 25. Self‑Regulatory Processes, Stress, and Coping  545
Emotion
Self- regulatory models also have a place for 
emotion. Carver and Scheier (1990, 1998) 
suggested that the core of emotions arises 
through the operation of a second layer of 
feedback processes. This layer operates si -
multaneously with behavior guidance and 
in parallel to it. One way to characterize 
what this second process does is to say that 
it checks continuously on how well the be -
havior system is doing. Thus, the input for 
the affect-  creating loop reflects the rate of 
discrepancy reduction in the action system 
over time .
Velocity input does not create affect by it -
self, because a given rate of progress has dif -
ferent meanings in different circumstances. 
Rather, the input is compared against a ref -
erence value (cf. Frijda, 1986, 1988): a tar -
geted or desired (or expected) rate of action 
progress. Carver and Scheier (1990, 1998) 
suggested that the outcome of this compari -
son is reflected as a hazy sense of confidence 
or doubt, and as affective valence. Several 
studies have yielded evidence consistent with 
this view (for review, see Carver & Scheier, 
2013).
Earlier we said that action regulation in -
volves both approach and avoidance. The 
view of affect just described holds that posi -
tive feelings arise when an action system is 
doing well at doing what it is organized to 
do. Approach systems act to reduce discrep -
ancies. When they are making better than 
targeted progress toward desired goals, posi -
tive affect arises. When progress is not sat -
isfactory, affect turns more negative. Avoid -
ance systems act to enlarge  discrepancies. If 
avoidance systems are doing well at that— 
keeping the person distant from threats— 
positive affect should arise. If they are doing 
poorly, affect should be negative.
This much would seem to be the same 
across the two types of systems. On the 
other hand, there is also a difference in the 
specific affects involved (Carver & Scheier, 
1998). Drawing in part on work by Higgins 
(1987, 1996), we think that an affect dimen -
sion relating to approach runs (in its purest 
form) from depression to elation (via anger 
and excitement; Carver, 2004). An affect 
dimension relating to avoidance runs (in its 
purest form) from fear to relief or content -ment (for more on this and other issues con -
cerning affect, see Carver, 2003; Carver & 
Scheier, 2013).
The Interface between Affect and Action
The two-layer viewpoint just outlined im -
plies a natural relation between affect and 
action; that is, if the input function of the 
affect loop is a sensed rate of progress of ac -
tion, the output function of the affect loop 
must be a change in rate of that action. 
Thus, the affect loop has a direct influence 
on what occurs in the action loop.
Some changes in rate output are straight -
forward. If you are lagging behind, you try 
harder. If you are way ahead of schedule, 
you might reduce your effort (Thürmer, 
Scheier, & Carver, 2020). Other chang -
es are less straightforward. The rates of 
many “behaviors” are defined not by pace 
of physical action but in terms of choices 
among potential actions, or entire programs 
of action. For example, increasing your rate 
of progress on a project at work may mean 
choosing to spend a day working rather 
than relaxing with family and friends. In -
creasing your rate of being kind means 
choosing to do an act that reflects kindness, 
when an opportunity arises. Thus, change 
in rate must often be translated into other 
terms, such as concentration, or allocation 
of time and effort.
Confidence and  Doubt
In describing the origin of affect earlier, we 
suggested that one mechanism yields two 
subjective readouts: affect, and a sense of 
confidence versus doubt. These readouts are 
intertwined. Thus, what we have said about 
affect applies equally well to the vague sense 
of confidence and doubt that also accompa -
nies action.
This hazy sense of confidence or doubt 
does not operate in a psychological vacuum, 
however. When people experience adversity 
in trying to move toward goals, they some -
times interrupt themselves and assess more 
deliberatively the likelihood of a successful 
outcome (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990, 
1998). In doing this, people presumably use 
memories of prior outcomes in similar situa -
tions, while considering such possibilities as 