as Leibniz’s infinite quantities, his distinction between assignable and inassignable quantities, and his transcendental law of homogeneity. However, the B-framework also enables us to carry out many additional moves unknown to Leibniz, for instance those related to the detailed structure of ${}^\ast{{\mathbb N}}$ as in . Thus, the *difference* between the Leibnizian framework and a modern infinitesimal B-framework is *large*.

On the other hand, a Weierstrassian A-framework may not cover all the moves Leibniz may make in his framework LEI, but one might argue that the *difference* between (A) and LEI is small. Thus, one may not necessarily have $\text{LEI}\subseteq\text{(A)}$, but one might argue that the difference $\text{(A)}-\text{LEI}$ is *small*. This may be taken as evidence that (A) and LEI are more similar to each other than (B) and LEI are. This could affect the assessment of appropriateness. Finally, could it be that neither the Weierstrassian nor the modern infinitesimal account is appropriate to cope with Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus?

Separating entities from procedures {#three}
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What would it mean exactly to separate ontological problems from procedural problems? A possible approach is to attempt to account for Leibniz’s procedures in a framework limited to first order logic, with a small number 