544 v. AFFECTI vE PROCESSES
Feedback Processes and  Self‑Regulation
Goals give us something to aim for, but 
how should we think about the mechanics 
of reaching them? We have found it useful 
to think about goals as reference values for 
feedback processes. A feedback loop  (Miller, 
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973) 
is generally seen as consisting of an input, a 
reference value, a comparator function, and 
an output. The input  is a source of informa -
tion about a current condition—  a percep -
tion. The reference value  is a desired or in -
tended condition—  a goal. The comparator 
function  compares input to reference value, 
with one of two outcomes: Either the values 
are discriminably different from each other 
or they are not.
The output function can be thought of as 
behavior (though sometimes the behavior is 
internal). If the comparison yields “no dif -
ference,” the output stays as it was: no out -
put, or output ongoing at its current level. 
If the comparison yields “discrepancy,” the 
output function changes.
There are two kinds of feedback loops, 
which have different effects (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998). In a discrepancy-  reducing 
loop,  the output acts to diminish any differ -
ence between the reference value (standard 
of comparison) and the input. The attempt 
to make input match the standard can be in -
terpreted as an attempt to approach or attain 
a desired goal. In a discrepancy-  enlarging 
loop, the reference value is not one to match, 
but one to avoid. Values to be avoided might 
include pain, interpersonal rejection, and 
parking tickets. A discrepancy-  enlarging 
loop senses present conditions, compares 
them to the to-be-  avoided value, and tries 
to keep the present condition away from the 
comparison point.
Discrepancy-  enlarging processes are often 
constrained in some way by discrepancy- 
reducing processes (Carver, Lawrence, & 
Scheier, 1999; Carver & Scheier, 1998). To 
put it differently, avoidance often segues 
into a compatible act of approach (a pattern 
often called active avoidance ).
Hierarchical  Organization
Goals differ in their level of abstraction 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973). A man might have the goal, at a fairly high 
level of abstraction, of being a good father. 
He may also have the goal, at a lower level of 
abstraction, of taking his son to soccer prac -
tice. The first goal is to be a particular kind 
of person,  the second is to complete particu -
lar kinds of action . There are also goals even 
more concrete than the latter one, for exam -
ple, the goal of turning the wheel to park the 
car. Such goals are closer to specifications of 
individual acts than was the second, which 
was more a summary statement about the 
desired outcome of intended action patterns.
These examples of concrete goals link to 
the earlier example of an abstract goal, mak -
ing the point that goals can be organized in a 
hierarchy. Long ago, William Powers (1973) 
made the argument that feedback loops un -
derlying behavior are organized that way. 
He proposed that the output of a high-level 
loop consists of resetting reference values 
at the next lower level. To put it differently, 
high-order systems “behave” by providing 
goals to the systems just below them.
Powers said little about the levels of most 
interest to personality psychologists, except 
to suggest labels for several levels whose 
existence makes intuitive sense. Programs  
are activities involving conscious decisions 
at various points. Sequences,  the next level 
down, are sets of acts that run off autono -
mously, once cued. Above programs are 
principles,  abstract qualities that are imple -
mented by programs.
The idea of hierarchical organization has 
some implications that have been widely ad -
opted in today’s psychology. For example, 
moving toward a lower goal can contribute 
to attaining a higher goal (or even several 
at once). It implies that a given higher goal 
often can be attained by diverse action pos -
sibilities at lower levels. Thus, people some -
times shift radically the way in which they 
try to reach a goal, when the goal itself has 
not changed. The notion of hierarchical or -
ganization also implies that a given lower-
level action can be done in the service of 
diverse higher-  level goals. Thus, a given act 
can have different meanings, depending on 
its purpose.
Another point implied by a hierarchy is 
that goals differ in importance. The higher 
in the hierarchy, the more fundamental is 
the goal to the overriding sense of self.