John O. Brennan Counterterrorism advisor to President Obama What did Brennan do as an advisor to Obama? In late 2008, Brennan was reportedly the top choice to become the next Director of the CIA in the incoming Obama administration. When did he begin in that position? President Obama then appointed him to be his Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, What else did he do? In August 2009, Brennan criticized some Bush-administration anti-terror policies, saying that waterboarding had threatened national security by increasing the recruitment of terrorists Did he have any notable moments under Obama? Brennan was present in the Situation Room in May 2011 when the United States conducted the military operation that killed Osama bin Laden. What else is significant? In an early December 2009 interview with the Bergen Record, Brennan remarked, "the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities have to bat 1.000 every day.
What is the result of this?
What was the result of John Brennan's remark "the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities have to bat 1,000 every day" during his interview with the Bergen Record in early December 2009?
In late 2008, Brennan was reportedly the top choice to become the next Director of the CIA in the incoming Obama administration. However, Brennan withdrew his name from consideration because of opposition to his CIA service under President George W. Bush and past public statements he had made in support of enhanced interrogation and the transfer of terrorism suspects to countries where they might be tortured (extraordinary rendition). President Obama then appointed him to be his Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the President's chief counterterrorism advisor and a position that did not require Senate confirmation.  In August 2009, Brennan criticized some Bush-administration anti-terror policies, saying that waterboarding had threatened national security by increasing the recruitment of terrorists and decreasing the willingness of other nations to cooperate with the U.S. He also described the Obama administration's focus as being on "extremists" and not "jihadists". He said that using the second term, which means one who is struggling for a holy goal, gives "these murderers the religious legitimacy they desperately seek" and suggests the US is at war with the religion of Islam.  In an early December 2009 interview with the Bergen Record, Brennan remarked, "the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities have to bat 1.000 every day. The terrorists are trying to be successful just once". At a press conference days after the failed Christmas Day bomb attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Brennan said U.S. intelligence agencies did not miss any signs that could have prevented the attempt but later said he had let the President down by underestimating a small group of Yemeni terrorists and not connecting them to the attempted bomber. Within two weeks after the incident, however, he produced a report highly critical of the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies, concluding that their focus on terrorist attempts aimed at U.S. soil was inadequate. In February 2010, he claimed on Meet the Press that he was tired of Republican lawmakers using national security issues as political footballs, and making allegations where they did not know the facts.  Brennan was present in the Situation Room in May 2011 when the United States conducted the military operation that killed Osama bin Laden. He called President Obama's decision to go forward with the mission one of the "gutsiest calls of any president in memory." In the aftermath of the operation, Brennan said that the U.S. troops in the raid had been "met with a great deal of resistance," and bin Laden had used a woman as a human shield. CANNOTANSWER
The terrorists are trying to be successful just once".
Information bias is a cognitive bias to seek information when it does not affect action. People can often make better predictions or choices with less information: more information is not always better.  An example of information bias is believing that the more information that can be acquired to make a decision, the better, even if that extra information is irrelevant for the decision.

Example

In an experiment , subjects considered this diagnostic problem involving fictitious diseases:

A female patient is presenting symptoms and a history which both suggest a diagnosis of globoma, with about 80% probability. If it isn't globoma, it's either popitis or flapemia. Each disease has its own treatment which is ineffective against the other two diseases. A test called the ET scan would certainly yield a positive result if the patient had popitis, and a negative result if she has flapemia. If the patient has globoma, a positive and negative result are equally likely. If the ET scan was the only test you could do, should you do it? Why or why not?

Many subjects answered that they would conduct the ET scan even if it were costly, and even if it were the only test that could be done. However, the test in question does not affect the course of action as to what treatment should be done. Because the probability of globoma is so high with a probability of 80%, the patient would be treated for globoma no matter what the test says. Globoma is the most probable disease before or after the ET scan.

In this example, we can calculate the value of the ET scan. Out of 100 patients, a total of 80 people will have globoma regardless of whether the ET scan is positive or negative. Since it is equally likely for a patient with globoma to have a positive or negative ET scan result, 40 people will have a positive ET scan and 40 people will have a negative ET scan, which totals to 80 people having globoma. This means that a total of 20 people will have either popitis or flapemia regardless of the result of the ET scan. The number of patients with globoma will always be greater than the number of patients with popitis or flapemia in either case of a positive or negative ET scan so the ET scan is useless in determining what disease to treat. The ET scan will indicate that globoma should be treated regardless of the result.

See also
 Shared information bias
 Cognitive psychology
 List of cognitive biases

References

Studies

Cognitive biases Yaqeen () is generally translated as "certainty", and is considered the summit of the many stations by which the path of walaya (sometimes translated as Sainthood) is fully completed. This is the repository of liberating experience in Islam. In relation to the exoteric religious life, certainty is the sister of religious life in its perfection (ehsân), that is, to say the adoration of Allah according to the visionary way; through this channel it is the pillar of Islam in the accomplishment of its external practices, as it is the foundation of faith (iman) in its internal dogma. It is, in fact, ihsân which gives the external religion its true meaning and the domain of faith its real values. It occurs in the Quran about certainty, "And worship your Lord until there comes to you the certainty". Certainty (yaqeen) comprises three degrees.

Stages

Ilm-ul-yaqeen (the knowledge of certainty)

The first degree is referred to by the name ‘ilm-ul-yaqeen (the knowledge of certainty), which means that certainty is the result of knowledge. At this degree the object of certainty is knowledge just as the aim of knowledge is certainty. Both together are in the soul uniquely, such that certainty is the first degree of spiritual life and the last of speculative experience. This particular degree of mystical yaqeen is the result of divine theophanies in act at the level of existence and also the result of theophanies of lights of nature at the gnostic level.

Ayn-ul-yaqeen (the vision of certainty)

The second degree of yaqeen is what one calls in Sufi terms ayn-ul-yaqeen (the vision of certainty), that is, certainty as a consequence of contemplation and vision. At this level, the object of certainty is present in front of the gnostic and is not only a speculative concept. Here knowledge becomes what one calls ilm-e-huzuri’’ (knowledge by Presence), and that is the second aspect of Certainty in the spiritual way and in liberating experience. By this kind of knowledge, the man of the Way is distinguished from philosophers and learned men. This particular degree of spiritual Certainty is the result of divine theophanies of Attributes at the level of existence.

Haqq-ul-yaqeen (the final level of certainty gained through experience)

Finally, the last degree of yaqeen is called haqq-ul-yaqeen (the level of certainty gained through experience), that is, certainty as supreme truth. Here, certainty has a particular coloring: it is the fruit of an all-embracing experience because the object of certainty is identical to the one who is experiencing it, knowledge being transformed into actual experience and actual experience into knowledge. At this stage, in fact, knowledge is not limited to the intellect, nor to the vision of the one who is contemplating it, it becomes one with the human being. This is the final phase of yaqeen'', the apotheosis of the spiritual and intellectual journey. This high degree of Sufi certainty is the effect of the Emanation of the divine Theophanies in Essence at its existential level and that of the diffusion of the Light of lights (Dazzling Irradiations) at the level of the theophanies of the gnostic.

See also

Baqaa
Ground Luminosity
Three Bodies
Nūr (Islam)

References

External links
Theophanies and Lights in the Thought of Ibn 'Arabi

Sufi philosophy
Islamic terminology In science, a null result is a result without the expected content: that is, the proposed result is absent. It is an experimental outcome which does not show an otherwise expected effect. This does not imply a result of zero or nothing, simply a result that does not support the hypothesis. 

In statistical hypothesis testing, a null result occurs when an experimental result is not significantly different from what is to be expected under the null hypothesis; its probability (under the null hypothesis) does not exceed the significance level, i.e., the threshold set prior to testing for rejection of the null hypothesis. The significance level varies, but common choices include 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01.

As an example in physics, the results of the Michelson–Morley experiment were of this type, as it did not detect the expected velocity relative to the postulated luminiferous aether. This experiment's famous failed detection, commonly referred to as the null result, contributed to the development of special relativity. The experiment did appear to measure a non-zero "drift", but the value was far too small to account for the theoretically expected results; it is generally thought to be inside the noise level of the experiment.

Scientific journals for null results
There are now several scientific journals dedicated to the publication of negative or null results, including the following:
 Journal of Negative Results in Biomedicine
 Journal of Pharmaceutical Negative Results
 Journal of Unsolved Questions

While it is not exclusively dedicated to publishing negative results, BMC Research Notes also publishes negative results in the form of research or data notes.

See also
Aether theories
Imponderable fluid
 Noise (electronics)
Publication bias

References

Design of experiments
Logic and statistics