 26. Naturalizing the Self 565
Self- representations can vary in how ab -
stract they are. At the most specific level are 
personal or autobiographical memories, such 
as “I remember feeling shy when I was with 
this person,” which are related to episodic 
memory. At the next level are semantic rep -
resentations or generalized knowledge about 
the self, such as “I am a shy person.” Finally, 
at the most abstract or conceptual level are 
meta-  theories about oneself such as growth 
mindset (Dweck, 1999) and personal narra -
tives (McAdams, Chapter 5, this volume; Mc -
Adams, 2013; McLean & Lilgendahl, 2018).
Both self-  awareness (“I”) and self- 
representations (“Me”) have been concep -
tualized as individual-  difference variables 
(although, as noted below, the basic capac -
ity for self-  awareness and self-  representation 
is assumed to be common to all humans). 
For example, people differ in the degree 
to which they are chronically self-aware, 
and focus attention on themselves (Carver 
& Scheier, 1998). Similarly, people’s self- 
representations (the “Me”) vary in content, 
valence, structure, and complexity. Individ -
ual differences in the descriptive content of 
the Me—some people see themselves as shy 
and others outgoing, some as anxious and 
others calm, and so on—are the essence of 
personality self-  reports, and predict a wide 
range of real-world outcomes (e.g., Roberts, 
Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007).
Each self-  representation, as well as the 
collective set of representations character -
izing a person’s self-  concept, can vary in 
valence, or social desirability. A person 
who sees him- or herself as shy, cruel, in -
considerate, anxious, and unimaginative 
would have a more negatively valenced set 
of self-  representations than a person who 
sees him- or herself as outgoing, kind, con -
siderate, calm, and imaginative. Some re -
searchers have argued that individual dif -
ferences in self-  esteem reflect the aggregated 
valence of people’s domain-  specific self- 
representations. For example, when one per -
ceives oneself as shy and considers shyness 
to be a negative trait, one will have a more 
negative self-  evaluation (e.g., “I feel bad 
about myself because I am shy, and shyness 
is a bad thing”). When such negative self- 
representations permeate the self-  concept, 
low self-  esteem is likely to result. Longitu -
dinal studies have demonstrated that low self- esteem prospectively predicts antisocial 
behavior, depression, relationship problems, 
lower occupational status, and other aspects 
of psychosocial functioning (Cameron & 
Granger, 2019; Mier & Ladny, 2018; Orth, 
Robins, & Widaman, 2012; Orth & Rob -
ins, 2019; Trzesniewski et al., 2006). Thus, 
both the content and the valence of individu -
als’ self-  representations have important con -
sequences for a wide range of outcomes.
Furthermore, there are individual differ -
ences in the structure of self-  representations: 
One person may associate “shyness” with 
being quiet, reserved, and polite, whereas 
another person may associate “shyness” with 
being anxious, fearful, and defensive. Con -
sequently, the two networks of activation 
will result in distinct patterns of behavior 
when the concept of “shyness” is salient due 
to the structure of this self-  representation 
(McConnell, 2011).
Finally, there are individual differences 
in the complexity of self-  representations. 
Higher self-  complexity, or self-  concept dif -
ferentiation,  refers to variability in self- 
representations across different social roles 
or contexts. For example, someone high in 
self- concept differentiation might see him -
self as “adventurous and extraverted” with 
friends but “risk-  averse and introverted” 
with his parents, whereas someone low in 
self- concept differentiation might see him -
self as “adventurous and extraverted” in all 
social contexts (Donahue, Robins, Roberts, 
& John, 1993). Individuals with high levels 
of self-  concept differentiation tend to exhib -
it worse psychological adjustment and men -
tal health, demonstrating the importance of 
having an integrated, rather than fragment -
ed, sense of self (Bleidorn & Ködding, 2013; 
Donahue et al., 1993).
In conclusion, complex self processes de -
rive largely from more low-level processes, 
namely, the capacity to form stable self- 
representations (the “Me”) and an ongo -
ing sense of self-  awareness (the “I”) that 
focuses attention on discrepancies between 
actual and ideal identities. Although all 
typically developing humans have stable 
self- representations and a sense of self- 
awareness, there are meaningful individual 
differences in both capacities, and these in -
dividual differences are linked to a number 
of important psychosocial outcomes.