Final version to appear in Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between (CUP, 2014).
The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent
Final version to appear in Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between (CUP, 2014).
The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Truth in a model, or relative truth, instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth would appear to be, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models.
I wish to examine the apparent dual nature of logical truth (without dwelling on Davidson), and suggest that we are dealing with a distinction between a metaphysical and a linguistic interpretation of truth. I take my cue from John Etchemendy’s work, who suggests that absolute truth could be consi