performed and a certificate is created stating that the key originates from a TP and is usable if and only if the platform is in a certain state. This certificate is transmitted to the mobile device, and then, together with the binding key, to SyncS. Steps 1 to 4 only have to be performed once during roll out of the device or take ownership by its user. In Step 5 the data is transmitted to SyncS, which can now encrypt the data with the binding key or with a hybrid scheme. Data transmission is executed in Steps 5–7. Note that the first presented method is much more flexible than the second one, since in the former the server can decide each time if the particular device can be considered as trustworthy.

The combination of the ticket system with the content protection system proceeds as follows. After it has been activated, the mobile device uses a ticket obtained from the PCA as a token to access SyncS which can either be the RS itself or an associated service. The ticket AIK cannot be used for data encryption, but the ticket payload can carry the mentioned public key for content encryption, *and* 