L.D. JAIKWAL Vs. STATE OF U.P.
No Judge can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other The appellant was a senior advocate. He was required To appear before the Special Judge to make his submission on the question of sentence to be imposed upon his client who was convicted for an offence under s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As he appeared in a shirt and trouser outfit and not in Court attire, the Judge asked him to appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professional capacity.The appellant took umbrage and left the Court. Some other advocate appeared in the matter and the accused having being found guilty of the charge of corruption the Judge imposed a sentence of four years R.I. The appellant made a written application to the Judge couched in scurrilous language making the imputation that the Judge was a ’corrupt Judge’ and added that he was ’contaminating the seat of justice’; and forwarded copies of the application, without occasion or need to the Administrative Judge, Chief Secretary and other authorities.The High Court initiated contempt proceedings, found the appellant guilty of having committed criminal contempt under s. 2(c)(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and after affording full opportunity of hearing, imposed a sentence of simple imprisonment for one week and a fine of Rs. 500. Hence the present appeal. The appellant was a senior advocate. He was required To appear before the Special Judge to make his submission on the question of sentence to be imposed upon his client who was convicted for an offence under s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As he appeared in a shirt and trouser outfit and not in Court attire, the Judge asked him to appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professional capacity. The appellant took umbrage and left the Court. Some other advocate appeared in the matter and the accused having being found guilty of the charge of corruption the Judge imposed a sentence of four years R.I. The appellant made a written application to the Judge couched in scurrilous language making the imputation that the Judge was a ’corrupt Judge’ and added that he was ’contaminating the seat of justice’; and forwarded copies of the application, without occasion or need to the Administrative Judge, Chief Secretary and other authorities. The High Court initiated contempt proceedings, found the appellant guilty of having committed criminal contempt under s. 2(c)(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and after affording full opportunity of hearing, imposed a sentence of simple imprisonment for one week and a fine of Rs. 500. Hence the present appeal. ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT: Written apology tendered to Judge ’as directed by the Supreme Court under contempt of court proceeding sufficient to set aside conviction by High Court? RATIO OF THE COURTConsiderations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that the appellant should not escape with impunity on the mere tendering of an apology which in any case does not wipe out the mischief. If such a apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, it would virtually be tantamount to issuing a license to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. The High Court was justified in imposing a substantive sentence and the said sentence cannot be said to be excessive or out of proportion.No Judge can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other. By the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against one or other of the parties. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented to by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such a risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. A line has therefore to be drawn some where, some day, by some one. That is why the Court is impelled to act (rather than merely sermonize) much as the Court dislikes imposing punishment whilst exercising the contempt jurisdiction, which no doubt has to be exercised very sparingly and ’with circumspection.An attitude of unmerited leniency cannot be adopted at the cost of principle and at the expense of the Judge who has been scandalized. To pursue a populist line of showing indulgence is not very difficult in fact it is more difficult to resist the temptation to do so rather than to adhere to the mail studded path of duty. Institutional perspective demands that considerations of populism are not allowed to obstruct the path of duty.In the instant case, the appellant sought to justify his conduct before the High Court on the ground of the treatment alleged to have been meted out to him by the Special Judge. No remorse was felt. No sorrow was expressed. No apology was offered: He expressed his sorrow only before this Court, saying that he had lost his mental balance, and was granted an opportunity to tender an apology. He appeared before the Special Judge and tendered a written apology indicating that he was doing so: “as directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” This circumstance shows it was a ’paper’ apology, and that the expression of sorrow came from his pen, not from his heart. It is one thing to “say” sorry-it is another to “feel” sorry. This Court cannot subscribe to the ’slap-say sorry-and forget’ school of thought in administration of contempt jurisdiction. Considerations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that the appellant should not escape with impunity on the mere tendering of an apology which in any case does not wipe out the mischief. If such a apology were to be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, it would virtually be tantamount to issuing a license to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. The High Court was justified in imposing a substantive sentence and the said sentence cannot be said to be excessive or out of proportion. No Judge can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other. By the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against one or other of the parties. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented to by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such a risk, it will sound the death knell of the institution. A line has therefore to be drawn some where, some day, by some one. That is why the Court is impelled to act (rather than merely sermonize) much as the Court dislikes imposing punishment whilst exercising the contempt jurisdiction, which no doubt has to be exercised very sparingly and ’with circumspection. An attitude of unmerited leniency cannot be adopted at the cost of principle and at the expense of the Judge who has been scandalized. To pursue a populist line of showing indulgence is not very difficult in fact it is more difficult to resist the temptation to do so rather than to adhere to the mail studded path of duty. Institutional perspective demands that considerations of populism are not allowed to obstruct the path of duty. In the instant case, the appellant sought to justify his conduct before the High Court on the ground of the treatment alleged to have been meted out to him by the Special Judge. No remorse was felt. No sorrow was expressed. No apology was offered: He expressed his sorrow only before this Court, saying that he had lost his mental balance, and was granted an opportunity to tender an apology. He appeared before the Special Judge and tendered a written apology indicating that he was doing so: “as directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.” This circumstance shows it was a ’paper’ apology, and that the expression of sorrow came from his pen, not from his heart. It is one thing to “say” sorry-it is another to “feel” sorry. This Court cannot subscribe to the ’slap-say sorry-and forget’ school of thought in administration of contempt jurisdiction. DECISION HELD BY COURT: Appeal was accordingly dismissed.
 Vs STATE OF U.P DATE OF JUDGMENT17 05 1984 THAKKAR M.P.833 1984 SCC 405 1984 SCALE (1 Advocate making written application couched in scurrilous language Imputation Judge ’a corrupt Judge’ ’and contaminating the seat of justice’ High Court convicting and sentencing advocate for contempt of Court appeal to Supreme Court Written apology tendered to Judge ’as directed by the Supreme Court’ Whether sufficient to set aside conviction by The appellant was a senior. advocate. He was required to appear before the Special Judge to make his submission on the question of sentence to be imposed upon his client who was convicted for an offence under s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. As he appeared in a shirt and trouser outfit and not in Court attire the Judge asked him to appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professional capacity. The appellant took umbrage and left the Court. Some other advocate appeared in the matter and the accused having being found guilty of the charge of corruption the Judge imposed a sentence of four years R.I The appellant made a written application to the Judge couched in scurrilous language making the imputation that the Judge was a ’corrupt Judge’ and added that he was ’contaminating the seat of justice’ and forwarded copies of the application without occasion or need to the Administrative Judge Chief Secretary and other authorities The High Court initiated contempt proceedings found the appellant guilty of having committed criminal contempt under s. 2(c)(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 and after affording full opportunity of hearing imposed a sentence of simple imprisonment for one week and a fine of Dismissing the Appeal HELD: 1. Considerations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that the appellant should not escape with impunity on the mere tendering of an apology which in any case. does not wipe out the mischief. If such a apology were to be accepted as a rule and not as an exception it would virtually be tantamount to issuing a ’licence’ to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity. The High Court was justified in imposing a substantive sentence and the said sentence cannot be said to be excessive or out of proportion.[838E 837E 838F No Judge can take a decision which does not displease one side or the other. By the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against one or other of the parties. If the fact that he renders a decision which is resented to by a litigant or his lawyer were to expose him to such a risk it will sound the death knell of the institution. The day must be dreaded when a Judge cannot work with independence by reason of the fear that a disgruntled member of the Bar can publicly humiliate him and heap disagree on him with impunity if any of his orders or the decision rendered by him displeases any of the Advocates appearing in the matter A line has therefore to be drawn some where some day by some one. That is why the Court is impelled to actmuch as the Court dislikes imposing punishment whilst exercising the contempt jurisdiction which no doubt has to be exercised very sparingly and ’with circumspection.of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the Court The learned Advocate appeared in a shirt and trouser outfit in disregard of the rule requiring him to appear only in Court attire when appearing in his professional capacity The learned Judge asked him to appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professional capacity. The learned Advocate apparently took umbrage and left the Court. Some other Advocate appeared on behalf of accused who had been found guilty of a charge of corruption. The learned Judge imposed a sentence of 4 years’ R.I. which may have been considered to be on the high side. The matter in that case could have been carried to the High Court by way of an appeal both on the question of conviction as also on the question of sentence. But so far as the Court of the Special Judge was concerned as the judgment had been pronounced and nothing more remained to be done by that Court the matter should have rested there. The appellant a senior Advocate of long standinghowever made a written application to the learned Special Judge couched in scurrilous. language making the imputation that the Judge was a "corrupt Judge" and adding that he was contaminating the seat of justice". A threat was also held out that a complaint was being lodged to higher authorities that he was corrupt and did not deserve to be retained in service. The offending portion may better be quoted "I am making a complaint against you to the highest authorities in the country that you are corrupt and do not deserve to be retained in service The earlier people like you are bundled out the better for us all As for quantum of sentence I will never bow down before you. You may award the maximum sentence. Any way you should feel ashamed of yourself that you are contaminating the seat of justice There is no known provision for making such an application after a matter is disposed of by a Judge. Nor was any legal purpose to be served by making such an Obviously application was made to terrorize and harass the Judge for imposing a sentence which perhaps be considered to be on the high side whether or not it was really so was for the higher Court to decide As pointed out earlier it was however not permissible to adopt a course of intimidation in order to frighten the Judge. His malicious purpose in making the application is established by another tell tale circumstance by forwarding copy of this application without any occasion or need for it to several authorities and dignitaries 1. Administrative Judge Allahabad for favour of requisitioning case file S.T. No. 2 from Dehradun and scanning through the fasts 2. Chief Secretary Uttar Pradesh Government Lucknow 3. Director Vigilance Commission U.P. Lucknow 4. Prime Minister Secretariat Delhi 5. State Counsel Shri Pooran Singh Court of Shri V.K. Agarwal Dehradun 6. Shri D. Vira I.C.S. Chairman Indian Police Commission Delhi 7. President Bar Association Dehradun 8. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Bharat The High Court of Allahabad initiated contempt proceedings found the appellant guilty of having committed criminal contempt under Section 2(c)(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 after affording him full opportunity of hearing and imposed a sentence of S.I for 1 week and a fine of Rs. 500 much as the Court dislikes imposing punishment whilst exercising the contempt jurisdiction which no doubt has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection. We do not think that we can adopt an attitude of unmerited leniency at the cost of principle and at the expense of the Judge who has been scandalized. We are fully aware that it is not very difficult to show magnanimity when some one else is the victim rather than when oneself is the victim. To pursue a populist line of showing indulgence is not very difficult in fact it is more difficult to resist the temptation to do so rather than to adhere to the nail studded path of duty. Institutional perspective demands that considerations of populism are not allowed to obstruct the path of duty. We therefore cannot take a lenient or indulgent view of this matter. the day must be dreaded when a Judge cannot work with independence by reason of the fear that a disgruntled member of the Bar can publicly humiliate him and heap disgrace on him with impunity if any of his orders or the decision rendered by him displeases any of the Advocates appearing in the matter We firmly believe that considerations regarding maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that we do not allow the appellant to escape with impunity on the mere tendering of an apology which in any case does not wipe out the mischief We are of the opinion that the High Court was therefore justified in imposing a substantive sentence. And the sentence imposed cannot be said to be excessive or out of Appeal is accordingly dismissed N.V.K. Appeal dismissed