of their joint inputs. This protocol was later made secure against malicious adversaries by employing standard (classical) techniques for boosting the security of honest-but-curious protocols to the malicious adversarial setting (e.g. using the GMW compiler as in [@GMW87]). Another such technique is the Cut-and-Choose technique first used in this context in [@LinPin07].

The quantum analogue (secure two-party quantum computation, or 2PQC) involves the computation of a function using a quantum computer and was first examined in [@DNS10] for a quantum honest-but-curious adversaries (called specious) and later made secure against more malicious adversaries in [@DNS12]. The latter protocol, did not use any of the standard boosting classical techniques, but instead used a stepwise quantum authentication protocol, where two-ways online quantum communication was required. Moreover, both protocols use extra classical cryptographic primitives, which in the case of the malicious [@DNS12] is a full actively secure *classical* two-party computation primitive.

The use of classical boosting techniques (such as Cut-and-Choose) for quantum protocols is complicated not only because specific care is needed when defining quantum analogues, for example, for garbled circuits but also for technical reasons since the rewinding method for proving security cannot be directly used in quantum protocols (as demonstrated for zero 