countenance this counterfactual scenario. The Born rule implies that $Pr_{b}^{\Phi ^{+}}(H_{B})={\frac12}$, and anyone who accepts quantum mechanics accepts the implication that $Ch_{p^{\prime }}(\bar{e}_{B})={\frac12}$. So anyone who accepts quantum mechanics will have credence $Cr_{p^{\prime
}}(\bar{e}_{B}/I_{p^{\prime }})={\frac12}$ no matter what he takes to happen in the backward light cone of $p^{\prime
}$ (as specified by $I_{p^{\prime }}$).[^6] If he accepts quantum mechanics, Bob will conclude that there is nothing it makes sense to contemplate doing to alter his estimate of $Ch_{p^{\prime
}}(\bar{e}_{B})$, and so there  is no conceivable counterfactual scenario in which one in Bob’s position arranges for the measurement in $\mathbf{2}$ to have had the different outcome $\bar{e}_{B}$. In general, there is causal dependence between events in $\mathbf{1}$ and $\mathbf{2}$ only if it makes sense to speak of an intervention in one of these regions that would affect a hypothetical agent’s estimated chance of what happens in the other. Anyone who accepts quantum mechanics should deny that makes sense.

Perhaps the most basic reason why counterfactual dependencies between happenings in region $\mathbf{2}$ and the chance(s) of $e_{A}$ are no sign of causal dependence is that chances are not beables, and are incapable of entering into causal relations. That Bell thought they 