case both notions are trivially equivalent. The situation is not as clear with quantum specious adversaries. We only get that if the protocol is secure against covert adversaries with a certain $\epsilon$ then it is also secure against specious adversaries with the same $\epsilon$, which is not required to be negligible.

The Quantum Cut-and-Choose Technique {#quantum cc}
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The Cut-and-Choose method is a standard technique to boost a protocol secure against honest-but-curious to being secure against malicious adversaries, by enforcing the honest-but-curious behaviour. The classical Yao protocol, which also relies on a client/server (or garbler/evaluator) setup, was first proven secure against honest-but-curious adversaries (e.g. in [@LP04proof]) and then against malicious adversaries using this technique in [@LinPin07].

The garbler creates $s$ copies of the graph and the evaluator chooses which ones (the *check graphs*) they will check for consistency. If the checks pass and additional precautions are taken, the evaluator is confident that with high probability the remaining graphs (the *evaluation graphs*) were also constructed correctly and can be used for the computation. Here we will have $s$ graphs in total, $s-1$ *check graphs* and $1$ *evaluation graph*. In the classical Yao protocol, the probability of cheating and not getting caught 