be any fact of the matter as to which observable some numerical value obtained in an experiment is a value of leads to serious problems. It seems therefore worth investigating whether one really needs to deny this assumption for consistency in epistemic accounts of quantum states. In what follows I shall give a brief argument that this is not the case. In particular, as I shall argue, abandoning the notion of a quantum state that a quantum system is in does *not* necessarily entail abandoning the notion of a quantum state assignment being performed correctly.

Assuming that there is an objective fact as to which observable some measured value is a value of, it seems plausible that agents having registered such a value must update the states they assign in a fixed and determinate way by applying the projection postulate, taking into account the measured result. However, even with respect to cases where this narrows down possible post-measurement states to assign to a uniquely determined (pure) quantum state, saying this is *not* the same as concluding that this state is the *true* post-measurement quantum state of the system after measurement, applying to the system in an agent-independent way. The simple 