in the financial system. In the Eisenberg-Noe framework, financial firms must satisfy their liabilities by transferring assets. One firm being unable to meet its liabilities due to a shortfall of assets can cause other firms to default on some of their liabilities as well, causing a cascading failure in the financial system. The existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments of this baseline model was proven in [@EN01]. That paper additionally provides methods for numerically computing the realized interbank payments. This baseline model has been extended in multiple directions, including bankruptcy costs, cross-holdings, and fire sales. We refer to [@AW_15; @Staum] for reviews of the prior literature. In regards to bankruptcy costs in financial networks, we refer to [@E07; @RV13; @EGJ14; @GY14; @AW_15; @CCY16; @veraart2017distress]. Cross-holdings have been studied in [@E07; @EGJ14; @AW_15; @GHM12]. Fire sales for a single (representative) illiquid asset have been studied in [@CFS05; @NYYA07; @GK10; @AFM13; @CLY14; @AW_15; @AFM16] and for multiple illiquid assets in [@feinstein2015illiquid; @feinstein2016leverage; @feinstein2017currency]. These network models have been implemented by central banks and regulators for stress testing of and studying cascading failures in the banking systems under their jurisdiction, see, e.g., [@Anand:Canadian; @HK:Modeling; @BEST:2004; @ELS13; @U11; @GHK2011].

Mean field models have 