order.

In @OtSo01 jurors have heterogeneous abilities (as in this paper), who care only about being right (they are “experts”, with reputations to uphold), rather than about obtaining a correct verdict. We call them *honest* voters. The main difference between their model and ours in this paper is that they retain the Condorcet assumption about binary signals. They talk about the problem of groupthink, herding and conformism, the last also is discussed in terms of committee decisions regarding the “secretary problem” in @AlBa16.

@DePi00 mainly consider the equilibria of simultaneous versus sequential voting, but they do make an important comment on voting order of heterogeneous jurors" in their Conclusions (p. 48):

> “…if voters are endowed ex ante with differential information (some voters can be better informed that others( knowing which voters voted in favor and which against can affect the choice of a later voter. It can be shown that, in a common-value and two signal environment (as in Sec. IIIC above), if the player’s signals are completely ordered (in the sense of Blackwell), then it is optimal to have the better informed vote earlier. This provides an interesting contrast to the findings of Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001). They 