of other agents measures in part your command of the subject being examined. Second, you will be incentivized to grade accurately by a better final grade. If your message cannot influence your evaluation, then you have no incentive to provide good evaluations. For this reason, even if we extend the sort of methods proposed by Holzman and Moulin to the task of ranking, the starting assumptions are very different. Another related problem is “selection from the selectors” [@selectingselectors]. The goal here is to select a subset of $k$ agents from a group (e.g. to select a subcommittee). The problem of awarding a prize from a group of peers can be seen as the special case of $k=1$. As approval voting is not impartial, Alon, Fischer, Procaccia and Tennenholtz look for impartial rules that approximate approval voting (that is, guarantee that the total approval scores of the $k$ winners are within a fixed fraction of the optimal answer). Again, a difference with this work is that we are not trying to achieve or approximate impartiality.

A closely related problem is the division of cash between a group of partners [@dividedollar]. Each partner cares selfishly about their share but is supposed to 