for a hypothetical agent whose world-line has entered the future light cone of $\mathbf{2}$ at $q$ is it true that specification of the result in $\mathbf{2}$ permits a 100% confident prediction of the previously totally uncertain result on the other side. A hypothetical agent at $p$ is not in a position to make a 100% confident prediction: for such an agent the result in $\mathbf{1}$ remains totally uncertain: what happens in $\mathbf{2}$ makes no difference to what (s)he should believe, since region $\mathbf{2}$ is outside the backward light cone of $p$. That is why it is $Ch_{p}(e_{A})$, not $Ch_{q}(e_{A})$, that says what is certain at $p$. Newtonian absolute time fostered the illusion of the occurrence of future events becoming certain for everyone at the same time—when they occur if not sooner. Relativity requires certainty, like chance, to be relativized to space-time points—idealized locations of hypothetical knowers.

So does ordinary quantum mechanics violate local causality? If the probabilities (LC) speaks of are $Pr_{a,b}^{\Phi ^{+}}(V_{A}),$ $Pr_{a,b}^{\Phi ^{+}}(H_{A})$, and the condition that these be unaltered is understood to be that $Pr_{a,b}^{\Phi
^{+}}(V_{A})=Pr_{a,a}^{\Phi ^{+}}(V_{A}|B),$ $Pr_{a,b}^{\Phi
^{+}}(H_{A})=Pr_{a,a}^{\Phi ^{+}}(H_{A}|B)$, then ordinary quantum mechanics violates (LC). But if this is all (LC) means, then it is not 