Petitioner had previously been given to understand by a member of the Commission that under no circumstances would petitioner and his group be allowed to demonstrate in Birmingham. The Alabama Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that 1159, as written, unconstitutionally imposed an "invidious prior restraint" without ascertainable standards for the granting of permits, and that the ordinance had been discriminatorily enforced. However, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1967 narrowly construed 1159 as an objective, even-handed traffic regulation which did not allow the Commission unlimited discretion in granting or withholding permits, and upheld petitioner's conviction.
Petitioner was previously informed by a member of the Commission that he and his group would be prohibited from demonstrating in Birmingham. The Alabama Court of Appeals overturned the conviction based on the grounds that 1159, as written, constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint without clear standards for permit issuance, and that the ordinance had been applied unfairly. However, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1967 interpreted 1159 as a neutral traffic regulation that did not grant the Commission unlimited authority to approve or deny permits. This ruling upheld petitioner's conviction.