the perspective of ontic accounts of quantum states collapse is disconcerting in that it remains completely dubious and unclear under which conditions it occurs. From the perspective of the epistemic conception of states, in contrast, measurement collapse merely reflects a sudden and discontinuous change in the epistemic situation of the state-assigning agent, not a discontinuity in the time-evolution of the system itself, so the question of under which conditions it occurs becomes meaningless. A question that does make sense from the point of view of the epistemic conception of quantum states is under which conditions an agent assigning a quantum state *should apply* the collapse postulate. This question will be discussed in more detail in connection with the Rule Perspective in Section 3.2. Objections against the employment of “anthropocentric notions” (such as “measurement”, “information”, “apparatus”) in this take on collapse are discussed in Section 5.

The epistemic conception of states undermines the measurement problem in the form just discussed and offers an elegant justification of the otherwise mysterious collapse, but it cannot guarantee that the problem will not arise at a different stage in a different form. One objection critics are likely to raise, for instance, is that rejecting conceptual 