Despite detailed discussion of response bias in the previous edition of this book ( Paulhus, 1991 ), there is a con-
tinuing need for efforts to integrate and systematize the accumulated knowledge on response styles and response
biases. Given the increasing use of computers to administer and score scales and questionnaires in modern days,
and more sophisticated developments in analytic methods, we devote some time to discussing the differences
between the various modalities of item administration in terms of social desirability and other modes of response
bias. Finally, an overview of other more sophisticated methodologies for detecting, correcting or even preventing
motivational distortion and responses bias will be discussed.
In this prefatory chapter, we first discuss measures of response styles found in measures of ‘normal’ personal-
ity and then turn to those developed for measures of psychopathology, where motivational and response distor-
tion (both conscious and unconscious) are more likely to occur than with the assessment of ‘normal’ aspects of
personality. We have selected a variety of commercially published measures to illustrate the range of approaches
to dealing with motivational distortion and response styles that have been adopted.
Response biases in self-report measures are regarded as impediments to the valid assessment of individual
differences. These biases may be classified as response sets where these sets are transient or temporary influ-
ences brought about by factors such as general situational demands (e.g., high stakes testing) or specific assess-
ment conditions (e.g., time of day), or these biases may be classified as response styles where these styles
constitute relatively stable factors that endure over situations and time (e.g., to be agreeable with everything,
a habit of always saying no). As an example of the complexity of these issues, Weijters, Baumgartner,
and Schillewaert (2013) report on the relative influence of careless responding and acquiescence on the score
variance of short measures of self-esteem and optimism in the context of the issue of whether or not to reverse-
key items.
Prominent response biases include response sets such as acquiescence (agreeing with everything or ‘yea-say-
ing’), dis-acquiescence (disagreeing with everything or ‘nay-saying’), midpoint responding, extreme responding
(Weijters, Geuens, & Schillewaert, 2010 ), and styles such as socially desirable responding. Within socially desir-
able responding, various sub-dimensions have been identified and labeled (e.g., Holden & Fekken, 1989 ;
Paulhus, 1984 ). Over the past 25 years, the differentiation of socially desirable responding into components of
impression management and self-deceptive enhancement has been widely accepted. Whereas impression man-
agement has been regarded as a deliberate, conscious misrepresentation or distortion, self-deception has been
viewed as an unconscious positivity or negativity bias ( Paulhus, 1998 ) that may be related to narcissism or other
personality aberrations or misperceptions resulting in distorted self-perceptions. Such unconscious motivational
distortion/response bias is not even recognized by the respondent.
Faking is usually regarded as a subset of impression management and has been defined as involving intent,
deception, and other-orientation ( Holden & Book, 2012 ). That is, there is a conscious attempt to mislead someone
else in order to achieve a goal ( Ziegler et al., 2012 ). However, faking can be either deliberate/conscious, or unin-
tentional/unconscious, ranging all the way from lack of adequate self-insight to deliberate dissimulation (e.g., see
Boyle, 1985 ). Although faking may be multidimensional or context dependent, it is often viewed as emphasizing
either positivity (faking good) or negativity (faking bad, malingering). Consequently, malingering is a type of fak-
ing, which is a type of impression management, which is a type of socially desirable responding, which is a type
of response bias.
Clearly, the validity of individual respondents’ scores on self-report measures will be distorted by non-
content-relevant responding ( Paunonen & LeBel, 2012; Ziegler & Bu ¨hner, 2009 ). Further, although some measures
of response biases arguably may be confounded with content that is relevant for particular assessments, any for-
tuitous association between content and style seems theoretically post hoc and weak ( Holden & Passey, 2010 ).
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that faking in particular distorts the ranking of test-takers which may in
turn have detrimental effects, for example, in selection contexts ( Converse, Peterson & Griffith 2009 ). After sev-
eral years of controversy, it is clear that faking in real-life applicant settings indeed does occur ( Griffith,
Chmielowski & Yoshita 2007; Griffith & Converse, 2012 ). These authors provide a conservative estimate that the
proportion of individuals who either intentionally fake their responses on personality questionnaires is around
one-third in a non-threatening applied setting. With regard to malingering in threatening contexts, empirical evi-
dence suggests the proportion of those faking ranges up to 70%. Thus, there is potentially an even larger preva-
lence of deliberate faking than unconscious motivational response distortion in some contexts ( Hall & Hall, 2012 ).
Overall, therefore, response biases continue to remain as threats to the use of construct valid rating and self-
report scales for the measurement of individual differences. We now turn to evaluating different approaches to
the measurement of response style as construed by the designers of ‘normal’ personality instruments, followed
by approaches used in the assessment of psychopathology.17 RESPONSE BIASES AND SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING
I. INTRODUCTION: CORE ISSUES IN ASSESSMENT