model where jurors have private information in the form of a binary signal ($A$ or $B$), Condorcet showed that for jurors of fixed ability $p>1/2$ (probability of a correct signal), or of varying abilities all at least $p$, the reliability approaches $1$ as the jury size increases.

Our model is a little more sophisticated than that of Condorcet in two ways: signals and abilities. Condorcet’s voters get a binary signal, for $A$ or for $B$. Our jurors get a signal $s$ in the interval $[-1,+1]$, with higher signals giving a higher probability of $A$. The signal $s=0$ is neutral and useless, as $A$ and $B$ remain equally likely after such a signal. In analogy with Condorcet’s probability $p$ (that the binary signal is correct) our jurors have an ability in the interval $[0,1]$, which is proportional to the probability of $A$ given a positive signal $s$, $0<s\leq1$. An ability of $0$ makes that probability $1/2$, the same as the *a priori* probability and hence useless (no ability at all). Jurors of higher ability have, in general, more useful private information. When a juror of given ability comes to vote, he will vote for the alternative, $A$ or $B$, that he 