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Of course the U.S. Supreme Court can order the Alabama Supreme Court to remove the monument , but what gives a lower court that power ? We dispose summarily of Pelullo 's remaining contentions : ( i ) that the District Court should have recused itself . While scholars such as Larry Kramer [ FN150 ] and Mark Tushnet [ FN151 ] argue that the Court should not be the final expositor of the Constitution for all branches of government , the vast majority of legal scholars [ FN152 ] argue with equal vehemence that the Constitution ( as interpreted by Marbury ) says what it * 1466 appears to say : the Supreme Court can and should declare what the law is , even in difficult or politically sensitive cases . The amici argue that the District Court should accept the Supreme Court 's invitation to develop an innovative procedure for accommodating the competing interests asserted in this case : " when important constitutional principles are on a collision course , as in this case , courts should be wary of any winner-take-all resolution . It follows that the orders of the District Court should be affirmed , and that leave to file petitions for habeas corpus in this Court should be denied . First , accepting that conjecture at face value and across the board proves far too much : by the government 's logic , no indicted member of al Qaeda facing trial in an Article III court should be allowed to consult with counsel-a result barred by the Sixth Amendment . Fiscal Court would decide whether to accept them . In the circumstances disclosed , I conclude that the District Court should have refused to interfere by injunction with the essential rights of the municipality to control its own parks and streets . It is anticipated that the effectiveness of the Domestic Violence Court will be a part of the assessment conducted under those standards .