times, but it cannot explain the divergence between scores on different
traits. The scales of the GZTS differ much more in content than in theresponse styles they are likely to elicit. Thus, the low correlations be -
tween unlike traits (e.g., sociability and thoughtfulness, r=−.06) are
easily explained if content determines responses but are hard to explainif response sets determine responses. And if response sets do not ac -
count for scale scores at one time, they cannot account for the stability
of scale scores across time. It is, however, still possible that stability isexaggerated by consistency of response habits.
Because response sets (including random responding, uncertainty ,
social desirability , and acquiescence) can be measured in the GZTS, weconducted empirical tests of this possibility (Costa, McCrae, & Aren -
berg, 1983). We found that there is indeed a certain consistency of
response style across administrations, but it is less pronounced than theconsistency of individual traits. And when we analyzed the data toeliminate the effects of this consistency , we found that the stability coef-ficients remained essentially unchanged. Artifacts of response set do notaccount for stability of personality .
The Self-Concept and Stability
A much more interesting and reasonable rival hypothesis was suggestedto us by Seymour Epstein. He drew attention to the distinction betweenpersonality and the self-concept, between what we are really like andwhat we believe we are like. He suggested that we may develop a viewof ourselves early in adulthood and cling to that picture over the yearsdespite changes in our real nature. Rosenberg (1979) expressed thesame idea this way:
The power and persistence of the self-consistency motive may be quite re -
markable. People who have developed self-pictures early in life frequently
continue to hold to these self-views long after the actual self has changedradically . . . . [T]he person who grows gruff and irritable with the passingyears may still thank of himself as “basically” kindly , cheerful, and well-disposed; thus behavior which has become chronic is either unrecognizedor is perceived as a temporary aberration from the true self. (p. 58)
Psychologists and sociologists have long known that we do have a
self-concept, a theory of what we are like (Epstein, 1973), and that itseems to guide our behavior. It is this theory of ourselves that we drawQualifications and Rival Hypotheses 119