be able to emulate all of Leibniz’s moves in the modern framework, but it also enables us to carry out many moves that Leibniz would have never dreamt of*? As mentioned above, this is not the case at the level of first order logic.

What about the claim that *the difference between Leibniz framework and the infinitesimal framework is large*? At the procedural level this is arguably not the case.

What about the claim that *the Weierstrass framework may not cover all of Leibniz’s, but the *difference*, $\text{(A)}-\text{LEI}$, is *small*, indicating that (A) and LEI are more similar to each other than (B) and LEI are, affecting the assessment of appropriateness*? What needs to be pointed out here is that actually the considerable distance in ontology between (A) and LEI is about the same is the distance between (B) and LEI. The Weierstrassian punctiform continuum where almost all real numbers are undefinable (so that no individual number of this sort can ever be specified, unlike $\pi$, $e$, etc.) is a far cry from anything one might have imagined in the 17th century.

As far as the question *Could it be that neither Weierstrass nor the infinitesimal account is appropriate to 