be shown in the next section \[sub:Detailed-Authentication-Protocol-Remote-Attestation\], remote attestation can be used as a more efficient substitute of verifiable computation.

Authentication Protocols\[sec:Authentication-Protocols\]
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In this section, we describe authentication protocols for Sybil-resistant, anonymous authentication using Zero-Knowledge protocols \[sub:Detailed-Authentication-Protocol\] and remote attestation \[sub:Detailed-Authentication-Protocol-Remote-Attestation\].

Authentication Protocols using Zero-Knowledge\[sub:Detailed-Authentication-Protocol\]
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### Security Goals

The following security goals must be met for the system to be considered secure:

1.  The registered miner’s key to the blockchain *opens, but no one can shut; he can shut, but no one can open* (*Isaiah 22:22*, [@isaiah2222]). For the security of the system to be considered equivalent to the currently available permissionless blockchains, anyone holding a valid public certificate should be able to register a pseudo-anonymous identity on the blockchain but no one should be able to remove it (i.e., uncensorable free entry is guaranteed).

2.  Protection against malicious issuers: some certification authorities may turn against some citizens and try to cancel access to the permissionless blockchain or stole their funds.

    1.  Mandatory passphrase. An issuer may counterfeit a certificate with the same unique identifiers, thus possessing a valid certificate isn’t secure enough and a passphrase is deemed mandatory.

    2.  Non-bruteforceable. Operations must be computationally costly on the 