strictly higher reliability of the verdict than the anti-seniority order (increasing order of ability), unless all jurors have the same ability.

3.  **Sequential vs. simultaneous voting** (Theorem \[thm:simultaneous-vs-sequential\]). When the abilities of the jurors are sufficiently homogeneous, simultaneous voting has higher reliability than sequential voting. But when the abilities are sufficiently heterogeneous, honest sequential voting (in the optimal order) has higher reliability. (We provide suitable indices of homogeneity and heterogeneity.)

4.  **Effect of diversity on reliability** (Theorem \[thm:monotonicity\]). For a jury of fixed average ability, reliability is an increasing function of the heterogeneity index.

5.  **When is honest sequential voting strategic, that is, (perfectly) optimal?** (Theorem \[thm:honest-vs-strategic\]). When the abilities of the jurors are sufficiently heterogeneous, honest sequential voting in the optimal order is strategic in that it maximizes reliability with respect to any (not just honest) strategy thresholds.

To see how these results aid an organization, which has to make a binary decision, consider that the organization has hired three experts of distinct abilities and wishes to determine the optimal voting mechanism. First, suppose it has no additional funds to incentivize strategic voting, so voting is honest. If the abilities of the fixed set of expert are sufficiently homogeneous, 