Buddhism and Racism (Part 2 of 2: Internal Psychology)
Without greed for gain, without aversion for loss, a sage does not put forth a claim as among superiors, nor as among equals, nor as
Buddhism and Racism (Part 2 of 2: Internal Psychology)
Without greed for gain, without aversion for loss, a sage does not put forth a claim as among superiors, nor as among equals, nor as among inferiors. He does not come to conception; he is without conception. —verse 13 of the Purābedha Sutta, of the Sutta-Nipāta
Also he would not conceive a view in the world based on knowledge, or on morality and observances either. He would not present himself as equal, nor would he imagine himself to be inferior, or superior. —verse 4 of the Paramaṭṭhaka Sutta, also of the Sutta-Nipāta
Unlike the western world today, race was not a burning issue in the Buddha’s time in northern India, if ancient Buddhist literature is any indication, and gender obviously hadn’t evolved to the level of a “hot topic” yet, though class evidently had. The Buddha occasionally spoke out against classist discrimination, favoring a relatively colorblind, meritocratic system in which a person is judged, if at all, on the merits of his own personal character and actions, not his ancestry. As I pointed out in part 1, anyone who was not disqualified for other reasons—no runaway slaves, no debtors, nobody legally obligated to serve the government, no branded criminals, no one with a serious disease like leprosy, no eunuchs, and so on—could enter the Sangha of the Four Quarters regardless of race. This almost universal acceptance of converts is similar to Christianity and many other religions, geared as they are towards the liberation, or at least the betterment, of the human race, and may be typical of spiritual systems in general.
Some historical considerations were mentioned last time, and so this time maybe I should back up a little and address a little issue that perhaps should have been mentioned first and foremost: What exactly is racism? There are at least two plausible ways of answering that question.
One possible definition of racism is considering one race to be better or worse, superior or inferior, especially when compared with another, generally one’s own, and resulting in hostility or contempt towards that race—or towards some specific member of that race. Another possible definition would be more along the lines of racialism, or scientific racism, or tenets of human biodiversity, in which one considers different races to be, well, different, physically and especially psychologically, without the negative emotions like hostility, hatred, resentment, or contempt, but acknowledging that those acknowledged differences may indeed result in some races being better at some things than other races. The main differences between the two types of racism are that the first involves feelings of aversion, and also a blanket, context-free notion of a group of people being “inferior.” Note that I do not include the Social Justice (Cultural Marxist) definition of racism, which asserts that only the dominant group in a society (namely Whitey) can be racist. I consider such a definition to be politicized arrant hogwash, and at variance with most dictionaries of the English language.
The first case of racism is obviously unethical and akusala, as it entails hostility and other forms of aversion; and in Buddhist ethics it is the mental state of the moral agent much more than the subsequent results that determine the moral quality of any action. At a deeper and more subtle level such contemptuous racism would be a clear case of māna, usually rendered into English as “conceit,” and which I have read literally means “measuring,” that is measuring oneself up against others. As seen in the verses quoted above, a monk striving for enlightenment shouldn’t even consider himself to be anyone’s equal, let alone superior or inferior, largely because all views pertaining to self should be dismissed. All of this kind of measuring, from the perspective of advanced Buddhist ethical practice, would be conceit, Wrong View, and a matter of samsaric delusion, as well as a stumbling block in the way of Nibbāna—but that is very advanced philosophy, and not for the common person trying to get along in the world. Buddhist ethics is extremely finely tuned.
But even backing away from the most subtle and profound Buddhist ethical philosophy, any claim of inferiority in general, without some specific context, would very probably involve some sort of veiled hostility, or at least some subtle atimāna or contempt. On the other hand, to acknowledge that races differ, based on empirical observation and statistical averages, may be samsaric and ultimately based on illusion, but nevertheless it does not imply hostility or contempt. (People 