The commitment was essential if we were to save South Vietnam. Yet, he noted several disadvantages to it:  (a) the strategic reserve of U.S. forces is so weak that we cannot afford to send forces to a peripheral area of the Communist bloc where they could be engaged for an uncertain duration; (b) although U.S. prestige is already engaged in Vietnam, it will become more so by the sending of troops; (c) if the first contingent is not sufficient, it will be difficult to resist the pressure to reinforce and if it is intended to close the Vietnamese frontiers and clean-up the insurgents, there is no limit to our possible commitment (unless we attack the source in Hanoi); and (d) the introduction of U.S. forces may increase tensions and risk escalation into a major war in Asia.
The decision was vital if we were to save South Vietnam from collapse. Nevertheless, he noted several potential drawbacks: (a) the reserve of U.S. military assets is too limited to support prolonged engagement; (b) deploying troops would further increase U.S. influence; (c) insufficient initial deployment could lead to increased pressure to reinforce and escalate commitment; (d) introducing U.S. forces might heighten tensions and risk escalating into a larger conflict.