112 I. THEORETICAL  PERSPECTI vES AND  CONCEPT uAL uNITS
ers because others will reward me only if I 
achieve this goal” (controlled performance- 
approach goal complex).2 When including 
a “pure” goal, a “pure” reason, and their 
related goal complex in the same statistical 
model, one can disentangle the effect of each 
construct from the others, that is, testing 
the unique variance explained by each con -
struct after removing the shared variance 
explained by the other two.
Sommet and Elliot used this approach 
in four studies involving more than 1,700 
participants and reached three main conclu -
sions. First, testing goals and reasons sepa-
rately,  mastery-  approach goals and autono -
mous reasons were each a positive predictor 
of beneficial experiential and self-  regulated 
outcomes (e.g., interest, positive emotion, 
deep learning, and persistence). This rep -
licates the well-known findings from the 
achievement goal literature reviewed ear -
lier, as well as those from the SDT literature 
showing that autonomous reasons make 
tasks more meaningful and foster personal 
growth (Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Ryan, 
1991; Vansteenkiste, Zhou, Lens, & Soe -
nens, 2005).
Second, testing goals and reasons simul -
taneously,  mastery-  approach goals and au -
tonomous reasons were each still a positive 
predictor of most of the beneficial outcomes, 
with the predictive strength of both  mastery- 
approach goals and autonomous reasons 
being diminished when controlling for the 
other (without dropping to nonsignificance). 
This demonstrates that mastery-  approach 
goals and autonomous reasons are both 
distinct (operating at different level) and 
overlapping (predicting similar outcomes), 
but that none of the construct unilaterally 
“captures” all the variance explained by the 
other. In light of this set of results, it cannot 
be concluded that the influence of goals is 
reducible to the influence of reasons or, for 
that matter, vice versa.
Third, testing goals, reasons, and goal 
complexes together,  the autonomous 
mastery-  approach goal complex was found 
to be a positive predictor of most of the 
beneficial outcomes, with the predictive 
strength of both  mastery-  approach goals and 
autonomous reasons being diminished when 
controlling for the goal complex construct 
(without dropping to nonsignificance). This demonstrates that mastery-  approach goals 
and autonomous reasons may fuse into an 
autonomous mastery-  approach goal complex 
and produce additional benefits. Moreover, 
as in the extant research, controlling for the 
autonomous mastery-  approach goal complex 
diminished the effect of “pure” mastery- 
approach goals (since the goal component is 
assessed two times), but in the same way it 
diminished the effect of “pure” autonomous 
reasons (since the reason component is also 
assessed two times). Similar results were ob -
served for performance-  approach goals, the 
autonomous performance-  approach goal 
complex, and performance goal-  relevant out -
comes (e.g., grade aspiration, persistence).
Interestingly, Sommet and Elliot’s (2017) 
findings are reminiscent of a past controversy 
regarding the relative influence of financial 
goal content and autonomous goal motives. 
Kasser and Ryan (1993) demonstrated that 
financial goals (striving for status or wealth) 
were a negative predictor of well-being. 
Later, Srivastava, Locke, and Bartol (2001) 
disputed these findings, suggesting that this 
relation could be accounted by “the ‘why’ 
behind the [financial] goal, rather than the 
goal itself” (p. 959; see also Carver & Baird, 
1998). Accordingly, the authors showed that 
the negative relation between financial goals 
and well-being was eliminated when includ -
ing the controlled reasons connected to these 
financial goals (e.g., appearance reasons). 
However, Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, and Kasser 
(2004) critiqued their operationalization, 
arguing that there was a confound in the 
assessment of goals and reasons. Once the 
ambiguity had been resolved, the authors 
observed that financial goals had a negative 
effect on well-being, with controlled reasons 
(relative to autonomous reasons) having an 
additional, independent, and incremental 
negative effect on well-being.
The idea that both the energizing force 
of reasons and the directive force of goals 
are needed to give a full account of human 
motivation can be found in other lines of 
inquiry as well, such as intrinsic versus  
extrinsic exercise goal content and autono -
mous versus  controlled reasons (Sebire, 
Standage, & Vansteenkiste, 2009; see also 
Sheldon, Sommet, Corcoran, & Elliot, 
2018; Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006), 
short-term emotional preference and long-