Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Colombia
|Publisher||Human Rights Watch|
|Publication Date||1 January 1993|
|Cite as||Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Colombia, 
Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Colombia
|Publisher||Human Rights Watch|
|Publication Date||1 January 1993|
|Cite as||Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 - Colombia, 1 January 1993, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/467fca63c.html [accessed 10 March 2014]|
|Disclaimer||This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.|
Events of 1992
Human Rights Developments
Peace talks between the government and leftist guerrillas floundered in May amid mutual accusations of bad faith. In their wake, military operations increased throughout the country. President César Gaviria has increased funding to the armed forces and police by levying a special "war tax" in an effort to destroy the guerrillas militarily. Far from retreating, however, guerrillas mounted two nationwide offensives in late May and October. Abuses by both sides have led to a dramatic worsening of an already serious human rights situation, among the worst in the hemisphere.
On November 8, President César Gaviria declared a "state of internal commotion" after guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia's largest guerrilla organization, killed 26 policemen guarding an oil pumping station near Orito, Putumayo and staged a wave of bombing attacks in several cities, including Bogotá. The Colombian constitution allows the president to invoke emergency powers in case of foreign attack or serious threat to public order, but in neither case does it permit the suspension of any right established in the constitution. Such a prohibition notwithstanding, President Gaviria announced several new executive decrees that do restrict certain civil rights. One prohibits broadcast journalists from disseminating any information received from the guerrillas. The executive decrees also authorize military intelligence to investigate suspects and present evidence against civilians in court, a responsibility previously reserved for the Judicial Technical Police.
Although the emergency measures were taken to strengthen counterinsurgency efforts, Colombian human rights groups noted the extreme dangers inherent in giving the Army the power to investigate and bring cases before the courts. Army involvement in investigations is highly suspect; on repeated occasions, the Army has detained, murdered and disappeared civilians they suspected of guerrilla sympathies, and has later presented the victims as "guerrillas killed in action." Human rights groups also fear for their work, especially since the Army has frequently accused them of being "guerrilla fronts" and now has additional powers to investigate and bring cases against them.
Although the government asserts that human rights violations decreased in 1992, local human rights groups recorded noticeable increases over 1991. In the first eight months of 1992, there were 91 massacres carried out by state security forces, guerrillas and paramilitary groups, causing 477 deaths, the majority peasants, youths and workers, according to the Permanent Committee in Defenseof Human Rights. This figure represents a 20 percent increase over 1991. The total number of victims of political violence threatens to increase in 1992, surpassing last year's record of over 10 victims per day. By September, the number of unresolved disappearances had climbed to 75.
Overall, the Andean Commission of Jurists-Colombian Section found that 40 per cent of the cases of political killings reported by September were attributable to state agents, 30 per cent to paramilitary groups acting in collusion with the security forces, 27.5 per cent to guerrillas, and the remaining 2.5 per cent to others including drug traffickers. In addition to its substantial role in committing these murders, the government remains unable to investigate crimes and punish perpetrators satisfactorily. Despite apparently good intentions and a stated willingness to introduce reforms, little has so far been accomplished.
To the contrary, Colombia's new constitution put the military and police, the leading agent of human rights violations, further from civilian control by reaffirming the jurisdiction of military courts over crimes committed by members of the armed forces and extending that jurisdiction to the National Police. The new constitution also permits officers to employ the defense of obedience to superior orders to avoid responsibility for their abusive acts. Military courts have yet to produce credible inquiries or fair trials. Instead, abusers remain in their posts and impede other investigations in a twisted example of esprit de corps.
As part of the peace accord in 1991 with the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT) and the Quintín Lame guerrillas, the government funded a Commission on Ways to Overcome Violence, composed of respected academics, human rights monitors and former officials. In its massive report, the commission concluded that because violence has different origins and manifestations in different parts of