In 1997, Andrew Wiest called the plan an imaginative way to return to a war of movement, foreshadowing the amphibious warfare of the Second World War and a credit to Haig but that his refusal to agree to a landing independent of events at Ypres, showed that he had overestimated the possibility of a German collapse. In 2008, J. P. Harris wrote that the German spoiling attack demonstrated that the decline of the German armies in France had been exaggerated and that the War Cabinet neglected to question Haig more rigorously, after he had assured them that the reverse was due to local factors.
In 1997, Andrew Wiest portrayed the plan as a pioneering strategy to revive a war of movement, foreshadowing the amphibious warfare of World War II and acknowledging Haig's credit; nonetheless, his reluctance to agree on an independent landing at Ypres revealed that he had miscalculated the German collapse. In 2008, J. P. Harris argued that the German spoiling attack demonstrated that the decline of German forces in France had been exaggerated and that the War Cabinet should have questioned Haig more critically, after he assured them it was due to local factors.