on the foundations of quantum theory, the epistemic conception of states has been heavily criticised on a number of grounds. The main aim of the present paper is to consider the most important objections brought forward together with possible rejoinders. Most of the objections considered were originally raised as criticisms of *quantum Bayesianism*, a remarkably radical epistemic account of quantum states the core idea of which is to interpret quantum probabilities as subjective degrees of belief in accordance with the subjective Bayesian account of probability. One of the goals of the present paper is to explore quantum Bayesianism’s resources for answering these objections.

In addition to quantum Bayesianism, the paper expounds and develops another version of the epistemic conception of quantum states, introduced in the following sections as the “Rule Perspective” (for reasons to be given). It is based on a combination of ideas developed in an earlier study of the epistemic conception of states (see [@Friederich]) with elements drawn from Richard Healey’s recent pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory (see [@Healey]).[^4] The main result of the discussion of objections in later sections of this paper is that the Rule Perspective fares much better in answering them than quantum Bayesianism. This 