Russian Armed Forces
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
March 11, 2019
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History and Roles of Enlisted Professionals in the Russian Armed Forces1
The Russian Federation has pursued the development
Russian Armed Forces
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
March 11, 2019
Download the PDF
History and Roles of Enlisted Professionals in the Russian Armed Forces1
The Russian Federation has pursued the development of a professional enlisted component in the Russian Armed Forces since the early 1990s. The impetus for this stemmed from the conscription system inherited from the Soviets. After the Second World War, the Soviets believed that the future of modem warfare would closely resemble the battles they had fought in the last years of the war, albeit with nuclear weapons. These battles would require vast numbers of troops organized in divisions, army groups, and fronts to execute high speed maneuver warfare to penetrate enemy defenses and then exploit these successes. At that time the Soviets believed that the enlisted force that would be required to fight in future battles would resemble the enlisted force that fought in the WWII. In order to amass a large army without bankrupting the economy, the Soviets retained their universal conscription system. The intent was that all males would receive a basic level of military training during their two-year stint and then be able to return to civilian life. These former conscripts would infrequently be called for musters, and would be called en masse in the event of a mobilization. This system had an unintended consequence for the strong NCO corps that the Soviets had inherited from the Tsarist Army (the Imperial Russian Army, 1721 - 1917). The two-year conscription model for the enlisted personnel had no real career path for those who desired to serve past their initial conscription length. The strong NCO corps that emerged after the WWII soon disappeared as these NCOs either left the service or became commissioned officers. In the Soviet Armed Forces, officers, not NCOs, became the primary small unit leaders and trainers.2
This system began experiencing problems as the Soviet Armed Forces began to modernize rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. Technically advanced equipment requires skilled manpower to operate and maintain. Since two-year conscription terms were considered insufficient time to train individuals to perform complex technical tasks, Soviet officers performed duties that would normally be performed by NCOs in Western armies. The Soviets believed this was an inefficient way of managing manpower, and decided to create “warrant officer” positions primarily to maintain and operate advanced equipment. These warrant officers, recruited from conscripts who had completed their initial tours, were generally not viewed favorably by the officer corps, since the best conscripts who wanted to continue their military service were enrolled in military academies to become officers. Warrant officers relieved some of the technical and small unit leadership burdens that were placed on officers, but were never well-regarded as an institution and had little in common with Western NCOs and warrant officers.3
In addition to technical positions, warrant officers filled positions similar to U.S. first sergeants (albeit with far less authority) and served as platoon leaders for maintenance and supply units. The Russian Federation abolished all warrant officer positions during the 2008 “New Look” reforms and converted all warrant officers into contract NCOs. Warrant officer billets have since been brought back. There has been little reporting about how warrant officer and contract NCO positions differ, but there is little practical difference, and for the purposes of this article, the term enlisted professionals is inclusive of Russian warrant officers.4
Russia has maintained a hybrid system of conscription and contract service to the present day.5 In this system, officers, not NCOs, are the primary trainers of the platoon. In order to prepare these lieutenants, cadets usually attend four- or five-year military academies that more closely resemble a combination of the U.S. Military Academy and the Basic Officer Leaders Course.6 As soon as a new lieutenant graduates from an academy and takes command of their platoon, they are expected to immediately begin training and maintaining discipline.7 Soviet lieutenants fill the leadership, planning, training, and disciplinary roles of both a U.S. platoon leader and platoon sergeant.
A problem that arose with this system is that when the lieutenant would leave at night to be with their family, a system of hazing, known as dedovschina, developed among the conscripts. This unofficial, but deeply institutionalized practice consisted of senior (second year) conscripts hazing the junior (first year) conscripts. These practices often involved theft, beatings, and humiliation, which became somewhat infamous and embarrassing to the government. The problem was so severe, that essentially, a small unit discipline problem began to harm national security as young men, and their parents, feared conscripted service. Although this practice has become less common in today’s Russian military, it still occasionally surfaces in the media.
Conscription became unpopular due to the problems associated with dedovschina. The popularity dropped even further because of the turbulent financial situation, which was devastating the Russian Armed Forces. And due to the failing economic situation, little progress was made towards full enlisted professionalization, but Russia did start its first “contract NCO” program, which allow