true state of Nature. That is, the Principal cares only about the correctness of the verdict, while the jurors care only about the correctness of their own votes. In the sub-game, honest voting is exactly the unique Nash equilibrium. In fact, no juror can improve his expected payoff (probability he votes correctly) by changing from honesty, if the prior voters stick to honest voting. Thus it is stronger than the usual definition of Nash equilibrium.

Literature {#sec:literature}
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The celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem [@Condorcet1785] is concerned with a model with an odd number $n$ of jurors who receive independent binary signals for one of two states of Nature. Each juror receives the correct signal with the same probability $p$. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT) states that if each juror votes his signal, the probability that the majority vote is correct goes to $1$ as $n$ approaches to infinity if $p>1/2$. There is a large body of literature on extensions and discussions of this result. In this paper we are interested in extensions to *sequential voting* of heterogeneous ability jurors, where the jurors vote in order, with knowledge of all previous votes. In particularly we are interested in work related to voting 