obtain the opposite optimal order in an environment in which information providers care not about the outcome but about appearing to be well informed. It is not difficult, however, to construct examples in which having the best-informed voter vote first is not optimal. Hence it seems unlikely that general insights into this question can be obtained."

The point of this paper is that we are indeed able to obtain general insights into this question.

@AGKP08 discuss the optimal voting order of experts and cite examples in which courts of judges follow either anti-seniority (increasing order of ability, in our terminology) or seniority (decreasing order) orders, respectively, in the ancient Sanhedrin court and in the contemporary American Supreme Court. Voting order in selection committees is analyzed in @AlGaSo10, but there voting is by veto.

A sequential voting model, with discrete but non binary signals, was introduced by @AlCh17a. Ability levels were also discrete, so propositions about which ability orderings are best could be obtained by exhaustive search among the finite number of possibilities. Most of that paper is about *strategic* voting where voters wish to obtain the correct majority verdict, even if this means voting for an alternative which a juror 