believes to be less likely. For the question of the optimal ability ordering of three jurors with abilities $a<b<c$, that paper shows by exhaustive search that $b,a,c$ and $b,c,a$ are the optimal orderings (the order of the last two voters in strategic voting does not matter). For honest voting, it is shown for the finite number of cases considered, that the ordering $b,c,a$ is optimal. This is the observation that led us to attempt the general algebraic proof, where $a,b$ and $c$ are real numbers, that is given here. The first algebraic proof of this kind was obtained recently by @AlCh17b for a simpler voting model, where first two jurors vote simultaneously and then the remaining (third) juror casts the deciding vote if there is a tie. This is a much simpler model algebraically as their are only two voting thresholds to consider (for the casting voter), depending on whether the the more able juror voted $A$ or $B$. @AlCh17a also consider larger juries, up to size 13. It uses simulation to compare randomly generated juries, which vote honestly in increasing, decreasing or random ability order. For all these sizes, decreasing order has higher reliability than random, and random has 