the the high or low probabilistic forecasts decrease the in behavioral economic game % of behavioral game participants voting in each *election" fafter seeing probabilistic forecasts (left) and vote share projections (right)
Before each round, respondents saw probabilistic forecasts and vote share projections for their team. Sometimes these numbers were closer to 50-50, sometimes they depicted large margins or high odds. The exact numbers were selected based on random assignment, though both vote share and probability for a team had to be either below or above 50% – for example, a team might be assigned a projected 56% of the vote and a 63% chance of winning.
Results showed that probabilistic forecasts with higher odds of one candidate winning resulted in people not expending resources necessary to cast a vote in the game. In contrast, the size of vote share projections had no detectable effect on voting in the game.
the the high or low probabilistic forecasts decrease  | the in behavioral economic game  | % of behavioral game participants voting in each *election" fafter  | seeing probabilistic forecasts (left) and vote share projections (right)  | Response to probabilities  | Response to vote share  | 80  | 80  | 75  | 75  | 70  | 70  | 65  | 65  | 60  | 60  | 0.1  | 0.2 0.3  | 0.4  | 0.5  | 2.5  | 5.0  | 7.5  | 10.0  | Even  | Even  | Lopsided  | Lopsided  | Distance from even fodds (5)  | Distance from even vote share  | presented to participant  | (50%) presented to participant  | Source: Pew Research Center analysis of behavioral economic online game,  | conducted via a Qualtrics panel, March 2017 Estimates not weighted  | PEW RESEARCH CENTER 