the information possessed by each agent, we aim at characterizing the emerging stable network topologies at Nash Equilibrium (NE). Throughout our analysis, we focus on two classes of linking cost scenarios: homogeneous link formation cost and heterogeneous link formation costs. In the former, connecting to any agent entails the same cost, while in the later, the link cost is recipient-dependent. The link cost can correspond to tokens [@tok1] [@tok2], or an abstraction for any monetary, energy, or delay costs incurred by the agent forming the link. An agent in the network is an abstraction for a mobile user, a mobile device, or a transmitter/receiver that is rational and self-interested.

We show that the networks that emerge at equilibrium are minimally connected; thus, agents tend to minimize the overall cost of constructing the network. With homogeneous link costs, equilibrium leads to a network in which each component is a star. Moreover, we show how information redundancy affects the link cost ranges at which the network becomes connected or disconnected, in addition to its impact on the network efficiency by quantifying the Price-of-Anarchy (PoA). For instance, we show that for networks with low link costs, when the link costs are homogeneous, all 