and the second author develop a model of social choice among bundles of elements, which they call [*objects*]{}. They show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements (they call this the [*object construction power*]{}) an authority may have the power to determine the social outcome. The object construction power is stronger than the agenda power (i.e. the power to decide the order on which the social outcomes are decided on), traditionally studied in the literature (for instance, by McKelvey [@mckelvey76]). Moreover, in their approach, objects decompose the computationally complex search space into quasi-separable subspaces (see Simon [@simon82]), simplifying the computational task and making decisions possible. They also show that by appropriately designing objects it is possible to break almost all intransitive cycles, which frequently characterize social choice.

In order to formally analyze the properties of a social choice model with object construction and achieve general results, they use geometric properties of hyperplane arrangements and link them to graph theory by means of Salvetti’s Complex. In this respect, the model of Marengo and the second author is a novel contribution 