it should keep the voting silent (or simultaneous) by not allowing later voters to know the results of earlier voting (Theorem \[thm:simultaneous-vs-sequential\]). (This is done for preference voting in US elections, but for different reasons.) If the ability set is sufficiently heterogeneous, then later voters should be told the outcome of earlier votes (Theorem \[thm:simultaneous-vs-sequential\]) and they should vote in the order given by Theorem \[thm:optimal-sequence\]. We note that other variations are possible, for example, later voters could be told the votes of only some of the earlier voters. If the jury is not fixed, then Theorem \[thm:monotonicity\] suggests that, assuming the cost of an expert juror is increasing in ability, heterogeneous juries might be preferable. Finally, we consider whether it might be advantageous to pay a bonus to each expert for a correct jury (majority) decision, assuming the correctness of the verdict becomes common knowledge in the near future, as with weather predictions. In general, this will be a cost-benefit problem, but Theorem \[thm:honest-vs-strategic\] shows that such payments are wasteful if the ability set is sufficiently heterogeneous.

For larger juries of odd size $n=2m+1$, we propose the Ascending-Descending Order (ADO), where the most able $m+1$ jurors vote first in 