more straightforward way. The epistemic conception of states may not completely dispel the felt tension between quantum and relativity theory, but it arguably removes any clear-cut inconsistency between the two.

Two epistemic accounts of quantum states
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Various different epistemic accounts of quantum states have been proposed, and it is not my aim to provide a systematic overview of them here. Rather, I shall focus only on two (very different) epistemic accounts of quantum states and discuss their respective problems and advantages in more detail. The first account is quantum Bayesianism, a position developed by C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs and R. Schack, supported in some of its central tenets by H. N. Barnum, M. D. Appleby (and perhaps other authors).[^11] Its core idea is to interpret quantum probabilities as subjective degrees of belief in accordance with the subjective Bayesian take on probability. An exposition of the central claims and results of quantum Bayesianism is given in Section 3.1. The second account to be discussed, the *Rule Perspective*, combines ideas developed in [@Friederich] with ideas drawn from Richard Healey’s recently proposed pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory (see [@Healey]). Section 3.2.1 introduces it as an account of the rules governing 