conceptualizes hope as a cognitive construct. This comprises individuals’ ability to work to personally important
goals ( Snyder, 1994; Snyder, Rand, & Sigmon 2002; Weis & Speridakos, 2012 ).
To assess hope, Snyder et al. (1991) constructed the Adult Hope Scale (AHS), consisting of four statements
designed to reflect agency, four statements designed to reflect pathways, and four unscored ‘filler’ items, with
which respondents indicate their extent of agreement. The reliability and validity of the SHS is backed by much
research. In addition, the SHS is associated with multiple meaningful psychological and physical variables.
A large body of evidence supports the reliability and validity of the SHS as a measure of dispositional hope, and
connects hope to a host of meaningful psychological and physical variables (see Snyder, 2002 ;Snyder et al.,
2001). Indeed, some suggest the SHS has the most construct and external validity of any measure of hope.
Empirical research supports Snyder et al.’s (1991) bidimensional model of hope. Factor analyses of the SHS
have revealed two distinct factors reflecting agency and pathways that are positively correlated, with the typical
magnitude of correlation being about .40 ( Snyder et al., 2001 ). Consistent with the notion of correlated factors,
confirmatory factor analyses have shown that responses to the SHS are accurately represented in terms of an
overarching higher-order hope construct defined by the agency and pathways subtraits ( Babyak, Snyder, &
Yoshinoba 1993; Bryant & Cvengros, 2004; Rand, 2009 ). Thus, researchers often use SHS total score as a unitary
measure of hope (e.g., Snyder et al., 1991 ).
Another body of research on the construct of hope is that of Dufault and Martocchio (1985) , as constructed by
Herth (1991) in the field of nursing research. They define hope as ‘a multidimensional dynamic life force charac-
terized by a confident yet uncertain expectation of achieving a future good which is realistically possible and
personally significant’ ( Dufault & Martocchio, 1985 , p. 380). Hope is assumed to include two spheres /C0generalized
hope, ‘an intangible umbrella that protects hoping persons by casting a positive glow on life’ ( Dufault &
Martocchio, 1985 , p. 380), and particularized hope, which concerns a specific outcome or hope object /C0which
include affective, behavioral, cognitive, affiliative, temporal, and contextual components.
To operationalize the constructs in Dufault and Martocchio’s (1985) model, Herth (1991) constructed the Herth
Hope Scale (HHS), consisting of 30 statements designed to tap three factors: Temporality and Future (the perceived
likelihood of attaining the desired outcome), Positive Readiness and Expectancy (feelings of confidence), and
Interconnectedness (the awareness of interdependence between self and others). With the HHS, respondents indi-
cate degree of agreement with each statement. Despite the underlying multidimensional model, researchers often
treat the HHS as measuring a single global construct. Although there are other existing models of hope, including
those of Beck (1993) ,Nunn and colleagues (1996) ,Hinds (1984) ,Nowotny (1989) ,Post-White, Ceronsky, and
Kreitzer (1996) , and Staats and Stassen (1985) , the conceptual models underlying Snyder et al.’s (1991) and Herth’s
(1991) instruments have been used most often in the empirical literature. More recently, interest has shifted toward
the development of context-dependent measures /C0like the Snyder State Hope Scale ( Snyder et al., 1996 ) and the
Work Hope Scale (Juntunen & Wettersten, 2006) to assess more transitory states of hope.
Optimism, in comparison, reflects a generalized positive expectancy for future outcomes. Although numerous
models of optimism have been developed (e.g., Chang, 2001 ;Colligan, Offord, Malinchoc, Schulman, & Seligman
1994;Dember, Martin, Hummer, Howe, & Melton 1989 ;Gillham, 2000 ;Levy, 1985 ;Malinchoc, Offord, & Colligan
1995), the most dominant theoretical orientation has undoubtedly been Scheier and Carver’s (1985) . In their origi-
nal conceptualization, Scheier and Carver (1985) defined optimism as a stable predisposition to ‘believe that good
rather than bad things will happen’ (p. 219). Thus, as opposed to hope, optimism was originally conceptualized
as a unitary trait representing a bipolar continuum, with optimism and pessimism.
To assess dispositional optimism, Scheier and Carver (1985) constructed the Life Orientation Test (LOT) con-
sisting of four statements designed to reflect optimism, four statements designed to reflect pessimism, and four
unscored ‘filler’ items, with which respondents indicate their extent of agreement. A large body of evidence sup-
ports the reliability and validity of the LOT as a measure of dispositional optimism, and connects optimism to a
variety of important psychological and physical outcomes (see Scheier & Carver, 1992 ). Although early critics
(e.g., Smith, Pope, Rhodewalt, & Poulton 1989 ) argued that the LOT is better conceived as a measure of neuroti-
cism rather than optimism, later evidence has supported the discriminant validity of the LOT as distinct from
general negative affectivity (e.g., Bryant & Baxter, 1997 ;Mroczek, Sprio, Aldwin, Ozer, & Bosse 1993 ;Scheier
et al., 1994 ). Indeed, far more evidence supports the construct validity and cross-sample generalizability of the
LOT than exists for any other existing measure of optimism.
Subsequent conceptual and empirical work led to the refinement of the original LOT. In particular, Scheier
et al. (1994) identified two LOT items that seem explicitly to reflect positive reinterpretation as a coping strategy,
rather than the expectation of positive outcomes per se. Because including these two problematic items in the
LOT might inflate the relationship between optimism and positive reinterpretation ( Affleck & Tennen, 1996 ),49 OVERVIEW OF THE MEASURES
II. EMOTIONAL DISPOSITIONS