That is, the investment strategy is exactly the same as in the model without consumption studied in [@lacker2017mean]. The equilibrium consumption policy, as a function of the various model parameters, displays even more highly nonlinear and non-monotone behavior than the investment policy, and we study this in detail in Section \[se:discussion\]. Notably, each agent’s rate of consumption $c_t$ changes monotonically with time $t$ over the entire horizon $[0,T]$; however, whether an agent increases or decreases consumption over time depends in a complex manner on her own risk preferences as well as certain aggregates of the other agents’ parameters.

Three key features of our model are relative consumption concerns, relative wealth concerns, and asset specialization. We defer to the introduction of [@lacker2017mean] for a thorough discussion of the latter two topics and further references, but we stress the particularly important and by now well-established point that mutual fund choice is highly influenced by relative performance [@sirri1998costly]. That is, out-performing other fund managers tends to attract greater future investment in one’s own fund. The most closely related works to ours, after [@lacker2017mean], are [@anthropelos-geng-zariphopoulou; @basak2015competition; @bielagk2017equilibrium; @dosreis-zariphopoulou; @espinosa2015optimal; @frei2011financial]. These papers study continuous-time models of optimal investment under relative performance concerns in 