while electorates in preference voting are typically large, juries in information voting are typically small, and often of size three, such as refereeing team in tennis or boxing, appellate levels in legal decisions, doctors giving second or third opinions on the necessity of an operation. For juries of size three we are able to answer all of our above questions regarding comparative reliability, as follows.

1.  **Optimal voting order** (Theorem \[thm:optimal-sequence\]). For juries of distinct abilities, the unique voting order that maximizes the reliability of the verdict for honest sequential voting is given as follows: the median ability expert should vote first, then the expert of highest ability, and finally the expert of least ability. (This order was suggested by numerical work in @AlCh17a.) This is our main result and by far the hardest to prove. See also the introduction of the more general Ascending-Descending Order (ADO) ordering in Section \[sec:large-juries\]: The median ability juror votes first, then the voting is in increasing order up to the highest ability. After the highest votes, the remaining jurors vote in decreasing order of ability.

2.  **Seniority vs. anti-seniority voting orders** (Theorem \[thm:seniority-sequence\]). The seniority voting order (decreasing order of ability) has a 