with the best coalition members the neighbors’ reputation coalitions information. They confirm that the use of rewiring indeed improves cooperation when they play the donation game in their social scenario. Griffiths and Luck present and demonstrate a decentralised tag-based mechanism to support cooperation in the presence of cheaters without requiring reciprocity. The simple rewiring enables agents to change their neighbour connections, in particular by removing connections to the worst neighbours and replacing them with connections to neighbours with whom others have had positive experiences. Their results show that cooperation can be improved by enabling agents to change their neighbour connections. In contrast, in this paper, we consider the multiagent coordination problem in cooperative MASs and how rewiring can increase the benefits of individual agents during long-run interactions under the social learning framework.

Problem Description
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We consider a population $N$ of agents, each of which has (bidirectional) connections to its neighbors. We use $O_i$ to denote agent $i$’s neighborhood, such that each agent $i$ is only able to interact with its neighbors in $O_i$. We model the strategic interaction among each pair of agents as a cooperative game, where each agent always receives the same payoff under the same outcome. 