412 Iv. COGNITI vE AND M OTIvATIONAL P ROCESSES
The CAPS  Model
The CAPS model has been extensively de -
scribed before (see Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 
1998, 1999, 2008; Shoda & Mischel, 1996, 
2000; Mischel, 2004). Therefore, in this 
chapter, we provide only a summary of the 
model before our larger discussion of how 
this approach is fruitfully reflected in the 
study of RS.
From its inception, the key challenge for 
the CAPS model has been to demonstrate 
that there is (at least to some degree) stabil -
ity in the way behavior changes from one 
situation to another. If such variability is not 
systematic, then situation–  behavior contin -
gencies must be noise and should be ignored. 
If there is systematicity and thus stabil -
ity, however, then such situation–  behavior 
contingencies can be thought of as if–then 
signatures  of personality and are therefore 
worthy of consideration as additional sourc -
es of personality coherence.
Because examining the temporal stability 
of if–then contingencies required massive 
amounts of empirical data (repeated obser -
vations across time and contexts), initial 
evidence was sparse but consistent with the 
model (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1998). With 
the invention of new technologies such as 
mobile phones over the last two decades that 
allow easy implementation of longitudinal 
within-  person research designs (i.e., experi -
ence sampling studies), a substantial amount 
of data has now accumulated, clearly dem -
onstrating that within-  person variability, 
or if–then profiles are relatively stable (e.g., 
Borkenau, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 
2006; English & Chen, 2007; Fleeson, 2001; 
Fournier, Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2008; 
Mendoza-  Denton & Mischel, 2007; Shoda, 
Mischel, & Wright, 1993, 1994; Vansteel -
andt & Van Mechelen, 2006; Fleeson & 
Furr, 2016; McCabe & Fleeson, 2016).
As the very concept of if–then signatures 
implies, situations in the CAPS model are 
incorporated into the conceptualization of 
personality itself. However, it is important 
to note that situations in CAPS are defined 
in terms of the way they are constructed 
and perceived by the person. As such, they 
specifically refer to psychological situations  
and not to nominal or physical features of 
settings (e.g., at school). The relationship 
between the ifs  and the thens  in a CAPS system is explained by the availability/ac -
cessibility of five basic types of cognitive 
and affective units (CAUs) and the interre -
lationships among them: (1) encodings and 
construals; (2) expectations and beliefs; (3) 
feelings and emotions; (4) goals and values; 
and (5) competencies and self-  regulatory 
abilities (Mischel, 1973). The specific CAUs 
that are available and accessible in the sys -
tem, as well as the interconnected activation 
network, are the result of each individual’s 
own social, cultural, and biological learning 
history (Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
In this framework, psychological features 
of a situation (i.e., ifs ) elicit activation in a 
small subsample of available CAUs, which 
then spread to other CAUs to which they are 
connected (i.e., activation network), through 
excitatory or inhibitory links, generating a 
behavioral response (i.e., thens ). Behavior -
al responses, in return, alter the situations 
people face subsequently, thus creating self- 
fulfilling prophecies in the way people ac -
tively construct their social worlds (Shoda, 
LeeTiernen, & Mischel, 2002; Zayas, 
Shoda, & Ayduk, 2002).
What is stable is the system itself. A par -
ticular situational feature reliably activates a 
particular encoding, emotion, expectation, 
and so on, and this initial activation spreads 
through a particular network of other 
CAUs, resulting in a particular behavioral 
response. In other words, the same activa -
tion network of CAUs is reliably activated in 
response to a particular situational feature, 
leading the individual to behave in a similar 
way every time that psychological situation 
is encountered. On the other hand, when the 
individual encounters a different psychologi -
cal feature, it activates a different network 
of CAUs that may generate different behav -
ioral responses. Thus, although the person 
may behave inconsistently across situations, 
such as behavior A in situation X and behav -
ior B in situation Y,  their behavior changes 
reliably and stably from A to B when the 
psychological situation changes from X to 
Y. This conceptualization allows one to ex -
plain both consistency and inconsistency in 
behavior across situations within a unified 
framework.
Furthermore, people with a similar dis -
position share the psychological features 
they pay attention to, the way they construe 
them, the activation network of CAUs that 