views as more likely, given prior voting and his private signal $s$. This type of voting, called *honest voting*, models the jurors as experts who have known abilities by reputation. They wish to vote for the alternative that turns out to be true, assuming Nature is eventually revealed. This would be true if they are making short term predictions (say weather or the economy). This type of voting by experts was introduced by @OtSo01. Overall, the model of signals and abilities used here is the same linear signal model introduced in @AlCh17b in a simpler voting model and is similar in spirit to the discrete signal model of @AlCh17a. The way in which a juror’s signal and ability affect his judgement of the probability of $A$ is described fully in Section \[sec:preliminaries\].

Given the above model, we are able to address four questions about the comparative reliability of different voting schemes or voting orders. The main question addressed in this article is the optimal voting order for jurors of different abilities. Putting higher ability jurors first is more likely to have them vote before a majority verdict is established, but also may create negative herding effects. We also consider when 