The Nature of Value
ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE THE factors common to all forms of the value of goods, and thus to formulate the general concept of “value,” can be found in the works of all recent German authors who have
The Nature of Value
ATTEMPTS TO DETERMINE THE factors common to all forms of the value of goods, and thus to formulate the general concept of “value,” can be found in the works of all recent German authors who have independently treated the theory of value. Moreover, they have all tried to distinguish the use value of goods from mere utility.
Friedländer (“Theorie des Werthes,” Dorpater Universitäts Program, 1852, p. 48) defines value as “das im menschlichen Urtheil erkannte Verhältniss, wornach ein Ding Mittel für die Erfüllung eines erstrebenswerthen Zweckes sein kann.” (See also H. Storch, Cours d’économie politique, St. Petersbourg, 1815, I, 36.) Since the relationship described by Friedländer (provided that the end desired is the satisfaction of a human need or an end that is causally connected with the satisfaction of a human need) is what is responsible for the utility of a thing, his definition is identical with one in which the value of a good is conceived to consist in its recognized fitness for attaining an end, or as the recognized utility of a thing. But utility is a general prerequisite of goods character and Friedländer’s definition is therefore too broad, quite apart from the fact that it does not touch upon the nature of value. Indeed, Friedländer comes to the conclusion (op. cit., p. 50) that non-economic goods are just as much objects of human valuation as economic goods.
Like many of his predecessors, Karl Knies (“Die nationalökonomische Lehre vom Werth,” Zeitschriftfür die gesammte Stattswissenschaft, XI, 423) sees in value the degree of suitability of a good for serving human ends. (See also the earlier editions of Wilhelm Roscher’s Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie