points closer to it than the the other server (a.k.a. its Voronoi cell). Hotelling showed that if both servers locate themselves at the center of the line,

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then a Nash equilibrium would be reached, i.e., a situation in which neither server would rather relocate unilaterally. He next showed that three servers competing on the line reach no equilibrium state - in every configuration of servers there will be one server who can increase its profit by moving.

This initial idea sparked decades of research. Notably, in 1975, Eaton and Lipsey [@eaton1975principle] completely characterized all Nash equilibria of the $n$ server game, for every $n$. Over the years numerous variations were made to each component of the game, including the number of players, the pricing policy, the behavior of clients, and the geometry of the market. Eiselt, Laporte and Thisse [@eiselt1993competitive] provide an annotated bibliography categorized by these features (for a more recent survey see Eiselt et al. [@eiselt2011equilibria]).

#### Motivation.

In this paper, we consider the Hotelling game in a failure prone setting, and explore how the Hotelling game behaves differently in a world where faults may occur either in the environment, or in the servers themselves. In 