of abstract argumentation research is the definition and evaluation of different *argumentation semantics*. An argumentation semantics is a definition of how a graph of arguments–an *argumentation framework*–should be *resolved*, *i.e.* which arguments can be considered *accepted* and which cannot. Considering the variety of argumentation *semantics* (which determine how argumentation frameworks are to be resolved), as well as the range of advanced frameworks that aim to augment Dung’s basic definition of an argumentation framework, it is not clear *how* such a is to be resolved in the sense of Leibniz and consequently *what* the result of a calculation process for argument resolution should be.

From the perspective economic theory, a classical model of choice is the notion of the *rational man* (see, *e.g.*, Rubinstein [@rubinstein1998modeling]). While the rational man as a sufficiently precise model of human decision-making has been debunked by a body of empirical research [@kahneman2003maps], it can still be considered relevant, for example for *prescriptive* modeling of an ideal agent that strictly optimizes according to clear preferences when determining its choices. Aligning abstract argumentation with the rational man paradigm requires, as this paper shows, the introduction of a new *argumentation principle*–an axiomatic requirement to an argumentation semantics [@van2017principle]–that Dung-style 