### Some other game theoretical aspects {#some-other-game-theoretical-aspects .unnumbered}

After all, we can consider the maximum blocking efficiencies of $ i $ and $ j $ as a simple symmetric game. Furthermore, with $\gamma_{i} = \gamma_{j} =1$, we can analyze the game using the results in Sec. \[secsecdfga\] considering a small adjustment in the variables therein so that $$\gamma_D \rightarrow \gamma_{1i}, \qquad \gamma_I \rightarrow \gamma_{2j}, \qquad \alpha \rightarrow \alpha_i .
\label{moakasdi}$$ regarding the agent $ i $.

Beside this, if we assume two agents as two players, then every selection of every agent for its forgetting factor can be considered as a different pure strategy. For the condition of $ \gamma_{1i} + \gamma_{2i} = \gamma_{1j} + \gamma_{2j} = 1 $, a given pure strategy $ A $ would be a selection as $ A \equiv \gamma = [\gamma_{A}, 1-\gamma_{A}] $. Therefore we can have two players regarding 2 different pure strategies $ A, B $ and build our game such that playing $ A [\gamma_{A}, 1-\gamma_{A}] $ for two agents means that two agents have similar selections for their blocking and teaching forgetting factors. In addition, a payoff obtained by every agent could be considered as its maximum efficiency $ r_{max} 