Haidt introduced a new measure of the moral intuitions that underlie his model; however, his review does not
address the wealth of contemporary instruments for measuring individual differences in moral tendencies.
Indeed, with the notable exception of Chapter 3 in Peterson and Seligman (2004) , there has been no systematic
review of contemporary measurement models for individual differences in moral predispositions. The present
chapter addresses this deficit by reviewing major contemporary measures of moral personality.
MEASURES REVIEWED HERE
Our review focuses on three dominant, contemporary lines of measurement for the moral personality: (i) the
Schwartz Value Survey (SVS); (ii) Peterson and Seligman’s Values in Action measure (VIA); and (iii) Haidt’s
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). The SVS is the most commonly used, broad-band measure of individ-
ual differences in moral characteristics. The VIA questionnaire and the MFQ are examples of recently developed,
novel research programs examining morally-relevant constructs as individual differences, with the main goal of
understanding how people differ in their overall patterns of moral behavior ( Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme,
Meindl, & Helzer, 2014 ). We also include several alternatives to the SVS measure. Scales/measures reviewed in
this chapter include:
1.Study of Values ( Kopelman, Rovenpor, & Guan, 2003 )
2.Virtues Scale ( Cawley, 1997; Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000 )
3.Value Survey ( Schwartz, 1992 )
4.Portrait Values Questionnaire ( Schwartz, 2012 )
5.Values in Action Questionnaire ( Peterson & Seligman, 2004 )
6.Moral Foundations Questionnaire ( Graham et al., 2011 )
OVER VIEW OF THE MEASURES
The original Allport and Vernon (1931) Study of Values (SOV) was revised in 1951 and 1960; however out-
dated item content and wording, norms, and psychometric information; statistical unsuitability of SOV scale
scores for many psychometric purposes; and unexamined validity of the original Spranger model ultimately com-
bined to render this instrument problematic for contemporary use. Although the third edition of the SOV was
the third most frequently cited non-projective personality measure, and the fifth most frequently cited personality
measure by 1970 ( Kopelman et al., 2003 ), it was rarely cited at all by the 1980s. To revive the instrument,
Kopelman et al. (2003) published a fourth edition of the SOV, in which they updated 15 of the original 45 items.
These item changes fell into three categories: ‘gender-inclusive wording, expanded religious inclusiveness, and
updated cultural conventions’ (p. 206).
Cawley et al. (2000) developed the Virtues Scale (VS) as an antidote to personality psychology’s exclusion of
evaluative traits such as morality. They viewed this exclusion as paradoxical, in light of the inclusion in the Big
Five of evaluative traits such as Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Cawley et al. cited Allport’s (1937) exclu-
sion of character from personality, as well as Allport and Odbert’s (1936) exclusion of evaluative trait terms from
their lexically derived list of trait terms, as influencing psychology to ‘turn away from virtue.’ They intended
their VS as an empirical tool with which ‘to reintroduce the concept of virtue into modern psychology’ (p. 1001).
Paradoxically, Cawley et al. also adopted Allport and Odbert’s (1936) lexical approach to identify (moral) trait
terms. Thus, the Cawley et al. goal was to develop an individual differences measure of virtue that would permit
and encourage empirical exploration of virtue as a psychological concept. In particular, they hoped that their VS
could be used to clarify relationships among virtue, personality, and moral development. The VS includes 140
self-report items, each of which in turn includes three statements reflecting what a person is, what a person does,
and how a person is viewed by others with respect to a particular virtue. The virtue items define the four virtue
subscales of Empathy, Order, Resourceful, and Serenity.
Schwartz & Bilsky (1987) introduced a model containing seven universal motivational domains of values:
Enjoyment, Security, Achievement, Self-Direction, Restrictive-Conformity, Prosocial, and Social Power. Each
domain (except Social Power) included at least one of the 36 values previously proposed by Rokeach (1973) .
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) maintained Rokeach’s distinction between terminal and instrumental values, and
they assumed that the seven ‘motivational domains’ (including Maturity but not Social Power) would relate in a506 18. MEASURES OF VALUES AND MORAL PERSONALITY
V. VICES AND VIRTUES