which all of $R(F_1), \ldots , R(F_i)$ are true, then the beliefs of $R$ are inconsistent with $S$ which is unacceptable.

Oblivious reasoning with incomplete information may lead to inconsistency. Indeed, let $M_{R(F_i)}$ denote a set of all models of $S$ in which $R(F_i)$ is true. Then the set of beliefs $\{R(F_1), \ldots , R(F_k)\}$ is consistent with $S$ (and so, holds in some state of $W$) iff $$\bigcap_{i = 1}^{k} M_{R(F_i)} \not= \emptyset.$$ For all queries $F$ incomplete in $S$, $M_{R(F)}$ is a proper subset of $MOD(S)$, so the size of their intersection (3) is a monotone decreasing function of $k$ such that for a large $k$ condition (3) may not hold [^1]. This does not happen if the reasoning is *non-oblivious* such that in derivation of $R(F_i)$ all previously produced beliefs are taken into consideration. One way of doing so is to derive $R(F_i)$ from $S \cup \{R(F_1), \ldots , R(F_{i-1})\}$. In this case, however, the value of each belief depends on the order of queries in their sequence.

\[ex-nonobliv\] $S = \{a \vee b, b \vee c, c \vee a, \neg a \vee \neg b \vee 
\neg c\}$;\
$MOD(S) = \{\{a, b, \neg c\}, \{a, \neg b, 