sequential honest voting, where jurors can take into account previous voting, is better or worse than simultaneous voting (or secret ballot)as in the Condorcet model. We also answer the question of whether, for fixed average ability, a more heterogeneous or homogeneous jury has higher reliability when voting in the optimal sequential order. Finally, we ask when sequential honest voting is optimal, or strategic, in that it maximizes the reliability of the verdict. If not, the jurors might be incentivized to jointly modify their voting thresholds to produce a better verdict, which could mean possibly voting for the alternative that a juror views as less likely. This might be accomplished by giving all jurors a reward later, if majority verdict turns out to be correct, or perhaps by giving them stock in the company making the decision. Since we are dealing with majority verdicts and, for a single member jury, all the above distinctions are meaningless, we consider a jury of three experts, where we find sharp answers to all of our above questions. For medium-sized juries, say five to eleven, we propose in Section \[sec:large-juries\] an analog of the optimal rank ordering of abilities for three-member juries.

We note that 