
[ Deletia; in case anybody hadn't noticed, Frank and I are debating
  "objective morality", and seemingly hitting semantics. ]


      It may be that, being a non-native English-speaker, I've
misunderstood your usage of "objective", and tried to debate something
you don't assert; my apologies. I'm at a loss to imagine what you really
do mean, though.


      Wrong point. The age of the universe has no direct effect on
humanity's sticking power, in the way the moral system of a society can
have.

      I'm saying the Universe has a "real age", because I see evidence
for it; cosmology, astronomy and so on. I say this age is independent of
people's opinions of it, because I know different people have a lot of
different opinions in the matter, yet empirical tests consistently seem
to give roughly the same results.


      I can't see how it does that. Put a creationist to the task of
performing the tests and calculations, see to it (s)he makes no blatant
errors in measuring or calculating, and the result of the test will be
the same.


      Because logically consistent empirical tests contradict their
opinion. If those tests were just my opinion, then their own tests
(which would then be their opinion) would contradict mine, even if we
conducted said tests in identical manner, no? They don't, which I take
as showing these tests have some validity beyond our opinion of them.


      Map the activity of nerves and neural activity, if you mean
physical pain. You have a sharp point, I'll give you that; but you still
haven't given me a way to quantify morality.


      We agree. Hypotheses, however, can change; I hold that there is no
"ultimate hypothesis of morality" towards which these changes could
gravitate, but that they could be changed in any way imaginable,
producing different results suitable for different tasks or purposes.


      "Better" and "worse" are (almost?) always defined in the context
of a moral system. Your prediction will _always_ be correct, *within*
*that* *moral* *system*. What you need now is an objective definition of
"good" and "bad"; I wish you luck.


      Isn't that what _you're_ doing, when assuming an "objectively
real" morality? Besides, what _exactly_ is provably wrong with my
statement?


      Claiming there is no objective morality is suddenly a positive
claim? Besides, I think I _can_ lend some credence to my claim; ponder
different individuals, both fully functional as human beings and members
of society, but yet with wildly different moral codes. If morality was
"objective", at least one should be way off base, but yet hir
'incorrect' morality seems to function fine. How come?

      As for producing these individuals, it might be easiest to pick
them from different societies; say, an islamic one and some polynesian
matrilineal system, for example (if such still exist).

[ deletia - testing for footballs on desks ]


      One thing is "good" under some circumstances, because we wish to
achieve some goal, for some reason. Other times we wish to do something
else, and that thing is no longer so clearly "good" at all.

      Some things are hard to make "good", because we'd seldom if ever
wish to achieve the sort of goal mass murder would lead one into. Still,
the Aztecs were doing fine until the Spaniards wiped them out.

      I almost always know what "good" means; sometimes I even know why.
I never claim this "good" is thereby fixed in stone, immutable.

[...]

      Yes, me too, and I've tried a thing or two down that line; it
doesn't look good for objective values to me at all.
