374 Iv. COGNITI vE AND M OTIvATIONAL P ROCESSES
in terms of the variability of performance 
across time: To the extent that the mind 
is noisy, higher levels of variability almost 
necessarily result (Slifkin & Newell, 1998). 
If the information processing operations of 
neurotic people are noisier, then, we might 
expect higher levels of reaction time vari -
ability across trials of a task. Robinson 
and Tamir (2005) investigated these ideas 
in three studies in which participants were 
asked to categorize presented stimuli as 
quickly as possible. Neuroticism did not 
tend to predict average reaction times (RTs), 
but it did tend to predict the variability of 
RTs across trials. Moreover, these relation -
ships became stronger when researchers 
controlled for average categorization speed. 
Thus, there is some indication that neurotic 
people have noisier or more variable minds 
in a basic cognitive sense.
In the Robinson and Tamir (2005) stud -
ies, neurotic people had more variable RTs, 
but their average response time was not 
slower. This interesting pattern of findings 
suggests that neurotic people may tend to 
compensate for their lapses of attention on 
some (slower) trials with more vigorous re -
sponses on other (faster) trials. Just such a 
multiprocess result was reported by Bresin, 
Robinson, Ode, and Leth-  Steensen (2011), 
who found that neurotic people are both 
more “driven” on their fast trials and more 
“distracted” on their slow trials, as reflected 
in the ex-  Gaussian parameters of m (mu) and 
t (tau), respectively. Thus, the noise charac -
teristic of neuroticism appears to have a par -
ticular ex-  Gaussian signature.
Cognition as  a Moderator of  Neuroticism–
Outcome  Relationships
Neuroticism is a problematic trait, but it 
need not always be. Just as psychotherapy 
can mitigate some of the negative conse -
quences of neuroticism (Sauer-  Zavala et 
al., 2017), cognitive processing tendencies 
can render it more or less likely that one’s 
neuroticism level will result in neuroticism- 
consistent outcomes (Robinson & Gordon, 
2011). Two pertinent lines of research are 
highlighted here.
Buddhist thinking contends that orienting 
to the present can offer a respite for distress- prone people (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 
2007). Consistent with this idea, one set of 
studies showed that neuroticism predicted 
anger (Study 1) and depression (Study 2) to 
a lesser extent among participants higher in 
dispositional mindfulness (Feltman, Robin -
son, & Ode, 2009). In fact, neurotic people 
who were mindful were not particularly de -
pressed at all. Similar mitigating influences 
have been found for the variable of encoding 
speed, measured in RT tasks (Robinson & 
Clore, 2007). In these studies, neuroticism 
predicted somatic distress, negative affect, 
and neurotic behaviors primarily among 
people slow to assign meaning to events as 
they occur. Thus, paying attention to what is 
actually happening, in the current moment, 
appears to be beneficial at higher levels of 
neuroticism.
By contrast, carrying the past into 
the present—  in the form of cognitive 
perseveration—  appears to exacerbate the in -
fluence of neuroticism. In a series of studies, 
Robinson, Wilkowski, Kirkeby, and Meier 
(2006) measured perseveration in terms 
of tendencies to be faster when responses 
were repeated rather than switched across 
consecutive trials of a categorization task. 
Such perseverative tendencies are indicative 
of, or facilitate, habit formation (Norman 
& Shallice, 1986). As hypothesized, people 
more prone to perseveration were also more 
“traited” with respect to their neuroticism 
levels. Specifically, the trait of neuroticism 
predicted relevant outcomes (e.g., neurotic 
behavior) to a greater extent at higher levels 
of perseveration. These results suggest that 
we could help neurotic people by reducing 
their perseverative thinking tendencies, if 
they have them (Robinson & Gordon, 2011).
Finally, I highlight a research direction 
that should be of interest to both person -
ality and social psychologists. As is well 
known, Mischel (1968) critiqued the idea 
of personality traits by stating that behav -
ior seems to depend primarily on the situ -
ation. This viewpoint eventually became a 
personality theory when it was suggested 
that personality could be likened to if–then 
(situation–  behavior) profiles that differ 
from person to person (Mischel & Shoda, 
1995). For example, aggression might pri -
marily vary by frustration for one person 