last property is important because it allows one to interpret the *shapley value* as a measure of relative contribution with respect to the value of resources created by the grand coalition. In particular, it is not difficult to see that the *shapley value* gives us one particular *outcome* (as defined in Section 3.1.1) of a cooperative game by allocating the value created by the grand coalitions to a player with the properties above.\
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Unfortunately, the allocation given by the *Shapley value* may not be *stable* in conventional cooperative games (since a stable solution may not even exist). In later sections, we will observe the recurring theme where fairness and stability may not be achievable together.

### Limitations in context of data sharing

Even though we are tempted to model the data sharing process as a cooperative game and regard the combined learnt model as the value generated by a group of players, we observe that under conventional game theory, the ideal outcomes (based on conventional concepts of stability and fairness) of such games are less than desirable and do not promote sharing of data. For example, imagine if two agents A and B whose datasets are valued in the 