
I can't answer all our questions in detail, but I can take a stab at
them.

The form the operations that compute R1, R2, and R3 is, of course, the
famous ``triple encryption'' suggested for use with DES.  It's much
stronger than a single encryption, and has an effective key length of
160 bits.  For reasons that were discussed when DES was first
standardized, a simple double encryption would not have the same
strength.  Triple encryption has been used by IBM since more or less
the beginning to encrypt other keys.  It's recommended for anything of
very high value.  And I think we can agree that the R_i and S_i fit
that description.

Why n_1, n_2, and n_3?  Well, you need different plaintext values.  I
have no idea if they'll be disclosed or not.  At a guess, they're
constructed so that they differ in as many bit positions as possible.
A goo cryptosystem will scramble things a lot with even a 1-bit change
-- but the values of N in a series will have fairly similar bit
patterns, and there might, conceivably, be a weakness.  So the n_i
values are -- and I'm guessing -- chosen to increase the Hamming
distance.

In any event, I'm quite convinced that one cannot go back to the S_i
from the U_i, let alone U.  (Observe:  if the NSA has U, they don't
need to find S_i.  But even if they do, they can't get U_1 and U_2.  In
theory, they should never even see those values, even with a warrant.)

The real question, I think, is why use this scheme at all, as opposed
to a hardware random number generator.  My answer is that this is
*much* more verifiable.  Look -- suppose that NSA, NIST, the ACLU, the
EFF, and the NRA combined to build a *really* good random number
generator, and that it passed every test you could think of.  When you
come back next week to program some more chips, does it still work that
well?  Have any components changed in value?  Have the components been
changed out from under you?  Does it still work well the in the
presence of a focused microwave beam that tends to bias it towards
selecting 1 bits?  Yes, you can run detailed statistical tests on it
again, but that's hard.

Consider, on the other hand, a software solution.  You bring your own
floppies with you, you can run cryptographic checksums, etc.  It's a
lot easier to verify that the software is unchanged, in other words.
(Yes, I can think of ways to cheat software, too.  I think that they're
a lot harder.)

There are three issues with Clipper.  The first is whether or not the
architecture of the whole scheme is capable of working.  My answer,
with one significant exception, is yes.  I really do think that NSA and
NIST have designed this scheme about as well as can be, assuming that
their real objectives are as stated: to permit wiretapping, under
certain carefully-controlled circumstances, with a minimum risk of
abuse.  (The exception is that U exists outside of the chip, on a
programming diskette.  That's seriously wrong.  U_1 and U_2 should be
loaded onto the chip separately.)  To those who disagree (and I don't
claim my answer is obvious, though I found my own reasoning
sufficiently persuasive that I was forced to rewrite the Conclusions
section of my technical analysis paper -- I had originally blasted the
scheme), I issue this invitation:  assume that you were charged with
implementing such a system, with complete regard for civil rights and
due process.  What would you do differently?  In answering this
question, please accept NSA's fundamental assumptions:  that both
strong cryptography against outsiders, and the ability to wiretap
*some* domestic users, is necessary.  (If you feel it necessary to
challenge those assumptions, do it in the context of the last issue I
present below.  Right here, I'm discussing *just* the technical
aspects.  And no, I don't by any means claim that just because
something can be done, it should be.)

The second issue is whether or not this whole architecture is actually
going to be used.  Just because Clipper chips are made this way doesn't
mean that that's the only way they'll be made.  Maybe the NSA will
substitute its own chips between the programming facility and the
shipping dock.  And they'll generate bogus warrant requests, so that
the escrow agents don't wonder why they've never called.  (``Sorry,
guys; all them terrorists and drug dealers and pedophiles seem to have
bought triple-DES phones instead.  Who'd 'a' thunk it?'')  I have no
answer to this question, and at the moment, I don't see a way of
answering it.  Those concerns are part of my reasoning in my answer
to the final question, below.

The third, and most serious issue, is whether or not Clipper is a good
idea even if carried out strictly according to the letter of the law.
I think that the answer is no, but it's not a no-brainer.  I'm a civil
libertarian, not a libertarian, for reasons that I explained at great
length on the net in the Elder Days, and that I don't have the energy
to repeat now.  But that means that I'm willing to accept that some
laws are necessary, so long as they respect the essential rights of
individuals.  The government already has the ability and -- in our
system -- the right to issue search warrants, and while that power has
certainly been abused, it's also been used quite properly and fairly in
other cases.  Is key escrow sufficiently different?  I think so -- but
again, it's not an easy question for me.  (It is easy for libertarians
to answer, of course, since Clipper is completely alien to much of the
rest of their (oft-admirable) philosophy.  And it's also easy for those
who give their unreserved trust to government, a group I'm much more
distant from.)
