- In the run-up to the 2008 election, Democratic presidential hopefuls pledge to replace the foreign-policy unilateralism and arrogance of the Bush administration with a multilateral approach that is equally meddlesome. Neither the current leading Democratic nor
- In the run-up to the 2008 election, Democratic presidential hopefuls pledge to replace the foreign-policy unilateralism and arrogance of the Bush administration with a multilateral approach that is equally meddlesome. Neither the current leading Democratic nor Republican foreign-policy approaches reflect the vision of Americas founders, who believed the republic should differ from its European counterparts by sending goods and ideas, not soldiers and decrees, to foreign shores. (ch. 1)
- It is common today to hear World War II called the Good War, and American opponents of entry into Europes war are often caricatured as ignorant appeasers. Yet the anti-interventionist America First Committee included John F. Kennedy, Gerald Ford, novelists Sinclair Lewis and Gore Vidal, poet e. e. cummings, and other respected figures. Legitimate concerns about allying with Stalin, who had murdered millions more people than Hitler, were often ignored or misrepresented. (ch. 3)
- Anti-American hostility in the Middle East and elsewhere today is partly a reaction against U.S. support for unpopular regimes. In the late 1940s and early 50s, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft warned that Trumans and Eisenhowers support for non-democratic regimes that might otherwise fall into the Soviet orbit would produce resentment against America. Labeled ostrich-like by many of his contemporaries, Taft now looks like a cleareyed visionary. (ch. 4)
- Recent nation-building efforts in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraqcountries with traditions of dictatorship, repression, political murder, revolt, and massacreare also unlikely to result in democracy anytime soon. Instead of fostering democracy, attempts to engage in democratic nation building tend to produce 1) truces with gangs and warlords willing to keep a lower profile and 2) puppet governments that eventually become or give way to dictatorship. From 1850 to 2006, Great Britain and the United States sent military forces abroad 51 times to engage in democratic nation building, but they have left behind a lasting democracy in only 14 of those countriesa success rate of just 27 percent. (ch. 5, 6)
- Pundits across the spectrum hold post-war Germany as a model of successful democratic nation building by the United States. In reality, from 1945 to 1952, U.S. occupation policy sought not to foster reconstruction or promote democracy, but to wreck Germanys economy, deny it any war-making potential, and punish ordinary Germans. A 1949 article in Commentary magazine exposed Why Democracy Is Losing in Germany. (ch. 7)
- Not counting war casualties, an estimated 262 million ordinary citizens were murdered by their own governments in the 20th century. Democratic-peace theorists argue that democracies kill far fewer of their own (and perhaps never make war against each other) because democracy diffuses political power. However, a new theory argues that a more effective way to protect citizens from their governments isnt to promote democratic measures, but rather to strengthen private-property rights. (ch. 12)
- Although opponents of globalization view themselves as pro-peace progressives, their support for protectionism actually makes wars more likely. International trade not only makes countries wealthier, but it also fosters peace. Trade between Taiwan and China may be the leading reason war between them hasnt broken out. Activists should take up the cause of promoting stronger commercial ties between countries as a way to promote peace. (ch. 14)
For more than a century U.S. foreign policy, whether conducted by Democrats or Republicans, liberals or conservatives, has been based on the assumption that Americans interests are served best by intervening abroad to secure open markets for U.S. exports, fight potential enemies far from American shores, or engage in democratic nation building. Before the 20th century, however, a foreign policy of nonintervention was widely considered more desirable, and Washingtons and Jeffersons advice that the republic avoid foreign entanglements was largely heeded.
Opposing the Crusader State: Alternatives to Global Interventionism, edited by Robert Higgs and Carl P. Close, examines the history of American noninterventionism and its relevance in todays world. Arguing that intervention is not an appropriate default setting for U.S. foreign policy, the books contributors clarify widespread misunderstandings about noninterventionism, question the wisdom of nation building, debate the validity of democratic-peace theory, and make the case for pursuing a peace strategy that emphasizes private-property rights and free trade.
Readers will come away from this book with a richer understanding of the noninterventionist movements in U.S. history, write Higgs and Close in the books introduction. More important, they will better understand the complexities surrounding democratic nation building and democratic-peace theory, which will enable them to evaluate better not only recent U.S. foreign interventions, but also legislative efforts to promote freedom abroad, such as the Advance Democracy Act of 2005. Most important, perhaps, they will have a firmer understanding of why many classical liberals embrace the strengthening of commercial ties between all countries as a means of avoiding war.
American noninterventionists have often argued that meddling in the affairs of other countries and committing U.S. troops overseas runs counter to the republics founding principles and weakens economic and civil liberties at home. Joseph R. Stromberg develops this theme in chapter 2, Imperialism, Noninterventionism, and Revolution: Opponents of the Mod