Wayne N. Aspinall Colorado River Storage Act of 1956 What was the Colorado River Storage Act of 1956? The bill, sponsored by Wayne Aspinall and several western allies, called for damming several areas in the Upper Basin of the Colorado River.
Was the bill easy to pass?
Was the Colorado River Storage Act easy to pass?
Aspinall favored dams and water reclamation projects for several reasons: (1) the power they generated; (2) general recreational use; and (3) he felt the key to Western economic prosperity lay in obtaining permanent stored supply of water for economic purposes. In Aspinall's mind, Americans had many opportunities to enjoy scenic areas, so damming a few of them would not hurt the country. After his career, he boasted that he had brought over $1 billion worth of water projects to his district. According to his observers, he "never met a dam he didn't like." The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) came before Congress in the early to mid-1950s. The bill, sponsored by Wayne Aspinall and several western allies, called for damming several areas in the Upper Basin of the Colorado River. It included the Echo Park Dam proposal, located within Dinosaur National Monument. This became a volatile issue between environmentalists and water project advocates. Located just below the Green and Yampa Rivers, the proposed 525-foot (160 m) high dam would have created a 43,000 acre (170 km2) lake, flooding the Green River Canyon for 63 miles (101 km) and the Yampa River Canyon for 44 miles (71 km). However, because of increased environmental awareness around the country, the majority of the public opposed the project. In 1954 alone, the Department of the Interior received 20,000 pieces of mail about the plan, and one insider estimated the letters ran 80 to 1 in opposition of the project. In 1954 and 1955, environmentalists defeated the controversial aspects of the CRSP. In '55, Aspinall conceded that for the bill to pass, he needed to sacrifice the Echo Park plan. Several more compromises between the two sides gave way to the Colorado River Storage Act of 1956 (Public Law 485, in chapter 203), which called for the creation of other irrigation projects and several large dams, including the Glen Canyon Dam in Utah, which created Lake Powell. Other projects created from the CRSP included the Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Curecanti reservoirs. For his compromise, Aspinall gained five other reclamation projects and three hydroelectric dams for the Fourth District. The bill passed the House 256-136 in March 1956 and then-President Dwight Eisenhower signed it into law soon thereafter. CANNOTANSWER
This became a volatile issue between environmentalists and water project advocates.
Wayne Norviel Aspinall (April 3, 1896 – October 9, 1983) was an American lawyer and politician from Colorado. He is largely known for his tenure in the United States House of Representatives, serving as a Democrat from 1949–1973 from Colorado's Fourth District. Aspinall became known for his direction of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, of which he was the chairman from 1959–1973. Aspinall focused the majority of his efforts on western land and water issues.

His actions supporting resource development often drew the ire of the increasingly powerful environmental lobby in the 1960s. David Brower, a prominent executive director of the Sierra Club, said that the environmental movement had seen "dream after dream dashed on the stony continents of Wayne Aspinall."  The congressman returned the animosity, calling environmentalists "over-indulged zealots" and "aristocrats" to whom "balance means nothing."  This battle shaped Aspinall's congressional career.

Biography
Aspinall was born in Middleburg, Logan County, Ohio in 1896 and moved to Palisade, Colorado in 1904. He studied at the University of Denver until World War I, when he enlisted in the armed services (the Air Service of the Signal Corps). He returned to DU after his discharge and graduated in 1919. After several years of teaching around the state, he enrolled in law school in Denver and graduated in 1925. In 1930, he won a seat in the Colorado State House of Representatives, serving as Speaker in 1937 and 1938 before moving to the State Senate from 1939 to 1948. He served in World War II as a captain in Military Government during 1943 and 1944 as well. In 1948, he chose to run for national office, hoping for it to be a stepping stone to Colorado's governorship. However, he would stay in the U.S. House for 24 years.

Living on Colorado's Western Slope defined Aspinall's political ideology. His family had traditionally voted Republican, but the party's in-fighting in 1912 between Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft disillusioned Aspinall. However, despite becoming a Democrat, his rural roots shaped a relatively conservative philosophy. He believed in limited federal involvement in western land and water issues; to him, localities could better decide the uses of their resources. "When I was young…I lived outside the little town of Palisade, and the townspeople always seemed to call the shots. Then I moved to Palisade, and the bigger town of Grand Junction always seemed to call the shots. Then I went to the state Legislature, and the Eastern Slope…seemed to call the shots. And in Congress, the big metropolitan areas seemed to hold all the marbles."

His service in the U.S. House ended in 1972 with his loss in the Fourth District Democratic primary. However, Aspinall remained active in politics. He voiced his opinions on the need for the United States to become self-reliant for its energy needs, pushing oil shale development until his death in 1983.

Colorado history remembers Aspinall as one of the state's most influential politicians. Known as "The Chairman," he led the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee during a period that defined future water and land policy in the United States. Colorado governor Richard Lamm, a Democrat who had several ideological differences with Aspinall, remarked that "[N]o one in our history has done more to win Colorado a place at the table in Washington." He had a son, Owen Aspinall, who went on to become Governor of American Samoa.

Colorado River Storage Act of 1956
Aspinall favored dams and water reclamation projects for several reasons: (1) the power they generated; (2) general recreational use; and (3) he felt the key to Western economic prosperity lay in obtaining permanent stored supply of water for economic purposes. In Aspinall's mind, Americans had many opportunities to enjoy scenic areas, so damming a few of them would not hurt the country. After his career, he boasted that he had brought over $1 billion worth of water projects to his district. According to his observers, he "never met a dam he didn't like."

The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) came before Congress in the early to mid-1950s. The bill, sponsored by Wayne Aspinall and several western allies, called for damming several areas in the Upper Basin of the Colorado River. It included the Echo Park Dam proposal, located within Dinosaur National Monument. This became a volatile issue between environmentalists and water project advocates. Located just below the Green and Yampa Rivers, the proposed  high dam would have created a 43,000 acre (170 km2) lake, flooding the Green River Canyon for  and the Yampa River Canyon for . However, because of increased environmental awareness around the country, the majority of the public opposed the project. In 1954 alone, the Department of the Interior received 20,000 pieces of mail about the plan, and one insider estimated the letters ran 80 to 1 in opposition of the project.

In 1954 and 1955, environmentalists defeated the controversial aspects of the CRSP. In '55, Aspinall conceded that for the bill to pass, he needed to sacrifice the Echo Park plan. Several more compromises between the two sides gave way to the Colorado River Storage Act of 1956 (Public Law 485, in chapter 203), which called for the creation of other irrigation projects and several large dams, including the Glen Canyon Dam in Utah, which created Lake Powell. Other projects created from the CRSP included the Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Curecanti reservoirs. For his compromise, Aspinall gained five other reclamation projects and three hydroelectric dams for the Fourth District. The bill passed the House 256–136 in March 1956 and then-President Dwight Eisenhower signed it into law soon thereafter.

Frying Pan Arkansas Project of 1962
This plan, originally proposed in 1951, called for water diversion out of the Frying Pan and Roaring Fork Rivers on the Western Slope of Colorado to the Arkansas River, which flowed to a drier climate in the southeast part of the state. Because the Front Range (Boulder, Denver, Colorado Springs, and Pueblo) had a tremendous population advantage over the Western Slope, most of the state favored the project. Precedent for this maneuver had been set in 1937 with the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, which transferred Western Slope water to farmers in northeast Colorado.

Because he wanted to focus the House's efforts on the CRSP in the mid-'50s, Aspinall tabled Fry-Ark until 1960. However, when the issue resurfaced, Aspinall's opinion created controversy in his own district. Many of his constituents disapproved of sending their water to the Front Range. Aspinall, however, pushed the plan through because he realized that as a strong proponent of public water development, it seemed contradictory for him to block reclamation projects that benefited others. The bill passed in August 1962 when Aspinall attained a plan calling for the construction of a  reservoir on the Roaring Fork River near Aspen, which would compensate the Western Slope for its loss of water.

Fry-Ark demonstrated Aspinall's resolve to proliferate the amount of publicly funded water projects throughout the West, pitting him against the wishes of the majority of his constituents in the early 1960s. He quickly regained favor with them, however, when its precedent eventually brought more dams and reclamation projects back to the Fourth District.

Wilderness Act of 1964
One of the first comprehensive pieces of environmental legislation during the era faced a lengthy battle in Congress between Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and western politicians like Aspinall. When the Wilderness bill first came to the House in 1961, Aspinall employed various stall tactics to never allow the popular bill out of the Interior Committee. He continued this through 1962 and into '63, earning him the wrath of the country's environmentalists, preservationist politicians, and a large amount of the public.

However, in November 1963 Aspinall made a deal with John F. Kennedy. Aspinall greatly desired a public land review commission (see below), while one of Kennedy's primary goals was the passage of the Wilderness Act. Aspinall agreed to release the bill in exchange for the administration's cooperation with the land commission. (Also, Kennedy's assassination on November 22, 1963 created an ethos in Washington that essentially made Kennedy a martyr. Lyndon Johnson took up and pushed through many of his legislative goals because of public empathy.)

Before Aspinall let the Wilderness Act of 1964 pass, he dropped the original request of 55 million acres (220,000 km2) of protected wilderness to only 9.1 million acres (37,000 km2). He also inserted a clause, called the "1984 clause," that allowed mining interests to still have access to many of these areas until December 31, 1983. Despite these concessions, the House passed it 373-1 and Lyndon Johnson signed it in September. The act also refused to turn over exclusive power to the executive branch, keeping some power in Congress for public land oversight. Ironically, the National Wildlife Federation named Aspinall their "Conservationist of the Year" in 1964 for his role in the eventual passage of the bill.

Colorado River Basin Act of 1968 and the Central Arizona Project
From 1966 to 1968, Aspinall took on the final significant water project battle of his congressional career. The purpose of the Colorado River Basin Project, according to supporters, was to build dams to generate revenue and energy for communities in the Lower Basin of the Colorado River without using much of the Upper Basin's river water. The primary focus of the project was the Central Arizona Project (CAP). CAP supporters, among other demands, wanted to build two dams, one that would flood Grand Canyon National Monument and part of Grand Canyon National Park (Bridge Canyon Dam), with the other on the edge of the Grand Canyon (Marble Canyon Dam). Aspinall originally supported this, claiming it would generate revenue for all Colorado River Basin states. In turn, however, he demanded that his district receive five reclamation projects for his support. Several congressmen, including Arizona senator Carl Hayden, saw this as action as a move that held the state hostage, and many would come to resent Aspinall for it.

Environmentalists vehemently opposed the CAP because of its detriment to the scenery of the Grand Canyon. Aspinall would later say "We viewed the development of the river as the only reasonable, practicable, safe, and logical way for millions of Americans and visitors to enjoy the canyon bottom which to date so few have had an opportunity to visit or view."  However, during the debate, the Sierra Club mocked that philosophy, purchasing an ad in national newspapers in July 1966. "Should we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can get nearer the ceiling?" it asked.

Sensing that he couldn't break the stalemate, Aspinall dropped the Grand Canyon dams from the CRPB in late August 1967. The bill eventually passed in the middle of 1968, creating the Colorado River Basin Act. However, in exchange for this compromise, Aspinall did receive five projects for Colorado (the Dallas Creek, Animas-La Plata, West Divide, San Miguel, and Dolores projects).

Of those five, only two were eventually built (Dolores and Dallas Creek). The Animas-La Plata project is currently under construction, and is one of the last major water projects in the West. Jimmy Carter declared a "Hit List" in 1977 on what he felt was wasteful spending on "pork barrel" water projects, eliminating the other three (among others). Furthermore, no new major reclamation projects were approved during the rest of the era, partly because Aspinall's heavy-handed demands that constrained the legislation broke apart the western coalition of politicians that supported the construction of water projects.

Public Land Law Review Commission
Kennedy's concession in 1963 to enact the Wilderness Act gave Aspinall the go-ahead to organize his pet project, the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) in 1965. The PLLRC reviewed all federal regulations affecting the control and uses of the nation's public lands and recommended changes that would help the federal government manage these areas more efficiently. Aspinall served as the commission's chair for the entirety of its existence, from 1965 until 1970.

The final report came out on June 23, 1970. Titled "One Third of the Nation's Lands," it gave 137 recommendations to Richard Nixon and Congress. Among its suggestions: 
 States should have a greater say in how public lands are managed
 Congress should have greater say in the uses of public land because the executive branch exerted too much singular influence
 All public-land issues should be concentrated under a new Department of Natural Resources, with committees in the House and Senate
 The Secretary of the Interior's power to withdraw public lands from development without Congressional approval should be limited
 Regional mining, timber, and grazing needs should be supported to increase economic growth in local communities
 The federal government should help stimulate the oil shale industry

Environmentalists blasted its findings. The Sierra Club accused the study of being "oriented toward maximum immediate commercial exploitation..." predicated upon a world with an "ever-expanding economy and unlimited resources."  Others stated that the report only considered studies and opinions favorable to Aspinall's political ideology. Many citizens were also still unhappy with Aspinall for blocking the creation of the Redwood National Park in California for half of the decade until its passage in 1968, and they saw this as more evidence that he served as a mouthpiece for the extractive industries' interests in Congress.

Aspinall proposed HR 9211 in his final session in Congress to implement many of the PLLRC's recommendations, but it failed to pass. During the height of the environmental movement, many of these suggestions were unacceptable to the public. However, later bills spawned from the ideas in the PLLRC, such as the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.

1970 and 1972 Democratic primaries
After over two decades in office, the turbulent forces of the 1960s and early '70s caught up with Aspinall. With liberalism gaining strength throughout the country by protesting the Vietnam War and advocating civil rights for African Americans and equal rights for women, reformers gained control of the Democratic Party. They jumped on the opportunity to remove one of the party's most conservative members.

In 1970 a young Democrat named Richard Perchlik challenged Aspinall in the Fourth District Democratic primary. Although Aspinall won by over 11,000 votes in his first primary challenge since 1948, Perchlik's campaign portrayed Aspinall as old (74 at the time) and out of touch with the ideals of liberals on the war and the environment. The challenger also accused "The Chairman" of being too connected to the extractive special interests and railed against him for his role in what reformers viewed as a flawed seniority system in Congress.

Aspinall's friend and colleague, Democratic congressman Byron Rogers of Colorado's First District, did not survive 1970's primary season, however. A young liberal lawyer from Denver, Craig Barnes, defeated Rogers (although Barnes himself lost the general election). Rogers had a similar philosophy and legislative record to Aspinall, seemingly foreshadowing Aspinall's fate in 1972.

The degree to which Aspinall appreciated the challenge of liberal Democrats is debated. He did say that "this drive toward liberalism, organization of committees, etc., is causing me to wonder if I haven't reached the place where I should let some younger and more militant person take over."  However, he never altered his campaign message in 1972, even after the Republican-controlled Colorado General Assembly redrew the state's district lines to include largely liberal precincts in the Fourth District. "Wayne Aspinall represents all the interests because all the people have interest in our resources," his campaign said, continuing to target the miners, ranchers, and loggers that lived on the Western Slope. He never attempted to alter his message to assuage the concerns of his new liberal constituents.

His opponent in the 1972 Democratic primary, Alan Merson, employed the same strategy that Perchlik and Barnes used two years previously.  Merson attacked Aspinall for being slow to recognize developing energy problems, promoting policies that fed constant growth, building needless water projects, and being a tool of special interests. Merson received extensive external aid, accepting endorsements from The New York Times, Field and Stream, and even Reader's Digest. The environmental lobby provided most of the support to Merson's campaign, with $20,000 coming from the League of Conservation Voters. Environmental Action, having named Aspinall to their 1972 "Dirty Dozen" list of biggest congressional enemies to the environment, also endorsed Merson.

Using the young, liberal vote on the Front Range, Merson defeated Aspinall in the primary 53% to 47%. History credits Aspinall's loss to his age, the strength of the environmental issue in 1972, and the redistricting that cost "The Chairman" much of his conservative support on the Western Slope.

However, redistricting still favored Republicans, despite the liberal Merson's victory. Moving urban voters into the Fourth split the Democratic vote and consolidated Republican strength. Merson lost to James Paul Johnson, who had been Aspinall's unsuccessful Republican opponent in 1966, in the general election in November 1972.

Post-Congressional life
Aspinall stayed relatively active after leaving office in January 1973. He crossed party lines and endorsed Gerald Ford for president in 1976. He also pressed for further exploration of oil shale in the late 1970s, serving on the board of directors for the Paraho Oil Shale Demonstration, Inc., hoping to lead the country to an alternative energy source to end American reliance on oil during the energy crisis caused by the Arab Oil Embargo.

He proudly took part in the Sagebrush Rebellion, a western philosophy popular from 1979–1982 that attempted to reclaim some federally protected land for determination by states and local governments.

Aspinall resumed the practice of law, was a resident of Palisade, Colo., until his death there October 9, 1983; he was cremated, and his ashes were interred at Orchard Mesa Municipal Cemetery, Grand Junction, Colorado. The United States Post Office and Courthouse in Grand Junction was renamed the Wayne N. Aspinall Federal Building in 1972.

References

 Aspinall, Wayne N. Papers, Election Files and Grand Junction Office Files. 1948–1973. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries, Archives. Accessed February 27, 2006.
 Schulte, Steven C. Wayne Aspinall and the Shaping of the American West. Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2002.
 Sturgeon, Steven Craig. Wayne Aspinall and the Politics of Western Water. Doctoral Thesis. History, 1998, University of Colorado at Boulder. Directed by Prof. Patricia Nelson Limerick.

External links
 http://digital.library.du.edu/findingaids/view?docId=ead/m008.xml;query=;brand=default Guide to the Wayne Aspinall Papers at the University of Denver, retrieved 2014-09-25. 
 Biography at the US Congress
 

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The "Jimmy Kimmel test" is a political litmus test used in political discourse in the United States during 2017 efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act. First proposed by United States Senator Bill Cassidy, the test was used throughout 2017 to frame political debate over health care reform, and Cassidy's use of it in September 2017 prompted comedian and late-night talk show host Jimmy Kimmel to publicly attack a Senate health care bill co-sponsored by Cassidy. The resulting public debate contributed to the failure of the Senate bill.

Kimmel described the test as measuring whether, as a result of health care reform, a family would "be denied medical care, emergency or otherwise, because they can't afford it."

Background

Political efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act

The Affordable Care Act, commonly called the "ACA" or "Obamacare", was enacted by the 111th United States Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama in 2010. From 2011 to 2017, numerous attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act were made by Republicans opposed to the law, although none were successful before President Obama left office on January 20, 2017.

On March 6, 2017, House Republicans announced a proposed replacement for the Affordable Care Act, the American Health Care Act (AHCA). The bill was withdrawn on March 24, 2017, after it was certain that the House would fail to garner enough votes to pass it. The result was in-fighting within the Republican Party. However, deliberations on the American Health Care Act continued.

Birth of Jimmy Kimmel's son
William ("Billy") John Kimmel, the son of comedian and late-night talk show host Jimmy Kimmel, was born on April 21, 2017. The infant was born with a rare congenital heart defect, tetralogy of Fallot (TOF) with pulmonary atresia, which was first detected by a nurse who noticed his purplish appearance when he was three hours old. He underwent successful surgery at three days old.  Kimmel's show, Jimmy Kimmel Live!, was cancelled during the entire week of April 24 without public explanation so Kimmel could spend time with his family.

Creation of the Jimmy Kimmel test
Jimmy Kimmel returned to the air on May 1, 2017.  Kimmel chose to focus on his son's birth and health condition in his first episode back, inviting cardiac surgeon Dr. Mehmet Oz onto his show to explain his son's condition.  During the show's opening monologue, Kimmel referenced Congress' efforts to repeal parts of the 2010 Affordable Care Act, and the possibility that repeal would lead to individuals with pre-existing medical conditions losing their health insurance:

Kimmel's monologue received substantial attention in the news and on social media. Within 24 hours, video of the monologue was viewed over 14 million times and received over 230,000 reactions on Facebook. The video was retweeted by former President Obama and former Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.

On May 4, the House of Representatives passed the AHCA (which would repeal portions of the ACA), sending the bill to the Senate.  On Friday, May 5, United States Senator Bill Cassidy told CNN that he would decide whether he would support the AHCA based on whether it would "pass the Jimmy Kimmel test", which he described as measuring whether a child born with a pre-existing health condition would continue to receive health care regardless of cost. Following Cassidy's comments, Kimmel invited Cassidy onto his show to discuss the Senate version of the bill. Cassidy appeared on Jimmy Kimmel Live! via satellite on May 8, 2017. While interviewing Cassidy, Kimmel attempted to establish a clearer definition of the "Jimmy Kimmel test".

Cassidy responded that Kimmel was on the "right track", and then shifted the discussion to how to pay for insurance coverage.

Use in political discourse
The "Jimmy Kimmel test" was regularly mentioned by pundits and observers in 2017 during national conversation on health care. CNN analyst Chris Cillizza described the Jimmy Kimmel test as becoming "the health care fight's measuring stick."

In June 2017, the test was used to quickly frame debate over the Senate version of an Affordable Care Act repeal bill. Shortly after the bill was unveiled to the public by Senate leadership, reporters asked Cassidy if he believed the Senate repeal bill would pass the Jimmy Kimmel test. Cassidy replied that he believed that it would, but that he needed to read the full text of the bill.  

Multiple attempts to pass a Senate repeal bill in June and July 2017 failed.  Senate Republicans faced a September 30, 2017 deadline in order to pass an Affordable Care Act repeal using reconciliation, a process that would permit the Senate to pass legislation with only 51 votes.  On September 13, Cassidy and Sen. Lindsey Graham jointly proposed a new repeal bill, referred to as the Cassidy-Graham bill.  The Cassidy-Graham proposal would create a waiver system allowing states to opt out of Affordable Care Act requirements, which could result in patients with pre-existing conditions being charged higher insurance premiums in those states.  Discussion of the Cassidy-Graham bill quickly focused on whether the bill would pass the "Jimmy Kimmel test", with journalist and conservative commentator Jennifer Rubin writing on September 18 that Cassidy's bill "flunks his own Jimmy Kimmel test".  Kimmel retweeted Rubin's editorial, which prompted Cassidy to publicly declare his belief that the Cassidy-Graham bill would "absolutely" pass the Jimmy Kimmel test.

Cassidy's claim sparked a public debate between Kimmel and Cassidy over whether the Cassidy-Graham bill passed the Jimmy Kimmel test. On September 19, national news outlets reported that Jimmy Kimmel was preparing to comment on the Cassidy-Graham bill. During Jimmy Kimmel Live! later that evening, Kimmel openly attacked the Cassidy-Graham bill, and told his viewers that Cassidy "lied to [Kimmel's] face" when Cassidy promised Kimmel he would not support a bill that could not pass the Jimmy Kimmel test. In his monologue, Kimmel also joked that the Cassidy-Graham bill would pass a different Jimmy Kimmel test, in which your child could afford health care only if the father was named Jimmy Kimmel.

Cassidy responded on September 20 during interviews with MSNBC and CNN, insisting the Cassidy-Graham bill would pass the Jimmy Kimmel test and claiming that Kimmel didn't understand the bill.  Graham also attacked Kimmel, calling Kimmel's monologue "absolute garbage" and claiming that it was "inappropriate" for Kimmel to call Cassidy a liar.  Kimmel responded in another on-air monologue on the evening of September 20, demonstrating his understanding of the bill by describing projected consequences such as a $243 billion reduction in federal funding, the total elimination of federal funding after 2026, and the removal of obligations by health insurers to pay for essential health benefits.  

On September 21, President Donald Trump defended the Cassidy-Graham bill and its impact on individuals with pre-existing health conditions, which was seen as a sign of the influence the Kimmel-Cassidy dispute was having on the healthcare debate.  Vanity Fair described Trump's tweets as defending a "bill that failed the Jimmy Kimmel test."

Senator John McCain announced on September 22 that he would vote against the Cassidy-Graham bill, a move which was labeled likely to kill the bill and Republicans' ACA repeal efforts.  CNN analyst Bill Carter noted that Cassidy had dragged Kimmel into the debate by creating the "Jimmy Kimmel test", and said that if McCain's action does kill Republicans' repeal effort, Kimmel's opposition should be acknowledged as a legitimate factor in their failure.  In a nationwide poll conducted from September 22-25, 2017, voters were asked if they trusted Jimmy Kimmel or Republicans in Congress more on health care; 47% of respondents chose Kimmel while only 34% chose Republicans.

See also
 Healthcare reform in the United States

References

2017 controversies in the United States
2017 in American politics
American political catchphrases
Affordable Care Act Victoria v Commonwealth was an important decision of the High Court of Australia concerning the procedures in section 57 of the Constitution. The decision was one of several by the High Court following the 1974 joint sitting of the Australian Parliament. The High Court held, by majority, that one of the laws passed at the joint sitting - the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Act 1973  - was not valid because the required time had not elapsed between the Senate's first rejection of the law and its being passed a second time by the House of Representatives.

Background 
Section 57 of the Constitution provides the procedure for the breaking of deadlocks between the House of Representatives and the Senate:

During its first term in office, the Whitlam Government held a majority in the House of Representatives but not the Senate, which twice rejected 10 government bills. On 13 December 1973, the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill was passed by the House of Representatives and transmitted to the Senate. The government moved a motion to suspend the Standing Orders to allow the Bill to proceed to passage "without delay". The Senate did not pass the motion and instead adjourned debate to later in the day. One the resumption of debate, the Senate resolved to adjourn the debate to the next sitting day. The Senate then adjourned to a date to be fixed which, in due course, became 28 February 1974.

On 14 February 1974, the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck, prorogued the Parliament until 28 February 1974. Pursuant to the Senate's standing orders, all bills lapsed as a result of the prorogation, subject to the Senate resolving to take up the bill once more.

On 7 March 1974, the House of Representatives resolved to send a request to the Senate to resume reconsideration of the Bill. The Senate resumed consideration of the Bill on 19 March 1974 and ultimately rejected it on 2 April 1974.

On 8 April 1974, the House of Representatives again passed the Bill. On 10 April 1974, the Senate adjourned debate on the Bill for 6 months.

On 14 April 1974, the Governor-General dissolved both Houses, citing 6 bills which had been twice rejected by the Senate, including the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill. At the double dissolution election in May 1974, the Whitlam government was returned with a slightly reduced majority in the House of Representatives and still without a Senate majority. Following the Senate's further rejection of the bills used as justification for the double dissolution election, an historic joint sitting of the Commonwealth Parliament was convened in August 1974, at which all 6 of the rejected bills which had been cited for the double dissolution were passed.

Argument 
The states of Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia commenced proceedings challenging the validity of the Act. They argued that the Bill had been first rejected by the Senate on 2 April 1974 and that, as a result, the required 3 months had not passed before its second passage by the House of Representatives. Therefore, it was argued, the Bill was not one to which section 57 of the Constitution could apply.

The Commonwealth made several arguments in defence of the validity of the Act:
 that the adjournment of debate on 13 December 1973 was a rejection or failure to pass the law;
 that in determining whether the law was rejected or not passed, regard could be had to statements by Opposition senators about their intention to oppose the law;
 the interval of 3 months referred to in section 57 is calculated from the first passing of the law by the House of Representatives;
 the provisions of section 57 are merely directory, not mandatory;
 the issues are non-justiciable.

Decision 
All members of the Court wrote separate opinions. All members, other than Justice McTiernan, concluded that the Court had jurisdiction. By majority, the Court held that the Act was invalid as it had not met the requirements of section 57 and so should not have been considered and passed at the joint sitting.

Majority 
Chief Justice Barwick and Justices Gibbs, Stephen and Mason held the Act to be invalid. They rejected the Commonwealth's contention that the Senate had failed to pass the Bill when it adjourned on 13 December 1973. Barwick CJ held that the Senate will have failed to pass a bill where the time has come for it to "take a stand with respect to the Bill" and it "merely prevaricates". page 122 He concluded that such time had not been reached on 13 December 1973. pages 123-4 Justice Gibbs held that section 57 permitted the Senate a "reasonable time" to consider a bill transmitted by the House of Representatives and that it was "impossible to hold" that the Senate had failed to pass the Act on 13 December 1973. pages 148-9 Justice Stephen held that the Senate would not have failed to pass a bill as long as it was engaged in the normal process of deliberation upon proposed laws and the deliberative process was not being used for the ulterior purpose of delaying, rather than considering, the proposed law. page 171 Justice Mason also held the test to be one of reasonable time for the Senate to consider the law. page 186

Dissent 
Justices McTiernan and Jacobs dissented. Justice McTiernan held that the question of whether a law met the requirements of section 57 was a political question which could not be decided by the High Court. pages 135-137 Justice Jacobs considered the controversy to be justiciable and held that section 57 gives to the Senate a period of 3 months in which to pass the proposed law and, if it has not done so, then it has "failed to pass the law" with the period of 3 months to be calculated from when it was first open to the Senate to consider the law. pages 195-6

References 

High Court of Australia cases
1975 in Australian law
1975 in case law
Australian constitutional law