Test/C0Retest
(Jackson (1984) reported two-week test /C0retest reliability coefficients (.86 and .84) for the PRF Desirability scale.
Validity
Convergent/Concurrent
Positive correlations between the PRF Desirability scale and other measures of socially desirable responding
(Holden & Passey, 2010; Jackson, 1984 ) showed congruence of the Desirability scale with other measures of social
desirability.
Divergent/Discriminant
Holden, Book, Edwards, Wasylkiw, and Starzyk (2003) found that the PRF Desirability scale score could distin-
guish between respondents answering honestly or faking (either in terms of positivity or negativity) and that this
capability was unsurpassed by other commonly used measures.
Construct/Factor Analytic
A principal components analysis of the PRF Desirability scale with other measures of socially desirable
responding ( Holden & Passey, 2010 ) revealed evidence for the construct validity of the Desirability scale.
Criterion/Predictive
Studies of experimentally induced faking support the merits of the PRF Desirability scale score in the identifi-
cation of non-content-based responding. Holden and Evoy (2005) noted a large effect size for the PRF Desirability
scale score in its association with an underlying dimension of dissimulation.
Location
Jackson, D.N. (1984). Personality Research Form manual (3rd ed.). Port Huron, MI: Sigma Assessment Systems.
Results and Comments
The PRF-E Desirability scale was originally developed as a validity scale for Jackson’s measure of Murray’s
needs. The scale underwent the same item selection processes as for the content scales, and this care in its devel-
opment is evident in its evidence for construct validity in comparison to some other measures of the construct of
desirability. For the most part, the scale correlates with both Impression Management and Self-Deception scales
because it originally was not developed to have a content interpretation.
MALINGERING
Malingering may be regarded as an extreme form of Impression Management, and recent evidence suggests
that malingering is not categorically distinct from less extreme forms of response distortion ( Walters et al., 2008 ).
The American Psychiatric Association (2000) defines malingering as ‘ the intentional production of false or grossly
exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives ’ (p. 739). It is helpful to differentiate
malingering from the feigning of symptoms, where feigning is defined as ‘ the deliberate fabrication or gross exagger-
ation of psychological or physical symptoms without any assumptions about its goals ’(Rogers, 2008 , p. 6). Although
more general terms, such as dissimulation, have also been used in descriptions of the deliberate distortion of
responses, there is less of a consensus on definitions. Such response distortions may involve exaggeration, but
sometimes the minimization of responses occurs as well. Rogers (2008) noted that three domains of malingering
can be defined. Here, we exclude the intentional production of symptoms of cognitive impairment or of feigned
medical symptoms ( Rogers et al., 2010 ). This leaves the feigning of symptoms of psychological disorders, their
fabrication or exaggeration.
Individuals can knowingly distort the ‘true’ situation for a variety of reasons and over a range of content.
There is as lack of consensus as to whether or not this tendency to distort is a consistent trait that goes across
many situations, or a state that occurs only under certain circumstances ( Ziegler et al., 2012 ). In addition, the
issue of intentionality or conscious production of symptoms differentiates feigning symptoms from those pro-
duced through a dissociative process, where the symptoms arise as a result of unconscious processes. Although
the term ‘malingering’ is sometimes used less precisely, the concept of ‘faking bad’ is closely related, but without26 2. RESPONSE BIAS, MALINGERING, AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION: CORE ISSUES IN ASSESSMENT