fei75766_ch19_610-639.indd 636  02/06/20 01:53 PM
Part VI    Learning-Cognitive Theories636
make a choice (Kelly, 1980). We choose between alternatives within a con -
struct system that we ourselves have built. We make those choices on the 
basis of our anticipation of events. But more than that, we choose those alter -
natives that appear to offer us the greater opportunity for further elaboration 
of our anticipatory system. Kelly referred to this view as the elaborative choice;  
that is, in making present choices, we look ahead and pick the alternative that 
will increase our range of future choices.
Kelly adopted a teleological  as opposed to a causal view of human 
personality. He repeatedly insisted that childhood events per se do not 
shape current personality. Our present construction of past experiences may 
have some influence on present behavior, but the influence of past events is 
quite limited. Personality is much more likely to be guided by our present antic -
ipation of future events. Kelly’s fundamental postulate—the one on which all 
corollaries and assumptions stand—is that all human activity is directed by the 
way that we anticipate events (Kelly, 1955). There can be no question, then, 
that Kelly’s theory is essentially teleological.
Kelly emphasized conscious processes  more than unconscious ones. 
However, he did not stress conscious motivation  because motivation plays 
no part in personal construct theory. Kelly speaks of levels of cognitive 
awareness. High levels of awareness refer to those psychological processes 
that are easily symbolized in words and can be accurately expressed to 
other people. Low-level processes are incompletely symbolized and are dif -
ficult or impossible to communicate.
Experiences can be at low levels of awareness for several reasons. First, 
some constructs are preverbal because they were formed before a person 
acquired meaningful language, and, hence, they are not capable of being 
symbolized even to oneself. Second, some experiences are at a low level of 
awareness because a person sees only similarities and fails to make mean -
ingful contrasts. For example, a person may construe all people as trustwor -
thy. However, the implicit pole of untrustworthiness is denied. Because the 
person’s superordinate construction system is rigid, he or she fails to adopt 
a realistic construct of trustworthy/untrustworthy and tends to see the actions 
of others as completely trustworthy. Third, some subordinate constructs may 
remain at a low level of awareness as superordinate constructs are changing. 
For instance, even after a person realizes that not everyone is trustworthy, 
the person may be reluctant to construe one particular individual as being 
untrustworthy. This hesitation means that a subordinate construct has not yet 
caught up to a superordinate one. Finally, because some events may lie 
outside a person’s range of convenience, certain experiences do not become 
part of that person’s construct system. For example, such involuntary pro -
cesses as heartbeat, blood circulation, eye blink, and digestion are ordinarily 
outside one’s range of convenience; and one is usually not aware of them.
On the issue of biological versus social influences,  Kelly was inclined more 
toward the social. His sociality corollary assumes that, to some extent, we are 
influenced by others and in turn have some impact on them. When we accu -
rately construe the constructions of another person, we may play a role in a 
social process involving that other person. Kelly assumed that our interpretation Final PDF to printer