argumentation semantics typically do not fulfill. In contrast, applying argumentation semantics that do not guarantee rational behavior can lead to *boundedly rational* behavior that reflects human decision-making fallacies (see, *e.g.*, Kahneman [@kahneman2003maps]).

In this paper, we use a novel[^1] formal approach to explore the intersection of abstract argumentation and (bounded) economic rationality and show that abstract argumentation can lead to economically not rational choice processes.

Let us provide an example that illustrates the problem this paper focusses on. An agent ${\cal A}_1$ uses abstract argumentation for choosing a subset $A^{*}$ from a set $\{a, b\}$. For this, the agent constructs the *attack relation* $(a, b)$, *i.e.* $a$ attacks $b$. Given the set of attack relations $\{(a, b)\}$, the arguments $\{a, b\}$ are typically resolved as $\{a\}$. Let us refer to the constructed argumentation framework as $AF$. The agent’s choice of $\{a\}$ implies that the agent prefers choosing $\{a\}$ over all other possible options: $\{a\} \succeq \{a, b\},  \{a\} \succeq \{b\}, \{a\} \succeq \{ \}$. Now, let us assume that a second agent ${\cal A}_2$ consults ${\cal A}_1$ to consider a third item $c$, *i.e.* the set to choose from is now $\{a, b, c\}$. ${\cal A}_2$ also recommends to ${\cal 