused 'soon before'"
+her death.525.
+[s 304B.7] Proximity Test.—
+"The expression ""soon before her death"" used in section 304B, IPC, 1860 and section"
+"113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is present with the idea of proximity test. Though the"
+"language used is ""soon before her death"", no definite period has been enacted and the"
+"expression ""soon before her death"" has not been defined in both the enactments."
+"Accordingly, the determination of the period which can come within the term ""soon"
+"before her death"" is to be determined by the Courts, depending upon the facts and"
+"circumstances of each case. However, the said expression would normally imply that"
+the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the
+"death in question. In other words, there must be existence of a proximate and live link"
+between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If the
+alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to
+"disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no"
+consequence.526. The section was not attracted where there had been no harassment
+for about 15 months prior to the occurrence.527. Where the wife was persistently
+subjected to cruelty and harassment by the husband and other in-laws for gold
+"ornaments and the last such torture was practiced 15 days before the occurrence, the"
+"Court said that the requirement of ""soon before"" was very well satisfied.528. The import"
+of this expression was examined by the Orissa High Court529. in a case in which there
+was a history of beating the wife up for dowry. But the couple reconciled and resumed
+joint life. The wife joined her husband after a long stay with her parents. The husband
+left her back with her parents and after a fortnight took her away. Within two days
+"thereafter her parents were informed of her death. During the fortnight, she had not"
+made any complaint to her parents about dowry or torture. The Court held that the
+section was not attracted because there was no cruelty or harassment soon before her
+"death. The Court compared section 304B with section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872"
+"where also the words ""soon before"" occur and said:530. A conjoint reading of section"
+"113B of the Act and section 304B, IPC, 1860 shows that there must be material to"
+show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment.
+Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to
+"bring it within the purview of the ""death occurring otherwise than in normal"
+"circumstances."" The determination of the period which can come within the term ""soon"
+"before"" is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances"
+"of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression ""soon before"" would"
+normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or
+harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live
+link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If
+the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to
+"disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence."
+"Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient"
+"whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would"
+result in abuse of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not strictly and
+squarely fall within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was led to
+"show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts"
+and circumstances of a given case.531.
+"Principles relating to section 304B IPC, 1860 and 113B Evidence Act summarised by"
+Supreme Court
+"(a) To attract the provisions of section 304B, IPC, 1860, the main ingredient of the"
+"offence to be established is that soon before the death of the deceased, she was"
+subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand of dowry.
+(b) The death of the deceased woman was caused by any burn or bodily injury or some
+other circumstance which was not normal.
+(c) Such death occurs within seven years from the date of her marriage.
+(d) That the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
+relative of her husband.
+(e) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry.
+(f) It should be established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before
+her death.
+(g) The expression (soon before) is a relative term and it would depend upon
+circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what
+would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence.
+(h) It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period and that brings in the importance
+of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising
+"a presumption under section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872."
+"(i) Therefore, the expression ""soon before"" would normally imply that the interval"
+should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in
+question. There must be existence of a proximate or life link between the effect of
+"cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. In other words, it should not"
+be remote in point of time and thereby make it a stale one.
+"(j) However, the expression ""soon before"" should not be given a narrow meaning which"
+would otherwise defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act and should not
+lead to absurd results.
+(k) Section 304B is an exception to the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence
+that a suspect in the Indian Law is entitled to the protection of Article 20 of the
+"Constitution, as well as, a presumption of innocence in his favour. The concept of"
+deeming fiction is hardly applicable to criminal jurisprudence but in contradistinction to
+"this aspect of criminal law, the legislature applied the concept of deeming fiction to the"
+provisions of section 304B.
+"(l) Such deeming fiction resulting in a presumption is, however, a rebuttable"
+"presumption and the husband and his relatives, can, by leading their defence prove that"
+the ingredients of section 304B were not satisfied.
+(m) The specific significance to be attached is to the time of the alleged cruelty and
+"harassment to which the victim was subjected to, the time of her death and whether"
+the alleged demand of dowry was in connection with the marriage. Once the said
+"ingredients were satisfied, it will be called dowry death and by deemed fiction of law,"
+the husband or the relatives will be deemed to have committed that offence.
+Kashmir Kaur v State of Punjab.532.
+[s 304B.8] Comparison between section 304B and section 498A.—
+Cruelty has been defined in the explanation for the purpose of section 498A.
+"Substantive section 498A, IPC, 1860 and presumptive section 113A of the Evidence"
+"Act, 1872 have been inserted in the respective statutes by Criminal Law (Second"
+"Amendment) Act, 1983. It is to be noted that sections 304B and 498A, IPC, 1860"
+cannot be held to be mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct
+offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has
+"to be proved. The Explanation to section 498A gives the meaning of ""cruelty"". In section"
+"304B, there is no such Explanation about the meaning of ""cruelty"". But having regard to"
+"common background to these offences, it has to be taken that the meaning of ""cruelty"
+"or harassment"" is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to section 498A under"
+"which ""cruelty"" by itself amounts to an offence. Under section 304B, it is ""dowry death"""
+that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of
+marriage. No such period is mentioned in section 498A. A person charged and
+acquitted under section 304B can be convicted under section 498A without that charge
+"being there, if such a case is made out. If the case is established, there can be a"
+"conviction under both the sections.533. Section 498A, IPC, 1860 and section 113A of"
+"the Evidence Act, 1872 include in their amplitude past event of cruelty. Period of"
+"operation of section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 is seven years. Presumption arises"
+when a woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of
+marriage.534.
+"Following this in Nand Kishore v State of Maharashtra,535.,536. it was held that all the"
+ingredients of this section must exist conjunctively. There must be nexus between
+cruelty and harassment to raise the presumption of dowry death under section 113B of
+"the Evidence Act, 1872."
+"The Supreme Court again explained the expression ""soon before death"" in Hans Raj v"
+"State of Punjab.537.,538. There should have been continuous cruelty connected with"
+demand of dowry and the same should have been shown to be in existence till date
+"when the deceased met her parents two days before her death. In this case, there was"
+no intervening circumstance on record showing settlement regarding demand of
+dowry. The existence of harassment for dowry would be deemed to be there right up to
+the point of death. The accused was liable to be convicted. The meaning of the
+expression is to be decided by the Court after analysing facts and circumstances
+leading to the victim's death to see whether there is any proximate connection between
+the cruelty or harassment for dowry demand and the death.539.
+"The Supreme Court held under section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 that an"
+agreement for dowry is not always necessary. There was in this case a persistent
+demand for a TV set and a scooter. The demand was related with marriage. It fell
+within the meaning of the word dowry under section 304B.540. The woman died of self-
+poisoning. The evidence of her sister revealed that she had informed her about the
+harassment about one and a half years before death. The Court said that such
+"harassment could not come within the words ""soon before death"". There was no"
+"convincing evidence to prove the grave charge of ""dowry death"". The accused persons"
+were acquitted.541. A harassment shown to have taken place eight months before the
+"suicide was held to be not coming within the scope of the words ""soon before"". The"
+conviction under section 304B was set aside. The evidence showed that cruelty was
+there. The accused persons were not able to explain why the deceased wife committed
+"suicide. The conviction and sentence under section 306 (abetment of suicide), section"
+"498A and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was maintained.542."
+[s 304B.9] Presumption of guilt and Doctrine of reverse burden.—
+The rule of law requires a person to be innocent till proved guilty. The concept of
+deeming fiction is hardly applicable to the criminal jurisprudence. In contradiction to
+"this aspect, the legislature has applied the concept of deeming fiction to the provisions"
+"of section 304B. Where other ingredients of section 304B are satisfied, in that event,"
+"the husband or all relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death. In other words,"
+the offence shall be deemed to have been committed by fiction of law. Once the
+"prosecution proves its case with regard to the basic ingredients of section 304B, the"
+Court will presume by deemed fiction of law that the husband or the relatives
+"complained of, has caused her death. Such a presumption can be drawn by the Court"
+keeping in view the evidence produced by the prosecution in support of the substantive
+"charge under section 304B of the Code. Of course, deemed fiction would introduce a"
+"rebuttable presumption and the husband and his relatives may, by leading their defence"
+"and proving that the ingredients of section 304B were not satisfied, rebut the same.543."
+"By a deeming fiction in law, the onus shifts on to the accused to prove as to how the"
+deceased died. It is for the accused to show that the death of the deceased did not
+result from any cruelty or demand of dowry by the accused persons.544. The Court has
+"to presume that the appellant has committed the offence under section 304B, IPC,"
+1860. The prosecution had led sufficient evidence before the Court to raise a
+presumption that the appellant had caused the dowry death of the deceased and it
+"was, therefore, for the appellant to rebut this presumption. The appellant has chosen"
+not to examine any defence witness to rebut this presumption of dowry death against
+"him under section 113B of Evidence Act, 1872. The Courts below were, thus, right in"
+"holding that the appellant was guilty of the offence under section 304B, IPC, 1860.545."
+"As the financial status of both the families seems to be very very poor, the demand of"
+dowry and meeting out such demand seems to be highly improbable.
+"[s 304B.10] Section 113B of Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+"Alongside insertion of section 304B in IPC, 1860, the legislature also introduced"
+"section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872, which lays down when the question as to"
+whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
+before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or
+"harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that"
+"such person had caused the dowry death. If section 304B, IPC, 1860 is read together"
+"with section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872, a comprehensive picture emerges that if a"
+married woman dies in unnatural circumstances at her matrimonial home within seven
+years from her marriage and there are allegations of cruelty or harassment upon such
+married woman for or in connection with demand of dowry by the husband or relatives
+"of the husband, the case would squarely come under ""dowry death"" and there shall be a"
+presumption against the husband and the relatives.546. When the question is whether a
+person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before
+"her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for,"
+"or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person"
+had caused the dowry death.547. The Court shall not presume the same unless it is
+"established that soon before her death, a woman has been subjected to cruelty or"
+harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry.548. For the purposes of
+"this section, ""dowry death"" shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of IPC,"
+"1860 (45 of 1860).549. As per the definition of ""dowry death"" in section 304B, IPC, 1860"
+"and the wording in the presumptive section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872, one of the"
+"essential ingredients amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman"
+concerned must have been 'soon before her death' subjected to cruelty or harassment
+"""for or in connection with the demand for dowry"".550. But the prosecution under section"
+"304B of IPC, 1860 cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment or"
+"cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and such was caused ""soon before her"
+death.551.
+The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:
+(1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the
+dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the
+"accused is being tried for the offence under section 304B, IPC, 1860.)"
+(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.
+"(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry."
+(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death552.
+[s 304B.11] Injuries insufficient to cause death.—
+Where injuries as found on the person of the deceased could not have caused her
+"death, the offence would not attract the mischief of the section 304B, though there"
+might have been history of torture for dowry.553.
+Asphyxia only means that the death took place due to lack of air going to the lungs.
+The Doctor had to clearly opine whether this was due to strangulation or hanging and if
+"it was due to hanging, whether the hanging was suicidal or homicidal.554."
+[s 304B.12] Normal circumstances.—
+"These words apparently carry the meaning of natural death. The expression ""otherwise"
+"than under normal circumstances"" means a death not taking place in the course of"
+nature and apparently under suspicious circumstances if not caused by burns or bodily
+injury.555.
+[s 304B.13] Nexus between suicide and harassment.—
+The prosecution has to show nexus between suicide and harassment in the sense that
+"the victim was induced by the cruelty to take the extreme step. In this case, the"
+accused was not able to point out any other cause. Evidence showed that she was
+driven away from the matrimonial home and came back because of the intervention of
+"Panchayat. Within a period of two months thereafter, there was the suicide. The Court"
+said that the cruelty and suicide were inter-related. Presumption under section 113B of
+"the Evidence Act, 1872 became applicable. The accused was convicted under the"
+section.556.
+[s 304B.14] Presumption.—
+Where there was sufficient evidence to prove dowry demand and death had also taken
+"place within seven years, the Supreme Court held that the presumption arising under"
+the section did not become automatically rebutted by the fact that the accused
+persons had been acquitted under section 302. There were 15 injuries on her person
+"which were not self-inflicted. Thus, they were homicidal.557."
+[s 304B.15] Section attracted whether death homicidal or suicidal.—
+"Where the suicide is due to demand of dowry soon before bride's death, section 304B"
+would apply. The section applies irrespective of the fact whether there is homicide or
+suicide.558.
+"[s 304B.16] Comparison with section 498A, IPC, 1860.—"
+Where two women were acquitted of chargesunder section 498A which deals with
+"cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Disapproving the High Court view, K"
+"Jayachandra Reddy, J, observed559. that sections 304B and 498A cannot be held to be"
+mutually exclusive.
+These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common
+essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to s. 498A gives
+"the meaning of ""cruelty"". In s. 304B there is no such Explanation about the meaning of"
+"""cruelty"". But having regard to the common background to these offences we have to take"
+"that the meaning of ""cruelty or harassment"" be the same as we find in the Explanation to s."
+"498A under which ""cruelty"" by itself amounts to an offence. Under s. 304B it is ""dowry death"""
+that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of marriage. No
+such period is mentioned in s. 498A.... Further it must also be borne in mind that a person
+charged and acquitted u/s. 304B can be convicted u/s. 498A without that charge being
+"there, if such a case is made out..."
+"If the case is established, there can be a conviction under both the sections but no"
+separate sentence would be necessary under section 498A in view of the substantive
+sentence being awarded for the major offence under section 304B.560.
+"[s 304B.17] Comparison with Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.—"
+The Supreme Court stated this comparison in the following words:
+"The object of s. 4, Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 is to discourage the very demand for property"
+or valuable security as consideration for a marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4
+"prohibits the demand for ""giving"" property or valuable security which demand, if satisfied,"
+"would constitute an offence u/s. 3 read with s. 2 of the Act. Thus, the ambit and scope of"
+ss. 3 and 4 of the 1961 Act are different from the ambit and scope of s. 304-B IPC. Hence
+"the ingredients of s. 498-A IPC and ss. 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, are different from the"
+ingredients of s. 304-B IPC. The High Court gravely erred in coming to the finding that once
+"the charge u/s. 304-B IPC could not be proved, then conviction u/s. 498-A IPC and ss. 3 and"
+4 of the 1961 Act also could not be recorded.561. Section 4 of the Act is the penal section
+"and demanding a ""dowry"", as defined u/s. 2 of the Act, is punishable under this section.562."
+[s 304B.18] New offence.—
+Retrospective operation.—The section creates a new offence. An act committed prior to
+its enactment and enforcement cannot be tried under this section.563. The Allahabad
+High Court proceeded somewhat differently. In reference to the offence of bride
+"burning for dowry which occurred before coming into force of section 304B, it cannot"
+be said that section 304B is an ex post facto law and it cannot apply in connection with
+an occurrence which took place prior to its enactment. The new offence of 'bride
+burning' was unknown on the date of occurrence in this case. Section 304B does not
+"create a new offence, rather it reiterates in substance the offence under section 302"
+"under which such offences were punished. So, doctrine of ex post facto would not"
+apply.564.
+[s 304B.19] Inclusion of section 302 in all Dowry death Cases.—
+"In Rajibir v State of Haryana,565. a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court directed all"
+"trial Court to ordinarily add section 302 to the charge of section 304B, so that death"
+sentences can be imposed in such heinous and barbaric crimes against women. The
+Supreme Court has clarified the direction in Rajbir by observing that:
+Be that as it may the common thread running through both the orders is that this Court had
+in Rajbir's case566. directed the addition of a charge u/s. 302 IPC to every case in which the
+"accused are charged with s. 304-B. That was not, in our opinion, the true purport of the"
+order passed by this Court. The direction was not meant to be followed mechanically and
+without due regard to the nature of the evidence available in the case. All that this Court
+"meant to say was that in a case where a charge alleging dowry death is framed, a charge"
+u/s. 302 can also be framed if the evidence otherwise permits.
+[s 304B.20] Charge under section 304B.—Conviction under section 306.—
+"An offence of abetment of suicide punishable under section 306 of IPC, 1860 is much"
+"broader in scope than an offence punishable under section 304B of IPC, 1860.567. Plea"
+"that only charge under section 304B, IPC, 1860 framed and no charge under section"
+"306, IPC, 1860 framed the appellant could not be convicted for offence punishable"
+"under section 306, IPC, 1860 repealed.568. Accused originally charged and convicted"
+"under section 304B of IPC, 1860. The Court found Conviction for dowry death"
+unsustainable. Prosecution adduced evidence on the issue of cruelty to deceased not
+only on ground of alleged demand of dowry but also on ground of her having no issue.
+Court held that mere failure to mention section 306 in charge cannot adversely
+prejudice the defence of accused. Held while acquitting accused for offence
+"punishable under section 304B of IPC, 1860, conviction can be recorded under section"
+"306 of IPC, 1860.569. In K Prema S Rao v Yadla Srinivasa Rao,570. the Court, analysing"
+"the evidence, ruled thus:"
+"The same facts found in evidence, which justify conviction of the appellant u/s. 498A for"
+"cruel treatment of his wife, make out a case against him u/s. 306 IPC of having abetted"
+commission of suicide by the wife. The appellant was charged for an offence of higher
+"degree causing ""dowry death"" u/s. 304B which is punishable with minimum sentence of"
+seven years' rigorous imprisonment and maximum for life. Presumption u/s. 113A of the
+Evidence Act could also be raised against him on same facts constituting offence of cruelty
+u/s. 498A IPC. No further opportunity of defence is required to be granted to the appellant
+when he had ample opportunity to meet the charge u/s. 498A IPC.
+"In a case, the Supreme Court said:"
+the basic ingredients of the offence u/s. 306 IPC have been established by the prosecution
+inasmuch as the death has occurred within seven years in an abnormal circumstance and
+"the deceased was meted out with mental cruelty. Thus, we convert the conviction from one"
+u/s. 304B IPC to that u/s. 306 IPC.571.
+[s 304B.21] Sections 304B and 306 together–
+"The Supreme Court, in Bhupendra v State of MP,572. examined that whether an offence"
+under sections 304B and 306 together would be attracted in a case and was of the
+"opinion that section 306 of IPC, 1860 is much broader in its application and takes"
+"within its fold one aspect of section 304B of the IPC, 1860. These two sections are not"
+mutually exclusive. If a conviction for causing a suicide is based on section 304B of
+"IPC, 1860, it will necessarily attract section 306 of IPC, 1860. However, the converse is"
+not true.
+[s 304B.22] Evidence of date of marriage.—
+The presumption starts running from the date of marriage. The prosecution has
+therefore to prove the date of marriage. The prosecution failed to do so. It was held
+that the Courts below erred in shifting the burden of showing the date of marriage to
+the defence and then the presumption on the basis of their statement about the fact of
+marriage.573. Where the marriage had taken place more than seven years before the
+"incident, the husband was acquitted under the section.574."
+"492. Ins. by Act 43 of 1986, section 10 (w.e.f. 19-11-1986)."
+"493. Dhan Singh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3156 (All)."
+"494. Kunhiabdulla v State of Kerala, (2004) 4 SCC 13 [LNIND 2004 SC 291] : AIR 2004 SC 1731"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 291] : (2004) 2 KLT 152 . State of AP v Raj Gopal Asawa, (2004) 9 SCC 157"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 715] : 2003 Cr LJ 157 .
+"495. State of HP v Jagroop Singh, 1993 Cr LJ 2766 (HP), though there was proof of harassment,"
+"but near about the period of the incident, cordial relations prevailed, no presumption, Ratan Lal v"
+"State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 3723 (MP), no presumption because, no proof of marriage beyond"
+"reasonable doubt, nor of harassment, nor of death within the statutory period. Sankara Suri Babu"
+"v State of AP, 1991 Cr LJ 1480 (AP), proof of demand of dowry four years after marriage, hence"
+"no presumption. Nunna Venkateswarlu v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 108 (AP), no agreement for"
+"dowry at the time of marriage; about the subsequent demands, the court said, they would not"
+"create the presumption. Rajinder Kumar v State of Haryana, 1996 Cr LJ 3742 (P&H), there was no"
+"evidence showing demand, the husband made desperate attempt to save the deceased and"
+"himself got severely burnt, acquittal. Anil Kumar Jain v State of MP, (1996) Cr LJ 3191 (MP),"
+"evidence of dowry demand which was fulfilled, no evidence of harassment either then or"
+"subsequently, the wife was depressed by reason of her illness also, no mention of harassment"
+"in dying declaration, section not attracted."
+"496. Shanti v State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 [LNIND 1990 SC 696] : 1991 Cr LJ 1713 ."
+"497. Shanti v State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 [LNIND 1990 SC 696] at p 1229 : 1991 Cr LJ"
+1713 .
+"498. As to this see Akula Ravinder v State of AP, AIR 1991 SC 1142 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 990, where it"
+is emphasised that death must be proved to be one out of the course of nature and the mere
+fact that the deceased was young and death was not accidental is not sufficient to establish
+that death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Ashok Kumar v
+"State of Punjab, 1987 Cr LJ 1412 (P&H), where the wife died of self-poisoning within the"
+"statutory period, but there was no proof of cruelty by the husband or others. Mohan Lal v State of"
+"Punjab, (1984) 1 Chand L Rep 647, suicide by married woman by burning herself and the"
+"evidence only showed some maltreatment on some earlier occasions for inadequate dowry, not"
+"sufficient for conviction. Gurditta Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1992 Cr LJ 309 (DB), single judge"
+"session, 1991 Cr LJ 303 (Raj), where the court said that simply because a young wife had"
+"brought her life to a tragic end by committing suicide by consuming insecticide, it could not be"
+said that she had embraced death on account of any demand of dowry by her husband or
+mother-in-law.
+"499. For the effect of not being able to show the date of marriage, see Arbind kumar Ambasta v"
+"State of Jharkhand, 2002 Cr LJ 3973 (Jhar), the effect being that the charge would have to be an"
+ordinary one of murder and the benefit of the special provision would not be available.
+"500. Kashmir Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1039 [LNIND 2012 SC 802] : 2013 Cr LJ 689 ;"
+"GA Mohd Moideen v State of TN, 2000 Cr LJ 4355 (Mad), a mere demand of money made by"
+accused husband for the purpose of taking a shop on lease and refusal or delay in meeting the
+"demand would not be sufficient to infer compulsion for suicide. Bajrang v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 134 (Raj), cruelty soon before death for demand for dowry are necessary"
+"constituents without which the offence is not complete. Satvir Singh v State, 1998 Cr LJ 405"
+"(P&H), the married woman failed in her attempt at suicide, the offence under the section could"
+"not arise. Nilamani Nath v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 962 (Ori), dowry demand could not be"
+"proved nor the fact who caused death, mere production of a stick with which death was"
+supposed to have been caused was not sufficient. Another case in which demand for dowry and
+ill-treatment could not be proved and was before the Supreme Court was Ramaswamy v Dasari
+"Mohan, 1998 Cr LJ 1105 : AIR 1998 SC 774 [LNIND 1998 SC 17] . Gurnam Singh v State, 1998 Cr"
+"LJ 3694 (P&H), the husband could not be shown to be guilty, rather he took his wife to the"
+"hospital and in the process was himself partly burnt, acquittal. Bhagwandas v Sham Lal, AIR"
+"1997 SC 1873 [LNIND 1997 SC 304] : 1997 Cr LJ 1927 , the victim wife had left home and was"
+residing with her parents. She was taken back after an amicable settlement. There was no
+"cruelty thereafter. Thus, no presumption of dowry death. Conviction under section 498A and not"
+"under section 304B. State of HP v Jog Raj, 1997 Cr LJ 2033 (HP), no conviction because the"
+"alleged demand of Rs. 15,000 was not proved and was also not in itself a dowry demand."
+"Balasaheb v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 3476 (Bom), demands made for celebration of"
+seventh month of wife's pregnancy. It could not be interpreted as a demand in connection with
+"marriage under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Conviction set aside. Gati Bahera v State of"
+"Orissa, 1997 Cr LJ 4331 (Ori), death due to diarrhoea, in village areas it cannot be said to be"
+unnatural. It is not uncommon for ailing persons to remain without medical care. Kishan Singh v
+"State of Punjab, (2007) 14 SCC 204 [LNIND 2007 SC 1218] : AIR 2008 SC 233 [LNIND 2007 SC"
+"1218] , Supreme Court restated ingredients. Biswajit Halder v State of WB, (2008) 1 SCC 202"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 344] : 2007 Cr LJ 2300 , dowry demand was there but there was no proof of any"
+"cruelty or harassment being practiced, bride's suicide followed in about four months after"
+"marriage. Nallam Veera Satyanarayanadam v PP High Court of AP, (2004) 10 SCC 769 [LNIND"
+"2004 SC 250] : AIR 2004 SC 1708 [LNIND 2004 SC 250] , all ingredients of the defence satisfied."
+"Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 724 , no proof against mother-in-law, she could"
+"not be punished only for the fact of being mother-in-law. Surinder Kaur v State of Haryana, (2004)"
+4 SCC 109 [LNIND 2004 SC 256] : AIR 2004 SC 1747 [LNIND 2004 SC 256] : 2004 Cr LJ 1765 .
+Conviction of two sister-in-laws was wrongful there being no evidence against them. Arun Garg v
+"State of Punjab, (2004) 8 SCC 251 [LNIND 2004 SC 1012] , dowry demand proved because twice"
+"over she rang to her father stating that she was being threatened with death for dowry, she died"
+"of poisoning, husband convicted."
+"501. Bakshish Ram v State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1484 [LNIND 2013 SC 1157] : (2013) 4 SCC"
+131 [LNIND 2013 SC 1157] .
+"502. Indrajit Sureshprasad Bind v State of Gujarat, (2013) 14 SCC 678 [LNIND 2013 SC 219] :"
+(2013) 2 SCR 931 [LNIND 2013 SC 219] .
+"503. Subs. by Act 43 of 1986, section 2, for ""or after the marriage"" (w.e.f. 19-11-1986)."
+"504. Subs. by Act 63 of 1984, section 2, for certain words (w.e.f. 2-10-1985)."
+"505. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961."
+"506. Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : AIR 2010 SC"
+2839 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : 2010 Cr LJ 4402 .
+"507. Ram Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 4 SCC 70 [LNIND 2008 SC 204] ; Satbir Singh v State"
+"of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2828 [LNIND 2001 SC 2168] ."
+"508. Madhu Sudan Malhotra v KC Bhandari, (1988) Supp 1 SCC 424."
+"509. State of Andhra Pradesh v Raj Gopal Asawa, (2004) 4 SCC 470 [LNIND 2004 SC 347] ."
+"510. Vidhya Devi v State of Haryana, (2004) 9 SCC 476 [LNIND 2004 SC 78] : AIR 2004 SC 1757"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 78] , there was additional demand for dowry after marriage. State of AP v Raj"
+"Gopal Asawa, (2004) 4 SCC 470 [LNIND 2004 SC 347] : AIR 2004 SC 1933 [LNIND 2004 SC 347] ,"
+mere demand for dowry is enough.
+"511. Kans Raj v State of Punjab, 2000 Cr LJ 2993 : AIR 2000 SC 2324 [LNIND 2000 SC 735] ."
+"512. Koppisetti Subbharao v State of AP, AIR 2009 SC 2684 [LNIND 2009 SC 1038] : (2009) 12"
+"SCC 331 [LNIND 2009 SC 1038] ; Reema Aggarwal v Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+1499] : AIR 2004 SC 1418 [LNIND 2004 SC 1499] .
+"513. State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh, 2014 Cr LJ 3586 : AIR 2014 SC 2561 [LNIND 2014 SC 518] ."
+"514. K Prema S Rao v Yadla Srinivasa Rao, 2003 (1) SCC 217 [LNIND 2002 SC 662] : AIR 2003 SC"
+11 [LNIND 2002 SC 662] : 2003 SCC (Cr) 271 : 2003 Cr LJ 69 .
+"515. Tummala Venkateswar Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2014 Cr LJ 1641 : 2014 (4) SCJ 322"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 1090] .
+"516. Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : AIR 2010 SC"
+2839 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : 2010 Cr LJ 4402 .
+"517. Tarsem Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 1454 [LNIND 2008 SC 2415] , Yashoda v State"
+"of MP, (2004) 3 SCC 98 [LNIND 2004 SC 155] ."
+"518. Satya Narayan Tiwari v State of UP, 2011 Cr LJ 445 : (2010) 13 SCC 689 [LNINDORD 2010"
+SC 188] : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 393.
+"519. State of Rajasthan v Girdhari Lal, 2014 Cr LJ 41 : 2014 (3) SCJ 584 [LNIND 2013 SC 908] ."
+"520. Sukhwinder Singh v State of Punjab, 2014 Cr LJ 446 : 2014 (2) SCJ 629 ."
+"521. Vidhya Devi v State of Haryana, (2004) 9 SCC 476 [LNIND 2004 SC 78] : AIR 2004 SC 476 ."
+"522. Deen Dayal v State of UP, (2009) 11 SCC 157 [LNIND 2009 SC 19] : AIR 2009 SC 1238"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 19] : 2009 Cr LJ 1119 : (2009) 2 All LJ 169. On facts, the offence was"
+"established. Narayanamurthy v State of Karnataka, (2008) 16 SCC 512 [LNIND 2008 SC 1179] :"
+"AIR 2008 SC 2377 [LNIND 2008 SC 1179] , mere cruelty is not sufficient, it has to be in"
+connection with dowry and continue up to a period soon before death. Govindaraju v State of
+"Karnataka, (2009) 14 SCC 236 [LNIND 2009 SC 1362] : 2009 Cr LJ 3457 : (2009) 2 APLJ 203 ,"
+"mental torture proved by the fact that she had not taken any food for two days before her death,"
+"her death in her own bed room, in the early hours of morning by burns not explained by the"
+"accused, conviction under section 304B justified. Raja Lal Singh v State of Jharkhand, (2007) 15"
+"SCC 415 [LNIND 2007 SC 609] : [2007] 6 SCR 105 [LNIND 2007 SC 609] , death within seven"
+"months of marriage, ingredients of the offence established. Tarsem Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"(2008) 16 SCC 155 [LNIND 2008 SC 2415] : AIR 2009 SC 1454 [LNIND 2008 SC 2415] ,"
+"ingredients restated, meaning of dowry explained, object of provision explained, offence not"
+covered because ultimately inability to bear a child was the cause for harassment. Dharam
+"Chand v State of Punjab, (2008) 15 SCC 513 [LNIND 2008 SC 2160] : AIR 2009 SC 1304 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 2160] , remission of sentence not applicable to the offence under the section,"
+"government order of 14 August 2002. Under section 433, Cr PC, 1973. Prem Kumar v State of"
+"Rajasthan, (2009) 3 SCC 726 [LNIND 2009 SC 23] : AIR 2009 SC 1242 [LNIND 2009 SC 23] : 2009"
+"Cr LJ 1123 , death by burn injuries and head-bone fracture proved, taunting and harassment for"
+"insufficient dowry also proved, the High Court set aside the acquittal by the trial Court and"
+"convicted under the section, upheld by the Supreme Court."
+"523. Pradipsinh Nanubha Zala v State of Gujarat, 2016 Cr LJ 4779 (Guj)."
+"524. Suresh Kumar v State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 551 : 2013 (14) Scale 90 ."
+"525. Surinder Singh v State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 561 : AIR 2014 SC 817 [LNIND 2013 SC 1006]"
+.
+"526. Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v State of Maharashtra, 2012 AIR (SCW) 5308 : 2012 Cr LJ 4763 :"
+"2012 (8) Scale 692 [LNIND 2012 SC 590] ; Kaliyaperumal v State of TN, JT 2003 (7) SC 392"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 715] : AIR 2003 SC 3828 [LNIND 2003 SC 715] ; Yashoda v State of MP, JT 2004"
+(2) SC 318 [LNIND 2004 SC 155] : 2004 (3) SCC 98 [LNIND 2004 SC 155] ; Uday Chakraborty v
+"State of WB, AIR 2010 SC 3506 [LNIND 2010 SC 593] ; State of Andhra Pradesh v Raj Gopal"
+"Asawa, AIR 2004 SC 1933 [LNIND 2004 SC 347] : (2004) 4 SCC 470 [LNIND 2004 SC 347] ."
+"527. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 724 : AIR 2004 SC 4368 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+796] .
+"528. Yashoda v State of MP, (2004) 3 SCC 98 [LNIND 2004 SC 155] : AIR 2005 SC 1411 [LNIND"
+2004 SC 155] .
+"529. Keshab Chandra Panda v State of Orissa, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 174 (Ori). Another case on dowry"
+"theme, Gordhan Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LJ 273 (Raj), the husband was convicted"
+under sections 304B and 498A because there was evidence to show harassment and cruelty
+"and the wife had taken spray poison within seven years of marriage. Sant Gopal v State of UP,"
+"(1995) 1 Cr LJ 312 (All), there was no evidence of dowry torture, but the offence of murder"
+"simpliciter under section 300 was made out. Babaji Charan Barik v State, 1994 Cr LJ 1684 (Ori),"
+"no proof of harassment. About the expression ""soon before"", the court said that it is a relative"
+term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no fixed period can be
+indicated in that regard.
+"530. Keshab Chandra Panda v State of Orissa, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 174 (Ori) at p. 178."
+"531. Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : AIR 2010 SC"
+"2839 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : 2010 Cr LJ 4402 ; Pathan Hussain Basha v State of AP, JT 2012 (7)"
+SC 432 [LNIND 2012 SC 473] .
+"532. Kashmir Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1039 [LNIND 2012 SC 802] : 2013 689."
+"533. See Akula Ravinder v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1142 ."
+"534. Where there was no proof of harassment soon before death, conviction under section"
+"304B was set aside, and was converted to one under section 498A. See also Dilip v State of"
+"Orissa, 2002 Cr LJ 1613 (Ori), only the father-in-law was convicted to 10-year imprisonment and"
+"fine of Rs. 1,000 under this section read with section 498A, husband and mother-in-law were"
+"acquitted. Venugopal v State of Karnataka, AIR 1999 SC 146 [LNIND 1998 SC 1339] : 1999 Cr LJ"
+"29 , there was unnatural death of wife within two years of marriage. Evidence showed that she"
+"was ill-treated, harassed and beaten by the accused husband many a time for dowry. Evidence"
+also showed that she was ill-treated by her husband before her death. Plea of suicide was not
+"acceptable. Conviction for murder under the section. Prem Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1998"
+"SC 2628 [LNIND 1998 SC 721] : 1998 Cr LJ 4019 , wife died in the husband's house of burn"
+injuries. He was not able to explain the happening. There was evidence of dowry harassment
+"conviction for murder upheld. Satpal v State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1476 : 1999 Cr LJ 594 ,"
+"harassment on account of dowry demand was not proved, but there was direct and convincing"
+evidence to show that the wife had been humiliated and treated with cruelty on some occasions
+by the accused husband. His conviction under section 498A was maintained. Bhuneshwar Pd
+"Chaurasia v Bhuneshwar Chaurasia, 2001 Cr LJ 3541 (Pat), death by poisoning, the body was"
+cremated hurriedly on the same night without informing police or relatives. There was evidence
+"of dowry demand soon before death. The husband convicted but his father acquitted, there"
+"being no evidence against him. Budhi Singh v State of HP, 2000 Cr LJ 4879 , no evidence to"
+"show that soon before death, the housewife who committed suicide was subjected to"
+harassment or cruelty. She became compelled for suicide because of other quarrels with her
+husband. The accused could be convicted only under section 498A. Surveshwar Singh v State of
+"Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 2179 (Raj), no evidence of cruelty soon before death, that is to say, in the"
+"immediate past, acquittal. State of Karnataka v MV Manjunathogowda, AIR 2003 SC 809 [LNIND"
+"2003 SC 5] , death of wife within six months, the testimony of her father and brother established"
+that soon before her death she was being subjected to cruelty in connection with demand for
+dowry. The accused husband was sentenced to RI for 10 years.
+"535. The Court referred to Shanti v State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 [LNIND 1990 SC 696] :"
+"1991 Cr LJ 1713 . Also followed in Keshab Chandra Panda v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 174 (Ori),"
+"recounting the ingredients into five points. Pramila Patnaik v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 2385"
+"(Ori), no proof of harassment etc. PP Rao v State of AP, 1994 Cr LJ 2632 (AP), offence proved,"
+conviction.
+"536. Nand Kishore v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 3706 (Bom)."
+537. There were details in the statements of the witnesses of the items already given and the
+fact of withdrawal by the husband of the whole amount from the wife's account which was
+opened by her father.
+"538. Hans Raj v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324 [LNIND 2000 SC 735] : 2000 Cr LJ 2993 ."
+"539. State of Rajasthan v Jaggu Ram, (2008) 12 SCC 51 [LNIND 2007 SC 1514] : AIR 2008 SC"
+"982 [LNIND 2007 SC 1514] : 2008 Cr LJ 1039 , death within 1½ years of marriage, cruel"
+treatment and harassment started immediately after marriage and continued till death. High
+"Court erred in acquitting by giving undue weightage of some discrepancies, ignoring the fact"
+"that she suffered head injuries at her in-laws' place and died of them, her parents not informed,"
+cremation in hush-hush manner.
+"540. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958 [LNIND 1998 SC 176] : 1998 Cr LJ 1144"
+". Meka Ramaswamy v Dasari Mohan, AIR 1998 SC 774 [LNIND 1998 SC 17] : 1998 Cr LJ 1105 ,"
+there was no proof of any demand. The mere fact that death took place within four months was
+"not sufficient to convict. Mahesh Kumar v State, 2001 Cr LJ 4417 (All), death caused within 11"
+months of marriage by throttling and body burnt to give it the touch of suicide. Her statement to
+her brother two to three days before death that she would not be permitted to leave till the
+demand for scooter was met. The statement was held to be made soon before her death. The
+Orissa High Court has expressed the opinion that the proximity of time between ill-treatment
+and time of death is not a highly relevant factor and not an essential item to prove by evidence.
+"See Niranjan v State, 1998 Cr LJ 630 (Ori). State v Srikanth, 2002 Cr LJ 3605 (Kant), allegation"
+"that the wife was driven to suicide by cruelty, the court found that the harassment had ceased"
+"three to four years before the suicide, there was no nexus between the cruelty and suicide. The"
+fact of husband contemplating remarriage which could have become the cause of suicide was
+also not evident. The court also said that grandparents should not be charged without
+"something specific against them. Cases in which charge not proved: Mangal Ram v State of MP,"
+"1999 Cr LJ 4342 (MP), death within seven years, there was harassment for four tolas of gold."
+She was beaten and turned out. But it seemed that the cause of suicide was quarrel with some
+persons and not dowry demand. Hence offence under section 498A made out but not under
+"section 304B. T Raghunatha Reddy v State of AP, 1999 Cr LJ 4857 (AP), death of wife and child"
+"due to drowning, evidence not clear, possibility of accident not ruled out, acquittal."
+"541. Public Prosecutor, HC of AP v Appireddy Madhavan Reddy, 2003 Cr LJ NOC 28 (AP) : (2002)"
+2 Andh LT (Cri) 590 .
+"542. Savalram v State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 2831 (Bom)."
+"543. Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 (12) SCC 350 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : AIR 2010 SC"
+"2839 [LNIND 2010 SC 582] : 2010 Cr LJ 4402 ; GV Siddaramesh v State of Karnataka, 2010) 3"
+"SCC 152 [LNIND 2010 SC 145] : 2010 Cr LJ1649, accused has not rebutted or discharged the"
+presumption. Conviction upheld.
+"544. Pathan Hussain Basha v State of AP, 2012 Cr LJ 4230 : (2012) 8 SCC 594 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+473] : AIR 2012 SC 3205 [LNIND 2012 SC 473] .
+"545. Amar Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2010 SC 3391 [LNIND 2010 SC 701] : (2010) 3 SCC"
+(Cr) 1130.
+"546. Pathan Hussain Basha v State of AP, 2012 Cr LJ 4230 : (2012) 8 SCC 594 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+"473] : AIR 2012 SC 3205 [LNIND 2012 SC 473] ; Biswajit Halder @ Babu Halder v State of WB,"
+(2008) 1 SCC 202 [LNIND 2007 SC 344] .
+"547. Section 113B of Evidence Act, 1872."
+"548. Jagjit Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2018 SC 5719 [LNIND 2018 SC 498] ."
+"549. Section 113B of Evidence Act, 1872."
+"550. Bakshish Ram v State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1484 [LNIND 2013 SC 1157] : (2013) 4 SCC"
+131 [LNIND 2013 SC 1157] .
+"551. Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh v State of Maharashtra, 2012 AIR (SCW) 5308 : 2012 Cr LJ 4763 :"
+2012 (8) Scale 692 [LNIND 2012 SC 590] .
+"552. M Srinivasulu v State of AP, 2007 (12) SCC 443 [LNIND 2007 SC 1047] : AIR 2007 SC 3146"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1047] ; Kulwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1567 [LNIND 2013 SC 205]"
+": (2013) 4 SCC 177 [LNIND 2013 SC 271] : 2013 Cr LJ 2199 (SC); Tarsem Singh v State of Punjab,"
+(2008) 16 SCC 155 [LNIND 2008 SC 2415] .
+"553. State of HP v Nikku Ram, 1995 Cr LJ 4184 . Bhaskar Ramappa Madar v State of Karnataka,"
+"(2009) 11 SCC 690 [LNIND 2009 SC 723] : 2009 Cr LJ 2422 , no proof of dowry demand, hence"
+"no abetment by such demand. State of Rajasthan v Teg Bahadur, 2005 SCC (Cr) 218, no proof of"
+dowry demand.
+"554. Krishna Punitram Dhobi v State of Chhattisgarh, 2016 Cr LJ 4800 (Chh)."
+"555. Kailash v State of MP, (2006) 12 SCC 667 [LNIND 2006 SC 803] : AIR 2007 SC 107 [LNIND"
+2006 SC 803] .
+"556. Dhian Singh v State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 759 : AIR 2005 SC 1450 ."
+"557. Rameshwar Das v State of Punjab, (2007) 14 SCC 696 [LNIND 2007 SC 1474] : AIR 2008 SC"
+"890 [LNIND 2007 SC 1474] : 2008 Cr LJ 1400 , part of dowry demands fulfilled and also proved,"
+"death by suicide within seven years, the very fact that a pregnant woman should commit suicide"
+speaks of unbearable harassment. Conviction under section 304B not interfered with.
+"558. Bhagwan Das v Kartar Singh, (2007) 11 SCC 205 [LNIND 2007 SC 650] : AIR 2007 SC 2045"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 650] , in this case, no charge under the section had been framed, the accused"
+could not be convicted under this section.
+"559. Shanti v State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 [LNIND 1990 SC 696] at p 1230 : 1991 Cr LJ"
+"1713 . Noorjahan v State, (2008) 11 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 950] : AIR 2008 SC 2131 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 950] , cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and has to be proved. But"
+otherwise these provisions have created distinct offences.
+"560. See also Padmaben Shambalbhai Patel v State of Gujarat, (1991) 1 SCC 744 : (1991) 1 GLH"
+"125 , where the conviction of the sister of the deceased woman's husband was sustained on the"
+basis of the dying declaration ignoring hypertechnicalities about the mode of recording a dying
+declaration. For another case of the conviction of the husband for burning his wife which
+"conviction was founded on dying declaration, see Ved Prakash v State (Delhi Admn), 1991 Supp"
+"1 SCC 296. See also Ashok Kumar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990 SC 2134 [LNIND 1990 SC 515] :"
+"1990 Cr LJ 2276 : (1991) 1 SCC 166 [LNIND 1990 SC 515] , where the social background of the"
+"provisions for protection of the person of married women is explained. Ravi Kumar v State, 1991"
+"Cr LJ 2579 (Del), applicant losing his wife leaving 20 months old baby, his parents infirm, bail"
+"allowed. State of Kerala v Rajayyan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 989 (Ker) here death within seven years was"
+"caused by drowning in a well, all the ingredients of section 304B were made out, hence"
+"conviction. Prakash Chander v State, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 368 (Del), husband convicted under section"
+304B for burning off his wife because all the ingredients were proved. His mother was convicted
+under section 498A which only meant her acquittal under section 304B. In an appeal against
+"this acquittal, it was held that the High Court had no power to convict her under section 304B. D"
+"Jayana v State of Karnataka, (2009) 6 SCC 575 [LNIND 2009 SC 1188] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 75,"
+there was sufficient evidence relating to demand of dowry to attract section 498A but the same
+"was not sufficient for the purposes of section 304B, conviction under section 304B, was set"
+"aside and that under section 498A, was maintained. Custodial sentence of 3½ years already"
+"served was held to be sufficient. Jagjit Singh v State of Punjab, (2009) 4 SCC 759 [LNIND 2009"
+"SC 544] : AIR 2009 SC 2133 [LNIND 2009 SC 544] : 2009 Cr LJ 2440 , facts established, since"
+"the minimum sentence imposed, no interference in appeal. Anand Kumar v State of MP, (2009) 3"
+"SCC 799 [LNIND 2009 SC 404] : AIR 2009 SC 2155 [LNIND 2009 SC 404] , onus on the accused"
+under section 306 is not as heavy as in the case of a dowry death under section 304B. State of
+"UP v Santosh Kumar, (2009) 9 SCC 626 [LNIND 2009 SC 1770] , comparison with section 498A"
+"restated. Kanti Lal v State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 498 [LNIND 2009 SC 902] : AIR 2009 SC"
+"2703 [LNIND 2009 SC 902] : (2009) 9 AP LJ 95 , charge proved through witnesses. Madan Lal v"
+"State of UP, (2009) 11 SCC 527 [LNIND 2009 SC 540] : AIR 2009 SC 2175 [LNIND 2009 SC 540] :"
+"(2009) 3 All LJ 806, two injuries on neck, wind pipe and sound box fractured, medical opinion"
+"that it could be due to epileptic fit was unfounded, even Modi's Medical Jurisprudence did not"
+"say so, offence proved."
+"561. State of UP v Santosh Kumar, (2009) 9 SCC 626 [LNIND 2009 SC 1770] ."
+"562. Pathan Hussain Basha v State of AP, (2012) 8 SCC 594 [LNIND 2012 SC 473] : AIR 2012 SC"
+3205 [LNIND 2012 SC 473] .
+"563. Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v State of Gujarat, 1991 Cr LJ 3135 (SC), in view of the protection"
+"under Article 20(1) of the Constitution. See also Praveen Malhotra v State, 1990 Cr LJ 2184 (Del),"
+where the husband's bail application was not allowed to be opposed as of right by the father of
+"the deceased bride or by a women's organisation. Amarnath Gupta v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ"
+"2163 (MP), neither suicide note nor the fact that the accused was lawyer by profession was"
+"considered enough by itself for grant of bail. Premwati v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 268 , treatment"
+by in-laws such that the bride was left with no choice but to end her life.
+"564. Bhoora Singh v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 2294 (All)."
+"565. Rajibir v State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 568 [LNIND 2009 SC 1352] ."
+"566. Rajibir v State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 568 [LNIND 2009 SC 1352] ."
+"567. Karan Singh v State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 2708 : (2014) 5 SCC 738 [LNINDU 2014 SC 38] ."
+"568. Narwinder Singh v State of Punjab, (2011) 2 SCC 47 [LNIND 2011 SC 25] : AIR 2011 SC 686"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 25] .
+"569. Ashaben v State of Gujarat, 2011 Cr LJ 854 (Guj)."
+"570. K Prema S Rao v Yadla Srinivasa Rao, 2003 (1) SCC 217 [LNIND 2002 SC 662] : AIR 2003"
+SC.
+"571. Gurnaib Singh v State of Punjab, (2013) 7 SCC 108 [LNIND 2013 SC 1343] : 2013 (7) Scale"
+89 [LNIND 2013 SC 1343] .
+"572. Bhupendra v State of MP, 2014 Cr LJ 546 : 2014 (1) SCJ 627 ."
+"573. Baljeet Singh v State of Haryana, (2004) 3 SCC 122 [LNIND 2004 SC 249] : AIR 2004 SC"
+1714 [LNIND 2004 SC 249] .
+"574. Dalbir Singh v State of UP, (2004) 5 SCC 334 [LNIND 2004 SC 455] : AIR 2004 SC 1990"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 455] : 2004 All LJ 1448 : 2004 Cr LJ 2025 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 305] Abetment of suicide of child or insane person.
+"If any person under eighteen years of age, any insane person, any delirious person,"
+"any idiot, or any person in a state of intoxication, commits suicide, whoever abets the"
+"commission of such suicide, shall be punished with death or 575.[imprisonment for"
+"life], or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This and the following section have been inserted because the ordinary law of
+abetment is inapplicable. They apply when suicide is in fact committed. In order to
+"frame charge under section 305 of IPC, 1860 the material placed by the prosecution"
+"before the trial judge must be such that if it is accepted at its face value, it would"
+establish that the commission of suicide by the girl below 18 years of age was the
+direct and proximate cause of the abetment or instigation offered by the applicant.576.
+"575. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"576. Chandan Soni v State, 2006 Cr LJ 3528 (Chh)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 306] Abetment of suicide.
+"If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"Abetment of suicide is punishable under this section and attempt to commit suicide,"
+under section 309.
+[s 306.1] Ingredients.—
+The ingredients of abetment of suicide are as follows:
+The prosecution has to prove—
+(i) the deceased committed suicide;
+(ii) the accused instigated or abetted the commission of suicide;
+(iii) direct involvement by the accused in such abetment or instigation is
+"necessary.577. In Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh,578. the Supreme Court"
+held that where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct
+creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but
+"to commit suicide, an ""instigation"" may be inferred. In other words, in order to"
+"prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be"
+established that
+"(a) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds"
+or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the
+"deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words"
+or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more
+"quickly in a forward direction, and"
+"(b) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the"
+deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above.
+"Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of"
+instigation.
+"Relevantly, it may be mentioned that there is a marked difference between"
+"""intimidatory"" statement and ""instigatory"" statement. ""Intimidatory"" statements may"
+"give rise to two types of consequences, (a) either the person to whom such statements"
+are made may be frightened and may be on receiving end or he may be angry enough
+"to retaliate, whereas (b) instigatory statements falls within the category of goading,"
+"provoking, etc.579. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or"
+intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the
+"accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.580."
+"[s 306.2] The scope and ambit of section 107 IPC, 1860 and its co-relation"
+"with section 306 IPC, 1860.—"
+Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a
+person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate
+"or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.581. The intention and"
+involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative.
+Any severance or absence of any of this constituents would militate against this
+indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the
+accused to actualise the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment
+"essential to attract the punitive mandate of section 306, IPC, 1860. Contiguity,"
+"continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the"
+"concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained"
+"incitement for suicide.582. In the case of M Mohan v State,583. the Apex Court held that"
+"there should be some live link, or a proximate link between the act of the accused and"
+"the act of committing of suicide. If the live link is missing, it cannot be said that the"
+"accused has instigated, or intentionally aided the commission of suicide. Mere threats"
+of involving the family in a false and frivolous cases cannot be tantamount to
+instigation.584.
+Words uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without any intention could not be regarded
+as an instigation.585. A type of active role which can be described as amounting to
+instigation or aiding for doing something is requisite before a person can be said to
+have committed the offence under the section.586.
+"[s 306.3] What, if the abetted survives.—"
+"The Supreme Court in Satvir Singh v State of Punjab,587. explained this particular"
+situation and held that a person can be convicted only when the abetted person
+"commits suicide. If it ends in an attempt, the abetter cannot be convicted. It is possible"
+to abet the commission of suicide. But nobody would abet a mere attempt to commit
+"suicide. It is also inconceivable to have abetment of an abetment. Hence, there cannot"
+"be an offence under section 116 read with section 306, IPC, 1860."
+[s 306.4] Maltreatment of wife.—
+Mere stray instances of quarrel between husband and wife or the evidence that at
+times the appellant used to consume liquor cannot be termed as abetment as defined
+"under section 107 IPC, 1860. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the"
+accused/appellant instigated or abetted the deceased to end her life and that being the
+"position his conviction under section 306 IPC, 1860 is not justified, and therefore, liable"
+to be set aside.588. Where husband maltreating and beating wife for not conceiving and
+"wife committed suicide, husband is liable to be convicted under section 306.589. The"
+"accused husband, a drunkard, always ill-treated his wife, beat her and imputed"
+unchastity. The wife in a quarrel set herself ablaze and died. The husband along with
+others attempted to stamp out flames. The conviction of the accused for murder was
+set aside and he was convicted under section 306.590.
+[s 306.5] Vicious habits like drinking and gambling and beating wife.—
+The wife of the accused poured kerosene oil on herself and set herself ablaze. In her
+dying declaration she said that her husband used to take liquor after borrowing money
+from villagers and beat her after taking liquor. The Court said that this in itself did not
+amount to abetment.591. The statement in the dying declaration was that the husband
+"used to get drunk, beat her and consistently abuse her. He also told her that he did not"
+bother if she lived or died and asked her to die. The Court held that this did not mean
+that the accused intended to lead her to commit suicide. The offence of abetment was
+not made out.592.
+[s 306.6] Extra-marital relationship.—
+"Extra-marital relationship as such is not defined in the IPC, 1860. The mere fact that the"
+"husband has developed some intimacy with another, during the subsistence of"
+"marriage and failed to discharge his marital obligations, as such would not amount to"
+"""cruelty"", but it must be of such a nature as is likely to drive the spouse to commit"
+"suicide to fall within the explanation to section 498A, IPC, 1860. Court, on facts, found"
+that the alleged extra-marital relationship was not of such a nature as to drive the wife
+to commit suicide.593.
+It has been held that the creation of circumstances for the victim to commit suicide
+"amounts to abetment. In this case, the deceased husband felt humiliated at the"
+activities of indulgence of his wife with the accused. The accused openly spoke of his
+relationship with the wife of the deceased. The outrageous acts of the accused drove
+the deceased to suicide. The accused was held to be guilty of abetting suicide.594.
+"[s 306.7] Failure to appear at arranged marriage, no abetment.—"
+The accused settled marriage ceremony date with the girl with whom he was in love
+affair but did not turn up. The girl committed suicide. It was not proved that the
+accused intended to lead her to suicide by not marrying or knew that suicide was a
+"likely consequence. It being an independent act of the victim girl, the accused was"
+acquitted.595.
+[s 306.8] Pressure for repayment of loan.—
+Where the accused had lent a certain amount to a lady and he was persistently
+"demanding repayment from her, which was no offence, the accused did not know that"
+"she had purchased poisonous tablets and might commit suicide, he was held not liable"
+for abetment of suicide.596.
+[s 306.9] Pressure for accounting proceeds—importance of suicide note.—
+The deceased was the owner of a finance firm. The accused joined as a partner of the
+group of persons who owned land. The deceased sold the plots and handed over
+proceeds to the accused who neither handed over the money to the group nor effected
+transfer in favour of purchasers. The latter pressurised the deceased as a result of
+which he committed suicide.
+This fact figured in the suicide note. The Court attached importance to this fact and
+held the accused guilty of causing abetment.597.
+[s 306.10] Pressure for parting with streedhan.—
+The accused was forcing his wife to transfer the land to his name which she had
+received as a part of her streedhan from her father. He concealed her letters. These
+facts drove her to suicide. He was convicted under section 498A for the offence of
+cruelty. On the same evidence he was convicted under section 306 read with section
+"221, Cr PC, 1973.598."
+[s 306.11] Demand for recruitment money.—
+A demand for a sum of money for recruitment in a job does not amount to instigating
+suicide.599.
+[s 306.12] Advice.—
+Instigation necessarily indicates some active suggestion or support or stimulation to
+"the commission of the act itself, and advice can become an instigation only if it is"
+found that it was an advice which was meant actively to suggest or stimulate the
+"commission of an offence.600. Following this, it was held that where two persons were"
+in love with a married woman and quarrelled over her and one of them (the accused)
+along with the lady taunted the other to commit suicide. The frustration thus caused
+led him to suicide. It was held that no fault could be found with cognizance of the
+offence under section 306.601.
+[s 306.13] Abetment by defamation.—
+The publication of a defamatory article against the victim was held to be not sufficient
+abetment for leading the victim to suicide.602.
+[s 306.14] Abetment by rape.—
+"The Supreme Court examined the possibility of such an abetment, but there was no"
+punishment because the incident of rape itself could not be proved. The suicide was
+committed by the woman more than five and a half months after the incident. Her
+statements could not be regarded as dying declaration because there were no
+circumstances at the time which were related with her death. There was delay in
+lodging FIR and also in conducting medical examination. There was no evidence to
+connect the accused with the crime. The cause for commission of suicide was not
+"legally proved.603. Where the suicide was allegedly committed because of rape, if the"
+"rape is not proved, conviction of accused for abetment to suicide is not proper.604."
+[s 306.15] Instigation from Superior officers.—
+"In Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat,605. the deceased was a driver in the"
+"Microwave Project Department. He had undergone a bypass surgery for his heart, just"
+before the occurrence of such incident and his doctor had advised him against
+performing any stressful duties. The accused was a superior officer to the deceased.
+"When the deceased failed to comply with the orders of the accused, the accused"
+"became very angry and threatened to suspend the deceased, rebuking him very harshly"
+for not listening to him. The accused also asked the deceased how he still found the
+"will to live, despite being insulted so the driver committed suicide. For the purpose of"
+"bringing home any charge, vis-à-vis section 306/107 IPC, 1860 against the accused,"
+Supreme Court stated that there must be allegations to the effect that the accused had
+"either instigated the deceased in some way, to commit suicide or had engaged with"
+"some other persons in a conspiracy to do so, or that the accused had in some way"
+aided any act or illegal omission to cause the said suicide. If the making of
+"observations by a superior officer, regarding the work of his subordinate, is termed as"
+"abetment to suicide, it would become almost impossible, for superior officers to"
+discharge their duties as senior employees. In Vaijnath Kondiba Khandke v State of
+"Maharashtra,606. action was taken against the deceased and his salary was stopped for"
+a month. The Supreme Court held that merely on that count it cannot be said that there
+was guilty mind or criminal intent to drive a person to commit suicide. That action
+simplicitor cannot be considered to be pointer against such superior officer for
+"attracting section 306 IPC, 1860, unless the situation is created deliberately so as to"
+drive a person to commit suicide.
+[s 306.16] Instigation by principal/Teachers.—
+"Student committed suicide, because the Principal scolded, hit and asked him to"
+"apologise before students in the assembly, when gutka pouches were recovered from"
+his bag. Even if these allegations are taken as unrebutted facts even then there is no
+evidence to show that the petitioner had instigated or intentionally aided the
+"commission of suicide.607. Accused, supervisor of school gave beatings to deceased"
+student for sitting on his scooter. The deceased on account of the above incident had
+"committed suicide. Even if it is true that accused had beaten the deceased, it could not"
+be said that it was an act of attempt to commit suicide or instigating the commission
+of suicide by deceased.608.
+[s 306.17] Failure to provide plot after taking money.—
+The allegation against the accused was that he had taken money from the deceased
+for providing him a plot of land but refused to do so and that led to the commission of
+"suicide. There was no evidence to the effect that the accused goaded or urged, or"
+provoked or incited or even encouraged the commission of suicide. The Court said that
+the mere failure to fulfil the promise concerning a plot of land was not sufficient for
+satisfying the ingredients of section 306.609.
+"[s 306.18] 304B and 306 IPC, 1860.—Difference.—"
+It has been held that cruelty or harassment sans demand of dowry which drives the
+wife to commit suicide attracts the offence of abetment of suicide under section 306
+"IPC, 1860.610."
+[s 306.19] Sentence under sections 306 and 498A.—
+The Calcutta High Court observed that composite sentence for conviction under both
+the sections should not be passed.611.
+[s 306.20] Proof.—
+Instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. All cases may not
+be of direct evidence in regard to instigation having a direct nexus to the suicide. There
+could be cases where the circumstances created by the accused are such that a
+person feels totally frustrated and finds it difficult to continue existence.612. In Chitresh
+"Kumar Chopra v State (Govt of NCT of Delhi),613. the Supreme Court reiterated the legal"
+position laid down in its earlier three Judges Bench judgment in the case of Ramesh
+"Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh,614. and held that where the accused by his acts or"
+continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left
+"with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may be inferred. In order"
+"to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be"
+established that:—
+"(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful"
+omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased
+"reacted; or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission"
+or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward
+direction; and
+(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke urge or encourage the deceased
+"to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly,"
+presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.615.
+[s 306.21] Burden of Proof.—
+The effect of these new provisions on the matter of burden of proof is amply
+demonstrated by the decision of the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh v Satpal
+Singh.616. The bride died in her in-laws' home within seven months of her marriage.
+Evidence ruled out accidental death thus confirming the prosecution version of suicide.
+"As to the question of instigation, Ray J, proceeded as follows:617."
+The prosecution witnesses clearly testified to the greedy and lustful nature of the husband
+and others in that they persistently taunted the deceased and tortured her for not having
+brought sufficient dowry from her father. It is also in evidence that they taunted her for
+carrying an illegitimate child. All this … caused depression in her mind and drove her to take
+the extreme step of putting an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene oil on person and
+setting it afire. Circumstantial evidence (unaccounted delay in providing treatment and
+informing her parents living not far away) and the evidence of prosecution witnesses clearly
+proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons instigated and abetted Ravinder
+Kaur. The findings arrived at by the High Court without considering the circumstantial
+evidence as well as the evidence of prosecution witnesses cannot be sustained. As such
+the findings of the High Court are liable to be reversed and set aside.
+The Supreme Court has reiterated in Wazir Chand v State of Haryana618. that before
+"section 306 can be acted upon, there must be clear proof of the fact that the death in"
+question was a suicidal death. In this case the evidence adduced was not able to justify
+a finding of suicide. The only other possibility was accidental burning of the newly-
+married woman though she was being victimised for insufficient dowry and there is no
+"chance of an accident being abetted. The husband and in-laws were, however, found"
+guilty under section 498A for causing harassment for dowry.
+"[s 306.22] Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+"Section 113A was inserted by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983, w.e.f."
+"26 December 1983. When death takes place within seven years of her marriage,"
+"presumption under section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 springs into action."
+When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted
+by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed
+suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her
+"husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may"
+"presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide"
+had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.619. Section 113A
+only deals with a presumption which the Court may draw in a particular fact situation
+which may arise when necessary ingredients in order to attract that provision are
+established. Criminal law amendment and the rule of procedure was necessitated so
+as to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill-treated or
+"forcing to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives, demanding dowry."
+Legislative mandate of the section is that when a woman commits suicide within seven
+years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband
+"had subjected her to cruelty as per the terms defined in section 498A IPC, 1860, the"
+Court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such
+suicide has been abetted by the husband or such person. Though a presumption could
+"be drawn, the burden of proof of showing that such an offence has been committed by"
+"the accused under section 498A, IPC, 1860 is on the prosecution.620."
+Once the prosecution succeeds in establishing the component of cruelty leading to a
+"conviction under section 498A, in our view only in a rare case, the Court can refuse to"
+"invoke the presumption of abetment, if other requirements of section 113A of the"
+"Indian Evidence Act, 1872 stand satisfied.621."
+[s 306.23] Constitutional validity.—
+The scope of the pronouncement of the Apex Court that attempt to commit suicide is
+ultra vires the Constitution does not make the offence of abetment to commit suicide
+ultra vires the Constitution because the former is volitional and well-planned act of the
+person concerned whereas the latter is on the different footing as therein a third person
+forces the other person to take his life by committing suicide.622. The Constitutional
+validity of section 306 (abetment of suicide) has been upheld in a decision of the
+Bombay High Court also.623. Section 306 constitutes an entirely independent offence.
+"It is based on this principle of public policy that nobody should involve himself in, or"
+"instigate or aid, the commission of a crime. It is not violative of Article 14 or 21 of the"
+Constitution.
+[s 306.24] Abetment of attempt to commit Suicide.—
+Section 306 prescribes punishment for abetment of suicide while section 309 punishes
+attempt to commit suicide. Abetment of attempt to commit suicide is outside the
+purview of section 306 and it is punishable only under section 309 and read with
+"section 107 IPC, 1860.624. A conviction in terms of section 107 IPC, 1860 is not"
+sustainable on mere allegation of harassment without any positive action in proximity
+to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused that led a person to commit
+suicide. A casual remark that is likely to cause harassment in ordinary course of things
+will not come within the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand or a word in a fit of
+anger will not earn the status of abetment. There has to be positive action that creates
+a situation for the victim to put an end to life.625.
+[s 306.25] Euthanasia.—
+Assisted suicide and assisted attempt to commit suicide are made punishable for
+cogent reasons in the interest of society. Such a provision is considered desirable to
+also prevent the danger inherent in the absence of such a penal provision. The
+"Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab,626. held that both euthanasia and"
+assisted suicide are not lawful in India which overruled the two Judge Bench decision
+of the Supreme Court in P Rathinam v UOI.627. The Court held that the right to life under
+Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right to die. But in Aruna Ramchandra
+"Shanbaug v UOI,628. the Supreme Court held that passive euthanasia can be allowed"
+under exceptional circumstances under the strict monitoring of the Court.629.
+"577. Jagannath Mondal v State of WB, 2013 Cr LJ 1994 (Cal)."
+"578. Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2001 (9) SCC 618 [LNIND 2001 SC 2368] : 2001 Cr"
+LJ 4724 .
+"579. Jagannath Mondal v State of WB, 2013 Cr LJ 1994 (Cal)."
+"580. M Mohan v State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2011) 3 SCC 626"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 246] : 2011 (3) Scale 78 [LNIND 2011 SC 246] : AIR 2011 SC 1238 [LNIND 2011
+"SC 246] : 2011 Cr LJ 1900 ; Amalendu Pal v State of WB, (2010) 1 SCC 707 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"1978] ; Rakesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 [LNIND 2001 SC 2368] ; Gangula"
+"Mohan Reddy v State of AP, (2010) 1 SCC 750 [LNIND 2010 SC 3] ; Thanu Ram v State of MP, 2010"
+(10) Scale 557 [LNIND 2010 SC 962] : (2010) 10 SCC 353 [LNIND 2010 SC 962] : (2010) 3 SCC
+"(Cr) 1502; SS Chheena v Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 [LNIND 2010 SC 746] : 2010"
+"AIR SCW 4938; Sohan Raj Sharma v State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 2108 [LNIND 2008 SC 845] :"
+(2008) 11 SCC 215 [LNIND 2008 SC 845] .
+"581. S S Chheena v Vijay Kumar Mahajan, 2010 (12) SCC 190 [LNIND 2010 SC 746] : 2010 AIR"
+SCW 4938.
+"582. Gurcharan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2017 SC 74 [LNIND 2016 SC 582] ."
+"583. M Mohan v State, AIR 2011 SC 1238 [LNIND 2011 SC 246] : 2011 (3) SCC 626 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 246] .
+"584. Vijay Kumar Rastogi v State of Rajasthan, 2012 (2) Crimes 628 (Raj)."
+"585. Sonti Rama Krishna v Sonti Shanti Sree, (2009) 1 SCC 554 [LNIND 2008 SC 2319] : AIR 2009"
+SC 923 [LNIND 2008 SC 2319] .
+"586. Randhir Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC 5097 . Darbar Singh v State of Chhattisgarh,"
+2013 Cr LJ 1612 (Chh).
+"587. Satvir Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2826 [LNIND 2001 SC 2200] : 2001 Cr LJ 4625 ."
+"588. Sanjay Jain v State of MP, 2013 Cr LJ 668 (Chh)."
+"589. Sudarshan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 3024 [LNIND 2011 SC 699] : 2011 Cr LJ"
+4364 .
+"590. Jeevan Babu Desai v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 2996 (Bom). Surender v State of"
+"Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 375 [LNIND 2006 SC 1015] : 2007 Cr LJ 375 , the husband subjected her"
+"to cruelty, inference drawn from facts and circumstances of the case that there was intention to"
+abet and to instigate her to suicide. Conviction under this section and not under section 302.
+"591. Pachipala Laxmaiah v State of MP, 2001 Cr LJ 4063 (AP). State of Gujarat v Jivabhai, 2001"
+Cr LJ 1343 (Guj) suicide by married woman by pouring kerosene and setting herself on fire. No
+evidence of abetment by the husband or anybody else.
+"592. Bammidi Rajamallu v State of AP, 2001 Cr LJ 1319 (AP)."
+"593. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v State of Gujarat, 2013 (3) Mad LJ (Crl) 700 : 2013 (II) Ori LR 867"
+: 2013 (4) RCR (Criminal) 271 : 2013 (11) Scale 198 [LNIND 2013 SC 803] .
+"594. Dammu Sreenu v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ 2185 (AP)."
+"595. Satish v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 935 (Bom)."
+"596. Manish Kumar Sharma v State of Rajasthan, 1995 Cr LJ 3066 (Raj)."
+"597. Didigam Bhikshapathi v State of AP, AIR 2008 SC 527 [LNIND 2007 SC 1386] : (2008) 2 SCC"
+403 [LNIND 2007 SC 1386] : 2008 Cr LJ 724 : (2008) 106 Cut LT 313.
+"598. K Prema S Rao v Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11 [LNIND 2002 SC 662] , sentenced to"
+"five years imprisonment and fine of Rs. 20,000."
+"599. JS Ghura v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 2158 (Raj)."
+"600. Raghunath Dass v Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 502 : (1920) 21 Cr LJ 213 ."
+"601. Prahlad Das Chela v State of MP, 1996 Cr LJ 3659 (MP)."
+"602. State of Gujarat v Pradyman, 1999 Cr LJ 736 (Guj)."
+"603. Sudhakar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 2602 [LNIND 2000 SC 920] : 2000 Cr LJ"
+3490 .
+"604. Partha Dey v State of Tripura, 2013 Cr LJ 2101 (Gau)."
+"605. Madan Mohan Singh v State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 [LNIND 2010 SC 763] . See also"
+"Praveen Pradhan v State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 9 SCC 734 [LNIND 2012 SC 612] : 2012 (9) Scale"
+745 : 2012 Cr LJ 4925 .
+"606. Vaijnath Kondiba Khandke v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2018 SC 2659 ."
+"607. Aroma Philemon v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1933 (Raj)."
+"608. Hasmukhbhai Gokaldas Shah v State of Gujarat, 2009 Cr LJ 2919 (Guj)."
+"609. Mahesh v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 50 (MP)."
+"610. Narwinder Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 (2) SCC 47 [LNIND 2011 SC 25] : AIR 2011 SC 686"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 25] .
+"611. Samir Samanta v State of WB, 1993 Cr LJ 134 (Cal)."
+"612. Amit Kapoor v Ramesh Chander, JT 2012 (9) SC 312 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : 2012 (9) Scale"
+58 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] : (2012) 9 SCC 460 [LNIND 2012 SC 564] .
+"613. Chitresh Kumar Chopra v State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2009 (16) SCC 605 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+1663] : AIR 2010 SC 1446 [LNIND 2009 SC 1663] .
+"614. Ramesh Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2001 SC 3837 [LNIND 2001 SC 2368] : ( 2001"
+Cr LJ 4724 .
+"615. State of MP v Shrideen Chhatri Prasad Suryawanshi, 2012 Cr LJ 2106 (MP); Jetha Ram v"
+"State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 2459 (Raj); Kailash Baburao Pandit v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr"
+LJ 4044 (Bom).
+"616. Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 445 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] at p 458 : AIR"
+"1990 SC 209 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] : 1990 Cr LJ 562 . See also Wazir Chand v State of Haryana,"
+(1990) 1 SCC 445 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] : AIR 1990 SC 209 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] : 1990 Cr LJ
+562 .
+"617. Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 445 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] at p 458 : AIR"
+1990 SC 209 [LNIND 1989 SC 475] : 1990 Cr LJ 562 .
+"618. Wazir Chand v State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 378 [LNIND 1988 SC 569] : 1989 Cr LJ 809 :"
+(1989) 1 SCC 244 [LNIND 1988 SC 569] . Another case of acquittal on charge of abetment for
+"suicide is Chanchal Kumari v Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1986 SC 752 : 1986 Cr LJ 816 ."
+"Dalip Singh v State of Punjab, 1988 (1) Crimes 211 [LNIND 1953 SC 61] , wife died of hanging"
+"within one year, the prosecution case well established, conviction not to be struck out only"
+because there were only two witnesses and those too the father and brother of deceased wife.
+"Shyama Devi v State of WB, 1987 Cr LJ 1163 where also the evidence of relatives was"
+considered to be sufficient without any corroboration from outside evidence. PB Bikshdhapathi v
+"State of AP, 1989 Cr LJ 1186 , drinking and coming late of the husband coupled with beating and"
+"demanding dowry was taken to amount to cruelty as defined in section 498A, IPC, 1860."
+"Khemraj Hiralal Agarwal v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 2271 (Bom), an attempt to abuse the"
+"section by proceeding against a husband who, far from demanding anything, was helping the"
+"family members of his wife, was frustrated by the court. Gajanan Singh v Maharashtra, 1996 Cr"
+"LJ 2921 (Bom), evidence not clear to show that the death of the married woman was"
+"immolation or murder, the section not attracted."
+"619. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872."
+"620. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v State of Gujarat, 2013 (3) Mad LJ (Crl) 700 : 2013 (II) Ori LR 867"
+: 2013 (4) RCR (Criminal) 271 : 2013 (11) Scale 198 [LNIND 2013 SC 803] .
+"621. Satish Shetty v State of Karnataka, 2016 Cr LJ 3147 : AIR 2016 SC 2689 [LNIND 2016 SC"
+245] .
+"622. Krishan Lal v UOI, 1994 Cr LJ 3472 (P&H); Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 Cr LJ 1660 :"
+"AIR 1996 SC 946 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] , provision for penalising attempt to commit suicide and"
+"abetment of suicide, held constitutional; overruling P Rathinam v UOI, 1994 AIR SCW 1764 :"
+1994 Cr LJ 1605 : AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] : (1994) 3 SCC 394 [LNIND 1994 SC
+1533] .
+"623. Naresh Morotrao v UOI, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 96 (Bom)."
+"624. Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 946 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] : (1996) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 653] .
+"625. Pawan Kumar v State of HP, AIR 2017 SC 2459 [LNIND 2017 SC 241] ."
+"626. Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] ."
+"627. P Rathinam v UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] : 1994 (3) SCC 394 [LNIND"
+1994 SC 1533] .
+"628. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"629. In March 2018, a five-judge Constitution Bench gave legal sanction to passive euthanasia,"
+permitting 'living will' by patients on withdrawing medical support if they slip into irreversible
+coma. The SC held that the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right; see Common Cause
+"(A Regd. Society) v UOI, LNIND 2018 SC 87 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 307] Attempt to murder.
+"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such"
+"circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, and if hurt is caused to any person by such"
+"act, the offender shall be liable either to 630.[imprisonment for life], or to such"
+punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
+Attempts by life convicts.
+631.[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of 632.
+"[imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.]"
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if"
+death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under
+this section.
+"(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes"
+"it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section,"
+though the death of the child does not ensue.
+"(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed"
+the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in
+"this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment"
+provided by the latter part of 633.[the first paragraph of] this section.
+"(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same"
+with food which remains in A's keeping; A has not yet committed the
+offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z's table or delivers it
+to Z's servant to place it on Z's table. A has committed the offence defined
+in this section.
+COMMENT.—
+Attempt to murder.—This and the following section seem to apply to attempts to
+"murder, in which there has been not merely a commencement of an execution of the"
+"purpose, but something little short of a complete execution, the consummation being"
+"hindered by circumstances independent of the will of the author. The act or omission,"
+"although it does not cause death, is carried to such a length as, at the time of carrying"
+"it to that length, the offender considers sufficient to cause death.634."
+The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under section
+307 are:
+(i) that the death of a human being was attempted;
+"(ii) that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of"
+the accused; and
+(iii) that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done
+with the intention of causing such bodily injury as:
+(a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or
+"(b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the"
+accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be
+"so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or"
+"(b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no"
+excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.635.
+"To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of"
+causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused
+may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the
+"accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even,"
+"in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The"
+"section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such"
+"an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned,"
+but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is
+not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be
+sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted.
+"What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with"
+the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An
+"attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if"
+there is present an intent coupled with some over act in execution thereof.636. To bring
+"a case within the ambit of section 307, the prosecution has to make out the facts and"
+circumstances envisaged by section 300. If the ingredients of section 300 are wholly
+"lacking, there can be no conviction under section 307.637. The ingredients of the"
+section are (1) intention or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (2) the
+doing of an act towards it.638. The Supreme Court held in Pulicherla Nagaraju v State of
+AP that:
+The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or
+"several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii)"
+whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii)
+whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in
+causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or
+free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre-
+meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a
+"stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for"
+such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting
+the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi)
+whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances
+"is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with"
+reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention.639.
+"In a group clash, one person died and several others were injured, some of them"
+seriously. The accused also received injuries. Two of the accused were convicted under
+"section 307 and others under section 324. The Supreme Court held that, though the"
+"injuries caused by the two accused were somewhat serious, the offence for attempt to"
+murder was not made out as their case stood on the same footing as that of others
+and altered their conviction to one under section 324.640.
+[s 307.1] Attempt.—
+Attempt is an intentional preparatory action which fails in its object—which so fails
+through circumstances independent of the person who seeks its accomplishment.641.
+The mere use of lethal weapons is sufficient to invoke the provisions of section
+307.642. There was evidence that the accused dealt with not only one blow but two
+blows successively with an axe on the head of the victim. It was held that the intention
+to cause death could be gathered from the circumstances.643. It is not necessary to
+constitute the offence that the attack should result in an injury. An attempt is itself
+sufficient if there is requisite intention. An intention to murder can be gathered from
+circumstances other than the existence or nature of the injury.644.
+To attract the offence the injury need not be caused to vital parts.645.
+[s 307.2] Whether act committed must be capable of causing death.—
+"The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any."
+"The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the"
+"intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore,"
+"an accused charged under section 307 IPC, 1860 cannot be acquitted merely because"
+the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.646. It is not
+essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted in order
+that the charge under section 307 be made out. It is enough if there is an intention
+"coupled with some common act in execution thereof.647. In Hari Singh,648. the Supreme"
+Court added that:
+the intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute
+murder. Without this ingredient being established there can be no offence of attempt to
+"murder … The intention is to be gathered from all the circumstances, and not merely from"
+the consequences that ensue.
+"The nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, motive for the crime,"
+"severity of the blow, and the part of the body where the injury is inflicted, are some of"
+the factors that may be taken into consideration to determine the intention.
+[s 307.3] Acting in self-defence.—
+The accused alleged that he was attacked by the assailant party. The plea seemed to
+the Court to be true because there was no explanation from the prosecution side about
+injuries sustained by the accused. The medical papers of the complainant did not
+mention the name of the assailant though it was a medico-legal case. The conviction
+of the accused for attempt to murder was held liable to be set aside.649.
+[s 307.4] Rape on young girl.—
+"Where the accused took away a girl of four years to a lonely place near a canal,"
+"sexually assaulted her and threw her in the canal, but was saved by a passer-by, his"
+sentence of three years RI with fine of Rs. 500 under section 307 was raised to seven
+"years RI and fine of Rs. 1,000.650."
+[s 307.5] Simple hurt.—
+Intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder. Where the
+"injuries caused were simple in nature and also not on vital parts of the body, the Court"
+said that the intention for attempt to murder could not be inferred. The Court held that
+no offence under section 324 was made out because injuries were caused with a
+sharp-cutting weapon.651. Where the accused persons had no common intention to kill
+or have knowledge that death was likely to ensue but only intended to vent their ire
+"against their neighbour for having assaulted their bullocks, when the injuries sustained"
+"by the injured persons were simple in nature, the Supreme Court held the accused"
+persons cannot be convicted under section 307 r/w 34.652.
+[s 307.6] Nature of injuries is not determinative.—
+The nature of injuries has been held by the Supreme Court to be not a determinative
+factor. The framing of charge was challenged in this case on the ground that the
+injuries inflicted on the victim were simple in nature and no injury was found on any
+vital part of the body. The determinative factor is intention or knowledge and not the
+nature of injury.653. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was
+"simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of section 307, IPC, 1860. The"
+"determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not"
+nature of the injury.654.
+[s 307.7] Section 307 and Section 326.—
+"A bare perusal of these two provisions clearly reveals that while section 307 IPC, 1860"
+"uses the words ""under such circumstances"", these words are conspicuously missing"
+"from section 326 IPC, 1860. Therefore, while deciding whether the case falls under"
+"section 307 IPC, 1860 or under section 326 IPC, 1860 the Court must necessarily"
+examine the circumstances in which the assault was made. Considering the fact that
+"the assault was made after some premeditation and pre-planning, considering the fact"
+"that assault was carried out in the dead of the night, considering the nature of the"
+"weapon, used, nature of the injuries caused, obviously, the present case falls under the"
+"ambit of section 307 IPC, 1860 and not under section 326 IPC, 1860. Therefore, the"
+learned trial Court was certainly justified in acquitting the appellant for offence under
+"section 326 IPC, 1860 and in convicting him for offence under section 307 IPC,"
+1860.655.
+"630. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for transportation for life (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"631. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, section 11."
+"632. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"633. Ins. by Act 12 of 1891, section 2 and Sch II."
+"634. M&M 274; Rawal Arab, (1898) Unrep Cr C 964. Lugga Singh v State of Punjab, (2008) Cr LJ"
+"90 (P&H), two accused had altercation with a worker because of offering his labour at low wage,"
+"one of them struck the victim with gandasi at head, there being no such common intention, the"
+"non-attacking accused was acquitted. Asharam v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 164 [LNIND 2007"
+"SC 534] : AIR 2007 SC 2594 [LNIND 2007 SC 534] , accused fled from the scene taking the"
+"victim to be dead, testimony of injured witness corroborated by medical evidence, conviction"
+upheld.
+"635. Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC 3223 [LNIND 2009 SC 568] :"
+(2009) 11 SCC 273 [LNIND 2009 SC 568] .
+"636. State of MP v Kedar Yadav, 2011 (1) SCC (Cr) 1008."
+"637. Arjun Thakur v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 3526 (Ori). Hemant Kumar Mondal v State of WB,"
+"1993 Cr LJ 82 (Cal), the accused instigated three persons for committing the offence of murder;"
+"he was guilty of abetment, convicted under sections 307/109. Cr LJ 1340 (Gau), militants,"
+"engaged police in an encounter, presumption of intention to kill. Chhota Master v State of Orissa,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 3185 (Ori), accused persons stabbed the victim in the stomach, intestines came out,"
+"threw him into river from bridge and pelted stones, conviction under sections 307/34 not"
+"interfered with. Balakrishna Tripathy v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 3591 (Ori), only one accused"
+"allowed to be charged, there was no evidence against others; Hingu v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"365 : AIR 1998 SC 198 [LNIND 1997 SC 1528] . Santosh Kumar v State of UP, 1997 under section"
+"307 was held to be made out. Raja v State, 1997 Cr LJ 1863 (Del), injuries with dagger,"
+serologist's report on blood on dagger not necessary where there was sufficient evidence
+"otherwise to connect the accused with the attempt.; Achhaibar Pd v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 2666"
+": 1997 All LJ 705, the accused fired at police constable at close range, the bullet pierced the"
+"chest through and through, dying declaration, section 307 attracted. Another ruling on the same"
+"facts, Ranveer Singh v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 2266 (All), no leniency in punishment. Pulkit"
+"Purbey v State of Bihar, 1997 Cr LJ 2371 (Pat), several injuries of simple nature on non-vital"
+"parts, only one on head, no intention to cause death, conviction under section 326. Sirish"
+"Chandra Paul v State of Assam, 1997 Cr LJ 2617 (Gau), injury on vital part, intention to cause"
+"death, conviction under section 307."
+"638. Sumersimbh Umedsinh Rajput v State of Gujarat, (2007) 13 SCC 83 [LNIND 2007 SC 1450] :"
+AIR 2008 SC 904 [LNIND 2007 SC 1450] : 2008 Cr LJ 1388 .
+"639. Pulicherla Nagaraju v State of AP, (2006) 11 SCC 444 [LNIND 2006 SC 621] : AIR 2006 SC"
+"3010 [LNIND 2006 SC 621] : 2006 Cr LJ 3899 ; Mangesh v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC"
+123 [LNIND 2011 SC 20] : AIR 2011 SC 637 [LNIND 2011 SC 20] : 2011 Cr LJ 1166 .
+"640. Dharam Pal v State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 2484 : 1993 Cr LJ 2856 (SC). Parsuram Pandey v"
+"State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068 [LNIND 2004 SC 1075] : (2004) 13 SCC 189 [LNIND 2004 SC"
+"1075] , the Supreme Court explained the ingredients of the offence. State of UP v Virendra"
+"Prasad, (2004) 9 SCC 37 [LNIND 2004 SC 138] : AIR 2004 SC 1517 [LNIND 2004 SC 138] , firing"
+"at police from close range, intention clear conviction."
+"641. Luxman, (1899) 2 Bom LR 286 . Sagayam v State of Karnataka, AIR 2000 SC 2161 [LNIND"
+"2000 SC 740] : 2000 Cr LJ 3182 , police search of the house of the accused. The latter tried to"
+assault the police officer and his staff but they escaped. The accused threatened that he would
+kill them. The court said that it was only a threat. The overt act attributed to him did not amount
+"to attempt to murder. Parveen v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 310 [LNIND 1996 SC 1723] : 1997"
+"Cr LJ 252 , the victim of attack testified that the accused on being refused glasses for taking"
+"liquor, went to his tractor and came to the hotel with a gun, fired at him, but he was saved as he"
+"stretched to the ground, convicted. Pratap Singh v State, 2001 Cr LJ 3154 (Uttaranchal),"
+"conviction for attempt to murder, injury caused on death with sharp-edged weapon, injury"
+"grievous but short of death. Shankar Lal v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 4595 : AIR 1998 SC 3271"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 632] , evidence of victim alone is sufficient. Parveen v State of Haryana, AIR"
+"1997 SC 310 [LNIND 1996 SC 1723] : 1997 Cr LJ 252 , offence proved."
+"642. Narayan v State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 1549 (Kant). The accused was also held guilty of"
+"murder because his attack on the son succeeding in killing him, the mother survived in injured"
+"state and became witness. Prakash Chandra Yadav v State of Bihar, (2007) 13 SCC 134 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 1232] : 2008 Cr LJ 438 , doing of an act with intention or knowledge to cause death is a"
+necessary ingredient. Receipt of injury by the victim is not a prerequisite for conviction under the
+first part. The second part is attracted when the victim receives an injury. In a rivalry between
+"tenderers, two bombs were hurled on the rival, one did not explode, the other exploded, but"
+victim escaped unhurt. Trial Court convicted the accused. High Court acquitted him because of
+no injury. Validity of the judgment on evidence was not considered. Case relegated to HC for
+"reconsideration. Balmiki Singh v Ramchandra Singh, (2008) 10 SCC 218 [LNIND 2008 SC 1866] :"
+"AIR 2009 SC 377 [LNIND 2008 SC 1866] , Supreme Court did not interfere in the order of"
+"acquittal by the HC because of discrepancies in evidence. Jagdish Murar v State of UP, (2006) 12"
+"SCC 626 [LNIND 2006 SC 648] , allegation of firing a shot not properly investigated, benefit of"
+doubt given to accused.
+"643. Bansidhar Mallick v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 897 (Ori)."
+"644. Manik Bandu Gawali v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 2246 (Bom). In Joginder Singh v"
+"State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 2255 (SC), the Supreme Court set aside a conviction which did not"
+"seem to have been based upon a fair investigation. Bir Singh v State of HP, 2006 Cr LJ 2456 : AIR"
+"2006 SC 1944 [LNIND 2006 SC 305] : (2006) 9 SCC 579 [LNIND 2006 SC 305] , incident of"
+"attempted murder took place in police post, information given immediately, injuries"
+"corroborated medical evidence and constable on duty, could not be disbelieved only because"
+"the village Pradhan had turned hostile. Jagdish v State of Haryana, 2005 Cr LJ 3073 : AIR 2005"
+"SC 2576 [LNIND 2005 SC 507] , land dispute, attack on victim with lathi and gandasa,"
+"amputation of arms, conviction under section 307, reducing sentence from 10 years to eight"
+years RI and fine of Rs. 1 lac.
+"645. Anjani Kumar Chaudhary v State of Bihar, 2014 Cr LJ 3798 : 2014 (3) AJR 628 ."
+"646. State of MP v Kedar Yadav, 2011 (1) SCC (Cri) 1008 [LNIND 2006 SC 1061] ; Ajay v State of"
+"Chattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 13409 (Chh); State of MP v Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"215] : AIR 2009 SC 1642 [LNIND 2009 SC 215] ; Manoj Kumar Mishra v State of Chhattisgarh,"
+"2013 Cr LJ 1487 (Chh); State of Maharashtra v Balram Bama Patil, 1983 (2) SCC 28 [LNIND 1983"
+"SC 40] ; Girija Shanker v State of UP, 2004 (3) SCC 793 [LNIND 2004 SC 154] , R Parkash v State of"
+"Karnataka, JT 2004 (2) SC 348 [LNIND 2004 SC 189] and State of MP v Saleem @ Chamaru, 2005"
+(5) SCC 554 [LNIND 2005 SC 1070] .
+"647. Chhanga v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 1415 [LNIND 2017 SC 97] ."
+"648. Hari Singh, (1988) 4 SCC 551 [LNIND 1988 SC 411] : AIR 1988 SC 2127 [LNIND 1988 SC"
+"411] . See also AG Bhagwat v UT Chandigarh, 1989 Cr LJ 214 (P&H), acid thrown on lady"
+"colleague for disfiguring her, not liable under this section. Ram Kumar v State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR"
+"1999 SC 2259 [LNIND 1999 SC 1277] : 1999 Cr LJ 3522 , accused fired a shot from country-"
+"made pistol. The victim, a near relative, was injured. The act showed the intention of the"
+"accused. Hence, convicted. The sentence was reduced from 10 years RI to seven years RI. Rajan"
+"v State of MP, 2000 Cr LJ 2423 (MP), allegation that accused fired at police party which had"
+"gone into jungle to catch him, nobody was aimed at in the group or individually, firing struck no"
+"body, acquittal. Dnyaneshwar v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr LJ 2152 (Bom)— Benefit of doubt"
+given to the accused.
+"649. Rehmat v State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 1526 [LNIND 1996 SC 1386] : 1997 Cr LJ 764 ."
+"Nasir Sikander Shaikh v State of Maharashtra, 2005 Cr LJ 2621 : AIR 2005 SC 2533 [LNIND 2005"
+"SC 474] , burden is heavy on the prosecution to prove every ingredient of the offence, the"
+defence has only to probabilise the material which is there in support of the defence plea. Karan
+"Singh v State of MP, (2003) 12 SCC 587 [LNIND 2003 SC 840] , the plea of self-defence found to"
+be not real.
+"650. State of Maharashtra v Umesh Krishna Pawar, 1994 Cr LJ 774 (Bom)."
+"651. Sarjug Turi v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 2864 (Jhar), conviction was shifted to u/s. 324, the"
+"offence and prosecution being of 17 years long standing, the accused was released on"
+probation.
+"652. Lakshmi Chand v State of UP, AIR 2018 SC 3961 ."
+"653. Ratan Singh v State of MP, (2009) 12 SCC 585 [LNIND 2009 SC 984] : AIR 2010 SC 597"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 984] .
+"654. State of MP v Kashiram, AIR 2009 SC 1642 [LNIND 2009 SC 215] . Therefore, whether the"
+injury is simple or grievous in nature hardly matters to invoke the provisions of section 307. Sk
+"Khaja Sk Dawood v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1150 (Bom)."
+"655. Pooran Singh Seera Alias Pooran Meena v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 2100 (Raj);"
+"Raghunath v State By Police of Vijayapura Police Station, 2011 Cr LJ 549 (Kar); Neelam Bahal v"
+"State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2010 SC 428 [LNIND 2009 SC 2056] : (2010) 2 SCC 229 [LNIND 2009"
+SC 2056] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 308] Attempt to commit culpable homicide.
+Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such
+"circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable"
+"homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and,"
+"if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, on grave and sudden provocation, fires a pistol at Z, under such circumstances that"
+if he thereby caused death he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to
+murder. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT.—
+The wording of this section is the same as that of the preceding one except that it
+"deals with an attempt to commit culpable homicide. The punishment provided is,"
+"therefore, not so severe. Before an accused can be held to be guilty under section 308"
+"IPC, 1860 it was necessary to arrive at a finding that the ingredients thereof, namely,"
+requisite intention or knowledge was existing.656. When the accused can be attributed
+only knowledge that by inflicting such injuries he was likely to cause death and an
+"attempt to commit such an offence would be one punishable under section 308 IPC,"
+1860.657.
+[s 308.1] Nature of injury.—
+Whether the injury was grievous or simple deserved a back seat in face of the charge
+"under section 308/34 IPC, 1860. Offence punishable under section 308 IPC, 1860"
+postulates doing of an act with such intention or knowledge and under such
+"circumstances that if one by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable"
+homicide not amounting to murder. An attempt of that nature may actually result in
+hurt or may not. It is the attempt to commit culpable homicide which is punishable
+"under section 308 IPC, 1860 whereas punishment for simple hurts can be meted out"
+"under sections 323 and 324 and for grievous hurts under sections 325 and 326 IPC,"
+"1860. Qualitatively, these offences are different.658."
+[s 308.2] Self-defence.—
+Merely because the prosecution witnesses had suffered more injuries than the
+"respondents, would not be sufficient to hold that the respondents were the aggressor"
+"party. In other words, the defence version cannot be discarded only on the basis of"
+lesser number of injuries having been suffered by them. Appeal against acquittal
+"dismissed.659. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court"
+"found that plea of self-defence was not made out by the appellant and, therefore,"
+contention that the finding recorded by the High Court that he was guilty under section
+"304, Part-I IPC, 1860 for causing death of the deceased and under section 308, IPC,"
+1860 for causing injuries to Rahmat should be sustained cannot be accepted.660.
+[s 308.3] Sentence.—
+Trial Court convicted accused under section 308 r/w 149 and sentenced them to three
+years RI and fine of Rs. 500 each. The High Court confirmed the conviction and
+sentence. The Supreme Court modified the sentence by reducing the imprisonment to
+"one year and increased the fine amount to Rs. 25,000.661. Accused was convicted"
+"under section 308, IPC, 1860. Offence was committed when the accused was 17 years"
+"old. High Court released him under section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.662."
+"656. Bishan Singh v State, AIR 2008 SC 131 [LNIND 2007 SC 1178] : (2007) 13 SCC 65 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 1178] ; Sheetala Prasad v Sri Kant, (2010) 2 SCC 190 [LNIND 2009 SC 2121] : AIR 2010"
+SC 1140 [LNIND 2009 SC 2121] .
+"657. Tukaram Gundu Naik v State of Maharashtra, (1994) 1 SCC 465 [LNIND 1993 SC 820] : 1994"
+Cr LJ 224 .
+"658. Sunil Kumar v NCT Delhi, (1998) 8 SCC 557 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 1522."
+"659. State of UP v Munni Ram, (2011) 3 SCC (Cr) 745 : AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 573."
+"660. Shaukat v State of Uttaranchal, (2010) 5 SCC 68 [LNIND 2010 SC 387] : 2010 Cr LJ 4310 :"
+(2010) 2 SCC (Cr) 1238.
+"661. Lakhan v State of MP, (2013) 1 SCC 363 [LNIND 2012 SC 796] ."
+"662. State v Ravindra Singh, 2013 Cr LJ 2874 (Utt). See also Jameel v State of UP, (2010) 12 SCC"
+532 [LNIND 2009 SC 1960] : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 303.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 309] Attempt to commit suicide.
+Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of
+"such offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may"
+"extend to one year 663.[or with fine, or with both]."
+COMMENT.—
+"Suicide by itself is not an offence under either English or Indian Criminal Law, though at"
+"one time it was a felony in England.664. It is a unique legal phenomenon in the IPC,"
+"1860 that the only act, the attempt of which alone will become an offence. The person"
+"who attempts to commit suicide is guilty of the offence under section 309 IPC, 1860"
+whereas the person who committed suicide cannot be reached at all. Section 306
+renders the person who abets the commission of suicide punishable for which the
+condition precedent is that suicide should necessarily have been committed.665.
+"The act done must be in the course of the attempt, otherwise no offence is committed."
+"Where a woman with the intention of committing suicide by throwing herself in a well,"
+"actually ran towards it, when she was seized by a person, it was held that she might"
+"have changed her mind, and she was caught before she did anything which might have"
+been regarded as the commencement of the offence.666. Her act simply amounted to
+preparation. The pounding of oleander roots with an intention to poison oneself with
+the same was held not to constitute this offence.667. Where the accused jumped into a
+"well to avoid and escape from police, and when rescued he came out of the well of his"
+"own accord, it was held that, in the absence of evidence that he jumped into the well to"
+"commit suicide, he could not be convicted of this offence.668. A village woman of 20"
+"years old was ill-treated by her husband. There was a quarrel between the two, and the"
+"husband threatened that he would beat her. Late that night the woman, taking her six"
+"months' old baby in her arms, slipped away from the house. After she had gone some"
+"distance she heard somebody coming up behind her, and when she turned round and"
+"saw her husband pursuing her, she got into a panic and jumped down a well nearby"
+with the baby in her arms. The result was that the baby died but the woman recovered.
+One of the charges against her was attempt to commit suicide. It was held that she
+"should not be convicted under this section of an attempt to commit suicide, for the"
+"word ""attempt"" connotes some conscious endeavour to accomplish the act, and the"
+accused in jumping down the well was not thinking at all of taking her own life but only
+of escaping from her husband.669. If a person openly declares that he will fast to death
+and then proceeds to refuse all nourishment until the stage is reached when there is
+"imminent danger of death ensuing, he can be held guilty under this section but when"
+"the evidence falls short of this, it cannot be said to be sufficient to sustain the"
+charge.670. A woman who had been suffering from chronic incurable disease retired to
+bed with her one and a half-year-old child but was found with the child inside a well
+about 200 feet away from her house in the early morning of the next day when they
+"were both taken out of the well, it was found that though the woman was alive the child"
+"had died. On being prosecuted under sections 302 and 309 IPC, 1860, she denied"
+having jumped into the well. She further pleaded that she was too ill and there was
+something wrong with her brain. The trial Judge did not give her the benefit of section
+"84 IPC, 1860 and convicted her of both the offences charged. In acquitting her the High"
+Court of Bombay held that in the absence of any evidence that she deliberately jumped
+"into the well along with the child, she could not be convicted merely on the basis of"
+"imagination or denied the benefit of section 84 IPC, 1860. In any case, the Judge"
+"should have given her the benefit of doubt.671. Moreover, suspicion however strong is"
+not proof.672. Where a desolate woman jumped into a well with her two children and
+was released with admonition for the offence under section 309 but was sentenced to
+"imprisonment for three months for the offence under section 307 IPC, 1860, the"
+Supreme Court directed that she should also be released with admonition for the
+"offence under section 307 IPC, 1860.673. Witness clearly stated that deceased was"
+"shouting, pleading with the accused to not kill her, when accused gave sword blows to"
+her. There is no material available to establish that deceased volunteered herself for
+"death — Exception 5 to section 300 could not be invoked. Conviction and sentence, as"
+"recorded by trial Court under sections 302 and 309 of IPC, 1860 against appellant was"
+held proper.674.
+[s 309.1] Voluntary termination of life.—
+A person cannot claim his own life by saying that he had led a successful life and the
+mission of his life was fulfilled. It would amount to suicide as it would attract the
+provisions of sections 306 and 309. The Court said that no distinction could be made
+between suicide as ordinarily understood and the right to voluntarily put an end to one's
+life.675.
+[s 309.2] Fast-unto-death.—
+Where a person commenced fast-unto-death for certain demands but even before his
+"demands were conceded, he chose to get himself treated medically without protest, it"
+was held that the mens rea to destroy himself was absent and it could not be said that
+he attempted to commit suicide.676.
+[s 309.3] Constitutional validity of section 309.—
+"In P Rathinam v UOI,677.,678. the constitutional validity of section 309 was challenged"
+and the Supreme Court observed that the provision punishing attempt to commit
+suicide is cruel and irrational and is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and it
+deserves to be effaced from the statute book to humanalise penal laws. It added that
+the act of attempted suicide has no baneful effect on society and it is also not against
+"religion, morality or public policy, besides suicide or attempt to commit it causes no"
+harm to others.
+This decision was subsequently reversed and it has been held again that the provision
+for penalising attempt to commit suicide and abetment of suicide is not
+unconstitutional.679.
+The Constitution Bench in a subsequent decision in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab680. and
+other connected matters has overruled the view taken in the case of P Rathinam681.
+"that section 309 IPC, 1860 is constitutionally invalid. It was held that, on the facts"
+which are not only proved but are also admitted by A1 the acquittal of A1 under section
+"309, IPC, 1860 has to be set aside and he will have to be convicted under that"
+section.682.
+"[s 309.4] The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017"
+"Parliament has now enacted the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 which vide section 115"
+lays down that:
+(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 309 of the Indian Penal Code any
+"person who attempts to commit suicide shall be presumed, unless proved otherwise, to"
+have severe stress and shall not be tried and punished under the said Code.
+"(2) The appropriate Government shall have a duty to provide care, treatment and"
+"rehabilitation to a person, having severe stress and who attempted to commit suicide,"
+to reduce the risk of recurrence of attempt to commit suicide.
+"In view of the above provisions, if a person attempts to commit suicide, it shall be"
+"presumed, unless proved otherwise, that he has severe stress and he shall not be tried"
+"and punished under section 309 of the IPC, 1860. By inverting the presumption against"
+"guilt but retaining the provision in the statute book, attempt to suicide is still a criminal"
+"offence. In order to render conviction, prosecution will be required to lead evidence and"
+prove that the survivor did not have severe stress and did not suffer any issue of
+mental health.
+[s 309.5] Euthanasia.—
+In India active euthanasia is illegal and a crime under section 302 or at least section
+"304 IPC, 1860. Physician assisted suicide is a crime under section 306 IPC, 1860"
+"(abetment to suicide). The Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab,683. held"
+that both euthanasia and assisted suicide are not lawful in India which overruled the
+two Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in P Rathinam v UOI.684. The Court
+held that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution does not include the right
+"to die. But in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI,685. the Supreme Court held that"
+passive euthanasia can be allowed under exceptional circumstances under the strict
+monitoring of the Court. The difference between 'active' and passive' euthanasia is that
+in active euthanasia something is done to end the patient's life while in passive
+"euthanasia, something is not done that would have preserved the patient's life. It is"
+usually defined as withdrawing medical treatment with a deliberate intention to causing
+"the patient's death. In Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v UOI,686. a five-judge"
+"Constitution Bench gave legal sanction to passive euthanasia, permitting 'living will' by"
+patients on withdrawing medical support if they slip into irreversible coma. The
+Supreme Court held that the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right.
+[s 309.6] Procedure for passive euthanasia.—
+Article 226 gives abundant power to the High Court to pass suitable orders on the
+application filed by the near relatives or next friend or the doctors/hospital staff praying
+for permission to withdraw the life support to an incompetent person of the kind above
+mentioned. When such an application is filed the Chief Justice of the High Court should
+forthwith constitute a Bench of at least two Judges who should decide to grant
+approval or not. Before doing so the Bench should seek the opinion of a committee of
+three reputed doctors to be nominated by the Bench after consulting such medical
+authorities/medical practitioners as it may deem fit. Preferably one of the three doctors
+"should be a neurologist, one should be a psychiatrist, and the third a physician. For this"
+purpose a panel of doctors in every city may be prepared by the High Court in
+consultation with the State Government/Union Territory and their fees for this purpose
+may be fixed. The committee of three doctors nominated by the Bench should carefully
+examine the patient and also consult the record of the patient as well as taking the
+views of the hospital staff and submit its report to the High Court Bench.
+"Simultaneously with appointing the committee of doctors, the High Court Bench shall"
+"also issue notice to the State and close relatives, e.g., parents, spouse,"
+"brothers/sisters, etc., of the patient, and in their absence his/her next friend, and supply"
+a copy of the report of the doctor's committee to them as soon as it is available. After
+"hearing them, the High Court bench should give its verdict. The above procedure"
+should be followed all over India until Parliament makes legislation on this subject.687.
+[s 309.7] Abetment of attempt to commit Suicide.—
+Section 306 prescribes punishment for abetment of suicide while section 309 punishes
+attempt to commit suicide. The history of use of the provisions of section 309 shows
+"that the section has been pressed into service primarily in the case of Sati, where the"
+"widow commits suicide and others have various reasons – economic and social, to"
+abet such hapless woman to commit suicide. If a hapless Sati victim is goaded to
+"commit suicide and the abetters abet her to jump into the funeral pyre of her husband,"
+it would be preposterous for law to hold the abetters not guilty of any offence merely
+because she escapes or is saved from death later.688.
+"663. Subs. by Act 8 of 1882, section 7, for ""and shall also be liable to fine""."
+"664. Gangula Mohan Reddy v State of AP, AIR 2010 SC 327 [LNIND 2010 SC 3] : (2010) 1 SCC"
+"327 ; Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] : AIR 1996 SC 946"
+[LNIND 1996 SC 653] .
+"665. Satvir Singh v State of Punjab, (2001) 8 SCC 633 [LNIND 2001 SC 2168] : 2001 Cr LJ 4625 ."
+"666. Ramakka, (1884) 8 Mad 5."
+"667. Tayee, (1883) Unrep Cr C 188."
+"668. Dwarka Poonja, (1912) 14 Bom LR 146 [LNIND 1912 BOM 6] ."
+"669. Dhirajia, (1940) All 647 ."
+"670. Ram Sunder, AIR 1962 All 262 [LNIND 1961 ALL 65] ."
+"671. Phulabai, 1976 Cr LJ 1519 (Bom)."
+"672. Brij Bhusan Singh, AIR 1946 PC 38 ."
+"673. Radharani, 1981 Cr LJ 1705 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 1776 (2) : 1981 (Supp) SCC 84. Rukhmina"
+"Devi v State of UP, 1989 Cr LJ 548 (All), mother locked herself up with her son after altercation"
+with family. She killed the child and then attempted suicide. Convicted under this section and
+section 300 with a remark that because her husband had also rejected her and she was the
+"victim of rage, her sentence might be remitted by the State. For a case in which the"
+"circumstances ruled out the possibility of suicide, see Subedar Tewari v State of UP, AIR 1989 SC"
+"733 : 1989 Cr LJ 923 : 1989 (Supp) SCC 91. Kavita v State of TN, AIR 1998 SC 2473 [LNIND 1998"
+SC 642] : 1998 Cr LJ 3624 no proof that the woman threw her children into the well and then
+"herself jumped into it to commit suicide. Conviction set aside. Ram Kumar v State of Gujarat, AIR"
+1998 SC 2732 [LNIND 1998 SC 772] : 1998 Cr LJ 4048 the deceased-woman and her accused
+husband were alone in the house. There was ligature mark on her neck. Her body was on a cot
+and not hanging. The court said that the theory of suicide became demolished and that of
+"murder could be inferred. State of Maharashtra v Maruti; State of UP v Sikandar Ali, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"2520 : AIR 1998 SC 1862 [LNIND 1998 SC 1231] double murder, conviction. Death penalty not"
+"warranted, life imprisonment. State of HP v Jeet Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1293 : 1999 Cr LJ 2025 ,"
+"whether death was homicidal or suicidal, injuries found on both leg of the dead body on the"
+basis of which the doctor stated that death might have been due to smothering. This opinion
+was formed without chemical examiner's report. The finding of the High Court that the
+deceased might have committed suicide was held liable to be set aside.
+"674. Narendra v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 723 (Raj); Ujwala Sonyabapu Bhujade v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1791 (Bom)— offences under sections 302 and 309 IPC, 1860 not"
+proved.
+"675. CA Thomas Master v UOI, 2000 Cr LJ 3729 (Ker)."
+"676. Ramamoorthy v State of TN, 1992 Cr LJ 2074 (Mad). Banwarilal Sharma v State of UP,"
+"(1998) 3 SCC 604 : JT 1998 (4) SC 466 ; Balamani v State, 2010 (4)Ker LT 329 ."
+"677. Jagadeeswar v State of AP, 1988 Cr LJ 549 approved and Dubal v State of Maharashtra,"
+1987 Cr LJ 743 overruled. The court also noted the distinction between suicide and euthanasia
+and section 306 and section 309.
+"678. P Rathinam v UOI, 1994 Cr LJ 1605 ."
+"679. Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1994 Cr LJ 1660 (SC), the decision of Division Bench in P"
+"Rathinam v UOI, 1994 AIR SCW 1764 : (1994) 3 SCC 394 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] : 1994 Cr LJ"
+1605 : AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] overruled by Constitution Bench.
+680. Supra.
+681. Supra.
+"682. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"683. Gian Kaur v State of Punjab, 1996 (2) SCC 648 [LNIND 1996 SC 653] ."
+"684. P Rathinam v UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1844 [LNIND 1994 SC 1533] : 1994 (3) SCC 394 [LNIND"
+1994 SC 1533] .
+"685. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"686. Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v UOI, LNIND 2018 SC 87 ."
+"687. Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 454 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] : AIR 2011 SC"
+1290 [LNIND 2011 SC 265] .
+"688. Berin P Varghese v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 1759 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 310] Thug.
+"Whoever, at any time after the passing of this Act, shall have been habitually"
+associated with any other or others for the purpose of committing robbery or child-
+"stealing by means of or accompanied with murder, is a thug."
+COMMENT.—
+This and the following section incorporate the provisions of the Thuggee Act of 1836.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+[s 311] Punishment.
+"Whoever is a thug shall be punished with 689.[imprisonment for life], and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+Gangs of persons habitually associated for the purpose of inveigling and murdering
+"travellers or others in order to take their property, etc., are called thugs. Thugs are"
+"robbers and dacoits, but all robbers and dacoits are not thugs. Thugs committed"
+robbery or dacoity or kidnapping are always accompanied with murder. Killing of the
+victim was the essential thing (still in MP & UP ravines).
+"689. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 312] Causing miscarriage.
+"Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child1 to miscarry, shall, if such"
+miscarriage2 be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the
+"woman, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with"
+"child,3 shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation.—A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this"
+section.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section deals with the causing of miscarriage with the consent of the woman,"
+while the next section deals with the causing of miscarriage without such consent.
+"The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (34 of 1971) provides for the"
+termination of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners where its continuance
+would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or grave injury to her physical or
+"mental health or where there is a substantial risk that if the child was born, it would"
+suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
+Where the pregnancy is alleged to have been caused by rape or as a result of failure of
+"a contraceptive used by a married woman or her husband, it would be presumed to"
+constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. The termination
+of a pregnancy by a person who is not a registered medical practitioner will be an
+"offence under the IPC, 1860, which to that extent is modified. It is high time that this"
+"section too was suitably amended in terms of Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act,"
+1971 (34 of 1971) to include the various other grounds on account of which a
+pregnancy can now be terminated by registered medical practitioner. In this connection
+"see also comment under section 91 ante. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act,"
+"1971 does not empower the husband, far less his relations, to prevent the concerned"
+woman from causing abortion if her case is covered under section 3 of that Act. Under
+"section 312 of the IPC, 1860 causing miscarriage is a penal offence. Relevant civil law"
+has since been embodied in the Act legalising termination of pregnancy under certain
+"circumstances. Since law is liberal for effecting such termination, the Act does not lay"
+down any provision on husband's consent in any situation.690.
+"1. 'With child' means pregnant, and it is not necessary to show that 'quickening', that is,"
+"perception by the mother of the movements of the foetus, has taken place or that the"
+"embryo has assumed a foetal form, the stage to which pregnancy has advanced and"
+the form which the ovum or embryo may have assumed are immaterial. Where a
+"woman was acquitted on a charge of causing herself to miscarry, on the ground that"
+she had only been pregnant for one month and that there was nothing which could be
+"called foetus or child, it was held that the acquittal was bad in law.691."
+A woman quick with a child simply means a particular stage of pregnancy at which
+quickening takes place. It is a perception of the woman of the movement of foetus.
+Section 312 can even apply to a pregnant woman herself who causes her own
+miscarriage. Good faith by itself is not enough. It has to be good faith for the purpose
+of saving the life of the mother or the child and not otherwise. This observation of the
+High Court of Delhi occurs in a case692. in which the doctor was found to be negligent
+and careless in injecting needles twice for performing abdominocentesis. The result
+was that the patient had to undergo forced abortion because septic developed. There
+was consent only for one insertion and that was not at all applicable to second
+insertion.
+2. 'Miscarriage' is the premature expulsion of the child or foetus from the mother's
+womb at any period of pregnancy before the term of gestation is completed.
+[s 312.1] Death in attempt to terminate pregnancy.—
+A woman had pregnancy of 24 weeks out of illicit relations and a doctor administered
+an injection for termination of the pregnancy but the woman died the next day without
+miscarriage. It was held that the act of the doctor amounted to 'voluntarily causing
+"miscarriage' within the meaning of section 312 read with section 511, as the doctor"
+"was presumed to know the possible effects of the medicine.693. Deceased, an"
+"unmarried girl was pregnant from accused, she died while causing miscarriage due to"
+perforation of uterus following abortion. It is a clear case that accused was
+instrumental in causing the woman to miscarry and obviously it was not done in good
+faith for purpose of saving life of deceased. Miscarriage was with a view to wipe out
+evidence of deceased being pregnant. Accused liable to be convicted under sections
+"312, 315, 316 and 201 of IPC, 1860.694."
+3. 'Quick with child'.—Quickening is the name applied to peculiar sensations
+experienced by a woman about the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy.
+"690. Dr Mangla Dogra v AK Malhotra, AIR 2012 CC 1401 : 2012 (3) Ker LT (SN) 124 (P&H)."
+"691. Ademma, (1886) 9 Mad 369."
+"692. Meeru Bhatia Prasad v State, 2002 Cr LJ 1674 (Del)."
+"693. Akhil Kumar v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 2029 (MP). Mohamed Sharif v State of Orissa, 1996"
+"Cr LJ 2826 (Ori) termination under medical advice, death not caused, the accused not liable."
+"694. State of Maharashtra v Flora Santuno Kutino, 2007 Cr LJ 2233 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 313] Causing miscarriage without woman's consent.
+Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding section without the
+"consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick with child or not, shall be"
+"punished with 695.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+Under this section the act should have been done without the consent of the woman.
+Under it the person procuring the abortion is alone punished; under section 312 such
+person as well as the woman who causes herself to miscarry are both punished. Where
+"the accused woman kicked a pregnant woman in her abdomen resulting in miscarriage,"
+her conviction under section 313 was sustained.696.
+[s 313.1] CASES.—
+Section 313 would be attracted only if it is established that the pregnancy is terminated
+without the consent of the prosecutrix.697.
+"695. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"696. Tulsi Devi v State of UP, 1996 Cr LJ 940 (All)."
+"697. Shantaram Krishna Karkhandis v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 149 (Bom). See also"
+"Pranab Kanti Sen v State of WB, 2010 Cr LJ 162 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 314] Death caused by act done with intent to cause miscarriage—.
+"Whoever, with intent to cause the miscarriage of a woman with child, does any act"
+"which causes the death of such woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to"
+"fine,"
+if act done without woman's consent.
+"And if the act is done without the consent of the woman, shall be punished either"
+"with 698.[imprisonment for life], or with the punishment above mentioned."
+Explanation.— It is not essential to this offence that the offender should know that
+the act is likely to cause death.
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides for the case where death occurs in causing miscarriage. The act
+of the accused must have been done with intent to cause the miscarriage of a woman
+with child.
+[s 314.1] CASES.—
+The son-in-law of a pregnant woman left her at the house of the accused doctor. Her
+dead body was recovered from the place where it was buried in the accused's house. It
+was in a decomposed state. The accused made extra-judicial confessions to three
+different persons to the effect that the death took place during abortion. Circumstantial
+evidence also proved this fact beyond reasonable doubt. His conviction under the
+"section was confirmed as also the five-year RI sentence, but fine was set aside.699. A"
+homeopath operated upon a pregnant woman to cause abortion but she died a few
+hours after operation because her uterus got perforated. His conviction under section
+314 was upheld.700. A nurse attempted to cause miscarriage of a pregnant girl but was
+"unsuccessful. On the third day another person, the accused, an attendant, made an"
+attempt and succeeded but the condition of the girl became serious after five days.
+She was hospitalised and died of septicaemia which had developed from ruptures and
+tears in the internal parts of vagina. There was no evidence to show that ruptures and
+tears had occurred at the hands of the accused. It was held that his conviction under
+section 314 was not proper.701.
+"A person, named, C, was alleged to have had illicit relations with the deceased woman."
+He took her to a doctor for the purpose of aborting her pregnancy. The doctor caused
+"her death in that process. The doctor was not qualified for the purpose, nor his clinic"
+"was approved by the Government under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act,"
+1971 and was also not having the basic facilities for abortion. There was a concurrent
+finding that the act was done by the doctor in furtherance of the common intention with
+C. It was held that the conviction of C under this section read with section 34 was
+proper.702.
+[s 314.2] Section 313 and Section 314.—
+Ingredients for both these offences are contra-indicative and cannot go together. When
+"conviction is recorded under section 304-A, it pre-supposes a negligent act, which"
+would rule out any intentional act; whereas the conviction for offences under sections
+313 and 314 can be founded only on intentional act of the accused and not negligence.
+"Presence of mens rea would be sine qua non in such a situation. The trial Court,"
+"therefore, apparently erred in recording conviction of the appellants for offences"
+"punishable under sections 304-A and 313 and 314 of IPC, 1860.703."
+"698. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"699. Moideen Sab v State of Karnataka, 1993 Cr LJ 1430 (Kant)."
+"700. Jacob George v State of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 3851 : (1994) 3 SCC 430 [LNIND 1994 SC 417] ."
+"701. Vatchhalabai Maruti Kshirsagar v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 702 (Bom)."
+"702. Surendra Chauhan v State of MP, AIR 2000 SC 1436 [LNIND 2000 SC 515] : 2000 Cr LJ 1789"
+"; Telenga Munda v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 3094 (Pat), the pregnant girl was taken to a doctor"
+"who operated crudely causing rupture of big vessels resulting in death, abortion stick was also"
+"found in her internal part, the doctor did not inform police, direct nexus between his act and"
+"death, conviction of the doctor proper."
+"703. Mahesh Govindbhai Barot v State of Gujarat, 2009 Cr LJ 3535 (Guj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 315] Act done with intent to prevent child being born alive or to cause it to
+die after birth.
+Whoever before the birth of any child does any act with the intention of thereby
+"preventing that child from being born alive or causing it to die after its birth, and does"
+"by such act prevent that child from being born alive, or causes it to die after its birth,"
+"shall, if such act be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the"
+"mother, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Any act done with the intention here mentioned which results in the destruction of the
+"child's life, whether before or after its birth, is made punishable. So far as offence"
+"punishable under section 315 of the IPC, 1860 is concerned, the offence is committed"
+by a person who before the birth of any child does any act with the intention of thereby
+"preventing that child from being born alive or causing it to die after its birth, and does"
+"by such act prevent that child from being born alive, or causes it to die after its birth, if"
+such act be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the
+"mother.704. Cognizance taken of the offence under section 315 of IPC, 1860 and the"
+charge framed therein against the petitioner are also not maintainable in view of the
+fact that no documentary evidence could be collected in course of investigation in
+support of the allegation that the pregnancy of the prosecutrix was terminated at the
+instance of the petitioner. She was even not medically examined by the Doctor or the
+Board of Doctors and there is no medical report in support of the allegation that her
+pregnancy was ever terminated at any earlier point of time. As the alleged offence
+"under section 315 of the IPC, 1860 relates to termination of pregnancy, such offence"
+may be supported through the medical opinion of the registered practitioner and for
+"want of such prima facie material charge cannot be framed in such section, accordingly"
+"the cognizance cannot be taken for the offence under section 315 of the IPC, 1860.705."
+Intention is one of the major ingredients of sections 315. Wording of section 315 of the
+"IPC, 1860 itself shows that whoever before the birth of any child does any act with the"
+intention of thereby preventing that child from being born alive or causing it to die after
+"its birth, and does by such act prevent that child from being born alive, or causes it to"
+"die after its birth, shall, if such act be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving"
+the life of the mother be punished with imprisonment. In this case the patient was
+admitted for delivery. During course of delivery there was rupture of uterus which led to
+"bleeding and subsequent death of the patient and the child. So, it is not case of any"
+prosecution witness that the respondent deliberately committed offence punishable
+"under section 315 of the IPC, 1860.706."
+"704. State of Maharashtra v Rajendra Ramkisan Jaiswal, 2010 Cr LJ 3603 (Bom)."
+"705. Girish Kumar Sharan v State of Jharkhand, AIR 2010 Cr LJ 4215 (Jhar)."
+"706. State of Maharashtra v Rajendra Ramkisan Jaiswal, 2010 Cr LJ 3603 (Bom)"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 316] Causing death of quick unborn child by act amounting to culpable
+homicide.
+"Whoever does any act under such circumstances, that if he thereby caused death he"
+"would be guilty of culpable homicide, and does by such act cause the death of a quick"
+"unborn child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, knowing that he is likely to cause the death of a pregnant woman does an act which,"
+if it caused the death of the woman would amount to culpable homicide. The woman is
+"injured, but does not die; but the death of an unborn quick child with which she is"
+pregnant is thereby caused. A is guilty of the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes offences against children in the womb where the pregnancy has
+advanced beyond the stage of quickening and where the death is caused after the
+quickening and before the birth of the child. Any act or omission of such a nature and
+"done under such circumstances as would amount to the offence of culpable homicide,"
+"if the sufferer were a living person, will, if done to a quick unborn child whose death is"
+"caused by it, constitute the offence here punished."
+Unless the act is done against the mother with an intention or with a knowledge which
+"brings it within the purview of section 299, it cannot constitute an offence under this"
+section merely because the death of a quick unborn child has resulted from an act
+against the mother.707. A husband striking his wife dead was held guilty of the offence
+under this section. The medical evidence showed that she was carrying a male child of
+20 weeks. A foetus gets life after 12 weeks of conception.708.
+The principle laid down in section 301 is again applied here.
+[s 316.1] Charge.—
+The trial Court did not frame charge against accused no. 3 for the offence under
+"section 312 of the IPC, 1860 but that will not come in the way in convicting him for the"
+"offence under section 312, IPC, 1860. Because the offences from sections 312 to 318"
+"are of similar nature, type and category, they are all relating to miscarriage. Secondly,"
+the punishment prescribed under section 312 is not higher than the maximum
+punishment prescribed under section 316. Because the punishment prescribed is up to
+10 years if the act causes death of quick unborn child. The maximum punishment
+prescribed under section 312 is seven years if the woman be quick with child.709.
+"707. Jabbar, AIR 1966 All 590 [LNIND 1980 MAD 327] ."
+"708. Murugan v State of TN, 1991 Cr LJ 1680 (Mad)."
+"709. State of Maharashtra v Flora Santuno Kutino, 2007 Cr LJ 2233 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 317] Exposure and abandonment of child under 12 years of age, by parent or"
+person having care of it.
+"Whoever being the father or mother of a child under the age of twelve years, or having"
+"the care of such child, shall expose or leave such child in any place with the intention"
+"of wholly abandoning such child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
+Explanation.—This section is not intended to prevent the trial of the offender for
+"murder or culpable homicide, as the case may be, if the child dies in consequence of"
+the exposure.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is intended to prevent the abandonment or desertion by a parent of his or
+"her children of tender years, in such a manner that the children, not being able to take"
+"care of themselves, may run the risk of dying or being injured. It does not apply when"
+children are left under the care of others.710. It applies where a child is exposed and no
+"death supervenes; if, however, death follows, the conviction must be under section"
+304.711. The offence is complete notwithstanding that no actual danger or risk of
+danger arises to the child's life.
+[s 317.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires three essentials—
+(1) The person coming within its purview must be father or mother or must have the
+care of the child.
+(2) Such child must be under the age of 12 years.
+(3) The child must have been exposed or left in any place with the intention of
+wholly abandoning it.
+"710. Felani Hariani, (1871) 16 WR (Cr) 12; Mussumat Khairo, (1872) PR No. 33 of 1872;"
+"Mussamat Bhagan, (1878) PR No. 4 of 1879."
+"711. Banni, (1879) 2 All 349 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 318] Concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body.
+"Whoever, by secretly burying or otherwise disposing of the dead body of a child"
+"whether such child die before or after or during its birth, intentionally conceals or"
+"endeavours to conceal the birth of such child, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is intended to prevent infanticide. It is directed against concealment of
+birth of a child by secretly disposing of its body.
+[s 318.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) Secret burying or otherwise disposing of the dead body of a child.
+(2) It is immaterial whether such child dies before or after or during its birth.
+(3) Intention to conceal the birth of such child by such secret burying or disposal.
+Simple
+Hurt
+Grievous
+Of Hurt
+Aggravated forms
+1. By dangerous weapons.
+2. To extort property or to constrain to do
+illegal act.
+3. By means of poison to commit offence.
+"4. To extort confession, or to compel"
+restoration of property.
+5. To deter public servant from his duty.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 319] Hurt.
+"Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt."
+COMMENT.—
+The authors of the Code say:
+Many of the offences which fall under the head of hurt will also fall under the head of
+"assault. A stab, a blow which fractures a limb, the flinging of boiling water over a person, are"
+"assaults, and are also acts which cause bodily hurt. But bodily hurt may be caused by many"
+"acts which are not assaults. A person, for example, who mixes a deleterious potion, and"
+places it on the table of another; a person who conceals a scythe in the grass on which
+"another is in the habit of walking; a person who digs a pit in a public path, intending that"
+"another may fall into it, may cause serious hurt, and may be justly punished for causing"
+"such hurt; but they cannot, without extreme violence to language, be said to have committed"
+"assaults. We propose to designate all pain, disease and infirmity by the name of hurt.712."
+"The definition of hurt appears to contemplate the causing of pain, etc., by one person"
+to another. Pulling a woman by the hair was held to be this offence.713.
+[s 319.1] Act neither intended nor likely to cause death is hurt even though
+death is caused.—
+Where there is no intention to cause death nor knowledge that death is likely to be
+"caused from the harm inflicted, and death is caused, the accused would be guilty of"
+hurt only if the injury caused was not serious. Where the accused with a view to
+"chastising her daughter, eight or 10 years old, for impertinence, gave her a kick on the"
+"back and two slaps on the face, the result of which was death, it was held that she was"
+guilty of voluntarily causing hurt.714. Where in course of a sudden quarrel the accused
+hit his friend on his head with a stick weighing only 210 grams which unfortunately
+"proved fatal, it was held that no knowledge of death could be ascribed to him. His"
+"conviction was accordingly changed to one under section 323, IPC, 1860.715."
+[s 319.2] Poisoned sweetmeats.—
+"A boy of about 16 years of age, being in love with a girl some three or four years"
+"younger, and apparently intending to administer to her something in the nature of a love"
+"philtre, induced another boy younger than himself to give the girl some sweetmeats."
+The girl and some of the other members of her family ate the sweetmeats and all the
+persons who partook of them were seized with more or less violent symptoms of
+"dhatura poisoning, though none of them died. It was held that the boy was guilty of"
+causing hurt.716.
+"712. Note M, p 151."
+"713. (1883) Weir, 3rd Edn, p 196. It is the duty of the court to pass a judgment of its own"
+whether the hurt in question is of one category or the other. The medical evidence is only an
+"opinion to help the court to formulate its own opinion. Hadia Mia v State of Assam, 1988 Cr LJ"
+"1459 (Gau). See Ashok v Prahlad, 1988 Cr LJ 78 (Bom), where the report of the medical officer"
+was ignored. The injuries caused to the victim by the constable's beating were not visible.
+"Sailendra Nath Hati v Aswini, 1988 Cr LJ 343 (Cal), woman slapped and kicked on waist after she"
+"fell, accused guilty of causing hurt."
+"714. Beshor Bewa, (1872) 18 WR (Cr) 29."
+"715. Dhyaneshwar, 1982 Cr LJ 1870 (Bom)."
+"716. Anis Beg v State, (1923) 46 All 77 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 320] Grievous hurt.
+"The following kinds of hurt only are designated as ""grievous"":"
+First.—Emasculation.
+Secondly.—Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
+"Thirdly.—Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear,"
+Fourthly.—Privation of any member or joint.
+Fifthly.—Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
+Sixthly.—Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
+Seventhly.—Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
+Eighthly.—Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the
+"space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits."
+COMMENT.—
+Grievous hurt is hurt of a more serious kind. This section merely gives the description
+of grievous hurt.
+The authors of the Code observe:
+We have found it very difficult to draw a line between those bodily hurts which are serious
+"and those which are slight. To draw such a line with perfect accuracy is, indeed, absolutely"
+"impossible; but it is far better that such a line should be drawn, though rudely, than that"
+"offences some of which approach in enormity to murder, while others are little more than"
+"frolics which a good-natured man would hardly resent, would be classed together.717."
+"To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there must be some"
+"specific hurt, voluntarily inflicted, and coming within any of the eight kinds enumerated"
+in this section. Where the injury was caused on the abdomen with a sharp-edged
+weapon and the doctor stated that the injury was penetrating into the abdominal cavity
+"touching the interior surface of the stomach, not involving any important structure or"
+"organ involving danger to life, it was held that the accused had caused simple hurt and"
+not grievous hurt.718. A person cannot be said to have caused grievous hurt unless the
+"hurt caused is one of the kinds of hurt specified under section 320, IPC, 1860."
+"Therefore, it is the duty of the Court to give a finding on its own whether the hurt was"
+simple or grievous. The Court is not concerned with the classification made by a doctor
+as to whether the hurt was simple or grievous. A doctor is to describe the facts in
+respect of the nature of injury and the Court is to decide whether the nature of the
+"injury described by the doctor comes within any of the clauses of section 320, IPC,"
+1860.719.
+[s 320.1] Clause 1.—
+'Emasculation' means depriving a male of masculine vigour.
+[s 320.2] Clause 6.—Disfigurement of head or face.—
+Disfiguration means doing a man some external injury which detracts from his personal
+"appearance but does not weaken him, as the cutting of a man's nose or ears. Where a"
+girl's cheeks were branded with a red-hot iron which left scars of a permanent
+"character, it was held that the disfigurement contemplated by this section was"
+caused.720.
+"[s 320.3] Clause 7.—Fracture, dislocation bone, tooth.—"
+For the application of this clause it is not necessary that a bone should be cut through
+and through or that the crack must extend from the outer to the inner surface or that
+there should be displacement of any fragment of the bone. If there is a break by cutting
+"or splintering of the bone or there is a rupture or fissure in it, it would amount to a"
+fracture within the meaning of this clause.721. It has been held that a mere partial cut
+"of the bone amounts to fracture and is, therefore, a grievous injury within the meaning"
+of section 320 (Seventhly).722.
+"[s 320.4] Clause 8.—Endangering life, severe bodily pain, etc.—"
+"This clause speaks of two things: (1) any hurt which endangers life, and (2) any hurt"
+"which causes the sufferer to be during the space of 20 days (a) in severe bodily pain, or"
+(b) unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. Some hurts which are not like those hurts
+"which are mentioned in the first seven clauses, are obviously distinguished from a"
+"slight hurt, may nevertheless be more serious. Thus, a wound may cause intense pain,"
+"prolonged disease or lasting injury to the victim, although it does not fall within any of"
+the first seven clauses. Before a conviction for the sentence of grievous hurt can be
+"passed, one of the injuries defined in section 320 must be strictly proved, and the"
+eighth clause is no exception to the general rule of law that a penal statute must be
+construed strictly.723.
+The line between culpable homicide not amounting to murder and grievous hurt is a
+very thin line. In the one case the injuries must be such as are likely to cause death; in
+"the other, the injuries must be such as to endanger life.724."
+An injury can be said to endanger life if it is in itself that it may put the life of the injured
+in danger.725.
+The mere fact that a man has been in hospital for 20 days is not sufficient; it must be
+proved that during that time he was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.726. Where
+"the accused caused hurt to a woman who remained in hospital only for 17 days, out of"
+"which she was in danger for three days, it was held that he had caused grievous"
+hurt.727. A disability for 20 days constitutes grievous hurt: if it continues for a smaller
+"period, then the offence is hurt.728. The two accused persons tied their victim to an"
+electric pole and assaulted him only to teach him a lesson for spreading scandalous
+information about the alleged love affair of the accused. Their victim died. There was
+"no evidence to attribute any particular overt act to any of them, nor of the intention of"
+any of them to cause death or that any of them was armed with a deadly weapon. It
+was held that their offence fell within this clause because they endangered the life of
+"their victim and not under section 300 (murder).729. Where the accused persons, after"
+"raping a girl of 11 years, thrust a stick into her private part and she died of injuries"
+"thereby caused, it was held that while the accused could be convicted under this"
+"clause, in the absence of evidence that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course"
+"of nature to cause death, they could not be convicted under section 302.730."
+[s 320.5] Acts neither intended nor likely to cause death may amount to
+grievous hurt even though death is caused.—
+Where there is no intention to cause death or no knowledge that death is likely to be
+"caused from the harm inflicted, and death is caused, the accused would be guilty of"
+"grievous hurt if the injury caused was of a serious nature, but not of culpable homicide."
+Where the only intention of the accused who was convicted for the offence of murder
+"was to steal the jewels of the deceased and the only violence which he committed, viz.,"
+"cutting the nostrils of the deceased, was necessary in order to facilitate the theft and"
+"the death of the deceased was entirely unexpected, it was held that the accused was"
+not guilty of murder but of causing grievous hurt under section 325.731. Where the
+medical evidence showed that the injury on the forehead which caused death was by a
+lathi and not by an iron rod as deposed to by witnesses and the internal injury could not
+"be correlated to the external injury caused by the accused, it was held to be a fit case"
+"where the accused should be convicted only under section 325 IPC, 1860.732. Where"
+the accused acting on a sudden spur of the moment squeezed the testicles of the
+deceased as a result of which he had a shock resulting in cardiac arrest and sudden
+"death, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it was a case falling under the"
+"eighth clause of the section, i.e., causing hurt which endangers life. It was a case of"
+grievous hurt punishable under section 325 and not that of simple hurt punishable
+"under section 323.733. See also discussion and cases under sub-head ""Act neither"
+"intended nor likely to cause death is hurt even though death is caused"" under section"
+"319, ante."
+[s 320.6] Spleen.—
+"Where the accused, pulling the deceased out of a cot, kicked him, and struck him on"
+"the side or on the ribs with a stick, whereby the deceased, whose spleen was diseased,"
+"died, it was held that he was guilty of voluntarily causing grievous hurt.734."
+[s 320.7] Blow aimed at a person falling upon another.—
+"The accused struck a woman, carrying an infant in her arms, violently over her head"
+and shoulders. One of the blows fell on the child's head causing death. It was held that
+the accused had committed hurt on the infant under circumstances of sufficient
+aggravation to bring the offence within the definition of grievous hurt.735. In the course
+"of an altercation between the accused and the complainant on a dark night, the former"
+"aimed a blow with his stick at the head of the latter. To ward off the blow, the"
+"complainant's wife, who had a child on her arm, intervened between them. The blow"
+"missed its aim, but fell on the head of the child causing severe injuries, from the effects"
+of which it died. It was held that the accused was guilty of simple hurt only.736. The
+accused had the intention of causing hurt to a person but not grievous hurt and the
+"nature of the blow, taken with reference to the person against whom it was aimed,"
+cannot be taken to indicate the necessary intention or knowledge as to causing
+grievous hurt.
+[s 320.8] Use of weapon.—
+"To cause ""grievous hurt"" it is not necessary that any weapon of offence must be used."
+"Even without any weapon, an injury of the nature mentioned in section 320 could be"
+caused. The offence under section 325 is voluntarily causing grievous hurt. It does not
+speak of use of any weapon of offence.737.
+[s 320.9] Supply of arrack mixed with dangerous substance.—
+The arrack supplied was mixed with methyl alcohol resulting in many deaths. The Court
+concluded that the person responsible for the mixing had knowledge that the
+consumption of such substance was likely to cause serious adverse effects. Some of
+the victims lost eyesight. The Court said that the maximum sentence under the section
+was properly awarded.738.
+"717. Note M, p 151."
+"718. Jagdish Chand v State of HP, 1992 Cr LJ 3076 (HP)."
+"719. Hadis Mia v State of Assam, 1987 Cr LJ 1459 (Gau)."
+"720. Anta Dadoba, (1863) 1 BHC 101."
+"721. Hori Lal, AIR 1970 SC 1969 [LNIND 1969 SC 314] : 1970 Cr LJ 1665 ."
+"722. Narinder Singh v Sukhbir Singh, 1992 Cr LJ 2616 (P&H)."
+"723. State of Karnataka v Parashram Kallappa Ghevade, 2007 Cr LJ 479 (Kar); Mathai v State of"
+"Kerala, 2005 SCC (Cr) 695 : AIR 2005 SC 710 [LNIND 2005 SC 37] ."
+"724. Abdul Wahab, (1945) 47 Bom LR 998 , FB."
+"725. Ramla, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 387 . See further; AG Bhagwat v UT Chandigarh, 1989 Cr LJ 214 at p"
+"223 where holding that by causing hurt by sulphuric acid, the accused was guilty of offence"
+"punishable under section 326, causing hurt by dangerous means, cited Queen Empress v Vasta"
+"Chela, (1895) ILR 19 Bom 247 to the effect that staying on in hospital at public expense for 20 or"
+"more days is not the last word. Also to the same effect Khair Din v Emperor, AIR 1931 Lah 280 :"
+"1931–32 Cr LJ 1254 , Mathu Paily v State of Kerala, 1962 (1) Cr LJ 652 Ker; and State (Delhi"
+"Admn) v Mewa Singh, (1969) 71 Punj LR (D) 290 , Tuna v State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 524 Orissa,"
+mere stay in hospital for 20 days.
+"726. Vasta Chela, (1894) 19 Bom 247. The accused in a quarrel inflicted an injury on the victim"
+by the blade of a scissors and there was no evidence that the victim was in severe bodily pain or
+"was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for 20 days, clause (8) of section 320 was not"
+"attracted; Pritam Singh v State, 1996 Cr LJ 7 (Del), in the instant case, the injury was of simple"
+nature and the victim remained hospitalised for 20 days. The injured person was neither
+"hospitalised for 20 days nor was unable to follow his ordinary pursuit, section 320, 'Eighthly' was"
+"not attracted, Babloo v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ 3534 (MP)."
+"727. Bassoo Rannah, (1865) 2 WR (Cr) 29."
+"728. Bishnooram Surma, (1864) 1 WR (Cr) 9."
+"729. Formina Sebastio Azardeo v State of Goa, 1992 Cr LJ 107 SC : AIR 1992 SC 133 . See also"
+"Dau Dayal v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr LJ 2321 , where injuries were not dangerous to life and"
+hospitalisation was also for 13 days and were given in response to an attack on the accused by
+"a chain and, therefore, conviction under section 320/326 was set aside."
+"730. Ghuraiyaa v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1129 ."
+"731. Guruvulu, (1945) Mad 73."
+"732. Mohinder Singh, 1985 Cr LJ 1903 : AIR 1986 SC 309 . Formina Sebastio Azardeo v State of"
+"Goa, AIR 1992 SC 133 : 1992 Cr LJ 107 tying a person to an electric pole apparently with a view"
+to teaching him a lesson for giving publicity to the love affair involving two of the three accused
+"and beating him, but he died, the three accused being related to each other husband and wife"
+"and their nephew and the alleged love affair was between the wife and the nephew, no evidence"
+of the respective role played by them. The husband was acquitted and the remaining two were
+convicted for causing grievous hurt.
+"733. State of Karnataka v Shivlingaiah, AIR 1988 SC 115 [LNIND 2012 DEL 2078] : 1988 Cr LJ"
+"394 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 881. See also Madhusudan Sahu v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LR (SC) 623 :"
+"1987 (Supp) SCC 80, injury caused in a moment of aberration due to loss of self-control."
+"734. O'Brien, (1880) 2 All 766 ; Idu Beg, (1881) 3 All 776 ."
+"735. Sahae Rae v State, (1873) 3 Cal 623 ."
+"736. Chatur Natha, (1919) 21 Bom LR 1101 [LNIND 1919 BOM 89] ."
+"737. Sreekumar v State of Kerala, 2009 Cr LJ 3862 (Ker)."
+"738. EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] : (1995) 2 Cr LJ"
+1445 . The fact that the prime mover was 72 years old was held to be not an attenuating
+circumstance because of the magnitude of misery caused.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 321] Voluntarily causing hurt.
+"Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with"
+"the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby"
+"cause hurt to any person, is said ""voluntarily to cause hurt""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 322] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt.
+"Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows"
+"himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is"
+"grievous hurt, is said ""voluntarily to cause grievous hurt."""
+Explanation.—A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he
+both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous
+"hurt. But he is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself"
+"to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind, he actually causes grievous hurt of"
+another kind.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, intending or knowing himself to be likely permanently to disfigure Z's face, gives Z a"
+"blow which does not permanently disfigure Z's face, but which cause Z to suffer severe"
+bodily pain for the space of twenty days. A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt.
+COMMENT.—
+Section 321 and the Explanation to this section make it clear that either the ingredient
+of intention or of knowledge must be essentially present in order to constitute the
+"offence of hurt.739. Where the accused caught hold of a man, sat on his chest, gave fist"
+blows and hit his head on the wall but the injuries caused were not so grievous as to
+"pointedly show that the accused had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death,"
+"his conviction under section 304, Part II was altered to one under section 321.740."
+"739. Devasahayam, (1962) 1 Mad LJ 161."
+"740. K Swaminatha Reddy v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 1387 (AP). Rajendran v State of TN, 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 171 (Mad), the accused attacked his sister-in-law with iron rod in a fit of anger, statements of"
+"the injured and of witnesses and medical evidence, conviction of accused proper."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 323] Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.
+"Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"This is a general section for the punishment of voluntarily causing hurt. Sections 324,"
+"327, 328, 329 and 330 deal with the same offence committed under certain"
+"aggravating circumstances: and sections 334, 336 and 337 provide for punishment"
+when there are certain mitigating circumstances.
+A prosecution under this section does not abate by reason of the death of the person
+injured.741.
+[s 323.1] CASES.—
+Allegation that accused/superintendent of police arrested the younger brother of
+complainant and got him mercilessly beaten by his personal guards. Injuries on
+different parts of body clearly rules out the theory of sustaining it while falling down on
+"ground. Besides the testimony of injured, the prosecution case has further been"
+corroborated by medical evidence. Record and evidence proved that conspiracy was
+hatched by accused to apprehend the detenu and others who were demanding his
+"transfer. Accused liable to be convicted under section 323 of IPC, 1860.742. First"
+accused picked up a wooden piece (Pacher) with both the hands and hit on the head of
+"the deceased. On receiving injury, he fell unconscious on the spot. Thereafter, the other"
+accused came running and dealt a blow on the head of PW3. Conviction of first
+"accused under section 304 Part II and co-accused under section 323 IPC, 1860 was"
+held proper.743. Where accused having sticks in their hands entered the house of
+"complainant and assaulted him, the overt act attributed to accused by witnesses is"
+"specific, medical evidence fully supports the case of prosecution and"
+"accused/respondent is liable to be convicted under section 323 of IPC, 1860.744. The"
+"accused, a shopkeeper, in a sudden quarrel hit his wife on the head with an iron weight"
+of 200 grams which resulted in her death. The medical evidence showed that the injury
+was of a simple nature and there was no evidence that the deceased died of shock
+"caused by the injury. He was held liable only under section 323 IPC, 1860 and not under"
+"section 304 IPC, 1860.745. So also where the wife attacked the husband with a brick"
+causing multiple injuries resulting in his death but according to medical evidence the
+injuries were of a simple nature and were not sufficient in ordinary course of nature to
+"cause death, it was held that the accused wife could not be convicted under section"
+"302 IPC, 1860. Her conviction was accordingly changed to one under section 323 IPC,"
+1860.746.
+The accused pushed the victim. She fell down and sustained injuries of simple nature.
+This act of the accused was held to fall under section 323.747. Where the accused gave
+"a push on the chest of the deceased and the victim fell on a stone resulting in death,"
+conviction was recorded under section 323.748. The accused husband returned home
+at midnight in a drunken state. He beat his wife and threw a piece of stone on her head
+and she died. The post-mortem report revealed three simple injuries on her head and
+exact cause of death could not be ascertained. Relations between the accused and the
+deceased were found to be cordial. Intention to cause the victim's death was not
+proved. Conviction of the accused under section 300 was set aside and he was
+convicted under section 323.749. Several persons attacked and caused the death of
+"their victim. All, including the present appellant, were holding the deceased and one of"
+them K dealt fatal blows. K was convicted of murder under section 302. All his fellows
+were convicted under this section read with section 149 except the present appellant
+who was convicted under section 302 read with section 34. The Supreme Court held
+that the appellant should also have been convicted under this section read with section
+"149.750. Thomas v State of Kerala,751. the fist blow caused by the accused resulted in"
+"subdural haematoma which led to the death of the victim, but it could not be said that"
+the accused could be attributed with the knowledge that by such act he was likely to
+"cause death, nor could it be said that the accused intended to cause that particular"
+"injury which he actually caused, it was held that accused could be convicted only under"
+"section 323 and not section 300. In Mohan Singh v State of Rajasthan,752. the accused"
+attacked his victim and caused voluntary hurt to him by inflicting fist blows and
+causing nose injury. His guilt was established by the evidence of the witnesses. The
+plea of alibi raised by the accused was not tenable. His conviction under section 323
+was upheld.
+"Where the offence was punishable under this section and also under sections 304, Part"
+"II/34, and was covered by the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951, the Court did not"
+"consider it proper to subject children to imprisonment but, looking at the brutal nature"
+"of the offence, imposed a sentence of fine.753."
+"Where the accused brothers chanced to converge, having not met before, at their"
+sister's place avowedly to teach her a lesson for having instituted proceedings against
+"them and one of them who, not known to others was carrying a knife, inflicted a knife"
+"blow which, landing on a vital part, caused death, they were convicted under this"
+section and the knife wielding brother under section 304 Part-II.754. In a case of
+"attempt to murder, one of the accused gave only one blow with a 'lathi' on the shoulder"
+of the injured without sharing the common intention of the other accused. Injury was
+simple and caused only swelling. He was convicted for his individual act under section
+323 and was released on probation.755.
+[s 323.2] Conviction altered to 323.—
+Where the Doctor had clearly established that the injuries sustained by the deceased
+were all simple in nature inflicted upon non-vital parts of the body. The injuries in
+question were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The High
+Court justified in allowing the appeal of the respondents in part and acquitting them of
+the charge of murder while maintaining their conviction for the remaining offences with
+which they were charged.756.
+Where in a quarrel the accused kicked the deceased on his testicles but as no medical
+"treatment was given for two days, the injured died due to Toxaemia caused by"
+gangrene. The injury to the testicles was not the direct cause of his death. The
+Supreme Court set aside his conviction under section 304 Part II and convicted him
+under section 323 instead.757. In a dispute over land the defence of accused regarding
+exercising of private defence was not accepted. Sentence of accused under section
+"304, Part II was maintained. Other accused were convicted under section 323 IPC,"
+1860.758.
+"The accused, a police constable, beat up a frail old man of 60 years weighing only 38"
+Kg. His ribs were broken and that resulted in his death. The Court said that the accused
+must have intended the consequences of his act. His conviction was altered from
+"under section 323 to section 304, Part II. The incident had become 15 years old. He"
+had already served some portion of his punishment. He was allowed to surrender to
+serve the remaining portion.759.
+[s 323.3] Acquittal.—
+Allegation that accused/respondents gave beatings to complainant and one of them
+caused incised wound on her right forearm with sickle. Prosecution did not explain as
+to how the respondents had sustained injuries in said incident. Acquittal of
+respondents was held proper.760. Where there is no corroborative evidence that injuries
+"found on person of informant was caused none other than by the appellant, the offence"
+"under section 323 of IPC, 1860 could not be proved beyond doubt. Conviction recorded"
+against appellant was held improper and liable to be set aside.761.
+[s 323.4] Punishment.—
+Where there was no pre-planned intention to cause death and the incident was the
+"result of a heated moment caused by exchange of abuses, the sentence of six months"
+RI was modified to the period already undergone.762. In an incident of hurt and
+"kidnapping, both the accused persons were married and had children. Their previous"
+conduct was not bad. The victim girl was not physically harmed and become married
+subsequently. Sentence of six years RI under section 366 for kidnapping was reduced
+to two years but the sentence of six months under section 323 was not reduced.763.
+[s 323.5] Probation.—
+In view of the fact that incident occurred on spur of moment and was traverse in nature
+"and accused did not have any previous conviction, accused was allowed to release on"
+probation.764.
+"741. Muhammad Ibrahim v Shaik Davood, (1920) 44 Mad 417."
+"742. Mandira Nandi v Dilip Kumar Baruah, 2012 Cr LJ 2567 (Gau); Bandela Daveedu v State of AP,"
+2011 Cr LJ 4257 (AP)—Where accused caused simple injuries to victim and not grievous
+"injuries. Accused are guilty for offence under section 323 read with 34 IPC, 1860 and 324 read"
+"with 34 IPC, 1860 instead of section 325 read with 34 IPC, 1860 and section 326 read with 34"
+"IPC, 1860."
+"743. Angrej Singh @ Kaka v State of HP, 2012 Cr LJ 3335 (HP). Ayoub Dedar v State of J&K, 2010"
+"Cr LJ 2497 (JK). Allegation that appellant caught hold of victim, 10/12 years old girl in jungle,"
+committed an indecent assault on her and also made an attempt to commit rape on her.
+"Conviction of appellant under section 376/511 and 323 of IPC, 1860 was held proper."
+"744. State of Maharashtra v Tatyaba Bajirao Jadhav, 2011 Cr LJ 2717 (Bom)."
+"745. PP v NS Murthy, 1973 Cr LJ 1238 (AP). Sri Prakash v State, 1990 Cr LJ 486 : 1989 All LJ"
+"117, beating child with no injuries, death followed because of enlarged spleen, conviction under"
+"sections 323 and 326 and not section 304. The accused caused two injuries on the victim, one"
+by sharp-edged weapon and the other by blunt weapon but only the blunt weapon was
+recovered from the accused. It was held that the injury caused by the sharp-edged weapon
+could not be assigned to the accused. His conviction under section 326 was converted to
+"section 323; Jam v State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr LJ 2572 (Raj)."
+"746. Sridevi, 1974 Cr LJ 126 (All). Darshan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 66 : 1990 Cr LJ"
+"2684 ; prosecution case not proved. Purandar Bhukta v State of Orissa, 1991 Cr LJ 1388 ,"
+allegation that the accused slapped the informant on his face causing bleeding injury but the
+"fact not mentioned in FIR, benefit of doubt. Munshilal v State of UP, 1990 Cr LJ 984 , no"
+"explanation of multiple injuries on accused persons, fatal to prosecution."
+"747. Sellamuthu v State of TN, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2143 (Mad). Where the wife of the accused gave"
+only a single blow to the head of the victim and thereafter remained a silent witness to things
+"happening, she was convicted only under this section and not for causing death under the"
+"doctrine of common intention under section 34, Darshan Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 2 Cr"
+"LJ 2138 (Raj). The accused inflicted single lathi blow on the head of the deceased, injury simple,"
+"but death due to haemorrhage, conviction under section 323, Dunga Ram v State of Rajasthan,"
+1996 Cr LJ 3672 (Raj).
+"748. Pichapillai v State of TN, 1996 Cr LJ 3634 (Mad)."
+"749. Shyamji v State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr LJ 2458 (Raj)."
+"750. Shri Jawahar v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 376 : AIR 1991 SC 273 . Pandu v State of MP, (1995)"
+"1 Cr LJ 226 (MP), sentence for grievous hurt reduced to the period already undergone where the"
+accused belonged to backward class and had no antecedent record of crime.
+"751. Thomas v State of Kerala, 1992 Cr LJ 581 (Ker)."
+"752. Mohan Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1994 Cr LJ 2229 (Raj)."
+"753. State of UP v Akhtar Khan, 1991 Cr LJ 1779 (All). Another case of punishment for three"
+"months already undergone and a fine of Rs. 1000; Raghuvir Singh v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 48 ."
+"Prafulla Bora v State of Assam, 1988 Cr LJ 428 (Gau), the accused, a boy of 18–19 years old at"
+"the time of occurrence, 11 years passed since then, imprisonment for two years considered"
+sufficient but released on probation.
+"754. Om Prakash v State, 1990 Cr LJ 2373 (Del)."
+"755. Kuldeep Singh v State of Punjab, 1994 Cr LJ 2201 : 1994 AIR SCW 1451."
+"756. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, (2012) 4 SCC 564 [LNIND 2012 SC 199] : AIR 2012 SC 1595"
+"[LNIND 2012 SC 199] ; Puran v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 3704 (MP); Haripada Rajak v State of"
+"Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 3636 (Jha); Gharbharan v State of Chhattisgarh, 2010 Cr LJ 471 (Chh)."
+"757. Pirthi v State of Haryana, AIR 1994 SC 1582 : 1994 Cr LJ 2187 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC 498 ."
+"758. Nasiruddin Khan v State of Bihar, AIR 2008 SC 3198 [LNIND 2008 SC 1528] : (2008) 12 SCC"
+"129 [LNIND 2008 SC 1528] ; Abani K Debnath v State of Tripura, AIR 2006 SC 518 : (2005) 13 SCC"
+422 .
+"759. State of Kerala v Balakrishnan, 1999 Cr LJ 5038 (Ker). Bhoora Ram v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 3440 (Raj), free fight, two of them had not caused any fatal injury, who caused the"
+"fatal injury, conviction of all under section 323, it being a free fight the right of private defence"
+"was not available. Raghunath Sahu v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 2760 (Ori), free fight, no"
+"recoveries, conviction improper. Upendra Singh Solanki v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1850"
+"(Raj), attack on public servant but not for the purpose of preventing him from doing his official"
+"duty, conviction under sections 323 and 324. Habil Mia v State of Assam, 1997 Cr LJ 1866 (Gau),"
+conviction for hurt and kidnapping.
+"760. State of HP v Sarla Devi, 2011 Cr LJ 2505 (HP)."
+"761. Gunadhar Majhi v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 2536 (Jhar)."
+"762. Rati Ram v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 1525 (All)."
+"763. Habil Mia v State of Assam, 1997 Cr LJ 1866 (Gau)."
+"764. Chandrakant Kashinath Somware v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 4916 (Bom); Sitaram"
+"Paswan v State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 3534 [LNIND 2005 SC 703] : (2005) 13 SCC 110 [LNIND"
+2005 SC 703] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 324] Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.
+"Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by"
+"means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which,"
+"used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated"
+"substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any"
+explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the
+"human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any"
+"animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section makes simple hurt more grave, and liable to more severe punishment"
+where it has the differentia of one of the modes of infliction described in the
+section.765.
+[s 324.1] CASES.—
+"Where the accused gave a blow on the left side of the head of the victim with a Farsha,"
+"a sharp-cutting weapon, causing a simple scalp-deep injury and there was the"
+"possibility that the sharp edge of the weapon was not used, it was held that his"
+"conviction should be changed from section 307 to one under section 324 IPC, 1860"
+since Farsha is a weapon which if used as a weapon of offence is likely to cause
+death.766. Where a head injury was caused with a deadly weapon and the injured was
+"discharged from the hospital after 15 days, but six months thereafter he had to be"
+"hospitalised again for brain operation and he did not recover, the death being not solely"
+"due to the injury, the accused persons convicted under this section and their conviction"
+under section 304 was set aside.767. Tooth is an instrument of cutting and as such
+"biting off the tip of the nose would be an offence under this section or section 326 IPC,"
+"1860 depending on the nature of the injury, simple or grievous.768. Where there is no"
+"serious injury on any vital part of the body of the victim, the offender should be"
+"convicted under section 324 and not under section 326 IPC, 1860.769. Thus, where the"
+accused inflicted an injury on the right shoulder of the deceased with a broken soda
+water bottle with sharp edges without knowing that the deceased was suffering from
+"haemophilia (tendency of excessive bleeding), it was held that the accused was liable"
+"only under section 324 and not under section 302 IPC, 1860.770. Where simple injuries"
+"not likely to cause death were inflicted with a sword, the Supreme Court transferred the"
+conviction from under section 307 to one under this section and allowed the offences
+"to be compounded on payment to the victim a sum of Rs. 3,000.771. Where in a case of"
+"a dowry death, the evidence showed that the accused, mother-in-law caused injuries on"
+the person of the daughter-in-law. She committed suicide. The accused was punished
+"under section 324 but on consideration of circumstances and facts that she was 80,"
+"only a sentence of fine of Rs. 3,000 was imposed. Offence under section 306 was not"
+"made out.772. Where the accused, a boy of 18 years of age at the time of incident"
+"having no criminal history, in a sudden scuffle gave a blow on the chest of the"
+"deceased with an ordinary knife resulting in his death and thereafter, mutely allowed to"
+"take the knife from his hand and went to the hospital along with the deceased, it was"
+"held that he had no intention to cause death or grievous hurt to the deceased, and was"
+"guilty under section 324 and not under section 304, Part II.773. Where the accused"
+assaulted his victim by 'Katti' blow causing grievous hurt and the co-accused assaulted
+the victim only by lathis and hands causing minor injuries and no pre-concert between
+"the accused and the co-accused regarding the assault by the 'Katti' was established, it"
+was held that the co-accused could not be vicariously held liable for the acts of the
+accused and be convicted under section 324.774. Where a blow was inflicted with the
+"blunt side of the axe on the thigh of the victim, the Supreme Court reduced the"
+"sentence to four months' RI and increased the fine to Rs. 3,000.775. Where the accused"
+deliberately attacked and killed a person with a deadly weapon and was held to be
+"rightly convicted for murder under section 300, he was convicted under this section"
+and sentenced to pay a fine for causing hurt on the hand of the intervening wife of the
+deceased with a rice pounder.776.
+In a free fight between two groups resulting in death of one person and injuries to
+"several others, fatal injury could not be attributed to any one of the accused who also"
+received a number of injuries. It was held that the accused were properly convicted
+under sections 324 and 325.777. Where one of the accused caused two gunshot
+"injuries to a man which proved fatal, the other accused caused him only an incised"
+injury. The accused causing fatal injuries was sentenced under section 302 and the
+other accused only under section 324.778. In an altercation the accused dealt a blow
+with spade lying on the spot on the head of a 70-year-old man who became
+"unconscious, was hospitalised and died after three weeks. The blow caused only linear"
+fracture of left frontal bone. It was found that essential element of voluntarily causing
+grievous hurt was wanting. It was held that his offence fell under section 324 and not
+under section 326.779. Allegation that accused resorted to repeated firings at two
+persons on two occasions at two different times and place. On first occasion accused
+fired in air and pellets after being ricocheted from ceiling caused simple injuries to
+three persons. On second occasion also appellant had not caused any injury to
+"anybody. In view of dearth of convincing evidence on record, it cannot be concluded"
+with any degree of certainty that appellant had an intention to commit murder of
+anybody. Only conclusion could be drawn is that appellant wanted to cause hurt for
+"dispersing crowd. Appellant can only be convicted under section 324 of IPC, 1860 and"
+"not under section 307 IPC, 1860.780. Medical evidence that injuries, however, serious in"
+nature but not grievous in nature. Skin grafting has been done and victim is fit for
+"discharge — Accused is guilty of offence under section 324 IPC, 1860 and not under"
+"section 307 IPC, 1860.781. The accused struck his wife once only on the neck causing"
+simple injury. She fell down and was further injured and died. The instrument (wooden
+"reaper) was dangerous. The conviction was altered from under section 304, Part II to"
+section 324.782.
+[s 324.2] Sections 324/149.—
+Prosecution failed to prove that appellants had made unlawful assembly and caused
+incised wound to complainant in furtherance of common object. Accused who
+"assaulted the complainant liable to be convicted under section 324 IPC, 1860 and other"
+"accused persons liable to be convicted under section 323 of IPC, 1860.783."
+[s 324.3] Acquittal.—
+"The essential ingredients to make out an offence under section 324 IPC, 1860 should"
+be that there must be voluntarily causing hurt and also the required intention. In other
+"words, to constitute an offence of voluntarily causing hurt, there must be complete"
+correspondence between the result and the intention or the knowledge of the person
+who causes the said hurt.784. Where the injured witness himself attributed the injury on
+"him to the deceased, instead of the accused, the conviction of the accused on the"
+charge of section 324 cannot be sustained under law.785. Where no explanation by
+prosecution as to how the injuries were caused to deceased and the role attributed to
+"appellants by prosecution is fully covered by their right of private defence, conviction"
+"and sentence is liable to be set aside.786. In a case, the allegation was that the accused"
+petitioner inflicted simple and grievous injuries with sharp-edged weapon on person of
+victim. The Injury Report was not proved and the doctor who signed it was not called
+for examination. The Petitioner was held entitled to acquittal.787.
+[s 324.4] Punishment.—
+Where injuries were caused on account of quarrel over land and the incident was
+"already 17 years old, the accused was sentenced to two years RI and fine.788. Incident"
+had occurred more than 35 years ago. There was no complaint against appellant during
+pendency of appeal of indulging into any criminal activities. Period of imprisonment
+"already undergone by appellant with fine of Rs. 10,000 and in default thereof to"
+undergo six months simple imprisonment would meet ends of justice.789.
+[s 324.5] Non-Compoundable.—
+"Before the Code of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment Act) 2005 came into force,"
+"offence under section 324 of IPC, 1860 was compoundable with the permission of the"
+"Court as prescribed in the table, under sub-section (2) of section 320 of Cr PC, 1973."
+The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment Act) 2005 (Act 25 of 2005) has taken out
+"section 324 of IPC, 1860 from the sphere of compounding and thereby made it non-"
+"compoundable. Since the offence committed under section 324 of IPC, 1860 before"
+"Amendment Act came into force, was compoundable with the permission of the Court"
+"pursuant to the provisions prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 320 of Cr PC,"
+1973—as was in force before the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 2005
+came into effect.790. After coming into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure
+"(Amendment) Act 2005 the offence under section 324, IPC is made non-"
+"compoundable. However, in this case the offence under section 324, IPC was"
+committed on 23 July 1986 on which date it was compoundable with the permission of
+the Court. As the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment Act) 2005 is not applicable
+"to the facts of the case, the offence under section 324, IPC, 1860 would be"
+compoundable with the permission of the Court.791.
+[s 324.6] Probation.—
+"Accused is convicted under section 324 IPC, 1860. Taking into consideration the 20"
+"years age of one of the appellants on date of incident, benefit of Probation of Offenders"
+"Act, 1958, is extended to him.792."
+"765. See Madhab Digai v State of Orissa, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 1206 (Ori) conviction for injuries caused"
+by knife.
+"766. Jai Narain, 1972 Cr LJ 469 : AIR 1972 SC 1764 . Anwarul Haq v State of UP, 2005 Cr LJ 2602"
+": AIR 2005 SC 2382 [LNIND 2005 SC 425] : (2005) 10 SCC 581 [LNIND 2005 SC 425] , assault"
+"and injury with knife, though not recovered, conviction on the basis of evidence of eyewitnesses."
+"767. State of Orissa v Rabu Naik, 1990 Cr LJ 2777 (Ori). See also State of Gujarat v Bharwad"
+"Jakshibhai Naeq bhai, 1990 Cr LJ 2531 (Guj), where the common object of an unlawful assembly"
+"was only to belabour the members of a particular community, and they were striking with iron-"
+"rimmed sticks, one blow proving fatal, conviction under this section and section 326 and not for"
+murder.
+"768. Jamil, 1974 Cr LJ 867 (All); See also Jagat Singh, 1984 Cr LJ 1551 (Del); Chaurasi Manjhi,"
+AIR 1970 Pat 322 .
+"769. Kailash Prasad, 1980 Cr LJ 190 : AIR 1980 SC 106 ."
+"770. Anbumani v State, 1981 Cr LJ (NOC) 115 (Mad)."
+"771. Narendra Kumar v State of Rajasthan, (1987) 24 All CC 516 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 884 : 1988 Supp"
+"SCC 536 ; Madan Lal v State of HP, 1990 Cr LJ 310 , simple injuries. Ramesh v State of UP, AIR"
+"1992 SC 664 : 1992 Cr LJ 669 , a single injury at back of neck, conviction shifted to under this"
+section from under section 307.
+"772. State of HP v Nikku Ram, 1995 Cr LJ 4184 : AIR 1996 SC 67 [LNIND 1995 SC 851] ."
+"773. Shrirang Kisan Kurade v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 1362 (Bom)."
+"774. Mohan Tripathy v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 1188 (Ori). Chand Mohammed v State of Bihar,"
+"2013 Cr LJ 542 (Pat); Sheikh Ahmad v State, 2013 Cr LJ 267 (Pat); Deepak v State, 2013 Cr LJ"
+"2801 (Utt); Madan Lal v State, 2013 Cr LJ 2885 (Utt); Chagalamari Subbaiah v State of AP, 2010 Cr"
+LJ 655 (AP)
+"775. Bishna v State of Haryana, 1988 SCC (Cr) 48 : 1987 Supp SCC 184 . Another case of"
+simultaneous assault by several persons which was held to fall under this section is Vithal
+"Bhimashah Koli v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 179 [LNIND 1982 BOM 340] : 1983 Cr LJ"
+"340 : (1983) 1 SCC 431 . See also Sheopoojan Chamar v State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 1462 , in"
+"addition to the principal offender, whose sentence was not modified, that of his two associates"
+"who caused minor injuries, reduced to the period already undergone."
+"776. Re Thunicharam, 1991 Cr LJ 1318 (Mad). Pushap Raj v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 2 Cr LJ"
+1776 (Raj) conviction under the section of those members who caused only simple injuries as
+"distinguished from those who caused death. Bhola Singh v State of Punjab, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1830"
+"(P&H) causing injuries to eyewitness, conviction under the section."
+"777. Amrik Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 AIR SCW 2482 : 1993 Cr LJ 2857 : 1994 Supp (1) SCC"
+320 . the court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. Shyama Pradhan v State
+"of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 2936 (Ori), deliberate attack on the victim, probation not allowed, sentence"
+reduced to the period already undergone.
+"778. State of UP v Jamshed, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 610 : 1994 Cr LJ 635 ; Para Seenaiah v State of"
+"AP, (2012) 6 SCC 800 [LNIND 2012 SC 314] : AIR 2012 SC 2875 [LNIND 2012 SC 314] ."
+"779. Golak Chandra Nayak v State of Orissa, 1993 Cr LJ 274 ."
+"780. Kamla v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 2659 (All); Krishna Babu Bhoir v State of Maharashtra, 2011"
+Cr LJ 1813 (Bom).
+"781. Smt. Shakunthalamma v State, 2012 Cr LJ 801 (Kar); Ram Nath Deepak v State NCT of Delhi,"
+2011 Cr LJ 14059 (Del). Plea on the part of petitioners that Sessions Court erred in framing
+"charge against petitioners under section 308 IPC, 1860 instead of section 324 IPC — Liable to"
+be rejected.
+"782. Munusamy v State of TN, 1996 Cr LJ 3161 (Mad). Ram Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1998"
+"SC 1759 [LNIND 1998 SC 414] : 1998 Cr LJ 2279 (SC), assault on victims causing grievous hurt."
+"There was no explanation for the injuries suffered by the accused persons, who gave an"
+"explanation which seemed to be more probable, acquittal. Mobin v State of UP, 2000 Cr LJ 2098"
+"(All), in the absence of evidence regarding internal damage underneath the injury, the injury"
+could not be said to be grevious. Conviction under section 307 altered to one under section 324.
+"Ram Kumar Goutam v State of MP, 2001 Cr LJ 1604 (MP), medical evidence showed that an"
+"incised wound over abdomen and two contusions on legs, wounds simple and not grevious,"
+"conviction under section 324. Nabin Chandra Saikia v State of Assam, 2000 Cr LJ 3824 (Gau),"
+"conviction for acid attack. Ramharakh v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 3001 (All), injuries caused were"
+"of simple nature, death because of enlarged spleen which became ruptured, which fact not"
+"known to assailants, offence under section 324 made out. P Johnson v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr"
+"LJ 3651 (Ker) injured persons admitted to hospital soon after the incident, but thereafter laxity"
+"in all respects. No case against accused persons made out. Peedikandi Abdulla v State of Kerala,"
+1998 Cr LJ 2758 (Ker) no offence of hurt under section 323 or of outraging modesty under
+"section 354 made out. Shankar Lal v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 4595 : AIR 1998 SC 3271"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 632] , the victim was assaulted with knife. As soon as he recovered"
+"consciousness, he named the accused person as the assailant. Evidence of the victim alone"
+"was held to be sufficient for conviction. Sheo Dularey v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 269 (All), injury"
+"with axe but simple conviction under section 324. Dabhugotto Ithaiah v State of AP, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"3651 (AP), hurt caused with dangerous weapons in a group rivalry between political parties. Oral"
+"and documentary evidence. Conviction proper. Kothandapani v State of TN, 2003 Cr LJ 151"
+"(Mad), the accused persons attacked with casuarina sticks and caused simple injuries on his"
+"legs, imposition of fine of Rs. 500 was considered to be enough. Muni Lal Paswan v State of"
+"Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 1625 (Pat), allegation that the accused person assembled together and"
+"attempted to kill, but the evidence showed that only the main accused dealt blows with spade"
+on the head of the injured victim. The conviction of the main accused was altered from section
+307 to section 324 and his sentence reduced to the period already undergone. Others
+"discharged. Karunamoy Sarmah v State of Assam, 2003 Cr LJ 1968 (Gau), simple injuries"
+"caused, scuffling over stengun. Conviction under section 324 and not section 307. State of"
+"Karnataka v Jagadisha, 2003 Cr LJ 2141 (Kant) different versions of the place of the incident"
+and that of recovery of weapons. It was not possible to ascertain whether the incident took
+"place inside or outside the house, this should not discredit the prosecution case, nor some"
+"irregularities and omissions in the investigation. Mukati Pd Rai v State of Bihar, 2005 SCC Cr LJ"
+"681 : AIR 2005 SC 1271 : (2004) 13 SCC 144 , accused wielding lathis trespassed into the house"
+"of the victim, and instigated others to beat them up. They received lathi injuries. Accused"
+"convicted under section 324/114, (offence committed in the presence of abettor)."
+"783. Brijesh Roopsingh Baghel v State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 2273 (MP)."
+"784. Pitchavadhmtiilu v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 469 (AP)."
+"785. Kumar v State represented by Inspector of Police, AIR 2018 SC 2386 [LNIND 2018 SC 262] ."
+"786. Haren Das v State of Assam, 2012 Cr LJ 1467 (Gau)."
+"787. Suraj Mal v State, 2010 Cr LJ 1583 (Raj)."
+"788. Nathu v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 2382 (All)."
+"789. Kamla v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 2659 (All); Amruta Shankarrao Deshmukh v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1147 (Bom)."
+"790. Prabhat Das v State of Tripura, 2013 Cr LJ 1712 (Gau); Naresh Kumar v State of Haryana,"
+"(2012) 9 SCC 330 [LNIND 2012 SC 478] : 2012 (3) SCC (Cr) 1137; Bineesh v State of Kerala, 2012"
+Cr LJ 4128 .
+"791. Hirabhai Jhaverbhai v the State of Gujarat, 2010 (6) SCC 688 [LNIND 2010 SC 335] : AIR"
+"2010 SC 2321 [LNIND 2010 SC 335] ; Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008"
+[came into force on 31 December 2009] replaced the list of compoundable offences under
+"section 320 of Cr PC, 1973 which finally resolved the confusion whether section 324 etc., are"
+"compoundable or not. See the conflicting views of the Supreme Court in Manoj v State of MP,"
+"(AIR 2009 SC 22 [LNIND 2008 SC 1920] ) and in Md Abdul Sufan Laskar v State of Assam, 2008"
+(9) SCC 333 .
+"792. Chandrabhan v State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 4667 (MP). Madan Lal v State, 2013 Cr LJ 2885"
+(Utt).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 325] Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt.
+"Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous"
+"hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may"
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section prescribes the punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt except in
+"cases provided for by section 335. The facts involved in a particular case, depending"
+"upon various factors like size, sharpness, would throw light on the question whether"
+the weapon was a dangerous or deadly weapon or not. That would determine whether
+in the case section 325 or section 326 would be applicable. Considering the size of the
+"stone which was used, as revealed by material on record, it cannot be said that a"
+"dangerous weapon was used. Therefore, the conviction was altered to section 325 IPC,"
+1860.793. Where a player in a friendly cricket match blew a stump against another
+"player which hit his head and caused death, it was held that the intention to cause"
+"death or likelihood of it being not proved, an offence under section 325 was made out,"
+injury having been caused by a blunt weapon.794. Where medical evidence showed that
+attack on the forehead of the deceased was by a lathi and the internal injury could not
+"be correlated to the external injury caused by the accused, it was held that the accused"
+"was liable under section 325 IPC, 1860 and not under section 304, Part II, IPC, 1860.795."
+Where two injuries were caused in a quarrel by the two accused persons each of whom
+inflicted one stick blow one of which proved fatal but it could not be known who had
+"inflicted that blow and since intention to cause death was not established, conviction"
+was altered from under section 302 to section 325 read with section 34.796. In a fight
+"between two groups, one person received one stick blow on the head and died a week"
+after treatment and operation. It could not be said that the accused had knowledge that
+blow would cause death of that person. Conviction of the accused under section 304
+Part II/34 was altered to one under sections 325 and 34.797. In an altercation between
+"father and the son, the son gave a blow on the head of his father with a heavy stick and"
+ran away. The victim died after one week in the hospital. It was held that the attack was
+not pre-meditated and the offence fell under section 325 and not under section 302.798.
+In a case the victim had sustained a grievous injury on a vital portion of the body and
+"the injury was life threatening, imposition of sentence of six days only, which was the"
+period already undergone by the accused in confinement was held too lenient.
+"However, as the parties had forgotten their differences and were living peacefully for 25"
+"years, the Court taking into consideration the aggravating as well as mitigating factors"
+"under the facts of this case, imposed a sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment"
+"and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- against the accused.799. In a clash over property dispute the"
+accused party caused grievous injuries to two persons and simple injuries to some
+others. The occurrence took place 17 years before and some of the accused were more
+than 76 years of age and one of them had died. Their conviction under section 325 was
+affirmed but the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone as the Court
+"did not think it fit to send them back to jail. However, a fine of Rs. 200 was imposed on"
+"each one of them.800. In this connection, see also discussion and cases under sub-"
+"heads ""Death caused without requisite 'intention or knowledge' not culpable homicide"""
+"and ""single blow or lathi blow"" under section 299, ante.801."
+[s 325.1] Sentence.—
+Once the accused is held guilty of commission of offence punishable under section
+"325 IPC, 1860 then imposition of jail sentence and fine on the accused is mandatory."
+"So far as jail sentence is concerned, it may extend up to 7 years as per court's"
+"discretion whereas so far as fine amount is concerned, its quantum would also depend"
+upon the Court's discretion.802. Where the victim sustained a grievous injury on a vital
+"portion of the body, i.e., the head, which was fractured and the injury was life"
+"threatening, imposition of the sentence of six days only which was the period already"
+undergone by the accused in confinement was held too lenient. The Supreme Court
+considering the aggravating as well as mitigating factors under the facts that the
+parties have forgotten their differences and are living peacefully imposed a sentence of
+"6 months' RI and a fine of Rs. 25,000/- against the accused.803."
+[s 325.2] Compounding of offence under sections 323 and 325.—
+"During the pendency of proceedings under these sections, the parties effected a"
+compromise at the instance of their elders. Parties belonged to the same family and
+there was no previous enmity. Permission to compound the offence under section 325
+was granted by the High Court.804.
+"793. Mathai v State of Kerala, AIR 2005 SC 710 [LNIND 2005 SC 37] : (2005) 3 SCC 260 [LNIND"
+2005 SC 37] .
+"794. Shailesh v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 914 (Bom)."
+"795. Mohinder Singh, 1985 Cr LJ 1903 (SC) : AIR 1986 SC 309 . See Maiku v State of UP, 1989 Cr"
+"LJ 860 : AIR 1989 SC 67 : 1989 Supp (1) SCC 25 , where a police party could not be convicted"
+under this section when a lathi blow was given to an escaping witness in the course of an
+"investigation and he died, it being not explained which of the party had played what role."
+"Bibhisan Barik v State of Orissa, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 390 (Ori) where while sentencing for grievous"
+"hurt caused six years ago, the social status of the parties, genesis of the dispute were taken into"
+account for holding that custody already undergone was sufficient punishment. Wachittar Singh
+"v State of Punjab, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1614 (P&H), grievous injuries caused by attacking the party by"
+"reason of a land dispute, those accused who caused injuries on legs with a blunt weapon were"
+"released on bail under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The benefit of probation was"
+"extended to other accused also. State of Karnataka v Sririyappa, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2304 (Kant), here"
+"the offence was punishable with life imprisonment, benefit of probation under section 4 of the"
+"Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 was held to be improper."
+"796. Siddapuram Siva Reddy v State of AP, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 701 (AP)."
+"797. Halke v State of MP, AIR 1994 SC 951 : 1994 Cr LJ 1220 . Takhaji Hiraji v Thakore Kubersing"
+"Chammansing, AIR 2001 SC 2328 [LNIND 2001 SC 1150] : 2001 Cr LJ 2602 , in a fight between"
+"two village communities, the accused gave blows to the victim with a stick causing fracture in"
+"his hand, conviction under the section proper. Rs. 500 was recovered as a fine for compensating"
+the victim and a bond for keeping peace was taken from the accused with sureties. Nathu v
+"State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 2382 (All), land dispute, lathi blows, unintended death of one victim,"
+accused persons held guilty of causing grievous hurt with common intention. Conviction of all
+"under section 34/326. Ajay Sharma v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 4590 : AIR 1998 SC 2798"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 879] , no finding of common intention to kill, conviction recorded under section"
+"324. ABC Imports & Exports v Asst. Director, Enforcement, a mob of 200 came to the field to"
+"prevent transplantation by the prosecution party, one caused death at the spur of moment,"
+"others inflicted minor injuries. One was held liable to be convicted for murder, other only for hurt"
+"under section 325/34. State of Karnataka v Dwaraka Bhat, 1997 Cr LJ 226 : AIR 1996 SCW 4132 ,"
+"accused pushed victim with great force, he fell down and sustained head injury and became"
+"unconscious. Conviction. State of Karnataka v Basavegowda, 1997 Cr LJ 4386 (Kant), the"
+"accused husband took his wife to forest, assaulted her with a stone and extorted her"
+ornaments. One serious injury and other simple injuries were caused. She was the sole witness
+but found reliable. The fact that the divorced had remarried was not in itself an expression of
+hostility towards the accused. Conviction was under section 325 and not section 307. The
+"accused was a young rustic villager, uneducated but no criminal background, nine years had"
+lapsed since the incident. Sentence of two years for grevious hurt and two years for extortion
+were reduced to the period already undergone.
+"798. Bellana Kannam Naidu v State of AP, 1994 Cr LJ 1146 (AP)."
+"799. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 ."
+"800. Ayub v State of UP, AIR 1994 SC 1064 : 1994 Cr LJ 1219 ."
+"801. See also Rattan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2417 : 1988 BLJR 459 : 1988 SCC (Cr)"
+"708 : 1988 Supp SCC 456 , death caused by lathi blow; Ganga Prasad v State of UP, 1987 SCC"
+"(Cr) 345 : (1987) 2 SCC 232 , lacerated injury caused with a spade which was allowed to be"
+compounded.
+"802. State of UP v Tribhuwan, AIR 2017 SC 5249 [LNIND 2017 SC 2876] ."
+"803. State of Rajasthan v Mohan Lal, AIR 2018 SC 3564 . See also Subhash Chander Bansal v"
+"Gian Chand, AIR 2018 SC 655 [LNIND 2018 SC 19] ."
+"804. Mohinder Singh v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 85 (P&H). Pappu v State of Punjab, AIR 2000"
+"SC 3633 , the accused and prosecution witnesses injured in the incident were close relatives."
+They settled their dispute as between themselves. The sentence of the accused was reduced to
+the period already undergone.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 326] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.
+"Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous"
+"hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument"
+"which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or"
+"any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by"
+"means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is"
+"deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by"
+"means of any animal, shall be punished with 805.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+The relationship between this section and the preceding one is the same as that
+between sections 324 and 323. Before a conviction for the sentence of grievous hurt
+"can be passed, one of the injuries defined in section 320 must be strictly proved, and"
+the eighth clause is no exception to the general rule of law that a penal statute must be
+"construed strictly. The expression ""any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence,"
+"is likely to cause death"" has to be gauged taking note of the heading of the section."
+The essential ingredients to attract section 326 are:
+(1) voluntarily causing a hurt;
+(2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and
+(3) the grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means.806.
+[s 326.1] Dangerous weapon.—
+What would constitute a 'dangerous weapon' would depend upon the facts of each
+case and no generalisation can be made. The heading of the section provides some
+insight into the factors to be considered. As was noted by the Supreme Court in State
+"of UP v Indrajeet alias Sukhatha,807. there is no such thing as a regular or earmarked"
+weapon for committing murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a particular article
+can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined
+"factually. At this juncture, it would be relevant to note that in some provisions, e.g.,"
+"sections 324 and 326 expression ""dangerous weapon"" is used. In some other more"
+"serious offences the expression used is ""deadly weapon"" (e.g., sections 397 and 398)."
+"The facts involved in a particular case, depending upon various factors like size,"
+"sharpness, would throw light on the question whether the weapon was a dangerous or"
+deadly weapon or not. That would determine whether in the case section 325 or
+section 326 would be applicable.808.
+In the absence of any evidence that the stick which was used as a weapon of offence
+"was of lethal type and something like sharp blade or sharp point, etc., was attached to"
+"it, the stick was held to be not an instrument within the meaning of this section.809."
+Where the accused-teacher assaulted the child-student with a wooden stick that
+caused injury to the eye of the child but there was no material to show that the stick
+"that was wielded by the accused was a dangerous weapon, the conviction of the"
+accused under section 326 may not be warranted; but the offence would fall under
+"section 325 IPC, 1860.810."
+[s 326.2] Injuries not serious enough to endanger life.—
+It was proved that the accused persons caused injuries which led to the victim's death.
+He did not receive any medical assistance for full four hours. He lost a lot of blood
+which became the cause of death. None of the injuries were on the vital parts of the
+body. They were not serious enough to endanger life by themselves. The Court said
+"that at the highest, the accused persons could be said to be guilty under sections"
+326/34 for causing grievous hurt.811. In an altercation the accused persons beat the
+injured with fist and leg blows on stomach and waist. An attempt was made to help
+him out of the injury by fomenting at home. But he had to be shifted to hospital and
+operated upon. It was held that the accused was guilty of attempt to cause grievous
+hurt and not attempt to murder.812. The accused persons armed with lathis and a tangi
+went to the field of the victims and picked up a fight while they were ploughing their
+field. Looking at the attack they ran away. On their way back they met the uncle of their
+victims who happened to ask them about the matter. They being annoyed by the
+"question, hit him on the head with a lathi. He died. The Court viewed the act as only one"
+intended to cause grievous hurt. Sentence of five years RI was awarded.813.
+[s 326.3] Internal injuries.—
+"On account of a quarrel, the husband kicked his wife in the abdomen and chest. Liver"
+injuries were caused of which she died. Conviction was recorded under section 326.
+There was no appeal by the State for any higher punishment. There was no evidence to
+"suggest any dowry demand. Hence, there could be no conviction under section"
+498A.814.
+[s 326.4] Disfiguration.—
+The wife of the accused was being taken to a Police Station in execution of search
+warrant accompanied by a police constable. The accused assaulted his wife and
+"caused injuries resulting in amputation of her limbs. The whole nose was also cut,"
+which itself was held to be sufficient to attract permanent disfiguration. Conviction of
+the accused under section 326 was not interfered with.815.
+[s 326.5] Burn Injuries.—
+Incident of throwing burning Kerosene Lamp by accused on complainant and the
+"complainant sustained 25–30 per cent burn injuries on chest, abdomen and hands."
+Doctor clarified that burn injuries are fatal and dangerous to life in case the injuries get
+"infected and develop into septicaemia. Therefore, injuries cannot be said to be fatal."
+"Accused was liable to be convicted only under section 326 of IPC, 1860 not under"
+section 307.816.
+[s 326.6] Acid attack.—
+The accused threw acid on the faces of their victims. Medical evidence showed that
+"the injuries caused on the faces and eyes were not sufficient to cause death, conviction"
+of the accused under section 307 was altered to one under section 326. The Court
+observed that unless it can be shown that the intention or knowledge of the accused
+was to cause such bodily injury as would come within one of the four clauses of
+"section 300, he cannot be held guilty of an offence under section 307.817."
+[s 326.7] Attack with axe.—
+Protest against cutting of trees became the cause for assault. The accused and his
+companions started assaulting. The victim received a head injury with an axe. The blow
+caused fracture because of its force. The accused persons were not entitled to the
+"benefit of private defence, they being the aggressors.818."
+[s 326.8] Attack with piece of stone.—
+"The weapon of assault was a piece of stone. As per the evidence of the doctor, the"
+injury caused was grievous one. But considering the size of the stone used for the
+"purpose, it could not be said that a dangerous weapon was used. The conviction was"
+altered to section 325 from section 326.819.
+[s 326.9] Counter case.—
+In a case the accused inflicted a knife blow to a man and the accused was also injured
+during the same incident and filed a counter case but took no steps to bring his case to
+trial. It was held that filing of the counter case was not fatal to the prosecution case
+though both the cases should have been clubbed together. Conviction of the accused
+under section 326 was upheld.820. The eye-witnesses who deny the presence of
+"injuries on the person of the accused are lying on the most material point, and"
+"therefore, their evidence is unreliable.821."
+[s 326.10] Feeding prasad containing poison.—
+The accused distributed prasad to persons on relay fast. It contained poison. One
+"person died, others affected. The Court was of the view that it could not be said that"
+"there was intention to kill a particular person, distribution being made openly. But"
+because the accused must have had knowledge that a poisonous substance may
+cause grievous hurt or even death. In respect of the death he was convicted under
+"section 304, Part I and in respect of others affected under section 326.822."
+[s 326.11] Protest against eve-teasing.—
+The accused were friends of the victim who had objected to eve-teasing by one of
+them. The victim-protestor was assaulted. It was held that they could be convicted
+individually for their role in the assault under section 326 but not for the murder. There
+was no common intention of going to that extent.823.
+[s 326.12] Uncertainty as to cause of death.—
+The first doctor who examined the injured person in the hospital stated that none of the
+injuries either individually or collectively appeared to be dangerous to life. The doctor
+"who last examined the patient stated that 'A' group blood having been exhausted, 'O'"
+group blood was given and death might have been due to blood reaction. The post-
+mortem doctor stated that death was due to rupture of liver. The conviction was shifted
+from under sections 302/34 to that under sections 325–326/34.824.
+[s 326.13] Torture in police custody.—
+Victim was arrested and kept in police station for three days and was not produced
+before a Magistrate within 24 hours. Third degree methods adopted on him and his
+penis was also chopped off with a barber's razor. It was a barbaric act on the part of
+"the accused, who deserve no leniency. Both accused persons are held guilty under"
+"section 326 IPC, 1860.825."
+[s 326.14] Section 307 vis-a-vis Section 326.—
+"In some cases offence under section 326 IPC, 1860 may be acutely more serious than"
+"another falling under section 307 IPC, 1860. For instance, acid thrown on the face of"
+"young, unmarried girl would come under section 326 IPC, 1860 but it would be far more"
+"serious than a firearm shot missing the victim that would fall under section 307 IPC,"
+1860.826. A bare perusal of these two provisions clearly reveals that while section 307
+"IPC, 1860 uses the words ""under such circumstances"", these words are conspicuously"
+"missing from section 326 IPC, 1860. Therefore, while deciding whether the case falls"
+"under section 307 IPC, 1860 or under section 326 IPC, 1860 the Court must necessarily"
+examine the circumstances in which the assault was made.827. Doctor categorically
+stated that injury could have caused death. Radiologist also stated that chopping of the
+leg was grievous act in nature. The Supreme Court held that High Court was not
+justified in altering conviction from section 307 read with section 149 to 326 read with
+"section 149 IPC, 1860.828. Number of injures were quite grievous but accused were"
+careful not to give any blow on any vital part of body. Doctor did not say that injuries
+"were sufficient in the course of nature to cause death. Therefore, accused was"
+"convicted under section 326 IPC, 1860 instead of section 307 IPC, 1860.829."
+[s 326.15] Punishment.—
+Imposing only fine while convicting the accused under section 326 and not imposing
+"punishment of imprisonment, was held to be a non-compliance of the provisions of the"
+"code.830. Accused poured acid on the head of victim with the result that face, neck,"
+"eyes, chest, etc., were seriously burnt. High Court reduced sentence from three years to"
+already undergone (35 days). For such a heinous crime accused deserves no
+leniency.831.
+"In a case,832. the Supreme Court held the imposition of three months' imprisonment to"
+be proper but pointed out that the Courts below should have taken notice of the
+"provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or of section 360 Cr PC, 1973. While"
+"upholding the sentence, the Court directed the prisoner to be released on probation."
+Often in Court at the sentencing stage the spotlight fell almost entirely upon the
+"offender and the circumstances of the offender, and there was seldom reference to the"
+suffering of the victim of violence.833.
+[s 326.16] Offence not compoundable.—
+"In Suresh Babu v State of AP,834. Supreme Court allowed the compounding of an"
+"offence under section 326 IPC, 1860 even though such compounding was not"
+"permitted by section 320 of the Code. However, in Surendra Nath Mohanty v State of"
+"Orissa,835. and in Ramlal v State of Jammu and Kashmir,836. it was held that an offence"
+which law declares to be non-compoundable cannot be compounded at all even with
+"the permission of the Court and held Suresh Babu,837. per incuriam. In Jalaluddin v State"
+"of UP,838. and in Bankat v State,839. the Apex Court reiterated that as the offence under"
+"section 326, IPC, 1860 is not compoundable, even if the parties settled the matter. In"
+"Ramgopal v State of MP,840. Supreme Court held as follows:"
+There are several offences under the IPC that are currently non - compoundable. These
+"include offences punishable u/s. 498-A, s. 326, etc. of the IPC. Some of such offence can be"
+made compoundable by introducing a suitable amendment in the statute. We are of the
+opinion that the Law Commission of India could examine whether a suitable proposal can
+be sent to the Union Government in this regard. Any such step would not only relieve the
+Courts of the burden of deciding cases in which the aggrieved parties have themselves
+"arrived at a settlement, but may also encourage the process of reconciliation between them."
+"We, accordingly, request the Law Commission and the Government of India to examine all"
+these aspects and take such steps as may be considered feasible.
+The Law Commission of India examined the issue in view of the direction in Ramgopal's
+Case and submitted its 237th Report suggesting to make section 498A and section
+324 compoundable: no changes were suggested regarding section 326. In Gian Singh v
+"State of Punjab,841. a three-Judge Bench held that sub-section (9) of section 320"
+mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.
+"Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an offence has to be in accord with"
+section 320 and in no other manner. But the power of compounding of offences given
+to a Court under section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal
+proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding
+"of offences, power of a criminal Court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in"
+"section 320 and the Court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other"
+"hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or"
+criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to
+whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate
+"consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. The result is, though section"
+"326 IPC, 1860 is a non-compoundable offence, the High Court can quash the"
+"proceedings by using its inherent power under section 482 Cr PC, 1973 in case of"
+settlement between the parties.
+"805. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"806. Prabhu v State of MP, AIR 2009 SC 745 [LNIND 2008 SC 2354] : (2008) 17 SCC 381 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 2354] .
+"807. State of UP v Indrajeet alias Sukhatha, (2000) 7 SCC 249 [LNIND 2000 SC 1148] ."
+"808. Prabhu v State of MP, AIR 2009 SC 745 [LNIND 2008 SC 2354] : (2008) 17 SCC 381 [LNIND"
+"2008 SC 2354] ; Mathai v State of Kerala, 2005 (2) JT 365 ."
+"809. Jagannath v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 795 (Bom)."
+"810. C R Kariyappa v State of Karnataka, AIR 2018 SC 4312 ."
+"811. State of Karnataka v Shivaraj, 2002 Cr LJ 2493 (Kant), the accused persons were all"
+"agriculturists and not seasoned or regular criminals, there was neither brutality nor"
+"premeditation, they had served considerable period of time in custody during the trial. Their"
+imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone and fine of Rs. 2000 each.
+"812. Rajesh Kumar v State of Haryana, 2002 Cr LJ 756 (P&H), the accused were less than 21"
+"years of age, first offenders, faced proceedings for 10 years, released on probation on furnishing"
+"bond of Rs. 10,000 each and with surety bond of like amount for three years. State v Abdul"
+"Rashid, 2002 Cr LJ 3118 (J&K), three accused persons assaulted the victim who died and his"
+"brother received injuries with a sharp weapon, but injury was not sufficient to cause death."
+Perforation of wound became the cause of death. The accused also caused grievous hurt with
+"dangerous weapon. Convicted under sections 326/34. GS Walia v State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ"
+2524 (SC) attack with iron rods and axe resulting in death. Medical report did not show injury as
+sufficient to cause death. Inference that attack was only to cause injuries. Liability for conviction
+"only under section 325. State of Karnataka v Lokesh, 2002 Cr LJ 3795 (Kant) all the accused"
+convicted under the section read with section 34.
+"813. Chowa Mandal v State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 1603 [LNIND 2004 SC 147] : 2004 Cr LJ 1405 ."
+"814. Arjuna Das v State of Orissa, 2000 Cr LJ 3601 (Ori)."
+"815. Devisingh v State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 1301 (MP)."
+"816. Anant Nathu Mankar v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 2713 (Bom)."
+"817. Kulamani Sahu v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 2245 (Ori). Sangeeta Kumari v State of"
+"Jharkhand, 2003 Cr LJ 1734 (Jha); Vishwambhar Narayan Jadhav v Mallappa Sangramappa"
+"Mallipatil, AIR 2009 SC 854 [LNIND 2008 SC 2349] : (2007) 15 SCC 600. See section 326A and"
+section 326B.
+"818. AC Gangadhar v State of Karnataka, AIR 1998 SC 2381 [LNIND 1998 SC 506] : 1998 Cr LJ"
+3602 the sentence of imprisonment for one year was not excessive in view of the injury caused.
+"Melampati v GM Prasad, 2000 Cr LJ 3449 : AIR 2000 SC 2195 [LNIND 2000 SC 745] accused"
+"persons caused too many injuries with axe, knife and other sharp weapons, the victim died on"
+"the spot. Some of them acquitted by the High Court. In reference to the remaining two, the"
+Supreme Court found failure of prosecution to prove anything against them.
+"819. Mathai v State of Kerala, 2005 Cr LJ 898 : AIR 2005 SC 710 [LNIND 2005 SC 37] : (2005) 3"
+"SCC 260 [LNIND 2005 SC 37] , no hard and fast rule can be applied for assessing proper"
+sentence. Also a long passage of time cannot always be determinative factor. Major portion of
+"the sentence awarded was already suffered, it was reduced to the period undergone."
+"820. Mohd Ibrahim v State of AP, 1993 Cr LJ 2489 (AP)."
+"821. Ganesh Datt v State of Uttarakhand, 2014 Cr LJ 3128 : AIR 2014 SC 2521 [LNIND 2014 SC"
+186] .
+"822. State of Bihar v Ram Nath Pd, 1998 Cr LJ 679 : AIR 1998 SC 466 [LNIND 1997 SC 1581] ."
+"823. Heeralal Ramlal Parmar v State, 1998 Cr LJ 574 (Bom). The court said that ends of justice"
+would be served if the jail sentence was reduced to the period already undergone and accused
+"persons directed to pay fine of Rs. 15,000 each."
+"824. State of Haryana v Mange Ram, AIR 2002 SC 558 : 2003 Cr LJ 830 ."
+"825. Central Bureau of Investigation v Kishore Singh, (2011) 6 SCC 369 [LNIND 2010 SC 1033] :"
+(2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 970 : AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 584.
+"826. Mangal Singh v Kishan Singh, AIR 2009 SC 1535 [LNIND 2008 SC 2280] : (2009) 17 SCC"
+303 [LNIND 2008 SC 2280] .
+"827. Pooran Singh Seera Alias Pooran Meena v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 2100 (Raj); Neelam"
+"Bahal v State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2010 SC 428 [LNIND 2009 SC 2056] : (2010) 2 SCC 229 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 2056] .
+"828. State of MP v Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26 [LNIND 2009 SC 215] : AIR 2009 SC 1642 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 215] .
+"829. Mangal Singh v Kishan Singh, AIR 2009 SC 1535 [LNIND 2008 SC 2280] : (2009) 17 SCC"
+303 [LNIND 2008 SC 2280] .
+"830. Dhandapani v Dhandapani, 1995 Cr LJ 3099 (Mad), relying on State of UP v Manbodhan Lal,"
+"AIR 1957 SC 912 [LNIND 1957 SC 93] : 1958 SCJ 150 [LNIND 1957 SC 93] and Re Rayar, 1982"
+"Mad LW (Cr) 47 : 1982 Cr LJ (NOC) 122 . Mangal Singh v Kishan Singh, AIR 2009 SC 1535 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 2280] : (2009) 17 SCC 303 [LNIND 2008 SC 2280] .
+"831. Vishwambhar Narayan Jadhav v Mallappa Sangramappa Mallipatil, AIR 2009 SC 854 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 2349] : (2007) 15 SCC 600 [LNIND 2008 SC 2349] .
+"832. Jagat Pal Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 3622 ; Santokh Singh v State of Rajasthan,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 1410 (Raj), the accused inflicted solitary sword blow on the head of the victim,"
+"convicted under section 326, the incident took place 16 years ago, the accused had remained in"
+"jail for two months, sentence of three years RI reduced to one year RI. Bhanwar Lal v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 1472 (Raj), another case in which sentence of two years RI was reduced"
+"to one year RI. Syed Shafiq Ahmed v State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cr LJ 1403 (Bom) conviction for"
+throwing acid on his estranged wife and her relatives and disfiguring them. Hari Ram v State of
+"Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 1027 (Raj), the accused caused grievous hurt with a sharp weapon on the"
+neck of the victim. Other accused persons were released on probation. He had remained in jail
+for two months and 18 days. Sentence reduced to the period already undergone. Sat Narain v
+"State, 2000 Cr LJ 1018 (Del), the accused had undergone some part of the sentence. He had"
+faced the trauma of criminal proceedings for 23 years. His sentence was reduced to the period
+"already undergone. State of Maharashtra v Harishchandra Tukaram, 1997 Cr LJ 612 (Bom), each"
+of the four accused persons were in jail for a period of 10 months. Instead of sending them to
+"jail, the court directed them to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000 to be paid to the victim by way of"
+"compensation. State of Maharashtra v Hindurao Daulu, 1997 Cr LJ 1649 (Bom), accused was of"
+27 years. He could not be said to be a young person for showing any leniency. State of Gujarat v
+"Sivapan Day, 1997 Cr LJ 2032 (Gau), the accused was a young man, 17 years had elapsed since"
+the offence. He got married and had two kids. Taking into view the manner of killing and making
+"a woman husbandless, the accused was sentenced to 3½ years RI and a fine of Rs. 1,000."
+"Tamilselvan v Union Territory of Pondicherry, 1997 Cr LJ 2094 (Mad), the complainant, a"
+"personnel officer, had initiated disciplinary proceedings against the accused, who attacked him"
+and caused grevious hurt. This was viewed as a heinous crime. Punishment of fine was
+imposed.
+"833. R v Williams, (2000) 2 Cr App R (S) 380 [CA (Crim Div)]. R v Hennessey, (2000) 2 Cr App R"
+"(S) 480 [CA (Crim Div)], attack on wife, following arguments, causing 16 wounds, including two"
+"stab wounds, six years' imprisonment. R v Hyles, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S) 26 [CA (Crim Div)], the"
+accused came to his woman friend. He believed that she had with the help of two men sold his
+car. He asked for the price. He came back after some time with a kettle of hot water and poured
+"it on her injuring her, five years' imprisonment. R v Bishop, (2000) 2 Cr App R (S) 416 [CA (Crim"
+"Div)], causing severe injuries to a woman in a club by thrusting a beer bottle against her face;"
+"four years' imprisonment. R v Jones, (2001) 1 Cr App R (3) 116 [CA (Crm Div)], attack on police"
+man by chasing him with a vehicle. The fact that the victims were police officers increased the
+"gravity of the offence, sentence of five years' imprisonment."
+"834. Suresh Babu v State of AP, (1987) 2 JT 361 ."
+"835. Surendra Nath Mohanty v State of Orissa, AIR 1999 SC 2181 [LNIND 1999 SC 482] ."
+"836. Ramlal v State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1999 SC 895 [LNIND 1999 SC 60] ."
+837. Supra.
+"838. Jalaluddin v State of UP, 2001 AIR SCW 2266."
+"839. Bankat v State, AIR 2005 SC 368 [LNIND 2004 SC 1183] ."
+"840. Ramgopal v State of MP, 2010 (7) Scale 711 [LNIND 2010 SC 690] ."
+"841. Gian Singh v State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 [LNIND 2010 SC 1128] : 2012 (9) Scale"
+257 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 326A] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc."
+"Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity to, or burns or maims or"
+"disfigures or disables, any part or parts of the body of a person or causes grievous"
+"hurt by throwing acid on or by administering acid to that person, or by using any other"
+means with the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause
+"such injury or hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for
+"life, and with fine:"
+Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses of
+the treatment of the victim:
+Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the
+victim.]842.
+COMMENTS
+The section is introduced on the basis of the recommendations of Justice JS Verma
+Committee.843.
+[s 326A.1] Gravity of injury not necessary.—
+"Merely because the title to section 326A speaks about grievous hurt by use of acid, it is"
+not a requirement under the section that the injuries caused should be invariably
+"grievous. Even if the injuries are simple, the mere act of throwing or attempt would"
+attract the offence under sections 326A and 326B.844.
+[s 326A.2] Fine mandatory and reasonable.—
+The fine is mandatory and the quantum should be just and reasonable in the sense that
+it should be sufficient to meet the medical expenses for the treatment of the victim.
+"Therefore, the second proviso under section 326A requires that the fine imposed"
+should be paid to the litigant.845.
+"842. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 5 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"843. Report of Justice JS Verma Committee – in Paras 4 to 9 of Chapter 5, at pp 146 to 148,"
+"wherein references were also made to the decision of Sachin Jana v State of WB, (2008) 3 SCC"
+390 [LNIND 2008 SC 167] : 2008 (2) Scale 2 [LNIND 2008 SC 167] : 2008 Cr LJ 1596 and the
+"226th Report of Law Commission of India, July 2008 at Para 3."
+"844. Maqbool v State of UP, AIR 2018 SC 5101 ."
+"845. Maqbool v State of UP, AIR 2018 SC 5101 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[[s 326B] Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid.
+Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or attempts to administer
+"acid to any person, or attempts to use any other means, with the intention of causing"
+permanent or partial damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or
+"disability or grievous hurt to that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation I.—For the purposes of section 326A and this section, ""acid"" includes any"
+"substance which has acidic or corrosive character or burning nature, that is capable"
+of causing bodily injury leading to scars or disfigurement or temporary or permanent
+disability.
+"Explanation 2.—For the purposes of section 326A and this section, permanent or"
+partial damage or deformity shall not be required to be irreversible.]846.
+COMMENTS.—
+"While section 326-A focuses more on the grievous hurt resulting from the use of acid,"
+in section 326-B the legislative focus is more on the act of throwing or attempting to
+throw acid with the intention of causing grievous hurt of the nature.
+[s 326B.1] Guidelines.—
+"The Supreme Court in Laxmi v UOI,847. directed the state to consider (i) Enactment of"
+appropriate provision for effective regulation of sale of acid in the States/Union
+"Territories. (ii) Measures for the proper treatment, after care and rehabilitation of the"
+victims of acid attack and needs of acid attack victims. (iii) Compensation payable to
+acid victims by the State/or creation of some separate fund for payment of
+compensation to the acid attack victims. In a subsequent order in the same case the
+Supreme Court issued many directions to curb the menace of acid attacks. [See the
+Box with 'Supreme Court Guidelines to prevent Acid Attacks'.]
+Supreme Court Guidelines to prevent Acid Attacks
+"7.(i) Over the counter, sale of acid is completely prohibited unless the seller maintains a"
+log/register recording the sale of acid which will contain the details of the person(s) to
+whom acid(s) is/are sold and the quantity sold. The log/register shall contain the
+address of the person to whom it is sold.
+(ii) All sellers shall sell acid only after the buyer has shown:
+(a) a photo ID issued by the Government which also has the address of the person.
+(b) specifies the reason/purpose for procuring acid.
+(iii) All stocks of acid must be declared by the seller with the concerned Sub-Divisional
+Magistrate (SDM) within 15 days.
+(iv) No acid shall be sold to any person who is below 18 years of age.
+"(v) In case of undeclared stock of acid, it will be open to the concerned SDM to"
+"confiscate the stock and suitably impose fine on such seller up to 50,000/-"
+"(vi) The concerned SDM may impose fine up to 50,000/- on any person who commits"
+breach of any of the above directions.
+"8. The educational institutions, research laboratories, hospitals, Government"
+"Departments and the departments of Public Sector Undertakings, who are required to"
+"keep and store acid, shall follow the following guidelines:"
+(i) A register of usage of acid shall be maintained and the same shall be filed with the
+concerned SDM.
+(ii) A person shall be made accountable for possession and safe keeping of acid in
+their premises.
+(iii) The acid shall be stored under the supervision of this person and there shall be
+compulsory checking of the students/personnel leaving the laboratories/place of
+storage where acid is used.
+[Laxmi v UOI.848.]
+"846. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 5 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"847. Laxmi v UOI, 2013 (9) Scale 291 ."
+"848. Laxmi v UOI, 2013 (9) Scale 291 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 327] Voluntarily causing hurt to extort property, or to constrain to an illegal"
+act.
+"Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer, or"
+"from any person interested in the sufferer, any property or valuable security, or of"
+constraining the sufferer or any person interested in such sufferer to do anything
+"which is illegal or which may facilitate the commission of an offence, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"This is an aggravated form of the offence of hurt and is severely punishable, because"
+the object of causing it is to extort property from the sufferer. Where one of the five
+persons accused of murder was armed with a sharp-edged weapon but inflicted only
+"one injury by the blunt side of his weapon, he could only be said to have shared the"
+common intention of causing simple injury and was liable under section 327 and not
+under section 300.849.
+"849. Dhin Singh v State of Punjab, 1995 Cr LJ 4167 : AIR 1995 SC 2451 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 328] Causing hurt by means of poison, etc., with intent to commit an"
+offence.
+Whoever administers to or causes to be taken by any person any poison or any
+"stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug, or other thing with intent to cause hurt"
+"to such person, or with intent to commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence"
+"or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause hurt, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section is complete even if no hurt is caused to the person to
+"whom the poison or any other stupefying, intoxicating, or unwholesome drug is"
+administered. This section is merely an extension of the provisions of section 324.
+Under section 324 actual causing of hurt is essential: under this section mere
+administration of poison is sufficient to bring the offender to justice. In order to prove
+an offence under section 328 the prosecution is required to prove that the substance in
+"question was a poison, or any stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug, etc., and"
+that the accused administered the substance to the complainant or caused the
+complainant to take such substance and further that he did so with intent to cause hurt
+"or knowing it to be likely that he would thereby cause hurt, or with the intention to"
+"commit or facilitate the commission of an offence. It is, therefore, essential for the"
+prosecution to prove that the accused was directly responsible for administering
+"poison, etc., or causing it to be taken by any person, through another. In other words,"
+the accused may accomplish the act by himself or by means of another. In either
+"situation direct, reliable and cogent evidence is necessary.850."
+[s 328.1] Section 328 and section 376.—
+Accused offered the complainant/prosecutrix a cold drink (Pepsi) allegedly containing
+a poisonous/intoxicating substance. According to the complainant/prosecutrix she felt
+"inebriated after taking the cold drink. In her aforesaid state, the appellant-accused"
+started misbehaving with her. There were no scientific materials to prove the
+allegations and hence the proceedings were held liable to be quashed.851.
+[s 328.2] Causing unwholesome thing to be taken.—
+"Where the accused mixed milk-bush juice in his toddy pots, knowing that if drunk by a"
+"person it would cause injury, with the intention of detecting an unknown thief who was"
+"always in the habit of stealing his toddy, and the toddy was drunk by some soldiers who"
+"purchased it from an unknown vendor, it was held that he was guilty under this"
+section.852.
+[s 328.3] Hooch tragedies.—
+Prosecution case is that 70 persons died after having consumed liquor from the shops
+"and sub-shops which were catered by the firm named ""Bee Vee Liquors"" and 24 lost"
+"eyesights permanently, not to speak of many others who became prey of lesser"
+injuries. It was the liquor supplied by the firm to the shops and sub-shops which was
+"consumed; and so, it has to be held that the consumers were made to take the liquor"
+"supplied by the firm. On facts, the requirements of section 328 being present, the"
+conviction under section 328 was held rightful.853.
+"[s 328.4] Charge under section 304, Conviction under section 328.—"
+The charge under section 304 framed against the appellant was with definite allegation
+of culpable homicide not amounting to murder by reason of administration of drug
+without taking precaution for reaction there from. This is totally different from causing
+hurt by means of administration of unwholesome drug. On no count a definite charge
+"of culpable homicide can be an error for causing hurt. Going by section 214 Cr PC,"
+1973 in every charge words used in describing an offence shall be deemed to have
+been used in the sense attached to them by law under which such offence is
+"punishable. Therefore, to construe the section relating to culpable homicide as only an"
+error for causing hurt by unwholesome drug will lead to be misleading so far as the
+accused is concerned resulting in failure of justice so far as his opportunity to defend
+is concerned.854.
+"850. Joseph Kurian v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 4 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] : (1995) 1 Cr LJ 502 :"
+(1994) 6 SCC 535 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] .
+"851. Prashant Baharti v State of NCT Delhi, 2013 (1) Scale 652 [LNIND 2013 SC 78] ."
+"852. Dhania Daji, (1868) 5 BHC (Cr C) 59. Where a person mixed 2.64% methyl in arrack not"
+"knowing that such a small quantity is likely to cause death, having been acquitted under section"
+"304, was also acquitted under this section; Joseph Kurian v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 4"
+[LNIND 1994 SC 927] : (1995) 1 Cr LJ 502 : (1994) 6 SCC 535 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] .
+"853. EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] : (1995) 2 SCC"
+"99 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] ; Ravinder Singh v State of Gujarat, 2013 Cr LJ 1832 (SC) : AIR 2013 SC"
+"1915 [LNIND 2013 SC 151] ; Chandran @ Manichan v State, AIR 2011 SC 1594 [LNIND 2011 SC"
+"358] : (2011) 5 SCC 161 [LNIND 2011 SC 358] ; See Joseph Kurian v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC"
+4 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] : (1995) 1 Cr LJ 502 : (1994) 6 SCC 535 [LNIND 1994 SC 927] in which
+accused are acquitted under section 328 on facts.
+"854. Radha Sasidharan v State of Kerala, 2006 Cr LJ 4702 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 329] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort property, or to constrain to"
+an illegal act.
+Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt for the purpose of extorting from the
+"sufferer or from any person interested in the sufferer, any property or valuable"
+"security, or of constraining the sufferer or any person interested in such sufferer to do"
+"anything that is illegal or which may facilitate the commission of an offence, shall be"
+"punished with 855.[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section is similar to section 327, the only difference being that the hurt caused"
+under it is grievous.856. Where a grievous hurt was caused to obstruct the person from
+"deposing in Court, the Court said that it amounted to forcing him to commit an act"
+which was illegal. Framing of charge under the section was not improper.857. In this
+"provision the words ""for the purposes of extorting"" are most important to meet the"
+argument of learned counsel for appellant. This will include an attempt to extort also.
+"This provision would be attracted even if extortion is not complete. Section 329, IPC,"
+1860 deals with grievous hurt caused for the particular purpose that is extortion or
+other purposes mentioned in the section. The offence of extortion may or may not have
+been completed. Two appellants along with others attacked the complainant with
+"knives. Two appellants with one more, each stabbed the complainant. They were held"
+liable for each other's acts because they acted in concert to extort money.858.
+"855. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"856. Phani Bhusban Das v State of WB, AIR 1995 SC 70 : (1995) 1 Cr LJ 551 , 21-year old"
+"incident, injuries by lathi blows, conviction under this section maintained."
+"857. Ameen v State of MP, 2001 Cr LJ 1947 (MP)."
+"858. Virendra Kumar v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 2170 (MP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 330] Voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession, or to compel restoration"
+of property.
+Whoever voluntarily causes hurt for the purpose of extorting from the sufferer or from
+"any person interested in the sufferer, any confession or any information which may"
+"lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or for the purpose of constraining"
+the sufferer or any person interested in the sufferer to restore or to cause the
+"restoration of any property or valuable security or to satisfy any claim or demand, or"
+to give information which may lead to the restoration of any property or valuable
+"security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, a police-officer, tortures Z in order to induce Z to confess that he committed a"
+crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section.
+"(b) A, a police-officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen"
+property is deposited.
+A is guilty of an offence under this section.
+"(c) A, a revenue officer, tortures Z in order to compel him to pay certain arrears of"
+revenue due from Z.
+A is guilty of an offence under this section.
+"(d) A, a zamindar, tortures a raiyat in order to compel him to pay his rent. A is guilty"
+of an offence under this section.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is similar to section 327 which deals with causing of hurt for the purpose
+of extorting property or valuable security. It punishes the inducing of a person by
+"causing hurt to make a statement, or a confession, having reference to an offence or"
+misconduct; and whether that offence or misconduct has been committed is wholly
+immaterial.859. An offence under this section is made out if it is proved that the
+accused caused hurt to extort confession or any information. If the victim dies later it
+is not necessary to prove that death was a result of the hurt caused.860. The offence is
+complete as soon as the hurt is caused to extort confession or any information.
+[s 330.1] Custodial Torture.—
+"Though sections 330 and 331 of the IPC, 1860 make punishable those persons who"
+cause hurt for the purpose of extorting the confession by making the offence
+"punishable with sentence up to 10 years of imprisonment, but the convictions, as"
+experience shows from track record have been very few compared to the considerable
+increase of such onslaught because the atrocities within the precincts of the police
+station are often left without much traces or any ocular or other direct evidence to
+prove as to who the offenders are. Disturbed by this situation the Law Commission in
+"its 113th Report recommended amendments to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 so as to"
+provide that in the prosecution of a police officer for an alleged offence of having
+"caused bodily injuries to a person while in police custody, if there is evidence that the"
+"injury was caused during the period when the person was in the police custody, the"
+Court may presume that the injury was caused by the police officer having the custody
+of that person during that period unless the police officer proves to the contrary. The
+onus to prove the contrary must be discharged by the police official concerned.
+"Keeping in view the dehumanising aspect of the crime, the flagrant violation of the"
+fundamental rights of the victim of the crime and the growing rise in the crimes of this
+"type, where only a few come to light and others don't, the Government and the"
+legislature must give serious thought to the recommendation of the Law Commission
+and bring about the appropriate changes in the law not only to curb the custodial crime
+but also to see that the custodial crime does not go unpunished. The Courts are also
+"required to have a change in their outlook approach, appreciation and attitude,"
+particularly in cases involving custodial crimes and they should exhibit more sensitivity
+"and adopt a realistic rather than a narrow technical approach, while dealing with the"
+"cases of custodial crime so that as far as possible within their powers, the truth is"
+found and guilty should not escape so that the victim of the crime has the satisfaction
+that ultimately the majesty of law has prevailed.861.
+Where daughter of accused and son of complainant married each other. Complainant
+and his family members were brutally tortured by police officials it was held that order
+framing charge against petitioner was proper.862.
+"Where the accused, the investigating officer and his assistant, entertained suspicion"
+about two persons in a case of theft and subjected the suspects to ill-treatment to
+"extort confession or information leading to detection of stolen properties, the accused"
+were held guilty of offence under section 330.863.
+"[s 330.2] Conviction under sections 302, 330 and 34 based on an unsigned"
+dying declaration.—Death caused by police officers to extract confession based on
+dying declaration. Guidelines issued by the Delhi High Court that the declaration should
+carry the signature of the declarant not observed. Held that the issuance of the
+guidelines is for ensuring and for testing the genuineness of the dying declaration of
+"person, who is in the last moment of his life. Merely because there was a defect in"
+"following the said guideline, which, as is now pointed out, is of a trivial nature and if the"
+"dying declaration recorded is otherwise proved by ample evidence, both oral as well as"
+"documentary, on the ground of such trivial defects, the whole of the dying declaration"
+cannot be thrown out by the reason of such trivial defects.864.
+[s 330.3] As to the mind of the declarant.—
+"It is true that when a person is on his or her deathbed, there is no reason to state a"
+falsehood but it is equally true that it is not possible to delve into the mind of a person
+who is facing death.865.
+[s 330.4] Abetment.—
+Where the accused stood by and acquiesced in an assault on a prisoner committed by
+"another policeman for the purpose of extorting a confession, it was held that he"
+abetted the offence under this section.866.
+"859. Nim Chand Mookerjee, (1873) 20 WR (Cr) 41."
+"860. State of HP v Ranjit Singh, 1979 Cr LJ (NOC) 210 (HP)."
+"861. Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v Vasant Raghunath Dhoble, AIR 2003 SC 4567 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+"653] : 2003 Cr LJ 4548 ; State of MP v Shyamsunder Trivedi, (1995) 4 SCC 262 [LNIND 1995 SC"
+644] : (1995) 1 SCC (Cr) 715.
+"862. Ajay Kumar Singh v State (Nct of Delhi), 2007 Cr LJ 3545 (Del). Sham Kant v State, AIR 1992"
+SC 1879 : 1992 Cr LJ 3243 (SC).
+"863. Sham Kant v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1992 SC 1879 : 1992 Cr LJ 3243 . Ashok K John v"
+"State of UP, AIR 1997 SC 610 [LNIND 1996 SC 2177] : 1997 Cr LJ 743 , an arrestee was tortured."
+This was an infringement of fundamental rights of a citizen. He was held to be entitled to
+receive compensation from the State the amount of which would vary according to the proved
+facts of each case. Punishment under section 330 was not an adequate remedy. Jaffar Khan v
+"State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 1571 (Raj), offence not proved. Indu Jain v State of MP, (2008) 15"
+"SCC 341 [LNINDORD 2008 SC 299] : AIR 2009 SC 976 [LNIND 2008 SC 2115] : 2009 Cr LJ 951 ,"
+"the case of custodial death, framing of charge under the section was dropped by the trial court"
+and High Court but the Supreme Court allowed it.
+"864. Narender Kumar v State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2016 SC 150 [LNIND 2015 SC 711] : 2015 (13)"
+Scale 821 [LNIND 2015 SC 711] .
+"865. Jumni v State of Haryana, 2014 Cr LJ 1936 : 2014 (4) SCJ 36 [LNIND 2014 SC 222] ."
+"866. Latifkhan v State, (1895) 20 Bom 394; Dinanath, (1940) Nag 232."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+"[s 331] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort confession, or to compel"
+restoration of property.
+Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt for the purpose of extorting from the
+"sufferer or from any person interested in the sufferer, any confession or any"
+"information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or for the"
+purpose of constraining the sufferer or any person interested in the sufferer to restore
+"or to cause the restoration of any property or valuable security, or to satisfy any claim"
+or demand or to give information which may lead to the restoration of any property or
+"valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is similar to the preceding section except that the hurt caused under it
+"should be 'grievous'. Sections 330 and 331 of the IPC, 1860 provide punishment to one"
+who voluntarily causes hurt or grievous hurt as the case may be to extort the
+confession or any information which may lead to the detection of an offence or
+"misconduct, thus, the Constitution as well as the statutory procedural law and law of"
+Evidence condemn the conduct of any official in extorting a confession or information
+under compulsion by using any third degree methods.867. The diabolic recurrence of
+police torture resulting in a terrible scare in the minds of common citizens that their
+lives and liberty are under a new and unwarranted peril because guardians of law
+destroy the human rights by custodial violence and torture and invariably resulting in
+death. The vulnerability of human rights assumes a significance when functionaries of
+the State whose paramount duty is to protect the citizens and not to commit gruesome
+"offences against them, in reality, such functionaries perpetrate them.868."
+"867. Kartar Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 Cr LJ 3139 ."
+"868. Dalbir Singh v State of UP, AIR 2009 SC 1674 [LNIND 2009 SC 220] : (2009) 11 SCC 376"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 220] . The anguish expressed in Gauri Shanker Sharma v State of UP, AIR 1990"
+"SC 709 [LNIND 1990 SC 8] ; Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab, 1992 (3) SCC 249 [LNIND 1992 SC"
+"396] ; Smt. Nilabati Behera @ Lalita Behera v State of Orissa, AIR 1993 SC 1960 [LNIND 1993 SC"
+"1167] ; Pratul Kumar Sinha v State of Bihar, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 100 ; Kewal Pati v State of UP,"
+"1995 (3) SCC 600 ; Inder Singh v State of Punjab, 1995 (3) SCC 702 [LNIND 1995 SC 1381] ; State"
+"of MP v Shyamsunder Trivedi, 1995 (4) SCC 262 [LNIND 1995 SC 644] and by now celebrated"
+"decision in Shri DK Basu v State of WB, JT 1997 (1) SC 1 [LNIND 1996 SC 2177] seems to have"
+caused not even softening of police's attitude towards the inhuman approach in dealing with
+persons in custody.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 332] Voluntarily causing hurt to deter public servant from his duty.
+Whoever voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge
+"of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any"
+"other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in"
+consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the lawful
+"discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+This section resembles section 353. Under it there is causing of hurt to the public
+"servant, under section 353 there is assault or criminal force for the same purpose."
+"Ingredients of an offence under section 332 of IPC, 1860 are:"
+(1) hurt must have been caused to a public servant and
+(2) it must have been caused—
+"(a) while such public servant was acting in the discharge of his duty as such,"
+or
+(b) in order to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as a public
+servant or
+(c) in consequence of his having done or attempted to do anything in the
+lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant.
+"Evidence necessary to establish an offence under section 332 of IPC, 1860 are:"
+"(a) the accused voluntarily caused bodily pain, disease or infirmity to the victim (as"
+"provided under section 321 of IPC, 1860),"
+"(b) the victim of the hurt is a public servant, and"
+"(c) at the time of causing of hurt, the public servant concerned was discharging his"
+"duties qua public servant. An offence under section 332 of IPC, 1860 is attracted"
+if the accused voluntarily caused hurt to any person being a public servant in the
+discharge of his duty. It is not necessary to establish further that hurt was
+voluntarily caused to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as a
+"public servant. On the other hand, if hurt was voluntarily caused to a public"
+"servant, while not discharging his duty as a public servant, it is necessary to"
+prove that hurt was caused with intent to prevent or deter that person or any
+"other public servant from discharging his duty. Alternatively, if hurt was"
+"voluntarily caused to a public servant, while he was discharging his official duty"
+"as such public servant, it is not necessary to establish further that it was so"
+caused with the intention to prevent or deter that person from discharging his
+"duty as such public servant. On the other hand, even if hurt was caused"
+"voluntarily to a public servant, if he was not discharging his duty as a public"
+"servant at that time, it is necessary to prove additionally that hurt was caused to"
+prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as a public servant.869.
+"Where a public servant was assaulted due to an earlier private quarrel, the assault"
+"having no causal connection with the duty of the public servant, the accused could not"
+"be held liable under section 332 IPC, 1860. His conviction was, therefore, changed to"
+"one under section 323 IPC, 1860.870."
+Accused/appellant cut the hose pipe from the train and assaulted the complainant/
+"constable when he questioned the act. According to them, the accused/appellant and"
+other accused persons had gone to the extent of pulling down the complainant from
+"the train and when he was taken to the guardroom, they were shouting at him"
+threatening to throw him on the railway track. Offence was clearly made out.871.
+"Where the accused persons entered the premises of a government school and abused,"
+humiliated and voluntarily caused hurt to deter the Head Master of the school from his
+"duty and they abused the other teachers also, the Court did not interfere with their"
+conviction under section 332.872.
+[s 332.1] Sentence.—
+"Accused, an under trial prisoner gave beatings to jail warden with a wooden plank on"
+head. He was a habitual offender and also involved in other cases. Injuries caused to
+victim were grievous in nature. He also attacked other warden with sole object of
+fleeing from prison. Trial Court exercised its judicial discretion to award maximum
+punishment taking into consideration all relevant factors. Sentence imposed upon
+appellant was held proper by the High Court.873.
+"869. Rajan v State, 2011 (4) Ker LJ 157 ."
+"870. D Chattaiah, 1978 Cr LJ 1473 : AIR 1978 SC 1441 . Jhamman v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 2970"
+", refusal to give sample to a food Inspector."
+"871. Gyan Bahadur v State of MP, 2013 Cr LJ 1729 (MP)."
+"872. Madhudas v State of Rajasthan, 1994 Cr LJ 3595 (Raj)."
+"873. Rakesh Rai v State of Sikkim, 2012 Cr LJ 4033 (SIK)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 333] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to deter public servant from his duty.
+Whoever voluntarily causes grievous hurt to any person being a public servant in the
+"discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that"
+"person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant,"
+or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the
+"lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides for the aggravated form of the offence dealt with in the last
+section. The hurt caused under it must be grievous. Where the accused gave fist blow
+"on the face of the victim which caused loosening of one tooth, but the victim was"
+"discharged from the hospital on the same day, moved about throughout the day and"
+"attended his duties the next day, it was held that the injury could not be regarded as"
+grave and serious. It was a case of simple hurt.874. The basic differences between
+"sections 333 and 325 IPC, 1860 are that section 325 gets attracted where grievous hurt"
+"is caused, whereas section 333 gets attracted if such hurt is caused to a public"
+servant.875.
+Complainant had sustained grievous hurt while he was on patrolling duty. He was
+questioning the unauthorised parking of a pickup van. He was taken inside the van then
+kicked and punched. Witnesses corroborated each other on material particulars.
+Conviction was upheld.876. Where a police constable was assaulted by unknown
+"persons and no identification parade was conducted, it was held that accused cannot"
+be convicted unless it is proved that the injury was inflicted by the accused.877.
+The accused was working as a watchman in an office of FCI and misbehaved twice
+with members of the staff in respect of which complaints were made to the District
+Manager who procured suspension order of the accused from the higher official and
+served it on him. The accused attacked and beat the Manager. It was held that it
+"amounted to preventing and deterring a public servant, from acting in lawful discharge"
+of his duty and the accused was liable to be convicted under section 333.878.
+[s 333.1] Irrationality in sentence.—
+It is to be noted that there is terrible irrationality in the sentence prescribed for
+"committing offences under section 333, IPC, 1860. The said offence is in combination"
+of offence — defined under section 320 and the offence of assault on a public servant
+"punishable under section 333, IPC, 1860. The offence of grievous hurt is punishable"
+"under section 326, IPC, 1860 with life imprisonment or with the imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term, which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine."
+Whereas a higher form of manifested offence under section 333 is made punishable
+only with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years
+and shall also be liable to fine. The different types of injuries enumerated under section
+"320 do not ensue same amount of harm, pain and disability. Therefore, proportionate to"
+"the nature of grievous injuries and its consequences, the punishment should be"
+redefined. So also the punishment for an offence under section 333 should be
+redefined.879.
+"874. VB Murthy v State of WB, 1995 Cr LJ 1819 (Cal). The accused was required to pay a fine of"
+Rs. 2000 and released on probation. He was an unemployed young graduate with no criminal
+"record or leaning. Siyasaran v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ 2126 (SC), here a fist blow was given to a"
+"surgeon in a Government hospital, benefit of probation was not given because violence against"
+hospital doctors was not tolerable. The sentence was reduced to the period already undergone
+"and a fine of Rs. 50,000 was imposed in lieu of compensation. State of MP v Saleem, 2005 Cr LJ"
+"3435 : AIR 2005 SC 3996 [LNIND 2005 SC 1070] : (2005) 5 SCC 554 [LNIND 2005 SC 1070] ,"
+knife injury to deter a public servant.
+"875. State of MP v Imrat, AIR 2008 SC 2967 [LNIND 2008 SC 1391] : (2008) 11 SCC 523 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 1391] .
+"876. Chand Ram v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 1415 (HP)."
+"877. State v Tidda alias Sonu, 2008 (4) Crimes 623 (MP). See also State v Mohammed Sadiq,"
+2006 Cr LJ 3391 (Kar).
+"878. Lam Jaya Rao v State of AP, 1992 Cr LJ 2127 (AP)."
+"879. State of Karnataka v Mohammed Sadiq, 2006 Cr LJ 3391 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 334] Voluntarily causing hurt on provocation.
+"Whoever voluntarily causes hurt on grave and sudden provocation, if he neither"
+intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause hurt to any person other than the
+"person who gave the provocation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend"
+"to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section serves as a proviso to sections 323 and 324. See Comment on Exception
+1 to section 300.880.
+[s 334.1] Sentence.—
+"High Court imposed a sentence of one year for offence under section 334 IPC, 1860"
+"whereas the maximum sentence for offence under section 334 IPC, 1860 is one month."
+The sentence reduced to one month.881.
+"880. See also Bosco Lawrence Fernandes v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2007 (Bom),"
+covered under section 34.
+"881. Ahmed Ali v State of Tripura, (2009) 6 SCC 704 [LNIND 2009 SC 1043] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+12.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 335] Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on provocation.
+"Whoever 882.[voluntarily] causes grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation, if he"
+neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt to any person
+"other than the person who gave the provocation, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to four years, or with fine which may"
+"extend to two thousand rupees, or with both."
+"Explanation.—The last two sections are subject to the same provisos as Exception 1,"
+section 300.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section serves as a proviso to sections 325 and 326. However, in the absence of"
+"the exact words being recorded, the abuses even involving mother and sister which are"
+"commonly indulged in by rustic villagers like the accused, could not be regarded as"
+grave and sudden within the meaning of this section.883. Unless there is sudden and
+"grave provocation, section 335 will not be attracted.884."
+"882. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882, section 8."
+"883. State of Maharashtra v BR Patil, 1978 Cr LJ 411 (Bom). Arjunan v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"2327 (Mad), in a dispute over cutting of tree, the accused pelted stones and caused injuries to"
+the victim who died and witnesses were injured. The deceased had caused the provocation.
+"Accused was liable to be convicted under section 335 and not section 325. State of MP v Rajesh,"
+"1997 Cr LJ 2466 (MP), objection of accused to construction of a urinal which caused ugly sight"
+"to the accused. This caused provocation. For injuries caused under such provocation, the"
+accused was held to be entitled to the benefit of section 335. Another accused who was not
+"provoked was convicted under section 324. Ahmed Ali v State of Tripura, (2009) 6 SCC 704"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 1043] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr) 12, the maximum term under the section being four"
+"years, the accused was sentenced to two years with a fine of Rs. 1,000. He being a person of"
+"tender years, the period was reduced to three months maintaining the fine amount."
+"884. CBI v Kishore Singh, (2011) 6 SCC 369 [LNIND 2010 SC 1033] : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 970 : AIR"
+"2011 SC (Supp) 584; Upparapalli Tirumala Rao v State of AP, 2004 Cr LJ 4514 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 336] Act endangering life or personal safety of others.
+Whoever does any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the
+"personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to two"
+"hundred and fifty rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"Rash and negligent acts which endanger human life, or the personal safety of others,"
+"are punishable under this section even though no harm follows, and are additionally"
+"punishable under sections 337 and 338 if they cause hurt, or grievous hurt. The word"
+"""rashly"" means something more than mere inadvertence or inattentiveness or want of"
+ordinary care; it implies an indifference to obvious consequences and to the rights of
+others.885. An intentional act done with consideration cannot be a rash and negligent
+act.886.
+Many specific acts of rashness or negligence likely to endanger life or to cause hurt or
+injury are made punishable by Chapter XIV.
+"Section 279 punishes rash driving or riding; section 280, rash navigation of a vessel;"
+"section 284, rash or negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance; section"
+"285, rash or negligent conduct with respect to any fire or combustible matter; section"
+"286, rash or negligent conduct with respect to any explosive substance; section 287,"
+negligent conduct with respect to any machinery in the possession of the accused;
+"section 288, negligence with respect to pulling down or repairing buildings; section 289,"
+"negligence with respect to animals; section 304A, rash or negligent act causing death;"
+"section 336, any rash or negligent act endangering life or personal safety of others;"
+"section 337, rash or negligent act causing hurt; and section 338, rash or negligent act"
+"causing grievous hurt. Like section 304A, sections 279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC, 1860 are"
+"attracted for only the negligent or rash act. The scheme of sections 279, 304A, 336,"
+337 and 338 leaves no manner of doubt that these offences are punished because of
+the inherent danger of the acts specified therein irrespective of knowledge or intention
+to produce the result and irrespective of the result. These sections make punishable
+the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to human life.
+"885. Remal Dass, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 718 ."
+"886. Kala Bhika, (1964) 67 Bom LR 223 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 337] Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others.
+Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to
+"endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with"
+"fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Section 304A deals with those cases where death is caused by a rash or negligent act;
+"this section, where hurt is caused. The essential ingredients of section 337, IPC, 1860"
+are that whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as
+"to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished. So, one of"
+the essential ingredients of this section must be that hurt must be caused to someone
+in doing an act and the person bearing to take reasonable care is said to be negligent
+of his act.887. This section applies only to acts done rashly or negligently but without
+any criminal intent. But such negligence or rashness must be proved as would
+necessarily carry with it criminal liability.888. Where the victim suffered only simple
+"injuries, section 337 is to be applied.889."
+[s 337.1] CASES.—
+"The allegation was that the accused, car driver, drove car in a rash and negligent"
+manner and caused injury to a child who was playing on side of road. Evidence showed
+that the vehicle was going in middle of road and child was also playing in the middle.
+Brake skid marks on road were duly depicted in site plan. Rash or negligent act of
+driving by respondent was not proved beyond doubt. Acquittal of accused was held
+proper.890. Injured was occupant of the truck along with the petitioner and had received
+the injuries on account of the incident/accident where the truck after hitting the Motor
+"Cycle, had gone and struck against the pole. No allegation of any intention or"
+knowledge on the part of the petitioner can be made to attract the offence under
+"section 325, IPC, 1860."
+[s 337.2] Section 324 vis-a-vis section 337.—
+"Essential ingredients to make out an offence under section 324 IPC, 1860 should be"
+that there must be voluntarily causing hurt and also required intention. But evidence
+showed that there was no intention of petitioner/ accused to attack victim and his
+"intention was only to attack, witness because of some altercation or dispute between"
+them. Petitioner/accused cannot be said to have committed the offence punishable
+"under section 324 IPC, 1860. At the same time evidence showed that victim received"
+"simple injuries. Petitioner liable to be convicted under section 337 of IPC, 1860 and not"
+under section 324.891.
+[s 337.3] Negligence with reference to gun.—
+The causing of hurt by negligence in the use of a gun was held to fall within the purview
+of this section rather than of section 286. But where all the evidence against the
+accused was that he went out shooting when people were likely to be in fields and that
+"a single pellet from his gun struck a man who was sitting in a field, it was held that this"
+was not sufficient evidence of rashness or negligence to support a conviction under
+this section.892.
+[s 337.4] Negligent operation.—
+The accused removed intra-uterine device during the fourth month of pregnancy of the
+complainant. The latter had a premature delivery. The child died after 22 days of
+delivery. The Court said that the incident was not the direct result of the act of the
+accused. The complaint was quashed.893.
+[s 337.5] Conviction under section 279 and section 337.—
+"Whether a Court can convict a person under sections 279 and 337, IPC, 1860 for"
+commission of the same act of offence and accordingly pass sentence under both the
+"sections. As the offence having been outcome of the same act, the Court should"
+"punish the accused for one offence and at the same time, while passing the order of"
+"sentence, the Court should also consider that when the sentence prescribed under"
+"section 279, IPC, 1860 being higher it is a grave offence than the offence prescribed"
+"under section 337, IPC, 1860 the accused could be punished under section 279, IPC,"
+1860 only.894.
+"[s 337.6] Factories Act, 1948.—"
+"Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 will come into play even if nobody sustains any"
+injury or even if the accident does not result in death of any person. But sections 337
+"and 338, IPC, 1860 will apply where a negligent act results in causing injuries to any"
+person.895.
+[s 337.7] Moral turpitude.—
+"Offence punishable under section 337 IPC, 1860 would not involve moral turpitude so"
+as to remove the petitioner—accused from service.896.
+[s 337.8] Sentence.—
+Where the accused was convicted under section 337 for an incident of accident
+occurring 20 years before and he had already served a part of sentence and had
+"children of tender age, his sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.897."
+[s 337.9] Pleading guilty.—
+Pleading guilty is not a ground for the Magistrate to let off the accused with sentence
+of fine only.898.
+"887. Ashok Chandak v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 638 (AP)."
+"888. Arumugham v Gnanasoundar, AIR 1962 Mad 362 [LNIND 1961 MAD 133] . See also Swaran"
+"Singh v State, 1991 Cr LJ 1867 (Del), conviction shifted from section 338 to section 337 because"
+the injury actually proved was of very simple nature. Annasaheb Bandu Patil v State of
+"Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ 814 , no injury was caused to anybody by bus driver's negligence in"
+"suddenly braking the bus though it dashed against a pole, conviction set aside."
+"889. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 (SC) : (2012) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 15] : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"890. State of HP v Jawahar Lal Jindal, 2011 Cr LJ 3827 (HP); State of HP v Niti Raj alias Gogi,"
+2009 Cr LJ 1922 (HP) order of acquittal reversed; for the same effect see State of HP v Varinder
+"Kumar, 2008 Cr LJ 41759 (HP)."
+"891. Ch Pitchavadhmtiilu v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 469 (AP)."
+"892. Abdus Sattar v State, (1906) 28 All 464 . State of Karnataka v Krishna, (1987) 1 SCC 538"
+[LNIND 1987 SC 701] : AIR 1987 SC 861 [LNIND 1987 SC 701] : 1987 Cr LJ 776 death caused by
+"rash and negligent driving, the Supreme Court enhanced the sentence to six months' RI from"
+"two months simple imprisonment, being unconscionably lenient."
+"893. Shaheed K (Dr) v PK Shahida, 1998 Cr LJ 4638 (Ker)."
+"894. Md Hiran Mia v State of Tripura, 2010 Cr LJ 189 (Gau)]"
+"895. Ashok Chandak v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 638 (AP); Ejaj Ahmad v State of Jharkhand, 2010"
+Cr LJ 1953 (Jha).
+"896. Ch Pitchavadhmtiilu v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 469 (AP)."
+"897. Hari Ram v State, 1995 Cr LJ 3152 (Del). Vasi v State of Gujarat, 2010 (15) SCC 247 [LNIND"
+2010 SC 342] .
+"898. Thomas v State, 2013 Cr LJ 825 (Ker)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of the Causing of Miscarriage, of Injuries to unborn Children, of the"
+"Exposure of Infants, and of the Concealment of Births."
+[s 338] Causing grievous hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of
+others.
+Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently
+"as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"The last section provided for 'hurt', this section provides for 'grievous hurt' caused"
+"under similar circumstances. Section 338, IPC, 1860 is applicable when the other"
+"ingredients of section 337, IPC, 1860 are complied with and in addition to that, if a"
+grievous hurt is caused to someone.899.
+[s 338.1] CASES.—Sexual intercourse causing injury.—
+A husband has not the absolute right to enjoy the person of his wife without regard to
+"the question of safety to her. Hence, where a husband had sexual intercourse with his"
+"wife, aged 11 years, and she died from the injuries thereof, it was held that he was"
+guilty of causing grievous hurt by doing a rash act under this section.900. Clause (6) of
+section 375 will now make the husband guilty of rape also. Where a driver of a motor
+"bus, by reason of his inattention and failure to apply brakes, pressed a person against a"
+"wall, he was held to have committed an offence under this section as well as under"
+section 279.901.
+[s 338.2] Running over by cart.—
+"Where a person, by allowing his cart to proceed unattended along a road, ran over a boy"
+"who was sleeping on the road, it was held that he had committed an offence under"
+section 337 or section 338.902.
+[s 338.3] Section 304 Part II and section 338.—
+"The scheme of sections 279, 304A, 336, 337 and 338 leaves no manner of doubt that"
+these offences are punished because of the inherent danger of the acts specified
+therein irrespective of knowledge or intention to produce the result and irrespective of
+the result. These sections make punishable the acts themselves which are likely to
+cause death or injury to human life. The question is whether indictment of an accused
+"under section 304 Part II and section 338 IPC, 1860 can co-exist in a case of single"
+"rash or negligent act. It can, two charges are not mutually destructive. If the act is done"
+with the knowledge of the dangerous consequences which are likely to follow and if
+death is caused then not only that the punishment is for the act but also for the
+resulting homicide and a case may fall within section 299 or section 300 depending
+"upon the mental state of the accused viz., as to whether the act was done with one"
+kind of knowledge or the other or the intention. Knowledge is awareness on the part of
+the person concerned of the consequences of his act of omission or commission
+indicating his state of mind. There may be knowledge of likely consequences without
+any intention. Criminal culpability is determined by referring to what a person with
+reasonable prudence would have known.903.
+"[s 338.4] Medical negligence, criminal liability.—"
+"The only state of mind which is deserving of punishment is that, which demonstrates"
+"an intention to cause harm to others, or where there is a deliberate willingness to"
+subject others to the risk of harm. Negligent conduct does not entail an intention to
+"cause harm, but only involves a deliberate act subjecting another to the risk of harm,"
+"where the actor is aware of the existence of the risk and, nonetheless, proceeds in the"
+face of the risk.904.
+"[s 338.5] Offences under Factories Act, 1948.—"
+"The ingredients of section 337 and section 338, IPC, 1860 and the provisions of the"
+"Andhra Pradesh Fire Services Act, 1999 and the Factories Act, 1948 cannot be said to"
+be one and the same. They apply to different situations for different purposes and for
+different measures to be taken by the owner or occupier of the factories. Even the
+"steps to be taken under both the enactments are different as discussed above, and"
+"even if no fire accident had taken place, the provisions of Factories Act, 1948 and the"
+"Fire Services Act will apply. But when there is no accident, section 337 and section 338,"
+"IPC, 1860 do not apply. Sections 337 and 338, IPC, 1860 are applicable where the"
+"owner or occupier, knowing very well that no preventive steps were taken and it will be"
+dangerous for the workers to work in such a situation and without any due regard to the
+"consequences which a man would think and for the safety of the workers, extract work"
+from them and wherein from the circumstances it appears that such an act of
+extracting work from workers amount to acting in rash and negligent manner.
+"Therefore, to attract section 337 and section 338, IPC, 1860 something more, i.e.,"
+"careless and negligent act is required to be proved, even after proving of violation of"
+"provisions of Fire Services Act and the Factories Act, 1948. Thus, it is clear that section"
+"337 and section 338, IPC, 1860 are applicable only in aggravated situations besides"
+"violation of the provisions of the Fire Services Act and the Factories Act, 1948.905. The"
+expression act includes omission.906.
+"899. Ashok Chandak v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 638 (AP)."
+"900. Hurree Mohun Mythee, (1890) 18 Cal 49 ."
+"901. State of HP v Man Singh, 1995 Cr LJ 299 (HP). SD Khetani (Dr) v State, 1998 Cr LJ 2493 ."
+"902. Malkaji, (1884) Unrep Cr C 198; See the Comments under sections 279 and 304A."
+"903. Alister Anthony Pareira v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1160 (SC) : (2012) 2 SCC 648"
+[LNIND 2012 SC 15] : AIR 2012 SC 3802 [LNIND 2012 SC 15] .
+"904. Dr PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ 385 : 2013 (11 ) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+815] .
+"905. Ashok Chandak v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 638 (AP)."
+"906. Dr PB Desai v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ 385 : 2013 (11 ) Scale 429 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+815] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 339] Wrongful restraint.
+Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from
+"proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said"
+wrongfully to restrain that person.
+Exception.—The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in
+"good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within"
+the meaning of this section.
+ILLUSTRATION
+A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to pass. A not believing in good faith that
+he has a right to stop the path. Z is thereby prevented from passing. A wrongfully
+restrains Z.
+COMMENT.—
+"Wrongful restraint means the keeping a man out of a place where he wishes to be, and"
+has a right to be.907. The slightest unlawful obstruction to the liberty of the subject to
+"go, when and where he likes to go, provided he does so in a lawful manner, cannot be"
+"justified, and is punishable under this section.908."
+[s 339.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) Voluntary obstruction of a person.
+(2) The obstruction must be such as to prevent that person from proceeding in any
+direction in which he has a right to proceed. The word 'voluntary' is significant. It
+connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must be a
+restriction on the normal movement of a person. It should be a physical one.
+They should have common intention to cause obstruction.909.
+"The following illustrations, given in the original Draft Code,910. further elucidate the"
+meaning of this section:—
+(a) A builds a wall across a path along which Z has a right to pass. Z is thereby
+prevented from passing. A wrongfully restrains Z.
+(b) A illegally omits to take proper order with a furious buffalo which is in his
+possession and thus voluntarily deters Z from passing along a road along which
+Z has a right to pass. A wrongfully restrains Z.
+"(c) A threatens to set a savage dog at Z, if Z goes along a path along which Z has a"
+right to go. Z is thus prevented from going along that path. A wrongfully
+restrains Z.
+"(d) In the last illustration, if the dog is not really savage, but if A voluntarily causes Z"
+"to think that it is savage, and thereby prevents Z from going along the path, A"
+wrongfully restrains Z.
+From these illustrations it will appear that a person may obstruct another by causing it
+"to appear to that other that it is impossible, difficult or dangerous to proceed, as well as"
+"by causing it actually to be impossible, difficult or dangerous for that other to proceed."
+"For the offence of wrongful restraint, the necessary pre-condition is that the person"
+concerned must have a right to proceed.911. It is an inevitable factor under section 339
+"of the IPC, 1860 which defines wrongful restraint that the person, who is obstructed,"
+has the right to proceed in a particular direction. If section 339 and section 31 are read
+"together, it will be clear that if the accused voluntarily obstructs any person so as to"
+prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has right to
+"proceed, he is said to have wrongfully restrained that person. Section 339 of the IPC,"
+1860 requires that the accused should have obstructed a person from proceeding in
+any direction in which he has the right to proceed and when he obstructs any person
+and restrains him from proceeding in any direction he commits the offence of wrongful
+"restraint punishable under section 341 of the IPC, 1860.912. Whoever obstructs a"
+"person from proceeding to a direction to which that person has a right to proceed,"
+commits an offence of wrongful restraint. While dealing with the offence which is
+"punishable under section 341 of IPC, 1860 and which has been defined by section 339"
+"of IPC, 1860 the Court is obliged to see following ingredients:"
+(1) Whether the person so obstructed had a lawful right to proceed to a direction to
+which he has been obstructed;
+(2) Whether such obstruction was for enforcement of a legal right of the obstructer.
+(3) Whether such obstructer obstructed such person in good faith. It has to be kept
+in mind that nothing can be said to be done in good faith which is not done with
+"due care and caution. If these ingredients are indicated by the complaint, the"
+Magistrate is obliged to take the cognizance of the complaint so presented
+before him unless there are the other grounds for acting otherwise which has to
+be justified by reasons recorded in writing.913.
+Where the tenant and his family members were prevented by some other tenants in
+"league with the landlord from using the main gate by force and abuses, the Court"
+observed that it was utterly wrong to have dismissed the complaint as a matter of civil
+nature.914.
+"Obstruction contemplated by this section, though physical, may be caused not only by"
+"physical force but also by menaces and threats, the criterion of the offence thereunder"
+or under section 341 being more the effect than the method.915. The fact of physical
+obstruction even by mere words would fall within the ambit of this section.916.
+[s 339.2] CASES.—Wrongful restraint.—
+"Where the accused, a boy of 15 years, caught hold of a man from the back to enable"
+"the main accused, his brother, to attack, it was held that common intention of murder"
+"could not be inferred. Accordingly, his conviction from under sections 302/34 was"
+converted to one under section 340.917. The driver of a bus purposely made his bus
+"stand across the road in such a manner as to prevent another bus, which was coming"
+"from behind, to proceed further. It was held that the driver of the first bus was guilty of"
+wrongful restraint.918. Where the tenants of a housing society converted an open space
+"within the compound into a garden and cordoned it, this offence was held to have been"
+"committed and though the accused were companies, they could be prosecuted under"
+this section and section 447.919. Their conduct caused obstruction to the free
+movement of other members.
+[s 339.3] No wrongful restraint.—
+Where a person obstructs a private pathway claimed by way of a right of easement
+"over his land and which right was not admitted, he does not commit the offence of"
+wrongful restraint.920. The obstruction under this section has to be to a person and not
+to an empty car.921. Where at the behest of a constable the accused stopped some
+carts in which rice was being carried by some persons in the bona fide belief that the
+"rice was being smuggled out, they could not be held liable under section 341, IPC, 1860"
+"even if suspicion ultimately proved to be incorrect, for they would still get the protection"
+"of section 79, IPC, 1860 that is, mistake of fact.922. Where a tenant was partially"
+"obstructed from entering the premises by the closure of one of the door leaves, it was"
+held that it did not amount to wrongful restraint as he was still free to enter the
+premises.923. The wife of the complainant was working as a teacher in a school. The
+"complainant, a judicial officer, was staying in the quarter allotted to her in the school"
+"compound till he was posted to some other place. Thereafter, he used to visit his family"
+and was permitted to park his car at a particular place but he was prevented from using
+the main gates of the school. He was not restrained from using the passage leading to
+the school premises where his wife was allotted residential quarter. It was held that
+criminal restraint to a 'person' is punishable but not any obstruction for plying/parking
+of a vehicle at a particular place.924. Where the Sarvodaya workers prevented visitors
+"from entering a liquor shop, it cannot be held an offence under section 339 IPC,"
+1860.925.
+"The word ""voluntarily"" connotes direct physical restraint. There should be restriction on"
+"the normal movement of a person. In this case, the accused person had decided on"
+"behalf of a limited company to get a road repaired and the repair, if carried out, might"
+"have caused some inconvenience to the complainant, it was held that there was no"
+offence under sections 339 and 341.926.
+[s 339.4] Matter of civil nature.—
+The right of a co-sharer to enjoy the joint family property is a civil right. Where such
+"right is denied by other co-shares for one reason or another, the Court said that it"
+"should be enforced by taking recourse to remedies available under the civil laws,"
+criminal proceedings cannot be resorted for such purposes.927.
+"907. Note M, p 154."
+"908. Saminada Pillai, (1882) 1 Weir 339."
+"909. Keki Hormusji Gharda v Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475 [LNIND 2009 SC 1276] :"
+AIR 2009 SC 2594 [LNIND 2009 SC 1276] .
+910. P 59.
+"911. Vijay Kumari v SM Rao, AIR 1996 SC 1058 : 1996 Cr LJ 1371 . In the instant case after"
+"termination of the licence, the teacher had lost her right to enter the room of the hostel."
+"912. Bharat Kishormal Shah v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 4088 (Bom)."
+"913. Noor Mohamed Alias Mohd v Nadirshah Ismailshah Patel, 2004 Cr LJ 985 (Bom)."
+"914. Paritosh Chowdhury v Sipra Banerjee, 1988 Cr LJ 1299 (Cal)."
+"915. Nripendra Nath Basu v Kisen Bahadur, (1952) 1 Cal 251 ."
+"916. Re Shanmugham, 1971 Cr LJ 182 ."
+"917. Har Vansh Singh v State of UP, 1993 Cr LJ 3059 (All)."
+"918. Abraham v Abraham, (1950) Mad 858."
+"919. Sanghi Motors (Bom) Ltd v MT Shinde, 1989 Cr LJ 684 Bom. Section 447 punishes criminal"
+trespass.
+"920. Basam Bhowmick, AIR 1963 Cal 3 [LNIND 1962 CAL 48] ."
+"921. Shankarlal, 1975 Cr LJ 1077 (Gau)."
+"922. Keso Sahu, 1977 Cr LJ 1725 (Ori)."
+"923. Sankar Chandra Ghose, 1981 Cr LJ 1002 (Cal)."
+"924. Rita Wilson v State of HP, 1992 Cr LJ 2400 (HP)."
+"925. Narayanan v State, 1986 Ker LT 1265 ."
+"926. Keki Hormusji Gharda v Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475 [LNIND 2009 SC 1276] :"
+2009 Cr LJ 3733 .
+"927. Rajinder Singh Katoch v Chandigarh Admn, (2007) 10 SCC 69 [LNIND 2007 SC 1233] : AIR"
+2008 SC 178 [LNIND 2007 SC 1233] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 340] Wrongful confinement.
+Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person
+"from proceedings1 beyond certain circumscribing limits,2 is said ""wrongfully to"
+"confine"" that person."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A causes Z to go within a walled space, and locks Z in. A is thus prevented from"
+proceeding in any direction beyond the circumscribing line of wall. A wrongfully
+confines Z.
+"(b) A places men with firearms at the outlets of a building, and tells Z that they will"
+fire at Z if Z attempts to leave the building. A wrongfully confines Z.
+COMMENT.—
+"Wrongful confinement, which is a form of wrongful restraint, is keeping a man within"
+"limits out of which he wishes to go, and has a right to go.928."
+[s 340.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) Wrongful restraint of a person.
+(2) Such restraint must prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain
+circumscribing limits. The offence of wrongful confinement as defined under
+section 340 of the Code occurs when individual is wrongfully restrained in such
+a manner as to prevent him/her from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing
+limits.929.
+[s 340.2] Wrongful confinement and wrongful restraint.—
+"From the definition, it is evident that 'wrongful confinement' is a species of 'wrongful"
+"restraint' as defined in section 339 IPC, 1860. While, in 'wrongful restraint', there is only"
+"a partial suspension of one's liberty, 'wrongful confinement' reflects total suspension of"
+liberty beyond certain prescribed limits. The period of suspension is immaterial for
+constituting an offence of 'wrongful confinement' or 'wrongful restraint'. When a person
+"is restrained and is prevented from going, where he has a right to go, the restraint"
+"becomes wrongful if such restraint is not in exercise of any right, power or authority"
+under any law.930.
+1. 'Prevent that person from proceedings'.—The restraining of a person in a particular
+place or compelling him to go in a particular direction by force of an exterior will
+overpowering or suppressing in any way his own voluntary action is an imprisonment
+on the part of him who exercises that exterior will.931. There can be no wrongful
+"confinement when a desire to proceed has never existed, nor can a confinement be"
+wrongful if it was consented to by the person affected.932. Mere insistence by words of
+mouth or mere sitting around a person would not satisfy the requirements of the
+offence of wrongful confinement which requires that there must be voluntary
+obstruction to that person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any
+direction in which that person has a right to proceed.933. To support a charge of
+wrongful confinement proof of actual physical restriction is not essential. It is sufficient
+if such evidence shows that such an impression was produced on the mind of the
+victim as to create a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that he or she was not
+free to depart and that he or she would be forthwith seized or restrained if he or she
+attempted to do so.934.
+2. 'Certain circumscribing limits'.—
+"A prison may have its boundary, large or narrow, visible and tangible, or, though real still in"
+the conception only; it may itself be moveable or fixed: but a boundary it must have; and that
+boundary the party imprisoned must be prevented from passing; he must be prevented from
+"leaving that place, within the ambit of which the party imprisoning would confine him,"
+except by prison-breach. Some confusion seems to me to arise from confounding
+imprisonment of the body with mere loss of freedom: it is one part of the definition of
+freedom to be able to go withersoever one pleases; but imprisonment is something more
+than the mere loss of this power; it includes the notion of restraint within some limits
+defined by a will or power exterior to our own.935.
+[s 340.3] Forced to walk.—
+"Where a person was forced to walk under duress to a particular direction, it amounted"
+to an offence of wrongful confinement. An act by which a person is prevented from
+proceeding towards a particular direction is an offence under the section.936.
+[s 340.4] Moral force.—
+"Detention through the exercise of moral force, without the accompaniment of physical"
+"force or actual conflict, is sufficient to constitute this offence.937."
+[s 340.5] Period of confinement.—
+"The time during which a person is kept in wrongful confinement is immaterial, except"
+with reference to the extent of punishment.938.
+[s 340.6] Remedy of compensation under writ of habeas corpus.—
+"Freedom from detention and compensation for wrongful detention, it has been held,"
+"can be ordered under writ of habeas corpus; however, the Court added that the remedy"
+"under section 340 IPC, 1860 cannot be treated as an alternative or substitute for"
+remedy of habeas corpus. It is only an additional remedy.939.
+[s 340.7] Compensation for unauthorised detention.—
+"The petitioner was detained by an order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class"
+whereas the authority for order of detention vested with the State or Central
+"Government. It was held that the said detention, being without authority of law,"
+amounted to wrongful confinement. The detention was quashed and the detenu was
+"granted a compensation of Rs. 3,000.940."
+[s 340.8] CASES.—Wrongful confinement.—
+Where two police-officers arrested without warrant a person who was drunk and
+"creating disturbance in a public street, and confined him in the police-station though"
+one of them knew his name and address and it was not found to what extent he was a
+"danger to others or their property, it was held that the arrest having been made by the"
+"police-officers without warrant, for a non-cognizable offence, their action amounted to"
+wrongful confinement unless it was justified on the ground of right of private defence
+"or under section 81 as was, in fact, held by the Court.941. Though an illegal search in"
+"violation of the provisions of section 165 Cr PC, 1973 can be resisted, there is no"
+justification for bodily lifting and bringing back the Investigating Officer after he has left
+the house and to confine and threaten him till he gives a written statement that he has
+searched the house of the appellant. It was held that by such acts the accused had
+committed offences of wrongful confinement and assaulting a public servant within
+"the meaning of sections 342 and 353, IPC, 1860.942. A police officer arrested and"
+detained a person in the thana lock-up despite production of a bail order from the
+Court. It was held that the officer was clearly guilty of an offence under section 342
+"IPC, 1860.943."
+[s 340.9] Custody of child.—
+It is an incorrect proposition of law that a father would never be held liable for offence
+of wrongful 'confinement' if he detains the child by having snatched her away from the
+"mother, who, under some authority of law, had, at the time of snatching, the custody of"
+the child and is entitled to have custody of the child. When a minor is kept against the
+"will of the person, who has the custody of such a child and/or who is entitled to take"
+"the custody of the child, such detention would amount to 'wrongful confinement'. In"
+"such a case, it is the will of the person, who is entitled to have custody of such a child,"
+"which will be the will of the child, for, the child's willingness or 'consent' would be"
+"immaterial unless the welfare of the child, in a given case, demands removal of the"
+"child from the custody of the person, who is, otherwise, entitled to keep the custody of"
+"the child. Guardian and custodian are not synonymous with each other. Thus, even"
+"when a parent, who, with impunity, snatches away a child from the lawful custody of"
+"the other parent, who held such custody and who is entitled to have the custody of the"
+"child under the law—personal, statutory or otherwise—such snatching away of the child"
+"and his detention against the will of the parent in whose custody the child was, would"
+amount to an offence of 'wrongful confinement'.944.
+[s 340.10] No wrongful confinement.—
+Where the wife who has attained the age of 21 stated before the Court that she was not
+"detained by her parents against her will, there was no wrongful confinement and as"
+such the habeas corpus petition by the husband could not succeed.945.
+"928. Note M, p 154."
+"929. Subhash Krishnan v State of Goa, (2012) 8 SCC 365 [LNIND 2012 SC 480] : AIR 2012 SC"
+3003 [LNIND 2012 SC 480] .
+"930. Piyush Chamaria v Hemanta Jitani, 2012 Cr LJ 2306 (Gau)."
+"931. Parankusam v Stuart, (1865) 2 MHC 396 ; SA Hamid v Sudhirmohan Ghosh, (1929) 57 Cal"
+102 .
+"932. Muthammad Din, (1893) PR No. 36 of 1894."
+"933. Lilabati Kanjilal, 1966 Cr LJ 838 ."
+"934. Bhagwat v State, 1971 Cr LJ 1222 . See further, Rabinarayan Das v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr"
+"LJ 269 (Ori), where the court added that an essential ingredient of the offence is that the"
+accused should have wrongfully restrained the complainant and such restraint was to prevent
+the complainant from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits.
+"935. Per Coleridge, J, in Birid v Jones, (1845), QB 742, 744."
+"936. Nania Nanuram v State of MP, 1995 Cr LJ 1870 (MP). The court also said that a person"
+charged with murder can be convicted under section 341 or 342.
+"937. Venkatachala Mudali, (1881) 1 Weir 341."
+"938. Suprosunno Ghosaul, (1866) 6 WR (Cr) 88. Taking away a girl for rape was held to be a"
+"confinement of this kind and punished as such, sentence of three years RI was held to be not"
+"excessive, Periyasami Re, 1995 Cr LJ 1203 (Mad)."
+"939. Poovan v SI of Police, 1993 Cr LJ 2183 (Ker)."
+"940. Paothing Tangkhul v State of Nagaland, 1993 Cr LJ 2514 ."
+"941. Gopal Naidu, (1922) 46 Mad 605 (FB)."
+"942. Shyamlal, 1972 Cr LJ 638 : AIR 1972 SC 886 [LNIND 1972 SC 100] . Shamshuddeen v State"
+"of Kerala, 1989 Cr LJ 2068 , the accused confining the two police officers who rescued a person"
+"from his confinement, no leniency shown in sentencing. D Ramalinga Reddy v D Babu, 1999 Cr LJ"
+"2918 (AP), wrongful restraint. Samir Saha v State of Assam, 1998 Cr LJ 1360 (Gau) proof of"
+"actual physical restriction is not necessary; Sanji Ladha v State of Gujarat, 1998 Cr LJ 2746 (Guj)."
+"943. Dharmu, 1978 Cr LJ 864 (Ori)."
+"944. Piyush Chamaria v Hemanta Jitani, 2012 Cr LJ 2306 (Gau)."
+"945. Madhu Bala, 1982 Cr LJ 555 (SC) : AIR 1982 SC 938 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 341] Punishment for wrongful restraint.
+Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment
+"for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five"
+"hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENTS.—
+The only allegation relating to section 341 was that accused stood in front of victim in
+such a manner that she had to move backward. From such act alone it cannot be said
+"that he ""wrongfully restrained"" her within the meaning of section 339, IPC, 1860 to"
+"make him liable under section 341, IPC, 1860.946. Accused, appellant caught the victim"
+"from behind, pushed her on ground, removed her panty and made an attempt to rape."
+Evidence of victim was found consistent. She specifically stated that upon getting
+opportunity she kicked in testicles of accused and escaped from place of occurrence.
+Conviction under section 341 and section 511 of 376 was upheld.947. Accused with 2–
+3 other persons restricted the deceased on way and an axe blow was given by first
+accused on the head of the deceased and that was resisted by patting hands ahead.
+Consequent to the blow aforesaid he received an injury near his ear. A lathi blow then
+"was given by second accused on the head of the deceased, consequent to which he fell"
+down and then he was severely beaten by the accused. Deceased succumbed to the
+injuries sustained. Conviction under sections 302 and 341 was upheld.948.
+"946. Rupan Deol Bajaj v Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] : (1995) 6"
+SCC 194 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] .
+"947. Rajesh Vishwakarma v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 2753 (Jha); Amar Soni v State of"
+"Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ 4003 (Jha)—Acid attack."
+"948. Natha v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 1905 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 342] Punishment for wrongful confinement.
+Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment of
+"either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may"
+"extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"Section 342, IPC, 1860 is not confined to offences against public servants but is a"
+"general section and makes a person who wrongfully restrains another, guilty of the"
+offence under that section. A wrongful confinement is a wrongful restraint in such a
+manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond a certain circumscribed
+limits. This offence has nothing to do with the investigation or search.949. The essential
+"ingredients of the offence ""wrongful confinement"" are that the accused should have"
+wrongfully confined the complainant and such restraint was to prevent the complainant
+from proceeding beyond certain circumscribed limits beyond which he/she has a right
+to proceed. The factual scenario clearly establishes commission by the appellant as
+"well of the offence punishable under section 342 IPC, 1860.950. Confinement need not"
+necessarily be a confinement where the person is physically held within a certain
+"circumscribed limit. To support the charge of wrongful confinement, proof of actual"
+physical obstruction is not essential. It is the condition of the mind of the person
+"confined, having regard to the circumstances that leads him to reasonably believe that"
+he was not free to move and that he would be forthwith restrained if he attempted to do
+so.951.
+"Where a man, illegally taken into police custody was beaten by the police and he"
+"committed suicide, the accused police officials were punished under section 342. Case"
+under sections 352 and 302 was not made out.952. Wife suffered a blow of hammer on
+left side below ear and immediately died on spot. Accused husband convicted under
+"section 342 and 302 IPC, 1860.953. Victim after being arrested was kept in police"
+station for three days and was not produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours. SHO
+cannot be absolved from the charges under section 342.954. In Vadamalai v Syed
+"Thastha Keer,955. the complainant was allegedly detained and beaten by"
+appellant/police officials in Police Station but the evidence does not show that he was
+kept in police station for four days. Conviction of the appellant by High Court under
+"sections 323, 342 held not sustainable and liable to be set aside."
+The officers who visited the house of the accused for making inquiry under Money
+"Lenders Act, were not allowed to go out of the house for some time. It was found that"
+there was no apprehension in their mind about use of force in case they tried to move
+out. It was held that no offence under section 342 was made out.956.
+"949. Shyam Lal Sharma v State of MP, AIR 1972 SC 886 [LNIND 1972 SC 100] : (1972) 1 SCC 764"
+[LNIND 1972 SC 100] .
+"950. Raju Pandurang Mahale v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1677 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] :"
+(2004) 4 SCC 371 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] .
+"951. Mrityunjay Kumar v State, 2010 Cr LJ 44 (Sik)."
+"952. State v Balkrishna, 1992 Cr LJ 1872 (Mad)."
+"953. Daulat Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 1797 (Raj); Subhash Krishnan v State, (2012) 8"
+SCC 365 [LNIND 2012 SC 480] : AIR 2012 SC 3003 [LNIND 2012 SC 480] — Every ingredients of
+"section 342 and section 364 is clearly made out; Baby v State, (2012) 11 SCC 362 [LNINDU 2012"
+"SC 11] —The sentences imposed under section 376, section 506 (ii) and 342 IPC, 1860 were"
+"maintained; Elavarasan v State, AIR 2011 SC 2816 [LNIND 2011 SC 604] : (2011) 7 SCC 110"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 604] — Conviction under section 304–Part II and 342.
+"954. Central Bureau of Investigation v Kishore Singh, (2011) 6 SCC 369 [LNIND 2010 SC 1033] :"
+(2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 970 : AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 584.
+"955. Vadamalai v Syed Thastha Keer, (2009) 3 SCC 454 [LNIND 2009 SC 304] : AIR 2009 SC"
+1956 [LNIND 2009 SC 304] .
+"956. State of Gujarat v Keshavlal Maganbhai Jogani, 1993 Cr LJ 248 (Guj). Veena Rangnekar v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 2000 Cr LJ 2443 , death by electrocution in the house let to the tenant."
+Police team came in with permission to check new wiring. They were obstructed in their work of
+taking photographs and not allowed to leave the house for sometime. Guilty under the section.
+"Suresh N Bhusare v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 4559 (SC) conviction set aside because the"
+victim girl had gone voluntarily and not lifted and confined. Also see Suresh Balkrishna Nakhava
+"v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 284 (Bom); Shivraj Chandrappa Yadav v State of Maharashtra,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 3168 (Bom). Raju Pandurang Mahale v State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 194] : AIR 2004 SC 1677 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] : 2004 Cr LJ 1441 , brought into"
+"a house under a false pretence, locked from outside, the victim could go out only next day,"
+offence under the section made out.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 343] Wrongful confinement for three or more days.
+"Whoever wrongfully confines any person for three days, or more, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or"
+"with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Whoever wrongfully confines any person for three days or more shall be punished
+under this section. Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to
+prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribed limits is said to
+"'wrongfully confine' that person, as defined under section 340, IPC, 1860. Use of"
+physical force is not necessary for the offence of wrongful confinement. A mere
+"detention of a person against law would attract section 343, IPC, 1860.957."
+[s 343.1] Sanction.—
+Since illegal detention and the assault made against the first respondent by the
+"petitioner did not form part of the official duty of the petitioner and, therefore, there was"
+"no necessity to obtain prior sanction under section 197, Cr PC, 1973.958."
+"957. A Azeez v Pasam Hari Babu, 2003 Cr LJ 2462 (AP)."
+"958. A Azeez v Pasam Hari Babu, 2003 Cr LJ 2462 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 344] Wrongful confinement for ten or more days.
+"Whoever wrongfully confines any person for ten days, or more, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 345] Wrongful confinement of person for whose liberation writ has been
+issued.
+"Whoever keeps any person in wrongful confinement, knowing that a writ for the"
+"liberation of that person has been duly issued, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+either description for a term which may extend to two years in addition to any term of
+imprisonment to which he may be liable under any other section of this Chapter.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 346] Wrongful confinement in secret.
+Whoever wrongfully confines any person in such manner as to indicate an intention
+that the confinement of such person may not be known to any person interested in the
+"person so confined, or to any public servant, or that the place of such confinement"
+may not be known to or discovered by any such person or public servant as
+"hereinbefore mentioned, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to any other punishment to"
+which he may be liable for such wrongful confinement.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+[s 347] Wrongful confinement to extort property or constrain to illegal act.
+Whoever wrongfully confines any person for the purpose of extorting from the person
+"confined, or from any person interested in the person confined, any property or"
+valuable security or of constraining the person confined or any person interested in
+such person to do anything illegal or to give any information which may facilitate the
+"commission of an offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"This and the next section may be compared with sections 329 and 330, as the"
+aggravating circumstances mentioned in the former are the same as those in the latter.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement
+"[s 348] Wrongful confinement to extort confession, or compel restoration of"
+property.
+Whoever wrongfully confines any person for the purpose of extorting from the person
+confined or any person interested in the person confined any confession or any
+"information which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or for the"
+purpose of constraining the person confined or any person interested in the person
+confined to restore or to cause the restoration of any property or valuable security or
+"to satisfy any claim or demand, or to give information which may lead to the"
+"restoration of any property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section may be compared with section 330. In the former case confession is
+"extorted by wrongful confinement; in the latter, by causing hurt. To prove an offence"
+under this section it is not necessary to show that a formal arrest was made. It is
+enough if it is shown that the person was prevented from proceeding beyond certain
+circumscribed limits.959. Evidence showed that deceased died of multiple injuries and
+such injuries were caused when deceased was in illegal custody of accused. Accused
+"was held liable to be convicted under sections 348 and 304 Part II of IPC, 1860.960."
+"959. State of HP v Ranjit Singh, 1979 Cr LJ (NOC) 210 (HP)."
+"960. State of AP v G Veereshalinga, 2011 Cr LJ 1991 (AP); Anup Singh v State of HP, AIR 1995 SC"
+"1941 : 1995 Cr LJ 3223 ; Ajay Kumar Singh v State (NCT of Delhi), 2007 Cr LJ 3545 (Del). Order"
+framing charge against the accused was held proper.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 349] Force.
+"A person is said to use force to another if he causes motion, change of motion, or"
+"cessation of motion to that other, or if he causes to any substance such motion, or"
+"change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into contact with"
+"any part of that other's body, or with anything which that other is wearing or carrying,"
+or with anything so situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling:
+"Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation of"
+"motion, causes that motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in one of the"
+three ways hereinafter described.
+First.—By his own bodily power.
+Secondly.—By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change or
+"cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or on the part of"
+any other person.
+"Thirdly.—By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move."
+COMMENT.—
+'Force' as defined in clause (1) contemplates the presence of the person to whom it is
+"used, that is to say, it contemplates the presence of the person using the force and of"
+the person to whom the force is used.961.
+"961. Bihari Lal, (1934) 15 Lah 786, 789."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 350] Criminal force.
+"Whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent, in"
+"order to the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to cause,"
+"or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or"
+"annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use criminal force to"
+that other.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) Z is sitting in a moored boat on a river. A unfastens the moorings, and thus"
+intentionally causes the boat to drift down the stream. Here A intentionally
+"causes motion to Z, and he does this by disposing substances in such a manner"
+that the motion is produced without any other act on on any person's part. A has
+therefore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done so without Z's
+"consent, in order to the committing of any offence, or intending or knowing it to"
+"be likely that this use of force will cause injury, fear or annoyance to Z, A has"
+used criminal force to Z.
+"(b) Z is riding in a chariot. A lashes Z's horses, and thereby causes them to quicken"
+their pace. Here Z has caused change of motion to Z by inducing the animals to
+change their motion. A has therefore used force to Z; and if A has done this
+"without Z's consent, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby"
+"injure, frighten or annoy Z, A has used criminal force to Z."
+"(c) Z is riding in a palanquin. A, intending to rob Z, seizes the pole and stops the"
+"palanquin. Here A has caused cessation of motion to Z, and he has done this by"
+his own bodily power. A has therefore used force to Z; and as A has acted thus
+"intentionally, without Z's consent, in order to the commission of an offence. A"
+has used criminal force to Z.
+(d) A intentionally pushes against Z in the street. Here A has by his own bodily
+power moved his own person so as to bring it into contact with Z. He has
+therefore intentionally used force to Z; and if he has done so without Z's
+"consent, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby injure, frighten"
+"or annoy Z, he has used criminal force to Z."
+"(e) A throws a stone, intending or knowing it to be likely that the stone will be thus"
+"brought into contact with Z, or with Z's clothes, or with something carried by Z,"
+"or that it will strike water, and dash up the water against Z's clothes or"
+"something carried by Z. Here, if the throwing of the stone produce the effect of"
+"causing any substance to come into contact with Z, or Z's clothes. A has used"
+"force to Z; and if he did so without Z's consent, intending thereby to injure,"
+"frighten or annoy Z, he has used criminal force to Z."
+"(f) A intentionally pulls up a woman's veil. Here, A intentionally uses force to her,"
+"and if he does so without her consent, intending or knowing it to be likely that he"
+"may thereby injure, frighten or annoy her, he has used criminal force to her."
+"(g) Z is bathing, A pours into the bath water which he knows to be boiling. Here A"
+intentionally by his own bodily power causes such motion in the boiling water as
+"brings that water into contact with Z, or with other water so situated that such"
+contact must affect Z's sense of feeling; A has therefore intentionally used force
+"to Z; and if he has done this without Z's consent, intending or knowing it to be"
+"likely that he may thereby cause injury, fear, or annoyance to Z, A has used"
+criminal force.
+"(h) A incites a dog to spring upon Z, without Z's consent. Here, if A intends to cause"
+"injury, fear or annoyance to Z, he uses criminal force to Z."
+COMMENT.—
+The preceding section defines 'force'. This section says that 'force' becomes criminal
+"(1) when it is used without consent and in order to the committing of an offence, or (2)"
+"when it is intentionally used to cause injury, fear or annoyance to another to whom the"
+"force is used. To attract the definition of 'criminal force' under section 350 IPC, 1860,"
+"there must be intentional use of force on any person, without that person's consent."
+"Such force must have been used for committing an offence, or intending to cause, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will cause injury, fear or"
+"annoyance to the person on whom the force is used. In other words, the criminal force"
+contemplated under this section is intended to mean criminal force as applied to a
+person and not as applied to an inanimate object or substance.962. A person is said to
+use force when he causes motion or change of motion or cessation of motion to
+"another person or the above in substance, which brings it into contact with any part of"
+"the other person's body or with anything that the other is wearing or carrying, or with"
+anything so situated that such contact affects other's sense of feeling. This should be
+done by his own bodily power or by use of some substance or by inducing any animal
+to change this motion. The use of force will become criminal when it is done against
+the consent of any person with the intention of committing an offence or to cause
+"injury, fear or annoyance to any person. In this case admittedly no assault was resorted"
+to.963.
+"The term 'criminal force' includes what in English law is called 'battery'. It will, however,"
+be remembered that 'criminal force' may be so slight as not to amount to an offence
+"(section 95), and it will be observed that 'criminal force' does not include anything that"
+the doer does by means of another person. The definition of 'criminal force' is so wide
+as to include force of almost every description of which a person is the ultimate object.
+[s 350.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) The intentional use of force to any person.
+(2) Such force must have been used without the person's consent.
+(3) The force must have been used—
+(a) in order to the committing of an offence; or
+"(b) with the intention to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will cause,"
+"injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom it is used."
+[s 350.2] Illustrations.—
+The various illustrations exemplify the different ingredients of the definition of 'force'
+"given in section 349. Illustration (a) exemplifies 'motion'; ill. (b), 'change of motion'; ill."
+"(c), 'cessation of motion'; ills. (d), (e), (g) and (h), 'bring that substance into contact with"
+any part of that other's body'; ills. (j) and (g) 'other's sense of feeling'. Clause 1 of
+"section 349 is illustrated by ills. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g); clause 2 by ill, (a); and clause 3,"
+by ills. (b) and (h).
+The petitioners had picked up or snatched the ballot papers from the custody and
+possession of the public servants. They had even torn the same in this process. It was
+held that they used criminal force.964.
+"962. Devaki Amma v State, 1981 Ker LT 475 ."
+"963. S P Mallik v State of Orissa, 1982 Cr LJ 19 (Pat)"
+"964. Bhupinder Singh v State of Punjab, 1997 Cr LJ 3416 (PH)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 351] Assault.
+"Whoever makes any gesture, or any preparation1 intending or knowing it2 to be likely"
+that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that he
+"who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is"
+said to commit an assault.
+Explanation.—Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the words which a person
+uses may give to his gestures or preparation such a meaning as may make those
+gestures or preparations amount to an assault.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A shakes his fist at Z, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may thereby"
+cause Z to believe that
+"A is about to strike Z, A has committed an assault."
+"(b) A begins to unloose the muzzle of a ferocious dog, intending or knowing it to be"
+likely that he may thereby cause Z to believe that he is about to cause the dog to
+attack Z. A has committed an assault upon Z.
+"(c) A takes up a stick, saying to Z, ""I will give you a beating"". Here, though the words"
+"used by A could in no case amount to an assault, and though the mere gesture,"
+"unaccompanied by any other circumstances, might not amount to an assault,"
+the gesture explained by the words may amount to an assault.
+COMMENT.—
+"It is not every threat, when there is no actual personal violence that constitutes an"
+"assault; there must, in all cases, be the means of carrying the threat into effect. If a"
+"person is advancing in a threatening attitude, with an intention to strike another so that"
+"his blow will almost immediately reach the other, if he is not stopped, then this is an"
+"assault in point of law, though at the particular moment when he is stopped, he is not"
+near enough for his blow to take effect.965. In order to constitute assault it is not
+necessary that there should be some actual hurt caused. A threat constitutes
+assault.966. Pointing a loaded pistol at another is undoubtedly an assault within the
+"meaning of this section and as such punishable under section 352 IPC, 1860 though"
+"not under section 307 IPC, 1860.967. In this connection see also sub-para entitled,"
+"""attempt to discharge loaded firearm"" under section 307 ante."
+[s 351.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two things—
+(1) Making of any gesture or preparation by a person in the presence of another.
+(2) Intention or knowledge of likelihood that such gesture or preparation will cause
+the person present to apprehend that the person making it is about to use
+criminal force to him.
+"1. 'Makes any gesture, or any preparation'.—Illustration (a) illustrates that gestures"
+which cause a person to apprehend that the person making them is about to use
+"criminal force amount to an assault. As seen from the definition of ""assault"", a gesture"
+"or even a preparation on the part of accused would be sufficient to constitute ""assault"""
+and accused need not have even attacked the deceased.
+The apprehension of the use of criminal force must be from the person making the
+"gesture or preparation, and if that apprehension arises not from that person but from"
+"somebody else, it does not amount to assault on the part of that person. Further,"
+criminal force cannot be said to be used by one person to another by causing change in
+"the position of another human being. Where, therefore, the accused himself did nothing"
+which could come under the definition of assault but simply made a gesture at which
+his followers advanced a little forward towards the complainant in a threatening
+"manner, it was held that he was not guilty of the offence of assault under section"
+"353.968. Where the accused, armed with a sharp-edged weapon, went to the shop of a"
+man and hurled a challenge to him from some distance asking him to come out and
+"threatening him that he would not go back without killing him, it was held that the"
+"manner in which the accused hurled the challenge, he committed an assault within the"
+meaning of section 351 and the retaliation by that man was in self-defence.969.
+"Though mere preparation to commit a crime is not punishable (see section 511), yet"
+preparation with the intention specified in this section amounts to an assault: see ill.
+(b).
+2. 'Intending or knowing it to be likely'.—Intention or knowledge is the gist of the
+"offence. Inadvertent recklessness, i.e., a failure to give thought to the possibility of risk"
+"involved in pursuing a course of action, is insufficient to amount to mens rea requisite"
+for a conviction for assault.970.
+[s 351.2] Explanation.—
+"Mere words do not amount to an assault, but the words which the party threatening"
+uses at the time either give his gestures such a meaning as may make them amount to
+"an assault, or, on the other hand, may prevent them from being held to amount to an"
+"assault. In the latter case, the effect of the words must be such as clearly to show the"
+party threatened that the party threatening has no present intention to use immediate
+criminal force.971. A preparation taken with words which would cause a person to
+"apprehend that criminal force would be used to him, if he persisted in a particular"
+"course of conduct, does not amount to an assault, if there is no evidence to show that"
+the accused was about to use criminal force to him then and there.972.
+[s 351.3] Blood transfusion without consent.—
+"A person, aged 57, and a Jehovah's witness was seriously injured. He carried a card"
+stating that no blood was to be administered under any circumstances. The doctor
+administered blood transfusions which he considered necessary to preserve the
+victim's life. The doctor was held liable in battery for treating the adult patient in a
+manner to which he did not consent.973.
+"965. Stephens v Myers, (1830) 4 C&P 349."
+"966. Rupabati v Shyama, (1958) Cut 710."
+"967. Swadesh Mahato, 1979 Cr LJ 1275 (Pat); See also James, (1844) 1 C&K 530; Vijaidutta Jha,"
+(1947) Nag 237.
+"968. Muneshwar Bux Singh, (1938) 14 Luck 409 ."
+"969. Mathew v State of Kerala, 1993 Cr LJ 213 (Ker). R v Chan-Fook, (1994) 2 All ER 552 , the"
+"complainant suffered no physical injury as a result of the assault, he felt abused, humiliated and"
+frightened.
+"970. R v Nash, (1991) Cr LR 768 (CA), Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, section 47"
+(English).
+"971. AC Cama v HF Morgan, (1864) 1 BHC 205."
+"972. Birbal Khalifa, (1902) 30 Cal 97 ."
+"973. Macette v Shulman, (1991) 2 Mad LR 162 (CA)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 352] Punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave
+provocation.
+Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and
+"sudden provocation given by that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which"
+"may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+Explanation.—Grave and sudden provocation will not mitigate the punishment for an
+"offence under this section, if the provocation is sought or voluntarily provoked by the"
+"offender as an excuse for the offence, or"
+"if the provocation is given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public"
+"servant, in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant, or"
+if the provocation is given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of
+private defence.
+"Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to mitigate the offence, is a"
+question of fact.
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides punishment for assault or use of criminal force when there are no
+aggravating circumstances.974. Section 352 constitutes a minor offence in relation to
+"section 354 IPC, 1860. The offence under section 354 IPC, 1860 includes the"
+"ingredients of the former.975. See section 300, Exception 1, which is identical with the"
+explanation to this section.
+[s 352.1] CASE.—
+"Where the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly with a common object, act"
+of unlawful assembly cannot be attributable with the subsequent change in the
+"common object of some of the other members of the assembly, it was held that"
+members who did not share common intention and stood outside were liable to be
+convicted under section 352 read with149 and not under section 326 r/w. 149.976.
+"974. Nagar Prasad v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 1580 (All); R v Onabanjo, (2001) 2 Cr App R (S) 7 [CA"
+"(Crim Div)], The accused appealed against a total sentence of 15 months' imprisonment, having"
+been convicted of common assault against his former girlfriend and of putting her in fear of
+"violence contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act, 1997 section 4 after she had ended"
+their relationship. The accused contended that the offences had been committed whilst he was
+under the influence of alcohol and in response to his inability to cope with the breakdown of the
+relationship.
+"It was held that repeated threats by the accused to kill justified the sentence imposed,"
+notwithstanding the presence of several mitigating factors including his attempts to seek help
+"for his alcohol addiction and depression. R v Tucknott, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S) 93 [CA (Crim Div)],"
+the accused was convicted for threatening to kill his ex-girlfriend and her new partner. The
+"threats were issued in prison to prison officers, stating intentions on release. The sentence was"
+imposed as it was deemed necessary in order to protect the public from a man who the court
+"held and shown himself to be capable of extreme violence against previous partners and who,"
+"the medical experts and probation service agreed, was likely to re-offend."
+It was held that given his early guilty plea and the fact that he could not realistically have carried
+"out the threats as he had been in prison at the time, the sentence was reduced to five years to"
+bring it in the sentencing in comparable cases.
+"975. RD Bajaj v KPS Gill, AIR 1996 SC 309 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] : (1995) 6 SCC 194 [LNIND 1995"
+SC 981] .
+"976. Bhimrao v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 1493 [LNIND 2003 SC 167] : (2003) 3 SCC 37"
+"[LNIND 2003 SC 167] . See also Ashok Chintawar v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2234 (Bom);"
+"Hanuman v State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 1614 : (1977) 4 SCC 599 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 353] Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his
+duty.
+Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the
+"execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that"
+"person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of"
+anything done or attempted to be done by such person in the lawful discharge of his
+"duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The public servant must be acting in the discharge of a duty imposed by law on him in
+"the particular case, and the section will not protect him for an act done in good faith"
+under colour of his office.977. If hurt is caused under the circumstances mentioned in
+the section then either section 332 or section 333 will apply.
+[s 353.1] CASES.—Defect in warrant.—
+It is made clear in the illustrations that the words alone will not amount to assault. So
+"also, the mere gesture of picking up a stick alone will not constitute assault unless"
+accompanied by other circumstances. The gesture explained by the words alone
+"amounts to assault. Therefore, mere preparation of carrying a weapon and standing"
+before the victim without making any gesture which will disclose the intention or
+"knowledge will not constitute assault. As seen from Illustration (c), mere carrying a"
+stick without being accompanied by a statement which will disclose the intention or
+knowledge will not constitute assault. But there is nothing in evidence to reveal
+"commission of any of the overt acts to constitute offence under section 353 IPC, 1860."
+The prosecution has failed to prove any of the offences alleged against appellants.978.
+"Resistance to an illegal order of attachment is not an offence under section 353, IPC,"
+1860.979. Where the accused allegedly assaulted the District Revenue Officer who
+distributing flood relief in village and made an attempt to snatch the cash and evidence
+"of witnesses was found cogent, convincing and credit worthy, conviction was"
+upheld.980. Accused allegedly snatched the service revolver of complainant police
+"officer and fired at him. All the witnesses who were independent witnesses, turned"
+hostile. Offence under sections 307 and 353 was held not proved.981.
+[s 353.2] Search without proper order or warrant.—
+"Where the accused resisted a public officer who attempted to search a house, in the"
+"absence of a proper written order authorizing him to do so, he was held to have"
+committed no offence under this section.982. But the Madras High Court has held that
+a search without a search warrant does not justify an obstruction or resistance to an
+"officer, if he was acting in good faith and without malice.983. Even though an illegal"
+"search under section 165, Cr PC, 1973 can be resisted, yet there is no justification to"
+assault an officer after he has finished the search and left the house. Such an act
+"amounts to an offence under section 353 IPC, 1860.984. In this connection see also"
+"sub-head ""Cases"" under section 340 ante."
+[s 353.3] Public servant must be acting in execution of duty.—
+Where the accused created hindrance in the discharge of duties of police in order to
+"avoid arrest, it was held that conviction under section 353 was justified.985. Where a"
+cart owner refused to give his cart for the use of a Forest Settlement Officer who
+"required it as per executive orders of Government, and assaulted the peon in preventing"
+"him from seizing his cart, it was held that he could not be convicted of an offence"
+"under this section, because the rules aforesaid had not the force of law, and a public"
+"servant acting under them was not acting in the execution of his duty.986. Similarly,"
+where a forest officer who was authorised to arrest a person only when the offence
+was committed within five miles of the border arrested the accused when there was no
+"evidence that the offence was committed within the five mile belt, it was held that the"
+"arrest not being justified, the accused did not commit any offence under this section by"
+inflicting some injuries on the officer during a scuffle.987. Legality of the execution of
+"duty is the sine qua non for the application of section 353 IPC, 1860.988. Where a"
+Headmaster of a school was assaulted with a ruler by a fellow teacher out of previous
+"personal grudge and not due to any performance of public duty, it was held that the"
+accused could not be convicted under section 353 though his conviction under section
+"325, IPC, 1860 was legal as the Headmaster suffered a dislocation of the right shoulder"
+joint.989. In this connection see also comments under section 332 ante. Where the
+Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes paid a surprise visit to the shop of the
+"accused and took up some books of account maintained by the shop for inspection, as"
+"he was empowered to do under the State's Sales Tax Law, and the accused snatched"
+"away the books from him, it was held by the Supreme Court that the act of the accused"
+amounted to use of criminal force and he could be convicted under this section. It was
+observed that to feel annoyed at this action of the accused would be the natural
+reaction of the Assistant Superintendent.990. Where the driver of the Transport
+Department prevented a Deputy Sarpanch from entering the bus through driver's cabin
+"and was kicked by the latter and thus suffered a grievous injury, it was held while"
+driving or standing by the bus the driver was on public duty and by stopping a trespass
+into driver's cabin he was undoubtedly acting in the discharge of his duty as public
+"servant. The Deputy Sarpanch was, therefore, clearly liable under section 353, IPC,"
+1860.991.
+Petitioner used vulgar and fitting language against complainant when he went to
+petitioner's office to ask reason for not permitting him to mark his presence in
+Attendance Register. It was held that act of petitioner cannot be defined to be an act in
+discharge of official duty. There was no need of previous sanction to prosecute him.992.
+[s 353.4] Posting adverse comments of social media site.—
+The appellant posted adverse comments against the police officer on Facebook. The
+threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to
+do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to
+cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But
+material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the
+complainant. Offence not made out.993.
+[s 353.5] To deter public servant from discharging duty.—
+Where the accused was asked by a sub-inspector to stop his car and he while
+pretending to stop sped away and in this process hit the mudguard of the motor-cycle
+"on which the Sub-Inspector was sitting, it was held that the facts of the case did not"
+make out an offence of assault on a public servant or using criminal force so as to
+deter him from discharging his duties as public servant.994. The accused suspected
+that the complainant public servant was instrumental in his transfer. The complainant
+was proceeding to his office to resume his duty. On the way he was assaulted by the
+accused. It was held that no offence was committed under section 353 because the
+public servant was not assaulted to deter him from discharge of his duty.995. The wife
+of the accused was being taken to Police Station in execution of search warrant
+accompanied by a police constable. The accused attacked his wife and also the police
+"constable. Conviction of the accused under section 353 was held to be proper, though"
+no injury as such was caused to the constable. The Court observed that actual causing
+of injury is not necessary for conviction under section 353.996. In a complaint under
+sections 323 and 329 the investigating Head Constable demanded bribe for arresting
+some persons and was caught red-handed in a trap but on his call the villagers
+attacked the raiding party and snatched away their belongings and currency notes used
+"in the trap, thus deterring the public servants from discharging their duties and"
+rescuing the accused from the lawful custody of the Inspector of the raiding party.
+"Conviction of the Head Constable under section 395 read with section 109, sections"
+"353/109 and 224, the constable whom the head constable handed over the money"
+"under section 395 and the villagers under sections 353, 149, 226 and 147 was"
+upheld.997. Four persons brought a woman to a room of a circuit house for the purpose
+of prostitution. When one of them was busy in sexual intercourse and others were busy
+"in drinking, the police reached there and as they were about to arrest the accused, one"
+of the accused obstructed the police officers in discharge of their duties. The
+conviction of that accused under section 353 was upheld.998.
+"[s 353.6] Section 353 vis-a-vis Section 186 IPC, 1860.—"
+There is an essential distinction between the offences punishable under sections 353
+"and 186 IPC, 1860. The ingredients of the two offences are distinct and different. While"
+"the former is a cognizable offence, the latter is not. A mere obstruction or resistance"
+unaccompanied by criminal force or assault will not constitute an offence under
+"section 353 IPC, 1860. Where an accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the"
+"discharge of his duties, section 186 IPC, 1860 is attracted. But under section 353, there"
+must be in addition to the obstruction use of criminal force or assault to the public
+servant while he was discharging his duty. It may also be noted that the quality of the
+two offences is also different. While section 186 occurs in Chapter X dealing with
+"contempt of the lawful authority of public servants, section 353 appears in Chapter XVI"
+which deals with offences affecting the human body. This is also a clear indication that
+"use of criminal force contemplated under section 353 IPC, 1860 is against a person"
+and not against any inanimate object.999.
+"977. Dalip, (1896) 18 All 246 ; Raman Singh v State, (1900) 28 Cal 411 , 414; Bolai De, (1907) 35"
+"Cal 361 ; Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v Nonelal, (1946) Nag 395. See,"
+"however, Yamanappa Limbaji, (1955) 58 Bom LR 551 ."
+"978. Prasad v State, 2013 (1) KLD 714; State of HP v Dinesh Chander Sharma, 2011 Cr LJ 2418"
+(HP).
+"979. State of HP v Durga, 1980 Cr LJ (NOC) 10 (HP)."
+"980. Raj Singh v State of Haryana, 2008 Cr LJ 3205 (PH)."
+"981. Sumersinbh Umedsinh Rajput v State of Gujarat, AIR 2008 SC 904 [LNIND 2007 SC 1450] :"
+(2007) 13 SCC 83 [LNIND 2007 SC 1450] .
+"982. Narain, (1875) 7 NWP 209."
+"983. Pukot Kotu, (1896) 19 Mad 349."
+"984. Shyam Lal, 1972 Cr LJ 638 : AIR 1972 SC 886 [LNIND 1972 SC 100] ; See also State of UP v"
+"Sant Prakash, 1976 Cr LJ 274 (All—FB)."
+"985. Bhairon Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2010 Cr LJ 1177 (Raj)."
+"986. Rakhmaji, (1885) 9 Bom 558. A teacher, against whom an inquiry had been conducted by a"
+"constable, abused a constable who was waiting for a bus to the police station, thinking that he"
+"was the same constable, was let off with admonition. State of Karnataka v M Chandrappa, 1987"
+Cr LJ 950 (Kant).
+"987. State of Tripura v Sashimohan, 1977 Cr LJ 1663 (Gau)."
+"988. Poulose, 1985 Cr LJ 222 (Ker)."
+"989. SN Roy, 1978 Cr LJ 1514 (Gau). See also Sagwan Passi, 1978 Cr LJ 1062 (Pat)."
+"990. Chandrika Sao, AIR 1967 SC 170 [LNIND 1962 SC 316] : 1967 Cr LJ 261 ."
+"991. Manumiya, 1979 Cr LJ 1384 : AIR 1979 SC 1706 [LNIND 1979 SC 93] ."
+"992. Prakash Chandra Bafna v Oba Ram, 2011 Cr LJ 416 (Raj)."
+"993. Manik Taneja v State of Karnataka, 2015 Cr LJ 1483 ."
+"994. P Rama Rao, 1984 Cr LJ 27 (AP). See BS Narayanan v State of AP, 1987 SCC (Cr) 791 : 1987"
+"Supp SCC 172 , where the offender was released under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958."
+There was a long lapse of time and also the chance of the offender losing his job. Shaik Ayyub v
+"State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 420 : (1994) Supp 2 SCC 269. Killing police officers to resist"
+"arrest, punished under the section."
+"995. Rajendra Datt v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 1025 (P&H)."
+"996. Devisingh v State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 1301 (MP)."
+"997. Ami Lal v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 1585 (Raj)."
+"998. Kalyanasundaram v State of TN, 1994 Cr LJ 2487 (Mad)."
+"999. Devaki Amma v State, 1981 Ker LT 475 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 354] Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.
+"Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or"
+"knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, 1000.[shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
+"than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+State Amendments
+Andhra Pradesh.—The following amendments were made by Act No. 6 of 1991.
+"In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, for section 354 of the Indian Penal"
+"Code, 1860, the following section shall be substituted namely—"
+354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.—Whoever
+"assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be"
+"likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may
+extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may be less than five years, but which shall not be less than two years."
+[Vide Andhra Pradesh Act 6 of 1991].
+"Chattisgarh—In section 354, insert the following proviso, namely:"
+"""Provided that where offence is committed, under this section by a relative, guardian or"
+"teacher or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the person assaulted, he"
+shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not
+be less than two years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to
+"fine."""
+"[Vide Chattisgarh Act 25 of 2015, sec. 3 (w.e.f. 21-7-2015).]"
+Madhya Pradesh.—The following amendments were made by Act No. 14 of 2004.
+"In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, after section 354 of the Indian Penal"
+"Code, 1860, the following section shall be inserted namely—"
+"""354A. Assault or use of Criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe her.—Whoever"
+assaults or uses criminal force to any woman or abets or conspires to assault or uses
+such criminal force to any woman intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that by
+"such assault, he will thereby outrage or causes to be outraged the modestly of the"
+"woman by disrobing or compel her to be naked on any public place, shall be punished"
+with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year
+"but which may extent to ten years and shall also be liable to fine."""
+"[Vide Madhya Pradesh Act 14 of 2004, sec. 3 (w.e.f. 2-12-2004)]."
+"Orissa.—In the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the entry"
+under column 5 relating to section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for the
+"word 'Bailable', the word 'non-bailable' shall be substituted (vide Orissa Act 6 of 1995,"
+"section 3, w.e.f. 10-3-1995)."
+COMMENT.—
+"The provisions of section 354 IPC, 1860 has been enacted to safeguard public morality"
+"and decent behaviour. Therefore, if any person uses criminal force upon any woman"
+"with the intention or knowledge that the woman's modesty will be outraged, he is to be"
+"punished. In Vishaka v State of Rajasthan,1001. and Apparel Export Promotion Council v"
+"AK Chopra,1002. the Supreme Court held that the offence relating to modesty of woman"
+"cannot be treated as trivial. In order to constitute the offence under section 354, IPC,"
+1860 mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is likely to be outraged is sufficient
+without any deliberate intention of such outrage alone for its object. There is no
+abstract conception of modesty that can apply to all cases. A careful approach has to
+be adopted by the Court while dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty.
+"The essential ingredients of the offence under section 354, IPC, 1860 are as under:"
+(1) That the person assaulted must be a woman.
+(2) Accused must have used criminal force on her intending thereby to outrage her
+modesty.
+(3) What constitutes an outrage to female modesty is nowhere defined—The
+essence of a woman's modesty is her sex.
+"(4) Act of pulling a woman, removing her dress coupled with a request for sexual"
+"intercourse, as such would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman."
+"(5) Knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged, is sufficient to constitute the"
+offence without any deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for its
+object.1003.
+"Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence punishable under section 354, IPC,"
+1860 and it can be committed by a person assaulting or using criminal force to any
+"woman, if he knows that by such act the modesty of the woman is likely to be affected."
+Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the mind and cannot be
+demonstrated like physical objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has to be
+culled out from various circumstances in which and upon whom the alleged offence is
+alleged to have been committed.1004. Even though it is true that assault or criminal
+force to woman is one of the essential pre-conditions for applicability of section 354
+"IPC, 1860 but the same has to be with an intent to outrage her modesty or knowing it to"
+be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty. Neither the use of criminal force
+alone nor act of outraging the modesty alone is sufficient to attract an offence under
+"section 354 IPC, 1860.1005."
+[s 354.1] Modesty.—Meaning.—
+The essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the accused is
+"the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is"
+not always decisive. Modesty is an attribute associated with female human beings as a
+class. It is virtue which attaches to a family owing to her sex. The ultimate test for
+"ascertaining whether the modesty of a woman has been outraged, assaulted or"
+insulted is that the action of the offender should be such that it may be perceived as
+one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. A person slapping
+on the posterior of a woman in full public glare would amount to outraging her modesty
+for it was not only an affront to the normal sense of feminine decency but also an
+"affront to the dignity of the lady. The word ""modesty"" is not to be interpreted with"
+"reference to the particular victim of the act, but as an attribute associated with female"
+human beings as a class. It is a virtue which attaches to a female on account of her
+"sex.1006. In State of Punjab v Major Singh,1007., a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme"
+Court considered the question — Whether modesty of a female child of seven and half
+"months can also be outraged. The majority view was in the affirmative. Bachawat, J, on"
+"behalf of majority, opined as:"
+The offence punishable u/s. 354 is an assault on or use of criminal force to a woman with
+the intention of outraging her modesty or with the knowledge of the likelihood of doing so.
+The Code does not define 'modesty'. What then is a woman's modesty? … The essence of a
+woman's modesty is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is written large on her body.
+"Young or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses a modesty"
+capable of being outraged. Whoever uses criminal force to her with intent to outrage her
+modesty commits an offence punishable u/s. 354. The culpable intention of the accused is
+"the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its absence is not"
+"always decisive, as, for example, when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily touches"
+"the flesh of a sleeping woman. She may be an idiot, she may be under the spell of"
+"anaesthesia, she may be sleeping, she may be unable to appreciate the significance of the"
+"act; nevertheless, the offender is punishable under the section.1008."
+An indecent assault upon a woman is punished under this section. Rape is punished
+under section 376; but the offence under this section is of less gravity than rape.1009.
+Knowledge that modesty is likely to be outraged has been held to be sufficient to
+constitute the offence without any deliberate intention to outrage modesty. In this case
+"the victim woman was brought into a room under false pretexts, the room was locked"
+"from outside, inside she was forced to drink, photographs taken in naked state and"
+raped. All the participants were held to be guilty of outraging her modesty.1010. A
+person who is guilty of attempting rape cannot be allowed to escape with the lesser
+penalty of this section. Where the accused walked into the room where a female child
+of seven and a half months was sleeping and committed an indecent assault on the
+"child, he was held to have committed an offence under this section as he had outraged"
+and intended to outrage whatever modesty the little victim was capable of.1011. Their
+Lordships of the House of Lords have pointed out that a person is guilty of indecent
+assault if he intentionally assaults the victim and intends to commit not just an assault
+"but an indecent assault, i.e., an assault which right-minded persons would think is"
+"indecent. Accordingly, any evidence explaining the defendant's conduct, whether an"
+"admission by him or otherwise, is admissible to establish whether he intended to"
+"commit an indecent assault. In this case,1012. a 26-year-old shop assistant pulled a 12-"
+year-old girl visitor to the shop across his knees and smacked her with his hand 12
+times on her bottom outside her shorts for no apparent reason. On being asked he
+"explained his weakness as ""buttock fetish"". But for this admission there was nothing to"
+convert the assault (to which he confessed) into an indecent one. His explanation to
+his secret motive was held to be relevant to hold him guilty of indecent assault.
+"Moreover, according to section 10, IPC, 1860 a woman denotes a female human being"
+of any age. Where the woman is a consenting party there cannot be any outraging of
+modesty.1013. Unless culpable intention is proved mere touching the belly of a female
+in a public bus cannot be called a deliberate act of outraging the modesty of a female
+within the meaning of this section. In the circumstances of the case the act of the
+accused was held to be accidental and not intentional.1014. Where the accused caught
+hold of a married woman and tried to open the string of her salwar with a view to
+"committing rape on her but being hit by the woman with a kulhari fled away, it was held"
+"that he could not be convicted under section 376 read with section 511 IPC, 1860 as"
+his action did not show a determination to have sexual intercourse at all events and in
+spite of resistance. The conviction of the accused was accordingly changed to one
+"under section 354, IPC, 1860.1015."
+"Where the allegation was, while the victim was returning from home, the accused came"
+"from behind and pressed her breast, the Court convicted him under section 354 IPC,"
+1860.1016. The accused came from behind her and caught hold of her and laid her
+down on the cot and sat on her chest. She shouted and after that the accused left her
+"house. After hearing her shouts, her cousin mother-in-law came there. High Court"
+"rejected the defence of false implication and convicted the accused under section 354,"
+"IPC, 1860.1017. Where a married woman alleged that the two accused persons had"
+dragged her in her own home and raped her one after the other and the medical
+"evidence showed that though there were traces of semen on her clothes, there were"
+"none on the clothes of the accused persons, the Court opined that the case was not"
+made out; the presence of semen on the clothes of a married woman is not unusual
+"and therefore, the accused could have been prosecuted only for outraging the modesty"
+of a woman.1018.
+"Some labourers, including a woman, were taken to a police station for some work."
+"When they demanded wages, they were beaten up. The woman was stripped bare and"
+thrashed. The matter came before the Supreme Court in a writ petition under Article 32
+"of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the offence under section 354, IPC,"
+1860 was established in reference to the woman and awarded compensation to be
+recovered from the salary of the guilty officers.1019. The offence was held to have been
+made out where a senior police officer slapped the posterior of the prosecutrix in the
+midst of guests in a party. The accused must have been fully aware that such an act
+would embarrass her and outrage her modesty. She made hue and cry immediately.
+Her conduct did not suggest that she was stage-managing things to malign the
+accused. The Court observed such behaviour was not expected from a high-ranked
+police officer. His conviction for the offence under the section was maintained by the
+Supreme Court.1020.
+[s 354.2] Parading a naked tribal woman.—
+In a case of parading of a naked tribal woman after disrobing her on the village road in
+"broad daylight by appellants, the Supreme Court held that the dishonour of the victim"
+called for harsher punishment.1021.
+[s 354.3] Outraging modesty or Rape.—
+Dividing line between attempt to commit rape and indecent assault is not only thin but
+also is practically invisible. Evidence of informant that when she went to the house of
+"accused, she found that the victim was sleeping on the floor and accused was lying on"
+her. Accused removed her nicker with a view to commit sexual intercourse. Medical
+evidence does not indicate as to whether accused has tried to force his penis inside
+the private part of girl but could not succeed. Offence committed by accused did not
+amount to attempt to commit rape punishable under section 376 read with section 511
+"of IPC, 1860 but was one under section 354.1022. Though there was ample evidence"
+"that the victim was disrobed by the accused and thus the accused, outraged her"
+modesty there was no evidence of rape. Conviction under section 376 was altered to
+section 354.1023. But in State of UP v Rajit Ram1024. the Supreme Court set aside a
+judgment by which a conviction under section 376 was altered to section 354 and
+remitted the case back to trial court. The accused in another case had forcibly laid the
+prosecutrix on the bed and broken her pyjama's string but made no attempt to undress
+"himself and when the prosecutrix pushed him away, he did not make efforts to grab her"
+again. It was held that it was not an attempt to rape but only outraging of the modesty
+of a woman and conviction under section 354 was proper.1025. But in Ram Mehar v
+"State of Haryana,1026. the accused caught hold of the prosecutrix, lifted her and then"
+"took her to a bajra field where, he pinned her down and tried to open her salwar but"
+could not do so as the prosecutrix had injured him by giving a sickle blow. The accused
+failed to give his blood sample with the result it could be presumed that his innocence
+was doubtful. Ocular evidence of the prosecutrix was also corroborated by other
+"evidence. It was held that conviction of the accused under sections 354, 376/511 was"
+"proper. The accused caught the victim from behind, pushed her on ground, removed her"
+panty and attempted rape. Upon getting opportunity she kicked him in testicles and
+escaped from place of occurrence. The accused was convicted under section 511 read
+with section 376.1027.
+"[s 354.4] Punishment enhanced by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (Act"
+13 of 2013).—
+"By the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 while no change has been made in the"
+"definition of the offence, the punishment for the offence prescribed in this section has"
+been changed by providing a minimum sentence of one year and a maximum sentence
+of five years.
+[s 354.5] CASES.—
+Where the allegation was that the Principal of a school misbehaved with the girl
+"student, the High Court declined to quash the FIR, though he was exonerated in"
+Departmental proceedings.1028. Where the prosecutrix did not state specifically about
+"the act, but has loosely described as ""fondling"", the Supreme Court altered the"
+"conviction from section 376 to section 354.1029. Victim, a deaf and dumb girl aged 13"
+years was lured by the accused from her house to a distant place. When family of
+"victim reached place, the accused fled away leaving victim who was weeping. Her"
+clothes were soiled with mud and accused concealed it. Accused was liable to be
+convicted under section 354.1030. Where the accused touched the hand of the blind
+"prosecutrix, removed the quilt with which she was covering herself and put his hand in"
+"her 'midi', conviction of the accused for attempt to commit rape was set aside but"
+"conviction under sections 354, 457 and 506 was confirmed.1031."
+Where the accused forcibly laid the prosecutrix on bed and cut the string of her pyjama
+"and tore her underwear but did not undress himself, the offence fell under section 354"
+and the offence of attempt to commit rape was not made out.1032.
+Where the accused persons caught hold of a woman and removed the 'saree' from her
+"person but ran away on seeing someone approaching, their act attracted section 354"
+and not sections 375/511. Their conviction under sections 376/511 read with section
+34 was altered to one under sections 354/34.1033.
+Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment.
+[s 354.6] Compounding.—
+"Where the accused and respondent No. 2 had entered into a compromise and,"
+"accordingly, she had filed an affidavit before the Supreme Court during the pendency of"
+appeal. Supreme Court allowed to compound the offences under sections 354 and 506
+"IPC, 1860.1034."
+[s 354.7] Jurisdiction.—
+The petitioners were charged with the offence of kidnapping and outraging the
+modesty of the victim girl. She was taken to different places by train. In the course of
+the journeys she was subjected to outraging. It was held that the Courts of the other
+place would have jurisdiction to try the offender for both the offences.1035. The
+accused held the arms of the prosecutrix with one hand and put the other hand on her
+breasts. This was held to be an offence under section 354.1036.
+[s 354.8] Sentencing.—
+The Court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the
+society at large while considering the imposition of an appropriate punishment.1037.
+[s 354.9] Benefit of Probation.—
+As the appellant has committed a heinous crime and with the social condition
+"prevailing in the society, the modesty of a woman has to be strongly guarded and as"
+"the appellant behaved like a roadside romeo, the Supreme Court held that it is not a fit"
+"case where the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 should be given to the"
+appellant.1038.
+"1000. Subs. by Act 13 of 2013, section 6, for ""shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both"" (w.r.e.f. 3-2-"
+2013).
+"1001. Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 [LNIND 1997 SC 1081] ."
+"1002. Apparel Export Promotion Council v AK Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625 [LNIND 1999 SC 33] ."
+"1003. Aman Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1497 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] : (2004) 4 SCC"
+379 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] .
+"1004. Namdeo Dnyanaba Agarkar v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr LJ 3946 (Bom); Vidyadharan v"
+"State of Kerala, AIR 2004 SC 536 [LNIND 2003 SC 985] : (2004) 1 SCC 215 [LNIND 2003 SC 985] ;"
+"State of Punjab v Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63 [LNIND 1966 SC 130] ."
+"1005. Gigi v State, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 228 ."
+"1006. Tarkeshwar Sahu v State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 560 [LNIND 2006 SC 795] : 2006 (3) SCC"
+"(Cr) 556; Aman Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1497 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] ; Raju"
+"Pandurang Mahale v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1677 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] ."
+"1007. State of Punjab v Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63 [LNIND 1966 SC 130] : 1967 Cr LJ 1 ."
+"1008. Also see Sanjay Das v The State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 2095 (Chh)."
+"1009. Madan Lal v State of Rajasthan, 1987 Cr LJ 257 (Raj). Man Singh v State of Rajasthan,"
+"(1995) 2 Cr LJ 2050 (Raj), no proof of either alleged rape or of outraging modesty. State of TN v"
+"P Balan, 1996 Cr LJ 3705 (Mad), girl forcibly laid up, seminal stains were absent from the body"
+"or clothes, held offence not proved, punishment under sections 341/354."
+"1010. Raju Pandurang Mohale v State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] :"
+AIR 2004 SC 1677 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] .
+"1011. Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63 [LNIND 1966 SC 130] : 1967 Cr LJ 6 ."
+"1012. R v Court, (1988) 2 All ER 221 (HL)."
+"1013. Sadananda, 1972 Cr LJ 658 (Assam)."
+"1014. SP Mallik, 1982 Cr LJ 19 (Pat). Divender Singh v Hari Ram, 1990 Cr LJ 1845 HP, pushing"
+"and beating a girl, intention to outrage modesty not established. Citing, Ram Das v State of WB,"
+AIR 1954 SC 711 : 1954 Cr LJ 793 . Assault by one public servant upon another public servant
+would be covered by section 355 and not by this section. Santanu Kumar Sadangi v State of
+"Orissa, 1989 Cr LJ 2353 (Ori)."
+"1015. Rameshwar, 1984 Cr LJ 786 (P&H). Ram Asrey v State of UP, 1990 Cr LJ 405 : 1989 All LJ"
+"165, High Court can allow compounding of this offence."
+"1016. Asharaf Khan v State of MP, 2013 Cr LJ 1286 (MP)"
+"1017. Namdeo Dnyanaba Agarkar v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr LJ 3946 (Bom). Pritam Singh v"
+"State of HP, 2012 Cr LJ 468 (HP); Dhannula Govindaraju v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ 395 (AP)."
+"1018. State of Orissa v Musa, 1991 Cr LJ 2168 (Ori). For another case of dragging a woman and"
+"making her forcibly naked and committing some acts, but no proof of rape and therefore, the"
+"court opining conviction under this section, see Basudev Naik v State of Orissa, 1991 Cr LJ 1594"
+(Ori). The accused loosening the cord of the petticoat of the prosecutrix and about to sit on her
+waist when she cried out for help. Conviction under this section and not for rape. It was not
+"even attempt to rape, but only a preparation for it. Ankariya v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 751 ."
+"1019. Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarter,"
+"(1989) 4 SCC 730 : 1990 SCC (Cr) 75. See also Chander Kala v Ram Kishan, AIR 1985 SC 1268"
+"[LNIND 1985 SC 166] : 1985 Cr LJ 1490 : (1985) 4 SCC 212 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] , charge under"
+"the section was fully established; Rafi Uddin Khan v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 874 (Ori),"
+"essentials of rape not made, but those of outraging modesty established."
+"1020. Kanwar Pal S Gill v State (Admn. of UT, Chandigarh), 2005 Cr LJ 3443 : AIR 2005 SC 3104"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 558] : (2005) 6 SCC 161 [LNIND 2005 SC 558] , delay in filing complaint was"
+"due to the fact that she first struggled for administrative action and having failed, filed a"
+complaint.
+"1021. Kailas v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 793 [LNIND 2011 SC 22] : AIR 2011 SC 598"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 22] .
+"1022. Tukaram Govind Yadav v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1501 (Bom)."
+"1023. Jeet Singh v State, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 365 ; Aman Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC"
+1497 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] : (2004) 4 SCC 379 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] .
+"1024. State of UP v Rajit Ram, 2011 (6) Scale 477 : (2011) 14 SCC 463 ."
+"1025. Jai Chand v State, 1996 Cr LJ 2039 (Del); Bisheshwar Murmu v State of Bihar, 2004 Cr LJ"
+326 (Jhar).
+"1026. Ram Mehar v State of Haryana, 1998 Cr LJ 1999 (P&H)."
+"1027. Rajesh Vishwakarma v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 2753 (Jha)."
+"1028. KP Sharma v State, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 367 (Raj); Amit Kumar Alias Mittal v State of UP, 2011"
+Cr LJ 3710 (All).
+"1029. Premiya v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2009 SC 351 [LNIND 2008 SC 1889] : (2008) 10 SCC 81"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 1889] .
+"1030. State v Sangay Sherpa, 2013 Cr LJ 2266 (Sik)."
+"1031. Keshav Baliram Naik v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 1111 (Bom). Sanjay Das v The"
+"State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 2095 (Chh)—Allegation was that accused/appellants caught hold of"
+prosecutrix's hand and tried to pull her to do bad work with her. There is no cogent evidence in
+"respect of section 506 Part II of IPC, 1860. However, act done by accused is liable to be"
+"punished under section 354 of IPC, 1860."
+"1032. Jai Chand v State, 1996 Cr LJ 2039 (Del)."
+"1033. Damodar Behera v State of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 346 (Ori). Another similar case is State of"
+"Karnataka v Shivaputrappa, 2002 Cr LJ 1686 (Kant), it was a murder taking place in the process"
+of attempted rape. The accused was seen running away from the place of the incident. Medical
+evidence was not able to establish the precise cause of death. Medical evidence also showed
+"that there was no sexual assault, but there were minor injuries on the lower part of the body"
+from which the offence of outraging her body was made out. Conviction under section 376/511
+"was altered to one under section 354. Shiv Shankar v State of UP, 2002 Cr LJ 2673 (All), the"
+accused caught hold of the victim and then made her fall to the ground. This was held to be not
+"an attempt to rape but an outrage to the modesty of a woman. Shoukat v State of Rajasthan,"
+"2002 Cr LJ 364 (Raj), taking away a nursing woman from her home under false pretences and"
+"then molesting and beating her on the way, held, outraging the modesty of a woman made out."
+"Bali v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 909 (Raj), allegation of forcible rape not proved but"
+"application of force to outrage the modesty of women proved, punishment under section 354."
+"Tarachand v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ (Raj), victims primary school students of tender age,"
+"the sexual assailant was their head master, conviction. Madan Lal v State of J&K, 1998 Cr LJ 667"
+"(SC), evidence showed that the accused had gone beyond the stage of preparation, mere non-"
+penetration was not sufficient to absolve him of the offence of attempt to commit rape. It was
+"not a case of mere assault under section 354. Kuthu v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 960 (MP), the"
+accused took the prosecutrix by deception to a lonely place and cruelly pushed a bunch of
+"leaves into her mouth. They untied her undergarments to satisfy their lust. Conviction proper,"
+"four months RI not interfered with. Shivraj Chandrappa Yadav v State, 1998 Cr LJ 3168 , the"
+accused attempted to commit rape on a 10 year old girl. Sentence of two years RI and fine of
+Rs. 500 under section 354 and six months imprisonment and fine of Rs. 100 under section 342
+"was not interfered with. See also Raja v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1608 (Raj); Ram Mehar v"
+"State, 1998 Cr LJ 1999 (P&H); Peedikandi Abdulla v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 2758 (Ker);"
+"Shakuntala Devi v Suneet Kumar, 1997 Cr LJ 335 (Del), accused entered house of complainant,"
+"dragged her out, tore her clothes and improperly behaved with her, prima facie, the offence made"
+"out. Refusal by court to frame charge was improper. Raja Giri v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 2347"
+"(Pat), the victim woman intercepted and laid down on the ground with the intent of raping her,"
+"witnesses reached on her cries and they could not go further, guilty of outraging modesty."
+"1034. Surat Singh v State, (2012) 12 SCC 772 [LNIND 2012 SC 837] : 2013 (1) Scale 1 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 837] .
+"1035. Devalla Venkateswarlu v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 798 (AP)."
+"1036. State of HP v Ram Das, 1999 Cr LJ 2802 (HP), her public image and position in family was"
+"damaged, even the accused was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 only because of the fact that"
+the incident was fairly old.
+"1037. State of MP v Bablu, 2014 Cr LJ 4565 : 2014 (9) Scale 678 [LNIND 2014 SC 948] ."
+"1038. Ajahar Ali v State of WB, 2013 (12) Scale 410 [LNIND 2013 SC 924] ; Pritam Singh v State"
+"of HP, 2012 Cr LJ 468 (HP)– Petitioner, aged about 28 years, agriculturist by profession,"
+belonged to a respectable and peace-loving family — He would be stigmatised and in case he
+was sentenced his life would be ruined— Benefits of section 4 of Act was granted to petitioner.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+1039.[[s 354-A] Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment.
+(1) A man committing any of the following acts—
+(i) physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual
+overtures; or
+(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
+(iii) showing pornography against the will of a woman; or (iv) making sexually
+coloured remarks;
+shall be guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
+(2) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or clause (ii) or
+clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for
+"a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of sub-section (1)
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
+"may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.]"
+COMMENTS.—
+This new provision has its origin in the judgment of Supreme Court1040. dealing with
+the issue of sexual harassment in workplaces. The suggestions given by Supreme
+Court got statutory recognition by the enactment of Sexual Harassment of Women at
+"Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.1041."
+"1039. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 7 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"1040. Vishakha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 [LNIND 1997 SC 1081] : (1997) 6 SCC"
+241 [LNIND 1997 SC 1081] .
+1041. Act 14 of 2013 (w.e.f 9 December 2013).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+1042.[s 354-B] Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe.
+Any man who assaults or uses criminal force to any woman or abets such act with the
+"intention of disrobing or compelling her to be naked, shall be punished with"
+imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years
+"but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+COMMENTS.—
+"This new provision has not been based on any recommendation, but is an incorporation"
+of the State Amendment made by Madhya Pradesh into the original section 354 which
+was numbered as a separate section 354A.
+"1042. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 7 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+1043.[s 354-C] Voyeurism.
+"Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a private act in"
+circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed
+either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or
+disseminates such image shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of
+"either description for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may"
+"extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and be punished on a second or"
+"subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall"
+"not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+"Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, ""private act"" includes an act of"
+"watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be"
+"expected to provide privacy and where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are"
+exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim
+is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public.
+"Explanation 2.—Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or any act, but"
+not to their dissemination to third persons and where such image or act is
+"disseminated, such dissemination shall be considered an offence under this section.]"
+COMMENTS.—
+This is a new provision prescribing an offence based on the suggestions of the Justice
+"JS Verma Committee, constituted in the aftermath of the December 2012 Nirbhaya"
+"rape incident. During the deliberations, the Committee was surprised to find out that"
+"offences such as stalking, voyeurism, 'eve-teasing', etc., are perceived as 'minor'"
+"offences, even though they are capable of depriving not only a girl child but frail"
+children of their right to education and their freedom of expression and movement. The
+Committee was of the view that it is not sufficient for the State to legislate and
+"establish machinery of prosecution, but conscious and well-thought-out attempts are"
+required to be made to ensure the culture of mutual respect is fostered in India's
+children. Preventive measures for the initial minor aberrations were deemed necessary
+to check their escalation into major sexual aberrations.
+The definition of this offence has the following ingredients:
+(I) If a person—
+"(i) either watches,"
+(ii) or captures the image.
+"(II) of, a woman engaging in a private act."
+(III) in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of—
+(i) either not being observed by the perpetrator
+(ii) or not being observed by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator.
+"1043. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section. 7 (w.e.f. 3-2-"
+2013).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+1044.[s 354-D] Stalking.
+(1) Any man who—
+"(i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to"
+foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of
+disinterest by such woman; or
+"(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of"
+"electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking:"
+Provided that such conduct shall not amount to stalking if the man who
+pursued it proves that—
+(i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime and the
+man accused of stalking had been entrusted with the responsibility of
+prevention and detection of crime by the State; or
+(ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or
+requirement imposed by any person under any law; or
+(iii) in the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable and
+justified.
+(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall be punished on first conviction
+with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine; and be punished on a second or"
+"subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+COMMENTS.—
+The definition of this offence has the following ingredients:
+(I) If a man—
+"(i) follows a woman and contacts or attempts to contact such woman,"
+"(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of"
+"electronic communication,"
+(iii) or watches or spies on a person
+(II) to foster personal interaction repeatedly
+(III) despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman
+"So, when despite a clear indication of disinterest by woman, if she is followed by a man"
+either in person or through the electronic medium then he is guilty of the offence of
+stalking as defined in this section
+[s 354-D.1]Eve-teasing.—
+The Indian Journal of Criminology and Criminalistics (January–June 1995 Edn) has
+"categorised eve-teasing into five heads, viz., (1) verbal eve-teasing; (2) physical eve-"
+teasing; (3) psychological harassment; (4) sexual harassment; and (5) harassment
+"through some objects. In Vishaka v State of Rajasthan,1045. the Supreme Court has laid"
+"down certain guidelines on sexual harassments. In Rupan Deol Bajaj v KPS Gill,1046. the"
+Supreme Court has explained the meaning of 'modesty' in relation to women.1047.
+Supreme Court Guidelines on Eve-teasing
+"Before undertaking suitable legislation to curb eve-teasing, it is necessary to take at"
+least some urgent measures so that it can be curtailed to some extent. In public
+"interest, we are therefore inclined to give the following directions:"
+1. All the State Governments and Union Territories are directed to depute plain
+"clothed female police officers in the precincts of bus-stands and stops, railway"
+"stations, metro stations, cinema theatres, shopping malls, parks, beaches, public"
+"service vehicles, places of worship, etc., so as to monitor and supervise incidents"
+of eve-teasing.
+2. There will be a further direction to the State Government and Union Territories to
+install CCTV in strategic positions which itself would be a deterrent and if
+"detected, the offender could be caught."
+"3. Persons in-charge of the educational institutions, places of worship, cinema"
+"theatres, railway stations, bus-stands have to take steps as they deem fit to"
+"prevent eve-teasing, within their precincts and, on a complaint being made, they"
+must pass on the information to the nearest police station or the Women's Help
+Centre.
+4. Where any incident of eve-teasing is committed in a public service vehicle either
+"by the passengers or the persons in charge of the vehicle, the crew of such"
+"vehicle shall, on a complaint made by the aggrieved person, take such vehicle to"
+the nearest police station and give information to the police. Failure to do so
+should lead to cancellation of the permit to ply.
+5. State Governments and Union Territories are directed to establish Women'
+"Helpline in various cities and towns, so as to curb eve-teasing within three"
+months.
+6. Suitable boards cautioning such act of eve-teasing be exhibited in all public
+"places including precincts of educational institutions, bus stands, railway"
+"stations, cinema theatres, parties, beaches, public service vehicles, places of"
+"worship, etc."
+"7. Responsibility is also on the passers-by and on noticing such incident, they"
+should also report the same to the nearest police station or to Women Helpline to
+save the victims from such crimes.
+8. The State Governments and Union Territories of India would take adequate and
+effective measures by issuing suitable instructions to the concerned authorities
+including the District Collectors and the District Superintendent of Police so as to
+take effective and proper measures to curb such incidents of eve-teasing.
+[Deputy Inspector General of Police v S Samuthiram.1048.]
+"1044. Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 7 (w.e.f. 3 February"
+2013)
+"1045. Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, (1977) 6 SCC 241 ."
+"1046. Rupan Deol Bajaj v KPS Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 [LNIND 1995 SC 981] ."
+"1047. Deputy Inspector General of Police v S Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+755] : AIR 2013 SC 14 [LNIND 2012 SC 755] . See the Box with 'Supreme Court Guidelines on Eve-
+teasing'.
+"1048. Deputy Inspector General of Police v S Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+755] : AIR 2013 SC 14 [LNIND 2012 SC 755]
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+"[s 355] Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour person, otherwise"
+than on grave provocation.
+"Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending thereby to dishonour"
+"that person, otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.—The offence under section 55 is non-cognizable, bailable and triable by"
+any Magistrate vide A.P. Act No. 3 of 1992 section 2 (w.e.f. 15-2-1992).
+COMMENT.—
+The intention to dishonour may be supposed to exist when the assault or criminal force
+is by means of gross insults. An accused person while under trial struck a Sub-
+Inspector of Police who was in the witness-box giving evidence against him. It was held
+that he was guilty of this offence.1049.
+"1049. Altaf Mian, (1907) 27 AWN 186."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 356] Assault or criminal force in attempt to commit theft of property carried
+by a person.
+"Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, in attempting to commit theft"
+"on any property which that person is then wearing or carrying, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 357] Assault or criminal force in attempt wrongfully to confine a person.
+"Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person, in attempting wrongfully to"
+"confine that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand"
+"rupees, or with both."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Criminal Force and Assault
+[s 358] Assault or criminal force on grave provocation.
+Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person on grave and sudden
+"provocation given by that person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a"
+"term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred"
+"rupees, or with both."
+Explanation.—The last section is subject to the same Explanation as section 352.
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides for mild punishment if the assault or criminal force is the result
+of grave and sudden provocation.
+"The word ""last"" in the Explanation is inaccurate. Instead of the words ""the last"" the word"
+"""this"" only should have been used."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 359] Kidnapping.
+"Kidnapping is of two kinds: kidnapping from 1050.[India], and kidnapping from lawful"
+guardianship.
+COMMENT.—
+The literal meaning of 'kidnapping' is child stealing.
+Kidnapping is of two kinds. But there may be cases in which the two kinds overlap each
+"other. For instance, a minor may be kidnapped from India as well as lawful"
+guardianship. A bare perusal of the provisions clearly shows that the legislature did not
+confine to constitute the offence only if a minor girl is taken away from the place where
+"she used to reside but the emphasis is upon taking away the girl from the ""lawful"
+"guardianship"". Sections 359 and 361, IPC, 1860 do not spell-out any territorial"
+jurisdiction for committing the offence. In my view the rigour of the law travels with the
+ward/subject and any person involving himself or herself in the offence of kidnapping
+or procuring a minor girl at any point of time would also come within the purview of
+"sections 359 and 361, IPC, 1860.1051."
+"1050. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"1051. Taru Das v State of Tripura, 2008 Cr LJ 3143 (Gau)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 360] Kidnapping from India.
+Whoever conveys any person beyond the limits of 1052.[India] without the consent of
+"that person, or of some person legally authorised to consent on behalf of that person,"
+is said to kidnap that person from 1053.[India].
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section may be committed on a grown-up person or a minor by
+conveying him or her beyond the limits of India. If the person kidnapped is above 12
+years of age and has given consent to his or her being conveyed beyond the limits of
+"India, no offence is committed.1054. Now, the age limit for boys is 16 and for girls 18"
+under Act XLII of 1949.
+[s 360.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two things:—
+(1) Conveying of any person beyond the limits of India.
+(2) Such conveying must be without the consent of that person.
+"1052. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"1053. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"1054. Haribhai v State, (1918) 20 Bom LR 372 : 42 Bom 391."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 361] Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.
+"Whoever takes or entices any minor under 1055.[sixteen] years of age if a male, or"
+"under 1056.[eighteen] years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of"
+"the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without"
+"the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful"
+guardianship.
+"Explanation.—The words ""lawful guardian"" in this section include any person lawfully"
+entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person.
+Exception.—This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith
+"believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes"
+"himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is"
+committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.
+State Amendment
+"Manipur.—The following amendments were made by Act No. 80 of 1950, s. 3(2) (w.e.f."
+"16-4-1950) read with Act 81 of 1971, s. 3 (w.e.f. 25-1-1972)."
+"In its application to the State of Manipur, in Section 361 for the word ""eighteen"""
+"substituted the word ""fifteen""."
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section may be committed in respect of either a minor or a
+"person of unsound mind. To kidnap a grown-up person of sound mind, therefore, would"
+not amount to an offence under it.
+[s 361.1] Object.—
+The object of this section is at least as much to protect children of tender age from
+"being abducted or seduced for improper purposes, as for the protection of the rights of"
+parents and guardians having the lawful charge or custody of minors or insane
+persons.
+[s 361.2] Ingredients.—
+This section has four essentials1057..—
+(1) Taking or enticing away a minor or a person of unsound mind.
+"(2) Such minor must be under 16 years of age, if a male, or under 18 years of age, if"
+a female.
+(3) The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such
+minor or person of unsound mind.
+(4) Such taking or enticing must be without the consent of such guardian.
+[s 361.3] 'Takes or entices any minor'.—
+The Supreme Court considered the interpretation of expression 'takes or entices' in S
+"Varadarajan v State of Madras,1058. and State of Haryana v Rajaram.1059. The purpose"
+"and object of section 361 IPC, 1860 appears to be in dispute. In Varadarajan, the"
+"Supreme Court had occasion to consider this. In section 498 IPC, 1860 we find"
+identical expression 'takes or entices' employed by the legislature. That was of course
+"for a totally different offence. While considering the object of section 361 IPC, 1860,"
+"the Supreme Court in Varadarajan, took the view that the interpretation of the"
+"expression 'takes or entices' in section 498 IPC, 1860 cannot be blindly and"
+mechanically imported while considering the interpretation of the same expression in
+"section 361 IPC, 1860. It took the view that section 498 IPC, 1860 is meant essentially"
+"for protection of the rights of the husband, whereas section 361 IPC, 1860 and other"
+"cognate sections of the IPC, 1860 are intended more for the protection of minors and"
+persons of unsound mind than the rights of the guardians of such persons. But in
+"Rajaram, the Supreme Court held that:"
+The object of this section seems as much to protect the minor children from being seduced
+for improper purposes as to protect the rights and privileges of guardians having the lawful
+charge or custody of their minor wards. The gravamen of this offence lies in the taking or
+"enticing of a minor under the ages specified in this section, out of the keeping of the lawful"
+guardian without the consent of such guardian. The words 'takes or entices any minor … out
+"of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor' in S. 361, are significant. The use of the"
+"word 'keeping' in the context connotes the idea of charge, protection, maintenance and"
+control: further the guardian's charge and control appears to be compatible with the
+"independence of action and movement in the minor, the guardian's protection and control of"
+"the minor being available, whenever necessity arises. On plain reading of this section the"
+consent of the minor who is taken or enticed is wholly immaterial: it is only the guardian's
+consent which takes the case out of its purview. Nor is it necessary that the taking or
+enticing must be shown to have been by means of force or fraud. Persuasion by the
+accused person which creates willingness on the part of the minor to be taken out of the
+keeping of the lawful guardian would be sufficient to attract the section.
+A person who allows such a minor who is already out of the keeping of the guardian to
+"accompany him commits no offence under section 361 IPC, 1860. That alone is the"
+dictum in Varadarajan. It is no authority on the question whether consent of a minor
+(even a knowledgeable minor close to 18 years) is relevant or crucial in a prosecution
+"under section 361 IPC, 1860. Later a two-Judge Bench in T D Vadgama v State of"
+"Gujarat,1060. ascertained the precise distinction in the dictum between the three-Judge"
+Benches in Varadarajan and Rajaram. The dictum in Varadarajan turned on its own
+peculiar facts. It was held:
+"it would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior"
+"to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had"
+"at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our opinion, if evidence to"
+"establish one of those things is lacking, it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused"
+is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after
+"she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined"
+the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house
+"by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused"
+"could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our"
+"opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful"
+"guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to 'taking'."
+The intention with which kidnapping is effected can be ascertained from the
+circumstances of the offence at the time of occurrence or prior or subsequent to it. A
+kidnapping does not per se lead to any inference of intent or purpose of
+kidnapping.1061. Persuasion by the accused which created willingness on the part of
+the minor to be taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian was held by the
+Supreme Court to be enough to attract section 361. The Supreme Court also restated
+the ingredients.1062.
+Promise of marriage made to the minor girl for leaving the house of the lawful guardian
+was held to be an enticement.1063.
+The word 'take' means 'to cause to go' to escort or to get into possession. It implies
+want of wish and absence of desire of the person taken. There is a distinction between
+taking and allowing a minor to accompany a person.1064.
+[s 361.4] When 'taking' is complete.—
+The offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship is complete when the minor is
+actually taken from lawful guardianship; it is not an offence continuing so long as the
+minor is kept out of such guardianship. In determining whether a person takes a minor
+"out of the lawful keeping of its guardian, the distance to which the minor is taken away"
+is immaterial.1065.
+[s 361.5] 'Enticing'
+is an act of the accused by which the person kidnapped is induced of his own accord to
+go to the kidnapper. The word 'entice' involves an idea of inducement or allurement by
+exciting hope or desire in the other. It may take many forms difficult to visualise. It is
+not necessary that 'taking' or 'enticing' should be by means of force or fraud. The word
+'entice' involves the idea of inducement or allurement.1066.
+"[s 361.6] 'Under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age,"
+if a female'.—
+In the case of a boy the age limit is fixed at 16 years; in the case of a girl at 18 by Act
+XLII of 1949. Before this amendment the age limit was 14 and 16 respectively. Where a
+"girl under that age is kidnapped, it is no defence that the accused did not know the girl"
+"to be under that age, or that from her appearance he might have thought that she was"
+"of a greater age.1067. Anyone dealing with such a girl does so at his peril, and if she"
+"turns out to be under 18 he must take the consequences,1068. even though he bona fide"
+believed and had reasonable ground for believing that she was over eighteen.1069.
+[s 361.7] 'Any person of unsound mind'.—
+If the person kidnapped is normally of sound mind but is made unconscious from
+"poisoning, such a person cannot be said to be of unsound mind. For example, a person"
+under an anaesthetic for an operation can hardly be said to be of unsound mind. Where
+a girl aged 20 years had been made unconscious from dhatura poisoning when she
+"was taken away, it was held that she could not be said to be a person of unsound mind,"
+and the person taking her away could not be guilty of kidnapping.1070.
+[s 361.8] 'Out of the keeping of the lawful guardian'.—
+The Legislature has advisedly preferred the expression 'the keeping of the lawful
+guardian' to the word 'possession'. The word 'keeping' is compatible with the
+independence of action and movement in the object kept.1071.
+Persuasion by the accused is sufficient to constitute 'taking' within the meaning of this
+section. Consent of the minor is wholly immaterial. It is only the guardian's consent that
+takes the case out of the purview of this section.1072.
+"In Vipin Menon v State of Karnataka,1073. it was held that the father, in the absence of"
+"divestment of right of guardianship, cannot be guilty of kidnapping his minor child."
+[s 361.9] Explanation.—'Lawful guardian'.—
+The Explanation is intended to extend the protection given to parents to any person
+lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of the minor.1074.
+Where the order in favour of the mother was passed by the lower Court but it was
+"stayed by the High Court, it was held that the father who had custody of the minor child"
+would continue to be in lawful custody until further orders. The Supreme Court clarified
+"that the law in India is to be governed by the provisions of IPC, 1860 and not the US"
+"International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act, 1993.1075."
+[s 361.10] 'Entrustment'.—
+"Entrustment, which this section requires, may be inferred from a well-defined and"
+consistent course of conduct governing the relations of the minor and the person
+alleged to be the lawful guardian.1076.
+"1055. Subs. by Act 42 of 1949, sec. 2, for ""fourteen""."
+"1056. Subs. by Act 42 of 1949, sec. 2, for ""sixteen""."
+"1057. Restated in Biswanath Mallick v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1416 (Ori)."
+"1058. S Varadarajan v State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942 [LNIND 1964 SC 223] : 1965 (2) Cr LJ"
+33 .
+"1059. State of Haryana v Rajaram, AIR 1973 SC 819 [LNIND 1972 SC 508] : 1973 (1) SCC 544"
+[LNIND 1972 SC 508] : 1973 Cr LJ 651 .
+"1060. T D Vadgama v State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 SC 2313 [LNIND 1973 SC 187] : 1973 (2) SCC"
+413 [LNIND 1973 SC 187] .
+"1061. Badshah v State of UP, (2008) 3 SCC 681 [LNIND 2008 SC 310] : 2008 Cr LJ 1950 : (2008)"
+3 All LJ 524.
+"1062. Prakash v State of Haryana, (2004) 1 SCC 339 [LNIND 2003 SC 1045] : AIR 2004 SC 227"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1045] : 2004 Cr LJ 595 .
+"1063. Moniram Hazarika v State of Assam, (2004) 5 SCC 120 [LNIND 2004 SC 476] : AIR 2004"
+SC 2472 [LNIND 2004 SC 476] : 2004 Cr LJ 2553 .
+"1064. Biswanath Mallick v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1416 (Ori)."
+"1065. Chhajju Ram, AIR 1968 P&H 439 ."
+"1066. Biswanath Mallick v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1416 (Ori)."
+"1067. Robins, (1844) 1 C&K 456; Krishna Maharana, (1929) 9 Pat 647. Biswanath Mallick v State"
+"of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1416 (Ori)."
+"1068. Christian Olifier, (1866) 10 Cox 402."
+"1069. Prince, (1875) LR 2 CC R 154; Krishna Maharana, sup. Where the prosecution produced the"
+school leaving certificate for proof of age and not the horoscope though available and two
+"doctors testified on behalf of the accused that the girl was major, the accused acquitted under"
+"benefit of doubt, Pravakar v Ajaya Kumar Das, 1996 Cr LJ 2626 (Ori). Vishnu v State of"
+"Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 1724 (Bom), evidence of mother of prosecutrix and that of her school"
+head master showed her to be below 16. This was also corroborated by medical evidence. This
+fact was not challenged by the defence. Finding as to her age as below 16 was held to be
+"proper. Mohan v State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cr LJ 1891 (Raj), failure of the prosecution to prove"
+"that the prosecutrix was under 18 years of age at the relevant time, offence under the section"
+not made out.
+"1070. Din Mohammad, 1939 20 Lah 517."
+"1071. Lakshmidhar Misra, (1956) Cut 546. Biswanath Mallick v State of Orissa, (1995) 2 Cr LJ"
+"1416 (Ori), kidnapping from custody of guardian without the intention of forced marriage,"
+"offence under section 361, not under section 366."
+"1072. State of Haryana v Raja Ram, 1973 Cr LJ 651 (SC); See also Rasool v State, 1976 Cr LJ 363"
+(All).
+"1073. Vipin Menon v State of Karnataka, 1992 Cr LJ 3737 (Kant)."
+"1074. Jagannadha Rao v Kamaraju, (1900) 24 Mad 284, 291; Baz v State, (1922) 3 Lah 213. A girl"
+living in a rented room for the purpose of an examination where her father visited her once is in
+"the custody of the guardian. Bhagban Panigrahi v State of Orissa, 1989 Cr LJ (NOC) 103 (Ori)."
+"1075. Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 9 SCC 551 [LNIND 2009 SC 1646]"
+.
+"1076. Nageshwar, AIR 1962 Pat 121 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 362] Abduction.
+"Whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from"
+"any place, is said to abduct that person."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section merely gives a definition of the word ""abduction"" which occurs in some of"
+the penal provisions which follow. There is no such offence as abduction under the
+"Code, but abduction with certain intent is an offence. Force or fraud is essential."
+[s 362.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two things:—
+(1) Forceful compulsion or inducement by deceitful means.1077.
+(2) The object of such compulsion or inducement must be the going of a person
+from any place.
+"""The expression ""deceitful means"" includes a misleading statement. It is, really"
+"speaking, a matter of intention. The intention of the accused is the basis and gravamen"
+"of the charge. The volition, the intention and conduct of the woman do not determine"
+the offence.1078. The offence of abduction under section 362 of the Code involves use
+of force or deceit to compel or induce any person to go from any place.1079.
+[s 362.2] Abduction and kidnapping.—
+"(1) 'Kidnapping' is committed only in respect of a minor under 16 years of age if a male,"
+"and under 18 years if a female or a person of unsound mind; 'abduction', in respect of a"
+person of any age.
+"(2) In 'kidnapping', the person kidnapped is removed out of lawful guardianship. A child"
+without a guardian cannot be kidnapped. 'Abduction' has reference exclusively to the
+person abducted.
+"(3) In 'kidnapping', the minor is simply taken away. The means used may be innocent. In"
+"'abduction', force, compulsion, or deceitful means are used."
+"(4) In kidnapping, consent of the person taken or enticed is immaterial; in abduction,"
+"consent of the person moved, if freely and voluntarily given, condones abduction."
+"(5) In kidnapping, the intent of the offender is a wholly irrelevant consideration: in"
+"abduction, it is the all-important factor."
+(6) Kidnapping from guardianship is a substantive offence under the Code; but
+"abduction is an auxiliary act, not punishable by itself, but made criminal only when it is"
+"done with one or other of the intents specified in section 364, et seq.1080."
+"1077. Suresh Babu v State of Kerala, 2001 Cr LJ 1483 (Ker), where a girl of about 16 years old"
+was in love with the accused and the evidence showed that she left her home on her own
+accord and joined the accused for getting their marriage registered and lived as husband and
+wife thereafter. Conviction of the accused was set aside because it could not be said that he
+"kidnapped her. Ram Chandra Singh v Nabrang Rai Burma, 1998 Cr LJ 2156 (Ori), on the same"
+point.
+"1078. A Pasayat, J in Rabinarayan Das v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 269 , 273 (Ori), citing Re"
+"Khalandar Sahab, AIR 1955 SC 39 , Edn (Sic) ""or AIR 1955 59 (AP)""."
+"1079. Subhash Krishnan v State of Goa, (2012) 8 SCC 365 [LNIND 2012 SC 480] : AIR 2012 SC"
+3003 [LNIND 2012 SC 480] .
+"1080. Restated in Biswanath Mallick v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1416 (Ori)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 363] Punishment for kidnapping.
+"Whoever kidnaps any person from 1081.[India] or from lawful guardianship, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+State Amendment
+"Uttar Pradesh.—The offence u/s. 363 IPC is non-bailable, vide U.P. Act, No. 1 of 1984."
+COMMENT.—
+This section must be read with section 361. The offence of kidnapping from lawful
+guardianship penalised by this section is the offence which is defined by section 361.
+"The person against whom the offence is committed must be under the age of sixteen,"
+"if a male, and under the age of eighteen, if a female.1082."
+[s 363.1] Tribal Custom.—
+Where a married girl of 17 years of age was forcibly carried away by the accused and
+his companions from a jungle where she had gone with others to collet mohua flowers
+"with a view to marrying her according to their tribal custom, it was held that such a"
+"custom, if any, could apply only to the cases of young unmarried men and women and"
+had no application to legalise the kidnapping of a married minor girl out of the keeping
+of her lawful guardian.1083.
+"[s 363.2] Section 363 IPC is not a minor offence of Section 376 IPC, 1860.—"
+"Offence of kidnapping under section 363 IPC, 1860 and of rape under section 376 IPC,"
+"1860 cannot be held to be cognate offences. Therefore, accused cannot be convicted"
+for offence of kidnapping in absence of charge framed against him for the said
+offence.1084.
+[s 363.3] Extradition offence.—
+"Offence under section 363 of the IPC, 1860 is an extraditable offence, provided it is not"
+a pure matrimonial dispute.1085.
+"1081. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"1082. Ismail Sayadsaheb, (1933) 35 Bom LR 886 : 57 Bom 537 FB. Anandham v State of TN,"
+"(1995) 1 Cr LJ 632 (Mad), here the accused was acquitted under section 376 (rape) and section"
+"366 (kidnapping for marriage), he was convicted under this section for simple kidnapping. Omi v"
+"State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 155 (All), acquittal from charges of kidnapping and rape, story of the"
+"victim not reliable, medical evidence also not proving rape. Kuldeep K Mahato v State of Bihar,"
+"AIR 1998 SC 2694 [LNIND 1998 SC 714] : 1998 Cr LJ 1597 (Raj), the prosecutrix was below 18"
+years of age. She was taken away by the accused person to a particular place by means of a
+tempo. The court said that the offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship was made out.
+"But ingredients of the offence of rape not proved. Hence, no conviction for rape. Bagula Naik v"
+"State of Orissa, 1999 Cr LJ 2077 (Ori), a girl left home of her own, met by chance a person on the"
+road who took her to his home and detained her for several days. The version given by the girl
+was truthful. The fact that there was no mens rea and he appeared before the police along with
+the girl was not sufficient to prove his innocence. His conviction was maintained. Sumitra Bai v
+"State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 2541 (MP), taken away by one person and deposited in the house of"
+"another, both liable. Mahesh Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 597 (Raj), gang rape after"
+"kidnapping, both accused helped each other in the satisfaction of their lust, either liable for act"
+"of the other. Akeel v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 4530 (MP) consenting party to sex, accused not"
+"liable for rape, but she being below 18 years, he was guilty of kidnapping. Jitmohan Lohar v State"
+"of Orissa, 1997 Cr LJ 2842 (Ori), the girl of consenting age going away voluntarily, conviction for"
+kidnapping not proper.
+"1083. Dutta Pradhan, 1985 Cr LJ 1842 (Ori). See also Tannu Lal v State of UP, 1981 SCC (Cr) 675"
+": 1981 Supp SCC 47 , conviction of the main accused along with his two companions who either"
+"stood by or helped him. Prem Chand v State, 1987 Cr LJ 910 (Del) no proof of allegations."
+"1084. F Nataraja v State, 2010 Cr LJ 2180 (Kar)."
+"1085. Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 9 SCC 551 [LNIND 2009 SC 1646]"
+: (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 47.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 1086.[363A] Kidnapping or maiming a minor for purposes of begging.
+"(1) Whoever kidnaps any minor or, not being the lawful guardian of a minor,"
+"obtains the custody of the minor, in order that such minor may be employed or"
+used for the purpose of begging shall be punishable with imprisonment of
+"either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+(2) Whoever maims any minor in order that such minor may be employed or used
+"for the purposes of begging shall be punishable with imprisonment for life, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+"(3) Where any person, not being the lawful guardian of a minor, employs or uses"
+"such minor for the purposes of begging, it shall be presumed, unless the"
+"contrary is proved, that he kidnapped or otherwise obtained the custody of that"
+minor in order that the minor might be employed or used for the purpose of
+begging.
+"(4) In this section,—"
+(a) 'begging' means—
+"(i) soliciting or receiving alms in a public place, whether under the"
+"pretence of singing, dancing, fortune-telling, performing tricks or"
+selling articles or otherwise;
+(ii) entering on any private premises for the purpose of soliciting or
+receiving alms;
+"(iii) exposing or exhibiting, with the object of obtaining or extorting"
+"alms, any sore, wound, injury, deformity or disease, whether of"
+himself or of any other person or of an animal;
+(iv) using a minor as an exhibit for the purpose of soliciting or
+receiving alms;
+"(b) ""minor"" means—"
+"(i) in the case of a male, a person under sixteen years of age; and"
+"(ii) in the case of a female, a person under eighteen years of age.]"
+COMMENT.—
+This section was inserted by Act LII of 1959. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons
+it is stated:
+"To put down effectively the evil of kidnapping of children for exploiting them for begging, the"
+provisions existing in the Indian Penal Code are not quite adequate. There is also no special
+provision for deterrent punishment for the greater evil of maiming of children so as to make
+them objects of pity.
+"This section makes kidnapping or obtaining custody of a minor, and the maiming of a"
+"minor for employing him for begging, specific offences and provides for deterrent"
+punishment.
+"1086. Ins. by Act 52 of 1959, section 2 (w.e.f. 15 January 1960)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 364] Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder.
+Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be murdered
+"or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered, shall be punished"
+with 1087.[imprisonment for life] or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
+"extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A kidnaps Z from 1088.[India], intending or knowing it to be likely that Z may be"
+sacrificed to an idol. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+(b) A forcibly carries or entices B away from his home in order that B may be
+murdered. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT.—
+To establish an offence under this section it must be proved that the person charged
+with the offence had the intention at the time of the kidnapping or abduction that the
+person kidnapped or abducted will be murdered or so disposed of as to be put in
+danger of being murdered.1089. The Supreme Court stated the ingredients to be: (1)
+kidnapping by the accused must be proved; (2) it must also be proved that the person
+"in question was kidnapped in order, (a) that he may be murdered, or (b) that he might"
+be disposed of in such manner as to be put in danger of being murdered.1090.
+When it was not proved that kidnapping was with intention to commit murder of victim
+"boy, it was held that conviction of appellant under section 363 of IPC, 1860 is proper"
+"though charge against accused was framed under section 364 IPC, 1860.1091."
+[s 364.1] Presumption of killing by abductors.—
+"An abducted victim was murdered later on. It was held that the Court can, depending"
+"on the factual situation, draw the presumption that the abductors are responsible for"
+the murder. It is their responsibility to explain to the Court what they had done with the
+victim.1092. The facts of the case showed that the parties were inimically disposed
+against each other. The presence of the accused at the place of occurrence was also
+established. They picked up the person and bodily lifted him away. They fired in the air
+to ward off resistance. The abducted person was not seen or heard of since 27 years.
+"Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 applied to create presumption of death. In"
+"the face of such death, whether actual or presumptive, the inference of murder by"
+abductors arises. The Court said that it would not be necessary to prove corpus delicit.
+The offence under the section was made out.1093. Where abduction of the victim was
+"proved and the victim was found murdered soon after abduction, the Supreme Court"
+said that it was for the accused to satisfy the Court as to how the abducted victim was
+"dealt with. In the absence of any such explanation, the Court may draw the"
+presumption that the abductor was murderer also.1094.
+"1087. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, sec. 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-1956)."
+"1088. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+"1089. Tondi v State, 1975 Cr LJ 950 (All) : AIR 1940 Cal 561 followed; Sardar Hussain v State of"
+"UP, 1988 Cr LJ 1807 : AIR 1988 SC 1766 [LNIND 1988 SC 366] : 1988 Supp SCC 623 . State of"
+"MP v Mahesh Mohan Lal Mali, 1990 Cr LJ 2483 , of the two accused, evidence that child"
+kidnapped and killed was last seen with one of them and this fact along with his extra-judicial
+"confession, was sufficient for conviction, but the bare confession of the other accused not"
+"sufficient. State of MP v Amar Singh, AIR 1994 SC 650 : 1994 Cr LJ 619 , witnesses not"
+"implicating the accused of abduction or murder, evidence not sufficient to prove the guilt of the"
+"accused, acquittal affirmed. Pankaj Naik v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 829 (Ori), kidnapped child"
+"deposing the story, admits tutoring, his evidence not trustworthy, medical evidence"
+"contradictory, conviction not sustainable. Arumugham v State of TN, 1994 Cr LJ 520 (Mad),"
+where the accused was prosecuted for abducting a girl and killing her and the extra-judicial
+confession of the accused and the alleged cause of death by throttling were not proved by the
+"oral and medical evidence, it was held that accused was entitled to acquittal."
+"1090. Badshah v State of UP, (2008) 3 SCC 681 [LNIND 2008 SC 310] : 2008 Cr LJ 1950 : (2008)"
+3 All LJ 524.
+"1091. Vinod Hembrum v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 2763 (Jha)."
+"1092. Sucha Singh v State of Punjab, 2001 Cr LJ 1734 (SC). Kalpana Mazumdar v State of Orissa,"
+"2002 Cr LJ 3756 (SC), accused was seen throwing the dead body of the abducted person into"
+water; he was not able to explain how the dead body came into his possession. Presumption
+"against the abductor of the child of killing him. Murlidhar v State of Rajasthan, 2005 Cr LJ 2608 :"
+"AIR 2005 SC 2345 [LNIND 2005 SC 486] : (2005) 11 SCC 133 [LNIND 2005 SC 486] , prosecution"
+"proceeded on footing that there eyewitnesses to the fact of murder, hence section 106, Indian"
+"Evidence Act, 1872 (burden on the abductor to show what happened to the abducted person)"
+did not apply. Conviction under section 364 maintained but that under sections 302/34 set
+aside.
+"1093. Badshah v State of UP, (2008) 3 SCC 681 [LNIND 2008 SC 310] : (2008) 2 SCC (Cr) 712 :"
+"2008 Cr LJ 1950 : (2008) 3 All LJ 524. Rangnath Sharma v Satendra Sharma, (2008) 12 SCC 259"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1659] , another well-proved case of kidnapping and murder."
+"1094. State of MP v Lattora, (2003) 11 SCC 761 : 2004 SCC (Cr) 1195."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+"1095.[s 364-A] Kidnapping for ransom, etc."
+Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such
+"kidnapping or abduction and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his"
+conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death
+"or hurt, or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or"
+1096.[any foreign State or international inter-governmental organisation or any other
+"person] to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom, shall be punishable"
+"with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+COMMENT.—
+"It is relevant to point out that section 364A had been introduced in the IPC, 1860 by"
+virtue of Amendment Act 42 of 1993. The statement of objects and reasons are as
+follows:
+"Statement of Objects and Reasons. - Kidnappings by terrorists for ransom, for creating panic"
+amongst the people and for securing release of arrested associates and cadres have assumed
+serious dimensions. The existing provisions of law have proved to be inadequate as
+deterrence. The Law Commission in its 42nd Report has also recommended a specific
+provision to deal with this menace. It [was] necessary to amend the Indian Penal Code to
+provide for deterrent punishment to persons committing such acts and to make consequential
+"amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
+It is clear from the above the concern of Parliament in dealing with cases relating to
+"kidnapping for ransom, a crime which called for a deterrent punishment, irrespective of"
+the fact that kidnapping had not resulted in death of the victim. Considering the
+"alarming rise in kidnapping young children for ransom, the legislature in its wisdom"
+provided for stringent sentence.1097.
+[s 364-A.1]Ingredients.—
+"Before section 364-A is attracted and a person is convicted, the prosecution must"
+prove the following ingredients:
+"(1) the accused must have kidnapped, abducted or detained any person;"
+(2) he must have kept such person under custody or detention; and
+"(3) kidnapping, abduction or detention must have been for ransom. To pay a"
+"ransom, in the ordinary sense means to pay the price or demand for ransom."
+This would show that the demand has to be communicated.1098.
+"The term ""ransom"" has not been defined in the Code. Stated simply, ""ransom"" is a sum"
+"of money to be demanded to be paid for releasing a captive, prisoner or detenu."
+Kidnapping for ransom is an offence of unlawfully seizing a person and then confining
+"the person usually in a secret place, while attempting to extort ransom. This grave"
+crime is sometimes made a capital offence. In addition to the abductor a person who
+acts as a go-between to collect the ransom is generally considered guilty of the
+crime.1099.
+"In a case, where a male child was kidnapped for ransom and murdered, the Supreme"
+Court refused to interfere with the death penalty awarded by the Courts below. The
+Supreme Court held that the offence of kidnapping for ransom accompanied by a
+"threat to cause death contemplates punishment with death. Therefore, even without an"
+"accused actually having murdered the individual kidnapped for ransom, the provision"
+"contemplates the death penalty. Section 302 of the IPC, 1860 also contemplates the"
+"punishment of death for the offence of murder. It is, therefore apparent, that the"
+"accused was guilty of two heinous offences, which independently of one another,"
+provide for the death penalty.1100.
+[s 364-A.2]Letters of demanding ransom.—
+Letter demanding ransom written by the accused. Plea of the accused that the letters
+were written under the pressure of the police was rejected as there was no cross-
+examination on this point.1101.
+[s 364-A.3]Provision not unconstitutional.—
+Given the background in which the law was enacted and the concern shown by the
+"Parliament for the safety and security of the citizens and the unity, sovereignty and"
+"integrity of the country, the punishment prescribed for those committing any act"
+contrary to section 364A cannot be dubbed as so outrageously disproportionate to the
+nature of the offence as to call for the same being declared unconstitutional.1102.
+[s 364-A.4]Sentencing.—
+The Supreme Court observed that keeping in mind the alarming rise in kidnapping of
+"young children for ransom, the legislature has in its wisdom provided stringent"
+sentence. The Supreme Court said that the High Court rightly refused to interfere. The
+judgment of the High Court did not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.
+The sentence of life imprisonment was awarded and a fine of Rs. 1000 with default
+stipulation.1103.
+"Section 364A IPC, 1860 was not on the statute book at the time of commission of the"
+"offence. Unfortunately, a charge under section 363 was also not framed by the Trial"
+Court. It would not be appropriate to remand the case for framing fresh charge against
+the appellants after a lapse of more than 20 years. His conviction and sentence for the
+"offence punishable under section 384 read with section 34 IPC, 1860 was"
+maintained.1104.
+[s 364-A.5]Continuing offence.—
+"If section 364A IPC, 1860 and section 472 Cr PC, 1973 are to be read together, it has to"
+be held that even after the death of the victim every time a ransom call was made a
+fresh period of limitation commenced.1105.
+[s 364-A.6]Distinction between offences under section 364 and section 364-A.—
+The ingredients for the offence under sections 364 and 364-A are different. Whereas
+the intention to kidnap a person in order that he may be murdered or may be so
+disposed of as to be put in danger of being murdered satisfies the requirements of
+section 364; for obtaining conviction for the offence under section 364-A it is
+necessary to prove that not only such kidnapping or abetment has taken place but
+thereafter the accused threatened to cause death or hurt to such person or by his
+conduct gives rise to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death
+or hurt or causes hurt or death to such person in order to compel the Government or
+any foreign State or international intergovernmental organisation or any other person to
+"do or abstain from doing any act or to pay a ransom. Thus, it was obligatory on the part"
+of the trial court to frame a charge which would answer the description of the offence
+envisaged under section 364-A. It may be true that the kidnapping was done with a
+view to getting ransom but the same should have been put to the appellant while
+framing a charge. The prejudice to the appellant is apparent as the ingredients of a
+"higher offence had not been put to him while framing the charge. Hence, the appellant"
+could not have been convicted under section 364-A. The appellant was held to be guilty
+of an offence under section 364. He deserved the highest punishment prescribed
+"therein, i.e., rigorous imprisonment for life.1106."
+"1095. Ins. by Act 42 of 1993, section 2, (w.e.f. 22 May 1993)."
+"1096. Subs. by Act 24 of 1995, for ""any othr person"" (w.e.f. 26-5-1995)."
+"1097. Akram Khan v State of WB, AIR 2012 SC 308 [LNIND 2011 SC 1205] : (2012) 1 SCC 406"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 1205] .
+"1098. Malleshi v State of Karnataka, 2004 (8) SCC 95 [LNIND 2004 SC 934] : AIR 2004 SC 4865"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 934] ; Vinod v State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 1142 [LNIND 2008 SC 155] : 2008"
+(2) SCC 246 [LNIND 2008 SC 155] .
+"1099. Suman Sood v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 5 SCC 634 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] : AIR 2007 SC"
+"2774 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] : (2007) Cr LJ 4080 , it was proved in this case that one accused"
+kidnapped a person for getting an arrested person released. His wife (second accused)
+"remained at the secret place where the victim was kept, and provided him food and medicine."
+"This was held to be not sufficient to convict her under section 364-A, though found to be enough"
+to sustain conviction under sections 365/120-B.
+"1100. Sunder @ Sundararajan v State, (2013) 3 SCC 215 [LNIND 2013 SC 91] : AIR 2013 SC 777"
+"[LNIND 2013 SC 91] ; Vikram Singh v State of Punjab, 2010 (3) SCC 56 [LNIND 2010 SC 106] : AIR"
+2010 SC 1007 [LNIND 2010 SC 106] .
+"1101. Vinod Kumar v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1250 ."
+"1102. Vikram Singh v UOI, 2015 Cr LJ 4500 ."
+"1103. Vinod v State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 246 [LNIND 2008 SC 155] : AIR 2008 SC 1142"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 155] : 2008 Cr LJ 1811 : (2008) 105 Cut LT 559.
+"1104. Jaipal v State, 2011 Cr LJ 4444 (Del)."
+"1105. Vikas Chaudhary v State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 3380 [LNIND 2010 SC 743] : (2010)"
+3 SCC (Cr) 936.
+"1106. Anil v Admn of Daman & Diu, Daman, (2006) 13 SCC 36 [LNIND 2006 SC 1035] : (2008) 1"
+SCC (Cr) 72.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 365] Kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine
+person.
+Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to cause that person to be
+"secretly and wrongfully confined, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT.—
+Where there was sufficient evidence to show that the victim woman was abducted
+from her house and then taken to different places which included confinement to one
+"place till she was recovered by the police, it was held that the accused could be"
+convicted under this section and section 368 but not section 366.1107.
+"The prosecutrix had left her home voluntarily, of her own free will to get married to the"
+"appellant. She was 19 years of age at the relevant time and was, hence, capable of"
+understanding the complications and issues surrounding her marriage to the appellant.
+"According to the version of events provided by her, the prosecutrix had called the"
+"appellant on a number given to her by him, to ask him why he had not met her at the"
+place that had been pre-decided by them. Offence not made out.1108.
+"In the order of extradition section 364A mentioned and not section 365 IPC, 1860."
+"Offence under section 365 IPC, 1860 is lesser offence than the offence punishable"
+"under section 364A IPC, 1860. Hence, protection of accused and trial for lesser offence"
+"under section 365 IPC, 1860 cannot be held to be without authority of law.1109."
+"1107. Fiyaz Ahmed v State of Bihar, 1990 Cr LJ 2241 SC : AIR 1990 SC 2147 ."
+"1108. Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] : 2013 (7) Scale"
+383 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] .
+"1109. Suman Sood v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2007 SC 2774 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] : (2007) 5 SCC"
+634 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+"[s 366] Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc."
+"Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman1 with intent that she may be compelled, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her"
+"will,2 or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it"
+"to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+"shall also be liable to fine; 1110.[and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as"
+"defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion,"
+"induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that"
+"it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person"
+shall be punishable as aforesaid].
+COMMENT.—
+"Where a woman has no intention of marriage or lawful intercourse when kidnapped,"
+this section applies.
+[s 366.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires.—
+1. Kidnapping or abducting of any woman.
+2. Such kidnapping or abducting must be—
+(i) with intent that she may be compelled or knowing it to be likely that she
+will be compelled to marry any person against her will; or
+"(ii) in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or"
+knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit
+intercourse; or
+(iii) by means of criminal intimidation or otherwise by inducing any woman to
+"go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that she will be,"
+forced or seduced to illicit intercourse.
+It is immaterial whether the woman kidnapped is a married woman or not. To
+"constitute an offence under section 366, IPC, 1860, it is necessary for the prosecution"
+to prove that the accused induced the complainant-woman or compelled by force to go
+"from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction"
+took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse
+and/or that the accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to
+illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an
+"accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as a charge under section 366,"
+"IPC, 1860 is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it"
+must further be proved that the accused abducted the woman with intent that she may
+"be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person"
+or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be
+likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution
+"proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in section 366, IPC, 1860 the"
+"Court cannot hold the accused guilty and punish him under section 366, IPC, 1860.1111."
+"1. 'Kidnaps or abducts any woman'.—If the girl was 18 years old or over, she could only"
+"be abducted and not kidnapped, but if she was under eighteen she could be kidnapped"
+as well as abducted if the taking was by force or the taking or enticing was by deceitful
+"means.1112. Doubts about age, if not resolved satisfactorily, would go in favour of the"
+accused.1113.
+2. 'With intent that she may be compelled … to marry any person against her will'.—The
+intention of the accused is the basis and the gravamen of the offence under this
+"section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the woman do not determine the"
+offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the accused kidnapped or
+"abducted the woman, and the intent of the accused is the vital question for"
+"determination in each case. Where only confinement was established, the Supreme"
+Court held that conviction was possible under sections 365 and 368 and not 366.1114.
+"Once the necessary intent of the accused is established the offence is complete,"
+"whether or not the accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not in"
+the event the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.1115.
+"In order to establish an offence under section 366 IPC, 1860 it must first be established"
+"that the offence of kidnapping under section 361 IPC, 1860 has been proved. It must"
+then be shown that such kidnapping was with the contumacious intent referred to
+"under section 366 IPC, 1860.1116. If the girl kidnapped is below 18 years, consent is"
+immaterial for the offence to be made out.1117.
+3. 'Forced or seduced to illicit intercourse'.—The word 'forced' is used in its ordinary
+dictionary sense and includes force by stress of circumstances. The expression
+"'seduced', used in this section and section 366A, means inducing a woman to submit to"
+illicit intercourse at any time.1118. The Supreme Court in this case disapproved of the
+view taken by the Allahabad and Lahore High Courts that the word 'seduced' used in
+this section is properly applicable only to the first act of illicit intercourse unless there
+"be a proof of return to chastity on the part of the girl. The Calcutta, the Patna, the"
+Madras and the Bombay High Courts had held that 'seduction' is not used in the narrow
+"sense of inducing a girl to part with her virtue for the first time, but includes subsequent"
+seduction for further acts of illicit intercourse.1119. Mere abduction does not make out
+"an offence under section 366, IPC, 1860. It must further be proved that the accused"
+abducted the woman for any of the purposes mentioned in section 366.1120.
+[s 366.2] Consent.—
+Merely because a person did not give passive resistance it does not mean his helpless
+resignation on face of inevitable compulsion cannot be deemed as consent. Only
+conclusion relevant is that she was kidnapped and kept under barrier and was raped
+against her will.1121. Where the evidence showed that victim herself had called the
+"accused to meet her at a place outside the village, it was held that accused was"
+entitled to acquittal.1122. Prosecutrix aged 19 years accompanied her elder sister went
+with appellant voluntarily and did not make any annoyance and performed intercourse
+"with him. Only after tracing her out by Police, in connection with report of missing"
+"person, she stated to Police some ingredients of offence of rape. It is apparent that in"
+"spite of having opportunity at various stages and various places, she did not complain"
+to any one or did not make any annoyance saying that she is being taken by appellant
+without her will. Offence was not made out.1123. Where the girl supposed to have been
+taken away under threats was taken from one place to another and they stayed at
+"different hotels, the girl making no protest anywhere, her consent was presumed.1124."
+"Where the prosecutrix, a teenaged girl, did not put up struggle or jump down from the"
+"cycle of the accused or not even raised an alarm while being taken away, the offence"
+under section 366 was not made out. The conviction was set aside.1125.
+Mere submission without resistance cannot tantamount to consent.1126.
+[s 366.3] Tribal custom of forced marriage.—
+The existence of a tribal custom under which a girl can be forced to marry her abductor
+or kidnapper by taking her away and subjecting her to intercourse cannot be accepted
+"as a good defence, it being contrary to law. But a lenient sentence of only six months"
+was imposed in view of the application for compounding submitted by the victim girl
+and her father. The token punishment was necessary because the offence was not
+compoundable.1127.
+[s 366.4] Section 366 is not a minor offence of section 376.—
+"It is true that section 222 of the Cr PC, 1973 entitles a Court to convict a person of an"
+offence which is minor in comparison to the one for which he is being tried but section
+"366 of the IPC, 1860 cannot be said to be a minor offence in relation to an offence"
+"under section 376 of the IPC, 1860 as both the offences are of distinct and different"
+categories having different ingredients.1128.
+[s 366.5] Punishment.—
+"In State of MP v Rameshwar,1129. where the victim was approximately 16 years of age"
+and was seduced and kidnapped by the respondent by promising to marry her. The
+"Supreme Court, restored the sentence awarded by the trial Court, but reduced it to one"
+year.1130.
+[s 366.6] When sentence shall run consecutively.—
+"In Muthuramalingam v State,1131. the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court"
+"examined the various issues relating to the sentencing of the accused, where multiple"
+"murders were committed by them, and held that while multiple sentences for"
+imprisonment for life can be awarded for multiple murders or other offences
+"punishable with imprisonment for life, the life sentences so awarded cannot be"
+"directed to run consecutively. Such sentences would, however, be super imposed over"
+"each other, so that any remission or commutation granted by a competent authority in"
+one does not ipso facto result in remission of the sentence awarded to the prisoner for
+the other.
+"1110. Added by Act 20 of 1923, section 2."
+"1111. Gabbu v State of MP, AIR 2006 SC 2461 [LNIND 2006 SC 410] : (2006) 5 SCC 740 [LNIND"
+2006 SC 410] .
+"1112. Prafullakumar Basu, (1929) 57 Cal 1074 , 1079. For an example of kidnaping by deceitful"
+"means, see Nawabkhan v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1179 (MP). The Supreme Court did not"
+approve the conviction on the evidence of a prosecutrix who was for several days taken openly
+from place to place and she never protested even when she had opportunities to do so. Hari
+"Ram v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 475 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 1071."
+"1113. Satish Kumar v State, 1988 Cr LJ 565 (Del)."
+"1114. Fiyaz Ahmad v State of Bihar, 1990 Cr LJ 2241 : AIR 1990 SC 2147 . There was nothing to"
+show that the confinement was either to compel her to marry or to submit to sexual intercourse
+against her wish.
+"1115. Khalil-Ur-Rahman, (1933) 11 Ran 213 (FB). Moniram Hazarika v State of Assam, (2004) 5"
+"SCC 120 [LNIND 2004 SC 476] : 2004 Cr LJ 2553 : AIR 2005 SC 2472 , accused regular visited to"
+"the house of the girl's brother, developed intimacy and persuaded her to abandon the lawful"
+guardianship under promise of marriage. Conviction under section 366 was upheld.
+"1116. Shajahan v State, 2011 Cr LJ 573 ."
+"1117. Brij Lal Sud v State of Punjab, (1970) 3 SC 808 ; Parshotam Lal v State of Punjab, (2010) 1"
+SCC 65 [LNIND 2009 SC 1870] : (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 449 — prosecutrix below 16 years;
+"compounding not allowed. Sachindra Nath, 1978 Cr LJ 1494 (Cal). A girl of 18 years old left"
+"home, in the absence of her father, of her own choice with cash and gold and joined the accused"
+"who took her to various places and subjected her to sex, no offence made out against the"
+"accused. Om Prakash v State of Haryana, 1988 Cr LJ 1606 (P&H). Keshav v State, 2001 Cr LJ"
+"1201 (Del), the victim aged about 18 years, evidence showed that she had voluntarily gone with"
+"the accused and of her own free will, acquittal because the offence not made out. Varda v State"
+"of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 1283 (Raj), allegation of kidnapping of daughter-in-law not proved, she"
+"accompanied the accused to many places. Mehmood v State, 1998 Cr LJ 2408 (Del), the girl had"
+"voluntarily gone with the accused. Hence the acquittal. P Ashriya v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"3162 (Ori), the girl in question was minor, there was no adjudication as to valid marriage, the"
+"accused being a kidnapper, his application for custody of the girl was rejected."
+"1118. Ramesh, (1962) 64 Bom LR 780 (SC)."
+"1119. Prafullakumar Basu, (1929) 57 Cal 1074 ; Krishna Maharana, (1929) 9 Pat 647; Lakshman"
+"Bala, (1934) 37 Bom LR 176 , 59 Bom 652; Kartara v State, (1957) Pun 2003; Gopichand Fattumal,"
+(1960) 63 Bom LR 408 .
+"1120. Chote Lal, 1979 Cr LJ 1126 : AIR 1979 SC 1494 . Goverdhan v State of MP, (1995) 1 Cr LJ"
+"633 (MP), the conduct of the abducted girl showed her willingness to marriage because she"
+accompanied the accused to court premises for swearing an affidavit for marriage and
+"thereafter stayed at a rest house, the charge under the section not made out."
+"1121. Dipak Kumar v The State of Bihar, 2012 Cr LJ 480 (Pat)."
+"1122. Amarshibhai v State of Gujarat, 2013 Cr LJ 2768 (Guj); Shyam v State, AIR 1995 SC 2169 ."
+"1123. Mahesh v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 910 (MP)."
+"1124. State of Haryana v Naresh, 1996 Cr LJ 3614 (P&H), girl was below 18 years old. In such"
+"cases the courts of both places would have jurisdiction namely, the place from where the girl"
+was taken away and the place to which she was carried.
+"1125. Shyam v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 2169 : 1995 Cr LJ 3974 . Baldeo v State of UP,"
+"1993 Cr LJ 1915 (All), the girl attained the age of discretion, voluntarily accompanied the"
+"accused, the latter only fulfilling her desire to go away, acquittal."
+"1126. Satish Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 4860 (Raj). Sentence was reduced to the"
+period already undergone. Similar benefit of reduction was ordered to be given to the accused
+"who had not appealed. Gurnam Singh v State of Punjab, 1998 Cr LJ 4024 (SC), kidnapping and"
+"murder of three persons, death sentence reduced to life imprisonment under sections 302/34."
+"Kuldeep K Mahato v State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 4033 : AIR 1998 SC 2694 [LNIND 1998 SC 714] ,"
+"for details see under section 363. See also Shivnath v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 2691 (MP); State"
+"of Maharashtra v Surendra Kumar Mevalal Mahesh, 1998 Cr LJ 3768 (Bom); Dewan Singh v State,"
+1998 Cr LJ 3905 (Del).
+"1127. Nattu v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1567 (MP). See also Kunwarsingh v State of MP, 2013 Cr"
+"LJ 901 (MP); Panna v State of Rajasthan, 1987 Cr LJ 997 (Raj), where a tribal custom for sale of"
+girls was not accepted but light punishment was inflicted because of the custom and senior age
+of the accused.
+"1128. Surendra Rai v State of Bihar, 2013 Cr LJ 1847 (Pat)."
+"1129. State of MP v Rameshwar, AIR 2005 SC 687 [LNIND 2005 SC 77] : (2005) 2 SCC 373"
+[LNIND 2005 SC 77] .
+"1130. Rajesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 2724 [LNIND 1998 SC 752] : 1998 Cr LJ 4042"
+(SC).
+"1131. Muthuramalingam v State, 2016 Cr LJ 4165 : (2016) 8 SCC 313 [LNIND 2016 SC 308] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+1132.[s 366A] Procuration of minor girl.
+"Whoever, by any means whatsoever, induces any minor girl under the age of eighteen"
+"years to go from any place or to do any act with intent that such girl may be, or"
+"knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with"
+"another person shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT.—
+Section 366A was enacted by Act XX of 1923 to give effect to certain Articles of the
+International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children signed
+by various nations at Paris on 4 May 1910. While section 366A deals with procuration
+of minor girls from one part of India to another section 366B makes it an offence to
+import into India from any country outside India girls below the age of 21 years for the
+purpose of prostitution.
+[s 366A.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two things: (1) inducing a girl under eighteen years to go from any
+"place or to do an act,1133. and (2) intention or knowledge that such girl will be forced or"
+seduced to illicit intercourse with a person.
+"The applicability of section 366-A of the IPC, 1860 requires, first, that the accused must"
+"induce a girl; second, that the person induced was a girl under the age of 18 years;"
+"third, that the accused has induced the victim knowing that it is likely that she will be"
+"forced or seduced to an illicit sexual intercourse; fourth, that such intercourse must be"
+"with that person other than the accused; fifth, that the inducement caused the girl to go"
+there in the place or to do any act.1134. An offence under this section is one of
+"inducement with a particular object, and when after the inducement the offender offers"
+the girl to several persons a fresh offence is not committed at every fresh offer for
+"sale.1135. Where a woman, even if she has not attained the age of 18 years, follows the"
+"profession of a prostitute, and in following that profession she is encouraged or"
+"assisted by someone, no offence under this section is committed by such person, for it"
+cannot be said that the person who assists a girl accustomed to indulge in
+promiscuous intercourse for money in carrying on her profession acts with intent or
+knowledge that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse.1136.
+1. 'Seduced'.—The verb 'seduce' is used in two senses. It is used in its ordinary and
+narrow sense as inducing a woman to stray from the path of virtue for the first time: it
+is also used in the wider sense of inducing a woman to submit to illicit intercourse at
+any time or on any occasion. It is in the latter sense that the expression has been used
+"in sections 366 and 366A of the IPC, 1860 which sections partially overlap. The word"
+"""seduced"" is used in the ordinary sense of enticing or tempting irrespective of whether"
+the minor girl has been previously compelled or has submitted to illicit intercourse.1137.
+A person who merely accompanies a woman going out to ply her profession of a
+"prostitute, even if she has not attained the age of 18 years, could not be said thereby to"
+induce her to go from any place or to do any act with the intent or knowledge that she
+will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse within the meaning of section 366A.1138.
+[s 366A.2] Age.—
+"In a case before the Supreme Court, the father of the girl stated that her age on the"
+date of the incident was around 19 years. The doctor also certified the age to be above
+18 years. The girl told the Court that she was of only 14 years. The Supreme Court said
+that the High Court did not consider the age factor fully. The charge failed on the
+ground of the failure of prosecution to establish that the girl was less than 18 years of
+age.1139.
+[s 366A.3] CASES.—
+Where statement and conduct of the victim showed that there was neither threat nor
+"force used by the accused, it cannot be said that victim was forcibly kidnapped and"
+kept in custody. Accused was held entitled to acquittal.1140.
+[s 366A.4] Non-framing of charge under section 366-A.—
+"Offence under section 366-A is not a minor offence to section 366 IPC, 1860 so as to"
+"invoke section 222(2) of Cr PC, 1973. Conviction of appellants under section 366 IPC,"
+1860 without there being a charge is illegal and liable to be set aside.1141.
+[s 366A.5] Difference between sections 366 and 366A.—
+A bare perusal of this section would indicate that the kidnapping or abduction of any
+"woman with a view to compel her for marriage, etc. is covered by this section. Now, a"
+perusal of the section would indicate that if the minor girl is induced to go from any
+"place or to do any act with an intent that such girl may be, or knowing that it is likely"
+"that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be"
+"punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable"
+to fine. The title to the section is procuration of minor girl. The essential ingredient is
+inducement of a minor girl to go from any place or to do any act with intent that such
+girl may be or knowing that it is likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit
+intercourse with another. The minor must be proved to have been induced to go or to
+"do something. If the charge is under section 366A then ""Kidnapping"" is not the"
+"essential ingredient. While kidnapping, abduction is a part of the offence under section"
+"366, its latter part, viz., ""inducement"" is the only common ingredient in section 366 and"
+"section 366A IPC, 1860.1142."
+"1132. Ins. by Act 20 of 1923, section 3."
+"1133. Where there was no threat or inducement or persuasion in taking away a minor girl,"
+"provisions of section 361 or 366A were not attracted. State of Kerala v Rajayyan, 1996 Cr LJ 145"
+"(Ker). Sannaia Subba Rao v State of AP, (2008) 17 SCC 225 [LNIND 2008 SC 1502] , the evidence"
+on record did not reveal the requisite intention. The accusation of forced came to be stated at
+the trial only for the purpose of attracting major punishment. There was no reliable evidence of
+"kidnapping. Zakir v State of MP, (2009) 6 SCC 646 [LNIND 2009 SC 2977] : AIR 2009 SC 2437"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 2977] , the prosecutrix in her examine-in-chief could not recognise the accused"
+as she had not seen him before. The trial court and High Court ignored this statement. The
+conviction was set aside.
+"1134. Ganesh Mallik v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 562 (Jha)."
+"1135. Sis Ram, (1929) 51 All 1888 ."
+"1136. Ramesh, (1962) 64 Bom LR 780 (SC). Y Srinivasa Rao v State of AP, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1997"
+"(AP), here the fact of age below 18 years was not made out and, therefore, no offence under the"
+"section. Ganga Dayal Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 859 : 1994 Cr LJ 951 , the accused,"
+"aged 55 years, abducted a minor girl and his guilt was conclusively proved. His only plea that in"
+"that old age he could not have developed fancy for a minor girl, not tenable. His conviction was"
+not interfered with.
+"1137. Gopichand Fattumal, (1960) 63 Bom LR 408 ; Ramesh, (1962) 64 Bom LR 780 (SC)."
+"Mojuddin v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 2000 (Raj) girl above 18 years old, she had been going"
+"away and staying with the accused earlier also. Conviction set aside. Rajan v State of Rajasthan,"
+"2002 Cr LJ 3152 (Raj), the prosecutrix, a minor girl, and the accused had love affair. She herself"
+"went with the accused to different places. Hence, no offence made out under section 366A."
+"Mahesh v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 4625 (Raj), conviction for kidnapping a minor girl and"
+subjecting her to rape and also forcing her to surrender before others. Rakesh v State of
+"Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1434 (Raj), age of the prosecutrix could not be proved to be below 18"
+"years. Offence under the section not made out. Sushanta v State of Tripura, 2002 Cr LJ 195"
+"(Gau), fact of abduction established by unimpeachable testimony of prosecutrix, offence of"
+"abduction was made out. Krishna Mohan Thakur v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 1898 (Pat),"
+"kidnapping away a girl from a hotel room and subjecting her to rape, conviction under the"
+section.
+"1138. Ramesh v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 1908 [LNIND 1962 SC 239] : 1963 Cr LJ 16 ."
+"1139. Jinish Lal Sha v State of Bihar, AIR 2002 SC 2081 , on appeal from 2002 Cr LJ 274 (Pat)."
+"1140. Ramji Prasad v State of Bihar, 2013 Cr LJ 446 (Pat); Ashok Mahto v State of Jharkhand,"
+"2011 Cr LJ 1601 (Jha); State of Bihar v Rakesh Kumar, 2013 Cr LJ 1990 (Pat) — Accused"
+acquitted for non-existing of ingredients for constituting offences under section 366A of the
+"IPC, 1860."
+"1141. Suramani v State, 2011 Cr LJ 2871 (Mad)"
+"1142. Kailash Laxman Khamkar v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 3255 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+1143.[s 366B] Importation of girl from foreign country.
+Whoever imports into 1144.[India] from any country outside India 1145.[or from the
+State of Jammu and Kashmir] any girl under the age of twenty-one years with intent
+"that she may be, or knowing it to be likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit"
+"intercourse with another person,"
+"1146.[***] shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENT.—
+This section makes it an offence (1) to import into India from any country outside India
+a girl under the age of twenty-one years with the intent or knowledge specified in the
+"section, or (2) to import into India from the State of Jammu and Kashmir a girl under"
+"the age of twenty-one years with intent that she may be, or knowing it to be likely that"
+"she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with any person. The Select"
+Committee in their Report observed:
+The case of girls imported from a foreign country we propose to deal with by the insertion
+of a new section 366B in the Code. We are unanimously of opinion that the requirements of
+the Convention will be substantially met by penalising the importation of girls from a foreign
+country. At the same time we have so worded the clause as to prevent its being made a
+dead letter by the adoption of the course of importing the girl first into an Indian State.1147.
+After the coming into force of the Constitution of India this section was amended to
+bring it in accord with the changed circumstances.
+"1143. Ins. by Act 20 of 1923, section 3."
+"1144. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950"
+"and Act 3 of 1951 sec. 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-4-1951), to read as above."
+"1145. Ins. by Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"1146. Certain words omitted by Act 3 of 1951, sec. 3 and Sch. (w.e.f. 1-4-1951)."
+"1147. Gazette of India, dated 10 February 1923, Part V, p 79."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+"[s 367] Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to grievous hurt,"
+"slavery, etc."
+"Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected,"
+"or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subject to grievous hurt, or"
+"slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such"
+"person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+"[s 368] Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement, kidnapped or"
+abducted person.
+"Whoever, knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has been abducted,"
+"wrongfully conceals or confines such person, shall be punished in the same manner"
+as if he had kidnapped or abducted such person with the same intention or
+"knowledge, or for the same purpose as that with or for which he conceals or detains"
+such person in confinement.
+COMMENT.—
+This section does not apply to the principal offender but to those persons who assist
+him in concealing a kidnapped or abducted person. It refers to some other party who
+assists in concealing any person who has been kidnapped. A kidnapper cannot be
+convicted under this section.1148. The other party who wrongfully conceals or confines
+a kidnapped person knowing that he has been kidnapped suffers the same
+consequences at par with the person who had kidnapped or abducted the person with
+the same intention or knowledge or for the same purpose.1149. This is one of those
+sections in which subsequent abetment is punished as a substantive offence.
+[s 368.1] Ingredients.—
+To constitute an offence under this section it is necessary to establish the following
+ingredients:—
+(1) The person in question has been kidnapped.
+(2) The accused knew that the said person had been kidnapped.
+(3) The accused having such knowledge wrongfully conceals or confines the
+person concerned.
+Apart from direct evidence these ingredients can be proved by facts and circumstances
+of a particular case.1150. Where the complicity of the accused in selling the wife of the
+"co-accused was established and the buyer raped and killed her, a conviction under this"
+section was upheld by the Supreme Court.1151. Three accused persons were charged
+of the offence of kidnapping a child but the child was recovered from the custody of
+another person who was a relative of the three accused persons. They were acquitted.
+It was held that the other person could not be convicted under section 368 unless it
+was proved that the person from whose custody the child was recovered had
+knowledge of the fact that the child was a kidnapped child.1152.
+"1148. Bannu Mal, (1926) 2 Luck 249 . Fiyaz Ahmed v State of Bihar, 1990 Cr LJ 2241 : AIR 1990"
+"SC 2147 , a conviction for confinement of the abducted person."
+"1149. Birbal Choudhary v State of Bihar, AIR 2017 SC 4866 [LNIND 2017 SC 2898] ."
+"1150. Saroj Kumari, 1973 Cr LJ 267 : AIR 1973 SC 201 [LNIND 1972 SC 554] ."
+"1151. Pyare Lal v State of UP, AIR 1987 SC 852 [LNIND 1987 SC 99] : 1987 Cr LJ 769 : 1987 All"
+CC 77 (2) : 1987 1 SCC 526 .
+"1152. Tikam v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 1381 (All). Dharam Pal v State, 2000 Cr LJ 5060 (Del), guilt"
+under the section established. The accused had undergone some part of the sentence and had
+faced the trauma of prosecution for 25 years. The sentence was reduced to the period already
+undergone.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 369] Kidnapping or abducting child under ten years with intent to steal from
+its person.
+Whoever kidnaps or abducts any child under the age of ten years with the intention of
+"taking dishonestly any moveble property from the person of such child, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+1153.[s 370] Trafficking of person
+"(1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b) transports, (c)"
+"harbours, (d) transfers, or (e) receives, a person or persons, by—"
+"First.—using threats, or"
+"Secondly.—using force, or any other form of coercion, or Thirdly.—by abduction,"
+or
+"Fourthly.—by practising fraud, or deception, or"
+"Fifthly.—by abuse of power, or"
+"Sixthly.—by inducement, including the giving or receiving of payments or"
+"benefits, in order to achieve the consent of any person having control over the"
+"person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received,"
+commits the offence of trafficking.
+"Explanation 1.—The expression ""exploitation"" shall include any act of physical"
+"exploitation or other form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to"
+"slavery, servitude, or the forced removal of organs."
+Explanation 2.—The consent of the victim is immaterial in determination of the
+offence of trafficking.
+(2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous
+"imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which"
+"may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"(3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one person, it shall be"
+punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
+"ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+"(4) Where the offence involves the trafficking of a minor, it shall be punishable"
+"with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years,"
+"but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"(5) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one minor, it shall be"
+punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
+"fourteen years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also"
+be liable to fine.
+(6) If a person is convicted of the offence of trafficking of minor on more than one
+"occasion, then such person shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which"
+"shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+(7) When a public servant or a police officer is involved in the trafficking of any
+"person, then such public servant or police officer shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that"
+person's natural life and shall also be liable to fine.]
+COMMENTS
+1. Amendment of 2013.—Vide the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 (Act 13 of
+"2013), the entire section has been changed so as to enlarge the scope of the offence"
+"and include within its purview not just the mischief of slavery, but trafficking in general"
+"—of minors and also adults, and also forced or bonded labour, prostitution, organ"
+transplantation and to some extent child-marriages.1154.
+"For the purposes of this new offence, an offender has been classified into five"
+"categories, thus covering every aspect of the commission of such offences. A person"
+"can be held liable within the mischief of this offence if he either (i) recruits, or (ii)"
+"transports, (iii) harbours, (iv) transfers, or (v) receives, a person or persons."
+COMMENT.—
+The sections of the Code relating to slavery were enacted for the suppression of
+"slavery, not only in its strict and proper sense, namely, that condition whereby an"
+"absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life, fortune and liberty of"
+"another, but in any modified form where an absolute power is asserted over the liberty"
+of another.1155.
+[s 370.1] Ingredients.—
+This section makes penal—
+"(1) the importation, exportation, removal, buying, selling of a person as a slave;"
+(2) the disposal of a person as a slave; and
+"(3) the acceptation, reception, or detention, of any person against his will as a slave."
+"1153. Sections 370 and 370A subs. for section 370 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,"
+"2013 (13 of 2013), section 8 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013). Prior to substitution by section 8 of the"
+"Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013), section 370 stood as under:"
+"[s 370] Whoever imports, exports, removes, buys, sells or disposes of any person as a slave, or"
+"accepts, receives or detains against his will any person as a slave, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also"
+be liable to fine.
+1154. Chapter 6 of Justice JS Verma Committee's Report is on Trafficking of Woman and
+"Children, wherein the entire issue of trafficking has been discussed at length."
+"1155. Ram Kuar v State, (1880) 2 All 723 , 731 (FB)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+1156.[s 370-A] Exploitation of a trafficked person.
+"(1) Whoever, knowingly or having reason to believe that a minor has been"
+"trafficked, engages such minor for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be"
+punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
+"five years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"(2) Whoever, knowingly by or having reason to believe that a person has been"
+"trafficked, engages such person for sexual exploitation in any manner, shall be"
+punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
+"three years, but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+"1156. Sections 370 and 370A subs. for section 370 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,"
+"2013 (13 of 2013), section 8 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 371] Habitual dealing in slaves.
+"Whoever habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, traffics or deals in slaves,"
+"shall be punished with 1157.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides for the punishment of the slave-trader who is habitually engaged
+in the traffic of buying and selling human beings. The preceding section dealt with the
+casual offender.
+"1157. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1"
+January 1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+"[s 372] Selling minor for purposes of prostitution, etc."
+"Whoever sells, lets to hire, or otherwise disposes of1 any 1158.[person under the age"
+of eighteen years2 with intent that such person shall at any age be employed or used
+for the purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful
+"and immoral purpose,3 or knowing it to be likely that such person will at any age be]"
+"employed or used for any such purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall be liable to fine."
+"1159.[Explanation I.—When a female under the age of eighteen years is sold, let for"
+"hire, or otherwise disposed of to a prostitute or to any person who keeps or manages"
+"a brothel, the person so disposing of such female shall, until the contrary is proved, be"
+presumed to have disposed of her with the intent that she shall be used for the
+purpose of prostitution.
+"Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section ""illicit intercourse"" means sexual"
+"intercourse between persons not united by marriage or by any union or tie which,"
+"though not amounting to a marriage, is recognised by the personal law or custom of"
+"the community to which they belong or, where they belong to different communities,"
+"of both such communities, as constituting between them a quasi-marital relation.]"
+COMMENT.—
+This section requires:—
+"(1) Selling, or letting to hire, or other disposal of a person."
+(2) Such person should be under the age of eighteen years.
+"(3) The selling, letting to hire, or other disposal must be with intent or knowledge of"
+likelihood that the person shall at any age be employed or used for
+"(i) prostitution, or"
+"(ii) illicit intercourse with any person, or"
+(iii) any unlawful and immoral purpose.
+[s 372.1] Scope.—
+This section applies to males or females under the age of 18 years.1160. It applies to a
+"married or an unmarried female even where such female, prior to sale or purchase, was"
+leading an immoral life.1161. It also applies where the girl is a member of the dancing
+girl caste.1162.
+This section deals with one who sells a person under 18 years; the next section
+punishes one who buys such person.
+"1. 'Sells, lets to hire, or otherwise disposes of'.—These words are the counterpart of"
+"the words ""buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession"", occurring in section 373. The"
+performance of gejee (initiation ceremony) on a minor girl does not amount to her
+"disposal.1163. The ceremony of tying a talimani to a minor girl, worshipping a basin of"
+"water by her and distributing food is merely a preliminary step before the selling, letting"
+"out, or disposing of the girl for the purpose of prostitution, and is no offence under this"
+section.1164.
+2. 'Person under the age of eighteen years'.—The section applies to all persons under
+"18 years, whether males or females."
+3. 'With intent that such persons shall at any age be employed or used for the purpose
+of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any unlawful and immoral
+purpose'.—It is necessary to show that the accused intended that the person shall be
+employed for an immoral purpose. The introduction of the words 'at any age' takes
+away the defence that though a girl was made over to a prostitute it was not intended
+that she should actually be used for the purpose of prostitution until she had passed
+the age of eighteen years.1165.
+"The word 'prostitution' is not confined to acts of natural sexual intercourse, but includes"
+any act of lewdness. It means surrender of a girl's chastity for money.
+The words 'illicit intercourse with any person' are explained in Explanation 2. The
+accused cannot now rely on the plea that the girl was not destined for a life of
+"prostitution, but merely for a single act of sexual intercourse. Cases which laid down"
+that no offence was committed if employment for prostitution was not habitual are no
+longer of any authority.
+[s 372.2] Adoption of daughter by dancing girl.—
+Such adoption would be an offence if it was done with the intention or knowledge
+specified in the section. The burden of proof that the possession of the girl is not given
+to or obtained by a prostitute for leading an immoral life is on the person who gives the
+possession of such girl and the person who receives the girl under Explanation 1 to this
+section and section 373.
+[s 372.3] Dev dasi.—
+The dedication of minors to the service of a temple as dasis (servants) amounts to a
+"disposal of such minors, knowing it to be likely that they will be used for the purpose of"
+prostitution within the meaning of this section.1166.
+"1158. Subs. by Act 18 of 1924, sec. 2, for certain words."
+"1159. Ins. by Act 18 of 1924, sec. 3."
+"1160. Kammu, (1878) PR No. 12 of 1879."
+"1161. Ismail Rustomkhan, (1906) 8 Bom LR 236 [LNIND 1906 BOM 10] ."
+"1162. Ramanna v State, (1889) 12 Mad 273."
+"1163. Parmeshwari Subbi, (1920) 22 Bom LR 894 [LNIND 1920 BOM 54] ."
+"1164. Sahebava Birappa, (1925) 27 Bom LR 1022 ."
+"1165. Ramanna, (1889) 12 Mad 273; and Karuna Baistobi, (1894) 22 Cal 164 , are therefore"
+overruled.
+"1166. (1881) 1 Weir 359, FB; Basava v State, (1891) 15 Mad 75; Jaili Bhavin, (1869) 6 BHC (Cr C)"
+"60; Tippa, (1892) 16 Bom 737."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+"[s 373] Buying minor for purposes of prostitution, etc."
+"Whoever buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of any 1167.[person under the"
+age of eighteen years with intent that such person shall at any age be employed or
+used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit intercourse with any person or for any
+"unlawful and immoral purpose, or knowing it to be likely that such person will at any"
+"age be] employed or used for any purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+"1168.[Explanation I.—Any prostitute or any person keeping or managing a brothel, who"
+"buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of a female under the age of eighteen"
+"years shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have obtained possession of"
+such female with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution.
+"Explanation II.—""Illicit intercourse"" has the same meaning as in section 372."
+COMMENT.—
+This section and section 372 conjointly punish both the giver as well as the receiver of
+a person under the age of eighteen years for an immoral purpose. Both the sections
+relate to the same subject-matter. The former contemplates an offence committed by
+"the person who sells, or lets to hire, or otherwise disposes of any person under the age"
+"of eighteen years, with the requisite intent or knowledge. The latter relates to the case"
+"of the person who buys, hires, or otherwise obtains possession of any person under the"
+age of eighteen. The first section strikes at any bargain of the nature contemplated by
+"it, whoever may be the party who sells or lets the person, even though it should be the"
+"father or mother or lawful guardian. The second strikes at the bawds, keepers of"
+brothels and all others who fatten on the profits arising from the general prostitution of
+girls.
+[s 373.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires—
+"1. Buying, hiring or otherwise obtaining possession of a person."
+2. The person should be under the age of eighteen years.
+"3. The buying, hiring, or otherwise obtaining possession must be with intent or"
+knowledge of likelihood that the person shall at any age be employed or used for
+"(i) prostitution, or"
+"(ii) illicit intercourse, or"
+(iii) any unlawful and immoral purpose.
+[s 373.2] Explanation I.—
+"In order that the presumption under this Explanation should take effect, it is necessary"
+that the accused should be a prostitute or should be keeping or managing a brothel at
+the time he or she obtains possession of a girl.1169.
+[s 373.3] 'Person under the age of eighteen years with intent that such person
+shall at any age be employed or used for the purpose of prostitution or illicit
+"intercourse with any person, etc.'—"
+The age-limit was raised to 18 years by Act V of 1924.
+The introduction of the words 'at any age' indicates that the offence is committed even
+if the employment of the person for immoral purpose is to take place after the
+"completion of eighteen years, that is, at any time."
+The words 'illicit intercourse' are explained in Explanation 2 to section 372. See
+comment on section 372.
+"1167. Subs. by Act 18 of 1924, sec. 2, for certain words."
+"1168. Ins. by Act 18 of 1924, sec. 4."
+"1169. Banubai Irani, (1942) 45 Bom LR 281 (FB)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+"Of Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and Forced Labour"
+[s 374] Unlawful compulsory labour.
+"Whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against the will of that person, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is intended to put a stop to the practice of forced labour. It requires—
+(1) Unlawful compulsion of any person.
+(2) The unlawful compulsion must be to labour against the will of that person.
+This section is aimed at the abuses arising from forced labour which ryots were in
+former times compelled to render to great landholders.
+"Where the accused induced the complainants who, he alleged, were indebted to him in"
+"various sums of money, to consent to live on his premises and to work off their debts"
+"and the complainants were to, and did in fact, receive no pay, but were fed by the"
+"accused as his servants, and he insisted on their working for him, and punished them"
+"by beating them if they did not do so, it was held that he was not guilty under this"
+section though his act came within section 352.1170.
+Imposition of hard labour on persons undergoing imprisonment is legal. They can be
+compelled to do hard labour.1171.
+"1170. Madan Mohan Biswas, (1892) 19 Cal 572 ."
+"1171. State of Gujarat v Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, 1998 Cr LJ 4561 : AIR 1998 SC 3164"
+[LNIND 1998 SC 920] .
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1173. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13"
+"of 2013), section 9 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013). Prior to substitution by section 9 of the Criminal Law"
+"(Amendment) Act, 2013 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013), section 375 stood as: [s 375] Rape.—A man is said to"
+"commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under"
+circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:— First.—Against her will. Secondly.—
+"Without her consent. Thirdly.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any"
+"person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly.—With her consent, when the man"
+"knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another"
+"man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly.—With her consent, when, at the time"
+"of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him"
+"personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand"
+"the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly.—With or without her consent,"
+when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual
+"intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception.—Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife,"
+"the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. State Amendments Manipur.—The following"
+amendments were made by Act 30 of 1950 (prior to Act 43 of 1983). (a) in clause fifthly for the word
+"“sixteen” substitute the word “fourteen” and (b) in the Exception, for the word “fifteen” substitute the word"
+“thirteen”. [s 375] Rape.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1173.[s 375] Rape.
+"A man is said to commit ""rape"" if he —"
+"(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a"
+woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
+"(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into"
+"the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or"
+any other person; or
+(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into
+"the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her do"
+so with him or any other person; or
+"(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do"
+so with him or any other person;
+under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:
+—
+First.—Against her will.
+Secondly.—Without her consent.
+"Thirdly.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her"
+"or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt."
+"Fourthly.—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband"
+and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to
+whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
+"Fifthly.—With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason"
+of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally
+"or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable"
+to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
+"Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age."
+Seventhly.—When she is unable to communicate consent.
+"Explanation 1.—For the purposes of this section, ""vagina"" shall also include"
+labia majora.
+Explanation 2.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the
+"woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication,"
+communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act:
+Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration
+"shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the"
+sexual activity.
+Exception 1.—A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
+"Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the"
+"wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.]"
+COMMENTS.—
+The chapter sub-heading itself was changed from 'Of rape' to 'Sexual Offences' by Act
+43 of 1983. The definition of rape has undergone a major change in admitting non-
+penile penetration also but it continues to be gender-specific as committed against a
+"female. Earlier, a public interest litigation in Sakshi v UOI,1174. seeking for a declaration"
+to treat non-penile penetration also to be treated as rape failed when the Supreme
+Court declined the relief but the Court's exhortation to alter the definition paved way for
+the change of law.
+"[s 375.1] The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013"
+"Based on the recommendations made by the Justice Verma Committee, the Criminal"
+"Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, came into force with effect from 3 February 2013. The"
+"Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 made amendments to the Cr PC, 1973, Indian"
+"Evidence Act, 1872 and the IPC, 1860. The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013"
+expanded the definition of rape and substituted new sections for old sections such as
+"sections 370, 375, 376, 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D. The Criminal Law (Amendment)"
+"Act, 2013 also amended existing sections as well as created new offences in the IPC,"
+"1860, such as:"
+• Public servant disobeying direction under law (section 166A)
+• Punishment for non-treatment of victim (section 166B)
+"• Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc. (section 326A)"
+• Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid (section 326B)
+• Sexual harassment and punishment for sexual harassment (section 354A)
+• Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe (section 354B)
+• Voyeurism (section 354C)
+• Stalking (section 354D)
+• Punishment for repeat offenders (section 376E)
+The altered definition increasing the age of consent to 18 is also significant for it
+makes any form of penetration as set out under the section with any girl less than 18
+"years of age to constitute rape. In a matrimonial setting, it would not have resulted in"
+rape if the woman was still less than 18 and above 15 so long as there was consent by
+virtue of Exception 2 contained in the section. But the decision of the Supreme Court in
+"Independent Thought v UOI,1175. has held the provision to be unconstitutional in so far it"
+relates to girl between ages 15 to 18. Now the Exception 2 has to be read as 'Sexual
+"intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under"
+eighteen years of age is not rape'.
+Rape is violative of victim's fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is
+"the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, as it is an assault on"
+"the body, mind and privacy of the victim. While a murderer destroys the physical frame"
+"of the victim, a rapist degrades and defiles the soul of a helpless female. Rape reduces"
+"a woman to an animal, as it shakes the very core of her life. By no means can a rape"
+"victim be called an accomplice. Rape leaves a permanent scar on the life of the victim,"
+and therefore a rape victim is placed on a higher pedestal than an injured witness. Rape
+is a crime against the entire society and violates the human rights of the victim. Being
+"the most hated crime, rape tantamounts to a serious blow to the supreme honour of a"
+"woman, and offends both, her esteem and dignity. It causes psychological and physical"
+"harm to the victim, leaving upon her indelible marks.1176."
+[s 375.2] First clause—Against her will.—In a case decided prior to the enactment of
+"the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013,"
+the prosecutrix stated that first offending act was done despite her resistance but
+subsequently she became a consenting party because of repeated promises of
+marriage. In the FIR she stated that she surrendered before him even at the time of the
+first act because of the promises of marriage. The Court held that her version was not
+reliable and found that the charge against the accused did not stand established.1177.
+[s 375.3] Second clause—Without consent.—
+It must be said that now in a custodial rape if the girl says that she did not give
+"consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent1178. (vide section 114A"
+"Indian Evidence Act, 1872)."
+[s 375.4] Consent on promise of marriage.—
+"Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through"
+"deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing,"
+"as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between"
+rape and consensual sex and the Court must very carefully examine whether the
+"accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motive, and had"
+"made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the"
+ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a
+"promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the Court must examine whether there"
+"was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether"
+the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and
+consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees
+"to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not"
+"solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an"
+"accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were"
+"beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so."
+Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if
+"the Court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and"
+"that he had clandestine motives.1179. Where a man and woman were living together,"
+sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the man and when the
+evidence suggested that it was not a case of a passive submission in the face of any
+psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent not borne out of any
+"misconception created in her mind, complaint under this section will be untenable.1180."
+In the event that the accused's promise is not false and has not been made with the
+"sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act(s) would"
+"not amount to rape. Thus, the same would only hold that the prosecutrix, under a"
+"misconception of fact to the extent that the accused is likely to marry her, submits to"
+"the lust of the accused, such a fraudulent act cannot be said to be consensual, so far"
+as the offence of the accused is concerned.1181.
+[s 375.5] Consent.—Meaning.—
+"IPC, 1860 does not define consent in positive terms. But what cannot be regarded as"
+consent is explained by section 90 which reads as 'consent given first under fear of
+injury and second under a misconception of fact is not consent at all'. There are two
+grounds specified in section 90 which are analogous to coercion and mistake of fact.
+The factors set out in first part of section 90 are from the point of view of the victim
+and second part of section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of
+view of the accused. It envisages that the accused has knowledge or has reason to
+believe that the consent was given by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or
+"misconception of fact. Thus, the second part lays emphasis on the knowledge or"
+reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The requirements of
+"both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the Court has to see"
+whether the person giving the consent has given it under fear or misconception of fact
+"and the Court should also be satisfied that the person doing the act, i.e., the alleged"
+offender is conscious of the fact or should have reason to think that but for the fear or
+"misconception, the consent would not have been given. This is the scheme of section"
+90 which is couched in negative terminology. As observed in Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar
+"v State of Bihar,1182. section 90 cannot be considered as an exhaustive definition of"
+"consent for the purposes of IPC, 1860. The normal connotation and concept of consent"
+is not intended to be excluded.1183. Submission of the body under the fear or terror
+cannot be construed as a consented sexual act. Consent for the purpose of section
+375 requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on
+the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully
+exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or
+"not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances.1184. The"
+consent does not merely mean hesitation or reluctance or a 'No' to any sexual
+advances but has to be an affirmative one in clear terms. Consent has to be
+"categorical, unequivocal, voluntary and could be given by words, gestures or any form"
+of verbal or non-verbal communication signifying willingness to participate in specific
+sexual act. Woman who does not physically resist act of rape shall not by that reason
+"only be regarded as having consented to such sexual activity. In normal parlance,"
+consent would mean voluntary agreement of complainant to engage in sexual activity
+without being abused or exploited by coercion or threats. Normal rule is that consent
+has to be given and it cannot be assumed.1185.
+"[s 375.6] Section 114A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+"India Evidence Act, 1872 was amended by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1983 and"
+"section 114A was incorporated which imposed the burden of proving ""consent"" upon"
+the accused in the cases of aggravated rape. This was an exception of the general rule
+"of presumption of innocence of the accused. By the Criminal Law Amendment Act,"
+2013 the old section was substituted on the recommendation of Justice Verma
+Commission which reads as a follows;—
+[114A] Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecution for rape
+"In a prosecution for rape under clause(a), clause(b), clause(c), clause(d), clause(e), clause(f),"
+"clause(g), clause(g), clause(h), clause(i), clause(j), clause(k), clause(l), clause(m), clause(n), of"
+"sub-section (2) of section 376, where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the"
+question is whether it was without the consent of the woman alleged to have been raped and
+"such woman states in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent, the Court shall"
+presume that she or he did not consent.
+"Explanation.—In this section ""sexual intercourse"" shall mean any of the acts mentioned in"
+clauses (a) to (c) of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code
+[s 375.7] Will and Consent.—
+"In Dileep Singh v State of Bihar,1186. the Supreme Court observed that:"
+though will and consent often interlace and an act done against the will of the person can
+"be said to be an act done without consent, the Indian Penal Code categorizes these two"
+expressions under separate heads in order to be as comprehensive as possible.
+In the facts of the case what is crucial to be considered is whether first clause or
+"second clause of section 375 IPC, 1860 is attracted. The expressions 'against her will'"
+and 'without her consent' may overlap sometimes but surely the two expressions in
+first and second clause have different connotation and dimension. The expression
+'against her will' would ordinarily mean that the intercourse was done by a man with a
+"woman despite her resistance and opposition. On the other hand, the expression"
+'without her consent' would comprehend an act of reason accompanied by
+deliberation.1187.
+Supreme Court Guidelines to Prevent Child Sexual Abuse
+"(1) The persons in charge of the schools/educational institutions, special homes,"
+"children homes, shelter homes, hostels, remand homes, jails, etc., or wherever children"
+"are housed, if they come across instances of sexual abuse or assault on a minor child"
+which they believe to have committed or come to know that they are being sexually
+molested or assaulted are directed to report those facts keeping upmost secrecy to the
+"nearest SJPU or local police, and they, depending upon the gravity of the complaint and"
+"its genuineness, take appropriate follow up action casting no stigma to the child or to"
+the family members.
+"(2) Media personals, persons in charge of Hotel, lodge, hospital, clubs, studios,"
+photograph facilities have to duly comply with the provision of section 20 of the Act 32
+"of 2012 and provide information to the SJPU, or local police. Media has to strictly"
+comply with section 23 of the Act as well.
+"(3) Children with intellectual disability are more vulnerable to physical, sexual and"
+"emotional abuse. Institutions which house them or persons in care and protection,"
+"come across any act of sexual abuse, have a duty to bring to the notice of the Juvenile"
+Justice Board/SJPU or local police and they in turn be in touch with the competent
+authority and take appropriate action.
+"(4) Further, it is made clear that if the perpetrator of the crime is a family member"
+"himself, then utmost care be taken and further action be taken in consultation with the"
+"mother or other female members of the family of the child, bearing in mind the fact that"
+best interest of the child is of paramount consideration.
+"(5) Hospitals, whether Government or privately-owned or medical institutions where"
+children are being treated come to know that children admitted are subjected to sexual
+"abuse, the same will immediately be reported to the nearest JJ Board/SJPU and the JJ"
+"Board, in consultation with SJPU, should take appropriate steps in accordance with the"
+law safeguarding the interest of child.
+"(6) The non-reporting of the crime by anybody, after having come to know that a minor"
+"child below the age of 18 years was subjected to any sexual assault, is a serious crime"
+and by not reporting they are screening offenders from legal punishment and hence be
+"held liable under the ordinary criminal law and prompt action be taken against them, in"
+accordance with law.
+"(7) Complaints, if any, received by NCPCR, SCPCR, Child Welfare Committee (CWC) and"
+"Child Helpline, NGO's or Women's Organizations, etc., they may take further follow up"
+"action in consultation with the nearest JJ Board, SJPU or local police in accordance"
+with law.
+(8) The Central Government and the State Governments are directed to constitute
+"SJPUs in all the Districts, if not already constituted and they have to take prompt and"
+effective action in consultation with JJ Board to take care of child and protect the child
+and also take appropriate steps against the perpetrator of the crime.
+(9) The Central Government and every State Government should take all measures as
+"provided under section 43 of the The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,"
+2012 (Act 32/2012) to give wide publicity of the provisions of the Act through media
+"including television, radio and print media, at regular intervals, to make the general"
+"public, children as well as their parents and guardians, aware of the provisions of the"
+Act.
+[Shankar Kisanrao Khade v State of Maharashtra.1188.]
+[s 375.8] Consent of woman of Scheduled Caste or Tribe.—
+"In Re Director General of Prosecution,1189. it was held that the consent given by a"
+woman of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribe community for sexual intercourse to
+one who was in a position to dominate her was no defence to a charge under section
+375.
+"The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989"
+specified the sessions Court as a special Court under the Act. It was held that the trial
+of the offence of rape by such a Court was not without jurisdiction. The sessions Court
+remained the same Court even after its specification as a special Court. Setting aside
+of conviction on the technical ground of want of jurisdiction which was raised after the
+trial was over was not proper.1190.
+[s 375.9] No consent.—
+Where physical contact with the accused in the nature of a kiss or a hug was being
+"accepted by the prosecutrix without any protest, such past conduct will definitely not"
+"amount to consent as for every sexual act, every time, consent is a must.1191. Where"
+"the accused took away the prosecutrix to offer prayers to a deity, stayed in a"
+'dharamshala' for the night and had sex with her threatening her that the police were
+"nearby, it was held that the prosecutrix could not be described as an accomplice merely"
+because she did not raise alarm and the accused was liable to be convicted under
+section 376.1192.
+"Where a blind helpless young girl was raped by the accused, it was held that expression"
+"""consent"" cannot be equated to inability to resist out of helplessness and absence of"
+injuries on the victim also does not by itself amount to consent by her.1193. Section
+"375, as amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, lays down a woman"
+who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of
+"that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity."
+[s 375.10] Third and Fourth clauses—Passive non-resistance or consent obtained by
+fraud.—
+If a girl does not resist intercourse in consequence of misapprehension this does not
+"amount to a consent on her part. Where a medical man, to whom a girl of fourteen"
+"years of age was sent for professional advice, had criminal connection with her, she"
+"making no resistance from a bona fide belief that he was treating her medically, it was"
+held that he was guilty of rape.1194. The submission of her body by the prosecutrix
+"under fear or terror, cannot be construed as a consented sexual act. The Supreme"
+Court said in this case that the fact of consent is to be ascertained only on careful
+study of all the relevant circumstances.1195.
+[s 375.11] Husband and wife.—
+Clause 4 deals with a rapist who knows that he is not his victim's husband and also
+knows that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom
+she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. In a case because of matrimonial
+difficulties the wife left the matrimonial home and returned to live with her parents
+informing the husband of her intention to petition for divorce. While the wife was so
+"staying at her parents' house, the husband forced his way in and attempted to have"
+sexual intercourse with her in the course of which he assaulted her. His conviction for
+attempted rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm was upheld.1196.
+[s 375.12] Void marriage.—
+Where the marriage with the complainant was void because the accused was already
+"married and had a living spouse, of which fact was known to the complainant, he was"
+held to be guilty of rape.1197.
+[s 375.13] Pregnant woman.—
+Stringent punishment has been provided for commission of rape on a woman known to
+"the culprit to be pregnant. It is, therefore, necessary knowledge of the accused should"
+be established by evidence.1198.
+[s 375.14] Fifth clause—Sexual intercourse with idiot or drunken person.—
+"Where a man had carnal knowledge of a girl of imbecile mind, and the jury found that it"
+"was without her consent, she being incapable of giving consent from defect of"
+"understanding, it was held that this amounted to rape. Where the accused made a"
+"woman quite drunk, and whilst she was insensible violated her person, it was held that"
+this offence was committed.1199. These cases will now fall within the mischief of the
+"fifth clause to section 375, IPC, 1860."
+[s 375.15] Exception 2.—
+The age limit was raised to 15 years by an amendment of the Act in 1949.
+There may be cases in which the check of the law may be necessary to restrain men
+from taking advantage of their marital rights prematurely. Instances of abuse by the
+husband in such cases will fall under this clause.
+"[s 375.16] Section 375, Exception 2—Constitutional validity"
+"In Independent Thought v UOI,1200. the Supreme Court held that sexual intercourse with"
+girl below 18 years of age is rape regardless of whether she is married or not. The
+Court held that Exception 2 creates unnecessary and artificial distinction between
+married girl child and unmarried girl child and has no rational nexus with any unclear
+objective sought to be achieved. This artificial distinction is contrary to philosophy and
+ethos of Article 15(3) of Constitution as well as contrary to Article 21 of Constitution. It
+"is also contrary to philosophy behind some statutes, bodily integrity of girl child and her"
+"reproductive choice. It is inconsistent with provisions of POCSO, which must prevail."
+"The Supreme Court held that Exception 2 to section 375, IPC, 1860 insofar as it relates"
+"to girl child below 18 years is liable to be struck down and is to read down as, ""Sexual"
+"intercourse or sexual acts by man with his own wife, wife not being 18 years, is not"
+"rape""."
+[s 375.17] Attempt.—
+"Where the accused dragged the prosecutrix from a canal to the thrashing ground,"
+"disrobed her and made her to lie down and attempted to rape her, it was held that it"
+was not a mere preparation but an attempt to commit rape.1201. It has been held that
+intention or expression or even an indecent assault upon a woman does not amount to
+attempt to rape unless the determination of the accused to gratify his passion at all
+events and in spite of resistance is established.1202.
+[s 375.18] Indecent assault is not attempt to commit rape.—
+"Indecent assault upon a woman does not amount to an attempt to commit rape, unless"
+the Court is satisfied that there was a determination in the accused to gratify his
+"passion at all events, and in spite of all resistance.1203."
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1173. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 9 (w.e.f. 3"
+"February 2013). Prior to substitution by section 9 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013"
+"(w.e.f. 3 February 2013), section 375 stood as:"
+"[s 375] Rape.—A man is said to commit ""rape"" who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has"
+sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following
+descriptions:—
+First.—Against her will.
+Secondly.—Without her consent.
+"Thirdly.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in"
+whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.
+"Fourthly.—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her"
+consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself
+to be lawfully married.
+"Fifthly.—With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness"
+of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any
+"stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and"
+consequences of that to which she gives consent.
+"Sixthly.—With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age."
+Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the
+offence of rape.
+"Exception.—Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen"
+"years of age, is not rape."
+State Amendments
+Manipur.—The following amendments were made by Act 30 of 1950 (prior to Act 43 of 1983).
+"(a) in clause fifthly for the word ""sixteen"" substitute the word ""fourteen"" and"
+"(b) in the Exception, for the word ""fifteen"" substitute the word ""thirteen""."
+"1174. Sakshi v UOI, AIR 2004 SC 3566 [LNIND 2004 SC 657] ."
+"1175. Independent Thought v UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4904 ."
+"1176. Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] : (2013) 7 SCC"
+675 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] .
+"1177. Deelip Singh v State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 [LNIND 2004 SC 1123] : AIR 2005 SC 203"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1123] .
+"1178. Fletcher, (1859) 8 Cox 131. Sohan Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 2618 (Raj), the"
+prosecutrix fell prey to persons dealing in flesh trade. Passing through several hands she was
+ultimately purchased by the accused. The fact that she had given consent at the starting point
+of the chain did not ensure for the benefit of the accused. She ran away from the hands of the
+accused. Her testimony was considered to be fully reliable for the purpose of convicting the
+"accused. Shiv Nath v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 2691 (MP), statements and letters to the accused"
+of the prosecutrix showed her consent. No conviction.
+"1179. Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 2071 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] : (2013) 7 SCC"
+675 [LNIND 2013 SC 533] .
+"1180. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v State of Maharashtra, 2019 (1) Scale 64 ."
+"1181. Uday v State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639 [LNIND 2003 SC 228] ; Yedla Srinivasa Rao v"
+"State of AP, 2006 (11) SCC 615 [LNIND 2006 SC 785] ; Pradeep Kumar Verma v State of Bihar, AIR"
+2007 SC 3059 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] .
+"1182. Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v State of Bihar, 2005 (1) SCC 88 [LNIND 2004 SC 1123] ."
+"1183. Pradeep Kumar Verma v State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059 [LNIND 2007 SC 965] ."
+"1184. State of HP v Mange Ram, AIR 2000 SC 2798 [LNIND 2000 SC 1144] ; Uday v State of"
+"Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639 [LNIND 2003 SC 228] ."
+"1185. Mahmood Farooqui v State, 2018 Cr LJ 3457 (Del)."
+"1186. Dileep Singh v State of Bihar, (2005) 1 SCC 88 [LNIND 2004 SC 1123] ."
+"1187. State of UP v Chhteyal, AIR 2011 SC 697 [LNIND 2011 SC 73] : (2011) 2 SCC 550 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 73] .
+"1188. Shankar Kisanrao Khade v State of Maharashtra, (2013)5 SCC 546 [LNIND 2013 SC 429] :"
+2013 (6) Scale 277 [LNIND 2013 SC 429] : 2013 Cr LJ 2595 .
+"1189. Re Director General of Prosecution, 1993 Cr LJ 760 (Ker)."
+"1190. State of HP v Gita Ram, AIR 2000 SC 2940 [LNIND 2000 SC 1209] : 2000 Cr LJ 4039 ."
+"1191. Mahmood Farooqui v State, 2018 Cr LJ 3457 (Del)."
+"1192. State of Orissa v Gangadhar Behuria, 1992 Cr LJ 3814 (Ori). Dayaram v State of MP, 1992"
+"Cr LJ 3154 (MP), the accused took away a minor girl pretending that he would marry her and"
+"instead subjected her to sex without consent, conviction under section 376 (1) and not under"
+section 376 as such.
+"1193. Rabinarayan Das v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 269 (Ori)."
+"1194. William's Case, (1850) 4 Cox 220."
+"1195. State of HP v Mange Ram, AIR 2000 SC 2798 [LNIND 2000 SC 1144] : 2000 Cr LJ 4027 ."
+"1196. Reg v R, 3 WLR 767 (HL)."
+"1197. Bhupinder Singh v UT of Chandigarh, (2008) 8 SCC 531 [LNIND 2008 SC 1375] : 2008 Cr LJ"
+"3546 , the Supreme Court refused to interfere."
+"1198. Om Prakash v State of UP, 2006 Cr LJ 2913 : AIR 2006 SC 2214 [LNIND 2006 SC 382] :"
+"(2006) 9 SCC 787 [LNIND 2006 SC 382] , the suggestion of false accusation was not accepted"
+because there was no apparent for the married woman to do so. The sentence was reduced
+from 10 to seven years.
+"1199. Camplin, (1845) 1 Cox 220."
+1200. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 382 of 2013 decided by Supreme Court on 11 October 2017.
+"1201. Fagnu Bhoi v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 1808 (Ori)."
+"1202. Kandarpa Thakuria v State of Assam, 1992 Cr LJ 3084 (Gau)."
+"1203. Shankar, (1881) 5 Bom 403; Rameswar, 1984 Cr LJ 786 (Raj). State of MP v Udhe Lal, 1996"
+"Cr LJ 3202 (MP), attempt proved by the statements of the prosecutrix and corroboration,"
+acquittal only on the ground that there were minor variations in her statements was held to be
+"not proper, sixteen years had passed, sentence of two years RI and fine of Rs. 5000 was held to"
+"be sufficient. R v C, 1992 Cr LR 642 (CA), self-induced intoxication was held to be no defence to"
+the charge of indecent assault on a child by inserting his fingers into her vagina.
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1204. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13"
+"of 2013), section 9 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013). Earlier section 376 was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section"
+"3 (w.e.f. 25 December 1983). Section 376, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under: [s 376]"
+"Punishment for rape.—(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but
+which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the
+"women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished"
+with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a"
+"sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. (2) Whoever,— (a) being a police officer"
+commits rape— (i) within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or (ii) in the premises of
+any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or (iii) on a woman
+"in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or (b) being a public servant, takes"
+advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in
+"the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or (c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail,"
+remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a
+woman’s or children’s institution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate
+"of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or (d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital,"
+takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or (e) commits rape
+on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or (f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years
+"of age; or (g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not"
+"be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may,"
+"for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of"
+either description for a term of less than ten years. Explanation 1.—Where a woman is raped by one or
+"more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be"
+deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub-section. Explanation 2.—“Women’s or
+"children’s institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or"
+"children or a widows’ home or by any other name, which is established and maintained for the reception"
+and care of woman or children. Explanation 3.—“Hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and includes
+the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of
+persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation. [s 376] Punishment for rape.—
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1204.[s 376] Punishment for rape.—
+"(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall"
+be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which
+"1205.[shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for"
+"life, and shall also be liable to fine]."
+"(2) Whoever,—"
+"(a) being a police officer, commits rape—"
+(i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is
+appointed; or
+(ii) in the premises of any station house; or
+(iii) on a woman in such police officer's custody or in the custody of a
+police
+officer subordinate to such police officer; or
+"(b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public"
+servant's custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to
+such public servant; or
+(c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in area by the Central or a
+State Government commits rape in such area; or
+"(d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other"
+place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in
+"force or of a women's or children's institution, commits rape on any"
+"inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or"
+"(e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on"
+a woman in that hospital; or
+"(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust"
+"or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; or"
+(g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or
+(h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or 1206.[* * *]
+"(j) commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or"
+"(k) being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits rape"
+on such woman; or
+(l) commits rape on a woman suffering from mental or physical disability; or
+(m) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or
+disfigures or endangers the life of a woman; or
+"(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,"
+shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not
+"be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life,"
+which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural
+"life, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—"
+"(a) ""armed forces"" means the naval, military and air forces and includes any"
+member of the Armed Forces constituted under any law for the time
+"being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces"
+that are under the control of the Central Government or the State
+Government;
+"(b) ""hospital"" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts"
+of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during
+convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;
+"(c) ""police officer"" shall have the same meaning as assigned to the"
+"expression ""police"" under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861);"
+"(d) ""women's or children's institution"" means an institution, whether called an"
+orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widow's
+"home or an institution called by any other name, which is established and"
+maintained for the reception and care of women or children.]
+"1207.[(3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be"
+punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
+"than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which"
+"shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and"
+shall also be liable to fine:
+Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical
+expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
+Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid
+to the victim.
+COMMENT.—
+"Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Mathura Act).—Acquittal of policemen in the"
+infamous Mathura Rape Case1208. and the nationwide protest against the verdict led to
+"the 1983 Amendments to the Rape Laws in India. Sections 375 and 376, IPC, 1860 had"
+"been substantially changed by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 43 of"
+"1983). The same Act also introduced several new sections, viz., sections 376A, 376B,"
+"376C and 376D, IPC, 1860. Of these, section 376A punished sexual intercourse with"
+"wife without her consent by a judicially separated husband, section 376B punished"
+"sexual intercourse by a public servant with woman in his custody, section 376C"
+"punished sexual intercourse by Superintendent of Jail, Remand Home, etc., with"
+inmates in such institutions and section 376D punished sexual intercourse by any
+member of the management or staff of a hospital with any woman in that hospital.
+These new sections were introduced with a view to stop sexual abuses of women in
+"custody, care and control by various categories of persons which though not"
+amounting to rape were nevertheless considered highly reprehensible. The amended
+"section 376 IPC, 1860 prescribed a minimum punishment of seven years'"
+"imprisonment for the offence of rape. For combating the vice of custodial rape, rape on"
+"pregnant woman, rape on girls under 12 years of age and gang rape a minimum"
+"punishment of 10 years' imprisonment had been made obligatory. However, for special"
+reasons to be recorded in the judgment the Court in either case could impose a
+"sentence lesser than seven or 10 years, as the case may be."
+A further improvement in the law relating to sexual offences could be found in the
+"provisions of section 228A IPC, 1860, section 327(2) Cr PC, 1973 and section 114A"
+"Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which were introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment)"
+"Act, 1983. New provisions for trial in camera (section 327(2) Cr PC, 1973) and against"
+"disclosure as to identity of the victims of sexual offences as in sections 376, 376A,"
+"376B, 376C and 376D, IPC, 1860 (section 228, IPC, 1860) were not only to protect the"
+honour of sexually-victimised women but also made it possible for them to depose in
+"Court without any fear of social ostracism. And section 114A Indian Evidence Act, 1872"
+"by raising a presumption as to absence of consent in cases of custodial rape, rape on"
+"pregnant women and gang rape as in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) of sub-section"
+"(2) of section 376, IPC, 1860 merely on the evidence of the ravished women had, at"
+"least partially, removed the infirmity from the evidence of a victim of rape that was"
+"hitherto unjustly attached to her testimony without taking note of the fact that in India,"
+a disclosure of this nature was likely to ruin the prospect of the girl's rehabilitation in
+society for all times to come and unless her story was painfully true she would not
+"have taken such a grave risk merely to malign the accused.1209. Moreover, in cases of"
+"rape, particularly custodial rape it was almost impossible to get any other independent"
+evidence to corroborate the testimony of the prosecutrix.
+It has been held that the result of the Amendment of 1983 is that the offences listed in
+"section 376(2) are graver in nature and therefore, it is necessary that the charge under"
+the sub-section should be distinctly recorded and also reasons for conviction should be
+recorded.1210.
+"[s 376.1]Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 13 of 2013 (w.e.f. 2 March 2013) (post"
+Nirbhaya):
+"After a violent incident of a gang rape of a woman in the capital city of Delhi in 2012,"
+"bowing to public outrage, Verma Committee had been set up whose recommendations"
+"gave place to important changes in law relating to rape. Some recommendations, viz.,"
+"not to increase the age of consent to 18 from 16, as it stood before; introduction of"
+matrimonial rape; non-requirement of sanction for prosecution of armed personnel
+were not accepted but the law changed as regards against consent by introducing
+"section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 barring questions in cross-examination"
+of the victim about the previous sexual experience or immoral character and also
+"making the issue of previous sexual experience as irrelevant, and certain other"
+"procedural aspects in Cr PC, 1973 inter alia, relating to investigation by woman police"
+"officers, video recording of statements before magistrates, time limit for completing of"
+"enquiry, requirement of trial proceedings in camera, etc."
+[s 376.1.1] No death for rape.—
+"Respecting the demand from many quarters, the Verma committee reacted as:"
+"In our considered view, taking into account the views expressed on the subject by an"
+"overwhelming majority of scholars, leaders of women's organisations, and other"
+"stakeholders, there is a strong submission that the seeking of death penalty would be a"
+"regressive step in the field of sentencing and reformation. We, having bestowed"
+"considerable thought on the subject, and having provided for enhanced sentences (short of"
+"death) in respect of the above-noted aggravated forms of sexual assault, in the larger"
+"interests of society, and having regard to the current thinking in favour of abolition of the"
+"death penalty, and also to avoid the argument of any sentencing arbitrariness, we are not"
+inclined to recommend the death penalty.
+[s 376.1.2] Chemical Castration.—
+Rejecting the proposal of Chemical Castration as a punishment for rape Committee
+observed:
+We note that it would be unconstitutional and inconsistent with basic human rights treaties
+for the state to expose any citizen without their consent to potentially dangerous medical
+"side-effects. For this reason, we do not recommend mandatory chemical castration of any"
+type as a punishment for sex offenders.
+"[s 376.2] Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 (w.e.f. 21 April 2018)."
+After public outrage against a suspected gang rape and murder of a girl aged eight in
+"Rasana village near Kathua in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Criminal Law"
+"(Amendment) Act, 2018 amended Chapter XVI of the IPC, 1860 to provide for stringent"
+punishment for perpetrators of rape particularly of girls below 12 and 16 years. Rape
+on a woman under 12 years of age is now made punishable with rigorous
+"imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 20 years, but which may extend to"
+"imprisonment for life, and with fine or with death. Gang rape on a woman under 12"
+"years of age is now made punishable with imprisonment for life, and with fine, or with"
+death. Rape of girls below the age of 16 years is punishable with imprisonment of 20
+years or life imprisonment. The imprisonment for life shall mean imprisonment for the
+remainder of that person's natural life. The minimum punishment for rape of girl above
+the age of 16 is 10 years.
+Section 376 is not gender neutral and sexual abuse of minor boys does not come
+within its purview. The punishment under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
+"(POCSO) Act, 2012 continues to be 10 years to life imprisonment for offences against"
+boys below 12 and seven years to life imprisonment for offences against boys above
+12 to 18.
+"The law amends the Cr PC, 1973 mandating the completing of investigation from the"
+existing provision of three months to two months. The Act also bars anticipatory bail in
+cases of rape of minor girls below 16 years of age. Any appeal against sentence of
+rape shall be disposed of within six months.
+[s 376.3] Medical Examination of accused and victim.—
+In cases of rape or attempted rape medical examination of the victim and the accused
+soon after the incident often yields a wealth of corroborative evidence. Such an
+"opportunity should not, therefore, be lost on any account. Though the prosecutrix can"
+"be examined only with her consent, the accused can be subjected to such an"
+"examination by virtue of section 53 of the Cr PC, 1973. It has also to be remembered"
+"that the accused too can demand such an examination under section 54 Cr PC, 1860"
+especially when he feels that such an examination will disprove the charge brought
+"against him. Thus, presence of smegma on corona glandis (glans penis) of the accused"
+soon after the incident is proof against complete penetration since it is rubbed off
+during intercourse.1211. But to be of any value examination of smegma must be done
+within 24 hours.1212.
+"Where proof of sexual intercourse with the woman is itself not an issue, such as when"
+it is an admitted fact and the case rests upon issues of consent and where medical
+"examination revealed semen stains on the vaginal swabs and salwar of the victim, the"
+Court said that at best it is an evidence of commission of sexual intercourse but not
+necessarily of rape.1213.
+[s 376.4] Two finger Test.—
+"The two finger test and its interpretation violate the right of rape survivors to privacy,"
+"physical and mental integrity and dignity. Thus, this test, even if the report is"
+"affirmative, cannot ipso facto, be given rise to presumption of consent. In view of"
+"International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966; United Nations"
+"Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,"
+"1985, rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not re-traumatise them or"
+violate their physical or mental integrity and dignity. They are also entitled to medical
+procedures conducted in a manner that respects their right to consent. Medical
+"procedures should not be carried out in a manner that constitutes cruel, inhuman, or"
+degrading treatment and health should be of paramount consideration while dealing
+with gender-based violence. The State is under an obligation to make such services
+available to survivors of sexual violence. Proper measures should be taken to ensure
+their safety and there should be no arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
+privacy.1214.
+[s 376.5] Prosecutrix not an accomplice.—
+A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of an offence of rape is not an
+accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted
+"upon without corroboration in material particulars, for the reason, that she stands on a"
+"much higher pedestal than an injured witness.1215. A woman, who is the victim of"
+"sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust"
+"and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as"
+"that of an accomplice. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 nowhere says that her evidence"
+cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly
+a competent witness under section 118 and her evidence must receive the same
+weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence.1216.
+[s 376.6] Defence that the girl was of easy virtue.—
+"Whether the victim of rape was previously accustomed to sexual intercourse or not,"
+"cannot be the determinative question. On the contrary, the question still remains as to"
+whether the accused committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of.
+"Even if the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it can certainly not give a licence to any"
+person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim. So as to
+whether the victim is of a promiscuous character is totally irrelevant in a case of rape.
+Even a woman of easy virtue has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual
+"intercourse to anyone and everyone, because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for"
+being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. A prosecutrix stands on a higher
+pedestal than an injured witness for the reason that an injured witness gets the injury
+"on the physical form, while the prosecutrix suffers psychologically and"
+"emotionally.1217. In Narender Kumar v State (NCT of Delhi),1218. the Supreme Court"
+dealt with a case where the allegation was that the victim of rape herself was an
+"unchaste woman, and a woman of easy virtue. The Court discussed Rajoo v State of"
+"MP,1219. and held that so far as the prosecutrix is concerned, mere statement of"
+"prosecutrix herself is enough to record a conviction, when her evidence is read in its"
+totality and found to be worthy of reliance. The incident in itself causes a great distress
+"and humiliation to the victim though, undoubtedly a false allegation of rape can cause"
+"equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The Court further held"
+"that some facts exist proving that victim was habituated to sexual intercourse, cannot"
+be a reason to draw an inference that she was of 'loose moral character'. This cannot
+be a reason for her to be raped; she also has a right to protect her dignity and refuse to
+"submit to sexual intercourse by anyone. Merely because a woman is of easy virtue, her"
+evidence cannot be discarded on that ground alone rather it is to be cautiously
+appreciated.1220.
+[s 376.7] Past Sexual conduct of Victim.—Legislative changes.— [s 376.8] Section
+"155(4) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 removed.—"
+"Under section 155(4) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 the credit of a witness may be"
+"impeached when a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown"
+that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character. This clause was omitted by Act
+"4 of 2003, section 3 (w.e.f. 11 December 2002) whereby the defence is prohibited from"
+impeaching prosecutrix's testimony on the basis of her past sexual history.
+"[s 376.9] Insertion of new section 53A in Indian Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+By the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 a new section (53A) was inserted in the
+"Indian Evidence Act, 1872 in which it is clearly stated that where the question of"
+"consent is in issue, evidence of the character of the victim or of such person's previous"
+sexual experience with any person shall not be relevant on the issue of such consent or
+the quality of consent. Section 53A of Evidence Act; Evidence of character or previous
+sexual experience not relevant in certain cases.—In a prosecution for an offence u/ss.
+"354, 354A, 354B, 354C, section 354D, 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D or 376E of the Indian"
+"Penal Code (45 of 1860) or for attempt to commit any such offence, where the question"
+"of consent is in issue, evidence of the character of the victim or of such person's previous"
+sexual experience with any person shall not be relevant on the issue of such consent or
+the quality of consent.
+"[s 376.10] Amendment to section 146 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+"By the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 the proviso to section 146 of the Indian"
+"Evidence Act, 1872 was substituted by a new proviso which prohibits to adduce"
+evidence or to put questions in the cross-examination of the victim as to the general
+"immoral character, or previous sexual experience, of such victim with any person for"
+proving such consent or the quality of consent.1221.:—
+[s 376.11] Suicide by victim.—
+"Where in a rape case, the victim committed suicide before the trial and was not"
+"available for examination but the other evidence proved the guilt of the accused, it was"
+held that non-availability of the victim was no ground for acquittal. The accused was
+"convicted under sections 375/511 as at least attempt to rape, if not rape, was"
+established from the evidence.1222.
+[s 376.12] Absence of injury.—
+It is true that injury is not a sine qua non for deciding whether rape has been
+committed. But it has to be decided on the factual matrix of each case. It was observed
+"in Pratap Misra v State of Orissa,1223. where allegation was of rape by many persons"
+"and several times, but no injury was noticed. Presence of injury in this case, certainly is"
+"an important factor if the prosecutrix's version is credible, and then no corroboration"
+would be necessary. But if the prosecutrix's version is not credible then there would be
+need for corroboration.1224.
+[s 376.13] Corroboration of testimony.—
+"The trend of judicial opinion is that in rape cases corroboration is not a matter of law,"
+"but a guide of prudence, as the testimony of the victim is vital unless there are"
+compelling reasons for corroboration.1225. The Supreme Court has held that a woman
+who has been raped is not an accomplice. If she was ravished she is the victim of an
+outrage and if she consented there is no rape. In the case of a girl below the age of
+"consent, her consent will not matter so far as the offence of rape is concerned, but if"
+she consented her evidence will be suspect as that of an accomplice. The true rule of
+prudence requires that in every case of this type the advisability of corroboration
+should be present in the mind of the Judge and that must be indicated in the judgment.
+But corroboration can be dispensed with by the Judge if in the particular
+circumstances of the case before him he himself is satisfied that it is safe to do
+so.1226. Indeed no rule of thumb can be laid down in this matter for every case must
+"depend a good deal on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. Thus, in Rafiq's"
+"case1227. Krishna Iyer, J, observed:"
+when no woman of honour will accuse another of rape since she sacrifices thereby what is
+"dearest to her, he cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist on corroborative evidence, even"
+"if taken as a whole, the case spoken to by the victim strikes a judicial mind as probable …"
+When a woman is ravished what is inflicted is not merely physical injury but the deep sense
+of some deathless shame … Judicial response to human rights cannot be blunted by legal
+bigotry.
+"Similarly, in Bhoginbhai's case1228. Thakkar, J, observed with some anguish:"
+In the Indian setting refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault in the
+absence of corroboration as a rule is adding insult to injury … A girl or a woman in the
+tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit
+that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be
+conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society … And when in the face of these
+"factors the crime is brought to light, there is built-in assurance that the charge is genuine"
+rather than fabricated … Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown
+or believed to be self-inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to
+"exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence is entitled to great"
+weight absence of corroboration notwithstanding.
+Refusal by the accused person to subject himself to blood test for the purpose of
+determining his fatherhood of the child who was born as a result of the alleged rape
+was considered to be an evidence of corroboration.1229.
+[s 376.14] Conviction on sole testimony of prosecutrix.—
+A conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is sustainable where the Court is
+convicted of the truthfulness of the prosecutrix and there exist no circumstances which
+"cast a shadow of doubt over her veracity.1230. To insist on corroboration, except in the"
+"rarest of rare cases, is to equate one who is a victim of the lust of another, with an"
+accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood.1231.
+[s 376.15] CASES.— Rape by police constable.—
+The victim was allegedly raped in a hotel room by a police constable. She could not
+identify him. No test identification parade was held. The Supreme Court said that the
+identity was established by the fact that the accused was arrested from the hotel. The
+room was booked by him. He was not able to explain his whereabouts at the time of
+the offence. The Court further observed that the Courts have to adopt a different
+approach in such case. The Court should not get swayed by minor contradictions or
+discrepancies and defective investigation.1232.
+[s 376.16] Rape and conspiracy for rape.—
+The four accused persons used their affluence and pretensions for friendship and
+thereby lured innocent schoolgirls and then sexually exploited them and subjected
+"them to rape. Two of them actually committed acts of rape, the third made overtures to"
+"one of the victims and the fourth, being a driver, conveyed them to the farmhouse"
+where they were exploited. Their acts were proved by witnesses. Two of them were
+"convicted under section 376. The third and the forth, though committed no act of rape,"
+"were convicted under section 376 read with section 120-B (conspiracy), it being not"
+necessary that all co-conspirators should act in a similar manner. Their life sentence
+was reduced to 10 years of RI.1233.
+[s 376.17] CASES.—Charge not proved.—
+"Where the evidence of prosecutrix contradicts as to time and offence, and when the"
+"medical and FSL reports did not support the prosecution case, Supreme Court held that"
+the acquittal is proper.1234. Where the age of the victim was doubtful and she stated
+that without her consent the accused did something to her which he ought not to have
+"done but not disclosing what he actually did, it was held that it could not be inferred"
+that the accused had committed rape on her. It was held that conviction of the accused
+under section 376 was rightly set aside.1235.
+The prosecutrix was an educated woman and employed. She went in the jeep of the
+accused at night for a long distance intending to meet her senior officer. She alleged
+that she was raped by the accused in his house when they halted there. This was
+wholly unusual conduct. There was no explanation of any compelling reason for
+meeting the officer at night. There were no stains of semen or blood on her clothes.
+She asserted virginity but medical evidence showed that she was habituated to sex.
+The accused was held to be entitled to benefit of doubt.1236.
+Two persons were charged and prosecuted under section 376(2)(g) for gang raping a
+"girl. The victim was desirous of marrying one of them and, therefore, did not report the"
+matter willingly. There were various infirmities in the prosecution evidence. The
+conviction of the accused for the aforesaid offence was set aside.1237.
+[s 376.18] Unchaste woman.—
+The Supreme Court has laid down that the unchastity of a woman does not make her
+"""open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he wishes. Merely"
+"because she is a woman of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be thrown overboard. At"
+the most the officer called upon to evaluate her evidence would be required to
+administer caution unto himself before accepting her evidence.1238. Where in a
+"prosecution for gang rape, the prosecutrix did not make any complaint to anybody for"
+"five days giving false explanation for delay, the doctor found no injury on any part of her"
+"body and she was found to be a lady of immoral character or of lax morals, it was held"
+that it was unsafe to rely on her evidence.1239. The Supreme Court has held that the
+mere fact that the prosecutrix was of loose moral character and was used to sexual
+"intercourse and might have gone to the accused herself, were not grounds to disbelieve"
+"her statement. Such facts could demolish the case of abduction. But the prosecutrix,"
+"being of 10–11 years of age, was not capable of giving consent for abusing her"
+sexually. The conviction of the accused was restored.1240.
+"According to the Supreme Court, it is not a ground for acquittal of the accused that the"
+prosecutrix was not having a good character and was a girl of easy virtues.1241.
+"[s 376.19] The proviso removed by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.—"
+"The proviso to section 376(2) IPC, 1860 laid down that the Court may, for adequate and"
+"special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose sentence of imprisonment of"
+either description for a term of less than 10 years. This proviso is now removed by
+"Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 in the wake of increasing crimes against women."
+"It is, therefore, no longer possible to plead for any mitigating circumstances for"
+reducing the quantum of punishment.
+"Where a person took away his niece under the promise of providing her a job, and"
+"completely believing his trust, raped her in a beastly manner, the Court said that no"
+"further leniency could be shown to him and, therefore, the sentence of seven years' RI"
+and a fine of Rs. 2000 was to be maintained.1242.
+A defenceless married woman was tricked out of her house taking advantage of the
+drunken state of her husband. She was ravished in a most dastardly manner by three
+out of six members of the gang. All the three were awarded the maximum penalty of
+life-term by the Courts below. Only one came up in appeal before the Supreme Court.
+The Court said that no leniency could be shown to any one of them. The single
+appellant could not be treated differently from others who were serving their life
+sentence.1243.
+[s 376.19.1] Incest.—
+The accused had lost contact with his daughter when she was very young. They met
+again when she was 23 and they were both alcoholics. The incest started when the
+"daughter was 24 and continued for three years, during which time she gave birth to"
+their child. It was held that the offence as aggravated by the duration of the
+"relationship, the fact that a child was born and that the incest continued before, during"
+and after the pregnancy. The sentencing judge had given due weight to the accused's
+"depression, alcoholism and contrition, The sentence of 2½ years was considered to be"
+"alright. However, there was no justification for the extended licence period it was not"
+possible to conclude that the normal licence period would be inadequate to prevent
+"recommission, having regard to other ways in which contact with the daughter could be"
+prevented.1244..
+[s 376.20] Rape and grievous hurt.—
+The victim girl aged seven years was in the care and custody of the accused and the
+natural and unnatural sexual acts were committed by him over a period of time. The
+injuries which were caused by the accused on the day of the incident were either on the
+skull or the hand or the thumb and therefore could not have been the reason for which
+death had occurred. In such a situation the liability of the accused for the commission
+"of the offence under section 302, IPC, 1860 would remain in serious doubt. The"
+"accused should be held liable for the offence under section 325, IPC, 1860. Thus, the"
+Court while maintaining the conviction and sentences awarded under sections 376 (2)
+"(f) and 377, IPC, 1860 altered the conviction under section 302, IPC, 1860 to one under"
+"section 325, IPC, 1860. Accordingly, the death penalty was set aside and punishment of"
+RI for seven years was imposed.1245.
+[s 376.21] Jurisdiction.—
+The offence was completed at the place of kidnapping. The girl was carried to some
+other place where the ultimate purpose of raping her by several persons was
+accomplished. The Court said that the offences in question were a series of acts so
+connected together as to form part of the same transaction within the meaning of
+"section 223(d), Cr PC, 1973. All of them could be tried at the place of kidnapping.1246."
+The offence is not compoundable. It has been held that a compromise cannot be a
+factor in reduction of quantum of punishment.1247.
+[s 376.22] Trial-in-camera.—
+An application for trial-in-camera without disclosing the name of the applicant was
+allowed and her father was not allowed to seek quashing of the complaint in the
+interest of family honour.1248.
+[s 376.23] Offences comparable to rape and indecent assault.—
+The accused appealed against a sentence of nine years' imprisonment imposed
+"following his guilty plea to causing a nuisance to the public by making threatening,"
+obscene and malicious telephone calls. He had made about 1000 telephone calls over
+a two weeks' period to 15 complainants. The calls had been made for his sexual
+gratification and had involved him ordering his victims to perform sexual acts against
+"themselves, under threat of rape or serious physical injury. He had a record of previous"
+convictions for using the telephone system to send offensive and indecent matter.
+It was held that the sentencing judge was entitled to conclude that the offences
+committed by the accused had been comparable to rape and indecent assault. His
+"previous convictions, together with the pre-sentence report and a psychiatric report,"
+also demonstrated that he presented a continuing and escalating danger to women.
+"Accordingly, the sentence imposed was not excessive.1249."
+[s 376.24] Probation.—
+The refusal to grant probation to the person found guilty of rape has been held to be
+proper.1250.?
+Assistance to Rape Victims : Supreme Court Guidelines
+"In Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v UOI,1251. the Supreme Court found that in"
+"the cases of rape, the investigating agency as well as the Subordinate Courts"
+"sometimes adopt totally an indifferent attitude towards the prosecutrix and therefore,"
+the Supreme Court issued following directions in order to render assistance to the
+victims of rape:
+(1) The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with legal representation.
+It is important to have someone who is well-acquainted with the criminal justice system.
+The role of the victim's advocate would not only be to explain to the victim the nature of the
+"proceedings, to prepare her for the case and to assist her in the police station and in Court"
+but to provide her with guidance as to how she might obtain help of a different nature from
+"other agencies, for example, mind counselling or medical assistance. It is important to"
+secure continuity of assistance by ensuring that the same person who looked after the
+complainant's interests in the police station represents her till the end of the case.
+(2) Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station since the victim of sexual
+"assault might very well be in a distressed state upon arrival at the police station, the"
+guidance and support of a lawyer at this stage and whilst she was being questioned would
+be of great assistance to her.
+(3) The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her right to representation
+before any questions were asked of her and that the police report should state that the
+victim was so informed.
+(4) A list of advocates willing to act in these cases should be kept at the police station for
+victims who did not have a particular lawyer in mind or whose own lawyer was unavailable.
+"(5) The advocate shall be appointed by the Court, upon application by the police at the"
+"earliest convenient moment, but in order to ensure that victims were questioned without"
+"undue delay, advocates would be authorised to act at the police station before leave of the"
+Court was sought or obtained.
+"(6) In all rape trials anonymity of the victim must be maintained, as far as necessary."
+"(7) It is necessary, having regard to the Directive Principles contained under Article 38(1) of"
+the Constitution of India to set up Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Rape victims
+"frequently incur substantial financial loss. Some, for example, are too traumatised to"
+continue in employment.
+(8) Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the Court on conviction of the offender
+and by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board whether or not a conviction has taken
+"place. The Board will take into account pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of earnings"
+due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if this occurred as a result of the rape.
+"In addition thereto, it is an obligation on the part of the State authorities and"
+"particularly, the Director General of Police and Home Ministry of the State to issue"
+proper guidelines and instructions to the other authorities as how to deal with such
+"cases and what kind of treatment is to be given to the prosecutrix, as a victim of sexual"
+assault requires a totally different kind of treatment not only from the society but also
+from the State authorities. Certain care has to be taken by the Doctor who medically
+examines the victim of rape. The victim of rape should generally be examined by a
+"female doctor. Simultaneously, she should be provided the help of some psychiatric."
+The medical report should be prepared expeditiously and the Doctor should examine
+"the victim of rape thoroughly and give his/her opinion with all possible angle, e.g.,"
+"opinion regarding the age taking into consideration the number of teeth, secondary sex"
+"characters, and radiological test, etc. The Investigating Officer must ensure that the"
+"victim of rape should be handled carefully by lady police official/officer, depending"
+upon the availability of such official/officer. The victim should be sent for medical
+examination at the earliest and her statement should be recorded by the IO in the
+presence of her family members making the victim comfortable except in incest cases.
+Investigation should be completed at the earliest to avoid the bail to the accused on
+"technicalities as provided under section 167 Cr PC, 1973 and final report should be"
+"submitted under section 173 Cr PC, 1973 at the earliest."
+[Dilip v State of MP. 1252.]
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1204. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 9 (w.e.f. 3"
+"February 2013). Earlier section 376 was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25"
+"December 1983). Section 376, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under:"
+"[s 376] Punishment for rape.—(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2),"
+commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall
+not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten
+years and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under
+"twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment,"
+impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.
+"(2) Whoever,—"
+(a) being a police officer commits rape—
+(i) within the limits of the police station to which he is appointed; or
+(ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station
+to which he is appointed; or
+(iii) on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to
+him; or
+"(b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a"
+woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant
+subordinate to him; or
+"(c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of"
+custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman's or
+children's institution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any
+"inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or"
+"(d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official"
+position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or
+(e) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
+(f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or
+"(g) commits gang rape,"
+shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years
+but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine:
+"Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment,"
+impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years.
+Explanation 1.—Where a woman is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in
+"furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be deemed to have committed"
+gang rape within the meaning of this sub-section.
+"Explanation 2.—""Women's or children's institution"" means an institution, whether called an"
+"orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widows' home or by any other name,"
+which is established and maintained for the reception and care of woman or children.
+"Explanation 3.—""Hospital"" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any"
+institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons
+requiring medical attention or rehabilitation.
+"1205. Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, section 4(a), for ""shall not be less than seven years, but which"
+"may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine"" (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018)."
+"1206. Clause (i) omitted by Act 22 of 2018, section 4(b) (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018). Clause (i), before"
+"omission, stood as under:"
+"""(i) commits rape on a woman when she is under sixteen years of age; or""."
+"1207. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 4(c) (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018)."
+"1208. Tukaram, 1978 Cr LJ 1864 : AIR 1979 SC 185 [LNIND 1978 SC 254] ."
+"1209. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai, 1983 Cr LJ 1096 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 753 [LNIND 1983 SC"
+161] : (1983) 3 SCC 753 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 728.
+"1210. Ram Charan v State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 1825 (MP); Saifuddin v UOI, 2002 Cr LJ 3159 (J&K)"
+dismissal of army man from service on account of rape which was proved. No interference.
+"1211. Ram Kala, 47 Cr LJ 611 (All)."
+"1212. SP Kohil, 1978 Cr LJ 1804 : AIR 1978 SC 1753 [LNIND 1978 SC 235] . Followed in"
+"Panibhusan Behera v State of Orissa, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1561 (Ori). Where there was no other"
+"evidence of either enticement or rape, the mere presence of semen stains on the frock of the"
+"alleged victim was held to be not sufficient for conviction; Mahesh Kumar Bherulal v State of MP,"
+"(1995) 2 Cr LJ 2021 (MP). Y Srinivasa Rao v State of AP, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1597 (AP), no medical"
+"evidence that any forced act was committed on the prosecutrix. Rahim Beg v State of UP, AIR"
+"1973 SC 343 : 1972 Cr LJ 1260 , held that semen stain on the 'langot' of a young man can exist"
+because of a variety of reasons and would not necessarily connect him with the offence of rape.
+"1213. Tameezuddin v State (NCT) of Delhi, (2009) 15 SCC 566 [LNINDORD 2009 SC 430] . Raju v"
+"State of MP, AIR 2009 SC 858 [LNIND 2008 SC 2358] , recovery of stained underwear of the"
+"accused, could not by itself support the allegation of rape. Pawan v State of Uttaranchal, (2009)"
+"15 SCC 259 [LNIND 2009 SC 464] : (2009) 3 All LJ 637 : 2009 Cr LJ 2257 , semen stains found"
+on the underwear of the accused labourers as supported by other circumstances were held
+sufficient to lead to conviction.
+"1214. Lillu @ Rajesh v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 1784 [LNIND 2013 SC 435] : 2013 (6) Scale"
+17 [LNIND 2013 SC 435] .
+"1215. State of UP v Pappu @ Yunus, AIR 2005 SC 1248 : 2005 (3) SCC 594 ; Aman Kumar v State"
+"of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1497 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] : 2004 (4) SCC 379 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] ."
+"1216. Vijay alias Chinee v State of MP, 2010 (8) SCC 191 [LNIND 2010 SC 659] : 2010 AIR SCW"
+"5510, State of Maharashtra v Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain, 1990 (1) SCC 550 [LNIND 1990"
+SC 26] : 1990 Cr LJ 889 .
+"1217. State of UP v Munshi, AIR 2009 SC 370 [LNIND 2008 SC 1717] : 2008 (9) SCC 390 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 1717] .
+"1218. Narender Kumar v State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2012 SC 2281 [LNIND 2012 SC 347] : 2012 (5)"
+Scale 657 [LNIND 2012 SC 347] .
+"1219. Rajoo v State of MP, AIR 2009 SC 858 [LNIND 2008 SC 2358] ."
+"1220. State of Maharashtra v Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207 [LNIND 1990 SC"
+"610] ; State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh, AIR 1996 SC 1393 [LNIND 1996 SC 2903] ; and State of UP"
+"v Pappu @ Yunus, AIR 2005 SC 1248 ."
+"1221. Section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has been further amended vide the Criminal"
+"Law (Amendment) Act, 2018. In section 146 of the Evidence Act, in the proviso, for the words,"
+"figures and letters ""section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D"", the words, figures"
+"and letters ""section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section"
+"376DA, section 376DB"" have been substituted"
+"1222. State of Karnataka v Mahabaleshwar Gourya Naik, AIR 1992 SC 2043 : 1992 Cr LJ 3786 ."
+"1223. Pratap Misra v State of Orissa, 1977 (3) SCC 41 ."
+"1224. Lalliram v State of MP, 2008 (10) SCC 69 [LNIND 2008 SC 1833] : 2008 (12) Scale 491"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 1833] ; Aman Kumar v State of Haryana, 2004 (4) SCC 379 [LNIND 2004 SC 184]"
+.
+"1225. Gurcharan Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2661 [LNIND 1972 SC 433] : 1972 (2)"
+"SCC 749 [LNIND 1972 SC 433] ; Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam v Miss Subhra Chakraborty, AIR 1996"
+SC 922 [LNIND 1995 SC 1314] : 1996 (1) SCC 490 [LNIND 1995 SC 1314] .
+"1226. Rameshwar, (1952) SCR 377 [LNIND 1951 SC 76] : AIR 1952 SC 54 [LNIND 1951 SC 76] ;"
+"Sidheswar Ganguly, AIR 1958 SC 143 [LNIND 1957 SC 108] . Karnel Singh v State of MP, AIR 1995"
+"SC 2472 [LNIND 1995 SC 776] : 1995 Cr LJ 4173 , the sole testimony of the prosecutrix"
+"corroborated by medical evidence found reliable, conviction of the accused under section 375"
+"upheld; Dharma v Nirmal Singh Bittu, AIR 1996 SC 1136 [LNIND 1996 SC 272] : 1996 Cr LJ 1631 ,"
+"where the accused was found guilty of attempt to rape and committing murder of his victim, the"
+Supreme Court set aside the acquittal of the accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
+"Sri Narayan Saha v State of Tripura, (2004) 7 SCC 775 [LNIND 2004 SC 906] : AIR 2005 SC 1452"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 906] , conviction without corroboration permissible."
+"1227. Rafiq, 1980 Cr LJ 1344 : AIR 1981 SC 96 [LNIND 1980 SC 331] . State of Karnataka v Raju,"
+(2007) 11 SCC 490 [LNIND 2007 SC 1074] : AIR 2007 SC 3225 [LNIND 2007 SC 1074] : 2007 Cr
+"LJ 4700 , evidence of the victim appearing to be probable. The court exposed the"
+impermissibility of insistence by the accused on corroboration of the testimony. No accused
+can cling to a fossil formula and insist on corroboration even if the case taken as a whole
+strikes to the judicial mind as probable. Judicial response to human rights cannot be allowed to
+"be blunted by legal jugglery. Shrawan v State of Maharashtra, (2006) 13 SCC 191 , the allegation"
+of rape of the woman and assault on her husband when the latter went to the house of the
+"accused to protest, police antipathy, alleged facts seemed to be true, conviction and sentence"
+upheld.
+"1228. Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai, 1983 Cr LJ 1096 : AIR 1983 SC 753 [LNIND 1983 SC 161] :"
+"(1983) 3 SCC 217 [LNIND 1983 SC 161] . Satpal v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 564 (Raj),"
+corroboration is not required as a rule. The fact of a litigation between the complainant and
+accused families was not material because a father would not involve his daughter into such a
+"bad role. Laxman Dass v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 4501 , corroboration not considered"
+"necessary, injuries on person though not on private part, conviction. Gurmit Singh case was"
+"followed in State of Karnataka v Manjanna, AIR 2000 SC 2231 [LNIND 2000 SC 812] : 2000 Cr LJ"
+"3471 here also acquittal was set aside, the court saying that the conclusion of the court below"
+regarding reaction of the victim and her mother and delay in lodging the FIR was contrary to
+"evidence. Visweswaran v State of TN, 2003 Cr LJ 2548 (SC), rape by accused constable in hotel"
+"room, no identification by the victim, but the room was booked by him, he was arrested at the"
+hotel premises and he was not able to explain his whereabouts at about the time of offence.
+The court said that these circumstances sufficiently made him out.
+"1229. Swati Lodha v State of Rajasthan, 1991 Cr LJ 939 (Raj)."
+"1230. Ramdas v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 2 SCC 170 [LNIND 2006 SC 928] : AIR 2007 SC"
+"155 [LNIND 2006 SC 928] . Narayan v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 6 SCC 465 [LNIND 2007 SC 456]"
+": 2007 Cr LJ 2733 , testimony of the prosecutrix found to be not believable, no conviction on that"
+"basis. State of Punjab v Ramdev Singh, AIR 2004 SC 1290 [LNIND 2003 SC 1106] ; State of"
+"Chhattisgarh v Derha, (2004) 9 SCC 699 [LNIND 2004 SC 535] ; State of HP v Shree Kant Shekari,"
+AIR 2004 SC 4404 [LNIND 2004 SC 921] . Medical evidence that the victim showed signs of
+"previous sexual intercourse, the court said it would not have any adverse effect on her"
+"testimony. It could not be a ground for acquitting the rapist. Wahid Khan v State of MP, (2010) 1"
+"SCC Cr 1208 : (2010) 2 SCC 9 [LNIND 2009 SC 2041] : AIR 2010 SC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 2041] ,"
+evidence of prosecutrix stands on equal footing with that of an injured witness and if it inspires
+"confidence, corroboration is not necessary. The court noted the adverse things like social"
+"repercussions, backward society, dangers of being ostracized, difficulties of rehabilitation and"
+"survival, psychology not to admit adverse unless it was a fact. A 12-year-old girl was the victim"
+"in this case, being taken away by the accused in auto-rickshaw."
+"1231. State of HP v Sanjay Kumar, 2016 (4) Crimes 424 (SC) : 2016 (12) Scale 831 ."
+"1232. Visveswaran v State of TN, AIR 2003 SC 2471 [LNIND 2003 SC 481] , imprisonment for a"
+"period of seven years and fine of Rs. 10,000 was affirmed."
+"1233. Moijullah v State of Rajasthan, (2004) 2 SCC 90 [LNIND 2003 SC 1143] : AIR 2004 SC 3186"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1143] .
+"1234. State v Babu Meena, AIR 2013 SC 2207 [LNIND 2013 SC 114] : (2013) 4 SCC 206 [LNIND"
+"2013 SC 114] ; Rajesh Patil v State of Jharkhand, 2013 Cr LJ 2062 (SC); delay coupled with non-"
+examination of doctor and IO created reasonable doubt in the prosecution story.
+"1235. State of Karnataka v Sureshbabu Puk Raj Porral, 1994 Cr LJ 1216 ."
+"1236. Sudhansif Sekhar Sahoo v State of Orissa, AIR 2003 SC 2136 [LNIND 2002 SC 832] . The"
+Supreme Court expressed the opinion that sole testimony is not to be relied upon unless it is
+"safe, reliable and worthy of acceptance. State of Punjab v Chatinder Pal Singh, (2008) 17 SCC 90"
+"[LNINDORD 2008 SC 308] : AIR 2009 SC 974 [LNINDORD 2008 SC 308] , prosecution witnesses"
+"going back upon their statements, two inconsistent dying declaration, when two courts on"
+"analysis of evidence found the accused not guilty, no scope for interference."
+"1237. Shatrughan v State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 120 (MP). Thomas v State of Kerala, 1999 Cr LJ 1297"
+"(Ker), accused committed forced sex from behind, medical opinion that such act was possible"
+"by use of force. Offence proved and conviction upheld. State of Rajasthan v Om Prakash, AIR"
+"2002 SC 2235 [LNIND 2002 SC 370] (Supp), charge proved, non-examination of witnesses other"
+"than family members was immaterial. Fota v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 1677 (Raj), charge"
+"of rape found to be false, one of the reasons for the finding being that the father of the girl had"
+"compromised with the alleged rapist, this could not be probable. State of Punjab v Gurdeep"
+"Singh, 1999 Cr LJ 4597 : (2000) 8 SCC 547 [LNIND 2000 SC 1292] , the only evidence was that"
+"the accused was seen by a relative of the girl chasing her in a drunken state, but he did nothing,"
+"not enough to connect that man with rape and murder. Suresh N Bhusane v State of Maharashtra,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 4559 : AIR 1998 SC 3131 [LNIND 1998 SC 733] , voluntary conduct rather than"
+"forcible lifting, charge of rape not proved. Prahlad Singh v State of MP, 1997 Cr LJ 4078 : AIR"
+"1997 SC 3442 [LNIND 1997 SC 1080] , fact of rape established, but the accused could not be"
+"identified by the victim girl. Acquittal. Prakash Sakharam Mandale v State of Maharashtra, 1997"
+"Cr LJ 4199 (Bom), the victim's age could not be established beyond doubt. She remained silent"
+about her age. This fact spoke of her connivance. Acquittal.
+"1238. State of Maharashtra v Madhukar N Mardikar, (1991) 1 SCC 57 [LNIND 1990 SC 610] : AIR"
+1991 SC 207 [LNIND 1990 SC 610] . For a review of case—law on the need for corroboration see
+"State of Maharashtra v Kalgya Kale, 1989 Cr LJ 1389 (Bom). See also Daler Singh v State of"
+"Haryana, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 614 (P&H), no implicit reliance can be placed upon the testimony of a"
+prosecutrix who is a woman of easy virtue and seems to be consenting. There were other
+"infirmities also in the evidence tendered, hence acquittal."
+"1239. Banti v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 715 (MP). Mohan v State of MP, 2001 Cr LJ 3046 (MP), it is"
+no defence that the girl was used for sex. The spontaneity in disclosure of the incident by the
+prosecurtix has a greater value as res gestae. It is substantive evidence.
+"1240. State of UP v Om, 1999 Cr LJ 5030 : 1998 SCC (Cr) 1343. Milind Ambadas Mhaske v State,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 357 (Bom), bad character of the prosecutrix does not enable the accused to escape"
+"from his culpability. Grown-up married woman having two children, consent could not be"
+"inferred from the absence of injuries on private part. Sanju Gupta v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1684 (Ori), a woman may be of immoral character, persons forcing her to sex against her will"
+would be guilty of rape.
+"1241. State of UP v Pappu, 2005 Cr LJ 331 : AIR 2005 SC 1248 : (2005) 3 SCC 594 ."
+"1242. Maguni Ranjan Jyoti v State of Orissa, 2003 Cr LJ 530 (Ori)."
+"1243. Ramesh Kumar v State of Haryana, (2008) 5 SCC 139 [LNIND 2008 SC 508] . Viswanathan"
+"v State, (2008) 5 SCC 354 [LNIND 2008 SC 999] : AIR 2008 SC 2222 [LNIND 2008 SC 999] ,"
+version of the victim and her brother was corroborated by material objects medical evidence
+"and dispositions, accused persons carried away the victim to an isolated place and subjected"
+"her to rape, clearly showed their common intention of gang rape."
+"1244. R v DM (Incest : Sentencing), (2002) EWCA Crim 1702 : (2003) 1 Cr App R (S) 59 [CA (Crim"
+"Div)]; Ram Kumar v State of MP, 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 18 (MP) : (2002) 3 MPH7 111, rape on the"
+"accused's own minor daughter. She stood cross-examination, she could not cry out because she"
+"was in helpless situation, conviction was based solely on her testimony. Neel Kumar v State of"
+"Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 [LNIND 2012 SC 298] : 2012 (5) Scale 185 [LNIND 2012 SC 298];"
+Rape and murder of his own four-year daughter by the appellant; Death sentence liable to be set
+aside and life imprisonment awarded. The appellant must serve a minimum of 30 years in jail
+without remissions.
+"1245. Rajesh v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 532 [LNINDORD 2016 SC 11435] ."
+"1246. Praveen v State of Maharashtra, 2001 Cr LJ 3417 (Bom)."
+"1247. Mangilal v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 2304 (MP)."
+"1248. Trilochan Singh Johar v State, 2002 Cr LJ 528 (Del)."
+"1249. R v Eskdale (Stuart Anthony), (2002) 1 Cr App R (S) 28, [CA (Crim Div)]."
+"1250. State of MP v Babulal, (2008) 1 SCC 234 [LNIND 2007 SC 1400] : AIR 2008 SC 582 [LNIND"
+2007 SC 1400] : 2008 Cr LJ 714 .
+"1251. Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v UOI, (1995) 1 SCC 14 [LNIND 1994 SC 1582] ."
+"1252. Dilip v State of MP, 2013 Cr LJ 2446 (SC)."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1253. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13"
+"of 2013), section 9 (w.e.f. 3 February 2013). Earlier section 376A was substituted by Act 43 of 1983,"
+"section 3 (w.e.f. 25-12-1983). Section 376A, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under: [s 376A]"
+"Intercourse by a man with his wife during separation.—Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife,"
+who is living separately from him under a decree of separation or under any custom or usage without her
+consent shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+years and shall also be liable to fine. [s 376A] Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent
+vegetative state of victim.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1253.[s 376A] Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent
+vegetative state of victim.
+"Whoever, commits an offence punishable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of"
+section 376 and in the course of such commission inflicts an injury which causes the
+"death of the woman or causes the woman to be in a persistent vegetative state, shall"
+be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
+"twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean"
+"imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, or with death.]"
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1253. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 9 (w.e.f. 3"
+"February 2013). Earlier section 376A was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25-12-"
+"1983). Section 376A, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under:"
+[s 376A] Intercourse by a man with his wife during separation.—Whoever has sexual intercourse
+"with his own wife, who is living separately from him under a decree of separation or under any"
+custom or usage without her consent shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
+for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine.
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1254. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 5 (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018). [s"
+376AB] Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1254.[s 376AB] Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age.
+"Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years of age shall be punished with"
+"rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which"
+"may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the"
+"remainder of that person's natural life, and with fine or with death:"
+Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
+rehabilitation of the victim:
+Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1254. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 5 (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018)."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1255. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13"
+"of 2013), section 376B (w.e.f. 3-2-2013). Earlier section 376B was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3"
+"(w.e.f. 25-12-1983). Section 376B, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under: “[s 376B]"
+"Intercourse by public servant with woman in his custody.—Whoever, being a public servant, takes"
+"advantage of his official position and induces or seduces, any woman, who is in his custody as such public"
+"servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him, to have sexual intercourse with him, such"
+"sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+description for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine”. [[s 376-B] Sexual
+intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1255.[[s 376-B] Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation.
+"Whoever has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether"
+"under a decree of separation or otherwise, without her consent, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description, for a term which shall not be less than two years"
+"but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation.—In this section, ""sexual intercourse"" shall mean any of the acts"
+mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of section 375].
+COMMENT.—
+"At a trial for rape, the accused asked the judge to give his ruling on the point whether a"
+husband could be convicted of raping his wife where the parties are living apart at the
+time. The judge held that the common law rule of marital exemption that a man cannot
+be guilty of raping his own wife applied to the facts. The report did not show the cause
+of their living apart.1256. This decision should be taken in the light of the declaration by
+the House of Lords that a husband can be guilty of raping his wife.1257. [Edited under
+"the preceding section under the heading ""Exception: Rape by Husband"".] The legislative"
+intent in changes introduced in sections 375 and 376 and introduction of sections 376-
+A to 376-D in 1983 has been restated by the Supreme Court in Mohan Anna Chavan v
+State of Maharashtra.1258.
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1255. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 376B (w.e.f. 3-2-"
+"2013). Earlier section 376B was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25-12-1983)."
+"Section 376B, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under:"
+"""[s 376B] Intercourse by public servant with woman in his custody.—Whoever, being a public"
+"servant, takes advantage of his official position and induces or seduces, any woman, who is in"
+"his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him, to"
+"have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape,"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five
+"years and shall also be liable to fine""."
+"1256. R v J (Rape : Marital Exemption), (1991) 1 All ER 759 ."
+"1257. R v R (Rape : Marital Exemption), (1991) 4 All ER 481 ."
+"1258. Mohan Anna Chavan v State of Maharashtra, (2008) 7 SCC 561 [LNIND 2008 SC 1265] ."
+"The Supreme Court also restated the meaning, consequences and egregiousness of the matters"
+dealt with in the amendment.
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1259. Subs. by Act 13 of 2013, section 9, for section 376C"
+"(w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013). Earlier section 376C was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25-12-1983)."
+"Section 376C, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under:: “[s 376C] Intercourse by"
+"superintendent of jail, remand home, etc.—Whoever, being the superintendent or manager of a jail, remand"
+home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman’s
+or children’s institution takes advantage of his official position and induces or seduces any female inmate
+"of such jail, remand home, place or institution to have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse"
+"not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.—“Superintendent” in relation
+"to jail, remand home or other place of custody or a women’s or children’s institution includes a person"
+"holding any other office in such jail, remand home, place or institution by virtue of which he can exercise"
+any authority or control over its inmates. Explanation 2.—The expression “women’s or children’s institution”
+shall have the same meaning as in Explanation 2 to sub-section (2) of section 376.” [s 376C] Sexual
+intercourse by a person in authority.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1259.[s 376C] Sexual intercourse by a person in authority.
+"Whoever, being—"
+(a) in a position of authority or in a fiduciary relationship; or
+(b) a public servant; or
+"(c) superintendent or manager of a jail, remand home or other place of custody"
+"established by or under any law for the time being in force, or a women's or"
+children's institution; or
+"(d) on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a hospital,"
+abuses such position or fiduciary relationship to induce or seduce any woman
+either in his custody or under his charge or present in the premises to have
+"sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the"
+"offence of rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which shall not be less than five years, but which may"
+"extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation 1.—In this section, ""sexual intercourse"" shall mean any of the acts"
+mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of section 375.
+"Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, Explanation 1 to section 375"
+shall also be applicable.
+"Explanation 3.—""Superintendent"", in relation to a jail, remand home or other"
+"place of custody or a women's or children's institution, includes a person"
+"holding any other office in such jail, remand home, place or institution by virtue"
+of which such person can exercise any authority or control over its inmates.
+"Explanation 4.—The expressions ""hospital"" and ""women's or children's"
+"institution"" shall respectively have the same meaning as in Explanation to"
+subsection (2) of section 376].
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1259. Subs. by Act 13 of 2013, section 9, for section 376C (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013). Earlier section"
+"376C was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25-12-1983). Section 376C, before"
+"substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under::"
+"""[s 376C] Intercourse by superintendent of jail, remand home, etc.—Whoever, being the"
+"superintendent or manager of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or"
+under any law for the time being in force or of a woman's or children's institution takes
+"advantage of his official position and induces or seduces any female inmate of such jail,"
+"remand home, place or institution to have sexual intercourse with him, such sexual intercourse"
+"not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
+"Explanation 1.—""Superintendent"" in relation to jail, remand home or other place of custody or a"
+"women's or children's institution includes a person holding any other office in such jail, remand"
+"home, place or institution by virtue of which he can exercise any authority or control over its"
+inmates.
+"Explanation 2.—The expression ""women's or children's institution"" shall have the same meaning"
+"as in Explanation 2 to sub-section (2) of section 376."""
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1260. Subs. by Act 13 of 2013, section 9, for section 376D"
+"(w.r.e.f. 3 February 2013). Earlier section 376D was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25"
+"December 1983). Section 376D, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under: “[s 376D]"
+Intercourse by any member of the management or staff of a hospital with any woman in that hospital.—
+"Whoever, being on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a hospital takes advantage of his"
+"position and has sexual intercourse with any woman in that hospital, such sexual intercourse not"
+"amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—The expression “hospital” shall
+have the same meaning as in Explanation 3 to sub-section (2) of section 376”. [s 376-D] Gang rape.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1260.[s 376-D] Gang rape.
+Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in
+"furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have"
+committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
+"term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to life which"
+"shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and with fine:"
+Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
+rehabilitation of the victim:
+Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.]
+COMMENT.—
+Sections 376-A–376-D inserted by the Act 43 of 1983 were sought to deal with such
+"cases which were not covered by section 376. They have thus, been inserted to meet a"
+situation which was otherwise not provided for under section 376. These sections now
+"stand substituted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013."
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1260. Subs. by Act 13 of 2013, section 9, for section 376D (w.r.e.f. 3 February 2013). Earlier"
+"section 376D was substituted by Act 43 of 1983, section 3 (w.e.f. 25 December 1983). Section"
+"376D, before substitution by Act 13 of 2013, stood as under:"
+"""[s 376D] Intercourse by any member of the management or staff of a hospital with any woman in"
+"that hospital.—Whoever, being on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a"
+hospital takes advantage of his position and has sexual intercourse with any woman in that
+"hospital, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with"
+imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and shall also be
+liable to fine.
+"Explanation.—The expression ""hospital"" shall have the same meaning as in Explanation 3 to sub-"
+"section (2) of section 376""."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1261. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 6 (w.r.e.f. 21 April 2018)."
+[[s 376DA] Punishment for gang rape on woman under sixteen years of age.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1261.[[s 376DA] Punishment for gang rape on woman under sixteen years of
+age.
+Where a woman under sixteen years of age is raped by one or more persons
+"constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those"
+persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished
+"with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that"
+"person's natural life, and with fine:"
+Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
+rehabilitation of the victim:
+Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.]
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1261. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 6 (w.r.e.f. 21 April 2018)."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1262. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 6 (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018). [[s"
+376DB] Punishment for gang rape on woman under twelve years of age.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1262.[[s 376DB] Punishment for gang rape on woman under twelve years of
+age.
+Where a woman under twelve years of age is raped by one or more persons
+"constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those"
+persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished
+"with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for"
+"the remainder of that person's natural life, and with fine, or with death:"
+Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
+rehabilitation of the victim:
+Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.]
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1262. Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, section 6 (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018)."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+"Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / 1263. Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, section 9 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013). [s"
+376E] Punishment for repeat offenders.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+1172.
+[Sexual Offences]
+1263.[s 376E] Punishment for repeat offenders.
+Whoever has been previously convicted of an offence punishable under section 376
+or section 376A or 1264.[section 376AB or section 376D or section 376DA or section
+"376DB,] and is subsequently convicted of an offence punishable under any of the said"
+sections shall be punished with imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment
+"for the remainder of that person's natural life, or with death.]"
+"1172. Subs. by Act 43 of 1983, section 3, for the heading ""Of rape"" (w.e.f. 25 December 1983)."
+"1263. Ins. by Act 13 of 2013, section 9 (w.r.e.f. 3-2-2013)."
+"1264. Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, section 7, for ""section 376D"" (w.r.e.f. 21-4-2018)."
+"The Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed"
+Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB) / [s 377] Unnatural offences.
+Currency Date: 28 April 2020
+© 2020 LexisNexis
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVI OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY OF
+OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE
+Of Unnatural Offences
+[s 377] Unnatural offences.
+"Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man,"
+"woman or animal, shall be punished with 1265.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+Explanation.—Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary
+to the offence described in this section.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section was intended to punish the offence of sodomy, buggery and bestiality. The"
+offence purported to consist in a carnal knowledge committed against the order of
+"nature by a person with a man, or in the same unnatural manner with a woman, or by a"
+"man or woman in any manner with an animal. To attract the above offence, the"
+following ingredients were required: 1) Carnal intercourse and 2) against the order of
+nature.
+[s 377.1] Constitutionality of section 377.—Naz Judgment.—
+"The Delhi High Court in a landmark judgment declared section 377 IPC, 1860"
+"unconstitutional, insofar it criminalised consensual sexual acts of adults in private as"
+"violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution.1266. But in Suresh Kumar Koushal"
+"v NAZ Foundation,1267. the Supreme Court overruled the Delhi High Court judgment"
+holding that those who indulge in carnal intercourse in the ordinary course and those
+who indulge in carnal intercourse against the order of nature constitute different
+classes and the people falling in the latter category cannot claim that section 377
+suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and irrational classification. What section 377
+does is merely to define the particular offence and prescribe punishment for the same
+which can be awarded if in the trial conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
+"Cr PC, 1973 and other statutes of the same family the person is found guilty. Therefore,"
+"section 377 IPC, 1860 was held to be not ultra vires Articles 14 and 15 of the"
+Constitution. It was also observed by the Supreme Court that the Court merely
+pronounced on the correctness of the view taken by the Delhi High Court on the
+"constitutionality of section 377 IPC, 1860 and found that the said section did not suffer"
+"from any constitutional infirmity. Notwithstanding this verdict, the competent"
+legislature shall be free to consider the desirability and propriety of deleting section
+"377 IPC, 1860 from the statute book or amend the same."
+"A constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar v UOI,1268. overruled"
+Suresh Kumar Koushal and held that consensual carnal intercourse among adults in
+"private space, does not in any way harm public decency or morality. Therefore, section"
+377 in its present form violates Article 19(1)(a). The court held that so far as section
+"377 penalises any consensual sexual relationship between two adults, be it"
+"homosexuals (man and man), heterosexuals (man and woman) or lesbians (woman"
+"and woman), cannot be regarded as constitutional. However, if anyone engages in any"
+"kind of sexual activity with animal, said aspect of section 377 is constitutional and it"
+shall remain a penal offence. The court held that any act of description covered under
+section 377 done between two individuals without consent of any one of them would
+"invite penal liability. Further, non-consensual acts which have been criminalised by"
+virtue of section 377 have already been designated as penal offences under section
+"375 and under POCSO Act, 2012."
+[s 377.2] Section 375 not subject to section 377.—
+"In Navtej Singh Johar v UOI,1269. the Supreme Court further held that section 375 gives"
+due recognition to absence of 'wilful and informed consent' for act to be termed as
+"rape, per contra, section 377 which does not contain any such qualification. Section"
+"375, as substituted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, does not use words"
+'subject to any other provision of IPC' which indicates that section 375 is not subject to
+section 377. Criminalisation of carnal intercourse between two adults was held legally
+unsustainable.
+[s 377.3] Penetration.—
+The explanation states that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse
+"necessary to the offence of rape. Section 377 of IPC, 1860 presupposes carnal"
+intercourse against the order of nature.1270. As in rape so also in an unnatural offence
+even the slightest degree of penetration is enough and it is not necessary to prove the
+completion of the intercourse by the emission of seed.1271.
+"In a case arising out of unnatural offence, it was held that the acts alleged against the"
+accused falling into two categories (1) sexual intercourse per OS (mouth) and (2)
+manipulation and movement of penis of the accused whilst being held by the victims in
+such a way as to create orifice like thing for making manipulated movement of
+"insertion and withdrawal till ejaculation of semen, fell within the sweep of unnatural"
+carnal offences and quashing of proceedings was not warranted.1272.
+The victim girl aged seven years was in the care and custody of the accused and the
+offences were committed by him over a period of time. Medical evidence and DNA
+profile conclusively established commission of natural and unnatural sexual acts on
+the deceased by the accused. Imposition of the maximum punishment awardable for
+"the said offences, i.e., life imprisonment was held perfectly justified.1273."
+"[s 377.4] Anal intercourse—Sodomy, medical evidence.—"
+When an expert categorically ruled out the commission of an unnatural offence having
+"regard to his expertise, it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution to draw his"
+attention so as to enable him to furnish an explanation. It was contended that
+lacerations are likely to disappear if the examination is made after two to three days
+and nature of injuries would also depend upon several factors. The doctor in his
+evidence stated that the tissues around the anus are hard and rough. At the time of
+"answering the calls of nature, the extra skin will be expanded. Immediately after it will"
+come to original status. By examination it was found that the boy was not habitually
+used for anal intercourse. If there is continuous act of intercourse for about a week or
+"even two, three days it can be found out as to whether he had any intercourse or not. It"
+may be true that absence of medical evidence by itself is not a crucial factor in all
+"cases, but, the same has to be taken into consideration as a relevant factor when other"
+evidence points towards the innocence of the appellant. It was not a case where only
+one view was possible. It is a well-settled principle of law that where two views are
+"possible, the High Court would not ordinarily interfere with the judgment of"
+acquittal.1274.
+[s 377.5] Conviction without charge.—
+Though medical evidence shows that victim was subjected to rape and carnal
+"intercourse on more than one occasion before she was murdered, there was no charge"
+"of sodomy under section 377 IPC, 1860 framed by trial Court. It was held that accused"
+cannot be convicted under section 377.1275.
+"1265. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1-1-"
+1956).
+"1266. Naz Foundation v Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 94 (Del)."
+"1267. Suresh Kumar Koushal v NAZ Foundation, AIR 2014 SC 563 [LNIND 2013 SC 1059] : 2014"
+Cr LJ 784 .
+"1268. Navtej Singh Johar v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 4321 ."
+"1269. Navtej Singh Johar v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 4321 ."
+"1270. Kailash Laxman Khamkar v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 3255 (Bom)."
+"1271. Hughes, (1841) 9 C & P 752; See also GD Ghadge, 1980 Cr LJ 1380 (Bom)."
+"1272. Brother John Antony v State of TN, 1992 Cr LJ 1352 (Mad). The court explained the"
+meaning and scope of the unnatural offence and referred to various authorities on this subject.
+"1273. Rajesh v State of MP, AIR 2017 SC 532 [LNINDORD 2016 SC 11435] ."
+"1274. Gowrishankara Swamigalu v State of Karnataka, (2008) 14 SCC 411 [LNIND 2008 SC 598] :"
+AIR 2008 SC 2349 [LNIND 2008 SC 598] : 2008 Cr LJ 3042 . The offence was supposed to have
+been committed for seven consecutive days at 8 a.m. in the office room a part of which was
+converted into a bed room. The whole thing sounded like unnatural.
+"1275. State of Maharashtra v Shankar Krisanrao Khade, 2009 Cr LJ 73 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+[s 378] Theft.
+"Whoever, intending to take dishonestly1. any movable property2. out of the possession"
+"of any person3. without that person's consent,4. moves that property5. in order to such"
+"taking, is said to commit theft."
+"Explanation 1.—A thing so long as it is attached to the earth, not being movable"
+"property, is not the subject of theft; but it becomes capable of being the subject of"
+theft as soon as it is severed from the earth.
+Explanation 2.—A moving effected by the same act which affects the severance may
+be a theft.
+Explanation 3.—A person is said to cause a thing to move by removing an obstacle
+"which prevented it from moving or by separating it from any other thing, as well as by"
+actually moving it.
+"Explanation 4.—A person, who by any means causes an animal to move, is said to"
+"move that animal, and to move everything which, in consequence of the motion so"
+"caused, is moved by that animal."
+"Explanation 5.—The consent mentioned in the definition may be express or implied,"
+"and may be given either by the person in possession, or by any person having for that"
+purpose authority either express or implied.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A cuts down a tree on Z's ground, with the intention of dishonestly taking the"
+"tree out of Z's possession without Z's consent. Here, as soon as A has severed"
+"the tree in order to such taking, he has committed theft."
+"(b) A puts a bait for dogs in his pocket, and thus induces Z's dog to follow it. Here, if"
+A's intention be dishonestly to take the dog out of Z's possession without Z's
+consent. A has committed theft as soon as Z's dog has begun to follow A.
+(c) A meets a bullock carrying a box of treasure. He drives the bullock in a certain
+"direction, in order that he may dishonestly take the treasure. As soon as the"
+"bullock begins to move, A has committed theft of the treasure."
+"(d) A, being Z's servant, and entrusted by Z with the care of Z's plate, dishonestly"
+"runs away with the plate, without Z's consent. A has committed theft."
+"(e) Z, going on a journey, entrusts his plate to A, the keeper of the warehouse, till Z"
+shall return. A carries the plate to a goldsmith and sells it. Here the plate was
+"not in Z's possession. It could not therefore be taken out of Z's possession, and"
+"A has not committed theft, though he may have committed criminal breach of"
+trust.
+(f) A finds a ring belonging to Z on a table in the house which Z occupies. Here the
+"ring is in Z's possession, and if A dishonestly removes it, A commits theft."
+"(g) A finds a ring lying on the highroad, not in the possession of any person. A by"
+"taking it, commits no theft, though he may commit criminal misappropriation of"
+property.
+(h) A sees a ring belonging to Z lying on a table in Z's house. Not venturing to
+"misappropriate the ring immediately for fear of search and detection, A hides"
+"the ring in a place where it is highly improbable that it will ever be found by Z,"
+with the intention of taking the ring from the hiding place and selling it when the
+"loss is forgotten. Here A, at the time of first moving the ring, commits theft."
+"(i) A delivers his watch to Z, a jeweller, to be regulated. Z carries it to his shop. A,"
+not owing to the jeweller any debt for which the jeweller might lawfully detain the
+"watch as a security, enters the shop openly, takes his watch by force out of Z's"
+"hand, and carries it away. Here A, though he may have committed criminal"
+"trespass and assault, has not committed theft, inasmuch as what he did was not"
+done dishonestly.
+"(j) If A owes money to Z for repairing the watch, and if Z retains the watch lawfully"
+"as a security for the debt, and A takes the watch out of Z's possession, with the"
+"intention of depriving Z of the property as a security for his debt, he commits"
+"theft, inasmuch as he takes it dishonestly."
+"(k) Again, if A, having pawned his watch to Z, takes it out of Z's possession without"
+"Z's consent, not having paid what he borrowed on the watch, he commits theft,"
+though the watch is his own property inasmuch as he takes it dishonestly.
+"(l) A takes an article belonging to Z out of Z's possession, without Z's consent, with"
+the intention of keeping it until he obtains money from Z as a reward for its
+restoration. Here A takes dishonestly; A has therefore committed theft.
+"(m) A, being on friendly terms with Z, goes into Z's library in Z's absence, and takes"
+"away a book without Z's express consent for the purpose merely of reading it,"
+"and with the intention of returning it. Here, it is probable that A may have"
+conceived that he had Z's implied consent to use Z's book. If this was A's
+"impression, A has not committed theft."
+"(n) A asks charity from Z's wife. She gives A money, food and clothes, which A"
+knows to belong to Z her husband. Here it is probable that A may conceive that
+"Z's wife is authorised to give away alms. If this was A's impression, A has not"
+committed theft.
+"(o) A is the paramour of Z's wife. She gives A valuable property, which A knows to"
+"belong to her husband Z, and to be such property as she has no authority from Z"
+"to give. If A takes the property dishonestly, he commits theft."
+"(p) A, in good faith, believing property belonging to Z to be A's own property, takes"
+"that property out of B's possession. Here, as A does not take dishonestly, he"
+does not commit theft.
+COMMENT—
+"Section 378 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) defines 'theft' as the dishonest"
+removal of movable property 'out of the possession of any person' without the consent
+"of that person. 'Theft', has the following ingredients, namely, (i) dishonest intention to"
+take property; (ii) the property must be movable; (ii) it should be taken out of the
+possession of another person; (iv) it should be taken without the consent of that
+person; and (v) there must be some moving of the property in order to accomplish the
+taking of it.
+"To bring home an offence under section 378 IPC, 1860, the prosecution is to prove (a)"
+that there was a movable property; (b) that the said movable property was in the
+possession of person other than the accused; (c) that the accused took it out or moved
+"it out of the possession of the said person; (d) that the accused did it dishonestly, i.e.,"
+with intention to cause wrongful gain to himself or wrongful loss to another; (e) that the
+accused took the movable property or moved it without the consent of the possessor
+of the movable property.1
+The Criminal Court is not required to adjudicate on rival claims of title claimed by the
+parties. All that the Criminal Court has to decide is whether at the time of the alleged
+incident the property which is the subject-matter of theft was in the 'possession' of the
+complainant and whether it was taken out of the possession of the complainant with a
+dishonest intention.2
+"1. Prafula Saikia v State of Assam, 2012 Cr LJ 3889 (Gau)."
+"2. P T Rajan Babu v Anitha Chandra Babu, 2011 Cr LJ 4541 (Ker)."
+"3. Nobin Chunder Holder, (1866) 6 WR (Cr) 79."
+"4. Ramratan, AIR 1965 SC 926 [LNIND 1964 SC 365] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 18 ."
+"5. Rameshwar Singh, (1936) 12 Luck 92 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+[s 379] Punishment for theft.
+Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
+"a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+In order to constitute theft five factors are essential:—
+(1) Dishonest intention to take property;
+(2) The property must be movable;
+(3) The property should be taken out of the possession of another person;
+(4) The property should be taken without the consent of that person; and
+(5) There must be some moving of the property in order to accomplish the taking of
+it.
+1. 'Intending to take dishonestly'.—Intention is the gist of the offence. The intention to
+take dishonestly exists when the taker intends to cause wrongful gain to one person or
+"wrongful loss to another person. Where, therefore, the accused acting bona fide in the"
+interests of his employers finding a party of fishermen poaching on his master's
+"fisheries, took charge of the nets and retained possession of them, pending the orders"
+"of his employers, it was held that he was not guilty of theft.3 When a person seizes"
+cattle on the ground that they were trespassing on his land and causing damage to his
+"crop or produce and gives out that he is taking them to the cattle pound, he commits"
+"no offence of theft, and however mistaken he may be about his right to that land or"
+crop. He has no dishonest intention.4 Where a respectable person just pinches the
+"cycle of another person, as his own cycle at the time was missing, and brings it back"
+and the important element of criminal intention is completely absent and he did not
+"intend by his act to cause wrongful gain to himself, it does not amount to theft.5"
+The intention to take dishonestly must exist at the time of the moving of the property
+[vide ill. (h)]. The taking must be dishonest. It is not necessary that the taking must
+cause wrongful gain to the talker; it will suffice if it causes wrongful loss to the owner.6.
+"Thus, where the accused took the complainant's three cows against her will and"
+"distributed them among her creditors, he was found guilty of stealing.7. It makes no"
+difference in the accused's guilt that the act was not intended to procure any personal
+benefit to him. Could it be said that a servant would not be guilty of theft if he were to
+"deliver over his master's plate to a pressing tailor, and tell him to pay himself? If the act"
+"done was not done animo furtandi, it will not amount to theft. It is no more stealing than"
+it will be to take a stick out of a man's hand to beat him with it.8.
+[s 379.1] Taking need not be with intent to retain property permanently.—
+It is not necessary that the taking should be permanent or with an intention to
+appropriate the thing taken9. [vide ill. (1)]. There may be theft without an intention to
+deprive the owner of the property permanently. Where the accused took out an Indian
+"Air Force plane for an unauthorised flight, even temporarily, it was held that he was"
+guilty of theft.10. It would satisfy the definition of theft if the accused takes away any
+movable property out of the possession of another person though he intended to return
+"it later on. The accused, who was working in a Government office, removed a file to his"
+"house, made it available to an outsider and then returned it to the office after two days."
+It was held by the Supreme Court that the accused was guilty of theft.11.
+[s 379.2] Bona fide dispute.—
+"Where property is removed in the assertion of a contested claim of right, however ill-"
+"founded that claim may be, the removal thereof does not constitute theft.12. Where the"
+question in dispute between two parties was whether the sale of a mahal (village)
+carried within its ambit the sale of certain trees and the servant of one of the parties
+cut and removed the trees under his master's orders under the bona fide belief that they
+"belonged to his master, it was held that the servant was not guilty of theft.13. The"
+dispute as to ownership must be bona fide. A mere colourable pretence to obtain or
+"keep possession of property does not avail as a defence.14. It is not theft if a person,"
+"acting under a mistaken notion of law, and believing that certain property is his, and"
+"that he has the right to take the same, until payment of the balance of some money due"
+"to him from the vendor, removes such property from the possession of the vendee.15."
+"Where a bona fide claim of right exists, it can be a good defence to a prosecution for"
+theft. Thus where the question of possession was in a fluid state and the accused bona
+"fide believed that the crop was his as he had cultivated the land, no offence either of"
+criminal trespass or theft could be made out against him. Such a matter is better
+"decided in a Civil Court.16. However, it was held in a case of dacoity that the question"
+of bona fide claim of right arises only where the accused show to the Court's
+"satisfaction that their belief is reasonable and is based on some documents and title,"
+however weak it may be.17. An act does not amount to theft under such circumstances
+unless there be not only no legal right but no appearance or colour of a legal right.18.
+[s 379.3] Mistake.—
+When a person takes another man's property believing under a mistake of fact and in
+"ignorance of law, that he has a right to take it, he is not guilty of theft because there is"
+"no dishonest intention, even though he may cause wrongful loss.19."
+[s 379.4] Taking back property lent on hire.—
+There was a hire-purchase agreement in respect of a vehicle. The custody of the
+vehicle was handed over to the hirer. The financier was to continue as the owner till the
+last instalment. The financier took back the vehicle for default in payments in
+accordance with the agreement. It was held that this did not amount to theft by the
+owner of his vehicle as the vital element of dishonest intention was lacking.20.
+[s 379.5] Hire Purchase.—
+When hirer himself committed default by not paying the instalments and under the
+"agreement, the appellants have repossessed the vehicle, the respondent-hirer cannot"
+have any grievance as the vital element of 'dishonest intention' is lacking. The element
+of 'dishonest intention' which is an essential element to constitute the offence of theft
+cannot be attributed to a person exercising his right under an agreement entered into
+between the parties as he may not have an intention of causing wrongful gain or to
+cause wrongful loss to the hirer.21. Because of the fact that status of complainant
+relating to the vehicle in question having purchased under Hire Purchase Agreement till
+saturation of the loan amount remains merely a trustee or bailee on behalf of financer
+and further in the aforesaid background the financer happens to be the real owner of
+"the vehicle till saturation of the loan amount, no prosecution would lie on that score.22."
+The hire-purchase agreement in law is an executory contract of sale and confers no
+right in rem on hire until the conditions for transfer of the property to him have been
+fulfilled.23.
+2. 'Movable property'.—Explanations 1 and 2 state that things attached to the land may
+"become movable property by severance from the earth, and that the act of severance"
+"may of itself be theft [vide ill (a)]. Thus, the thief who severs and carries away is put in"
+exactly the same position as if he carried away what had previously been severed. A
+sale of trees belonging to others and not cut down at the time of sale does not
+constitute theft.24. But removal of a man's trees that had been blown down by a storm
+amounts to theft.25.
+It is not necessary that the thing stolen must have some appreciable value.
+[s 379.6] CASES.— Earth and stones.—
+Cart-loads of earth26. or stones27. quarried and carried away from the land of another
+are subject of theft.
+[s 379.6.1] Timber.—
+Extraction of teak timber without licence amounts to theft of Government timber.28. In
+"Bhaiyalal v State of MP,29. it was held that the act of cutting of trees standing on"
+Government land amounts to theft under section 378.
+[s 379.6.2] Salt.—
+"Salt spontaneously formed on the surface of a swamp appropriated by Government,30."
+"or in a creek under the supervision of Government,31. is subject of theft; but not that"
+which is formed on a swamp not guarded by Government.32.
+[s 379.6.3] Human body.—
+"Human body whether living or dead (except bodies, or portions thereof, or mummies,"
+preserved in museums or scientific institutions) is not movable property.33.
+[s 379.6.4] Idol.—
+Idol is movable property and can be the subject matter of theft. It's being a juridical
+person for certain purposes is no bar to its also being a movable property.34.
+[s 379.6.5] Gas.—
+"A, having contracted with a gas company to consume gas and pay according to meter,"
+"in order to avoid paying for the full quantity of gas consumed, introduced into the"
+entrance pipe another pipe for the purpose of conveying the gas to the exit pipe of the
+"meter and so to the burners, for consumption without passing through the meter itself."
+"The entrance pipe was the property of A, but he had not by his contract any interest in"
+the gas until it passed through the meter. It was held that A was guilty of larceny.35.
+[s 379.6.6] Electricity.—
+"Theft of electricity is governed by section 135 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Though the"
+"electricity is not movable property within the meaning of section 378, IPC, 1860, and as"
+"such its dishonest abstraction cannot be regarded as theft under section 378, yet by a"
+"legal fiction created by section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (now repealed),"
+such an act should be deemed to be an offence of theft and punished under section
+"379, IPC, 1860, and section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910. In the case of Mahalakshmi"
+"Spinners Ltd v State of Haryana,36. it was held that when there is a specific/ special law"
+"covering the question of theft of electricity, i.e. section 135 of the Electricity Act, (Act 9"
+"of 1910), the general law contained in section 379, IPC, 1860 will not be applicable. Any"
+"attempt by the notice to add offence under section 379 IPC, 1860 will be a crude devise"
+by the prosecution to overcome the likely objection from the accused about the filing of
+the complaint instead of registration of FIR. Law is well settled that special law will
+prevail over the general law.
+[s 379.6.7] Water.—
+"Water supplied by a water company to a consumer, and standing in his pipes, may be"
+the subject of larceny.37. Water when conveyed in pipes and so reduced into
+possession can be the subject of theft;38. but not water running freely from a river
+through an open channel made and maintained by a person.39.
+[s 379.6.8] Animals.—Bull.—
+A bull dedicated to an idol and allowed to roam at large is not res nullius (thing
+"belonging to no one) but remains the property of the trustees of the temple, and can"
+become the subject of theft;40. but not a bull set at large in accordance with a religious
+usage.41.
+[s 379.6.9] Peacock.—
+A peacock tamed but not kept in confinement is the subject of theft.42. So is the case
+with pigeons kept in a dovecote and partridges.
+[s 379.6.10] Fish.—
+"Fish in an ordinary open irrigation tank,43. or in a tank not enclosed on all sides but"
+"dependent on the overflow of a neighbouring channel,44. are ferae naturae and not"
+subject to theft. If the water in an irrigation tank has gone so low as not to permit the
+"fish leaving the tank then they may be subject of theft.45. Similarly, fish in an enclosed"
+tank are restrained of their natural liberty and liable to be taken at any time according to
+"the pleasure of the owner, and are, therefore, subject of theft.46. Thus fish in an"
+enclosed Government tank is the property in possession of Government and it is theft
+to catch fish therein without a licence apart from being an offence under the Fisheries
+"Act, 1897.47. Fish are said to be in the possession of a person who has possession of"
+any expanse of water such as a tank where they live but from where they cannot
+escape. They are also regarded as being in the possession of a person who owns an
+exclusive right to catch them in a particular spot known as a fishery but only within that
+"spot.48. Where plots belonging to different owners in a low-lying area, demarcated by"
+"ridges of small height, are sub-merged during certain months in the year by one sheet"
+"of water and fish escape from one plot to another, it cannot be said in such a case that"
+fish is the subject matter of theft.49.
+[s 379.6.11] Crop.—
+Removal of paddy crop has been held to be theft. Persons who helped removal under
+directions as labourers were not guilty. The fact that the land was in the possession of
+the complainant and it was he who had grown the crop was held to be sufficient to
+negative the accused's suggestion that he removed the crop under a bona fide belief
+that he was entitled to it.50.
+[s 379.6.12] Standing Timber.—
+Standing timber being embedded in the earth is immovable property but the moment it
+is severed from the earth it becomes capable of being the object of theft.51.
+[s 379.6.13] Ballot Paper.—
+Accused was allegedly found in possession of a bundle of 84 stolen postal ballot
+papers at gate of printing press. High Court rejected the plea of petitioner that since he
+"was found in possession of ballot papers, he ought not to have been tried for an"
+"offence under section 380 IPC, 1860,rather he could have been tried under section"
+"127(p)(iv) of Assam Panchayat Act, 1994.52."
+[s 379.6.14] Motor vehicles.—
+"The allegation was that the accused changed engine, colour, etc. of stolen vehicles and"
+got them registered in new owners' names. But no particular instance was shown. The
+incident was more than ten years old. There was no explanation for delay in presenting
+"charge-sheet. Hence, acquittal was held proper.53."
+3. 'Out of the possession of any person'.—The property must be in the possession of
+"the prosecutor.54. Thus, there can be no theft of wild animals, birds, or fish, while at"
+"large, but there can be a theft of tamed animals. It is sufficient if property is removed"
+"against his wish from the custody of a person who has an apparent title, or even colour"
+of right to such property.55. Transfer of possession of movable property without
+"consent of the person in possession need not, however, be permanent or for a"
+considerable length of time nor is it necessary that the property should be found in
+possession of the accused. Even a transient transfer of possession is sufficient to
+meet the requirement of this section.56.
+"The authors of the Code remark: ""We believe it to be impossible to mark with precision,"
+"by any words, the circumstances which constitute possession. It is easy to put cases"
+"about which no doubt whatever exists, and about which the language of lawyers and of"
+"the multitude would be the same. It will hardly be doubted, for example, that a"
+"gentleman's watch lying on a table in his room is in his possession, though it is not in"
+"his hand, and though he may not know whether it is on his writing-table or on his"
+dressing-table. As little will it be doubted that a watch which a gentleman lost a year
+"ago on a journey, and which he has never heard of since, is not in his possession. It will"
+"not be doubted that when a person gives a dinner, his silver forks, while in the hands of"
+"his guests, are still in his possession; and it will be as little doubted that his silver forks"
+are not in his possession when he has deposited them with a pawnbroker as a pledge.
+"But between these extreme cases lie many cases in which it is difficult to pronounce,"
+"with confidence, either that property is or that it is not in a person's possession.""57."
+A movable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with
+respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other
+"persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to"
+do so in case of need.58.
+[s 379.7] 'Any person'.—
+The person from whose possession the property is taken may or may not be the owner
+of it and may have his possession either rightful or wrongful. Mere physical control of
+the person over the thing is quite enough [vide ills. (j) and (k)].
+[s 379.8] Attachment.—
+Theft can be committed by the owner of property under attachment by removing it.59.
+"The removal of crops, standing on land attached and taken possession of by the Court"
+"under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(Cr PC, 1973), amounts to theft.60."
+"Where a judgment-debtor, whose standing crops were attached, harvested them while"
+"the attachment was in force, it was held by the Madras High Court that he could not be"
+convicted of theft but of offences under sections 424 and 403.61.
+[s 379.9] Joint possession.—
+"Where there are several joint owners in joint possession, and any one of them,"
+"dishonestly takes exclusive possession, he would be guilty of theft.62. A co-owner of"
+"movable property with another, even if his share is defined, can be guilty of theft, if he is"
+"found to remove the joint property without even an implied consent of the co-owner,"
+with a view to cause wrongful loss to the co-owner and consequently wrongful gain to
+"himself or anybody else.63. Similarly, if a coparcener dishonestly takes the separate"
+"property of another coparcener, it amounts to theft.64."
+[s 379.10] Seizure of things delivered under hire-purchase.—
+"In Shriram Transport Finance Co Ltd v R Khaishiulla Khan,65. it was held that in case of a"
+"hire-purchase transaction, when the financier seizes the vehicle for default in payment"
+"of instalments by the hirer, the financier cannot be charged for an offence of theft"
+under section 378 because of absence of mens rea. The right of the owner to get back
+the vehicle is not affected by the fiction of 'deemed owner' under the Motor Vehicles
+"Act, 1988. The act of taking back the vehicle did not amount to theft.66."
+[s 379.11] Animals ferae naturae.—
+Animals found in reserve forests are ferae naturae and incapable of possession. Till
+"they are tamed and domesticated and brought to the custody of a person, whether it is"
+"Government or any other individual, such animals cannot be said to be in the"
+possession of the Government and persons who remove them cannot be convicted of
+theft.67.
+[s 379.12] CASES.—
+Where the complainant had an apparent title as tenant of the land together with long
+"possession, and he had on the strength of this raised the crops which the accused"
+"removed, it was held that the accused was guilty of theft because he was not justified"
+"in taking the law into his own hands, even if he was entitled to hold the land, as he was"
+not in actual possession of it.68.
+Where a person takes a lorry on hire-purchase system from a company which under the
+agreement had reserved the right of seizing the lorry in the event of default in payment
+"of instalments, and default is made, then the company is not entitled to retake"
+possession of the lorry by force or by removing it from the hands of the purchaser's
+"servants who had no authority, express or implied, to give any consent. If the company"
+or its agents do so they are guilty of an offence under this section. The question
+whether ownership had or had not passed to the purchaser is wholly immaterial as this
+section deals with possession and not ownership. The legal possession of the lorry
+was vested in the purchaser and the company was not entitled to recover possession
+"of the lorry, even though default in payment of any instalments had taken place, without"
+the consent of the purchaser. Possession of the driver and the cleaner was the
+possession of their master and they were not competent to give consent on behalf of
+the master.69.
+4. 'Consent'.—The thing stolen must have been taken without the consent of the person
+"in possession of it. Explanation 5 says that consent may be express or implied, and"
+"may be given either by the person in possession, or by any person having for that"
+purpose authority either express or implied [vide ills. (m) and (n)]. But consent given
+under improper circumstances will be of no avail [vide ill. (c)]. Consent obtained by a
+false representation which leads to a misconception of facts will not be a valid
+consent.70.
+[s 379.13] CASES.—
+A sought the aid of B with the intention of committing a theft of the property of B's
+"master. B, with the knowledge and consent of his master, and for the purpose of"
+"procuring A's punishment, aided A in carrying out his object. It was held that as the"
+"property removed was so taken with the knowledge of the owner, theft was not"
+"committed, but A was guilty of abetment of theft.71. Really speaking, the owner did not"
+consent to the dishonest taking away of the property. He merely assisted the thief in
+"carrying out the latter's dishonest intention. Cf.ills. (m), (n) and (o). The thief had no"
+"knowledge of the owner's act and it could not, therefore, be construed as a consent."
+[s 379.14] Unauthorised consent.—
+"Possession of wood by a Forest Inspector, who is a servant of Government, is"
+"possession of the Government itself and a dishonest removal of it, without payment of"
+"the necessary fees, from his possession, albeit with his actual consent, was held to"
+constitute theft as consent was unauthorised and fraudulent.72.
+5. 'Moves that property'.—The offence of theft is completed when there is a dishonest
+"moving of the property, even though the property is not detached from that to which it"
+is secured. The least removal of the thing taken from the place where it was before is a
+"sufficient asportation though it is not quite carried off. Upon this principle the guest,"
+who having taken off the sheets from his bed with an intent to steal them carried them
+"into the hall, and was apprehended before he could get out of the house, was adjudged"
+"guilty of theft. So also was he, who having taken a horse in a close with intent to steal"
+"it, was apprehended before he could get it out of the close.73."
+Explanations 3 and 4 state how 'moving' could be effected in certain cases.
+Illustrations (b) and (c) elucidate the meaning of Explanation 4.
+In a prosecution under sections 379/411 in respect of timber seized in a raid the link
+between the seized timber and the accused was not established nor was any evidence
+brought to show that the seized timber was transported by the accused under the guise
+of permits issued to him by the forest department. Acquittal of the accused of the
+offences under the aforesaid sections was not interfered with.74.
+"6. Explanations 1 and 2.—The moving by the same act, which effects the severance,"
+may constitute theft.75. Carrying away of trees after felling them is theft76. but mere
+"sale is not.77. In the case of growing grass, a moving by the same act, which affects its"
+"severance from the earth, may amount to theft.78."
+"Where certain land, on which there was a standing crop of paddy, was entrusted to the"
+accused to take care of and watch till the paddy was ripe when they were to give notice
+"to the factory people who would reap it, it was held that by cutting the crops"
+"themselves and disposing of the same, the accused had committed theft.79."
+[s 379.15] Husband and wife.—Hindu law.—
+There is no presumption of law that husband and wife constitute one person in India
+for the purpose of criminal law. If the wife removes her husband's property from his
+"house with dishonest intention, she is guilty of theft.80. A Hindu woman who removes"
+"from the possession of her husband and without his consent, her stridhan (woman's"
+property) cannot be convicted of theft because this species of property belongs to her
+"absolutely.81. So also, a husband can be convicted if he steals his wife's stridhan."
+Where certain articles of movable property were in the joint possession of husband and
+"wife, it was held that the husband who was alleged to have taken away the articles"
+could not be held guilty of theft.82.
+[s 379.16] Mohammedan law.—
+It is laid down that a Mohammedan wife may be convicted of stealing from her
+"husband, because under this system of law, there does not exist the same union of"
+interest between husband and wife as exists between an English husband and wife.83.
+The same reasoning would apply in the case of a Mohammedan husband.
+[s 379.16.1] Necessitas inducit privilegium quo ad jura privata.—
+Where a man in extreme want of food or clothing steals either in order to relieve his
+"present necessities, the law allows no such excuse to be considered."
+[s 379.17] Single or several thefts.—
+Removal by one single act of several articles constitutes one offence of theft only
+although the articles belong to different persons.84.
+[s 379.18] Restoration of stolen property.—
+The property stolen may be returned to the person from whom it was stolen under
+"section 452, Cr PC, 1973, and an innocent purchaser may be compensated for the price"
+"paid under section 453, if any money is found in the possession of the thief. But the"
+property restored should be in existence at the time of theft. R's cow having been
+"stolen, the thief after a lapse of a year and a half was convicted. Six months after the"
+"theft V innocently purchased the cow, which while in his possession, had a calf. The"
+Magistrate ordered that the cow and the calf should be delivered up by V to R. It was
+"held that, as the calf was not even in embryo at the date of the theft, the order to deliver"
+up the calf was illegal.85.
+"In Karuppanan v Guruswami,86. it was held by the High Court of Madras that where the"
+person accused of theft is acquitted and claims as his own the property seized from
+"him, it should be restored to him in the absence of special reasons to the contrary. The"
+Court observed that since it was clear that the learned Sub-Magistrate has over-looked
+"the fundamental principle, that when property is seized from a person who is"
+"afterwards acquitted of stealing it, the property should ordinarily be returned to that"
+person. The Magistrate cannot be said to have exercised his discretion in a judicial
+manner.
+"[s 379.19] Possession, presumption of theft.—"
+Where electric wires stolen from an electric sub-station were found in the possession
+of the accused and there was evidence to show that the material of that kind was not
+"available in the market, it was held that a presumption arose that the material was a"
+stolen property and that the accused committed the theft. Considering that the
+"accused was the sole breadwinner of the family and he had no past criminal record,"
+one year's RI was considered to be good enough punishment to meet the ends of
+justice.87.
+[s 379.20] Theft and extortion.—
+"The offence of extortion is carried out by overpowering the will of the victim, in"
+"committing a theft, on the other hand, the offender's intention always is to take away"
+without consent.88.
+[s 379.21] Charge proved.—
+The accused administered intoxicating substance to complainant and took away
+valuable goods and cash. The complainant identified these articles in the Test
+Identification Proceedings conducted during investigation and they were also identified
+"by him in the Court hence, conviction was held to be proper.89."
+[s 379.22] Double jeopardy.—
+"In a case, FIR was registered under section 379 of IPC, 1860 and section 21(1) of"
+"Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 for the allegation was"
+theft of sand belonging to Government. The plea of Double Jeopardy was rejected
+holding that both offences are not same in terms of Article 20(2) of the Constitution. A
+"cursory comparison of these two provisions with section 378 of IPC, 1860 would go to"
+show that the ingredients are totally different. The contravention of the terms and
+"conditions of mining lease, etc. constitutes an offence punishable under section 21 of"
+"the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957, whereas dishonestly taking any movable property"
+"out of the possession of a person without his consent constitutes theft. Thus, it is"
+"undoubtedly clear that the ingredients of an offence of theft as defined in s 378 of IPC,"
+1860 are totally different from the ingredients of an offence punishable under section
+"21(1) r/w.s. 4 (1) and 4 (1 A) of the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957.90."
+"6. Madra, (1946) Nag 326."
+"7. Madaree Chowkeedar, (1865) 3 WR (Cr) 2."
+"8. Bailey, (1872) LR 1 CCR 347. For a general study as to the notion of theft and obtaining by"
+"false pretenses, see M Adekunle Owaade, THE DILEMMA OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN PROPERTY"
+OFFENCES—A comparative Analysis of the basic Issues in stealing and obtaining by false
+"pretenses, (1989) 31 JILI 226."
+"9. Sri Churn Chungo, (1895) 22 Cal 1017 (FB); Nagappa, (1890) 15 Bom 344."
+"10. KN Mehra, AIR 1957 SC 369 [LNIND 1957 SC 14] : 1957 Cr LJ 550 ."
+"11. Pyare Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1094 [LNIND 1962 SC 341] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 178 ."
+"12. Algarasawmi Tevan, (1904) 28 Mad 304."
+"13. Ramzani, (1943) 19 Luck 399 ."
+"14. Arfan Ali, (1916) 44 Cal 66 ; Harnam Singh v State, (1923) 5 Lah 56."
+"15. Hamid Ali Bepari, (1925) 52 C l 1015."
+"16. Ram Ekbal v State, 1972 Cr LJ 584 : AIR 1972 SC 949 ."
+"17. G Raminadin, 1980 Cr LJ 1477 : AIR 1980 SC 2127 ; See also Dandi Deka, 1982 Cr LJ NOC"
+188 (Gau).
+"18. Apparao v Lakshminarayana, AIR 1962 SC 586 [LNIND 1961 SC 324] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 518 ;"
+"Chandi Kumar v Abanidhar Roy, AIR 1965 SC 585 [LNIND 1963 SC 231] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 518 ."
+"19. Nagappa, (1890) 15 Bom 344."
+"20. Charanjit Singh Chadha v Sudhir Mehra, AIR 2001 SC 3721 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] ."
+"21. Charanjit Singh Chadha v Sudhir Mehra, AIR 2001 SC 3721 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] : (2001) 7"
+SCC 417 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] .
+"22. Naresh Singh v State of Bihar, (PATNA HC) : 2017 (2) PLJR 514 ."
+"23. Charanjit Singh Chadha v Sudhir Mehra, AIR 2001 SC 3721 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] ."
+"24. Balos, (1882) 1 Weir 419."
+"25. Dunyapat, (1919) 42 All 53 ."
+"26. Shivramm, (1891) 15 Bom 702."
+"27. Suri Venkatappayya Sastri v Madula Venkanna, (1904) 27 Mad 531 (FB)."
+"28. Yeok Kuk, (1928) 6 Ran 386."
+"29. Bhaiyalal v State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 29 (MP)."
+"30. Tamma Ghantaya, (1881) 4 Mad 228."
+"31. Mansang Bhavsang, (1873) 10 BHC 74."
+"32. Government Pleader, (1882) 1 Weir 412."
+"33. Ramadhin, (1902) 25 All 129 ."
+"34. Ahmed v State, AIR 1967 Raj 190 [LNIND 1966 RAJ 32] ."
+"35. White v White, (1853) 6 Cox 213. R v Hughes, (2000) 2 Cr App R (S) 399 [CA (Crim Div)], gas"
+"meter by passed, three months' imprisonment."
+"36. Mahalakshmi Spinners Ltd v State of Haryana, 2007 Cr LJ 429 (P&H)."
+"37. Ferens v O'Brien, (1883) 11 QBD 21 ."
+"38. Mahadeo Prasad, (1923) 45 All 680 ."
+"39. Sheikh Arif, (1908) 35 Cal 437 ."
+"40. Nalla, (1887) 11 Mad 145."
+"41. Romesh Chunder Sannyal v Hiru Mondal, (1890) 17 Cal 852 ; Bandhu, (1885) 8 All 51 ; Nihal,"
+(1887) 9 All 348 .
+"42. Nanhe Khan, (1897) 17 AWN 41."
+"43. Subba Reddi v Munshoor Ali Saheb, (1900) 24 Mad 81."
+"44. Maya Ram Surma v Nichala Katani, (1888) 15 Cal 402 ."
+"45. Subbian Servai, (1911) 36 Mad 472."
+"46. Shaik Adam, (1886) 10 Bom 193; Nokolo Behara v State, (1927) 51 Mad 333."
+"47. State of Rajasthan v Pooran Singh, 1977 Cr LJ 1055 (Raj)."
+"48. Chandi Kumar v Abanidhar Roy, AIR 1965 SC 585 [LNIND 1963 SC 231] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 496 ."
+"49. Bairagi Rout v Brahmananda Das, 1970 Cr LJ 638 ."
+"50. Sukchand Harijan v State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 1579 (Ori). Relying on Kabir v Arjun Sial,"
+"(1959) 25 Cut LT 249. Droupadi Devi v Padmanabha Mishra, 1997 Cr LJ 2807 (Ori), the accused"
+removed his own cultivated crop. The fact of dispute about land which was in possession of the
+accused would not make him guilty of theft. Civil case of ownership was pending.
+"51. P T Rajan Babu v Anitha Chandra Babu, 2011 Cr LJ 4541 (Ker)."
+"52. Prafula Saikia v State of Assam, 2012 Cr LJ 3889 (Gau)."
+"53. Public Prosecutor v B Ramakrishna, 1997 Cr LJ 3940 (AP)."
+"54. Hossenee v Rajkrishna, (1873) 20 WR (Cr) 80. Rabi Kumar Agarwal v State of WB, 2003 Cr LJ"
+"1342 (Cal), items of furniture alleged to be stolen by forcing entry into the room, no proof"
+available that the complainant was in possession of such items. Charge not allowed to be
+"framed. Sashibhusan Giri v Kalakar Moharita, 2003 Cr LJ 1065 , allegation of cutting and"
+"removing paddy crop from the complainant's land, but neither he nor his witness were able to"
+identify the field in question and when the crop was shown there. There was dispute about
+"possession, one claiming through succession and the other through sale deed. Thus, the"
+"ingredient of theft was not made out. Lila Satynarayan Pd. v Shiv Nandan Singh, 2003 Cr LJ NOC"
+"34 : (2002) 2 BLJR 864 , theft of logs, no record of purchase or of possession, false charge."
+"55. Queen-Empress v Gangaram Santram, (1884) 9 Bom 135."
+"56. State of Maharashtra v Vishwanath, 1979 Cr LJ 1193 : AIR 1979 SC 1825 [LNIND 1979 SC"
+316] .
+"57. The Works of Lord Macaulay, Note N, On the Chapter of offences against property."
+"58. James Fitzjames Stephen, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAW, 9th Edn, Article 359. Harichandran v"
+"State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 41 (Mad), the accused was admittedly the owner of the land from where"
+"he removed rocks for commercial purposes. No offence. State of Rajasthan v Amit, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"121 (Raj), theft of generator, no details as to generator given, chowkedar not produced in"
+"evidence, delay of 15-20 days in lodging report, acquittal of accused proper."
+"59. Periyannan, (1883) 1 Weir 423; Chunnu, (1911) 8 ALJR 656."
+"60. Bande Ali Shaikh, (1939) 2 Cal 419 ."
+"61. Obayya, (1898) 22 Mad 151."
+"62. Ponnurangam, (1887) 10 Mad 186."
+"63. Ramsharnagat Singh, 1966 Cr LJ 856 ."
+"64. Sita Ram Rai, (1880) 3 All 181 ."
+"65. Finance Co Ltd v R Khaishiulla Khan, 1993 Cr LJ 1069 (Kant)."
+"66. Sundaram Finance Ltd v Mohd. Abdul Wakeel, 2001 Cr LJ 2441 (MP) Another similar case"
+"Charanjit Singh Chadha v Sudhir Mehra, 2001 Cr LJ 4255 (SC), retaking things delivered under"
+"hire-purchase. Sekar v Arumugham, 2000 Cr LJ 1552 (Mad) lorry financed under hire-purchase"
+"and hypothecation, seized by the banker on default, no theft."
+"67. Perumal, (1955) Mad 795."
+"68. Pandita v Rahimulla Akundo, (1900) 27 Cal 501 ."
+"69. HJ Ransom v Triloki Nath, (1942) 17 Luck 663 . Selvaraj v State of TN, 1998 Cr LJ 2683"
+"(Mad), the victim stated that someone had stolen his money by cutting his bag, but he had not"
+seen him. The person who was caught was neither identified nor was anything recovered from
+"him. Acquitted. See also Shahul Hameed v State of TN, 1998 Cr LJ 885 (Mad)."
+"70. Parshottam, (1962) 64 Bom LR 788 ."
+"71. Troylukho Nath Chowdhry v State, (1878) 4 Cal 366 ."
+"72. Hanmanta, (1877) 1 Bom 610."
+73. 2 East PC 555.
+"74. State of HP v Jagat Ram, 1992 Cr LJ 1445 (HP)."
+75. (1870) 5 MHC (Appx) xxxvi.
+"76. Bhagu : Vishnu, (1897) Unrep Cr C 928."
+"77. Balos, (1882) 1 Wier 419."
+"78. Samsuddin, (1900) 2 Bom LR 752 ."
+"79. Durga Tewari, (1909) 36 Cal 758 ."
+"80. Butchi v State, (1893) 17 Mad 401."
+"81. Natha Kalyan, (1871) 8 BHC (Cr C) 11."
+"82. Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 [LNIND 2009 SC 1121] :"
+2009 Cr LJ 3462 .
+"83. Khatabai, (1869) 6 BHC (Cr C) 9."
+"84. Krishna Shahuji, (1897) Unrep Cr C 927."
+"85. Vernede, (1886) 10 Mad 25. The appellant and two others were put up for joint trial. The"
+"charges levelled against the two were under section 448 (house trespass) and section 380,"
+"whereas the charge against the appellant only was under section 448, which is a summons case"
+and section 380 is a warrant case. The charge against the appellant was held to be an abuse of
+the process of the court and the proceeding against him was accordingly quashed. Bhaskar
+"Chattoraj v State of WB, AIR 1991 SC 317 : 1991 Cr LJ 451 ."
+"86. Karuppanan v Guruswami, (1933) ILR 56 Mad 654 : AIR 1933 Mad 434 [LNIND 1932 MAD"
+175] a.
+"87. Rasananda Bindani v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 121 (Ori). See further State of Kerala v"
+"Kuttan Mohanan, 1988 Cr LJ 453 (Ker), where the fact that the owner did not report the matter to"
+"the police was held to be no ground for rejecting his testimony. Santu v State of MP, 2001 Cr LJ"
+"4455 (Chhattisgarh), property recovered from the accused could not be proved to be stolen,"
+conviction set aside.
+"88. Dhananjay v State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 768 [LNIND 2007 SC 111] : 2007 Cr LJ 1440 :"
+(2007) 2 KLJ 294 .
+"89. Manish Soni v State (Govt. of NCT) Delhi, 2013 Cr LJ 1949 (Del). See Abul Hassan v State"
+"2009 Cr LJ 3664 (Pat), where the allegation was that appellant took away cash and wrist watch"
+of informant after administering intoxicant mixed in tea. But accused is given benefit of doubt
+on the ground that the prosecution failed to produce any medical report on the record of the
+Forensic Science Laboratory that the mouth wash of the informant or his brother contained
+"intoxicant substance, sufficient to cause sedation if administered in required quantity."
+"90. Sengol v State, 2012 Cr LJ 1705 (Mad)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+"[s 380] Theft in dwelling house, etc."
+"Whoever commits theft in any building,1 tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel"
+"is used as a human dwelling, or used for the custody of property, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,"
+and shall also be liable to fine.
+State Amendment
+"Tamil Nadu.—The following amendments were made by Tamil Nadu Act No. 28 of 1993,"
+Section 2.
+Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act XLV of 1860) (hereinafter in this Part
+"referred to as the principal Act), shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section"
+"and after sub-section (1) as so renumbered, the following sub-section shall be added,"
+namely:—
+"""(2) Whoever commits theft in respect of any idol or icon in any building used as a"
+place of worship 'shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
+not be less than two years but which may extend to three years and with fine which
+shall not be less than two thousand rupees:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than two years."""
+COMMENT—
+"The object of the section is to give greater security to property deposited in a house,"
+tent or vessel. Theft from a person in a dwelling house will be simple theft under
+section 379.91.
+1. 'Theft in any building'.—Building means a permanent edifice of some kind. Theft
+"should, under the section, have been committed in any such building. Theft from a"
+"veranda,92. or the top of a house,93. or a brake-van,94. is not theft in a building. But"
+"where the accused stole some luggage and cash from a railway carriage, when it was"
+"at a railway station, it was held that though the railway carriage was not a building, the"
+"railway station was, and the accused was therefore, guilty under this section.95. An"
+"entrance hall surrounded by a wall in which there were two doorways but no doors,"
+"which was used for custody of property, was held to be a building.96. A courtyard97. is,"
+"but a compound98. is not, a building. Merely on basis of having possession of some"
+"stolen articles, accused cannot be held to be guilty of offences punishable under"
+sections 450 and 380.99.
+[s 380.1] CASES.—
+The only evidence against accused is the alleged recovery of gold chain at his instance.
+That cannot connect the appellant to the theft.100. The accused persons were
+suspected to have committed some offences of house-breaking and on being
+interrogated they voluntarily disclosed some places where they had committed house-
+breaking in respect of gold ornaments and then they disclosed the shop of a goldsmith
+"to whom they had sold the gold and silver ornaments. It was held that their conviction,"
+based merely on uncorroborated evidence as to recovery of stolen property at their
+"instance, was highly unsafe. Accordingly, their conviction under sections 380 and 457"
+"was set aside.101. In a case involving theft of an idol, the guilt of the accused could not"
+be proved by circumstantial evidence. The confession of the co-accused was not
+voluntary. Acquittal of the accused was held to be justified.102.
+[s 380.2] House breaking and Theft.—
+Offence under section 454 also includes section 380. In view of the conviction for
+"section 454 of the IPC, 1860, separate conviction for the offence under section 380 of"
+"the IPC, 1860 is not needed.103."
+[s 380.3] Punishment.—
+The accused was poor and rustic villager. He was the only bread winner of the family.
+He was not a previous convict. He had already faced trial for seven years. The order
+releasing him after due admonition was held to be proper.104.
+[s 380.4] Sentences in different cases can run concurrently.—
+"The Supreme Court, in Benson v State of Kerala,105. examined whether an accused, who"
+is sentenced to undergo different periods of sentences punished in different cases
+"should undergo the imprisonment consecutively or can undergo concurrently, and held"
+"that in terms of sub-section (1) of section 427 Cr PC, 1973, if a person already"
+undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
+"imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment would normally commence at"
+"the expiration of the imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced, however, this"
+normal Rule is subject to a qualification and it is within the powers of the Court to
+direct that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence.
+[s 380.5] Probation.—
+"Taking note of the age of accused which is put at 20 years, he could be given the"
+"benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.106."
+"91. Tandi Ram v State, (1876) PR No. 14 of 1876."
+"92. (1870) 1 Weir 435; contra, Jabar, (1880) PR No. 1 of 1881."
+93. (1866) 1 Weir 435.
+94. (1880) 1 Weir 436.
+"95. Sheik Saheb, (1886) Unrep Cr C 293."
+"96. Dad, (1878) PR No. 10 of 1879."
+"97. Ghulam Jelani, (1889) PR No. 16 of 1889."
+"98. Rama, (1889) Unrep Cr C 484."
+"99. Bablu Alias Mahendra v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2009 Cr LJ 1856 (MP)."
+"100. Azeez v State of Kerala, (2013) 2 SCC 184 [LNIND 2013 SC 54] ."
+"101. Meghaji Godaji Thakore v State of Gujarat, 1993 Cr LJ 730 (Guj); Kuldip Singh v State of"
+"Delhi, (2003) 12 SCC 528 [LNIND 2003 SC 1071] : AIR 2004 AC 771 : (2004) 109 DLT 190 ,"
+conviction set aside because of doubtful recovery. The accused was employed in the house of
+the deceased. He was removed but reemployed in the factory of the deceased. This fact had to
+"be excluded because it was not put to him during his examination under section 313, Cr PC,"
+"1973. The accused being a domestic help, the presence of his fingerprints in the household"
+articles was natural and not of any special significance. He was not the only person employed
+the deceased being in the habit of changing servants.
+"102. State of HP v Raj Kumar, 1004 Cr LJ 894 (HP). Om Prakash v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ"
+"1636 : AIR 1998 SC 1220 [LNIND 1998 SC 87] , five accused persons robbed complainant of his"
+wrist watch and currency notes and ran away. The witnesses chased them out to no use and
+went to police station. But two of them were acquitted. Conviction of the rest of them was
+"altered from section 395 to one under section 392, (punishment for robbery). Raju v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 4547 (Raj), woman attacked when alone by accused persons, they"
+"strangulated her, recovery of stolen articles on their information, evidence of sons and"
+"daughters-in-law of deceased, conviction under sections 302, 380 and 454."
+"103. K E Lokesha v State of Karnataka, 2012 Cr LJ 2120 (Kar)."
+"104. State of HP v Ishwar Dass, 1999 Cr LJ 3931 (HP)."
+"105. Benson v State of Kerala, (2016) 10 SCC 307 [LNIND 2016 SC 408] : 2016 (9) Scale 670 ."
+"106. E Lokesha v State of Karnataka, 2012 Cr LJ 2120 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+[s 381] Theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master.
+"Whoever, being a clerk or servant, or being employed in the capacity of a clerk or"
+"servant, commits theft in respect of any property in the possession of his master or"
+"employer, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+This section provides for a severe punishment when a clerk or servant has committed
+theft because he has greater opportunities of committing this offence owing to the
+confidence reposed in him. When the possession of the stolen property is with the
+"master, this section applies; when it is with the servant, section 408 applies. Where"
+"some policemen stole a sum of money shut up in a box, and placed it in the Police"
+"Treasury building, over which they were mounting guard as sentinels, they were held to"
+have committed an offence under this section and not under section 409.107. Where
+"the property was not in possession of the master, or the money was entrusted to the"
+"accused and he misappropriated the same, the offence under section 381 will not be"
+attracted.108.
+"107. Juggurnath Singh, (1865) 2 WR (Cr) 55; Radhey Shyam v State of UP, 2002 Cr LJ 1227 (All),"
+domestic servants who were prosecuted for theft and murder of their master remained on duty
+"even when investigation was going on, nothing was found against them, they were not allowed"
+"to be prosecuted only on the basis of suspicion. Slim Babamiya Sutar v State of Maharashtra,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 2696 (Bom), murder, connection of the accused with it not proved, but two gold"
+"articles of the deceased were recovered from the accused, hence convicted under section 381,"
+"sentence of three years RI reduced to 6 months already undergone, accused directed to be"
+"released. N Narasimha Kumar v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ 3188 (AP), theft by clerk of the State"
+Public Service Commission's question papers and stealing xerox copies. Investigating Officer
+was not examined. No recovery of question paper from the accused. His conviction was set
+"aside. State of HP v Dev Prakash, 2003 Cr LJ 2882 (HP), alleged theft of stamp papers from the"
+strong room of the District Treasury Officer. Not proved.
+108. Vijay Kumar v State of Rajasthan 2012 Cr LJ 2790 (Raj).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+"[s 382] Theft after preparation made for causing death, hurt or restraint in"
+order to the committing of the theft.
+"Whoever commits theft, having made preparation for causing death, or hurt, or"
+"restraint, or fear of death, or of hurt, or of restraint, to any person, in order to the"
+"committing of such theft, or in order to the effecting of his escape after the committing"
+"of such theft, or in order to the retaining of property taken by such theft, shall be"
+"punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A commits theft on property in Z's possession; and, while committing this theft,"
+"he has a loaded pistol under his garment, having provided this pistol for the"
+purpose of hurting Z in case Z should resist. A has committed the offence
+defined in this section.
+"(b) A picks Z's pocket, having posted several of his companions near him, in order"
+"that they may restrain Z, if Z should perceive what is passing and should resist,"
+or should attempt to apprehend A. A has committed the offence defined in this
+section.
+COMMENT—
+Under this section it is not necessary to either to cause hurt or even to make an
+"attempt to cause hurt. Mere preparation to cause hurt should the occasion arise e.g., to"
+affect his escape is enough to bring the accused within the mischief of this section.
+One who keeping a knife with him commits theft may be liable under this section even
+though there was no occasion to wield the knife or to cause injury.109.
+"If hurt is actually caused when a theft is committed, the offence is punishable as"
+"robbery, and not under this section.110. In robbery there is always injury. In offences"
+under this section the thief is full of preparation to cause hurt but he may not cause it.
+Offences against Property—Extortion
+"109. Re Diwan Singh, 1980 Cr LJ 760 (MP)."
+"110. Hushrut Sheikh, (1866) 6 WR (Cr) 85."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+[s 383] Extortion.
+"Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury1 to that person, or to any"
+"other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any"
+"person any property2 or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be"
+"converted into a valuable security, commits ""extortion""."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him
+money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.
+"(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will"
+sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain moneys to A. Z
+signs and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.
+(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign and deliver
+"to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and"
+thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.
+"(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his"
+seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A.
+"Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has"
+committed extortion.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+[s 384] Punishment for extortion.
+Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
+"for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This offence takes a middle place between theft and robbery.
+[s 384.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two things:—
+(1) intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to himself or another;
+(2) dishonestly inducing the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any
+property or valuable security.
+These ingredients have been restated by the Supreme Court as follows:
+(1) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to him or to any other person;
+(2) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional;
+(3) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any
+person any property or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a
+valuable security;
+(4) such inducement must be done dishonestly.111.
+[s 384.2] Theft and extortion.—
+Extortion is thus distinguished from theft—
+(1) Extortion is committed by the wrongful obtaining of consent. In theft the
+offender takes without the owner's consent.112.
+(2) The property obtained by extortion is not limited as in theft to movable property
+only. Immovable property may be the subject of extortion.
+(3) In extortion the property is obtained by intentionally putting a person in fear of
+"injury to that person or to any other, and thereby dishonestly inducing him to"
+part with his property. In theft the element of force does not arise.
+1. 'Puts any person in fear of any injury'.—The 'fear' must be of such a nature and
+"extent as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and takes away from"
+his acts that element of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent.113.
+"Thus threatening to expose a clergyman, who had criminal intercourse with a woman in"
+"a house of ill-fame in his own church and village, to his own bishop, and to the"
+"archbishop, and also to publish his shame in the newspapers, was held to be such a"
+threat as men of ordinary firmness could not be expected to resist.114. The making use
+of real or supposed influence to obtain money from a person against his will under
+"threat, in case of refusal, of loss of appointment, was held to be extortion.115. The"
+accused husband took his wife to a forest and obtained her ornaments under threats to
+kill her. The ornaments were subsequently recovered from him. He was held guilty of
+"the offence of extortion, not robbery.116.A refusal to allow people to carry away fire-"
+wood collected in a Government forest without payment of proper fees;117. a payment
+taken from the owners of trespassing cattle under the influence of a threat that the
+cattle would be impounded if the payment were refused;118. the obtaining of a bond
+"under the threat of non-rendering of service as a vakil,119. and a refusal to perform a"
+marriage ceremony and enter the marriage in the register unless the accused was paid
+"Rs. 5,120. were held not to constitute extortion."
+[s 384.3] Threat of criminal accusation.—
+"The terror of criminal charge, whether true or false, amounts to a fear of injury.121. The"
+guilt or innocence of the party threatened is immaterial. Even the threat need not be a
+"threat to accuse before a judicial tribunal, a threat to charge before any third person is"
+enough.122.
+Housing Loan taken by the complainant. Proceedings initiated by issuing notice under
+"section 13 (2) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 would not amount to extortion.123."
+2. 'Dishonestly induces the person … to deliver to any person any property'.— Delivery
+by the person put in fear is essential in order to constitute the offence of extortion.
+"Where a person through fear offers no resistance to the carrying off of his property, but"
+"does not deliver any of the property to those who carry it off, the offence committed"
+will be robbery and not extortion.124. The offence of extortion is not complete before
+actual delivery of the possession of the property by the person put in fear.125.
+When the accused honestly believes that the complainant had taken the money
+"belonging to him (the accused), an attempt to get it back cannot be said to be with the"
+intention of causing wrongful loss to him.126.
+Where the headmaster of a school called a lady teacher to a place where he was alone
+"and induced her to sign three blank papers by threatening an attack on her modesty,"
+the Supreme Court held that it amounted to an offence under this section.127.
+An accused was charged with the offence of murder by resorting to extortion. The
+"prosecution failed to prove several particulars relating to the major offence, but proved"
+the commission of minor offence punishable under section 384 read with section 34.
+The conviction of the accused for the minor offences under section 384 read with
+section 34 was held to be proper.
+[s 384.4] 'To any person'.—
+"It is not necessary that the threat should be used, and the property received, by one and"
+the same individual. It may be a matter of arrangement between several persons that
+"the threats should be used by some, and property received by others; and they all would"
+be guilty of extortion.128.
+[s 384.5] CASES.—
+The accused persons came to the place of their victims with fire arms and forced them
+to handover their gun. The accused then abducted them and shot them dead in nearby
+orchard. The Court said that all of them who came there to commit extortion must be
+attributed knowledge that killings might take place in the prosecution of their object. All
+of them were held vicariously liable for murder. Their conviction under sections
+384/149 and 302/149 was proper.129.
+[s 384.6] Compounding.—
+"The offences under sections 384 and 506 Part II IPC, 1860 are not compoundable"
+"under section 320 of the Cr PC, 1973. Therefore, the prayer of compounding the"
+offences made by the complainant and A1 in their joint application supported by their
+affidavits cannot be legally accepted.130.
+"111. Dhananjay v State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 768 [LNIND 2007 SC 111] : 2007 Cr LJ 1440 ; J"
+Senthil Kumar v State of Jhar 2006 Cr LJ 4524 (Jha).
+"112. See the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dhananjay v State of Bihar, (2007) 14 SCC 768"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 111] .
+"113. Walton v Walton, (1863) 9 Cox 268. Bare threats are not enough. Ramjee Singh v State of"
+"Bihar, 1987 Cr LJ 137 (Pat)."
+"114. Miard, (1844) 1 Cox 22."
+"115. Meer Abbas Ali v Omed Ali, (1872) 18 WR 17 ."
+"116. State of Karnataka v Basavegowda, 1997 Cr LJ 4386 (Kant). See also Raju v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 4547 (Raj)."
+"117. Abdul Kadar v State, (1866) 3 BHC (Cr C) 45."
+"118. (1880) 1 Weir 438, 440; Habib-ul-Razzaq v State, (1923) 46 All 81 ."
+119. (1870) 5 MHC (Appex) xiv.
+"120. Nizam Din v State, (1923) 4 Lah 179."
+"121. Mobarruk, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 28."
+"122. Robinson, (1837) 2 M & R 14; Abdulvahab Abdulmajid Shaikh v State of Gujarat, (2007) 4"
+"SCC 257 [LNIND 2007 SC 527] : (2007) 3 Guj LR 1841, conviction for extortion, all the essentials"
+proved.
+"123. GIC Housing Finance Ltd v The State of Maharashtra, 2016 Cr LJ 4824 (Bom) : 2017 (2)"
+Bom CR (Cr) 234 .
+"124. Duleelooddeen Sheik, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 19."
+"125. Labhshanker, AIR 1955 Sau 42 ."
+"126. Mahadeo v State, (1950) Nag 715."
+"127. Chander Kala v Ram Kishan, AIR 1985 SC 1268 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] : 1985 Cr LJ 1490 :"
+(1985) 4 SCC 212 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] : 1985 SCC (Cr) 491.
+"128. Shankar Bhagvat, (1866) 2 BHC 394."
+"129. Rameshwar Pandey v State of Bihar, 2005 Cr LJ 1407 : AIR 2005 SC 1064 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+1058] : (2005) 9 SCC 210 [LNIND 2005 SC 1058] .
+130. Karipi Rasheed v State of AP (2009) 17 SCC 515 [LNINDU 2009 SC 26] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+"[s 385] Putting, person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion."
+"Whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts any person in fear, or attempts"
+"to put any person in fear, of any injury, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+By this section a distinction between the inchoate and the consummated offence is
+recognised. The attempt to commit extortion may proceed so far as to put a person in
+"fear of injury, or there may be an attempt to excite such fear; but there may not be any"
+"delivery of property, etc. This section punishes the putting of a person in fear of injury"
+in order to commit extortion.
+"The injury contemplated must be one which the accused can inflict, or cause to be"
+inflicted. A threat that God will punish a man for some act is not such an injury. No
+injury can be caused or threatened to be caused unless the act done is either an
+offence or such as may properly be made the basis of a civil action.131.
+[s 385.1] CASES.—
+A cloth-seller was threatened with the imposition of a fine if he continued to sell foreign
+"cloth. He continued to sell such cloth, and, to enforce payment of the fine, his shop was"
+picketed for two hours and he lost a certain amount of business and ultimately paid the
+fine. It was held that the person responsible for the picketing was guilty of an offence
+under this section as well as under section 384.132. Where a mukhtar in a criminal case
+threatened with intent to extort money to put questions to prosecution witnesses which
+"were irrelevant, scandalous and indecent, and which were intended to annoy and insult,"
+it was held that he was guilty under this section.133. No sanction is necessary for
+prosecuting a police officer under this section for his act abetting the accused to extort
+money from a person by putting him under fear of arrest. Such an act is not a part of
+his official functions.134.
+"131. Tanumal Udhasing, (1944) Kar 146 ."
+"132. Chaturbhuj, (1922) 45 All 137 ."
+"133. Fazlur Rahman, (1929) 9 Pat 725."
+"134. Chand Ahuja v Gautam K. Hoda, 1987 Cr LJ 1328 (P&H)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+[s 386] Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt.
+Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt
+"to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+If the fear caused is that of death or grievous hurt it naturally causes great alarm. The
+"section therefore, provides for severe penalty in such cases."
+Where the accused wrote letters demanding ransom from the father of the boy whom
+"they kidnapped, putting the father in fright of the boy being murdered and there was"
+"throughout the likelihood of the boy being murdered if the ransom money was not paid,"
+the accused were held guilty under this section.135.
+"135. Ram Chandra v State, AIR 1957 SC 381 : 1957 Cr LJ 567 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+"[s 387] Putting person in fear of death or of grievous hurt, in order to commit"
+extortion.
+"Whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any person in"
+"fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+The relation between this section and section 386 is the same as that between section
+385 and section 384.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+[s 388] Extortion by threat of accusation of an offence punishable with death or
+"imprisonment for life, etc."
+Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of an accusation against
+"that person or any other, of having committed or attempted to commit any offence"
+"punishable with death, or with 136.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a"
+term which may extend to ten years or of having attempted to induce any other person
+"to commit such offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for"
+"a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the"
+"offence be one punishable under section 377 of this Code, may be punished with 137."
+[imprisonment for life].
+COMMENT—
+It is immaterial whether the person against whom the accusation is threatened be
+"innocent or guilty, if the prisoner intended to extort money. The aggravating"
+circumstance under this section is the threat of an accusation of an offence punishable
+"with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for ten years. If the accusation is of"
+unnatural offence then the penalty provided is severer.
+"136. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"137. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Extortion
+"[s 389] Putting person in fear of accusation of offence, in order to commit"
+extortion.
+"Whoever, in order to the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any person in"
+"fear of an accusation, against that person or any other, of having committed, or"
+attempted to commit an offence punishable with death or with 138.[imprisonment for
+"life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the offence be punishable under section"
+"377 of this Code, may be punished with 139.[imprisonment for life]."
+COMMENT—
+This section bears the same relation to section 388 as section 385 bears to section
+384.
+"138. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"139. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 390] Robbery.
+In all robbery there is either theft or extortion.
+When theft is robbery.
+"Theft is ""robbery"" if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the"
+"theft, or in carrying away1 or attempting to carry away property obtained by the"
+"theft, the offender, for that end,2 voluntarily causes3 or attempts to cause to any"
+"person4 death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant"
+"hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint."
+When extortion is robbery.
+"Extortion is ""robbery"" if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in"
+"the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that"
+"person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to"
+"that person or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person"
+so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted.
+Explanation.—The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near to put the
+"other person in fear of instant death, or instant hurt, or of instant wrongful"
+restraint.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A holds Z down and fraudulently takes Z's money and jewels from Z's clothes
+"without Z's consent. Here A has committed theft, and in order to the committing"
+"of that theft, has voluntarily caused wrongful restraint to Z. A has therefore"
+committed robbery.
+"(b) A meets Z on the highroads, shows a pistol, and demands Z's purse. Z in"
+"consequence, surrenders his purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z by"
+"putting him in fear of instant hurt, and being at the time of committing the"
+extortion in his presence. A has therefore committed robbery.
+(c) A meets Z and Z's child on the highroad. A takes the child and threatens to fling
+"it down a precipice, unless Z delivers his purse. Z, in consequence delivers his"
+"purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z, by causing Z to be in fear of instant"
+hurt to the child who is there present. A has therefore committed robbery on Z.
+"(d) A obtains property from Z by saying—""Your child is in the hands of my gang, and"
+"will be put to death unless you send us ten thousand rupees"". This is extortion,"
+"and punishable as such; but it is not robbery, unless Z is put in fear of the instant"
+death of his child.
+COMMENT—
+Robbery is a special and aggravated form of either theft or extortion. The chief
+distinguishing element in robbery is the presence of imminent fear of violence. The
+"second para distinguishes robbery from theft, the third distinguishes it from extortion."
+[s 390.1] Object.—
+"The authors of the Code observe: ""There can be no case of robbery which does not fall"
+within the definition either of theft or of extortion; but in practice it will perpetually be a
+matter of doubt whether a particular act of robbery was a theft or extortion. A large
+"proportion of robberies will be half theft, half extortion. A seizes Z, threatens to murder"
+"him, unless he delivers all his property, and begins to pull off Z's ornaments. Z in terror"
+"begs that A will take all he has, and spare his life, assists in taking off his ornaments,"
+"and delivers them to A. Here, such ornaments as A took without Z's consent are taken"
+by theft. Those which Z delivered up from fear of death are acquired by extortion. It is
+"by no means improbable that Z's right-arm bracelet may have been obtained by theft,"
+and left-arm bracelet by extortion; that the rupees in Z's girdle may have been obtained
+"by theft, and those in his turban by extortion. Probably in nine-tenths of the robberies"
+"which are committed, something like this actually takes place, and it is probable that a"
+few minutes later neither the robber nor the person robbed would be able to recollect in
+what proportions theft and extortion were mixed in the crime; nor is it at all necessary
+"for the ends of justice that this should be ascertained. For though, in general the"
+consent of a sufferer is a circumstance which vary materially modifies the character of
+"the offence, and which ought, therefore, to be made known to the Courts, yet the"
+consent which a person gives to the taking of his property by a ruffian who holds a
+"pistol to his breast is a circumstance altogether immaterial"".140."
+The Explanation and illustrations (b) and (c) mark the distinction between simple
+extortion and extortion which is robbery. Illustration (a) indicates when theft is robbery.
+"An analysis of section 390 IPC, 1860 would show that in order that theft may constitute"
+"robbery, prosecution has to establish:"
+(a) if in order to the committing of theft; or
+(b) in committing the theft; or
+(c) in carrying away or attempting to carry away property obtained by theft; or
+(d) the offender for that end i.e. any of the ends contemplated by (a) to (c); or
+(e) voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful
+restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint.
+"In other words, theft would only be robbery if for any of the ends mentioned in (a) to (c)"
+the offender voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or
+wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of instant hurl or instant wrongful restraint.
+"If the ends does not fall within (a) to (c) but, the offender still causes or attempts to"
+cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or fear of instant death or of
+"instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint, the offence would not be robbery. The Court"
+emphasised that (a) or (b) or (c) have to be read conjunctively with (d) and (e). It is only
+when (a) or (b) or (c) co-exist with (d) and (e) or there is a nexus between any of them
+and (d) and (e) would theft amount to robbery.141.
+"[s 390.2] Theft, extortion and robbery.—"
+"Theft or extortion when caused with violence causing death or fear of death, hurt or"
+"wrongful restraint is robbery. When there is no theft, as a natural corollary, there cannot"
+be robbery. Robbery is only an aggravated form of theft or extortion. Aggravation is in
+"the use of violence causing death or fear of death, hurt or restraint. Violence must be in"
+"the course of theft and not subsequently. Also, it is not necessary that violence should"
+"actually be committed, even attempt to commit it is enough.142."
+"1. 'Carrying away'.—Even if death, hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of any of these, is"
+"caused after committing theft, in order to carry away the property obtained by theft,"
+this offence would be committed.
+"2. 'For that end'.—Death, hurt or wrongful restraint must be caused in committing theft,"
+"or in carrying away property obtained by theft. The expression ""for that end"" clearly"
+means that the hurt caused by the offender must be with the object of facilitating the
+committing of theft or must be caused while the offender is committing theft or is
+carrying away or is attempting to carry away property obtained by theft.143. Where a
+person caused hurt only to avoid capture when surprised while stealing144. it was held
+"that theft, and not robbery, was committed. The use of violence will not convert the"
+"offence of theft into robbery, unless the violence is committed for one of the ends"
+specified in this section. Where the accused abandoned the property obtained by theft
+"and threw stones at his pursuer to deter him from continuing the pursuit, it was held"
+that the accused was guilty of theft and not of robbery.145. The victim was relieved of
+his watch in a running train by one of the two accused who were associates in crime.
+"As the snatcher was trying to get down from the train, the victim raised alarm."
+Whereupon the second accused gave a slap to the victim. It was held that the hurt
+"caused was directly related to the theft i.e., to facilitate carrying away of the property"
+"obtained by theft and as such the accused were rightly convicted under section 392,"
+"IPC, 1860.146."
+3. 'Voluntarily causes'.—These words denote that an accidental infliction of injury by a
+"thief will not convert his offence into robbery. Thus, where a person while cutting a"
+"string, by which a basket was tied, with intent to steal it, accidentally cut the wrist of the"
+"owner, who at the moment tried to seize and keep the basket, and ran away with it, it"
+was held that the offence committed was theft and not robbery.147. But where in
+"committing theft, there is indubitably an intention seconded by an attempt to cause"
+"hurt, the offence is robbery.148. In order to make an offence of theft a robbery there"
+must be either theft and injury or threat of injury while committing theft.149.
+4. 'Person'.—The word 'person' cannot be so narrowly construed as to exclude the dead
+body of a human being who was killed in the course of the same transaction in which
+theft was committed.150.
+[s 390.3] CASES.—
+"Where participation of the accused, was not explained by the prosecution and there"
+"were contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses, the Court acquitted the"
+accused.151.
+The accused sprinkled chilli powder in the eyes of certain persons and snatched their
+attaches containing cash. The evidence of persons who were carrying was found to be
+reliable. Cash was recovered as a result of disclosures made by the accused.
+"Presumption under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 applied. The accused"
+was accordingly convicted.152.
+"140. Note N, p 162."
+"141. State of Maharashtra v Joseph Mingel Koli, 1997 (2) Crimes 228 [LNIND 1996 BOM 667]"
+(Bom.).
+"142. Venu v State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 94 [LNIND 2008 SC 208] : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr) 623 :"
+AIR 2008 SC 1199 [LNIND 2008 SC 208] : 2008 Cr LJ 1634 .
+"143. Venu v State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 94 [LNIND 2008 SC 208] : AIR 2008 SC 1199"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 208] : 2008 Cr LJ 1634 .
+"144. Kalio Kerio, (1872) Unrep Cr C 65."
+"145. (1865) 1 Weir 442; Kalio Kiero, sup."
+"146. Harish Chandra, 1976 Cr LJ 1168 : AIR 1976 SC 1430 : (1976) 2 SCC 795 ."
+"147. Edwards, (1843) 1 Cox 32."
+"148. Teekai Bheer, (1866) 5 WR (Cr) 95."
+"149. Padmanava Mohapatra, 1983 Cr LJ NOC 238 (Ori). Proved case of robbery and murder."
+"State of Kerala v Naduvectil Vishwanathan, 1991 Cr LJ 1501 ."
+"150. Jamnadas, AIR 1963 MP 106 [LNIND 1962 MP 173] ."
+"151. Prabhat Marak v State of Tripura, 2011 Cr LJ 1844 (Gau)."
+"152. Rameshwar Soni v State of MP, 1997 Cr LJ 3418 (MP). As to when theft becomes robbery"
+"see State of Maharashtra v Vinayak Tukaram, 1997 Cr LJ 3988 (Bom), here the accused snatched"
+three gold buttons from the shirt of the victim at a railway platform. He gave a knife blow on
+being caught. Convicted for robbery. The Court said that it could not be contended that he gave
+the knife blow only to extricate himself from the clutches of the person holding him and to
+ensure the taking away of the stolen gold buttons.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 391] Dacoity.
+"When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or"
+where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a
+"robbery, and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five"
+"or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit"
+"""dacoity""."
+COMMENT—
+"Dacoity is robbery committed by five or more persons, otherwise there is no difference"
+between dacoity and robbery. The gravity of the offence consists in the terror it causes
+by the presence of a number of offenders. Abettors who are present and aiding when
+"the crime is committed are counted in the number. Section 391 IPC, 1860 explains the"
+offence of 'dacoity'. When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to
+"commit a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or"
+"attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present and aiding such commission and"
+"attempt amount to five or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is"
+"said to commit 'dacoity'. Under section 392 IPC, 1860, the offence of 'robbery'"
+simpliciter is punishable with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to ten years or
+"14 years depending upon the facts of a given case. Section 396 IPC, 1860 brings within"
+"its ambit a murder committed along with 'dacoity'. In terms of this provision, if any one"
+"of the five or more persons, who are conjointly committing dacoity, commits murder in"
+"so committing dacoity, every one of those persons shall be punished with death or"
+imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten
+"years and shall also be liable to fine. On a plain reading of these provisions, it is clear"
+"that to constitute an offence of 'dacoity', robbery essentially should be committed by"
+"five or more persons. Similarly, to constitute an offence of 'dacoity with murder' any one"
+"of the five or more persons should commit a murder while committing the dacoity, then"
+"every one of such persons so committing, attempting to commit or aiding, by fiction of"
+"law, would be deemed to have committed the offence of murder and be liable for"
+punishment provided under these provisions depending upon the facts and
+circumstances of the case.153.
+Dacoity is perhaps the only offence which the Legislature has made punishable at four
+"stages. When five or more persons assemble for the purpose of committing a dacoity,"
+each of them is punishable under section 402 merely on the ground of joining the
+assembly. Another stage is that of preparation and if any one makes preparation to
+"commit a dacoity, he is punishable under section 399. The definition of 'dacoity' in this"
+"section shows that the other two stages, namely, the stage of attempting to commit"
+"and the stage of actual commission of robbery, have been treated alike, and come"
+"within the definition.154. In other words, attempt to commit dacoity is also dacoity."
+"""It will, therefore, be seen that it is possible to commit the offence of dacoity under"
+"section 395, IPC, 1860, by merely attempting to commit a robbery by five or more"
+"persons without being successful in getting any booty whatsoever. Thus, if in a"
+particular case the dacoits are forced to retreat due to stiff opposition from the
+"inmates or villagers without collecting any booty, then it must be held that the offence"
+of dacoity is completed the moment the dacoits take to their heels without any
+"booty"".155. Even in such a case all the dacoits can be convicted and punished under"
+"section 395, IPC, 1860.156."
+"In a case of dacoity the circumstance that the inmates of the house, seeing the large"
+"number of dacoits, do not offer any resistance and no force or violence is required or"
+used does not reduce the dacoity to theft.157.
+[s 391.1] 'Conjointly'.—
+This word manifestly refers to united or concerted action of the persons participating
+in the transaction. It is only when their individual action can be properly referred to their
+concerted action that the question of conviction under this section can arise.158. When
+there is doubt as to how many persons are involved in commission of offence and the
+"accused/appellants were not identified during Test Identification Parade, they are"
+entitled to benefit of doubt.159.
+[s 391.2] Five or more persons.—
+"Interpretation of section 391 IPC, 1860 is simple, that there must be at least five"
+persons in a dacoity; the section nowhere says that minimum five persons must be
+convicted of it.160.
+[s 391.3] CASES.—
+"Where the allegation was that on the day of incident, victim was travelling on scooter"
+"with cash, two scooter borne accused armed with sword, knife, club and pistol stopped"
+"victim, asked him to leave scooter and get away and then accused with their"
+"accomplices fled away with scooter, accused were acquitted on the ground that test"
+identification parade was conducted after 46 days of arrest of alleged accused.161.
+The accused persons took away gold ornaments and service revolver of the victim.
+"They were apprehended and, on the basis of their statements, stolen articles were"
+recovered. Identification of the accused persons and the articles was made by the
+victim at TI parade. The conviction of the accused person was held to be proper.162.
+Where there were only five named accused who committed the dacoity and out of five
+"two were acquitted holding that only three took part in the offence, it was held that the"
+"remaining three could not be convicted of dacoity, as the offence of dacoity could not"
+be committed by less than five persons.163. Where in spite of the acquittal of a number
+"of persons, it is found as a fact that along with the persons convicted there were other"
+"unidentified persons who participated in the offence, bringing the total number of"
+"participants to five or more, it was held that the conviction of the identified persons,"
+"though less than five, was perfectly correct.164. Recovery of articles shortly after a"
+dacoity at the instance of the accused persons has been held by the Supreme Court to
+be sufficient for conviction under section 396 as well as under section 412.165.
+"153. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v State of UP, (2011) 8 SCC 300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : AIR 2011 SC"
+3114 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] .
+"154. Dhanpat, AIR 1960 Pat 582 ."
+"155. R Deb, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, CRIMINAL LAW AND INVESTIGATION, 2nd Edn, vol II,"
+p 780.
+"156. Shyam Behari v State, 1957 Cr LJ 416 (SC-Para 5)."
+"157. Ram Chand, (1932) 55 All 117 ."
+"158. Dambaru Dhar Injal, (1951) 3 Ass 365."
+"159. Musku Pentu v State of AP, 2005 Cr LJ 1355 (AP)."
+"160. Allaudin v State (NCT of Delhi), 2016 Cr LJ 1617 (Del) : 2016 (2) RCR (Criminal) 734."
+"161. Asif Ahmad v State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 Cr LJ 4461 (Cha)."
+"162. Lalu v State of Orissa, 2003 Cr LJ 1677 (Ori)."
+"163. Debi, (1952) 2 Raj 177 ; Lingayya, AIR 1958 AP 510 ; See also Ram Shankar, 1956 Cr LJ 822"
+"(SC); Khagendra Gahan, 1982 Cr LJ 487 (Ori); Ram Lekhan, 1983 Cr LJ 691 (1) : 1983 All LJ 283 :"
+"AIR 1983 SC 352 (1) : (1983) 2 SCC 65 : 1983 SCC (Cr) 339. Atar Singh v State of UP, 2003 Cr LJ"
+"676 (All), the informant alleged that 3-4 persons entered into the house forcibly, the offence"
+could not amount to dacoity.
+"164. Ghamandi v State, 1970 Cr LJ 386 ; See also Saktu v State, 1973 Cr LJ 599 : AIR 1973 SC"
+760 . Conviction for dacoity requires proper identification of the persons involved. Ram Ishwar
+"Paswan v State of Bihar, 1989 Cr LJ 1042 (Pat), acquittal because no identification. State of HP v"
+"Jagar Singh, 1989 Cr LJ 1213 , conviction for highway dacoity."
+"165. Lachman Ram v State of Orissa, AIR 1985 SC 486 [LNIND 1985 SC 77] : 1985 Cr LJ 753 :"
+1985 SCC (Cr) 263. Failure in filing the list of articles supposed to have been taken away or in
+"indicating their nature makes the complaint liable to be dismissed. Suresh v State of UP, 1990"
+Supp SCC 138 : 1990 SCC (Cr) 643. Revision against acquittal not allowed in a case where the
+"trial court considered every piece of evidence and gave cogent reasons, Mohamed Nagoor"
+"Meeran v State of TN, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 857 (Mad). Joseph v State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 1608"
+"[LNIND 2000 SC 746] : (1998) 4 SCC 387 [LNIND 1998 SC 328] , conviction of accused for"
+"murder and for robbing the victim of her jewelry, good proof. George v State of Kerala, (2002) 4"
+"SCC 475 [LNIND 2002 SC 256] , robbery, rings and wristwatch recovered from the accused,"
+"presumption under section 114A, conviction. Sanjay v State (NCT) of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 1231"
+"(SC), robbery with murder, proved against accused, conviction. Ronny v State of Maharashtra,"
+1998 Cr LJ 1638 : AIR 1998 SC 1251 [LNIND 1998 SC 302] robbery with triple murder.
+Conviction.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 392] Punishment for robbery.
+Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be"
+"committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be"
+extended to fourteen years.
+COMMENT—
+This section no doubt allows the Court discretion as regards the minimum punishment
+"to be awarded, but when the offence is attended with circumstances which would"
+"make the attempt to commit it punishable with the minimum sentence of seven years,"
+it would not be a proper exercise of discretion to award a lesser sentence when the
+offence has been accomplished.166. A person who has been convicted of robbery
+under this section need not be convicted of theft.167. Where the wholly of the robbed
+"property was not recovered from the persons accused, it was held that the proper"
+section to convict was section 411.168.
+[s 392.1] Essential ingredients for punishment under Section 392.—
+Essential ingredients for punishment under section 392 are:
+(1) The accused committed theft;
+(2) he voluntarily caused or attempted to cause:
+"(i) death, hurt or wrongful restraint,"
+"(ii) fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint;"
+(3) he did either act for the end:
+"(i) of committing theft,"
+"(ii) while committing theft,"
+(iii) in carrying away or in the attempt to carry away property obtained by
+theft.169.
+"Where section 397 also applies, (robbery accompanied by attempt to cause death or"
+grievous hurt) the punishment has to be for a period not less than seven years. The
+Supreme Court has held that this minimum prescribed sentence cannot be by-passed
+by resorting to plea bargaining.170. Section 392 itself provides that when robbery is
+"committed on a highway and between sunset and sunrise, deterrent punishment is"
+called for.171.
+[s 392.2] CASES.—
+"In a case of alleged dacoity and murder, seven accused persons were convicted under"
+section 396 as looted property was recovered from their possession within a very short
+time after the offence. The evidence of an eye-witness showed that murder was
+committed only by the three of the accused persons of whom one was given benefit of
+doubt. It was held only the remaining two accused were liable to be punished under
+sections 392 and 302 and other only under section 411.172. Where the accused was
+alleged to have committed dacoity alongwith four other co-accused who were
+"acquitted, his conviction under section 395 was altered to one under section 392"
+(robbery).173. When articles recovered from accused were identified to be articles of
+"theft by complainant, the fact that watch recovered was not mentioned in FIR is not"
+sufficient to reject testimony of complainant. No explanation was offered by accused
+as to how they came into possession of articles recovered. The Supreme Court held
+that Recoveries proved sufficient to connect accused with crime.174.
+[s 392.3] Bank Robbery.—
+The identity of the accused was proved by fingerprint impressions available at the door
+of the bank. The photographs of the fingerprints were to be proved by examining the
+"photographer. However, this lapse in the prosecution cannot result in acquittal of the"
+appellants. The evidence adduced by the prosecution must be scrutinized
+independently of such lapses either in the investigation or by the prosecution or
+otherwise. The result of the criminal trial would depend upon the level of investigation
+or the conduct of the prosecution. Criminal trials should not be made casualty for such
+lapses in the investigation or prosecution.175.
+[s 392.4] Sentence.—
+"The offence was committed in a cool, calculated and gruesome manner. The accused"
+"could have easily committed the robbery without taking away the life of the victim, if"
+"robbery had been the motive. Keeping in mind the macabre nature of the crime, the"
+High Court of Madras ordered that the sentences imposed on the accused should run
+consecutively and not concurrently.176.
+"166. Chandra Nath, (1931) 7 Luck 543 . See also Suryamoorthi v Govindaswamy, AIR 1989 SC"
+"1410 [LNIND 1989 SC 232] : 1989 Cr LJ 1451 : (1989) 3 SCC 24 [LNIND 1989 SC 232] , a"
+"conviction under the section for robbery; Laxmi Raj Shetty v State of TN, AIR 1988 SC 1274"
+[LNIND 1988 SC 260] : 1988 Cr LJ 1783 : (1988) 3 SCC 319 [LNIND 1988 SC 260] where the
+death sentence was reduced to life imprisonment for offence of robbery with murder. More fully
+"discussed under section 302. Hardayal Prem v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 269 : 1991 Cr LJ"
+"345 , charges against two under sections 302, 304 and 392 for murder and robbery. Both"
+convicted of robbery and murder under sections 302/ 392. One did not appeal and the other
+having appealed by special leave earned his acquittal. His companion was also given the same
+"right of acquittal; Chandran v State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 2148 : 1990 Cr LJ 2296 , setting aside"
+"of conviction for robbery because of irregularities. Din Dayal v State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1991 SC"
+"44 , accused, a higher secondary boy of 14 years old, snatching wrist watch with others,"
+sentence of 2½ years reduced to 8 months already spent in custody.
+"167. State of Kerala v Suku, 1989 Cr LJ 2401 (Ker)."
+"168. Shankar v State, 1989 Cr LJ 1066 (Del). It has also been held that an accused should not"
+"be convicted both under sections 392 and 394, Philip Bhimsen v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 2"
+Cr LJ 1694 (Bom).
+"169. Venu v State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 94 [LNIND 2008 SC 208] : (2008) 1 SCC (Cr) 623 :"
+AIR 2008 SC 1199 [LNIND 2008 SC 208] : 2008 Cr LJ 1634 .
+"170. Kripal Singh v State of Haryana, 1999 Cr LJ 5031 : (1999) 5 SCC 649 ; R v Williams, (2001)"
+"Cr App R (S) 2 [CA (Crim Div)], maximum penalty imposed upon the accused who used and"
+threatened violence to force the attendant to give him a whisky bottle from the vend out of
+vending hours.
+"171. Venu v State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 94 [LNIND 2008 SC 208] : AIR 2008 SC 1199"
+[LNIND 2008 SC 208] .
+"172. State of MP v Samaylal, 1994 Cr LJ 3407 (MP)."
+"173. Madan Kandi v State of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 227 (Ori); Ram Rakha v State of Punjab, AIR 2000"
+SC 3521 : 2000 Cr LJ 4038 the two convicts came to the house of the victim and took away his
+"licensed rifle and also Rs. 3000, and jewelry belonging to some other person. Conviction under"
+"the section was upheld. Ganga Din v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 1762 (All), robbery, no proper"
+"identification, acquittal. Ronny v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1638 : AIR 1998 SC 1251"
+"[LNIND 1998 SC 302] , in a case of triple murder and robbery, the accused persons was"
+"recognised and articles recovered. Complete chain of circumstances, conviction not interfered"
+"with. Ravi Magor v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2886 , robbery by entering home, tying up people,"
+"recoveries, identification, conviction. Identification in court without test identification did not"
+"render evidence of identification inadmissible. Kayyumkhan v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"3137 (Bom) robbery in train, victims identified robbers, conviction. Pravakar Behera v State of"
+"Orisssa, 1997 Cr LJ 3291 (Ori), uncertainty as to number of persons involved. Conviction shifted"
+from dacoity to robbery.
+"174. Akil @ Javed v State of Nct of Delhi, 2013 Cr LJ 571 : 2013 AIR(SCW) 59."
+"175. Ajay Kumar Singh v The Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 2016 Cr LJ 4174 : AIR 2016 SC"
+3528 [LNIND 2016 SC 301] : (2016) 2 SCC (LS) 547.
+"176. K Ramajayam v The Inspector of Police, 2016 Cr LJ 1542 (Mad) : 2016 (2) MLJ (Crl) 715 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 393] Attempt to commit robbery.
+Whoever attempts to commit robbery shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment
+"for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 394] Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery.
+"If any person, in committing or in attempting to commit robbery, voluntarily causes"
+"hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in committing or attempting"
+"to commit such robbery, shall be punished with 177.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+This section imposes severe punishment when hurt is caused in committing robbery.
+Section 397 similarly provides for the minimum sentence of imprisonment which must
+be inflicted when grievous hurt is caused.
+"Commenting on the section, the Supreme Court observed: section 394 prescribes"
+punishment for voluntarily causing hurt in committing or attempting to commit robbery.
+The offence under section 394 is a more serious than one under section 392. Section
+394 postulates and contemplates the causing of harm during commission of robbery
+or in attempting to commit robbery when such causing of hurt is hardly necessary to
+facilitate the commission of robbery. Section 394 applies to cases where during the
+course of robbery voluntary hurt is caused. Section 394 classifies two distinct classes
+"of persons. Firstly, those who actually cause hurt and secondly, those who do not"
+"actually cause hurt but are ""jointly concerned"" in the commission of the offence of"
+"robbery. The second class of persons may not be concerned in the causing of hurt, but"
+they become liable independently of the knowledge of its likelihood or a reasonable
+belief in its probability.178.
+"In a prosecution for robbery and murder, injuries were caused to the deceased in the"
+process of removing earrings. The Court said that the fact that the booty was
+distributed among three accused and they had secreted the robbed articles. These
+things revealed the common intention to commit robbery. One of them picked up a
+stone piece and caused death of the victim. There was nothing to show that the
+accused even knew of any such possibility. Others could not be convicted of murder
+"and robbery with the help of presumption under section 114 Evidence Act, 1872. They"
+were liable to be convicted only under sections 394/34.179.
+[s 394.1] Forceful removal of vehicle by finance company.—
+Forcible removal of vehicle from possession of purchaser by finance company on
+default of payment without recourse to proper remedy through civil Court or to
+"arbitration clause, contained in hypothecation agreement, would be covered under"
+"section 394 of IPC, 1860.180. The practice of hiring recovery agents, who are"
+"musclemen, is deprecated and needs to be discouraged. The Bank should resort to"
+procedure recognized by law to take possession of vehicles in cases where the
+borrower may have committed default in payment of the instalments instead of taking
+resort to strong-arm tactics. The recovery of loans or seizure of vehicles could be done
+only through legal means. The banks cannot employ goondas to take possession by
+force.181.
+[s 394.2] Charge framed under sections 394 and 397.—
+There is nothing wrong in convicting the accused under section 394 read with section
+397.182. All ingredients of offence punishable under section 392 are covered in offence
+"under section 394.183. Section 397 of the IPC, 1860 prescribes enhanced punishment"
+"for using a deadly weapon at the time of committing robbery. As an obvious corollary,"
+section 397 had no application to the case where robbery was not actually completed.
+"Even so, measure of punishment had to be regulated by section 398 of the IPC, 1860"
+that provides for minimum punishment of seven years imprisonment in a case of
+"attempt to commit robbery when armed with deadly weapon. In this view of the matter,"
+the conviction of the appellants for the offence under section 394 read with section
+"397 of the IPC, 1860 deserves to be converted into one under section 394 read with"
+"section 398 of the IPC, 1860.184."
+[s 394.3] Compounding.—
+"An offence punishable under section 394 IPC, 1860 is not compoundable with or"
+without the permission of the Court concerned. But High Court can use its power under
+"section 482 Cr PC, 1973 for quashing the prosecution under the said provision in the"
+light of the compromise that the parties have arrived at.185.
+"[s 394.4] Presumption under section 114(a) of Evidence Act, 1872.—"
+"As per Section 114(a) of the Evidence Act, 1872, when the stolen property is recovered"
+"from a person, soon after the commission of theft or dacoity, a presumption can be raised"
+that either he has himself committed the offence of theft or he has received the stolen
+property.186.
+"177. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"178. Aslam v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 9 SCC 227 [LNINDORD 2008 SC 127] : (2008) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+764 : AIR 2009 SC 363 [LNIND 2008 SC 1918] .
+"179. Limbaji v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 491 [LNIND 2001 SC 2859] ; Om Prakash v"
+"State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 SC 1220 [LNIND 1998 SC 87] , five accused persons robbed the"
+complainant of his wrist watch and currency notes and ran away. Eye-witnesses chased them
+"and then went to police station. Investigation was also successful. Two accused were let off,"
+"others acquitted. Rama Kant v State of UP, 2001 Cr LJ 2072 (All), complaint against police"
+"personnel alleging robbery and extracting of money, the court lamented that those who were"
+"supposed to protect people themselves resorted to crime, the complaint was not to be quashed."
+"State of UP v Tekchand, 2000 Cr LJ 3821 (All), snatching of a gun in a hotel cabin, conviction"
+"under section 394, but it could not be known to one of the accused that the other was going to"
+"kill. Sudesh v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 2602 (MP), evidence showed that murder and removal of"
+"ornaments from the body of the victim were simultaneous acts, conviction under sections"
+"302/394; Rajjo v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 2996 (All), death caused in robbery by a single knife"
+"blow, conviction under section 304 II, the matter being 20 years old. Abu Barks v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 154 (Raj), robbery and murder, the accused was seen going towards the"
+"place with knife, not enough to connect him with the incident, acquittal. Shravan Dashrath"
+"Datarange v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1196 (Bom), not only the accused who caused"
+"hurt, but also an associate would be equally liable for the mischief contemplated by the section."
+"See also Public Prosecutor v Yenta Arjuna, 1998 Cr LJ 179 (AP); Shravan Dashrath Datrange v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1196 (Bom); Ratanlal v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1788"
+"(Raj); Ashok Kumar v State of MP, 1998 Cr LJ 4103 (MP); State of MP v Mukund, 1997 Cr LJ 534"
+"(MP), a housewife and her two minor children found throttled to death in their house, things"
+recovered from robbers very soon thereafter on guidance provided by the husband. Both the
+intruders and murderers convicted.
+"180. V A George v Abraham Augustine, 2012 Cr LJ 3355 (Ker)."
+"181. ICICI Bank Ltd v Prakash Kaur, 2007 (2) SCC 711 [LNIND 2007 SC 237] : JT 2007 (4) SC 39"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 237] : 2007 (1) KLJ 846 : AIR 2007 SC 1349 [LNIND 2007 SC 237] ; The
+"Managing Director, Orix Auto Finance Indian Ltd v Shri Jagmander Singh, 2006 (1) Supreme 708 :"
+2006 (2) SCC 598 [LNIND 2006 SC 89] ; Maruthi Finance Ltd v Vijayalaxmi reported in (2012) 1
+SCC 1 [LNIND 2011 SC 1153] : AIR 2012 SC 509 [LNIND 2011 SC 1153] -even in case of
+"mortgaged goods subject to Hire Purchase Agreements, the recovery process has to be in"
+accordance with law and the recovery process referred to in the Agreements also contemplates
+such recovery to be effected in due process of law and not by use of force. Till such time as the
+"ownership is not transferred to the purchaser, the hirer normally continues to be the owner of"
+"the goods, but that does not entitle him on the strength of the agreement to take back"
+possession of the vehicle by use of force. The guidelines which had been laid down by the
+"Reserve Bank of India as well as the appellant bank itself, in fact, support and make a virtue of"
+such conduct. If any action is taken for recovery in violation of such guidelines or the principles
+"as laid down by this Court, such an action cannot but be struck down."
+"182. Narottam Das v State, 2013 Cr LJ 2676 (Chh)."
+"183. Rahamat Khan alias Badal Khan v State of W B, 2008 Cr LJ 3285 (Cal)."
+"184. Ganesh Singh v State of MP, relied on Phool Kumar v Delhi Admn, 1975 (1) SCC 797 [LNIND"
+1975 SC 112] .
+"185. Shiji @ Pappu v Radhika, 2012 Cr LJ 840 (SC) : (2011) 10 SCC 705 [LNIND 2011 SC 1158] :"
+AIR 2012 SC 499 [LNIND 2011 SC 1158] .
+"186. Satish Raju Waman Koli v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 4247 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 395] Punishment for dacoity.
+"Whoever commits dacoity shall be punished with 187.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+"188..—When a person is involved in an offence of theft of higher magnitude, then it"
+becomes dacoity and when dacoity is committed with murder and also results in
+"causing grievous hurt to others, it becomes robbery punishable under sections 395,"
+"section 396 and section 397 of IPC, 1860. In other words, when the offence of theft is"
+"committed conjointly by five or more persons, it becomes dacoity and such dacoity by"
+those persons also results in commission of murder as well as causing of grievous
+"hurt to the victims, it results in an offence of robbery. A reading of section 395, section"
+"396 and section 397 of IPC, 1860 makes the position clear that by virtue of the conjoint"
+"effort of the accused while indulging in the said offence, makes every one of them"
+"deemed to have committed the offence of dacoity and robbery. In the result, when such"
+"offences of dacoity and robbery are committed, the same result in the death of a"
+person or hurt or wrongful restrain or creating fear of instant death or instant hurt or
+"instant wrongful restraint. In substance, in order to find a person guilty of offences"
+"committed under sections 395, 396 and 397 of IPC, 1860, his participation along with a"
+group of five or more persons indulging in robbery and in that process commits murder
+and also attempts to cause death or grievous hurt with deadly weapons would be
+sufficient. Use of a knife in the course of commission of such a crime has always been
+held to be use of a deadly weapon. Keeping the above basic prescription of the offence
+"described in the above provisions in mind, we examined the case on hand. In the first"
+"instance, what is to be examined is whether the basic ingredient of the offence falling"
+"under section 395, section 396 and section 397 of IPC, 1860, namely, participation of"
+five or more persons was made out.189.
+[s 395.1] Cases.—
+"In T Alias Sankaranarayanan v State Rep. By Inspector of Police,190. allegation was that"
+accused along with others entered the premises of complainant in false pretext of
+conducting income tax raid and looted jewels and cash. Accused acquitted since there
+was no TIP and accused was identified for first time in Court after seven years of
+occurrence.
+[s 395.2] Sentence.—
+"Dacoity is a daredevil act. Most of the time, a serious crime like dacoity is committed"
+by unknown persons and it is very difficult to trace them and still difficult to secure their
+"conviction. As a matter of fact, looking to the nature of crime and the manner in which"
+"the appellants looted temple properties, graver punishment was warranted. In any case,"
+sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment awarded by the trial Court and confirmed
+"in appeal by the High Court for the offence under section 395 IPC, 1860 calls for no"
+interference.191.
+Considering that the value of the alleged loot including cash and mobile was only Rs.
+"16,550 and the young age of the accused, the trial Court sentenced him to rigorous"
+imprisonment of only one year along with a fine of Rs. 100. The High Court allowed the
+appeal to the extent of enhancing the sentence to five years of rigorous imprisonment
+along with the fine imposed by the trial Court. Considering the same reasons as
+recorded by the trial Court the Supreme Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment to
+"the extent already undergone, i.e., three years and two months.192."
+"187. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"188. Krishna Gopal Singh v State of UP, AIR 2000 SC 3616 , finding that the accused person"
+committed robbery is a sine qua non for sustaining a conviction under section 395. Kapoorchand
+"Chaudhary v State of Bihar, 2002 Cr LJ 1424 (Pat), no leniency in terms of punishment was"
+shown to dacoits who had robbed innocent bus passengers of their belongings irrespective of
+the fact that the accused persons had been facing the rigour of the trial for 14 years. Praful
+"Kumar Patel v State of Orissa, 2000 Cr LJ 2724 (Ori) entry into house with court orders to seize"
+"articles attached, complaint quashed. Gandikota Narasaiah v Superintendent, 1999 Cr LJ 3947"
+"(AP), conviction in three cases of dacoity, direction should not be given that the sentence in all"
+the three cases should run concurrently. Such direction may operate as a licence to professional
+"dacoity. Subedar Yadav v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 4663 (All), punishment for dacoity in five"
+"houses in the night of the incident, identified by 4 witnesses in lantern light. Devendran v State of"
+"TN, 1998 Cr LJ 814 : AIR 1998 SC 2821 [LNIND 1997 SC 1368] , entered house, killed two old"
+"ladies and car driver, and looted jewelry, etc., offence against accused persons proved beyond"
+"doubt. Conviction under sections 302, 326. Shahul Hameed v State of TN, 1998 Cr LJ 885 (Mad),"
+"doubtful evidence, acquittal. Badloo v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 1072 (All), concocted evidence, no"
+"conviction, not even for a lesser offence. Rajvee v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 1588 (All), conviction"
+"on sale basis of identification evidence not proper. SK Jamir v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 1728"
+"(Ori), dacoity by entering into house, good evidence, conviction. Another similar conviction,"
+"Satish v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 3352 (All); Subhaya Perumal Pilley v State of Maharashtra, 1997"
+"Cr LJ 922 (Bom), more than five were involved, force was used, threatening words were spoken,"
+"and gold was taken away, essentials of section 395, proved. No hurt or injury caused. 10 years"
+"imprisonment was reduced to 7 years. Araf Mulla v State of Orissa, 1997 Cr LJ 4213 (Ori),"
+"dacoity at petrol pump, no proper proof. Abdul Gafur v State of Assam, (2007) 12 SCC 627"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1422] : AIR 2008 SC 607 [LNIND 2007 SC 1422] : 2008 Cr LJ 800 , acquittal,"
+"infirmities in the prosecution in the background of admitted animosity between the parties, the"
+prosecution version was unacceptable.
+"189. Deepak @ Wireless v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 4643 : (2012) 8 SCC 785 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 558] .
+"190. T Alias Sankaranarayanan v State Rep. By Inspector of Police, 2011 Cr LJ 4006 (Mad)."
+"191. Ram Babu v State of UP, AIR 2010 SC 2143 [LNIND 2010 SC 365] : (2010) 5 SCC 63 [LNIND"
+"2010 SC 365] ; Arjun Mahto v State of Bihar, AIR 2008 SC 3270 [LNIND 2008 SC 1627] : (2008) 15"
+SCC 604 [LNIND 2008 SC 1627] - the passage of time cannot wash away gravity of offence.
+"192. Pareshbhai Annabhai Sonvane v State of Gujarat, 2016 Cr LJ 2076 : 2016 (3) Scale 349"
+[LNINDU 2016 SC 73] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 396] Dacoity with murder.
+"If any one of five or more persons, who are conjointly committing dacoity, commits"
+"murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those persons shall be punished with"
+"death, or 193.[imprisonment for life], or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may"
+"extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+Under this section extreme penalty of death may be inflicted on a person convicted of
+"taking part in a dacoity in the course of which a murder is committed, even though"
+there is nothing to show that he himself committed the murder or that he abetted it.
+The section declares the liability of other persons as co-extensive with the one who has
+"actually committed murder. Where in the course of a dacoity one man was shot dead,"
+and the accused person who was tried had a gun and others of the dacoits also had
+"guns, and there was no evidence that the accused was the man who fired the fatal"
+"shot, the sentence was altered from one of death to one of transportation for life.194."
+[s 396.1] Ingredients.—
+The offence under this section requires two things:—
+(1) The dacoity must be the joint act of the persons concerned.
+(2) Murder must have been committed in the course of the commission of the
+dacoity.195.
+"Section 391 IPC, 1860 explains the offence of 'dacoity'. When five or more persons"
+"conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or where the whole number of"
+"persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present"
+"and aiding such commission and attempt amount to five or more, every person so"
+"committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit 'dacoity'. Under section 392 IPC,"
+"1860, the offence of 'robbery' simpliciter is punishable with rigorous imprisonment"
+which may extend to ten years or 14 years depending upon the facts of a given case.
+"Section 396 IPC, 1860 brings within its ambit a murder committed along with 'dacoity'."
+"In terms of this provision, if any one of the five or more persons, who are conjointly"
+"committing dacoity, commits murder in so committing dacoity, every one of those"
+persons shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life or rigorous
+imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to
+"fine.196. In the first instance, what is to be examined is whether the basic ingredient of"
+"the offence falling under sections 395, 396 and 397 of IPC, 1860, namely, participation"
+"of five or more persons was made out.197. On a plain reading of these provisions, it is"
+"clear that to constitute an offence of 'dacoity', robbery essentially should be committed"
+"by five or more persons. Similarly, to constitute an offence of 'dacoity with murder' any"
+"one of the five or more persons should commit a murder while committing the dacoity,"
+"then every one of such persons so committing, attempting to commit or aiding, by"
+"fiction of law, would be deemed to have committed the offence of murder and be liable"
+for punishment provided under these provisions depending upon the facts and
+circumstances of the case.198.
+"For recording conviction for dacoity, there must be five or more persons. In the absence"
+"of such finding, an accused cannot be convicted for dacoity. In a given case, however, it"
+may happen that there may be five or more persons and the factum of five or more
+"persons is either not disputed or is clearly established, but the Court may not be able to"
+record a finding as to identity of all the persons said to have committed the dacoity and
+may not be able to convict them and order their acquittal observing that their identity is
+"not established. In such case, conviction of less than five persons—or even one—can"
+"stand. But in the absence of such finding, less than five persons cannot be convicted"
+"for dacoity. A similar situation arises in dealing with cases of ""unlawful assembly"" as"
+"defined in section 141 IPC, 1860 and liability of every member of such unlawful"
+assembly for an offence committed in prosecution of common object under section
+"149 IPC, 1860. In this case there were six accused. Out of those six accused, two were"
+acquitted by the trial Court without recording a finding that though offence of dacoity
+"was committed by six persons, identity of two accused could not be established. They"
+"were simply acquitted by the Court. Therefore, as per settled law, four persons could"
+"not be convicted for dacoity, being less than five which is an essential ingredient for"
+"commission of dacoity. Moreover, all of them were acquitted for an offence of criminal"
+"conspiracy punishable under section 120-B IPC, 1860 as also for receiving stolen"
+"property in the commission of dacoity punishable under section 412 IPC, 1860. The"
+conviction of the appellant in this case for an offence punishable under section 396
+"IPC, 1860, therefore, could not stand and must be set aside.199."
+[s 396.2] Presence of all not necessary.—
+"The section says that if ""any one of five or more persons, who are conjointly"
+"committing dacoity, commits murder in so committing dacoity"" then every one of those"
+persons shall be liable to the penalty prescribed in the section. It is not necessary that
+murder should be committed in the presence of all. When in the commission of a
+"dacoity a murder is committed, it matters not whether the particular dacoit was inside"
+"the house where the dacoity is committed, or outside the house, or whether the murder"
+"was committed inside or outside the house, so long only as the murder was committed"
+in the commission of that dacoity.200. The essence of an offence under this section is
+murder committed in commission of dacoity. It does not matter whether murder is
+committed in the immediate presence of a particular person or persons. It is not even
+necessary that murder should have been within the previous contemplation of the
+perpetrators of the crime.201. But in a case the dacoits were forced to retreat without
+"collecting any booty, the offence of dacoity would be completed as soon as they left"
+the house of occurrence and took to their heels. And if a murder was committed by any
+"one of the dacoits in course of such a retreat without any booty, then only the actual"
+"murderer will be liable under section 302, IPC, 1860, and conjoint responsibility under"
+"section 396, IPC, 1860, could not be fixed on others though all of them could be"
+"convicted under section 395, IPC, 1860 as attempt to commit dacoity is also"
+dacoity.202.
+[s 396.3] Number of Persons.—
+Conviction for an offence of dacoity of less than five persons is not sustainable.203. For
+"recording conviction, there must be five or more persons. In absence of such finding,"
+"an accused cannot be convicted for an offence of dacoity. In a given case, however, it"
+may happen that there may be five or more persons and the factum of five or more
+"persons is either not disputed or is clearly established, but the Court may not be able to"
+record a finding as to identity of all the persons said to have committed dacoity and
+may not be able to convict them and order their acquittal observing that their identity is
+"not established. In such case, conviction of less than five persons — or even one can"
+"stand. But in absence of such finding, less than five persons cannot be convicted for an"
+offence of dacoity.204.
+[s 396.4] Presumption from recent possession.—
+"Simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference can be drawn that a person in"
+possession of the stolen articles is guilty of the offence of murder and robbery.205. The
+nature of the presumption under Illustration (a) of section 114 of the Indian Evidence
+"Act, 1872 must depend upon the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can"
+be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or otherwise. Each case must
+be judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent possession
+"sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according ""as the stolen article is or"
+"is not calculated to pass readily from hand to hand"". If the stolen articles were such as"
+"were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed"
+could not be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding
+during that period.206.
+[s 396.5] Section 396 and Section 302.—
+"The ingredients of both these offences, to some extent, are also different in as much as"
+"to complete an offence of 'dacoity' under section 396 IPC, 1860, five or more persons"
+"must conjointly commit the robbery while under section 302 of the IPC, 1860 even one"
+"person by himself can commit the offence of murder. But, as already noticed, to attract"
+"the provisions of section 396, the offence of 'dacoity' must be coupled with murder. In"
+"other words, the ingredients of section 302 become an integral part of the offences"
+"punishable under section 396 of the IPC, 1860. Resultantly, the distinction with regard"
+to the number of persons involved in the commission of the crime loses its
+significance as it is possible that the offence of 'dacoity' may not be proved but still the
+"offence of murder could be established, like in the present case. Upon reasonable"
+"analysis of the language of these provisions, it is clear that the Court has to keep in"
+mind the ingredients which shall constitute a criminal offence within the meaning of
+the penal section. This is not only essential in the case of the offence charged with but
+even where there is comparative study of different penal provisions as the accused
+may have committed more than one offence or even offences of a graver nature. He
+"may finally be punished for a lesser offence or vice versa, if the law so permits and the"
+requisite ingredients are satisfied.207. On the conjoint reading of sections 396 and 302
+"IPC, 1860, it is clear that the offence of murder has been lifted and incorporated in the"
+"provisions of section 396 IPC, 1860. In other words, the offence of murder punishable"
+under section 302 and as defined under section 300 will have to be read into the
+"provisions of offences stated under section 396 IPC, 1860. In other words, where a"
+"provision is physically lifted and made part of another provision, it shall fall within the"
+ambit and scope of principle akin to 'legislation by incorporation' which normally is
+applied between an existing statute and a newly enacted law. The expression 'murder'
+appearing in section 396 would have to take necessarily in its ambit and scope the
+"ingredients of section 300 of the IPC, 1860. The provisions are clear and admit no"
+scope for application of any other principle of interpretation except the 'golden rule of
+"construction', i.e., to read the statutory language grammatically and terminologically in"
+the ordinary and primary sense which it appears in its context without omission or
+"addition. These provisions read collectively, put the matter beyond ambiguity that the"
+"offence of murder, is by specific language, included in the offences under section 396."
+"It will have the same connotation, meaning and ingredients as are contemplated under"
+"the provisions of section 302 IPC, 1860.208."
+[s 396.6] Charge under section 396.—Conviction under section 302.—
+No prejudice has been caused to the appellant by his conviction for an offence under
+"section 302 IPC, 1860 though he was initially charged with an offence punishable under"
+"section 396 IPC, 1860 read with section 201 IPC, 1860. The circumstances which"
+"constitute an offence under section 302 were literally put to him, as section 302 IPC,"
+"1860 itself is an integral part of an offence punishable under section 396 IPC, 1860."
+"Once the appellant has not suffered any prejudice, much less a serious prejudice, then"
+"the conviction of the appellant under section 302 IPC, 1860 cannot be set aside merely"
+for want of framing of a specific/ alternate charge for an offence punishable under
+"section 302 IPC, 1860. It is more so because the dimensions and facets of an offence"
+under section 302 are incorporated by specific language and are inbuilt in the offence
+"punishable under section 396 IPC, 1860. Thus, on the application of principle of"
+"'cognate offences', there is no prejudice caused to the rights of the appellant.209."
+[s 396.7] Rarest of the rare.—
+Five members of a family including two minor children and the driver were ruthlessly
+"killed by the use of a knife, an axe and an iron rod with the help of four other. The crime"
+was obviously committed after pre-meditation with absolutely no consideration for
+"human lives and for money. Even though the appellant was young, his criminal"
+propensities are beyond reform and he is a menace to the society. death sentence was
+"held to be the appropriate punishment.210. In a dacoity with double murder, the"
+accused had gained confidence of the lady of the house and other inmates and visited
+them frequently. They committed dacoity after killing the lady and her grandson cold-
+bloodedly and attempted to kill two others. Their guilt was proved duly by
+circumstantial and direct evidence. The offences were found to be both heinous and
+barbaric and it was a 'rarest of rare case'.211.
+"193. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"194. Lal Singh, (1938) All 875 . See also Nanhau Ram v State of MP, 1988 Cr LJ 936 : AIR 1988"
+SC 912 : 1988 Supp SCC 152 . Where all the ingredients were established and the conviction
+"was sustained, Lalli v State of West Bengal, AIR 1986 SC 990 : 1986 Cr LJ 1083 : 1986 All LJ 768"
+": (1986) 2 SCC 409 , pre-planned dacoity, cold- blooded murder, concealment of bodies, the"
+"Supreme Court did not reduce life sentence and six-year R I Sheodan v State of UP, 1988 Cr LJ"
+"479 (All), R I for five years to persons robbing and injuring bus passengers disrupting social life"
+"of the area. State of UP v Hardeo, AIR 1992 SC 1854 : 1992 Cr LJ 3160 , evidence not reliable,"
+acquittal.
+"195. To bring an offence under section 396, the prosecution has to establish that murder was"
+"committed during dacoity. Hence, when prosecution alleges commission of murder during"
+"dacoity, the offence traverses from section 395 to section 396. Any person committing the"
+"offence of dacoity with murder cannot be convicted and sentenced under both the sections,"
+"Rahimal v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 3819 (All)."
+"196. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 3114 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : (2011) 8 SCC"
+300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] .
+"197. Deepak @ Wireless v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 4643 : (2012) 8 SCC 785 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 558] .
+"198. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 3114 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : (2011) 8 SCC"
+300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] .
+"199. Raj Kumar v State of Uttaranchal, (2008) 11 SCC 709 [LNIND 2008 SC 849] : (2008) 3 SCC"
+(Cr) 888 : (2008) 5 All LJ 637 : AIR 2008 SC 3248 [LNIND 2008 SC 849] .
+"200. Teja, (1895) 17 All 86 ; Umrao v State, (1894) 16 All 437 , dissented from; Chittu, (1900) PR"
+"No. 4 of 1900. Sunil v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 3063 (Raj), it was not material that all the"
+"five dacoits were not arrested. Miscreants entered the house of victim, caused one death,"
+injured others and looted property. Crime against them proved. Conviction. Shobit Chamar v
+"State of Bihar, 1998 Cr LJ 2259 (SC) six members of family killed in the process of dacoity,"
+"trustworthy eye-witnesses, conviction. Anthony De Souza v State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 258"
+"[LNIND 2002 SC 674] , all the five accused proved to have participated in murder, the trial of"
+"juvenile delinquent was split, High Court converting conviction from under sections 396/149 to"
+"that under sections 396/34, improper."
+"201. Samunder Singh, AIR 1965 Cal 598 [LNIND 1963 CAL 83] ."
+"202. Shyam Behari, 1957 Cr LJ 416 (SC-Para 5) : AIR 1956 SC 320 . See Suryamurthy v"
+"Govindaswamy, AIR 1989 SC 1410 [LNIND 1989 SC 232] : 1989 Cr LJ 1451 : (1989) 3 SCC 24"
+"[LNIND 1989 SC 232] , where some of the accused were acquitted because evidence of their"
+"identity was not dependable. Ajab v State of Maharashtra, 1989 Cr LJ 954 : AIR 1989 SC 827 :"
+"1989 Supp (1) SCC 601 , appeal on the matter of sentence; Hari Nath v State of UP, 1988 Cr LJ"
+"422 : (1988) 1 SCC 14 [LNIND 1987 SC 743] : AIR 1988 SC 345 [LNIND 1987 SC 743] , dacoity at"
+"night, identification not dependable. Sheonath Bhar v State of UP, 1990 Cr LJ 2423 (All), no"
+"conviction on the basis only of identification. Ramdeo Rai Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1990 SC"
+1180 [LNIND 1990 SC 126] : 1990 Cr LJ 1183 the High Court finding that the appellant alone
+was guilty of the murder shifted the conviction to under section 302 with no prejudice to the
+"accused, upheld by the Supreme Court."
+"203. Ram Lakhan v State of UP, (1983) 2 SCC 65 ."
+"204. Raj Kumar Alias Raju v State of Uttranchal, (2008) 11 SCC 709 [LNIND 2008 SC 849] ; Saktu"
+"v State of UP, (1973) 1 SCC 202 distinguished."
+"205. Geejaganda Somaiah v State of Karnataka, AIR 2007 SC 1355 [LNIND 2007 SC 312] ; Gulab"
+"Chand, AIR 1995 SC 1598 [LNIND 1995 SC 440] ; Tulsiram Kanu v State, AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cr"
+"LJ 225 - the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the"
+"Evidence Act, 1872 has to be drawn under the 'important time factor'. If the ornaments in"
+"possession of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a"
+"presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if a long period has expired in the interval, the"
+presumption cannot be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case.
+"206. Earabhadrappa v State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 446 [LNIND 1983 SC 83] : 1983 Cr LJ 846"
+.
+"207. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 3114 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : (2011) 8 SCC"
+"300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] ; Iman Ali v State of Assam, AIR 1968 SC 1464 [LNIND 1968 SC 92] :"
+1968 (3) SCR 610 [LNIND 1968 SC 92] .
+"208. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 3114 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : (2011) 8 SCC"
+300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] .
+"209. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v State of UP, AIR 2011 SC 3114 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] : (2011) 8 SCC"
+"300 [LNIND 2011 SC 726] ; State of UP v Sukhpal Singh, (2009) 4 SCC 385 [LNIND 2009 SC 339] :"
+"AIR 2009 SC 1729 [LNIND 2009 SC 339] - Accused persons entered premises, looted licensed"
+gun and other articles and also killed two persons and injured others. Supreme Court held that
+charging accused under section 396 and instead of sub-section 302 is proper.
+"210. Sonu Sardar v State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 97 [LNIND 2012 SC 909] : AIR 2012 SC"
+1480 [LNIND 2012 SC 909] ; Ankush Maruti Shinde v State of Maharashtra [(2009) 6 SCC 667
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1056] : AIR 2009 SC 2609 [LNIND 2009 SC 1056] .
+"211. State of Karnataka v Rajan, 1994 Cr LJ 1042 (Kant)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+"[s 397] Robbery or dacoity, with attempt to cause death or grievous hurt."
+"If, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly"
+"weapon,1 or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or"
+"grievous hurt to any person, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be"
+punished shall not be less than seven years.
+COMMENT—
+Sections 397 and 398 do not create any offence but merely regulate the punishment
+already provided for robbery and dacoity.212. This section fixes a minimum term of
+imprisonment when the commission of robbery and dacoity has been attended with
+"certain aggravating circumstances, viz., (1) the use of a deadly weapon, or (2) the"
+"causing of grievous hurt, or (3) attempting to cause death or grievous hurt."
+Section 34 of the Code has no application in the construction of this section.213.
+[s 397.1] Accused must be armed with deadly weapon.—
+"It is necessary to prove that at the time of committing robbery, the accused was armed"
+with a deadly weapon and not merely that one of the robbers who was with him at the
+time carried one.214. The liability to enhanced punishment is limited to the offender
+who actually uses the weapon himself and causes grievous hurt and not to others who
+in combination with such person have committed robbery or dacoity.215. The
+expression 'the offender' occurring in this section pertains to actual offender. It does
+not include all persons who participate in robbery or dacoity.216. The section does not
+provide for constructive liability as in section 149.217.
+1. 'Uses any deadly weapon'.—These words are wide enough to include a case in which
+a person levels his revolver against another person in order to overawe him. It is not
+correct to say that a person does not use a revolver unless he fires it.218. Where the
+"accused carried knife open to the view of the victims, it is sufficient use of a deadly"
+weapon to terrorise them within the meaning of this section and no other overt act as
+brandishing of the knife is necessary to apply this section.219. In reference to the word
+"""uses"" as it occurs in the section, it has been held that if the weapon carried by the"
+offender was within the vision of the victim so as to be capable of creating terror in his
+mind that is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of use of deadly weapon. It is not
+necessary to show further any hurt caused by the use of the weapon.220.
+The section postulates only the individual act of the accused to be relevant. It thus
+negates the application of the principle of constructive or vicarious liability as provided
+"in section 34. Where all the accused persons carried their respective deadly weapons, it"
+was held that each one of them satisfy the requirement of section 397. Conviction
+could be only under section 397 and not section 397 read with section 34.221.
+[s 397.2] Comparison with section 394.—
+The section relates itself only to an offender who actually uses the weapon himself. It
+has no scope for constructive liability. The accused in this case had not himself caused
+any grievous hurt in the commission of the robbery. His conviction under this section
+read with section 34 was not proper.222. The liability under section 397 is only
+"individual, whereas liability under section 394 is both individual and vicarious.223."
+[s 397.3] Deadly weapon.—
+"In Babulal Jairam Maurya v State of Maharashtra,224. it was held that the word ""deadly"
+"weapon"" as used here has to be a real deadly weapon and not just assumed or"
+mistaken to be a deadly weapon. A toy-pistol cannot be said to be a deadly weapon
+"whatever be its impact on persons who were frightened with it. Bamboo sticks or lathis,"
+"which were possessed and held by the accused, were held by the Supreme Court to be"
+not deadly weapons. There was no evidence of any grievous hurt or attempt to inflict
+it.225.
+[s 397.4] Grievous hurt.—
+Any hurt which endangers life is a grievous hurt. It would be seen that one of the
+injuries was caused just below the nipple. The term 'endangers life' is much stronger
+"than the expression 'dangerous to life'. Apart from that in the provision, attempt to"
+cause grievous hurt attracts its application.226.
+[s 397.5] Recovery of property.—
+"The Supreme Court observed in Lachhman Ram v State of Orissa:227. ""The factum of"
+recovery of articles at the instance of the accused persons in the presence of police
+officers and panch witnesses is itself sufficient to bring the case not only under section
+"412 but also under section 391""."
+[s 397.6] Death sentence.—
+"In a robbery and double murder case, it was found that the acts of the accused persons"
+were heinous and they had committed murder brutally and showed no regard for
+human lives. They were hardened criminals with previous criminal records. It was held
+that life imprisonment could not serve any reformative treatment to the accused. The
+sentence was enhanced to capital punishment.228.
+The accused was convicted for the offence of robbery and murder of five persons;
+murders were premeditated and carried out for gain. The entire family was
+exterminated in a cruel manner. The accused was a young person but not the
+breadwinner of anyone. The imposition of death sentence was confirmed.229.
+[s 397.7] Probation.—
+The Supreme Court had granted the benefit of probation to the appellant who was less
+than 21 years of age as on the date of the offence. The report of the Probation officer
+had been called and keeping in view the circumstances as had been detailed in the
+report of the Probation officer coupled with the fact that the appellant being less than
+"21 years of age on the date of offence, he had been granted benefit of probation.230."
+"212. Gaya Bhakta v State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 1576 (Ori), the charge should, therefore be under"
+"section 395 read with section 397. Kallu v State of MP, 1992 Cr LJ 238 (MP)."
+"213. Ali Mirza, (1923) 51 Cal 265 ; Dulli, (1924) 47 All 59 ."
+"214. Bhavjya v State, (1895) Unrep Cr C 797. Dhanai Mahto v State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 3602 ,"
+bamboo sticks and lathis have been held to be not deadly weapons for the purposes of this
+"section. KV Chacko v State of Kerala, 2001 Cr LJ 713 : AIR 2001 SC 537 [LNIND 2000 SC 1797] ,"
+"circumstance of dacoity with murder not proved. Hence, acquittal."
+"215. Deoji Keru, (1872) Unrep Cr C 65; Phool Kumar, 1975 Cr LJ 778 : AIR 1975 SC 905 [LNIND"
+"1975 SC 112] : (1975) 1 SCC 797 [LNIND 1975 SC 112] ; Komali Viswasam, (1886) 1 Weir 450;"
+"Nageshwar, (1906) 28 All 404 ; Ali Mirza, supra; Dulli, supra."
+"216. Willson v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 4042 (Bom)."
+"217. Hazara Singh v State, (1946) 25 Pat 227."
+"218. Chandra Nath, (1931) 7 Luck 543 . Where the accused, while committing the robbery did"
+not use the Deshi Katta recovered from his possession for threatening the victims nor caused
+"them any grievous injury, it was held that offence under section 397 was not made out against"
+"him, Babu Lal v State of Rajasthan, 1994 Cr LJ 3531 (Raj). Where the accused was caught red-"
+handed brandishing his knife and demanding money from a man and was convicted under
+"section 397. The sentence being minimum seven years R.I., it was not interfered with. Sanjay v"
+"State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 2172 (Bom)."
+"219. Phool Kumar, 1975 Cr LJ 778 : AIR 1975 SC 905 [LNIND 1975 SC 112] ; Jai Prakash, 1981"
+"Cr LJ 1340 (Del); Jang Singh, 1984 Cr LJ 1135 (Raj)."
+220. (2004) 3 SCC 116 : AIR 2004 SC 1253 : 2004 Cr LJ 936 : (2004) 3 MPLJ 361 : (2004) 3 Mah
+LJ 581 .
+"221. Ashfaq v State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2004) 3 SCC 116 : AIR 2004 SC 1253 ."
+"222. Paramjeet Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 757 (Raj)."
+"223. Shravan Deshrath v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 1196 (Bom)."
+"224. Babulal Jairam Maurya v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 281 (Bom)."
+"225. Dhanai Mahto v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 147 (SC), the court said that in such a case the"
+maximum punishment provided by section 397 need not be imposed. Four years were held to be
+sufficient.
+"226. Niranjan Singh v State of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 2434 [LNIND 2007 SC 796] : (2007) 10 SCC 459"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 796] .
+"227. Lachhman Ram v State of Orissa, AIR 1985 SC 486 [LNIND 1985 SC 77] : 1985 Cr LJ 753 :"
+(1985) 2 SCC 533 [LNIND 1985 SC 77] . Mangal Tularam Warkhade v State of Maharashtra 2012
+"Cr LJ 510 (Bom) Recovery of cash as booty of dacoity, not proved. Accused acquitted"
+"228. Prem v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 1608 (Del)."
+"229. KV Chacko v State of Kerala, 2001 Cr LJ 1179 (Ker)."
+"230. Masarullah v State of Tamil Nadu, 1983 SCC (Cr) 84 : (1983 Cr LJ 1043 )."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 398] Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with deadly weapon.
+"If, at the time of attempting to commit robbery or dacoity, the offender is armed with"
+"any deadly weapon, the imprisonment with which such offender shall be punished"
+shall not be less than seven years.
+COMMENT—
+This section can regulate the punishment only in cases of an attempt to commit
+robbery as distinguished from a case in which the offender has accomplished his
+purpose and robbery has actually been committed.231. It applies to such of the
+offenders as are armed with deadly weapons though they do not use them in the
+attempt to rob or commit dacoity. It does not apply to other offenders who in
+combination with such persons have committed robbery or dacoity.232. The words
+"""uses"" and ""is armed"" in sections 397 and 398, IPC, 1860, have to be given identical"
+"meaning to resolve apparent anomaly.233. Thus, carrying a deadly weapon would be"
+"enough to attract the mischief of either section. In the charge-sheet, accused were"
+charged under section 396. Section 398 is referred only for the purpose of sentence.
+"Hence, the argument that when section 398 is attracted, life imprisonment cannot be"
+"awarded is untenable. Substantive offence here is section 396. But, if section 398 is"
+"attracted, minimum punishment shall be seven years. Sections 397 and 398 cannot be"
+used conjunctively or constructively as held by the Apex Court in Paramjeet Singh v
+"State of Rajasthan.234. In fact, as held in various Court decisions, a person cannot be"
+convicted under section 398 unless he is armed with a deadly weapon while
+committing or attempting to commit robbery or dacoity.235.
+"Section 398, IPC, 1860 gets attracted if at the time of attempting to commit robbery or"
+"dacoity, the offender is armed with a deadly weapon which will attract an imprisonment"
+"not less than seven years. When no robbery or dacoity has been committed as such, in"
+the sense that no property was removed from the house of the complainants and
+"nothing said to be belonging to the complainants was recovered, it would be difficult to"
+hold that there was any attempt in regard to the commission of robbery or dacoity.
+"Scattering of articles in the house may cause a scene as if ransacked, but that does not"
+proved the charge.236. For the offence of attempt to commit robbery the maximum
+punishment prescribed by law is rigorous imprisonment for seven years with fine.
+However the discretion is left to the Court to quantify the actual sentence to be
+"awarded. However, if at the time of attempting to commit robbery the offender is"
+"armed with any deadly weapon, the offence becomes more serious or aggravated and"
+"therefore, section 398 provides that in such circumstances the imprisonment with"
+"which, the offender shall be punishable, shall not be less than seven years. If at the"
+time of committing robbery the offender is not armed with any deadly weapon the
+Court may award sentence of imprisonment for a term up to seven years and if he was
+armed with deadly weapon the sentence of imprisonment shall not be less than seven
+years. In such circumstances the maximum sentence of rigorous imprisonment of
+"seven years has to be awarded. It is well settled that section 398 IPC, 1860 does not"
+create any offence but merely regulates the punishment already provided for robbery or
+dacoity. One cannot be convicted and sentenced separately under sections 393 and
+"398 of IPC, 1860.237."
+[s 398.1] Cases.—
+"The allegation was that appellants entered into the house of complainant, injured her in"
+order to commit robbery but was apprehended by police. They demanded key of
+almirah and ornaments from complainant by overawing her with deadly weapons like
+knife and kattas. High Court held that conviction under section 394 read with section
+"397 deserves to be converted into one under section 394 read with s, 398 of IPC,"
+1860.238.
+"[s 398.2] Charge under section 398 conviction under section 458 IPC, 1860.—"
+"The accused was charged under section 398 of IPC, 1860 and section 25(1)(A) and"
+"section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. Trial Court acquitted the accused from both the"
+"charges holding that prosecution has failed to prove the charges, however, come to the"
+"conclusion that the accused committed an offence under section 458 of IPC, 1860. The"
+High Court held that section 458 of Penal Code in no way was a cognate offence of
+"offence prescribed under section 398, IPC, 1860. Hence, Conviction for offence under"
+"section 458 IPC, 1860 without framing charge was set aside.239."
+"231. Chandra Nath, (1931) 7 Luck 543 ."
+"232. Ali Mirza, (1923) 51 Cal 265 ; Nabibux, (1927) 30 Bom LR 88 ; 52 Bom 168."
+"233. Phool Kumar, 1975 Cr LJ 778 : AIR 1975 SC 905 [LNIND 1975 SC 112] . Surender @ Babli v"
+State AIR 2012 SC 1725 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 141] -High Court convicted the accused under
+"sections 393, 398 and 302/34 of IPC, 1860 on the ground that weapon which had been"
+recovered at the instance of appellant proved his involvement in the incident. Supreme Court set
+aside the conviction
+"234. Paramjeet Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 757 (SC)"
+"235. Sharafu Alias Sharafudheen v State of Kerala, 2007 Cr LJ 2908 (Ker)."
+"236. Chinnadurai v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1996 SC 546 : (1995) Supp3 SCC 686."
+"237. Shahaji Ramanna Nair v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 4653 (Bom)."
+"238. Ganesh Singh v State of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 3691 (MP)."
+"239. Manik Miah v State of Tripura, 2013 Cr LJ 1899 (Gau)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 399] Making preparation to commit dacoity.
+"Whoever makes, any preparation for committing dacoity, shall be punished with"
+"rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+This section makes preparation to commit dacoity punishable. 'Preparation' consists in
+devising or arranging means necessary for the commission of an offence.240.
+Under the Code preparation to commit an offence is punishable in three cases:—
+(1) Preparation to wage war against the Government of India (section 122).
+(2) Preparation to commit depredation on territories of a Power at peace with the
+Government of India (section 126).
+(3) Preparation to commit dacoity.
+"In a popular sense assembling to commit dacoity may be an act of preparation for it,"
+"but a mere assembly, without further preparation, is not 'preparation' within the"
+meaning of this section. Section 402 applies to mere assembling without proof of other
+"preparation. A person may not be guilty of dacoity, yet guilty of preparation, and not"
+"guilty of preparation, yet guilty of assembling.241."
+[s 399.1] Distinction between sections 399 and 402.—
+"Though the offences falling under both the sections, more or less, involve similar"
+"ingredients, the only difference between the two is that while under section 402 mere"
+"assemblage without preparation is enough, section 399 require some additional steps"
+by way of preparation. There can be cases where there may be an assembly for the
+purpose of dacoity without even a fringe of preparation. The mere fact that the
+appellants are acquitted of the charge under section 399 is no ground to knock off the
+"charge under section 402, IPC, 1860.242. In order to establish an offence punishable"
+"under section 399, IPC, 1860 some act amounting to preparation must be proved and"
+what must be proved further is an act for which preparation was being made was a
+"dacoity, that is to say, robbery to be committed by five or more persons. The"
+"prosecution has to establish under section 402, IPC, 1860 that there had been an"
+assembly of five or more persons constituted for the purpose of committing dacoity
+and that the accused persons were members of that assembly. If there is no clear and
+acceptable evidence of any assemblage of the appellants with three or more persons
+for the purpose of committing dacoity then the appellants cannot be held liable under
+"section 402, IPC, 1860.243."
+[s 399.2] Distinction between attempt and preparation.—
+"A culprit first intends to commit the offence, then makes preparation for committing it"
+"and thereafter attempts to commit the offence. If the attempt succeeds, he has"
+"committed the offence; if it fails due to reasons beyond his control, he is said to have"
+attempted to commit the offence. Attempt to commit an offence can be said to begin
+when the preparations are complete and the culprit commences to do something with
+the intention of committing the offence and which is a step towards the commission of
+"the offence. The moment he commences to do an act with the necessary Intention, he"
+"commences his attempt to commit the offence. The word ""attempt"" is not itself"
+"defined, and must, therefore, be taken in its ordinary meaning. This is exactly what the"
+provisions of section 511 require. An attempt to commit a crime is to be distinguished
+from an intention to commit it and from preparation made for its commission. Mere
+"intention to commit an offence, not followed by any act, cannot constitute an offence."
+The will is not be taken for the deed unless there be some external act which shows
+"that progress, has been made in the direction of it, or towards maturing and effecting it."
+Intention is the direction of conduct towards the object chosen upon considering the
+motives which suggest the choice. Preparation consists in devising or arranging the
+means or measures necessary for the commission of the offence. It differs widely from
+attempt which is the direct movement towards the commission after preparations are
+made. Preparation to commit an offence is punishable only when the preparation is to
+commit offences under section 122 (waging war against the Government of India) and
+"section 399 (preparation to commit dacoity). The dividing, line between a mere"
+preparation and an attempt is sometimes thin and has to be decided on the facts of
+each case. There is a greater degree of determination in attempt as compared with
+preparation.244.
+[s 399.3] CASES.—
+"Where it is proved that the accused, who were residents of different villages had"
+gathered with lethal arms at an unearthly hour in a desolate place under a tree with no
+"explanation for their conduct whatsoever much less an acceptable one, the Court"
+found them guilty under sections 399 and 402.245.
+Where a number of persons were sitting in a Railway waiting hall at about 9.30 at night
+"and a country-made gun without any cartridge, a whistle and a torch of five cells were"
+"recovered from their possession, it could not be said without any other evidence that"
+they had made preparation to commit dacoity within the meaning of this section nor
+would it amount to an offence of assemblage for the purpose of committing dacoity
+under section 402.246. The mere fact that eight persons were found in a school at
+about 1 a.m. and some of them were armed does not make out a case either under
+"section 399 or under section 402, IPC, 1860, unless it is shown that they assembled"
+there for the purpose of committing dacoity. In such a situation the possibility that they
+had so assembled there for murdering somebody or committing some other offence
+"cannot be ruled out.247. In this connection see also Comments under section 402, IPC,"
+"1860, especially the case of Naushera therein."
+[s 399.4] Sentence.—
+The occurrence had taken place twenty nine years ago and the appellant has remained
+in custody for a period of more than six months. The Supreme Court while upholding
+"the conviction of the appellant, sentence of imprisonment awarded against him is"
+reduced to the period already undergone by him.248.
+"240. Jain Lal, (1942) 21 Pat 667."
+"241. Ramesh Chandra Banerjee, (1913) 41 Cal 350 ; Madhusudan Sen Gupta, AIR 1958 Cal 25"
+"[LNIND 1957 CAL 48] . Shiv Ram Singh v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 4103 (All), assembly in"
+"preparation for dacoity on trucks and other motor vehicles, spot arrests, 2 years RI imposed."
+"Another case of the same kind Radharaman v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 4129 (All), arrest by police"
+"party when the accused assembled for preparation for dacoity, independent public witnesses."
+"242. Naushera v State, 1982 Cr LJ 29 (P&H). Shravan Dashrath v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr"
+"LJ 1196 (Bom), the same distinction stated."
+"243. Asgar v State of Rajastan, 2003 Cr LJ 1997 ; In Karam Dass v State, AIR 1952 Pun 249 :"
+"1952 Cr LJ 1119 , the Punjab High Court held that to bring the case within section 399 of the"
+"Code, it is not necessary that persons shown to be making the preparations should be five or"
+"more in number. It is, however, necessary for the prosecution to prove that the raid for which the"
+"persons prosecuted were making preparation was to be committed by five or more persons, for"
+"otherwise it would not be dacoity but merely robbery, and mere preparation for committing"
+"robbery, unless it ends in an actual attempt, is not punishable by law."
+"244. Koppula Venkat Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2004 SC 1874 [LNIND 2004 SC 301] :"
+(2004) 3 SCC 602 [LNIND 2004 SC 301] .
+"245. Birbal B Chouhan v State of Chhattisgarh, AIR 2012 SC 911 [LNIND 2011 SC 1157] : (2011)"
+10 SCC 776 [LNIND 2011 SC 1157] .
+"246. Brijlal Mandal, 1978 Cr LJ 877 (Pat); see also Gholtu Modi, 1986 Cr LJ 1031 (Pat). Suleman"
+"v State of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 1707 [LNIND 1999 SC 133] : 1999 Cr LJ 2525 , persons staying in"
+"Dharamsala at noon, witness stated that he overheard them talking about their plan to loot a"
+"petrol pump, it did not seem to be truthful to the court, their conviction under sections 399 and"
+"402 was held to be not proper. Shiv Ram Singh v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 4103 (All), criminals"
+"caught on spot alongwith articles, the sentence of two years RI being already on the lower side,"
+"no scope for further reduction. Ram Sewak v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 4680 (All), failure to prove"
+"that accused assembled in preparation for dacoity. Another similar case is Sukhlal v State of MP,"
+1998 Cr LJ 1366 (MP).
+"247. Chaturi Yadav, 1979 Cr LJ 1090 : AIR 1990 SC 1412 [LNIND 1998 SC 579] ."
+"248. Nasir v State of UP, AIR 2010 SC 1926 [LNIND 2009 SC 1517] : (2010) 13 SCC 251 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 1517] ; Ravi Rajwar v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 634 (Pat)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 400] Punishment for belonging to gang of dacoits.
+"Whoever, at any time after the passing of this Act, shall belong to a gang of persons"
+"associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity, shall be punished with"
+"249.[imprisonment for life], or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may"
+"extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+This section provides for the punishment of those who belong to a gang of persons
+who make it their business to commit dacoity. Its object is to break up gangs of dacoits
+by punishing persons associated for the purpose of committing dacoity. The mere fact
+that women lived as wives or mistresses with men who were dacoits was held not
+sufficient to prove that they belonged to a gang of persons associated for the purpose
+"of habitually committing dacoity within the meaning of this section, unless it be proved"
+that the women themselves were associated with the husbands or protectors for the
+purpose of themselves habitually committing dacoities.250.
+The expression 'belong' implies something more than casual association for the
+purpose of committing one or two dacoities by a person who was ordinarily living by
+honest means. It refers to those persons who habitually associate with a gang of
+dacoits and actively assist them in their operations. But if a person with a bad past
+record participates in the commission of dacoity even on one occasion in association
+"with a well-known gang of habitual dacoits knowing them to be such a gang, it may be"
+reasonably inferred that he belongs to that gang unless there is some other material on
+record to justify an inference that the association was of a casual nature.251.
+The word 'gang' means any band or company of persons who go about together or act
+in concert. The essence of the word is that the persons should act in concert.252.
+Evidence that persons concerned were associated for the purpose of committing
+dacoities in a number of cases during a short period of time is good enough evidence
+to prove association within the meaning of this section even if such evidence was not
+"considered sufficient for conviction under section 395, IPC, 1860, in specific cases.253."
+"249. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"250. Yella, (1896) Unrep Cr C 863."
+"251. Bhima Shaw, (1956) Cut 195; Bai Chaturi, AIR 1960 Guj 5 [LNIND 1989 GUJ 36] ."
+"252. Sharaf Shah Khan, AIR 1963 AP 314 [LNIND 1961 AP 52] ."
+"253. State of Assam v Hetep Boro, 1972 Cr LJ 1074 (Assam)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 401] Punishment for belonging to gang of thieves.
+"Whoever, at any time after the passing of this Act, shall belong to any wandering or"
+other gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually committing theft or
+"robbery, and not being a gang of thugs or dacoits, shall be punished with rigorous"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT—
+The principle enunciated in the last section is extended by this section to a gang of
+thieves or robbers. It is not necessary to prove that each individual member of the gang
+has habitually committed theft or has committed any particular theft in company with
+the other members.254. Even so the word 'belonging' implies something more than
+mere casual association. It conveys the notion of continuity and more or less continued
+association of the accused with the gang extending over a considerable length of time
+which must be proved so as to warrant an inference that the accused identified himself
+with the gang the common purpose of which was the habitual commission of either
+theft or robbery.255.
+"254. Beja, (1913) PR No. 13 of 1914."
+"255. Re Akbar Ali, 1981 Cr LJ NOC 36 (Mad). Acquittal by lower courts under this section and"
+"there being no charge at that time of receiving stolen property under section 410, the Supreme"
+Court did not in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution convict under section 410.
+"Pandara Nadar v State of TN, AIR 1991 SC 391 : 1991 Cr LJ 468 . See the comments under"
+section 399.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Robbery and Dacoity
+[s 402] Assembling for purpose of committing dacoity.
+"Whoever, at any time after the passing of this Act, shall be one of five or more persons"
+"assembled for the purpose of committing dacoity, shall be punished with rigorous"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT—
+An unlawful assembly of persons meeting for a common purpose to commit dacoity is
+subject to the severe punishment provided in this section even though no step is taken
+in the prosecution of the common object.256.
+"256. Bholu, (1900) 23 All 124 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Misappropriation of Property
+[s 403] Dishonest misappropriation of property.
+Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use1 any movable
+"property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A takes property belonging to Z out of Z's possession, in good faith, believing, at"
+"the time when he takes it, that the property belongs to himself. A is not guilty of"
+"theft; but if A, after discovering his mistake, dishonestly appropriates the"
+"property to his own use, he is guilty of an offence under this section."
+"(b) A, being on friendly terms with Z, goes into Z's library in Z's absence, and takes"
+"away a book without Z's express consent. Here, if A was under the impression"
+"that he had Z's implied consent to take the book for the purpose of reading it, A"
+"has not committed theft. But, if A afterwards sells the book for his own benefit,"
+he is guilty of an offence under this section.
+"(c) A and B, being joint owners of a horse, A takes the horse out of B's possession,"
+"intending to use it. Here, as A has a right to use the horse, he does not"
+"dishonestly misappropriate it. But, if A sells the horse and appropriates the"
+"whole proceeds to his own use, he is guilty of an offence under this section."
+Explanation 1.—A dishonest misappropriation for a time only is a misappropriation
+within the meaning of this section.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A finds a Government promissory note belonging to Z, bearing a blank endorsement. A,"
+"knowing that the note belongs to Z, pledges it with a banker as a security for a loan,"
+intending at a future time to restore it to Z. A has committed an offence under this
+section.
+Explanation 2.—A person who finds property not in the possession of any other
+"person, and takes such property for the purpose of protecting it for, or of restoring it"
+"to, the owner does not take or misappropriate it dishonestly, and is not guilty of an"
+"offence; but he is guilty of the offence above defined, if he appropriates it to his own"
+"use, when he knows or has the means of discovering the owner, or before he has used"
+reasonable means to discover and give notice to the owner and has kept the property
+a reasonable time to enable the owner to claim it.
+"What are reasonable means or what is a reasonable time in such a case, is a question"
+of fact.
+"It is not necessary that the finder should know who is the owner of the property, or"
+"that any particular person is the owner of it; it is sufficient if, at the time of"
+"appropriating it, he does not believe it to be his own property, or in good faith believes"
+that the real owner cannot be found.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A finds a rupee on the high road, not knowing to whom the rupee belongs. A"
+picks up the rupee. Here A has not committed the offence defined in this
+section.
+"(b) A finds a letter on the road, containing a banknote. From the direction and"
+contents of the letter he learns to whom the note belongs. He appropriates the
+note. He is guilty of an offence under this section.
+(c) A finds a cheque payable to bearer. He can form no conjecture as to the person
+"who has lost the cheque. But the name of the person, who has drawn the"
+"cheque, appears. A knows that this person can direct him to the person in"
+whose favour the cheque was drawn. A appropriates the cheque without
+attempting to discover the owner. He is guilty of an offence under this section.
+(d) A sees Z drop his purse with money in it. A picks up the purse with the intention
+"of restoring it to Z, but afterwards appropriates it to his own use. A has"
+committed an offence under this section.
+"(e) A finds a purse with money, not knowing to whom it belongs; he afterwards"
+"discovers that it belongs to Z, and appropriates it to his own use. A is guilty of"
+an offence under this section.
+"(f) A finds a valuable ring, not knowing to whom it belongs. A sells it immediately"
+without attempting to discover the owner. A is guilty of an offence under this
+section.
+COMMENT—
+Criminal misappropriation takes place when the possession has been innocently come
+"by, but where, by a subsequent change of intention, or from the knowledge of some"
+"new fact with which the party was not previously acquainted, the retaining becomes"
+wrongful and fraudulent.257. The offence consists in the dishonest misappropriation or
+"conversion, either permanently or for a time, of property which is already without wrong"
+"in the possession of the offender.258. See illustrations (a), (b) and (c) which show that"
+the original innocent taking amounts to criminal misappropriation by subsequent acts.
+Illustration (a) is qualified by ill. (b).259.
+[s 403.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires—
+(1) Dishonest misappropriation or conversion of property for a person's own use.
+(2) Such property must be movable. Section 403 deals with the offence of dishonest
+"misappropriation of property. It provides that ""whoever dishonestly misappropriates or"
+"converts to his own use any movable property"", shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or both. The
+basic requirement for attracting the section is: (i) the movable property in question
+should belong to a person other than the accused; (ii) the accused should wrongly
+appropriate or convert such property to his own use; and (iii) there should be dishonest
+intention on the part of the accused. Here again the basic requirement is that the
+subject matter of dishonest misappropriation or conversion should be someone else's
+"movable property. When NEPC India owns/possesses the aircraft, it obviously cannot"
+"'misappropriate or convert to its own use' such aircraft or parts thereof. Therefore,"
+section 403 is also not attracted.260. Section 403 uses the words 'dishonestly' and
+"'misappropriate'. These are necessary ingredients of an offence under section 403, IPC,"
+1860.261.
+1. 'Dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use'.—There must be actual
+"conversion of the thing misappropriated to the accused's own use. Where, therefore,"
+"the accused found a thing, and merely retained it in his possession, he was acquitted of"
+this offence.262. Where the accused found a purse on the pavement of a temple in a
+"crowded gathering and put it in his pocket but was immediately after arrested, it was"
+"held that he was not guilty of criminal misappropriation, for it could not be assumed"
+that by the mere act of picking up the purse or putting it in his pocket he intended to
+appropriate its contents to his own use.263. Where a person took possession of a
+"bullock which had strayed, but there was no evidence that it was stolen property, and"
+"he dishonestly retained it, he could be convicted under this section and not under"
+"section 411.264. The accused purchased for one anna, from a child aged six years, two"
+"pieces of cloth valued at 15 annas, which the child had taken from the house of a third"
+person. It was held that assuming that a charge of dishonest reception of property
+(section 411) could not be sustained owing to the incapacity of the child to commit an
+"offence, the accused was guilty of criminal misappropriation, if he knew that the"
+property belonged to the child's guardian and dishonestly appropriated it to his own
+use.265.
+[s 403.2] Theft and criminal misappropriation.—
+(1) In theft the offender dishonestly takes property which is in the possession of a
+person out of that person's possession; and the offence is complete as soon as the
+offender moves the property. Criminal misappropriation takes place even when the
+"possession has been innocently come by, but where, by a subsequent change of"
+"intention or from the knowledge of some new fact, with which the party was not"
+"previously acquainted, the retaining becomes wrongful and fraudulent."
+(2) The dishonest intention to appropriate the property of another is common to theft
+"and to criminal misappropriation. But this intention, which in theft is sufficiently"
+"manifested by a moving of the property, must in criminal misappropriation be carried"
+into action by an actual misappropriation or conversion.
+[s 403.3] Entrustment of cash.—
+"Where a certain amount of cash, which was entrusted to the cashier, was missing from"
+"the bank and the money was neither found with the cashier nor at his home, the Court"
+said that he could be held liable for negligence but not for breach of trust in the
+absence of proof for misappropriation by him.266.
+[s 403.4] Joint property.—
+"An owner of property, in whichever way he uses his property and with whatever"
+"intention, will not be liable for misappropriation and that would be so even if he is not"
+the exclusive owner thereof. A partner has undefined ownership along with the other
+partners over all the assets of the partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his
+own purposes he may be accountable civilly to the other partners. But he does not
+thereby commit misappropriation.267.
+[s 403.5] Main contractor receiving payment but not paying to sub-contractor.
+—
+The principal or main contractor contracted with a sub-contractor for completion of the
+project. The sub-contractor filed a criminal complaint alleging that the main contractor
+had received payment under the project but was not paying him. The Supreme Court
+said that the money paid to the main contractor was not in the nature of money or
+"immovable property of the sub-contractor. Hence, there could be no misappropriation."
+It was a claim of civil nature.268.
+[s 403.6] Civil nature.—
+"When the dispute in question is purely of civil nature, Magistrate is justified in"
+"dismissing the complaint under section 203 Cr PC, 1973.269. Merely because a civil"
+"claim has been raised by the complainant regarding the breach of agreement, it cannot"
+prevent him from initiating criminal proceedings.270.
+[s 403.7] Charge under section 406.—Conviction under section 403.—
+"Section 222(1) Cr PC, 1973 provides when a person is charged with an offence"
+"consisting of several particulars, a combination of some only of which constitutes a"
+"complete minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the remaining particulars"
+"are not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence, though he was not charged"
+with it. Sub-section (2) of section 222 provides that when a person is charged with an
+"offence and facts are proved which reduced it to a minor offence, he may be convicted"
+"of the minor offence, although he is not charged with it. Offence under section 403 is"
+"certainly a minor offence in relation to the offence under section 406, IPC, 1860.271."
+[s 403.8] Offence partly committed outside India.—
+Indian Courts have jurisdiction against foreigners residing in foreign countries but their
+acts connected with transaction or part of transaction arising in India. Foreign
+"nationality, their residence outside India, and the fact that they were not present in India"
+"when the offence(s) was/were allegedly committed, are of no consequence, in view of"
+the aforesaid decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed272.
+case.273.
+"257. Bhagiram Dome v Abar Dome, (1988) 15 Cal 388 , 400; Pramode, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 562 ."
+"258. Ramakrishna, (1888) 12 Mad 49, 50."
+"259. Mahadev Govind, (1930) 32 Bom LR 356 ."
+260. Indian Oil Corporation. v NEPC India Ltd. AIR 2006 SC 2780 [LNIND 2006 SC 537] : (2006) 6
+"SCC 736 [LNIND 2006 SC 537] ; Ramaswamy Nadar v The State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56"
+"[LNIND 1957 SC 102] : 1958 Cr LJ 228 ; Mohammed Ali v State of MP, 2006 Cr LJ 1368 (MP);"
+"Diamond Cables Ltd v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 Cr LJ 4100 (AP)."
+"261. Udhar v State, AIR 2003 SC 974 [LNIND 2003 SC 67] : (2003) 2 SCC 219 [LNIND 2003 SC"
+67] - Neither of these ingredients are satisfied in the facts and circumstance of this case. It
+cannot be said that there is any dishonest intention on the part of appellants nor it can be said
+that TCPL or the appellants have misappropriated or converted the movable property of the
+"complainant to their own use. Since the basic ingredients of the relevant Section in the IPC,"
+"1860 are not satisfied, the order taking cognizance of the offence as well as the issue of"
+summons to the appellants is wholly uncalled for.
+"262. Abdool, (1868) 10 WR (Cr) 23A."
+"263. Phuman, (1907) PR No. 11 of 1908."
+"264. Phul Chand Dube, (1929) 52 All 200 ."
+"265. Makhulshah v State, (1886) 1 Weir 470."
+"266. State of Maharashtra v Mohan Radhakrishna Pednekar, 1998 Cr LJ 3771 (Bom)."
+"267. Velji Raghavji, (1964) 67 Bom LR 443 (SC). Mahal Chand Sikwal v State of WB, 1987 Cr LJ"
+1569 (Cal).
+"268. U Dhar v State of Jharkhand, AIR 2003 SC 974 [LNIND 2003 SC 67] : 2003 Cr LJ 1224 ."
+"269. Kaumudiben Harshadbhai Joshi v State of Gujarat, 2012 Cr LJ 4720 (Guj)."
+"270. Lee Kun Hee v State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND 2012 SC 89] : AIR 2012 SC 1007"
+[LNINDORD 2012 SC 443] : 2012 Cr LJ 1551 .
+"271. Kundanlal v State of Maharashtra, 2001 Cr LJ 2288 (Bom)."
+"272. Mobarik Ali Ahmed, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] : 1957 Cr LJ 1346 ."
+273. Lee Kun Hee v State of UP (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND 2012 SC 89] : AIR 2012 SC 1007
+[LNINDORD 2012 SC 443] : 2012 Cr LJ 1551 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Misappropriation of Property
+[s 404] Dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by deceased person
+at the time of his death.
+"Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use property, knowing"
+that such property was in the possession of a deceased person at the time of that
+"person's decease, and has not since been in the possession of any person legally"
+"entitled to such possession, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+and if the offender at the time of such person's decease was employed by him as a
+"clerk or servant, the imprisonment may extend to seven years."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"Z dies in possession of furniture and money. His servant A, before the money comes"
+"into the possession of any person entitled to such possession, dishonestly"
+misappropriates it. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
+COMMENT—
+This section relates to a description of property peculiarly needing protection. The
+offence consists in the pillaging of movable property during the interval which elapses
+"between the time when the possessor of the property dies, and the time when it comes"
+into the possession of some person or officer authorized to take charge of it.274. The
+very object of this provision was to protect the property which was in possession of
+deceased at the time of his death till the person(s) entitled to it step in.275.
+[s 404.1] CASES.—
+"The circumstances namely recovery of revolver of the deceased from accused, along"
+"with live and spent cartridges, the recovery of mobile handset of Panasonic from the"
+"custody of the accused, and the fact that the accused was using the same soon after"
+the murder of the deceased with mobile phone which was registered in the name of the
+"accused (and that he continued to use it till his arrest), leaves no room for any doubt,"
+that the prosecution has brought home the charges as have been found to be
+established against the accused.276. Where the accused misused the ATM card of the
+"deceased, it was held he had committed offence under this section.277."
+274. M & M 364.
+"275. Prabhat Bhatnagar v State, 2007 Cr LJ 4349 (Raj)."
+"276. Gajraj v State (NCT) of Delhi, (2011) 10 SCC 675 [LNIND 2011 SC 929] : 2012 Cr LJ 413 ;"
+"Munish Mubar v State, 2013 Cr LJ 56 (SC) : AIR 2013 SC 912 [LNIND 2012 SC 610] . Articles"
+belong to the deceased recovered from the accused based on his disclosure statement.
+Accused could not offer any explanation. Conviction confirmed by the Supreme Court. Prakash
+"Alias Ajayan v State, 2009 Cr LJ 2930 (Ker)-Gold chain of deceased recovered from one of the"
+accused. Conviction was held proper. Also see Ramesh v State of Rajasthan (2011) 3 SCC 685
+[LNIND 2011 SC 213] .
+"277. Ashok Kumar Kundi v State of Uttarakhand, 2014 Cr LJ 378 (Utknd)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Breach of Trust
+[s 405] Criminal breach of trust.
+"Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property,1 or with any dominion over"
+"property, dishonestly misappropriates2 or converts to his own use that property, or"
+dishonestly uses or disposes of that property3 in violation of any direction of law
+"prescribing the mode in which such trust4 is to be discharged, or of any legal contract,"
+"express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or"
+"wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits ""criminal breach of trust""."
+"278.[Explanation 279.[1].—A person, being an employer 280.[of an establishment whether"
+exempted under section 17 of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous
+"Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not] who deducts the employee's contribution"
+from the wages payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family
+"Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall be deemed to"
+have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he
+makes default in the payment of such contribution to the said fund in violation of the
+"said law, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said"
+contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.]
+"281.[Explanation 2.—A person, being an employer, who deducts the employees'"
+contribution from the wages payable to the employee for credit to the Employees'
+State Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees' State Insurance
+"Corporation established under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948),"
+shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so
+deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such contribution to the
+"said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the"
+amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.]
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, being Executor to the will of a deceased person, dishonestly disobeys the law"
+"which directs him to divide the effects according to the will, and appropriate"
+them to his own use. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
+"(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z going on a journey, entrusts his furniture to A, under"
+a contract that it shall be returned on payment of a stipulated sum for
+warehouse room. A dishonestly sells the goods. A has committed criminal
+breach of trust.
+"(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent for Z, residing at Delhi. There is an express or"
+"implied contract between A and Z, that all sums remitted by Z to A shall be"
+"invested by A, according to Z's direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A, with"
+directions to A to invest the same in Company's paper. A dishonestly disobeys
+the direction and employs the money in his own business. A has committed
+criminal breach of trust.
+"(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in good faith, believing that it"
+"will be more for Z's advantage to hold shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z's"
+"directions, and buys shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of buying"
+"Company's paper, here, though Z should suffer loss, and should be entitled to"
+"bring a civil action against A, on account of that loss, yet A, not having acted"
+"dishonestly, has not committed criminal breach of trust."
+"(e) A, a revenue-officer, is entrusted with public money and is either directed by law,"
+"or bound by a contract, express or implied, with the Government, to pay into a"
+certain treasury all the public money which he holds. A dishonestly appropriates
+the money. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
+"(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried by land or by water. A"
+dishonestly misappropriates the property. A has committed criminal breach of
+trust.
+COMMENT—
+The basic requirement to bring home the accusations under section 405 are the
+requirements to prove conjointly i) entrustment and ii) whether the accused was
+"actuated by dishonest intention or not, misappropriated it or converted it to his own"
+use to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it.282. Two distinct parts are
+involved in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust. The first part
+consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion
+or control is acquired by the accused. The second is the misappropriation or dealing
+with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created.283. A
+trust contemplated by section 405 would arise only when there is an entrustment of
+"property or dominion over property. There has, therefore, to be a property belonging to"
+someone which is entrusted to the person accused of the offence under section 405.
+The entrustment of property creates a trust which is only an obligation annexed to the
+ownership of the property and arises out of a confidence reposed and accepted by the
+"owner.284. However, it must be borne in mind that section 405 IPC, 1860 does not"
+contemplate the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It
+contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of property makes it
+over to another person to be retained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be
+disposed of by him on the happening of a certain event.285.
+"278. Ins. by Act 40 of 1973, section 9 (w.e.f. 1 November 1973)."
+"279. Explanation renumbered as Explanation 1 by Act 38 of 1975, section 9 (w.e.f. 1 September"
+1975).
+"280. Ins. by Act 33 of 1988, section 27 (w.e.f. 1 August 1988)."
+"281. Ins. by Act 38 of 1975, section 9 (w.e.f. 1 September 1975)."
+"282. Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 547 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+"461] : AIR 2012 SC 3242 [LNIND 2012 SC 461] ; Asoke Basak v State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10"
+"SCC 660 [LNIND 2010 SC 1699] : (2011) 1 SCC(Cr) 85; Indian Oil Corpn. v NEPC India Ltd, (2006)"
+"6 SCC 736 [LNIND 2006 SC 537] ; Pratibha Rani v Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370 [LNIND 1985"
+"SC 86] ; Rashmi Kumar v Mahesh Kumar Bhada, (1997) 2 SCC 397 [LNIND 1996 SC 2178] ; R"
+"Venkatkrishnan v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"283. Onkar Nath Mishra v State, (NCT of Delhi) (2008) 2 SCC 561 [LNIND 2007 SC 1511] : (2008)"
+1 SCC (Cr) 507.
+"284. Common Cause v UOI, (1999) 6 SCC 667 [LNIND 1999 SC 637] : 1999 SCC (Cr) 1196."
+285. VP Shrivastava v Indian Explosives Ltd (2010) 10 SCC 361 [LNIND 2010 SC 920] : (2010) 3
+"SCC (Cr) 1290; Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 575 [LNIND 1956 SC"
+40] : 1956 Cr LJ 1116 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Breach of Trust
+[s 406] Punishment for criminal breach of trust.
+Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of
+"either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT—
+"The criminal breach of trust would, inter alia, mean using or disposing of the property"
+by a person who is entrusted with or has otherwise dominion there over. Such an act
+must not only be done dishonestly but also in violation of any direction of law or any
+contract express or implied relating to carrying out the trust.286. To constitute this
+offence there must be dishonest misappropriation by a person in whom confidence is
+placed as to the custody or management of the property in respect of which the breach
+of trust is charged. The ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of
+which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed must be in some
+person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person
+or in some way for his benefit.287. The offence of criminal breach of trust closely
+resembles the offence of embezzlement under the English law. Offences committed by
+trustees with regard to trust property fall within the purview of this section.
+A partner has undefined ownership along with other partners over all the assets of the
+partnership. If he chooses to use any of them for his own purpose he may be
+accountable civilly to other partners. But he does not thereby commit any
+misappropriation. A partner may have dominion over the partnership property. But
+mere dominion is not enough. It must further be shown that his dominion was the
+result of entrustment. Thus to prosecute a partner the prosecution must establish that
+dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the partnership was by a special
+"agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused partner. If in the absence of"
+such a special agreement a partner receives money belonging to the partnership he
+cannot be said to have received it in a fiduciary capacity or in other words cannot be
+held to have been entrusted with dominion over partnership properties and without
+entrustment there cannot be any criminal breach of trust.288. The Supreme Court has
+reiterated that where a partner is entrusted with property under special contract and he
+"holds that property in a fiduciary capacity, any misappropriation of that property would"
+amount to criminal breach of trust.289.
+[s 406.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) Entrusting any person with property or with any dominion over property;
+(2) The person entrusted (a) dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his own
+use that property; or
+(b) Dishonestly using or disposing of that property or wilfully suffering any other
+person so to do in violation
+(i) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
+"discharged, or"
+(ii) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust.
+"This offence consists of any one of four positive acts, namely, misappropriation,"
+"conversion, user, or disposal of property. Neither failure to account for breach of"
+"contract, however dishonest, is actually and by itself the offence of criminal breach of"
+trust.290.
+Sufferance of any loss by the victim is not necessary for leading to a conviction under
+the section.291.
+The section does not require that the trust should be in furtherance of any lawful
+object. Offences committed by trustees with regard to trust property fall within the
+purview of this section. Negligence or other misconduct causing the loss of trust
+"property may make the person entrusted civilly responsible, but will not make him"
+guilty of criminal breach of trust.
+[s 406.2] Criminal misappropriation and criminal breach of trust.—
+In criminal misappropriation the property comes into the possession of the offender by
+"some casualty or otherwise, and he afterwards misappropriates it. In the case of"
+"criminal breach of trust the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he"
+"dishonestly misappropriates the same, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do,"
+instead of discharging the trust attached to it.
+"1. 'Being in any manner entrusted with property'.—The words ""in any manner"" do not"
+"enlarge the term ""entrustment"" itself and, unless there is entrustment, the transaction in"
+question cannot be affected by the terms of that section.292. The word 'entrusted' is
+not a term of law. In its most general significance all it imports is a handing over of the
+possession for some purpose which may not imply the conferring of any proprietary
+right at all.293. The natural meaning of 'entrusted' involves that the assured should by
+"some real and conscious volition have imposed on the person, to whom he delivers the"
+"goods, some species of fiduciary duty.294. The expression ""entrustment"" carries with it"
+the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that
+"property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further, the person"
+handing over property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to
+create a fiduciary relationship between them.295.
+"Once entrustment is proved, the prosecution has not to prove any misappropriation. It"
+is for the accused to prove in his defence that there was no misappropriation. The
+offence becomes proved when it is shown that the money has not been applied to the
+purpose for which it was entrusted.296.
+"[s 406.3] Customary gifts at engagement, etc.—"
+"Gifts in cash or kind which are customarily given at the time of engagement, tilak or"
+marriage ceremony cannot be regarded as an entrustment of items of dowry. No
+complaint can be presented against the donee in respect of such customary
+practices.297.
+"Where a person authorised to collect, delegates his functions to a subordinate of his,"
+"and the latter acts in exercise of such delegated authority, any amount that is paid to"
+him would constitute 'entrustment' within the meaning of section 405.298.
+[s 406.4] 'Property'.—
+The word 'property' is used in the Code in a much wider sense than the expression
+'movable property'. There is no good reason to restrict the meaning of the word
+'property' to movable property only when it is used without any qualification in this
+section or other sections of the Penal Code.299. The offence of criminal breach of trust
+"is committed not only by dishonest conversion, but also by dishonest use or"
+"disposition, and there is nothing in the wording of this section to exempt from the"
+definition of criminal breach of trust dishonest use of immovable property by the
+person entrusted with dominion over it.
+In cases of criminal breach of trust a distinction has to be drawn between the person
+entrusted with property and one having control or general charge over the property. In
+"case of the former, if it is found that the property is missing, without further proof, the"
+"person so entrusted will be liable to account for it. In the latter case, that person will be"
+liable only when it is shown that he misappropriated it or was a party to criminal breach
+of trust committed in respect of that property by any other person.300.
+2. 'Dishonestly misappropriates'.—A temporary misappropriation may also constitute a
+criminal breach of trust. The bank officials in this case made public money available to
+a private party contrary to statutory provisions and Departmental instructions. The
+dishonest intention was self-evident.301. Terms of section 405 are very wide. They
+apply to one who is in any manner entrusted with property or dominion over property.
+Section 405 does not require that trust should be in furtherance of any lawful object. It
+merely provides that a person commits criminal breach of trust if he dishonestly
+misappropriates or converts to his own use the property entrusted to him.302.
+[s 406.5] Negligence is not 'Dishonestly'.—
+Criminal or dishonest intention is a sine qua non in an offence of criminal breach of
+trust. This being so the prosecution has to show that the accused dishonestly
+misappropriated or converted to his own use or dishonestly disposed of property
+entrusted to him. The prosecution must prove 'entrustment' or 'domino' over the
+property with the person proceeded and the person so entrusted has dishonestly
+misappropriated or converted that property. Even if the prosecution succeeds in
+"proving entrustment, it would fail to establish the offence against the accused, if it fails"
+to prove that he has misappropriated the property entrusted303.
+It has been held that a mere error of judgment does not attract criminal liability.304.
+[s 406.6] Wilful omission to account.—
+"Similarly, ""in the case of a servant charged with misappropriating the goods of his"
+master the elements of criminal offence of misappropriation will be established if the
+"prosecution proves that the servant received the goods, that he was under a duty to"
+account to his master and had not done so. If the failure to account was due to an
+"accidental loss the facts being within the servant's knowledge, it is, for him to explain"
+"the loss"".305. In JM Desai's case the matter was further clarified by the Supreme Court"
+"to say, ""conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not in all"
+"cases be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or"
+"over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but"
+where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account
+which is untrue an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be
+"made"".306."
+Mere retention of goods by a person without misappropriation does not constitute
+criminal breach of trust.307.
+3. 'Dishonestly uses or disposes of that property'.— To constitute the offence of
+"criminal breach of trust punishable under section 406 of the IPC, 1860, there must be"
+dishonest misappropriation by a person in whom confidence is placed as to the
+custody or management of the property in respect of which the breach of trust is
+charged. The misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest
+"intention. Every breach of trust gives rise to a suit for damages, but it is only when there"
+is evidence of a mental act of fraudulent misappropriation that the commission of
+embezzlement of any sum of money becomes a penal offence punishable as criminal
+breach of trust. It is this mental act of fraudulent misappropriation that clearly
+"demarcates an act of embezzlement which is a civil wrong or tort, from the offence of"
+"criminal breach of trust. In the present case, apparently the prosecution has failed to"
+establish the offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust in the absence of mens
+"rea. In such view of the matter, the accused persons could not have been convicted.308."
+"3A. In violation of any direction of law.—The criminal breach of trust would, inter alia,"
+mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is entrusted with or has
+otherwise dominion there over. Such an act must not only be done dishonestly but also
+in violation of any direction of law or any contract express or implied relating to
+carrying out the trust. A direction of law need not be a law made by the Parliament or a
+Legislature; it may be made by an authority having the power therefor; the law could be
+"a subordinate legislation, a notification or even a custom.309. It has been held that the"
+"expression ""direction of law"", even if taken literally, would include a direction issued by"
+authorities in exercise of their statutory power as also power of supervision. Failure on
+the part of bank officials to follow RBI instructions and provisions of a Departmental
+Manual was a violation of a direction of law amounting to criminal breach of trust. The
+Manual was the UCO Bank Manual of Instructions on Bill Discounting.310.
+"It has been held that the expression ""direction of law"" in section 405 includes banking"
+"norms, practices and directions given in internal Departmental instructions of a bank."
+Bank officials who allowed advance credits on banker's cheques to a customer in
+violation of Departmental instructions acted in violation of direction of law. The
+officials had dominion over the money belonging to the bank and they dishonestly used
+that money for conferring a benefit on the customer. They were held guilty of the
+offence under the section.311.
+[s 406.7] Partner.—
+"In Velji Raghavji,312. the Supreme Court approved this statement of law in Bhuban"
+"MohanRana v Surendra Mohan Das, and held that mere existence of the accused's"
+dominion over property is not enough and that it must be further shown that his
+dominion was the result of entrustment. According to the Supreme Court the
+prosecution must establish that dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the
+"partnership was by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused"
+"partner. Where the partner of a firm had taken away some VCRs and cassettes, a"
+"criminal complaint was not allowed, the loss to the firm being essentially of civil nature"
+"and, therefore, civil proceedings would have been more appropriate.313. Signing of"
+contracts on behalf of the firm particularly when the partnership deed authorised
+partners to sign documents on behalf of others was held to be not constituting a
+criminal breach of trust.314. As to when can a partner be prosecuted on a charge of
+"criminal breach of trust see ""Comments"" ante."
+[s 406.8] Misappropriation of company money by nominated director.—
+The accused was the director of a public limited company and in that capacity he
+misappropriated a huge sum of money. In the complaint against him the charge was
+"made out under section 409. However, the charge was framed under section 408. It"
+was held that the accused was a nominated director of the company and there was
+"nothing to indicate that he was an employee or servant of the company. Hence, his"
+conviction under section 408 was not to be legally sound. He was convicted under
+section 406.315.
+[s 406.9] Directors of company.—
+The directors of a company were prosecuted for non-deposit of PF amount of
+employees. It was held that directors are not in the position of the principal employer.
+They could not be prosecuted as there was no entrustment of the amount to them in
+"terms of section 405, explanation 1.316. The offence alleged in the criminal complaint"
+"filed by respondent is under sections 405 and 420 IPC, 1860 where under no specific"
+"liability is imposed on the officers of the company, if the alleged offence is by the"
+"Company. In the absence of specific details about the same, no person other than"
+Company can be prosecuted under the alleged complaint.317.
+The complainant was the wholesale dealer of the company. His dealership was
+terminated. Even so he sent a demand draft to the company for supply of goods. He
+did so because his dealership was subsequently reinstated by the company. The
+proprietor of the dealer firm filed a complaint alleged offence by the company because
+neither it supplied the goods nor returned the money. The company's application for
+quashing the complaint was rejected because the offence was prima facie made out.
+The Supreme Court said that only the company could be made liable but not its
+managing director or any other employee. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the
+"High Court. Costs and compensation of harassment was quantified at Rs. 1,00,000.318."
+[s 406.10] Husband and Wife.—
+The Supreme Court has held that reading this section with sections 4 and 6 of the
+"Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, marriage gifts and ornaments received from in-laws must"
+"be handed over to the wife on being driven out and a failure to do so, would amount to"
+an offence under this section.319. Where the wife was turned out of the house by the
+husband who refused to return the 'streedhan' despite repeated requests and
+"persuasions, it was held that criminal breach of trust is a continuing offence and fresh"
+cause of action accrues to the wife till the return of the property.320.
+It has been held that taking away by the mother-in-law of gifts and cash offerings to the
+wife at the time of her marriage amounts to misappropriation of streedhan. It was
+further held that offering of 25 lakh rupees for grant of divorce by mutual consent as
+compensation to the complainant did not per se constitute any offence under the
+"section. Any gift made to the bridegroom or her parents, whether in accordance with"
+any custom or law also did not constitute an offence under the section. The
+proceedings were directed to be continued only against the mother-in-law.321.
+[s 406.11] Pledgee.—
+"where, in derogation of the statutory requirement of giving reasonable notice before"
+"disposing of the articles pledged, the pledgee sells them and the price obtained is also"
+"not commensurate with the real value of the goods, the Delhi High Court expressed the"
+opinion that it may amount to criminal breach of trust.322.
+[s 406.12] Vehicle delivered under hire-purchase.—
+When hirer himself committed default by not paying the instalments and under the
+"agreement, the appellants have repossessed the vehicle, the respondent-hirer cannot"
+have any grievance as the vital element of 'dishonest intention' is lacking. The element
+of 'dishonest intention' which is an essential element to constitute the offence of theft
+cannot be attributed to a person exercising his right under an agreement entered into
+between the parties as he may not have an intention of causing wrongful gain or to
+cause wrongful loss to the hirer.323.Where a person to whom a truck was delivered
+"under hire-purchase scheme, altered the identity of the vehicle by tampering with"
+"numbers, it was held that an offence under section 406 was made out. The accused"
+was convicted to four years R1.324.
+[s 406.13] Default in refunding share application money.—
+"A person, who makes a public issue for inviting applications for shares and who"
+becomes liable to refund the share application money because of refusal by a stock
+"exchange to approve his securities and fails to refund the money, can be prosecuted for"
+criminal breach of trust.325.
+[s 406.14] Money saving scheme.—
+The petitioner was running money saving scheme. He used to collect money from the
+members for different committees and disbursement to them. The disbursement was
+stopped because of non-payment by members of the amount due. It was held that
+there was no dishonest intention to misappropriate money and offences under
+sections 406 and 420 were not made out.326.
+[s 406.15] Re-payment of loan.—
+Where the accused sold machinery and goods which had been hypothecated to bank
+"and the amount not paid to bank for repayment of loan, Court held that dispute in"
+question is of civil nature and the trial Court justified in dismissing complaint under
+section 203.327.
+4. 'Legal contract express or implied'.—Violation of a contract in order to amount to
+"criminal breach of trust has to be in respect of a legal or valid contract, and not one for"
+"a criminal purpose, e.g., purchase of stolen property, etc.328."
+[s 406.16] CASES.—Breach of trust.—
+Where a retired employee of a company wrongly occupied the Company quarters for
+"more than 18 years, dismissal of complaint under section 630 Companies Act, 2013"
+"and section 406 IPC, 1860 on technical grounds by the magistrate was held"
+untenable.329. The complaint does not contain the averment that Rs.5 lakhs was
+"entrusted to the appellant, either in his personal capacity or as the Chairman of MSEB"
+and that he misappropriated it for his own use. The said amount was deposited by the
+complainant company with MSEB and there is nothing in the complaint which may
+even remotely suggest that the complainant had entrusted any property to appellant or
+"that the appellant had dominion over the said money of the complainant, which was"
+"converted by him to his own use, so as to satisfy the ingredients of section 405 IPC,"
+1860. Proceedings quashed.330. Where the accused took a jeep on loan for a specific
+purpose and for a particular period but refused to return it on demand by the
+complainant after the purpose had been served and the stipulated period was long
+"over, it was held that there was a prima facie case of criminal breach of trust and as"
+such the complaint could not be thrown out.331.
+[s 406.17] Refusal to return streedhan.—
+Where the husband and the father-in-law turned out a Hindu woman from the marital
+"home and refused to return her ornaments, money and clothes despite repeated"
+"demands, it was held that an offence of criminal breach of trust as defined in sections"
+"405 and 406, IPC, 1860, was prima facie made out and the case could not be quashed."
+"Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and section 14 of the Hindu Succession"
+"Act, 1956, nowhere provide that the concept of streedhan is abolished or that a remedy"
+under the criminal law is not available.332.
+[s 406.18] Violation of legal contract.—
+"where there is a mere breach of the contract terms, such as default in payment of an"
+"instalment, a liability of civil nature only would arise.333. Where a contractor was given"
+"cement for construction work by the Minor Irrigation Department, Government of Bihar"
+under a specific agreement that he would return unused cement but instead of doing
+"so he sold the cement to outsiders, it was held a fiduciary relationship had been clearly"
+established in the instant case and the contractor was liable to be convicted under
+"section 406, IPC, 1860.334."
+[s 406.19] Acting contrary to directions of person entrusting money.—
+"One of the accused persons, a registered stock broker, purchased mutual fund"
+securities in the name of a bank and later on sold them. The sale was contrary to the
+terms subject to which securities were issued (sale before completion of lock-in
+period). But otherwise there was no violation of any statutory provisions. Neither the
+name lending bank nor the issuing institution objected to the sale. It was held that the
+accused was the real owner of the securities. There was no breach of trust on his part
+because the property sold was his own. The securities were purchased by another
+financial institution and the other accused was an officer of that institution. He was
+also acquitted of similar charges. He could not be convicted under the Prevention of
+"Corruption Act, 1988 for the reason that purchase of securities to the tune of 33 crores"
+could not have been done without authorisation from higher authorities. The
+transaction was also legal.335.
+[s 406.20] Civil wrong when becomes crime.—
+A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. When dispute
+"between the parties constitute only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the Courts"
+would not permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking cognizance of
+the offence has been made out336. An act of breach of trust simpliciter involves a civil
+wrong of which the person wronged may seek his redress for damages in a civil Court
+but a breach of trust with mens rea gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. The
+"element of 'dishonest intention' is therefore, an essential element to constitute the"
+"offence of Criminal Breach of Trust.337. Breach of trust may be basically a civil wrong,"
+but it gives rise to criminal liability also when there is mens rea.338. The difference
+"between the two lies in dishonest intention.339. If there is a flavour of civil nature, the"
+same cannot be agitated in the form of criminal proceeding. If there is huge delay and
+"in order to avoid the period of limitation, it cannot be resorted to a criminal"
+proceeding.340. A civil suit was filed alleging negligence and breach of contractual
+obligations. The Court said that a breach of contract simpliciter does not constitute any
+offence. The criminal complaint must disclose the ingredients of the offence. For
+ascertaining the prima facie correctness of the allegations the Court can look at the
+correspondence between the parties and other admitted documents. Criminal
+proceedings should not be encouraged when they are found to be mala fide or
+otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.341. Merely because a civil claim has
+"been raised by the complainant regarding the breach of agreement, it cannot prevent"
+him from initiating criminal proceedings.342. Though a case of breach of trust may be
+both a civil wrong and a criminal offence but there would be certain situations where it
+would predominantly be a civil wrong and may or may not amount to a criminal
+"offence. The present case is one of that type where, if at all, the facts may constitute a"
+civil wrong and the ingredients of the criminal offences are wanting. Having regard to
+the relevant documents including the trust deed as also the correspondence following
+"the creation of the tenancy, the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, the"
+natural relationship between the settlor and the trustee as mother and son and the fall
+out in their relationship and the fact that the wife of the co-trustee was no more
+"interested in the tenancy, it must be held that the criminal case should not be"
+continued.343.
+[s 406.20.1] Matters under special laws.—
+"The act of taking away dowry articles by the husband and in-laws, being in violation of"
+"special legislation contained in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, such offence should"
+"be tried under the special legislation rather than under the general provisions of IPC,"
+1860. The Supreme Court also pointed out that if any article was given by way of
+"dowry, the question of its entrustment on behalf of wife would not arise.344."
+[s 406.21] Arbitration clause.—
+The presence of an arbitration clause between the parties does not bar criminal
+proceedings under section 406. Both civil and criminal proceedings can be there side
+by side.345.
+[s 406.22] Period of Limitation.—
+The Punjab and Haryana High Court is of the view that the offence under the section is
+of continuing nature. Every day a fresh cause of action keeps accruing until the
+property is actually returned.346.
+[s 406.23] Sanction for prosecution.—
+In a charge against a Government servant under the section read with section 120B
+"(conspiracy), sanction for prosecution is not necessary.347. Since transaction for"
+"offences involved took place in a foreign country, sanction from Central Government is"
+a must to enable Court to take cognizance of offences and proceed further in case.
+"The High Court held that trial has proceeded without sanction and, thus, rendering it"
+"invalid, and in course of such invalid trial magistrate passed order for further"
+"investigation, which too was invalid.348."
+[s 406.24] Compromise.
+Compounding was denied on the ground that section 406 not compoundable as
+amount involved was more than Rs. 250. The Supreme Court held that it is perhaps
+"advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature,"
+the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal
+proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the
+"prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot"
+afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and
+meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground
+of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.349.
+[s 406.25] Jurisdiction.—
+The Streedhan was handed over at one place and misappropriated at another place. It
+was held that there was no jurisdiction at the place where it was entrusted because at
+that time there might have been no intention to misappropriate. Thus jurisdiction was
+only at the place where misappropriation was committed.350.
+[s 406.25.1] Entrustment of cheque.—
+A cheque has been held to be a property within the meaning of section 405. A blank
+cheque was issued to a person who misappropriated the same or used it for a purpose
+for which it was not given. The case under section 406 was held to have been made
+out.351.
+[s 406.26] Dishonour of cheque.—
+There were regular business dealings in the course of which payments were made by
+cheques. One such cheque was dishonoured for which the criminal complaint was
+instituted. There was nothing in the complaint to show that the intention was to cheat
+the complainant by giving him the cheque as a camouflage. The transaction under
+which the cheque was given was a mere agreement to sell without any actual transfer
+of goods. Thus the offence of cheating or of criminal breach of trust was not made out.
+The complaint was quashed.352.
+"286. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+646.
+"287. CM Narayan, AIR 1953 SC 478 [LNIND 1952 SC 159] : 1954 Cr LJ 102 ."
+"288. Velji Raghavji Patel, 1965 (2) Cr LJ 431 : AIR 1965 SC 1433 [LNIND 1964 SC 350] ."
+"289. Anil Saran v State of Bihar, AIR 1996 SC 204 [LNIND 1995 SC 819] : 1996 Cr LJ 408 ."
+"290. Daityari Tripatti v Subodh Chandra Chaudhuri, (1942) 2 Cal 507 ."
+"291. R Venkatkrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"292. Satyendra Nath Mukherji, (1947) 1 Cal 97 . This case was approved by the Supreme Court"
+"in Jaswantlal, AIR 1968 SC 700 [LNIND 1967 SC 338] : 1968 Cr LJ 803 . Dani Singh, AIR 1963 Pat"
+"52 ; Ram Niranjan, (1964) 1 Cr LJ 614 ."
+"293. Per Lord Haldane in Lake v Simmons, (1927) AC 487 . VR Dalal v Yougendra Naranji"
+"Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625 [LNIND 2008 SC 1222] : AIR 2008 SC 2793 [LNIND 2008 SC 1222] ,"
+"""entrustment"" being the first ingredient of breach of trust, if it is missing, there would be no"
+"criminal breach of trust. Onkar Nath Mishra v State (NCT) of Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561 [LNIND"
+"2007 SC 1511] : 2008 Cr LJ 1391 , entrustment of property to in-laws or any misappropriation by"
+"them found lacking, charge not made out."
+294. Per Lord Sumner in ibid.
+"295. Jaswantlal, AIR 1968 SC 700 [LNIND 1967 SC 338] : 1968 Cr LJ 803 ."
+"296. State of HP v Karanvir, 2006 Cr LJ 2917 : AIR 2006 SC 2211 [LNIND 2006 SC 394] : (2006) 5"
+SCC 381 [LNIND 2006 SC 394] .
+"297. Khuman Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1693 (Raj)."
+"298. Rajkishore v State, AIR 1969 Ori 190 [LNIND 1969 ORI 35] ."
+"299. RK Dalmia, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 805 ."
+"300. Kesar Singh v State, 1969 Cr LJ 1595 ."
+"301. R Venkatkrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] . It made no difference"
+to the criminal liability that the money was quickly recovered and Departmental action was
+taken against bank officials.
+302. Ibid.
+"303. Sardar Singh, 1977 Cr LJ 1158 : AIR 1977 SC 1766 ."
+"304. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] ."
+"305. Krishan Kumar, 1959 Cr LJ 1508 (SC) : AIR 1959 SC 1390 [LNIND 1959 SC 135] ."
+"306. JM Desai, 1960 Cr LJ 1250 : AIR 1960 SC 889 [LNIND 1960 SC 79] ; See also Bipin Chandra,"
+1964 (1) Cr LJ 688 (Ori).
+"307. Nirmalabai v State, (1953) Nag 813."
+"308. Ramdeo Singh v State of Bihar, 2013 Cr LJ 891 (Pat)."
+"309. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC(Cr) 646."
+"310. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] ."
+"311. Mir Naqvi Askari v CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : AIR 2010 SC 528"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1651] .
+"312. Velji Raghavji, (1964) 67 Bom LR 443 SC : AIR 1965 SC 1433 [LNIND 1964 SC 350] : (1965)"
+2 Cr LJ 431 .
+"313. Alagiri v State, 1996 Cr LJ 2978 (Mad)."
+"314. Anwarul Islam v WB, 1996 Cr LJ 2912 (Cal). Nandlal Lakotia v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ"
+"1900 (Pat), a partner becomes the owner of his share only after settlement of accounts and"
+allotment of his share to the partner. The partner in this case was a working partner. He
+dishonestly misappropriated the property to the firm entrusted to him. He was liable for criminal
+breach of trust.
+"315. Turner Morrison & Co, Bombay v KN Tapuria, 1993 Cr LJ 3384 ."
+"316. BP Gupta, v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 781 (Pat)."
+"317. Thermax Ltd v KM Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 [LNIND 2011 SC 947] : (2012) 2 SCC (Cr) 650;"
+"Pramod Parmeshwarlal Banka v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 4906 (Bom)."
+"318. SK Alagh v State of UP, (2008) 5 SCC 662 [LNIND 2008 SC 368] : AIR 2008 SC 1731 [LNIND"
+2008 SC 368] : 2008 Cr LJ 2256 : (2008) 3 All LJ 588.
+"319. Madhu Sudan Malhotra v Kishore Chand Bhandari, 1988 BLJR 360 : 1988 SCC (Cr) 854 :"
+1988 Supp SCC 424 .
+"320. Balram Singh v Sukhwant Kaur, 1992 Cr LJ 792 (P&H)."
+"321. Bhaskar Lal Sharma v Monica, (2009) 10 SCC 604 [LNIND 2009 SC 1432] : (2009) 161 DLT"
+739 .
+"322. JRD Tata, Chairman TISCO v Payal Kumar, 1987 Cr LJ 447 (Del)."
+"323. Charanjit Singh Chadha v Sudhir Mehra, AIR 2001 SC 3721 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] : (2001) 7"
+SCC 417 [LNIND 2001 SC 2906] .
+"324. State of UP v Sita Ram, 1998 Cr LJ 4225 (All), the court said that ingredients of the offence"
+under section 420 were not made out.
+"325. Radhey Shyam Khemka v State of Bihar, 1993 AIR SCW 2427 : 1993 Cr LJ 2888 : (1993) 3"
+SCC 54 [LNIND 1993 SC 276] .
+"326. Ghansham Das v State of Haryana, 1992 Cr LJ 2594 (P&H)."
+"327. Kaumudiben Harshadbhai Joshi v State of Gujarat, 2012 Cr LJ 4720 (Guj)."
+"328. Gobardhan Chandra Mandal v Kanai Lal Mandal, (1953) 2 Cal 133 ."
+"329. Automobile Products India Ltd v Das John Peter, (2010) 12 SCC 593 [LNIND 2010 SC 624] :"
+(2011) 1 SCC(Cr) 768.
+"330. Asoke Basak v State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 660 [LNIND 2010 SC 1699] : (2011) 1"
+"SCC(Cr) 85 ; Chandralekha v State of Rajasthan, JT 2012 (12) SC 390 [LNIND 2012 SC 809] :"
+2012 (12) Scale 692 [LNIND 2012 SC 809] – FIR filed after six years of the incident-Continuation
+of proceedings is an abuse of process of law-FIR quashed; Also see MM Prasad Khaitan v RG
+"Poddar, (2010) 10 SCC 673 [LNIND 2010 SC 991] ."
+"331. Halimuddin Ahmad, 1976 Cr LJ 449 (Pat)."
+"332. Pratibha Rani, 1985 Cr LJ 817 : AIR 1985 SC 628 [LNIND 1985 SC 86] : (1983) 2 SCC 370 ."
+"For other cases of prosecution of the same kind, see Manas Kumar Dutta v Aloka Dutta, 1991 Cr"
+"LJ 288 (Ori); Bairo Prasad v Laxmibai Pateria, 1991 Cr LJ 2535 : AIR 1985 SC 628 [LNIND 1985"
+SC 86] : (1985) 2 SCC 370 [LNIND 1985 SC 86] . Where the amount defalcated was surrendered
+by the accused and he was released on bail. His sentence of one year R.I. was reduced to the
+"period already undergone. Diannatius v State of Kerala, 1988 SCC (Cr) 57 (II) : 1987 Supp SCC"
+"189 . Such a proceeding cannot be stayed under writ jurisdiction. C Laxmichand v State of TN,"
+1991 Cr LJ 1647 (Mad).
+"333. Sunil Ranjan Ghose v Samar Roy, 1987 Cr LJ 1603 (Cal)."
+"334. Kalaktar Singh, 1978 Cr LJ 663 (Pat); State v Jaswantlal Nathalal, 1968 Cr LJ 803 (SC)"
+distinguished on the ground that in the latter case the contract was not produced in evidence
+nor any oral evidence led to prove the terms of the contract. See further Madhavrao J Scindia v
+"SC Angre, AIR 1988 SC 709 [LNIND 1988 SC 100] : 1988 Cr LJ 853 : (1988) 1 SCC 692 [LNIND"
+"1988 SC 100] , where elements of a crime were wanting and, therefore, proceedings, were"
+"quashed; Bal Kishan Das v PC Nagar, AIR 1991 SC 1531 : 1991 Cr LJ 1837 , where arbitration"
+"proceedings about the matter in question had been going on for more than 17 years, the"
+Supreme Court rejected prosecution under this section. Thematter was of civil nature; AL Panian
+"v State of AP, 1990 Supp SCC 607 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 84, failure to pay on due date on the expiry of"
+credit period of sale is not a matter covered by this provision. Central Bureau of Investigation v
+"Duncan Industries, AIR 1996 SC 2452 [LNIND 1996 SC 1028] : 1996 Cr LJ 3501 , the allegation in"
+the complaint that the goods in respect of which floating charge was created in favour of banks
+"were disposed by the debtor company, does not constitute criminal breach of trust."
+"335. S Mohan v CBI, (2008) 7 SCC 1 [LNIND 2008 SC 1234] : (2008) 106 Cut LT 360, following"
+"the Canbank Financial Services Ltd, case (2004) 8 SCC 355 [LNIND 2004 SC 892] : AIR 2004 SC"
+"5123 [LNIND 2004 SC 892] , where it was held that the accused had a transferable interest in the"
+securities purchased in the name of Andhra Bank and its subsidiary.
+"336. Joseph Salvaraj A v State of Gujarat, AIR 2011 SC 2258 [LNIND 2011 SC 576] : (2011) 7 SCC"
+"59 [LNIND 2011 SC 576] ; Devendra v State of UP, (2009) 7 SCC 495 [LNIND 2009 SC 1158] :"
+(2009) 3 SCC Cr 461.
+"337. Venkatakrishnan v CBI, 2010 SC 1812 : (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ; SW"
+"Palanikar v State of Bihar, 2002 (1) SCC 241 [LNIND 2001 SC 2381] ."
+"338. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC Cr 646."
+"339. R Venkatkrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"340. Thermax Ltd v KM Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 [LNIND 2011 SC 947] : (2012) 2 SCC(Cr) 650."
+"341. All Cargo Movers India Pvt Ltd v Dhanesh Badarmal Jain, (2007) 14 SCC 776 [LNIND 2007"
+SC 1227] : AIR 2008 SC 247 [LNIND 2007 SC 1227] .
+"342. Lee Kun Hee v State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND 2012 SC 89] : AIR 2012 SC 1007"
+"[LNINDORD 2012 SC 443] : 2012 Cr LJ 1551 ; Arun Bhandari v State of UP, (2013) 2 SCC 801"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 18] : 2013 Cr LJ 1020 (SC)- Case is not purely in civil nature- High Court erred in
+"quashing the order of cognizance; See also Adarsh Kaur Gill v State of NCT of Delhi, 2013 Cr LJ"
+1955 (Del).
+"343. Thermax Ltd v KM Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 [LNIND 2011 SC 947] : (2012) 2 SCC (Cr) 650;"
+"Nagawwa v Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, 1976 (3) SCC 736 [LNIND 1976 SC 188] : AIR 1976"
+"SC 1947 [LNIND 1976 SC 188] ; State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992"
+SC 604 .
+"344. Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 [LNIND 2009 SC 1121] :"
+2009 Cr LJ 3462.
+"345. Sham Lal v State of Punjab, 2001 Cr LJ 2987 (P&H)."
+"346. Balram Singh v Sukhwant Kaur, 1992 Cr LJ 972 (P&H). The court surveyed a number of"
+"authorities on the concept of continuing offence. State of Bihar v Deokaran Kenshi, AIR 1973 SC"
+"908 [LNIND 1972 SC 392] : 1973 Cr LJ 347 and Bhagirath Kanoris v State of MP, AIR 1984 SC"
+"1688 [LNIND 1984 SC 377] : 1984 Lab IC 1578 , wherein the Supreme Court explained the"
+"concept of a continuing offence. Best v Butter, (1932) 2 KB 108 , wherein it was held under the"
+"Trade Unions Act that every day that the moneys were willfully withheld, the offence was"
+"committed. The court noted the contrary view expressed in Waryam Singh v State of Punjab,"
+"1982 Cr LJ (NOC) 117 (P&H) and State of Punjab v Sarwan Singh, 1981 Cr LJ 722 (SC) : 1981"
+"PLR 451 : AIR 1981 SC 1054 [LNIND 1981 SC 201] , but distinguished them because there in the"
+"opposite party had conceded to the proposition. In Gurcharan Singh v Lakhwinder Singh, (1987) 1"
+Recent CR 424 it was again taken for granted without argument that the offence under the
+section was not of continuing nature.
+"347. State of Kerala v V Padmanabhan, AIR 1999 SC 2405 [LNIND 1999 SC 585] : 1999 Cr LJ"
+3696 .
+"348. P T Abdul Rahiman v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 893 (Ker)."
+"349. Madan Mohan Abbot v State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1969 [LNIND 2008 SC 755] : (2008) 4"
+SCC 582; Now section 406 is made compoundable irrespective of the amount involved in the
+case by the Amendment Act 5 of 2009.
+"350. Vijay Kumar v Sunita, 2000 Cr LJ 4116 (MP)."
+"351. Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v Rajvir Industries Ltd, (2008) 13 SCC 678 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+36] : AIR 2008 SC 1683 [LNIND 2008 SC 36].
+"352. Sneh Lata v Swastika Agro Industrial Corp, 2001 Cr LJ 4432 (P&H)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Breach of Trust
+"[s 407] Criminal breach of trust by carrier, etc."
+"Whoever, being entrusted with property as a carrier,1 wharfinger or warehouse-keeper,"
+"commits criminal breach of trust in respect of such property, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+"Those who receive property under a contract, express or implied, to carry it or to keep it"
+in safe custody are punishable under this section for a criminal breach of trust with
+respect to such property.353.
+1. 'Carrier'.—A carrier is a person who undertakes to transport the goods of other
+persons from one place to another for hire.354. It is clear that the expression 'carrier' in
+"s.407 IPC, 1860 includes all types of carriers, including a common carrier or a private"
+carrier.355.
+[s 407.1] Jurisdiction.—
+Where the accused was entrusted with the carriage of a quantity of coffee from an
+"estate in Mysore to a firm of merchants in Mangalore, and a portion of the goods was"
+abstracted and there was no evidence as to when or where such abstraction took
+"place, it was held that the Magistrate at Mangalore had jurisdiction to try the accused"
+as there was failure to deliver the goods at Mangalore in accordance with the terms of
+entrustment.356.
+"Where there was misappropriation of goods entrusted for delivery, the Court said that"
+"the Courts at both the places, namely the place of entrustment and place of delivery,"
+would have jurisdiction.357.
+"353. The section does not apply to a custodian of goods under the Essential Commodities Act,"
+"1955 for violation of certain clauses storage of licence. Pramod Kumar Nayak v State of Orissa,"
+"1989 Cr LJ 1041 (Ori). Surinder Arora v Durga Das, 1988 Cr LJ 1645 , nor to company officers for"
+"violation of Gratuity Act, 1972."
+"354. Wharton, 14th Edn p. 164."
+"355. Kanhayalal Baid v RajKumar Agarval, 1981 Cr LJ. 824 ."
+"356. Public Prosecutor v Podimonu Beary, (1928) 52 Mad 61."
+"357. Jijo v State of Karnataka, 2003 Cr LJ 256 (Kant)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Breach of Trust
+[s 408] Criminal breach of trust by clerk or servant.
+"Whoever, being a clerk1 or servant2 or employed as a clerk or servant,3 and being in"
+"any manner entrusted in such capacity with property, or with any dominion over"
+"property, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+Section 381 punishes theft by a clerk or a servant. This section inflicts enhanced
+punishment on such a person for criminal breach of trust. The property must have been
+entrusted to the accused in his capacity as a clerk or a servant. A clerk or a servant
+who takes his master's property is punishable for theft.
+"1. 'Clerk'.—A clerk in modern usage means a writer in an office, public or private, either"
+for keeping accounts or entering minutes.
+2. 'Servant'.—Master and servant—a relation whereby a person calls in the assistance
+"of others, where his own skill and labour are not sufficient to carry out his own"
+business or purpose.358. A servant acts under the direct control and supervision of the
+master and is bound to conform to all reasonable orders given in the course of his
+work.359.
+3. 'Employed as a clerk or servant'.—Where the accused employee dishonestly
+misappropriated money entrusted with him and left the service and there is no
+documentary evidence except extra-judicial confession of accused Court held that
+accused is entitled to acquittal.360. Where a person sent his salesman with a letter to
+"fetch Rs. 10,000 from his residence and he, instead of returning, slipped away with the"
+"money, it was held that the fact that he absconded for a number of days clearly"
+established his intention of causing wrongful gain for himself.361.
+"In the prosecution of an employee under this section, the original account books were"
+"destroyed after the matter was decided by the sessions' judge, so that it was"
+impossible for the appellate Court to verify the correctness of the questionable entries
+"and the other evidence was of suspicious nature, the Court had no choice but to acquit"
+the accused.362. The Court relied upon its own earlier decision363. where it was
+"observed: ""The appellate court and the revisional court are entitled, while scrutinising"
+"the case against the accused, to have complete material before it on which the"
+prosecution relies for proving the case against the accused persons. In the present
+"case, to deprive this court of the benefit of looking at the entries, in a serious infirmity"
+"which must be held fatal to the prosecution case.""364."
+[s 408.1] Branch manager of transport company.—
+The accused was a branch manager of a transport company. He delivered a
+consignment to the co-accused on his promise to deposit consignee copy inspite of
+specific instructions from the head office not to deliver the consignment without
+receiving the consignee copy. It was held that the conduct of the accused was prima
+facie dishonest and he was properly convicted under section 408.365.
+[s 408.2] Employer.—Directors of company.—
+Criminal proceedings were launched against the employer for default in payment of
+contribution to the Employees State Insurance. It was held that the expression
+"""employer"" did not include directors.366."
+"358. Wharton, 14th Edn, p 641."
+"359. Chandi Prasad, (1955) 2 SCR 1035 [LNIND 1955 SC 108] : AIR 1955 SC 149 ."
+"360. Raghunath Dhondu Vani v Ilahi Babulal Mujavar, 2012 Cr LJ 1345 (Bom); Mancheswar"
+"Service Co-op Society Ltd v Anant Narayan Mishra, 2003 Cr LJ 4390 (Ori)."
+"361. Harish Chandra Singh v State of Orissa, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 602 (Ori), the offence under the"
+section was made out.
+"362. Makimuddin v State, 1991 Cr LJ 2903 (Del)."
+"363. Mohd. Ibrahim v State, AIR 1969 (Del) 315 [LNIND 1968 DEL 115] : 1969 Cr LJ 1377 ."
+"364. Citing Lala Ram v State, 1988 Chand Cr C 446 : 1989 Cr LJ 572 , stressing the duty of the"
+"prosecution under sections 451-452, Cr PC to preserve the evidence."
+"365. Banwarilal Agrawal v A Suryanarayan, 1994 Cr LJ 370 ."
+"366. Employees State Insurance Corpn. v SK Agarwal, AIR 1998 SC 2676 : 1998 Cr LJ 4027 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Breach of Trust
+"[s 409] Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or"
+agent.
+"Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over"
+"property in his capacity of a public servant1 or in the way of his business as a banker,2"
+"merchant,3 factor,4 broker,5 attorney6 or agent,7 commits criminal breach of trust in"
+"respect of that property, shall be punished with 367.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+"This section classes together public servants, bankers, merchants, factors, brokers,"
+attorneys and agents. As a rule the duties of such persons are of a highly confidential
+"character, involving great powers of control over the property entrusted to them; and a"
+breach of trust by such persons may often induce serious public and private calamity.
+[s 409.1] Ingredients.—
+"In order to sustain conviction under section 409, IPC, 1860, two ingredients are to be"
+"proved; namely, (i) the accused, a public servant or a banker or agent was entrusted"
+with the property of which he is duty bound to account for; and (ii) the accused has
+committed criminal breach of trust. What amounts to criminal breach of trust is
+"provided under section 405, IPC, 1860. The basic requirement to bring home the"
+accusations under section 405 are the requirements to prove conjointly (i) entrustment
+"and (ii) whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not,"
+misappropriated it or converted it to his own use to the detriment of the persons who
+entrusted it.368.
+Merely because the accused allegedly kept the amount in defiance of the official
+"instruction, it cannot be an incriminating circumstance to arrive at a conclusion that he"
+has committed the breach of trust. It is a settled position of law that suspicion
+howsoever grave cannot take the place of proof.369.
+The section cannot be construed as implying that any head of an office that is
+negligent in seeing that the rules about remitting money to the treasury are observed is
+ipso facto guilty of criminal breach of trust; but something more than that is required to
+bring home the dishonest intention. There should be some indication which justifies a
+finding that the accused definitely had the intention of wrongfully keeping Government
+out of the moneys.370. Subjecting to a civil liability would thus attract one of the
+"ingredients of criminal breach of trust. There cannot be, however, any doubt"
+whatsoever that a mere error of judgment would not attract the penal provision
+"contained in section 409 of the IPC, 1860.371. the fact that the accused puts back the"
+"money,372. or promises to do so,373. does not wipe out the offence or absolve him from"
+liability. Where a post-master misappropriated the money entrusted to him but paid
+"back the whole amount before being challenged, his acquittal on this ground was held"
+to be wrong.374. But the Courts do take that fact into account as a mitigating factor
+and would consider light punishment as sufficient to meet the ends of justice.375.
+Where certain articles disappeared from an open godown which was being watched by
+"a Chowkidar (watchman), it was held that the over-all incharge overseer could not be"
+held liable under the section unless there was the proof that the articles disappeared
+because of his doings or non-doings.376.
+The offence under the section requires criminal intent or mens rea. Where in the matter
+"of post office deposit accounts, all that was proved showed that there was negligence"
+"in maintaining them, the Court said that it could be a fit case for departmental"
+proceedings but not proceedings under section 409 because the intention to
+misappropriate the proceeds of the accounts was not in evidence.377.
+[s 409.2] Property of Government company.—
+The property of a Government company was purchased by a firm of which the accused
+was a partner. He was the CM of the company. The CM or the Minister was not shown
+to have dominion over the property of the company. The relationship between the CM
+and the company was not shown to be of trustee and fiduciary. It was held that the
+ingredients of the section were not satisfied.378. The complaint does not contain the
+"averment that Rs.5 lakhs was entrusted to the appellant, either in his personal capacity"
+or as the Chairman of Maharashtra State Electricity Board and that he misappropriated
+it for his own use. The said amount was deposited by the complainant company with
+MSEB and there is nothing in the complaint which may even remotely suggest that the
+complainant had entrusted any property to appellant or that the appellant had
+"dominion over the said money of the complainant, which was converted by him to his"
+"own use, so as to satisfy the ingredients of section 405 IPC, 1860. Proceedings"
+quashed.379.
+[s 409.3] Prosecution against company.—
+"Since, the majority of the Constitution Bench ruled in Standard Chartered Bank v"
+Directorate of Enforcement.380. That the company can be prosecuted even in a case
+"where the Court can impose substantive sentence as also fine, and in such case only"
+fine can be imposed on the corporate body.381.
+[s 409.4] Ownership right in films.—
+In an agreement for film production the terms stated that the rights in the negative of
+the film and the right of distribution for exhibition were to be vested in the complainant.
+"The accused, the other party, departed from the terms and exhibited the film publicly"
+without consent of the complainant. It was held that the accused was guilty of the
+offence of breach of trust.382.
+[s 409.5] Temporary misappropriation.—
+The allegation is that while he was working as a Lower Division Clerk in the Office of
+"the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the accused had temporarily misappropriated an"
+"amount of Rs. 1,839. Admittedly, the sum had been deposited in the post office before"
+"the due date and that no loss had been caused to the Department, even if it is assumed"
+"that a false entry had been made in the record. Offence alleged under IPC, 1860 against"
+the appellant are trivial in nature and have caused no harm and in fact no offences in
+"the eye of law. The benefit of section 95 IPC, 1860 is available to the appellant.383."
+"1. 'In his capacity of a public servant'.—Persons like public servants, bankers, etc., who"
+are made liable under the section occupy a position of highly confidential nature
+involving great power of control over property entrusted to them. Breach of trust by
+such persons may result in serious public or private calamity. High morality is expected
+from such persons. They are supposed to discharge their duties honestly.384. Where a
+police dog handler had taken a sum of money by way of travelling and daily allowance
+"(TA, DA), but went on to his native place on unauthorized absence and returned the"
+"money on coming back, it was held that he did not use the money for the official"
+"purpose and though the diversion was temporary, it constituted an offence under the"
+section. The trial Court convicted him. It was held that there was no scope for
+interference in the judgment of the trial Court.385.
+2. 'Banker'.—A banker is one who receives money to be drawn out again as the owner
+"has occasion for it, the customer being lender, and the banker borrower, with the"
+superadded obligation of honouring the customer's cheques up to the amount of the
+money received and still in the banker's hands.386. The word 'banker' includes a cashier
+"or shroff.387. In ANZ Grindlays Bank plc v Shipping and Clearing (Agents) Pvt Ltd,388. it"
+was held that relation between the bank and its depositors is that of debtor and
+creditor but that the relation of trust can be created under special circumstances.
+"Where the principal debtor did not repay the bank loan, the bank as creditor can adjust"
+it at the maturity of the fixed deposit receipts deposited by the guarantor with the bank
+"as security, though the debt became barred by limitation at the time of maturity of the"
+said fixed deposit receipts. Such adjustment would not amount to offences punishable
+"under sections 109, 114 and 409 IPC, 1860.389. Bank officials who allowed advance"
+credits on banker's cheques to a customer in violation of Departmental instructions
+acted in violation of direction of law. The officials had dominion over the money
+belonging to the bank and they dishonestly used that money for conferring a benefit on
+the customer. They were held guilty of the offence under the section.390.
+[s 409.6] Securities Scam.—
+The National Housing Bank cannot advance loans to anybody except housing finance
+"institutions, scheduled banks and statutory slum clearance bodies. The advancement"
+"of any loan to any individual is an offence under National Housing Bank Act, 1987."
+Allegation of advancement of loan to Harshad Mehta by NHB under the disguise of a
+call money transaction was held illegal. If as result of that illegal transaction a private
+person who was not expected to reap the fruit of 'call money' was allowed to retain the
+"same for a period to make an unlawful gain therefrom, offence of criminal breach of"
+trust must be held to be have been committed.391.
+3. 'Merchant'.—A merchant is one who traffics to remote countries; also any one
+dealing in the purchase and sale of goods.392. A failure on the part of persons
+responsible to refund the share application money when it becomes refundable
+"because of the stock exchange refusal to approve the prospectus, has been taken to be"
+a misappropriation by a merchant.393.
+4. 'Factor'.—Is a substitute in mercantile affairs; an agent employed to sell goods or
+"merchandise consigned or delivered to him by or for his principal, for a compensation"
+commonly called factorage or commission.394. Complainant took loan from company
+against shares of complainant. Shares were not returned to him after repayment of
+"loan. Court below has found that the charge under section 409 was tenable since,"
+"though the accused were not bankers or the public servants, they would fit in the"
+"category of factor. The ""factor"" has been defined in Law Lexicon as ""A factor is a"
+"mercantile agent who, in the customary course of his business as such agent, is"
+"entrusted with the possession or control of goods, wares, or merchandise for sale on"
+"commission"". An agent employed to sell goods or merchandise consigned or delivered"
+"to him, by or for his principal, for compensation commonly called ""factorage"" or"
+"""commission"". The Bombay High Court held that it cannot be held that accused"
+"directors of company were agent, employed by complainant, to sell goods or"
+"merchandise, entrusted to them for compensation called a ""factorage"" or ""commission"""
+and the accused were not covered by definition of 'factor' as envisaged under section
+"409 IPC, 1860.395."
+5. 'Broker'.—Is an agent employed to make bargains and contracts between other
+"persons in matters of trade, commerce and navigation, by explaining the intentions of"
+"both parties, and negotiating in such a manner as to put those who employ him in a"
+condition to treat together personally. More commonly he is an agent employed by one
+party only to make a binding contract with another.396.
+A factor is entrusted with the possession as well as the disposal of property; a broker is
+employed to contract about it without being put in possession.397.
+"6. 'Attorney'.—Is one who is appointed by another to do something in his absence, and"
+who has authority to act in the place and turn of him by whom he is delegated.398. The
+"High Court, while dismissing the revision petition, observed that it was possible that the"
+appellants were duped by the general power of attorney holder who knew that his
+powers had been revoked but concealed the fact. If there any bona fides in the conduct
+"of the accused person, (by reason of revival of power), such arguments could have"
+made at the trial stage. The Court refused to interfere in the judgment.399.
+"7. 'Agent'.—Is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in"
+dealings with third persons.400. An agent though bound to exercise his authority in
+accordance with all lawful instructions which may be given to him from time to time by
+his principal is not subject in its exercise to the direct control or supervision of the
+"principal.401. The trustee of a temple is an agent of the deity, and if he misappropriates"
+temple jewels he is guilty under this section.402. Where it is a servant's duty to account
+"for and pay over the moneys received by him at stated times, his not doing so wilfully"
+amounts to embezzlement.403. The term 'agent' is not restricted to persons who carry
+on the profession of agents. The requirements of this section would be satisfied if the
+person is an agent of another and that other person entrusts him with property or with
+any dominion over property in the course of his duties as an agent. The entrustment
+"must be in connection with his duties as an agent.404. Where the appellant, an agent"
+entrusted with the distribution of the rice under the 'Food for Work Scheme' to the
+workers on production of coupons was charged with misappropriation of 67.65
+"quintals of rice, the evidence proves that there was entrustment of property to the"
+"accused, Court upheld the conviction.405."
+[s 409.7] Commission agent.—
+The accused was appointed as commission agent. Certain accounts were found to be
+outstanding against the accused. The Court said that it was a dispute between a
+principal and his agent of civil nature. The agent should not be harassed for such a
+dispute by resort to criminal proceedings.406.
+[s 409.8] Minister.—
+"Accused, the Minister for electricity and higher officials of Electricity Board alleged to"
+have awarded contract at a very high and exorbitant rate with special conditions having
+"heavy financial implications, by reducing the retention and security amount and by"
+allowing the contractor to return only fifty per cent of the empty cement bags. It is
+found that accused persons have abused their official positions. Supreme Court set
+aside the order of acquittal and convicted the accused.407.
+[s 409.9] Independent contractor.—
+An independent contractor was entrusted with a specific quantity of steel for purposes
+of fabrication and erection of trolley. He fraudulently disposed of the steel contrary to
+the terms on which possession was handed over to him. The Court said that he could
+"be treated as a trustee for the purposes of appropriate use of steel, in view of the"
+decision of the Supreme Court in Somnath v State of Rajasthan.408. He was guilty of
+criminal breach of trust and liable to be punished under section.409.
+[s 409.10] Insurance agent.—
+Where an agent of the Life Insurance Corporation collected the premium amount from
+"the policy holder but did not deposit it with the corporation, his conviction for"
+misappropriation was held to be proper.410.
+[s 409.11] Buyer of goods.—
+Goods were delivered to a buyer in a sales transaction in the ordinary course of
+business and he became the owner also because the vesting of property was not
+linked with payment. It was held that he could not be held liable for misappropriating
+"his own property though his cheque, which was issued for payment of price afterwards,"
+bounced.411. Where the buyer refused to accept the shipment on premise that on a
+random checking too many defects were found in the garments and complaint was
+"filed to recover the dues, Supreme Court held that the dispute between the parties is"
+civil in nature.412.
+"[s 409.12] Entrustment.—"""
+"Entrustment"" being a necessary part of the offence, where it is not proved, no offence"
+arises under this section.413. It is the settled law that mere proof of entries in the books
+"of account, unsupported by any evidence of receipt, is not alone sufficient to fasten the"
+accused with the offence of criminal breach of trust.414. An Assistant Engineer was
+charged for criminal breach of trust for misappropriating Govt. Funds. It was found that
+there was no entrustment of funds to the accused public servant. It was held that
+"question of misappropriation of funds does not arise.415. Accordingly, a school"
+inspector withdrawing money against false pay bills and misappropriating the entire
+amount was held to be punishable for misappropriation and cheating but not of
+criminal breach of trust because the amount withdrawn was not entrusted to him.416.
+Where a postal delivery agent was given an insured cover supposed to contain Rs.
+"1000 and on delivery to the addressee, who opened the cover in the presence of the"
+"agent, it was found that it contained blank papers, the agent was held not liable under"
+the section. The prosecution did not prove the most vital fact that at the time of
+"handing over to the agent, the cover did contain the amount in question.417. Where a"
+quantity of diesel oil which was delivered to a junior officer under his signature and he
+"embezzled it, his senior was not allowed to be prosecuted. There was no entrustment"
+to him. The fact that he exercised authority over the junior did not establish his
+"possession. The conviction of the senior was set aside, while that of the junior was"
+upheld.418. Where no account was produced as to the quantity of yarn entrusted and
+"how much was returned after making the finished product, it was held that there was"
+no infirmity in the order of acquittal.419.
+[s 409.13] President of Co-operative Society.—
+It has been held that the President of a Co-operative Society is not a public servant.
+Dishonest retention of money of the society by the President was not an offence under
+section 409. But section 406 was attracted.420. Secretary of co-operative society is not
+"a public servant within meaning of section 21 IPC, 1860 r/w.s. 8 of W.B. Co-operative"
+"Societies Act, and no previous sanction is necessary for prosecuting him for offence"
+"under section 409, IPC, 1860.421."
+[s 409.14] Burden of proof.—
+The prosecution has to prove that a public servant was entrusted with property which
+he was duty bound to account for and that he misappropriated the property. Where the
+"fact of entrustment has been admitted or proved, the burden is then upon him to show"
+that the property was applied to the purpose for which it was entrusted to him.422.
+[s 409.15] Amount repaid.—
+The accused persons acting through directors of company in concert with the
+Chartered Accountants and some other persons hatched a criminal conspiracy and
+executed it by forging and fabricating a number of documents in order to support their
+claim to avail hire purchase loan form the bank. The accused had not only duped the
+"bank, they had also availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never"
+"purchased and used by them, causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic"
+offence against the society. Supreme Court had declined to quash the proceedings.
+"Merely because the dues of the bank have been paid up, the appellant cannot be"
+exonerated from the criminal liability.423.
+[s 409.16] CASES.
+Even a mistaken receipt of money by a public servant in official capacity does create an
+obligation for the public servant to render an account of the money so received. All that
+is required is entrustment or acquisition of dominion over property in the capacity of a
+"public servant. Thus where the accused, an official of the Indian Unit of Hindustan"
+Insurance Society who had no authority to collect premiums from Pakistani policy-
+"holders, did in fact represent to them that they could pay their premiums to him and"
+also issued receipts purporting to act in his official capacity and thereafter
+"misappropriated the money after making false entries in the relevant register, it was"
+"held that he was guilty under section 409, IPC, 1860.424. It should, however, be"
+remembered that the prosecution has to prove that the public servant has acted
+dishonestly in regard to property entrusted to him.425.
+[s 409.17] Section 420 and 409.—Distinction.—
+"In 'criminal breach of trust', an accused comes into possession of a property or"
+"acquires dominion over a property honestly and bona fide, but he develops dishonest"
+"intention subsequent to the taking possession of, or subsequent to having acquired the"
+"dominion over, the property and, having developed such dishonest intention, he"
+dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use the property or dishonestly
+uses or disposes of the property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the
+"mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or"
+"implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any"
+"other person so to do. Thus, in 'criminal breach of trust', the intention of the accused"
+"cannot be dishonest or mala fide at the time, when he comes into possession of the"
+"property or comes to acquire dominion over the property; but, having come into"
+"possession of, or having acquired dominion over, the property, the accused develops"
+"dishonest intention and actuated by such mens rea, he converts to his own use the"
+property or dishonestly uses or disposes of the property in violation of any direction of
+"law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal"
+"contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust,"
+"or wilfully suffers any other person so to do. Contrary to what happens in ""criminal"
+"breach of trust"", the intention of the accused, in a case or ""cheating"", is dishonest from"
+"the very commencement of the transaction. There is really no consent by the person,"
+who is intentionally induced by deception to deliver the property or allow any person to
+"retain the property or is intentionally induced, as a result of deception, to do or omit to"
+"do anything, which he would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived, and which"
+"act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,"
+"mind, reputation or property. In short, thus, while in ""criminal breach of trust"", the"
+accused comes into possession of the property without dishonest intention and
+develops dishonest intention subsequent to his coming into possession of the
+"property, the offence of 'cheating' is one, wherein the accused has dishonest intention"
+from the very commencement of the transaction.426.
+"[s 409.18] Section 409 and section 477A IPC, 1860.—"
+"Contention of the accused is that scheme of sections 408 and 409 IPC, 1860 goes to"
+show that distinct offences have been provided respectively for the clerks or servants
+and for the bankers and the present petitioner has been charged for the offence under
+"section 409 IPC, 1860 as he is a banker, but at the same time, he has been convicted"
+"for the offence under section 477A IPC, 1860, where bankers have not been included in"
+"the description of offence under section 477A IPC, 1860 and conviction under sections"
+"477A and 409 IPC, 1860 cannot go hand to hand. The accused has been charged for"
+"the offence under section 409 IPC, 1860 as he was public servant at the relevant time"
+being a Postal Assistant and his contention that he was a banker is misplaced. The
+accused has not been charged as a banker.427.
+[s 409.19] Director.—
+A director of a company is not only an agent but also a trustee of the assets of the
+company which come to his hand. Thus having dominion and control over property he
+can come within the mischief of this section if he dishonestly misappropriates that
+property to his own use.428. The manager of a rice mill was held liable under the
+section for causing disappearance of a quantity of paddy from a huge stock of the
+material entrusted to him.429.
+[s 409.20] Directors of Company.—Vicarious liability.—
+It is to be noted that the concept of 'vicarious liability' is unknown to criminal law. As
+"observed earlier, there is no specific allegation made against any person but the"
+members of the board and senior executives are joined as the persons looking after the
+management and business of the appellant Company.430. The Penal Code does not
+contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing
+Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The
+"learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question, viz., as to whether"
+"the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety,"
+would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any
+offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and
+Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the Statute. Statutes
+indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said
+"purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations"
+which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.431. In the case of
+"Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha,432. a complaint was lodged by the"
+"complainant for prosecution under sections 409, 109 and 114, IPC, 1860 against the"
+"Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank and a host of officers Since the principal"
+"debtor defaulted in payment of debt, the Branch Manager of the bank on maturity of the"
+said fixed deposit adjusted a part of the amount against the said loan. The complainant
+"alleged that the debt became barred by limitation and, therefore, the liability of the"
+"guarantors also stood extinguished. It was, therefore, alleged that the officers of the"
+bank criminally embezzled the said amount with dishonest intention to save
+themselves from financial obligation. The Magistrate without adverting whether the
+"allegations in the complaint prima facie make out an offence charged for, in a"
+"mechanical manner, issued the process against all the accused persons. The High"
+Court refused to quash the complaint and the matter finally came to Supreme Court.
+"The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the proceedings and held that the"
+"complaint was laid impleading the Chairman, the Managing Director of the Bank by"
+name and a host of officers. There lies responsibility and duty on the Magistracy to find
+whether the concerned accused should be legally responsible for the offence charged
+for. Only on satisfying that the law casts liability or creates offence against the juristic
+person or the persons impleaded then only process would be issued.
+[s 409.21] Society.—
+The accused was in charge of a society's affairs. Shortage of funds was detected. It
+was held that the fact that the accused agreed to make good the shortage at a later
+point of time could not be treated as an admission of guilt on his part. Ingredients of
+misappropriation were not made out. The mere discrepancy in amount was not
+sufficient to sustain the conviction.433.
+Prosecution has to prove entrustment and not how property was dealt with.—The
+prosecution has to show that the property in question was entrusted to the accused. It
+is then for the accused to show how he dealt with the property. 434.
+[s 409.22] Previous sanction.—
+In a prosecution against the Vice-chancellor of a University where section 50(2) of the
+"1994 University Act, 1904 says no prosecution will lie against the appellant without"
+"previous sanction of the Syndicate, prosecution cannot be launched in the absence of"
+the previous sanction of the Syndicate.435. As far as the offence of criminal conspiracy
+"punishable under section 120-B, read with section 409 of the IPC, 1860 is concerned"
+"and also section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, are concerned they"
+"cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in section 197 of the Cr PC, 1973.436."
+[s 409.23] Punishment.—
+"The accused, working as an assistant accountant in a company, received on behalf of"
+the company certain recoveries from a firm but did not credit them in the account of
+the said firm. He was found guilty and was convicted and sentenced to undergo RI of 1
+and a half years under section 409 and RI of 1 and a half years under section 477-A.
+The Apex Court upheld the conviction but considering time factor and age of the
+"accused, the sentence was reduced to six months, RI under each count.437."
+"The accused, a postmaster, was convicted under this section. The offence happened"
+15 years ago. He deposited the misappropriated amount with interest even before the
+"FIR was filed. He was punished only with fine of Rs. 4,000 without any"
+imprisonment.438.
+[s 409.24] Moral turpitude.—
+"Undoubtedly, the embezzlement of Rs.5000 by the appellant, for which he had been"
+"convicted under section 409 IPC, 1860, was an offence involving moral turpitude.439."
+[s 409.25] Conviction of Employee under section 409.—will release on
+probation remove the disqualification.—
+"Once a Criminal Court grants a delinquent employee the benefit of P.O. Act, 1958, its"
+order does not have any bearing so far as the service of such employee is concerned.
+"The word ""disqualification"" in section 12 of the Act 1958 provides that such a person"
+shall not stand disqualified for the purposes of other Acts like the Representation of
+"the People Act, 1950 etc. The conviction in a criminal case is one part of the case and"
+"release on probation is another. Therefore, grant of benefit of the provisions of Act"
+"1958, only enables the delinquent not to undergo the sentence on showing his good"
+"conduct during the period of probation. In case, after being released, the delinquent"
+"commits another offence, benefit of Act 1958 gets terminated and the delinquent can"
+"be made liable to undergo the sentence. Therefore, in case of an employee who stands"
+"convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, it is his misconduct that leads to his"
+dismissal.440.
+"367. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"368. Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 547 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+461] : AIR 2012 SC 3242 [LNIND 2012 SC 461] .
+"369. Sachindra Das v The State of Tripura, 2016 Cr LJ 3908 : 2016 (2) GLT 894 ."
+"370. Lala Raoji, (1928) 30 Bom LR 624 . Mohan Tiwari v State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1992 Cr LJ"
+"737 (Gau), unauthorised extraction of timber by the contractor from a forest officer in"
+"connivance with the officials concerned, prima facie evidence of guilt."
+"371. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+646.
+"372. Vishwa Nath v State of J&K, AIR 1983 SC 174 : 1983 Cr LJ 231 : (1983) 1 SCC 215 ."
+"373. Vijay Digambar Lanjekar v State of Maharashtra, 1991 SCC (Cr) 841 : 1991 Supp (2) SCC 8,"
+"the court reduced the sentence of 2 years' RI to the period already undergone. Where, on the"
+"other hand, credit sale was in vogue and the amounts involved stood deposited before CID"
+"probe, the conviction was not sustained. Narendra Pratap Narain Singh v State of UP, AIR 1991"
+SC 1394 [LNIND 1991 SC 186] : 1991 Cr LJ 1816 .
+"374. State of MP v Prempal, 1991 Cr LJ 2878 . The court followed Vishwanath v State of J & K,"
+AIR 1983 SC 174 : 1983 Cr LJ 231 where the principle laid down was that a public servant
+"entrusted with Government money misappropriates that amount for personal use, refund of that"
+"amount, after the act of defalcation is discovered, does not absolve the accused of the offence."
+"375. See Ram Mohan Saxena v State of MP, 1977 (II) MPWN 377; Bahadur Singh v State of MP,"
+"(1976) JLJSN 120; Narbada Singh Chouhan v State of MP, (1971) JLJ SN 11 and State v Autar"
+"Singh, (1966) JLJ SN 99."
+"376. Janeshwar Das Agarwal v State of UP, AIR 1981 SC 1646 : 1981 All LJ 887 : (1981) 18 All"
+CC 151 : (1981) 3 SCC 10 .
+"377. Chandraiah v State of AP, (2003) 12 SCC 670 : AIR 2004 SC 252 : 2004 Cr LJ 365 ."
+"378. R Sai Bharathi v J Jayalalitha, (2004) 2 SCC 9 [LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : AIR 2004 SC 692"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 1023] : 2004 Cr LJ 286 .
+"379. Asoke Basak v State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 660 [LNIND 2010 SC 1699] : (2011) 1"
+SCC(Cr) 85.
+"380. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+476] .
+"381. CBI v Blue Sky Tie-up Pvt Ltd, 2012 Cr LJ 1216 : AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 613."
+"382. Krishna Rao Keshav v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 1129 (All)."
+"383. NK Illiyas v State of Kerala, 2012 CR LJ 2418 : AIR 2012 SC 3790 [LNIND 2011 SC 646] ; R"
+"Venkatkrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] . It made no difference to the"
+criminal liability that the money was quickly recovered and departmental action was taken
+against bank officials.
+"384. R Venkatkrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] ."
+"385. Shabbir Ahmed Sherkhan v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 5 SCC 22 [LNIND 2009 SC 621] :"
+(2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 1016 .
+"386. Wharton, 14th Edn, p 109. The relationship of trust can arise between them only under"
+"special circumstances. ANZ Grindlays Bank v Shipping and Clearing (Agents) Pvt Ltd, 1992 Cr LJ"
+"77 (Cal), paying money after instructions to close account, no cheating. MV Bany v State of TN,"
+1989 Cr LJ 667 (Mad).
+"387. Hira Lal, (1907) PR No. 19 of 1908. A bank manager permitting money to be withdrawn"
+against false drafts signed by him commits this offence. Adithela Immanuel Raju v State of
+"Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 243 . The protections and privileges of a banker are not available to persons"
+"who are not legally engaged in the banking business. AG Abreham v State of Kerala, 1987 Cr LJ"
+"2009 (Ker). Withdrawal of money from Post Office by forging signature, liability made out. State"
+"of Orissa v Sapneswar Thappa, 1987 Cr LJ 612 (Ori)."
+"388. ANZ Grindlays Bank plc v Shipping and Clearing (Agents) Pvt Ltd, 1992 Cr LJ 77 (Cal)."
+"389. Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 [LNIND 1992 SC 300] :"
+"1992 Cr LJ 2916 ; S Jayaseelan v State of SPF, 2002 Cr LJ 732 (Mad), the cashier received"
+"repayment of loan installments, issued receipts and also made entries in the pass book but did"
+not show the repayments in the ledger books. Dishonest intention established. Sentence of 2
+"years reduced to 18 months because he had paid back. Bank of Baroda v Samrat Exports, 1998"
+"Cr LJ 2773 (Kant), the debit by the bank to the guarantor's account in respect of the sum due"
+from the principal borrower was not a dishonest misappropriation. MN Ojha v Alok Kumar
+"Srivastav, (2009) 9 SCC 682 [LNIND 2009 SC 1708] : AIR 2010 SC 201 [LNIND 2009 SC 1708] -"
+the averments made in the complaint does not disclose the commission of any offence by the
+appellant or any one of them. Proceedings quashed.
+"390. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND 2009 SC 1652] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"646; Satyajit Roy v State of Tripura, 2010 Cr LJ 3397 (Gau)- Where the allegation was of Criminal"
+"breach of trust by banker, conviction based on an alleged writing of accused without examining"
+the hand writing expert is held not proper.
+"391. R Venkatkrishnan v CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 [LNIND 2009 SC 1653] : AIR 2010 SC 1812"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1653] .
+"392. Wharton, 14th Edn, p 649."
+"393. Radhey Shyam Khemka v State of Bihar, AIR 1993 SCW 2427 : 1993 Cr LJ 2888 : (1993) 3"
+SCC 54 [LNIND 1993 SC 276] .
+"394. Ibid, p. 400."
+"395. Pramod Parmeshwarlal Banka v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 4906 (Bom)."
+"396. Ibid, p. 148."
+"397. Stevens v Biller, (1883) 25 Ch D 31 ."
+"398. Wharton, 14th Edn, p 95."
+"399. Chaman Lal v State of Punjab, (2008) 11 SCC 721 : AIR 2009 SC 2972 [LNIND 2009 SC 721]"
+.
+400. The Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872) section 182.
+"401. Chandi Prasad, (1955) 2 SCR 1035 [LNIND 1955 SC 108] ."
+"402. Muthusami Pillai, (1895) 1 Weir 432."
+"403. Chandra Prasad, (1926) 5 Pat 578."
+"404. RK Dalmia, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 805 . A partner of a"
+firm opening an account in the firm name showing himself as a proprietor and depositing firm
+"cheques into it and withdrawing money from it, does not commit an offence under this section"
+"or section 419. Tapan Kumar Mitra v Manick Lal Dey, 1987 Cr LJ 1483 (Cal)."
+"405. Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 547 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+461] : AIR 2012 SC 3242 [LNIND 2012 SC 461] .
+"406. SK Agarwal v Manoj Dalmia, 2001 Cr LJ 3343 (All)."
+"407. V S Achuthanandan v R Balakrishna Pillai, AIR 2011 SC 1037 [LNIND 2011 SC 165] : 2011"
+(3) SCC 317 [LNIND 2011 SC 165] .
+"408. Somnath v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 1490 [LNIND 1972 SC 112] : 1972 Cr LJ 897"
+"409. Sadashiva Rao v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 2110 ."
+"410. Suresh Tolani v State of Rajasthan, 2001 Cr LJ 1959 (Raj)."
+"411. HICEL Pharma Ltd v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 2566 (AP)."
+"412. Sharon Michael v State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 3 SCC 375 [LNIND 2008 SC 2506] : (2009) 2"
+SCC (Cr) 103.
+"413. Roshan Lal Raina v State of J & K, AIR 1983 SC 631 : 1983 Cr LJ 975 : 1983 2 SCC 429 . See"
+"also Jat Ram v State of HP, 1991 Cr LJ 1435 , false wage bill, not properly proved."
+"414. State of Orissa v Gopinath Panigrahi, 1995 Cr LJ 4095 (Ori). Todar Singh Premi v State of UP,"
+"1992 Cr LJ 1724 (All), no proof of entrustment of money to the accused Government service."
+"Prafulla Kumar Panda v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 3818 (Ori), no proof of entrustment of"
+"cheque, the only cheque produced was of personal payment, no offence."
+"415. Bansidhar Swain v State, 1993 Cr LJ 830 (Ori)."
+"416. Shankerlal Vishwakarma v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 2808 (MP). The Court cited this book at"
+p. 2812 to highlight the distinction between Cheating and Criminal Breach of Trust and Criminal
+"Misappropriation. See at p 396 of 26th Edn of 1987 and State of MP v DN Pandya, 1983 MPLJ"
+"778 . Jitendra Nath Bose v State of WB, 1991 Cr LJ 922 (Cal), no evidence of entrustment;"
+"Government and non-Government property lumped together in charge, held not proper,"
+"Baikuntha v Nilamani Bantha, 1991 Cr LJ 59 (Ori), entrustment of cash not proved."
+"417. Fakira Nayak v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 1479 (Ori)."
+"418. Jiwan Dass v State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 1301 [LNIND 1999 SC 204] : 1999 Cr LJ 2034 ."
+"419. VN Sonal v Nagamanickam, 2001 Cr PC 3428 (Mad)."
+"420. Shanmugham v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 2042 (Mad)."
+"421. Rabindra Nath Bera v State of West Bengal, 2012 CR LJ 913 (Cal)."
+"422. Mustafikhan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) 1 SCC 623 [LNIND 2006 SC 1076] ."
+"423. Sushil Suri v CBI, (2011) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] : AIR 2011 SC 1713 [LNIND 2011"
+"SC 494] ; Nikhil Merchant v Central Bureau of Investigation, (2008) 9 SCC 677 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+1660] distinguished.
+"424. S and R, Legal Affairs, West Bengal v SK Roy, 1974 Cr LJ 678 : AIR 1974 SC 794 [LNIND"
+1974 SC 35] .
+"425. Sardar Singh, 1977 Cr LJ 1158 : AIR 1977 SC 1766 : (1977) 1 SCC 463 . See also State of"
+"Orissa v Gangadhar Pande, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 150 : 1991 SCC (Cr) 389, leniency shown to a"
+misappropriating Government servant because of old age and retirement since long. Kulbir
+"Singh v State of Punjab, 1991 Cr LJ 1756 (P&H), embezzlement of stone metal, proceedings"
+"instituted after a lapse of 9 yrs., quashed."
+"426. Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd v Delta Classic Pvt Ltd, 2010 Cr LJ 4591"
+(Bom).
+"427. Vijay Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 2790 (Raj)."
+"428. Shivanarayan, 1980 Cr LJ 388 (SC)."
+"429. Narindra Kumar Jain v MP, 1996 Cr LJ 3200 : AIR 1996 SC 2213 ."
+"430. Thermax Ltd v K M Johny, 2011 (11) Scale 128 [LNIND 2011 SC 947] : 2011 (13) SCC 412"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 947] ; GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v India Infoline Ltd, (2013) 4 SCC 505"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 232] : AIR 2013 SC 1433 [LNIND 2013 SC 232] - from perusal of order passed
+by the Magistrate it reveals that two witnesses including one of the trustees were examined by
+the complainant but none of them specifically stated as to which of the accused committed
+breach of trust or cheated the complainant except general and bald allegations made therein-
+proceedings quashed.
+"431. Maksud Saiyed v State of Gujarat, 2008 (5) SCC 668 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] : JT 2007 (11)"
+"SC 276 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] ; Pramod Parmeshwarlal Banka v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ"
+4906 (Bom).
+"432. Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha, AIR 1992 SC 1815 [LNIND 1992 SC 300] :"
+1993 Supp (1) SCC 499
+"433. State of Karnataka v Syed Mehaboob, 2000 Cr LJ 1184 (Kant)."
+"434. N Bhargavan Pillai v State of Kerala, AIR 2004 SC 2317 [LNIND 2004 SC 520] : 2004 Cr LJ"
+2494 : (2004) 2 KLT 725 .
+"435. R Ramachandran Nair v Deputy Superintendent Vigilance Police, (2011) 4 SCC 395 [LNIND"
+2011 SC 319] : (2011) 2 SCC (Cr) 251.
+"436. Raghunath Anant Govilkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1486; Shreekantiah"
+"Ramayya Munipalli v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 [LNIND 1954 SC 180] and also Amrik"
+"Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 [LNIND 1955 SC 15] ; State of UP v Paras Nath Singh,"
+(2009) 6 SCC 372 [LNINDORD 2009 SC 650] : 2009 Cr LJ 3069 .
+"437. Inder Sen Jain v State of Punjab, AIR 1994 SC 1065 : 1994 Cr LJ 1224 . Bachchu Singh v"
+"State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 2285 [LNIND 1999 SC 1375] : 1999 Cr LJ 3528 , misuse of tax"
+"money collected by a Gram Sachiv, he was sentenced to six months RI and fine. He had already"
+undergone 4½ months. His sentence was reduced to period already undergone.
+"438. State of HP v Karanvir, 2006 Cr LJ 2917 : AIR 2006 SC 2211 [LNIND 2006 SC 394] : (2006) 5"
+SCC 381 [LNIND 2006 SC 394] .
+"439. Sushil Kumar Singhal v Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, 2010 AIR (SCW) 5119 :"
+(2010) 8 SCC 573 [LNIND 2010 SC 730] .
+"440. Sushil Kumar Singhal v Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, 2010 AIR (SCW) 5119 :"
+(2010) 8 SCC 573 [LNIND 2010 SC 730] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of the Receiving of Stolen Property
+[s 410] Stolen property.
+"Property, the possession whereof has been transferred by theft, or by extortion, or by"
+"robbery, and property which has been criminally misappropriated or in respect of"
+"which 441.[***] criminal breach of trust has been committed, is designated as ""stolen"
+"property"", 442.[whether the transfer has been made, or the misappropriation or breach"
+"of trust has been committed, within or without 443.[India]]. But, if such property"
+subsequently comes into the possession of a person legally entitled to the possession
+"thereof, it then ceases to be stolen property."
+"441. The words ""the"" and ""offence of"" rep. by Act 12 of 1891, section 2 and Sch I and Act 8 of"
+"1882, section 9, respectively."
+"442. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882, section 9."
+"443. The words ""British India"" have successively been subs. by the A.O. 1948, the A.O. 1950 and"
+"Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Sch (w.e.f. 1 April 1951), to read as above."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of the Receiving of Stolen Property
+[s 411] Dishonestly receiving stolen property.
+"Whoever dishonestly receives or retains1 any stolen property, knowing or having"
+"reason to believe the same to be stolen property,2 shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+State Amendment
+"Tamil Nadu.—The following amendments were made by T.N. Act No. 28 of 1993, section"
+2.
+Section 411 of the principal Act shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section
+"and after sub-section (1) as so renumbered, the following sub-section shall be added,"
+namely—
+"""(2) Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any idol or icon stolen from any building"
+used as a place of worship knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen
+"property shall, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), be punished with"
+rigorous imprisonment which shall not be less than two years but which may exceed to
+three years and with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than two years."""
+COMMENT—
+Section 410 defines stolen property. A property is stolen for the purpose of this section
+"when its possession is transferred by theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity or criminal"
+breach of trust or which was obtained under misappropriation committed whether in
+India or outside. An extended meaning is given to the words 'stolen property' which are
+"used in the four subsequent sections. Not only things which have been stolen, extorted"
+or robbed but also things which have been obtained by criminal misappropriation or
+criminal breach of trust are within the meaning assigned to these words. Section 411
+provides punishment to the person who dishonestly receives stolen property. The
+person must have the knowledge that it is a stolen property. This section as also the
+"succeeding sections are directed not against the principal offender, e.g., a thief, robber"
+or misappropriator but against the class of persons who trade in stolen articles and are
+"receivers of stolen property. Principal offenders are therefore, outside the scope of this"
+section. Accordingly the conviction of the principal offender is also not a prerequisite to
+the conviction of the receiver of stolen property under this section.444.
+[s 411.1] Essential ingredients.—
+(a) Dishonest receipt or retention of stolen property. (b) Knowledge or reason to believe
+at the time of receipt that the property was obtained in the ways specified in the
+section. The offence of dishonest retention of property is almost contemporaneous
+with the offence of dishonestly receiving stolen property. A person who dishonestly
+"receives property and retains it, must obviously continue to retain it. It is the duty of the"
+prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of a person under section 411 to prove:
+(1) That the stolen property was in the possession of the accused.
+(2) That some person other than the accused had possession of the property
+before the accused got possession of it and
+(3) That the accused had knowledge that the property was stolen.445. When the field
+"from which the ornaments were recovered was an open one, and accessible to all and"
+"sundry, it is difficult to hold positively that the accused was is possession of these"
+articles. The fact of recovery by the accused is compatible with the circumstance of
+somebody else having placed the articles there and of the accused somehow acquiring
+"knowledge about their whereabouts and that being so, the fact of discovery cannot be"
+regarded as conclusive proof that the accused was in possession of these articles.446.
+"As observed by the Apex Court in the case of N Madhavan v State of Kerala,447. as a"
+normal rule after an inquiry or trial when the accused is discharged or acquitted the
+Court ought to restore the property from the person from whose custody it was taken
+"and in a case of conviction, it is the person from whose possession it was stolen, who"
+would be entitled to its possession when the property seized is referable to such stolen
+property.
+"1. 'Dishonestly receives or retains'.— To constitute dishonest retention, there must"
+"have been a change in the mental element of possession,—possession always"
+subsisting animo et facto—from an honest to a dishonest condition of the mind in
+"relation to the thing possessed. Where pursuant to a hire purchase agreement, on the"
+"default of the purchaser to pay the instalment amount, the seller of a vehicle"
+"repossessed it, it was held that as there was no dishonest intention to retain on his"
+"part, the provisions of this section were not attracted.448."
+[s 411.2] Identity of stolen property.—
+Before a conviction can be recorded under this section it must be shown that the
+"property recovered and seized was stolen property. Where, therefore, the identity of the"
+"property is not established, there cannot be any conviction under section 411, IPC,"
+1860.449.
+2. 'Knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property'.—The offence
+"made punishable is not the receiving of stolen property from any particular person, but"
+receiving such property knowing it to be stolen. The word 'believe' is a much stronger
+"word than suspect, and it involves the necessity of showing that the circumstances"
+were such that a reasonable man must have felt convinced in his mind that the
+property with which he was dealing must be stolen property.450.
+[s 411.3] Stolen property of the deceased.—
+Where stolen ornaments of the deceased which she had been wearing when she was
+last seen alive are discovered within three days of the murder in pursuance of an
+"information given by the accused and there is no other evidence, the accused can be"
+"convicted only under section 411 and not under section 302, IPC, 1860, or section 394,"
+"IPC, 1860, as there is nothing to connect him with the murder or the robbery.451."
+[s 411.4] Recent Possession.—
+There is a presumption under the law that where a person is found to be in a recent
+"possession of stolen or robbed articles, he must be the offender himself or must have"
+"received them with knowledge. In reference to the meaning of the expression ""recent"
+"possession"", the Supreme Court has suggested that no fixed time limit can be laid"
+down and each matter must go by its own facts. It varies according to whether the
+property in question in its nature is capable of passing readily from hand to hand. If the
+"goods are not of that kind, even one year may not be too long. In the present case,"
+"however, there was no gap of time between the arrest of the accused and the recovery"
+"and, hence, the presumption of his guilt.452."
+[s 411.5] Sentencing.—
+Where the period of 12 years had elapsed since the institution of the case and the
+"accused (revision petitioner) remained in jail for ten months, his sentence was reduced"
+to the period already undergone. The Court did not interfere in the concurrent finding of
+fact.453.
+[s 411.6] Presumption from possession.—
+A property which was alleged to have been taken by robbery at the point of pistol was
+found in the possession of the accused. While the charge of robbery under section 392
+"failed, that of receiving stolen property became established by reason of the"
+"presumption created by section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.454. When the"
+prosecution established beyond all reasonable doubt that M.O s. 25–27 belonged to
+"the deceased No. 1, were found in the possession of A2, the burden shifts to the"
+accused to explain the same under section 114-A of the Evidence Act. If he has not
+"explained the possession of stolen articles, the presumption is that he is receiver of"
+stolen property or a thief.455.
+[s 411.7] Probation.—
+The accused was under 21 years of age; has five brothers and sisters; is son of a poor
+"agriculturist and that the stolen articles recovered from him are not so valuable, the"
+sentence of imprisonment imposed by the learned appellate Court is set aside and the
+petitioner is directed to be released on probation of good conduct for a period of six
+months.456.
+"444. Mir Naqvi Askari v CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : AIR 2010 SC 528"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1651] .
+"445. Mir Naqvi Askari v CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : AIR 2010 SC 528"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1651] .
+"446. Trimbak v State, AIR 1954 SC 39 : 1954 Cr LJ 335 (SC)."
+"447. N Madhavan v State of Kerala, AIR 1979 SC 1829 [LNIND 1979 SC 321] ."
+"448. Rajendra Kumar, 1969 Cr LJ 243 . Sheonath Bhar v State of UP, 1990 Cr LJ 1423 (All), where"
+dishonest retention of stolen watch was proved and fine Rs. 125 only was imposed because a
+long time had passed and the accused had already remained in jail for a month. Syed Basha v
+"State of Karnataka, 2001 Cr LJ 1813 (Kant), the prosecution failed to prove that the accused was"
+in possession of sandalwood billets stolen by someone else. The presumption under section 84
+"of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 regarding ownership of sandalwood trees was held to be not"
+"applicable to sandalwood billets. Jitendra Kumar Agarwal v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 3834"
+"(Jhar), charge of receiving ration material not quashed because wheat was found in the"
+"compound of the petitioner. Karni Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 1791 (Raj), where the"
+"accused was not seen anywhere near the house from which things were stolen, he was"
+punished only for receiving stolen property because things were recovered from his possession.
+"A Devendran v State of TN, 1998 Cr LJ 814 : AIR 1998 SC 2821 [LNIND 1997 SC 1368] , articles"
+stolen in an incident of murder and robbery were recovered from the house of the accused after
+"two months. Not sufficient to convict him for robbery and murder, but only for receiving stolen"
+"property under section 411. See also Shahul Hameed v State, 1998 Cr LJ 885 (Mad)."
+"449. Mahabir Sao v State, 1972 Cr LJ 458 : AIR 1972 SC 642 : (1972) 1 SCC 505 ; Chandmal,"
+"1976 Cr LJ 679 : AIR 1976 SC 917 : (1976) 1 SCC 621 ; Mewaram v State of UP, 1988 Cr LJ 1215"
+"All, failure to identify wrist watch recovered, conviction under the section set aside. Sabitri"
+"Sharma v State of Orissa, 1987 Cr LJ 956 (Ori), mere possession, no liability. Narayan Das v State"
+"of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 29 (Raj) failure to prove identity of the stolen property so as to show"
+that it was the same stolen property which was recovered.
+"450. Mohon Lal, 1979 Cr LJ 1328 : AIR 1979 SC 1718 ."
+"451. Nagappa Dhondiba, 1980 Cr LJ 1270 : AIR 1980 SC 1753 . See further Joga Gola v State of"
+"Gujarat, 1982 SCC (Cr) 141 : AIR 1982 SC 1227 : 1981 Supp SCC 66 , possession by the accused"
+of the cows which were in the herd of the deceased at the time of his death was considered to
+"be enough proof for a conviction under the section. See also Pandara Nadar v State of TN, AIR"
+"1991 SC 391 : 1991 Cr LJ 468 , where there was neither proof of possession on the part of any"
+"of the several persons, who were already acquitted from the charge of belonging to a gang of"
+"thieves; Kedar Nath v State of UP, AIR 1991 SC 1224 : 1991 Cr LJ 989 , no value of recovery of"
+"possession, where appeal being heard 17 years after occurrence. There was no charge in this"
+case under the section. The Supreme Court refused to convict 17 years after the occurrence.
+"452. Errabhadrappa v State of Karnataka, AIR 1983 SC 446 [LNIND 1983 SC 83] : 1983 Cr LJ 846"
+: (1983) 2 SCC 330 [LNIND 1983 SC 83] .
+"453. Kanik Lal Thakur v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 375 ."
+"454. Karni Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 1791 (Raj). Public Prosecutor v Yenta Arjuna,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 179 (AP), no evidence connecting the accused person with murder and robbery, but"
+"recovery from him created the presumption under section 114, Evidence Act, 1872 that he was"
+"recipient with knowledge. Preetam Singh v State, 1998 Cr LJ 1483 (Del) no presumption where"
+"the recovery process itself was faulted. Pentapati Veerababu v State of AP, 1998 Cr LJ 2505"
+"(AP), recovery of stolen property from an employee of the shop at the instance of the accused"
+from the house of his brother-in-law. Presumption against him because the in criminating
+evidence.
+"455. Giriraj Singh Gaghela v State of A P, 2009 Cr LJ 1257 (AP)."
+"456. Rajive Sandhu v State of Union Territory, 2004 Cr LJ 4308 (PH)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of the Receiving of Stolen Property
+[s 412] Dishonestly receiving property stolen in the commission of a dacoity.
+"Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property, the possession whereof"
+he knows or has reason to believe to have been transferred by the commission of
+"dacoity, or dishonestly receives from a person, whom he knows or has reason to"
+"believe to belong or to have belonged to a gang of dacoits, property which he knows"
+"or has reason to believe to have been stolen, shall be punished with 457."
+"[imprisonment for life], or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to"
+"ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+This section was enacted to stamp out the offence of dacoity which was very rampant
+when the Code came into force. It refers to persons other than actual dacoits. It
+provides the same punishment to a receiver of property obtained in dacoity as to
+"dacoits themselves. It is apparent from a plain reading of section 412 IPC, 1860, that a"
+"person receiving stolen goods, would be guilty of the offence under section 412 IPC,"
+"1860, if it can further be shown, that the recipient of the goods knew (or had reason to"
+"believe), that the person offering the goods, belonged to a gang of dacoits.458."
+[s 412.1] CASES.—
+"The Supreme Court held in PB Soundankar v State of Maharashtra, in absence of any"
+"evidence to show the appellant was aware, that the silver chips presented to him by"
+accused were procured by the commission of a dacoity or in the alternative that he
+knew (or had reason to believe) that accused belonged to a gang of dacoits the guilt of
+"the appellant under section 412 IPC, 1860 could not be stated to have been"
+"substantiated in the facts and circumstances of the present case."" Hence, the"
+conviction altered to section 411.459. Where properties looted in a dacoity were found
+in the possession of the accused who was the resident of the neighbouring village
+"within three days of the occurrence, it was held that it could be presumed that he had"
+known or had reason to believe that the properties were the stolen properties of the
+"dacoity and as such his conviction under section 412, IPC, 1860, was quite in order.460."
+The same principle was upheld by the Supreme Court to say that where property looted
+"in a dacoity was recovered from the accused very soon after the dacoity, the accused"
+"could not be convicted under section 395 but his conviction under section 412, IPC,"
+"1860, would be quite in order.461. Recovery at the instance of the accused persons of"
+stolen property shortly after a dacoity has been held by the Supreme Court as sufficient
+for a conviction under this section.462.
+[s 412.2] Conviction under section 395 and section 412;-
+When the accused was convicted of having committed dacoity there could not be any
+"further conviction under section 412.463. Even though dacoity is proved, conviction"
+"under section 412 is maintainable.464. In Mohan Chetri v State of West Bengal, it was"
+held that conviction under sections 412 or 411 is not permissible simultaneously with
+"conviction under sections 395 or 394, as the case may be, in respect of the same"
+accused.465.
+"457. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"458. PB Soundankar v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 1 SCC 635 [LNIND 2012 SC 759] ."
+"459. PB Soundankar v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 1 SCC 635 [LNIND 2012 SC 759] ; Narayan"
+"Prasad v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 204 [LNIND 2005 SC 881] : (2005) 13 SCC 247"
+"[LNIND 2005 SC 881] ; Rafi v State of Uttaranchal, 2012 Cr LJ. 4012 (Utt)-where looted property"
+was recovered from possession of accused persons conviction under section 396 and 412 was
+held proper.
+"460. Ishwari, 1980 Cr LJ 571 (All)."
+"461. Amar Singh, 1982 Cr LJ 610 (SC) : AIR 1982 SC 129 ."
+"462. Lachhman Ram v State of Orissa, AIR 1985 SC 486 [LNIND 1985 SC 77] : 1985 Cr LJ 753 :"
+"(1985) 2 SCC 533 [LNIND 1985 SC 77] . Pawan Yadav v State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 3626 (Pat),"
+"property stolen in dacoity recovered from the house of the co-accused, conviction proper, spent"
+"3 years in jail, single identification of looted property, sentence reduced to the period already"
+undergone.
+"463. Mojaffar v State of West Bengal, 2011 Cr LJ 1249 ; Dilip Malik v State, 1991 Cr LJ 2171"
+(Cal).
+"464. Mursalim Shaikh v State of West Bengal, 2011 Cr LJ 1840 (Cal)."
+"465. Mohan Chetri v State of West Bengal, 1992 Cr LJ 2374 (Cal). Rafikul Alam v State of West"
+"Bengal;2008 CR LJ 2005 (Cal); Raj Kumar v State, AIR 2008 SC 3284 [LNIND 2008 SC 2782] :"
+(2008) 11 SCC 709 [LNIND 2008 SC 849] - the Trial Court held that since recovery effected by
+"the prosecution was not in consonance with law, it could not be said that stolen articles of"
+dacoity were found from the accused and consequently charge for an offence punishable under
+"section 412, IPC, 1860 also could not be said to be established. Supreme Court did not interfere"
+with the order of acquittal.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of the Receiving of Stolen Property
+[s 413] Habitually dealing in stolen property.
+Whoever habitually receives or deals in property which he knows or has reason to
+"believe to be stolen property, shall be punished with 466.[imprisonment for life], or"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+The reason for inserting section 413 by the legislature is clear from the language of the
+section. The legislature purposely enacted knowing it well that there is already section
+411 in respect of offence of dishonestly receiving stolen property knowing it to be
+"stolen. The legislature inserted section 413 in the IPC, 1860 where under it is provided"
+"that if a person is habitually dealing in stolen property, he will be charged for offence"
+"under section 413, IPC, 1860. The terms of the provision make it clear that ""habitually"
+"dealing"" means there is evidence on record that there are other instances other than"
+the present instance of the accused found to be indulging in the act and he is facing
+"trial, then, it can be said that section 413, IPC, 1860 is attracted.467. This section"
+punishes severely the common receiver or professional dealer in stolen property.
+"466. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"467. State v Waman Gheeya, 2007 Cr LJ 3614 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of the Receiving of Stolen Property
+[s 414] Assisting in concealment of stolen property.
+Whoever voluntarily assists in concealing or disposing of or making away with
+"property which he knows or has reason to believe to be stolen property, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section requires two things—
+1. Voluntary assistance in concealing or disposing of or making away with property.
+2. Knowledge or reason to believe that such property is stolen property.
+"The section is intended to penalise the person, who deal with stolen property in such a"
+way that it becomes difficult to identify it or use it as evidence. It is not necessary to
+establish that the property was the subject matter of any particular theft. It would
+"suffice if the prosecution can establish that the accused had knowledge or ""had reason"
+"to believe"" that the property is stolen one. All that the prosecution is required to"
+establish is that the accused rendered help in either concealment or disposal of the
+"property, which he had reason to believe to be stolen property or had knowledge to"
+believe that it was such.468. It is not necessary for a person to be convicted under this
+section that another person must be traced out and convicted of an offence of
+committing theft. The prosecution has simply to establish that the property recovered
+is stolen property and that the accused provided help in its concealment and
+disposal.469.
+[s 414.1] CASES.—
+"The accused was the driver of a taxi, which was carrying several persons who had hired"
+"it. While on its way the taxi stopped at a place for some reason, not known, and two of"
+the passengers got down from the taxi and within a distance of about three and a half
+"yards from the taxi they suddenly and without premeditation attacked, injured and"
+robbed a man of his purse containing about Rs. 50. The robbers then boarded the taxi
+"and the driver, in spite of the cries of the victim, drove away as fast as he could. It was"
+held that the driver assisted the robbers in making away with the money so robbed and
+was guilty under this section.470. A person who helps the disposal of stolen property by
+buying the same himself has been held to be guilty of the offence under the
+section.471.
+"468. Sayyed Issaq v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 2950 (Bom)."
+"469. Ajendranath, AIR 1964 SC 170 [LNIND 1963 SC 126] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 129 ."
+"470. Hari Singh, (1940) 2 Cal 9 ."
+"471. Bhanwarlal v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 625 (Raj)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Cheating
+[s 415] Cheating.
+"Whoever, by deceiving any person1, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so"
+"deceived to deliver any property2 to any person, or to consent that any person shall"
+"retain any property,3 or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to"
+"do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived,4 and which act"
+"or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind,"
+"reputation or property,5 is said to ""cheat""."
+Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of
+this section.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service, intentionally deceives Z, and"
+thus dishonestly induces Z to let him have on credit goods for which he does not
+mean to pay. A cheats.
+"(b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article, intentionally deceives Z into a"
+"belief that this article was made by a certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus"
+dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.
+"(c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article, intentionally deceives Z into"
+"believing that the article corresponds with the sample, and thereby, dishonestly"
+induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.
+"(d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a house with which A keeps no"
+"money, and by which A expects that the bill will be dishonored, intentionally"
+"deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article, intending"
+not to pay for it. A cheats.
+"(e) A, by pledging as diamonds article which he knows are not diamonds,"
+"intentionally deceives Z, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend money. A"
+cheats.
+(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z
+may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money. A not
+intending to repay it. A cheats.
+(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to deliver to Z a certain
+"quantity of indigo plant which he does not intend to deliver, and thereby"
+dishonestly induces Z to advance money upon the faith of such delivery. A
+"cheats; but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to deliver the indigo"
+"plant, and afterwards breaks his contract and does not deliver it, he does not"
+"cheat, but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract."
+(h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has performed A's part of a
+"contract made with Z, which he has not performed, and thereby dishonestly"
+induces Z to pay money. A cheats.
+"(i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in consequence of such sale"
+"he has no right to the property, sells or mortgages the same to Z, without"
+"disclosing the fact of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives the"
+purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats.
+COMMENT—
+In most of the foregoing offences relating to property the offender merely got
+"possession of the thing in question, but in the case of cheating he obtains possession"
+plus property in it.
+"The authors of the Code observe: ""We propose to make it cheating to obtain property"
+"by deception in all cases where the property is fraudulently obtained; that is to say, in all"
+cases where the intention of the person who has by deceit obtained the property was
+to cause a distribution of property which the law pronounces to be a wrongful
+"distribution, and in no other case whatever. However immoral a deception may be, we"
+do not consider it as an offence against the rights of property if its object is only to
+cause a distribution of property which the law recognizes as rightful.
+"""We propose to punish as guilty of cheating a man who, by false representations,"
+"obtains a loan of money, not meaning to repay it; a man who, by false representations,"
+"obtains an advance of money, not meaning to perform the service or to deliver the"
+"article for which the advance is given; a man who, by falsely pretending to have"
+"performed work for which he was hired, obtains pay to which he is not entitled."
+"""In all these cases there is deception. In all, the deceiver's object is fraudulent. He"
+intends in all these cases to acquire or retain wrongful possession of that to which
+some other person has a better claim and which that other person is entitled to recover
+"by law. In all these cases, therefore, the object has been wrongful gain, attended with"
+"wrongful loss. In all, therefore, there has, according to our definition, been cheating"".472."
+[s 415.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) Deception of any person.
+(2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person—
+(i) to deliver any property to any person; or
+(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
+(b) Intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not
+"do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to"
+"cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.473. There"
+are two separate classes of acts which the persons deceived may be induced to do. In
+the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to
+any person. The second class of acts set-forth in the section is the doing or omitting to
+do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so
+deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the
+"second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or"
+dishonest.474.
+In the definition of cheating there are set forth two separate classes of acts which the
+"person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place, he may be induced"
+fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any
+person shall retain any property. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the
+doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do
+if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or
+dishonest. In the second class of acts the inducing must be intentional but not
+fraudulent or dishonest.
+The definition of the offence of cheating embraces some cases in which no transfer of
+property is occasioned by the deception and some in which such a transfer occurs; for
+these cases generally provision is made in section 417 of the Code. For cases in which
+property is transferred a more specific provision is made by section 420.
+"The offence of cheating is not committed if a third party, on whom no deception has"
+"been practised, sustains pecuniary loss in consequence of the accused's act.475."
+[s 415.2] Cheating and extortion.—
+"The offence of cheating must, like that of extortion, be committed by the wrongful"
+obtaining of a consent. The difference is that the extortioner obtains the consent by
+"intimidation, and the cheat by deception.476."
+[s 415.3] Breach of contract and cheating.—
+The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine
+one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may
+"be judged by his subsequent conduct, but for which the subsequent conduct is not the"
+sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution under
+"section 420, IPC, 1860, unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the"
+"beginning of the transaction, which is the time when the offence is said to have been"
+committed.477. There was allegation from one side that no payment was being made
+under the contract. The other side pleaded that part payments were made from time to
+time and the balance was withheld due to non-standard nature of the work and a letter
+to that effect was issued. The Court said that the controversy was wholly of civil
+nature. There was total absence of dishonest criminal intention to dupe contractions'
+right from the inception of the relationship.478. Although breach of contract per se
+"would not come in the way of initiation of a criminal proceeding, there cannot be any"
+doubt whatsoever that in absence of the averments made in the complaint petition
+"wherefrom the ingredients of an offence can be found out, the Court should not"
+"hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr PC, 1973.479."
+The distinction was explained by the Supreme Court in a case involving an agreement
+for sale of property. The allegation in the complaint was that the seller had not
+disclosed that one of his brothers had filed a partition suit which was pending. There
+was no allegation that non-disclosure of the suit was intentional. The dishonest
+intention on the part of the accused at the beginning of negotiations was not made out
+by averments in the complaint. The High Court was wrong in declining to quash the
+criminal proceedings.480.
+"The accused promised, propagated and induced the public through advertisements to"
+invest money in a circulation scheme. Double the money was promised to a member
+who enrolled 14 new members. The scheme was found to be practically impossible.
+Thus there was an element of cheating.481.
+[s 415.4] Dishonest intention at the time of making the promise a sine qua non
+for the offence of cheating.—
+To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or
+dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From mere fact that the
+"promisor could not keep his promise, it cannot be presumed that he all along had a"
+culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning.482.
+"[s 415.5] Cheating, criminal breach of trust, and criminal misappropriation.—"
+Cheating differs from the last two offences in the fact that the cheat takes possession
+of property by deception. There is wrongful gain or loss in both cases and in both
+cases there is inducement to deliver property. In the case of cheating the dishonest
+intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal
+"breach of trust, the person who comes into possession of but retains it or converts it to"
+his own use against the terms of the contract.483.
+Criminal breach of trust and cheating are two distinct offences generally involving
+dishonest intention but mutually exclusive and different in basic concept. The former is
+voluntary but the latter is purely on the basis of inducement with dishonest
+intention.484.
+"1. 'Deceiving any person'.—Deceiving means causing to believe what is false, or"
+"misleading as to a matter of fact, or leading into error. Whenever a person fraudulently"
+"represents as an existing fact that which is not an existing fact, he commits this"
+"offence. A wilful misrepresentation of a definite fact with intent to defraud, cognizable"
+by the senses—as where a seller represents the quantity of coal to be 14 cwt. whereas
+"it is in fact only eight cwt. but so packed as to look more; or where the seller, by"
+"manoeuvring, contrives to pass off tasters of cheese as if extracted from the cheese"
+"offered for sale, whereas it is not—is a cheating.485. Deception is a necessary"
+ingredient for the offences of cheating under both parts of this section. The
+"complainant, therefore, necessarily needs to prove that the inducement had been"
+caused by the deception exercised by the accused. Such deception must necessarily
+"produce the inducement to part with or deliver property, which the complainant would"
+"not have parted with or delivered, but for the inducement resulting from deception. The"
+explanation to the section would clearly indicate that there must be no dishonest
+"concealment of facts. In other words, non-disclosure of relevant information would"
+also be treated as a misrepresentation of facts leading to deception.486.
+It is not sufficient to prove that a false representation had been made but it is further
+necessary to prove that the representation was false to the knowledge of the accused
+and was made in order to deceive the complainant.487. Where a party was persuaded
+to take out a policy of insurance and the insurer subsequently failed to pay on the
+"happening of the event insured against, it was held that a dishonest intention cannot be"
+inferred from a subsequent failure to fulfil a promise.488.
+It is not necessary that the false pretence should be made in express words; it can be
+"inferred from all the circumstances attending the obtaining of the property,489. or from"
+conduct.490. If a person orders out goods on credit promising to pay for them on a
+"particular day knowing that it was impossible for him to pay, this would amount to"
+cheating. But the mere fact that he is in embarrassed circumstances does not lead to
+such inference.491.
+[s 415.6] Cheque discounting facility.—
+The complainant is required to show that accused had fraudulent or dishonest
+intention at the time of making promise or representation. In the absence of culpable
+"intention at the time of making initial promise, no offence is made out under section"
+"420. In present case, the allowing of cheque discounting facility by bank officials to"
+"customers of the bank, without any criminal intent being proved, did not amount to"
+"commission of offence, particularly as facility allowed was not contrary to RBI"
+Guidelines. It could not also be said that there was a meeting of minds in a conspiracy
+"to commit an offence, nor an act of corruption could be inferred from transactions"
+between the bank and its customers. The accused officials might have been
+prosecuted under section 409 but they were not so charged. Their conviction was set
+aside.492.
+2. 'Fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any
+property'.—The words 'fraudulently' and 'dishonestly' do not govern the whole of the
+"definition of cheating. The section is divided into two parts, the second of which"
+"provides for the case of a person who, by deceiving another intentionally, induces the"
+person so deceived to do an act which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm
+although the deceiver has not acted fraudulently or dishonestly.493.
+3. 'Or to consent that any person shall retain any property'.—It is cheating whether a
+"deception causes a person fraudulently or dishonestly to acquire property by delivery,"
+or to retain property already in his possession.
+Property does not have to be a thing which has money or market value. Since a
+passport is a tangible thing and a document of great importance for travel abroad there
+can be no doubt that it is property within the meaning of this section. Thus where the
+accused obtained several passports by making false representation to the passport
+"issuing authority they were rightly convicted under sections 420 and 420/120B, IPC,"
+1860.494.
+4. 'Intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not
+"do or omit, etc.'.—Intention is the gist of the offence. The person cheated must have"
+been intentionally induced to do an act which he would not have done or to omit to do
+"an act which he would have done, owing to the deception practised on him. The"
+intention at the time of the offence and the consequence of the act or omission itself
+"has to be considered.495. Intent refers to the dominant motive of action, and not to a"
+casual or merely possible result.496. Where the facts narrated in the complaint revealed
+"a commercial transaction, it was held that such a transaction could not lead to the"
+conclusion of a criminal intention to cheat. The Court said that the crux of this offence
+is the intention of the accused person.497.
+Sections 415 read with section 420 indicates that fraudulent or dishonest inducement
+on the part of the accused must be at the inception and not at a subsequent stage. In
+"this case, blank cheques were handed over to the accused during the period 2000–"
+2004 for use of business purposes but the dispute between the parties admittedly
+"arose much after that, i.e., in 2005. Thus, no case for proceeding against the"
+respondent under section 420 is made out. Filling up of the blanks in a cheque by itself
+would not amount to forgery. A case for proceeding against the respondents under
+"section 406 IPC, 1860 has been made out. A cheque being a property, the same was"
+entrusted to the respondents. If the property has been misappropriated has been used
+"for a purpose for which the same had been handed over, a case under section 406 IPC,"
+1860 may be found to have been made out. It may be true that even in a proceeding
+"under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the appellant could raise a defence"
+that the cheques were not meant to be used towards discharge of a lawful liability or a
+"debt, but the same by itself would not mean that in an appropriate case, a complaint"
+petition cannot be allowed to be filed.498.
+The existence of fraudulent intention at the time of making promise or
+misrepresentation is a necessary ingredient. The mere failure on the part of the
+accused to keep up the promise is not sufficient to prove the existence of such
+intention from the beginning.499.
+[s 415.7] Fraudulent or dishonest intention to be at the outset.—
+To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or
+dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up
+"the promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when"
+he made the promise cannot be presumed.500.
+A beverages company entered into a bottling agreement with a bottling company for
+"bottling services for a period of five years, subsequently, however, the beverage"
+company transferred its trade mark to another company to which the bottling
+agreement was also assigned. But the latter company terminated the agreement. The
+bottling company filed a complaint for cheating saying that they had spent a huge
+amount in setting up their bottling unit. The complaint was quashed. There was no
+arrangement with the beverages company at the time when the complainant was
+"bringing up his unit, nor did the beverages company have any intention of cheating"
+from the start or at any subsequent stage.501.
+Although it is necessary that there should be misrepresentation from the very
+"beginning, the intention to cheat may in some cases develop at a later stage in the"
+process of formation of the contract. The respondent in this case was a co-sharer in
+the joint property. The other co-sharers sold it to others representing that they had one-
+third share in the property when in fact it was not so. It was held that no cheating was
+practiced in the transaction upon the complaining co-sharer. It was a fraud on others.
+The complainant could not launch a criminal prosecution against them.502.
+"The illustration (b) provided in section 415, IPC, 1860, very well covers the facts of this"
+"case for cheating by the accused. The illustration provides that ""(b) A, by putting a"
+"counterfoil mark on an article, intentionally deceives Z into a belief that this article was"
+"made in a certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus dishonestly induces Z to buy and pay"
+"for the article, A cheats.""503."
+[s 415.8] Civil and Criminal liability.—
+A distinction must be made between a civil wrong and a criminal wrong. When dispute
+"between the parties constitute only a civil wrong and not a criminal wrong, the Courts"
+would not permit a person to be harassed although no case for taking cognizance of
+the offence has been made out.504. The case of breach of trust or cheating is both a
+"civil wrong and a criminal offence, but under certain situations where the act alleged"
+"would predominantly be a civil wrong, such an act does not constitute a criminal"
+offence.505. Sometimes case may apparently look to be of civil nature or may involve a
+commercial transaction but civil disputes or commercial disputes in certain
+circumstances may also contain ingredients of criminal offences and such disputes
+have to be entertained notwithstanding they are also civil disputes.506.
+[s 415.9] Cheating by Misrepresentation as to Encumbrance to Property.—
+It is the intention which is important and not whether a man is under a legal duty to
+"disclose or suppress facts within his knowledge. Therefore, where a person with the"
+intention of causing wrongful loss to another makes a false representation to him or
+"suppresses certain facts, he will be said to have acted dishonestly even if the law does"
+"not require him to state the truth. Therefore, the non-disclosure of the previous"
+encumbrances will not affect the rights of the previous mortgagees and will not pass a
+complete title to the purchaser; the purchaser may nevertheless have been cheated.507.
+Where the vendor of immovable property omitted to mention that there was an
+"encumbranceon the property, it was held that he could not be convicted of cheating"
+unless it was shown either that he was asked by the vendee whether the property was
+"encumbered and said it was not, or that he sold the property on the representation that"
+it was unencumbered.508.
+[s 415.10] Disconnection of Electricity and Water by Landlord.—
+The landlord disconnected the electricity and water supply of the tenant. The tenant
+could not make out that the landlord had the fraudulent intention of deceiving the
+"tenant at the time of entering into the transaction of lease. Thus, there was no"
+possibility of conviction for an offence under section 415.509.
+5. 'Which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person
+"in body, mind, reputation or property'.—The damage must be the direct, natural or"
+probable consequence of the induced act. The resulting damage or likelihood of
+damage may not be within the actual contemplation of the accused when the deceit
+"was practised. The person deceived must have acted under the influence of deceit, and"
+"the damage must not be too remote.510. The use of the expression ""cause"" in this"
+section postulates a direct and proximate casual connection between the act or
+omission and the harm and damage to the victim.511.
+It is necessary that the harm should be caused to the person deceived. Damage or
+"harm in mind covers both, injury to mental faculties or mental pain or anguish.512."
+Where the accused falsely identified a person before the Oaths Commissioner and thus
+"induced him to attest an affidavit, it was held that no offence under section 419, IPC,"
+"1860, was committed as the Oaths Commissioner did not suffer any harm in his body,"
+"mind, reputation or property.513."
+[s 415.11] Explanation.—
+The Explanation refers to the actual deception itself and not to the concealment of a
+deception by someone else. For the purposes of this section the concealment of fact
+need not be illegal if it is dishonest.514.
+[s 415.12] Trade mark.—
+The Madras High Court has held that the infringement of a trade mark may constitute
+"the offence of cheating and, therefore, the FIR for the offence was not to be"
+quashed.515.
+Selling property having no right to do so.—Where property is sold by a person knowing
+"that it does not belong to him, it was held that he defrauded the purchaser. The latter"
+"could prosecute him under section 415, but no third person could do so.516."
+The offence of cheating need not necessarily relate to property. It can also partake the
+nature of personation. The accused in this case palmed off his sister as belonging to a
+"higher caste with the object of getting her married to the petitioner, a person of higher"
+caste. It was held that the offence fell under the second part of the definition.517.
+[s 415.13] Prosecution of Company.—
+"In the case of Penal Code offences, for example under section 420 of the IPC, 1860, for"
+"cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, the punishment prescribed is"
+imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and
+"shall also be liable to fine; and for the offence under section 417, that is, simple"
+"cheating, the punishment prescribed is imprisonment of either description for a term"
+which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. If the appellants' plea is
+"accepted then for the offence under section 417 IPC, 1860, which is an offence of"
+"minor nature, a company could be prosecuted and punished with fine whereas for the"
+"offence under section 420, which is an aggravated form of cheating by which the victim"
+"is dishonestly induced to deliver property, the company cannot be prosecuted as there"
+is a mandatory sentence of imprisonment. There is no immunity to the companies from
+prosecution merely because the prosecution is in respect of offences for which the
+punishment prescribed is mandatory imprisonment.518. A corporation is virtually in the
+same position as any individual and may be convicted of common law as well as
+statutory offences including those requiring mens rea. The criminal liability of a
+corporation would arise when an offence is committed in relation to the business of the
+corporation by a person or body of persons in control of its affairs. Companies and
+corporate houses can no longer claim immunity from criminal prosecution on ground
+"that they are incapable of possessing necessary mens rea.519. Since, the majority of"
+the Constitution Bench ruled in Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of
+"Enforcement,520. that the company can be prosecuted even in a case where the Court"
+"can impose substantive sentence as also fine, and in such case only fine can be"
+imposed on the corporate body.521.
+[s 415.14] Directors of Company.—
+The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the
+part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the
+"Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question, viz.,"
+"as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in"
+"its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally"
+liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing
+Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the
+Statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities.
+"Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make"
+requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious
+liability.522.
+[s 415.15] Vicarious liability of employees.—
+A vicarious liability can be fastened only by reason of a provision of a statute and not
+"otherwise. For the said purpose, a legal fiction has to be created. Even under a special"
+statute when the vicarious criminal liability is fastened on a person on the premise that
+"he was in-charge of the affairs of the company and responsible to it, all the ingredients"
+laid down under the statute must be fulfilled. A legal fiction must be confined to the
+"object and purport for which it has been created."" No case of criminal misconduct on"
+their part has been made out before the formation of the contract. There is nothing to
+show that the appellants herein who hold different positions in the appellant-company
+"made any representation in their personal capacities and, thus, they cannot be made"
+"vicariously liable only because they are employees of the company.""523."
+[s 415.16] Allotment of wagons on false letters.—
+The accused who were railway employees tried to divert wagons by procuring their
+"allotment on fake letters of request issued by a fake firm, were held to be guilty of"
+cheating.524.
+[s 415.17] Representation to Public Service Commission and other appointing
+authority.—
+The accused who was at the time serving in the Madras Medical Service as a Civil
+Assistant Surgeon on a temporary basis applied for a permanent post notified by the
+"Madras Public Service Commission and made false representations as to his name,"
+"place of birth, father's name and a degree held by him which was a necessary"
+qualification. His name was recommended by the Commission and he was appointed
+by the Government to the post and drew his salary for several years before the fraud
+was detected. It was held that although the Commission was an independent statutory
+"body performing advisory function, the deception of such adviser was deception of the"
+Government and the accused was liable under the section.525. Where a non-scheduled
+caste candidate sat for the Indian Administrative Service Examination falsely declaring
+himself to be a scheduled caste candidate in his application before the Union Public
+Service Commission and thus obtained the advantage of the relaxed standard of
+examination prescribed for scheduled caste candidates and eventually got appointed
+"as an IAS. officer by the Government of India, it was held that he had clearly cheated"
+both the Union Public Service Commission and the Government of India and was rightly
+"convicted under section 429, IPC, 1860.526."
+Securing appointments from Government officials by producing fake letters from
+"Ministers and also by posing to be the brother of a minister, has been held to constitute"
+"an offence of cheating by personation, and of forgery under sections 466–467 and of"
+forging Ministerial communications under section 468.527.
+[s 415.18] Illustration(f).—
+It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a
+commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding
+"that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a"
+cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions.
+"One of the illustrations set out under section 415 of the IPC, 1860 (Illustration f) is"
+"worthy of notice now ""(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay"
+any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him
+"money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats.""528. On its plain language it is manifest"
+from this illustration that what is material is the intention of the drawer at the time the
+"cheque is issued, and the intention has to be gathered from the facts on the record. If"
+from the circumstances it is established that the failure to meet a cheque was not
+"accidental but was the consequence expected by the accused, the presumption would"
+be that the accused intended to cheat.529.
+The accused introduced a person to the bank only for opening an account. It was held
+that such act could not by itself spell out any intention to commit fraud or cheating.
+The evidence did not show that the introducer was in any way connected with the fraud
+committed on the bank by the person introduced or with the loss suffered by the bank.
+He was accordingly acquitted of all charges.530.
+"472. Note N, pp 164, 166."
+473. The restatement of these ingredients occurs in Divender Kumar Singla v Baldev Krishna
+"Singla, AIR 2004 SC 3084 [LNIND 2004 SC 228] : (2005) 9 SCC 15 [LNIND 2004 SC 228] ."
+"474. Hridya Rajan Pd. Verma v State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2341 [LNIND 2000 SC 563] ; Arun"
+"Bhandari v State of UP, (2013) 2 SCC 801 [LNIND 2013 SC 18] : 2013 Cr LJ 1020 (SC)."
+"475. Sundar Singh, (1904) PR No. 25 of 1904."
+476. Note N p 163.
+"477. K Periasami v State, 1985 Cr LJ 1721 (Mad); See also discussion under para ""Dishonest"
+"Intention at the outset"" infra. See also Poovalappil David v State of Kerala, 1989 Cr LJ 2452 (Ker),"
+"switching off AC machines in a cinema hall after the patrons are in, cheating. Proceedings on"
+"the report of a police sub-inspector not illegal. Vinar Ltd v Chenab Textile Mills, 1989 Cr LJ 1858"
+"(J&K) Ranbir Code, breach of business contract, no criminal proceeding allowed. Ranjit Pant v"
+"State of Jharkhand, 2003 Cr LJ 1736 (Jhar), the complainant (landowner) was induced by the"
+accused that on his handing over his land under a lease for establishing a petrol pump he would
+"be given dealership. A bank guarantee of Rs. 4 lacs was taken from him, but dealership was"
+"allotted to another person. Thus, it seemed to the court that the accused did not have bona fide"
+intention from the beginning. Framing of charge-sheet under section 468 forgery for cheating
+and section 420 was held to be proper.
+"478. Gautam Sinha v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 635 (Jhar)."
+"479. V Y Jose v State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 59."
+"480. Hridaya Ranjan Pd. Verma v State of Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 2341 [LNIND 2000 SC 563] : 2000"
+"Cr LJ 2983 ; Murari Lal Gupta v Gopi Singh, (2006) 2 SCC (Cr) 430; B Suresh Yadav v Sharifa Bee,"
+(2007) 13 SCC 107 [LNIND 2007 SC 1238] .
+"481. Kuriachan Chacko v State of Kerala, (2008) 8 SCC 708 [LNIND 2008 SC 1378] ."
+"482. Inder Mohan Goswami v State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 1179] :"
+"(2008) 1 SCC (Cr) 259 : AIR 2008 SC 251 [LNIND 2007 SC 1179] ; SN Palanitkar v State of Bihar,"
+AIR 2001 SC 2960 [LNIND 2001 SC 2381] .
+"483. KC Thomas v A Varghse, 1974 Cr LJ 207 (Ker)."
+"484. Vadivel v Packialakshmi, 1996 Cr LJ 300 (Mad)."
+"485. Goss, (1860) 8 Cox 262."
+"486. Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Incorporated, (2011) 1 SCC 74 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] :"
+AIR 2011 SC 20 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] .
+"487. Matilal Chakrabarti, (1950) 2 Cal 73 ."
+"488. National Insurance Co v Narendra Kumar Jhanjari, 1990 Cr LJ 773 (Pat). The court followed,"
+"State of Kerala v SA Pareed Pillai, AIR 1973 SC 326 : 1972 Cr LJ 1243 and Hari Prasad Chamaria v"
+"Bishun Kumar Surekha, AIR 1974 SC 301 [LNIND 1973 SC 264] : 1974 Cr LJ 352 . VP Shrivastava"
+"v Indian Explosives Limited, (2010) 10 SCC 361 [LNIND 2010 SC 920] : (2010) 3 SCC(Cr) 1290."
+"489. Maria Giles, (1865) 10 Cox 44; Khoda Bux v Bakeya Mundari, (1905) 32 Cal 941 ."
+"490. Mohsinbhai, (1931) 34 Bom LR 313 : 56 Bom 204."
+"491. Mohsinbhai, (1931) 34 Bom LR 313 : 56 Bom 204."
+"492. SVL Murthy v State, (2009) 6 SCC 77 [LNIND 2009 SC 1167] : AIR 2009 SC 2717 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1167] .
+"493. Mohabat, (1889) PR No. 20 of 1889. Representation that accommodation would be"
+provided to tourists and taking money from them in advance and then not providing
+"accommodation could amount to cheating, hence, process not stopped. Sanjiv Bharadwaj v"
+"Hasmukhlal Rambhai Patel, 1989 Cr LJ 1892 (Guj); Anil Ritolla v State of Bihar, (2007) 10 SCC 110"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1096] , such offence can be committed even in the making of a commercial"
+transaction. The allegations in the complaint did not show any intention to induce a person to
+deliver property.
+"494. NM Chakraborty, 1977 Cr LJ 961 (SC) : AIR 1977 SC 1174 [LNIND 1977 SC 179] ."
+"495. Harendra Nath Das v Jyotish Chandra Datta, (1924) 52 Cal 188 ."
+496. Ibid.
+"497. Rajesh Bajaj v State, NCT of Delhi, AIR 1999 SC 1216 [LNIND 1999 SC 233] : 1999 Cr LJ"
+1833 .
+"498. Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v Rajvir Industries Ltd, (2008) 13 SCC 678 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+36] : AIR 2008 SC 1683 [LNIND 2008 SC 36] .
+"499. KC Builders v CIT, (2004) 2 SCC 731 [LNIND 2004 SC 118] : AIR 2004 SC 1340 : (2004) 265"
+ITR 562 [LNIND 2004 SC 118] : (2004) 1 KLT 596 .
+"500. State of Kerala v AP Pillai, 1972 Cr LJ 1243 (SC) : AIR 1973 SC 326 . Followed in Bimal"
+"Kumar v Vishram Lekhraj, 1990 Cr LJ 444 (Bom), where dishonest intention in failing to furnish"
+"""G"" form was not proved. The court referred to, Trilok Singh v Satya Deo Tripathi, AIR 1979 SC"
+"850 : 1980 Cr LJ 822 and Ram Avtar Gupta v Gopal Das Taliwal, AIR 1983 SC 1149 : (1983) 2 SCC"
+"431 ; Shyam Sundar v Lala Bhavan Kishore, 1989 Cr LJ 559 (All), post-dated cheques"
+"dishonoured, intention at the outset to have them dishonoured not established. But see"
+"Radhakishan Dalmia v Narayan, 1989 Cr LJ 443 (MP), where payment of post- dated cheques"
+was stopped by the drawer and the court refused to quash proceedings because dishonest
+intention could be inferred.
+"501. Ajay Mitra v State of MP, AIR 2003 SC 1069 [LNIND 2003 SC 108] : 2003 Cr LJ 1249 ."
+"502. Devendra v State of UP, (2009) 7 SCC 495 [LNIND 2009 SC 1158] : (2009) 3 SCC Cr 461."
+"Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 712 [LNIND 2009 SC 1121] : 2009"
+"Cr LJ 3462 , here also there was no element of wrongful intention in the transaction either at the"
+initial stage or developing subsequently.
+"503. Raj Mangal Kushwaha v State of UP, 2010 Cr LJ 3611 (All)."
+"504. Devendra v State of UP, 2009 (7) SCC 495 [LNIND 2009 SC 1158] 2009 (7) Scale 613"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1158] .
+505. GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust v India Infoline Ltd (2013) 4 SCC 505 [LNIND 2013 SC
+232] : AIR 2013 SC 1433 [LNIND 2013 SC 232] .
+506. Arun Bhandari v State of UP (2013) 2 SCC 801 [LNIND 2013 SC 18] : 2013 Cr LJ 1020 (SC);
+"Lee Kun Hee v State, AIR 2012 SC 1007 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 443] : (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 89] .
+"507. Kuldip Singh v State, 1954 Cr LJ 299 (P&H)."
+"508. Bishan Das, (1905) ILR 27 All 561."
+"509. TP Amina v P Nalla Thampy Thera Dr., 2003 Cr LJ 2945 (Ker)."
+"510. Legal Remembrancer v Manmatha Bhusan Chatterjee, (1923) 51 Cal 250 ; Harendra Nath"
+"Das v Jyotish Chandra Datta, (1924) 52 Cal 188 ."
+"511. Ramji Lakhamsi v Harshadrai, (1959) 61 Bom LR 1648 ."
+"512. Baboo Khan v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 759 ."
+"513. Ram Jas, 1974 Cr LJ 1261 (SC); See also Bhujang, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 17 (Kant)."
+"514. Surendra Meneklal v Bai Narmada, AIR 1963 Guj 239 [LNIND 1963 GUJ 55] ."
+"515. Anja Match Industries v South Indian Locifer Match Works, 1999 Cr LJ 181 (Mad)."
+"516. Mohd. Ibrahim v State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 [LNIND 2009 SC 1774] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+929.
+"517. G v Rao v LHV Prasad, AIR 2000 SC 2474 [LNIND 2000 SC 429] : 2000 Cr LJ 3487 . See for"
+"example, V Srinivasa Reddy v State of AP, AIR 1998 SC 2079 [LNIND 1998 SC 158] : 1998 Cr LJ"
+"2918 , a case of bank fraud."
+518. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement (2005) 4 SCC 405 : 2005 (5) Scale 97
+.
+"519. Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Incorporated, (2011) 1 SCC 74 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] :"
+AIR 2011 SC 20 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012] .
+520. Supra.
+521. CBI v Blue Sky Tie-up Pvt Ltd 2012 Cr LJ 1216 : AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 613.
+"522. Maksud Saiyed v State of Gujarat, 2008 (5) SCC 668 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] : JT 2007 (11)"
+SC 276 [LNIND 2007 SC 1090] .
+"523. Sharon Michael v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 688; R Kalyani v Janak C Mehta,"
+2008 (14) Scale 85 [LNIND 2008 SC 2127] .
+"524. Jagdish Prasad v State of Bihar, 1990 Cr LJ 366 (Pat)."
+"525. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1965 SC 333 [LNIND 1964 SC 95] ."
+"526. Sushil Kumar Datta, 1985 Cr LJ 1948 (Cal)."
+"527. State of UP v Ram Dhani, 1987 Cr LJ 933 (All)."
+"528. Rajesh Bajaj v State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 [LNIND 1999 SC 233] ; Trisuns"
+"Chemical Industry v Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686 [LNIND 1999 SC 840] ."
+"529. Punit Pruthi v State, 2010 (1) Crimes 439 : 2010 Cr LJ 1111 (Del)."
+"530. Manoranjan Das v State of Jharkhand, (2004) 12 SCC 90 : AIR 2004 SC 3623 : (2004) 121"
+Comp. Cas 8 : 2004 Cr LJ 3042 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Cheating
+[s 416] Cheating by personation.
+"A person is said to ""cheat by personation"" if he cheats by pretending to be some other"
+"person, or by knowingly substituting one person for another, or representing that he or"
+any other person is a person other than he or such other person really is.
+Explanation.—The offence is committed whether the individual personated is a real or
+imaginary person.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A cheats by pretending to be a certain rich banker of the same name. A cheats by
+personation.
+"(b) A cheats by pretending to be B, a person who is deceased. A cheats by personation."
+COMMENT—
+To 'personate' means to pretend to be a particular person.531. As soon as a man by
+"word, act, or sign holds himself forth as a person entitled to vote with the object of"
+"passing himself off as that person, and exercising the right which that person has, he"
+"has personated him.532. If a person at Oxford, who is not a member of the university,"
+"goes to a shop for the purpose of fraud, wearing a commoner's cap and gown, and"
+"obtains goods, his appearing in a cap and gown is a sufficient false pretence although"
+nothing passed in words.533.
+The person personated may be a real or an imaginary person.
+[s 416.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires any one of the following essentials:
+(1) Pretention by a person to be some other person.
+(2) Knowingly substituting one person for another.
+(3) Representation that he or any other person is a person other than he or such
+other person really is.
+[s 416.2] CASES.—False representation at examination.—
+"Where A falsely represented himself to be B at a University Examination, got a hall-"
+"ticket under B's name, and wrote papers in B's name, it was held that A was guilty of"
+cheating by personation and forgery.534.
+[s 416.3] False Representation as bachelor.—
+It is not correct to say that without delivery of property there cannot be any cheating. A
+"bare reading of section 415, IPC, 1860, will show that if the person deceived is induced"
+by reason of deception to do or omit to do anything which he would not do if he were
+not so deceived and if the act he has done being so deceived results in some damage
+"or harm to his body, mind, reputation or property, the offence of cheating would"
+nevertheless be committed. Thus where the accused dishonestly induced the
+complainant and his daughter to go through the marriage ceremony professing himself
+"to be a bachelor while he had a wife living, it was held that his act amounted to an"
+"offence both under sections 416 and 417, IPC, 1860, as harm was caused to the"
+"complainant and his daughter to their body, mind, reputation and even to their"
+"property.535. In this connection see discussion under head ""Explanation"" under section"
+"415, ante."
+"531. Hague, (1864) 4B & S 715, 720."
+"532. Ibid, p. 721."
+"533. Barnard, (1837) 7 C & P 784."
+"534. Appasami, (1889) 12 Mad 151; Ashwini Kumar Gupta, (1937) 1 Cal 71 ."
+"535. MNA Achar v Dr. DL Rajgopal, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 228 (Kant). Anil Sharma v SN Marwaha,"
+(1995) 1 Cr LJ 163 (Del) complaint made after three years on the ground that the accused
+concealed the fact that he had a child from his first marriage held to be not maintainable.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Cheating
+[s 417] Punishment for cheating.
+Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
+"which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section punishes simple cases of cheating. Where there is delivery of any property
+"or destruction of any valuable security, section 420 is the proper section to apply.536."
+The accused made false representation to the complainant by way of promise to marry
+her and believing such promise she complied with his request by sharing the bed
+together. Consequently she became pregnant but he refused to marry her. The accused
+challenged the proceedings initiated against him under section 417. It was held that
+prima facie case was made out under the section.537.
+Certain letters were prepared on the letterhead of a Minister by the accused by which
+actors were invited to a cultural show. Letters did not carry the signature of the
+Minister. The Court said that the act of the accused did not cause nor was likely to
+cause any harm to any person in mind or body. His conviction under section 417 was
+held to be not proper.538. Only because accused issued cheques which were
+"dishonoured, the same by itself would not mean that he had cheated the complainant."
+"Assuming that such a statement had been made, the same, does not exhibit that there"
+had been any intention on the part of the appellant herein to commit an offence under
+section 417 of the Penal Code.539. Where accused giving assurance of marriage to
+victim girl had undergone intercourse with victim and she would not have undergone
+intercourse had there been no such assurance of marriage by accused. Accused
+subsequently having disowned assurance given by him. It was held that ingredients of
+cheating under section 415 can be said to have been established. Accused held guilty
+of committing offence punishable under section 417 of Code.540. Where accused is
+liable to be convicted under section 376 on allegation sexual intercourse by false
+promise of marriage there cannot be any separate conviction under section 417.541.
+Though once the accused-appellant alleged failed to keep his promise she allowed him
+to commit sexual intercourse for the second time and invited her pregnancy. Not only
+"that, even after termination of pregnancy for the second time she again allowed the"
+accused-appellant to have sexual intercourse with her and make her pregnant for the
+third time. Offence under section 417 not made out.542. Accused allegedly committed
+sexual intercourse on prosecutrix on pretext that he would provide temporary job of
+peon to her in bank which would be regularized after completion of one year. Though
+"the offence under section 376 is not made out, offence under section 417 is made"
+out.543. Where accused wanted to marry prosecutrix and on her refusal committed
+"forcible sexual intercourse with her. But, if the promise of marriage was given and the"
+"girl had succumbed on that account, by itself, may not amount to cheating. Besides"
+"this, the girl has very specifically stated that even subsequently, she was ravished"
+"against her wishes. Therefore, the theory of promise of marriage and the consent for"
+"sexual intercourse will wither away, acquit the accused of the offence under section"
+"417 of IPC, 1860 though he was convicted under section 376 IPC, 1860.544."
+536. No process was issued where the allegations were that the girl was represented to be as
+hale and hearty and it was found after the marriage that she was weak of sight and had urinary
+"infection. The complaint dismissed. Anilchandra Pitambardas v Rajesh, 1991 Cr LJ 487 (Bom)."
+"537. Ravichandran v Mariyammal, 1992 Cr LJ 1675 (Mad)."
+"538. Jibrial Diwan v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 3424 [LNINDORD 1997 SC 149] : 1997 Cr"
+LJ 4070 .
+"539. V Y Jose v State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 59. Allegation is accused cheated the"
+complainant by not making of payment of money within time given at time of receiving of loan.
+It is held that fraudulent dishonest intention of accused at time of issuance of cheques is to be
+proved to book her for offence of cheating and there is no such intention proved on the part of
+accused. Accused cannot be punished under sec 417 or 420 of IPC Kanailal Bhattacharjee v
+"Bhajana Biswas, 2012 Cr LJ 4158 (Gau)."
+"540. Manik Das Baishnav v State of Tripura, 2012 Cr LJ 1954 (Gau); Bipul Medhi v State of"
+"Assam, 2008 Cr LJ 1099 (Gau); Sukhamay Manna v State of West Bengal, 2010 Cr LJ 829 (Cal)-"
+question cannot be decided in revisional jurisdiction against framing of charge.
+"541. Ravi v State by Inspector of Police, 2010 Cr LJ. 3493 (Mad)."
+"542. Kanchan Deb v State of Tripura, 2011 Cr LJ 3853 (Gau); K Ashok Kumar Reddy v State of AP,"
+"2008 Cr LJ 2783 (AP); P Govindan v State by Inspector of Police, 2008 Cr LJ 4263 (Mad)."
+"543. Girish Kumar Sharan v State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ 4215 (Jha); Subrato Ghosh v State of"
+"Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ 3637 (Jha)."
+"544. Zindar Ali SK v State of West Bengal, 2009 (3) SCC 761 [LNIND 2009 SC 249] : AIR 2009 SC"
+1467 [LNIND 2009 SC 249] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Cheating
+[s 418] Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person
+whose interest offender is bound to protect.
+Whoever cheats with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause wrongful loss to
+"a person whose interest in the transaction to which the cheating relates, he was"
+"bound, either by law, or by a legal contract, to protect, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"Under section 418 of IPC, 1860 who ever cheats with the knowledge that is likely"
+thereby to cause wrongful loss to the person whose interest in the transaction to which
+"the cheating relates he was bound either by law or by legal contract to protect, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment or fine or with both.545. This section applies to cases of
+"cheating by guardians, trustees, solicitors, agents, and the manager of a Hindu family,"
+directors or managers of a bank in fraud of the shareholders. It is the abuse of trust
+that is met with severe punishment.
+[s 418.1] False balance-sheet for inducing to renew deposit.—
+"Where the directors, manager and accountant dishonestly that is to obtain wrongful"
+gain for themselves or to cause wrongful loss to others put before the shareholders
+balance sheets which they knew to be materially false and misleading and likely to
+mislead the public as to the condition of the bank and concealed its true condition and
+"thereby induced depositors to allow their money to remain in deposit with the bank,"
+they were held liable under this section.546. In Medchl Chemicals & Pharma Pvt Ltd v
+"Biological E Ltd,547. wherein it was observed that: ""In order to attract the provisions of"
+"section 418 and section 420 the guilty intent, at the time of making the promise is a"
+requirement and an essential ingredient thereto and subsequent failure to fulfil the
+promise by itself would not attract the provisions of section 418 or section 420. Mens
+rea is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of cheating under section 420. As
+a matter of fact Illustration (g) to section 415 makes the position clear enough to
+indicate that mere failure to deliver in breach of an agreement would not amount to
+"cheating but is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract."""
+"545. Behram Bomanji Dubash v State of Karnataka, 2010 Cr LJ 3963 (KAR)."
+"546. Moss, (1893) 16 All 88 . Refusal by bank officers, for reasons beyond their control, to take"
+a house on rent after promising was not punishable under this section though the landlord
+relying on the promise spent money on finishing the house as desired. It was a matter for a civil
+"action. S Shankarmani v Nibar Ranjan Parida, 1991 Cr LJ 65 (Ori)."
+"547. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma Pvt Ltd v Biological E Ltd, 2000 (3) SCC 269 [LNIND 2000 SC"
+373] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Cheating
+[s 419] Punishment for cheating by personation.
+Whoever cheats by personation shall be punished with imprisonment of either
+"description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"If a person cheats by pretending to be some other person, or representing that he is a"
+"person other than he, then, such person can be charged with the allegation of 'cheating"
+"by personation' (section 416, IPC, 1860) and punished under section. 419, IPC, 1860."
+[s 419.1] Overlapping.—
+"The offences under sections 170, IPC, 1860 and 419, IPC, 1860 overlap each other."
+"Cheating by personation (section 419, IPC, 1860) is an offence of general character,"
+"under which a person may pretend to be anyone, other than what he really is. But,"
+"cheating by pretending to be a public servant (section 170, IPC, 1860) is a specific"
+"offence, where one pretends to be a public servant and has all the ingredients of"
+"cheating by personation under section 419, IPC, 1860.548."
+"548. I K Narayana v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 874 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Cheating
+[s 420] Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.
+Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any
+"property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable"
+"security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being"
+"converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT—
+Simple cheating is punishable under section 417. But where there is delivery or
+destruction of any property or alteration or destruction of any valuable security
+resulting from the act of the person deceiving this section comes into operation. For an
+offence under this section it must be proved that the complainant parted with his
+property acting on a representation which was false to the knowledge of the accused
+and that the accused had a dishonest intention from the outset.549. In Sonbhandra
+"Coke Products v State of UP,550. it was held that offence of cheating can be made out"
+only if it has been shown that damage or harm has been caused to the person so
+deceived.
+The Supreme Court has held that the word 'property' in this section does not
+"necessarily mean that the thing, of which a delivery is dishonestly desired by the"
+"person who cheats, must have a money value or a market value, in the hand of the"
+person cheated. The communicated order of assessment received by an assessee is
+"""property"".551."
+An admission card to sit for an Examination of a University is property within the
+meaning of this section; though the admission card as such has no pecuniary value it
+has immense value to the candidate for the examination.552.A driving licence or its
+duplicate553. had been held to be property within the meaning of this section. Where a
+bank was defrauded of a large amount and the signatures of the accused bank
+"manager on drafts used for the purpose were proved beyond doubt to be his signature,"
+his conviction under the section was held to be proper.554. Where a builder was
+"defrauded by a conspiring team of financiers by giving him counterfeit currency,"
+"conviction under this section was fully warranted.555. In the ordinary course of things,"
+relationship of banker and customer is that of debtor and creditor and not that of
+trustee and beneficiary. Payment of money against cheques already issued by the
+customer at a time when the bank had received notice to close the account did not in
+itself amount to cheating the customer in conspiracy with the payee.556.
+[s 420.1] Intention to deceive at the time of inducement.—
+The primary requirement to make out an offence of cheating under section 415
+"punishable under section 420 IPC, 1860 is dishonest/fraudulent intention at the time of"
+inducement is made.557. The intention to deceive should be in existence at the time
+when the inducement was made. Mere failure to keep up a promise subsequently
+cannot be presumed as leading to cheating.558.
+The intention to deceive was held to be not there either at the initial stage or any
+subsequent stage in the mere fact of transferring a portion of the property over which
+the transferors had no complete ownership. The sale could be binding only to the
+extent of the transferor's right.559. Where bogus receipts were issued for part payment
+"of the price of the property over which the recipient had no ownership and therefore, no"
+"right to sell, he was held to be guilty of the offence under the section.560."
+[s 420.2] Dishonour of cheque.—
+"A cheque was returned unpaid by the bank under the remark ""payment stopped by"
+"drawer"". The complainant alleged that the cheque was dishonoured because the"
+drawer of the cheque had no sufficient balance or arrangement. The Court refused to
+quash the complaint. Issuing a cheque without arrangement of sufficient funds may
+amount to cheating.561. Where goods were delivered in a normal sales transaction and
+the buyer had also become the owner of the goods because the transfer of ownership
+"was not linked with payment, it was held that the fact that a cheque for the price, which"
+"was issued in due course, bounced, did not constitute the offence of cheating because"
+there was no evidence of intention to cheat at the outset of the transaction.562.
+Dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the bouncing of a cheque issued for an
+existing debt. The conviction of the accused for return of such cheque was not
+proper.563.
+A cheque was handed over in a share transaction by the accused. The cheque was
+signed by his wife. The person who passed the cheque was held guilty of cheating
+because of the dishonour but not his wife because she was not seen anywhere near
+the transaction.564.
+"[s 420.3] Section 138, NI Act and section 420 IPC, 1860.—"
+"In the prosecution under section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the mens rea,"
+"i.e., fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of Cheque is not required"
+"to be proved. But in a prosecution under section 420 IPC, 1860 the issue of mens rea"
+may be relevant. There may be some overlapping of facts in the cases under section
+"420 IPC, 1860 and section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but ingredients of"
+"offences are entirely different. Thus, the subsequent case is not barred.565."
+[s 420.4] Conversion of Cheques.—
+Cheques issued by a company in the name of a supplier were converted by an
+employee of the company by opening an account in the name of the supplier. The
+opening of the account was facilitated by an employee of the bank. Both of them were
+held to be joint offenders. The order of convicting both of them was held to be not
+improper.566.
+[s 420.5] Sections 417 and 420.—
+"In every case when property is delivered by a person cheated, there must always be a"
+stage when the person makes up his mind to give the property on accepting the false
+representation made to him. It cannot be said that in such cases the person
+committing the offence can only be tried for the simple offence of cheating under
+section 417 and cannot be tried under this section because the person cheated parts
+with his property subsequent to making up his mind to do so.567.
+[s 420.6] Goods received under hire-purchase.—
+Breach of the conditions of a hire purchase agreement under which goods or property
+has been received does not amount to an offence under this section.568.
+Where the complainant stated that the accused had taken the vehicle on hire-purchase
+but failed and neglected to pay certain instalments and the Court found that there was
+"no dishonest intention on the part of the hirer at the time of the transaction, the"
+"complaint was quashed, the Court observed that it was open to the complainant to"
+proceed against the hirer before a civil Court for appropriate relief.569.
+[s 420.7] Arbitration clause.—
+The presence of an arbitration clause in an agreement cannot prevent criminal
+prosecution of a person if the ingredients of the offence are made out to the prima
+facie extent.570.
+[s 420.8] Financial crime.—
+The accused an investment advisor charged with dishonestly concealing material facts
+relating to bonds. The question was whether he had committed the alleged act of
+"dishonesty contrary to the Financial Services Act, 1986 section 47(1). Such"
+determination would have to include considering his intentions as to his future
+"conduct. It was held that the phrase ""material facts"" within section 47(1) was to be"
+widely construed so as to include his present intention as to future conduct. Dishonest
+"concealment was also included within ""material facts"". It was required under section"
+4(A) of the 1964 Act to consider his intentions and it was appropriate for the jury to
+"consider such intentions, not in relation to dishonesty, but in relation to the victims of"
+the alleged acts in connection with the particulars of the offence.571.
+[s 420.9] Finance company's inability to pay back deposits.—
+A finance company was not able to pay back deposit owing to its poor financial
+condition as found by the Company Law Board and Reserve Bank. The Court found no
+evidence of any intention to commit criminal breach of trust or any dishonest
+inducement. The complaint was held liable to be quashed.572.
+Issuing cheques with knowledge that they would be dishonoured amounts to an
+offence under this section.573. Offence under section 420 was alleged against the
+"accused for issuance of cheque, who died and his business was inherited by his son."
+Police filed final report stating that the son is liable. The Court held that as it is well-
+settled law that a criminal's culpable offence shall not be inherited by his heirs. Once
+"the accused died, the charge against the accused has been dismissed as abates.574."
+[s 420.10] Legal opinion given by Advocate.—
+Allegation is that advocate submitted false legal opinion to the bank in respect of the
+housing loans in the capacity of a panel advocate and did not point out actual
+ownership of the properties in question. The liability against an opining advocate arises
+only when the lawyer has an active participant in a plan to defraud the bank. Merely
+"because his opinion may not be acceptable, he cannot be made liable for criminal"
+"prosecution, particularly, in the absence of tangible evidence that he associated with"
+other conspirators. There is no prima facie case for proceeding in respect of the
+charges alleged against him. Proceedings quashed.575.
+"[s 420.11] Fraudulent inducement for deposits, each deposit a separate"
+offence.—
+"Where a fraudulent finance company collects deposits, there is a separate offence"
+towards each depositor. The fact that the maximum punishment of five years is
+prescribed for a single offence of a cheating could not be pressed into service by the
+accused for seeking relief.576.
+[s 420.12] Punishment.—
+The accused obtained payments from the Government by sending bills with bogus
+railway receipt numbers. This was a false representation which amounted to cheating.
+A long period of 30 years had passed since then. The sentence of one year
+"imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone but the fine of Rs. 15,000"
+"was maintained.577. In a conspiracy to benefit from a forged will, the Court imposed"
+maximum possible punishment.578.
+[s 420.13] Pendency of civil suit.—
+A civil suit for specific performance was already pending against the party who caused
+the deception. The Court said that criminal proceeding was not to be quashed on that
+basis alone.579.
+[s 420.14] Proceedings quashed because the dispute is purely civil in nature.—
+It may be true that where the Court finds that the dispute between the parties was
+"purely of civil nature, it may not allow criminal proceedings to go on. But no such law"
+can be laid down because a case may be such that both a civil action and criminal
+"complaint may be maintainable, the cause of action for both being the same.580. Mere"
+breach of contract does not necessarily involve cheating.581. Where the dispute is
+"essentially about the profit of the hotel business and its ownership, it is purely civil in"
+"nature and hence, the proceedings are quashed.582. Where, complaint is about the non-"
+"payment after placing orders for fabrication work on complainant, the complaint would"
+only reveal that the allegations as contained in the complaint are of civil nature and do
+"not prima facie disclose commission of alleged criminal offence under section 420 IPC,"
+1860. Proceedings quashed.583. Allegation was that appellant had executed a sale
+deed in his favour in respect of a plot of land which had already been the subject
+"matter of a previous transfer, Court held that he can at best question such transfer and"
+claim damages in respect thereof from the vendor of the appellant by way of
+"appropriate damages, but an action in the Criminal Court would not lie in the absence"
+of any intention to cheat and/or defraud.584. An agreement for sale of land and the
+earnest money paid to the owner as part consideration and possession of the land
+having been transferred to the purchasers/complainants and the subsequent
+"unwillingness of the owner to complete the same, gave rise to a liability of a civil nature"
+"and the criminal complaint was, therefore, not competent.585."
+[s 420.15] Using forged marks sheet.—
+The petitioner knew that they were submitting a forged marks-sheet for the purpose of
+securing a seat in the medical college. Their conviction under sections 420 and 471
+(using as genuine a forged document) was held to be proper. Failure in securing the
+purpose would not result in acquittal.586.
+[s 420.16] Checking in under false pretences.—
+The allegation against the accused was that he made a representation to the railway
+retiring room attendant that he was an Assistant Commercial Manager in railways and
+"got a room allotted to him on that basis. Thus, a prima facie case of cheating was"
+made out. The complaint was not to be quashed.587.
+[s 420.17] Juristic persons.—
+The punishment of imprisonment provided under the section cannot be imposed on a
+"juristic person, a construction company in this case.588."
+In order to hold persons liable vicariously for any offence involved in the affairs of the
+"company, it is not enough to show that they were running the affairs of the company."
+All the ingredients of the offence must be proved against them. The company has also
+"to be made a party to the proceeding. In this case, there were only individual"
+accusations against the persons concerned.589.
+[s 420.18] Previous sanction.—
+The offence of cheating under section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to
+"section 467, section 468, section 471 and section 120B can by no stretch of"
+imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public
+"servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. Hence, the"
+"sanction of the competent authority under section 197 Cr PC, 1973 is not required.590."
+[s 420.19] Compounding.—
+Where the allegation was that accused with the assistance of known officials of AICTE
+had produced forged and fraudulent document to obtain recognition of the mentioned
+"institution from AICTE and thereby cheated AICTE, the application for compounding of"
+offence could not have been considered by the learned Magistrate without affording an
+opportunity of hearing to the AICTE. It is not the CBI which has been cheated by the
+action of the respondent No. 1 but in fact the AICTE.591.
+[s 420.20] Section 420 with non-compoundable offences.—
+"Simply because an offence is not compoundable under section 320 Cr PC, 1973 is by"
+itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under section 482 Cr
+"PC, 1973. That power can be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording"
+a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an
+exercise in futility.592.
+"549. Mobarik Ali, (1958) SCR 328 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] ."
+"550. Sonbhandra Coke Products v State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 657 (All)."
+"551. Ishwarlal Girdharilal, 1969 (71) Bom LR 52 : AIR 1969 SC 40 [LNIND 1968 SC 143] ; see also"
+"NM Chakraborty, 1977 Cr LJ 961 (SC)."
+"552. Abhayanand, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 822 SC."
+"553. Ramchander, AIR 1966 Raj 182 [LNIND 1965 RAJ 67] ."
+"554. Adithela Immanuel Raju v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 243 ."
+"555. Nellai Ganesan v State of TN, 1991 Cr LJ 2157 (Mad)."
+"556. ANZ Grindlays Bank v Shipping and Clearing (Agent) Pvt Ltd, 1992 Cr LJ 77 (Cal)."
+"557. Annamalai v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 692 (SC) : (2010) 8 SCC 524 [LNIND 2010 SC"
+745] .
+"558. SN Palantikar v State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960 [LNIND 2001 SC 2381] : 2001 Cr LJ 4765 ."
+"Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v CBI, New Delhi, 2003 (5) SCC 257 [LNIND 2003 SC 499] ."
+"559. Ramesh Dutt v State of Punjab, (2009) 15 SCC 429 [LNIND 2009 SC 1475] ."
+"560. N Devindrappa v State of Karnataka, (2007) 5 SCC 228 [LNIND 2007 SC 602] : AIR 2007 SC"
+1741 [LNIND 2007 SC 602] : 2007 Cr LJ 2949 .
+"561. Thomas Verghese v P Jerome, 1992 Cr LJ 3080 (Ker). Nemichand Swaroopchand v TH"
+"Raibhagi, 2001 Cr LJ 4301 (Kant), a cheque issued for return of articles in a business"
+"transaction dishonoured, there was nothing to show any fraudulent or dishonest intention, no"
+"offence made out. Jasmin B Shah v State of Jharkhand, 2003 Cr LJ 621 (Jhar), dishonour of"
+"cheque, investigation not complete, charge sheet not submitted, prayer for quashing the"
+proceeding rejected.
+"562. HICEL Pharma Ltd v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 2566 (AP). Rajendra Vasantrao Khoda, v"
+"Laxmikant, 2000 Cr LJ 1196 (Bom) a complaint as to dishonour of cheque was not quashed,"
+"ingredients of cheating being made out. Subodh S Salaskar v Jayaprakash M Shah, (2008) 13"
+SCC 689 [LNIND 2008 SC 1549] : AIR 2008 SC 3086 [LNIND 2008 SC 1549] : (2008) KLT 616 :
+"2008 Cr LJ 3953 post-dated cheque issued in 1996, presented in 2001, dishonoured because"
+"account closed, but money had been paid back before that, no cheating, subsequent closing"
+was inconsequential.
+"563. Venkatchalam v State, 1998 Cr LJ 3189 (Mad). Bipin Singh v Chongitham, 1997 Cr LJ 724 :"
+"AIR 1997 SC 1448 [LNIND 1996 SC 1690] , representation by the accused so as to create public"
+belief that a particular writing was that of a certain other person and not that he had himself
+written that book. No forgery or cheating. Mintu Singha Roy v Tenzing Dolkar; 2012 Cr LJ 3115
+(Sik) regarding the bounced cheque it was condoned as 50% of payment is received by the
+complainant
+"564. Devender Kumar Singla v Baldev Krishna Singla, AIR 2004 SC 3084 [LNIND 2004 SC 228] :"
+(2005) 9 SCC 15 [LNIND 2004 SC 228] .
+"565. Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 621 [LNIND 2012 SC"
+1473] : AIR 2012 SC 2844 [LNIND 2012 SC 1473] ; See the other view in Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v
+"Gorantla Venkatewwara Rao, (2011) 2 SCC 703 [LNIND 2011 SC 128] : 2011 Cr LJ 1094 ."
+"566. Vadivelu v State of TN, 1999 Cr LJ 369 (Mad)."
+"567. BS Dhaliwal, (1967) 1 SCR 211 [LNIND 1966 SC 165] ."
+"568. Abdul Rahim v Inspector of Police, 1992 Cr LJ 370 (Mad). OPTS Marketing Pvt Ltd v State of"
+"AP, 2001 Cr LJ 1489 (AP), prosecution under section 420, IPC, 1860 is still possible after the"
+"introduction of section 138 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, if the ingredients of the offence"
+"are satisfied, the complaint cannot be quashed."
+"569. Mahesh Kumar v State of Karnataka, 2003 Cr LJ 528 (Kant)."
+"570. SN Palanitkar v State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 2960 [LNIND 2001 SC 2381] : 2001 Cr LJ 4765 ."
+"571. R v Central Criminal Court, (2002) EWHC 548 : (2002) 2 Cr App. R 12 [QBD (Admin. Ct)]."
+"572. Nilesh Lalit Parekh v State of Gujarat, 2003 Cr LJ 1018 (Guj); Mohd. Shaf-at Khan v National"
+"Capital Territory of Delhi, (2007) 13 SCC 354 [LNIND 2007 SC 924] , collection by fraud company,"
+the court said that it would be appropriate to work out modalities as to how the properties of the
+"company could be sold to get the highest price, so that the dues of the depositors and others"
+could be paid back.
+"573. Ramprasad Chatterjee v Md. Jakir Kureshi, 1987 Cr LJ 1485 (Cal). But otherwise a cheque"
+"is not a representation that there is balance in the account. GK Mohanty v Pratap Kishore Das,"
+1987 Cr LJ 1446 (Ori). Where cheques were given subsequently to the transaction and there
+"was no inducement at the stage of negotiations, prosecution under the section was quashed,"
+"MS Natrajan v Ramasis Shaw, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 2011 (Cal). S Muthu Kumar v State of TN, (1995) 1"
+Cr LJ 350 (Mad) purchasing goods against post-dated cheques knowing that they would not be
+honoured is a ground for registering a complaint and the complaint is not liable to be quashed.
+"574. Lakshmi Metal Works v State, 2016 Cr LJ 2730 (Mad) : IV (2016) CCR 282 (Mad)."
+"575. Central Bureau of Investigation Hyderabad v K Narayana Rao, 2012 Cr LJ 4610 : (2012) 9"
+SCC 512 [LNIND 2012 SC 569] .
+"576. Narinderjit Singh v UOI, AIR 2001 SC 3810 [LNIND 2001 SC 2325] ."
+"577. Kuldip Sharma v State, 2000 Cr LJ 1272 (Del)."
+"578. R v Spillman, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S) 139 [CA (Crim Div)]. R v Ball, (2001) 1 Cr App R (S)"
+49[CA (Crim Div)] serious custodial punishment awarded where the accused persons deceived
+81 year old lady by receiving several times more money than the actual worth of the repair work
+done. The sentences correctly reflected that both the accused were jointly part of the
+"conspiracy which concerned an extremely serious fraud, an enormous sum of money and the"
+worst possible breach of trust. The report had been considered and the judge was entitled to
+"decide what weight should be attached to the evidence. Rajamani v Inspector of Police, 2003 Cr"
+"PC 2002 (Mad), freezing of the accounts of third parties was held to be illegal."
+"579. Vitoori Pradeep Kumar v Kaisula Dharmaiah, 2001 Cr LJ 4948 (SC)."
+"580. VR Dalal v Yougendra Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625 [LNIND 2008 SC 1222] : AIR 2008"
+"SC 2793 [LNIND 2008 SC 1222] . In the relations between partners in opening and closing a firm,"
+the essential ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating were missing.
+"581. VY Jose v State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78 [LNIND 2008 SC 2435] : (2009) 1 SCC Cr 996."
+"Dalip Kaur v Jagnar Singh, (2009) 14 SCC 696 [LNIND 2009 SC 1409] : AIR 2009 SC 3191 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 1409] , mere failure to refund the amount of advance which became due constituting"
+breach of contract did not amount to cheating or criminal breach of trust. B Suresh Yadav v
+"Sharifa Bee, (2007) 13 SCC 107 [LNIND 2007 SC 1238] : AIR 2008 SC 210 [LNIND 2007 SC 1238]"
+": 2008 Cr LJ 431 , dispute of civil nature, complaint was an abuse of process, quashed."
+"582. Paramjeet Batra v State of Uttarakhand, JT 2012 (12) SC 393 [LNIND 2012 SC 812] : 2012"
+"(12) Scale 688 [LNIND 2012 SC 812] ; Hussainbeg Hayatbeg Mirza v State of Gujarat, 2013 Cr LJ"
+1090 (SC) - proceedings quashed since there were no ingredients or elements of criminal
+"offence; to the same effect VP Shrivastava v Indian Explosives Limited, (2010) 10 SCC 361"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 920] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 1290.
+"583. Thermax Ltd v KM Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 [LNIND 2011 SC 947] : (2012) 2 SCC (Cr) 650;"
+but where the allegation is about the execution of fictitious sale deeds the purpose of which
+"was to make unlawful gain, the question whether the respondent was aware that such deeds"
+"were executed for getting lawful gain, which may cause injury to another person as defined"
+"under section 44 IPC, 1860 is a matter which can be established only on adducing evidence."
+"Order quashing the proceedings set aside [State of Madhya Pradesh v Surendra Kori, (2012) 10"
+SCC 155 [LNIND 2012 SC 681] : 2013 Cr LJ 167 : AIR 2012 SC (Supp) 949; Joseph Salvaraj A v
+"State of Gujarat, AIR 2011 SC 2258 [LNIND 2011 SC 576] : (2011) 7 SCC 59 [LNIND 2011 SC 576]"
+"; Udai Shankar Awasthi v State of UP, (2013) 2 SCC 435 [LNIND 2013 SC 22] 2013 (1) Scale 212"
+[LNIND 2013 SC 22] .
+"584. Rama Devi v State of Bihar, (2010) 12 SCC 273 [LNIND 2010 SC 875] : AIR 2010 SC (Supp)"
+"83; Kishan Singh v Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775 [LNIND 2010 SC 747] : AIR 2010 SC 3624"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 747] - After losing in civil suit FIR filed with the sole intention of harassing the
+respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous criminal proceedings. Proceedings
+quashed.
+"585. Nageshwar Prasad Singh v Narayan Singh,k (1998) 5 SCC 694 ; distinguished on facts in SP"
+"Gupta v Ashutosh Gupta, (2010) 6 SCC 562 [LNIND 2010 SC 507] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr) 193."
+"586. AS Krishna v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 207 (Ker). The incident was 17 years old. The"
+sentence of 1 year and 2 years was reduced to the period of three months. Premlata v State of
+"Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1430 (Raj) using false certificate to secure an appointment."
+"587. Develle Venkateswarlu v State of AP, 2000 Cr LJ 2929 (AP)."
+"588. Essar Constructions Ltd v CBI, 1999 Cr LJ 1861 (Bom)."
+"589. R Kalyani v Janak C Mehta, (2009) 1 SCC 516 [LNIND 2008 SC 2127] : (2009) 1 SCC Cr 567;"
+"MAA Annamalai v State of Karnataka, (2010) 8 SCC 524 [LNIND 2010 SC 745] : 2011 Cr LJ. 692"
+(SC).
+"590. Om Dhankar v State of Haryana, (2012) 11 SCC 252 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 439] : 2012 (3)"
+"Scale 363 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 439] relied on Prakash Singh Badal v State of Punjab, 2007 (1)"
+SCC 1 [LNIND 2006 SC 1091] : AIR 2007 SC 1274 [LNIND 2006 SC 1091] .
+"591. All India Council for Technical Education v Rakesh Sachan, 2013 (2) Scale 15 ."
+"592. AIR 2012 SC 499 [LNIND 2011 SC 1158] ; Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v State of Gujarat,"
+"2012 (6) Scale 525 [LNIND 2012 SC 417] : 2012 CR LJ 3900 ; Shiji @ Pappu v Radhika, 2011 (10)"
+SCC 705 [LNIND 2011 SC 1158] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Fraudulent Deeds and Dispositions of Property
+[s 421] Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent
+distribution among creditors.
+"Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently removes, conceals or delivers to any person, or"
+"transfer or causes to be transferred to any person, without adequate consideration,"
+"any property,1 intending thereby to prevent, or knowing it to be likely that he will"
+"thereby prevent, the distribution of that property according to law among his creditors"
+"or the creditors of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This and the three following sections deal with fraudulent conveyances referred to in
+"section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Presidency- towns and"
+Provincial Insolvency Acts.
+This section specially refers to frauds connected with insolvency. The offence under it
+consists in a dishonest disposition of property with intent to cause wrongful loss to the
+creditors. It will cover benami transactions in fraud of creditors. It will apply to property
+both movable and immovable.
+Compare sections 205–210 with sections 421–424 as they are similar in character.
+"The former sections deal with fraud on Courts, the latter, with fraud on creditors."
+[s 421.1] Ingredients.—
+To prove an offence under this section the prosecution must show:—
+"1. That the accused removed, concealed or delivered the property or that he transferred"
+it or caused it to be transferred to someone.
+2. That such transfer was without adequate consideration.
+3. That the accused thereby intended to prevent or knew that he was thereby likely to
+prevent the distribution of that property according to law among his creditors or
+creditors of another person.
+4. That he acted dishonestly and fraudulently.593.
+1. 'Property'.—This word includes a chose in action. The right to cut trees under an
+agreement for the purpose of making charcoal from wood is movable property.594.
+"593. Ramautar Chaukhany, 1982 Cr LJ 2266 (Gau)."
+"594. Manchersha v Ismail, (1935) 60 Bom 706, 38 Bom LR 168."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Fraudulent Deeds and Dispositions of Property
+[s 422] Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing debt being available for
+creditors.
+Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently prevents any debt or demand due to himself or to
+any other person from being made available according to law for payment of his debts
+"or the debts of such other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"This section, like the preceding section, is intended to prevent the defrauding of"
+creditors by masking property. Any proceedings to prevent the attachment and sale of
+debts due to the accused will fall under this section. The offence consists in the
+dishonest or fraudulent evasion of one's own liability.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Fraudulent Deeds and Dispositions of Property
+[s 423] Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false
+statement of consideration.
+"Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently signs, executes or becomes a party to any deed"
+"or instrument which purports to transfer or subject to any charge any property, or any"
+"interest therein, and which contains any false statement relating to the consideration"
+"for such transfer or charge, or relating to the person or persons for whose use or"
+"benefit it is really intended to operate, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"This section deals with fraudulent and fictitious conveyances and trusts. Under it, the"
+dishonest execution of a benami deed is punishable. Where the consideration for the
+"sale of immovable property was, with the consent of the purchaser, exaggerated in a"
+"deed of sale in order to defeat the claim of the pre-emptor, it was held that the"
+purchaser was guilty of this offence.595.
+"The scope of section 423, IPC, 1860 deals with two specific frauds in the execution of"
+"deeds or instruments of transfer or charge, namely, (i) false recital as to consideration"
+and (ii) false recital as to the name of beneficiary.596.
+The word 'consideration' does not mean the property transferred. An untrue assertion in
+a transfer deed that the whole of a plot of land belonged to the transferor is not a
+statement relating to the consideration for the transfer and is not an offence under this
+section.597.
+"595. Gurditta Mal, (1901) PR No. 10 of 1902; Mahabir Singh, (1902) 25 All 31 ."
+"596. Mukesh Dhirubhai Ambani v State of Orissa, 2005 Cr LJ 2902 (Ori)."
+"597. Mania Goundan, (1911) 37 Mad 47."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Fraudulent Deeds and Dispositions of Property
+[s 424] Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property.
+Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently conceals or removes any property of himself or
+"any other person, or dishonestly or fraudulently assists in the concealment or removal"
+"thereof, or dishonestly releases any demand or claim to which he is entitled, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section provides for cases not coming within the purview of sections 421 and 422.
+It contemplates such a concealment or removal of property from the place in which it is
+"deposited, as can be considered fraudulent. Where one of the several partners removed"
+"the partnership books at night, and when questioned denied having done so;598. where"
+"a judgment-debtor, whose standing crops were attached, harvested them while the"
+attachment was in force;599. where the accused who was bound under the conditions
+of his tenure to share the produce of his land with the landholder in a certain
+"proportion, dishonestly concealed and removed the produce, thus preventing the"
+"landholder from taking his due share,600. it was held that this offence was committed."
+"But a removal of crops to avoid an illegal restraint,601. or removal of property, which"
+"was attached after the date fixed for the return of the warrant of attachment, from the"
+possession of the custodian602. was held not to amount to an offence under this
+section. Certain crops were attached in execution of a decree and placed in the
+"custody of a bailiff. The crops did not belong to the judgment-debtors, and the owners"
+cut and removed a portion of them in spite of the resistance of the bailiff. It was held
+"that no offence was committed.603. In order to bring the case within section 424, IPC,"
+1860 it is necessary to show that there has been dishonest or fraudulent concealment
+or removal of any property or dishonest or fraudulent assistance in the matter of
+concealment or removal of the property. The other part of section 424 is not applicable
+"and therefore, it is not adverted to. There is no case in the complaint that any furniture"
+or equipment have been concealed or removed. The facts averred do not indicate any
+"such removal or concealment. What is stated is that they are still there, but that the"
+complainant is being obstructed from exercising the rights of joint possession over
+them. The question of assisting in the dishonest or fraudulent removal arises only if
+"there is concealment. Therefore, section 424, IPC, 1860 is not applicable.604."
+"598. Gour Benode Dutt, (1873) 21 WR (Cr) 10."
+"599. Obayya, (1898) 22 Mad 151."
+"600. Sivanupandia Thevan, (1914) 38 Mad 793."
+"601. Gopalasamy, (1902) 25 Mad 729."
+"602. Gurdial, (1932) 55 All 119 ."
+"603. Ghasi, (1929) 52 All 214 ."
+"604. GS Rajakumar v Dr. Subramoniam Poti, 1979 Cr LJ 738 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 425] Mischief.
+"Whoever with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or"
+"damage to the public or to any person,1 causes the destruction of any property, or any"
+such change in any property or in the situation thereof2 as destroys or diminishes its
+"value or utility, or affects it injuriously,3 commits ""mischief""."
+Explanation 1.—It is not essential to the offence of mischief that the offender should
+intend to cause loss or damage to the owner of the property injured or destroyed. It is
+"sufficient if he intends to cause, or knows that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or"
+"damage to any person by injuring any property, whether it belongs to that person or"
+not.
+Explanation 2.—Mischief may be committed by an act affecting property belonging to
+"the person who commits the act, or to that person and others jointly."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+(a) A voluntarily burns a valuable security belonging to Z intending to cause
+wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief.
+(b) A introduces water into an ice-house belonging to Z and thus causes the ice to
+"melt, intending wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief."
+"(c) A voluntarily throws into a river a ring belonging to Z, with the intention of"
+thereby causing wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief.
+"(d) A, knowing that his effects are about to be taken in execution in order to satisfy"
+"a debt due from him to Z, destroys those effects, with the intention of thereby"
+"preventing Z from obtaining satisfaction of the debt, and of thus causing"
+damage to Z. A has committed mischief.
+"(e) A, having insured a ship, voluntarily causes the same to be cast away, with the"
+intention of causing damage to the under-writers. A has committed mischief.
+"(f) A causes a ship to be cast away, intending thereby to cause damage to Z who"
+has lent money on bottomry on the ship. A has committed mischief.
+"(g) A, having joint property with Z in a horse, shoots the horse, intending thereby to"
+cause wrongful loss to Z. A has committed mischief.
+"(h) A causes cattle to enter upon a field belonging to Z, intending to cause and"
+knowing that he is likely to cause damage to Z's crop. A has committed
+mischief.
+COMMENT—
+"A bare perusal of this provision clearly reveals that either intention or knowledge, is"
+required for the offence of mischief. Explanation-1 clearly states that it is not essential
+for the offence of mischief that the offender should intend to cause loss or damage to
+the owner of the property injured or destroyed. In fact it is sufficient if he intends to
+"cause, or knows that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss of damage to any person by"
+"injuring any property, whether it belongs to that person or not. Thus, for the offence of"
+mischief it is sufficient that the offender knows that by his act he is likely to cause
+wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person.605. This section clearly speaks
+"of causing any change in property or to destroy or diminishes its value or utility, or"
+"affects it injuriously, commits ""mischief. Thus, on this broad definition, certainly by"
+"making construction on public land, which is not permissible, its utility will be"
+"diminished and the property will be injuriously affected"".606."
+"605. Satish Chand Singhal v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 4132 (Raj)."
+"606. Dilip Kumar v State of U P, 2011 Cr LJ 2832 (All)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 426] Punishment for mischief.
+Whoever commits mischief shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
+"for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Ingredients.—This section requires three things:—
+(1) intention or knowledge of likelihood to cause wrongful loss or damage to the
+public or to any person;
+(2) causing the destruction of some property or any change in it or in its situation;
+and
+"(3) such change must destroy or diminish its value or utility, or affect it injuriously."
+"This section deals with a physical injury from a physical cause.607. Section 426, IPC,"
+"1860 deals with punishment for the offence of ""mischief"" as defined in section 425."
+The said section 425 enacts a rule of which the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
+"laedasis but a partial exponent. It enacts a rule which, while preserving to the owner the"
+"maximum rights of property, prevents his using it to the injury or damage of another"
+and all fortiori it punishes all who wantonly cause such injury or damage to another's
+property. Neither malice nor an intention to cause injury is essential for the constitution
+of the offence which may be committed by injury caused with only the knowledge of
+"likelihood, which must, however, he strictly proved. The first part of the section sets out"
+"the mens rea on the guilty mind, which is the intention or the knowledge of likelihood of"
+causing wrongful loss or damage to the public or to any person. The second part of the
+"section pertains to the actus res, that is to say, the criminal act, which consists in"
+causing destruction to any property or any such change in any property or in the
+situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously.
+"The express mention of ""damage"" in the section is indicative of the fact that the"
+"purview of the offence of ""mischief"" is not intended to be confined only to cases of"
+"""wrongful loss"", but also to engulf within it all such cases of damages by unlawful"
+means. Destruction of any property within the meaning of the section carries with it the
+implication that something should be done to the property contrary to its natural use
+and serviceableness. Mischief implies the causing of wrongful loss or damage and no
+loss or damage is wrongful unless it involves invasion of a legal right. In any other case
+it is damnum sine injuria.608.
+"Acts done or attempted to be done in bona fide assertion of a right, however ill-founded"
+"in law that right may be, cannot amount to the offence of mischief within section"
+"425.609. Thus, where the accused pulled down a wall which obstructed his pathway to"
+"his kotha and which pathway he had been using for the last 22 years, it was held no"
+"offence under section 425, IPC, 1860, was committed.610."
+"1. 'Intend to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to"
+the public or to any person'.—This section does not necessarily contemplate damage
+of a destructive character. It requires merely that there should be an invasion of right
+"and diminution of the value of one's property, caused by that invasion of right, which"
+"must have been contemplated by the doer of it when he did it.611. A dominant owner,"
+"having a right of way over land belonging to another, has no right himself to remove an"
+"obstruction unless his right of way is impaired by it. If he does so, he has employed"
+"unlawful means and if loss of property is caused thereby to another, he is guilty under"
+this section.612. It is no answer to a charge of mischief to plead that the motive of the
+"accused was to benefit himself, and not to injure another, if he knew that he could only"
+secure that benefit by causing wrongful loss to another.613. Where while taking
+"possession of the allotted portion of a house on the basis of a valid allotment order, the"
+goods were simply put outside the premises and no obstruction was caused to the
+"complainant landlord to collect his goods, offences under sections 425 and 427 were"
+not made out.614.
+"2. 'Causes the destruction of any property or any such change in any property, etc.'.—It"
+is the essence of this offence that the perpetrator must cause the destruction of
+property or such change in it as destroys or diminishes its value or utility. The
+destruction of a document evidencing an agreement void for immorality constitutes
+this offence as it can be used as evidence for other collateral purposes.615. The
+accused on receiving delivery of a registered article from a Postmaster was requested
+"to sign an acknowledgement for the article received by him, but instead of returning the"
+same duly signed he tore it up and threw it on the ground. It was held that he was guilty
+of mischief.616.
+The 'destruction' or 'change' should be contrary to the natural use and serviceableness
+"of the property in question. If a person unauthorisedly allows goats to graze in a forest,"
+"the grazing rights in which are restricted to holders of permits, the offence of mischief"
+is not committed as by such an act the grass is only put to its normal use.617. The
+accused had a dispute about the possession of a certain land with the complainant.
+"The complainant dug a well with a view to cultivate the said land, but the accused"
+forcibly entered on the land and damaged the well. It was held that accused were guilty
+of mischief even though the complainant was a trespasser.618. Merely disconnecting
+electric supply does not amount to destruction of property or to such a change in
+"property as destroys or diminishes its utility or value, and does not constitute an"
+offence of mischief.619. A contrary view to this view of the Calcutta High Court has
+been taken by the Delhi High Court to say that switching off the electric supply by the
+"landlord to the tenanted premises, even without causing damage to the distribution"
+board or wires supplying electric current diminishes the value and utility of the tenanted
+"premises within the meaning of section 425, IPC, 1860.620. In order to make out an"
+offence of mischief it is necessary to show that there was wrongful loss or damage to
+the property. So unless the property was destroyed or underwent such a change due to
+"the action of the accused that its utility or value was diminished, no offence under"
+"section 425, IPC, 1860, could be said to have been committed. Thus where a family"
+took shelter in the door-way of an uninhabitable and dilapidated house by throwing
+"away a few articles, the offence of mischief was not committed.621. Cutting off the"
+water supply constitutes such destructive change in the flat as diminishes its value or
+utility.622.
+[s 426.1] 'Property'
+means some tangible property capable of being forcibly destroyed but does not include
+an easement. The section refers to corporeal property and provides for cases in which
+such property is either destroyed or altered or otherwise damaged with a particular
+intent. A right to collect tolls at a public ferry is not property within the meaning of this
+"section.623. Where a person owns land on which there is a drain, the water running"
+"through which is used as of right by way of easement by another person, the former is"
+"not guilty of mischief, if the drain is destroyed by him because an easement does not"
+come within the purview of 'property' within the meaning of section 425.624. The
+offence of mischief may be committed in respect of both movable and immovable
+property.625.
+[s 426.2] 'Change'
+means a physical change in composition or form. The section contemplates a physical
+injury from a physical cause. Making a breach in the wall of a canal is an act which
+causes such a change in the property as destroys or diminishes its value or affects it
+injuriously.626.
+"Where a landlord, in breach of an agreement with his tenants, omitted to pump water"
+"into their flats from a central reservoir without, however, interfering in any way with their"
+"taking water from the central reservoir, such omission did not constitute such a change"
+"as would make it ""mischief"" within the meaning of this section.627. There is a contrary"
+view to this which holds that cutting off the water supply does constitute an offence of
+mischief.628. So also would be the case in regard to cutting off the supply of electricity
+by the landlord to the tenanted portion of the house.629. This latter view appears to be
+more reasonable.
+"3. 'As destroys or diminishes its value or utility, etc.'.—Destruction or diminution in"
+value of the property regarding which the offence is committed is essential. The utility
+referred to in this section is that conceived by the owner and not by the accused.630.
+[s 426.3] Explanation 1.—
+Illustrations (e) and (f) exemplify this Explanation. It is not essential that the property
+"interfered with should belong to the person injuriously affected. D, as a lessee of"
+"Government, held rights of fishery in a particular stretch of a river. C, by diverting the"
+"water of that river, converted the bed of the river for a considerable distance into dry"
+"land, or land with a very shallow covering of water upon it, and by so doing he was"
+"enabled to destroy, and did destroy, very large quantities of fish, both mature and"
+immature. It was held that when C deliberately changed the course and condition of the
+river in the manner described to the detriment of D. he was guilty of mischief.631.
+[s 426.4] Explanation 2.—
+"A person who destroys property, which, at the time, belongs to himself, with the"
+"intention of causing, or knowing that it is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage to"
+anybody else is guilty of this offence.632. Illustrations (b) and (g) show that a man may
+"commit mischief on his own property. In order, however, to his doing so, it is necessary"
+"that he intends to cause wrongful loss to some person, as in the cases stated in the"
+illustrations.
+"607. Moti Lal, (1901) 24 All 155 , 156."
+"608. Gopinath Nayak v Lepa Majhi, 1996 Cr LJ 3814 (Ori)."
+"609. Ramchandra, (1968) 70 Bom LR 399 ."
+"610. Manikchand, 1975 Cr LJ 1044 (Bom); see also Santosh Kumar Biswas, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 79"
+(Cal.)
+"611. Juggeshwar Dass v Koylash Chunder, (1885) 12 Cal 55 . In Nagendranath Roy v Bijoy Kumar"
+"Dasburma, 1992 Cr LJ 1871 (Ori), it was held that mere negligence is not mischief. Negligence"
+accompanied with intention to cause wrongful loss or damage may amount to mischief.
+"Mischief involves mental act with destructive animus. In the instant case, an ailing calf died due"
+to administering of injections despite protests.
+"612. Hari Bilash Shau v Narayan Das Agarwala, (1938) 1 Cal 680 ; Zipru v State, (1927) 51 Bom"
+"487, 29 Bom LR 484."
+"613. S Pannadi, AIR 1960 Mad 240 [LNIND 1959 MAD 76] . Breaking open a person's godown"
+and throwing out articles is an offence under this section. Balai Chandra Nandy v Durga Charan
+"Banerjee, 1988 Cr LJ 710 (Cal)."
+"614. Ved Prakash v Chaman Singh, 1995 Cr LJ 3890 (All)."
+"615. Vyapuri, (1882) 5 Mad 401."
+"616. Sukha Singh, (1905) PR No. 24 of 1905."
+"617. Ragupathi Ayyar v Narayana Goundan, (1928) 52 Mad 151."
+"618. Abdul Hussain, (1943) Kar 7 ."
+"619. IH Khan v M Arathoon, 1969 Cr LJ 242 (Cal)."
+"620. PS Sundaran v S Vershaswami, 1983 Cr LJ 1119 (Del)."
+"621. Jaddan, 1973 Cr LJ 490 (All)."
+"622. Gopi Naik, 1977 Cr LJ 1665 (Goa)."
+"623. Ali Ahmad v Ibadat-Ullah Khan, (1944) All 189 ."
+"624. Punjaji v Maroti, (1951) Nag 855."
+"625. Ram Birich v Bishwanath, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 265 . See however, Sippattar Singh v Krishna, AIR"
+1957 All 405 [LNIND 1957 ALL 15] .
+"626. Bansi v State, (1912) 34 All 210 ."
+"627. Ram Das Pandey v Nagendra Nath Chatterji, (1948) 1 Cal 329 ."
+"628. Gopi Naik, 1977 Cr LJ 1665 (Goa)."
+"629. PS Sundaram, 1983 Cr LJ 1119 (Del)."
+"630. Sumerchand, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 692 ."
+"631. Chanda, (1905) 28 All 204 ."
+"632. Dharma Das Ghose v Nusseruddin, (1886) 12 Cal 660 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 427] Mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees.
+Whoever commits mischief and thereby causes loss or damage to the amount of fifty
+"rupees or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+Where evidence on record clearly establishes that the sugarcane stems in the fields of
+"the claimants were totally destroyed by using a tractor. Therefore, section 427, IPC,"
+1860 is clearly established.633.
+"While causing mischief, there must be an intention behind that. In the present case, the"
+"petitioners were discharging their official duty. Therefore, they had no intention to"
+cause any injury or mischief.634.
+"633. Kashiben Chhaganbhai Koli v State of Gujarat, (2008) 17 SCC 100 [LNIND 2008 SC 2366] :"
+2009 Cr LJ 1156 (SC).
+"634. Ramnish v CBI, 2016 Cr LJ 2371 (Del) : 2016 V AD (Del) 574."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 428] Mischief by killing or maiming animal of the value of ten
+rupees.Mischief by killing or maiming animal of the value of ten rupees.
+"Whoever commits mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering useless any"
+"animal or animals of the value of ten rupees or upwards, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section is intended to prevent cruelty to animals and consequent loss to the
+owner.
+[s 428.1] 'Maiming'.—
+refers to those injuries which cause the privation of the use of a limb or a member of
+"the body.635. 'Maiming' implies a permanent injury,636. wounding is not necessarily"
+maiming.
+"635. Fattehdin, (1881) PR No. 33 of 1881."
+"636. Jeans, (1884) 1 C & K 539."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+"[s 429] Mischief by killing or maiming cattle, etc., of any value or any animal of"
+the value of fifty rupees.
+"Whoever commits mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering useless, any"
+"elephant, camel, horse, mule, buffalo, bull, cow or ox, whatever may be the value"
+"thereof, or any other animal of the value of fifty rupees or upwards, shall be punished"
+"with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or"
+"with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section provides for enhanced punishment owing to the greater value of the
+animals mentioned therein. This section is applicable where permanent injury is
+caused to the animal by the offence of mischief.637. It has been held by the Supreme
+Court that the offence created by this section and the one under section 9(1) read with
+"section 50 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 are substantially the same offence."
+"Therefore, the bar of double jeopardy will not operate.638. It is apparent that the most"
+"significant words are the opening words of the section which says, ""whoever commits"
+"mischief by killing..."" and thus 'mischief' appears to be an essential ingredient for"
+"attracting the offence and the mischief has been defined under section 425 of the IPC,"
+1860. For constituting offence of mischief the essential ingredient would be the
+"destruction of the property. Therefore, if no one has any property or right in any animal,"
+the killing of that animal does not come within the purview of section 425 of the Code
+"and thus, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case where the complainant"
+"has never come with the case that any dog over which somebody has right, has been"
+"caught, rather according to complaint, only stray dogs have been caught that too where"
+"it has never been alleged to have been poisoned, maimed or rendered useless there"
+"would be no application of section 429 of the IPC, 1860.639."
+[s 429.1] Cruelty to animals.—
+Though the complainant under the allegations made in the complaint petition made
+prayer to take cognizance of the offence under sections 11 (i) (a)(b)(c)(e)(f)(g)(h)(i)
+"and (1) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and also under section 429 of"
+"the IPC, 1860 but the Court did not find any ground to proceed with the case so far"
+"offence under section 429 of the IPC, 1860 is concerned and hence, he did not take any"
+"cognizance of the said offence, still the petitioner has been summoned to face trial not"
+only for the offence under sections 11 (i)(a)(b)(c)(e)(f)(g)(h)(i) and (l) of the Prevention
+"of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 but also under section 429 of the IPC, 1860 and"
+"therefore, any insertion of the offence under section 429 of the IPC, 1860 in the"
+summon under the facts and circumstances stated above is an error which may have
+crept in inadvertently but otherwise also in the fact of allegation there would be no
+"application of section 429 of the IPC, 1860.640."
+"637. Gopalakrishna v Krishna Bhatta, AIR 1960 Ker 74 [LNIND 1959 KER 134] ."
+"638. State of Bihar v Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655 [LNIND 1988 SC 507] : 1989 Cr LJ 1005 :"
+AIR 1989 SC 1 [LNIND 1986 SC 198] .
+"639. A P Arya v State of Jharkhand, 2008 Cr LJ 3350 (Jha)."
+"640. A P Arya v State of Jharkhand, 2008 Cr LJ 3350 (Jha)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 430] Mischief by injury to works of irrigation or by wrongfully diverting
+water.
+"Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which causes, or which he knows to be"
+"likely to cause, a diminution of the supply of water for agricultural purposes, or for"
+"food or drink for human beings or for animals which are property, or for cleanliness or"
+"for carrying on any manufacture, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"This section deals with diminution of water supply, e.g., the placing of an embankment"
+across a channel. Section 277 applies if the water is fouled so as to be unfit for use.
+"This section applies equally to irrigation channels as to other sources of irrigation, such"
+as tanks and ponds.
+"For a conviction under this section, there must be some infringement of right resting in"
+some one by the act of the accused.641.
+"641. Ashutosh Ghosh, (1929) 57 Cal 897 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+"[s 431] Mischief by injury to public road, bridge, river or channel."
+Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which he knows to be
+"likely to render any public road, bridge, navigable river or navigable channel, natural or"
+"artificial, impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 432] Mischief by causing inundation or obstruction to public drainage
+attended with damage.
+Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which causes or which he knows to be
+likely to cause an inundation or an obstruction to any public drainage attended with
+"injury or damage, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+"[s 433] Mischief by destroying, moving or rendering less useful a light-house"
+or sea-mark.
+Whoever commits mischief by destroying or moving any light-house or other light
+used as a sea-mark or any sea-mark or buoy or other thing placed as a guide for
+"navigators, or by any act which renders any such light-house, sea-mark, buoy or other"
+"such thing as aforesaid less useful as a guide for navigators, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or"
+"with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section is an extension of the principle laid down in section 281. Sea-marks are
+very important in navigation and any tampering with them may lead to disastrous
+results.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+"[s 434] Mischief by destroying or moving, etc., a land-mark fixed by public"
+authority.
+Whoever commits mischief by destroying or moving any land-mark fixed by the
+"authority of a public servant, or by any act which renders such land-mark less useful"
+"as such, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This section is similar to the last section but the punishment prescribed is not so
+severe because tampering with land-marks does not lead to disastrous results.
+Possession by the accused of the land in which the land-marks are situated will not be
+a defence in a case where the ingredients of the offence under this section are made
+out.642.
+"642. Kannan Pillai v Ismail, (1961) KLT 656 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 435] Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to cause damage to
+amount of one hundred or (in case of agricultural produce) ten rupees.
+"Whoever commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance intending to cause, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, damage to any property to the"
+amount of one hundred rupees or upwards 643.[or (where the property is agricultural
+"produce) ten rupees or upwards], shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+"643. Ins. by Act 8 of 1882, section 10."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+"[s 436] Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy house,"
+etc.
+"Whoever commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance, intending to cause, or"
+"knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, the destruction of any building which"
+is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a human dwelling or as a place for the
+"custody of property, shall be punished with 644.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+"In order to attract section 436 of the IPC, 1860, the following ingredients must be"
+satisfied:
+(i) There must be commission of mischief by fire or any explosive substance.
+"(ii) It should have been committed intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that"
+the accused will thereby cause the destruction of any building.
+(iii) The building should be one which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as
+a human dwelling or as a place for custody of property.
+The section contemplates the destruction of a building. A 'building' is not necessarily a
+"finished structure.645. An unfinished house, of which the walls are built and finished,"
+"the roof on and finished, a considerable part of the flooring laid, and the internal walls"
+and ceiling prepared ready for plastering is a building.646. The dominant intention of
+"the Legislature in framing section 436, IPC, 1860, was to give protection to those"
+buildings which are used as human dwelling or as places where properties are stored
+for custody.
+"See also discussions under head 'Building' under section 442, infra."
+"644. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"645. Manning, (1871) LR 1 CCR 338."
+"646. William Edgell, (1867) 11 Cox 132."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 437] Mischief with intent to destroy or make unsafe a decked vessel or one
+of twenty tons burden.
+Whoever commits mischief to any decked vessel or any vessel of a burden of twenty
+"tons or upwards, intending to destroy or render unsafe, or knowing it to be likely that"
+"he will thereby destroy or render unsafe, that vessel, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+The vessel must be a 'decked vessel' or a 'vessel of a burden of twenty tons or
+upwards'. This limitation is laid down to exclude small craft of all kinds. The intention
+of the Legislature is to punish mischief committed on vessels which are likely to carry
+passengers.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 438] Punishment for the mischief described in section 437 committed by
+fire or explosive substance.
+"Whoever commits, or attempts to commit, by fire or any explosive substance, such"
+"mischief as is described in the last preceding section, shall be punished with 647."
+"[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+This section merely extends the principle laid down in the last section. It imposes
+higher penalty owing to the dangerous nature of the means used.
+"647. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 439] Punishment for intentionally running vessel aground or ashore with
+"intent to commit theft, etc."
+"Whoever intentionally runs any vessel aground or ashore, intending to commit theft of"
+"any property contained therein or to dishonestly misappropriate any such property, or"
+"with intent that such theft or misappropriation of property may be committed, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+This section punishes an act which is akin to piracy.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Mischief
+[s 440] Mischief committed after preparation made for causing death or hurt.
+"Whoever commits mischief, having made preparation for causing to any person death,"
+"or hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of death, or of hurt, or of wrongful restraint, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"five years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+"In order to attract the provisions of section 440 read with section 44, Penal Code, it is"
+necessary to allege and establish the following three essentials which constitute the
+offence under the said sections:-
+(1) Intention or knowledge of likelihood to cause wrongful loss or damage to the
+public or to any person.
+(2) Causing the destruction of some property or any such change in any property or
+in the situation thereof; and
+(3) Such changes must result in destroying or diminishing the value or utility of any
+property or affecting it injuriously.
+"It is thus, plain that either destruction of property or some change in the property or in"
+"the situation which has the effect of destroying or diminishing the value or utility or, in"
+"any event, affecting it injuriously is necessary. The word 'property' used in this section"
+really means some intangible property capable of being destroyed or damaged in its
+"value or utility. It must be remembered that section 440 read with section 44, IPC, 1860"
+is an offence committed against the property. Sections 425 and 440 appear in the 17th
+"chapter entitled ""Offences against Property."" If there is no allegation that mischief was"
+committed through the medium of property as is visualised by section 440 read with
+"section 425, IPC, 1860, it is plain that it cannot be validly said that an offence is"
+constituted.648.
+"648. Abid Ali Khan v Prabhakara Rao, 1968 CR LJ 398 (Vol 74, C. N. 115)(AP); Ramakant Rai v"
+"Madan rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395 [LNIND 2003 SC 837] : 2004 Cr LJ 36 (SC)- Order of acquittal"
+reversed.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 441] Criminal trespass.
+Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another1 with intent to
+"commit an offence2 or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession3 of"
+"such property,"
+"or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there4 with"
+"intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit"
+"an offence,"
+"is said to commit ""criminal trespass""."
+State Amendments
+Orissa.—Amendment by Orissa Act No. 22 of 1986 (w.e.f. 6-12-1986). Same as in Uttar
+"Pradesh except that for the words ""whether before or after the coming into force of the"
+"Criminal Laws (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1961"" read ""remains there"", and omit ""by the"
+"specified in the notice."""
+Uttar Pradesh.—The following amendments were made by U.P. Act No. 31 of
+"1961,section 2 (w.e.f. 13-11-1961)."
+"For Section 441, substitute the following:—"
+"""441. Criminal Trespass.—Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of"
+"another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in"
+"possession of such property, or, having lawfully entered into or upon such property,"
+"unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such"
+"person, or with intent to commit an offence,"
+"or, having entered into or upon such property, whether before or after the coming into"
+"force of the Criminal Law (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1961, with the intention of taking"
+unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use of such property fails to
+"withdraw from such property or its possession or use, when called upon to do so by"
+"that another person by notice in writing, duly served upon him, by the date specified in"
+"the notice,"
+"is said to commit ""criminal trespass""."""
+COMMENT—
+"The word ""trespass"" in common english acceptation means and implies unlawful or"
+"unwarrantable intrusion upon land. It is a transgression of law or right, and a trespasser"
+"is a person, entering the premises of another with the knowledge that his entrance is in"
+excess of the permission that has been given to him.649. The authors of the Code say:
+"""We have given the name of trespass to every usurpation, however slight, of dominion"
+"over property. We do not propose to make trespass, as such, an offence, except when it"
+is committed in order to the commission of some offence injurious to some person
+"interested in the property on which the trespass is committed, or for the purpose of"
+causing annoyance to such a person. Even then we propose to visit it with a light
+"punishment, unless it is attended with aggravating circumstances"".650."
+[s 441.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires—
+(1) Entry into or upon property in the possession of another.
+"(2) If such entry is lawful, then unlawfully remaining upon such property."
+(3) Such entry or unlawful remaining must be with intent—
+(a) to commit an offence; or
+"(b) to intimidate, insult, or annoy any person in possession of the property."
+The use of criminal force is not a necessary ingredient.
+1. 'Enters into or upon property in the possession of another'.—'Property' in this
+"section means immovable corporeal property, and not incorporeal property such as a"
+"right of fishery,651. or a right of ferry.652. A person plying a boat for hire within the"
+"prohibited distance from a public ferry cannot be said, with reference to such ferry, to"
+commit criminal trespass.653.
+The possession must be actual possession of some person other than the alleged
+trespasser.654. The offence can only be committed against a person who is in actual
+physical possession of the property in question. If the complainant is not in actual
+possession of the property this offence cannot be committed.655. But the offence may
+be committed even when the person in possession of the property is absent provided
+the entering into or upon the property is done with intent to do any of the acts
+"mentioned in the section. Where a person entered upon a field that had been leased,"
+"during the absence of the lessee, and ploughed it, and the lessor came to the spot on"
+"hearing of it to prevent the commission of such acts, it was held that that was not"
+enough to exonerate that person from intention to annoy the lessee and that such a
+person could be convicted of criminal trespass.656. The mere taking of unlawful
+possession of a house will not amount to either criminal trespass or house-trespass.
+An unlawful act is not necessarily an offence. The house in question must be in actual
+possession of the complainant. Mere constructive possession is not sufficient.657.
+2. 'Intent to commit an offence'.—Where in a pen-down peaceful strike the employees
+of the bank entered the office and occupied their seats and refused to work during
+office hours and was wholly confined to regular working hours and the only act alleged
+against them was that they refused to vacate their seats when they were called upon to
+"do so by the superior officers, it was held by the Supreme Court that the conduct of"
+strikers did not amount to criminal trespass.658.
+"3. 'Or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession'.— In order to establish"
+"that the entry on the property was with intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is"
+"necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or"
+insult was the main aim of the entry; it is not sufficient to show merely that the natural
+"consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult and this"
+was known to the accused.659.
+"The word 'intimidate' must be understood in its ordinary sense ""to overawe, to put in"
+"fear, by a show of force or threats of violence"". 660."
+The Supreme Court has held that this section does not require that the intention must
+be to annoy a person who is actually present at the time of the trespass.661.
+"4. 'Having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there'.— The"
+"original entry may be lawful, but if the person entering remains on the property with the"
+intent specified in the section he commits trespass. Where a person armed with
+weapons went on land of which he was the owner when no one else was there at the
+"time and refused to vacate it, when called upon to do so by a person who had no right"
+"to the land, it was held that the owner did not remain on the land unlawfully and was"
+"not therefore, guilty of the offence of criminal trespass.662."
+[s 441.2] Bona fide claim.—
+If a person enters on land in the possession of another in the exercise of a bona fide
+"claim of right, but without any intention to intimidate, insult, or annoy the person in"
+"possession, or to commit an offence, then although he may have no right to the land,"
+"he cannot be convicted of criminal trespass, because the entry was not made with any"
+"such intent as constitutes the offence.663. Bona fide claim of right, however ill-founded,"
+nullifies a case of criminal trespass.664. Where certain hutment dwellers of Bombay
+were facing demolition for having erected their huts on public footpaths and
+"pavements, the Supreme Court held that no offence under the section was made out."
+Their act was not voluntary. It was the dictate of their moral right to survive and their
+"state of helplessness. They did not intend to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult"
+or annoy any person in possession and that is the gist of the offence of criminal
+trespass under section 441.665. Where the accused continued in possession of the
+"tenanted premises even after the expiry of the lease period, he could not be said to be"
+in unauthorised possession and to have committed trespass.666.
+[s 441.3] Dispute as to possession in civil suit.—
+"Where dispute regarding possession of a property was pending in a civil suit, there"
+could be no trespass in respect of that property. The complainant must be in
+unquestionable possession of property at the time of alleged trespass.667.
+[s 441.4] Honest civil trespass.—
+A Judicial Magistrate was posted at a place where no Government accommodation
+"was available. He, therefore, stayed in a room in a dak bungalow. When he went away"
+"on leave, he locked his household effects in the room. A junior engineer broke open the"
+lock and shifted the belongings to another room as a senior official was to visit the
+"area. On return, the Magistrate filed an FIR against the junior engineer and cognizance"
+of the offence was taken. It was held that the engineer was not actuated with any
+dishonest intention and it was a case of honest civil trespass for which no cognizance
+could be taken.668.
+[s 441.5] Uttar Pradesh Amendment.—
+The effect of the Uttar Pradesh amendment was considered by the Allahabad High
+Court in Somnath Paul v Ram Bharose.669. The amendment has the effect of converting
+"a civil trespass into a criminal trespass when the entry into, or retention of, premises is"
+for the purpose of taking unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use. Going
+"by the earlier authorities, the court held that refusal to vacate premises after revocation"
+of licence under which possession was given would not by itself constitute a criminal
+trespass. The intent to do the acts stated in the amendment must also be proved.670.
+[s 441.6] Orissa Amendment.—
+"Section 441, IPC, 1860, as amended by Orissa Act, 22 of 1986, defines criminal"
+"trespass, which, when committed in respect of, inter alia, a human dwelling, becomes"
+"an offence punishable under section 448, IPC, 1860. Ordinarily, a dispute between the"
+tenant and the landlord regarding vacation of a premise after expiry of the period of
+"tenancy is a civil dispute, unless an offence of criminal trespass can be said to have"
+been committed. Prosecution against the tenant would not lie except the cases
+"covered by the Orissa Amendment. Section 441, IPC, 1860, which has been defined by"
+"Orissa Act, 22 of 1986, is quoted hereunder for better appreciation:"
+....... Whoever enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit
+"an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property."
+"Or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent"
+"thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an offence;"
+"or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, remains there with the intention of"
+taking unauthorised possession or making unauthorised use of such property and fails to
+"withdraw from such property or its possession or use, when called upon to do so by that"
+"another person by notice in writing duly served on him, is said to commit criminal trespass."
+The aforesaid section consists of three parts. The first two parts are same and similar
+"to that of the original section of the IPC, 1860. The third part, with which the charge is"
+"concerned, says that if the person has lawfully entered into the premises and remains"
+there with intention of (i) taking unauthorised possession or (ii) making unauthorised
+use of such property or (iii) fails to withdraw from such property or its possession or
+"use when called upon to do so by notice in writing duly served on him, he is said to"
+"have committed the offence.671. The rigors of section 441, IPC, 1860 as amended by"
+"the Orissa Act, 22 of the 198 shall not be applicable to the following cases:"
+(i) Statutory tenants whose tenancy is governed by any statute.
+"(They are protected by tenancy laws like Public Premises Eviction Act, etc.)"
+(ii) Tenant who has entered into possession by virtue of a lease.
+(Rights of such tenant are governed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property
+Act and the Specific Relief Act and he acquires a right of possession. After
+"determination of tenancy by notice, he would become ""Tenant holding over""""Tenant on"
+"sufferance"" or 'Tenant at will"" as the case may be. His possession being juridical, is"
+protected. He can be evicted only in due process of law. The possession of such
+tenant cannot be equated with that of trespassers.)
+"(iii) Person who has entered into possession by virtue of some covenant like, agreement"
+"to sell, will etc. and/or put forth a genuine right over the property possessed."
+"(If a person claims a right of title coupled with possession, till the dispute is"
+"adjudicated, his possession cannot be conclusively said to be that of a trespasser and"
+his right to possess would be subject to the result of the suit or legal proceeding.)672.
+"649. Kewal Chand v SK Sen, AIR 2001 SC 2569 [LNIND 2001 SC 1415] : (2001) 6 SCC 512"
+[LNIND 2001 SC 1415] .
+"650. Note N, p 168."
+"651. Charu Nayiah, (1877) 2 Cal 354 ."
+"652. Muthra v Jawahir, (1877) 1 All 527 ."
+653. Ibid.
+"654. Foujdar, (1878) PR No. 28 of 1878; Kunjilal v State, (1913) 12 ALJR 151."
+"655. Bismillah, (1928) 3 Luck 661 ."
+"656. Venkatesu v Kesamma, (1930) 54 Mad 515."
+"657. Satish Chandra Modak, (1949) 2 Cal 171 ."
+"658. Punjab National Bank v AIPNBE Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 [LNIND 1959 SC 166] ."
+"659. Mathri v State, AIR 1964 SC 986 [LNIND 1963 SC 292] . Sujya v State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cr"
+"LJ 1612 (Raj), entering the field of another and releasing cows to graze there, revenue records"
+"showed that the victims were khatedars of the field, the trespassers caused injuries on"
+"resistance, guilty of criminal trespass. They have no right of private defence."
+"660. TH Bird, (1933) 13 Pat 268."
+"661. Rash Behari v Fagu Shaw, (1970) 1 SCR 425 [LNIND 1969 SC 192] ."
+"662. Adalat, (1945) 24 Pat 519. The offence is of continuing nature within the meaning of"
+section 472 Cr PC. The offence would be continuing so long as the trespass is not lifted or
+vacated or insult etc. of the person lawfully in possession is not stopped. Gokak Patel Valkart
+"Ltd v Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath, (1991) 71 Com Cases 403 : (1991) 2 SCC 141 [LNIND"
+"1991 SC 878] . Akapati Bhaskar Patro v Trinath Sahu, 2002 Cr LJ 3397 (Ori), by virtue of the"
+Orissa Amendment and even otherwise also a tenant remaining in possession even after
+termination notice does not commit the offence of mischief by trespass. His possession is not
+unlawful.
+"663. Budh Singh, (1879) 2 All 101 , 103."
+"664. Manik Chand, 1975 Cr LJ 1044 (Bom); Santosh Kumar Biswas, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 79 (Cal)."
+"665. Olga Tellis v Bombay MC, (1985) 3 SCC 545 [LNIND 1985 SC 215] : AIR 1986 SC 180"
+"[LNIND 1985 SC 215] . For an analysis of the wider implications of this decision, see TN Singh,"
+"Ex Curia : Tulsiram Patel v Olga Tellis, (1987) 29 JI LI 547."
+"666. S Subramanium v State of UP, 1996 Cr LJ 929 (All)."
+"667. State of Goa v Pedro Lopes, 1996 Cr LJ 256 (Bom)."
+"668. Bagirath Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1992 Cr LJ 3934 (Raj)."
+"669. Somnath Paul v Ram Bharose, 1991 Cr LJ 2499 (All)."
+"670. The court followed Punjab National Bank v AIP NBE Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 [LNIND"
+"1959 SC 166] , entry of employees on pen down strike; Kanwal Sood v Nawal Kishore, AIR 1983"
+"SC 159 [LNIND 1982 SC 180] : 1983 Cr LJ 173 : (1983) 3 SCC 25 [LNIND 1982 SC 180] , refusal"
+"to vacate premises after the death of testator; Sinnasamy v King, 1951 AC 83 (PC), entry with"
+"bona fide belief in right to do so; Jawanmal v Bhanwari, AIR 1958 Raj 214 [LNIND 1958 RAJ 237] :"
+"1958 Cr LJ 1099 , bona fide belief; Babu Ram v State of UP, 1971 All LJ 4, bona fide belief;"
+"Mahabir Pd v State, 1976 Cr LJ 245 , notice under section 447; Rashid Ad v Rashidan, 1980 All LJ"
+"939, effect of UP Amendment, lawful entry becoming criminal trespass; DP Titus v LW Lyall, 1981"
+"Cr LJ 68 , lawful entry, subsequent unauthorised use."
+"671. Abdul Samad v Md. Qamruddin, 2007 Cr LJ. 4383 (Ori)."
+"672. Kumar Debasish v State of Orissa, 2008 Cr LJ 2397 (Ori)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 442] House trespass.
+"Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into1 or remaining in any building,2"
+"tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship,"
+"or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit ""house-trespass""."
+Explanation.—The introduction of any part of the criminal trespasser's body is entering
+sufficient to constitute house-trespass.
+COMMENT—
+The offence of criminal trespass may be aggravated in several ways. It may be
+"aggravated by the way in which it is committed, and by the end for which it is"
+"committed. When criminal trespass is committed in a dwelling house, or any building,"
+"tent or vessel used for human dwelling, it becomes, 'house trespass' as defined under"
+"section 442 IPC, 1860 and punishable under section 448 IPC, 1860. The offence"
+intended to be committed so as to constitute 'criminal trespass' is any offence. But if
+such offence intended to be committed is one punishable with imprisonment and the
+"criminal trespass is committed in a dwelling house, then the offence which is made out"
+"is not one punishable under section 448 IPC, 1860 but one punishable under section"
+"451 IPC, 1860 which is an aggravated form of house trespass.673."
+1. 'Entering into'.—The introduction of any part of the trespasser's body is entering
+"sufficient to constitute house-trespass.674. The roof being a part of a building, if any"
+"one goes on the roof of a building that will be tantamount to ""entering into"" the building"
+"within the meaning of that expression in this section.675. Section 441, IPC, 1860 would"
+show that it is only when a person unlawfully remains in a property of another person
+"""with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to"
+"commit an offence"" that an offence of criminal trespass is committed. While there may"
+be evidence in the present case that the accused/opposite party has unlawfully
+remained in the property belonging to the petitioner or that of the Mosque Committee
+"to whom the petitioner is said to have donated the property, there is no evidence"
+"whatsoever that the accused/opposite party remained there with intent to intimidate,"
+insult or annoy the petitioner or the Mosque Committee or with intent to commit an
+offence.676.
+2. 'Building'.—What is a 'building' must always be a question of degree and
+circumstances; its ordinary and usual meaning is an enclosure of brick or stone work
+covered in by a roof.677. The mere surrounding of an open space of ground by a wall or
+"fence of any kind cannot be deemed to convert the open space itself into a building,"
+and trespass thereon does not amount to house-trespass.678. Even a structure with a
+"thatched roof, doors and shutters would come within the meaning of building if it is"
+used as a human dwelling or place for the custody of property.679..
+[s 442.1] Police Station.—
+The criminal trespass in question need not be only in respect of a building used as a
+"human dwelling, but it also covers in building used as a place for custody of property"
+"and as the police station is a place where there will also be custody of property, it will"
+"also come under the definition of ""Building"" in section 442 IPC, 1860.680."
+"673. Appukuttan v State, 2010 Cr LJ. 3186 ."
+674. Vide Explanation.
+"675. Dinesh Thakur, 1970 Cr LJ 1199 ."
+"676. Md. Sahabuddin v Sayed Monowar Hussain, 1999 Cr LJ. 349 (Gau)."
+"677. Moir v Williams, (1892) 1 QB 264 , 270."
+"678. Palani Goundan, (1896) 1 Weir 523."
+"679. Rajoo v State, 1977 Cr LJ 837 (Raj)."
+"680. State of Karnataka v Richard, 2008 Cr LJ 2200 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 443] Lurking house-trespass.
+Whoever commits house-trespass having taken precautions to conceal such house-
+trespass from some person who has a right to exclude or eject the trespasser from
+"the building, tent or vessel which is the subject of the trespass, is said to commit"
+"""lurking house-trespass""."
+COMMENT—
+"The authors of the Code say: ""House-trespass, again, may be aggravated by being"
+committed in a surreptitious or in a violent manner. The former aggravated form of
+house-trespass we designate as lurking house-trespass; the latter we designate as
+"house-breaking. Again, house-trespass, in every form, may be aggravated by the time at"
+"which it is committed. Trespass of this sort has, for obvious reasons, always been"
+considered as a more serious offence when committed by night than when committed
+"by day. Thus, we have four aggravated forms of that sort of criminal trespass which we"
+"designate as house-trespass, lurking house-trespass, house-breaking, lurking house-"
+"trespass by night, and house-breaking by night""."
+"""These are aggravations arising from the way in which the criminal trespass is"
+committed. But criminal trespass may also be aggravated by the end for which it is
+committed. It may be committed for a frolic. It may be committed in order to (commit)
+"a murder. It may also often happen that a criminal trespass which is venial, as respects"
+"the mode, may be of the greatest enormity as respects the end; and that a criminal"
+trespass committed in the most reprehensible mode may be committed for an end of
+"no great atrocity. Thus, A may commit house-breaking by night for the purpose of"
+playing some idle trick on the inmates of a dwelling. B may commit simple criminal
+trespass by merely entering another's field for the purpose of murder or gang-robbery.
+Here A commits trespass in the worst way. B commits trespass with the worst object.
+In our provisions we have endeavoured to combine the aggravating circumstances in
+such a way that each may have its due effect in settling the punishment.681. The law is
+well settled that unless the accused is alleged to have taken some active steps and
+"means to conceal his presence, the allegation that the house-trespass was committed"
+"by night and the darkness helped the accused in concealing his presence, does not and"
+cannot justify a charge for the offence of committing lurking house-trespass. But if the
+"house-trespass is a lurking house-trespass"" as defined in section 443, IPC, 1860,"
+"because of the offender having taken some active steps to conceal his presence, it"
+"becomes automatically lurking house-trespass by night under section 444, IPC, 1860, if"
+it is committed after sunset and before sunrise.682.
+[s 443.1] CASES.—
+Entry upon the roof of a building may be criminal trespass. But it cannot sustain a
+"conviction for lurking house-trespass,683. or for house-breaking.684."
+"681. Note N, p 168."
+"682. Prem Bahadur, 1978 Cr LJ 945 (Sikkim); see also Dasai Kandu, 1979 Cr LJ NOC 110 (Pat);"
+"Bejoy Kumar Mohapatra, 1982 Cr LJ 2162 (Ori)."
+"683. Alla Bakhsh, (1886) PR No. 9 of 1887."
+"684. Fazla, (1890) PR No. 9 of 1890."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 444] Lurking house-trespass by night.
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass after sunset and before sunrise, is said to"
+"commit ""lurking house-trespass by night""."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 445] House-breaking.
+"A person is said to commit ""house-breaking"" who commits house-trespass if he"
+effects his entrance into the house or any part of it in any of the six ways hereinafter
+"described; or if, being in the house or any part of it for the purpose of committing an"
+"offence, or, having committed an offence therein, he quits the house or any part of it"
+"in any of such six ways, that is to say—"
+"First.—If he enters or quits through a passage by himself, or by any abettor of the"
+"house-trespass, in order to the committing of the house-trespass."
+"Secondly.—If he enters or quits through any passage not intended by any person,"
+"other than himself or an abettor of the offence, for human entrance; or through any"
+passage to which he has obtained access by scaling or climbing over any wall or
+building.
+Thirdly.—If he enters or quits through any passage which he or any abettor of the
+"house-trespass has opened, in order to the committing of the house-trespass by any"
+means by which that passage was not intended by the occupier of the house to be
+opened.
+Fourthly.—If he enters or quits by opening any lock in order to the committing of the
+"house-trespass, or in order to the quitting of the house after a house-trespass."
+Fifthly.—If he effects his entrance or departure by using criminal force or committing
+an assault or by threatening any person with assault.
+Sixthly.—If he enters or quits by any passage which he knows to have been fastened
+"against such entrance or departure, and to have been unfastened by himself or by an"
+abettor of the house-trespass.
+"Explanation.—Any out-house or building occupied with a house, and between which"
+"and such house there is an immediate internal communication, is part of the house"
+within the meaning of this section.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A commits house-trespass by making a hole through the wall of Z's house, and"
+putting his hand through the aperture. This is house-breaking.
+(b) A commits house-trespass by creeping into a ship at a port-hole between decks.
+This is house-breaking.
+(c) A commits house-trespass by entering Z's house through a window. This is
+house- breaking.
+"(d) A commits house-trespass by entering Z's house through the door, having"
+opened a door which was fastened. This is house-breaking.
+"(e) A commits house-trespass by entering Z's house through the door, having lifted"
+a latch by putting a wire through a hole in door. This is house-breaking.
+"(f) A finds the key of Z's housedoor, which Z had lost, and commits house-trespass"
+"by entering Z's house, having opened the door with that key. This is house-"
+breaking.
+"(g) Z is standing in his doorway. A forces a passage by knocking Z down, and"
+commits house-trespass by entering the house. This is house-breaking.
+"(h) Z, the door-keeper of Y, is standing in Y's doorway. A commits house-trespass by"
+"entering the house, having deterred Z from opposing him by threatening to beat"
+him. This is house-breaking.
+COMMENT—
+Invasion of a person's residence should naturally be meted out with deterrent
+punishment. This section describes six ways in which the offence of house-breaking
+may be committed. Clauses 1–3 deal with entry which is effected by means of a
+passage which is not ordinary. Clauses 4–6 deal with entry which is effected by force.
+Where a hole was made by burglars in the wall of a house but their way was blocked by
+"the presence of beams on the other side of the wall, it was held that the offence"
+committed was one of attempt to commit house-breaking and not actual house-
+"breaking, and illustration (a) to this section did not apply.685."
+"685. Ghulam, (1923) 4 Lah 399. See Bhagwan Das v State of UP, 1990 Cr LJ 916 (All), there"
+being no evidence that the accused was armed with any weapons whatsoever or anybody had
+"received injury, the offence was converted from one under section 395 to section 448."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 446] House-breaking by night.
+"Whoever commits house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise, is said to commit"
+"""house-breaking by night""."
+COMMENT—
+The preceding section contains an elaborate definition of house-breaking. The addition
+in this section of the element of time turns the offence into 'house-breaking by night'.
+The analysis of this offence suggests a division of its ingredients into (1) the breaking;
+(2) the entry; (3) the place; (4) the time; and (5) the intent.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 447] Punishment for criminal trespass.
+Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either
+"description for a term which may extend to three months, with fine or which may"
+"extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+A party claimed title by adverse possession. The other filed a complaint for criminal
+trespass. The complaint was dismissed for the fact that the dispute was of civil nature.
+It was held that such acquittal did not have the effect of proving the existence of title
+by adverse possession.686. Where the land in question was not shown to be in the
+"exclusive possession of the complainant, and the accused having his right of entry, his"
+entry into the land did not constitute a criminal trespass.687. Where certain land was
+"allotted to the complainant but the same was already in the possession of the accused,"
+the offence of criminal trespass was not made out because mere occupation even if
+illegal cannot amount to criminal trespass.688.
+[s 447.1] Continuing offence.—
+Trespass is a continuing offence. Allegation is that petitioners had constructed a wall
+on the retaining wall of the complainant. The petitioners in the petition have not
+"projected the case that they had removed alleged wall. Thus, it is a continuing offence"
+"under section 472 Cr PC, 1973. The bar of limitation is not applicable.689."
+"686. Jageshwar Ramsahay Ahir v Parmeshwar, AIR 2000 MP 223 [LNIND 1999 MP 382] ."
+"687. Dhanna Ram v State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 1204 (Raj)."
+"688. State of Rajasthan v Dipti Ram, 2001 Cr LJ 3910 (Raj); Janggu v State of MP, 2000 Cr LJ 711"
+(MP) here also the complainant could not prove his possession. Paramjeet Batra v State of
+Uttarakhand; JT 2012 (12) SC 393 [LNIND 2012 SC 812] : 2012 (12) Scale 688 [LNIND 2012 SC
+812] -proceedings quashed as it appears to be essentially a civil dispute
+"689. Jasbir Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2012 Cr LJ 2955 (HP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 448] Punishment for house-trespass.
+Whoever commits house-trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either
+"description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to"
+"one thousand rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+In order to sustain conviction under the section it has to be found that the intention of
+"the accused to commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy the complainant. There"
+must be an unlawful entry and there must be proof of one or the other of the intentions
+"mentioned in section 441. In this case, the evidence produced clearly established the"
+offence.690. The complainant was allotted a shop by the Rehabilitation Department
+"because of his being a displaced person, but the accused persons did not allow him to"
+enter the shop. Though the accused persons entered the shop lawfully they retained it
+unlawfully and dishonestly for more than 37 years. They were held to be guilty under
+this section read with section 34. The complainant died during the revision petition.
+The accused persons' conviction was maintained but they were released on probation
+and directed to restore the shop to the complainant's son.691. Allegation was that
+accused went to house of victim in order to commit offence of rape. Though rape was
+not committed at house of victim but committed at house of accused but entry of
+accused into house of victim was with intent to commit offence of rape. Accused is
+"liable to be convicted under section 448 IPC, 1860.692."
+"[s 448.1] Accused acquitted of main offence, trespass stands.—"
+Case of trespass and culpable homicide. Cause of death was not clearly established.
+There might have been some jostling but that did not lead to the death of the victim.
+The cardiac arrest cannot be attributed to this act of the accused. Though the accused
+"was acquitted of the offence under section 304, he was found to be guilty of section"
+447.693.
+"690. Vidyadharan v State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215 [LNIND 2003 SC 985] : AIR 2004 SC 536"
+[LNIND 2003 SC 985] : (2004) 1 KLT 105 [LNIND 2003 SC 985] : 2004 Cr LJ 605 : (2004) 2 MPLJ
+251 .
+"691. Kirpal Singh v Wazir Singh, 2001 Cr LJ 1566 (Del); NC Singhal (Dr.) v State, 1998 Cr LJ 3568"
+"(Del), the petitioner was carrying on medical practice in a licenced chamber of which the"
+respondent always had actual physical possession. He alleged that the respondent demolished
+the chamber and committed theft of his books and equipment. The court found that there was
+written notice to the petitioner of demolition and also that the charge of theft was vague
+because no details of books and equipment alleged to be stolen were given. See also Ram
+"Chandra Singh v Nabrang Rai Burma, 1998 Cr LJ 2156 (Ori); Bimal Ram v State of Bihar, 1997 Cr"
+"LJ 2846 (Pat), house trespass, the testimony of a witness could not be thrown overboard just"
+"only because he was a chance witness. Conviction. Chintamani Sethi v Raghunath Mohanty,"
+"2003 Cr LJ 2866 (Ori), complaint against the Sarpanch was found to be motivated for other"
+"reasons, hence, dismissed. Kishori Lal Agarwal v Ram Chandra Sindhi, 2003 Cr. LJ 2299 (All),"
+"charge on tenant that he occupied an additional room in the house, he was given notice to"
+"vacate, the notice did not specify the date within which he should do so. An offence under the"
+"section, held, not made out."
+"692. Krishna Bordoloi v State of Assam, 2012 Cr LJ 4099 (Gau)."
+"693. Bappa Malik v The State of West Bengal, 2016 Cr LJ 95 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 449] House-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with death.
+Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence
+"punishable with death, shall be punished with 694.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"rigorous imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT—
+"An act can be said to be committed ""in order to the committing of an offence"" even"
+"though the offence may not have been completed. The words ""in order to"" have been"
+"used to mean ""with the purpose of"".695."
+[s 449.1] Sentence to run concurrently.—
+"Offence under sections 302, 392, 404 and 449 committed in a gruesome manner."
+Considering the macabre nature of the crime the Court ordered the sentence to run
+consecutively.696.
+"694. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"695. Matiullah, AIR 1965 SC 132 [LNIND 1964 SC 56] . See the decision of the Supreme Court in"
+"Laxmi Raj Shetty v State of TN, AIR 1988 SC 1274 [LNIND 1988 SC 260] : (1988) 3 SCC 319"
+"[LNIND 1988 SC 260] , where death sentence for bank robbery and murder was reduced to life"
+"imprisonment. Bhaskar Chattoraj v State of WB, 1991 Cr LJ 451 (SC) : AIR 1991 SC 317 . One of"
+"the accused against whom there was no evidence, discharged. Satrughana Lamar v State, 1998"
+"Cr LJ 1588 , the accused entered into a hut, killed a person there with an axe, seen coming out"
+"with axe, recovery of weapon at his instance, conviction under sections 304/349 held proper."
+"Muniappan v State of TN, 1997 Cr LJ 2336 (Mad), charge of beating and murder not proved. All"
+round failure of evidence.
+"696. K Ramajayam v The Inspector of Police, 2016 Cr LJ 1542 (Mad) : 2016 (2) CTC 135 [LNIND"
+2016 MAD 88] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 450] House-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with
+imprisonment for life.
+Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence
+"punishable with 697.[imprisonment for life], shall be punished with imprisonment of"
+"either description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+698.
+COMMENT—
+Section 450 deals with house trespass in order to commit offence punishable with life
+"imprisonment. In the case, where the offence punishable with life imprisonment has"
+"been ruled out, one would have to look into actual act of the accused person. The act"
+of the appellant is that of assaulting the complainant with chopper. The injury caused
+"by the appellant is a simple injury. In such case, it would not attract life imprisonment"
+"and hence, section 450 of the IPC, 1860 would not be attracted.699."
+[s 450.1] Murder and house trespass.—
+"Where accused entered the house of deceased and killed him by giving sword blow,"
+"and his wife, who was the eye-witness to the incident lodged FIR within a period of"
+"three hours, it was held that accused was rightly convicted under sections 450 and 302"
+"of IPC, 1860.700."
+[s 450.2] Rape and House trespass.—
+"Where the victim aged above 18 years alleged that while she was sleeping, accused"
+entered her house and she woke-up when he was committing sexual intercourse with
+"her, and it was proved that she did not bolted door of house from inside and when she"
+"woke-up she did not raise alarm for help, it was held that offences are not made"
+out.701. Where it was proved that the accused entered the mentally challenged victim's
+"house, threw her on the cot and after removing her underwear committed forcible"
+"sexual intercourse with her, conviction under section 450 and section 376 IPC, 1860"
+was upheld.702.
+"697. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"698. Her Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 345 (Raj), entry into parental house to which the"
+"right of access was there. Hence, criminal trespass was not made out. Surjit Singh v State of"
+"Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 391 [LNIND 2007 SC 724] , 5 policemen were accused of entering into"
+the house of a woman with the intention to rape her. Their attempt was foiled by her sons who
+"cried for help. On the suggestion of one of them, the other killed the woman. They were not the"
+persons before the court. These two were neither involved in killing nor there any evidence of
+common intention. Criminal trespass into the house was established against them. They were
+convicted for the same.
+"699. Mohd. Kamar Abdul Ansari v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 4736 (Bom)."
+"700. Mohanlal v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 769 (Raj); Bablu Alias Mahendra v State of"
+"Madhya Pradesh, 2009 Cr LJ 1856 (MP)-material witnesses are not examined and evidence of"
+identification is doubtful. Accused is entitled to benefit of doubt.
+"701. Prahalad Mohanlal Sahu v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 1726 (SC); Ramesh v State,"
+"2011 Cr LJ. 3816 (Mad); Wilson David v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ 1402 (Chh)."
+"702. Jhaduram Sahu v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 1722 (Chh); Moti Lal v State of MP, 2008"
+"Cr LJ 3543 (SC);2008 (11) SCC 20 [LNIND 2008 SC 1427] ; Sadan v State of Madhya Pradesh,"
+2011 Cr LJ 2488 (MP).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 451] House-trespass in order to commit offence punishable with
+imprisonment.
+Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any offence
+"punishable with imprisonment, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+"and if the offence intended to be committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment"
+may be extended to seven years.
+COMMENT—
+This section is similar to sections 449 and 450. It provides punishment for house-
+trespass committed with intent to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment.
+"Where the accused was convicted of house-breaking, his object being to have sexual"
+"intercourse with the complainant's wife, it was held that the conviction was valid.703."
+The accused was held to be guilty of the offence under section 450 (lurking house-
+trespass where he entered the house at mid-night getting easy access because of
+acquaintance with the family and forcibly raped the victim girl finding her alone in her
+room. He was punished for rape and lurking house-trespass for committing an
+offence.704. Accused persons committed house trespass in order to commit an
+offence punishable with imprisonment. They went to the house of complainant with
+"preparation by holding sticks in their hands for assaulting the complainant. Therefore,"
+"all the four accused are liable to be convicted under section 451 of the IPC, 1860.705."
+Where evidence shows that accused after entering the house unlawfully remained
+there and had even intimidated and insulted and annoyed the victim when they were
+called upon to quit the house. Court held that conduct of the accused will clearly come
+"within the latter part of section 441 IPC, 1860 and the same will be punishable under"
+"section 451 IPC, 1860.706. There is enough material to show that the appellant had"
+"committed house trespass, however, not with intention to commit offence punishable"
+"with life imprisonment, hence, in such case section 451 IPC, 1860 would be attracted"
+instead of section 450.707. The accused trespassed into the house of the victim girl
+who was nearly about ten years of age on the date of occurrence and committed
+unnatural offence on her. After finding the victim alone in the house the accused
+committed unnatural offence by putting his penis having carnal intercourse against
+order of nature. Order of acquittal is reversed by the Supreme Court.708.
+It was alleged that the accused trespassed into the house of the victim when she was
+all alone in order to commit rape. But there was no evidence of any preparation or
+attempt to rape. The conviction under section 452 was held to be not proper. Since the
+trespass was not for any pious purpose because an offence under section 354
+"(outraging modesty) was likely to be involved, conviction was recorded under section"
+451.709. In another case the Courts below observed that from the evidence of PWs 1
+and 2 it is seen that theft had taken place in the room in which PW 2 was sleeping; the
+thief entered the house and committed theft of gold chain which PW 2 was wearing
+"and, therefore, this act will be covered by section 451 of the IPC, 1860, i.e., house-"
+trespass in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment. A1 and A3 have
+"been acquitted because nothing links them to the offence. But, similar is the case with"
+the appellant. The only evidence against him is the alleged recovery of gold chain at his
+instance. That cannot connect the appellant to the offence.710.
+The accused was convicted for house trespass for committing unnatural offence. The
+accused was convicted by the trial court but acquitted by the High Court because of no
+corroboration of the testimony of the victim. The Supreme Court restored the
+"conviction and observed that corroboration could not be required as a fossil formula,"
+even if the story revealed by the victim appeals to the judicial mind as probable.711.
+703. (1875) 8 MHC (Appex) vi.
+"704. Pacigi Narasimha v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 2997 (AP)."
+"705. State of Maharashtra v Tatyaba Bajirao Jadhav, 2011 Cr LJ 2717 (Bom)."
+"706. Appukuttan v State, 2010 Cr LJ. 3186 ."
+"707. Mohd. Kamar Abdul Ansari v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 4736 (Bom)."
+"708. State v Antony, (2007) 1 SCC 627 [LNIND 2006 SC 940] : AIR 2007 SC Supp 1828."
+"709. Ram Pratap v State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cr LJ 1450 (Raj). Gulam v State of Madhya Pradesh,"
+2011 Cr LJ 179
+"710. Azeez v State, (2013) 2 SCC 184 [LNIND 2013 SC 54] ; Alistait v State, (2009) 17 SCC 794 ."
+"711. State of Kerala v Kurissum Moottil Antony, (2007) 1 scc 627."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+"[s 452] House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint."
+"Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any"
+"person, or for assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for"
+"putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+The Legislature has enacted this section to provide higher punishment where house-
+"trespass is committed in order to cause hurt, or to assault, or to wrongfully restrain any"
+"person. For a conviction under this section, it is necessary to prove that the dominant"
+intention of the accused was to cause hurt to or to assault or to wrongfully restrain any
+"person.712. Preparation is the genesis of offence under section 452 of IPC, 1860. In"
+"absence of it being proved that any device as a metal rod, crow bar or even a stick was"
+"used by the accused due to which it could be described as ""preparation for commission"
+"of offence,"" it appears to be impossible to hold that there exists adequate material even"
+"to frame the charge for offence under section 452 of IPC, 1860.713. Criminal trespass is"
+committed by the accused when they entered the house of an individual with a view to
+"insult, intimidate or annoy such owner of the house/property. If the accused entered"
+"the house of an individual to insult, intimidate or annoy any person other than the"
+"owner of the property, it would not constitute criminal trespass. Once the conduct of"
+"the accused is not criminal trespass, it would not be house trespass and would not"
+"become punishable under section 452 IPC, 1860.714."
+"712. Pirmohammad, AIR 1960 MP 24 [LNIND 1959 MP 33] . Syam Lal v State of HP, 2002 Cr LJ"
+"3178 (HP), murder, rioting and house trespass, conviction. Raghunandan Pd. v State of UP, 1998"
+"Cr LJ 1571 (All), probably accused persons were in possession and complainants fired at them"
+"causing gunshot injuries thus, the accused persons had the right of private defence of person"
+"and property and were given the benefit of doubt. See also Jai Narain v State of Rajasthan, 1998"
+"Cr LJ 2199 (Raj); Devkaran v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 3883 (Raj). Rala Singh v State, 1997"
+"Cr LJ 1313 (P&H), in a charge of trespass and kidnapping against the accused persons, the"
+victim gave her age to be 20 years. She was examined but not subjected to ossification test.
+School leaving certificate showed her age to be 18 but her parents were not examined for
+corroboration. Guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
+"713. Subhash Sahebrao Datkar v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 736 (Bom); Chandreee v State"
+2011 (3) Crimes 215 (Raj)-although there is no evidence on record that the present accused
+"Chandraee entered the house of the complainant with any preparation, therefore, the essential"
+"fact of preparation is missing in the evidence and in the absence of any preparation, the offence"
+"under section 452 IPC, 1860 cannot be said to be made out and thus, the offence of the"
+"accused petitioner comes within the purview of section 451 IPC, 1860."
+"714. Koduri Venkata Rao v State of A P, 2011 Cr LJ. 3512 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 453] Punishment for lurking house-trespass or house-breaking.
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass or house-breaking, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT—
+This section provides penalty for the offences defined in sections 443 and 444.
+"In all ""house-breaking"" there must be ""house-trespass"", and in all ""house-trespass"" there"
+"must be ""criminal trespass"". Unless, therefore, the intent necessary to prove ""criminal"
+"trespass"" is present, the offence of house-breaking or house-trespass cannot be"
+committed. Where accused simply unlatched the chain and entered house of
+complainant in the night and there was nothing to show that any device such as metal
+"rod, crow bar or even a stick was used by accused. It was held that preparation for"
+commission of offence not proved. It is also held that house trespass without
+"preparation is covered under section 453 IPC, 1860, not under section 452 IPC,"
+1860.715.
+"715. Subhash Sahebrao Datkar v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 736 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 454] Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to commit offence
+punishable with imprisonment.
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass or house-breaking, in order to the"
+"committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+"shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence intended to be committed is theft, the"
+term of the imprisonment may be extended to ten years.
+State Amendment
+"Tamil Nadu.—The following amendments were made by Tamil Nadu Act No. 28 of 1993,"
+Section 4.
+"Section 454 of the Principal Act, shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section"
+"and after sub-section (1) as to renumbered, the following sub-section shall be added,"
+namely:—
+"""(2) Whoever commits lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in any building used"
+"as a place of worship, in order to the committing of the offence of theft of any idol or"
+"icon from such building, shall notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), be"
+punished with rigorous imprisonment which shall not be less than three years but
+which may extend to ten years and with fine which shall not be less than five thousand
+rupees:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three years."""
+COMMENT—
+This is an aggravated form of the offence described in the last section. The latter
+portion of this section is framed to include the cases of house-trespassers and house-
+"breakers by night who have not only intended to commit, but have actually committed,"
+theft.716. Though the relationship between parties is of landlord and tenant and
+"accused is tenant in complainant's premises, It cannot be said that origin of dispute"
+being of civil nature. It is held that criminal proceedings are maintainable.717.
+[s 454.1] Section 380 and section 454.—
+"In view of the conviction for section 454 of the IPC, 1860, separate conviction for the"
+"offence under section 380 of the IPC, 1860 is not needed as the offence under section"
+454 also includes section 380.718.
+"716. Zor Singh, (1887) 10 All 146 . See Khuda Bakhsh, (1886) PR No. 10 of 1886. Breaking open"
+a person's godown and throwing out articles is an offence under this section. Balai Chandra
+"Nandy v Durga Charan Banerjee, 1988 Cr LJ 710 (Cal)."
+"717. Balwant Singh Chuphal v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 1362 (Utt); Kana Ram v State of"
+"Rajasthan, 2002 Cr LJ 1867 (Raj)-possession of house/room in question remained with accused"
+petitioner. Offence not made out.
+"718. K E Lokesha v State of Karnataka, 2012 Cr LJ 2120 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+"[s 455] Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking after preparation for hurt,"
+assault or wrongful restraint.
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass, or house-breaking, having made"
+"preparation for causing hurt to any person, or for assaulting any person, or for"
+"wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of"
+"assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+The relation between this section and section 435 is the same as that between
+sections 452 and 450. This section is similar to section 458. The only difference is that
+"the trespass here is committed by day, whereas under section 458 it is committed"
+during night.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 456] Punishment for lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night.
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass by night, or house-breaking by night, shall"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking is ordinarily punishable under section 453;
+"but when it is committed at night, this section is applicable. The intent necessary to"
+prove 'criminal trespass' must be present and the Court must come to a definite
+inference as to the intention with which the entry was effected.719. Where the accused
+"persons, execution creditors, broke open the complainant's door before sunrise with"
+"intent to distrain his property, for which they were convicted on a charge of lurking"
+"house-trespass by night or house-breaking by night, it was held that as they were not"
+guilty of the offence of criminal trespass the conviction must be quashed.720.
+"719. Sankarsan, 1957 Cr LJ 286 ."
+"720. Jotharam Davay, (1878) 2 Mad 30."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 457] Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night in order to commit
+off-ence punishable with imprisonment.
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass by night, or house-breaking by night, in"
+"order to the committing of any offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five
+"years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the offence intended to be committed is"
+"theft, the term of the imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years."
+State Amendment
+"Tamil Nadu.—The following amendments were made by Tamil Nadu Act No. 28 of 1993,"
+Section 5.
+"Section 457 of the principal Act, shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section"
+"and after sub-section (1) as to renumbered, the following sub-section shall be added,"
+namely:—
+"""(2) Whoever commits lurking house-trespass by night or house-breaking by night in"
+"any building used as a place of worship, in order to the committing of the offence of"
+"theft of any idol or icon from such building, shall, notwithstanding anything contained"
+"in sub-section (1), be punished with rigorous imprisonment which shall not be less than"
+three years but which may extend to fourteen years and with fine which shall not be
+less than five thousand rupees:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three years."""
+"U.P.—The following amendments were made by U.P Act No. 24 of 1995, Section 11."
+"Section 457 of the principal Act, shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section"
+"and after sub-section (1) as to renumbered, the following sub-section shall be added,"
+namely:—
+"""(2) Whoever commits lurking house-trespass by night or house breaking by night in"
+any building used as a place of worship in order to the committing of the offence of
+theft of any idol or icon from such building shall notwithstanding anything contained in
+sub-section (1) be punished with rigorous imprisonment which shall not be less than
+three years but which may extend to fourteen years and with fine which shall not be
+less than five thousand rupees:
+"Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the"
+"judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three years."""
+COMMENT—
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence described in the
+"preceding section. When a person is charged under section 457 IPC, 1860, on the"
+allegation that he entered the dwelling house of another person with the intention of
+committing theft it will not be legal to convict him under section 456 on the ground that
+the entry was made with the intention of committing some other offence or with the
+intention of annoying or insulting the inmates.721.
+[s 457.1] For committing offence under the section.—
+"To constitute an offence under section 457, it is necessary to prove that house"
+trespass or breaking at night was committed in order to commit any offence
+punishable under this section. The mere fact that house trespass was committed at
+night does not attract the offence of lurking house trespass within the meaning of this
+section.722.
+"721. Sankarasan Boral v State, 1957 Cr LJ 286 ; Narayanan v State, AIR 1962 Ker.81 [LNIND 1961"
+KER 232] .
+"722. Kandarpa Thakuria v State of Assam, 1992 Cr LJ 3084 (Gau). State of Rajasthan v Vinod,"
+"2002 Cr LJ 1308 (Raj), the accused and his family were proved to be persons known to the"
+complainant being neighbours. The entry into the house could not be proved to be with the
+intention of committing an offence punishable with imprisonment. The finding of acquittal was
+"not interfered with. Satyanarayanan v State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 2529 (Raj) accused entered"
+"house at night, beat up the girl and subjected her to rape, conviction under section 458 was"
+altered to one under section 457 as the accused had not committed lurking house trespass. He
+"had made preparation for assault. Harjit Singh v State of Haryana, 1999 Cr LJ 580 (SC) offence"
+"under sections 457, 392, 397, 307, 332, 34, made out. See also R Trinath v State of Orissa, 1998"
+"Cr LJ 3458 (Ori). Joseph v State of Kerala, 1997 Cr LJ 4289 (Ker), case of theft not made out."
+"Raghabacharan Panda v V Dindayal Patra, 2003 Cr LJ 1307 (Ori), allegation that the shop of the"
+"chemist broken open by the landlord and handed over to another person for another purpose,"
+evidence was in favour of the accused land lord and his new tenant. Benefit of doubt. Md.
+"Siddique Hussain v State of Assam, 2003 Cr LJ 1487 (Gau), it was difficult for the court to believe"
+that any one should force his way to the house of another just only to committing a hurt. Benefit
+of doubt.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 458] Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night after preparation
+"for hurt, assault, or wrongful restraint."
+"Whoever commits lurking house-trespass by night, or house-breaking by night, having"
+"made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for"
+"wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of"
+"assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT—
+This section is similar to sections 452 and 455. To prove the charge for the offence
+"under section 458, IPC, 1860, the prosecution must prove:—"
+"(i) that the accused committed lurking house-trespass by night, or house-breaking"
+by night;
+"(ii) that he did as above after having made preparation for causing hurt, or for"
+"assaulting, or for wrongfully restraining some person, or for putting some one in"
+"fear of hurt, assault or wrongful restraint.723."
+It only applies to the house-breaker who actually has himself made preparation for
+"causing hurt to any person, etc., and not to his companions as well who themselves"
+have not made such preparation.724. There should also be some evidence of lurking
+"house-trespass, as defined in section 443, IPC, 1860."
+[s 458.1] Section 458 is not a cognate offence of section 398.—
+"The accused was charged under section 398 of IPC, 1860 and section 25(1)(A) and"
+"section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. Trial Court acquitted the accused from both the"
+"charges holding that prosecution has failed to prove the charges however, come to the"
+"conclusion that the accused committed an offence under section 458 of IPC, 1860. The"
+High Court held that section 458 of Penal Code in no way was a cognate offence of
+"offence under section 398, IPC, 1860. Hence, conviction for offence under section 458"
+"IPC, 1860 without framing charge is liable to be set aside.725."
+"723. Pania v State, 2002 Cr LJ 3050 (Raj)."
+"724. Ghulam, (1923) 4 Lah 399."
+"725. Manik Miah v State of Tripura, 2013 Cr LJ 1899 (Gau)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 459] Grievous hurt caused whilst committing lurking house-trespass or
+house-breaking.
+"Whoever, whilst committing lurking house-trespass or house-breaking, causes"
+"grievous hurt to any person or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person,"
+"shall be punished with 726.[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence described in
+section 453.
+"This and the following section provide for a compound offence, the governing incident"
+of which is that either a 'lurking house-trespass' or 'house-breaking' must have been
+"completed in order to make a person, who accompanies that offence either by causing"
+"grievous hurt or attempt to cause death or grievous hurt, responsible under those"
+sections.727.
+"During the period house-breaking lasts, if the trespasser causes grievous hurt to any"
+"person or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt, the provisions of this section will"
+be attracted. It cannot be accepted that it is only in the process of making an entry into
+"a house if the trespasser causes grievous hurt, that this section will be attracted, for,"
+the essential ingredient of lurking house-trespass or house- breaking is 'criminal
+trespass' and that offence continues so long as the trespasser remains on the property
+in possession of another.728.
+"726. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"727. Ismail Khan v State, (1886) 8 All 649 ; Hasmatullah Khan v State, 2005 Cr LJ 2266 (Utt)-"
+Charge U.S 459 convicted under section 457 since the injuries are simple in nature. Gopal Singh
+"v State of Rajasthan, 2008 Cr LJ 3272 (Raj)-conviction and sentence of the accused under"
+"sections 458, 459, 395/397 and 396, IPC, 1860 are maintained."
+"728. Bhanwarlal v Parbati, 1968 Cr LJ 130 . See contra Said Ahmed, (1927) 49 All 864 ."
+"Dharampal Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 3372 (Raj) murder in a chowk not owned and"
+possessed by the complainant party. The accused also had the right of way through it. He was
+not liable to be convicted under section 459 or 460.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 460] All persons jointly concerned in lurking house-trespass or house-
+breaking by night punishable where death or grievous hurt caused by one of
+them.
+"If, at the time of the committing of lurking house-trespass by night or house-breaking"
+"by night, any person guilty of such offence shall voluntarily cause or attempt to cause"
+"death or grievous hurt to any person, every person jointly concerned in committing"
+"such lurking house-trespass by night or house-breaking by night, shall be punished"
+"with 729.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT—
+"Before holding a person to be guilty of offence under section 460, IPC, 1860, the"
+prosecution must prove:—
+(i) that the accused committed lurking house trespass by night; or house breaking by
+night;
+"(ii) that he caused, or attempted to cause, death or grievous hurt;"
+(iii) that he did above whilst engaged in committing lurking house trespass by night or
+"house breaking by night. On the aforesaid analysis of section, it is clear that this"
+section applies to those persons who have actually committed lurking house trespass
+at night and not to those who may have accompanied their associates but did not
+"commit the offence. Indeed, it applies to actual doers, and not the others.730. This"
+section deals with the constructive liability of persons jointly concerned in committing
+'lurking house-trespass' or 'house-breaking by night' in the course of which death or
+grievous hurt to any one is caused. It is immaterial who causes death or grievous hurt.
+Every person jointly concerned in committing such house-trespass or house-breaking
+shall be punished in the manner provided in the section. A person who actually
+commits murder in the course of committing house-breaking will attract the penalty
+under section 302.731. Every person who is jointly concerned in committing the offence
+of lurking house trespass by night or house breaking by night is to be punished with life
+imprisonment where death has been caused or with imprisonment which may extend
+to ten years where grievous hurt has been caused to any person. This joint liability is
+"based upon the principle of constructive liability. Thus, the person who has actually"
+committed the death or grievous hurt would be liable to be punished under the relevant
+"provisions, i.e., section 302 or section 326, as the case may be, while committing the"
+offence of lurking house trespass by night. It is possible that common intention or
+"object be not the foundation of an offence under section 460 IPC, 1860. Thus, to"
+"establish an offence under section 460, it may not be necessary for the prosecution to"
+establish common intention or object. Suffice it will be to establish that they acted
+"jointly and committed the offences stated in section 460 IPC, 1860. The principle of"
+constructive liability is applicable in distinction to contributory liability. The Supreme
+"Court in the case of Abdul Aziz v State of Rajasthan,732. clearly stated that if a person"
+"committing housebreaking by night also actually commits murder, he must attract the"
+penalty for the latter offence under section 302 and the Court found it almost
+impossible to hold that he can escape the punishment provided for murder merely
+because the murder was committed by him while he was committing the offence of
+housebreaking and that he can only be dealt with under section 460.733.
+"The words ""at the time of the committing of"" are limited to the time during which the"
+"criminal trespass continues which forms an element in house-trespass, which is itself"
+"essential to house-breaking, and cannot be extended so as to include any prior or"
+"subsequent time.734. If the offender causes grievous hurt while running away, he will"
+not be punishable under this section.735.
+[s 460.1] Section 449 and section 460.—
+The element of house-trespass is common in both the sections and section 460 has
+large ambit. In section 449 actual commission of offence punishable with death is not
+"required and if the house trespass is proved in order to commit such offence, the"
+"accused persons would be liable for punishment under section 449, whereas in section"
+460 if a person guilty of lurking house trespass or housebreaking in night voluntarily
+cause or attempt to cause death or grievous hurt to any person then every person
+jointly concerned in committing such lurking house trespass in night shall be liable for
+punishment.736.
+"729. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"730. Badri Prasad Prajapati v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2005 Cr LJ 1856 (MP)."
+"731. Sohan Singh v State, AIR 1964 Punj 156 . Where in a case of house-breaking committed in"
+"well-lighted house, the victim identified the accused and the articles stolen from her house in"
+"two exercises of identification parades, conviction of the accused was sustained. Kasu Bhai v"
+"State of HP, 1992 Cr LJ 3251 (HP). State of MP v Bhagwan Singh, 2002 Cr LJ 3169 (MP), the"
+"accused assailants entered into a house during night time, assaulted a man and hanged him"
+and also caused death of his daughter. The motive was to avenge the action against them to
+prevent them from opening drainage towards the disputed land. They were held guilty of lurking
+"trespass and murder. Abdul Aziz v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 10 SCC 283 [LNIND 2007 SC 592] ,"
+"house-breaking by several persons, death caused by one of them, others also constructively"
+"liable, attracted section 302. It would require the accused to be charged with murder also. Mati"
+"Ratre v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ 560 (Chh)-Conviction set aside since testimony of sole"
+witness found to be not reliable
+"732. Abdul Aziz v State of Rajasthan, 2007 (10) SCC 28 ."
+"733. Haradhan Das v State of West Bengal, (2013) 2 SCC 197 [LNIND 2012 SC 817] ; Dukalu v"
+"State of Madhya Pradesh, 2011 CR LJ 1548 (Chh)- the appellants have been held responsible for"
+"causing death of the 2 deceased persons with the aid of section 149, IPC, 1860. It is not a case"
+in which at the time of committing lurking house trespass by night any one of the appellant
+caused death of the deceased person and liability has to be fastened on the principle of section
+"460. In the facts and circumstances of the case, if all the appellants were held liable for"
+"punishment under section 302 with the aid of section 149, IPC, 1860 on the principles of"
+"common object of the unlawful assembly, of which they were the members, it was not"
+"necessary to punish them separately under section 460, IPC, 1860 and punishment of the"
+"appellants under section 460, IPC, 1860, in the facts and circumstances of the case, also"
+requires to be set aside.
+"734. Muhammad, (1921) 2 Lah 342. State of Madhya Pradesh v Kalli, 2012 Cr LJ 2399 (MP)-"
+"where death was caused while committing theft in the house of deceased, and looted property"
+from house of deceased were recovered from possession of accused and identified by
+"witnesses in test identification parade, conviction of accused is held proper."
+"735. Ibid. Mohan Manjhi v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 4482 (Pat), for an offence under sections"
+"460 and 382, the accused was sentenced to undergo 3 years RI. The proceeding had lasted for"
+11 years. The accused had been in jail for 6 months. Considering their mental and financial
+"strain, the court reduced their sentence to the period already undergone with a fine of Rs. 1000."
+"736. Dukalu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2011 CR LJ 1548 (Chh)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 461] Dishonestly breaking open receptacle containing property.
+"Whoever dishonestly or with intent to commit mischief, breaks open or unfastens any"
+"closed receptacle which contains or which he believes to contain property, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+This and the following section provide for the same offence. As soon as the receptacle
+is broken open or unfastened the offence is complete. Where an IT raid could not be
+completed on the same day and the raiding team put the seized jewellery in an almirah
+"and after locking and sealing it, left it in the custody of the accused, the latter was held"
+liable of this offence because he cut the almirah to take out some articles.737.
+"737. State of Maharashtra v Narayan Champalal Bajaj, 1990 Cr LJ 2635 : 1990 Tax LR 918 (Bom)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVII OF OFFENCES AGAINST PROPERTY
+Of Theft
+Of Criminal Trespass
+[s 462] Punishment for same offence when committed by person entrusted
+with custody.
+"Whoever, being entrusted with any closed receptacle which contains or which he"
+"believes to contain property, without having authority to open the same, dishonestly,"
+"or with intent to commit mischief, breaks open or unfastens that receptacle, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT—
+"An offence under section 462 of IPC, 1860 is an aggravated form of the offence made"
+"punishable under section 461 of IPC, 1860.738."
+"738. Yamunabai w/o Trimbak Lolge v The State of Maharashtra, 1994 (2) Bom CR 73 [LNIND"
+1993 AUG 18] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 463] Forgery.
+1. [Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or part of a
+"document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or"
+"to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with"
+"property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit"
+"fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."
+COMMENTS.—
+"The definition of 'forgery' in section 463, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is very"
+wide. The basic elements of forgery are: (i) the making of a false document or part of it;
+"and (ii) such making should be with such intention as is specified in the section, viz., (a)"
+"to cause damage or injury to (i) the public, or (ii) any person, or (b) to support any claim"
+"or title, or (c) to cause any person to part with property, or (d) to cause any person to"
+"enter into an express or implied contract, or (e) to commit fraud or that fraud may be"
+"committed.2. If a document, which is not genuine, is being used as such and a person"
+is made to part with money on that basis then not only the offence of cheating as
+defined under section 415 IPC but also the offence of forgery as defined under section
+463 IPC is attracted.3.
+"1. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""Whoever makes any false documents or part of a document with intent to cause"
+"damage or injury w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been defined in"
+section 29A.
+"2. Sushil Suri v CBI, (2011) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] : AIR 2011 SC 1713 [LNIND 2011 SC"
+"494] ; State of UP v Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201 : (1999) 2 SCC 617 ."
+"3. Nahul Kohli v State, 2010 Cr LJ 4536 (Del)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 464] Making a false document.
+4. [A person is said to make a false document or electronic record—
+First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently—
+"(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;"
+"(b) makes or, transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;"
+(c) affixes any 5.[electronic signature] on any electronic record;
+(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the
+"6.[electronic signature],"
+with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of
+"document, electronic record or 7.[electronic signature] was made, signed,"
+"sealed executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by"
+"whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed,"
+executed or affixed; or
+"Secondly.—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation"
+"or otherwise, alters a document an electronic record in any material part thereof, after"
+"it has been made, executed or affixed with 8.[electronic signature] either by himself or"
+"by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such"
+alteration; or
+"Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or"
+alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his 9.[electronic signature] or any
+electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or
+"intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not"
+know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the
+alteration.]
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A has a letter of credit upon B for rupees 10,000 written by Z. A, in order to"
+"defraud B, adds a cipher to the 10,000, and makes the sum 1,00,000, intending"
+that it may be believed by B that Z so wrote the letter. A has committed forgery.
+"(b) A, without Z's authority, affixes Z's seal to a document purporting to be a"
+"conveyance of an estate from Z to A, with the intention of selling the estate to B"
+and thereby of obtaining from B the purchase-money. A has committed forgery.
+"(c) A picks up a cheque on a banker signed by B, payable to bearer, but without any"
+sum having been inserted in the cheque. A fraudulently fills up the cheque by
+inserting the sum of ten thousand rupees. A commits forgery.
+"(d) A leaves with B, his agent, a cheque on a banker, signed by A, without inserting"
+the sum payable and authorizes B to fill up the cheque by inserting a sum not
+exceeding ten thousand rupees for the purpose of making certain payment. B
+fraudulently fills up the cheque by inserting the sum of twenty thousand rupees.
+B commits forgery.
+"(e) A draws a bill of exchange on himself in the name of B without B's authority,"
+intending to discount it as a genuine bill with a banker and intending to take up
+"the bill on its maturity. Here, as A draws the bill with intent to deceive the banker"
+"by leading him to suppose that he had the security of B, and thereby to discount"
+"the bill, A is guilty of forgery."
+"(f) Z's will contains these words—""I direct that all my remaining property be equally"
+"divided between A, B and C"". A dishonestly scratches out B's name, intending"
+that it may be believed that the whole was left to himself and C. A has
+committed forgery.
+(g) A endorses a Government promissory note and makes it payable to Z or his
+"order by writing on the bill the words ""Pay to Z or his order"" and signing the"
+"endorsement. B dishonestly erases the words ""Pay to Z or his order"" and thereby"
+converts the special endorsement into a blank endorsement. B commits forgery.
+"(h) A sells and conveys an estate to Z. A afterwards, in order to defraud Z of his"
+"estate, executes a conveyance of the same estate to B, dated six months earlier"
+"than the date of the conveyance to Z, intending it to be believed that he had"
+conveyed the estate to B before he conveyed it to Z. A has committed forgery.
+(i) Z dictates his will to A. A intentionally writes down a different legatee from the
+"legatee named by Z, and by representing to Z that he has prepared the will"
+"according to his instructions, induces Z to sign the will. A has committed forgery."
+"(j) A writes a letter and signs it with B's name without B's authority, certifying that A"
+is a man of good character and in distressed circumstances from unforeseen
+"misfortune, intending by means of such letter to obtain alms from Z and other"
+"persons. Here, as A made a false document in order to induce Z to part with"
+property. A has committed forgery.
+(k) A without B's authority writes a letter and signs it in B's name certifying to A's
+"character, intending thereby to obtain employment under Z. A has committed"
+"forgery in as much as he intended to deceive Z by the forged certificate, and"
+thereby to induce Z to enter into an express or implied contract for service.
+Explanation 1.—A man's signature of his own name may amount to forgery.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A signs his own name to a bill of exchange, intending that it may be believed"
+that the bill was drawn by another person of the same name. A has committed
+forgery.
+"(b) A writes the word ""accepted"" on a piece of paper and signs it with Z's name, in"
+order that B may afterwards write on the paper a bill of exchange drawn by B
+"upon Z, and negotiate the bill as though it had been accepted by Z. A is guilty of"
+"forgery; and if B, knowing the fact, draws the bill upon the paper pursuant to A's"
+"intention, B is also guilty of forgery."
+(c) A picks up a bill of exchange payable to the order of a different person of the
+"same name. A endorses the bill in his own name, intending to cause it to be"
+believed that it was endorsed by the person whose order it was payable; here A
+has committed forgery.
+"(d) A purchases an estate sold under execution of a decree against B. B, after the"
+"seizure of the estate, in collusion with Z, executes a lease of the estate of Z at a"
+"nominal rent and for a long period, and dates the lease six months prior to the"
+"seizure, with intent to defraud A, and to cause it to be believed that the lease"
+"was granted before the seizure. B, though he executes the lease in his own"
+"name, commits forgery by antedating it."
+"(e) A, a trader, in anticipation of insolvency, lodges effects with B for A's benefit, and"
+with intent to defraud his creditors; and in order to give a colour to the
+"transaction, writes a promissory note binding himself to pay to B a sum for value"
+"received, and antedates the note, intending that it may be believed to have been"
+made before. A was on the point of insolvency. A has committed forgery under
+the first head of the definition.
+"Explanation 2.—The making of a false document in the name of a fictitious person,"
+"intending it to be believed that the document was made by a real person, or in the"
+"name of a deceased person, intending it to be believed that the document was made"
+"by the person in his lifetime, may amount to forgery."
+"10.[Explanation 3.—For the purposes of this section, the expression ""affixing 11."
+"[electronic signature]"" shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of"
+"subsection (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000]."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A draws a bill of exchange upon a fictitious person, and fraudulently accepts the bill in"
+the name of such fictitious person with intent to negotiate it. A commits forgery.
+COMMENTS.—
+"An analysis of section 464 of IPC, 1860 shows that it divides false documents into"
+three categories:
+A. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a
+document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made
+"or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom"
+or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed.
+"B. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or"
+"otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has"
+been made or executed by either himself or any other person.
+"C. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign,"
+execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a)
+"unsoundness of mind, or (b) intoxication, or (c) deception practised upon him, know the"
+"contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to"
+"have made a 'false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be"
+"someone else or authorised by someone else, or (ii) he altered or tampered a"
+"document, or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not"
+"in control of his senses.12. Making of any false document, in view of the definition of"
+'forgery' is the sine qua non therefor. What would amount to making of a false
+"document is specified in section 464 thereof. What is, therefore, necessary is to"
+execute a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document
+inter alia was made by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he
+"knows that it was not made.13. In the case of Mir Nagvi Askari v CBI, the Court held that:"
+A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies one of the three
+conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. The first
+condition being that the document has been falsified with the intention of causing it to be
+"believed that such document has been made by a person, by whom the person falsifying the"
+document knows that it was not made. Clearly the documents in question in the present
+"case, even if it be assumed to have been made dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been"
+made with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made by or under the
+authority of some one else. The second criteria of the section deals with a case where a
+person without lawful authority alters a document after it has been made. There has been
+no allegation of alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made. Therefore
+in our opinion the second criteria of the said section is also not applicable to the present
+"case. The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a document, signed by a"
+person who due to his mental capacity does not know the contents of the documents which
+were made i.e because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind etc. Such is also not the
+case before us. Indisputably therefore the accused before us could not have been convicted
+with the making of a false document.14.
+To attract the second clause of section 464 there has to be alteration of document
+dishonestly and fraudulently. So in order to attract the clause 'secondly' if the document
+is to be altered it has to be for some gain or with such objective on the part of the
+accused. Merely changing a document does not make it a false document.15.
+[s 464.1] Making of false document.—
+False document is said to have been made when a person dishonestly or fraudulently
+makes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document
+was made by some other person.16.
+[s 464.2] Issuance of a caste certificate.—
+The Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) issued a caste certificate. The application for the
+"same was supported by affidavit of the father of the applicant. Later, the High Power"
+"Scrutiny Committee cancelled the certificate. A complaint was filed alleging forgery,"
+"cheating, conspiracy, etc. The High Court held that no offence of forgery was"
+"constituted as neither signature nor seals, etc., of Sub-Divisional Officer were forged"
+"but the caste certificate was issued by the SDO, himself and therefore it was not a false"
+"document in the eyes of law according to the provisions of section 464 of IPC, 1860.17."
+"4. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Schedule,"
+"w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been defined in section 29A."
+"5. Subs. for the words ""digital signature"" by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act,"
+"2008 (10 of 2009), section 51 (w.e.f. 27 October 2009)."
+"6. Subs. for the words ""digital signature"" by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act,"
+"2008 (10 of 2009), section 51 (w.e.f. 27 October 2009)."
+7. Ibid.
+8. Ibid.
+9. Ibid.
+"10. Ins. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch, w.e.f. 17"
+October 2000.
+"11. Subs. for the words ""digital signature"" by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act,"
+"2008 (10 of 2009), section 51 (w.e.f. 27 October 2009)."
+"12. Mohammed Ibrahim v State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 [LNIND 2009 SC 1774] : 2010 Cr LJ"
+"2223 : AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 347; Malay Chatterjil v State of Bihar, 2012 Cr LJ 2240 (Pat)."
+"13. Devendra v State of UP, 2009 (7) SCC 495 : 2009 (7) Scale 613 [LNIND 2009 SC 1158] ."
+"14. Mir Nagvi Askari v CBI, AIR 2010 SC 528 [LNIND 2009 SC 1651] : (2009) 15 SCC 643 [LNIND"
+2009 SC 1651] .
+"15. Parminder Kaurl v State of UP, (2010) 1 SCC 322 [LNIND 2009 SC 1924] : AIR 2010 SC 840"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1924] .
+"16. Raj Shekhar Agrawal v State of WB, 2016 Cr LJ 993 (Cal) : (2015) 4 CALLT 615 (HC)."
+"17. Harvir Singh v State of MP, 2016 Cr LJ 3608 (MP) : 2016 (2) JLJ 422 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 465] Punishment for forgery.
+Whoever commits forgery shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
+"for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The offence of forgery is defined in sections 463 and 464 of the Code. Under section
+463 the making of a false document with any of the intents therein mentioned is
+"forgery, and section 464 sets forth when a person is said to make a 'false document'"
+within the meaning of the Code.
+The definition of forgery in the Code is not as simple and clear as the definition of
+forgery in common law. Forgery in common law is defined as the fraudulent making or
+alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right.
+[s 465.1] Ingredients.—
+The elements of forgery are—
+1. The making of a false document or part of it.
+2. Such making should be with the intent
+"(a) to cause damage or injury to (i) public, or (ii) any person; or"
+(b) to support any claim or title; or
+(c) to cause any person to part with property; or
+(d) to cause any person to enter into express or implied contract; or
+(e) to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed.
+1. 'Makes any false document'.— A school inspector prepared under his own signature
+false pay bills containing false claims for salaries of teachers who had not worked
+"within his jurisdiction, some of whom being purely fictitious, and encashed them from"
+the treasury. He was held to be guilty of making a false document but not of forgery
+"because he had not made the signature or writing of another, nor had altered the pay"
+bills.18.
+"The antedating of a document is not forgery, unless it has or could have operated to the"
+prejudice of some one.19. Incorporation or inclusion of a false statement in a document
+"would not ipso facto make the document false. For a document to be false, it has to tell"
+a lie about itself.20.
+[s 465.2] Publication of book.—
+"There was allegation that the accused person, in order to induce the public to purchase"
+"the book, falsely represented that the book was by a certain person. There was no"
+allegation that the accused himself had written the book and represented it to be that
+"of some other person. The Court said such allegations, even if true, do not make out a"
+case of forgery. The offence of cheating could not also be said to have been made out
+because it was a consequential offence.21.
+"Where the allegation was that the accused, who was working as a stenographer in the"
+"High Court, had fabricated a forged bail order and the evidence showed that the bail"
+"order in question was in fact written by the accused, the finding of the High Court that"
+the paper could not be said to be a document in the absence of signature of the
+accused was held to be not tenable. The document could have been used for causing
+"wrongful loss or obtaining wrongful gain. Hence, the offence under sections 466 and"
+468 was made out.22.
+2. 'To cause damage or injury to the public or to any person'.—The damage or injury
+must be intended to be caused by the false document to the public or any individual.23.
+"Thus, a police-officer who alters his diary so as to show that he had not kept certain"
+"persons under surveillance does not commit forgery, inasmuch as there is no risk of"
+loss or injury to any individual and the element of fraud as defined in section 25 is
+absent.24. It is the intent to cause damage or injury which constitutes the gist of this
+"offence. It is immaterial whether damage, injury or fraud is actually caused or not.25."
+Mere making of a false document would not constitute defrauding unless injury or
+intent to cause injury to the person deceived was also proved.26.
+To tamper with a proceeding in a Court of Justice in order to obtain from the Court a
+"decision or order, which it otherwise would not make, is as much a public mischief as"
+to attempt to secure the unauthorised release of a prisoner from jail or to obtain for an
+unqualified person credentials entitling him to practise as a surgeon or to navigate a
+ship.27.
+"3. 'Support any claim or title'.—Even if a man has a legal claim or title to property, he"
+will be guilty of forgery if he counterfeits documents in order to support it. See
+"illustrations (f), (g), (h) and (i). An actual intention to convert an illegal or doubtful claim"
+into an apparently legal one is dishonesty and will amount to forgery.28.
+The term 'claim' is not limited in its application to a claim to property. It may be a claim
+"to anything, as for instance, a claim to a woman as the claimant's wife, a claim to the"
+"custody of a child as being the claimant's child, or a claim to be admitted to attendance"
+"at a law class in a college, or to be admitted to a university or other examination, or a"
+claim to the possession of immovable or any other kind of property.29.
+4. 'To cause any person to part with property'.—It is not necessary that the property
+with which it is intended that false document shall cause a person to part should be in
+"existence at the time when the false document was made. For example, if A gave an"
+"order to B to buy the material for making and to make a silver tea service for him, and"
+"C, before the tea service was made or the materials for making it had been bought"
+"were to make a false letter purporting, but falsely, to be signed by A, authorizing B to"
+"deliver to D the tea service when made, C would have committed forgery within the"
+meaning of section 463 by making that false document with intent to cause B to part
+"with property, namely, the tea service, when made.30. A written certificate has been"
+held to be 'property' within the meaning of this section.31.
+"5. 'Intent to commit fraud'.—The Supreme Court had held that the expression ""defraud"""
+"involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is"
+"something other than economic loss that is deprivation of property, whether movable"
+"or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person"
+"in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary"
+loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment
+to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the
+"deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived the second condition is"
+satisfied.32.
+6. 'Fraudulently'.—This word is used in sections 471 and 464 together with the word
+"'dishonestly' and presumably in a sense not covered by the latter word. If, however, it be"
+"held that 'fraudulently' implies deprivation, either actual or intended, then apparently"
+that word would perform no function which would not have been fully discharged by
+the word 'dishonestly' and its use would be mere surplusage. So far as such a
+"consideration carries any weight, it obviously inclines in favour of the view that the"
+word 'fraudulently' should not be confined to transactions of which deprivation of
+property forms a part.33.
+"7. 'Makes'.—""The 'making of a document, or part of a document, does not mean"
+"'writing' or 'printing' it, but signing or otherwise executing it; as in legal phrase we speak"
+"of 'making an indenture' or 'making a promissory note', by which is not meant the"
+"writing out of the form of the instrument, but the sealing or signing it as a deed or note."
+The fact that the word 'makes' is used in the section in conjunction with the words
+"'signs', 'seals' or 'executes', or 'makes any mark denoting the execution', etc., seems to"
+very clearly to denote that this is its true meaning. What constitutes a false document
+or part of a document is not the writing of any number of words which in themselves
+"are innocent, but affixing the seal or signature of some person to the document, or part"
+"of a document, knowing that the seal or signature is not his, and that he gave no"
+"authority to affix it. In other words, the falsity consists in the document, or part of a"
+"document, being signed or sealed with the name or seal of a person who did not in fact"
+"sign or seal it"".34."
+[s 465.3] Fabricating letter or certificate.—
+"In a case, the allegation was that the accused made false document for getting sim"
+cards of mobile phones. Handwriting expert deposed that he was not in a position to
+give any finding on basis of specimen signature of appellant. It was held that since
+finding recorded by Special Judge was contrary to evidence given by handwriting
+"expert, conviction of appellant for offence punishable under section 465 read with"
+"section 471 of IPC, 1860, could not be sustained.35. Where accused was alleged to"
+"have obtained employment on strength of forged document, finding that accused had"
+"not been proved to have forged the documents, it was held that offence under section"
+465 is not made out.36.
+[s 465.4] Creation of a website by the company—
+Where the appellant created a website with the name Devi Consultancy Services for the
+"development of the existing company named Devi Polymers Private Limited, in the"
+absence of any possibility to impute any intent to cause damage or injury or to enter
+into any express or implied contract or any intent to commit fraud in the making of the
+"said website, no offence of forgery is made out, especially when he has not received a"
+single rupee or nor has he entered into any contract in his own name on the basis of
+the above website.37.
+[s 465.5] Acting for society after takeover.—
+Where the entire management of a society was taken over by the petitioners and they
+"were looking after its affairs by writing letters, drawing cheques and operating bank"
+accounts by signing their names on behalf of the society and not on anybody else's
+"names or behalf, the offence of forgery/making false document was not made out.38."
+[s 465.6] Alteration of document.—
+The mere alteration of a document does not make it a forged document. The alteration
+must be for some gain or for some objective. The Court said that presuming that figure
+"""1"" was added to the date mentioned on the document, it could not be said that the"
+"document became false. The accused had nothing to gain from it, nor it affected the"
+period of limitation.39.
+[s 465.7] Clause second.—Alteration on or cancellation of document [Section
+464].—
+This clause requires dishonest or fraudulent cancellation or alteration of a document in
+any material part without lawful authority after it has been made or executed by a
+person who may be living or dead.
+The conduct of an Advocate's clerk in forging the signature of another Advocate on a
+surety bond and in altering certain endorsements for the purposes of identification and
+"attestation, was held by the Supreme Court as amounting to an offence under this"
+section and not under section 468.40.
+[s 465.8] Sentence.—
+Accused employed as a sanitation supervisor was found to have committed offence of
+making fake trade licences and issuing them to various persons. Court below convicted
+"him for one year under section 471 read with section 465 IPC, 1860, and two years'"
+"simple imprisonment (SI) under section 468, IPC imposed upon him. Considering the"
+fact that he was a first offender and an orphan and sole bread earner of his family
+"which consisted of a minor child and an unemployed wife, the sentence under section"
+"471 read with section 465 IPC, 1860 was reduced to one month and the sentence"
+"under section 468 IPC, 1860 was reduced to two months.41."
+"18. Shankerlal Vishwakarma v State of MP, 1991 Cr LJ 2808 (MP)."
+"19. Gobind Singh, (1926) 5 Pat 573."
+"20. AK Khosla v TS Venkatesan, 1994 Cr LJ 1448 (Cal); Lee Cheung Wing v R, 1992 Cr App R 355"
+"(PC), falsification of a withdrawal slip to enable the withdrawal of money, offence; Premlata v"
+"State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 1430 (Raj); Manilal v State of Kerala, 1998 Cr LJ 785 (Ker). See"
+"also Joginder Lal v State (Delhi Admn.), 1998 Cr LJ 3175 (Del); Mohandas v State of TN, 1998 Cr"
+"LJ 3409 (Mad); Bharat Hiralal v Jaysiri Amarsinh, 1997 Cr LJ 2509 (Bom), forgery of a document"
+is possible even if the accused himself is the author and signatory of the document. A case of a
+"false bill, magistrate justified in taking cognizance."
+"21. Guru Bipin Singh v Chongtham Manihar Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1448 [LNIND 1996 SC 1690] :"
+1997 Cr LJ 724 .
+"22. State of UP v Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201 : 1999 Cr LJ 1830 ."
+"23. RR Diwakar v B Guttal, 1975 Cr LJ 90 (Kant)."
+"24. Sanjiv Ratnappa, (1932) 34 Bom LR 1090 : 56 Bom 488."
+"25. Kalyanmal, (1937) Nag 45."
+"26. Sadanand, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 103 (Goa); Tul Mohon Ram, 1981 Cr LJ NOC 223 (Del); see also"
+"Harnam Singh, 1976 Cr LJ 913 (SC), as in 'Comments' under section 477A infra. TN Rugmani v C."
+"Achutha Menon, AIR 1991 SC 983 [LNIND 1990 SC 803] , application for permission for"
+"construction made in another's name, but without any intention of causing harm, no offence"
+under the section.
+"27. Mahesh Chandra Prasad v State, (1943) 22 Pat 292."
+28. Ibid.
+"29. Soshi Bhushan, (1893) 15 All 210 , 217."
+"30. Soshi Bhushan, (1893) 15 All 210 , 217, 218."
+"31. Ibid, p 218."
+"32. Dr. Vimla, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 434 ."
+"33. Abbas Ali, (1896) 25 Cal 512 , 521, FB overruling Haradhan, (1892) 19 Cal 380 ."
+"34. Per Garth CJ in Riasat Ali, (1881) 7 Cal 352 , 355."
+"35. Nazeem Ahmed Wahid Ahmed Khanl v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1786 (Bom)."
+"36. Rupa Bania v State of Assam, 2006 Cr LJ 3455 (Gau)."
+"37. Ramesh Rajagopal v Devi Polymers Pvt Ltd, AIR 2016 SC 1920 [LNIND 2016 SC 170] :"
+2016(4) Scale 198 [LNIND 2016 SC 170] .
+"38. PN Parthasarthy v GK Srinivasa Rao, 1995 Cr LJ 3406 (Kant)."
+"39. Parminder Kaur v State of UP, 2010 Cr LJ 895 : AIR 2010 SC 840 [LNIND 2009 SC 1924] :"
+(2010) 1 SCC 322 [LNIND 2009 SC 1924] .
+"40. Sharvan Kumar v State of UP, AIR 1985 SC 1663 [LNIND 1985 SC 231] : (1985) 3 SCC 658"
+"[LNIND 1985 SC 231] , reducing the sentence to nine months, already undergone."
+"41. Tashi Dadul Bhutia v State of Sikkim, 2011 Cr LJ 1315 (Sik)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+"[s 466] Forgery of record of Court or of public register, etc."
+"42. [Whoever forges a document or an electronic record], purporting to be a record or"
+"proceeding of or in a Court of Justice, or a register of birth, baptism, marriage or"
+"burial, or a register kept by a public servant as such, or a certificate or document"
+"purporting to be made by a public servant in his official capacity, or an authority to"
+"institute or defend a suit, or to take any proceedings therein, or to confess judgment,"
+"or a power of attorney, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"43.[Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ""register"" includes any list, data or"
+record of any entries maintained in the electronic form as defined in clause (r) of sub-
+"section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000]."
+COMMENT.—
+Forging a document and using the forged document are quite different and distinct
+offence. The reliance on the false documents will not ipso facto implicate the person
+"who relied upon, under sections 465 and 466.44. If by virtue of preparing a false"
+document purporting it to be a document of a Court of Justice and by virtue of such
+"document, a person who is not entitled to be released on bail could be released then,"
+"undoubtedly damage or injury has been caused to the public at large and, therefore,"
+there is no reason why under such circumstances the accused who is the author of
+such forged document cannot be said to have committed offence under section 466 of
+"IPC, 1860. A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to"
+"defraud but not otherwise. The expression 'defraud' involves two elements, namely"
+deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss
+"and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or"
+such others. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or
+detriment to the deceived. The preparation of a forged bail order by the utilisation of
+which the person concerned obtained an advantage of being released deceiving the
+courts and the society at large cannot but be said to have made the document
+"fraudulently, thereby attracting section 466 of IPC, 1860.45."
+"42. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""whoever forges a document', w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have"
+been defined in section 29A.
+"43. Ins. by the Information Technology Act (21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch, (w.e.f. 17"
+October 2000).
+"44. C R Alimchandani v I K Shah, 1999 Cr LJ 2416 (Bom)."
+"45. State of UP v Ranjit Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1201 : 1999 (2) SCC 617 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+"[s 467] Forgery of valuable security, will, etc."
+"Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an"
+"authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or"
+"transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends"
+"thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or"
+any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment
+"of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or"
+"valuable security, shall be punished with 46.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence described in the
+preceding section. The forged document must be one of those mentioned in the
+section. A complaint by the court is necessary for cognizance of the offence.47.
+"Section 467, IPC, 1860, does not require the prosecution to prove that the accused who"
+"commits forgery, has benefitted thereby or any loss has occasioned to anyone"
+thereby.48. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed
+"claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed"
+by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the
+"owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document"
+"conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he"
+has a bona fide belief that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he
+may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is
+"not his property. But to fall under first category of ""false documents"", it is not sufficient"
+that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a
+further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be
+"believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person,"
+by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a
+"document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not"
+claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone
+"else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of"
+which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under
+"section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no"
+"forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code is"
+attracted.49.
+[s 467.1] Quashing of complaint.—
+There were bold allegations in the complaint that the shares of the complainant had
+been transferred on forged signatures. There was nothing to show how all or any of the
+"accused persons were involved. No offence was constituted under sections 406, 420,"
+"467, 468 and 120-B. The order taking cognizance was held to be improper. It was"
+quashed in respect of accused persons who preferred special leave petition and also in
+respect of those who did not file a petition.50.
+[s 467.2] CASES.—
+"Where the allegation was that a company, acting through its directors in concert with"
+the chartered accountants and some other persons: (i) conceived a criminal conspiracy
+"and executed it by forging and fabricating a number of documents, like photographs of"
+"old machines, purchase orders and invoices showing purchase of machinery in order to"
+support their claim to avail hire-purchase loan from Bank; (ii) on the strength of these
+"false documents, bank parted with the money by issuing pay orders and demand drafts"
+in favour of the Company; and (iii) the accused opened six fictitious accounts in the
+banks to encash the pay orders/bank drafts issued by Bank in favour of the suppliers of
+"machines, thereby directly rotating back the loan amount to the borrower from these"
+"fictitious accounts, and in the process committed a systematic fraud on the Bank and"
+obtained pecuniary advantage for themselves. Precise details of all the fictitious
+accounts as also the further flow of money realized on encashment of demand
+"drafts/pay orders have been incorporated in the charge sheet additionally, by allegedly"
+"claiming depreciation on the new machinery, which was never purchased, on the basis"
+"of forged invoices, etc.; the accused cheated the public exchequer as well. The"
+Supreme Court held that proceedings are not liable to be quashed merely because
+dues of bank have been paid up.51.
+A deed of agreement for purchase of shares is not a valuable security.52. A person who
+received money from a postman under a false representation that he was the payee
+"when in fact he was not, and signed the postal acknowledgement in the name of the"
+"payee, was held to have committed an offence under this section.53. Where the"
+"accused fraudulently brought into existence a registered sale deed, said to have been"
+"executed by the widow of a person, intending to deceive and also to injure the"
+"reversioners of that person, it was held that they were guilty under this section.54."
+Where the accused falsely identified a person before the Oaths Commissioner as the
+deponent and the said person affixed his thumb impression on the document and it
+was also apparent that the document could not even become an affidavit without
+"identification of the deponent by the accused, it was held that the accused abettor"
+having been present at the time of the commission of the offence of impersonation he
+"was guilty under section 467 read with section 114, IPC, 1860.55. A bank draft is a"
+security for the purposes of this section and the bank manager signing a forged draft is
+guilty of this offence.56. Making out cheques for withdrawing money for official
+purposes and obtaining the signature of the signing officer under that pretence was
+held to be punishable offence under this section.57.
+"[s 467.3] Bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,"
+"1973 (Cr PC, 1973).—"
+"Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr PC mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any"
+"offence described in section 463, or punishable under sections 471, 475 or 476, of IPC,"
+"1860, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document"
+"produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in"
+"writing of that court, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate. It"
+contemplates a situation where offences enumerated therein are committed with
+respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a
+proceeding in any court.58. The petitioner stood before the Court as surety in favour of
+"the accused person and filed the affidavit, bail declaration form and title document of"
+the Land record-of-rights book before the Court. It was further revealed that the
+petitioner filed the false declaration as well as false affidavit in support of the said
+"declaration. It was further found that both the documents, i.e., the declaration form as"
+well the affidavit of accused were prepared just before production of them in the Court.
+"Admittedly, the offence was committed before the documents were filed in the Court."
+Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr PC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in
+the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been
+"produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, i.e., during the time when"
+"the document was in custodia legis. This being the settled position of law, there"
+appears to be no justification in quashing the prosecution of the petitioner-accused on
+the ground that provisions of section 195(1)(b)(ii) are applicable.59.
+"46. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"47. See Sardul Singh v State of Haryana, 1992 Cr LJ 354 (P&H)."
+"48. Suresh Hingorani v State of Haryana, 2013 (1) Scale 225 [LNIND 2013 SC 21] : JT 2013 (8)"
+SC 66 [LNIND 2013 SC 21] .
+"49. Shiv Charan v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 211 (Raj)."
+"50. Ashok Chaturvedi v Shitual H Chanchani, 1998 Cr LJ 4091 : AIR 1998 SC 2796 [LNIND 1998"
+SC 751] .
+"51. Sushil Suri v CBI, (2011) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2011 SC 494] : AIR 2011 SC 1713 [LNIND 2011"
+SC 494] .
+"52. AK Khosla v TS Venkatesan, 1992 Cr LJ 1448 (Cal)."
+"53. Jogidas v State, (1921) 24 Bom LR 99 ; Sanjay Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr LJ"
+(NOC) 304 —using genuine special adhesive stamps fraudulently obtained for making false
+document— offence is under section 468 not under section 256–259 IPC.
+"54. Ganga Dibya, (1942) 22 Pat 95."
+"55. Calcutta Singh, 1978 Cr LJ 477 (P&H)."
+"56. Adithela Immanuel Raju v State of Orissa, 1992 Cr LJ 243 ; State of Haryana v Parmanand,"
+"(1995) 1 Cr LJ 396 , embezzlement by forging entries in records, but neither signature nor"
+"handwriting proved by expert evidence, conviction on the statement of a sole witness not"
+justified.
+"57. State of Punjab v Baj Singh, (1995) 2 Cr LJ 1311 (P&H); Joginder Pal Dhiman v UOI, 2002 Cr"
+"LJ 677 (HP), bank manager defrauded bank by forging amounts on FDRs and issuing drafts in"
+his own and wife's name. But on being detected he returned the whole amount involved.
+Sentence reduced to one year and amount of fine maintained.
+"58. Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 [LNIND 2005 SC 261] ; Mahesh"
+"Chand Sharma v State of UP, AIR 2010 SC 812 [LNIND 2009 SC 1740] : (2009) 15 SCC 519"
+"[LNIND 2009 SC 1740] ; CP Subhash v Inspector of Police Chennai, 2013 Cr LJ 3684 : JT 2013 (2)"
+"SC 270 [LNIND 2013 SC 74] , sale deed had not been forged while in custody of court, bar under"
+section 195 not applicable.
+"59. Jagannath Singh v State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 3008 (MP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 468] Forgery for purpose of cheating.
+"Whoever commits forgery, intending that the 60.[document or electronic record"
+"forged] shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section does not require that the accused should actually commit the offence of
+cheating. What is material is the intention or purpose of the offender in committing
+forgery.61. Where documents had been forged and fabricated only to be used as
+"genuine to make fraudulent and illegal claim over land owned by complainant, the"
+Supreme Court held that it cannot be held that respondents were not makers of
+documents or that filing of civil suit based on same would not constitute an offence.62.
+The Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that the conduct of an Advocate's clerk
+in forging the signature of another advocate on a surety bond and forging some
+"endorsements for identification and attestation, would not constitute an offence under"
+this section and that the conviction should have been under section 465.63.
+[s 468.1] Banking and other frauds.—
+"Where the accused, being the BDO, who was authorised to recommend the sanctioning"
+of housing loans to the villagers misappropriated the money of the bank by availing
+"loans in their names by forging their signatures, he was held to be guilty based on the"
+evidence of the villagers that they did not apply under the scheme.64.
+[s 468.2] Signing differently in vakalatnama.—
+Where it was alleged that in order to cheat the Complainant the accused signed in his
+"vakalathnama differently from his signatures available in his income tax returns, the"
+Court quashed the complaint as neither the Complainant has alleged any 'forgery' by
+"the petitioners causing any damage, or injury to the public nor to any person, nor to"
+"cause any person to part with property, nor to enter into any express or implied"
+"contract, nor with intent to commit fraud to any person or the Complainant in"
+particular.65.
+"60. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000) for the words ""document forged"","
+"w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been defined in section 29A."
+"61. Shivaji Narayan, (1970) 73 Bom LR 215 . Mallinath Ambanna Shedjale v Purushottam"
+"Vasudeo Somshetty, 2002 Cr LJ 506 (Bom), forgery of signature on partnership registration"
+"form, the mere fact that the handwriting expert could not positively say who committed the"
+"forgery, the accused partners could not be acquitted. Chandu Mahto v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ"
+"4472 (Pat), forgery of signature for operating colleague's PF Account. Held, guilty under"
+"sections 120-B, 419, 420, 468, 471 and 477-A. Srinivas Rao v State of AP, 2002 Cr LJ 3880 (AP),"
+the offence took place about nine years ago. The sentence of six months was reduced to two
+"months. Saroj Kumar Sahoo v State of Orissa, 2003 Cr LJ 1872 , allegation that the officers of the"
+State Financial Corporation and accused persons entered into a conspiracy to cheat the owner
+of the unit of disposing it of at a lower value than the market price. The allegation was not
+proved on evidence.
+"62. CP Subhash v Inspector of Police Chennai, 2013 Cr LJ 3684 : JT 2013 (2) SC 270 [LNIND"
+"2013 SC 74] ; Siba Prasad Satpathy v Republic of India, 2011 Cr LJ 3656 ."
+"63. Sharvan Kumar v State of UP, AIR 1985 SC 1663 [LNIND 1985 SC 231] : (1985) 3 SCC 658"
+[LNIND 1985 SC 231] : 1985 SCC (Cr) 437. A complaint by the Court concerned is necessary for
+"cognizance of this offence. See Sardul Singh v State of Haryana, 1992 Cr LJ 354 (P&H) vide"
+"section 195, Cr PC, 1973. Surender Singh v State, 2013 Cr LJ 3211 (Del), allegation of using fake"
+"number plates, not proved. Mere recovery of fake number plate does not establish guilt of"
+"appellant that he intended to cheat police official, accused acquitted."
+"64. Sukh Ram v State of HP, 2016 Cr LJ 4146 (SC) : 2016 (7) Scale 354 ."
+"65. Padam Chand v State of Bihar, 2016 Cr LJ 4998 (Pat) : 2016 (3) PLJR 258 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 469] Forgery for purpose of harming reputation.
+"Whoever commits forgery, 66.[intending that the document or electronic record"
+"forged] shall harm the reputation of any party, or knowing that it is likely to be used"
+"for that purpose, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"66. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""intending that the document forged"", w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic"
+"record"" have been defined in section 29A."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 470] Forged **[document or electronic record].
+A false 67.[document or electronic record] made wholly or in part by forgery is
+"designated ""a forged 68.[document or electronic record]""."
+COMMENT.—
+A person who forges a document or electronic record for the purpose of harming the
+reputation of another and thereby commits an offence under section 500 (defamation)
+commits an offence also under this section.
+"67. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""document"", w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been defined in"
+section 29A.
+"68. Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch I, for ""document"" (w.e.f. 17 October 2000)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 471] Using as genuine a forged ***[document or electronic record].
+Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine 1 any 69. [document or electronic
+record] which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged 70. [document or
+"electronic record], 2 shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such 71."
+[document or electronic record].
+COMMENT.—
+What this section requires is the use as genuine of any document which is known or
+believed to be a forged document; it does not lay down that such use can only occur
+"when the original itself is produced, for the section does not require the production of"
+the original.72.
+[s 471.1] Ingredients.—
+There must be—
+1. Fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as genuine.
+2. The person using it must have knowledge or reason to believe that the document
+is a forged one.
+1. 'Uses as genuine'.— Accused registered various documents relating to a project
+without verifying the credentials of the purchaser and seller and without examining that
+the land covered by the sale deeds was in existence or not or the land belongs to the
+State Government. Documents were prima facie found to be forged so as to get the
+benefit of the package which was meant for the project affected persons/oustees
+displaced from the land. Order of High Court quashing the proceedings was held liable
+to be set aside.73.
+[s 471.2] Sections 467 and 471.—
+Where there is forgery of a document purporting to be a valuable security as defined in
+section 471 becomes an offence under section 471 when it is used as genuine. The
+Supreme Court observed that the basic ingredient of both the offences is that there
+"should be ""forgery"" as defined in section 463 and forgery in turn depends upon creation"
+"of a ""false document"" as defined in section 464. If there is no ""false document"" as"
+"defined in section 464, offences under sections 467 and 471 are not made out. Further"
+the mere execution of a sale deed by claiming that property being sold was executant's
+property did not amount to commission of offences under sections 467 and 471 even if
+"title to property did not vest in the executant. This was for the reason that no ""false"
+"document"" as defined in section 464, was created.74."
+2. 'Knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document'.—These words are of
+general application.75. Where it was not shown that the accused had knowledge of the
+forged nature of the cheque76. or the lottery ticket77. which he used as genuine he
+"cannot be convicted under sections 467 and 471, IPC, 1860."
+"""Knowledge"" is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state"
+of mind. Reason to believe is another fact of the state of mind. It is not the same thing
+"as ""suspicion"" or ""doubt"". The mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing."
+"""Reason to believe"" is a higher level of the state of mind. Likewise knowledge will be"
+slightly on a higher plane than reason to believe. A person can be supposed to know
+when there is a direct appeal to his senses and a person is presumed to have reason to
+"believe if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. In substance, what is meant is"
+"that a reason to believe requires that a reasonable man would, by probable reasoning"
+"conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned. ""Knowledge"" and ""reason"
+"to believe"" has to be deduced from the various circumstances of the case.78. The"
+section is intended to apply to persons other than the forger himself but the forger is
+not excluded from the operation of the section. It is not required that the person forging
+the document must necessarily be convicted along with the person using the
+document.79.
+[s 471.3] Compounding.—
+Where there is no chance of recording a conviction insofar as the accused is
+"concerned and the entire exercise of trial is destined to be an exercise in futility, the"
+"High Court by exercising the inherent power under section 482 Cr PC, 1973, even in"
+offences which are not compoundable under section 320 may quash the
+prosecution.80.
+[s 471.4] Punishment.—
+"in Bank of India v Yeturi Maredi Shanker Rao,81. the Supreme Court confirmed the"
+sentence of nine months of rigorous imprisonment to a person who had knowledge of
+the forged signatures on withdrawal forms and who used them to affect withdrawal of
+"money. A forged will was prepared and executed in favour of the accused, but he could"
+"not draw any benefit under it, nor it was acted upon in any civil proceedings. He had"
+faced trial for more than 26 years. He was in jail for more than seven months. His
+sentence was accordingly reduced to the period already undergone.82. The accused
+filed a false marks sheet and gained admission. His past record was good. He had
+already lost a job. The sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already
+undergone.83.
+[s 471.5] CASE.—
+Accused while working as a lower division clerk in the office of the Deputy
+"Superintendent of Police had temporarily misappropriated an amount of Rs. 1,839 and"
+made false entry in the record. Admittedly the sum had been deposited in the post
+office before the due date and that no loss had been caused to the department.
+"Offence alleged under IPC, 1860, against the accused are trivial in nature and have"
+"caused no harm and in fact no offences in the eye of law. The benefit of section 95, IPC"
+is available to the appellant.84.
+[s 471.6] Certificate.—
+Where the accused applied to the Superintendent of Police for employment in the
+"Police force, and in support of his application presented two certificates which he knew"
+"to be false, it was held that he was guilty of offences under sections 463 and 471.85."
+Where the accused used a forged certificate of competency as an engine-room first
+"Tindal, he was held guilty under sections 471 and 463.86. With a view to qualify for"
+appearance at the competitive P.C.S examination the accused presented a certified
+"copy of the certificate granted to him by the University at his Matriculation examination,"
+"in which the date of birth had been altered from ""5 January 1901"" to ""15 January 1904""."
+It was held that he was guilty of an offence under this section inasmuch as the
+"document presented, being a false document, was used with intent to cause damage"
+and injury to the other candidates in the competitive examination for P.C.S. and to
+support his claim to appear.87. Where a forged certificate of age was filed by an
+"employee for the purpose of getting his superannuation postponed by two years, his"
+"conviction under sections 471, 420 and 511 was upheld. It was immaterial that the"
+employer had not acted upon the certificate.88.
+[s 471.7] Passport.—
+A person who forges a passport and uses it as genuine to get entry into India is guilty
+under section 471and section 467.89. Where unauthorised endorsements were made in
+a passport with a view to helping the person having his photograph on the passport to
+"travel to countries to which he was not entitled to go, such endorsements were made"
+"dishonestly and fraudulently and, therefore, the use of such a passport constituted an"
+"offence under section 471, IPC, 1860. Where, however, the very basis of the"
+prosecution case was that the endorsements were in the handwriting of the accused
+"but the expert opinion was hesitant and unsatisfactory, the conviction of the accused"
+could not be sustained.90.
+"Where passport alleged to have issued by using the former seal of the passport officer,"
+it is the duty of the investigating officer to find out in whose custody the unused seal
+"was kept and how the accused obtained possession of the same, for using it for"
+committing forgery.91.
+[s 471.8] Sanction.—
+The offence of cheating under section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to
+"sections 467, 468, 471 and 120B can by no stretch of imagination, by their very nature,"
+be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting
+"to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an"
+opportunity for commission of the offence.92.
+69. Subs. by Ibid.
+70. Subs. by Ibid.
+71. Subs. by Ibid.
+"72. Budhu Ram v State, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 698 (SC)."
+"73. State of Madhya Pradesh v Surendra Kori, 2013 Cr LJ 167 (SC); (2012) 10 SCC 155 [LNIND"
+2012 SC 681] .
+"74. Mohd Ibrahim v State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 [LNIND 2009 SC 1774] : (2009) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+929.
+"75. Ranchhoddas, (1896) 22 Bom 317."
+"76. Abdul Karim v State, 1979 Cr LJ 1123 (SC)."
+"77. Chatt Ram, 1979 Cr LJ 1411 (SC)."
+"78. AS Krishanan v State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576 [LNIND 2004 SC 349] : AIR 2004 SC 3229"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 349] : 2004 Cr LJ 2833 , forged marksheets were used in this case for securing"
+admission to medical college. The candidate (accused) deserved no leniency in the matter of
+punishment.
+79. Ibid.
+"80. Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana v State of Gujarat, 2012 AIR (SCW) 4092 : 2012 Cr LJ 3900 ;"
+"Ashok Sadarangani v UOI, AIR 2012 SC 1563 [LNIND 2012 SC 180] : (2012) 11 SCC 321 [LNIND"
+"2012 SC 180] , where emphasis is more on the criminal intent of the petitioners than on the civil"
+"aspects involving the dues of the bank in respect of which a compromise was worked out,"
+proceedings cannot be quashed.
+"81. Bank of India v Yeturi Maredi Shanker Rao, (1987) 1 SCC 577 [LNIND 1987 SC 104] : AIR 1987"
+SC 821 [LNIND 1987 SC 104] : 1987 Cr LJ 722 . Encashing a forged bank draft is an offence
+"under this section. Adithelo Immanuel Raju v State of Orissa, (1992) Cr LJ 243 ."
+"82. Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, 2002 Cr LJ 2171 (Raj)."
+"83. Tulsibhai Jivabhai Changani v State of Gujarat, 2001 Cr LJ 741 (SC)."
+"84. NK Illiyas v State of Kerala, 2012 Cr LJ 2418 : AIR 2012 SC 3790 [LNIND 2011 SC 646] ."
+"85. Khandusingh, (1896) 22 Bom 768."
+"86. Abbas Ali, (1896) 25 Cal 512 (FB)."
+"87. Chanan Singh, (1928) 10 Lah 545."
+"88. Galla Nageswara Rao v State of AP, 1992 Cr LJ 2601 (AP)."
+"89. Daniel, AIR 1968 Mad 349 [LNIND 1967 MAD 140] . Hema v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1011 : AIR"
+"2013 SC 1000 [LNIND 2013 SC 1240] , where accused in conspiracy with the owner of a travel"
+"agency filed application for passport by giving bogus particulars, court held that she is guilty."
+"90. Mahendra Singh v State, 1972 Cr LJ 34 (SC)."
+"91. Vijayachandran KK v The Supdt. of Police, 2008 (2) Ker LJ 751 : 2008 (3) Ker LT 307 ."
+"92. Om Dhankar, (2012) 11 SCC 252 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 439] : 2012 (3) Scale 363 [LNINDORD"
+"2012 SC 439] ; Prakash Singh Badal v State of Punjab, 2007 (1) SCC 1 [LNIND 2006 SC 1091] :"
+"AIR 2007 SC 1274 [LNIND 2006 SC 1091] ; Rakesh Kumar Mishra v State of Bihar, 2006 (1) SCC"
+557 [LNIND 2006 SC 8] : AIR 2006 SC 820 [LNIND 2006 SC 8] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+"[s 472] Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to commit"
+"forgery, punishable under section 467."
+"Whoever makes or counterfeits any seal, plate or other instrument for making an"
+"impression, intending that the same shall be used for the purpose of committing any"
+"forgery which would be punishable under section 467 of this Code, or, with such"
+"intent, has in his possession any such seal, plate or other instrument, knowing the"
+"same to be counterfeit, shall be punished with 93.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section and the section following are akin to sections 235, 255 and 256."
+"93. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+"[s 473] Making or possessing counterfeit seal, etc., with intent to commit"
+forgery punishable otherwise.
+"Whoever makes or counterfeits any seal, plate or other instrument for making an"
+"impression, intending that the same shall be used for the purpose of committing any"
+forgery which would be punishable under any section of this Chapter other than
+"section 467, or, with such intent, has in his possession any such seal, plate or other"
+"instrument, knowing the same to be counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment"
+"of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be"
+liable to fine.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 474] Having possession of document described in sections 466 or 467
+knowing it to be forged and intending to use it as genuine.
+"94.[Whoever has in his possession any document or electronic record, knowing the"
+same to be forged and intending that the same shall fraudulently or dishonestly be
+"used as genuine, shall, if the document or electronic record is one of the description"
+"mentioned in section 466 of this Code], be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;"
+"and if the document is one of the description mentioned in section 467, shall be"
+"punished with 95.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description, for"
+"a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section resembles sections 242, 243 and 259."
+"The offence under section 474, IPC, 1860, is made out by the mere fact of possession"
+of forged documents knowing them to be forged and intending the same to be
+"fraudulently and dishonestly used. So even if such documents are not actually used, it"
+"need not absolve the accused from the mischief of provisions contained in section 474,"
+"IPC. Thus, where the accused falsely posed as an I.A.S. officer and as a Joint Director"
+(Vigilance) attached to the Central Bureau of Investigation and was also found in
+possession of fictitious documents supporting such claim and such documents were
+being created by him from time to time with a view to entangle people in bogus
+"criminal cases, it was held that the accused was an impostor and had intended to use"
+"these faked documents in furtherance of his criminal design. He was, therefore, rightly"
+"convicted under section 474, IPC.96."
+"94. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""whoever has in his possession …., section 466 of this code"", w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The"
+"words ""electronic record"" have been defined in section 29A."
+"95. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"96. Dharam Pal, 1985 Cr LJ 474 (Del)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 475] Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating documents
+"described in section 467, or possessing counterfeit marked material."
+"Whoever counterfeits upon, or in the substance of, any material, any device or mark"
+used for the purpose of authenticating any document described in section 467 of this
+"Code, intending that such device or mark shall be used for the purpose of giving the"
+appearance of authenticity to any document then forged or thereafter to be forged on
+"such material, or who, with such intent, has in his possession any material upon or in"
+"the substance of which any such device or mark has been counterfeited, shall be"
+"punished 97.[with imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"The commencement of the forgery of banknotes and other similar securities, where it"
+"has proceeded to the length which is described in this section, is treated as a"
+substantive offence and punished. This section supplements the provisions of section
+472.
+"97. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 476] Counterfeiting device or mark used for authenticating documents other
+"than those described in section 467, or possessing counterfeit marked"
+material.
+"Whoever counterfeits upon, or in the substance of, any material, any device or mark"
+used for the purpose of authenticating 98.[any document or electronic record] other
+"than the documents described in section 467 of this Code, intending that such device"
+or mark shall be used for the purpose of giving the appearance of authenticity to any
+"document then forged or thereafter to be forged on such material, or who, with such"
+"intent, has in his possession any material upon or in the substance of which any such"
+"device or mark has been counterfeited, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to"
+fine.
+COMMENT.—
+"This section is similar to the preceding section, but as the document, the counterfeit of"
+"which is made punishable, is not of so much importance as in that section, the"
+punishment is not so severe.
+"98. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""any document"", w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been defined"
+in section 29A.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+"[s 477] Fraudulent cancellation, destruction, etc., of will, authority to adopt or"
+valuable security.
+"Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to cause damage or injury to the"
+"public or to any person, cancels, destroys or defaces, or attempts to cancel, destroy or"
+"deface, or secretes or attempts to secrete any document which is or purports to be a"
+"will, or an authority to adopt a son, or any valuable security, or commits mischief in"
+"respect of such documents, shall be punished with 99.[imprisonment for life], or with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+This section applies when the document tampered with or destroyed is either a will or
+an authority to adopt or a valuable security. Owing to the great importance of
+documents of this kind the punishment provided is severe.
+1. 'Document'.—The document must be a genuine one. The offence under this section
+cannot be committed in respect of a document which is a forgery.100.
+"99. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"100. Akbar Hossain, (1938) 43 Cal WN 222."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+[s 477A] Falsification of accounts.
+"Whoever, being a clerk, officer or servant, or employed or acting in the capacity of a"
+"clerk, officer or servant, wilfully, and with intent to defraud, destroys, alters, mutilates"
+"or falsifies any 101.[book, electronic record, paper, writing], valuable security or"
+"account which belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or has been"
+"received by him for or on behalf of his employer, or wilfully, and with intent to defraud,"
+"makes or abets the making of any false entry in, or omits or alters or abets the"
+"omission or alteration of any material particular from or in, any such 102.[book,"
+"electronic record, paper, writing], valuable security or account, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or"
+"with fine, or with both."
+Explanation.—It shall be sufficient in any charge under this section to allege a general
+intent to defraud without naming any particular person intended to be defrauded or
+"specifying any particular sum of money intended to be the subject of the fraud, or any"
+particular day on which the offence was committed.]
+COMMENT.—
+This section refers to acts relating to book-keeping or written accounts. It makes the
+falsification of books and accounts punishable even though there is no evidence to
+prove misappropriation of any specific sum on any particular occasion.
+[s 477A.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires that—
+"1. The person coming within its purview must be a clerk, an officer, or a servant, or"
+"acting in the capacity of a clerk, an officer, or a servant."
+2. He must wilfully and with intent to defraud—
+"(i) destroy, alter, mutilate, or falsify, any book, electronic record, paper, writing,"
+"valuable security, or account which:"
+"(a) belongs to or is in the possession of his employer, or"
+(b) has been received by him for or on behalf of his employer;
+(ii) make or abet the making of any false entry in or omit or alter or abet the
+"omission or alteration of any material particular from or in any such book, paper,"
+"writing, valuable security or account."
+"To convict a person under section 477-A IPC, 1860, the prosecution has to prove that"
+"there was a wilful act, which had been made with an intent to defraud and while proving"
+"""Intention to defraud"" the prosecution has to further prove two elements that the act"
+"was an act of deceit and it had caused an injury. In the present case, there may be an"
+"injury, but there is no deceit.103."
+The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Harnam Case104. are that there
+should be a wilful act of an accused with an intention to defraud. So both elements
+must be present and in other words it would mean that the act should be a wilful act
+"and should also be done with an intention to defraud. While trying to define ""intent to"
+"defraud"", the Court noted that it contains two elements, deceit and injury. There is no"
+"doubt that to convict a person under section 477-A IPC, the prosecution has to prove"
+"that there was a wilful act, which had been made with an intent to defraud and while"
+"proving ""Intention to defraud"" the prosecution has to further prove two elements that"
+"the act was an act of deceit and it had caused an injury. In the present case, there may"
+"be an injury, but there is no deceit.105."
+[s 477A.2] CASES.—
+"Where, however, the documents alleged to have been falsified are found to be missing"
+"from office records, no charge under section 477A, IPC, 1860, can be made out;106."
+where the Nazir of Special Judicial Magistrate's Court accepted an amount as fine but
+failed to deposit it in the treasury and made false entries in the Register of Judicial
+"Fines saying that the amount had been deposited, it was held that he was guilty of"
+"offences under sections 409, 467, 468 and 477A, IPC.107."
+"101. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""book, paper, writing"", w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been"
+defined in section 29A.
+"102. Subs. by The Information Technology Act (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and First Sch for the"
+"words ""book, paper, writing"", w.e.f. 17 October 2000. The words ""electronic record"" have been"
+defined in section 29A.
+"103. Kandipalli Madhavarao v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 4555 (AP)."
+104. Supra.
+"105. Kandipalli Madhavarao v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 4555 (AP)."
+"106. Rasul Mohd v State of Maharashtra, 1972 Cr LJ 313 : AIR 1972 SC 521 ; V Srinivasa Reddy v"
+"State of AP, AIR 1998 SC 2079 [LNIND 1998 SC 158] : 1998 Cr LJ 2918 , false advance shown by"
+bank employee to customers against their FDs. This was abuse of position as public servant.
+Audit report was against any such manipulation. Proper documents were also not produced
+before the court. Evidence actually produced was also not examined properly. The case was
+"sent back for fresh disposal without calling for additional evidence. See also Mohandass v State,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 3409 (Mad); Sharif Masin v State (UT Chandigarh), 1998 Cr LJ 1689 (P&H)."
+"107. State of Punjab v Rathanchand, 1984 Cr LJ NOC 153 (P&H). See also Ravichandran v State"
+"by Dy. Supdt. of Police, Madras, 2010 Cr LJ 2879 (SC) : AIR 2010 SC 1922 [LNINDORD 2010 SC"
+"76] ; Mir Nagivi Askari v CBI, AIR 2009 SC 528 [LNIND 2008 SC 1354] : (2009) 15 643; State v"
+"Mohan, AIR 2008 SC 368 [LNIND 2007 SC 1250] : (2007) 14 SCC 667 [LNIND 2007 SC 1250] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 478] [Omitted]
+"[Rep. by the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958, section 135 and Sch."
+(w.e.f. 25-11-1959).]
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 479] Property mark.
+A mark used for denoting that movable property belongs to a particular person is
+called a property mark.
+COMMENT.—
+The distinction between 'trade mark' and 'property mark' is not recognised in English
+law.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 480] [Omitted]
+"[Rep. by the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958), section 135 and"
+Sch. (w.e.f 25-11-1959).]
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 481] Using a false property mark.
+"Whoever marks any movable property or goods or any case, package or other"
+"receptacle containing movable property or goods, or uses any case, package or other"
+"receptacle having any mark thereon, in a manner reasonably calculated to cause it to"
+"be believed that the property or goods so marked, or any property or goods contained"
+"in any such receptacle so marked, belong to a person to whom they do not belong, is"
+said to use a false property mark.
+COMMENT.—
+False property mark.—This section defines the offence of using a false property mark.
+A property mark is intended to denote ownership over all movable property belonging
+to a person whether it is all of one kind or of different kinds. So long as the person
+"owns movable property, his property mark impressed upon them remains his, though"
+any particular article out of it may after such impression pass out of his hands and
+cease to be his.109.
+The function of a property mark to denote certain ownership is not destroyed because
+any particular property on which it was impressed has ceased to be of that ownership.
+[s 481.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two essentials:—
+"1. Marking any movable property or goods, or any case, package or receptacle"
+"containing goods; or using any case, package or receptacle, with any mark"
+thereon.
+2. Such marking or using must be in a manner reasonably calculated to cause it to
+"be believed that the property or goods so marked, or the property or goods,"
+"contained in such receptacle, belonged to the person to whom they did not"
+belong.
+The Supreme Court in Sumant Prasad's case said that the concept of a trade mark
+"under section 2(1)(g) of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, is distinct from that"
+"of a property mark under section 479 of IPC, 1860. It means the concept of trade mark"
+"has not nullified the concept of property mark. Thus, where the accused finding that his"
+'Puspa Raj' scent could not capture the market copied the property mark from the
+carton of complainant's best-selling scent 'Basant Bahar' in toto and marketed his
+"inferior product under the same name, it was held that he had committed the offence"
+of both using a false property mark as well as of selling goods marked with a
+counterfeit property mark. The fact that the complainant loosely mentioned in his
+"complaint 'trade mark' did not make any difference, for despite this the complainant's"
+allegations clearly made out that the accused tried to palm off his inferior scent as if it
+"was manufactured by and belonged to the complainant. He was, therefore, rightly"
+"convicted under sections 482 and 486, IPC.110."
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+"109. Dahyabhai, (1904) 6 Bom LR 513 ."
+"110. Sumant Prasad v Sheojanan, 1972 Cr LJ 1707 (SC)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 482] Punishment for using a false property mark.
+"Whoever uses 111.[***] any false property mark shall, unless he proves that he acted"
+"without intent to defraud, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+To succeed on the charges under sections 482 and 486 the complainant had to
+"establish that the appellant marked the scent manufactured and sold by him, or the"
+packets and receptacles containing such scent or used packets or receptacles bearing
+"that mark, and that he did so in a manner reasonably calculated to cause it to be"
+believed that the goods so marked or the scent contained in the packets and
+receptacles so marked belong to the complainant.112.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+"111. The words ""any false trade mark or"" omitted by Act 43 of 1958, section 135 and Sch (w.e.f."
+25 November 1959).
+"112. Sumat Prasad Jain v Sheojanam Prasad, AIR 1972 SC 2488 [LNIND 1972 SC 399] : (1973) 1"
+SCC 56 [LNIND 1972 SC 399] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 483] Counterfeiting a property mark used by another.
+Whoever counterfeits any 113.[***] property mark used by any other person shall be
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+"113. The words ""trade mark or"" omitted by Act 43 of 1958, section 135 and Sch (w.e.f. 25"
+November 1959).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 484] Counterfeiting a mark used by a public servant.
+"Whoever counterfeits any property mark used by a public servant, or any mark used"
+by a public servant to denote that any property has been manufactured by a particular
+"person or at a particular time or place, or that the property is of a particular quality or"
+"has passed through a particular office, or that it is entitled to any exemption, or uses"
+"as genuine any such mark knowing the same to be counterfeit, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence described in the
+preceding one. Enhanced punishment is inflicted where the mark used by a public
+servant is counterfeited.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 485] Making or possession of any instrument for counterfeiting a property
+mark.
+"Whoever makes or has in his possession any die, plate or other instrument for the"
+"purpose of counterfeiting a property mark, or has in his possession a property mark"
+for the purpose of denoting that any goods belong to a person to whom they do not
+"belong, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to three years or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The making or possession of instruments for counterfeiting a property mark is hereby
+punished.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 486] Selling goods marked with a counterfeit property mark.
+"114.[Whoever sells, or exposes, or has in possession for sale, any goods or things with"
+a counterfeit property mark] affixed to or impressed upon the same or to or upon any
+"case, package or other receptacle in which such goods are contained, shall, unless he"
+proves—
+"(a) that, having taken all reasonable precautions against committing an offence"
+"against this section, he had at the time of the commission of the alleged"
+"offence no reason to suspect the genuineness of the mark, and"
+"(b) that, on demand made by or on behalf of the prosecutor, he gave all the"
+information in his power with respect to the persons from whom he obtained
+"such goods or things, or"
+"(c) that otherwise he had acted innocently,"
+be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes those who sell or have in possession for sale goods marked with
+"a counterfeit property mark. For the purpose of section 486, it is necessary to establish"
+"that the appellant had sold, or exposed for sale, or had in his possession for sale goods"
+having a mark calculated to cause it to be believed that the scent was the scent
+manufactured by and belonging to the complainant.115.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+"114. Subs. by Act 43 of 1958, section 135 and Sch, for certain words (w.e.f. 25 November"
+1959).
+"115. Sumat Prasad Jain v Sheojanam Prasad, AIR 1972 SC 2488 [LNIND 1972 SC 399] : (1973) 1"
+SCC 56 [LNIND 1972 SC 399] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 487] Making a false mark upon any receptacle containing goods.
+"Whoever makes any false mark upon any case, package or other receptacle"
+"containing goods, in a manner reasonably calculated to cause any public servant or"
+any other person to believe that such receptacle contains goods which it does not
+"contain or that it does not contain goods which it does contain, or that the goods"
+contained in such receptacle are of a nature or quality different from the real nature or
+"quality thereof, shall, unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud, be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"three years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section is more comprehensive than sections 482 and 486. The fraudulent making
+of false marks of any description on goods for the purpose of deceiving public
+"servants, such as customs officers, is punishable under this section."
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 488] Punishment for making use of any such false mark.
+Whoever makes use of any such false mark in any manner prohibited by the last
+"foregoing section shall, unless he proves that he acted without intent to defraud be"
+punished as if he had committed an offence against that section.
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes the making use of a false mark. The preceding section punishes
+the making of such a mark.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+108.
+Of [***] Property and Other Marks
+[s 489] Tampering with property mark with intent to cause injury.
+"Whoever removes, destroys, defaces or adds to any property mark, intending or"
+"knowing it to be likely that he may thereby cause injury to any person, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
+"year, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section punishes the tampering with a property mark, criminal intention or"
+knowledge on the part of the accused is necessary.
+"108. Amendment.—The word ""trade"" has been omitted by the Trade and Merchandise Marks"
+"Act, 1958 (Act XLIII of 1958), section 135 and Sch. The Act came into force on 25 November"
+1959.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+Of Currency-Notes and Bank-Notes
+[s 489A] Counterfeiting currency-notes or bank-notes.
+"[Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of"
+"counterfeiting, any currency-note or bank-note, shall be punished with 116."
+"[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which"
+"may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+"Explanation.—For the purposes of this section and of sections 117.[489B, 489C, 489D"
+"and 489E], the expression ""bank-note"" means a promissory note or engagement for"
+the payment of money to bearer on demand issued by any person carrying on the
+"business of banking in any part of the world, or issued by or under the authority of any"
+"State or Sovereign Power, and intended to be used as equivalent to, or as a substitute"
+for money.]
+COMMENT.—
+The term counterfeit is defined in section 28 of the Code. Circulation of counterfeit
+currency would cause irreparable harm to our economy. Existence of a parallel
+economy would be highly detrimental to the growth of the nation. It affects the society
+as a whole. Offences affecting the people at large are to be viewed in a different angle.
+"In such cases, harm would be caused not to an individual or to a few individuals. The"
+adverse impact of trafficking in counterfeit currency in a large scale would be
+"disastrous. It would appear that the society does not cast much of a stigma on people,"
+"who deal with counterfeit currency.118. Sections 489A, 489B, 489C and 489D were"
+introduced in order to provide more adequately for the protection of currency-notes and
+"banknotes from forgery. Under the IPC, 1860, which was passed prior to the existence"
+"of a paper currency in India, currency-notes were not protected by any special"
+"provisions, but merely by the general provisions, applying to the forgery of valuable"
+securities. Before these sections were introduced charges for forging currency-notes
+"had to be preferred under section 467, for uttering them under section 471, and for"
+making or possessing counterfeit plates under section 472. The provisions of section
+467 afforded sufficient means for dealing both with forgery generally and with forgery
+of currency-notes. But it was at times difficult to obtain a conviction under the other
+sections. This provision says that the prosecution is required to prove that the accused
+was knowingly performing any part of the process to counterfeit currency-notes. It is
+"needless to mention that for proving the offence of conspiracy, there must be some"
+convincing evidence to the prosecution to prove that it was pre-arranged plan of all or
+some of the accused either for preparing fake currency or for their circulation. Only on
+the basis of circumstance like some persons were found in possession of counterfeit
+"currency-notes at or about the same time, inference cannot be drawn that all of them"
+"had engaged themselves in a conspiracy. However, if an accused is found in"
+"possession of counterfeit currency-notes, it is up to him to furnish satisfactory"
+explanation regarding the possession. This proposition is also applicable in respect of
+the material which can be used for preparing fake currency-notes and the process
+"which can be used for making fake currency-notes. If there is no such explanation, a"
+person found in possession of such material and counterfeit currency-notes can be
+convicted for offence under section 489-A of IPC.119.
+The object is not only to protect the economy of the country but also to provide
+adequate protection to currency-notes and banknotes.120. The section deals not only
+"with the complete act of counterfeiting, it also covers cases where the accused"
+performs any part of the process of counterfeiting.121.
+[s 489A.1] Counterfeit currency-notes and terrorism.—
+The Act 3 of 2013 introduced amendment in the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
+1967 to include the act of doing damage to the monetary stability of India by way of
+"production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency,"
+"coin or of any other material within the purview of terrorism. Thus, the act of dealing"
+with high quality counterfeit Indian currency-notes and coins with the intention of
+threatening the economic security of India is viewed as a terrorist act. (For details see
+"UA (P) Act, 1967, as amended by Act 3 of 2013.)"
+[s 489A.2] Foreign currency.—
+The Supreme Court in State of Kerala v Mathai Vergheese122. held that the expression
+'any currency-note' refers to all currency-notes and cannot be confined only to Indian
+currency. The purpose of the provisions is to maintain market respectability of the
+currency by assuring people that notes being offered to them are genuine and not
+worthless pieces of paper. The Legislature could not have intended to exclude from the
+"protection counterfeiting of currency-notes issued by foreign States. Further, the"
+expression 'bank-note' as used by sections 498A–498E would include a dollar bill or
+note because they are also issued under the authority of a State or sovereign power.
+This section is similar to sections 231 and 255.
+[s 489A.3] CASES.—
+"Where many fake currency-notes, hundreds of stamp and some material required for"
+preparing fake currency-notes were allegedly recovered from room and also from
+"person of appellant, and evidence and material was seized by police. The Court ruled"
+out possibility of implanting the material by police for falsely implicating the accused. It
+"was held that accused appellant liable to be convicted under section 489-A, IPC,"
+1860.123.
+"116. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"117. Subs. by Act 35 of 1950, section 3 and Sch II, for ""489C and 489D""."
+"118. Ahammed v State, 2010 Cr LJ 1797 (Ker)."
+"119. Narayan Maruti Waghmode v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 3318 (Bom)."
+"120. K Hashim v State of TN, (2005) 1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND"
+2004 SC 1142] .
+"121. K Hashim v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 143 : (2005) 1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : AIR"
+2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] .
+"122. State of Kerala v Mathai Vergheese, (1986) 4 SCC 746 [LNIND 1986 SC 461] : AIR 1987 SC"
+"33 [LNIND 1986 SC 461] : 1987 Cr LJ 308 ; Surinder Pal v State of Punjab, 2009 Cr LJ 4100"
+"(P&H), counterfeiting US dollars, accused convicted. K Hashim v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 143 :"
+"AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005) 1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] , the"
+"evidence of accomplice, the artist, provided material for corroboration of evidence, being the"
+"evidence of an accomplice, reliable. Chuwan Suba v State of Sikkim, 2013 Cr LJ 2135 (Sik),"
+allegation of possession of machinery to print fake notes. Conviction was held improper since
+the disclosure statement was not voluntary.
+"123. Narayan Maruti Waghmode v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 3318 (Bom); Md Amir"
+"Hussain v State of Assam, 2010 Cr LJ. 4201 [Gau]. See also Roney Dubey v State of WB, 2007 Cr"
+"LJ 4577 (Cal); Jayeshkumar Panchal v State, 2007 Cr LJ 2254 (Guj); Golo Mandla Ram Rao v"
+"State of Jharkhand, 2004 Cr LJ 1738 (Jha)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+Of Currency-Notes and Bank-Notes
+"[s 489B] Using as genuine, forged or counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes."
+"[Whoever sells to, or buys or receives from, any other person, or otherwise traffics in"
+"or uses as genuine, any forged or counter-feit currency-note or bank-note, knowing or"
+"having reason to believe the same to be forged or counter-feit, shall be punished with"
+"124.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+COMMENT.—
+"This section resembles sections 239, 241 and 258. It provides against trafficking in"
+forged or counterfeit notes. The section deals with the use of counterfeited currency-
+notes.125.
+An offence under section 489-B has the following essential ingredients:—
+"(i) selling, buying or receiving from any person or otherwise trafficking currency-"
+note or banknote;
+(ii) any forged or counterfeit currency-note or bank-note;
+(iii) knowing (or having reason to believe) that such note was forged or counterfeit.
+"To bring home an offence under section 498-B, IPC, 1860: (a) the prosecution is to"
+prove that the relevant currency-note or banknote was forged or counterfeit; (b) that the
+"accused sold to or received from, some person, or trafficked in, or used as genuine the"
+aforesaid currency-note or banknote; (c) that when the accused did so he had
+knowledge or reason to believe about its being forged or counterfeit. In order to sustain
+"the conviction of an accused, the prosecution has not only to prove that he had the"
+"possession of counterfeit note, having reason to believe it as such, but also to prove"
+"circumstances which lead clearly, indubitably and irresistibly to his intention to"
+use/circulate the notes in the public. Such intention can be proved by a collateral
+"circumstance that he had palmed off such notes before, or that he was in possession"
+"of such notes in such large a number, that his possession for any other purpose was"
+inexplicable.126. Merely because the petitioner had been found to be in possession of
+the counterfeit notes of similar denomination of the same series and numbers closer
+"to the numbers of the notes detected by the bank, it would be difficult to accept that the"
+notes have been used or circulated by the applicant.127. Mere possession does not
+necessarily indicate that there was mal-intention or intention to use. Intention to use
+"the counterfeit currency-notes, being an essential ingredient of the offence under"
+"sections 489B and 489C of IPC, prosecution is, no doubt, saddled with the liability to"
+establish such intention or attempt on the part of the appellant/accused to use such
+"counterfeit notes. On careful scrutiny of the evidence on record there was no evidence,"
+"whatsoever, which suggests that the appellant had made any effort to use the"
+"counterfeit currency-notes. Since evidence on that issue is lacking manifestly, hence,"
+the conviction of the appellant under section 489B of IPC cannot be sustained.128.
+[s 489B.1] Burden of proof.—
+"Under section 489B of IPC, 1860, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that at the"
+"time when the accused was passing the counterfeit notes, he knew that they were"
+forged one and the mere possession of such notes by him does not shift the burden of
+the accused to prove his innocent possession of such notes. The knowledge or reason
+to believe that the note was forged has to be proved to fix the liability under sections
+"489B and 489C of IPC. In the case of Golo Mandla Ram Rao v State of Jharkhand,129."
+the counterfeit currency-notes and incriminating articles were recovered from the
+possession of the accused and only the counterfeit coins from the possession of the
+co-accused.
+[s 489B.2] Information regarding the involvement of the accused admissible.—
+Where on the basis of information regarding the source of counterfeit currency notes
+"accused, who supplied it and subsequently all the others involved in the racket were"
+"arrested, though there were no recovery of notes from the intermediaries, the"
+"information was held admissible as the police were not aware of the other accused,"
+who were involved in the offence.130.
+"124. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"125. K Hashim v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 143 : AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005) 1"
+SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] .
+"126. Kiran Kumar K Khanda v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 2748 (Bom)."
+"127. Aditya Yadav v State, 2013 Cr LJ 3352 (Bom)."
+"128. Ashu Mondal v State of WB, 2013 Cr LJ 715 (Cal); Tej Pratap Singh v State, 2012 Cr LJ 486"
+(Del).
+"129. Golo Mandla Ram Rao v State of Jharkhand, 2004 Cr LJ 1738 : 2004 AIR Jhar HCR 453."
+"130. Mehboob Ali v State of Rajasthan, 2015 (4) Crimes 357 (SC) : (2016) 14 SCC 640 [LNIND"
+2015 SC 630] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+Of Currency-Notes and Bank-Notes
+[s 489C] Possession of forged or counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes.
+"[Whoever has in his possession any forged or counterfeit currency-note or banknote,"
+knowing or having reason to believe the same to be forged or counterfeit and
+"intending to use the same as genuine or that it may be used as genuine, shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
+"seven years, or with fine, or with both.]"
+COMMENT.—
+The ingredients which are required to constitute an offence under section 489C are as
+follows:
+(1) The note in question is a currency-note or bank-note;
+(2) Such note was forged or counterfeited;
+(3) The accused was in possession of the currency-note or bank-note;
+(4) The accused intended to use the same as genuine;
+(5) The accused knew or had reason to believe the note to be forged.131.
+"This section resembles sections 242, 243 and 257. It deals with possession of a forged"
+or counterfeit currency-note or banknote. The mere possession of a forged note is not
+an offence. It is not only necessary to prove that the accused was in possession of the
+forged note; but it should be further established that (1) at the time of this possession
+"he knew the note to be forged or had reason to believe it to be so, and (2) he intended"
+to use it as genuine. The onus lies on the prosecution to prove circumstances which
+"lead clearly, indubitably and irresistibly to the inference that the accused had the"
+intention to foist the notes on the public.132. Possession and knowledge that the
+currency-notes in question were counterfeit are both necessary. The section is not
+confined to Indian currency-notes alone.133. Possession of a large number of
+counterfeit currency-notes may itself justify drawing up of a presumption that the
+intention of the accused was to use them as genuine or that they may be used as
+"genuine within the meaning of section 489C, IPC, 1860. Thus, where the accused led"
+the searching officer to his Press premises and after digging the floor of it brought out
+a box containing many bundles of counterfeit currency-notes or where he produced 20
+"bundles of counterfeit currency-notes from his sachet, it was held an offence under"
+"section 489C, IPC, was made out.134. This is, however, not to say that such a"
+presumption can always be drawn from the mere fact of possession of a large bundle
+"of counterfeit currency-notes by the accused. Thus, where the accused while trying to"
+alter a two-rupee counterfeit note was caught and on search of his person 99 more
+such counterfeit notes were recovered but the accused claimed in course of his
+examination that he got these notes by selling three quintals of tamarind to an
+unknown person and that he had no knowledge that they were counterfeit till his
+interrogation by the police and the notes too were not of such description that a mere
+"look at them will convince anyone that they were counterfeit, it was held that the"
+"accused could not be convicted under sections 389B and 389C, IPC, in the absence of"
+any evidence or circumstance showing that he had knowledge that the notes were
+counterfeit notes. In this case the accused was not even asked in his examination
+"under section 342, Cr PC, 1973 (now section 313) if he knew the notes to be"
+counterfeit.135.
+"In Umashankar v State of Chhatisgarh,136. the Supreme Court examined the facts of the"
+case and principle involved therein as follows:137.
+"A perusal of the provisions, shows that mens rea of offences under Section 489B and"
+"489C is, ""knowing or having reasons to believe the currency-notes or bank-notes are"
+"forged or counterfeit"". Without the afore-mentioned mens rea, selling, buying or"
+receiving from another person or otherwise trafficking in or using as genuine forged or
+counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes is not enough to constitute offence under
+Section 489B of IPC. So also possessing or even intending to use any forged or
+counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes is not sufficient to make out a case under
+"Section 489C in the absence of mens rea, noted above. No material is brought on"
+record by the prosecution to show that the appellant had the requisite mens rea. The
+"High Court, however, completely missed this aspect. The learned trial Judge on the"
+basis of the evidence of [some prosecution witnesses] that they were able to make out
+"that currency note alleged to have been given to [one of them] was fake ""presumed"""
+"such a mens rea. On the date of the incident, the appellant was said to be 18 years old"
+student. On the facts of this case the presumption drawn by the trial Court is not
+"warranted under Section 4 of the Evidence Act. Further, it is also not shown that any"
+specific question with regard to the currency-notes being fake or counterfeit was put to
+the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On
+"these facts, we have no option but to hold that the charges framed under Sections"
+"489B and 489C are not proved. We, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence"
+passed on the appellant under Sections 489B and 489C of IPC and acquit him of the
+said charges.138.
+[s 489C.1] Burden of proof.—
+"In order to uphold conviction under section 489C of IPC, 1860, intention to use"
+"counterfeit currency-notes as genuine, is also to be proved beyond reasonable doubt."
+"Since the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the possession, knowledge and"
+"intention to use the currency-notes, it is also burden of the prosecution to establish the"
+circumstances which lead clearly and irresistibly to the inference that the accused had
+intention to pass the currency-notes to the public. When a large number of counterfeit
+"notes are recovered from the accused, in absence of any reasonable explanation"
+"tendered by the accused, this case must give rise to the presumption that possession"
+"of such notes was for trafficking in currency-notes. That presumption, no doubt, is a"
+"presumption of fact, which can be drawn from the circumstances of the case. The fact"
+that the accused was found in possession of a large number of notes gives rise to
+inference that it might be used as genuine.139.
+"131. Panna Lal Gupta v State of Sikkim, 2010 Cr LJ 825 (Sik); See also Karunakaran Nadar v State"
+"of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ 3748 (Ker)."
+"132. Bur Singh, (1930) 11 Lah 555. Md Amir Hussain v State of Assam, 2010 Cr LJ 4201 [Gau]."
+"133. K Hashim v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 143 : AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005) 1"
+SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] .
+"134. State of Karnataka v KS Ramdas, 1976 Cr LJ 228 (Kant). See also Ashu Mondal v State of"
+"WB, 2013 Cr LJ 715 (Cal), recovery of large number of counterfeit notes gives rise to"
+presumption that possession was for trafficking in currency notes. Conviction under section
+"489C upheld. Chuwan Suba v State of Sikkim, 2013 Cr LJ 2135 (Sik), conviction was held"
+"improper since the disclosure statement is found not voluntary. Tej Pratap Singh v State, 2012 Cr"
+"LJ 486 (Del), difference in number of currency, held not material, conviction was held proper."
+"Prabhakar Narayan Patlola v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 738 (Bom); Kurukshetra Sena v"
+"State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 Cr LJ 2493 ; Inthiyas Ahmed v State, 2011 Cr LJ 4802 (Kant),"
+prosecution has not proved that the notes seized from the possession of the accused were the
+same notes which were subjected for examination and further that on examination they were
+found to be counterfeit notes. Accused acquitted.
+"135. M Mammutti v State of Karnataka, 1979 Cr LJ 1383 (SC). Followed in Mohan Lal Sarma v"
+"State of WP, 1990 Cr LJ 215 (Cal), where the court added that mere possession does not shift"
+the burden to the accused. The prosecution has to prove the presence of the type of mens rea
+"required by these sections. Vijayan v State of Kerala, 2002 Cr LJ 187 (Ker), the informant stated"
+that even at first blush he was convinced that the notes in the possession of the accused were
+counterfeit as there was difference in colour. The accused held liable under the section. Abdul
+"Majeed v State of Maharashtra, 2002 Cr LJ 720 (Bom), the notes in question did not carry any"
+"sign of being counterfeit, the accused was an ordinary person, mere possession by him did not"
+"create a presumption of guilty knowledge. Mohammed Yasin v State of UP, 1997 Cr LJ 3188 (All),"
+a note of which two parts were pasted together was presented to a shopkeeper. He suspected
+genuineness and consulted another shopkeeper for guidance. Counterfeiting was so tactful that
+the accused could not detect it. He did not run away. He remained at the shop till police arrived.
+He had no other note. Ingredients of the offence not made out.
+"136. Umashankar v State of Chhatisgarh, AIR 2001 SC 3074 [LNIND 2001 SC 2237] : 2001 Cr LJ"
+4696 .
+137. Ibid at p 3075.
+"138. Citing M Mammutti v State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1705 [LNIND 1979 SC 125] : 1979 Cr"
+LJ 1383 .
+"139. Ashu Mondal v State of WB, 2013 Cr LJ 715 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+Of Currency-Notes and Bank-Notes
+[s 489D] Making or possessing instruments or materials for forging or
+counterfeiting currency-notes or bank-notes.
+"[Whoever makes, or performs, any part of the process of making, or buys or sells or"
+"disposes of, or has in his possession, any machinery, instrument or material for the"
+"purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended to be"
+"used, for forging or counterfeiting any currency-note or bank-note, shall be punished"
+"with 140.[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.]"
+COMMENT.—
+"This section is analogous to sections 233, 234, 256, 257 and 485."
+Where there is no evidence to show that the printing machine found on the land of the
+accused had any connection with the printing of the counterfeit notes found in the
+"possession of the accused, he could not be held guilty under section 489, IPC,"
+1860.141. It is not necessary that the machinery for counterfeiting found in possession
+of the accused should be the whole set required for counterfeiting.142.
+"140. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for ""transportation for life"" (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"141. State of Karnataka v Ramdas, Supra."
+"142. K Hashim v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 143 : AIR 2005 SC 128 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] : (2005) 1"
+SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XVIII OF OFFENCES RELATING TO DOCUMENTS AND TO
+PROPERTY MARKS
+Of Currency-Notes and Bank-Notes
+[s 489E] Making or using documents resembling currency-notes or bank-
+notes.
+"(1) [Whoever makes, or causes to be made, or uses for any purpose whatsoever, or"
+"delivers to any person, any document purporting to be, or in any way"
+"resembling, or so nearly resembling as to be calculated to deceive, any"
+currency-note or bank-note shall be punished with fine which may extend to
+one hundred rupees.
+"(2) If any person, whose name appears on a document the making of which is an"
+"offence under sub-section (1), refuses, without lawful excuse, to disclose to a"
+police-officer on being so required the name and address of the person by
+"whom it was printed or otherwise made, he shall be punished with fine which"
+may extend to two hundred rupees.
+(3) Where the name of any person appears on any document in respect of which
+any person is charged with an offence under sub-section (1) or on any other
+"document used or distributed in connection with that document it may, until"
+"the contrary is proved, be presumed that person caused the document to be"
+made.]
+COMMENT.—
+This section was introduced by Act VI of 1943 because photo prints and other
+"reproductions of currency-notes and banknotes, though printed for innocent purposes,"
+had passed into circulation in a number of cases and it was considered undesirable
+that in a country like India with a large mass of illiterate and ignorant persons such
+reproductions should be permitted to go unchecked before they menaced the safety of
+the currency.
+While the counterfeiting of any currency-note or banknote constituted a criminal
+"offence under section 489A read with section 28, there was no legal provision"
+"prohibiting the reproduction, or the production of imitations, of currency-notes and"
+banknotes for such purposes as advertisement and the like where there was no
+"intention to practise deception on any one, nor even a knowledge that deception was"
+likely to be practised with the help of imitations.143. There is no material on the record
+"to show that the xerox machine, the voltage stabiliser, the blank papers and the paper"
+containing some impression of the Indian currency-note belonged to the convict. Mere
+"fact that they were seized is not enough. Therefore, the question of the convict"
+becoming liable for possession of the aforesaid articles does not arise.144.
+"143. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gaz of India, 1943, Part V, p 56, dated 10 February 1943."
+"144. Roney Dubey v State of WB, 2007 Cr LJ 4577 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIX OF THE CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACTS OF SERVICE
+The authors of the Code observe:
+We agree with the great body of Jurists in thinking that in general a mere breach of
+contract ought not to be an offence but only to be the subject of a civil action.
+"To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions. Some breaches of contract"
+"are very likely to cause evil such as no damages or only very high damages can repair,"
+and are also very likely to be committed by persons from whom it is exceedingly
+"improbable that any damages can be obtained. Such breaches of contract are, we"
+"conceive, proper subjects for penal Legislation.1."
+[s 490] [Repealed]
+2.[* * *].
+1. The Works of Lord Macaulay - Note P.
+2. Omitted by Act 3 of 1925.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIX OF THE CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACTS OF SERVICE
+The authors of the Code observe:
+We agree with the great body of Jurists in thinking that in general a mere breach of
+contract ought not to be an offence but only to be the subject of a civil action.
+"To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions. Some breaches of contract"
+"are very likely to cause evil such as no damages or only very high damages can repair,"
+and are also very likely to be committed by persons from whom it is exceedingly
+"improbable that any damages can be obtained. Such breaches of contract are, we"
+"conceive, proper subjects for penal Legislation.1."
+[s 491] Breach of contract to attend on and supply wants of helpless person.
+"Whoever, being bound by a lawful contract to attend on or to supply the wants of any"
+"person who, by reason of youth, or of unsoundness of mind, or of a disease or bodily"
+"weakness, is helpless or incapable of providing for his own safety or of supplying his"
+"own wants, voluntarily omits so to do, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may"
+"extend to two hundred rupees, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+Object.—The authors of the Code say:
+We also think that persons who contract to take care of infants of the sick and of the
+"helpless, lay themselves under an obligation of a very peculiar kind, and may with propriety"
+be punished if they omit to discharge their duty. The misery and distress which their neglect
+may cause is such as the largest pecuniary payment would not repair; they generally come
+"from the lower ranks of life, and would be unable to pay anything. We, therefore, propose to"
+add to this class of contracts the sanction of the penal law.3.
+[s 491.1] Ingredients.—This section requires:—
+1. Binding of a person by a lawful contract.
+2. Such contract must be to attend on or to supply the wants of a person who is
+helpless or incapable of providing for his own safety or of supplying his own
+wants by reason of
+(i) youth; or
+(ii) unsoundness of mind; or
+(iii) disease; or
+(iv) bodily weakness.
+3. Voluntary omission to perform the contract by the person bound by it.
+Under this section it is not the breach of contract towards the other party to the
+"contract that is to be regarded, but the breach of the legal obligation towards the"
+"incapable person, which had been accepted and transferred by the contract."
+[s 491.2] Ordinary servants do not come within this section.—
+"The accused, a cook, on a morning whilst the complainant's wife was ill and unable to"
+"supply her wants, left his service without warning or permission. It was alleged that the"
+illness of the complainant's wife was aggravated thereby. It was held that the accused
+"was engaged only as an ordinary cook to a family, and was not bound to attend on, or"
+"to supply the wants of, any helpless person, and that, therefore, this section did not"
+apply.4.
+1. The Works of Lord Macaulay - Note P.
+3. The Works of Lord Macaulay - Note P.
+"4. Vithu, (1892) (Unrep) CrC 608."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XIX OF THE CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACTS OF SERVICE
+The authors of the Code observe:
+We agree with the great body of Jurists in thinking that in general a mere breach of
+contract ought not to be an offence but only to be the subject of a civil action.
+"To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions. Some breaches of contract"
+"are very likely to cause evil such as no damages or only very high damages can repair,"
+and are also very likely to be committed by persons from whom it is exceedingly
+"improbable that any damages can be obtained. Such breaches of contract are, we"
+"conceive, proper subjects for penal Legislation.1."
+[s 492] [Repealed]
+5.[* * *].
+1. The Works of Lord Macaulay - Note P.
+5. Omitted by Act 3 of 1925.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XX OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE
+[s 493] Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful
+marriage.
+Every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to him to
+believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexual intercourse
+"with him in that belief, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a"
+"term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+COMMENT.—
+"Upon perusal of section 493 of the IPC, 1860 to establish that a person has committed"
+"an offence under the said section, it must be established that a person had deceitfully"
+"induced a belief to a woman, who is not lawfully married to him, that she is a lawfully"
+married wife of that person and thereupon she should cohabit or should have had
+"sexual intercourse with that person. Looking at the afore-stated section, it is clear that"
+"the accused must induce a woman, who is not lawfully married to him, to believe that"
+"he is married to her and as a result of the afore-stated representation, the woman"
+should believe that she was lawfully married to him and there should be cohabitation or
+sexual intercourse as a result of the deception. The essence of an offence under
+"section 493 IPC, 1860 is, therefore, practice of deception by a man on a woman as a"
+consequence of which the woman is led to believe that she is lawfully married to him
+although she is not and then make her cohabit with him.1. The offence under this
+"section may also be punished as rape under section 375, clause (4).2."
+[s 493.1] Ingredients.—
+The section contains two ingredients:—
+(1) Deceit causing a false belief in the existence of a lawful marriage.
+(2) Cohabitation or sexual intercourse with the person causing such belief.
+[s 493.2] Proof of marriage.—
+"Section 493 IPC, 1860 do not presuppose a marriage between the accused and the"
+victim necessarily by following a ritual or marriage by customary ceremony. What has
+been clearly laid down and emphasised is that there should be an inducement of belief
+in the woman that she is lawfully married to the accused/ appellant and the
+inducement of belief of a lawful marriage cannot be interpreted so as to mean or infer
+that the marriage necessarily had to be in accordance with any custom or ritual or
+"under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. If the evidence on record indicate inducement of"
+a belief in any manner in the woman which cannot possibly be enlisted but from which
+it can reasonably be inferred by ordinary prudence that she is a lawfully married wife of
+"the man accused of an offence under section 493 IPC, 1860 the same will have to be"
+"treated as sufficient material to bring home the guilt under section 493 IPC, 1860."
+Interpretation of the section in any other manner including an assertion that the
+marriage should have been performed by customary rituals or in similar manner only in
+"order to establish that a belief of marriage had been induced, is bound to frustrate the"
+"very object and purpose of the provision for which it has been incorporated in the IPC,"
+1860 which is clearly to prevent the deceitful act of a man inducing the belief of a
+lawful marriage for the purpose of cohabitation merely to satisfy his lust for sexual
+pleasure.3.
+"Where a man and woman exchanged garlands, the man promising to marry formally,"
+"and had sex as a result of which the woman became pregnant, it was held that the"
+exchange of garlands did not amount to falsely inducing the woman to believe that she
+was married to the man. Section 493 was not attracted.4. Where a woman married a
+man with full knowledge that he was already a married man and there was no proof
+"that the man falsely induced her to believe anything, it was held that the ingredients of"
+the offence under section 493 were not made out.5.
+[s 493.3] Rape and section 493.—
+"In a case, the complainant made the allegation of fraud played by the petitioner by"
+suppressing the fact of earlier marriage and the alleged physical relationship were
+under a belief that she was a legally wedded wife of the petitioner. The Court held that
+"a bare perusal of provision of sections 493 and 495 of IPC, 1860 shows that the bodily"
+relationship or sexual intercourse by a husband with his second wife falls under the
+"category of offence under sections 493 and 495 of IPC, 1860 and it cannot be treated"
+"as rape as defined in section 375 of IPC, 1860. It is an independent offence, the"
+cognizance of which can be taken by the Court on the basis of complaint filed by the
+"complainant herself, therefore, the offence punishable under section 376 of IPC, 1860"
+is not made out as the alleged act of sexual intercourse by the petitioner with the
+"complainant may fall within the category of sections 493 and 495 of IPC, 1860 but not"
+"in the category of rape as defined in section 375 of IPC, 1860 and made punishable"
+"under section 376 of IPC; therefore, the cognizance of section 376 of IPC, 1860 is"
+against the settled principles of law.6.
+"[s 493.4] Cohabitation during the operation of divorce decree, set aside later.—"
+The fact that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent was dissolved by
+"an ex parte decree and while that order was in force, the respondent husband"
+"continued sexual relationship with the appellant, until he married another woman."
+Subsequently the ex parte decree was set aside by the Court. The Supreme Court held
+that the allegation that there was deception on the part of the husband for having
+"sexual relationship and that constituted an offence under section 493 of IPC, 1860"
+would not arise for the reason that there was subsistence of valid marriage during this
+period as the ex parte decree was set aside later.7.
+"1. Ram Chandra Bhagat v State of Jharkhand, 2013 (1) SCC 562 [LNIND 2010 SC 1138] ."
+"2. Kartick Kundu, 1967 Cr LJ 1411 (Cal). Sammun v State of MP, 1988 Cr LJ 498 (MP) where the"
+court added that the accused promising to marry the woman and passing her to others as his
+"wife does not come under this section. Moideenkutty Haji v Kunhikoya, 1987 Cr LJ 1106 (Ker—"
+"FB), a woman, who knows that the man whom she is permitting sex is not married to him,"
+cannot have recourse to this section to punish him.
+"3. Ram Chandra Bhagat v State of Jharkhand, 2013 (1) SCC 562 [LNIND 2010 SC 1138] . The"
+"three-Judge Bench accepted the view of Gyan Sudha Mishra J, in the referral order."
+"4. Amruta Gadtia v Trilochan Pradhan, 1993 Cr LJ 1022 (Ori)."
+"5. Saurava Barik v Gouri Kaudi, 1994 Cr LJ 440 . The court referred to Raghunath Padhy v State,"
+"AIR 1954 Ori. 198 [LNIND 1954 ORI 28] . Akhaya Kumar v State or Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 1757 (Ori),"
+the accused and prosecutrix were in love with each other for several years. The accused married
+another and still continued to cohabit with the prosecutrix on false pretences of marrying her.
+"The prosecutrix was aware of this fact. Hence, there was no deception. Framing of charge"
+"against the accused was not proper. Mana Begum v Jula Mohd, 1998 Cr LJ 3244 (Ori), evidence"
+of the victim that the accused on promise to marry her had sex with her. The court said that
+ingredients of the offence under s 493 were not made out.
+"6. Mahesh Kumar Dhawan v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 1639 ."
+"7. Ravinder Kaur v Anil Kumar, AIR 2015 SC 2447 [LNIND 2015 SC 268] : (2015) 8 SCC 286"
+[LNIND 2015 SC 268] .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XX OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE
+[s 494] Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife.
+"Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries 1 in any case in which such"
+"marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, 2"
+shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
+"extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+Exception3.—This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such
+"husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction,"
+nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or
+"wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been"
+"continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have"
+been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person
+"contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place,"
+inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so
+far as the same are within his or her knowledge.
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.—In A.P. the offence is cognizable, non-bailable, triable by the Magistrate"
+"of the first class and non-compoundable vide A.P. Act No. 3 of 1992, Section 2 (w.e.f. 15-"
+2-1992).
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes the offence known to the English law as bigamy.
+[s 494.1] Scope.—
+"The section does not apply to Mohammedan males, who are allowed to marry more"
+"than one wife, but it applies to Mohammedan females, and to Hindus, Christians8. and"
+Parsis9. of either sex.
+[s 494.2] Ingredients.—
+"Section 494, IPC, 1860, inter alia, requires the following ingredients to be satisfied,"
+"namely,"
+(i) the accused must have contracted first marriage;
+(ii) he must have married again;
+(iii) the first marriage must be subsisting; and
+(iv) the spouse must be living.10.
+"1. 'Having a husband or wife living, marries, etc'.—The validity of a marriage in the case"
+of Mohammedans and Jews will be determined in accordance with their religious
+"usages: in the case of Native Christians, by Act XV of 1872, in the case of Parsis, by Act"
+"III of 1936; and in the case of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains, by Act XXV of 1955."
+"The validity of a marriage solemnised under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 will be"
+determined by its provisions.11.
+There must be at the time of the second marriage a previous valid and subsisting
+"marriage.12. If the first marriage is not a valid marriage, no offence is committed by"
+contracting a second marriage.13.
+"Divorce dissolves a valid marriage, and the parties obtaining such dissolution can re-"
+marry.14.
+A Mohammedan woman marrying within the period of her iddat (the period of four
+months which a divorced wife was to observe after divorce before re-marrying) is not
+guilty of bigamy.15.
+"[s 494.3] Second marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954.—"
+"SI Jafri J, of the Allahabad High Court observed:16."
+Notwithstanding the fact that the personal law permits a muslim male to contract four
+"marriages, if a second marriage is contracted under the Special Marriage Act 1954 vis-a-vis"
+the fact that he has a legally wedded wife who has been married to him under the
+"Mohammedan law, s. 494 has to claw at the erring male … Mohammedan law does not take"
+preference over Special Marriage Act 1954 … There being no saving clause for the applicant
+"to purge him of the charges u/s. 494 …, the applicant is liable to be punished under [this"
+section].
+2. 'Marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place
+during the life of such husband or wife'.—The Supreme Court has observed that prima
+"facie, the expression ""whoever marries"" must mean ""whoever marries validly"" or"
+"""whoever … marries and whose marriage is a valid one"". If the marriage is not a valid"
+one according to the law applicable to the parties no question of its being void by
+reason of its taking place during the life of the wife or the husband of the person arises.
+"If the marriage is not a valid marriage, it is no marriage in the eyes of the law.17. The"
+"Supreme Court in another case had held that in a bigamy case, the second marriage as"
+"a fact, that is to say, the essential ceremonies constituting it, must be proved.18."
+Admission of marriage by the accused is not evidence of it for the purposes of proving
+"marriage in an adultery or bigamy case.19. Thus, where the second Hindu marriage was"
+"not proved by showing saptapadi and homam, the mere production of a marriage"
+"certificate under section 16 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 would not be sufficient to"
+prove that the second marriage was performed validly by performing all the essential
+ceremonies of a valid marriage. The mere fact of subsequent registration of the second
+marriage does not prove the validity of second marriage.20. Merely because the second
+marriage even if performed by performing all the essential ceremonies turns out to be
+"void by virtue of section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it cannot be said that"
+"section 494, IPC, 1860 will not be attracted.21. If the second marriage was not proved"
+to have been validly performed by observing essential ceremonies and customs in the
+"community, the conviction under section 494, IPC, 1860 could not be maintained.22."
+Perhaps the Courts in India were obliged to take the view they have taken because of
+"the word ""solemnised"" occurring in section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the"
+"inhibition contained in the proviso to section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 which"
+forbids taking into consideration even the opinion of a person with special means of
+knowledge to show that the two persons were always received and treated as husband
+"and wife by their friends and relatives so far offences under sections 494, 495, etc., IPC,"
+1860 are concerned.23.
+"Thus, if one deliberately keeps a small lacuna, e.g., instead of taking the seven steps"
+"(saptapadi), takes only six steps while celebrating the second marriage, one can easily avoid"
+the penalty prescribed by these sections even though one virtually ruins the lives of two
+"girls. If we are to effectively root out polygamy from this country, we must amend s. 494,"
+"IPC, and s. 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, in such a way that anyone who goes through a"
+form of marriage during the lifetime of his or her spouse will come within the mischief of
+the offence of bigamy. At the same time we should also delete from the proviso to s. 50 of
+"the Indian Evidence Act, the last portion which says 'or in prosecutions u/s. 494, 495, 497 or"
+"498 of the Indian Penal Code'. The National Committee on the Status of Women too made,"
+"more or less, similar recommendations in its report. It is also felt that ss. 493, 494, 495 and"
+"496, IPC, which have an element of cheating in them and affect unsophisticated rural"
+women more than women in urban areas should be made cognizable so that these poor
+women could get justice without being required to engage lawyers at their own cost.24.
+The Courts are also changing their viewpoint. In Indu Bhagya Natekar v Bhagya
+"Pandurang Natekar,25. it was held that it is not correct to say that in every case of"
+"bigamy, unless the second marriage can be proved by bringing in the evidence of the"
+"performance of ceremonies itself, a conviction under section 494 is virtually"
+impossible. The accused can be convicted even if there is other reliable evidence to
+establish the charge.
+"Where in a particular community 'saptapadi' was not an essential ceremony, the"
+"provisions of section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 applied and, therefore, the"
+performance of other ceremonies prevalent in the community constituted a valid
+marriage.26.
+"Under the provisions of the Indian Christian Marriage Act (XV of 1872), the first"
+"accused, who was a Roman Catholic Indian Christian, married the complainant, who"
+"was a Protestant, in a Protestant Church, the ceremony being performed by a"
+"Protestant Pastor, and subsequently, after obtaining a release deed from her, he"
+"married the second accused in a Roman Catholic Church, the ceremony being"
+performed by a Roman Catholic priest. It was held that the first accused had
+committed the offence of bigamy punishable under this section. The release deed
+executed by the complainant did not operate as a dissolution of the marriage between
+the first accused and herself. The marriage between the first accused and the
+"complainant was a legal and valid marriage and, as it was subsisting when the first"
+"accused married the second accused, the marriage of the first accused with the"
+second accused was void by reason of its taking place during the life of the
+complainant.27.
+Good faith and mistake of law are no defences to a charge of bigamy.28.
+[s 494.4] Conversion from Hinduism.—
+A married Hindu person contracted second marriage after embracing Islam. The
+Supreme Court said that despite his conversion he was guilty of the offence under
+"section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read with section 494, IPC, 1860 since mere"
+conversion did not automatically dissolve his first marriage.29. The Court followed its
+"own decision in Sarla Mudgal v UOI,30. which was to the effect that a Hindu husband"
+"who had, after conversion to Islam, contracted a second marriage without dissolving"
+his first marriage was guilty of the offence under section 494.
+[s 494.5] Ex parte divorce.—
+The accused husband entered into second marriage after obtaining ex parte divorce
+against his first wife. The Court said that he could not possibly be convicted under the
+"section, even if the ex parte divorce is subsequently set aside. Criminal proceeding"
+"against the husband was quashed, it being only an exercise in futility.31."
+[s 494.6] Custom of second marriage in the community.—
+A person was not allowed to be prosecuted under the section because of a custom in
+the community. The parties belonged to a scheduled tribe. Their marriage was
+governed by the customs and usages applicable to the tribe. There was no allegation in
+the complaint nor a proof of it that there was a custom of monogamy in the
+community.32.
+3. Exception.—The Exception lays down three conditions:—
+1. Continual absence of one of the parties for the space of seven years;
+2. The absent spouse not having been heard of by the other party as being alive within
+that time; and
+3. The party marrying must inform the person with whom he or she marries of the
+above fact.
+[s 494.7] Locus standi to file complaint.—
+"According to section 198 of Cr PC, 1973, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence"
+punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by
+some person aggrieved by the offence. Where the person aggrieved by an offence
+"punishable under sections 494 or 495 of the IPC (45 of 1860) is the wife, complaint"
+"may be made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter or by"
+"her father's or mother's brother or sister, (with the leave of the Court) or by any other"
+"person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption."
+[s 494.8] Complaint by Second wife.—
+Section 494 is intended to achieve laudable object of monogamy. This object can be
+"achieved only by expanding the meaning of the phrase ""aggrieved person"". Having"
+"regard to the scope, purpose, context and object of enacting section 494 IPC, 1860 and"
+"also the prevailing practices in the society sought to be curbed by section 494 IPC,"
+1860 there is no manner of doubt that the second wife should be an aggrieved person.
+"Until the declaration contemplated by section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is"
+"made by a competent Court, the woman with whom second marriage is solemnised"
+continues to be the wife within the meaning of s 494 IPC and would be entitled to
+maintain a complaint against her husband.33.
+[s 494.9] Police report.—
+"In the case of Ushaben v Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada34.,35. taking note of sub-section"
+"(4) of section 155, Cr PC, 1973 the Apex Court held that if a complaint contains the"
+"allegation about commission of offences both under section 498-A of the IPC, 1860 as"
+"well as section 494 of the IPC, 1860 the Court can take cognizance thereof even on a"
+police report. The bar under section 198 would not be applicable as complaint lodged
+"before police for offence under section 494 IPC, 1860 also related to other cognizable"
+"offences and if police files a charge-sheet, the Court can take cognizance also of"
+offence under section 494 along with other cognizable offences by virtue of section
+"155(4) of the Cr PC, 1973.36."
+[s 494.10] Jurisdiction.—
+"According to section 182(2) of the Cr PC, 1973 any offence punishable under sections"
+"494 or 495 of the IPC (45 of 1860), may be inquired into or tried by a Court within"
+whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the offender last resided with
+his or her spouse by the first marriage or the wife by the first marriage has taken up
+permanent residence after the commission of the offence.37.
+[s 494.11] Divorce in foreign country.—
+The marriage of the accused with the complainant was dissolved by a decree of
+divorce granted by a District Court in Sweden. The marriage of the accused with
+another lady after expiry of the period of appeal was held to be not an offence under
+the section.38.
+8. Act XV of 1872.
+9. Act III of 1936.
+"10. Pashaura Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 922 [LNIND 2009 SC 1988] : 2010 Cr LJ 875"
+(SC).
+11. Act XLIII of 1954.
+"12. Padi v State, AIR 1963 HP 16 [LNIND 1962 HP 8] ."
+"13. Chadwick, (1847) 11 QB 173 , 205."
+14. Where without granting divorce the court passed orders relieving the physically weak wife
+from the burden of the husband's sex demands and at the request of the wife permitted him to
+"take another wife; that was held to be wrong. Santosh Kumari v Surjit Singh, AIR 1990 HP 77"
+[LNIND 1989 HP 19] : 1990 Cr LJ 1012 .
+"15. Abdul Ghani v Azizul Huq, (1911) 39 Cal 409 ."
+"16. Anwar Ahmed v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 717 at 719. Radhika Sameena v SHO Habeebnagar"
+"PS, 1997 Cr LJ 1655 (AP), a Muslim entered into second marriage under the Special Marriage"
+"Act, 1954. He was liable to be prosecuted for the offence of bigamy."
+"17. Bhaurao, (1965) 67 Bom LR 423 (SC). For a critical examination of such cases, see MP"
+"Singh, Bigamy : A Conjecture for Deconstruction, (1988) 30 J ILI 225."
+18. Proof must be by cogent evidence. The mere fact of living together as husband and wife or
+of some letters on the point would not do. Religious ceremony of saptapadi also not proved.
+"Revanasiddaswamy HM v State of Karnataka, 1990 Cr LJ 1001 (Kant), no specific allegation that"
+saptapadi was not required in the community. Second marriage not proved. Santi Deb Berma v
+"Kanchan Prava Devi, AIR 1991 SC 816 : 1991 Cr LJ 660 ."
+"19. Kanwal Ram, AIR 1966 SC 614 [LNIND 1965 SC 198] ."
+"20. Baby Kar v Ram Rati, 1975 Cr LJ 836 (Cal); see also Chandra Bahadur, 1978 Cr LJ 942"
+(Sikkim).
+"21. Gopal Lal v State of Rajasthan, 1979 Cr LJ 652 (SC)."
+"22. L Obulamma, 1979 Cr LJ 849 (SC). Acting upon these cases in Kashiram v Somvati, 1992 Cr"
+"LJ 760 , the MP High Court found evidence of second formally valid marriage, but the earlier one"
+"was performed while the accused was a child, lesser sentence was awarded and the parents"
+"who arranged the second marriage were not awarded jail term citing, Bhunda Sukru v Chetram,"
+"1976 MPLJ 600 [LNIND 1975 MP 112] : 1977 Cr LJ 134 ; and Priya Bala v Suresh Chandra, AIR"
+1971 SC 1153 [LNIND 1971 SC 163] : 1971 Cr LJ 939 . Where the second marriage was
+performed according to the Arya Samaj Custom and it was pleaded that accordingly only three
+"and a half-rounds of sacred fire were enough to complete the marriage, it was held that without"
+"saptapadi the marriage was not complete; Urmila v State of UP, 1994 Cr LJ 2910 (All). Where"
+"there was no proof of performance of necessary ceremonies in the second marriage, it was held"
+that conviction for bigamy was not permissible and the accused could not be punished for
+"attempt to commit bigamy, Subir Kumar Kundu v State of WB, 1992 Cr LJ 1502 (Cal). D"
+"Vijyalakhsmi v D Sanjeeva Reddy, 2001 Cr LJ 1583 , the first and second marriages should be"
+proved to have been performed according to the legal or customary requirements applicable to
+the caste or community. The Andhra Pradesh State Amendment which has been approved by
+the President and which makes the offence cognizable would prevail over the Central
+"Legislation in case of conflict. P Satyanarayana v P Mallaiah, 1997 Cr LJ 211 : (1996) 6 SCC 122 ,"
+the husband admitted second marriage after 10 years of desertion by his wife. The court said
+that the prosecution was not absolved of its burden of proving that the second wife was taken
+"after solemnising due ceremonies of Hindu marriage. Manju Ram Kalita v State of Assam, (2009)"
+"13 SCC 330 [LNIND 2009 SC 1363] , concurrent finding of three courts below of the existence of"
+"second marriage, the Supreme Court refused to interfere in such finding at the fourth place, and"
+"also not in the punishment awarded. Purandar Sahoo v Golapi Sahoo, (2007) 15 SCC 696 ,"
+"disputes between man and wife, the latter left and lived with parents for 14 years, complaint of"
+"second marriage by the husband about four years ago from the date of complaint, prosecution"
+"not successful because neither there was any good proof of a second marriage, nor any"
+"explanation of four years' silence. Manju Ram Kalita v State of Assam, (2009) 13 SCC 330 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 1363] , petty quarrels could not be termed as ""cruelty""."
+"23. R Deb, Offences Against Women, 1985 Cr LJ, Journal portion, pp 9–16 (at p 11)."
+24. Ibid.
+"25. Indu Bhagya Natekar v Bhagya Pandurang Natekar, 1992 Cr LJ 601 (Bom)."
+"26. S Nagalingam v Sivagami, AIR 2001 SC 3576 [LNIND 2001 SC 1898] , the accused being"
+already a married man at the time he was convicted of the offence under the section. The
+"matter was remanded to the trial court for proper punishment. Manju Devi v State of Bihar, 2000"
+"Cr LJ 3382 (Pat), mere exchange of garlands could not take the place of a ceremony unless"
+"there was a custom to that effect. Manjula v Mani, 1998 Cr LJ 3244 (Ori), first marriage"
+"subsisting, second marriage proved by witnesses and entries in the marriage register under the"
+"Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Those who came to bless the second marriage were not held to be"
+guilty of abetment. The court also said that solemnisation of second marriage in accordance
+"with applicable ceremonies is not necessary for conviction, viz., section 7A of the Hindu"
+"Marriage Act, 1955. Yelamanchali Nageswari v Venkata Prasada Rao, 1998 Cr LJ 4128 (AP),"
+admission of second marriage by the accused in the application for mutual divorce was not
+considered to be sufficient unless there was evidence of ceremonies or some other legally
+"sanctioned form. See also, Bhagwan Swaroop Srivastava v Asha Srivastava, 1998 Cr LJ 265 (Raj);"
+"Sutesh Kurnat v State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 601 (Raj); Elango S v S Ravindran, 1998 Cr LJ 3095"
+"(Mad); Sham Singh v Satabjit Kaur, Cr LJ 4788 (P&H)."
+"27. Gnanasoundari v Nallathambi, (1946) Mad 367. Prasanna Kumar v Dhanalaxmi, 1989 Cr LJ"
+"1829 (Mad), where the date, place and form of second marriage were not given, nor witnesses"
+"indicated, complaint not good. B Chandra Manikyamma v B Sudarasna Rao, 1988 Cr LJ 1849"
+"(AP), second marriage must be strictly proved. Converting into another faith for show off and"
+"solemnising a marriage under that faith, no second marriage is valid in law."
+"28. Narantakath v Parakkal, (1922) 45 Mad 986; Abdul Ghani v Azizul Hiq, (1911) 39 Cal 409 ,"
+"dissented from. Gomathi v Vijayaraghavan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 81 (Mad), the court did not order"
+blood test of a child alleged to be from second wife for the purpose of proving a bigamous
+marriage. The mere birth of a child does not bring about a ceremonised marriage.
+"29. Lily Thomas v UOI, AIR 2000 SC 1650 [LNIND 2000 SC 827] : 2000 Cr LJ 2433 ."
+"30. Sarla Mudgal v UOI, AIR 1995 SC 1531 [LNIND 1995 SC 661] : 1995 AIR SCW 2326 : 1995 Cr"
+LJ 2926 : (1995) 3 SCC 635 [LNIND 1995 SC 661] .
+"31. Krishna Gopal Divedi v Prabha Divedi, AIR 2002 SC 389 [LNIND 2002 SC 142] ."
+"32. Surajmani Stella Kujur (Dr) v Durga Charan Hansdah, AIR 2001 SC 938 [LNIND 2001 SC 412] ."
+"33. A Subhash Babu v State of AP, AIR 2011 SC 3031 [LNIND 2011 SC 679] : 2011 (7) SCC 616"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 679] ; Babu Ram Saini v State of Uttaranchal, 2013 Cr LJ 1896 (Utt)."
+"34. Also see Pintu Alias Sujit Kumar Giri v State Of Orissa, 2013 Cr LJ 2099 (Ori)."
+"35. Ushaben v Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada, (2012) 6 SCC 353 [LNINDU 2012 SC 25] : 2012 Cr LJ"
+2234 .
+"36. A Subhash Babu v State of AP, AIR 2011 SC 3031 [LNIND 2011 SC 679] : 2011 (7) SCC 616"
+"[LNIND 2011 SC 679] ; Victor Auxilium v State, 2008 Cr LJ 774 (Mad)."
+"37. Azad @Naresh Kr Azad v State of Bihar, 2012 (2) Crimes 652 [LNIND 2012 PAT 329] (Pat)."
+"38. T Venkateswarlu v State of AP, 1999 Cr LJ 39 (AP)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XX OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE
+[s 495] Same offence with concealment of former marriage from person with
+whom subsequent marriage is contracted.
+Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding section having concealed
+"from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted, the fact of the"
+"former marriage, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term"
+"which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.— The offence is cognizable, non-bailable, triable by the Magistrate of"
+"the first class and non-compoundable vide A.P. Act No. 3 of 1992, Section 2 (w.e.f. 15-2-"
+"1992), in A.P."
+COMMENT.—
+"The offence mentioned in section 495 IPC, 1860 is extension of section 494 IPC, 1860"
+"and also is an aggravated form of bigamy provided in section 494 IPC, 1860. The"
+complainant (second wife) has adduced enough evidence to prove that the accused
+had concealed the fact of the former marriage by assuring her that he had taken
+divorce from his first wife and subsequently married her by performing the essential
+"Hindu rites and ceremonies in accordance with section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act,"
+1955. It is undisputed that accused first got married to Smt. Vijay Saini and thereafter
+"to the complainant, as admission to this effect has been made by the accused himself"
+"in his statement under section 313 Cr PC, 1973. Accused was rightly convicted under"
+"section 495 IPC, 1860.39."
+[s 495.1] Right to file complaint.—
+"Non-filing of the complaint under sections 494 or 495 IPC, 1860 by the first wife does"
+"not mean that the offence is wiped out. Even otherwise, the second wife suffers several"
+"legal wrongs and legal injuries and hence, complainant (second wife) was having every"
+"right to file the complaint under section 495 IPC, 1860.40."
+"A bare perusal of the provisions of sections 493 and 495 of IPC, 1860 shows that the"
+bodily relationship or sexual intercourse by a husband with his second wife falls under
+"the category of offence under sections 493 and 495 of IPC, 1860 and it cannot be"
+"treated as rape as defined in section 375 of IPC, 1860.41."
+"39. Babu Ram Saini v State Of Uttaranchal, 2013 Cr LJ 1896 (Utt)."
+"40. Babu Ram Saini v State Of Uttaranchal, 2013 Cr LJ 1896 (Utt); A Subhash Babu v State of AP,"
+AIR 2011 SC 3031 [LNIND 2011 SC 679] : 2011 (7) SCC 616 [LNIND 2011 SC 679] .
+"41. Mahesh Kumar Dhawan v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 1639 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XX OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE
+[s 496] Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful marriage.
+"Whoever, dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention, goes through the ceremony of"
+"being married, knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and"
+shall also be liable to fine.
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.— The offence is cognizable, non-bailable, triable by the Magistrate of"
+"the first class and non-compoundable vide A.P. Act No. 3 of 1992, Section 2 (w.e.f. 15-2-"
+"1992), in A.P."
+COMMENT.—
+This section punishes fraudulent or mock marriages.
+It applies to cases in which a ceremony is gone through which would in no case
+"constitute a marriage, and in which one of the parties is deceived by the other into the"
+"belief that it does constitute a marriage, or in which effect is sought to be given by the"
+proceeding to some collateral fraudulent purpose. Where the ceremony gone through
+"does, but for the previous marriage, constitutes a valid marriage, and both parties are"
+"aware of the circumstances of the previous marriage, s. 494 applies.42."
+[s 496.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires two essentials:—
+1. Dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention going through the ceremony of marriage.
+2. Knowledge on the part of the person going through the ceremony that he is not
+thereby lawfully married.
+[s 496.2] Sections 493 and 496.—
+The two sections are somewhat alike: the difference appears to be that under section
+"493, deception is requisite on the part of the man, and cohabitation or sexual"
+intercourse consequent on such deception. The offence under section 496 requires no
+"deception, cohabitation, or sexual intercourse as a sine qua non, but a dishonest or"
+fraudulent abuse of the marriage ceremony. In the latter case the offence can be
+"committed by a man or woman, in the former, only by a man."
+[s 496.3] Sections 494 and 496.—
+"An offence under section 494 is different from an offence under section 496, IPC, 1860."
+If the accused intends that there should be valid marriage and honestly goes through
+"the necessary ceremonies during the lifetime of the other spouse, then it may be a case"
+"under section 494, IPC, 1860, but if the accused only intends that there should only be a"
+show of marriage and dishonestly and fraudulently goes through the marriage
+"ceremony knowing fully well that he is not legally married thereby, then it is an offence"
+"under section 496, IPC, 1860.43."
+[s 496.4] CASE.—
+Where the accused married for the second time during the pendency of special appeal
+"against decree of divorce in violation of section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 but"
+"without concealing the fact of pendency of the appeal from the girl or her parents, no"
+"conviction could be entered under section 496, IPC, 1860 as the act of the accused was"
+neither dishonest nor fraudulent.44.
+"42. Rama Sona, (1873) Unrep Cr C 77."
+"43. Kailash Singh, 1982 Cr LJ 1005 (Raj)."
+"44. Ibid. Where the second marriage is performed fraudulently, complaint can be made by the"
+"person so deceived, and not by the first regular wife. Prasanna Kumar v Dhanalaxmi, 1989 Cr LJ"
+1829 (Mad).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XX OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE
+[s 497] Adultery.
+Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has
+"reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of"
+"that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of"
+"the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description"
+"for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case the"
+wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.— Punishment–Imprisonment for 5 years, or fine, or both–Non-"
+"cognizable, bailable triable by 1st class Magistrate and non-compoundable vide A.P. Act 3"
+"of 1992, w.e.f. 15-2-1992."
+COMMENT.—
+"In Joseph Shine v UOI,45. a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court decriminalised"
+"adultery and held section 497 of the IPC, 1860 unconstitutional as violative of Articles"
+14 and 21 of the Constitution. Under section 397 a man who had sex with a married
+woman without getting her husband's permission could be charged and face
+"punishment with imprisonment for a term up to five years, or with fine, or with both, if"
+"convicted. Before, it was struck down, the cognizance of the offence was limited to"
+"adultery committed with a married woman, and the male offender alone was made"
+"liable to punishment. Thus, under the Code, adultery was an offence committed by a"
+third person against a husband in respect of his wife. A married man was not liable if
+"had sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman, or with a widow, or even with a"
+married woman whose husband consented to it.
+"Prior to the judgment in Joseph Shine case, the Supreme Court in Sowmithri Vishnu's case46."
+"had upheld the constitutional validity of section 497, IPC, 1860. In Joseph Shine v UOI, AIR"
+"2018 SC 4898 , the Supreme Court observed that: Adultery is different from an offence"
+committed under Section 498-A or any violation of the Protection of Women from Domestic
+"Violence Act, 2005 or, for that matter, the protection conceived of under Section 125 of the"
+Code of Criminal Procedure or Sections 306 or 304B or 494 IPC. These offences are meant
+to sub-serve various other purposes relating to a matrimonial relationship and extinction of
+life of a married woman during subsistence of marriage. Treating adultery an offence would
+"tantamount to the State entering into a real private realm. The act, i.e., adultery does not fit"
+"into the concept of a crime. If it is treated as a crime, there would be immense intrusion into"
+the extreme privacy of the matrimonial sphere. It is better to be left as a ground for divorce.
+"For any other purpose as the Parliament has perceived or may, at any time, perceive, to treat"
+"it as a criminal offence will offend the two facets of Article 21 of the Constitution, namely,"
+"dignity of husband and wife, as the case may be, and the privacy attached to a relationship"
+between the two.
+"45. Joseph Shine v UOI, AIR 2018 SC 4898 ."
+"46. Sowmithri Vishnu v UOI, 1985 Cr LJ 1302 (SC) : AIR 1985 SC 1618 [LNIND 1985 SC 202] :"
+"(1985) Supp SCC 137 . Again emphasised in V Revathi v UOI, (1988) 2 SCC 72 [LNIND 1988 SC"
+20] : AIR 1988 SC 835 [LNIND 1988 SC 144] : (1988) 1 Ker LT 771 : (1988) 2 HLR 39 : (1988) 1
+Punj LR 649 .
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XX OF OFFENCES RELATING TO MARRIAGE
+[s 498] Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married
+woman.
+Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and whom he knows or has reason
+"to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that man, or from any person having"
+"the care of her on behalf of that man, with intent that she may have illicit intercourse"
+"with any person, or conceals or detains with that intent any such woman, 1 shall be"
+punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
+"years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+"Under section 498, IPC, 1860 enticing or taking away a married woman with criminal"
+intent is an offence. Entering or taking away somebody's wife for the purpose other
+"than mentioned in section 498, IPC, 1860 does not constitute an offence. Therefore, in"
+"order to bring home guilt of a person under section 498, IPC, 1860, the prosecution has"
+to prove that a married woman was enticed or taken away with an intention that she
+might have illicit intercourse with any person.47.
+"Sections 361 and 366 may be compared with this section, which may come into"
+"operation when the two former sections fail to apply, but only in respect of a married"
+woman. This and the preceding sections are evidently intended for the protection of
+"husbands, who alone can institute prosecutions for offences under them."
+The gist of the offence under this section appears to be the deprivation of the husband
+of his custody and his proper control over his wife with the object of having illicit
+intercourse with her.48.
+[s 498.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires three things:—
+1. Taking or enticing away or concealing or detaining the wife of another man from that
+man or from any person having the care of her on behalf of that man.
+"2. Such taking, enticing, concealing or detaining, must be with intent that she may have"
+illicit intercourse with any person.
+3. Knowledge or reason to believe that the woman is the wife of another man.
+[s 498.2] Sections 366 and 498.—
+A comparison of the ingredients constituting an offence under sections 366 and 498
+"shows that though there are some ingredients which are common, but the ingredients"
+for the offence under section 498 constitute of some of the very important particulars
+"which are not in an offence under section 366, IPC, 1860. The additional ingredients of"
+"section 498, IPC, 1860 namely, (i) that the woman said to have been taken away is the"
+"married wife of another man, and (ii) that the accused has taken her away with the"
+knowledge that she is the wife of that person are not at all in the offence under section
+"366, IPC, 1860. Therefore, the offence under section 498 cannot be said to be a minor"
+offence or an offence under section 366 within the meaning of the term used in section
+"222(2) of the Cr PC, 1973.49."
+"1. 'Detains with that intent any such woman'.—The word ""detains"" means ""keeps back""."
+"The keeping back need not necessarily be by physical force, it may be by persuasion or"
+by allurement and blandishment. The use of the word requires that there should be
+something in the nature of control or influence which can properly be described as a
+keeping back of the woman. To constitute detention proof of some kind of persuasion
+is necessary. It cannot properly be said that a man detains a woman if she has no
+desire to leave and on the contrary wishes to stay with him.50. The Supreme Court has
+"held that the keeping back may be by force, but it need not be by force. It can be the"
+"result of persuasion, allurement or blandishment, which may either have caused the"
+"willingness of the woman, or may have encouraged, or co-operated with, her initial"
+inclination to leave her husband.51.
+"47. Singana Naga Nooka Chakrarao v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 3466 ."
+"48. Alamgir v State of Bihar, (1959) Pat 334 : AIR 1959 SC 436 [LNIND 1958 SC 145] : 1959 Cr LJ"
+"527 : (1959) 2 SCA 116 [LNIND 1958 SC 145] . Natarajan v Ramanujam, 1977 Cr LJ 389 (Mad),"
+the main ingredient is enticing away married woman from her husband. Criminal intent on the
+"part of the accused has to be proved. The consequence of not examining the material witness,"
+"the wife, led to acquittal of accused. No interference."
+"49. Satya Narain v State of Bihar, 1985 Cr LJ 747 (Pat)."
+"50. Prithi Missir v Harak Nath, (1937) 1 Cal 166 ."
+"51. Alamgir, (1959) Pat 334 : AIR 1959 SC 436 [LNIND 1958 SC 145] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+1.
+[CHAPTER XX-A OF CRUELTY BY HUSBAND OR RELATIVES OF
+HUSBAND
+[s 498A] Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.
+"Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such"
+woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
+to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
+"Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, ""cruelty"" means—"
+(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
+"commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health"
+(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
+(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
+her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
+or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
+her to meet such demand.]
+State Amendment
+"Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh, offence is compoundable."
+COMMENT.—
+"This section has been introduced in the Code by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,"
+1983 (Act 46 of 1983) to combat the menace of dowry deaths. By the same Act section
+"113A has been added to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to raise a presumption"
+regarding abetment of suicide by a married woman.
+[s 498A.1] Ingredients.—
+"Ingredients of 498A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 are:"
+a) The woman must be married;
+b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and
+c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the
+woman or by the relative of her husband.2.
+"If the validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny, the demand of dowry in"
+respect of an invalid marriage would be legally not recognisable.3.
+"Concept of cruelty under section 498A IPC, 1860 and its effect under section 306 IPC,"
+1860 varies from individual to individual also depending upon the social and economic
+status to which such person belongs. The Supreme Court held that cruelty for the
+purpose of offence and the said Section need not be physical. Even mental torture or
+abnormal behaviour may amount to cruelty or harassment in a given case.4. Mental
+"cruelty, of course, varies from person to person, depending upon the intensity and the"
+"degree of endurance, some may meet with courage and some others suffer in silence,"
+to some it may be unbearable and a weak person may think of ending one's life.5.
+The usual and common domestic discord in any matrimonial home cannot amount to
+"'cruelty' within the meaning of section 498A of IPC, 1860.6. Assault on a woman"
+offends her dignity. It is one thing to say that every wear and tear of married life need
+not lead to suicide and it is another thing to put it so crudely and suggest that one or
+two assaults on a woman is an accepted social norm. Judges have to be sensitive to
+women's problems. What effect it will have on a woman depends on facts and
+circumstances of each case. There cannot be any generalisation on this issue.7.
+In a case before the Supreme Court8. involving the death by burning of a newly married
+"woman, the circumstances did not establish either murder or an abetted suicide and"
+"thus the in-laws escaped the jaws of sections 300 and 306, but they were caught in the"
+web of this newly-enacted section for prevention of harassment for dowry. Not to
+"speak of the things they were persistently demanding from the girl's side, the fact that"
+a large number of articles were taken back by her father after her death from her
+"matrimonial abode, showed that there was pressure being exerted on in-laws and"
+continued to be exerted till death for more money and articles. The Supreme Court
+observed in another case that this section has given a new dimension to the concept of
+cruelty for the purposes of matrimonial remedies and that the type of conduct
+described here would be relevant for proving cruelty.9. It is no impediment to a
+conviction under the section that the accused has been acquitted of the larger offence
+of murder under section 302. Where the charge was that of murdering wife for dowry
+and no evidence was available except this that the accused projected the theory of
+intruders killing her (which the Court did not believe) and did not immediately made
+"police report or to get medical help for his injured wife, this was held to be not"
+sufficient to convict him for murder. The harassment for dowry was established from
+his own conduct in deserting her and also through the mouth of the witnesses. That
+was held to be sufficient to convict him under section 498A.10.
+"Where after a spell of cruelty, the husband and wife reconciled and resumed joint life"
+and it was found that the husband left the wife back with her parents for a short spell
+"and then took her back and within two days informed her parents of her death, the wife"
+"made no complaint of cruelty, etc., during her short stay with parents, the section could"
+not come into play because there was no complaint after reconciliation.11. The Court
+"also added that sections 498A and 304B create distinct offences. ""Cruelty"" is common"
+element to both. A person charged under section 304B can be convicted under section
+498A without any charge under that section.
+A married woman committed suicide by burning herself after pouring kerosene. In her
+dying declaration she said that her husband used to beat her after taking liquor and he
+used to borrow money from the villagers for the purpose. The Court said that this
+amounted to cruelty within the meaning of the section making the accused liable to be
+"punished.12. When the accused mother-in-law, the husband and his brother harassed"
+the married woman and did not permit her to go to her parents. The husband and his
+brother disposed her of by fire after pouring kerosene. They were punished under
+section 302. Their mother was punished under this section (section 498A).13.
+Consequences of cruelty which was likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to
+"cause grave injury danger to life or limb or health, whether mental or physical, have to"
+be shown for attracting the section.14.
+[s 498A.2] Mens rea.—
+The requirement of proving that soon before her death the woman was subjected to
+cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relation of her husband for or in
+connection with any demand of dowry clearly shows that the legislation has imbibed
+the necessary mens rea for the offence of dowry death.15.
+[s 498A.3] Actus reus.—
+The Supreme Court has observed that in-laws of a deceased cannot be roped in only on
+the ground of being the close relatives of the husband of the deceased. Some overt act
+must be attributed to them in the incident and the same should also be proved beyond
+reasonable doubt.16.
+[s 498A.4] Suicide note.—
+The suicide note of the deceased wife made serious castigation against her husband
+for being an addict to some kind of narcotic drug. Serious allegations were also made
+against the mother-in-law. Allegations against the accused sister-in-law were not grave.
+But in no case there was reference to any concrete instance which could be termed to
+"be cruelty. Hence, no case was made out against the accused persons.17."
+[s 498A.5] Constitutional validity of section 498A.—
+The husband and relatives of the husband of a married woman form a class apart by
+themselves and it amounts to reasonable classification especially when a married
+woman is treated with cruelty within the four walls of the house of her husband and
+"there is no likelihood of any evidence available. Consequently, this section cannot be"
+said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.18.
+The mere possibility of abuse of a provision of law does not per se invalidate a
+legislation. The plea that section 498-A has no legal or constitutional foundation was
+held to be not tenable.19. Mere possibility of abuse of power in a given case would not
+"make it objectionable, ultra vires or unconstitutional. In such case, 'action' and not the"
+'section' may be vulnerable.20.
+Where the wife coming from respectable orthodox family was subjected by her
+"husband, who was of highly suspicious nature, to humiliation by demeaning and"
+"insulting her, calling her a prostitute, denying her family life and comfort and not"
+"permitting anybody to meet her, all this was held to be sufficient to justify the husband's"
+conviction under the section.21. The Court said:22.
+The expression cruelty postulates such a treatment as to cause reasonable apprehension in
+the mind of the wife that her living with the husband will be harmful and injurious to her life.
+To decide the question of cruelty the relevant factors are the matrimonial relationship
+"between the husband and wife, their cultural and temperamental state of life, state of health"
+and their inter-action in daily life.
+[s 498A.6] Cruelty by vexatious litigation.—
+"Where out of a sense of vindictiveness, the husband instituted vexatious litigation"
+against his wife and she was feeling humiliated and tortured by reason of execution of
+"search warrants and seizure of personal property, it was held that the section was wide"
+enough to encompass a cruelty committed through an abuse of the litigative process.
+[s 498A.7] Cruelty by deprivation and wasteful habits.—
+The husband disregarded his duty to provide his wife and infant child the elementary
+means of sustenance. He deliberately and irresponsibly squandered his earnings on
+gambling and other vices and thereby starved his wife and infant child to death. This
+was held to be amounting to cruelty under section 498A.23.
+"[s 498A.8] Calling wife ""barren woman"".—"
+"It was alleged that, as the deceased did not beget children for a period of three years"
+"after the marriage, accused harassed the deceased by calling her ""barren woman"". It"
+"was held that mere commenting that deceased was not begetting children, dose not"
+"amount to subjecting the deceased to cruelty within the meaning of section 498A IPC,"
+1860.24.
+[s 498A.9] Cruelty by persistent demand.—
+Cruelty or harassment need not be physical. Mental torture may amount to cruelty in a
+"given situation. The bride, in this case, was repeatedly taunted, maltreated and mentally"
+tortured right from the next day of marriage. There was a quarrel between her and the
+husband only a day before her death. This led the bride to commit suicide. Presumption
+"as to dowry death under section 113B, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 became applicable."
+There was no rebuttal from the side of the accused husband.25.
+[s 498A.10] Cognizance on Police Report.—
+"Section 198A of Code of Criminal procedure (Cr PC), 1973 permits a Court to take"
+cognizance of offence punishable under section 498A upon a police report of facts
+which constitute offence. Explanation to section 2(d) makes it clear that a report made
+by a police officer after investigation of a non-cognizable offence is to be treated as a
+complaint and the officer by whom such a report is made is to be deemed to be the
+"complainant. Thus, if a complaint contains allegations about commission of offence"
+"under section 498A of the IPC, 1860 which is a cognizable offence, apart from"
+"allegations about the commission of offence under section 494 of the IPC, 1860 the"
+Court can take cognizance thereof even on a police report. No fetters can be put on the
+police preventing them from investigating the complaint which alleges offence under
+"section 498A of the IPC, 1860 and also offence under section 494 of the IPC, 1860.26."
+[s 498A.11] Cruelty by extra-marital relations.—
+To the question whether 'extra-marital relationship' could be considered as 'cruelty'
+"under section 498A IPC, 1860 had arisen, the Supreme Court has answered the"
+question in negative. Mere fact that the husband has developed some intimacy with
+"another, during the subsistence of marriage and failed to discharge his marital"
+"obligations, as such would not amount to ""cruelty"", but it must be of such a nature as is"
+likely to drive the spouse to commit suicide to fall within the explanation to section
+"498A IPC, 1860.27. Courts should carefully assess the facts of each case before"
+deciding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim which induces her to commit
+suicide. The accused continued his relation with another woman and his illicit relation
+with another woman would have definitely created the psychological imbalance to the
+deceased which led her to take the extreme step of committing suicide. The conviction
+"of accused under sections 498-A and 306, IPC was held proper.28. In Laxman Ram"
+"Mane v State of Maharashtra,29. it was held that an illicit relationship of a married man"
+with another woman would clearly amount to cruelty within the meaning of section
+498A. Even assuming for a moment that this did not amount to cruelty within the
+"meaning of section 498A, it could still be used as a piece of evidence of harassment"
+and misbehaviour of the appellant towards the deceased. The act of the husband in
+"bringing a concubine to his house, living with her as husband and wife, and having"
+"sexual relations in the presence of his wife, amounts to 'cruelty' within the meaning of"
+"section 498A of IPC, 1860.30. Permitting the first wife to enter the house of deceased"
+with new born child does not amount to a cruel act to the second wife as such act
+cannot amount to cruelty within the meaning of second limb of clause (a) of the
+"Explanation under section 498A, IPC, 1860.31."
+[s 498A.12] Harassment and bigamy.—
+The wife filed an FIR alleging harassment and bigamy by the accused husband. The
+fact was that the second marriage was performed by the accused husband after the
+first marriage was dissolved. The affidavit filed by the wife did not state that the divorce
+"decree had been either stayed or set aside. Thus, ingredients of the offence of bigamy"
+were not made out. The affidavit was also silent about harassment for dowry demand.
+"It was held that the FIR was frivolous, vexatious, unwarranted and abuse of process.32."
+[s 498A.13] Harassment for non-dowry demand.—
+"Four years after the marriage, the wife was called upon to bring some money from her"
+parents for sending her husband's younger brother abroad. It could not be termed as a
+"dowry demand, but because she was harassed for it and on account of this she"
+"became compelled to end her life, it was held that an offence under section 498A was"
+made out.33. Section 498A does not specifically speak of a dowry demand. It speaks
+only of unlawful demand for property and valuable articles.34.
+[s 498A.14] Cruelty by non-acceptance of baby girl.—
+The conduct of the accused husband and his father in not accepting the birth of the
+baby girl was held as amounting to cruelty.35.
+[s 498A.15] Demand of son in adoption.—
+The Supreme Court has held that the demand of a son in adoption did not amount to a
+dowry demand so as to attract the provisions of section 498A.36.
+[s 498A.16] Act of remaining silent.—
+The allegation was that accused Nos. 2 and 4 did not come forward to participate in
+the settlement of the dowry on the ground that they belonged to the groom's family and
+remained silent. The act of remaining silent with regard to the settlement of the dowry
+demand will not amount to cruelty within the meaning of either clause (a) or clause (b)
+"of the Explanation of section 498A IPC, 1860.37."
+[s 498A.17] Cruelty by false attacks on chastity.—
+The father-in-law and the husband were shown to demand dowry though their demand
+was met by stepfather of the girl at the time of marriage. They also attacked her
+chastity when there was no reasonable ground for it. Homicidal death of the wife took
+place within five months of marriage. The Court said that all this amounted to cruelty
+within the meaning of section 498A.38.
+[s 498A.18] Taking away children.—
+The act of the husband in taking away the minor child without the consent of the wife
+was held as not amounting to cruelty for the purposes of section 498A.39.
+[s 498A.19] Outraging of modesty by father-in-law.—
+"Trying to outrage the modesty of a married woman in her matrimonial house, by her"
+"father-in-law also amounts cruelty as defined under section 498A IPC, 1860.40."
+[s 498A.20] Demand for looking after aged in-laws.—
+A difference of opinion within family on everyday mundane matters would not fall
+within the category of cruelty. Merely because the appellants were of the opinion that
+"the deceased, as a good daughter-in-law, should look after them in old age could not be"
+said to be an abetment of suicide.41.
+[s 498A.21] Mere demand of dowry an offence.—
+"Mere demand of dowry will not attract an offence under section 498-A IPC, 1860.42."
+"From a single instance of the accused stating that he had received meagre dowry, it"
+could not be inferred that he demanded dowry and maltreated his deceased wife on
+that count.43. In the absence of any agreement or settlement for dowry at the time of
+"marriage, a demand constitutes no offence. The demand must come within the"
+definition of dowry.44.
+"Mere harassment or mere demand for property, etc., is not cruelty. It is only where"
+harassment is shown to have been caused for the purpose of coercing a woman to
+meet demands that it amounts to a cruelty which has been made punishable under the
+section.
+[s 498A.22] Presumption of cruel treatment.—
+The wife of the accused committed suicide by jumping into a well. Her father testified
+that the neighbours told him of the sounds of a quarrel going on in the family on the
+fateful night. He testified that she was ill-treated for dowry and for being issueless. She
+attempted to jump into the same well earlier also. The ill-treatment did not stop even
+after she bore two sons. The Court said that a presumption could be raised that the ill-
+treatment continued unabated till the last moment of her decision to put an end to her
+life.45.
+"The presumption of cruelty within the meaning of section 113A, Indian Evidence Act,"
+1872 also arose making the husband guilty of abetment of suicide within the meaning
+of section 306 where the husband had illicit relationship with another woman and used
+to beat his wife making it a persistent cruelty within the meaning of Explanation (a) of
+section 498A.46.
+[s 498A.23] Harassment.—
+There should be sufficient nexus between incidents to constitute harassment. The
+"accused was convicted of harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act,"
+1997 [English] section 2 following two incidents separated by a period of four months
+in which he first slapped his former girlfriend and later on threatened her companion.
+He appealed by way of case stated on the basis that there had to exist a sufficient
+"nexus between the incidents complained of so as to give rise to a ""course of conduct"""
+for the purposes of section 7(3). His appeal was allowed. The Court said that whilst no
+"more than two incidents were needed to constitute harassment, the fewer the number"
+"of incidents and the wider the time lapse, the less likely such a finding would be"
+justified. On the facts of the instant case there was insufficient evidence upon which
+the finding of harassment could be proved.47.
+[s 498A.24] Every kind of harassment not covered.—
+It is not every harassment or every type of cruelty that would attract section 498A. The
+complainant has conclusively to establish that the beating and harassment in question
+was with a view to force her to commit suicide or to fulfil the illegal demand of dowry.
+"In this case, though there might have been a previous history of harassment for those"
+"purposes, at the moment of the complaint those urges were not proved to be figuring in"
+the harassment.48. Where the deceased was asked to part with her jewellery and
+valuables for the marriage of her sister-in-law but the matter was not pressed further
+"on her refusal and there was no harassment or coercion by her in-laws, it was held that"
+it did not amount to cruelty.49.
+A husband who does not call his wife back to the matrimonial home does not thereby
+cause any harassment.50. Where the deceased wife was told not to attend kitchen as a
+"measure for prevention of wastage, this was held to be no cruelty.51."
+The remarks passed by the mother-in-law that the daughter-in-law was not beautiful
+were held to be not sufficient to drive anybody to suicide. There was no evidence of
+cruelty or deprivation.52. The mere statements in the dying declaration that she wanted
+"to live separately, her husband gave her a beating the previous day and her"
+grandmother disliked her were held to be not sufficient to substantiate the prosecution
+case that cruel treatment was meted out to her so as to constitute an offence under
+section 498A.53.
+Where the deceased wife's annoyance was due to the fact that the children of a relative
+"were being looked after in her husband's home, the Court said that it did not amount to"
+cruelty or harassment because of dowry demand.54.
+[s 498A.25] Kicking daughter-in-law.—
+A three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court by order dated 14 March 2013 set aside its
+"own judgment in Bhaskar Lal Sharma v Monica,55. which held that the action of a"
+woman merely kicking her daughter-in-law or threatening her with divorce would not
+"come within the meaning of ""cruelty"" under section 498A of the IPC, 1860. The"
+Supreme Court allowed the curative petition filed by the National Commission directed
+restoration of the special leave petition (SLP) filed by Bhaskar Lal Sharma and his wife
+for a fresh hearing.
+[s 498A.26] Wife's desire to stay separately.—
+"Howsoever strong the desire of wife might be of staying separately, and howsoever"
+"genuine her grief would be for having been required to stay in a joint family, the same"
+"cannot constitute as ""wilful conduct"" of the appellants which was likely to drive wife to"
+commit suicide.56.
+[s 498A.27] Make section 498A compoundable.—
+Offence under section 498A is not compoundable except in the State of Andhra
+"Pradesh where by a State amendment, it has been made compoundable. In Ramgopal v"
+"State of MP,57. the Supreme Court requested the Law Commission and the Government"
+"of India to examine whether offence punishable under section 498A of the IPC, 1860"
+could be made compoundable. The Commission has given a comprehensive report
+"(237th Report) under the title of ""Compounding of IPC Offences"" recommending that"
+that the offence under section 498A should be made a compoundable offence with the
+permission of Court. But it has not been made compoundable yet.
+[s 498A.28] Complaint filed after institution of suit.—
+A complaint was lodged by the wife under the section after a divorce suit was filed by
+"her husband. In her written statement to the suit, the wife made no allegations of"
+"cruelty or harassment. In the meantime, the divorce was decreed and her application"
+"for reconciliation was rejected by the family Court, the complainant wife had also been"
+"living with her mother for a long time. Thus, no case was made out and the husband"
+was entitled to acquittal.58.
+Where the marriage was already 10 years old at the time of the incident of suicide by
+"taking poison and there was neither any record of cruelty or harassment, nor any sign"
+"of forcible administration of poison, the conviction of the accused husband was held to"
+be not proper.59.
+[s 498A.29] Past cruelty.—
+"The Supreme Court has given this observation that both section 498A, IPC, 1860 and"
+"section 113A, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 include in their amplitude past events of"
+"cruelty. The period of operation of section 113A, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is seven"
+years. The presumption of suicide by a married woman arises when it takes place
+within seven years from the date of marriage.
+[s 498A.30] Section 498A and 304B.—
+The two provisions are not mutually inclusive. They deal with different and distinct
+offences. Persons charged under section 304B but acquitted can be convicted under
+section 498A even in the absence of any charge.60. The deceased had been subjected
+to cruelty by her husband and mother-in-law over the demand of a Maruti Car as dowry
+and persistently pressed by them after about six months of the marriage and
+"continuously till her death. Accused was convicted under sections 498A and 304 IPC,"
+1860.61.
+[s 498A.31] Sections 498A and 306.—
+Distinction between sections 306 IPC and section 498A IPC is that of intention. Under
+"the latter, cruelty committed by the husband of his relations drag the woman concerned"
+"to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended.62."
+"Offences under sections 498A and 306 of IPC, 1860. Trial court acquitted of the"
+"offence under section 498A IPC, 1860. It was argued that the acquittal of the accused"
+"of the offence under section 498A IPC, 1860 has bearing on the offence under section"
+"306 IPC, 1860. The Supreme Court held that having absolved the appellants of the"
+"charge of cruelty, which is the most basic ingredient for the offence made out under"
+"section 498A, the third ingredient for application of section 113A of Indian Evidence"
+"Act, 1872 is missing, namely, that the relatives, i.e., the mother-in-law and father-in-law"
+who are charged under section 306 had subjected the victim to cruelty.63.
+[s 498A.32] Jurisdiction.—
+"A wife, maltreated for dowry, was sent back to her father where she became ill because"
+of shock and after effects of cruelty. The Court having jurisdiction at the place was held
+competent to entertain a complaint both under section 498A in respect of cruelty and
+"also under section 181(4) of Cr PC, 1973 in respect of misappropriation of"
+"streedhan.64. In Dukhi Ram v State of UP,65. the Court observed that the scope of"
+section 498A cannot be extended to co-villagers. Order summoning co-villagers for
+offence under section 498A amounts to abuse of process of Court. The order of the
+Magistrate was quashed.
+[s 498A.33] Territorial Jurisdiction.—
+Where the complaint by the aggrieved wife regarding ill-treatment by husband and in-
+laws was filed at a place where she was residing with her mother and the act
+"subjecting her to cruelty occurred at some other place, it was held that the Magistrate"
+at that place had no territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under
+section 498A. The plea that her husband and sister-in-law visited that place and
+subjected her to cruelty was not substantiated.66. In a prosecution for criminal breach
+"of trust and cruelty to wife, the facts were that the marriage had taken at one place"
+where also all the items of dowry were handed over. Breach of trust and ill-treatment
+"were committed at the husband's place. Thus, the offence was committed beyond the"
+territorial jurisdiction of the magistrate at the place of marriage. Still it was held that he
+had jurisdiction because a part of the cause of action had arisen at that place.67. In a
+"case, as a consequence of ill-treatment inflicted upon the complainant from time to"
+"time and demand of dowry, she was thrown out of her matrimonial home at Delhi and"
+as a result of that she was compelled to come and reside with her father at Bharatpur.
+It was held that the police station/Court situated at Bharatpur has also jurisdiction to
+inquire into or try the offence allegedly committed by the petitioners. Section 179 Cr
+"PC, 1973 makes it clear that if anything happened as a consequence of the offence, the"
+same may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing
+has been done or such consequence has ensued.68. The Supreme Court in Sunita
+"Kumari Kashyap v State of Bihar,69. with almost similar set of facts came to a"
+conclusion that the Court situated at Gaya also has jurisdiction to proceed with the
+criminal proceedings initiated on behalf of the complainant although the ill treatment
+upon the complainant in connection with demand of dowry was mainly inflicted at her
+matrimonial home situated at Ranchi because as a result of continuous torture and
+"unbearable treatment of her husband and in-laws the complainant had no other option,"
+but to come at her parental home situated at Gaya. The Supreme Court for arriving
+such a conclusion relied upon the case of Sujata Mukherjee v Prashant Kumar
+"Mukherjee,70. and State of MP v Suresh Kaushal,71. but distinguished these cases being"
+based on different set of facts.
+[s 498A.34] Suicide by mistress.—
+If the cruelty or harassment of the kind described in the Act is meted out to a mistress
+"which leads her to commit suicide, the section would cover her case also.72."
+[s 498A.35] Retrospective Effect of Section 498A.—
+A dowry harassment which had ended in March 1983 by the husband deserting his wife
+before the new provision came into force in 1983 was held to be not covered by it. This
+provision does not have retrospective effect.73. Where the relationship of marriage is
+"still continuing, the events of cruelty taking place prior to the amendment can be taken"
+into account. That does not have the effect of giving a retrospective operation to the
+provision.74.
+[s 498A.36] Compromise.—
+Where the wife had condoned the matrimonial cruelty of which she was the victim and
+"had resumed consortium with her husband, the Court found no obstruction in the"
+"provisions of the section in permitting them to compound the complaint and, therefore,"
+"ordered accordingly.75. In D Jayalakshmi v State of MP,76. it was held that in a"
+complaint under section 498A a compromise between husband and wife was
+permissible even though the offence is non-compoundable. It added that in exceptional
+circumstances only the High Court can permit compounding of a non-compoundable
+offence under its inherent powers. The offence under the section cannot be
+compounded by invoking inherent powers and by praying for quashing of proceedings
+on the ground of amicable settlement. The remedy of the parties is to take recourse to
+"sections 321 or 257, Cr PC, 1973 and seek withdrawal of the case.77. The offence"
+cannot be compounded on the basis of consent divorce under section 13-B of the
+"Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The proceedings were, however, quashed under section 482,"
+"Cr PC, 1973 to prevent abuse of judicial process.78. During the pendency of the"
+"prosecution, the husband and wife sorted out their differences and obtained a consent"
+divorce as per their compromise. The Court said that in the light of facts as they
+"developed, the ends of justice would be served by reducing the term of imprisonment"
+to the period already undergone.79.
+Compromise should be accepted as a basis for withdrawal or quashing of complaint at
+the instance of the complainant.80.
+[s 498A.37] Explanation.—
+"Clause (a).—In RP Bidlan v State of Maharashtra,81. it was held that under section 498A,"
+"Explanation (a), for proof of cruelty it is necessary to show a reasonable nexus"
+between cruelty and suicide. Mere proof of cruelty or suicide is not enough. There is no
+"vagueness or obscurity about the meaning of the word ""cruelty"" as spelt out in clauses"
+(a) and (b) of the Explanations. The definition sub-serves the object sought to be
+achieved.82.
+[s 498A.38] Meaning of the term 'relative of the husband'—whether include a 'girlfriend'
+or 'concubine'?.—
+An offence in terms of section 498A is committed by the persons specified therein.
+They have to be the 'husband' or his 'relative'. Either the husband of the woman or his
+relative must be subjected to her to cruelty within the aforementioned provision. In the
+"absence of any statutory definition, the term 'relative' must be assigned a meaning as"
+"is commonly understood. Ordinarily it would include father, mother, husband or wife,"
+"son, daughter, brother, sister, nephew or niece, grandson or granddaughter of an"
+individual or the spouse of any person. The meaning of the word 'relative' would
+"depend upon the nature of the statute. It principally includes a person related by blood,"
+marriage or adoption. By no stretch of imagination a girlfriend or even a concubine in
+an etymological sense would be a 'relative'. The word 'relative' brings within its purview
+a status. Such a status must be conferred by either blood or marriage or adoption. If no
+"marriage has taken place, the question of one being relative of another would not"
+arise.83. A complaint was filed against the husband and his relatives because of
+demand for dowry. Shia law was applicable to the parties. The husband had divorced
+"the complaining wife by ""talak"". Under the Shia law there is prohibition on marrying the"
+"woman whom one had earlier divorced. Thus, even if they were living together, they"
+could not be called husband and wife. Section 498A was not applicable. The complaint
+was liable to be dismissed.84.
+"[s 498A.39] Is Section 498A applicable to cruelty against ""legally wedded wife"" only?."
+—
+A person who enters into marital arrangement cannot be allowed to take shelter behind
+the smoke screen of contention that since there was no valid marriage the question of
+"dowry does not arise. The word ""husband"" would apply to a person who enters into"
+marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of
+husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for
+"any purposes enumerated in sections 304B and 498A, whatever be the legitimacy of"
+the marriage itself. A person contracting second marriage during the subsistence of
+the earlier marriage can be charged under sections 304B and 498A. The Court pressed
+into service the Heyden's rule of construction which means purposive construction and
+mischief rule.85. Section 498A of the IPC refers to word 'woman' and not to 'wife' and by
+the said section protection was contemplated to married woman and not to the legally
+wedded wife only. Where accused and deceased were residing together and the
+evidence proved that marriage of accused and deceased took place by 'sulagna
+"procedure', the contention of the accused that deceased was not his legally wedded"
+wife as there was no evidence of valid marriage between them to attract the provisions
+"of section 498A, cannot be accepted.86."
+[s 498A.40] Explanation.—Clause (b).—
+Where the deceased bride was subjected to cruelty and harassment and demand of
+"dowry and she was burnt to death within two years of her marriage, her earlier"
+statements about her state of affairs to her father and neighbours and her sister were
+held to be admissible under clause (b) of the Explanation to section 498A and
+conviction of the accused under section 498A was held to be proper.87.
+The basic ingredients of section 498A are cruelty and harassment. The Supreme Court
+"further held that in Explanation II, which relates to harassment, there is absence of the"
+requirement of physical injury but it includes coercive harassment for demand of
+dowry. It deals with the patent or latent acts of the husband or his family members.88.
+In a case the Supreme Court held that:
+unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of s. 32(1) of the Indian
+Evidence Act there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence.
+In order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the
+statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstance of the
+"transactions which resulted in her death, in cases in which the cause of death comes into"
+question. By no stretch of imagination can the statements of deceased contained in the two
+letters and those quoted by the witnesses be connected with any circumstance of the
+"transaction which resulted in her death. Even that apart, when dealing with an offence u/s."
+498A IPC disjuncted from the offence u/s. 306 IPC the question of her death is not an issue
+for consideration and on that premise also s. 32(1) of the Evidence Act will stand at bay so
+far as these materials are concerned.89.
+[s 498A.41] Punishment.—
+The accused contracted second marriage. He maltreated the first wife and denied her
+"diet, thus, subjecting her to mental and physical cruelty of extreme level and leading her"
+to suicide. He was not entitled to any sympathy. He was sentenced to undergo two
+years RI for offence under section 498A and five years under section 306 and also
+fine.90.
+The wife of the accused died of burns. Her letters indicated anguish about various
+incidents and methods of harassment practised upon her. Filthiest language was used
+in expressing the demand for dowry. There was oral evidence of the prosecution
+witness to that effect. This section does not require harassment soon before death.
+The Court said that the offence under the section was made out. The sentence of
+imprisonment of three years was reduced to three months in the interest of the children
+and their safety in the society.91.
+[s 498A.42] Plea of leniency.—
+"Where there was a history of the wife being continuously subjected to harassment,"
+assault and torture to the point of leaving no option to committing suicide and the
+"accused-husband was a police officer and an educated person, it was held that he"
+could not be allowed to escape jail sentence.92. The deceased-wife within four months
+of her marriage took the extreme step of putting an end of her life and committed
+suicide. The court held that it was not a fit case for reducing the quantum of sentence
+of the accused as showing any leniency would be a misplaced one.93.
+"In the context of simple imprisonment of six months, it was pleaded before the"
+Supreme Court that the appellant and the victim had since remarried and were living
+"happily in their respective families, the Court reduced imprisonment to the period of"
+two months already undergone.94.
+[s 498A.43] Misuse of section 498-A.—
+The section was inserted in the statute with the laudable object of punishing cruelty at
+the hands of husband or his relatives against a wife particularly when such cruelty had
+potential to result in suicide or murder of a woman. The expression 'cruelty' therein
+covers conduct which may drive the women to commit suicide or cause grave injury
+(mental or physical) or danger to life or harassment with a view to coerce her to meet
+unlawful demand. The Supreme Court observed that it is a matter of serious concern
+that large number of cases continue to be filed under this section alleging harassment
+of married women. Most of such complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over
+trivial issues. Many of such complaints are not bona fide. At the time of filing of the
+"complaint, implications and consequences are not visualised. But at times such"
+complaints lead to uncalled for harassment not only to the accused but also to the
+complainant.95. The provision should not be allowed to be used as a device for
+achieving oblique motives.96.
+[s 498A.44] Misuse of provisions to be prevented.—
+The Supreme Court has observed that the section was introduced with the avowed
+object of combating the menace of dowry deaths and harassment of a woman at the
+hands of her in-laws. But the provision should not be allowed to be used as a device for
+achieving oblique motives.97.
+[s 498A.45] CASES.—
+Where there is ample evidence on record to suggest that the deceased had been
+"suffering from psychosis/mental disorder, it was held not safe to convict the accused"
+"under sections 306 and 498A IPC, 1860.98. Where the suicide note exonerated the"
+"husband and his relatives, accused cannot be convicted under section 498A.99. Where"
+mother of deceased had admitted in her evidence that there was no demand of dowry
+"had been made by mother-in-law of the deceased, she is entitled to benefit of"
+doubt.100. Where the accused mother-in-law was residing in a separate residence far
+away from the place where deceased with her husband was residing and the evidence
+of independent witness proved that parents of deceased's husband had never visited
+"their place during their stay in the said house, accused is entitled to benefit of doubt."
+Where a husband had strangulated his second wife to death within a short span of time
+immediately after her marriage and the cruelty and harassment on the part of the
+"husband was proved from the evidence of the witnesses, the conviction of the husband"
+under section 498A was confirmed.101.
+"A harassment shown to have taken place eight months before the suicide, was held to"
+"be not coming within the scope of the words ""soon before"". The conviction under"
+section 304B was set aside. The evidence showed that cruelty was there. The accused
+persons were not able to explain why the deceased wife committed suicide. The
+"conviction and sentence under section 306 (abetment of suicide), section 498A and"
+"section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was maintained.102."
+[s 498A.46] Limitation.—
+For the offence of cruelty under section 498A cognizance can be taken even after the
+"expiry of the period of limitation by virtue of the provisions of section 473, Cr PC, 1973"
+since the offence is of continuing nature. There was nothing on record to show that
+more than three years ago prior to the filing of the complaint the accused had returned
+"the dowry items demanded by the complainant. The complaint under section 406 IPC,"
+"1860 was not time-barred. The offence under section 405, IPC, 1860 was committed as"
+and when the accused refused to return the dowry items on demand and
+misappropriate them.103.
+A complaint under the section was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that it
+was belated by two years. On the same ground the High Court declined leave to appeal
+against acquittal. The Supreme Court held that this was not proper. The section was
+brought in to protect woman against torture. The law of limitation must not be applied
+with such rigidity as to non-suit an aggrieved wife.104.
+A complaint alleged cruelty by the husband and his relatives. The question was that of
+limitation for filing a complaint. The Court said that cruelty is a continuing offence.
+With every act of cruelty a new period of limitation takes a start. The wife was harassed
+"and sent out of the matrimonial home. A complaint, even if time-barred, could be"
+entertained if otherwise it would give an unfair advantage to the accused person or
+result in miscarriage of justice.105.
+[s 498A.47] A re-look at the provision.—Supreme Court direction and
+recommendations of Law commission of India.—
+"In Preeti Gupta v State of Jharkhand,106. the Supreme Court held that a serious relook of"
+the entire provision is warranted by the legislation. It is also a matter of common
+knowledge that exaggerated versions of the incident are reflected in a large number of
+complaints. The tendency of over implication is also reflected in a very large number of
+cases. The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate
+acquittal in the trial may also not be able to wipe out the deep scars of suffering of
+"ignominy. Unfortunately, a large number of these complaints have not only flooded the"
+"Courts but also have led to enormous social unrest affecting peace, harmony and"
+happiness of the society. It is high time that the legislature must take into
+consideration the pragmatic realities and make suitable changes in the existing law. It
+is imperative for the legislature to take into consideration the informed public opinion
+and the pragmatic realities in consideration and make necessary changes in the
+"relevant provisions of law. Pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court, Law"
+Commission of India in its 243rd Report gave inter alia the following suggestions:
+"(a) The offence under section 498A shall be made compoundable, with the"
+permission of Court and subject to cooling off period of three months
+"(b) The offence should remain non-bailable. However, the safeguard against"
+arbitrary and unwarranted arrests lies in strictly observing the letter and spirit of
+"the conditions laid down in sections 41 and 41A of Cr PC, 1973 relating to"
+power of arrest and sensitising the Police on the modalities to be observed in
+cases of this nature
+(c) There should be a monitoring mechanism in the Police Dept. to keep track of
+section 498A cases and the observance of guidelines
+(d) the need for expeditious disposal of cases under section 498A should be given
+special attention by the prosecution and Judiciary.107.
+"[s 498A.48] Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.—"
+"The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted with a view"
+to provide for more effective protection of rights of women who are victims of violence
+of any kind occurring within the family. Those rights are essentially of civil nature with a
+mix of penal provisions. Section 3 of the Act defines domestic violence in very wide
+terms. It encompasses the situations set out in the definition of 'cruelty' under section
+498A. The Act has devised an elaborate machinery to safeguard the interests of
+women subjected to domestic violence. The Act enjoins the appointment of Protection
+Officers who will be under the control and supervision of a Judicial Magistrate of First
+"Class. The said officer shall send a domestic incident report to the Magistrate, the"
+police station and service providers. The Protection Officers are required to effectively
+"assist and guide the complainant victim and provide shelter, medical facilities, legal aid,"
+"etc., and also act on her behalf to present an application to the Magistrate for one or"
+more reliefs under the Act. The Magistrate is required to hear the application ordinarily
+within three days from the date of its receipt. The Magistrate may at any stage of the
+proceedings direct the respondent and/or the aggrieved person to undergo counselling
+with a service provider. 'Service Providers' are those who conform to the requirements
+of section 10 of the Act. The Magistrate can also secure the services of a welfare
+"expert preferably a woman for the purpose of assisting him. Under section 18, the"
+"Magistrate, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Respondent and on being"
+"prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, is"
+empowered to pass a protection order prohibiting the Respondent from committing
+any act of domestic violence and/or aiding or abetting all acts of domestic violence.
+There are other powers vested in the Magistrate including granting residence orders
+and monetary reliefs. Section 23 further empowers the Magistrate to pass such interim
+order as he deems just and proper including an ex parte order. The breach of protection
+order by the respondent is regarded as an offence which is cognizable and non-bailable
+and punishable with imprisonment extending to one year (vide section 31). By the same
+"section, the Magistrate is also empowered to frame charges under section 498A of IPC,"
+"1860 and/or Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The provisions of the Act are supplemental"
+to the provisions of any other law in force. The right to file a complaint under section
+498A is specifically preserved under section 5 of the Act. An interplay of the provisions
+of this Act and the proceedings under section 498A assumes some relevance on two
+aspects: (1) Seeking Magistrate's expeditious intervention by way of passing a
+protective interim order to prevent secondary victimisation of a complainant who has
+lodged FIR under section 498A. (2) Paving the way for counselling process under the
+supervision of Magistrate at the earliest opportunity.108.
+"1. Chapter XXA (containing section 498A) ins. by Act 46 of 1983, section 2 (w.e.f. 25 December"
+1983).
+"2. Suvetha v State, (2009) 6 SCC 757 [LNIND 2009 SC 1156] : 2009 Cr LJ 2974 ."
+"3. Reema Aggarwal v Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199 [LNIND 2004 SC 1499] : AIR 2004 SC 1418"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1499] .
+"4. Gananath Pattnaik v State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619 [LNIND 2002 SC 100] ."
+"5. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v State of Gujarat, 2013 (3) Mad LJ (Crl) 700 : 2013 AIR (SCW)"
+5219.
+"6. Rosamma Kurian v State of Kerala, 2014 Cr LJ 2666 (Ker) : 2014 (2) KHC 64 ."
+"7. Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar v State of Karnataka, AIR 2013 SC 329 [LNIND 2013 SC 4] : (2013)"
+3 SCC 462 [LNIND 2013 SC 4] .
+"8. Wazir Chand v State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 378 [LNIND 1988 SC 569] : 1989 Cr LJ 809 :"
+"(1989) 1 SCC 244 [LNIND 1988 SC 569] ; U Suvetha v State, (2009) 6 SCC 757 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"1156] : 2009 Cr LJ 2974 , ingredients re-enumerated by the Supreme Court. Bhaskar Lal Sharma"
+"v Monica, (2009) 10 SCC 604 [LNIND 2009 SC 1432] : (2009) 161 DLT 739 , misuse of anti-dowry"
+law not to be allowed. A girlfriend of the husband or a concubine being in the category of
+"relatives of the husband are not covered by section 498-A. Narendra v State of Karnataka, (2009)"
+6 SCC 61 [LNIND 2009 SC 1112] : (2009) 2 SCC (Cr) 929 : AIR 2009 SC 1881 [LNIND 2009 SC
+"1112] , death of wife in bed room due to compression of neck, husband's alibi plea found to be"
+"false, no two opinions, conviction. Krishna Ghose v State of WB, (2009) 12 SCC 413 [LNIND 2009"
+"SC 724] : AIR 2009 SC 2279 [LNIND 2009 SC 724] , death due to cruelty by husband and family"
+"members in the matrimonial home, alibi false, conviction."
+"9. Shobha Rani v Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 [LNIND 1987 SC 757] : AIR 1988 SC 121"
+"[LNIND 1987 SC 757] : (1988) 1 AIR 169 : 1988 BLJR 138 . See also Akula Ravinder v State of AP,"
+AIR 1991 SC 1142 . For a comparative account of this section with section 304B see notes
+"under section 304B and the decision of the Supreme Court in Shanti v State of Haryana, AIR"
+1991 SC 1226 [LNIND 1990 SC 696] . For another proceeding arising out of harassment of wife
+and acceptance of compromise by the Supreme Court on payment of compensation to the wife
+"to end all proceedings, see Mukund Martand Chitnis v Madhuri Mukund Chitnis, 1991 Supp (2)"
+"SCC 359 . See also Suman v State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 770 : (2010) 1 SCC 250"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1991] : AIR 2010 SC 518 [LNIND 2009 SC 1991] .
+"10. Chanda v State of AP, 1996 Cr LJ 2670 (AP). RI for three years and fine of Rs. 5,000. Chandra"
+"Prakash v State, 1996 Cr LJ 3443 (Del) a proceeding was not allowed to be quashed only on the"
+ground that allegations in detail of dowry demand and cruelty were not made in a pending
+"divorce proceedings between the parties. Noorjahan v State, (2008) 11 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+"950] : AIR 2008 SC 2131 [LNIND 2008 SC 950] , object restated, crimes against women and"
+children. There was no proof in this case of any demand for dowry.
+"11. Keshab Chandra Panda v State of Orissa, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 174 (Ori). Where the mother-in-law"
+"was convicted for the lesser offence under s 498A, it was an automatic acquittal from the"
+"serious offence under section 304-B, no appeal by State, High Court could not convict; Prakash"
+"Chander v State, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 368 (Del). State of Kerala v Rajayyan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 989 (Ker)"
+"death by falling in well, proof of dowry-related cruelty, conviction. Deepak v State of Maharashtra,"
+"(1995) 2 Cr LJ 2219 (Bom) wife killed by strangulation, defence of injury by a falling object"
+"unnatural, conviction held proper. Gondhan Ram v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 273 (Raj),"
+"married woman dying of spray poison which she consumed, within seven years, evidence of"
+"torture, conviction of husband alone. Jai Ram v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 1020 (Raj)"
+conviction of husband on evidence which was rejected in reference to all others was held to be
+"not proper. Chandrabhushan v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 101 (Bom) conviction of"
+"husband for leading wife to suicide by mental torture for dowry, but others not convicted"
+"because the couple was living separately. Gajanansingh v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 2921"
+"(Bom) no proof that the husband caused death, acquittal. Pammi Bai v State of MP, 1996 Cr LJ"
+"2796 (MP), death by burning, the conduct of the dying woman immediately after the incident not"
+"pointing to the husband setting her on fire, dying declaration doubtful and suspicious, acquittal."
+"12. Pachipala Laxmaiah v State of AP, 2001 Cr LJ 4063 (AP); another similar case Hariappari v"
+"State of Karnataka, 2001 Cr LJ 4286 (Kant), burnt by the husband, conviction. Dasrath Sao v"
+"State of Bihar, 2001 Cr LJ 4336 (Jhar) suicide by hanging, no proof of dowry demand or of"
+"cruelty or abetment, acquittal. Shaik China Buda v State of AP, 2002 Cr LJ 526 , no proof of"
+"cruelty, acquittal of husband."
+"13. Kodadi Srinivasa Lingam v State of AP, 2001 Cr LJ 602 (AP). Bammidi Rajamallu v State of"
+"AP, 2001 Cr LJ 1319 (AP), drinking husband, beating wife and consistently abusing her, cruelty"
+"under the section. Vanamala Amaranadh v State of AP, 2001 4498, dying declaration contained"
+"statements of cruelty, husband convicted. State of Haryana v Jai Prakash, 2000 Cr LJ 4995 (2) :"
+"(2000) 7 JT 404 (SC), no proper evidence, acquittal, appeal by State, copy of the evidence of the"
+"father and brother of the deceased not produced, acquittal not interfered with. Mangal Ram v"
+"State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 4342 (MP), suicidal death of married woman within seven years, there"
+was harassment for four tolas of gold and the demand being not met she was beaten up and
+"driven out. Offence under the section made out. Paparambaka Rosamma v State of AP, 1989 Cr"
+"LJ 4321 : AIR 1999 SC 3455 , a mere statement in the dying declaration that she wanted to live"
+separately from her in-laws and that they did not like her was held to be not sufficient to sustain
+a charge under this section.
+"14. Noorjahan v State, (2008) 11 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 950] : AIR 2008 SC 2131 [LNIND 2008"
+"SC 950] . Ran Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 4 SCC 70 [LNIND 2008 SC 204] : AIR 2008 SC"
+"1994 [LNIND 2008 SC 969] : 2008 Cr LJ 1941 , findings of the trial judge disapproved by the High"
+Court on presumptive basis. The Supreme Court restored the order of the trial judge. There was
+"no proof. B Venkat Swamy v Vijaya Nehru, (2008) 10 SCC 260 [LNIND 2008 SC 1682] , guilt not"
+"proved by circumstantial evidence, the deceased was found hanging in a room which was"
+bolted from inside.
+"15. Krishan Lal v UOI, 1994 Cr LJ 2472 (P&H)."
+"16. Kans Raj v State of Punjab, AIR 2000 SC 2324 [LNIND 2000 SC 735] : 2000 Cr LJ 2993 . See"
+"also Ram Saran Varshney v State of UP, 2016 Cr LJ 1251 : 2016 (3) SCJ 39 ."
+"17. Raj Rani v State (Delhi) Admn, AIR 2000 SC 3559 : 2000 Cr LJ 4672 . See also Satish Shetty v"
+"State of Karnataka, 2016 Cr LJ 3147 : 2016 (6) SCJ 14 ."
+"18. Krishan Lal v UOI, 1994 Cr LJ 3472 (P&H)."
+"19. Sushil Kumar Sharma v UOI, 2005 Cr LJ 3439 : AIR 2005 SC 3100 [LNIND 2005 SC 1208] :"
+(2005) 6 SCC 281 [LNIND 2005 SC 1208] . The court explained the distinction between sections
+"306 and 498-A, (cruelty and abetment of suicide) by saying that the difference is that of"
+intention.
+"20. Satish Kumar Batra v State of Haryana, AIR 2009 SC 2180 [LNIND 2009 SC 754] : (2009) 12"
+SCC 191 .
+"21. Sarojakshan v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 340 (Bom)."
+"22. At p 341. State of Karnataka v HS Srinivasa, 1996 Cr LJ 3103 (Kant) acquittal because of no"
+"proof. Balkrishna Pandurang Moghe v State of Maharashtra, 1992 Cr LJ 4496 (Bom), husband"
+and his relatives treated as a class apart from other offenders with the object of dealing
+effectively with cases of cruelty by in-laws to married women. Such classification does not
+result in invidious discrimination violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
+"23. State of Karnataka v Moorthy, 2002 Cr LJ 1683 (Kant); State of Maharashtra v Ashok Narayan,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 4993 : (2000) 9 SCC 257 [LNIND 2000 SC 413] (SC), a letter of the deceased wife"
+was produced in evidence by her brother but it did not show any demand nor mentioned any
+cruelty. The oral testimony of the brother was not considered to be sufficient.
+"24. State of AP v Kalidindi Sahadevudu, 2012 Cr LJ 2302 (AP)."
+"25. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958 [LNIND 1998 SC 176] : 1998 Cr LJ 1144"
+"(SC); Mangal Ram v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 4342 (MP), persistent demand for dowry, death due"
+"to burn injuries within seven years, conviction. Section 304B was not attracted because the"
+"""soon before"" requirement was not satisfied."
+"26. Ushaben v Kishorbhai Chunilal Talpada, (2012) 6 SCC 353 [LNINDU 2012 SC 25] : 2012 Cr LJ"
+2234 .
+"27. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v State of Gujarat, 2013 (3) Mad LJ (Crl) 700 : 2013 AIR (SCW)"
+5219.
+"28. Siddaling v State, AIR 2018 SC 3829 [LNIND 2018 SC 355] ."
+"29. Laxman Ram Mane v State of Maharashtra, 2010 (13) SCC 125 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cr) 782."
+"30. Chami v State, 2013 Cr LJ 3441 ; Suman v Puran Chand, 2013 Cr LJ 3703 (Raj). See also"
+"State of HP v Pawan Kumar, 2000 Cr LJ 4889 (HP)."
+"31. Kantilal Martaji Pandor v State of Gujarat, 2013 Cr LJ 3866 (SC)."
+"32. Pashaura Singh v State of Punjab, 2010 Cr LJ 875 : AIR 2010 SC 922 [LNIND 2009 SC 1988] ."
+"33. State of Punjab v Dal Jit Singh, 1999 Cr LJ 2723 (P&H)."
+"34. Shivanand Mallappa Koti v State of Karnataka, (2007) 13 SCC 68 [LNIND 2007 SC 778] : AIR"
+"2007 SC 2314 [LNIND 2007 SC 778] . See also M Sirinivaslu v State of AP, (2007) 12 SCC 443"
+"[LNIND 2007 SC 1047] : AIR 2007 SC 3146 [LNIND 2007 SC 1047] ; Vipin Jaiswal v State, AIR"
+2013 SC 1567 [LNIND 2013 SC 205] : (2013) 3 SCC 684 [LNIND 2013 SC 205] ; Modinsab
+"Kasimsab Kanchagar v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 2056 : AIR 2013 SC 1504 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+1276] : (2013) 4 SCC 551 [LNIND 2013 SC 1276] .
+"35. State of Karnataka v Balappa, 1999 Cr LJ 3064 (Kant)."
+"36. Bhaskar Ramappa Madar v State of Karnataka, (2009) 11 SCC 690 [LNIND 2009 SC 723] :"
+2009 Cr LJ 2422 .
+"37. Bharat Bhushan v State, 2013 (4) Scale 524 [LNIND 2013 SC 199] ."
+"38. State of Karnataka v KS Manjunathchary, 1999 Cr LJ 3949 (Kant), father-in-laws' conviction"
+reduced from three to two years. Fine money was enhanced and directed to be paid to the father
+of the deceased.
+"39. Sumangala L Hegde v Laxminarayana Anant Hegde, 2003 Cr LJ 1418 (Kant). The court noted"
+"the ruling in Ravindra Pyarelal Bidlan v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 3019 (Bom) to the effect"
+"that a cruelty is not mere harassment or mere demand for property, etc. There must be a"
+reasonable nexus between cruelty and suicide for proof of cruelty and also the ruling of the
+"Allahabad High Court in Vijay Kumar Sharma v State of UP, (1991) 1 crimes 298 (All), wherein"
+also a minor child was taken away by the husband and his relatives from the custody of the
+mother in order to coerce her to meet their dowry demand.
+"40. Manoj Kumar v State of HP, 2016 Cr LJ 5015 (MP)."
+"41. Nachhatar Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 Cr LJ 2292 : (2011) 11 SCC 542 [LNINDORD 2011"
+SC 269] .
+"42. Amar Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2010 SC 3391 [LNIND 2010 SC 701] : (2010) 3 SCC (Cr)"
+"1130; Rajesh Gupta v State, 2011 Cr LJ 3506 (AP)."
+"43. Prem Dass v State of HP, 1996 Cr LJ 951 (HP). Ashok v State, AIR 2000 SC 3444 [LNIND"
+"2000 SC 597] : 2000 Cr LJ 2988 , evidence to the effect that the husband and mother-in-law"
+"were regularly beating her for not getting scooter, there were marks of injuries on her body."
+Conviction under the section. The brother-in-law was given the benefit of doubt because there
+"was no evidence of his role. State of Maharashtra v Ashok Narayan, AIR 2000 SC 3568 [LNIND"
+2000 SC 413] : 2000 Cr LJ 4993 there was no assertion in her letters to her brother that the
+husband was making any demand or assaulted her or treated her with cruelty or torture.
+Conviction could not be maintained on the oral testimony of her brother. State of Karnataka v
+"Shivaraj, 2000 Cr LJ 2741 (Kant) second wife, death of, presumption of validity of marriage"
+"unless the contrary is shown, allegations of torture and cruelty not made out."
+"44. Ramesh Chand v State of UP, 1992 Cr LJ 1444 (All); Pyare Lal v State of Haryana, AIR 1999"
+SC 1563 .
+"45. Diwan Singh v State of Uttarakhand, 2016 Cr LJ 1258 (Utr) : 2016 (93) ALLCC 861."
+"46. Anoop Kumar v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 2938 (MP)."
+"47. Lau v DPP, (2000) 1 FLR 799 (QBD). State of AP v Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 582"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 2124] ; Hazarilal v State of MP, (2009) 13 SCC 783 [LNIND 2007 SC 805] ,"
+harassment not proved.
+"48. Sarla Prabhakar Waghmare v State of Maharashtra, 1990 Cr LJ 407 (Bom). Joytilal"
+"Chakraborty v Dipak Dutta, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 930 (Cal) no complaint by the woman about torture"
+"during her life-time, other evidence was also not reliable, complaint rejected. State of Haryana v"
+"Rajinder Singh, 1996 Cr LJ 1875 (SC), offence not proved, acquittal proper."
+"49. Tapan Pal v State of WB, 1992 Cr LJ 1017 (Cal)."
+"50. Tasrem Singh v Amrit Kaur, 1995 Cr LJ 3560 . Where the sufferings of the married woman"
+who committed suicide within seven years were not due to dowry demands but due to
+"incompatibility of temperament and attitudes, no conviction."
+"51. U Subba Rao v State of Karnataka, 2003 AIR—Kant HCR 1062 : 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 120 (Kant)."
+"52. Annupurnabal v State of MP, 1999 Cr LJ 2696 (MP); Ramesh v State of TN, 2005 Cr LJ 1732 :"
+"AIR 2005 SC 1989 [LNIND 2005 SC 222] : (2005) 3 SCC 507 [LNIND 2005 SC 222] , allegation"
+that the husband's married sister stayed with her parents for a few days. The allegation against
+her was she directed the complainant wife to wash WC and also made imputations against her.
+Did not amount to harassment for dowry demand.
+"53. Paparambaka Rosamma v State of AP, 1999 Cr LJ 4321 : AIR 1999 SC 3455 ; Lawrence v"
+"State of Kerala, 2002 Cr LJ 3455 (Ker); Taruna v State of WB, 2001 Cr LJ 4937 (SC); State of HP v"
+"Kewal Kumar, 2002 Cr LJ 3807 (HP)."
+"54. Lella Srinivasa Rao v State of AP, (2004) 9 SCC 713 [LNIND 2004 SC 1273] : AIR 2004 SC"
+1720 [LNIND 2004 SC 1273] .
+"55. Bhaskar Lal Sharma v Monica, (2010) 1 SCC (Cr) 383 : (2009) 10 SCC 604 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+1432] .
+"56. Ganpat Dnyanoba Garje v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1874 (Bom)."
+"57. Ramgopal v State of MP, 2010 (13) SCC 540 [LNIND 2010 SC 690] : 2010 (7) Scale 711"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 690] .
+"58. State v Dhruv Kumar Singh, 2002 Cr LJ 1315 ."
+"59. Lalmani Mahto v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 1 (Jhar) : (2002) 3 JLJR 576 ."
+"60. Arun Garg v State of Punjab, (2004) 8 SCC 251 [LNIND 2004 SC 1012] ."
+"61. Satya Narayan Tiwari v State of UP, 2011 Cr LJ 445 : (2010) 13 SCC 689 [LNINDORD 2010 SC"
+188] A.
+"62. Satish Kumar Batra v State of Haryana, AIR 2009 SC 2180 [LNIND 2009 SC 754] : (2009) 12"
+SCC 191 .
+"63. Heera Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2017 (6) Scale 152 ."
+"64. Vijai Ratan Sharma v State of UP, 1988 Cr LJ 1581 (All). To the same effect is the decision in"
+"S Faisal Nabi v State of MP, 2001 Cr LJ 1598 (MP), cruelty was committed at her in-laws' place"
+"and continued at her parents' home where she was forced to go, letters of dowry demand also"
+received at the latter place. The Courts at the place of parental home had jurisdiction. Mohd
+"Haroom v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 2532 (Raj), unlawful demands, held not sufficient in"
+themselves to constitute cruelty or lead to suicide.
+"65. Dukhi Ram v State of UP, 1993 Cr LJ 2539 (All)."
+"66. Rajaram Venkatesh v State of AP, 1993 Cr LJ 707 (AP)."
+"67. Suman Upadhyay v State of UP, 1999 Cr LJ 4657 (All)."
+"68. Gulshan Kapoor v State of Rajasthan, 2011 Cr LJ 4864 (Raj)."
+"69. Sunita Kumari Kashyap v State of Bihar, AIR 2011 SC 1674 [LNIND 2011 SC 405] : 2011 Cr LJ"
+2667 .
+"70. Sujata Mukherjee v Prashant Kumar Mukherjee, AIR 1997 SC 2465 : 1997 Cr LJ 2985 ."
+"71. State of MP v Suresh Kaushal, 2003 (11) SCC 126 : 2002 Cr LJ 217 (SC) reported in 2008"
+(11) SCC 103 [LNIND 2008 SC 821] : AIR 2008 SC 2666 [LNIND 2008 SC 821] .
+"72. Vamgarala Yedukondala v State of AP, 1988 Cr LJ 1538 (AP)."
+"73. Prasanna Kumar v Dhanalaxmi, 1989 Cr LJ 1829 (Mad). Amrish Kumar Agarwal v State of UP,"
+"2000 Cr LJ 1324 (All), offence committed before commencement of the new section,"
+prosecution not justified.
+"74. Vasanta Tulshiram Bhoyar v State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cr LJ 901 (Bom)."
+"75. State of Rajasthan v Gopilal, 1992 Cr LJ 273 . A similar approach was adopted by AP High"
+"Court in Thathapadi Venkatalakshmi v State of AP, 1991 Cr LJ 749 , the court pointing out that"
+the wife cannot be permitted to withdraw the charge-sheet if it is filed by the police. Gursharan
+"Kaur v State of Rajasthan, 1993 Cr LJ 2076 (Raj), the court ordered compromise to be recorded"
+setting aside the Magistrate's order.
+"76. D Jayalakshmi v State of MP, 1993 Cr LJ 3162 (AP)."
+"77. Pyare Lal Gupta v State, 2000 Cr LJ 1019 (Del)."
+"78. Manoj Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 10 (Raj)."
+"79. Gopal v State of TN, 1999 Cr LJ 3939 (Mad)."
+"80. BS Joshi v State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 1386 [LNIND 2003 SC 335] : 2003 Cr LJ 2028 , the"
+aggrieved wife settled the matter with her husband by going in for consent divorce and applied
+"for quashing of her complaint. Risal Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 2188 (SC) : 2012 AIR"
+"SCW 2249; Jitendra v Babita, (2013) 4 SCC 58 [LNIND 2013 SC 195] ."
+"81. RP Bidlan v State of Maharashtra, 1993 Cr LJ 3019 (Bom)."
+"82. Balkrishna Pandurang Moghe v State of Maharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 4496 (Bom). The Court said"
+that the section is not invalid on the ground of absence of nexus between the provision and the
+"object sought to be achieved; Rajendran v Commr of Police, AIR 2009 SC 855 [LNIND 2008 SC"
+"2339] : (2008) 17 SCC 501 [LNIND 2008 SC 2339] , evidence of torture leading to suicide."
+"83. Suvetha v State, (2009) 6 SCC 757 [LNIND 2009 SC 1156] : 2009 Cr LJ 2974 ; Ranjana"
+"Gopalrao Thorat v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Bom CR (Cr) 185 : (2007 (5) AIR Bom R 271; a"
+person can become a relative only by blood or marriage and not otherwise. The word relative
+has been defined in the Chambers Dictionary 'person who is related by blood or marriage'. A
+second wife cannot assume a character as wife if there is no marriage in the eye of law. Since
+"she is not a relative, she does not fall within the scope of section 498A of IPC, 1860 at all. She"
+"certainly deserves to be discharged as far as offence under section 498A of IPC, 1860 is"
+"concerned; John Indiculla v State, 2005 Cr LJ 2925 (Ker) - the second wife is a relative of the"
+husband.
+"84. Syed Hyder Hussain v State of AP, (2002) Cr LJ 3602 (AP)."
+"85. Reema Agarwal v Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199 [LNIND 2004 SC 1499] : AIR 2004 SC 1418"
+"[LNIND 2004 SC 1499] : 2004 Cr LJ 892 ; A Subhash Babu v State of AP, AIR 2011 SC 3031"
+[LNIND 2011 SC 679] : 2011 (7) SCC 616 [LNIND 2011 SC 679] .
+"86. Vasant Bhagwat Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 65 (Bom)."
+"87. Chandrawati v State, 1996 Cr LJ 975 (Del)."
+"88. Undavalli Narayana Rao v State of AP, (2009) 14 SCC 588 [LNIND 2009 SC 1515] ."
+"89. Inderpal v State of MP, (2001) 10 SCC 736 : 2002 Cr LJ 926 (SC); Gananath Pattnaik v State"
+"of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 619 [LNIND 2002 SC 100] ."
+"90. State of Karnataka v Siddaraju, 2000 Cr LJ 4220 (Kant); Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v"
+"State of Gujarat, (2009) 4 SCC 52 [LNIND 2009 SC 193] : AIR 2009 SC 1808 [LNIND 2009 SC 193]"
+": 2009 Cr LJ 1720 : (2009) 2 GLR 1074 , imprisonment for 10 years not interfered with, that"
+"under Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, section 3, reduced from five to three years. Balwant Singh v"
+"State of HP, (2008) 15 SCC 497 [LNIND 2008 SC 1942] : 2008 Cr LJ 4683 , sentence for one year"
+"maintained, that of aged parents-in-law reduced to the period already undergone. Shivcharan Lal"
+"Verma v State of MP, (2007) 15 SCC 369 , second marriage during life-time of the first wife,"
+"second wife tortured by both, section 498-A not applicable, but because she committed suicide"
+"because of the torture, conviction under section 306 maintained, but sentence of seven years"
+"reduced to five years. Milind Bhagwanrao Godse v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC (Cr) 182 :"
+"AIR 2009 AC 1828 : (2009) 3 SCC 699 [LNIND 2009 SC 338] : 2009 Cr LJ 1736 , torture leading"
+"to suicide, conviction under sections 498-A, 306, 109 read with section 34. Kailash v State of MP,"
+"(2006) 12 SCC 667 [LNIND 2006 SC 803] : AIR 2007 SC 107 [LNIND 2006 SC 803] , the accused"
+"had already under gone eight years of imprisonment, the court reduced the sentence to eight"
+"years. Anand Mohan Sen v State of WB, (2007) 10 SCC 774 [LNIND 2007 SC 688] : 2007 Cr LJ"
+"2770 , death by itself may not lead to an inference that cruelty was there, but in this case there"
+"were specific allegations which were proved by prosecution witnesses, ingredients were"
+"satisfied, no interference in the order of conviction by the High Court."
+"91. Malyala Vishwanatha Rao v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 11 (AP) : (2002) 1 ALT (Cr) 499."
+"Konidela Madhusudhan v State of AP, 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 172 (AP) : (2003) 1 Andh LD (Cr) 823,"
+harassment was not complained of immediately. The sentence of imprisonment was restricted
+"to the period already undergone. Chandra Kala Devi v State of Bihar, 2003 Cr LJ 3146 (Pat),"
+evidence of witnesses showed that the in-laws of the victim demanded motorcycle from parents
+and that she had to face hostile atmosphere for that reason. There was also an attempt to set
+"her on fire. Finding of guilt and sentence imposed were confirmed, but looking at their age and"
+"the fact that they remained in custody for 52 days, their sentence was reduced to the period"
+already undergone.
+"92. State of Maharashtra v Vasant Shankar Mhasane, 1993 Cr LJ 1134 (Bom). Raghumunda"
+"Satya Narayana v State of AP, AIR 2000 SC 3420 : 2000 Cr LJ 2779 the accused-husband was"
+convicted under the section and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The aggrieved wife filed
+affidavit saying that they had come to terms and that their peace would elude them if the
+husband had to undergo the whole sentence. The sentence was reduced to the period already
+undergone.
+"93. Siddaling v State, AIR 2018 SC 3829 [LNIND 2018 SC 355] ."
+"94. BT Jayaram v State of Karnataka, (2008) 14 SCC 530 : AIR 2006 SC 1799 . Satish Kumar"
+"Batra v State of Haryana, (2009) 12 SCC 491 [LNIND 2009 SC 754] : AIR 2009 SC 2180 [LNIND"
+"2009 SC 754] : 2009 Cr LJ 2447 , sentence reduced to the period already undergone 13 months."
+"95. Rajesh Sharma v State of UP, AIR 2017 SC 3869 [LNIND 2017 SC 351] ."
+"96. Onkar Nath Mishra v State (NCT) of Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561 [LNIND 2007 SC 1511] : 2008 Cr"
+LJ 1391 . See also Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v Union of India Ministry of Law and
+"Justice, AIR 2018 SC 4273 ."
+"97. Onkar Nath Mishra v State (NCT) of Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561 [LNIND 2007 SC 1511] : 2008 Cr"
+"LJ 1391 , there was not even whisper of wilful conduct of harassment."
+"98. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 705 : (2010) 13 SCC 657"
+[LNIND 2010 SC 1088] .
+"99. KRJ Sarma v Surya Rao, 2013 Cr LJ 2189 (SC); State of HP v Manju Rani, 2013 Cr LJ 101"
+"(HP); Anil Kumar Gupta v State of UP, 2011 Cr LJ 2131 : (2011) 11 SCC 24 [LNIND 2011 SC 275] ;"
+"Atikul Islam v State of Tripura, 2013 Cr LJ 1374 (Gau) — allegation of cruelty is not proved"
+"beyond reasonable doubt, Accused was acquitted."
+"100. Maniklal Jain v State of MP, 2012 Cr LJ 613 (SC) : 2011 AIR SCW 6471."
+"101. Anisetti Sivaprasada Rao v State of AP, 1994 Cr LJ 1760 (AP). Mangilal v State of Rajasthan,"
+"AIR 2001 SC 2937 [LNIND 2001 SC 2385] , the accused administered poison to his wife,"
+"acquittal set aside; Girdhar Shankar Tawade v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 2078 [LNIND"
+"2002 SC 325] : 2002 Cr LJ 2814 (SC), charges under sections 306 and 498A are independent of"
+each other. Acquittal under section 306 does not necessarily entail acquittal under section
+498A. But there was no evidence to bring home the charge even under section 498A.
+"102. Savalram v State of Maharashtra, 2003 Cr LJ 2831 (Bom)."
+"103. Hussan Lal v State of Punjab, 2002 Cr LJ 2436 (P&H)."
+"104. Vijaya v Laxmanan, 1999 Cr LJ 5012 : (1998) 8 SCC 415 ."
+"105. Arun Vyas v Anita Vyas, AIR 1999 SC 2071 [LNIND 1999 SC 1377] : 1999 Cr LJ 3479 ."
+"106. Preeti Gupta v State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 [LNIND 2010 SC 752] : AIR 2010 SC"
+3363 [LNIND 2010 SC 752] .
+"107. Law Commission of India—243rd Report, Para-9.1; Available at :"
+http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report243.pdf (last accessed in July 2019).
+108. Law Commission of India- 243rd Report- Para-9.1; Available at :
+http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report243.pdf (last accessed in July 2019).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XXI OF DEFAMATION
+[s 499] Defamation.
+"Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible"
+"representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending"
+"to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the"
+"reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to"
+defame that person.
+Explanation 1.—It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased
+"person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is"
+intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.
+Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a
+company or an association or collection of persons as such.
+"Explanation 3.—An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically,"
+may amount to defamation.
+"Explanation 4.—No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that"
+"imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or"
+"intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect"
+"of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be"
+"believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally"
+considered as disgraceful.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A says—""Z is an honest man; he never stole B's watch""; intending to cause it to"
+"be believed that Z did steal B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within"
+one of the exceptions.
+"(b) A is asked who stole B's watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be"
+believed that Z stole B's watch. This is defamation unless it falls within one of
+the exceptions.
+"(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B's watch, intending it to be believed"
+"that Z stole B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the"
+exceptions.
+Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published.
+First Exception.—It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning
+"any person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or"
+published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.
+Public conduct of public servants.
+Second Exception.—It is not defamation to express in a good faith any opinion
+whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public
+"functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that"
+"conduct, and no further."
+Conduct of any person touching any public question.
+Third Exception.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion
+"whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and"
+"respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no"
+further.
+ILLUSTRATION
+It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting Z's
+"conduct in petitioning Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a"
+"meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending a such meeting, in forming or"
+"joining any society which invites the public support, in voting or canvassing for a"
+particular candidate for any situation in the efficient discharges of the duties of which
+the public is interested.
+Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts.
+Fourth Exception.—It is not defamation to publish substantially true report of the
+"proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such proceedings."
+Explanation.—A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an inquiry in open
+"Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of"
+the above section.
+Merits of a case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others concerned.
+Fifth Exception.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion
+"whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been"
+"decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party,"
+"witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as"
+"far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A says—""I think Z's evidence on that trial is so contradictory that he must be"
+"stupid or dishonest"". A is within this exception if he says this is in good faith, in"
+as much as the opinion which he expresses respects Z's character as it appears
+"in Z's conduct as a witness, and no further."
+"(b) But if A says—""I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him"
+"to be a man without veracity""; A is not within this exception, in as much as the"
+"opinion which he expresses of Z's character, is an opinion not founded on Z's"
+conduct as a witness.
+Merits of public performance.
+Sixth Exception.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion
+respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to the
+"judgment of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his"
+"character appears in such performance, and no further."
+Explanation.—A performance may be substituted to the judgment of the public
+expressly or by acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the
+judgment of the public.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to the judgment of the public."
+"(b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that speech to the judgment of"
+the public.
+"(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage, submits his acting or singing"
+to the judgment of the public.
+"(d) A says of a book published by Z—""Z's book is foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z's"
+"book is indecent; Z must be a man of impure mind"". A is within the exception, if"
+"he says this in good faith, in as much as the opinion which he expresses of Z"
+"respects Z's character only so far as it appears in Z's book, and no further."
+"(e) But if A says—""I am not surprised that Z's book is foolish and indecent, for he is"
+"a weak man and a libertine"". A is not within this exception, inasmuch as the"
+opinion which he expresses of Z's character is an opinion not founded on Z's
+book.
+Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another.
+Seventh Exception.—It is not defamation in a person having over another any
+"authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with"
+"that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in"
+matters to which such lawful authority relates.
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness, or of an officer of the Court;"
+a head of a department censuring in good faith those who are under his orders; a
+"parent censuring in good faith a child in the presence of other children; a schoolmaster,"
+"whose authority is derived from a parent, censuring in good faith a pupil in the"
+presence of other pupils; a master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in
+service; a banker censuring in good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of
+such cashier as such cashier—are within this exception.
+Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.
+Eighth Exception.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation
+against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person
+with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.
+ILLUSTRATION
+If A in good faith accuse Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the
+"conduct of Z, a servant, to Z's master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z,"
+"a child, to Z's father—A is within this exception."
+Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other's interests.
+Ninth Exception.—It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of
+another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of
+"the interests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public"
+good.
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his business—""Sell nothing to Z unless"
+"he pays you ready money, for I have no opinion of his honesty"". A is within the"
+"exception, if he has made this imputation on Z in good faith for the protection of"
+his own interests.
+"(b) A, a Magistrate, in making a report of his own superior officer, casts an"
+"imputation on the character of Z. Here, if the imputation is made in good faith,"
+"and for the public good, A is within the exception."
+Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.
+"Tenth Exception.—It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one"
+"person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of"
+"the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is"
+"interested, or for the public good."
+COMMENT.—
+"Section 499 Indian Penal Code (IPC, 1860) brings under the criminal law, the person"
+who publishes as well as the person who makes the defamatory imputation. Section
+"499, IPC, 1860 emphasises the words ""makes or publishes"". The gist of the offence of"
+defamation lies in the dissemination of the harmful imputation. When a defamatory
+"statement is published, it is not only the publisher, but also the maker who becomes"
+"responsible and it is in that context that the word ""makes"" is used in section 499 IPC,"
+"1860. It is of essence that in order to constitute the offence of defamation, it must be"
+communicated to a third person because what is intended by the imputation is to
+"arouse hostility of others. Therefore, in brief, the essentials of defamation are, first, the"
+"words must be defamatory; second, they must refer to the aggrieved party; third, they"
+must be maliciously published.1.
+[s 499.1] Reputation.—
+Right to reputation is a facet of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the
+"Constitution.2. The right to enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious"
+"slander is of ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an"
+"element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right"
+"to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.3. The term 'person' includes not only the"
+physical body and members but also every bodily sense and personal attribute among
+which is the reputation a man has acquired. Reputation can also be defined to be good
+"name, the credit, honour or character which is derived from a favourable public opinion"
+"or esteem, and character by report. The right to enjoyment of a good reputation is a"
+valuable privilege of ancient origin and necessary to human society. 'Reputation' is an
+element of personal security and is protected by Constitution equally with the right to
+"enjoyment of life, liberty and property. Although, 'character' and 'reputation' are often"
+"used synonymously, these terms are distinguishable. 'Character' is what a man is and"
+'reputation' is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. 'Character' depends
+on attributes possessed and 'reputation' on attributes which others believe one to
+possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality
+at present.4.
+[s 499.2] Constitutional validity.—
+"The Constitutional validity of sections 499 and 500 of IPC, 1860 and section 199 of"
+"Code of Criminal Procedure, (Cr PC, 1973) was assailed in Subramanian Swamy v UOI,"
+"Ministry of Law,5. and the Supreme Court upheld it. The Court observed thus:"
+One cannot be unmindful that right to freedom of speech and expression is a highly valued
+and cherished right but the Constitution conceives of reasonable restriction. In that context
+criminal defamation which is in existence in the form of ss. 499 and 500 Indian Penal Code
+is not a restriction on free speech that can be characterized as disproportionate. Right to
+free speech cannot mean that a citizen can defame the other. Protection of reputation is a
+fundamental right. It is also a human right. Cumulatively it serves the social interest.
+The Apex Court did not accept that the provisions relating to criminal defamation are
+"not saved by the doctrine of proportionality, because it determines a limit which is not"
+impermissible within the criterion of reasonable restriction. The Court also held that the
+criminal prosecution on defamation will not negate and violate the right to speech and
+expression of opinion.
+"1. BRK Murthy v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1602 (AP)."
+"2. Mehmood Azam v State, AIR 2012 SC 2573 [LNIND 2012 SC 456] : (2012) 8 SCC 1 [LNIND"
+"2012 SC 456] ; Vishwanath S/o Sitaram Agrawal v Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, AIR 2010 SC 1974"
+[LNINDORD 2010 SC 207] : 2010 (7) SCC 263 [LNIND 2010 SC 438] .
+"3. Smt. Kiran Bedi v Committee of Inquiry, AIR 1995 SC 117 [LNIND 1994 SC 929] : 1994 (6) SCC"
+"565 [LNIND 1994 SC 952] : 1995 SCC (Cr) 29, quoted from D F Marion v Davis, 1989 (1) SCC 494"
+[LNIND 1989 SC 10] : AIR 1989 SC 714 [LNIND 1989 SC 833] .
+"4. Kishore Samrite v State of UP, (2013) 2 SCC 398 [LNIND 2012 SC 657] ."
+"5. Subramanian Swamy v UOI, Ministry of Law, 2016 Cr LJ 3214 : 2016 (5) SCJ 643 ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XXI OF DEFAMATION
+[s 500] Punishment for defamation.
+Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
+"which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The essence of the offence of defamation consists in its tendency to cause that
+description of pain which is felt by a person who knows himself to be the object of the
+"unfavourable sentiments of his fellow-creatures, and those inconveniences to which a"
+person who is the object of such unfavourable sentiments is exposed.6.
+[s 500.1] Ingredients.—
+The section requires three essentials:—
+1. Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person.
+2. Such imputation must have been made by
+"(a) words, either spoken or intended to be read; or"
+(b) signs; or
+(c) visible representations.
+3. Such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or with
+knowledge or reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the person concerning
+whom it is made.7. It is clear that intention to cause harm is the most essential sine
+"qua non for an offence under section 499, IPC, 1860. An offence punishable under"
+"section 500, IPC, 1860 requires blameworthy mind and is not a statutory offence"
+requiring any mens rea.8.
+1. 'Makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person'.—Everyone who
+"composes, dictates, writes or in any way contributes to the making of a libel, is the"
+"maker of the libel. If one dictates, and another writes, both are guilty of making it, for he"
+"shows his approbation of what he writes. So, if one repeats, another writes a libel, and"
+"a third approved what is written they are all makers of it, as all who concur and assent"
+to the doing of an unlawful act are guilty; and murdering a man's reputation by a libel
+"may be compared to murdering a man's person, in which all who are present and"
+"encourage the act are guilty, though the wound was given by one only.9. The mechanic"
+or the compositor of the Press does neither 'make nor publish' the matter that may be
+impugned as defamatory.10. Intention on the part of the accused to harm the
+reputation or the knowledge or reasonable belief that an imputation will harm the
+reputation of the person concerned being an essential ingredient of the offence of
+"defamation, the Chairman of a Company owning the newspaper in which the offending"
+news item is published cannot be held liable unless it is shown that he was somehow
+concerned with the publication of the defamatory news item. Under section 7 of the
+"Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 a presumption regarding awareness of the"
+contents of a newspaper can be raised only against the Editor whose name appears on
+the copy of the newspaper and no other Editors like the News Editor or Resident Editor
+whose names do not appear in the declaration printed on the copy of the newspaper.11.
+[s 500.2] 'Publishes'.—
+"The defamatory matter must be published, that is, communicated to some person"
+"other than the person about whom it is addressed, e.g., dictating a letter to a clerk is"
+publication.12. Imputations in a charge sheet which is sent to the employee himself
+does not amount to a publication.13. But where there is a duty which forms the ground
+"of privileged occasion, the person exercising the privilege may communicate matters"
+to a third person in the ordinary course of business. A solicitor who dictates to his clerk
+a letter containing defamatory statements regarding a person is not liable for
+defamation.14. Where the complainant's Advocate sent a notice to a party whose
+Advocate dictated a reply to his steno containing defamatory remarks and the same
+"was sent to the complainant's Advocate, the Kerala High Court held that this did not"
+amount to any publication.15.
+Communicating defamatory matter only to the person defamed is not publication.16.
+"The action of a person who sent to a public officer by post, in a closed cover, a notice"
+containing imputations on the character of the recipient but which was not
+communicated by the accused to any third person was held to be not such a 'making'
+or 'publishing' of the matter complained of as to constitute this offence.17. A notice
+under a Municipal Act was issued by the President of the Municipal Committee to a
+"certain person, who sent a reply containing defamatory allegations against the"
+President. This reply was put on the official file by the President and it was read by the
+members of the Committee. It was held that there was publication of the defamation.
+The placing of the reply on the official file was not a gratuitous or voluntary act on the
+"part of the President but it was his duty to do so, and the accused knew or must have"
+known that the contents of his reply would be necessarily communicated to the
+members of the Committee.18.
+"Where the alleged defamatory words were sent to the complainant by registered post, it"
+was held that there was no publication. There was absence of one of the necessary
+"ingredients of the offence, namely publication. The complaint was liable to be"
+quashed.19.
+Defamatory matter written on a postcard20. or printed on papers distributed or
+"broadcast,21. constitutes publication. So is the filing in a Court of a petition containing"
+defamatory matter concerning a person with the intention that it should be read by
+other persons.22. When a person presents a defamatory petition to a superior public
+"officer, who, in the ordinary course of official routine, sends it to some subordinate"
+"officer for inquiry, there is a publication of the letter at the place where he may receive"
+"it, and publication for which the original writer may prima facie be held responsible,"
+whether or not he expressly asks for an inquiry.23. Communication to a husband or wife
+"of a charge against the wife or husband is publication,24. but uttering of a libel by a"
+"husband to his wife is not, as in England they are one in the eye of the law.25."
+"Where a libel is printed, the sale of each copy is a distinct publication and a fresh"
+offence; and conviction or acquittal on an indictment for publishing one copy will be no
+bar to an indictment for publishing another copy.26.
+The person who publishes the imputation need not necessarily be the author of the
+imputation. The person who publishes and the person who makes an imputation are
+alike guilty.27.
+[s 500.3] General Statement.—
+"In order to constitute offence of defamation the words, signs, imputation made by"
+accused must either be intended to harm the reputation of a particular person or the
+accused must reasonably know that his/her conduct could cause such harm. Where
+the appellant's statement published in news magazine was a rather general
+endorsement of pre-marital sex and her remarks were not directed at any individual or
+"even at a 'company or an association or collection of persons', it was held that it cannot"
+be construed as an attack on the reputation of anyone in particular.28. Where a
+complaint was filed with regard to a statement made by the Gujarat Chief Minister
+published in media or newspaper or over television or through internet that ex-Prime
+Minister late Hon'ble Shri Jawahar Lal Nehru did nothing for children. The High Court
+upheld the rejection of complaint holding that it was only a general statement and
+cannot be construed as an attack on reputation of anyone in particular.29.
+[s 500.4] Repetition.—
+The Code makes no exception in favour of a second or third publication as compared
+with the first. If a complaint is properly laid in respect of a publication which is prima
+"facie defamatory, the Magistrate is bound to take cognizance of the complaint, and"
+"deal with it according to law.30. The publisher of a libel is strictly responsible,"
+irrespective of the fact whether he is the originator of the libel or is merely repeating
+it.31.
+[s 500.5] Publication of defamatory matter in newspaper.—
+"In a case of defamation, only the source of information on which the person accused"
+"has acted and the justification for his so acting, are to be considered. If he has not"
+"taken proper care and acted on gossip against the complainant hereby defamed, he"
+ought not to escape the consequence on the ground that he has contracted the
+incorrect report. The culpability in such cases does not depend upon the
+circumstances where he has tried to undo the wrong which he has committed or not
+"put up on fact he has acted with care or attention or has done so rashly or negligently, it"
+is no defence in the matter of defamation for the accused to say that he has acted on
+the information given to him by another. It is for him to establish that the source on
+which he acted is a proper source on which he is entitled and he did with care and
+"circumspection. Therefore, the editor and publisher are liable for the baseless and false"
+matter which was published in the journal. Such an irresponsible conduct and attitude
+on the part of the editor and publisher cannot be said to be done in good faith.32. In the
+matter of defamation the position of newspaper is not in any way different from that of
+member of the public in general. The responsibility in either case is the same.33. The
+publisher of a newspaper is responsible for defamatory matter published in such paper
+whether he knows the contents of such paper or not.34. But it would be a sufficient
+answer to a charge of defamation against the editor of a newspaper if he proved that
+the libel was published in his absence and without his knowledge and he had in good
+faith entrusted the temporary management of the newspaper during his absence to a
+competent person.35. The owner of a journal in order to be liable under section 499 has
+to have direct responsibility for the publication of the defamatory statement and he
+"must also have the intention to harm, or knowledge or reason to believe that the"
+imputation will harm the reputation of person concerned. The owner of a journal qua
+has no responsibility under the section.36. The prosecution of the chairman and
+managing director of a company owning the newspaper for the publication of
+defamatory article in the newspaper by reason of their holding those posts would be
+invalid unless their personal involvement in the publication of the article is
+established.37.
+Where a newspaper carried extracts from a book written on one of the former Prime
+"Ministers of India containing imputations of corruption, the editor of the newspaper"
+was liable to be prosecuted. His plea that he was only a publisher and not the author of
+the extracts was held to be not tenable. It was alleged that there was a criminal
+"conspiracy in the matter between the managing editor, resident editor and executing"
+editor. All of them were liable to be prosecuted.38. A chief editor of a newspaper cannot
+say that he is not responsible for selection and publication of matters in the
+newspaper. A complaint against the chief editor is maintainable.39.
+"The sending of a newspaper, containing defamatory matter by post from Calcutta,"
+"where it is published, addressed to a subscriber at Allahabad, is publication of such"
+defamatory matter at Allahabad.40.
+[s 500.6] Liability of Editor.—
+"From the scheme of the Press and Registration of Books (PRB) Act, it is evident that it"
+is the Editor who controls the selection of matter that is published. A news item has the
+potentiality of bringing doom's day for an individual. The Editor controls the selection of
+"the matter that is published. Therefore, he has to keep a careful eye on the selection."
+Blue-penciling of news articles by anyone other than the Editor is not welcome in a
+democratic polity. Editors have to take responsibility of everything they publish and to
+maintain the integrity of published record.41.
+[s 500.7] Prosecution against CEO of TV Channel.—
+"In order to constitute offence of defamation under criminal law, section 499, IPC, 1860"
+"contemplates ""intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such"
+"imputation will harm reputation of such person"" on the part of the accused. In the entire"
+"complaint, the complainant/1st respondent did not allege that the accused, who is"
+"Chief Executive Officer of TV-9 channel, telecast the news item or permitted to re-"
+telecast the news item with such state of mind (Mens rea). Except as Chief Executive
+"Officer of the TV news channel, the complainant did not allege any other connection for"
+the accused with telecasting of the news item. In the absence of any such connection
+for the accused with this news item and in the absence of any such mens rea or state
+"of mind for the accused in relation to this news item, simply because the accused"
+happened to be Chief Executive Officer or proprietor or partner or managing director of
+"the TV news channel, no criminal case can lie against him for offence punishable under"
+"section 500, IPC, 1860.42."
+[s 500.8] Jurisdiction.—
+Where a newspaper containing a defamatory article is printed and published at one
+place and is circulated or sold at other places by or on behalf of the accused
+"responsible for printing and publishing the newspaper, then there would be publication"
+of the defamatory article in all such places and jurisdictional Magistrate can entertain
+the complaint for defamation. It cannot be said that the act of publication comes to an
+end as soon as the issue of the newspaper is released at one place. If that newspaper
+"is despatched by the printer and publisher to other places for being sold or circulated,"
+the defamatory article gets published at each such place. The mere fact that the
+headquarter of a newspaper is based at a particular place or that it is printed and
+"published at one place, does not necessarily mean that there cannot be publication of"
+the defamatory article contained in the newspaper at another place. If the defamatory
+"imputation is made available to public at several places, then the offence is committed"
+at each such place. Though the first offence may be committed at the place where it is
+"printed and first published, it gets repeated wherever the newspaper is circulated at"
+other places.43.
+[s 500.9] Apology.—
+Where the incriminating news was not published in the newspaper by the editor
+knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter was defamatory of the
+"complainant, the editor had no ill will against him and had expressed regret for such"
+"publication, it was held that the editor could not be held responsible in connection with"
+the defamation.44.
+[s 500.10] 'Imputation'.—
+"It is immaterial whether the imputation is conveyed obliquely or indirectly, or by way of"
+"question, conjecture, or exclamation, or by irony.45."
+"The words ""coward, dishonest man, and something worse than either""46. and words to"
+the effect that the complainant and others were preparing to bring a false charge
+"against the accused,47. were held to be defamatory. Calling a counsel ""badmash"" in the"
+open Court was held to be not an offence within the meaning of section 499. The Court
+said that it might come under section 504. The acquittal of the accused under section
+500 was held to be proper.48. The accused married the complainant by exchange of
+garlands in a temple. He lived with her for a few days and then started demanding
+money and described her as unchaste woman and not decent looking. The Court said
+"that the ingredients of section 500 were prima facie made out and, therefore, the"
+accused was liable to be prosecuted.49.
+[s 500.11] 'Concerning any person'.—
+The words must contain an imputation concerning some particular person or persons
+whose identity can be established. That person need not necessarily be a single
+individual. Where the accused published in a paper an account of an outrage on a
+woman alleged to have been perpetrated by two constables out of four constables
+"stationed at a police station, it was held that, in the absence of proof that it was"
+"intended to charge any particular and identifiable constables with the alleged offence,"
+the accused could not be convicted.50. Where a film which was alleged to be
+defamatory of lawyers as a class formed the basis of a defamation case against the
+"producers including artists and Chairman of the Central Board of Censors, it was held"
+that though the offence of defamation can be committed in regard to a company or
+"collection of persons in view of Explanation 2 to section 499, IPC, 1860, yet it is"
+necessary to show that this collection of persons is a small determinate body whose
+identity can be fixed. Advocates as a class are incapable of being defamed.51. In this
+"connection see comments under head ""Explanation-2"" infra."
+"A newspaper is not a person and therefore, it is not an offence to defame a newspaper."
+"Defamation of a newspaper may, in certain cases, involve defamation of those"
+responsible for its publication.52.
+[s 500.12] Innuendo.—
+"Where the statement does not refer to the complainant directly, the doctrine of"
+innuendo may be pressed into service for the purpose of showing that the complainant
+was the real target of the attack. He must bring forward additional facts showing how
+"the words are related to him in a manner which is defamatory. ""A true innuendo is an"
+innuendo by which the plaintiff alleges a special defamatory meaning of the words
+distinct from their ordinary meaning and arising by virtue of extrinsic facts or matters
+"known to the recipients.""53. Applying this principle to the facts of a case before it, the"
+Supreme Court laid down that an innuendo cannot be established by an evidence
+showing inferences of two kinds. The evidence of additional facts must be capable of
+showing that the words were applicable to the complainant and the complainant
+alone.54.
+2. 'Such imputation should have been made by words either spoken or intended to be
+"read, or by signs or by visible representation'.—IPC, 1860 makes no distinction"
+between written and spoken defamation.55.
+[s 500.13] 'By signs or by visible representations'.—
+The words 'visible representation' will include every possible form of defamation which
+"ingenuity can devise. For instance, a statue, a caricature, and effigy, chalk marks on a"
+"wall, signs, or pictures may constitute a libel.56. The publication of a group photograph"
+"with a false caption depicting the persons in the photograph as soldiers of a ""goonda"
+"war"" was held to be defamatory.57. In another case, Complainant alleged that four"
+"photographs of an incident were published in a newspaper, in which, one photograph"
+showed the complainant more or less nude and that has caused defamation and harm
+to him. The photographs during a protest demonstration a protest demonstration and
+depicted the sequence of events when the complainant was being pulled out of a
+police jeep. It can never be stated that the publication of the photographs in the
+newspaper was with the intention or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it
+will harm the reputation of the complainant. Proceedings are liable to be quashed.58.
+"3. 'Intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will"
+"harm'.—In this section the expression ""harm"" means harm to the reputation of the"
+aggrieved party.59. It is not necessary to prove that the complainant actually suffered
+directly or indirectly from the scandalous imputation alleged; it is sufficient to show
+"that the accused intended to harm, or knew, or had reason to believe that the"
+imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant.60. A statement
+made primarily with the object that the person making it should escape from a difficulty
+cannot be made the subject of a criminal charge merely because it contains matter
+which may be harmful to the reputation of other people or hurtful to their feelings.61.
+The meaning to be attached to the word 'harm' is not the ordinary sense in which it is
+used. By 'harm' is meant imputation on a man's character made and expressed to
+others so as to lower him in their estimation. Anything which lowers him merely in his
+own estimation does not constitute defamation.62. Accusing a person in front of the
+"public, of having illicit relations with accuser's sister cannot be considered to have been"
+uttered merely as scurrilous abuse in the situation in which they were used against the
+accused. The accusation took place in an open gathering when not only the members
+of the Gram Panchayat were present but also the members of the general public.
+"Conviction of the accused under section 500 IPC, 1860 was upheld.63."
+[s 500.14] 'Reputation'.—
+A man's opinion of himself cannot be called his reputation.64. A man has no 'reputation'
+"to himself and therefore, communication of defamatory matter to the person defamed"
+is no publication.
+[s 500.15] Explanation 1.—
+"A prosecution may be maintained for defamation of a deceased person, but it has been"
+"ruled that no suit for damages will lie in such a case. Where, therefore, a suit was"
+brought by the heir and nearest relation of a deceased person for defamatory words
+"spoken of such deceased person, but alleged to have caused damage to the plaintiff as"
+"a member of the same family, it was held that the suit was not maintainable.65."
+[s 500.16] Explanation 2.—
+"Imputation concerning company, association or collection of persons.—An action for libel"
+will lie at the suit of an incorporated trading company in respect of a libel calculated to
+injure its reputation in the way of its business.66. The words complained of must attack
+"the corporation or company in the method of conducting its affairs, must accuse it of"
+fraud or mismanagement or must attack its financial position.67. A corporation has no
+reputation apart from its property or trade. It cannot maintain an action for a libel
+"merely affecting personal reputation. The words complained of, to support a"
+"prosecution, must reflect on the management of its business and must injuriously"
+"affect the corporation, as distinct from the individuals who compose it. They must"
+"attack the corporation in its method of conducting its affairs, must accuse it of fraud or"
+mismanagement or must attack its financial position. A corporation cannot bring a
+prosecution for words which merely affect its honour or dignity.68.
+A prosecution lies for libelling Hindu widows as a class.69. Where the defamatory
+"articles, published in a newspaper, related to the habitual immoral conduct of the girls"
+"of a particular college, but no particular girl or girls were named in or identifiable from"
+"the articles, and the complaint was filed by a number of girls of the college, it was held"
+"that the author of the articles was guilty of defamation, in as much as the inevitable"
+effect of the articles on the mind of the reader must be to make him believe that it was
+habitual with the girls of the college to misbehave in the ways mentioned so that all the
+girls in the college collectively and each girl individually must suffer in reputation.70.
+This Explanation covers any collection of persons but such collection of persons must
+be identifiable in the sense that one could with certainty say that this group of
+particular people has been defamed as distinguished from the rest of the community.
+Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh were
+"held to be an identifiable group and hence, could be the subject of defamation"
+"according to the Supreme Court.71. In this connection see para captioned ""Concerning"
+"any Person"" and the cases mentioned therein."
+The offending article must carry an imputation against a definite and ascertainable
+body of people. A complaint was not allowed to be continued where the article
+published in a magazine carried imputations against a certain community in general
+"and not against any particular group, nor the community was found to be a definite and"
+identifiable body of people and the imputations also did not relate to the
+complainant.72. Where a news in a local daily about insufficiency of sandal wood
+"pieces at the cremation of the President of a National Political Party was published, but"
+no defamatory words or imputation against the said political party was used in the
+"news item and it did not refer to any definite or determinate person or persons, it was"
+held that offence of defamation was not constituted.73.
+[s 500.17] Explanation 4.—
+This Explanation would not apply when the words used and forming the subject-matter
+of the charge are per se defamatory.74. Describing a woman that she has paramours
+wherever she goes is per se defamatory.75. Wanton allegations by the accused against
+"the complainant who was his wife that she was not virgin at the time of marriage, that"
+she had a living husband at that time and had a child from him and that she had gone
+"to the extent of committing theft, were held to be defamatory. The burden was upon"
+him to show that the publication in question was necessary in good faith for the
+"protection of his interest. He could not do this and, therefore, the Court showed no"
+mercy and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for two months and a fine of Rs.
+"3,000.76."
+[s 500.18] Exceptions.—
+The defamatory statement does not fall within any of the Exceptions by reason merely
+of the fact that it is punishable as an offence under section 182 or any other section of
+the Code.77.
+[s 500.19] Members of Legislature and Parliament.—
+"In the absence of legislation by the Indian Parliament on the subject, the privileges,"
+powers and immunities of a House of State Legislature or Parliament or of its
+members are the same as those of the House of Commons in England. A member of
+the House of Commons has an absolute privilege in respect of what he has spoken
+within the four walls of the House but there is only a qualified privilege in his favour
+"even in respect of what he has himself said in the House, if he causes the same to be"
+published in the public press. Where a member of a State Legislature got published in
+the press a question which the member had sought to put in the House but which the
+Speaker had disallowed and the question contained defamatory imputations regarding
+"the character of a person, it was held that the publication was not accepted by any of"
+the exceptions to section 499.78.
+A minister was questioned about misappropriation of Government funds. He replied by
+saying that the preliminary enquiry made by the government showed that some
+misappropriation had taken place. He also disclosed the names of the persons
+involved including that of the complainant as indicated in the report. This part of the
+proceedings was published in the newspaper of the accused. Since the newspaper
+"exercised its qualified privilege in good faith, it was held that there was no intention to"
+cause harm to the reputation of the complainant.79.
+[s 500.20] Exception 1.—
+This Exception and Exception 4 require that the imputation should be true. The
+remaining Exceptions do not require it to be so. They only require that it should be
+"made in good faith. When truth is set up as a defence, it must extend to the entire libel"
+and it is not sufficient that only a part of the libel is proved to be true.80.
+The truth of the imputation complained of shall amount to defence if it was for the
+"public benefit that the imputation should be published, but not otherwise. A Court may"
+"find that an imputation is true, and made for the public good, but on considering the"
+"manner of the publication (e.g., in a newspaper) it may hold that the particular"
+"publication is not for the public good, and is, therefore, not privileged.81. To get the"
+benefit of this exception the accused must prove that the statement made by him is
+true in its substance and effect and not in part. Whether or not the statement was
+"made for public good, an enquiry must be directed to the benefit that the publication"
+has rendered or sought to render to the public or to a section of the public and whether
+the matter did concern the public.82.
+[s 500.21] CASE.—
+C was put out of caste by a committee of his caste-fellows on the ground that there
+"was an improper intimacy between him and a woman of his caste. Certain persons,"
+"members of the committee, circulated a letter to the members of their caste stating"
+that C and such woman had been put out of caste and requesting the members of the
+caste not to receive them into their houses or to eat with them and also made
+"defamatory statements about them. It was held that, had such persons contented"
+themselves with announcing the determination of the committee and the grounds upon
+"which such determination was based, they would have been protected, but in as much"
+as they went further and made false and uncalled for statements regarding C; they had
+"not acted in good faith.83. If a person really was outcasted, a statement to the"
+members of the brotherhood that he was outcasted is the kind of statement
+"contemplated by the expression ""public good"".84. Where there exists a civil dispute"
+between the parties as to the property where school is situated and run by
+"complainant, which is admittedly pending in civil Court, mere alerting by accused to"
+parents to take admission of their children at their own risk in school or in summer
+camp cannot be considered as defamatory or affecting the reputation or character of
+complainant. The above caution notice by no stretch of imagination can be considered
+"as imputations actionable within the meaning of section 499 of the IPC, 1860.85."
+[s 500.22] Exception 2.—
+Every citizen has a right to comment on those acts of public men which concern him as
+"a citizen of the country, if he does not make his commentary a cloak for malice and"
+"slander. A writer in a public paper has the same right as any other person, and it is his"
+"privilege, if indeed it is not his duty, to comment on the act of public men which"
+"concern not himself only but which concern the public, and the discussion of which is"
+for the public good. And where a person makes the public conduct of a public man the
+"subject of comment and it is for the public good, he is not liable to an action if the"
+"comments are made honestly, and he honestly believes the facts to be as he states"
+"them, and there is no wilful misrepresentation of fact or any misstatement which he"
+"must have known to be a misstatement, if he had exercised ordinary care.86. In order"
+"that a comment may be fair (a) it must be based on facts truly stated, (b) it must not"
+impute corrupt or dishonourable motives to the person whose conduct or work is
+"criticised except in so far as such imputations are warranted by the facts, (c) it must be"
+"the honest expression of the writer's real opinion made in good faith, and (d) it must be"
+"for the public good. The question to be considered in such cases is, would any fair"
+"man, however prejudiced he might be, or however exaggerated or obstinate his views"
+"may be, have made the criticism.87."
+Any opinion expressed in good faith made by a public servant would not amount to
+offence of defamation when public servant was acting in discharge of public functions.
+"According to section 21 of the IPC, 1860, clause fifth, a member of Panchayat assisting"
+"a Court of justice is within the scope of definition of ""public servant"". Hence, opinion"
+expressed by member of Panchayat in good faith to assist Court of Justice does not
+amount to defamation.88.
+Those who fill a public position must not be too thin skinned in reference to comments
+made upon them. Whoever fills a public position renders himself open to attack. He
+"must accept an attack as a necessary, though unpleasant, appendage to his office.89."
+"The law of defamation under the IPC, 1860 cannot be equated with that of contempt of"
+Court in general terms.90. The Court did not accept the proposition that a reply
+submitted to a contempt notice can in no case amount to contempt of Court in the light
+of the second exception to section 499.91.
+[s 500.23] Exception 3.—
+The conduct of publicists who take part in politics or other matters concerning the
+"public can be commented on in good faith. M, a medical man and the editor of a"
+"medical journal, said in such journal of an advertisement published by H, another"
+"medical man, in which H solicited the public to subscribe to a hospital of which he was"
+surgeon in charge stating the number of successful operations which had been
+"performed, that it was unprofessional. It was held that in as much as such"
+"advertisement had the effect of making such hospital a ""public question"", M was within"
+"the third, sixth and ninth Exceptions.92. A newspaper carried a letter to the editor"
+stating certain facts about a co-operative hospital to the effect that there were
+embezzlements; female nurses were harassed if they refused to attend night duty and
+that the President signed only convenient vouchers. It was held that this was an
+assertion of facts and not an expression of opinion. The mere fact that the letter
+demanded an inquiry would not convert the factual assertion into an opinion. The third
+Exception was not applicable.93.
+Where the published statement was that the Marwari community had no faith and love
+"towards India, their mother land, it was held that this was not sufficient to constitute"
+the offence of defamation. The process issued by the magistrate was liable to be
+quashed.94.
+[s 500.24] Comparative Advertisement.—
+"A commercial advertisement is a form of speech and ""Commercial speech"" is a part of"
+the freedom of speech and expression guarantee under Article 19(1)(a) of the
+Constitution.95. Comparative advertising is advertisement where a party advertises his
+goods or services by comparing them with goods and services of another party. This is
+generally done by either projecting that the advertiser's product is of same or superior
+quality to that of the compared product or by denigrating the quality of the compared
+product. The advertiser has right to boast of its technological superiority in comparison
+with product of the competitor. He can declare that his goods are better than that of his
+"competitor. However, while doing so, he cannot disparage the goods of the competitor."
+"Therefore, if the advertising is an insinuating campaign against the competitor's"
+product such a negative campaigning is not permissible.96. The allegation was that
+advertisement published by petitioner along with Associated Traders at instance of
+petitioner disparaging respondents business. The Associated Traders had admitted
+that alleged advertisement was taken out by them on their own and Petitioner
+"Company had nothing to do with that. Offence under section 500 IPC, 1860 is not made"
+out against the petitioner.97.
+[s 500.25] Exception 4.—
+Where there are judicial proceedings before a properly constituted judicial tribunal
+"exercising its jurisdiction in open Court, then the publication, without malice, of a fair"
+and accurate report of what takes place before that tribunal is privileged.98. Though the
+publication of such proceedings may be to the disadvantage of the particular individual
+"concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the public that the proceedings of Courts of"
+Justice should be universally known. The general advantage to the country in having
+these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconvenience to the
+private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings.99. It is
+"immaterial whether the proceedings were ex parte or not,100. or whether the Court had"
+jurisdiction or not.101. But a report of judicial proceedings cannot be published if the
+"Court has prohibited the publication of any such proceedings,102. or where the subject-"
+matter of the trial is obscene103. or blasphemous.104.
+[s 500.26] CASE.—
+"A trustee of a temple was charged with defamation, the alleged defamatory statement"
+"being that the complainant, who performed the worship in the temple, had been"
+convicted and sent to jail for the theft of idols belonging to the temple. At the time
+"when the statement was made, an appointment in connection with the temple was in"
+question. It was held that the trustee was justified in making the statement either in the
+interest of the temple or because the statement was no more than a publication of the
+result of proceedings in a Court of Justice.105.
+[s 500.27] Exception 5.—
+The administration of justice is a matter of universal interest to the whole public. The
+"judgment of the Court, the verdict of jury, the conduct of parties and of witnesses, may"
+all be made subjects of free comment. But the criticism should be made in good faith
+and should be fair. It must not wantonly assail the character of others or impute
+"criminality to them. But in commenting on such matters, a public writer, as much as a"
+"private writer, is bound to attend to the truth, and to put forward the truth honestly and"
+in good faith and to the best of his knowledge and ability. It is not to be expected that in
+discharging his duty of a public journalist he will always be infallible. His judgment may
+"be biased, one way or the other, without the slightest reflection upon his good faith;"
+"and, therefore, if his comments are fair, no one has a right to complain.106."
+[s 500.28] Exception 6.—
+The object of this Exception is that the public should be aided by comment in its
+judgment of the public performance submitted to its judgment. All kinds of
+performances in public may be truly criticised provided the comments are made in
+good faith and are fair. Liberty of criticism is allowed; otherwise we should neither have
+purity of taste nor of morals. Good faith under this Exception requires not logical
+infallibility but due care and attention.107.
+[s 500.29] Exception 7.—
+"This Exception allows a person under whose authority others have been placed, either"
+"by their own consent or by the law, to censure, in good faith, those who are so placed"
+"under his authority, so far as regards the matter to which that authority relates.108. But"
+if this privilege is exceeded in any way the offence will be established. A man may in
+good faith complain of the conduct of a servant to the master of the servant even
+"though the complaint amounts to defamation, but he is not protected if he publishes"
+"the complaint in a newspaper. A spiritual superior, in pronouncing and publishing a"
+"sentence of excommunication, may be protected by privilege so long as the publication"
+is not more extensive than is required to effectuate the purpose for which the privilege
+is conceded to him for the censure of a member of the sect in matters appertaining to
+religion or the communication of a sentence he is authorized to pronounce to those
+who are to guide themselves by it.109. Where the complainant was dismissed from
+service on the allegation of theft of his master's property after a full domestic enquiry
+"in which the complainant was given an opportunity to defend himself, the finding of"
+such a domestic enquiry saying that the allegation was true could not form the basis of
+"defamation case as it is fully protected by Exceptions 7 and 8 of section 499, IPC,"
+1860. To hold otherwise would amount to paralysing the administration of justice.110.
+[s 500.30] CASE.—Imputation made by person in authority.—
+"The allegation was that accused, principal of a medical college made compliant"
+"against complainant, doctor that she was not taking interest in teaching or attending"
+"hospital, etc., and that she was more worried about her income from nursing home. It"
+was held that words mentioned in complaint were not with intention to defame the
+complaint or harm her reputation. Compliant was made within idea to bring about
+"betterment in college. Proceedings under section 500 IPC, 1860 is liable to be set"
+aside.111.
+[s 500.31] Exception 8.—
+Eighth Exception to section 499 provides that it is not defamation to prefer in good
+faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over
+"that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation. In the present case, the"
+accused No. 1 and other members of Society approached the police because
+"admittedly, the letter received by them contained some obscene material and"
+defamatory statement against the daughter of the accused No. 1 and they expected
+"guidance, which could include appropriate action against the culprit. It is clear that the"
+"case is clearly covered by Exception 8 and no case under section 500 IPC, 1860 could"
+be made out.112. In order to establish a defence under this exception the accused
+would have to prove that the person to whom the complaint was made had lawful
+"authority over the person complained against, in respect of the subject-matter of the"
+accusation.113. To obtain the protection given by this Exception (1) the accusation
+"must be made to a person in authority over the party accused, and (2) the accusation"
+must be preferred in good faith.114. Defamatory averments made in a plaint are not
+absolutely protected in a criminal proceeding for defamation.115.
+[s 500.32] CASES.—
+The accused had lodged a report with the police contending that the complainant had
+poured acid on the coconut trees and had damaged the same and he had asked the
+police to take action against the said complaint. According to the complainant the said
+complaint damaged his reputation. It was contended that the case would be covered
+by Exceptions 8 and 9 of section 499 and the accused sought to quash the
+"proceedings under section 500 IPC, 1860. The High Court found the petition meritless"
+and had dismissed it. The Supreme Court held that:
+for the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Exceptions 8 and 9 appended
+"to section 499 of the Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith"
+for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the
+public good. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must
+"prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bona fide would, thus, be on the appellant"
+"alone. At this stage, in our opinion, it would have been premature for the High Court to"
+"consider the materials placed by the, appellant before it so as to arrive at a definite"
+conclusion that there was no element of bad faith on the part of the appellant in making the
+said complaint before the police authorities.116.
+"[s 500.33] Exception 9.—Good faith, individual interest or public good.—"
+This Exception posits that the person to whom the communication is made has an
+interest in protecting the person making the accusation. Besides the bona fides of the
+"person making the imputation, the person to whom the imputation is conveyed must"
+have a common interest with the person making it which is served by the
+communication.117. The interest of the person referred to in this Exception has to be
+real and legitimate when communication is made in protection of the interest of the
+person making it. The privilege extends only to a communication upon the subject with
+respect to which the privilege extends and the privilege can be claimed in exercise of
+the right or safeguarding of the interest which creates the privilege.118. The regional
+manager of a bank issued confidential circular to branch managers of his region
+advising them to be vigilant while dealing with persons included in the list including the
+complainant. The circular was issued in his official capacity in public interest and under
+instructions of the Central office. The Court said that the circular was covered by
+"Exception 9. Therefore, even if the allegations made in the complaint were true, no"
+offence would be made out under section 500.119.
+This exception relates to private communication which a person makes in good faith
+for the protection of his own interest. This exception covers not only such allegations
+of facts as can be proved true but also expression of opinions and personal inferences.
+It has been incorporated to protect the interests of the parties in their business
+"transaction which are generally done bona fide and, therefore, the rule of public good on"
+"which this principle is based is, that honest transaction of business and social"
+intercourse would otherwise be deprived of the protection which they should enjoy.
+Whether any imputation made is with a motive or mala fide intention to lower the
+reputation or is made in good faith is to be determined from the facts and
+"circumstances of the case. Undisputedly, the requirement of good faith and public"
+"good, both, are to be satisfied and the failure to prove good faith would exclude the"
+application of Exception 9 in favour of the accused even if the requirement of public
+good is satisfied. The words 'good faith' as appearing in exception 9th not only require
+logical infallibility but also due care and attention.120.
+"This Exception refers to any imputation made in good faith, whereas the first Exception"
+applies only to true imputation made for the public good. That he acted in good faith
+must be proved by the accused.121. Question of good faith is a question of fact and
+has to be decided in course of the trial and at the initial stage. The journalists do not
+enjoy any special privilege.122.
+"In determining the question of good faith, regard should be to the intellectual capacity"
+"of the accused, his predilections and the surrounding facts.123."
+Where a rustic villager objected to the appointment of the complainant as a village
+munsiff in the bona fide belief that he was a rowdy and as such undesirable for a public
+"post like this, it was held that he acted in good faith and was protected by this"
+Exception.124.
+In order to establish good faith and bona fides it has to be seen first the circumstances
+"under which the defamatory matter was written or uttered; secondly, whether there was"
+"any malice; thirdly, whether the accused made any inquiry before he made the"
+"allegations; fourthly, whether there are reasons to accept the version that he acted with"
+care and caution and finally whether there is preponderance of probability that the
+accused acted in good faith.125.
+The burden lies on the person accused to prove the bona fide aspect of his publication.
+Cross-examination of the complainant can be used as a device for establishing good-
+faith. An imputation was made in a newspaper item that the complainant lady doctor
+had duped the Government by presenting false transfer allowance bills. The lady
+doctor's sole testimony that the publication harmed her reputation was held to be not
+sufficient to sustain her complaint. The accused showed that the publication was in
+good faith and in public interest.126.
+Where the agreement for selling their properties for settling their dues was signed by
+the accused persons and registered before the Sub-Registrar in the presence of the
+accused but subsequently a publication in the newspaper was made by the accused
+"after about two and a half months that the agreement was executed under compulsion,"
+it was held that the publication was not made in 'good faith' and could not be brought
+under Exception 9 of section 499.127.
+The ninth Exception to section 499 provides that it is not defamation to make an
+imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good
+"faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of any other person,"
+or for the public good. Even if it is assumed that the accused No. 1 and other accused
+made the imputation against the respondent No. 1 that he had written the letters and
+"thus, that imputation was made against his character, still that was made in good faith"
+because they wanted protection of the interest of the members of the family of
+accused No. 1 and particularly his daughter. They did not approach any unconnected
+"person, but police who could protect the interest of the accused No. 1 and his family"
+"members. In view of the legal position and the facts, which are clear from the"
+"complaint and the documents submitted with the complaint, it is clear that the case is"
+"clearly covered by Exceptions 8 and 9 and no case under section 500 IPC, 1860 could"
+be made out.128.
+[s 500.34] Club committee.—
+"The committee members of a social club, even if wrong, are given protection under this"
+"Exception, without which it would be impossible for such a body to function. Where the"
+"respondent, who was the wife of a member of a social club and was privileged to use"
+"the club, preferred a complaint against the members of the committee for defaming"
+"her in a letter addressed by them to her husband, it was held that as the committee had"
+"acted in good faith, even if they were mistaken they were protected by this"
+Exception.129.
+[s 500.35] Communication by member of caste.—
+There is a dividing line between the passing of a resolution at a caste meeting and its
+communication by the authorities of the caste to its members in the discharge of their
+social duty. If any member of a caste publishes to all its members a caste resolution in
+such discharge of duty the law will hold the occasion of the publication to be privileged.
+"But there must be good faith on the part of the member who publishes, that is, it must"
+be proved that the publication was made with due care and attention.130. There must
+"not be excessive publication, e.g., publication in a newspaper.131. Where a libellous"
+"communication is made regarding a member of a caste, the mere fact that the person"
+making such communication is a member of a caste will not of itself suffice to make
+the communication privileged.132. A person making defamatory expressions for the
+"protection of his son's interest is not privileged, unless the imputation is made in good"
+faith.133.
+"[s 500.36] Privileges of Judges, etc.—"
+"The privileges of parties, counsel, attorney, pleader and witnesses come under this"
+"Exception. So also, statements made in pleadings and reports to superior officers are"
+"protected by it. (As to civil actions, see the author's Law of Torts, 19th Edn; Chapter"
+XIII).
+"In India the law regarding defamatory statements, made in the course of judicial"
+"proceeding, by judges, counsel or pleaders, witnesses and parties is lacking in"
+uniformity. The High Court of Madras in earlier cases adopted the English rule of
+absolute immunity in all cases. The Bombay High Court has not followed the English
+rule in cases of criminal prosecution on the ground that English law could not be
+resorted to where it went beyond the terms of section 499: but in civil actions it has
+followed the dictum of the Privy Council in Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v Mugneeram
+Chowdhry.134. The Allahabad High Court has gone a step further and held that cases of
+defamation under the Code as well as civil suits for damages must be decided in
+"accordance with the provisions embodied in the IPC, 1860 and the Indian Evidence Act."
+The Calcutta High Court has held that the liability of a person prosecuted for
+"defamation must be determined by the application of the provisions of the IPC, 1860"
+and not otherwise.135. The Patna High Court has adopted the view of the Calcutta High
+Court.136.
+"[s 500.37] Counsel, pleader, etc.—"
+"Where the accused, father of the complainant, denied through a lawyer's notice that the"
+complainant was his son imputing unchastity to his mother and as such was not
+"entitled to any family property, it was held that the communication was protected under"
+"the 9th Exception to section 499, IPC, 1860, and the typing of that notice by the lawyer's"
+clerk also did not constitute publicity.137.
+The Kerala High Court has held that counsel who has signed the pleading of his client
+can rely on this Exception.138.
+[s 500.38] Witness.—
+The Bombay High Court has in a Full Bench case laid down that relevant statements
+made by a witness on oath or solemn affirmation in a judicial proceeding are not
+"absolutely privileged on a prosecution for defamation, but are governed by the"
+provisions of section 499.139.
+The Allahabad High Court in a Full Bench case held that a witness could be prosecuted
+for defamatory statements concerning a person unless he showed that the statements
+fell under one of the Exceptions to this section.140.
+"The Nagpur High Court had followed the Bombay, the Calcutta and the Allahabad High"
+Courts and held that a person giving evidence in a Court of law is not entitled to an
+absolute privilege in respect of statements which he makes and is consequently not
+immune from a complaint of defamation by reason of words uttered on oath in the
+witness-box.141.
+"The Madhya Pradesh High Court followed the Bombay, the Calcutta and the Nagpur"
+High Courts.142.
+[s 500.39] Pleadings.—
+Authority is strongly against the absolute immunity from prosecution for defamatory
+"statements contained in applications, pleadings and affidavits. The Bombay High Court"
+has held that statements made in a written statement filed by the accused are not
+absolutely privileged but are governed by the provisions of this section.143. The
+allegation was that the averments contained in the pleadings and oral evidence in a
+suit filed by the accused constituted defamatory statements. The Court held that on
+"reading of Exception 9 to section 499 of the IPC, 1860 the alleged imputations"
+contained in pleadings and evidence in civil suit OS No. 966 of 1998 and AS No. 155 of
+"2004 are covered by Exception 9 of section 499 of the IPC, 1860, even assuming that"
+the imputations are prima facie defamatory in nature.144.
+The Madras High Court has held in a Full Bench case that a defamatory statement in a
+complaint to a Magistrate is not absolutely privileged.145.
+"The Patna High Court had held, that a defamatory statement, whether on oath or"
+"otherwise, falls within section 499 and is not absolutely privileged. Where in a plaint the"
+"accused described the complainant (defendant No. 3) as the ""kept woman"" of"
+"defendant No. 1 without any foundation, it was held that he was guilty of"
+defamation.146.
+[s 500.40] Vicarious liability.—
+A defamatory letter was issued on the pad of a partnership firm. The letter was signed
+by one of the partners. The complainant in his examination before the Court did not say
+on oath anything against the rest of the partners who had not signed the letter. The
+Court said that such other partners who had not signed could not be vicariously held
+liable with the signing partner.147.
+[s 500.41] Communications with counsel.—
+Communication with one's counsel for legal advice is not a publication. The Court
+distinguished the case from the Supreme Court decision in MC Vergheese v TJ
+"Poonan.148. In this case, a husband's letters to his wife contained defamatory remarks"
+about her father. The father's proceedings against the husband were allowed because
+those letters amounted to a publication. But a communication between a client and his
+counsel is not a publication because of the intimate relationship between them. The
+counsel has no separate existence from the client in matters relating to legal duties.
+Communication to the council is communication to the client.149.
+[s 500.42] Reports.—
+"The report of an officer, in the execution of his duty, under his superior's orders, which"
+"contains defamatory imputations against others, but which does not appear to have"
+been made recklessly or unjustifiably is covered by this Exception. But a totally false
+report will not be protected.150.
+[s 500.43] Complaint through power of attorney.—
+The aggrieved person was employed in a foreign country. A complaint filed through a
+"power of attorney was held as not offending the provisions of section 199(1), Cr PC,"
+1973 as the complainant suffered from the infirmity of being away in a foreign
+country.151.
+[s 500.44] Exception 10.—
+This Exception protects a person giving caution in good faith to another for the good of
+"that other, or of some person in whom that other is interested or for the public good."
+[s 500.45] Complaint by aggrieved person necessary.—
+No Court shall take cognizance of this offence except upon a complaint made by the
+"person aggrieved (section 199 Cr PC, 1973). The words ""person aggrieved"" does not"
+"mean ""person defamed"". The words ""person aggrieved"" has a wider connotation than"
+"the words ""person defamed"".152."
+A complaint for defamation by the person aggrieved by it can be entertained by a Court
+notwithstanding that the accused could have been prosecuted on the same facts under
+section 182 on the complaint of a public servant. The two offences are fundamentally
+"distinct in nature, although they may arise out of one and the same statement of the"
+accused. The defamatory statement does not fall within any of the Exception to section
+"499 by reason merely of the fact that it is punishable as an offence under section 182,"
+or any other section of the Code; nor is this section included in the list of sections
+"contained in section 195(1)(b) of the Cr PC, 1973.153. Where the imputations were"
+"against the managing director of a society, the society was held to be not an aggrieved"
+"person and, therefore, had no locus standi to file a complaint.154."
+"A newspaper published extracts from books written on a former Prime Minister,"
+imputing charges of corruption against him and also his family members including his
+"sons, daughter and wife. It was held that his sons could be said to be aggrieved"
+persons. A complaint filed by one of the sons was not to be quashed.155.
+The continuation of the proceedings even after the death of the complainant has been
+held to be not proper.156. Where the allegation in the complaint was that the Kerala
+"Police had been defamed, the Court said that Kerala Police was not a definite and"
+"determinable body and, therefore, a member of the Kerala Police was not a person"
+affected by the defamatory statement and his complaint was not maintainable.157.
+When the statements in question are not directed against any person or against an
+"identifiable group of individuals, the complainants cannot be said to be an aggrieved"
+persons. The complainants have alleged defamation in respect of imputations against
+"the character of Tamil-speaking women, which could be viewed as a class of persons."
+"However, the appellant's remarks did not suggest that all women in Tamil Nadu have"
+engaged in pre-marital sex. In fact her statement in News Magazine did not refer to any
+specific individual or group at all.158.
+[s 500.46] Complaint by director of company.—
+"Locus standi.—The words ""some person aggrieved"" do not make it necessary that the"
+complaint should be made by the very person who has been defamed. In the case of an
+"imputation against a company, a director of the company would fall within the words"
+"""some person aggrieved"". He can file a complaint.159."
+[s 500.47] Complaint by advocate.—
+False allegations were made in a newspaper against the Commissioner of
+Endowments. A complaint filed by an Advocate was held to be non-maintainable being
+not an aggrieved person.160.
+[s 500.48] Employer—
+Labour.—Defamatory statements were made against retrenched workmen in the
+counter filed by the management. Some of the statements were repeated on different
+dates before the labour Court and labour officer. The Court said that the question of
+limitation could not be decided until the starting point of the offence was known and
+that had to be decided at the trial.161. The Court further said that aspects of good faith
+in the utterances could also be decided only after evidence.162.
+[s 500.49] President of Municipality.—
+"The President of a Municipality is not a 'person aggrieved', within the meaning of"
+"section 199 of the Cr PC, 1973, by the defamations of his subordinate officers.163."
+[s 500.50] Complaint against Juristic person.—
+"Simply because the accused is a corporate body, it cannot be said that it cannot"
+"commit an offence of defamation as defined under section 499 IPC, 1860.164."
+"Section 499, IPC, 1860, is an offence involving personal malicious intent, which is"
+evident from the fact that one of the essential ingredients is either intention to harm or
+knowledge or reasons to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of the
+"other. An artificial/juristic person cannot be prosecuted for offence under section 500,"
+"IPC, 1860, for such an artificial/juristic person cannot be attributed with any malicious"
+intention which can be attributed only to a living person. Chief Educational Officer being
+"an artificial/ juristic person prosecution against him for offence under section 500, IPC,"
+1860 would not be maintainable.165.
+[s 500.51] Punishment.—
+"The accused, an editor of a weekly, published an article in his paper making defamatory"
+"allegation against the petitioner, who was a Class I Officer and belonged to a"
+respectable business family. The editor made no amends till conviction. Sentence of
+"simple fine was enhanced to RI of two months and fine of Rs. 2,000.166."
+"In a case of defamation, the revision petition for enhancement of the sentence was"
+filed seven years after the commission of the offence. It was held that delay in filing the
+revision cannot be a ground for not to enhance the sentence when the accused had not
+made any amends for his criminal act.167. Where the utterances of the accused in a
+"meeting were proved to harm the reputation of the complainant, his conviction under"
+section 500 was held to be proper.168.
+For the publication of defamatory matter in a newspaper the sentence awarded was
+that of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and fine of Rs. 500. It was held to be too
+low and inadequate considering the damage caused to the reputation of the
+"complainant. The fine amount was accordingly enhanced to Rs. 10,000."
+[s 500.52] Quashing of complaint.—
+There were allegations in a private complaint that the respondents made imputations
+"against the complainant in applications made under section 436, Cr PC, 1973. The"
+sworn statements and documents produced showed that the imputations were made
+with the intention or knowledge or having reason to believe that they will harm
+"reputation. Thus, a prima facie was made out. The High Court could not at that stage"
+say that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction at the trial. Questions of good
+faith and of intention could be examined on the basis of evidence at the trial. The trial
+must go on. The quashing of the complaint was not proper.169.
+[s 500.53] Application of exceptions in pre-trial stage.—
+"The Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande, v Uttam,170. held that issuing of"
+process against the accused for the offence punishable under section 499 punishable
+"under section 500 of the IPC, 1860 can be questioned in higher Courts. Ultimately, the"
+Supreme Court quashed proceedings relating to prosecution of such a case in that
+"reported decision by applying Exception 8 to section 499 of the IPC, 1860. Therefore, it"
+cannot be said that application of exception cannot be considered at pre-trial stage and
+"by invoking section 482 of the Cr PC, 1973.171. In Vedurumudi Rama Rao v Chennuri"
+"Venkat Rao,172. Court considered applicability of Exception 9 to section 499 of the IPC,"
+1860 and held that truth of imputation need not be probed by such accused while
+claiming privilege under Exception 9; and finally quashed proceedings in criminal case
+"relating to the offence punishable under section 500 of the IPC, 1860. The Gujarat High"
+"Court in Darusing Durgasing v State of Gujarat,173. followed the above said reported"
+decision of the Supreme Court and quashed criminal proceedings for the offence
+"punishable under section 500 of the IPC, 1860 in view of Exceptions 7, 8 and 9 to"
+"section 499 of the IPC, 1860. In an examination fact situation, the Bombay High Court"
+"in Valmiki Faleiro v Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes,174. went to the extent of holding a paper"
+publication containing certain imputations as one saved by Exception 9 because
+intention of the accused was predominantly to protect his rights in the property and not
+"to harm reputation of the complainant. In Jeffrey J Diermeier v State of WB,175. it was"
+"pleaded that in the light of Explanation 4 as well as Tenth Exception to section 499 IPC,"
+"1860, the allegations in the complaint did not constitute an offence of defamation"
+"punishable under section 500 IPC, 1860. But the Supreme Court held that the mere plea"
+"that the accused believed that what he had stated was in ""good faith"" is not sufficient to"
+accept his defence and he must justify the same by adducing evidence. Court found it
+difficult to hold that a case for quashing of the complaint under section 482 of the
+Code has been made out.
+[s 500.54] Jurisdiction.—
+The Courts at the place of printing and publication of a newspaper as well as those at
+the place of distribution have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint.176. The respondent
+"is said to have given an interview to the Newspaper ""Economic Times"" intending it to be"
+"published and to be read by public. Therefore, though the act of making the defamatory"
+statement during the interview was done at a place outside the jurisdiction of the
+"Court, prosecution can be launched in Courts exercising jurisdiction over any one of the"
+places wherein circulation of the paper is made.177.
+[s 500.55] Cognizance on Police report.—
+"In Shiv Kumar Agarwal v State of Meghalaya,178. Gauhati High Court examined the"
+question whether a Magistrate can take cognizance of a non-cognizable offence
+"punishable under section 500, IPC, 1860 on the basis of the police report submitted by"
+"the police under section 173(2), Cr PC, 1973 while investigating both a cognizable"
+"offence and a non-cognizable offence under section 155(4), Cr PC, 1973 even after the"
+accused is discharged from the cognizable case. It is held that as one of the offences
+"alleged against the petitioner was a cognizable offence, namely, section 505(2), IPC,"
+"1860, by virtue of the legal fiction introduced in section 155(4), Cr PC, 1973, the case"
+was deemed to be a cognizable offence. Once the case was deemed to be a
+"cognizable offence, there was no legal impediment in investigating the case by the"
+"police. After the case was investigated by the police, the charge-sheet was submitted"
+"by them to the learned Magistrate under section 173, Cr PC, 1973 for trying the"
+"petitioner under section 505 (2)/500, IPC, 1860. However, the charge made against the"
+"petitioner under section 505(2), IPC, 1860 was quashed by this Court on the ground"
+"that no prosecution sanction under section 196 (1A), Cr PC, 1973 was obtained by the"
+police. The net result is that the trial Court had to proceed with consideration of the
+"charge under section 500, IPC, 1860 and, after hearing the parties, framed the charge"
+accordingly by rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for dropping the charge against
+him.179.
+"In the defamation matter, issuance of process after having examination of defamatory"
+"material with reaction of the public, would certainly be sufficient to satisfy the test of"
+"holding the enquiry under Section 202, Cr PC, 1973.180."
+[s 500.56] Section 211 and Section 500.—
+Section 211 imposes a punishment in case of a false charge or offence made with the
+"intent to injure someone before any Court of law, whereas section 500 provides for"
+punishment in case of a defamation of a person by any one. Defamation has been
+"defined under section 499 which provides inter alia whoever, by words either spoken or"
+"intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any"
+"imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to"
+"believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in"
+"the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Making a false complaint"
+before a Court of law would amount to committing fraud on Court. It is for the Court to
+proceed against the erring person. The provision has been made to preserve the
+sanctity of the Court. Section 500 gives right to sue to a person who is defamed within
+the meaning of section 499 by the conduct of the accused. These two provisions are
+totally distinct and can be tried in absence of each other.181.
+"6. Note R, p 175."
+7. It is not necessary to incorporate the whole of the published matter in a complaint. A
+complaint was not dismissed only on the ground that the matter under complaint was
+"presented not in the body of the complaint, but in an attached document. T Kunhambu v A"
+"Sojath, 1989 Cr LJ 1022 (Ker), following Balraj Khanna v Motiram, 1971 Cr LJ 1110 (SC). The"
+"complaint must be made by the party aggrieved. His wife is not an aggrieved person and,"
+"therefore, her complaint is not maintainable. Nazeem Bavakunju v State of Kerala, 1988 Cr LJ"
+"487 (Ker). MN Meera v AC Mathew, 2002 Cr LJ 3845 (Ker), the name of the complainant was not"
+mentioned by the accused while making the alleged defamatory statement. The complaint
+"should not have been thrown overboard on that ground alone. KM Selvaraj v A Amarlal, 2002 Cr"
+"LJ 3811 (Mad), defamatory statements in a circular against members and president of an"
+association regarding manipulation of accounts and misappropriation of funds. One of the
+signatories was a chartered accountant who had checked the accounts. The CA applied for
+dropping of his name because he was only a signatory. His request was accepted. It was held
+that the order discharging him was not proper. All accused persons had to face the
+consequences of the defamatory statement in the circular.
+"8. Standard Chartered Bank v Vinay Kumar Sood, 2010 Cr LJ 1277 (Del)."
+"9. Bacon's Abrid, vol IV, p 457."
+"10. Sunilakhya v HM Jadwet, AIR 1968 Cal 266 [LNIND 1967 CAL 167] ."
+"11. S Nihal Singh v Arjan Das, 1983 Cr LJ 777 (Del); see also DN Rao v RD Bhagvandas, 1986 Cr"
+"LJ 888 (AP). M Chandran v F Fanthome, 2003 Cr LJ 2173 (Sik), complainant had full knowledge"
+"of the document which was quite old, no witness cited, failure to make out defamatory nature of"
+"the remarks, the accused discharged. Period of limitation had also expired and no condonation"
+was sought.
+"12. Varnakote Illath v Kotalmana Keshavan, (1900) 1 Weir 579."
+"13. SS Sanyal v KVR Nair, 1987 Cr LJ 2074 (Cal), relying on TJ Ponnel v MU Verghese, AIR 1967"
+Ker 228 [LNIND 1966 KER 242] : 1968 Cr LJ 1511 . It is different if the employee himself goes
+round showing the notice to others. Such notice comes under 9th exception being necessary to
+protect the employer's interest.
+"14. Boxsius v Goblet Freres, (1894) 1 QB 842 . Other matters of the same kind, Pullman v Walter"
+"Hill, (1891) 1 QB 524 , dictation by the managing director of a company to his short-hand steno,"
+"and after being transcribed, sent to the plaintiff, held to be a publication, but not followed in"
+"subsequent cases. See Edmondson v Birch, (1907) 1 KB 371 and Sukhdeo Vithal v Prabhakar"
+"Sukhdeo, 1974 Cr LJ 1435 (Bom)."
+"15. PR Ramakrishnan v Subbaramma, AIR 1988 Ker 18 [LNIND 1986 KER 395] : 1988 Cr LJ 124 ."
+"But see Rev Fr Bernad Thaltil v Ramchandran Pillai, 1987 Cr LJ 739 (Ker), notice containing"
+libellous imputations of misappropriation.
+"16. Sadashiv Atmaram, (1893) 18 Bom 205. In BP Bhaskar v BP Shiva, 1993 Cr LJ 2685 (Mad), it"
+was held that scurrilous allegations or imputations contained in notices exchanged between
+parties do not amount to 'publication' under section 499. The court also held that a reply to the
+notice sent to the party's advocate containing defamatory statements of the party is not
+publication. It is a communication to the party himself.
+"17. Taki Husain, (1884) 7 All 205 (FB)."
+"18. Sukhdeo v State, (1932) 55 All 253 ."
+"19. Nagrathimam (Dr.) v M Kalirajan, 2001 Cr LJ 3007 (Mad)."
+"20. Sankara v State, (1883) 6 Mad 381."
+"21. Thiagaraya v Krishnasami, (1892) 15 Mad 214."
+"22. Greene v Delanney, (1870) 14 WR (Cr) 27; Abdul Hakim v Tej Chandar, (1881) 3 All 815 ."
+"23. Raja Shah, (1889) PR No. 14 of 1889."
+"24. Wenman v Ash, (1853) 13 CD 836."
+"25. Wennhak v Morgan, (1888) 20 QBD 635 ; Dr. Jaikishen Das v Sher Singh, (1910) PR No. 10 of"
+1910.
+"26. Pundit Mokand Ram, (1883) PR No. 12 of 1883."
+"27. Janardhan Damodhar Dikshit, (1894) 19 Bom 703. PM Abubacker v PJ Alexander, 2000 Cr LJ"
+1168 (Ker) the source of information regarding published defamatory statement is not a
+"consideration for prosecution for defamation. M Malle Reddy v T Venkatarama, 2000 Cr LJ 1086"
+"(AP), a complaint against an alleged defamatory statement published in a newspaper was not"
+allowed to be quashed in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
+"28. S Khushboo v Kanniammal, 2010 Cr LJ 2828 (SC) : AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] :"
+2010 (5) SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] .
+"29. Charmesh Sharma v State Of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 2115 (Raj)."
+"30. Howard, (1887) 12 Bom 167."
+"31. Harbhajan Singh, AIR 1961 Punj 215 ."
+"32. BRK Murthy v State, 2013 Cr LJ 1602 (AP); Tankasala Ashok v State of AP, 2010 Cr LJ 2074"
+"(AP) where there was nothing to show that editor had control over selection of publication,"
+proceedings against accused editor is liable to be quashed.
+"33. Dongar Singh v Krishna Kant, AIR 1958 MP 216 [LNIND 1958 MP 58] ."
+"34. McLeod, (1880) 3 All 342 ."
+"35. Ramasami v Lokanada, (1886) 9 Mad 387."
+"36. Bhagat Singh v Lachman Singh, AIR 1968 Cal 296 [LNIND 1967 CAL 189] . The chairman of a"
+company which is publishing a newspaper is not liable merely by virtue of his position as such.
+"Udayam Telugu Daily v State of AP, 1987 Cr LJ 143 (AP)."
+"37. AK Jain v State of Sikkim, 1992 Cr LJ 843 (Sikkim)."
+"38. KV Ramesh v HC Ramesh, 2001 Cr LJ 3556 ."
+"39. KM Mathew v KA Abraham, 1998 Cr LJ 327 (Ker). CB Solanki v Srikanta Parashar, 1997 Cr LJ"
+"3050 (Kant), ""editor"" for the purposes of the section does not include a person described as"
+"chief editor or managing director, particularly when there were no specific allegations against"
+them in the complaint. The Court also explained the scope of first and ninth exception and the
+burden of proof as to publication.
+"40. McLeod, supra; Girjashankar Kashiram, (1890) 15 Bom 286. The fact that the accused did"
+not know the person defamed through his newspaper is no defence. Sumatibai Vinayak Deo v
+"Nandkumar Deshpande, 1990 Cr LJ 2136 (Bom). Defamation in 1977. Appeal against acquittal"
+"allowed in 1990. No further prosecution allowed. Fine of Rs. 2,000 with a direction that Rs. 1,800"
+should be handed over to the aggrieved person imposed.
+"41. Gambhirsinh R Dekare v Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel, (2013) 3 SCC 697 [LNIND 2013 SC"
+175] : 2013 Cr LJ 1757 : AIR 2013 SC 1590 [LNIND 2013 SC 175] .
+"42. Ravi Prakash v J C Diwakar Reddy, 2010 Cr LJ 2558 (AP)."
+"43. P Lankesh v H Shivappa, 1994 Cr LJ 3510 (Kant)."
+"44. Radhanath Rath v Birja Prasad Ray, 1992 Cr LJ 938 (Ori)."
+"45. Archbold, 35th Edn, p 3633."
+"46. McCarthy, (1887) 9 All 420 ."
+"47. Shibo Prosad Pandah, (1878) 4 Cal 124 ."
+"48. Sirajuddin Ali v Mujtaba Ali, 2001 Cr LJ NOC 125 (AP)."
+"49. Gautam Sahu v State of Orissa, 1999 Cr LJ 838 ."
+"50. Government Advocate, B & O v Gopabandhu Das, (1922) 1 Pat 414. CL Sagar v Mayawati,"
+"2003 Cr LJ 690 (All), the complaint was that the vice president of a political party defamed the"
+complainant by stating in a public meeting that the person with long moustache in the party was
+a corrupt person. The complainant could not show that he was the only member of the party
+with long moustache. The newspaper report of the meeting did not carry any such remark. No
+offence made out.
+"51. Asha Parekh v State of Bihar, 1977 Cr LJ 21 (Pat); see also Narottamdas v Maganbhai, 1984"
+"Cr LJ 1790 (Guj); Aruna Asafali v Purna Narayan, 1984 Cr LJ 1121 (Gau)."
+"52. Maung Sein, (1926) 4 Ran 462."
+"53. Clerk & Lindsell on TORTS, 1701 (14th Edn 1975)."
+"54. Manmohan Kalia v Yash, (1984) 3 SCC 499 [LNIND 1984 SC 101] : AIR 1984 SC 1161 [LNIND"
+"1984 SC 101] . See also Sumatibai Vinayak Deo v Nandkumar Deshpande, 1990 Cr LJ 2136"
+"(Bom), where the veiled expression that only ""S"" knew what happened to the bowls brought by"
+"children to the school was held to be not defamatory; Lalliani v R L Rina, 1987 Cr LJ 1295 (Gau),"
+a biographical account of the life of a poet mentioning a named girl as his source of inspiration
+"and depicting their love affairs, a woman by that name was not able to convince the court that"
+"she was the object of the attack. But see V Subair v PK Sudhakaran (Dr), 1987 Cr LJ 736 (Ker),"
+"where a medical practitioner was described as a ""professional debauch"" and of ""low moral"
+"character"", the accused was held liable because the complainant was able to prove that he was"
+meant to be attacked.
+"55. Parvathi v Mannar, (1884) 8 Mad 175."
+"56. Monson v Tussauds Ltd, (1894) 1 QB 671 , 692."
+"57. Chellappan Pillai v Karanjia, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 142 ."
+"58. Jacob Mathew v Manikantan, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 62 : 2012 (3) KLT 824 ."
+"59. Veeda Menezes v Yusuf Khan, (1966) 68 Bom LR 629 (SC)."
+"60. Gobinda Pershad Pandey v Garth, (1900) 28 Cal 63 ; Pimento, (1920) 22 Bom LR 1224"
+"[LNIND 1920 BOM 117] ; U Aung Pe, (1938) Ran 404 (FB)."
+"61. Parwari, (1919) 41 All 311 ."
+"62. Taki Husain, (1884) 7 All 205 , 220 (FB); J Jayalalitha v Arcot N Veerasamy, 1997 Cr LJ 4585"
+"(Mad), absence of averment in the complaint that because of the imputation the complainant's"
+"reputation had been lowered in the estimation of others, dismissal of the complaint was proper."
+"63. Mohan Lal v State of HP, 2011 Cr LJ 2413 (HP)."
+64. Ibid.
+"65. Luckumsey Rowji v Hurban Nursey, (1881) 5 Bom 580."
+"66. South Hetton Coal Co v NE News Association, (1894) 1 QB 133 ."
+"67. Ibid, p 141."
+"68. Maung Chit Tay v Maung Tun Nyun, (1935) 13 Ran 297."
+"69. Mahim Chandra Roy v Watson, (1928) 55 Cal 1280 ."
+"70. Wahid Ullah Ahrari, (1935) 57 All 1012 ."
+"71. Sahib Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1451 [LNIND 1965 SC 15] ."
+"72. Vishwa Nath v Shambhu Nath, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 277 (All). The complainant had died and the"
+proceedings were not allowed to be continued by others. The court distinguished Ashwin
+"Nanubhai Vyas v State of Maharashtra, 1967 Cr LJ 943 : AIR 1967 SC 963 where the mother of"
+the deceased complainant was allowed to continue the proceedings. The court cited Raj Kapoor
+"v Narendra Noranbhai Nagardas, (1974) 15 Guj LJ 125 where the contemptuous remarks against"
+Bhangi community uttered by caste Hindus were held to be not defamatory. The court said that
+"if a person were to say that all lawyers were thieves, no particular lawyer could sue him unless"
+"there is something to point out to a particular individual, Eastwood v Holmes, (1858) 1 F&F 347."
+"The court also relied upon Narottamdas L Shah v Maganibhai, 1984 Cr LJ 1790 (Guj) where the"
+"agitating lawyers were described as ""Kazia dalals"" (dispute brokers) and it was held that the use"
+of such words in reference to the lawyers as a class could not be taken to refer to a determinate
+"or identifiable class of lawyers, namely, the lawyers who were participating in the agitation. MP"
+"Narayana Pillai v MP Chacko, 1986 Cr LJ 2002 (Ker) remarks in general about Christian girls"
+being used for prostitution to enable them to earn livelihood because their parents were not able
+to support them were held to be too general to be defamatory of any body. The court said that
+identity of the collection of the people will have to be established in relation to the defamatory
+"imputation. KM Mathew v TU Balan, 1985 Cr LJ 1039 (Ker) imputation against some leaders of"
+teachers who were on strike was held to be not actionable.
+"73. P Karunakaran v C Jayasooryan, 1992 Cr LJ 3540 (Ker)."
+"74. Amar Singh v KS Badalia, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 693 ; Shamsher Singh v State, 1982 Cr LJ NOC 167"
+(Del).
+"75. J Chelliah v Rajeswari, 1969 Cr LJ 571 ."
+"76. Madhuri Mukund Chitnis v Mukund Martand Chitnis, 1990 Cr LJ 2084 . The court referred to"
+"Sukhdeo v State of Maharashtra, 1974 (Bom) LJ 777 : 1974 Cr LJ 1435 and Baburao Shankarrao v"
+"Shaikh Biban Pahelwan, 1984 Cr LJ 350 , burden as to good faith."
+"77. U Aung Pe, (1938) Ran 404 (FB)."
+"78. Jatish Chandra v Hari Sadhan, AIR 1961 SC 613 [LNIND 1961 SC 19] ."
+"79. Jawaharlal Darda v Manoharao Ganpatrao, AIR 1998 SC 2117 [LNIND 1998 SC 361] : 1998 Cr"
+LJ 2928
+"80. Chandrasekhara v Karthikeyan, AIR 1964 Ker 277 [LNIND 1964 KER 90] . Neelakantan"
+"Kamalasanan v Achutan, 1988 Cr LJ 1212 (Ker)."
+"81. Janardhan Damodhar Dikshit, (1894) 19 Bom 703."
+"82. Deivasigamani, 1977 Cr LJ NOC 110 (Mad)."
+"83. Ramanand v State, (1881) 3 All 664 ."
+"84. Umed Singh, (1923) 46 All 64 . Dissented in Sukhdayal v Saraswati, (936) Nag 217."
+"85. Rajendra Vishwanath Chaudhary v Nayantara Durgadas Vasudeo, 2012 Cr LJ 1363 (Bom)."
+"86. E I Howard v M Mull, (1866) 1 BHC (Appx) 1xxxv, xci. Thus, the truth of the matter has not to"
+be proved literally. It is sufficient if the imputation is proved to be substantially true. 1989 Cr LJ
+"1022 . Following Murlidhar v Narayandas, AIR 1914 Sind 85 : 1915-16 Cr LJ 141 ; Surajmal Mehta"
+"v Horniman, AIR 1917 Bom 62 . Where it is stressed that even an exaggeration will not by itself"
+"defeat this defence; Purushottam Vijay v State of MP, AIR 1961 MP 205 [LNIND 1960 MP 59] DB :"
+1961 (2) Cr LJ 114 where it is observed :
+The statement of fact need only be substantially correct and need not be microscopically or
+photographically true : nor can the prosecutor fasten himself on to an inaccuracy in the detail unless
+the detail itself is such as to make substantial difference to the case.
+"87. Khare v Massani, (1943) Nag 347."
+"88. Radhelal Mangalal Jaiswal v Sheshrao Anandrao Lad, 2011 Cr LJ 2233 (Bom)."
+"89. Kartar Singh, (1956) SCR 476 [LNIND 1956 SC 39] . Relying upon and citing the"
+"observations of Lord Cockburn in Saymour v Butterworth, (1862) 3 F&F 372 and dicta of judges"
+"in R. v Sir R Garden, (1879) 5 QBD 1 . Followed in Radhanath Rath (Dr) v Biraja Prasad Rai, 1992 Cr"
+"LJ 938 (Ori), where the editor and publisher of a newspaper were held not liable as they"
+happened to include a defamatory matter relying upon their reporter who had been a
+trustworthy journalist.
+"90. Arundhati Roy Re, 2002 Cr LJ 1792 : AIR 2002 SC 1375 [LNIND 2002 SC 174] (para 24)."
+91. Ibid.
+"92. McLeod, (1880) 3 All 342 ."
+"93. T Kunhambu v A Sojath, 1989 Cr LJ 1022 (Ker). See also Dagar Singh v Shobha Gupta, 1998"
+Cr LJ 1541 (P&H).
+"94. Shatrughna Pd Sinha v Rajbhan Surajmal Rathi, 1997 Cr LJ 212 : (1996) 6 SCC 263 (SC)."
+"95. Tata Press Ltd v Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd, (1995) 5 SCC 139) [LNIND 1995 SC 755] :"
+AIR 1995 SC 2438 [LNIND 1995 SC 755] .
+"96. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser (I) Ltd, (2006 (32) PTC 307) : ( 2006 CLC 1105 )."
+"97. Nippon Sheet Glass Co Ltd v Raman Fibre Sciences Pvt Ltd, 2011 Cr LJ 2702 (Kar)."
+"98. Kimber v The Press Association, (1893) 1 QB 65 , 68."
+"99. J Wright, (1799) 8 TR 293, 298."
+"100. Kimber v The Press Association, supra."
+"101. Usill v Hales, (1878) 3 CPD 319 ."
+"102. Clement, (1821) 4 B & Ald. 218."
+"103. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360."
+"104. Carlile, (1819) 3 B & Ald. 167."
+"105. Singaraju Nagabhushanam, (1902) 26 Mad 464; Maksud Saiyed v State of Gujarat, (2005) 5"
+SCC 668 : (2007) 140 COMP CASES 590.
+"106. Woodgate v Ridout, (1865) 4 F&F 202, 216. See also Harbans Singh v State of Rajasthan,"
+"1998 Cr LJ 433 (Raj), the word ""shatir"" might be of offending nature and objectionable but not"
+necessarily defamatory. The order dropping the proceedings was not interfered with.
+"107. Abdool Wadood, (1907) 9 Bom LR 230 [LNIND 1907 BOM 6] , 31 Bom 293. See"
+"Ranganayakamma v K Venugopala Rao, 1987 Cr LJ 2000 (AP), the complainant's foreword to a"
+book was criticised by imputing words to the complainant himself which lacked good faith and
+showed malice.
+"108. Note R, p 183."
+"109. Sankara v State, (1883) 6 Mad 381, 395, 396."
+"110. ADM Stubbings v Shella Muthu, 1972 Cr LJ 968 (Ker)."
+"111. Dr. Vishnu Dutt Agarwal v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3595 (All)."
+"112. Yadav Motiram Patil v Rajiv G Ghodankar, 2011 Cr LJ 528 (Bom)."
+"113. Kanwal Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1317 [LNIND 1962 SC 322] ."
+"114. See Damodra Shenoi v PP Ernakulam, 1989 Cr LJ 2398 where it is stressed that the"
+accused must prove by preponderance of probability that he laboured under good faith as
+"defined in section 52, IPC."
+"115. J Sudershan v R Sankaran, 1992 Cr LJ 2427 (Mad). The court referred to MC Verugheese v"
+"TJ Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] ."
+"116. MA Rumugam v Kittu alias Krishnamoorthy, (2009) 1 SCC (Cr) 245 : AIR 2009 SC 341"
+"[LNIND 2008 SC 2186] ; Rallis India Ltd v K T Vijay Kumar, 2010 Cr LJ 2485 (AP); Nayana Jaikisan"
+"Tekwani v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 4094 (Bom)."
+"117. Kanwal Lal, AIR 1963 SC 1317 [LNIND 1962 SC 322] ."
+"118. Chamanlal, (1970) 3 SCR 913 [LNIND 1970 SC 106] ."
+"119. Vedurumudi Rama Rao v Chennuri Venkat Rao, 1997 Cr LJ 3851 (AP)."
+"120. Standard Chartered Bank v Vinay Kumar Sood, 2010 Cr LJ 1277 (Del)."
+"121. Mrs. Jinnat Ara Borbora, 1980 Cr LJ NOC (Gau)."
+"122. Sewakram v RK Karanjia, 1981 Cr LJ 894 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 514 : 1514 : (1981) 3 SCC 208"
+[LNIND 1981 SC 265] .
+"123. Muhammad Gul v Haji Fazley Karim, (1929) 56 Cal 1013 ."
+"124. Karuppusamy, 1974 Cr LJ 33 (Mad)."
+"125. Chamanlal, supra; see also Sukra Mahato v Basudeo Kumar, 1971 Cr LJ 1168 (SC);"
+"Prayagdutt, 1977 Cr LJ 1258 (MP)."
+"126. Pratibha (Dr.) v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Cr LJ 997 (Bom)."
+"127. P Swaminathan v Lakshmanan, 1992 Cr LJ 990 (Mad)."
+"128. Yadav Motiram Patil v Rajiv G Ghodankar, 2011 Cr LJ 528 (Bom)."
+"129. Beckett v Norris, (1945) Mad 749."
+"130. Virji Bhagwan, (1909) 11 Bom LR 638 ."
+"131. Vinayak Atmaram v Shantaram Janardan, (1941) 43 Bom LR 737 ."
+"132. Cooppoosami Chetty v Duraisami Chetty, (1909) 33 Mad 67."
+"133. Abdul Hakim v Tej Chandar Mukarji, (1881) 3 All 815 ."
+"134. Baboo Gunnesh Dutt Singh v Mugneeram Chowdhry, (1872) 11 Beng LR 321 (PC)."
+"135. Satish Chandra Chakravarti v Ram Doyal De, (1920) 48 Cal 388 (SB)."
+"136. Karu Singh, (1926) 7 PLT 587 ."
+"137. Sukhdeo Vithal Pansare, 1974 Cr LJ 1435 (Bom); see also Jiban Krishna Das, 1983 Cr LJ"
+NOC 39 (Cal).
+"138. Parameswara v Krishna Pillai, AIR 1966 Ker 264 [LNIND 1966 KER 11] ."
+"139. Bai Shanta v Umrao Amir, (1925) 50 Bom 162 : 28 Bom LR 1 (FB), overruling Babaji, (1892)"
+"17 Bom 127, and Balkrishna Vithal, (1893) 17 Bom 573."
+"140. Ganga Prasad, (1907) 29 All 685 (FB); Isuri Prasad Singh v Umrao Singh, (1900) 22 All 234 ."
+"141. Chotelal v Phulchand, (1937) Nag 425."
+"142. Hemraj v Babulal, AIR 1962 MP 241 [LNIND 1961 MP 92] ."
+"143. Bai Shanta v Umrao Amir, (1925) 50 Bom 162 : 28 Bom LR 1 (FB). Denial of the relationship"
+of husband and wife in an eviction proceeding between the tenant and complainant was held to
+"be not defamatory, Girish Kakkar v Dr. (Mrs.) Dhanwantri, 1991 Cr LJ 5 (Del). If the words are"
+"defamatory, the proceedings cannot be stayed because it is for the court to decide whether a"
+"privilege is available or not. Pravinchand v Ibrahim Md, 1987 Cr LJ 1795 (Bom)."
+"144. G Janardhana Reddy v A Narayana Reddy, 2010 Cr LJ 2660 (AP)."
+"145. Tiruvengada Mudali v Tripurasundari Ammal, (1926) 49 Mad 728, FB overruling Venkata"
+"Reddy, (1912) 36 Mad 216 (FB)."
+"146. Karu Singh, (1926) 7 PLT 587 : 27 Cr LJ 1320, following Kari Singh, (1912) 40 Cal 433 ."
+"147. Narendra Kapoor v Ramesh C Bansal, 1998 Cr LJ 1863 (Del)."
+"148. MC Vergheese v TJ Poonan, AIR 1970 SC 1876 [LNIND 1968 SC 339] : 1970 Cr LJ 1651 ."
+149. The court also distinguished the present case from its earlier decision in Rev Fr Bernard v
+"Ramachandran Pillai, 1986 Ker LT 1240 : 1987 Cr LJ 739 where in addition to the reply to the"
+"complainant's counsel, the accused spread the rumour in the locality about his alleged pilferage"
+as an employee.
+"150. Rajnarain Sein, (1870) 6 Beng LR (Appx) 42 : 14 WR (Cr) 22."
+"151. Fr. Thomas Maniankerikalam v Thomas J Padiyath, 2003 Cr LJ 945 ."
+"152. Pat Sharpe Mrs. v Dwijendra Nath, (1964) 1 Cr LJ 367 . M S Jayaraj v Commissioner of"
+"Excise, Kerala, (2000) 7 SCC 552 [LNIND 2000 SC 2302] : AIR 2000 SC 3266 [LNIND 2000 KER"
+461] - 'person aggrieved'- meaning
+"153. U Aung Pe, (1938) Ran 404 (FB)."
+"154. Homen Boroghain v Brahmaputra Valley Regional Handloom Weavers' Co-op Society, (1995)"
+"2 Cr LJ 2357 (Gau). Viswanath v Shambhu Nath, 1995 Cr LJ 277 (All) a complaint by a member"
+"of the community which was defamed in general, not maintainable. The complainant was not"
+"personally hurt. MP Narayna Pillai v MP Chacko, 1986 Cr LJ 2002 (Ker) a member of the"
+Christian community could not complain of a general remark against the community KM
+"Mathew v TU Balan, 1985 Cr LJ 1039 (Ker), remarks about teachers on strike, a leader could not"
+complain.
+"155. KV Ramesh v HC Ramesh, 2001 Cr LJ 3556 (Kant)."
+"156. Ratan Singh v Chain Singh, 2000 Cr LJ 2736 (Raj)."
+"157. Sasikurnar B Menon v S Vijayan, 1998 Cr LJ 3973 (Ker)."
+"158. S Khushboo v Kanniammal, 2010 Cr LJ 2828 (SC) : AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411]"
+": 2010 (5) SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] ; Charmesh Sharma v State Of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ"
+2115 (Raj).
+"159. John Thomas v Dr. K Jagdeesan, AIR 2001 SC 2651 [LNIND 2001 SC 1323] ."
+"160. Swamy Anoopananda v Bagmisri, 2000 Cr LJ 4296 (Ori)."
+"161. Beem Singh v S Ramayajam, 2003 Cr LJ NOC 61 (Mad) : 2002 Mad LJ (Ori) 351."
+162. Ibid.
+"163. Beauchamp v Moore, (1902) 26 Mad 43."
+"164. Rallis India Ltd v K T Vijay Kumar, 2010 Cr LJ 2485 (AP)."
+"165. Chief Education Officer, Salem v K S Palanichamy, 2012 Cr LJ 2543 (Mad). See other view in"
+"Rallis India Ltd v K T Vijay Kumar, 2010 Cr LJ 2485 (AP) discussed above."
+"166. Subhash K Shah v K Shankar Bhat, 1993 Cr LJ 1296 (Kant)."
+"167. Subhash K Shah v K Shankar Bhat, 1993 Cr LJ 1296 ."
+"168. Pyarelal Maganlal Jaiswal v State of Maharashtra, 1996 Cr LJ 989 (Bom)."
+"169. MN Damani v SK Sinha, AIR 2001 SC 2037 [LNIND 2001 SC 1149] . Rajesh Rangarajan v"
+"Crop Care Fed. of India, 2010 (9) Scale 23 [LNIND 2010 SC 626] -Proceedings quashed."
+"170. Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande, v Uttam, 1999 Cr LJ 1620 : AIR 1999 SC 1028 [LNIND 1999"
+SC 136] .
+"171. G Janardhana Reddy v A Narayana Reddy, 2010 Cr LJ 2660 ; AP Ramoji Rao, Chairman"
+"Ramoji Group of Companies v State of AP, AIR 2006 SC 3384 [LNIND 2006 SC 820] : (2006) 8"
+SCC 321) [LNIND 2006 SC 820] - proceedings quashed since the accused agreed to give a
+clarification in the TV channel as the news item was not the intended in any manner to defame
+or harm the reputation of the Chief Minister or his entourage of ministers and officials.
+"172. Vedurumudi Rama Rao v Chennuri Venkat Rao, 1997 Cr LJ 3851 ."
+"173. Darusing Durgasing v State of Gujarat, 1999 Cr LJ 1620 : AIR 1999 SC 1028 [LNIND 1999 SC"
+136] .
+"174. Valmiki Faleiro v Mrs. Lauriana Fernandes, 2005 Cr LJ 2498 ."
+"175. Jeffrey J Diermeier v State of WB, (2010) 6 SCC 243 [LNIND 2010 SC 512] : (2010) 3"
+SCC(Cr) 138.
+"176. KM Mathew v KA Abraham, 1998 Cr LJ 327 (Ker)."
+"177. Subhiksha Trading Services Ltd v Azim H Premji, 2011 Cr LJ 2769 (Mad)."
+"178. Shiv Kumar Agarwal v State of Meghalaya, 2013 Cr LJ 421 ."
+"179. Shiv Kumar Agarwal v State of Meghalaya, 2013 Cr LJ 421 ."
+"180. Abhijit Pawar v Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar, AIR 2017 SC 299 [LNIND 2016 SC 614] :"
+(2017)3 SCC 528 [LNIND 2016 SC 614] .
+"181. Bir Chandra Das v Anil Kumar Sarkar, 2011 Cr LJ 3422 (Cal)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XXI OF DEFAMATION
+[s 501] Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory.
+"Whoever prints 1 or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe"
+"that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple"
+"imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+The offence under this section is a distinct offence from the one under section 500.
+The person printing or engraving defamatory matter abets the offence. This section
+makes such abetment a distinct offence. Where the content of any news item carried in
+"a newspaper is defamatory as defined under section 499 IPC, 1860, the mere printing"
+of such material ' knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is
+"defamatory' itself constitutes a distinct offence under section 501 IPC, 1860.182."
+[s 501.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two things:—
+1. Printing or engraving any matter.
+2. Knowledge or reason to believe that such matter is defamatory.
+1. 'Prints'.—The publisher of a newspaper in which defamatory matter is printed is
+"liable under section 500. If he is also the printer of the newspaper, the case would be"
+covered by this section. But his liability under section 500 would in no way be
+"affected.183. In a case, where the Editor/owner of magazine published defamatory"
+statements containing imputations without due care and attention and without making
+any attempt of verification before publication and the same was not published in good
+"faith. The court held that the charges framed against the accused under section 500,"
+"501 and 502 read with section 34 IPC, 1860, stand proved.184."
+"182. Mohammed Abdulla Khan v Prakash K, AIR 2017 SC 5608 ."
+"183. Ramesh Chander, AIR 1966 Punj 93 ."
+"184. B R K Murthy v State Of AP, 2013 Cr LJ 1602 (AP). See also Editor, Deccan Herald v M S"
+"Ramaraju, 2005 Cr LJ 2672 (Kar)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XXI OF DEFAMATION
+[s 502] Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter.
+Whoever sells or offers for sale any printed or engraved substance containing
+"defamatory matter, knowing that it contains such matter, shall be punished with"
+"simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with"
+both.
+COMMENT.—
+This section supplements the provisions of the previous section by making the seller of
+defamatory matter punishable under it.
+[s 502.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two essentials:—
+1. Selling or offering for sale any printed or engraved substance.
+2. Knowledge that such substance contains defamatory matter.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 503] Criminal intimidation.
+"Whoever threatens another with any injury1. to his person, reputation or property, or to"
+"the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to"
+"cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not"
+"legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do,"
+"as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation."
+Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the
+"person threatened is interested, is within this section."
+ILLUSTRATION
+"A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn"
+B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.
+COMMENT.—
+The offence of criminal intimidation requires either a person or another in whom he is
+specially interested to be threatened. There must be an intent to cause alarm to the
+former by a threat to him of injury to himself or to the latter. The intent itself might be
+"complete, though it could not be effected. But the existence of the interest seems"
+"essential to the offence, as also and equally to the attempt to commit the offence,"
+since otherwise the attempt would be to do something not constituting the offence.1
+[s 503.1] Ingredients.—
+(1) Threatening a person with any injury.
+"(a) to his person, reputation or property or;"
+(b) to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
+(2) The threat must be with intent;
+"(a) to cause alarm to that person, or"
+(b) to cause that person to do any Act which he is not legally bound to do as
+means of avoiding execution of such threat; or
+(c) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally
+entitled to do as means of avoiding execution of such threat.
+"Therefore, intention must be to cause alarm to the victim and whether he is alarmed or"
+not is really of no consequence. But material has to be brought on record to show that
+intention was to cause alarm to that person.2.
+1. 'Threatens another with any injury'.—The gist of the offence is the effect which the
+"threat is intended to have upon the mind of the person threatened, and it is clear that"
+before it can have any effect upon his mind it must be either made to him by the person
+threatening or communicated to him in some way. The threat referred to in this section
+must be a threat communicated or uttered with the intention of its being
+communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing his mind.3. The
+threat must be one which can be put into execution by the person threatening. It is not
+necessary that the injury should be one to be inflicted by the offender; it is sufficient if
+he can cause it to be inflicted by another; and the infliction of it could be avoided by
+some act or omission that the person threatening desires. Punishment by God is not
+one which a person could cause to be inflicted or the execution of which he could
+avoid.4.
+"A threat, in order to be indictable, must be made with intent to cause alarm to the"
+complainant. Mere vague allegation by the accused that he is going to take revenge by
+false complaints cannot amount to criminal intimidation.5.
+[s 503.2] Criminal intimidation and Extortion.—
+Criminal intimidation is analogous to extortion. In extortion the immediate purpose is
+"obtaining money or money's worth; in criminal intimidation, the immediate purpose is"
+"to induce the person threatened to do, or abstain from doing, something which he was"
+not legally bound to do or omit.
+[s 503.3] Threat of injury to reputation.—
+"The accused took indecent photographs of a girl and threatened her father, in letters"
+"written to him with publication of the photographs unless ""hush money"" was paid to"
+him. The Supreme Court held that the accused was guilty of criminal intimidation and
+not of attempt to commit extortion.6. Where the head master of a school threatened a
+"lady-teacher that until she signed certain papers in blank he would spoil her modesty,"
+the Supreme Court held that this offence as well as that of extortion were made out.7.
+Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be
+sufficient to bring in the application of this section.8.
+[s 503.4] Person informed about threatened injury to another must be
+interested in him.—
+A threat to commit suicide is not within the section unless the other person be
+interested in the person giving the threat.9.
+"1. Mangesh Jivaji, (1887) 11 Bom 376, 379, 380."
+"2. Amulya Kumar Behera v Nabaghana Behera, 1995 Cr LJ 355 (Ori)."
+"3. Gunga Chunder sen v Gour Chunder Banikya, (1888) 15 Cal 671 , 673. See SS Sanyal v KVR."
+"Nair, 1987 Cr LJ 2074 , when the charge-sheeted employee met the chairman of the company,"
+"the latter remarked to him : ""your days are numbered,"" it was not an intimidation in the context"
+because the purpose must have been to tell him that his service was not going to last beyond
+numbered days.
+"4. Doraiswamy Ayyar, (1924) 48 Mad 774."
+"5. Govind, (1900) 2 Bom LR 55 ."
+"6. Romesh Chandra Arora, (1960) 1 SCR 924 [LNIND 1959 SC 177] ."
+"7. Chander Kala v Ram Kishan, AIR 1985 SC 1268 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] : 1985 Cr LJ 1490 :"
+"(1985) 4 SCC 212 [LNIND 1985 SC 166] . See also Anuradha v State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cr LJ"
+410 .
+"8. Manik Taneja v State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 [LNIND 2015 SC 35] ."
+"9. Nubi Buksh v Must. Oomra, (1866) PR No. 109 of 1866. See also Kolla Srinivas v State of AP,"
+2005 Cr LJ 2440 (AP).
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 504] Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.
+"Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending"
+or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public
+"peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
+COMMENT.—
+This section provides a remedy for using abusive and insulting language. Abusive
+language which may lead to a breach of the public peace is not an offence. There must
+"be an intentional insult. Insult may be offered by words or conduct. If it is by words, the"
+words must amount to something more than mere vulgar abuse.10. Mere breach of
+good manners does not constitute an offence under this section.11. If the insult is of
+such a nature that it may give provocation which might rouse a man to act either to
+"break the public peace or to commit any other offence, the offence is committed.12."
+In judging whether a particular abusive language comes within the mischief of section
+"504, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860), the Court has to see what would be the effect"
+of the language used in ordinary course of events and not how the complainant
+actually behaved on being abused. Merely because a man of cool temperament did not
+react violently or break the peace it does not follow that no offence was committed by
+the accused.13. In the absence of actual words used by the accused or even a gist of it
+in the complaint it is not possible to say if the case falls within the ambit of section 504
+"(IPC, 1960), and as such the charge has to be quashed.14. Thus where the only"
+allegation in the complaint was that when the complainant resisted the attempts by the
+"accused to evict her forcibly from the land in her tenancy, the accused persons abused"
+"her in filthy words, the complainant not disclosing the actual words used by the"
+"accused or that she was provoked by the insulting abuse, the accused were not"
+summoned.15.
+[s 504.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires two essentials:—
+1. Intentionally insulting a person and thereby giving provocation to him.
+2. The person insulting must intend or know it to be likely that such provocation will
+cause him to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.16.
+Mere hurling of abuses in absence of any allegation that such abuses were given
+intending or knowingly that such an action would provoke the aggrieved person to
+break public peace or to commit an offence does not fall within the definition of the
+"offence as prescribed under section 504, (IPC, 1860). A bare reading of the section"
+does not leave any room for doubt that the intentional insult which is given by the
+accused should be clothed with the intention or knowledge that such an insult would
+provoke the aggrieved person to commit breach of public peace or to commit an
+offence.17. Section 504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of
+peace.
+"In order to attract the ingredients of an offence under section 504 of the (IPC, 1860), it"
+would be necessary that actual words used or supposed to have been used should be
+"mentioned in the complaint/written report, otherwise it would be extremely difficult for"
+the Court to decide whether or not the words used amounted to an intentional insult.18.
+[s 504.2] Sections 499 and 504.—
+The difference between an offence under this section and defamation lies in the fact
+"that in defamation, publication to the prosecutor alone is not sufficient, as such an"
+imputation could not be said to harm the reputation of the person; but under this
+section this would complete the offence.
+"10. Pukh Raj v State, (1953) 3 Raj 983 ."
+"11. Abraham v State, AIR 1960 Ker 236 [LNIND 1960 KER 34] ."
+"12. Mohammed Sabad Ali v Thuleswar Borah, (1954) 6 Ass 274."
+"13. K Veerangaiah, 1976 Cr LJ 1690 (AP)."
+"14. Prem Pal Singh, 1981 Cr LJ 1208 (HP)."
+"15. Jodh Singh v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 3226 (All)."
+"16. Restated in Jodh Singh v State of UP, 1991 Cr LJ 3226 (All). Sanction to prosecute a public"
+servant under this section would be needed only when his act in question is a part of his official
+"duty, and not when he abuses or insults a person who is in police lock-up. Abani Ch Biswal v"
+"State of Orissa, 1988 Cr LJ 1038 (Ori)."
+"17. Abdul Majid v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 4392 (Raj); Prakash Chandra Bafna v Oba Ram,"
+2011 Cr LJ 416 (Raj)-using vulgar and filthy language against complainant when he went to his
+"office to ask reason for not permitting him to mark his presence in register- held, not part of"
+official duty and sanction is not necessary to prosecute him.
+"18. Shiv Sundar Bharti v State of Bihar, 2017(1) Crimes 351 (Pat) : 2016 Cr LJ 4761 (Pat)."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 505] Statements conducing to public mischief.
+"19.(1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report,—"
+"(a) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, 20."
+"[sailor or airman] in the Army, 21.[Navy or Air Force] 22.of India to"
+mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or
+"(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the"
+"public, or to any section of the public whereby any person may be"
+induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public
+tranquillity; or
+"(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or"
+community of persons to commit any offence against any other class
+"or community,"
+"shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to [three years], or"
+"with fine, or with both."
+"23.(2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classess."
+"Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing"
+"rumour or alarming news with intent to create or promote, or which is likely"
+"to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,"
+"language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of"
+"enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or"
+"regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment which may extend to 24.[three years], or with fine, or with both."
+"25.(3) Offence under sub-section (2) committed in place of worship, etc."
+Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (2) in any place of
+worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship
+"or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may"
+extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.
+"Exception.—It does not amount to an offence, within the meaning of this"
+"section, when the person making, publishing or circulating any such"
+"statement, rumour or report, has reasonable grounds for believing that such"
+"statement, rumour or report is true and makes, publishes or circulates [it in"
+good faith] and without any such intent as aforesaid.
+STATE AMENDMENT
+"Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh the offence is cognizable vide G.O. Ms. No. 732,"
+dated 5-12-1991.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is aimed at reports calculated to produce mutiny or to induce one section
+of the population to commit offences against another and to prevent and remove
+communal and religious tensions. The Supreme Court has held that the provisions of
+this section are not unconstitutional as being violative of the fundamental right of
+freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.26. Sub-
+sections (2) and (3) of this section have now been made cognizable offences under the
+"Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973). Of course, offences under this section"
+"and sections 506 and 507, (IPC, 1860), can be made cognizable offences in specified"
+areas by the State Government by a notification in the official Gazette under section 10
+"of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932."
+A mere threat which causes no alarm to the complainant does not constitute an
+offence under the section.27.
+[s 505.1] Sections 153A and 505.—
+It is necessary under section 505 that there should be a publication of words or
+"representation intended for promoting feelings of enmity or hatred, but this is not"
+necessary under section 153A. Inciting of the feelings of one group merely without any
+reference to another group does not attract section 153A or section 505.28. The Court
+"referred to the decision in Balwant Singh v State of Punjab,29. where the ruling was that"
+mens rea is a necessary ingredient for the offence under section 153A. Mens rea is an
+equally necessary postulate for the offence under section 505(2) also as could be
+"discerned from the words ""with intent to create or promote or which is likely to create"
+"or promote"" as used in that sub-section. The Court also referred to the decision in"
+"Sunilakhya Chowdhury v HM Jadwet,30. wherein it was held that the words ""makes or"
+"publishes any imputation"" should be interpreted as words supplementing each other. A"
+maker of imputation without publication is not liable to be punished under section 499.
+"The same interpretation is warranted in respect of the words ""makes, publishes or"
+"circulates"" in section 505 (IPC, 1860) also."
+"19. Section 505 renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section by Act 35 of 1969, section 3"
+(w.e.f. 4 September 1969).
+"20. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch I, for or sailor."
+"21. Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, section 2 and Sch I, for or Navy."
+22. Subs. by A.O. 1950 for of Her Majesty or in the Imperial Service Troops. The words or in the
+"Royal Indian Marine occurring after the words Majesty were omitted by Act 35 of 1934, section"
+2 and Sch.
+"23. Ins. by Act 35 of 1969, section 3(i) (w.e.f. 4 September 1969)."
+"24. Subs. by Act 41 of 1961, section 4, for two years (w.e.f. 12 September 1961)."
+"25. Ins. by Act 35 of 1969, section 3(i) (w.e.f. 4 September 1969)."
+"26. Kedar Nath, AIR 1962 SC 955 [LNIND 1962 SC 21] ."
+"27. Amitabh Adhar v NCT of Delhi, 2000 Cr LJ 4772 (Del)."
+"28. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v State of AP, AIR 1997 SC 3483 [LNIND 1997 SC 1060] : 1997 Cr LJ 4091"
+.
+"29. Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] : 1995 AIR SCW"
+2803 : (1995) 3 SCC 214 [LNIND 1995 SC 1420] .
+"30. Sunilakhya Chowdhury v HM Jadwet, AIR 1968 Cal 266 [LNIND 1967 CAL 167] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 506] Punishment for criminal intimidation.
+"Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with"
+"fine, or with both;"
+"If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc."
+"and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of"
+"any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or 31."
+"[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to"
+"seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with"
+"imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,"
+"or with fine, or with both."
+STATE AMENDMENTS
+Uttar Pradesh.—The following amendments were made by Notification No. 777/VIII 9-
+"4(2)-87, dated 31-7-1989, published in U.P. Gazette, Extra, Part-4, Section (Kha) dated 2-8-"
+1989.
+"""Any offence punishable under section 506, (IPC, 1860), when committed in any district"
+"of Uttar Pradesh, shall be notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal"
+"Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973) be cognizable and non-bailable."""
+Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh the offence is non-bailable if committed in A.P. vide
+"G.O. Ms. No. 732, dated 5-12-1991."
+COMMENT.—
+Where a person entered the victim's house during midnight armed with a knife and
+"threatened with death anyone who came between himself and the victim, the offence"
+under this section was held to have been made out.32. The threat must be real in the
+sense that the accused means what he says and the victim of the threat should feel
+threatened actually.33. Where the accused made his outburst on a public servant when
+"he was on the way to attend his office saying that he was going to kill him, it was held"
+that it was sufficient to hold that the act will fall under section 506.34.
+[s 506.1] Mere words.—
+"In order to attract the ingredients of section 506, (IPC, 1860) the intention of the"
+"accused must be to cause alarm to the victim. Mere expression of words, without any"
+"intention to cause alarm, would not suffice.35. In Amulya Kumar Behera v Nabaghana"
+"Behera,36. it was held that intention of the accused must be to cause alarm to the"
+"victim and whether he is alarmed or not is of no consequence. However, mere"
+expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to
+bring in the application of section 506.
+"In absence of basic ingredients of the section in the complaint, no case under section"
+"506 (IPC, 1860) can be sustained.37. Where all the witnesses have stated in specific"
+terms that the accused came prepared and intimidated the complainant and also other
+witnesses. All the respondents are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable
+"under section 506 of the (IPC, 1860).38."
+Where it was found that that the accused issued no threats to the complainant so as to
+"cause death or grievous hurt, it was held that mere exhortation to his co-accused to"
+"finish him, did not amount to threat. His conviction under section 506 was set aside.39."
+Asking a person not to work in a private garden and threatening him to go away form
+the garden would not satisfy the requirements of the section.40.
+The statements said to have been made against accused six months prior to the death
+"of the deceased with regard to the offence under section 506. (IPC, 1860) cannot be"
+"treated as admissible under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.41."
+[s 506.2] Part-I Non-cognizable.—
+"Since the part 1 of section 506 is not cognizable, the permission of the Magistrate"
+would be required to try the applicants under said section.42.
+"31. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for transportation for life (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"32. Ghanshyam v State of MP, 1990 Cr LJ 1017 (MP)."
+"33. Noble Mohandas v State of TN, 1989 Cr LJ 669 (Mad). Threatening and giving fist blow to a"
+"surgeon of a Government hospital, held offence under the section, Siyasaran v State of MP, 1995"
+Cr LJ 2126 (SC).
+"34. Rajendra Datt v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 1025 (P&H)."
+"35. Tammineedi Bhaskara Rao v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 1204 (AP)."
+"36. Amulya Kumar Behera v Nabaghana Behera, 1995 Cr LJ 3559 (Ori)."
+"37. Gorige Pentaiah v State of AP, 2009 Cr LJ 350 : 2008 (12) SCC 531 [LNINDORD 2008 SC 247]"
+.
+"38. State of Maharashtra v Tatyaba Bajirao Jadhav, 2011 Cr LJ 2717 (Bom); State of HP v Vijay"
+Kumar 2010 Cr LJ 475 .
+"39. Mohinder Singh v State of Haryana, 1993 Cr LJ 85 (P&H). Dimpey Gujral v Union Territory"
+"2013, AIR 2013 SC 518 : Cr LJ 520; Surat Singh v State, 2013 (1) Scale 1 [LNIND 2012 SC 837] ."
+"40. Saraswathi v State of TN, 2002 Cr LJ 1420 (Mad). Sanjay Pandey v Chhaganlal J Jain, 2001"
+Cr LJ 2127 (Bom).
+"41. D Vijay Kumar v State of AP, 2010 Cr LJ 968 (AP)."
+"42. Narendra Bhojram Patil v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 2762 (Bom). See also Vishwajit P"
+"Rane v State of Goa, 2011 Cr LJ 1289 (Bom), Government of Goa issued a notification declaring"
+"offence punishable under section 506 of the (IPC, 1860) committed within State of Goa, as"
+"cognizable and non-bailable. Held, there is no power vesting in the State Government to amend"
+"the First Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974) by issuing a notification."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 507] Criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication.
+Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous
+"communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of the"
+"person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to two years, in addition to the punishment"
+provided for the offence by the last preceding section.
+STATE AMENDMENT
+"Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh the offence is cognizable vide G.O. Ms. No. 732,"
+dated 5-12-1991.
+COMMENT.—
+For a conviction under this section it must be shown that the accused committed
+criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication.43.
+"43. Doraiswamy Ayyar, (1924) 48 Mad 774."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 508] Act caused by inducing person to believe that he will be rendered an
+object of Divine displeasure.
+Whoever voluntarily causes or attempts to cause any person to do anything which that
+"person is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do anything which he is legally entitled"
+"to do, by inducing or attempting to induce that person to believe that he or any person"
+in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered by some act of the offender
+an object of Divine displeasure if he does not do the thing which it is the object of the
+"offender to cause him to do, or if he does the thing which it is the object of the"
+"offender to cause him to omit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either"
+"description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A sits dharna at Z's door with the intention of causing it to be believed that, by so"
+"sitting, he renders Z an object of Divine displeasure. A has committed the"
+offence defined in this section.
+"(b) A threatens Z that, unless Z performs a certain act, A will kill one of A's own"
+"children, under such circumstances that the killing would be believed to render Z"
+an object of Divine displeasure. A has committed the offence defined in this
+section.
+COMMENT.—
+This section is intended to prevent such practices as dharna and traga.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+"[s 509] Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman."
+"Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any"
+"sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be"
+"heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon"
+"the privacy of such woman, 44.[shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term"
+"which may extend to three years, and also with fine]."
+COMMENT.—
+If a man intending to outrage the modesty of a woman exposes his person indecently
+to her or uses obscene words intending that she should hear them or exhibits to her
+"obscene drawing, he commits this offence."
+[s 509.1] Ingredients.—
+This section requires:—
+1. Intention to insult the modesty of a woman.
+2. The insult must be caused
+"(i) by uttering any word or making any sound or gesture, or exhibiting any object"
+intending that such word or sound shall be heard or that the gesture or object
+"shall be seen by such woman, or"
+(ii) by intruding upon the privacy of such woman.
+The burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused had uttered the words or
+"made the sound or gesture and that such word, sound or gesture was intended by the"
+"accused to be heard or seen by some woman. Normally, it is difficult to establish this"
+"and, seldom, a woman files complaint and often the wrong doers are left unpunished"
+even if complaint is filed since there is no effective mechanism to monitor and follow
+up such acts.45.
+[s 509.2] Indecent overtures.—
+"Section 509 (IPC, 1860) criminalises a 'word, gesture or act intended to insult the"
+modesty of a woman' and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that
+the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been
+"insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act. Clearly, this offence cannot be made"
+out when the complainants' grievance is with the publication of what the appellant had
+stated in a written form.46.
+"The modesty contemplated under section 509 is to be understood as the ""womanly"
+"propriety of behaviour"".47."
+"44. Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 10 (w.e.f. 3"
+"February 2013) for the words ""shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may"
+"extend to one year, or with fine, or with both."""
+"45. Deputy Inspector General of Police v S Samuthiram, AIR 2013 SC 14 [LNIND 2012 SC 755] :"
+(2013) 1 SCC 598 [LNIND 2012 SC 755] .
+"46. S Khushboo v Kanniammal, AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 Cr LJ 2828 (SC) :"
+2010 (5) SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] .
+"47. Aloshia Joseph v Joseph Kollamparambil, 2009 Cr LJ 2190 ; Maloji Patil v State of Goa, 2009"
+"Cr LJ 903 (Bom); Santha v State, 2006 (1) Ker LT 249 - whether a lady, can be convicted for an"
+"offence under section 509 (IPC, 1860)"
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+"CHAPTER XXII OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION, INSULT AND ANNOYANCE"
+[s 510] Misconduct in public by a drunken person.
+"Whoever, in a state of intoxication, appears in any public place, or in any place which it"
+"is a trespass in him to enter, and there conducts himself in such a manner as to cause"
+"annoyance to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term"
+"which may extend to twenty-four hours, or with fine which may extend to ten rupees,"
+or with both.
+COMMENT.—
+Ingredients.—This section requires two things:—
+1. Appearance of a person in a state of intoxication in
+"(i) any public place, or"
+(ii) any place which it is a trespass in him to enter.
+2. The person so appearing must have conducted himself in such a manner as to
+cause annoyance to any person.
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+CHAPTER XXIII OF ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT OFFENCES
+[s 511] Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with
+imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.
+Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by this Code1. with 1
+"[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed,"
+"and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where"
+"no express provision is made by this Code2. for the punishment of such attempt, be"
+"punished with 2 [imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term"
+"which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-"
+"half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence], or with such fine"
+"as is provided for the offence, or with both."
+ILLUSTRATIONS
+"(a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a box, and finds"
+"after so opening the box, that there is no jewel in it. He has done an act towards"
+"the commission of theft, and therefore is guilty under this section."
+(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z's pocket.
+A fails in the attempt in consequence of Z's having nothing in his pocket. A is
+guilty under this section.
+COMMENT.—
+"Before completion of crime, human mind has to pass four steps as under:—"
+(1) Intention to commit;
+(2) Preparation to commit it;
+(3) Attempt to commit it; and
+"(4) If the attempt is successful, then crime is complete."
+"Section 511 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860) is a general provision dealing with the"
+attempts to commit offences and not made punishable by other specific section. It
+makes punishable all attempts to commit offences punishable with imprisonment and
+not only those punishable for life or death.3.
+A person commits the offence of 'attempt to commit a particular offence' when (i) he
+"intends to commit that particular offence; and (ii) he, having made preparations and"
+"with the intention to commit the offence, does an act towards its commission; such an"
+"act need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of that offence, but must"
+"be an act during the course of committing that offence, section 511, IPC, 1860 is"
+"attracted.4. An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or a series of acts, which leads"
+"inevitably to the commission of the offence, unless something, which the doer of the"
+"act neither foresaw nor intended, happens to prevent this. An attempt may be"
+"described to be an act done in part execution of a criminal design, amounting to more"
+"than mere preparation, but falling short of actual consummation, and, possessing,"
+"except for failure to consummate, all the elements of the substantive crime. In other"
+"words, an attempt consists in it the intent to commit a crime, falling short of, its actual"
+commission or consummation/completion. It may consequently be defined as that
+which if not prevented would have resulted in the full consummation of the act
+attempted. The illustrations given in section 511 clearly show the legislative intention
+to make a difference between the cases of a mere preparation and an attempt.5.
+"In Om Prakash's case6. the Supreme Court has clearly held that like section 511, IPC,"
+"1860 in section 307, IPC, 1860 to the act need not be the penultimate act."
+[s 511.1] Essentials.—
+"In every crime, there is first intention to commit it; second, preparation to commit it;"
+"third, attempt to commit it. If the third stage, that is attempt is successful, then the"
+"crime is complete. If the attempt fails, the crime is not complete but the law punishes"
+"the person attempting the act. An 'attempt' is made punishable, because every attempt,"
+"although it fails of success, must create alarm, which, of itself, is an injury, and the"
+moral guilt of the offender is the same as if he had succeeded.
+"A culprit first intends to commit the offence, then makes preparation for committing it"
+"and thereafter attempts to commit the offence. If the attempt succeeds, he has"
+"committed the offence, if it fails due to reasons beyond his control, he is said to have"
+attempted to commit the offence. Attempt to commit an offence can be said to begin
+when the preparations are complete and the culprit commences to do something with
+the intention of committing the offence and which is a step towards the commission of
+"the offence. The moment he commences to do an act with the necessary intention, he"
+commences his attempt to commit the offence—the act need not be the penultimate
+act towards the commission of the offence but it must be an act during the course of
+committing that offence.7.
+(1) Intention.—Intention is the direction of conduct towards the object chosen upon
+considering the motives which suggest the choice.8. The will is not to be taken for the
+"deed, unless there be some external act which shows that progress has been made in"
+"the direction of it, or towards maturing and affecting it. In an attempt to commit an"
+"offence, there must be intention to commit the crime combined with doing of some act"
+"adopted to, but falling short of its actual commission.9."
+(2) Preparation.—Preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures
+necessary for the commission of an offence.10.
+[s 511.2] Removal of rice bags from godown in order to sell them.—
+A Government stockist removed 80 bags of rice from a godown in his charge and
+concealed them in a room with a view to sell them and appropriate the sale proceeds. It
+"was held that the act of the stockist amounted only to preparation and therefore, he"
+was not guilty of any offence.11.
+[s 511.3] Running towards well for committing suicide.—
+"A woman ran to a well stating she would jump into it, and she was caught before she"
+could reach it. It was held that she could not be convicted of an attempt to commit
+suicide as she might have changed her mind before jumping into the well.12.
+(3) Attempt.—Attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after the
+"preparations are made.13. In State of Maharashtra v Mohd. Yakub,14. reported in the"
+Apex Court considered the definition of 'attempt to commit crime' as the last proximate
+"act which a person does towards the commission of an offence, the consummation of"
+the offence being hindered by circumstances beyond his control. It was observed by
+"the Apex Court that what constitutes an ""attempt"" is a mixed question of law and fact,"
+"depending largely on the circumstances of the particular case. ""Attempt"" defies a"
+"precise and exact definition. Broadly speaking, all crimes which consist of the"
+commission of affirmative acts are preceded by some covert or overt conduct which
+may be divided into three stages. The first stage exists when the culprit first entertains
+"the idea or intention to commit an offence. In the second stage, he makes preparations"
+to commit it. The third stage is reached when the culprit takes deliberate overt steps to
+commit the offence. Such overt act or step in order to be 'criminal' need not be the
+penultimate act towards the commission of the offence. It is sufficient if such act or
+"acts were deliberately done, and manifest a clear intention to commit the offence"
+"aimed, being reasonably proximate to the consummation of the offence."
+The test for determining whether the acts constitute attempt or preparation is whether
+the overt acts already done are such that if the offender changes his mind and does not
+"proceed further in its progress, the acts already done would be completely harmless."
+"But where the thing done is such as, if not prevented by any extraneous cause, would"
+"fructify into commission of an offence, it would amount to an attempt to commit that"
+offence.15. An attempt to commit an offence does not cease to be an attempt merely
+because after the attempt is made and before the actual completion of the offence the
+offender may be able to prevent its completion by doing some other act in pursuance
+of a changed intention.16.
+An accused is liable for attempt where his failure to commit an offence is not due to
+"any act or omission of his own, but to the intervention of some factor independent of"
+his own volition.17. Where misrepresentations had been made and money obtained
+"from the persons sought to be cheated by misrepresentations, there is an attempt to"
+cheat and not merely a preparation for committing that offence.18.
+[s 511.4] Distinction between 'preparation' and 'attempt'.—
+There is a distinction between 'preparation' and 'attempt'. Attempt begins where
+preparation ends. A person commits the offence of attempt to commit a particular
+"offence when accused (i) intends to commit a particular offence, (ii) he having made"
+"preparation and with the intention to commit an offence, (iii) does an act towards its"
+"commission, such an act need not be the penultimate act towards the commission of"
+that offence but must be an act during the course of committing that offence.19.
+1. 'Offence punishable by this Code'.—No criminal liability can be incurred under the
+"Code by an attempt to do an act, which if done will not be an offence against the"
+Code.20.
+"The expression ""whoever attempts to commit an offence"" in this section can only mean"
+"""whoever intends to do a certain act with the intent or knowledge necessary for the"
+"commission of that offence"".21."
+[s 511.5] Impossible offence.—
+"An attempt is possible, even when the offence attempted cannot be committed; as"
+"when a person, intending to pick another person's pocket, thrusts his hand into the"
+"pocket, but finds it empty. That such an act would amount to a criminal attempt"
+"appears from the illustrations to this section. But in doing such an act, the offender's"
+"intention is to commit a complete offence, and his act only falls short of the offence by"
+reason of an accidental circumstance which has prevented the completion of the
+offence. It is possible to attempt to commit an impossible theft and so offend against
+"the Code because theft is itself an offence against the Code, and may therefore, be"
+attempted within the meaning of the Code. At the same time it is necessary to show
+that the means adopted are apparently suitable for the fulfilment of the design.22. Thus
+where a man threatens the life of another with a child's pop gun using a cork as a
+projectile23. or tries to pick the pocket of a man who is well beyond the reach of his
+"hand, no attempt either to commit murder or to steal can be said to have been"
+committed as the means adopted are impossible of achieving the designed purpose.
+Similar would be the case in regard to absolutely impossible acts. Thus where the act
+"is such that it is incapable of commission, e.g., trying to steal from an empty room or"
+an empty pocket or trying to kill a person by shooting at a bulge in a bed thinking it to
+"be the enemy, no criminal attempt can be said to have been committed.24. In the IPC,"
+"1860, however, trying to steal from an empty pocket would still constitute an attempt"
+"as Illustration (b) to section 511, IPC, 1860 specifically says so. Though in England too"
+this happened to be the law previously25. the position has materially changed after the
+decision of the House of Lords in Haughtons case.26. It is felt that the law in India
+should be changed on this score at least to bring about a uniformity of approach to this
+"question of attempt so far sections 307 and 511, IPC, 1860 are concerned especially,"
+"after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash's case,27. has held"
+that under both these sections the act need not be the last proximate act.
+[s 511.6] Attempt to cheat.—
+The accused applied to the Patna University for permission to appear at the MA
+Examination in English as a private candidate representing that he was a graduate
+having obtained his BA degree three years earlier and that he had been teaching in a
+"certain school. In support of his application, he attached certain certificates purporting"
+to be from the Headmaster of the School and the Inspector of Schools. The University
+"authorities gave the accused permission to appear at the examination. Later on, finding"
+that the certificates were false and that the accused was not a graduate and was not a
+"teacher, the University authorities withdrew the permission. The Supreme Court held"
+that the accused was guilty of attempting to cheat and that the moment the accused
+"dispatched his application to the University, he entered the realm of attempting to"
+commit the offence of cheating.28. Where the accused made an alteration in his own
+"affidavit under the honest belief that it was necessary for customs' clearance, the"
+Supreme Court set aside the conviction under section 420 read with this section.29.
+The offence of attempting to cheat may be committed even though the person
+attempted to be cheated does not believe in the representations made to him and is
+not misled by them but only feigns belief in order to trap the offender.30.
+[s 511.7] Outraging Modesty of a Woman and attempt to Rape (sections 354
+and 511 read with section 376).—
+In between complete rape and attempt to commit rape there is a rare area covered by
+"section 354 of IPC, 1860, i.e., assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage"
+her modesty or indecent assault. The dividing line between attempt to commit rape and
+indecent assault is not only thin but also is practically invisible. For an offence of
+"attempt to commit rape, prosecution is required to establish that the act of the accused"
+"went beyond the stage of preparation. In a given case, where the prosecutrix was made"
+naked and her cries attracted her uncle who came to the spot and then the accused
+"fled away, it was held that it was not a case of attempt to commit rape but was one"
+"under section 354 of IPC, 1860.31."
+[s 511.8] 'Attempt could be a minor offence'.—
+"It is true that there was no charge under section 376 read with section 511, IPC, 1860."
+"However, under section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973)"
+when a person is charged for an offence he may be convicted of an attempt to commit
+such offence although the attempt is not separately charged.32.
+2. 'Where no express provision is made by this Code'.—The section does not apply to
+cases of attempts made punishable by some specific sections of the Code. The
+attempts specifically provided for are:—
+"Section 121, attempt to wage war against the Government of India. Section 124,"
+attempt wrongfully to restrain the President and other high officials with intent to
+induce or compel them to exercise or refrain from exercising any of their lawful powers.
+"Section 125, attempt to wage war against the Government of any Asiatic Power in"
+"alliance or at peace with the Government of India. Section 130, attempt to rescue State"
+"prisoners or prisoners of war. Section 196, attempt to use as the evidence known to be"
+"false. Sections 198, 200, attempt to use as true a certificate or declaration known to be"
+"false in a material point. Section 213, attempt to obtain a gratification to screen an"
+"offender from punishment. Sections 239 and 240, attempt to induce a person to"
+"receive a counterfeit coin. Section 241, attempt to induce a person to receive as"
+"genuine counterfeit coin which, when the offender took it, he did not know to be"
+"counterfeit. Sections 307 and 308, attempts to commit murder and culpable homicide."
+"Section 309, attempt to commit suicide. Sections 385, 387 and 389, attempt to put a"
+"person in fear of injury or accusation in order to commit extortion. Section 391,"
+"conjoint attempt of five or more persons to commit dacoity. Sections 393, 394 and 398,"
+"attempts to commit robbery. Section 460, attempt by one of many joint house-breakers"
+by night to cause death or grievous hurt.
+"1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for transportation for life (w.e.f. 1 January"
+1956).
+"2. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for certain words (w.e.f. 1 January 1956)."
+"3. Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 Cr LJ 2077 (P&H)."
+"4. I K Narayana v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 874 (Kant)."
+"5. Koppula Venkat Rao v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 1874 [LNIND 2004 SC 301] : 2004 Cr LJ 1804"
+(SC).
+"6. Om Prakash, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 848 (SC)."
+"7. Abhayanand, AIR 1961 SC 1698 [LNIND 1961 SC 202] ; Om Prakash, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 848 (SC)."
+"8. James Fitzjames Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of England, 2nd Edn, p 69;"
+"Koppula Venkat Rao v State of AP, AIR 2004 SC 1874 [LNIND 2004 SC 301] : 2004 Cr LJ 1804 :"
+"(2004) 3 sCC 602, the Supreme Court explained why attempt has been characterized as crime."
+"9. Damodar Behera v State of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 344 (Ori)."
+"10. Quoted with approval from Mayne's Criminal Law in Peterson's case, (1876) 1 All 316 , 317"
+"and in Padala Venkatasami, (1881) 3 Mad 4, 5; Ashaq Hussain, (1948) Pak LR 155."
+"11. Bhagwat v State, (1948) 28 Pat 92."
+"12. Ramakka, (1884) 8 Mad 5."
+"13. Quoted with approval from Mayne's Criminal Law in Peterson, (1876) 1 All 316 , and in"
+"Padala Venkatasami, (1881) 3 Mad 4."
+"14. State of Maharashtra v Mohd. Yakub, AIR 1980 SC 1111 [LNIND 1980 SC 99] : (1980) 3 SCC"
+57 [LNIND 1980 SC 99] .
+"15. Tustipada Mandal, (1950) Cut 75."
+"16. Haricharan v State, AIR 1950 Ori 114 [LNIND 1949 ORI 25] (SB)."
+"17. Mangeram v Lal Chhatramohansingh, (1950) Nag 908."
+"18. Bashirbhai, (1960) 3 SCR 554 [LNIND 1960 SC 126] : 62 Bom LR 908."
+"19. State of Maharashtra v Mohd. Yakub, AIR 1980 SC 1111 [LNIND 1980 SC 99] : (1980) 3 SCC"
+57 [LNIND 1980 SC 99] .
+"20. Mangesh Jivaji, (1887) 11 Bom 376, 381; Ram Charit Ram Bhakat v Chairman, Rajshahi"
+"District Board, (1938) 1 Cal 420 ."
+"21. Om Prakash, AIR 1962 SC 1782 ."
+"22. Mohinder Singh, 1960 Cr LJ 393 (Punj)."
+23. Ibid.
+"24. Haughton v Smith, (1975) AC 476 Per House of Lords : (1973) 3 All ER 1109 : (1974) 2 WLR"
+607 ; see also Neilson (1978) RTR 232 .
+"25. Ring, (1892) 61 LJ MC 116."
+"26. Haughton, supra."
+"27. Om Prakash, 1961 (2) Cr LJ 848 (SC)."
+"28. Abhayanand, AIR 1961 SC 1698 [LNIND 1961 SC 202] ; see also Sudhir Kumar, 1973 Cr LJ"
+"1798 (SC); State of Maharashtra v Mohd. Yakub, 1980 Cr LJ 793 (SC)."
+"29. Kapoor Chand Maganlal Chanderia v State (Delhi Admn), 1985 SCC (Cr) 441 : (1985) Supp"
+SCC 268 .
+"30. Bashirbhai, 62 Bom LR 908 : (1960) 3 SCR 554 [LNIND 1960 SC 126] ."
+"31. Tukaram Govind Yadav v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1501 (Bom); State of MP v Babulal,"
+"AIR 1960 MP 155 [LNIND 1959 MP 49] ; Rajesh Vishwakarma v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ"
+"2753 (Jha); Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, 2010 Cr LJ 2077 (P&H)."
+"32. Pandharinath v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 14 SCC 537 [LNIND 2009 SC 1378] ."
+THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
+SUMMARY
+THE draft of the Indian Penal Code was prepared by the First Indian Law Commission
+when Macaulay was the President of that body. Its basis is the law of England freed
+"from superfluities, technicalities and local peculiarities. Suggestions were also derived"
+from the French Penal Code and from Livingstone's Code of Louisiana. The draft
+"underwent a very careful revision at the hands of Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice,"
+and puisne Judges of the Calcutta Supreme Court who were members of the
+"Legislative Council, and was passed into law in 1860. Though it is principally the work"
+"of a man who had hardly held a brief, and whose time was devoted to politics and"
+"literature, yet it is universally acknowledged to be a monument of codification and an"
+everlasting memorial to the high juristic attainments of its distinguished author.
+Objects of penal legislation.
+The legitimate objects of penal legislation are the selection of those violations of right
+which are sufficiently dangerous to the good order of society to justify and require the
+"infliction of punishment to repress them, and the adaptation of the degree of"
+punishment to the purpose of repressing such violations.
+Crime.
+"A crime is an act of commission or omission, contrary to municipal law, tending to the"
+"prejudice of the community, for which punishment can be inflicted as the result of"
+judicial proceedings taken in the name of the State. It tends directly to the prejudice of
+"the community, while a civil injury tends more directly and immediately to the prejudice"
+of a private right. The true test between a crime and a civil injury is that the latter is
+"compensated by damages, while the former is punished. The State is supposed to be"
+"injured by any wrong to the community and is, therefore, the proper prosecutor. Many"
+"crimes include a tort or civil injury; but every tort does not amount to a crime, nor does"
+"every crime include a tort. Conspiracy, conversion, private nuisance, wrongful distress,"
+"etc., are merely torts. Assault, false imprisonment, false charge, defamation, etc., are all"
+"crimes as well as torts. Forgery, perjury, bigamy, homicide, etc., are crimes but not torts."
+The great difference between the legal and the popular meanings of the word crime is
+that whereas the only perfectly definite meaning which a lawyer can attach to the word
+"is that of an act or omission punishable by law, the popular or moral conception adds"
+"to this the notion of moral guilt of a specially deep and degrading kind. By a criminal,"
+"people in general understand a person who is liable to be punished, because he has"
+done something at once wicked and obviously injurious in a high degree to the
+"common interest of society. Criminal law is, however, confined within very narrow limits"
+and can be applied only to definite overt acts or omissions capable of being distinctly
+"proved, which acts or omissions inflict definite evils, either on specific persons or on"
+the community at large.1.
+"By criminal law is now understood the law as to the definition, trial and punishment of"
+"crimes, i.e., of acts or omissions forbidden by law which affect injuriously public rights,"
+or constitute a breach of duties due to the whole community. Criminal law includes the
+"rules as to the prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of crimes. It lays"
+"down what constitutes an offence, what proof is necessary to prove it, what procedure"
+"should be followed in a court, and what punishment should be imposed."
+In criminal law the general principle is that there must be some guilty condition of mind
+in every offence. This is designated by the expression mens rea. It is however in the
+power of the Legislature to enact that a man may be convicted of an offence although
+there was no guilty mind. Where a statute requires a mental state to be proved as an
+"essential element of a crime, the burden is on the prosecution to prove it. The absence"
+of mens rea really consists in an honest and reasonable belief entertained by the
+"accused of the existence of facts, which, if true, would make the act charged against"
+him innocent.
+"The authors of the Code observe:—""We cannot admit that a Penal Code is by any"
+"means to be considered as a body of ethics, that the Legislature ought to punish acts"
+"merely because those acts are immoral, or that, because an act is not punished at all, it"
+follows that the Legislature considers that act as innocent. Many things which are not
+punishable are morally worse than many things which are punishable. The man who
+treats a generous benefactor with gross ingratitude and insolence deserves more
+"severe reprehension than the man who aims a blow in a passion, or breaks a window in"
+"a frolic; yet we have punishments for assault and mischief, and none for ingratitude."
+The rich man who refuses a mouthful of rice to save a fellow-creature from death may
+be a far worse man than the starving wretch who snatches and devours the rice; yet we
+"punish the latter for theft, and we do not punish the former for hard-heartedness.""2."
+Criminal law forms generally a part of the public law not variable in any one of its parts
+by the volition of private individuals and it is not necessarily deprived of its effect
+merely by the possible culpability of the individuals who may be the sufferers by the
+breach. The maxim ex turpicausa non orituractio is not a sufficient excuse for a man
+"who acts in opposition to the provisions of a penal statute. If a man, for instance, gives"
+"a spurious sovereign to a person for losing a bet, and the latter sues the former, he"
+cannot succeed for a breach of contract.
+Presumption of innocence.
+In criminal cases the presumption of law is that the accused is innocent. The burden of
+proving every fact essential to bring the charge home to the accused lies on the
+prosecution. The evidence must be such as to exclude every reasonable doubt of the
+"guilt of the accused. The evidence of guilt must not be a mere balance of probabilities,"
+but must satisfy the Court beyond all shadow of reasonable doubt that the accused is
+"guilty. In matters of doubt it is safer to acquit than to condemn, since it is better that"
+several guilty persons should escape than one innocent person suffer. Unbiased moral
+"conviction is no sufficient foundation for a verdict of guilty, unless it is based on"
+substantial facts leading to no other reasonable conclusion than that of guilt of the
+accused. No man can be convicted of an offence where the theory of his guilt is no
+more likely than the theory of his innocence.
+"Under section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is incumbent on the accused to"
+prove the existence of circumstances (if any) which bring the offence charged within
+"any exception or proviso contained in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, 1860), and the"
+court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. But if it is apparent from the
+"evidence on record whether produced by the prosecution or defence, that a general"
+"exception would apply, then the presumption is removed and it is duty of the court to"
+consider whether the evidence proves to the satisfaction of the court that the accused
+comes within the exception.
+Limitation.
+"Previously there was no limitation to prosecute a person for an offence as ""Nullum"
+"tempus occuritregi"" (lapse of time does not bar the right of the Crown) was the rule."
+"And as a criminal trial was regarded as an action by the government, it could be"
+"brought at any time. It would be odious and fatal, says Bentham, to allow wickedness,"
+"after a certain time, to triumph over innocence. No treaty should be made with"
+malefactors of that character. Let the avenging sword remain always hanging over their
+"heads. The sight of a criminal in peaceful enjoyment of the fruit of his crimes,"
+"protected by the laws he has violated, is a consolation to evil-doers, an object of grief"
+"to men of virtue, a public insult to justice and to morals. The Roman law, however, laid"
+down a prescription of 20 years for criminal offences as a rule. There is no period of
+limitation for offences which fall within the four corners of IPC.
+"An entire Chapter captioned ""Limitation For Taking Cognizance of Certain Offences"""
+"(Chapter XXXVI) has been added to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr PC, 1973) to"
+prevent taking of cognizance after certain periods in offences not punishable with
+"imprisonment for a term exceeding three years. Thus, section 468 of Cr PC, 1973 lays"
+down:
+(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code no Court shall take
+"cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the"
+expiry of the period of limitation.
+(2) The period of limitation shall be—
+"(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;"
+"(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not"
+exceeding one year;
+"(c) Three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term"
+exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.
+(3) ********
+A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Sarah Mathew v The Institute of
+"Cardio Vascular Diseases,3. held that the period of Limitation starts from the date of"
+"Complaint, not from date of Cognizance."
+"As opposed to the Benthamian concept of no limitation to criminal prosecutions, the"
+modern concept is that the accused shall not be kept under a perpetual threat for any
+length of time and right to have a speedy trial should be regarded as one of his basic
+human rights. In keeping with this spirit the new Criminal Procedure Code has further
+"made provisions in sub-section (5) of section 167, Cr PC, 1973, for the stoppage of"
+"investigation in Summons Cases, if the investigation is not concluded within six"
+months from the date on which the accused was arrested.
+Master's liability for servant's act.
+The master is liable for the tortious acts of his servants done in the course of his
+"employment and for the master's benefit, but in criminal law he who does the act is"
+"liable except where a person who is not the doer, abets or authorizes the act. There are,"
+"however, certain exceptions to this principle."
+1. Statutory liability.—A statute may impose criminal liability upon the master as regards
+the acts or omission of his servants. Licence cases form a class by themselves in
+which the master is generally held responsible.
+2. Public nuisance.—The owner of works carried on for his profit by his agents is liable
+to be indicted for a public nuisance caused by acts of his agents in carrying on the
+works.
+3. Neglect of duty.—If a person neglects the performance of an act which is likely to
+"cause danger to others, and entrusts it to unskilful hands he will in certain cases be"
+criminally liable.
+"1. Vicarious liability.—Indian Penal Code, 1860, save and except some matters does"
+not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part a person. (Exceptions to this rule
+"include section 34, 149, etc.)"
+2. Corporate Criminal Liability.—A company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for
+criminal offences. Although there are earlier authorities to the fact that the corporation
+"cannot commit a crime, the generally accepted modern rule is that a corporation may"
+be subject to indictment and other criminal process although the criminal act may be
+committed through its agent. The majority in the Constitution bench held that there is
+no immunity to the companies from prosecution merely because the prosecution is in
+respect of offences for which the punishment is mandatory imprisonment and fine. The
+corporations can no longer claim immunity from criminal prosecution on the ground
+that they are incapable of possessing the necessary mens rea for the commission of
+criminal offences.4.
+Scheme.
+"The following tabular statement gives an outline of the scheme of IPC, 1860.—"
+General Provisions
+1. Territorial operation of the Code (c. I).
+2. General Explanations (c. II).
+3. Punishments (c. III).
+4. General Exceptions (c. IV).
+5. Abetment (c. V).
+6. Conspiracy (c. VA).
+7. Attempts (c. XXIII).
+Specific Offences
+1. Affecting the State .. State (c. VI).
+"Army, Navy and Air Force (c."
+VIII).
+Public tranquillity (c. VIII).
+Public servants conduct of (c.
+IX).
+Contempt of authority of (c. X).
+Public Justice (c. XI).
+"Public health, safety, decency,"
+and morals (c. XIV).
+2. Affecting the common .. Elections (c. IXA).
+wealth Coin and Government Stamps
+(c. XII).
+Weights and Measures (c. XIII).
+Religion (c. XV).
+Contract of Service (c. XIX).
+Marriage (c. XX).
+"Homicide, murder, abetment of"
+"suicide, causing miscarriage,"
+"injuries to unborn children,"
+"exposure of infants, hurt"
+"(simple and grievous), wrongful"
+restraint
+"3. Affecting the human body .. and confinement, criminal"
+"force, assault, kidnapping,"
+"abduction, slavery, selling or"
+"buying minor for prostitution,"
+"unlawful labour, rape, unnatural"
+offence (c. XVI).
+"Theft, extortion, robbery,"
+"dacoity, criminal"
+"misappropriation, criminal"
+"breach of trust, receiving stolen"
+"property, cheating, fraudulent"
+deeds and dispositions of
+"mischief, criminal"
+"4. Affecting corporeal or trespass (c. XVII), documents"
+"incorporeal (forgery), property property"
+"marks, currency and bank"
+notes (c. XVIII).
+Defamation (c. XXI).
+"5. Affecting reputation Intimidation, insult and"
+annoyance (c. XXII).
+Date and extent of operation. Chapter 1.
+"The IPC, 1860, came into operation on 1 January 1862. It takes effect throughout India"
+except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. For every act or omission contrary to the
+provisions of the Code a person is liable to punishment under it (sections 1 and 2).
+Every person is made liable to punishment under the Code without distinction of nation
+"or rank. A foreigner, who enters the Indian territories and accepts the protection of"
+"Indian laws, virtually submits himself to their operation. The Penal Code does not"
+"exempt anyone from the jurisdiction of criminal Courts, but the following are"
+exceptions to this principle:—
+(1) The Sovereign.
+(2) Foreign Sovereigns.
+(3) Ambassadors.
+(4) Alien enemies
+(5) Foreign army.
+(6) Men-of-war.
+The courts in India are prohibited from issuing a process against the President of India
+or the Governor of a State. (Article 361 of Constitution)
+Territorial jurisdiction.
+The territorial jurisdiction of criminal courts will extend into the sea as far as 12
+nautical miles.
+Leading case:—R v Kastya Rama
+Extra-territorial operation.
+"An offence committed outside India may, however, be tried as an offence committed in"
+India under the following circumstances:—
+1. By virtue of any Indian law (section 3).
+2. When such offence is committed by
+"(1) any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India,"
+(2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be (section 4).
+Where an offence is committed beyond the limits of India but the offender is found
+within its limits he may be (I) extradited; or (II) tried in India.
+Extradition.
+(I) Extradition is the surrender by one State to another of a person desired to be dealt
+with for crimes of which he has been accused or convicted and which are justiciable in
+the courts of the other State. Whether an offender should be handed over pursuant to a
+requisition is determined by the domestic law of the State on which requisition is
+"made. In India, the procedure is to be found laid down in the Extradition Act, 1962.5."
+Intra-territorial trial.
+(II) The Courts in India are empowered to try offences committed out of India either on
+(A) Land or (B) High Seas or (C) Aircraft.
+Land.
+"(A) By virtue of sections 3 and 4 of IPC, 1860, and section 188 of Cr PC, 1973, local"
+courts can try offences committed outside India.
+When the consequence of an act committed by a foreigner outside India if ensued in
+"India, he can be tried in India.6."
+High seas: Admiralty Jurisdiction.
+(B) The jurisdiction to try offences committed on the high seas is known as Admiralty
+jurisdiction. It is founded on the principle that a ship on the high seas is a floating
+island belonging to the nation whose flag she is flying.
+The jurisdiction extends over—
+(1) Offences committed on Indian ships. Such offences may be committed:
+"(a) on the high seas or in rivers, below the bridges, where the tide ebbs and"
+"flows, and where great ships go; or"
+(b) at a spot where the municipal authorities of a foreign country might
+exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
+(2) Offences committed on foreign ships in Indian territorial waters.
+(3) Pirates.
+"Section 18 of IPC, 1860, defines India as the territory of India excluding the state of"
+Jammu and Kashmir. These territorial limits would include the territorial waters of
+"India.7. By The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other"
+"Maritime Zones Act 80 of 1976, extend of India's Territorial waters was statutorily fixed"
+at 12 nautical miles.
+All the High Courts in India have inherent admiralty jurisdiction and can invoke the
+same for the enforcement of a maritime claim.8. Admiralty jurisdiction was vested in
+"the mofussil courts by 12 & 13 Vic. c. 96, and section 686 of the Merchant Shipping"
+"Act, 1958. The investigation/enquiry under Part XII of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958,"
+cannot be held to be a substitute for a proper investigation into an alleged crime if the
+same has been committed.
+Aircraft.
+"(C) The provisions of IPC, 1860, are made applicable to any offence committed by any"
+"person on any aircraft registered in India, wherever it may be."
+Indian courts cannot try foreigners who are in India for offences committed by them
+outside India.
+Laws not affected by the Code.
+"The IPC, 1860, does not affect the provisions of (1) any act for punishing mutiny and"
+"desertion by officers, soldiers, sailors or airmen, in the service of the Government of"
+India;
+(2) any special or local law (section 5).
+An offence expressly made punishable by a special or local law will be punishable
+under the Code. But if the Legislature in framing the special or local law intended to
+"exclude the operation of the Code, no prosecution under the Code would lie. However, a"
+person cannot be punished both under the Code and the special law for the same
+offence.
+General Explanations. Chapter II.
+"In chapter II, the leading terms used in the Code are defined and explained and the"
+"meanings, thus, announced are steadily adhered to throughout the subsequent"
+chapters.
+"General exceptions are part of the definition of every offence contained in IPC, 1860,"
+"section 6, but the burden to prove their existence lies on the accused."
+"The Supreme Court has explained some of the categories of ""public servants"" (section"
+21).
+The definition is not exhaustive. A person may be a public servant under some other
+"statute. Naresh Kumar Madan v State of MP, Leader of opposition in the Assembly is not"
+a public servant. Sushil Modi v Mohan Guruswamy.
+Leading cases:—K Veeraswami v UOI Lakshmiman Singh v Naresh Ashok Marketing Ltd
+v PNB.
+"Imitation of foreign currency is an offence within the meaning of ""counterfeit"" (section"
+28).
+Leading case:—State of Kerala v Mathai Verghese
+An act includes an illegal omission save where the contrary appears from the context.
+Where the causing of an effect in an offence if it is caused either by an act or by an
+"omission, the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly by an omission is the"
+same offence (section 36). When an offence is committed by several persons
+"committing different acts, each person intentionally committing one of those acts,"
+"either singly or jointly with others, commits the offence (section 37)."
+Joint offenders.
+Where a criminal act is committed jointly by several persons the following principles
+will apply:—
+"1. When the act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such"
+persons is liable for it in the same manner as if it were done by him alone (section 34).
+Mere presence does not create a presumption of complicity. A person not cognizant of
+"the intention of his companion to commit murder is not liable for murder, though he"
+has joined his companion to do an unlawful act. There must be (i) a pre-arranged plan
+or a preconcert and (ii) in offences involving physical violence participation if section
+34 is to apply; both these factors must be established against the accused before he
+can be held liable under the section. Common intention or meeting of minds to bring
+about a particular result may well develop on the spot itself as between a number of
+persons. Joint responsibility was inflicted upon the sub-inspector (SI) in charge of a
+"police station where two police constables beat a person to death, though the SI"
+himself had done no beating. Amar Singh v HP. It is not necessary that all must come
+together. State of MP v Mansingh. The Supreme Court examined the effect of mere
+presence at the place of occurrence. State of UP v Sohruntia.
+Leading cases:—Barendra Kumar Ghose v Mahbub Shah; Hari Om v State of UP; Suresh v
+State of UP.
+The Supreme Court has reiterated that there could rarely be direct evidence of common
+intention. Jhinku Nai.
+2. When the act is only criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge
+"or intention, each is liable only to the extent of his own knowledge or intention (section"
+35).
+A person assisting the accused who actually performs the act must be shown to have
+"the particular intent or knowledge. If an act which is an offence, without reference to"
+"any criminal knowledge or intention on the part of the doer, is done by several persons,"
+each of them is liable for the offence.
+3. Where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal
+"act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act (section 38). Yunus v"
+"State, 1995 Cr LJ 3205 (Del), where common intention was found only up to the stage"
+"of causing hurt, though the end result of the crime was murder."
+"Section 34 deals with acts done with a common intention, section 38, with acts done"
+with different intentions.
+"An act done under compulsions of survival, such as putting up huts on public-"
+"footpaths, cannot be regarded as voluntary. (section 39)"
+Leading case:—Olga Tellis v Bombay MC
+Punishment. Chapter III.
+The punishments to which offenders are liable are:—
+1. Death.
+2. Imprisonment for life.
+3. Imprisonment :
+"(i) Rigorous (i.e., with hard labour);"
+(ii) Simple;
+(iii) Solitary.
+4. Forfeiture of property.
+5. Fine (section 63).
+Imposition of proper and appropriate sentence is a bounded obligation and duty of the
+court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused received
+appropriate sentence. The sentence must be accorded to the gravity of the offence
+"(section 53) Gurumukh Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2009 SC 2697 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+847] . The Supreme Court explained guidelines for sentencing policy in State of MP v
+"Babu Nath, AIR 2009 SC 1810 [LNIND 2008 SC 2471] ."
+Labour taken from prisoners must not be of obnoxious nature and payment must not
+"be less than the applicable minimum wage. Gurdev v HP, 1992 Cr LJ 2542 (HP)."
+In addition to these there is punishment of detention in reformatories or Borstal
+Schools in the case of juvenile offenders (Act VIII of 1897 and other local Acts).
+Death.
+1. Sentence of death may be commuted without the consent of the offender by the
+appropriate Government for any other punishment (section 54). The punishment of
+death may be awarded in the following cases:—
+(1) Waging war against the Government of India (section 121).
+(2) Abetting mutiny actually committed (section 132).
+(3) Giving or fabricating false evidence upon which an innocent person suffers death
+(section 194).
+(4) Murder (section 302).
+Capital punishment should be confined to rarest of rare cases.
+Leading cases:—Bachan Singh. Machhi Singh. Munwar Harun Shah. Triveniben v State
+of Gujarat Madhu Mehta v UOI.
+Swamy Shraddananda (2) v State of Karnataka; Santosh Kumar Bariyar v State
+"(5) Abetment of suicide of a minor, or an insane or an intoxicated person (section 305)."
+"(6) Attempt to murder by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life, if hurt is"
+caused (section 307).
+(7) Dacoity accompanied with murder (section 396).
+Sentence of death may be awarded where a person who is under sentence of
+imprisonment for life commits murder (section 302).
+Section 303 has been struck down by the Supreme Court as void and unconstitutional
+being violative of both Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. R Rathinam v UOI. This
+decision was subsequently reversed in Gain Kaur v State of Punjab.
+Leading cases:—Mithu. Bhagwan Bax Singh.
+Causing death in custody by third degree methods should merit deterrent punishment.
+Leading case:—Gauri Shanker Sharma v State of UP.
+Imprisonment for life.
+"2. The appropriate Government may commute, without the consent of the offender, a"
+sentence of imprisonment for life to imprisonment not exceeding 14 years (section 55).
+"In calculating fractions, imprisonment for life is reckoned as equivalent to 20 years"
+(section 57).
+Leading case:—Gopal Vinayak Godse v State of Maharashtra.
+Imprisonment for life must be inflicted for being a 'thug' (section 311).
+Imprisonment.
+"3. In every case in which sentence of imprisonment for life shall have been passed, the"
+"appropriate government may, without the consent of the offender, commute the"
+punishment for imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding 14 years
+(section 55);
+"The lowest term of imprisonment actually named for a given offence, viz., misconduct"
+"by a drunken person, is 24 hours (section 510); but the minimum is unlimited except in"
+two cases:—
+(1) If at the time of committing robbery or dacoity the offender uses a deadly weapon
+"or causes grievous hurt, or"
+"(2) If while committing this offence he is armed with a deadly weapon, he is punished"
+with imprisonment for not less than seven years (sections 397 and 398).
+"Sentence of imprisonment may be, in certain cases, wholly or partly rigorous or simple"
+(section 60). But in two cases the imprisonment must be rigorous:—
+(1) Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction for a capital
+offence (section 194).
+(2) House-trespass to commit an offence punishable with death (section 449).
+There are 12 offences that are punishable with simple imprisonment only.
+The courts are expected to properly operate the sentencing system. The court should
+impose such sentence for proved offences as will serve as a deterrent for their
+"commission by others. The socio-economic status, prestige, race, caste of the accused"
+or victim are irrelevant considerations in the policy of sentencing. State of Karnataka v
+Krishnappa (section 53).
+Solitary confinement.
+Solitary confinement may be inflicted for offences punishable with rigorous
+imprisonment. The offender may be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or
+"portions of his term of imprisonment, not exceeding three months in the whole. But the"
+solitary confinement must not exceed—
+"one month, if the term of imprisonment does not exceed six months;"
+"two months, if the term of imprisonment exceeds six months but does not exceed one"
+year;
+"three months, if the term of imprisonment exceeds one year (section 73)."
+"In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such confinement must not exceed 14"
+"days at a time, with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement of not less"
+"duration than such period; and when the imprisonment awarded exceeds three months,"
+the solitary confinement must not exceed seven days in any one month of the whole
+imprisonment awarded with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement of
+not less duration than such period (section 74).
+A sentence of solitary confinement for more than three months cannot be passed even
+if a person is convicted at one trial of more than one offence. Such confinement is
+awarded for offences under the Code only. Even then it cannot be awarded where
+imprisonment is not part of the sentence or where the imprisonment is in lieu of fine. It
+may be awarded in a summary trial. Solitary confinement must be imposed at intervals.
+"A sentence inflicting solitary confinement for the whole imprisonment is illegal, though"
+not more than 14 days are awarded.
+Forfeiture.
+4. The punishment of forfeiture of the property of the offender has been abolished
+except in the following cases:—
+(1) Where a person commits depredation on the territories of any power at peace with
+"the Government of India, he is liable, in addition to other punishments, to forfeiture of"
+"any property used, or intended to be used, in committing such depredation, or acquired"
+thereby (section 126).
+(2) Where a person receives property taken as above mentioned or in waging war
+"against any Asiatic Power at peace with the Government of India, he is liable to forfeit"
+such property (section 127).
+"(3) A public servant, who improperly purchases property, which, by virtue of his office,"
+"he is legally prohibited from purchasing, forfeits such property (section 169)."
+5. Fine is awarded as a sentence by itself in the following cases:—
+Fine.
+"(1) A person, in charge of a merchant vessel, negligently allowing a deserter from the"
+"Army, Navy or Air Force to obtain concealment in such vessels is liable to a fine not"
+exceeding Rs. 500 (section 137).
+"(2) The owner or occupier of land, on which a riot takes place or an unlawful assembly"
+"is held, and any person having or claiming any interest in such land, and not using all"
+"lawful means to prevent such riot or unlawful assembly, is punishable with fine not"
+"exceeding Rs. 1,000 (section 154)."
+(3) The person for whose benefit a riot has been committed not having duly
+endeavoured to prevent it (section 155).
+(4) The agent or manager of such person under like circumstances (section 156).
+(5) Illegal payments in connection with an election (section 171-H).
+(6) Failure to keep election accounts (section 171-I).
+(7) Voluntarily vitiating the atmosphere so as to render it noxious to the public health is
+punishable with fine of Rs. 500 (section 278).
+(8) Obstructing a public way or line of navigation is punishable with fine not exceeding
+Rs. 200 (section 283).
+(9) Committing of public nuisance not otherwise punishable is punishable with fine not
+exceeding Rs. 200 (section 290).
+"(10) Whoever publishes any proposal to pay any sum, or to deliver any goods, or to do"
+"or forbear from doing anything for the benefit of any person, on any event or"
+"contingency relative or applicable to the drawing of a ticket, lot, number, or figure, in any"
+"such lottery, not being a State lottery or a lottery authorised by the State Government, is"
+"punished with fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 (section 294A)."
+The general principal of law running through sections 63–70 is that the amount of fine
+"should not be harsh or excessive. Shantilal v State of MP, (2007) 11 SCC 243 [LNIND"
+2007 SC 1171] .
+Imprisonment in default of fine.
+The following provisions regulate the character and duration of the sentence of
+imprisonment in default of payment of fine:—
+"Where an offender is sentenced to a fine, the court may direct that the offender shall in"
+"default of payment suffer a term of imprisonment, which imprisonment may be in"
+excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced for the
+"offence, or to which he may be liable under a commutation of sentence (section 64)."
+If the offence be punishable with imprisonment as well as fine such imprisonment must
+not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment which is the maximum fixed for the
+offence (section 65); such extra imprisonment may be of any description to which the
+offender might have been sentenced for the offence (section 66).
+Leading case:—Ramjas v State of UP.
+"If such imprisonment is within the prescribed limits, it is not to be added to the"
+substantive punishment.
+Leading case:—P Balaraman v State of TN.
+When the offence is punishable with fine only such imprisonment must not exceed
+two months when the amount of the fine does not exceed Rs. 50;
+"four months when the amount does not exceed Rs. 100, and for"
+any term not exceeding six months in any other case (section 67).
+The imprisonment in such cases must be simple only.
+Such imprisonment terminates—
+(1) upon payment of the fine (section 68); or
+"(2) before the expiration of the term of imprisonment fixed in default of payment, if"
+"such a proportion of the fine be paid, or levied, that the term of imprisonment suffered"
+in default of payment is not less than proportional to the part of the fine still unpaid
+(section 69).
+"Fine may be levied within six years, or at any time during the term of imprisonment if it"
+be longer than six years; the death of the offender does not discharge from the liability
+"any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts (section 70)."
+The limitation starts from the date of sentence of conviction by the trial Court:
+Palakdhari Singh.
+An offender who has undergone full term of imprisonment inflicted in default of
+payment of fine is still liable for the amount of fine. The Bombay High Court has laid
+down that movable property of the offender can alone be distrained and sold for the
+recovery of fine. But the Calcutta High Court has held that a suit can be brought to
+recover fine by the sale of immovable property of the offender.
+The Government may commute a sentence of
+Commutation of sentence.
+"(1) death, for any other punishment;"
+"(2) imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for not more than 14 years (sections 54,"
+55).
+The Government may commute without the offender's consent sentence in cases of
+death and imprisonment for life.
+Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences.
+"(1) Where an offence is made up of parts, each of which constitutes an offence, the"
+offender is not punished for more than one offence unless expressly provided.
+(2) Where an offence falls within two or more separate definitions of offences; or where
+"several acts of which one or more than one would, by itself or themselves, constitute"
+"an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the offender is not punished"
+with a more severe punishment than the court which tries him could award for any one
+of such offences (section 71).
+Leading cases:—Roshan Lal; Puranmal.
+"The results of combination of section 220, Cr PC, 1973, with this section have been"
+enumerated at p 48.
+Doubt as to nature of offence.
+"Where it is doubtful as to of which of the several offences a person is guilty, he is"
+punished for the offence for which the lowest imprisonment is provided (section 72).
+Previous conviction.
+A person convicted by a Court in India of any offence
+"(a) relating to Coin and Government Stamps (Chapter XII), or"
+(b) against property (Chapter XVII)
+punishable with imprisonment for a term of three years or upwards shall be subject to
+"imprisonment for life, or to imprisonment for 10 years, if he is again guilty of any"
+offence punishable under either of those Chapters with like imprisonment for the like
+term (section 75).
+The offender is subject to increased punishment on the ground that the punishment
+undergone has had no effect in preventing a repetition of the crime. The subsequent
+offence must also be punishable with not less than three years' imprisonment. If the
+subsequent offence is committed by a person previously to his being convicted of the
+first offence he cannot be subjected to enhanced punishment. Attempts not
+specifically made offences within Chapters XII and XVII are not governed by this
+provision. The previous conviction of an accused for an offence under these Chapters
+cannot be taken into consideration at a subsequent conviction for abetment of an
+offence under those Chapters.
+3. Overlapping provisions.—The fact of overlapping provisions about one or more
+"offence, does not rule out trial under any one of them. The case did not fall within the"
+"Custom Act, 1962. It could not prevent trial under applicable provision of IPC, 1860. M"
+"Natarajan v State, (2008) 8 SCC 413 [LNIND 2008 SC 1093] ."
+General Exceptions. Chapter IV.
+The following acts are not offence under the Code:—
+1. Act of a person bound by law to do a certain thing (section 76).
+2. Act of a Judge acting judicially (section 77).
+3. Act done pursuant to an order or a judgment of a court (section 78).
+"4. Act of a person justified, or believing himself justified, by law (section 79)."
+5. Act caused by accident (section 80).
+6. Act likely to cause harm done without criminal intent to prevent other harm (section
+81).
+7. Act of a child under seven years (section 82).
+8. Act of a child above seven and under 12 years but of immature understanding
+(section 83).
+9. Act of a person of unsound mind (section 84).
+10. Act of an intoxicated person (section 85).
+11. Act not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt done by consent of the
+sufferer (section 87).
+12. Act not intended to cause death done by consent of the sufferer (section 88).
+13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person or by the
+consent of the guardian (section 89).
+14. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent (section 92).
+15. Communication made in good faith to a person for his benefit (section 93).
+16. Act done under threat of death (section 94).
+17. Acts causing slight harm (section 95).
+18. Acts done in private defence (sections 96–106).
+"1. Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law"
+(section 76).
+The general exception contained in section. 76–106 have the effect of converting an
+offence into a non-offence. They are of universal nature. They apply to the definition of
+"every offence. Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966"
+[LNIND 2004 SC 1370] .
+The maxim respondent superior has no application to cases where an offence is
+committed by a subordinate official acting under the orders of his superior. The official
+is bound to exercise his own judgment and unless the actual circumstances are of
+such a character that he may have reasonably entertained the belief that the order was
+"one which he was bound to obey, he will be responsible for his act."
+Leading cases:—State of WB v Shew Mangal Singh. R v Latifkhan.
+"2. Act of a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which"
+"in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law (section 77)."
+A Judge will be protected where he is acting judicially and not ministerially. If he acts
+"without jurisdiction and without good faith, he would be responsible."
+3. Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of a Court of Justice while such
+"judgment or order remains in force, and the person doing the act in good faith believes"
+that the Court has jurisdiction although it has not (section 78). This section differs
+from the preceding section on the question of jurisdiction. It protects officers acting
+under the authority of a judgment or order of a court even though the court has no
+"jurisdiction, provided the officer believed in good faith that the Court had jurisdiction."
+"4. Act done by a person justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact, and not"
+"by reason of a mistake of law, in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law to do"
+it (section 79).
+Mistake is a slip made by chance. It is not mere forgetfulness. Under sections 76 and
+79 the mistake should be one of fact and not of law. An honest and reasonable belief in
+"the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act for which a prisoner"
+"is indicted an innocent act, is a good defence. An alleged offender is deemed to have"
+"acted under that state of facts which he, in good faith and on reasonable grounds,"
+believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an offence. Iqnorantia facti doth
+"excusat, for such an ignorance many times makes the act itself morally involuntary. But"
+"if an act is clearly a wrong in itself, and a person, under a mistaken impression as to"
+"facts which render it criminal, commits the act, then he is guilty of an offence."
+Mistake of law is no defence because every person of the age of discretion is bound to
+"know the law, and presumed to do so. If a person infringes the statute law of the"
+country through ignorance or carelessness he abides by the consequences of his error.
+The maxim ignorantiajuris non excusat admits of no exception in its application to
+criminal offences. Even a foreigner who cannot reasonably be supposed in fact to
+"know the law of the land is not exempted. Similarly, ignorance of a statute newly"
+passed will not save a person from punishment.
+Leading cases:—R v Prince. R v Tolson. R v Esop. Bhawoo v Mulji. Mayer Hans George.
+Rajkapoor v Laxman.
+"Mayne deduces the following five rules, showing the extent to which ignorance of an"
+"essential fact may be pleaded as a defence, from the judgments in Prince's case."
+"(a) Where an act is in itself plainly criminal, and is more severely punishable if certain"
+"circumstances co-exist, ignorance of the existence of such circumstances is no answer"
+to a charge for the aggravated offence.
+"(b) Where an act is prima facie innocent and proper, unless certain circumstances"
+"coexist, then ignorance of such circumstances is an answer to the charge."
+"(c) Even in the last named case, the state of the defendant's mind must amount to"
+absolute ignorance of the existence of the circumstance which alters the character of
+"the act, or to a belief in its non-existence."
+"(d) Where an act which is itself wrong is, under certain circumstances, criminal, a"
+person who does the wrong act cannot set up as a defence that he was ignorant of the
+facts which turned the wrong into a crime.
+"(e) Where a statute makes it penal to do an act under certain circumstances, it is a"
+question upon the wording and object of the particular statute whether the
+responsibility of ascertaining that the circumstances exist is thrown upon the person
+who does the act or not. In the former case his knowledge is immaterial.
+5. Accident. This must have been caused—
+"(1) without criminal knowledge or intention,"
+"(2) in the doing of a lawful act,"
+"(i) in a lawful manner,"
+"(ii) by lawful means, and"
+(iii) with proper care and caution (section 80).
+An 'accident' is something that happens out of the ordinary course of things.
+6. Act done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm but done in good faith and
+"without any criminal intention to cause harm, for the purpose of preventing, or avoiding,"
+other harm to person or property (section 81).
+Mens rea
+"It is a maxim of English law that actus non facitreum, nisi mens sit rea (the intent and"
+act must both concur to constitute a crime). A crime is not committed if the mind of
+the person doing the act in question be innocent. The above maxim has undergone a
+modification owing to the greater precision of modern statutes. Crimes are now more
+accurately defined by statutes than before. It has become necessary to look at the
+object of each Act that is under consideration to see whether and how far knowledge is
+of the essence of the offences created. In three cases mens rea is not an essential
+ingredient in an offence:
+"(1) cases not criminal in real sense, but which, in the public interest, are prohibited"
+under a penalty;
+(2) public nuisances; and
+(3) cases criminal in form but which are only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right.
+"The above maxim has little application to offences under IPC, 1860, in its purely"
+technical sense because the definitions of various offences expressly contain an
+"ingredient as to the state of mind of the accused. Under the Code, therefore, mens rea"
+will mean one thing or another according to a particular offence. The guilty mind may
+"be a dishonest mind, or a fraudulent mind, or a rash or negligent mind, and so forth."
+It may be observed that criminal law has nothing to do with motives of offenders.
+Intention is quite different from motive. A person may do an act with a very high and
+laudable motive but if his act amounts to a crime he will be guilty. Where some Hindus
+removed cows from the possession of some Mohammedans to prevent the cows from
+"being slaughtered, they were held guilty of theft."
+Whether a person can for self-preservation inflict harm on others is discussed at p 64.
+Such acts will not exempt the offender from the full severity of law. It is murder to kill
+another to save one's own life.
+Leading cases:—R v Dudley (or Mignonette case). South Wark London Borough Council v
+Williams.
+7. Act done by a child under seven years (section 82); or by a child above seven and
+"under 12 years, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of"
+the nature and consequences of his conduct (section 83).
+Leading case:—Hiralal.
+"8. Act done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind,"
+is
+"(1) incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or"
+(2) that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law (section 84).
+"The 'unsoundness of mind' may be temporary or permanent, natural or supervening."
+But it must affect the cognitive faculties of the mind. If the offender is conscious that
+"the act was contrary to law and one which he ought not to do, he is punishable. The act"
+"to be not punishable must be such as would have been excused by law, if the facts had"
+been as the person of unsound mind supposed. Distinction has to be made between
+"legal insanity and medical insanity. Bapu v State of Rajasthan, (2007) 8 SCC 66 [LNIND"
+2007 SC 774] .
+Leading cases:—R v M'Naughton. R v Lakshman. R v Sakharam. Dahyabhai. S W
+Mohammad. Ahamadulla.
+The doctrine of irresistible criminal impulse was not accepted by the Calcutta High
+Court.
+"9. Act done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of intoxication, is"
+(1) incapable of knowing the nature of the act; or
+(2) that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law:
+provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his
+knowledge or against his will (section 85).
+"If an intoxicated person commits an offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge,"
+"he is dealt with as if he had that intent or knowledge, unless the thing which intoxicated"
+him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will (section 86).
+Drunkenness is one thing and the disease to which it may lead is a different thing. If a
+"man by drunkenness, brings on a state of disease which causes such a degree of"
+"madness, even for a time, which would relieve him of responsibility if it had been"
+"caused in any other way, then he would not be criminally responsible."
+Leading cases:—Basdev. Director of Public Prosecutions v Beard. Davis.
+"10. Act not intended, and not known, to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done"
+"by consent of the person, above 18 years to whom harm is caused (section 87)."
+"Ordinary games, such as fencing, boxing, football and the like are protected by this"
+section.
+"11. Act not intended, and not known to be likely to cause death, done in good faith by"
+consent of the person to whom harm is caused for his benefit (section 88).
+Surgical operations are protected under this section.
+"12. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person under 12 years, or of an insane"
+"person, by or by the consent of his guardian. This exception does not extend to:—"
+"(1) Intentional causing, or attempting to cause, death."
+"(2) The doing of anything which the doer knows to be likely to cause death, except to"
+"prevent death or grievous hurt, or to cure any grievous disease or infirmity."
+"(3) Voluntary causing, or attempting to cause, grievous hurt (except as above)."
+"(4) The abetment of any offence, to the committing of which it would not extend"
+(section 89).
+A consent to be a true one must not have been given—
+(1) by a person under fear of injury;
+(2) by a person under a misconception of fact;
+"(3) by a person of unsound mind, and the person obtaining the consent knows or"
+has reason to believe this;
+"(4) by a person who is intoxicated, and who is unable to understand the nature and"
+consequence of that to which he gives his consent;
+(5) by a person under 12 years of age (section 90).
+"An honest misconception by both the parties, however, does not invalidate the consent."
+Leading case:—Williams.
+"Sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any"
+"harm which they may cause to the person giving the consent (section 91), e.g., causing"
+"miscarriage, public nuisance, offences against public safety, etc."
+"13. Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person, even without consent, if it is"
+"impossible for him to give consent, or is incapable of giving it, and there is no guardian"
+from whom it is possible to obtain it in time for the thing to be done with benefit
+"(section 92). This exception is subject to the same provisos as section 89, with the"
+difference that it will not extend to causing hurt except to prevent death or hurt.
+"14. A communication made in good faith, although causing harm to the person to"
+"whom it is made, if it is for his benefit (section 94), e.g., communication in good faith"
+by a surgeon to a patient that in his opinion he cannot live.
+"15. Act [except (a) murder, and (b) offence against the State punishable with death]"
+"done under threats which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension of"
+"instant death; provided the doer did not of his own accord, or from an apprehension of"
+"harm short of death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such"
+constraint (section 94). Fear of grievous hurt is not a sufficient justification. Mere
+menace of future death will not be sufficient.
+No one can plead the excuse of necessity or compulsion as a defence to an act
+otherwise penal except as provided by this section.
+Leading cases:—R v Deoji. R v Latifkhan. R v Maganlal.
+16. Act causing such a slight harm that no person of ordinary sense and temper would
+complain of it (section 95).
+This section deals with those cases which come within the letter of the penal law but
+not within its spirit. It is based on the maxim de minimis non curatlex (the law does not
+take account of trifles).
+Private defence.
+17. Act done in exercise of the right of private defence (section 96). Every person has a
+"right, subject to certain restrictions, to defend,"
+(1) his own body and the body of any other person against any offence affecting the
+human body;
+"(2) the property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person,"
+"against any act, which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery,"
+"mischief, or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit any of such offences"
+(section 97).
+"(3) against an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, but is not that offence,"
+"by reason of the doer being of unsound mind, a minor, an intoxicated person, or a"
+person acting under a misconception of fact (section 98).
+The right of private defence is a defence right. It is neither a right of aggression nor of
+"reprisal. Thankachan v State of Kerala, (2008) 17 SCC 760 . The right is available not"
+only to the person put in danger but also to any member of the society who rises to the
+occasion with a spirit of rescue. Such a samaritan gets no legal right against the
+"person rescued. Kashi Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2008) 3 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 187]"
+.
+Exceptions to the right of private defence.
+There is no right of private defence against the following acts:—
+"(1) An act which does not reasonably cause apprehension of death or of grievous hurt,"
+"if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour"
+"of his office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law."
+(2) Same as above if done by the direction of a public servant.
+(3) Cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of public authorities
+(section 99).
+Leading Cases:—Amjadkhan. Jaidev.
+The right of private defence does not extend to the inflicting of more harm than it is
+necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence (ibid).
+Defence of body.
+The right of private defence of the body extends to the causing of death or any other
+harm to the assailant under the following circumstances:—
+(1) An assault causing reasonable apprehension of death.
+In this case if the defender be so situated that he cannot exercise the right without risk
+"of harm to an innocent person, he may even run that risk (section 106)."
+(2) An assault causing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt.
+(3) An assault with the intention of committing rape.
+(4) An assault with intention of gratifying unnatural lust.
+(5) An assault with intention of kidnapping or abducting.
+(6) An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person under circumstances
+which may cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public
+authorities for his release.
+"(7) ""Seventhly.—An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or"
+administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will
+"otherwise be the consequence of such act"" (section 100)."
+Leading case:—Vishwanath.
+"Subject to the above restrictions, the right of private defence of body extends to the"
+causing of any harm short of death (section 101).
+It commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises
+"from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not have"
+been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body
+continues (section 102).
+Defence of property.
+The right of private defence of property extends to the causing of death or any other
+harm to the assailant under the following circumstances:—
+(1) Robbery.
+(2) House-breaking by night.
+"(3) Mischief by fire to building, tent, or vessel, used as human dwelling or for custody of"
+property.
+"(4) Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, reasonably causing the apprehension of death or"
+grievous hurt (section 103).
+"Subject to the above restrictions, the right of private defence of property extends to the"
+causing of any harm short of death (section 104). It commences when a reasonable
+apprehension of danger to the property commences and continues against—
+"(1) Theft, till"
+"(a) the offender has affected his retreat with the property, or"
+"(b) the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or"
+(c) the property has been recovered.
+"(2) Robbery, as long as"
+"(a) the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death, or hurt, or"
+"wrongful restraint, or"
+"(b) the fear of instant death, or of instant hurt, or of instant personal restraint"
+continues.
+(3) Criminal trespass or mischief as long as the offender continues in the commission
+"of criminal trespass, or mischief."
+"(4) House-breaking by night, as long as the house-trespass, which has been begun by"
+"such house-breaking, continues (section 105)."
+All the provisions relating to private defence from section 96 to section 106 have to be
+read together in order to have a proper grasp of the scope and limitations of this right.
+Leading case:—Munney Khan v State.
+Excessive use of the right of private defence is a matter which can be determined only
+on the facts of each case. It necessitates a combined view of subjective and objective
+factors.
+Leading case:—Yogendra Morarji.
+"Mere verbal exchanges, however hot or abusive, do not create the right of private"
+defence.
+Leading case:—Jai Chand v State.
+There is no right of private defence in a free fight.
+Leading case:—Sikhar Bahera v State of Orissa.
+An aggressor has no right of private defence.
+"Leading case:—Dhananjai v State of UP, AIR 1996 SC 556 ."
+"Abetment, Chapter V."
+There are three kinds of abetment dealt with in the Code. A person abets the doing of a
+"thing, who"
+(1) instigates any person to do that thing; or
+"(2) engages with one or more other person or persons, in any conspiracy for the doing"
+"of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of the conspiracy"
+and in order to the doing of that thing; or
+"(3) intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing."
+"An abettor can be convicted, except in some cases, even where the principal culprit"
+stands acquitted.
+Leading cases:—Hardhan Chakrabarty v UOI Faguna Kedar Nath v State of Bihar Jamuna
+Singh v State of Bihar.
+"Abetment is separate and independent offence. Kishori Lal v State of MP, (2007) 10 SCC"
+297 .
+The law of abetment is adapting itself to the social malaise of dowry which leads to
+suicides by married women.
+Leading cases:—Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh. Brij Lal v Prem Chand.
+"A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact"
+"which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or"
+"procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing (section 107)."
+Leading Cases:—Pratima Datta. Shri Ram.
+It is not necessary that the person incited should have a mens rea corresponding to
+that of the inciter DPP v Armstrong.
+An abettor is a person who abets
+"(a) the commission of an offence, or"
+"(b) the commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person"
+"capable by law of committing an offence, with the same intention or knowledge as that"
+of the abettor (section 108).
+It should be noted that—
+"(1) Abetment of an illegal omission may amount to an offence (ib.,Explanation 1)."
+"(2) It is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed (ib.,Explanation 2)."
+"(3) The person abetted need not be capable of committing an offence, nor have any"
+"guilty intention or knowledge (ib.,Explanation 3)."
+"(4) The abetment of an abetment is an offence (ib.,Explanation 4)."
+(5) It is not necessary in abetment by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the
+"offence with the person abetted (ib., Explanation 5)."
+(6) A person will be guilty of abetment who abets the commission of any act without
+and beyond India which would constitute an offence if committed in India (section
+108A).
+"If the act abetted is committed but no express provision is made for its punishment,"
+then it shall be punished with the punishment provided for the offence abetted (section
+109).
+If a person abetted does the act with a different intention or knowledge from that of the
+"abettor, the latter will be punished as if the act had been done with his intention or"
+knowledge (section 110). The liability of the person abetted is not affected by this
+section.
+"If the act done is different from the one abetted, the abettor is still liable for it, if it is a"
+"probable consequence of the abetment, and committed under the influence of the"
+abetment (section 111). The liability is the same where the effect produced is different
+from that intended by the abettor (section 113).
+The abettor is liable to cumulative punishment for the act abetted and for the act done
+if the latter is a distinct offence (section 112).
+"If the abettor is present when the offence abetted is committed, he is deemed to have"
+committed such act or offence (section 114).
+Mere presence will not render a person liable. He must be sufficiently near to give
+"assistance, and he must participate in the act, no matter whether he is an eye-witness"
+to the transaction or not. Presence during the whole transaction is not necessary (ibid).
+Lending encouragement and assistance would amount to abetment even if the abettor
+was not present at the place where the killing took place. R v Cook. A constable who
+"kept watch while the head constable was committing rape inside their police station,"
+was held liable as an abettor. Ram Kumar v State of HP.
+If an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life is abetted and no express
+"provision is made for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender will be"
+punished with imprisonment extending to seven years if the offence is not committed;
+"but if an act causing harm is done in consequence, the imprisonment shall be extended"
+to 14 years (section 115). If in such a case the offence is punishable with
+"imprisonment, then the offender is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to"
+one-fourth part of the longest term provided for that offence (section 116). If in the
+above case the abettor or person abetted be a public servant whose duty it is to
+"prevent such offence, the imprisonment may extend to one-half of the longest term"
+provided for the offence (ibid).
+Abetting commission of an offence by the public or by more than ten persons is
+punishable with imprisonment extending to three years (section 117).
+There are three sections which punish concealment of a design to commit offences by
+"persons other than the accused, viz., sections 118, 119 and 120."
+Criminal conspiracy. Chapter VA.
+Criminal conspiracy is now a substantive offence under the Code. It was formerly
+punishable only as a species of abetment. It arises when two or more persons agree to
+do or cause to be done—
+(a) an illegal act; or
+"(b) an act which is not illegal, by illegal means."
+"Such an agreement may be to commit an offence. But if it is not so, it is necessary that"
+some overt act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such
+"agreement in pursuance thereof (section 120A) SC Bahri v State of Bihar, (Supreme"
+"Court). It is difficult to prove conspiracy by direct evidence, Hina Lal Harilal. If the"
+"offence conspired to is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous"
+"imprisonment for two years or upwards, the offender is punishable in the same manner"
+"as an abettor: but in any other case, he is liable to be punished with rigorous"
+"imprisonment for six months, or fine, or both (section 120B). Conspiracy has to be"
+treated as a continuing offence.
+A single person can be tried and convicted for the offence. It is not necessary that
+conspirators must be known to each other or that every one of them should have taken
+part in each and every act done in pursuance of the conspiracy. A wife joining her
+husband with knowledge that he was involved in a conspiracy with others was held to
+be equally guilty. R v Charstny.
+Leading cases:—Mirza Akbar. Bhagat Ram. Bhagwandas. V C Shukla. Kehar Singh
+Krishan Lal Pradhan Vinayak
+Offences against the State. Chapter VI.
+Offences against the State may be classified as follows:—
+I. Waging war against the Government of India.
+II. Assaulting high officers.
+III. Sedition.
+IV. Waging war against a Power at peace with the Government of India.
+V. Permitting or aiding the escape of a State prisoner.
+I. Waging war against the Government of India.
+"1. Waging or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war (section 121)."
+"2. Conspiring to commit, within or without India, offences punishable by section 121"
+(section 121A).
+"3. Collecting men, arms, or ammunition, or making any other preparation with a view to"
+waging such war (section 122).
+4. Concealing a design to wage war with intent to facilitate waging of such war by any
+act or illegal omission (section 123).
+"II. Assaulting the President, or the Governor of any State, with intent to compel or"
+restrain the exercise of any lawful power (section 124).
+Sedition.
+"III. A person commits sedition who,"
+"(1) by words (spoken or written), or by visible representation,"
+"(2) brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite"
+"disaffection towards,"
+(3) the Government established by law in India (section 124A).
+It should be noted that—
+"(1) 'Disaffection' includes disloyalty and feeling of enmity (ibid.,Explanation 1)."
+(2) Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of Government to obtain
+"their alteration, without exciting hatred, contempt, or disaffection, do not constitute this"
+"offence (ibid., Explanation 2)."
+"(3) Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative actions of Government,"
+"without exciting hatred, contempt, or disaffection, do not constitute this offence (ibid.,"
+Explanation 3).
+"Under the Constitution, criticism of the Government exciting disaffection or bad"
+feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the
+freedom of expression and of the press unless it is such as to undermine the security
+of or tend to overthrow the Government. This section is not ultra vires the Constitution.
+Anyone who uses in any way words or printed matter for the purpose of exciting
+"disaffection, be he the writer of those words or not, is liable. Publication of some kind"
+is necessary. The successful exciting of feelings of disaffection is placed on the same
+footing as the unsuccessful attempt to excite them.
+The law does not excuse the publication in newspapers of seditious writing copied
+from other papers. The editor of a paper is liable for seditious letters appearing in the
+paper.
+Leading cases:—R v Bal Gangadhar Tilak. R v Jogendra Chandra Bose (or Bangobasi
+case). Romesh Thappar. Kedar Nath.
+IV. Waging war against a Power at peace with the Government of India.
+"1. Waging, attempting to wage, or abetting the waging of such war against the"
+Government of any Asiatic Power at peace with the Government of India (section 125).
+"2. Committing, or preparing to commit, depredation on the territories of any Power at"
+peace with the Government of India (section 126).
+"3. Receiving any property, knowing the same to have been taken in the commission of"
+any of the offences mentioned in the two last preceding sections (section 127).
+V. Permitting or aiding the escape of a State prisoner.
+"1. Public servant voluntarily allowing a prisoner of State or war, in his custody, to"
+escape (section 128).
+"2. Public servant negligently suffering a prisoner of State or war in his custody, to"
+escape (section 129).
+"3. Aiding the escape, or rescuing, or attempting to rescue or harbouring, or concealing"
+"or resisting the recapture, of such prisoner (section 130)."
+"Army, Navy & Air Force offences. Chapter VII."
+"No person, subject to Articles of War, is subject to punishment under this Code for any"
+"offence relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force defined in this Chapter (section 139)."
+"This Chapter is framed in order that persons, not military, who abet a breach of military"
+"discipline, should not be liable under the military penal law but under the Code."
+"The following offences relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force find place in the Code:"
+—
+"1. Abetting mutiny, or attempting to seduce any officer, soldier, sailor, or airman, from"
+his allegiance or duty (section 131).
+"2. Abetment of mutiny, if mutiny is committed in consequence (section 132)."
+"3. Abetment of an assault by an officer, soldier, sailor or airman, on his superior officer,"
+when in the execution of his office (section 133).
+4. Abetment of such an assault if the assault is committed (section 134).
+"5. Abetment of the desertion of an officer, soldier, sailor, or airman (section 135)."
+6. Knowingly harbouring deserter (section 136).
+"7. Concealment of deserter from Army, Navy or Air Force of the Government of India"
+concealed on board a merchant vessel through negligence of master or person in
+charge of the vessel though he is ignorant of such concealment (section 137).
+"8. Abetment of act of insubordination by an officer, soldier, sailor, or airman, the act"
+abetted being actually committed in consequence of the abetment (section 138).
+"9. Wearing the garb, or carrying any token resembling any garb or token used by a"
+"soldier, sailor or airman with the intention that it may be believed that the wearer is a"
+"soldier, sailor or airman (section 140). The gist of the offence is the intention of the"
+"accused. Merely wearing a soldier's dress without the specific intention is no offence,"
+"e.g., actors put on soldier's garb while acting on the stage."
+There are six sections in the Code dealing with false personation—
+1. Personation of a soldier (section 140).
+2. Personation of a public servant (section 170).
+3. Wearing the garb or carrying the token used by a public servant (section 171).
+4. Personation of a voter at an election (section 171D).
+5. Personation for the purpose of an act or proceeding in a suit or prosecution (section
+205).
+6. Personation of a juror or assessor (section 229).
+Public tranquillity. Chapter VIII.
+Offences against public tranquillity hold a middle place between the State offences on
+the one hand and crimes against person and property on the other. They are four:
+I. Unlawful Assembly. different
+II. Rioting.
+III. Promoting enmity between classes.
+IV. Affray.
+Unlawful assembly.
+"I. An 'unlawful assembly' is an assembly of five or more persons, if their common"
+object is
+1. To overawe by criminal force—
+"(a) the Central or any State Government, or"
+"(b) the Parliament, or"
+"(c) the Legislature of any State, or"
+(d) any public servant in the exercise of his lawful power.
+2. To resist the execution of law or legal process.
+"3. To commit mischief, criminal trespass, or other offences."
+4. By criminal force—
+"(a) to take or obtain possession of any property, or"
+"(b) to deprive any person of any incorporeal right, or"
+(c) to enforce any right or supposed right.
+5. By criminal force to compel any person—
+"(a) to do what he is not legally bound to do, or"
+(b) to omit what he is legally entitled to do (section 141).
+"[Six months, or fine, or both. If armed with a deadly weapon, two years, or fine, or both"
+"(sections 143, 144).]"
+The assembly must consist of five or more persons. It is immaterial whether the
+"common object is in their minds when they come together, or whether it occurs to them"
+afterwards. There must be some present and immediate purpose of carrying into effect
+the common object. A meeting for deliberation only is not an unlawful assembly.
+Persons maintaining their own right or supposed right against the aggression of other
+people do not commit this offence. Common object means same or similar object; it is
+not necessary to have a preconcert or prior meeting of minds.
+An assembly not unlawful when it assembled may subsequently become an unlawful
+"one (section 143, Explanation). Illegal acts of one or two members do not change the"
+"lawful character of an assembly. Similarly, a lawful assembly does not become"
+unlawful merely because the members know that their assembly would be opposed
+and a breach of the peace would be committed.
+"Whoever, being aware of facts which render an assembly an unlawful one, intentionally"
+"joins it, or continues in it, is a member of that assembly (section 142). Persons may"
+"have associated themselves with a mob from perfectly innocent motives, but if the"
+"mob becomes an unlawful assembly, and they take part in its proceedings, they will be"
+liable. Every such member is deemed guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of
+the common object. There must be nexus between the common object and the offence
+committed.
+Leading case:—Allauddin Mia.
+If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of
+"the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew"
+"to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time"
+"of the committing of that offence, is a member of the said assembly, is guilty of that"
+offence (section 149). This section prevents the accused from putting forth the
+defence that he did not with his own hand commit the offence committed in
+prosecution of the common object. Common object does not mean common intention.
+"All will be guilty of any offence done in prosecution of the common object, though there"
+was no common intention to commit the offence as a means to the end. But members
+of an unlawful assembly may have a community of object only up to a certain point and
+beyond that they may differ in their objects.
+Leading cases:—R v Sabedali; Dalip Singh; Khudiram; Mushakhan; Beatty v Gillbanks.
+The common object may develop at the spot itself.
+Leading case:—Vithal Bhimshah Kali.
+Other cognate offences—
+1. Joining an unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon (section 144).
+2. Joining or continuing in an unlawful assembly knowing it has been commanded to
+disperse (section 145).
+3. Hiring of persons to join an unlawful assembly (section 150).
+4. Harbouring persons hired for an unlawful assembly (section 157).
+5. Being hired to take part in an unlawful assembly (section 158).
+"Persons, who are engaged or hired to do any of the acts which make an assembly"
+"unlawful, are likewise punished (ibid)."
+Riot.
+"II. When (1) force of violence is used, (2) by an unlawful assembly or by any member"
+"thereof, (3) in prosecution of the common object, every member is guilty of rioting"
+"(section 146). [Two years or fine, or both. If armed with a deadly weapon, Three years,"
+"or fine, or both (section 148).]"
+Riot is an unlawful assembly in a particular state of activity. To constitute the offence
+of rioting it must be proved:
+"(1) that the accused, being five or more in number, formed an unlawful assembly;"
+(2) that they were animated by a common unlawful object;
+(3) that force or violence was used by the unlawful assembly or any member of it;
+and
+(4) that such force was used in prosecution of the common object.
+"If the common object of an assembly is not illegal, it is not rioting even if force is used"
+by a member of it. If persons lawfully assembled for any purpose suddenly quarrel they
+do not commit riot.
+Other cognate offences—
+1. Rioting with deadly weapons (section 148).
+2. Hiring or conniving at hiring of persons to join unlawful assembly (section. 150).
+3. Assaulting or obstructing a public servant in the suppression of a riot (section.
+152).
+4. Malignantly or wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot (section.
+153).
+Liability of persons who provide space
+"Liability of persons who own, occupy, or have an interest in land, is governed by the"
+following provisions:
+"(1) The owner, or any person having or claiming an interest in land upon which an"
+"unlawful assembly is held, or riot is committed, is punishable with Rs. 1,000 fine, if he"
+or his agent (a) knowing of the offence do not give the earliest notice thereof at the
+nearest police station; or (b) believing the offence likely to be committed do not use
+any lawful means to prevent it; or (c) in the event of the offence taking place do not use
+all lawful means to disperse the unlawful assembly or suppress the riot (section 154).
+(2) Where a riot is committed on behalf of a person who is the owner or occupier of
+"land respecting which such riot takes place, or who claims any interest in such land, or"
+"in the subject of any dispute which caused the riot, such person is liable to a fine, if he"
+"or his agent having reason to believe that the riot is likely to be committed, or the"
+"unlawful assembly causing the riot is likely to be held, fails to use all lawful means for"
+"preventing the riot, or for suppressing and dispersing the same (section 155)."
+"Under similar circumstances, the agent or manager is punishable likewise (section"
+156).
+"Promoting enmity, etc."
+"III. (a) Promoting disharmony or enmity or hatred or ill-will between different religious,"
+"racial, language, caste or community groups on grounds of religion, race, language,"
+"caste or community, or"
+(b) Committing act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony or disturbing
+"public tranquillity,"
+"by words or signs, or visible representations, or otherwise [Three years, or fine, or both]."
+(c) Committing offence as stated in paras (a) and (b) in a place of worship or in any
+assembly engaged in religious worship or ceremonies (section 153A). [Five years and
+fine].
+"(d) Knowingly carrying arms in any procession or organizing, or holding taking part in"
+ant mass drill mort mass training with (section 153AA) [Six months and fine.]
+Leading cases:—Babu Rao Patel. Varsha Publications Pvt Ltd. Nand Kishore Singh.
+Chandanmal Chopra.
+Affray.
+"IV. When (1) two or more persons, (2) by fighting in a public place, (3) disturb the public"
+"peace, they commit an affray (section 159). [One month or Rs. 100, or both (section"
+160).]
+"The word 'affray' is derived from the French word affraier, to terrify. An 'affray' is an"
+offence against the public peace because it is committed in a public place and is likely
+"to cause general alarm and disturbance. 'Public place' is a place where the public go,"
+no matter whether they have a right to go or not. No quarrelsome or threatening words
+will amount to an affray.
+An 'affray' differs from a 'riot'.
+"(1) An affray cannot be committed in a private place, a riot can be."
+"(2) An affray is committed by two or more persons, a riot by five or more."
+(3) A riot is more severely punishable than an affray.
+Persons other than the actual rioters are punishable in respect of riot in the following
+cases:—
+(1) Owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held (section 154).
+(2) The person for whose benefit a riot is committed (section 155).
+(3) The agent of owner or occupier for whose benefit a riot is committed(section 156).
+"(4) One who knowingly harbours, in any house or premises under his control, any"
+persons being or about to be hired or employed as members of an unlawful assembly
+(section 157).
+"(5) One who is engaged, or hired, or offers to be hired, to do or assist in doing any of"
+"the acts specified in s. 141, as making an assembly unlawful (section 158)."
+Offences by or relating to public servants. Chapter IX.
+Chapter IX deals with offences by or relating to public servants. They are as follows:—
+Note:Sections 161 to 165A have been repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act
+"(vide, amendment of 1988)."
+"1. Whoever being, or expecting to be, a public servant"
+"(i) accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, any"
+"gratification other than legal remuneration,"
+(ii) as a reward for
+"(a) doing or forbearing to do any official act, or"
+(b) showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in
+"the exercise of his official functions, or"
+(c) rendering or attempting to render any service or dis-service to any
+"person, with the Central or any State Government or Parliament or"
+"the Legislature of any State, or a public servant,"
+"is guilty of taking illegal gratification (section 161). [Three years, or fine or both.] It is"
+"essential that the gratification should be obtained ""as a motive or reward""."
+Leading cases:—Mahesh. Maha Singh. R S Nayak v A R Antulay.
+2. Taking a gratification in order by corrupt or illegal means to influence a public
+"servant (section 162). [Three years, or fine or both.]"
+3. Taking a gratification for the exercise of personal influence with a public servant
+"(section 163). [One year's simple imprisonment, or fine, or both.]"
+4. Public servant abetting either of the two last mentioned offences (section 164).
+"5. Public servant obtaining any valuable thing, without consideration, from a person"
+concerned in any proceeding or business transacted by such public servant (section
+165).
+6. Abetting a public servant in committing an offence under section 161 or section 165
+(section 165A).
+7. Public servant knowingly disobeying law with intent to cause injury to any person
+(section 166).
+9. Public servant disobeying direction under law (section 166A).
+10. Punishment for non-treatment of victim (166B).
+8. Public servant framing or translating a document in a way which he knows or
+"believes to be incorrect, intending to cause injury to any person (section 167)."
+9. Public servant unlawfully engaging in trade (section 168).
+10. Public servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property (section 169).
+"11. Personating a public servant, and doing or attempting to do an act in such assumed"
+character under colour of office (section 170).
+12. Wearing a garb or carrying a token used by a public servant with fraudulent intent
+(section 171).
+Offences relating to elections. Chapter IXA.
+"Chapter IXA deals with offences relating to elections. It seeks to make punishable,"
+"under the ordinary penal law, bribing, undue influence, and personation, and certain"
+other malpractices at elections. It applies to membership of any public body where the
+law prescribes a method of election. Persons guilty of malpractices are debarred from
+holding positions of public responsibility for a specified period. The following are
+deemed to be offences under this chapter:—
+1. Giving or accepting gratification with the object of exercising any electoral right
+"(section 171B). Gratification includes treating, i.e., giving of food, drink, entertainment"
+or provisions (section 171E).
+"2. Interfering with the free exercise of any electoral right (clause 1), threatening any"
+"candidate or voter, or any person in whom he is interested, with injury of any kind; or"
+inducing any candidate or voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is
+interested will become an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure (clause 2)
+(section 171C).
+Something more than a mere act of canvassing would be necessary: Charan Lal Sahu v
+Giani Zail Singh.
+3. Personation at an election (section 171D).
+4. Publishing false statements in relation to the personal character or conduct of any
+candidate (section 171G).
+5. Illegal payments in connection with an election (section 171H).
+6. Failure to keep election accounts (section 171I).
+Contempt of the authority of public servants. Chapter X.
+Chapter X deals with contempt of the lawful authority of public servants. It contains
+those provisions which are intended to enforce obedience to the lawful authority of
+public servants.
+The following provisions relate to wilful omission or evasion of the performance of a
+public duty:—
+"1. Absconding to avoid service of a summons, notice, order or other proceeding from a"
+public servant (section 172).
+'Absconding' here means simply hiding. The section does not speak of a warrant.
+"2. Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or removing the same from any"
+"place to which it is lawfully affixed, or preventing the making of any proclamation under"
+due authority of publication thereof (section 173).
+"3. Non-attendance, in obedience to a summons, notice, order, or proclamation"
+"proceeding from a public servant in person or by agent, or having attended, departing"
+before it is lawful to depart (section 174).
+4. Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82 of Act 2 of 1974
+(section 174A)
+[Failure by person released on bail or bond to appear in court is an offence under
+section 229A.]
+The attendance must be in a place in India. The summons should be specific in its
+"terms as to the title of the Court, the place at which, the day, and the time of the day"
+when the attendance is required. A verbal order is quite sufficient. Mere affixing of
+summons to a house is not enough; personal service must be attempted.
+4. Intentional omission to produce or deliver up any document to a public servant by
+person legally bound to produce such document (section 175).
+"5. Intentional omission to give, or furnish, at the time and in the manner aforesaid by"
+"law, any notice or information to a public servant (section 176)."
+"6. Section 202, though not appearing in this Chapter, punishes intentional omission to"
+give information of offence by person bound to inform.
+7. Intentional omission to assist public servant in the execution of his duty when bound
+by law to give assistance (section 187).
+A person refusing to give true information to a public servant will be liable under the
+following circumstances:—
+1. Refusing on oath or affirmation to state the truth when required by a public servant
+legally competent to require it (section 178).
+The penalty of the section would not be attracted where the refusal to take oath would
+be justifiable: Kiran Bedi and Inder Singh v Commission of Inquiry.
+"2. Refusing by a person legally bound to state the truth, to answer any question,"
+demanded of him by a public servant authorized to question (section 179).
+A person examined under section 161 of Cr PC is now legally bound to state the truth.
+Leading case:—Nandini Sathpathy.
+3. Refusing to sign any statement made by the party when required by a public servant
+legally competent to require that he shall sign it (section 180).
+A person giving false information to a public servant is liable in the following cases:—
+"1. Furnishing, as true, information which the person furnishing same, being legally"
+"bound to furnish, knows or has reason to believe to be false [six months simple"
+"imprisonment, Rs. 1,000 fine]. If the information respects the commission of an"
+"offence, or prevention of it, or the apprehension of an offender—two years'"
+imprisonment or fine (section 177).
+"2. False statement on oath to a public servant, or person authorised to administer oath,"
+by a person legally bound to state the truth on the subject in question (section 181).
+This section refers to cases in which the false statements are made to any public
+servant in proceedings other than judicial.Section 191 refers to judicial proceedings.
+3. Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to
+"be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause,"
+such public servant—
+(a) to do or omit to do anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if
+the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by
+"him, or"
+(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any
+person (section 182).
+"4. Section 203, though not appearing in this chapter, punishes the giving of false"
+information respecting an offence.
+The following provisions deal with obstructing or disobeying a public servant:—
+1. Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a public servant
+(section 183).
+2. Obstructing the sale of property offered for sale by the lawful authority of a public
+servant (section 184).
+"3. Illegal purchase or bid for property, offered for sale by the authority of a public"
+"servant, on account of any person, whether himself or any other, who is under a legal"
+"incapacity to purchase that property at such sale, or bid for such property not intending"
+"to perform the obligation thereby, incurred (section 185)."
+4. Obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions (section 186).
+5. Intentional omission to assist public servant in the execution of his duty when bound
+by law to give assistance (section 187).
+6. Knowingly disobeying an order 'promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered
+to promulgate it' (section 188). [If such disobedience tends to cause obstruction or
+"injury to any person lawfully employed, then the punishment is simple imprisonment for"
+"one month, or Rs. 200 fine, or both. If it causes riot or affray, or danger to human life,"
+"health or safety, then with imprisonment of either description for six months, or Rs."
+"1,000 fine, or both]."
+"For violation of a curfew order under section 144 Cr PC, 1973, only a prosecution under"
+"section 188, IPC, 1860, can be launched in an appropriate case but no ""shoot to kill"""
+order is justified merely on that account.
+Three things are necessary—
+"(1) A lawful order promulgated by a public servant,"
+"(2) knowledge of the order and disobedience of it, and"
+(3) the adverse result that is likely to follow from such disobedience.
+"Disobedience per se of an order promulgated under section 144 Cr PC, 1973, is not an"
+offence and that it is necessary to prove that the disobedience would have tended to
+"have certain results mentioned in section 188 IPC, 1860."
+Leading cases:—Saroj Hazra. Jayantilal.
+"7. Threat of injury to a public servant, or to any person in whom such public servant is"
+believed to be interested in order to induce such public servant to do or refrain from
+doing an official act (section 189).
+8. Threat of injury to induce any person to refrain from applying for protection to a
+public servant (section 190).
+Chapter XI treats offences relating to false evidence and public justice.
+"A person is said to give 'false evidence', if he"
+False evidence. Chapter XI.
+"(1) being legally bound by an oath, or by an express provision of law to state the truth;"
+or
+(2) being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject;
+(3) makes any statement which is false; and
+"(4) which he either knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true (section"
+191).
+"If the Court has no authority to administer an oath, or if it has no jurisdiction at all, the"
+proceedings will be without jurisdiction. Oath or solemn affirmation is not a condition
+precedent to this offence. The false statement need not be material to the case. It is
+"not limited to evidence before a Court of Justice, but covers any statement made,"
+"under oath or otherwise, in pursuance of a legal duty to make it. A false allegation in a"
+written statement amounts to this offence. Illegality of a trial does not purge perjury
+committed in that trial. An accused is not liable if he gives false answers to questions
+put by the Court.
+A person is said to 'fabricate false evidence' if he
+Fabricating false evidence.
+(1) causes any circumstance to exist; or
+(2) makes any false entry in any book or record; or
+(3) makes any document containing a false statement;
+"(4) intending that such circumstance, false entry or false statement may appear in"
+"evidence in (a) a judicial proceeding, or (b) a proceeding taken by law before a public"
+servant or an arbitrator; and
+"(5) may cause any person, who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the"
+"evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion;"
+(6) touching any point material to the result of such proceeding (section 192). [If
+evidence is given or fabricated for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial
+"proceeding, seven years and fine; in any other case, three years and fine (section 193).]"
+This section refers to judicial proceedings. Section 181 refers to any proceeding before
+"a public servant. The definition of 'judicial proceeding' in Cr PC, 1973, is not applicable"
+to sections 192 and 193.
+Intention is the gist of the offence of fabricating false evidence.
+"The false evidence must be material to the case, though it may not be so under section"
+191. If no erroneous opinion could be formed touching any point material to the result
+of a proceeding there is no fabrication.
+As soon as the false evidence is fabricated the offence is complete. Actual use of such
+evidence is not necessary. Such use is punishable under section 196. The fabricated
+"evidence must, however, be admissible evidence. The offence cannot be committed"
+before a public servant not authorized to hold an investigation.
+Where a person makes two contradictory statements he can be charged in the
+"alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence, although it cannot be"
+"proved which of those contradictory statements is false. KTMS Mohd v UOI, (Supreme"
+Court).
+Persons accused of giving or fabricating false evidence should be tried separately and
+not jointly.
+An accused person who fabricates evidence to escape punishment is not liable under
+"this section, unless he contemplates injury to someone else."
+The aggravated forms of these two offences are—
+1. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of a capital
+offence (section 194).
+2. Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of an offence
+punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment (section 195).
+3. Threatening or inducing any person to give false evidence (section 195A).
+The following offences are punishable in the same manner as the giving of false
+evidence:—
+1. Issuing or signing any certificate required by law to be given or signed or by law
+made evidence of any fact knowing or believing that such certificate is false in any
+material point (section 197).
+2. Using as true a certificate known to be false in a material point (section 198).
+3. False statement made in any declaration which touches any material point and
+which is by law receivable as evidence (section 199).
+4. Using as true any such declaration known to be false in any material point (section
+200).
+5. Causing disappearance of evidence of the offence or giving false information to
+screen offender. The punishment is linked with the type of offence of which the
+evidence is destroyed. (section 201).
+6. Intentional omission to give information by the person who is bound to inform
+(section 202).
+7. Giving false information in respect of an offence which has been committed (section
+203).
+Destruction or secreting or obliteration of a document to prevent its production in
+evidence in a court is punishable (section 204).
+There are two offences in this chapter dealing with false personation.
+Personation
+"1. Falsely personating another, and in such assumed character making any admission"
+"or statement, or confessing judgment or causing any process to be issued or becoming"
+"bail or security, or doing any other act in any suit or prosecution (section 205)."
+Any fraudulent gain or benefit to the offender is not necessary.
+The Calcutta High Court has held that a person commits this offence even if he
+"personates a purely imaginary person. The Madras High Court, following English"
+"precedents, has held to the contrary."
+2. Personating a juror or assessor. (section 229).
+The following provisions deal with the abuse of process of court:—
+Abuse of process of Court.
+1. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure as forfeiture or
+in execution of a decree (section 206).
+2. Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeiture or in execution
+(section 207).
+3. Fraudulently suffering a decree for a sum not due (section 208).
+4. Fraudulently or dishonestly making a false claim in court (section 209).
+5. Fraudulently obtaining a decree for a sum not due or causing a decree or order to be
+executed against any person after it has been satisfied (section 210).
+The fact that the satisfaction of a decree is of such a nature that the court executing
+"the decree cannot recognize it, does not prevent the decree-holder from being"
+convicted of this offence.
+6. False charge of an offence.
+This has four ingredients:—
+"(1) Instituting or causing to be instituted any criminal proceedings, or"
+"(2) Falsely charging any person with having committed an offence,"
+"(3) Knowledge that there is no just or lawful ground for it,"
+"(4) Doing as above with intent to cause injury to any person (section 211). [Two years,"
+"or fine, or both. If criminal proceedings, be instituted on a false charge of an offence"
+"punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or"
+"upwards, then the punishment is seven years and fine.]"
+Criminal law may be put in motion—
+"(1) by giving information to the police, or"
+(2) by lodging a complaint before a Magistrate.
+A false charge to the police in respect of a cognizable offence amounts to institution of
+criminal proceedings. But as the police have no power to take any proceedings in non-
+"cognizable cases without orders from a Magistrate, a false charge of such offence"
+made to the police is not an institution of criminal proceedings but merely a false
+charge. No such distinction exists when a false charge of any offence is made before a
+Magistrate.
+Leading cases:—R v Karim Buksh. R v Jijibhai. Santosh Singh.
+For a false charge of offence of a serious nature severe punishment is provided.
+"According to the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts, in such cases it is not"
+"necessary that criminal proceedings should be instituted, the charge should merely"
+relate to a serious offence; whereas the Allahabad High Court has held that criminal
+proceedings should have been actually instituted.
+Leading cases:—R v Karim Buksh(Cal). R v Nanjunda Row(Mad). R v Bisheshar(All).
+The bringing of a vexatious charge is not an offence under this section. The
+compounding of the offence alleged to have been committed is no bar to a prosecution
+under this section. The person aggrieved may sue in a civil suit for damages for
+malicious prosecution instead of instituting criminal proceedings.
+There is a difference between section 182 and section 211.
+"Bombay High Court.—Under section 182 proof of (1) malice, and (2) want of reasonable"
+"and probable cause, except so far as they are implied in the act of giving false"
+"information, is not necessary; under section 211 such proof is absolutely required"
+(Raghavendra v Kashinathbhat).
+Calcutta High Court.—Prosecution for a false charge may be under either of these
+"sections. But if the false charge is of a serious nature, section 211 should be applied"
+(Sarada Prosad Chatterjee).
+"Allahabad High Court.—Where a specific false charge is made, the proper section to"
+apply is section 211. An offence under section 182 is complete when false information
+is given to a public servant although the latter takes no steps towards the institution of
+criminal proceedings (Jugal Kishore; Raghu Tiwari).
+Patna High Court.—It follows the view of the Calcutta High Court.
+Punjab.—The former Chief Court of the Punjab followed the view of the Bombay High
+Court.
+Screening an offender.
+1. Causing disappearance of evidence of an offence or giving false information to
+screen the offender (section 201).
+An offence should have been actually committed to render a person liable. An offender
+himself causing the disappearance of evidence can be held liable under this section.
+2. Taking gift to screen an offender from punishment (section 213).
+3. Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening an offender
+(section 214).
+Taking any gratification on account of helping any person to recover any moveable
+property of which he has been deprived by any offence under this Code is punished
+unless the person taking gift uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be
+apprehended (section 215).
+Harbouring an offender.
+1. Harbouring or concealing a person knowing him to be an offender with the intention
+of screening him from legal punishment (section 212).
+"2. Harbouring or concealing an offender who has escaped from custody, or whose"
+apprehension has been ordered (section 216).
+"3. Knowingly harbouring any persons who are about to commit, or have committed,"
+robbery or dacoity (section 216A).
+The following provisions deal with offences against public justice committed by public
+servants:—
+Offences by public servants.
+1. Public servant knowingly disobeying a direction of law with an intent to save any
+person from punishment or any property from forfeiture (section 217).
+"2. Public servant, charged as such with the preparation of a record or other writing,"
+"framing it incorrectly with intent to cause loss or injury to the public or any person, or to"
+save any person from punishment or property from forfeiture (section 218).
+"3. Public servant in a judicial proceeding corruptly or maliciously making any report,"
+"order, verdict, or decision, knowing that it is contrary to law (section 219)."
+"4. Public servant corruptly or maliciously committing any person for trial, or keeping"
+any person in confinement knowing that he is acting contrary to law (section 220).
+The Supreme Court analysed the requirements of this section in Suryamoorthy v
+Govindaswami.
+"5. Public servant intentionally omitting to apprehend, or suffering to escape, any person"
+when legally bound to apprehend or keep him in confinement (section 221).
+"6. Same as above, when such person is under sentence or lawfully committed to"
+custody (section 222).
+"7. Public servant legally bound to keep in confinement a person charged with, or"
+"convicted of, any offence, negligently suffering him to escape (section 223)."
+8. Public servant omitting to apprehend or suffering to escape from confinement any
+person in cases not otherwise provided for (section 225A).
+Resisting the law is punishable in the following cases:—
+1. A person resisting or obstructing the lawful apprehension of himself for any offence
+with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted; or escaping or attempting
+to escape from legal custody (section 224).
+"2. Resisting or obstructing lawful apprehension of another person for an offence, or"
+rescuing or attempting to rescue him from legal custody (section 225).
+"3. Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension, or escaping or rescuing from legal"
+custody in cases not otherwise provided for (section 225B). Violation of condition of
+remission of punishment (section 227).
+Contempt of Court.
+A person is guilty of contempt of Court if he intentionally offers any insult or causes
+"any interruption to any public servant, while he is sitting in any stage of a judicial"
+"proceeding (section 228). [Six months' simple imprisonment, or Rs. 1,000, or both.]"
+A person who prints or publishes the name or discloses the identity of the victim of a
+"rape case and other sexual offences under sections 376A, 376B, 376C or 376D without"
+due authorisation or permission of the court shall be punishable with imprisonment of
+either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to
+fine (section 228A).
+"This section, however, does not apply to the publication of the judgment of any High"
+Court or the Supreme Court (Explanation to section 228A).
+Coin and Stamps. Chapter XII.
+"Coin is metal used for the time being as money, and stamped and issued by the"
+authority of some State or Sovereign power in order to be so used. Old coins not used
+as money are not coins under this definition.
+Indian coin is—
+(1) metal stamped and issued—
+"(a) by the authority of the Government of India,"
+(b) in order to be used as money;
+(2) Metal which has been so stamped or issued shall continue to be Indian coin
+notwithstanding that it may have ceased to be used as money (section 230).
+Following are the various offences relating to coin:—
+"1. Counterfeiting coin or Indian coin (sections 231, 232)."
+"2. Making, mending, buying, or selling, or disposing of any die or instrument for"
+"counterfeiting coin or Indian coin (sections 233, 234)."
+3. Being in possession of any instrument or material for the purpose of using the same
+for counterfeiting of coin or Indian coin (section 235).
+"4. Abetting in India, counterfeiting of coin out of India (section 236)."
+Abetment must be completed in India.
+"5. Importing or exporting of a counterfeit coin or Indian coin (sections 237, 238)."
+6. Delivery to another of a coin or Indian coin possessed with the knowledge that it is
+"counterfeit (sections 239, 240)."
+"7. Delivery to another of a counterfeit coin as genuine, which, when first possessed, the"
+deliverer did not know to be counterfeit (section 241).
+8. Possession of a counterfeit coin or Indian coin by a person who knew it to be
+"counterfeit when he became possessed thereof (sections 242, 243)."
+Possession must be with intent to defraud.
+9. Any person employed in a mint causing a coin to be of different weight or
+composition from that fixed by law (section 244).
+10. Unlawfully taking from a mint any coining instrument or tool (section 245).
+11. Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing the weight or altering the composition of
+"any coin or Indian coin (sections 246, 247)."
+12. Altering appearance of any coin or Indian coin with intent that it shall pass as a coin
+"of different description (sections 248, 249)."
+13. Delivery to another of a coin or Indian coin possessed with the knowledge that it is
+"altered (sections 250, 251)."
+There must be both possession with knowledge and fraudulent delivery.
+14. Possession of an altered coin or Indian coin by a person who knew it to be altered
+"when he became possessed thereof (sections 252, 253)."
+"15. Delivery to another of an altered coin as genuine, which, when first possessed, the"
+deliverer did not know to be altered (section 254).
+The following offences relate to Government stamps:—
+1. Counterfeiting or performing any part of the process of counterfeiting a government
+stamp (section 255).
+2. Possession of an instrument or material for the purpose of counterfeiting a
+government stamp (section 256).
+"3. Making, buying, or selling any instrument for the purpose of counterfeiting a"
+government stamp (section 257).
+4. Sale of a counterfeit government stamp (section 258).
+5. Possession of a counterfeit government stamp (section 259).
+6. Using as genuine a government stamp known to be counterfeit (section 260).
+7. Fraudulently affecting any writing from a substance bearing a Government stamp or
+"removing from a document the stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to the"
+Government (section 261).
+8. Using a government stamp known to have been before used (section 262).
+9. Fraudulently erasing from a government stamp any mark denoting that the same has
+"been used, or selling or disposing of a stamp from which such a mark has been erased"
+(section 263).
+"10. Possession of a fictitious stamp or of any die, plate or instrument for making any"
+fictitious stamp (section 263A).
+Weights and measures. Chapter XIII.
+The following offences relate to weights and measures:—
+1. Fraudulent use of false instruments for weighing (section. 264).
+2. Fraudulent use of a false weight or measure or using any weight or measure of
+"length or capacity, as a different weight or measure from what it is (section 265)."
+"3. Possession of any instrument for weighing, or of any weight or measure of length or"
+"capacity, knowing it to be false, intending that the same may be fraudulently used"
+(section 266).
+"4. Making, selling, or disposing of any false instrument for weighing or any false weight"
+or measure of any length or capacity in order that the same may be used or knowing
+that it is likely to be used as true (section 267).
+Nuisance. Chapter XIV.
+A person is guilty of public nuisance who does
+"(1) any act, or is guilty of an illegal omission; and"
+(2) such act or omission causes
+"(a) any common injury, danger, or annoyance (i) to the public, or (ii) to the people in"
+general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity; or
+"(b) any injury, obstruction, danger, or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to"
+use any public right (section 268).
+"Nuisance is either (1) public, or (2) private. The former is an offence against the public"
+"as it affects the public at large, or some considerable portion of public. It depends in a"
+great measure upon the number of houses and the concourse of people in the vicinity;
+and the annoyance or neglect must be of a real and substantial nature. Public nuisance
+cannot be excused on the ground that the act complained of is inconvenient to a large
+"number of the public. Acts which seriously interfere with the health, safety, comfort, or"
+"convenience of the public generally, or which tend to degrade public morals, have"
+"always been considered public nuisance. A brew-house, glass-house, or swine-yard,"
+may be a public nuisance if it is shown that the trade is such as to render enjoyment of
+life and property uncomfortable. Public nuisance can only be the subject of one
+"indictment, otherwise a party might be ruined by a million prosecutions. No prescriptive"
+right can be acquired to maintain a public nuisance.
+"Private nuisance is anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or"
+"hereditaments of another, and not amounting to trespass. It is an act affecting some"
+particular individual or individuals as distinguished from the public at large. It is in the
+quantum of annoyance that public nuisance differs from private. Private nuisance
+"cannot be a subject of indictment but a ground of a civil action for damages, or"
+"injunction, or both."
+The following offences affect public health:—
+1. Negligent or malignant act likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life
+"(sections 269, 270). The Supreme Court considered under this section the position of a"
+person suffering from HIV (AIDS) X v Z.
+2. Wilful disobedience to a quarantine rule (section 271).
+3. Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale so as to make it noxious (section
+272).
+"4. Selling, offering or exposing for sale, as food or drink, any article which has been"
+rendered or has become noxious or unfit for food or drink (section 273).
+"5. Adulteration of drug so as to lessen its efficacy, change its operation or render it"
+noxious (section 274).
+6. Knowingly selling or causing to be used for medicinal purposes any adulterated drug
+(section 275).
+"7. Selling, or offering or exposing for sale, or issuing from a dispensary for medicinal"
+"purposes, any drug or medical preparation as a different drug or medical preparation"
+(section 276). Possession has been taken to be evidence of intention (sabapathee).
+"In the States of West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh offences under sections 272, 273, 274,"
+"275 and 276 IPC, 1860, have by virtue of local amendments been made cognizable,"
+non-bailable and punishable with imprisonment for life (see COMMENT under section
+272).
+8. Voluntarily corrupting or fouling the water of a public spring or reservoir so as to
+render it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used (section 277).
+9. Voluntarily vitiating the atmosphere so as to make it noxious to the public health
+(section 278). Carrying such material without proper protection and dumping it at
+"some place, though temporarily, constituted offences. Durham County Council v Peter"
+Connors Industrial Services and R v Metropolitan S Magistrate.
+The following offences relate to public safety:—
+"1. Rash or negligent driving or riding on a public way so as to endanger human life, or to"
+cause hurt or injury to any other person (section 279).
+Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a
+"reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct"
+"of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable"
+man would not do.
+There is a distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. Culpable rashness is
+acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may
+follow but with the hope that they will not. Culpable negligence is acting without the
+consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow. As between rashness
+"and negligence, rashness is a graver offence."
+Leading cases:—Bhalchandra. Padmacharan Naik.
+2. Rash or negligent navigation of a vessel (section 280).
+"3. Exhibiting any false light, mark, or buoy, intending or knowing it to be likely to mislead"
+any navigator (section 281).
+4. Conveying a person by water for hire in a vessel overloaded or unsafe (section 282).
+Hijacking and threat to blow up an aircraft have been considered under this section (R v
+Mason).
+"5. Causing danger, obstruction, or injury to any person in a public way or public line of"
+navigation (section 283).
+6. Rash or negligent conduct with respect to any poisonous substance so as to
+"endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person (section 284)."
+7. Rash or negligent conduct with respect to any fire or combustible matter (section.
+285).
+8. Rash or negligent conduct with respect to any explosive substance (section. 286).
+9. Rash or negligent conduct with respect to any machinery in the possession or under
+the charge of the offender (section. 287).
+10. Negligence with respect to pulling down or repairing buildings (section. 288).
+11. Negligence with respect to any animal (section. 289).
+Acts of public nuisance other than those mentioned above are punishable under the
+general section (section. 290). A person cannot continue a public nuisance after
+injunction to discontinue (section. 291).
+Offences against public morals and decency are:—
+"1. (a) Selling, letting to hire, distributing, or publicly exhibiting or circulating any"
+"obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any"
+obscene object; or
+"(b) importing, exporting, or conveying any obscene object for any of the above"
+purposes; or
+(c) taking part in or receiving profits from any business conducted for the
+abovementioned purposes; or
+"(d) advertising that any person is engaged in any of the abovementioned acts, or"
+that any obscene object can be got from that person; or
+(e) attempting to do any act which is an offence under this section (section. 292).
+Leading cases:—Ranjit Udeshi. Samaresh Basu v Amal Mitra. Rajkapoor v Laxman.
+Mahajan Singh v Commr. of Police.
+"2. Selling, letting to hire, distributing, exhibiting, or circulating to any person under the"
+"age of 20 years any obscene object referred to above, or attempting to do so (section."
+293).
+"A book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other"
+object is deemed obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its
+effect taken as a whole is such as tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely
+"to see, read or hear the matter."
+3. Causing annoyance to others by—
+(a) doing any obscene act in any public place; or
+"(b) singing, reciting, or uttering any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any"
+public place (section 294).
+"(4) Keeping any office, or place, for the purpose of drawing any lottery not being a state"
+lottery or a lottery authorised by the State Government (section 294A).
+"Whoever publishes any proposal to pay any sum, or to deliver any goods, on drawing of"
+"any ticket, lot or number, in a lottery is also punished (ibid). [Fine up to Rs. 100.]"
+"An agreement for contributions to be paid by lot, or a transaction requiring skill for"
+winning prizes is not a lottery. Transactions in which prizes are decided by chance
+amount to lottery.
+Offences relating to religion. Chapter XV.
+Chapter XV treats of offences relating to religion. They are as follows:—
+"1. Injuring or defiling a place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of"
+"persons, with intent to insult the religion of any class of persons (section 295)."
+"2. Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class, by"
+insulting its religion or religious belief irrespective of the fact whether the religious
+belief in question is rational or irrational. (section 295A).
+Leading cases:—Shalibhadra Shah. Nandkishore Singh. Chandanmal Chopra. T
+Parameswaran v District Collector.
+3. Voluntarily disturbing a religious assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of
+religious worship or religious ceremonies (section 296).
+"4. Trespassing in a place of worship or burial place, offering any indignity to corpse, or"
+"disturbing persons performing funeral ceremonies, with intent to wound the feelings, or"
+insult the religion of any person or with the knowledge that the feelings of any person
+are likely to be wounded (section 297).
+"5. Uttering any word or making any sound in the hearing of that person, or making any"
+"gesture in the sight of that person, or placing any object in the sight of that person"
+(section 298).
+Offences affecting human body. Chapter XVI.
+Offences against the person are—
+(1) Unlawful homicide.
+(a) Culpable homicide.
+(b) Murder.
+(c) Homicide by rash or negligent act.
+(d) Suicide.
+(e) Being a Thug.
+(2) Causing miscarriage.
+(3) Exposure of infants and concealment of births of children.
+(4) Hurt and grievous hurt.
+(5) Wrongful restraint.
+(6) Wrongful confinement.
+(7) Criminal force.
+(8) Assault. prostitution.
+(9) Kidnapping.
+(10) Abduction.
+(11) Slavery.
+(12) Selling or buying a minor for prostitution.
+(13) Forced labour.
+(14) Rape and other sexual offences.
+(15) Unnatural offence.
+"Culpable homicide, the genus, and murder, the species, are defined in very close"
+resembling terms.
+Culpable homicide.
+A person commits murder (section 300) culpable homicide if he causes death by doing
+an act— (section 299) if he causes death by doing an act—
+(1) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or
+(2) with the intention of causing such bodily (2) with the intention of causing such bodily
+injury as is likely to cause death; injury as the offender knows to be likely to
+cause death of the person to whom the harm is
+caused; or
+(3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to
+"any person, and the bodily injury intended to be"
+inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of
+nature to cause death; or
+(3) with the knowledge that he is likely by such (4) with the knowledge that it is so imminently
+act to cause death. dangerous that it must in all probability cause
+"death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause"
+death.
+"[Imprisonment for life; or 10 years and fine, if Capital punishment, or imprisonment for life,"
+the offence comes under clause 2. If it comes and fine—(section. 302).
+"under clause 3, then 10 years, or fine, or both—"
+(section 304).]
+An offence cannot amount to murder unless it falls within the definition of culpable
+homicide; but it may amount to culpable homicide without amounting to murder. All
+"acts of killing done with the intention to kill, or to inflict bodily injury sufficient to cause"
+"death, or with the knowledge that death must be the most probable result are prima"
+facie murder; while those committed with the knowledge that death will be a likely
+"result are culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Where the act is not done ""with"
+"the intention of causing death"" (clause 4, section 300) the difference between culpable"
+homicide and murder is merely a question of different degrees of probability that death
+would ensue. It is culpable homicide where death must have been known to be a
+probable result. It is murder where it must have been known to be the most probable
+"result. If an injury is deliberately inflicted, in the sense that it is not accidental or"
+"unintentional, and the injury, objectively speaking, is sufficient to cause death in the"
+"ordinary course of nature and death results, the offence is murder (clause 3, section"
+300).
+Leading cases:—State of AP v R Punnayya. R v Govinda. R v Idu Beg. R v Gora Chand
+Gopee. Virsa Singh.
+"English case.—""Likely"".—The accused was convicted of an offence of behaving in a"
+manner likely to endanger the safety of an air craft by the persistent use of his mobile
+"telephone in mid-flight. His appeal against conviction failed because the word ""likely"""
+"was correctly construed in its statutory context as meaning ""a real risk not to be"
+"ignored."" (R v White house)."
+"Death caused by an act, for example, setting a house on fire, done with foresight that"
+"someone may die, but without any intention of that kind, has been held by an English"
+Court to be not murder but only culpable homicide. Foresight is not the same thing as
+an intention. Foresight may only be an evidence of intention.
+Leading case:—R v Nadrick.
+"Other circumstances may also prove intention. For example, a married woman burning"
+"in the kitchen and her husband and others not at all coming up to her, held by the"
+Supreme Court to be evidence of intention. Subedar Tewari v State of UP.
+"Where death is caused by poison, the earlier legal propositions, one of which required"
+"that the accused must be shown to have possessed poison of the kind in question,"
+have now been revised.
+Death in police custody is not capable by itself of creating an inference of murder. State
+v Balkrishna.
+Leading case:—Bhupinder Singh v State of Punjab.
+Death caused by the effect of words on the imagination or the passions of a person
+amounts to culpable homicide. If a person engaged in the commission of an offence
+"causes death by pure accident, he shall suffer only the punishment provided for the"
+"offence, without any addition on account of the accidental death. Culpable homicide"
+"presupposes an intention, or knowledge of likelihood, of causing death. In the absence"
+"of these elements, even if death be caused, the offence will be that of hurt or grievous"
+"hurt, e.g., death caused by kicking a person suffering from a diseased spleen."
+A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disease or
+"bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other is guilty of homicide"
+"(Explanation 1). Similarly, where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who"
+"causes such injury is guilty of this offence, although by resorting to proper remedies"
+and skilful treatment death might have been prevented (Explanation 2). The causing of
+the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it is homicide to cause
+"the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the"
+child may not have breathed or been completely born (Explanation 3).
+If death is caused by the voluntary act of the deceased resulting from fear of violence
+"on the part of the offender, the offence will be murder. For instance, if four or five"
+"persons were to stand round a man, and so threaten him and frighten him as to make"
+"him believe that his life was in danger, and he were to back away from them and tumble"
+"over a precipice to avoid them, the persons threatening him will be guilty of murder."
+Where the attack was aimed at one person but it fell upon another resulting in the
+"latter's death, it was held that under the doctrine of transfer of malice, the attacker"
+"would be guilty of murder. Nagaraj v State, (2006) Cr LJ 3724 (Mad—FB); Rahimbux v"
+"State of MP, (2008) 12 SCC 270 [LNIND 2008 SC 2798] ."
+The punishment for murder is either death or imprisonment for life and also fine. The
+"Supreme Court has, in a long course of decisions, made it an established principle that"
+"the normal punishment for murder is life imprisonment and that ""death"" should be"
+"awarded in ""rarest of rare cases"". Examples of such rarest of rare cases are:"
+Leading cases:—Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Administration). Lichhmadevi v State of
+Rajasthan.
+An abnormal delay in executing a death sentence has been recognised as a ground for
+converting death sentence into life imprisonment.
+Leading cases:—Bachan Singh v State of Punjab Triveniben v State of Gujarat Madhu
+Mehta v UOI.
+The Supreme Court has noted serious changes which have taken place in the state of
+the society since the categories for award of death sentence were laid down. Because
+"of such changes, there should be some flexibility in the application of the categories."
+"Swami Shraddananda v State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 [LNIND 2008 SC 1488] ."
+The Supreme Court has also taken opportunities to explain the impact of the special
+"State-wise enactments for punishment of children vis-a-visIPC, 1860: Bhoop Ram v"
+State of UP.
+There is no difference in the liability of the offender if the injury intended for one falls
+on another by accident (section 301).
+Exceptions.
+Culpable homicide is not murder in the following cases:—
+Provocation.
+"1. Grave and sudden provocation depriving the offender of the power of self-control,"
+provided that the provocation is not—
+(a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse;
+(b) given by anything done in obedience to the law or by a public servant in the lawful
+exercise of his powers;
+(c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
+Provocation resulting from abusive language has been considered to be grave enough.
+Female infidelity is a common cause of provocation.
+An English decision allowed even a self-induced provocation to be taken into account
+for recording a finding of manslaughter: R v Johnson.
+"The longer the gap between the provoking incidents, less likely the defence of"
+provocation is to succeed. The loss of self-control need not be immediate. The mental
+state of accused at the time of the incident may be taken into account for determining
+whether the response was the result of the loss of self-control: R v Ahluwalia;
+Dhandayuthan v State.
+Private defence.
+"2. If the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person"
+"or property, exceeds it, and causes death without premeditation and without intending"
+more harm than is necessary.
+Public servant.
+3. If the offender being a public servant or aiding a public servant exceeds his legal
+"powers and causes death by an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and"
+"necessary for the due discharge of his duty, and without ill-will towards the deceased."
+Sudden fight.
+"4. If it is committed, without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion,"
+"upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage, or"
+acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
+The fight should not have been pre-arranged.
+Consent.
+"5. When the deceased, being above the age of 18 years, suffers death or takes the"
+risk of harm with his own consent.
+"Where any of the five exceptions applies, the offence will be punishable under the first"
+part of section 304.
+The special category of murder enshrined in section 303 under the heading
+"""punishment for murder by life-convict"" has been declared by the Supreme Court to be"
+unconstitutional.
+Leading case:—Mithu
+The result is that all murders are now punishable under section 302.
+Culpable homicide which does not amount to murder is punishable under section 304
+"for a term extending to 10 years, if the act by which death is caused is done with the"
+intention of causing death or by causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
+"The same section in its second paragraph, popularly known as Part II, provides that the"
+accused causing death may be punished with imprisonment extending to 10 years or
+"fine or both, if the act is done without intention to cause death or such bodily injury as"
+"is likely to cause death, but with only knowledge that it is likely to cause death (section"
+304).
+"The nature of the intention has to be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part"
+"of the body hit, the amount of force employed, and attending circumstances. Manubhai"
+"Atabhai v State of Gujarat, (2007) 10 SCC 358 [LNIND 2007 SC 822] ."
+"For distinction between section 304 and section 304-A, see Supreme Court decision"
+noted of p 615.
+Death by negligence.
+Causing the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to
+culpable homicide is punishable (section 304A). [Two years and fine.]
+Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is
+"so, and that it may cause injury, or knowledge that injury will probably be caused."
+Criminal negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and
+mischievous effect will follow but in circumstances which show that the actor has not
+exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had he would have had the
+consciousness.
+If death results from injury intentionally inflicted this section does not apply. Death
+should have been the direct result of the rash and negligent act and that act must be
+the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence. It
+must be the causacausans; it is not enough if it is causa sine qua non.
+Dowry death.
+"An unnatural death of a woman within seven years of marriage, whether by burns or"
+"injury or otherwise, taking place in the background of cruelty or harassment for dowry,"
+"is called a ""dowry death"". Whoever is guilty of causing such death is punishable for a"
+term not less than seven years and which may extend to imprisonment for life. The
+ingredients of section 304-B offence have been stated by the Supreme Court in Shanti v
+State of Haryana (section 304-B).
+Leading cases:—R v Nidamarti Nagabhushanam. R v Ketabdi Mundal. Bhalchandra. Syed
+Akbar.
+"The expression ""soon before"" as occurring in the section has been construed by the"
+"Orissa High Court in Keshab Chand Pandit v State, (1995) Cr LJ 175 (Ori), and also by"
+"the Supreme Court in Yashoda v State of MP, (2004) 3 SCC 98 [LNIND 2004 SC 155] ."
+"Deen Dayal v State of Up, (2009) 11 SCC 157 [LNIND 2009 SC 19] ."
+"The Supreme Court has observed that death ""otherwise than in normal circumstances"""
+would mean that the death was not in the usual course but apparently under suspicious
+circumstances if it was not caused by burn or bodily injury. Death of a woman by
+suicide occurring within seven years of marriage cannot be described as occurring in
+normal circumstances. (Rajayyan). The court has to analyse the facts and
+circumstances leading to the victim's death to see whether there is proximate
+connection between the cruelty or harassment for dowry demand and death. State of
+"Rajasthan v Jaggu Ram, (2008) 12 SCC 51 [LNIND 2007 SC 1514] . Kailash v State of MP,"
+"(2006) 12 SCC 667 [LNIND 2006 SC 803] ; Dhian Singh v State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC"
+759 .
+Suicide.—There are two provisions regarding abetment of suicide:—
+(1) Abetment of suicide of a child or an idiot or an insane or a delirious or an
+intoxicated person (section 305).
+(2) Abetment of suicide by any person (section 306). There can be abetment of suicide
+through dowry demand.
+Attempts.
+Attempts to destroy life are of three kinds:—
+"1. Attempt to murder, i.e., doing an act with such intention or knowledge, and under"
+such circumstances that if the doer by that act caused death he would be guilty of
+"murder (section 307). [Ten years and fine. If hurt is caused, then imprisonment for life"
+"or 10 years. If the offender is under sentence of imprisonment for life, then death.]"
+The Bombay High Court held that there may be an attempt under section 511 which
+does not come under this section. It is not intended to exhaust all attempts to commit
+murder which can be punished under the Code (R v Cassidy). But the Allahabad High
+Court has laid down that section 511 does not apply to attempts to commit murder
+which are fully and exclusively provided for by this section (R v Niddha).
+The Supreme Court held that a person commits an offence under this section when he
+has an intention to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention he does an act
+towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act
+"or not (Om Prakash); Samersimbh Umedsinh Rajput v State of Gujarat, (2007) 13 SCC 83"
+[LNIND 2007 SC 1450] .
+Leading case:—State of Maharashtra v Balaram Bama Patil.
+In the matter of suicide by a married woman in the circumstances specified in the
+"amendments, the burden of proving that her in-laws had not abetted the suicide has"
+been put upon them.
+Leading case:—Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh. Brij Lal v Prem Chand.
+There must be proof of the fact that the death in question was due to suicide.
+Leading case:—Wazir Chand v State of Haryana.
+"2. Attempt to commit culpable homicide, i.e., doing an act with such intention or"
+"knowledge, and under such circumstances, that, if the doer by that act caused death,"
+he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (section 308). [If hurt
+"is caused, then seven years, or fine, or both; in other cases three years, or fine, or both.]"
+3. Attempt to commit suicide.— An act towards the commission of this offence should
+"have been done (section 309). [One year, or fine, or both.] The act must have been done"
+"in the course of the attempt, otherwise no offence is committed."
+Criminologists feel that an attempt to commit suicide being the manifestation of a
+"diseased condition of mind, this section should be deleted from the Code; as such a"
+person requires sympathy and treatment rather than condemnation and punishment.
+"The Supreme Court ruled that the section was unconstitutional and, therefore, void P"
+Rathinam v UOI. This decision was subsequently reversed by another Supreme Court
+decision Gian Kaur v State of Punjab. The section is thus back to its honourable position
+in the Code as a measure to dissuade people from horrifying the society by attempting
+"self-demolition. See also section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, which lays"
+"down that notwithstanding anything contained in section 309 of IPC, 1860, any person"
+"who attempts to commit suicide shall be presumed, unless proved otherwise, to have"
+severe stress and shall not be tried and punished under the said Code.
+Thug.
+A 'thug' is a person who has been
+(1) habitually associated with any other or others for the purpose of committing—
+"(a) robbery, or"
+"(b) child stealing,"
+"(2) by means of, or accompanies with, murder (section 310). [Imprisonment for life and"
+fine (section 311).]
+"Miscarriage, exposure of children, etc."
+The following offences relate to birth and exposure of children:—
+"1. Voluntarily causing a woman with child or quick with child to miscarry, otherwise"
+than in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman (section 312) and
+without her consent (section 313).
+"The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, provides for the termination of"
+pregnancy under several other circumstances mentioned in that Act and these sections
+should now be read subject to those provisions.
+2. Causing the death of a woman by an act done with intent to cause miscarriage
+(section 314). Jacob George v State of Kerala.
+3. Doing an act without good faith with intent to prevent a child being born or to cause
+it to die after birth (section 315).
+4. Causing the death of a quick unborn child by an act amounting to culpable homicide
+(section 316).
+5. Exposure and abandonment of a child under 12 years by parent or persons having
+care of it (section 317).
+6. Concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body (section 318).
+"Whoever causes (1) bodily pain, (2) disease, or (3) infirmity, to any person is said to"
+cause hurt (section 319).
+Hurt.
+"A person voluntarily causes hurt, if he does any act"
+"(a) with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or"
+"(b) with knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt (section 321). [One year, or"
+"fine up to Rs. 1,000, or both (section 323).]"
+Acts which will amount to hurt may amount to assault. But hurt may be caused by
+"many acts which are not assaults, for instance, a person who mixes poison and places"
+"it on the table of another, or conceals a scythe in the grass on which another is in the"
+"habit of walking, or digs a pit in a road intending that another may fall into it, will be"
+guilty of hurt and not assault.
+Grievous hurt.
+The following kinds of hurt are designated as 'grievous':—
+1. Emasculation.
+2. Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
+3. Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
+4. Privation of any member or joint.
+5. Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
+6. Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
+7. Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
+"8. Any hurt which endangers life, or which causes the sufferer to be, during the space"
+"of 20 days, in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits (section 320)."
+A seller of arrack who mixed with it a dangerous substance was awarded maximum
+"punishment which was possible under the section. EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala,"
+AIR 1995 SC 1066 [LNIND 1995 SC 88] .
+"Voluntarily causing grievous hurt is voluntarily causing hurt, intending it or knowing it"
+likely to be grievous (section 322). [Imprisonment for seven years and fine (section
+325).]
+The following are aggravated forms of the above two offences:—
+"1. Voluntarily causing hurt (section 325), or grievous hurt (section 326), by an"
+"instrument used for shooting, stabbing, or cutting or which used as a weapon of"
+"offence is likely to cause death; or by fire or any heated substance or poison, or any"
+"explosive or deleterious substance, or by means of any animal, Voluntarily causing"
+grievous hurt by use of acid (section 326A). [Voluntarily throwing or attempting to
+throw acid is also made an offence by introducing section 326B.]
+"2. Voluntarily causing hurt (section 327), or grievous hurt (section 329), to extort from"
+"the sufferer or anyone interested in him, property or valuable security; or to constrain"
+him to do anything illegal; or to facilitate the commission of an offence.
+"3. Causing hurt by administering poison or any stupefying, intoxicating, or"
+"unwholesome drug, with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an offence"
+(section 328).
+"4. Voluntarily causing hurt (section 330), or grievous hurt (section 331), to extort from"
+"the sufferer or anyone interested in him, a confession or any information which may"
+"lead to the detection of an offence; or to constrain the restoration of property, or the"
+satisfaction of any claim.
+"5. Voluntarily causing hurt (section 332), or grievous hurt (section 333), to a public"
+"servant in the discharge of his duty, or to prevent or deter him from so discharging it."
+Humiliation and abuse of the head master and other teachers of a Government school
+after entering the premises was held to be covered by the section. Madhudas v State of
+Rajasthan.
+Hurt or grievous hurt caused on grave and sudden provocation is not severely punished
+(sections 334 and 335). Rash or negligent acts which endanger human life or the
+personal safety of others are made punishable even though no harm follows (section
+336); and if hurt or grievous hurt is caused by such acts the punishment will be more
+severe (sections 337 and 338).
+Wrongful restraint.
+"Wrongful restraint is (1) voluntarily obstructing a person, (2) so as to prevent him from"
+"proceeding in any direction, (3) in which he has a right to proceed. There must be the"
+"right to proceed Vijay Kumari v SM Rao, (SC). The word ""voluntarily"" connotes direct"
+physical restraint. There should be a restriction on the normal movement of a person.
+"Keki Harmusji Gharda v Mehervan Rustom Irani, (2009) 6 SCC 475 [LNIND 2009 SC"
+"1276] (section 339). [One month, or Rs. 500, or both (section 341).]"
+The slightest unlawful obstruction to the liberty of a person to go lawfully when and
+where he likes to go is punishable.
+Wrongful confinement.
+"Wrongful confinement is (1) wrongfully restraining a person, (2) in such a manner as to"
+prevent him from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits (section 340). [One
+"year, or Rs. 1,000 or both (section 342).]"
+Wrongful confinement is a form of wrongful restraint. Wrongful restraint keeps a man
+out of a place where he wishes to be. Wrongful confinement keeps a man within limits
+"out of which he wishes to go, and has a right to go."
+"In wrongful confinement there must be a total restraint, not a partial one. If a man"
+"merely obstructs the passage of another in a particular direction, leaving him at liberty"
+"to stay where he is or to go in any other direction if he pleases, he cannot be said"
+"thereby to confine him wrongfully. Detention through the exercise of moral force,"
+"without the accompaniment of physical force or actual conflict, is sufficient. But there"
+must be voluntary obstruction to the person alleged to be confined so as to prevent him
+from proceeding in any direction. Malice is not necessary. The period of confinement is
+immaterial except with reference to punishment.
+Leading cases:—Bird v Jones. Dhania v Clifford. Austin v Dowling.
+The Court can award compensation for false imprisonment in cases where the victim
+gains his freedom through Court order. Poonam v SI of Police; Paothing v State of
+Nagaland.
+The following are aggravated forms of this offence:—
+1. Wrongful confinement for three or more days (section 343).
+2. Wrongful confinement for ten or more days (section 344).
+3. Wrongful confinement of a person knowing that a writ for his liberation has been
+issued (section 345).
+4. Wrongful confinement is secret so as to indicate an intention that the confinement of
+such person may not be known to any person interested in that person or to any public
+servant (section 346).
+"5. Wrongful confinement for the purpose of extorting any property or valuable security,"
+or constraining person to do anything illegal or to give any information which may
+facilitate the commission of an offence (section 347).
+6. Wrongful confinement for the purpose of extorting confession or information which
+"may lead to the detection of an offence, or compelling restoration of any property or"
+valuable security or the satisfaction of any claim or demand (section 348).
+Force.
+"A person is said to use force to another,"
+"(1) if he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other, or"
+"(2) if he causes to any substance such motion, or change of motion or cessation of"
+"motion as brings that substance into contact (a) with any part of that other's body, or"
+"(b) with anything which that other is wearing or carrying, or (c) with anything so"
+situated that such contact affects that other's sense of feeling; provided that he does
+so in any of the three following ways:—
+(i) By his own bodily power.
+(ii) By disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or change of
+"motion, or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part, or"
+on the part of any other person.
+"(iii) By inducing any animal to move, to change its motion, or to cease to move"
+(section 349).
+Criminal force.
+A person uses 'criminal force' to another if
+"(1) he intentionally uses force to any person,"
+"(2) without that person's consent,"
+"(3) in order to the committing of any offence, or"
+"(4) intending by the use of such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use"
+"of such force he will cause, injury, fear, or annoyance to the person to whom the force is"
+"used (section 350). [Three months, or Rs. 500, or both.]"
+Assault.
+"A person commits an 'assault', if he"
+"(1) makes any gesture or any preparation,"
+"(2) intending or knowing it to be likely,"
+"(3) that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend,"
+"(4) that he is about to use criminal force to that person (section 351). [Three months,"
+"Rs. 500, or both (section 352).]"
+"An assault is something less than the use of criminal force, the force being cut short"
+before the blow actually falls. An assault is included in every use of criminal force.
+"Mere words do not amount to an assault, but the words which the party threatening"
+uses at the time may give his gestures such a meaning as may make them amount to
+an assault (Explanation).
+"Assault or criminal force on grave provocation is not severely punishable. [One month,"
+"or Rs. 200 fine, or both (section 358).] The provocation should not be voluntarily"
+"sought, or it should not have been given by anything done in obedience to the law or"
+"done by a public servant in the lawful exercise of his powers, or done in the lawful"
+exercise of the right of private defence.
+Leading cases:—Cama v Morgan. Stephen v Myres. Awadesh Mahato.
+An 'assault' differs from an 'affray'—
+"(1) An 'assault' may take place anywhere, whereas an 'affray' must be committed in a"
+public place.
+"(2) An 'assault' is regarded as an offence against the person of an individual, whereas"
+an 'affray' is regarded as an offence against the public peace.
+The following are aggravated forms of the offence of 'assault' and 'use of criminal
+force':—
+1. Assaulting or using criminal force to deter a public servant from the discharge of his
+duty (section 353).
+2. Assaulting or using criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty
+(section 354). The Criminal Law Amendment Act introduced some new offences
+against women;
+(a) Sexual harassment (section 354A)
+(b) Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe (section 354B)
+(c) Voyeurism (section 354C)
+(d) Stalking (section 354D)
+Knowledge that modesty is likely to be outraged has been held to be sufficient to
+constitute the offence without any deliberate intention to do so. Raju Pandurang Mohale
+"v State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371 [LNIND 2004 SC 194] . Police officers"
+committing cruelty upon a woman-worker who came into the police station along with
+other workers have been held liable to pay her compensation. The Government was
+ordered to pay out of their salary.
+"Leading cases:—People's Union of Democratic Rights v Police Commissioner, Delhi"
+Police; Rupan Deol Bajaj v Kanwar Pal Singh Gill
+3. Assaulting or using criminal force with intent to dishonour a person otherwise than
+on grave provocation (section 355).
+4. Assaulting or using criminal force in attempting to commit theft of property carried
+by a person (section 356).
+"5. Assaulting or using criminal force to any person, in attempting wrongfully to confine"
+that person (section 357).
+Kidnapping.
+Kidnapping is of two kinds:
+"(I) Kidnapping from India, and"
+(II) Kidnapping from lawful guardianship (section 359). [Seven years and fine.]
+I. Whoever
+"(1) conveys any person beyond the limits of India,"
+"(2) without the consent (a) of that person, or (b) of some person legally authorised to"
+"consent on behalf of that person,"
+is said to kidnap that person from India (section 360).
+"II. Whoever (a) takes, or (b) entices"
+"(1) any minor (a) under 16 years of age, if a male, or (b) under 18 years of age, if a"
+"female, or"
+"(2) any person of unsound mind,"
+"(3) out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind,"
+"(4) without the consent of such guardian,"
+is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship (section 361).
+These sections protect children of tender age from being kidnapped or seduced for
+"immoral purposes, as well as protect the rights of parents and guardians having the"
+custody of minors or insane persons.
+The persons kidnapped must be taken out of the possession of the parent by any
+"means, forcible or otherwise: and the consent of the person kidnapped does not lessen"
+the offence.
+The offence of kidnapping is complete when the minor is actually taken from lawful
+guardianship (R v Nemai Chattoraj; R v Ram Dei; Nanhak Sao v King-Emperor).
+Kidnapping from guardianship is not a continuing offence.
+It is no defence that the accused did not know that the person kidnapped was under 18
+or believed that she had no guardian. Anyone dealing with such person does so at his
+peril. The period of detention is immaterial.
+The circumstance that the act of the accused was not immediate cause of the girl
+leaving her father's place is no defence if he had at an earlier stage solicited her or
+induced her to take this step (Varadrajan).
+Leading cases:—T D Vadgama. Sachindra Nath.
+Abducting.
+A person is said to 'abduct' another if he
+"(1) by force compels, or"
+"(2) by any deceitful means induces,"
+any person to go from any place (section 362).
+'Abduction' differs from 'kidnapping'—
+(1) In 'abduction' the removal of the person need not be from the protection of the
+lawful guardian.
+(2) The element of force or fraud existing in 'abduction' is absent in kidnapping.
+"(3) In 'abduction' the age of the person abducted is immaterial, in 'kidnapping', the"
+"person must be under 16, if a male, and under 18, if a female."
+(4) Abduction is a continuing offence. Kidnapping is not a continuing offence.
+The following are aggravated forms of the offence of 'kidnapping' or 'abducting':—
+1. Kidnapping or maiming a minor for purposes of begging (section 363A).
+"2. Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder (section 364). Badshan v State of UP,"
+(2008) 3 SCC 681 [LNIND 2008 SC 310] .
+"2a. Kidnapping for ransom, etc., (section 364-A) Suman Sood v State of Rajasthan,"
+"(2007) 5 SCC 634 [LNIND 2007 SC 647] , statement of ingredients."
+3. Kidnapping or abducting with intent secretly and wrongfully to confine a person
+(section 365).
+4. Kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel her to marry any person against her
+"will, or to force or seduce her to illicit intercourse (section 366)."
+Leading case:—Ramesh.
+"Punishment followed where the offence was established by other evidence, though the"
+body of the young widow who was subjected to gang rape was not traceable.
+Leading case:—Arun Kumar v State of UP.
+"5. Inducing a woman to go from any place, by means of criminal intimidation or abuse"
+"of authority or any method of compulsion, in order that she may be forced or seduced"
+to illicit intercourse (ibid).
+6. Inducing a minor girl under the age of 18 years to go from any place or to do any act
+with the intention or knowledge that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse
+(section 366A).
+7. Importing a girl under 21 years of age from a foreign country or from the State of
+Jammu and Kashmir with intent or knowledge that she will be forced or seduced to
+illicit intercourse (section 366B).
+"8. Kidnapping in order to subject a person to grievous hurt, slavery, or unnatural lust"
+(section 367).
+9. Wrongfully concealing or confining a kidnapped or abducted person (section 368).
+10. Kidnapping or abducting a child under 10 years with intent to steal movable
+property from the person of such child (section 369).
+Offences dealing with trafficking
+1. Trafficking of person (section 370)
+2. Exploitation of a trafficked person (section 370A)
+"3. Habitually importing, exporting, removing, buying, selling, trafficking or dealing in"
+slaves (section 371).
+Sale of minor for immoral purposes.
+Two provisions relate to selling or buying of persons under 18 years of age for immoral
+purposes:—
+"1. Selling, letting to hire, or otherwise disposing of any person under the age of 18 years"
+"for the purpose of (a) prostitution, or (b) illicit intercourse, or (c) for any unlawful and"
+"immoral purpose, or (d) knowing it to be likely that such person will at any age be used"
+for such a purpose (section 372).
+"2. Buying, hiring, or otherwise obtaining possession of such person for a like purpose"
+(section 373).
+"When a girl under 18 years is disposed of to, or is obtained possession of by, a"
+"prostitute or a brothel-keeper, the person disposing of or obtaining possession of such"
+"girl shall be presumed to have disposed of her or obtained possession of her, for"
+"prostitution (Explanation 1, sections 372 and 373)."
+"""Illicit intercourse"" means sexual intercourse between persons not united by marriage,"
+"or by any union or tie which, though not amounting to a marriage, is recognized by the"
+"personal law or custom of the community to which they belong or, where they belong to"
+"different communities, of both such communities, as constituting between them a"
+"quasimarital relation (Explanation 2, sections 372 and 373)."
+Unlawful labour.
+"Unlawfully compelling any person to labour against his will [One year or fine, or both"
+(section 374).]
+Sexual offences
+"As introduced by the Criminal law (Amendment Act), 2013—A man is said to commit"
+"""rape"" if he—"
+"(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a"
+woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
+"(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the"
+"vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other"
+person; or
+(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the
+"vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with"
+him or any other person; or
+"(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so"
+"with him or any other person,"
+under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:—
+First.—Against her will.
+Second.—Without her consent.
+"Third.—With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any"
+"person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt."
+"Fourth.—With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that"
+her consent is given because she believes that he is another roan to whom she is or
+believes herself to be lawfully married.
+"Fifth.—With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of"
+unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through
+"another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the"
+nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.
+"Sixth.—With or without her consent, when she is under 18 years of age."
+Seventh.—When she is unable to communicate consent.
+Leading cases:—Rameswar. Bhoginbhai. Rafique.
+It is a crime against basic human rights violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The
+courts should deal with such offence sternly and severely. The victim's testimony can
+be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. Aman Kumar v State of
+"Haryana, (2004) 4 SCC 379 [LNIND 2004 SC 184] ."
+"For the purposes of this section, ""vagina"" shall also include labia majora (Explanation-"
+"1). Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words,"
+"gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates"
+willingness to participate in the specific sexual act (Explanation-2).
+A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape (Excep.1).
+"Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under"
+"15 years of age, is not rape (Excep. 2). See Independent Thought v UOI, where the"
+Supreme Court held that sexual intercourse with girl below 18 years of age is rape
+regardless of whether she is married or not. The Supreme Court held that Exception 2
+"to section 375, IPC, 1860, is to read down as, ""Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by man"
+"with his own wife, wife not being 18 years, is not rape""."
+Leading cases:—Balwant Singh v State of Punjab Arun Kumar v State of UP. Promod
+Mehta v State of Bihar.
+Indecent assault upon a woman does not amount to an attempt to commit rape unless
+the Court is satisfied that the accused was determined to gratify his passion at all
+"events, and in spite of all resistance."
+Leading case:—Rameshwar(see comments under section 354).
+Other Rape related offences
+Causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of victim (section 376A)
+Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation (section 376B)
+Sexual intercourse by a person in authority (section 376C)
+Gang rape (section 376D)
+Punishment for repeat offenders (section 376E)
+The circumstances in which the corroboration of the testimony of the victim of a rape
+would be necessary have been explained by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra
+v CK Jain.
+The mitigating circumstances which would enable the Court to award less than 10
+years' imprisonment have been explained by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v
+"Prem Chand, with this caution that though the conduct of the prosecutrix in the facts"
+"and circumstances of the case may be taken into account, her general character or"
+"reputation would neither be an aggravating factor, if good, nor a mitigating factor, if"
+bad.
+The need for proper identification of the offender and that of promptitude in filing FIR
+have also been explained.
+Leading cases:—Harpal Singh v State of HP; R v Chance.
+Unnatural offence.
+"Unnatural offence is having (1) carnal intercourse, (2) against the order of nature, (3)"
+"with any man, woman or animal (section 377)."
+Leading case:—Navtej Singh Johar v UOI (holding that consensual carnal intercourse
+"among adults in private space, does not in any way harm public decency or morality)."
+Offences against property. Chapter XVII.
+The following are the offences against property dealt with in Chapter XVII:—
+1. Theft.
+2. Extortion.
+3. Robbery.
+4. Dacoity.
+5. Criminal misappropriation of Property.
+6. Criminal Breach of Trust.
+7. Receiving stolen property.
+8. Cheating.
+9. Fraudulent deeds and dispositions of Property.
+10. Mischief.
+11. Criminal trespass.
+The above offences may be grouped in three classes:—
+(1) Offences dealing with deprivation of property (sections 378–424).
+(2) Offences dealing with injury to property (sections 125–440).
+(3) Offences dealing with violation of rights of property in order to the commission of
+some other offence (sections 441–462).
+Theft.
+A person is said to commit theft who
+"(1) intending to take dishonestly,"
+"(2) any movable property,"
+"(3) out of the possession of any person,"
+"(4) without that person's consent,"
+"(5) moves that property, in order to such taking (section 378). [Three years, or fine, or"
+both (section 379).]
+A thing attached to the earth can be the subject of theft when separated from the
+earth. A person moving an obstacle which prevented a thing from moving is said to
+cause it to move. A person causing an animal to move is said to move whatever is
+thereby moved by the animal. The owner's consent may be express or implied
+(Explanations).
+The intention to take dishonestly must exist at the time of the moving of the property. If
+"the act is not done animofurandi, it will not amount to theft. The test is: Is the taking"
+warranted by law? It is not necessary that the taking should be of a permanent
+"character, or that the accused should have derived any profit. Property removed in the"
+assertion of a contested claim does not constitute theft. A bona fide claim of right
+rebuts the presumption of dishonesty. But a creditor removing a debtor's property to
+enforce payment is liable. A person taking dishonestly his own property out of the
+"possession of another is guilty of this offence. Thus, the person from whose"
+possession the property is taken may not be the owner. If one of the joint owners takes
+exclusive possession of joint property dishonestly he would be guilty of theft. The least
+removal of the thing from its place is sufficient for the offence. It does not matter
+whether the property remains within its owner's reach or not.
+"Leading cases:—Ramratan, K N Mehra, Chandi Kumar v Abanidhar Roy, R v Nagappa, R v"
+"Shri Churn Chungo, Ram Ekbal."
+The following are aggravated forms of the offence:—
+"1. Theft in any building, tent, or vessel, used as a human dwelling or for the custody of"
+property (section 380).
+"2. Theft by a clerk or a servant, of property in possession of his master (section 381)."
+"3. Theft after preparation made for causing death, hurt, or restraint, or fear of death,"
+"hurt, or restraint to any person, in order to the committing of such theft or the effecting"
+"of such escape afterwards, or the retaining of property taken by such theft (section"
+382). Knowledge acquired by those who forced their entry into a house that there was
+only one old man inside and he suffered from a weak heart would be sufficient for
+"conviction, though they left without taking away anything and the man died behind"
+"them, his heart giving way."
+Leading case:—R v Watson.
+Extortion
+A person commits 'extortion' if he
+(1) intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury
+"(a) to that person, or"
+"(b) to any other, and thereby"
+(2) dishonestly induces the person so put in fear
+(3) to deliver to any person any
+"(a) property, or"
+"(b) valuable security, or"
+"(c) anything signed or sealed, which may be converted into a valuable"
+"security (section 383). [Three years, or fine, or both (section 384).]"
+Putting any person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion [Two
+"years, or fine, or both (section 385).]"
+"The inducement to part with the property should be dishonest, i.e., with intent to cause"
+wrongful gain or loss.
+The 'fear' in extortion must be such as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it
+operates and to take away from his acts that element of free voluntary action which
+alone constitutes consent. The terror of a criminal charge or of loss of an appointment
+"amounts to a fear of injury. 'Fear' must precede the delivery of property. Thus, wrongful"
+"retention of property obtained without threat will not amount to extortion, even though"
+subsequent threats are used to retain it.
+'Theft' differs from 'extortion':—
+(1) In 'theft' the property is taken without the owner's consent; in 'extortion' the consent
+is obtained by putting a person in fear of any injury to him or any other. In theft element
+of force does not arise.
+(2) 'Theft' can only be committed of movable property; 'extortion' may be committed of
+immovable property as well.
+The following are aggravated forms of extortion:—
+"1. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death, or grievous hurt to that person or to"
+any other (section 386).
+"2. Putting or attempting to put any person in fear of death, or grievous hurt to himself"
+or any other in order to commit extortion (section 387).
+"3. Extortion by threat of accusation of an offence, punishable with death or"
+"imprisonment for life, or 10 years' imprisonment, or of having attempted to induce any"
+other person to commit such offence (section 388).
+4. Putting or attempting to put any person in fear of such accusation as is mentioned
+above in order to commit extortion (section 389).
+Robbery. 'Robbery' is an aggravated form of either theft or extortion. In all 'robbery'
+there is either theft or extortion.
+Theft is 'robbery' if—
+"(1) in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or"
+"(2) in carrying away, or attempting to carry away, property obtained by the theft,"
+"(3) the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes, or attempts to cause, to any person"
+"(a) death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or"
+"(b) fear of instant death, instant hurt, or instant wrongful restraint."
+"Extortion is 'robbery' if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is"
+"(1) in the presence of the person put in fear, and"
+"(2) commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, instant hurt, or"
+"instant wrongful restraint to that person, or to some other person, and"
+"(3) by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up"
+the thing extorted (section 390). [Ten years and fine. If the robbery is committed on the
+"highway between sunset and sunrise, then 14 years (section 392). Attempt, seven"
+"years and fine (section 393). If hurt is caused, imprisonment for life, or 10 years and"
+fine (section 394).] The offender is said to be present if he is near enough to put the
+other in fear.
+"An accidental injury by a thief will not convert his offence into robbery. Similarly, if hurt"
+"is caused to avoid capture, while retreating without any property, the offence will not"
+"amount to robbery, e.g., throwing stones to avoid pursuit."
+Belonging to a wandering gang of persons associated for the purpose of habitually
+committing theft or robbery is made punishable (section 401).
+Dacoity.
+"When (1) five or more persons conjointly commit, or attempt to commit, a robbery, or"
+"(2) where the whole number of persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit,"
+"a robbery, and persons present and aiding such commission or attempt amount to five"
+"or more, every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit 'dacoity'"
+(section 391). [Imprisonment for life or 10 years (section 395).]
+"If any one of the dacoits commits murder in committing dacoity, every one of them"
+"shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment"
+extending to 10 years and fine (section 396). It does not matter whether a particular
+"dacoit was inside the house where the dacoity was committed, or outside the house, so"
+long as the murder is committed in the commission of the dacoity. It is not necessary
+"that the murder should be committed in the presence of all. It is, however, necessary"
+"that murder should be committed in course of the commission of dacoity. Thus, while"
+the dacoits were returning after an attempt to commit dacoity without any booty due to
+stiff opposition of the villagers and one of the dacoits to facilitate retreat killed one of
+"the villagers by shooting, it was held that as dacoity had ended the moment the dacoits"
+took to their heels without any booty the murder was an individual act of the dacoit
+who fired the fatal shot and other dacoits could only be held liable for an offence under
+"section 395, IPC, 1860, and not under section 396."
+Leading case:—Shyam Behari.
+Preparation to commit dacoity is punishable (section 399). and so is either belonging
+"to a gang of dacoits (section 400), or assembling for the purpose of committing"
+dacoity (section 402).
+Aggravated forms of robbery and dacoity are—
+(1) Offender using any deadly weapon at the time of committing robbery or dacoity or
+causing or attempting to cause death or grievous hurt to any person (section 397).
+For the purpose of this section it is not necessary that the weapon should be actually
+used. Mere carrying of the weapon causes a psychological sense of insecurity and fear
+and this would constitute enough use within the meaning of this section.
+Leading case:—Phool Kumar.
+"This section only applies to the offender who actually uses a deadly weapon, or causes"
+grievous hurt.
+(2) Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with a deadly weapon (s 398).
+Criminal misappropriation.
+A person commits 'criminal misappropriation' if he
+(1) dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use
+"(2) any movable property (section 403). [Two years, or fine, or both.]"
+The offence is committed though the misappropriation be only temporary. The finder of
+"property is not guilty if he takes it to protect it or to find the owner; but he is guilty, if he"
+"appropriates it knowing the owner, or having the means of discovering him, or before"
+"using reasonable means to discover him, or not believing it to be his own property, or"
+not believing in good faith that the owner cannot be found (Explanations 1 and 2).
+"This offence takes place when the possession has been innocently come by, but where"
+"by a subsequent change of intention, or from the knowledge of some new fact with"
+"which the party was not previously acquainted, the retaining becomes wrongful and"
+"fraudulent. Thus, retention of money by a servant authorized to collect it from a person"
+may be criminal misappropriation even though he retains it on account of wages due to
+him.
+A person retaining money paid by mistake will be guilty of criminal misappropriation.
+But there can be no criminal misappropriation of things which have actually been
+abandoned.
+Leading cases:—Bhagiram v Abar Dome. R v Sita. Romesh Chunder v Hiru Mondal.
+'Theft' is distinguished from 'criminal misappropriation'—
+(1) In 'theft' the property is taken out of the possession of another person and the
+offence is complete as soon as the offender moves the property. In 'criminal
+misappropriation' there is no invasion of another's possession. The property is often
+innocently got into possession.
+(2) In 'theft' the dishonest intention must precede the act of taking; in 'criminal
+misappropriation' it is the subsequent intention to convert or misappropriate the
+property that constitutes the offence.
+There is a difference between 'criminal misappropriation' and 'cheating'. In 'criminal
+"misappropriation' as in 'criminal breach of trust', the original reception of property is"
+"legal, the dishonest conversion takes place subsequently. In 'cheating' deception is"
+practised to get possession of the thing.
+Dishonest misappropriation of property possessed by a deceased person at the time of
+his death is an offence (section 404).
+Criminal breach of trust.
+"A person commits 'criminal breach of trust', if he"
+"(1) being in any manner entrusted with (a) property, or (b) any dominion over property;"
+"(2) dishonestly (a) misappropriates, or (b) converts to his own use, that property; or"
+"(3) dishonestly (a) uses, or (b) disposes of, that property;"
+(4) in violation (a) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to
+"be discharged, or (b) of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made"
+touching the discharge of such trust; or
+"(5) wilfully suffers any other person so to do (section 405). [Three years, or fine, or both"
+(section 406).]
+The property may be movable or immovable.
+'Criminal misappropriation' differs from 'criminal breach of trust'—
+(1) In the former the property comes into the possession of the offender by some
+"casualty, and he afterwards misappropriates it; in the latter the offender is lawfully"
+entrusted with property and he dishonestly misappropriates it or wilfully suffers any
+other person to do so.
+(2) 'Criminal breach of trust' only applies to conversion of property held by a person in a
+"fiduciary capacity; 'criminal misappropriation', to property coming into possession of"
+the offender anyhow.
+(3) 'Criminal misappropriation' can only be of movable property. 'Criminal breach of
+"trust' can be of any property, movable or immovable."
+The following are aggravated forms of criminal breach of trust:—
+"1. Criminal breach of trust by a carrier, wharfinger, or warehouse-keeper (section 407)."
+2. Criminal breach of trust by a clerk or servant (section 408).
+"3. Criminal breach of trust by a public servant, banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney"
+or agent (section 409).
+The Supreme Court has laid down that the offence is not wiped off by reason of the
+fact that the money in question has been returned or accounted for.
+Leading case:—Viswanath v State of J&K.
+Stolen property.
+'Stolen property' is—
+"(1) property the possession whereof has been transferred by (a) theft, (b) extortion, or"
+(c) robbery;
+(2) property criminally misappropriated;
+(3) property in respect of which criminal breach of trust has been committed.
+"It is immaterial whether the transfer has been made, or the misappropriation or breach"
+"of trust has been committed, within or without India. But if such property subsequently"
+"comes into the possession of a person legally entitled to the possession thereof, it"
+ceases to be stolen property (section 410). [Receiving or obtaining stolen property
+"knowing it to be such is punishable with three years, or fine, or both (section 411).] A"
+"person who is found to be in the possession of property shortly after an offence, is"
+presumed to be criminally mixed up with the transaction. The Supreme Court has
+"explained the meaning of the term ""recent possession"" in this connection."
+Leading case:—Earabhadrappa v State of Karnataka.
+This section does not apply to the actual thief when theft is committed in India.
+If stolen goods are restored to the possession of the owner and he returns them to the
+"thief for the purpose of enabling him to sell them to a third person, they are no longer"
+stolen goods; and the third person cannot be convicted of receiving them although he
+received them knowing them to be stolen.
+'Dishonest retention' of property is distinguished from 'dishonest reception' of it. In the
+"former offence the dishonesty supervenes after the act of acquisition of possession,"
+while in the latter dishonesty is contemporaneous with such act. Thus a person cannot
+be convicted of 'receiving' if he has no guilty knowledge at the time of receipt. But he is
+guilty of 'retaining' if he subsequently knows or has reason to believe that the property
+"was stolen. Neither the thief, nor the receiver of stolen property, commits the offence of"
+retaining such property dishonestly merely by continuing to keep possession of it.
+Property into or for which the stolen property has been converted or exchanged is not
+"stolen property, e.g., proceeds of a stolen cheque, or the change given for a stolen"
+currency-note. But an ingot made out of stolen ornaments still retains it character as
+stolen property.
+"Res nullius cannot be the subject of receiving, e.g., a bull let loose as a part of religious"
+ceremony and belonging to no one is not the subject of theft.
+"If articles belonging to different persons are received at one time, the conviction will be"
+only for one act of receiving and not separate convictions.
+The following are aggravated forms of this offence:—
+1. Dishonestly receiving property stolen in the commission of a dacoity (section 412).
+2. Habitually dealing in stolen property (section 413).
+"3. Voluntarily assisting in concealing or disposing of, or making away with, stolen"
+property (section 414).
+Cheating.
+A person is said to 'cheat' if he
+(1) by deceiving any person;
+(2) fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived;
+(3) to deliver any property to any person; or
+(4) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
+(5) intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
+would not do or omit if he were not deceived; and which
+"(6) act or omission causes, or is likely to cause, damage or harm to that person in body,"
+"mind, reputation, or property (section 415)."
+Dishonest concealment of facts is a deception (Explanation).
+"[One year, or fine, or both (section 416).]"
+"Like 'extortion', cheating is committed by the wrongful obtaining of a consent. The"
+"difference is that, in the former the consent is obtained by intimidation, in the latter, by"
+deception.
+'Cheating' also differs from 'theft'
+"(1) In the former the property obtained by deception may be movable or immovable, in"
+"the latter, it must be movable."
+"(2) In 'theft' the property is taken without the consent of the owner, in 'cheating' the"
+owner's consent is obtained by deception.
+It is not necessary that cheating should be committed in express words if it can be
+inferred from all the circumstances attending the obtaining of property. But it is
+necessary that a person should be deceived. If a person knows what the deception is
+"and acts on it, the person practising deception will be guilty of attempt to cheat but not"
+of cheating. The offence will be committed even if the person deceived is other than
+"the one on whom the deception is practised. Similarly, it is not necessary that there"
+should be an intent to deceive any particular individual. If a false prospectus or
+"balance-sheet is issued to the public, or to a section of the public, the persons issuing it"
+will be guilty of cheating although there was no intent to deceive any one in particular
+(R v Ross).
+The person to whom the property is delivered may not be participescriminis. Property
+obtained by cheating does not fall within the definition of stolen property.
+"Mere puffing will not amount to this offence (R v Bryan, the Elkington spoon case)."
+Leading cases:—R v Abbas Ali. R v Appasami. R v Soshi Bhushan. Bashirbhai.
+"If the deception is in regard to a future event, then there must be evidence of an"
+intention to cheat when the deception was made. Mere failure to carry out a promise is
+"not enough. A man may intend to fulfil his promise, but subsequently he may change"
+his mind.
+The following are aggravated forms of cheating:—
+1. Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may thereby be caused to a person
+whose interest the offender is bound to protect (section 418).
+"2. Cheating by personation (sections 416, 419)."
+3. Cheating and thereby dishonestly inducing the person deceived to deliver any
+"property to any person, or to make, alter, or destroy a valuable security, or anything"
+"which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable"
+security (section 420). Provisions of the section.
+A person is said to 'cheat by personation' if he cheats
+Cheating by personation.
+"(1) by pretending to be some other person, or"
+"(2) by knowingly substituting one person for another, or"
+(3) by representing that he or any other person is a person other than he or such other
+person really is (section 416).
+It is immaterial whether the individual personated is a real or imaginary person
+"(Explanation). [Three years, or fine or both (section 417).]"
+"As soon as a man by words, act, or sign, holds himself out as a particular person with"
+"the object of passing himself off as that person, and exercising the right which that"
+"person has, he has personated him. For instance, if A represents himself to be B at an"
+"examination, or represents himself to be of a particular caste which he is not, or gives a"
+"false description of his position in life, he commits this offence."
+Fraudulent deeds and dispositions.
+The following provisions relate to fraudulent deeds and dispositions of property:—
+1. Dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment or transfer of property to prevent
+distribution among creditors (section 421).
+2. Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing from being made available for creditors a debt
+or demand due to the offender or to any other person (section 422).
+"3. Dishonestly or fraudulently signing, executing or becoming a party to any instrument"
+which purports to transfer or charge any property and which contains any false
+statement as to the consideration for such transfer or charge or as to the person or
+persons for whose benefit it is intended to operate (section 423).
+4. Dishonestly or fraudulently concealing or removing any property of the offender or of
+"any other person or assisting in the concealment, or removal thereof, or dishonestly"
+releasing any demand or claim to which the offender is entitled (section 424).
+A person commits 'mischief' if he
+Mischief.
+"(1) with intent to cause, or knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful loss or damage"
+to (a) the public or (b) any person;
+"(2) causes (a) the destruction of any property, or (b) any such change in any property,"
+"or in the situation thereof, as destroys or diminishes its value or utility, or affects it"
+injuriously (section 425).
+The offender need not intend loss or damage to the owner. The property may belong to
+"the offender, or to him jointly with others (Explanation). [Three months, or fine or both"
+(section 426).]
+A man may commit mischief on his own property to cause wrongful loss to some
+person. If a person does any act amounting to mischief in the exercise of a bona fide
+claim or right he cannot be convicted of this offence. An act done through negligence
+"will never amount to mischief. Mischief cannot be committed in respect of a res nullius,"
+"e.g., killing a bull which was set free."
+The aggravated forms of mischief are as follows:—
+"1. Committing mischief, and thereby causing damage to the amount of Rs. 50 (section"
+427).
+"2. Mischief by killing, poisoning, rendering useless, or maiming any animal of the value"
+of Rs. 10 (section 428).
+"3. Mischief by killing, poisoning, maiming or rendering useless any elephant, camel,"
+"horse, mule, buffalo, bull, cow or ox or any other animal of the value of Rs. 50 or"
+upwards (section 429).
+"This offence is similar to that created under section 50 of the Wild Life Protection Act,"
+"1972. The two enactments are, therefore, not likely to attract the doctrine of double"
+jeopardy.
+Leading case:—State of Bihar v Murad Ali Khan.
+4. Mischief by injury to works of irrigation or by wrongfully diminishing the supply of
+"water for agricultural purposes or for food, or drink, or cleanliness (section 430)."
+"5. Mischief by injury to public road, bridge, river or channel, so as to render it"
+impassable or less safe for travelling or conveying property (section 431).
+6. Mischief by causing inundation or obstruction to public drainage attended with
+damage (section 432).
+"7. Mischief by destroying, or moving or rendering less useful a light house or sea-mark"
+or by exhibiting false lights (section 433).
+"8. Mischief by destroying, moving, or rendering less useful any land-mark fixed by the"
+authority of a public servant (section 434).
+9. Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to cause damage to the amount
+of Rs. 100 or upwards or where the property is agricultural produce—Rs. 10 or upwards
+(section 435).
+10. Mischief by fire or explosive substance with intent to destroy any building used as a
+"place of worship, or human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property (s. 436)."
+"What is a new development under the section, the Madras High Court allowed public"
+interest litigation under the section and compelled the State to pay compensation to
+the victims of a riot to whom the State did not provide any protection at the material
+time nor prosecuted the offenders afterwards.
+Leading case:—R Gandhi v UOI.
+11. Mischief with intent to destroy or make unsafe a decked vessel or a vessel of 20
+tons burden (section 437).
+12. Mischief or attempt to commit mischief with fire or any explosive substance
+(section 438).
+13. Intentionally running a vessel aground or ashore with intent to commit theft or
+misappropriation of property (section 439).
+"14. Mischief committed after preparation made for causing to any person death, hurt,"
+"or wrongfully restraint, or fear of death, hurt, or wrongful restraint (section 440)."
+A person commits 'criminal trespass' if he
+Criminal trespass.
+(1) enters into or upon property in the possession of another;
+(2) with intent to commit an offence; or
+"(3) to intimidate, insult, or annoy any person in possession of such property; or"
+(4) having lawfully entered into or upon such property unlawfully remains there;
+"(a)with intent to intimidate, insult, or annoy any such person, or"
+"(b)with intent to commit an offence (section 441). [Three months or Rs. 500, or both"
+(section 447).]
+Trespass can only be committed in respect of corporeal property. The essence of the
+"offence is the intention with which it is committed. The causing of such annoyance,"
+intimidation or insult must be the main aim of the entry (Mathri). It is not necessary that
+the intention must be to annoy a person who is actually present at the time of the
+trespass (Rash Behari). A person entering on the land of another in the exercise of a
+bona fide claim of right will not be guilty though the claim is unfounded. But if the entry
+is made with intent to annoy it does not matter whether it was made under a claim of
+"right. The annoyance must be such as would affect an ordinary man, not what would"
+specially and exclusively annoy a particular individual of a queer temperament.
+The property must be in the actual possession of a person other than the trespasser. It
+is de facto and not de jure possession that is necessary. The person in possession may
+be an individual or a corporate person.
+"The entry must be to commit an offence as defined in section 40, and not any unlawful"
+act. Thus entering an exhibition building without a ticket does not amount to criminal
+trespass. Slum dwellers upon public land cannot be equated with a trespasser under
+these sections. Their action has been described by the Supreme Court to be not
+"voluntary, but one due to compulsion of circumstances."
+Leading case:—Olga Tellis v Bombay MC.
+House-trespass.
+A person commits 'house-trespass' if he
+(1) commits criminal trespass
+"(2) by entering into, or remaining in"
+"(a) any building, tent, or vessel used as a human dwelling, or"
+(b) any building
+"(i) used as a place of worship, or"
+(ii) as a place for the custody of property (section 442).
+"Introduction of any part of the trespasser's body is sufficient (Explanation). [One year,"
+"or Rs. 1,000, or both (section 448).]"
+The following are aggravated forms of this offence:—
+1. House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with death
+(section 449).
+2. House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with
+imprisonment for life (section 450).
+3. House-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with
+imprisonment (section 451).
+"4. House-trespass after preparation made for causing hurt, assault, or wrongful"
+"restraint to any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, assault, or wrongful"
+restraint (section 452).
+Lurking house-trespass.
+"'Lurking house-trespass' is house-trespass, after taking precautions to conceal such"
+house-trespass from some person who has a right to exclude or eject the trespasser
+"from the building, tent, or vessel which is the subject of the trespass (section 443)."
+[Two years and fine (s. 453).]
+Whoever commits lurking house-trespass after sunset and before sunrise is said to
+commit 'lurking house-trespass' by night (section 444). [Three years and fine (section
+456).]
+House-breaking.
+A person is said to commit 'house-breaking' if he
+"(a) commits house-trespass, and effects his entrance into the house, or"
+"(b) if being in the house for committing an offence, or after committing an offence,"
+quits it in any of the following ways—
+"(1) Through a passage made by himself, or by any abettor of the house-trespass, in"
+order to the committing of the house-trespass.
+"(2) Through any passage not intended by any person other than himself, or an abettor"
+"of the offence, for human entrance, or through any passage to which he has obtained"
+access by scaling or climbing over any wall or building.
+"(3) Through any passage which he, or any abettor of the house-trespass, has opened, in"
+order to the committing of the house-trespass by any means by which that passage
+was not intended by the occupier of the house to be opened.
+(4) By opening any lock.
+"(5) By using criminal force, or committing an assault, or by threatening any person with"
+assault.
+(6) By any passage which he knows to have been fastened against such entrance or
+"departure, and to have been unfastened by himself, or by an abettor of the house-"
+trespass (section 445). [Two years and fine (section 453).]
+House-breaking after sunset and before sunrise is said to be 'house-breaking by night'
+(section 466). [Three years and fine (section 456).]
+The following are aggravated forms of the offence of lurking house-trespass and
+housebreaking:—
+1. Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to the commission of an offence
+punishable with imprisonment (section 454).
+2. Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking after preparation made for causing hurt to
+any person (section 455).
+3. Causing grievous hurt or attempting to cause death or grievous hurt to any person
+whilst committing lurking house-trespass or house-breaking (section 459).
+The following are aggravated forms of the offence of 'lurking house-trespass by night'
+and 'house-breaking by night':—
+1. Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night in order to the commission of an
+offence punishable with imprisonment (section 457).
+"2. Lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night, after preparation made for"
+causing hurt to any person (section 458).
+All persons jointly concerned in lurking house- trespass or house-breaking by night are
+punishable where death or grievous hurt is caused by one of them (section 460).
+Dishonestly breaking open a receptacle containing property is punishable (section
+461). The punishment is much more severe when such act is committed by a person
+who is entrusted with its custody (section 462).
+Chapter XVIII deals with offences relating to documents and to property marks.
+A person commits forgery if he
+Forgery. Chapter XVIII.
+"(1) makes any false document, or part of a document,"
+(2) with intent
+"(a) to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or"
+"(b) to support any claim or title, or"
+"(c) to cause any person to part with property, or"
+"(d) to enter into any express or implied contract, or"
+"(e) to commit fraud, or that fraud may be committed (section 463)."
+"[Three years, or fine or both (section 465).] Using as genuine a forged document is"
+punishable likewise (section 471).
+A person is said to make a false document—
+"I. If he dishonestly or fraudulently (a) makes, signs, seals, or executes a document,"
+(b) with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a
+"document was made, signed, sealed or executed"
+"(i) by, or by the authority of a person by whom, or by whose authority he knows that"
+"it was not made, signed, sealed, or executed, or"
+"(ii) at the time at which he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, or executed."
+Or
+"II. If he dishonestly, or fraudulently, without lawful authority by cancellation or"
+"otherwise,"
+"(a) alters a document in any material part thereof,"
+"(b) after it has been made or executed either by himself, or by any other person,"
+"whether such person be living, or dead at the time of such alteration. Or"
+"III. If he dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute, or alter a"
+"document, knowing that such person"
+"(a) by reason of unsoundness of mind, or intoxication cannot, or"
+"(b) by reason of deception practised upon him, does not, know the contents of the"
+"document, or the nature of the alteration (section 464)."
+A man's signature of his own name may amount to forgery (Explanation 1). But this
+must have been done in order that it may be mistaken for the signature of another
+person of the same name. Making a false document in the name of a fictitious person
+"intending it to be believed that the document was made by a real person, or in the name"
+of a deceased person intending it to be believed that the document was made by that
+person in his lifetime may amount to forgery (Explanation 2). A false document made
+wholly or in part by forgery is designated 'a forged document' (section 470).
+It is not an essential quality of the fraud mentioned in the section that it should result in
+or aim at deprivation of property. The offence is complete as soon as a document is
+made with intent to commit a fraud. But the false document must appear on its face to
+"be one which, if true, would possess some legal validity or must be legally capable of"
+"effecting the fraud intended. A writing, though not legal evidence of the matter"
+"expressed, may yet be a document if the parties framing it believed and intended it to"
+be evidence of such matter. It is not necessary that the document should be made in
+the name of a really existing person.
+Counterfeiting a document to support a legal claim will amount to forgery. Antedating a
+document or inserting a false date in it constitutes forgery.
+"A general intention to defraud, without the intention of causing wrongful gain or loss to"
+"any particular person, is sufficient. There must, however, be a possibility of some"
+person being defrauded. A man may have an intent to defraud and yet there may not be
+any person who could be defrauded by his act.
+"If several persons combine to forge an instrument and each takes a distinct part in it,"
+they are nevertheless all guilty.
+It will amount to forgery even though the fabricated document purports to be a copy of
+another document.
+Personation at an examination will amount to forgery as well as cheating.
+Leading cases:—R v Abbas Ali. R v Lalit Mohan. R v Shoshi Bhushan. R v Kotamraju.
+Harnam Singh.
+A document made to conceal a previous fraudulent or dishonest act amounts to
+forgery. But such falsification is not forgery if it is only for the purpose of concealing a
+previous negligent act.
+The following are aggravated forms of the offence of forgery:—
+"1. Forgery of a record of a Court of Justice or of a register of births, baptism, marriage"
+"or burial, or a certificate or authority to institute or defend a suit or a power of attorney"
+(section 464).
+2. Forgery of a valuable security or will (section 467).
+3. Forgery for the purpose of cheating (section 468).
+4. Forgery for the purpose of harming the reputation of any person (section 469).
+Other offences relating to documents are:—
+"1. Making or possessing a counterfeit seal, plate, etc., with intent to commit forgery"
+punishable under section 467 (section 472).
+2. Same as above when punishable otherwise (section 473).
+"3. Possession of a valuable security or will, known to be forged, with intent to use it as"
+genuine (section 474).
+4. Counterfeiting a device or mark used for authenticating any document described in
+"section 467, or possessing counterfeit marked material (section 475)."
+5. Same as above when the documents are other than those described in section 467
+(section 476).
+"6. Fraudulent cancellation, destruction, defacement or secreting, etc., of a will or an"
+"authority, to adopt, or a valuable security (section 477)."
+7. Falsification of accounts by a clerk or officer or servant with intent to defraud
+(section 477A).
+Property-mark.
+A mark used for denoting that movable property belongs to a particular person is called
+a 'property-mark' (section 479).
+A person uses a false property-mark
+"(1) if he marks any movable property or goods, or any case, package, or other"
+receptacle containing movable property or goods; or
+"(2) uses any case, package or other receptacle, having any marks thereon;"
+(3) in a manner reasonably calculated to cause it to be believed that the property or
+"goods contained in any such receptacle so marked, belong to a person to whom they"
+"do not belong (section 481). [One year, or fine, or both (section 482).]"
+The function of a property-mark to denote certain ownership is not destroyed because
+any particular property on which it is impressed ceases to be of that ownership.
+While trade-mark denotes the manufacture of quality of the goods to which it is
+"attached, property-mark, the ownership of them."
+The following offences relate to counterfeiting any property-mark used by a person:—
+1. Counterfeiting any property-mark used by another (section 483).
+2. Counterfeiting a mark used by a public servant to denote that any property has been
+manufactured by a particular person or at a particular time or place or that property is
+of a particular quality or has passed through a particular office or that it is entitled to
+any exemption (section 484).
+3. Making or possession of any instrument for counterfeiting a property-mark (section
+485).
+4. Selling or exposing or possessing for sale or any purpose of trade or manufacture
+any goods or things with a counterfeit property-mark (section 486).
+5. Making a false mark upon any receptacle containing goods (unless without intent to
+defraud) (section 487).
+6. Making use of any false mark (unless without intent to defraud) (section 488).
+7. Tampering with property-mark with intent to cause injury (section 489).
+There are five offences relating to currency-notes and bank-notes.—
+Currency-notes and bank-notes.
+1. Counterfeiting currency-notes or bank-notes (section 489A)
+"2. Selling, buying, or using as genuine forged or counterfeit currency-notes or bank-"
+notes knowing the same to be forged or counterfeit (section 489B).
+"3. Possession of forged or counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes, knowing or having"
+reason to believe the same to be forged or counterfeit and intending to use the same
+as genuine (section 489C). Possession and knowledge that the currency notes in
+question were counterfeit are both necessary. The section is not confined to Indian
+"currency notes alone. K Hashim v State of TN, (2005) 1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142]"
+.
+4. Making or possessing instruments or materials for forging or counterfeiting
+currency-notes or bank-notes (section 489D). It is not necessary that the machinery for
+counterfeiting found in possession of the accused should be the whole set required for
+"counterfeiting. K Hashim v State of TN, (2005) 1 SCC 237 [LNIND 2004 SC 1142] ."
+5. Making or using documents resembling currency-notes or bank-notes (section
+489E).
+"The expression ""currency-notes"" or ""bank-notes"" would include such notes of a foreign"
+"country. In other words, foreign currency would also be within the mischief of these"
+provisions.
+"Leading case:—State of Kerala v Mathai Verghese, (1986) 4 SCC 746 [LNIND 1986 SC"
+461] .
+Contract of service. Chapter XIX.
+Chapter XIX treats of criminal breach of contracts of service.
+The only case in which the Code now punishes a breach of contract is the following:—
+Voluntarily omitting to perform a lawful contract to attend on or supply the wants of a
+"child, or an insane or a sick person, who is incapable of providing for his own safety or"
+"of supplying his own wants (section 491). [Three months, or Rs. 200, or both.]"
+"Ordinary servants, such as cooks, do not come within the purview of this section."
+Marriage. Chapter XX.
+Chapter XX deals with offences relating to marriage.
+The following two provisions relate to mock or invalid marriages:—
+1. Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage
+(section 493). [Ten years and fine.]
+2. Dishonestly or fraudulently going through a marriage ceremony knowing that no
+lawful marriage is thereby created (section 496). [Seven years and fine.]
+The latter offence differs from the former in the fact that in it the ceremony is gone
+"through, which is valid on the face of it but invalid for some reason known to one party,"
+or the other. The former section applies to deception practised by a man on a woman;
+the latter applies to an offence by a man as well as by a woman.
+Bigamy.
+A person commits 'bigamy' if that person
+"(1) having a husband or a wife living,"
+"(2) marries in any case in which such marriage is void,"
+(3) by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife (section 494).
+[Seven years and fine.] If the former marriage is concealed from the person with whom
+"the subsequent marriage is contracted, the punishment is ten years and fine (section"
+495).
+There are two exceptions in which the second marriage is not an offence—
+(1) When the first marriage has been declared void by a Court of competent
+jurisdiction.
+(2) When the husband or wife has been continually absent or not heard of for seven
+"years, provided that this fact be disclosed to the person with whom the second"
+marriage is contracted.
+This section applies to Mohammedan women but not to men of that community and to
+"Hindus, Christians and Parsis of either sex."
+"The first marriage must be a valid marriage. But a Mohammedan girl has the option, if"
+"Shia, to ratify, or if Sunni, to cancel, her marriage on reaching the age of puberty if a"
+person other than her father or grand-father had given her in marriage.
+"If the marriage is not a valid marriage according to the law applicable to the parties, no"
+question of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life time of the
+husband or the wife of the person arises and this section does not apply. Admission of
+marriage by the accused is not evidence of it in a bigamy case; the second marriage as
+"a fact and the essential ceremonies constituting it, must be proved. The Courts are not"
+now so emphatic about proof of ceremonies. Indu Bhagya Natekar v BP Natekar.
+Conversion of a Hindu wife to Mohammedanism or Christianity does not dissolve her
+marriage with her Hindu husband and if she marries a Mohammedan or a Christian she
+commits bigamy.
+"Leading cases:—R v Ram Kumari, R v Ganga; R v Millard; Bhaurao Shankar, Kanwal Ram."
+"It appears, however, that a Christian cannot by embracing Mohammedanism marry a"
+second time during the lifetime of his first wife. He cannot cast off to the winds a
+contractual obligation by his own act.
+"The rigour of the second exception was somewhat modified in Tolson's case, which"
+lays down that if the second marriage takes place within seven years under a bona fide
+"belief based on reasonable grounds that the former consort was dead, no offence"
+would be committed.
+Adultery.
+"A person commits adultery, if he"
+"(1) has sexual intercourse with a person,"
+"(2) whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man,"
+"(3) without the consent or connivance of that man,"
+(4) such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape (section 497). [Five
+"years, or fine, or both.]"
+Leading case:—Joseph Shine v UOI (holding section 497 unconstitutional).
+"Taking or enticing away or concealing or detaining a woman, knowing or having reason"
+"to believe her to be married, from her husband, in order that she may have illicit"
+"intercourse with any man is punishable (section 498). [Two years, or fine, or both.]"
+Cruelty to married woman.—Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her
+to cruelty is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
+three years and shall also be liable to fine (section 498A). This Chapter [Chapter XX-A]
+and the section have given a new dimension to the concept of cruelty for the purposes
+of matrimonial remedies and the type of conduct described in the section will be
+relevant for proving cruelty. Consequence of cruelty which was likely to drive a woman
+"to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life or limb or health, whether"
+"mental or physical, have to be shown for attracting the section. Noorjahan v State,"
+(2008) 11 SCC 55 [LNIND 2008 SC 950] . The basic ingredients of section 498A are
+"cruelty and harassment. Undavalli Narayana Rao v State of AP, (2009) 14 SCC 588"
+[LNIND 2009 SC 1515] .
+Leading case:—Wazir Chand v State of Haryana.
+"This section has been introduced by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of"
+1983) to combat the vice of dowry deaths. By the same Act section 113A has been
+"added to the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which enables the Court to draw a presumption"
+regarding abetment of suicide by a married woman if she commits suicide within seven
+years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or relative had subjected her to
+cruelty. A mere demand for dowry is an offence.
+Illustrations on the meaning of harassment have been brought in from cases decided
+"under the [English] Protection From Harassment Act, 1997. The various types of"
+conduct which may constitute cruelty has been judicially construed.
+Defamation. Chapter XXI.
+"A person is guilty of 'defamation' if he,"
+"(1) by words, either (a) spoken, or (b) intended to be read; or"
+(2) by signs or visible representations;
+(3) makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person;
+"(4) intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will"
+"harm, the reputation of such person (section 499). [Two years simple, or fine, both"
+(section 500).]
+Defamation may be of a deceased person (Explanation 1). It may be concerning a
+"company, an association, or collection of persons (Explanation 2). It may be by ironical"
+expressions. It is however necessary to show that this collection of persons is a small
+determinate body whose identity can be fixed. Advocates as a class cannot therefore
+be defamed.
+The fact of reference to a particular person may be proved by means of the technique
+"of ""innuendo""."
+Leading cases:—Manmohan Kalia v Yash. Asha Parekh v State of Bihar.
+"An imputation harms a person's reputation which, in the estimation of others, directly or"
+"indirectly, either"
+(1) lowers his moral or intellectual character; or
+"(2) lowers his character in respect of his caste or calling, or his credit; or"
+"(3) causes it to be believed that his body is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally"
+considered disgraceful (Explanation 4).
+The definition in the Code applies to words as well as writings.
+"The IPC, 1860, makes no distinction between spoken and written defamation."
+"The defamatory matter must be published, i.e., communicated to a person other than"
+the one defamed. The person who makes the imputation intending to harm the
+"reputation of another, as well as the person who publishes it are alike guilty. The"
+publisher need not be the maker of the defamatory matter.
+The publisher of a newspaper is responsible for defamatory matter appearing in the
+newspaper whether he knows it or not. But it will be a good justification to plead if such
+matter is published in his absence and without his knowledge and the temporary
+management of the paper was in competent hands. A newspaper published at one
+place and sent to a subscriber at another will be considered to have been published at
+the latter place.
+Exceptions.
+Any of the following defences may be set up against a charge of defamation:—
+1. Imputation of any truth which the public good requires to be made or published.
+2. Opinion expressed in good faith respecting the conduct of a public servant in the
+"discharge of his duties, or his character so far as it appears in that conduct."
+3. Opinion expressed in good faith respecting the conduct of any person touching a
+"public question, or his character so far as it appears in that conduct."
+4. Publication of a substantially true report of the proceedings of a court.
+"Such report cannot be published if the court has prohibited it, or where the subject-"
+matter of the trial is obscene or blasphemous.
+5. Opinion expressed in good faith respecting the merits of a case decided in a court; or
+"the conduct of a party, witness or agent concerned therein; or the character of such"
+person so far as it appears in such conduct.
+6. Opinion expressed in good faith respecting the merits of a performance submitted
+by the author to public judgment; or respecting the author's character so far as it
+appears in such a performance.
+7. Censure passed in good faith by a person having lawful authority over another.
+8. Accusation preferred in good faith to a duly authorized person.
+"9. Imputation made in good faith by a person for the protection of his interest, or of any"
+"other person, or for the public good."
+"The privilege of judges, counsels, pleaders, witnesses, and parties comes under this"
+"exception. So also, as to statements made in pleadings and reports to superior officers."
+JUDGE.—A Judge cannot be prosecuted for defamation for words used by him whilst
+"trying a case in court even though such words are alleged to be false, malicious, and"
+without reasonable cause (Rama v Subramanya).
+COUNSEL OR PLEADER.—The Madras High Court held in Sullivan v Norton that no
+proceedings can be instituted against a counsel or pleader for uttering words that are
+"defamatory, or are calculated to hurt the feelings of others, or are absolutely devoid of"
+all solid foundation. This case has been doubted in a much later decision in which it
+was held that in the case of a lawyer good faith is to be presumed until bad faith is
+proved by proof of private malice when the Court will interfere (Mir Anwarrudin v Fathim
+Bai).
+The Bombay High Court has held that so long as an advocate acts on his client's
+"instructions, he has the fullest liberty of speech provided that he did not know or could"
+not know that they were false. (Bhaishankar v Wadia). Where express malice is absent
+the advocate or pleader is protected (Re Nagarji; Purshottamdas).
+The Calcutta High Court has held that advocates have no absolute privilege. But unless
+a counsel or pleader is actuated by improper motives he is protected. If bad faith is
+proved in putting questions to witnesses he is liable. There must be evidence that he
+was actuated by improper motives and not by a desire to further his client's interest.
+The Patna High Court has held that the privilege is not absolute but qualified and the
+burden is on the prosecution to prove absence of good faith.
+WITNESS.—The Bombay High Court has held in a Full Bench case that relevant
+statements made by a witness on oath or solemn affirmation in a judicial proceeding
+"are not absolutely privileged on a prosecution for defamation, but are governed by the"
+provisions of this section (Bai Shanta v Umrao).
+The Calcutta High Court has laid down that such statements should be relevant to the
+inquiry (Woolfun Bibi v Jerasat Sheikh). If a witness voluntarily makes defamatory
+statements he will be guilty (Haider Ali v Abru Mia).
+The Madras High Court is of opinion that statements of a witness made in the witness-
+"box are absolutely privileged. If they are false the remedy is by indictment for perjury,"
+and not for defamation (Manjaya v Shesha Shetti).
+The Allahabad High Court has held in a Full Bench case that a witness can be
+prosecuted for defamatory statements concerning a person unless he shows that the
+statements fall under one of the exceptions to this section (Ganga Prasad).
+The former Chief Court of the Punjab had adopted the view of the Calcutta and the
+Allahabad High Courts.
+"The former Nagpur High Court had followed the Bombay, the Calcutta and the"
+Allahabad High Courts and held that a witness is not entitled to absolute privilege
+(Chotelal's case).
+PARTY.—The Bombay High Court has held that relevant statements made by an
+"accused are not absolutely protected, but are governed by the provisions of section"
+499(Bai Shanta v Umrao).
+The Madras High Court has held that if an accused puts any question while defending
+"himself, the question cannot be made the subject of a prosecution for defamation"
+(Hayes v Christian). Statement in answer to a question by the Court is not absolutely
+privileged (Tiruvengada Mudali's case). If a defamatory statement is made before an
+"officer who is neither a judicial officer nor a court, e.g., a Registration Officer, such a"
+statement is not absolutely privileged. (Krishnammal's case).
+The Calcutta High Court has ruled in a Full Bench case that a defamatory statement on
+oath by a party falls within section 499 and is not absolutely privileged (Satish Chandra
+Chakravarti v Ram Doyal De).
+The Allahabad High Court holds the view that a suitor is not absolutely privileged.
+"PLEADING.—Defamatory statements in applications, pleadings and affidavits are not"
+absolutely privileged.
+The Bombay High Court has held that statements made in a written statement filed by
+the accused are not absolutely privileged. According to the Allahabad High Court any
+statement made in an application in good faith is protected.
+The Calcutta and the Patna High Courts have held that defamatory statements in a
+plaint or an affidavit are not absolutely privileged. But the decisions of the Calcutta
+High Court are not unanimous on the point whether statements in a complaint to a
+Magistrate are absolutely privileged or not.
+The Madras High Court has in a Full Bench case held that a defamatory statement in a
+complaint to a Magistrate is not absolutely privileged. (Triuvengada Mudali's case).
+The former Chief Court of the Punjab had laid down that such statements were not
+absolutely privileged.
+10. Caution intended in good faith for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed or
+"of some person in whom he is interested, or for public good."
+Other offences.
+The following acts also are made punishable:—
+1. Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory (section 501).
+2. Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter (section 502).
+Criminal intimidation. Chapter XXII.
+A person commits 'criminal intimidation' if he
+(1) threatens another with any injury
+"(a) to his person, reputation or property, or"
+"(b) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested,"
+(2) with intent
+"(a) to cause alarm to that person, or"
+"(b) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do"
+"any act which that person is legally entitled to do,"
+"(3) as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat (section 503). [Two years, or"
+"fine, or both.]"
+"If the threat be to cause (1) death or grievous hurt, (2) the destruction of any property"
+"by fire, (3) an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or seven years'"
+"imprisonment, then seven years, or fine, or both (section 506). [If intimidation is caused"
+"by an anonymous communication, then additional imprisonment for two years (section"
+507).]
+'Criminal intimidation' is closely analogous to 'extortion.' In the former the immediate
+"purpose is to induce the person threatened to do, or abstain from doing, something"
+"which he was not legally bound to do or omit; in the latter, the purpose is getting filthy"
+lucre by obtaining property. In 'criminal intimidation' the threat need not produce the
+effect aimed at nor should it be addressed directly to the person intended to be
+influenced. If it reaches his ears anyhow the offence is complete.
+The following two provisions relate to insult offered to persons other than public
+servants—
+Insult.
+"(1) Intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or to cause the"
+commission of any offence. (section 504).
+"(2) Uttering any word, or making any sound or gesture, or exhibiting any object,"
+intending to insult the modesty of a woman or intruding upon the privacy of a woman
+(section 509).
+Statement conducing to public mischief.
+"Making, publishing or circulating, any statement, rumour, or report"
+"(1) with intent to cause any officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the Army, Navy or Air"
+"Force, to mutiny, or to disregard or fail in his duty, or"
+(2) with intent to cause fear or alarm to the public whereby any person may be induced
+"to commit an offence against the State or public tranquillity, or"
+(3) with intent to incite any class of persons to commit any offence against any other
+"class is made punishable (section 505). [Three years, or fine, or both.] The offence is"
+"not committed if such statement, etc., is true and there is no such intent as aforesaid."
+"Making, publishing or circulating, any statement or report containing alarming news"
+"(1) with intent to create or promote feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between"
+"different groups or communities on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence,"
+"language, caste or community (section 505). [Three years, or fine, or both.]"
+(2) Aggravated form of the same offence when committed in any place of worship or in
+any assembly engaged in religious ceremonies (section 505). [Five years and fine.]
+Divine displeasure.
+Act or omission caused by inducing a person to believe that he will be rendered an
+object of Divine displeasure if he does not do or omit to do the things which it is the
+"object of the offender to cause him to do or omit, is punishable (section 508). [One"
+"year, or fine, or both.]"
+Intoxication.
+Intoxication alone is not made punishable by the Code. But a person who in a state of
+"intoxication appears in any public place, or in any place which it is a trespass in him to"
+"enter, and there conducts himself in such a manner as to cause annoyance to any"
+"person is liable to punishment (section 510). [24 hours, or Rs. 10, or both.]"
+Attempts. Chapter XXVIII.
+The last chapter deals with attempts to commit offences. Attempting to commit or
+"causing to be committed an offence, punishable by the Code with imprisonment for life"
+"or imprisonment, and in such attempt doing any act towards the commission of the"
+offence is—where there is no express provision for the punishment of such attempt—
+"punishable with imprisonment provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to"
+one-half of the imprisonment for life or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment
+"provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both"
+(section 511).
+Every commission of a crime has three stages—
+(1) intention to commit it;
+(2) preparation for its commission; and
+(3) a successful attempt.
+"Mere intention to commit a crime, not followed by any act, does not constitute an"
+offence. The will is not to be taken for the deed unless there be some external act
+which shows that progress has been made in the direction of it or towards maturing
+and effecting it.
+Preparation consists in devising means for the commission of an offence. The section
+does not punish acts done in the mere stage of preparation. Mere preparation is
+punishable only when the preparation is to wage war against the Government of India
+"(section 122), to commit depredations on the territories of any power at peace with the"
+"Government of India (section 126), or to commit dacoity (section 399)."
+Attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after the preparations are
+made. To constitute the offence of attempt there must be an act done with the
+"intention of committing an offence, and for the purpose of committing that offence,"
+and it must be done in attempting the commission of the offence.
+"It is, however, not necessary to show that it is the last proximate act. It is enough if it is"
+one in a series.
+An attempt can only be manifested by acts which would end in the consummation of
+"the offence, but for intervention of circumstances independent of the will of the party."
+An attempt is punishable even when the offence attempted cannot be committed; as
+when a person intending to pick another's pocket thrusts his hand into the pocket but
+finds it empty.
+"If the attempt to commit a crime is successful, then the crime itself is committed; but"
+"where the attempt is not followed by the intended consequences, section 511 applies."
+Leading cases:—Abhayanand. Om Prakash. R v Ramsarun. R v Mac Crea. R v Mangesh. R
+v Peterson. R v Baku.
+"1. Stephen's History of Criminal Law of England, vol I."
+"2. Note Q, p 174."
+"3. Mrs. Sarah Mathew v The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62 [LNIND 2013"
+SC 997] .
+"4. Standard Chartered Bank v Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC 530 [LNIND 2005 SC"
+"476] ; Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Incorporated, (2011) 1 SCC 74 [LNIND 2010 SC 1012]"
+.
+"5. Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 11 SCC 214 [LNIND 2010 SC"
+858] .
+"6. Lee Kun Hee v State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 [LNIND 2012 SC 89] ; Mobarik Ali v State of"
+"Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857 [LNIND 1957 SC 81] ."
+"7. BK Wadeyar v Daulatram Rameshwarlal, AIR 1961 SC 311 [LNIND 1960 SC 493] ."
+"8. M V Elisabeth v Harwan Investment and Trading, AIR 1993 SC 1014 [LNIND 1992 SC 194] ."