regulations [@chinaIdentityRegulation; @chinaRules] point to the obligation to verify and use real-world identities on blockchains, and the banning of contaminant cryptocurrency mining[@chinaBanMining; @NDRCbanlist].

Blockchain research has focused on better consensus algorithms obviating that incentives are a central aspect of permissionless blockchains and that better incentive mechanisms would improve the adoption of blockchains much more that scalability improvements. To bridge this gap, new proofs are introduced to demonstrate that mining a new cryptocurrency based on Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Identity would strictly dominate previous PoW/PoS cryptocurrencies, thus replacing them is proved to be a Nash equilibrium; additionally, the circulation of the proposed cryptocurrency would Pareto dominate other cryptocurrencies. Furthermore, thanks to the network effects arising from the network of users of trusted public certificates, the proposed cryptocurrency could become dominant over previous cryptocurrencies and the lower costs of its infrastructure imply the existence of a unique equilibrium where it dominates other forms of payment.

Contributions
-------------

The main and novel contributions are:

-   The use of anonymous credentials in permissionless blockchains in order to prevent Sybil attacks \[sec:Authentication-Protocols\]: previous works[@DBLP:journals/corr/KulynychITD17; @blockchainCA] considered the use of PKI infrastructures in blockchains (i.e., permissioned ledgers) but without transforming them into anonymous credentials in order to obtain the 