the attacker can decrypt the TRN transmitted between transmitter/receiver, and by knowing the TRN, the plaintext could be recovered. Similarly, extracting the TRN reveals the communicated messages, however, since the TRN would be updated dynamically, extracting the TRN would reveal only part of the messages. It is worth mentioning that assuming that the secret key or TRN is extracted, the functionality of the s-box would be revealed using specific messages.

Fig. \[ttest\] captures our assessment of the side-channel resistance of AEAD using a t-test for unprotected and protected implementations of AES-GCM and ACORN [@diehl2018comparison]. As illustrated, both implementations pass the t-test, indicating the guaranteed resistance against SCA. Note that this guaranteed resistance against SCA shows the robustness of communication channel during TRN transmission.

In addition, by adding the dynamicity in *ExTru*, any form of attacks, including SCA, the SAT, and algebraic, must be carried out in a limited time while the TRN of the CSTN/RCSTN is unchanged. As soon as the TRN is renewed, the previous side-channel traces or SAT iterations or algebraic calculations are useless. The period of TRN updates introduces a trade-off between energy and security and can be pushed to maximum security by changing the TRN for 