Nizam & Anr. V/s. State of Rajasthan
“Last seen theory” is an important link in the chain of circumstances that would point towards the guilt of the accused with some certainty. The facts of the case is that deceased-Manoj was the helper on the truck No.MP-07-2627 and had gone to Pune and thereafter to Barar alongwith his first driver Raj Kumar   (PW-2) and second driver Ram Parkash (PW-1) and from Barar they loaded the truck with pipes for destination to Ghaziabad on 23.01.2001.  Accused-appellants Nizam and Shafique who were the driver and cleaner respectively on the truck No. DL-1GA-5943 also loaded their truck with pipes from the same company on the same day at Barar and started for Ghaziabad along with truck No.MP-07-2627. During this period drivers and cleaners of both the trucks developed acquaintance with each other.  While on the way to Ghaziabad, driver Raj Kumar (PW-2) of truck No.MP-07-2627 got into quarrel with some local persons and consequently Barar police detained him along with his truck. Faced with such situation, Raj Kumar (PW-2) instructed his second driver Ram Parkash (PW-1) to hand over the amount of Rs.20,000/to Manoj with instructions to give the money to the truck owner.  Accordingly, Manoj left for Gwalior with accused persons by the truck No.DL-1GA-5943 on 23.01.2001.Dead body of deceased-Manoj was found on 26.01.2001 under suspicious circumstances in a field near village Maniya. On 26.01.2001 at about 3.00 O’clock, one Koke Singh (PW-13) went to collect the fodder and found a dead body lying in the field and the same was informed to Shahjad Khan (PW-4).  Based on the written information by Shahjad Khan (PW-Case was registered in FIR No.16/2001 under Sections 302 and 201 IPC on 26.01.2001 at Thana-Maniya, District Dholpur. Gullu Khan (PW-16)-Investigating Officer seized the dead body and prepared a Panchnama.  One bilty  (Ex. P17) of Uttar Pradesh, Haryana Roadlines (Pune) and one receipt (Ex. P18) of Madhya Pradesh Government, Shivpuri Naka pertaining to truck No. DL-1GA-5943 were recovered from the pocket of trouser of deceased-Manoj and in the said bilty     (Ex.P-17), name of the driver was mentioned as Nizam and truck No.DL-1GA-5943 and some phone numbers.  Based on the 2clues obtaining in the bilty, accused Nizam and Shafique were arrested on 27.01.2001 and the truck No.DL-1GA-5943 was recovered. After due investigation, chargesheet was filed against the appellants-accused under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.2, Dholpur held that the appellants-accused committed murder of deceased-Manoj to grab Rs.20,000/- and the prosecution has established the circumstances proving the accused-appellants guilty under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/- with default clause and two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/- with default clause respectively.Aggrieved by the verdict of conviction, appellants-accused preferred appeal before the High Court of Rajasthan, which vide impugned judgment dismissed the appeal thereby confirming the conviction of the accused-appellants and also respective sentence of imprisonment and fine amount imposed on each of them. Being aggrieved, the appellants have preferred this appeal.This appeal assails the correctness of the judgment dated 01.07.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan Jaipur Bench in Criminal Appeal No.1248 of 2002, whereby the High Court confirmed the conviction of the accused-appellants under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment imposed on each of them with a fine of Rs.2,000/- with default clause and also two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/- with default clause respectively. DECISION HELD BY COURT: Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, whether the courts below were right in invoking the “last seen theory.” RATIO OF THE COURT: The court after taking in consideration Sunil Clifford Daniel vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 205, Sampath Kumar vs. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri (2012) 4 SCC 124, Bodhraj @ Bodha And Ors. vs. State of Jammu &amp; Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC 45 and Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 13 SCC 621 observed that case of the prosecution is entirely based on the circumstantial evidence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature.  Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete, forming a chain and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused totally inconsistent with his evidenceBased on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, courts below expressed the view that motive for murder of Manoj was the lust for the money which Manoj was carrying. Courts below based the conviction of the appellants on the circumstances “last seen theory” as stated by PWs 1 and 2 along with recovery of bilty and receipt by PW-6 on which the name of the accused person (Nizam) was printed.The appellants are alleged to have committed murder of Manoj for the amount which Manoj was carrying.  But neither the amount of Rs.20,000/- nor any part of it was recovered from the appellants.  If the prosecution is able to prove its case on motive, it will be a corroborative piece of evidence lending assurance to the prosecution case. But even if the prosecution has not been able to prove the motive, that will not be a ground to throw away the prosecution case. Absence of proof of motive only demands careful scrutiny and deeper analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution. Apart from non-recovery of the amount from the appellants, serious doubts arise as to the motive propounded by the prosecution.  By perusal of the evidence of Sudama Vithal Darekar (PW-17) it is clear that driver Raj Kumar came to the police station complaining that by five to seven people of other vehicle have robbed him and the money. However, after investigation it was discovered that Raj Kumar gave false information and a case under Section 182 IPC was registered against him. Raj Kumar was produced before the Court and court imposed fine of Rs.1,000/- on him.  This fact was also verified from PW-16-investigating officer during his cross-examination.The court held that In case of circumstantial evidence, court has to examine the entire evidence in its entirety and ensure that the only inference that can be drawn from the evidence is the guilt of the accused.  In the case at hand, neither the weapon of murder nor the money allegedly looted by the appellants or any other material was recovered from the possession of the appellants.  There are many apparent lapses in the investigation and missing links:–(i) Non-recovery of stolen money; (ii) The weapon from which abrasions were caused; (iii) False case lodged by PW-2 alleging that he was being robbed by some other miscreants;   (iv) Non-identification of the dead body and (v) Non-explanation as to how the deceased reached Maniya village and injuries on his internal organ (penis). Thus the court find many loopholes in the case of the prosecution.  For establishing the guilt on the basis of the circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be firmly established and the chain of circumstances must be completed from the facts.  The chain of circumstantial evidence cannot be said to be concluded in any manner sought to be urged by the prosecution.Normally, this Court will not interfere in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below. But where material aspects have not been taken into consideration and where the findings of the Court are unsupportable from the evidence on record resulting in miscarriage of justice, this Court will certainly interfere. The court observed that Where time gap is long it would be unsafe to base the conviction on the “last seen theory”; it is safer to look for corroboration from other circumstances and evidence adduced by the prosecution. From the facts and evidence, we find no other corroborative piece of evidence corroborating the last seen theory. Finally the court held that In view of the time gap between Manoj left in the truck and the recovery of the body and also the place and circumstances in which the body was recovered, possibility of others intervening cannot be ruled out. In the absence of definite evidence that appellants and deceased were last seen together and when the time gap is long, it would be dangerous to come to the conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the murder of Manoj and are guilty of committing murder of Manoj.The “last seen theory” seems to have substantially weighed with the courts below and the High Court brushed aside many loopholes in the prosecution case.  None of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution and accepted by the courts below can be said to be pointing only to the guilt of the appellants and no other inference. If more than one inferences can be drawn, then the accused must have the benefit of doubt.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained and the appeal ought to be allowed.The court observed that There are many apparent lapses in the investigation and missing links:–(i) Non-recovery of stolen money; (ii) The weapon from which abrasions were caused; (iii) False case lodged by PW-2 alleging that he was being robbed by some other miscreants; (iv) Non-identification of the dead body and (v) Non-explanation as to how the deceased reached Maniya village and injuries on his internal organ (penis). Thus we find many loopholes in the case of the prosecution. DECISION HELD BY COURT: In this case the judgement was given by JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI that the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302 and 201 IPC is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The appellants are in jail and they are ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case.  
 Appeal186 of 2001 Special Leave Petition2436 of 2000 DR.SURAJMANI STELLA KUJUR Vs DURGA CHARAN HANSDAH & ANR DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14 02 2001 K.T.Thomas R.P.Sethi SETHI J Leave granted. Who is a "Hindu" for the purposes of the applicability of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 hereinafter referred to as "the Act") is a question of law to be determined in this appeal. Section 2 of the Act specifies the persons to whom the Act is applicable Clauses (b) andof Sub sectionof Section 2 make the Act applicable to a person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments including a Virashaiva a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo Prarthana or Arya Samaj and to persons who is a Buddhist Jaina or Sikh by religion. It is also applicable to any other person domiciled in the territories of India who is not a Muslim Christian Parsi or Jew by religion. The applicability of the Act is therefore comprehensive and applicable to all persons domiciled in the territory of India who are not Muslims Christians Parsis or Jews by religion. The term "Hindu" has not been defined either under the Act or Indian Succession Act or any other enactment of the Legislature. As far back as in 1903 the Privy Council in Bhagwan Koer v. J.C. Bose & Ors. Calcutta Series 11] observed: "We shall not attempt here to lay down a general definition of what is meant by the term ’Hindu’. to make it accurate and at the same time sufficiently comprehensive as well as distinctive is extremely difficult. The Hindu religion is marvellously catholic and elastic. Its theology is marked by eclecticism and tolerance and almost unlimited freedom of private worship. Its social code is much more stringent but amongst its different castes and sections exhibits wide diversity of practice. No trait is more marked of Hindu society in general than its horror of using the meat of the cow. Yet the Chamaras who profess Hinduism but who eat beef and the flesh of dead animals are however low in the scale included within its pale. It is easier to say who are not Hindus not practically and separation of Hindus from non Hindus is not a matter of so much difficulty. The people know the differences well and can easily tell who are Hindus and who are not The Act is therefore applicable to: "(1) All Hindus including a Virashaiva a Lingayat a Brahmo Prarthana Samajist and an Arya Samajist Budhists Jains Sikhs In this appeal the parties are admittedly tribals the appellant being a Oraon and the respondent a Santhal. In the absence of a notification or order under Article 342 of the Constitution they are deemed to be Hindus. Even if a notification is issued under the Constitution the Act can be applied to Scheduled Tribes as well by a further notification in terms of Sub sectionof Section 2 of the Act. It is not disputed before us that in the Constitution Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950 as amended by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes OrderActs 63 of 1956 108 of 1976 187 and 15 of 1990 both the tribes to which the parties belong are specified in Part XII. It is conceded even by the appellant that "the parties to the petition are two Tribals who otherwise profess Hinduism but their marriage being out of the purview of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 in light of Section 2(2) of the Act are thus governed only by their Santal Customs and usage". The appellant has however relied upon an alleged custom in the Tribe which mandates monogamy as a rule. It is submitted that as the respondent has solemnised a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage with the appellant the second marriage being void the respondent is liable to be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. No custom can create an offence as it essentially deals with the civil rights of the parties and no person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged. Custom may be proved for the determination of the civil rights of the parties including their status the establishment of which may be used for the purposes of proving the ingredients of an offence which under Section 3(37) of the General Clauses Act would mean an act or omission punishable by any law by way of fine or imprisonment Article 20 of the Constitution guaranteeing protection in respect of conviction of offence provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence. Law under Article 13 clause of the Constitution means the law made by the Legislature including intravires statutory orders and orders made in exercise of powers conferred by the statutory rules. The expression custom and usage" has been defined under Section 3(a) of the Act as: "the expression ’custom’ and ’usage’ and rule which having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area tribe community group or family Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy and Provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family it has not been discontinued by the For custom to have the colour of a rule or law it is necessary for the party claiming it to plead and thereafter prove that such custom is ancient certain and reasonable Custom being in derogation of the general rule is required to be construed strictly. The party relying upon a custom is obliged to establish it by clear and unambiguous evidence. In Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanatha Perumal Sethuraya held: "It is of the essence of special usage modifying the ordinary law of succession that they should be ancient and invariable and it is further essential that they should be established to be so by clear and unambiguous evidence. It is only by means of such evidence that the courts can be assured of their existence and that they possess the conditions of antiquity and certainty on which alone their legal title to This Court in Mirza Raja Pushpavati Vijayaram Gajapathi Raj & ors. v. Sri Pushavathi Visweswar Gajapathiraj Rajkumar of Vizianagram & Ors. again reiterated the same position of law regarding the establishment of a custom upon which a party intends to rely. The importance of the custom in relation to the applicability of the Act has been acknowledged by the Legislature by incorporating Section 29 saving the validity of a marriage solemnised prior to the commencement of the Act which may otherwise be invalid after passing of the Act Nothing in the Act can affect any right recognised by custom or conferred by any said enactment to obtain the dissolution of a Hindu Marriage whether solemnised before or after the commencement of the Act even without the proof of the conditions precedent for declaring the marriage invalid as incorporated in Sections 10 to 13 of the Act. In this case the appellant filed a complaint in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate New Delhi stating therein that her marriage was solemnised with the respondent in Delhi according to Hindu rites and customs". Alleging that the respondent has solemnised another marriage with the Accused No.2 the complainant pleaded: "That the accused No.1 has not obtained any divorce thro’ the Court of Law upto this date and hence the action of the accused No.1 is illegal and contravene the provision of law as laid down under Section Nowhere in the complaint the appellant has referred to any alleged custom having the force of law which prohibits the solemnisation of second marriage by the respondent and the consequences thereof. It may be emphasised that mere pleading of a custom stressing for monogamy by itself was not sufficient unless it was further pleaded that second marriage was void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife. In order to prove the second marriage being void the appellant was under an obligation to show the existence of a custom which made such marriage null ineffectual having no force of law or binding effect incapable of being enforced in law or non est. The fact of second marriage being void is a sine qua non for the applicability of Section 494 IPC. It is settled position of law that for fastening the criminal liability the prosecution or the complainant is obliged to prove the existence of all the ingredients constituting the crime which is normally and usually defined by a statute. The appellant herself appears to be not clear in her stand inasmuch as in her statement in the court recorded on 24th October 1992 she has stated that "I am a Hindu by religion". The complaint was dismissed by the trial court holding "there is no mention of any such custom in the complaint nor there is evidence of such custom. In the absence of pleadings and evidence reference to Book alone is not sufficient". the High Court vide the judgment impugned in this appeal held that in the absence of notification in terms of sub sectionof Section 2 of the Act no case for prosecution for the offence of bigamy was made out against the respondent because the alleged second marriage cannot be termed to be void either under the Act or any alleged custom having the force of law. In view of the fact that parties admittedly belong to the Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of clause of Article 366 of the Constitution as notified by the ConstitutionOrder 1950 as amended by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order Amendment) Acts 656 1076 187 and 190 passed in terms of Article 342 and in the absence of specific pleadings evidence and proof of the alleged custom making the second marriage void no offence under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code can possibly be made out against the respondent. The Trial Magistrate and the High Court have rightly dismissed the complaint of the appellant Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant however submitted that even if the second marriage was not void for the purposes of attracting the applicability of Section 494 and holding the respondent guilty of bigamy the appellant is entitled to maintenance succession and other benefits on account of her being the legally wedded wife of the respondent. We cannot adjudicate upon such a proclaimed right of the appellant. The appellant is at liberty to get her right established by way of civil proceedings in a competent court of jurisdiction. If any such proceedings are initiated the same would be decided on their merits in accordance with the principles of pleadings and proof not being influenced by any of the observations made by the trial magistrate or the High Court. There is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed