[lemma=","] [!lemma=the] [□] □ □
[lemma=","] [!lemma=the] [□=□] □ □
[lemma=","] [!lemma=the] [!□] □ □
As a result , in order to secure low rates of inflation , a European central bank may have to resort to relatively high levels of unemployment because it will lack the effective signaling process provided by a continent-wide system of wage coordination . It may seem surprising , in this perspective , that european central banks usually do not aknowledge unemployment as one of the economic fundamentals determining the stability of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement and at any rate reject the idea that it should be monitored by them as such . According to the rules of the ERM , each European central bank is required to defend its currency when it falls to the bottom of a pre-agreed fluctuation band . They therefore demanded a price , which took two main forms : a series of requirements of eligibility to enter the common currency , which essentially called for reduced governmental expenditures in these " weaker " countries ; and a strong , independent European central bank , which would be in the hands of conservative neoclassical bankers .