CHAPTER
18
Measures of Values and Moral Personality
John B. Campbell1, Eranda Jayawickreme2and Emily J. Hanson2
1Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA, USA;2Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
The study of morality within personality psychology, like American personality theory itself, is best read as
beginning with Gordon Allport (e.g., 1921) . As has been widely noted, Allport (1937, p. 52) wrote, ‘ Character is
personality evaluated, and personality is character devaluated .’ However, closer reading reveals that Allport’s intention
was to preserve the integrity of personality by separating volition and will form external standards that can be
used to evaluate behavior ( Piekkola, 2011 ).
This distinction becomes clear in Allport’s subsequent emphasis on ‘a unifying philosophy of life’ as a defining
feature of the ‘mature personality’ (p. 214) that integrates behavior through ‘some fundamental conception of
value,’ as well as his reference to one’s philosophy of life as the ‘apex of development in the mature personality’
(pp. 226 /C0227). This theme of guiding principles that structure behavioral choices pervades Allport’s writings. For
example, he described the developmental transition of the mature adult from a ‘must’ conscience based on fear
of punishment to an ‘ought’ conscience guided by patterns of values that inform appropriate behavior Allport,
(1955, p. 73; note the resonance with Kohlberg’s subsequent developmental stages of moral reasoning).
A clearer understanding of Allport’s fundamental embrace of value systems eliminates what otherwise would
be an enormous inconsistency between his supposed rejection of morality, and his embrace of Eduard Spranger’s
six ideal value types, which form the basis for the Allport and Vernon ( Vernon & Allport, 1931; Allport &
Vernon, 1931 ) Study of Values. Indeed, the Allport /C0Vernon /C0Lindzey Study of Values (SOV) was subtitled, ‘A
Scale for Measuring the Dominant Interests in Personality ’ (italics added), and it served as the initial psychological
measure of values or morality.
Braithwaite and Scott (1991) reviewed the SOV and several subsequent generations of personality and social
psychological measures of morality. They focused their review on the Rokeach Value Survey ( Rokeach, 1973 ),
which had become the dominant measure of individual value orientations. In the 23 years since that review, a
new generation of researchers has introduced alternative models and measures of the moral personality. In par-
ticular, the Schwartz Value Survey ( Schwartz, 1992 ), which was derived in part from the Rokeach measure, has
now become the dominant, broad-band measure of what we will term the moral personality; however, alternative
new measures, largely derived in response to the Allport SOV and the Schwartz Value Survey, also have been
introduced. In addition, distinctive new models of morality, notably those introduced by Peterson and Seligman
(2004) and by Haidt (2001, 2012) , are accompanied by their own, distinctive measures.
Haidt (2008; see also 2001, 2007, 2012, and Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) has provided a useful summary of major
research traditions within moral psychology. The ‘main line’ in this area is the cognitive-developmental
approach, which runs from Piaget (1932/1965) toKohlberg (1969) and traces developmental stages through
which children develop qualitatively distinct patterns of respect for rules. The central psychological process in
this approach is moral reasoning, which Kohlberg assessed via children’s responses to a series of moral dilem-
mas. In contrast, Haidt described a ‘new synthesis in moral psychology’ predicated on evolutionary psychology
and rising interest in affective processes, which leads to his ‘social intuitionist model’ ( Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008 ).
From Haidt’s perspective, moral judgments are understood as ‘rapid intuitive processes,’ rather than reasoned
analyses.
505Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Constructs.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-386915-9.00018-8 ©2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.