control. in contrast to normally-developing subjects, those with autism showed little sts or ffa activation, and less mpfc and amygdala activation. activity in extrastriate regions v3 and lo was identical across the two groups, suggesting intact lower-level visual processing in the subjects with autism. the study also reported less functional connectivity between sts and v3 in the autism group. however decreased temporal correlation between activity in sts and v3 would be expected simply from the lack of an evoked response in sts to intent-laden animations in subjects with autism. a more informative analysis would be to compute functional connectivity after regressing out evoked responses from all-time series. a subsequent study, using the incongruent/congruent gaze-shift paradigm described above, found that in high-functioning adults with autism, posterior sts (psts) activation was undifferentiated while they watched a human shift gaze toward a target and then toward adjacent empty space. the lack of additional sts processing in the incongruent state may suggest that these subjects fail to form an expectation of what the actor should do given contextual information, or that feedback about the violation of this expectation does not reach sts. both explanations involve an impairment or deficit in the ability to link eye gaze shifts with intentional explanations. this study also found a significant anticorrelation between sts activation in the incongruent-congruent contrast and social subscale score on the autism diagnostic interview-revised, but not scores on the other subscales. an fmri study demonstrated that the right temporoparietal junction (rtpj) of higher-functioning adults with autism was not more selectively activated for mentalizing judgments when compared to physical judgments about self and other. rtpj selectivity for mentalizing was also related to individual variation on clinical measures of social impairment: individuals whose rtpj was increasingly more active for mentalizing compared to physical judgments were less socially impaired, while those who showed little to no difference in response to mentalizing or physical judgments were the most socially impaired. this evidence builds on work in typical development that suggests rtpj is critical for representing mental state information, irrespective of whether it is about oneself or others. it also points to an explanation at the neural level for the pervasive mind-blindness difficulties in autism that are evident throughout the lifespan. in schizophrenia the brain regions associated with theory of mind include the superior temporal gyrus (sts), the temporoparietal junction (tpj), the medial prefrontal cortex (mpfc), the precuneus, and the amygdala. the reduced activity in the mpfc of individuals with schizophrenia is associated with theory of mind deficit and may explain impairments in social function among people with schizophrenia. increased neural activity in mpfc is related to better perspective-taking, emotion management, and increased social functioning. disrupted brain activities in areas related to theory of mind may increase social stress or disinterest in social interaction, and contribute to the social dysfunction associated with schizophrenia. practical validity group member average scores of theory of mind abilities, measured with the reading the mind in the eyes test (rme), are possibly drivers of successful group performance. high group average scores on the rme are correlated with the collective intelligence factor c, defined as a group's ability to perform a wide range of mental tasks, a group intelligence measure similar to the g factor for general individual intelligence. rme is a theory of mind test for adults that shows sufficient test-retest reliability and constantly differentiates control groups from individuals with functional autism or asperger syndrome. it is one of the most widely accepted and well-validated tests for theory of mind abilities within adults. evolution the evolutionary origin of theory of mind remains obscure. while many theories make claims about its role in the development of human language and social cognition, few of them specify in detail any evolutionary neurophysiological precursors. one theory claims that theory of mind has its roots in two defensive reactions—immobilization stress and tonic immobility—which are implicated in the handling of stressful encounters and also figure prominently in mammalian childrearing practices. their combined effect seems capable of producing many of the hallmarks of theory of mind, such as eye-contact, gaze-following, inhibitory control, and intentional attributions. non-human an open question is whether non-human animals have a genetic endowment and social environment that allows them to acquire a theory of mind like human children do. this is a contentious issue because of the difficulty of inferring from animal behavior the existence of thinking or of particular thoughts, or the existence of a concept of self or self-awareness, consciousness, and qualia. one difficulty with non-human studies of theory of mind is the lack of sufficient numbers of naturalistic observations, giving insight into what the evolutionary pressures might be on a species' development of theory of mind. non-human research still has a major place in this field. it is especially useful in illuminating which nonverbal behaviors signify components of theory of mind, and in pointing to possible stepping points in the evolution of that aspect of social cognition. while it is difficult to study human-like theory of mind and mental states in species of whose potential mental states we have an incomplete understanding, researchers can focus on simpler components of more complex capabilities. for example, many researchers focus on animals' understanding of intention, gaze, perspective, or knowledge (of what another being has seen). a study that looked at understanding of intention in orangutans, chimpanzees, and children showed that all three species understood the difference between accidental and intentional acts. individuals exhibit theory of mind by extrapolating another's internal mental states from their observable behavior. so one challenge in this line of research is to distinguish this from more run-of-the-mill stimulus-response learning, with the other's observable behavior being the stimulus. recently, most non-human theory of mind research has focused on monkeys and great apes, who are of most interest in the study of the evolution of human social cognition. other studies relevant to attributions theory of mind have been conducted using plovers and dogs, which show preliminary evidence of understanding attention—one precursor of theory of mind—in others. there has been some controversy over the interpretation of evidence purporting to show theory of mind ability—or inability—in animals. for example, povinelli et al. presented chimpanzees with the choice of two experimenters from whom to request food: one who had seen where food was hidden, and one who, by virtue of one of a variety of mechanisms (having a bucket or bag over his head, a blindfold over his eyes, or being turned away from the baiting) does not know, and can only guess. they found that the animals failed in most cases to differentially request food from the "knower". by contrast, hare, call, and tomasello found that subordinate chimpanzees were able to use the knowledge state of dominant rival chimpanzees to determine which container of hidden food they approached. william field and sue savage-rumbaugh believe that bonobos have developed theory of mind, and cite their communications with a captive bonobo, kanzi, as evidence. in one experiment, ravens (corvus corax) took into account visual access of unseen conspecifics. the researchers argued that "ravens can generalize from their own perceptual experience to infer the possibility of being seen". evolutionary anthropologist christopher krupenye studied the existence of theory of mind, and particularly false beliefs, in non-human primates. keren haroush and ziv williams outlined the case for a group of neurons in primates' brains that uniquely predicted the choice selection of their interacting partner. these primates' neurons, located in the anterior cingulate cortex of rhesus monkeys, were observed using single-unit recording while the monkeys played a variant of the iterative prisoner's dilemma game. by identifying cells that represent the yet unknown intentions of a game partner, haroush & williams' study supports the idea that theory of mind may be a fundamental and generalized process, and suggests that anterior cingulate cortex neurons may act to complement the function of mirror neurons during social interchange.