Asking monetary help for construction amounts to dowry:Supreme Court
The apex court clarified as to whether seeking monetary help from the daughter in law for construction for house would fall under the purview of demand for dowry.A  bench  consisting of Chief Justice  of India NV Ramana , Justices Hima Kohli and Justice AS Bopanna heard the appeal in the matter of  State of Madhya Pradesh vs Jogendra and Anr. Criminal Appeal no.- 190 of 2012 decided on 11.1.2022. The facts of the case are that within four years of marriage,the deceased, Geeta Bai committed suicide at her matrimonial home while being five months pregnant with the child of the accused  husband due to constant cruelty and harassment towards her.She committed suicide by pouring kerosene over her body set herself on fire which led to the death of the child as well as herself.The trial court convicted the accused husband and father in law for offences under sections 304B, 306 and 498A of IPC and awarded a sentenced of life  imprisonment.The accused appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court which held that demanding money to construct a house cannot be treated a demand for dowry.Aggrieved the high court judgement, the appellant appealed before this court. The counsel on behalf of the Appellants contended that the deceased was forced to commit the suicide as she was fed up of the constant harassment for money and would always complain about the assault on her for bringing the money whenever she would visit her mother and parental home.This was clearly a case of abetment to suicide and the trial court rightly convicted the accused for their crime however, the high court failed to appreciate the same and set aside the conviction. The counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that the deceased was also a party to such a demand as she was the one who herself asked her mother and maternal uncle for money to construct the house. The Supreme Court held that asking for constructing house does fall under the purview of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased is certainly a dowry death.It ruled that any demand from a woman with respect to property or valuables of any nature will be considered dowry.The court said that such provisions persist to create a deterrent effect upon the society and minds of people committing such crime and a liberal approach should be adopted by courts to eradicate this deep rooted evil from the society.It overturned the high court’s order of acquittal of the accused for dowry death under Section 304B and imposed a sentence of seven years for which the respondent should surrender within  four weeks to undergo the remaining sentence. Judgement reviewed by Bhaswati Goldar
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 IN THE CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH JOGENDRA & ANR RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT Hima Kohli J The present appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10th September 2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereby the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 17th December 2003 imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on the original accused No.1 Jogendra husband of the deceased Geeta Bai[respondent No. 1 herein] and the original accused No.2 Badri Prasad father in law of the deceased[respondent No. 2 herein] has been set aside under Sections 304 B and 306 of the Indian Penal Code 1 while maintaining the order of conviction imposed on the original accused no. 1 Jogendra 1 For short ‘IPC’ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 under Section 498 A IPC and reducing the sentence from three years to the period already undergone by him but setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the accused No. 2 Badri Prasad even under Section 498 A IPC. A quick glance of the relevant facts is necessitated. The deceased was 18 years old when she got married to the respondent No 1in a social marriage organisation function2 conducted on 7th May 1998. Before her marriage Geeta Bai along with her mother Kamla Bai and her brother used to reside with her maternal uncle Bansi Lalmother in law and 2 Samuhik VIvaah Sammelan CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 Jitenderbrother in law of the deceased but convicted both the respondents[A 1 and A 2]Shyam Bihari and Amrit Lal maternal uncles of the deceased who stated that the respondents had been demanding money from the deceased for constructing a house which her family members were unable to give. As a result she was constantly harassed and subjected to cruelty finally leading to her committing suicide. Dr. V.K Gargwho had conducted the post mortem examinationon the dead body of the deceased had deposed that on examining the uterus there was a foetus of five months in a dead condition and in his opinion the death of Geeta Bai had taken place due to burning. On the respondents preferring an appeal against the judgment of conviction dated 17th December 2003 passed by the Sessions Court the High Court gave a clean chit to the respondent No. 2while setting aside the order of conviction in respect of the respondent No.1 1 SCC 217 5 2005 Crl.L.J. 65 delivered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand 69 SCC 721 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 State of Madhya Pradesh Aggrieved by the said judgment the present appeal has been filed by the Mr. Prashant Singh learned Advocate General for the appellant State has assailed the impugned judgment and contended that the High Court has failed to appreciate the harassment caused to the deceased at the hands of the respondents who had been constantly demanding money from her to construct a house and purchase a plot of land that the High Court did not consider the testimonies of Bansi LalShyam BihariAmrit Laland Rajesh Bhaiwho had unanimously stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her parental home she would complain that she was being subjected to assault by the respondents for bringing a sum of ₹50 000 for constructing a house and that it was due to this harassment caused by them that the deceased got fed up and was forced to commit suicide. Learned counsel argued that contribution of money to construct a house as demanded by the respondents from the deceased ought to be treated as a dowry demand and it is quite apparently a case where the offence under Section 304 B was made out. It was also submitted that this was a clear cut case of abetment to commit suicide and both the respondents had rightly been convicted for CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 overturned in appeal the said offence by the trial Court which order has been erroneously For the purpose of deciding the present appeal it is considered appropriate to extract below the statement of the uncle of the deceased Bansi Lalwho has been found to be a reliable witness by both the Courts below: Whenever Gitabai had used to come then she had used to say that she is beaten. She had told about beating by father in law and husband. They had used to demand rupees fifty thousand for construction of house. So they had used to beat her. Since I had no money so I did not give. I and people of society had also convinced to son in law and father in law but they did not agree. Gitabai had also discussed about demand of rupees fifty thousand with my sister and wife We had received the information of death of Gitabai by phone at 11 o’clock of night. We did not give rupees fifty thousand thereafter Gitabai was beaten consequently her finger was also fractured. Her husband has committed beating Badriprasad had also expelled to Gitabai and Jogendra from the house. After ouster from the house Gitabai and Jogendra had lived near the father of Badriprasad in Khanpur. Then both of them had come to Kota from there. They had lived in Kota for 7 8 months. After spending of money in Kota both of them arrived near my sister Kamlabai in Takarbada. Both of them had stayed in Takarbada for 1 2 days. Jogendra demanded rupees twenty thousand from my sister in Takarbada. My sister had told me about it. Rupees twenty thousand was demanded for purchase of a plot in Kota. The both Gitabai and Jogendra arrived near me in Sultanpur from Takarbada. Jogendra also demanded rupees twenty thousand from me. Rupees was demanded for purchase of plot to construct the house. Money was used to demand as dowry. I had not given rupees. Then due to not giving of money threatening to my niece Gitabai he had carried her to Kota I saw to Gitabai at that time. Then she was pregnant Subsequently Badriprasad Jitendra and Sushila went near Jogendra and Gitabai in Kota and keeping their luggage forcibly they brought the luggage and they also brought to Gitabai and Jogendra in their house. After three months of carrying from Kota I received the news of death of Gitabai.” CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 Some of the relevant statements made by P.W. 1 during his cross examination are also extracted below After about 6 months of it Gitabai had again come to in laws house and she had stayed for 6 7 months and when we had used to go to take her then in laws of Gitabai had not used to send her. Witness himself said that their harassment process had started during this time. My younger brother had gone to take her for 6 7 times in this period. I had used to live in Kota. After this when my mother had died then Gitabai had come and she had also come for one more programme. When Gitabai had gone to in laws house after 6 months then after that I had met with her at the time of death of my mother. When my mother had died then Gitabai had come then she had stayed with my brother for 6 months When my mother had died then Jogendra had come with Gitabai on third day and he had also caused beating before us. He had not got tea so Jogendra had caused beating When Gitabai lived with brothers for 6 months then I had gone there for many times during that period. Accused and Sushilabai and Badri had also come there at the time of death of my mother. I had stayed in the village for 12 days It is incorrect to say when Gitabai had stayed in Takarwada at the time of death of mother then she had not made any complaint of in laws there. This fact is correct that first of all Gitabai had complained at the time of death of mother Jogendra had stayed in our village for 2 days xxx xxx xxx 18. When Badriprasad had come at the time of death of mother. After that I have not met with Badriprasad till today Badriprasad demands rupees fifty thousand for construction of house. Gitabai had told me this fact when Gitabai had come after death of mother then she had told this fact that Badriprasad demands rupees fifty thousand for construction of house. Sister Kamlabai had told me this fact. Besides her any other person did not tell the fact of demand of rupees fifty thousand. After 7 8 months of death of mother Kamlabai had told me the fact of rupees fifty thousand Which fact Kamlabai had told me after 4 5 months of that Gitabai and Jogendra had come near me for demand of rupees twenty thousand.” CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 It is clear that during his extensive cross examination P.W. 1 firmly stuck to his statements that the harassment of his niece Geeta Bai had started within six months of her wedding with the respondent No.1 who had asked her to fetch a sum of ₹20 000 on her for construction of a house which she was asked to convey to him. The said witness was consistent in his deposition that he used to give money to his deceased niece and her husband respondent No. 1 towards expenses and that both of them had demanded a sum of ₹50 000 for construction of a house which he had declined to give. Pertinently Shyam Bihari P.W. 2] and Amrit Lalboth maternal uncles of the deceased had the same version to narrate as P.W. 1. Thus the prosecution version was that the respondents used to harass the deceased and that the respondent No. 1 had demanded a sum of ₹20 000 whereas the respondent No. 2 had demanded ₹50 000 Rupees Fifty thousand] from the deceased for constructing a house and for buying a plot of land. Fed up with the constant dowry demands made on her by the respondents which her family could not satisfy Geeta Bai CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 had committed suicide by immolating herself at her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage. The most fundamental constituent for attracting the provisions of Section 304 B IPC is that the death of the woman must be a dowry death. The ingredients for making out an offence under Section 304 B have been reiterated in several rulings of this Court. Four pre requisites for convicting an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 B are as follows i) that the death of a woman must have been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstance that such a death must have occurred within a period of seven years of her marriage that the woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment at the hands of her husband soon before her death and that such a cruelty or harassment must have been for or related to any demand for dowry 10. As the word “dowry” has been defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 19617 the said provision gains significance and is “2. Definition of ‘dowry’ In this Act “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or b) by the parents of either party to a marriage by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person 7 For short ‘the Dowry Act’ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal law xxx Explanation II.— The expression “valuable security” has the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal CodeDowry must first consist of any property or valuable security— the word “any” is a word of width and would therefore include within it property and valuable security of any kind 2) Such property or security can be given or even agreed to be given. The actual giving of such property or security is therefore not necessary. 3) Such property or security can be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. 4) Such giving or agreeing to give can again be not only by one party to a marriage to the other but also by the parents of either party or by any other person to either party to the marriage or to any other person. It will be noticed that this clause again widens the reach of the Act insofar as those guilty of committing the offence of giving or receiving dowry is concerned 5) Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at before or at any time after the marriage Thus it can be many years after a marriage is 6) Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage of the parties. Obviously the expression “in connection with” would in the context of the social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean “in relation with” or “relating to”.” 8 Omitted by Act 6846 SCC 477 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 In the light of the above provision that defines the word “dowry” and takes in its ambit any kind of property or valuable security in our opinion the High Court fell into an error by holding that the demand of money for construction of a house cannot be treated as a dowry demand. In Appasaheb’s casereferred to in the impugned judgment this Court had held that a demand for money from the parents of the deceased woman to purchase manure would not fall within the purview of “dowry” thereby strictly interpreting the definition of dowry. This view has however not been subscribed to in Rajinder Singh’s casev. State of Andhra Pradesh represented by Public Prosecutor 10 do not state the law correctly. Noting that the aforesaid decisions were distinct from four other decisions of this Court viz. Bachni Devi and Another v. State of Haryana 11 Kulwant Singh and Others v. State of Punjab 12 Surinder Singh v. State of 13 and Raminder Singh v. State of Punjab 14 the Court opined that keeping in mind the fact that Section 304 B was inserted in the IPC to combat the social evil of dowry demand that has reached alarming 103 SCC 684 114 SCC 427 124 SCC 177 134 SCC 129 1412 SCC 582 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 proportions it cannot be argued that in case of an ambiguity in the language used in the provision the same ought to be construed strictly as that would amount to defeating the very object of the provision. In other words the Court leaned in favour of assigning an expansive meaning to the expression “dowry” and held thus : Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair pragmatic and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb case9 SCC 721(2007) 9 SCC 721 :3 SCCfollowed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal3 SCC 684 :2 SCC Cri) 15] do not state the law correctly. We therefore declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.” while relying on the provisions of Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act 187215 and Section 304 B IPC where the words “soon before her death” find mention the following pertinent observations have been made: “17. Thus the words “soon before” appear in Section 113 B of the Evidence Act 1872 and also in Section 304 B IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under these sections to spring into action it is necessary to show that the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the death. The interpretation of the words “soon before” is therefore important. The question is how “soon before” This would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources or essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment has a different impact on the mind of a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman Some instances which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore “soon before” is a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each case of dowry death 18. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab5 SCC 207 2000 SCC935] where this Court considered the term “soon before”. The relevant observations are as under:of the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which as earlier noticed has to be understood and determined under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time If the cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have persisted it shall be deemed to be ‘soon before death’ if any other intervening circumstance showing the non existence of such treatment is not brought on record before such alleged treatment and the date of death. It does not however mean that such time can be stretched to any period Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which under the circumstances be treated as having become stale enough.” Thus there must be a nexus between the demand of dowry cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity will have to be applied. But it is not a rigid test. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law. In Rajinder Singhfalling back on the rulings in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others 16 Dinesh v. State of Haryana 17 and 165 SCC 207 1712 SCC 532 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 Sher Singh @ Partapa v. State of Haryana 18 it has been emphasized that “soon before” is not synonymous to “immediately before” and the following observations have been made: “24. We endorse what has been said by these two decisions. Days or months are not what is to be seen What must be borne in mind is that the word “soon” does not mean “immediate”. A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304 B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304 B.” 3 SCC 724 196 SCC 108 206 SCC 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives 38.4. Section 304 B IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorisation is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can in cases be homicidal or suicidal or made by the respondent No. 2he had thrown out the deceased and the respondent No.1 from the matrimonial home. They had then shifted to Kota and resided there. Thereafter respondent No.2 had brought the couple back to Baroda and had again started demanding money from the deceased. Then the deceased and the respondent No CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 1 moved to Tankarwada. This time it was respondent No. 1 who had demanded a sum of ₹20 000 from the deceased and her uncle for constructing a house. On being persistently hounded with the repeated demands for money made on her which her family could not fulfil the hapless deceased who was well into the second trimester of her pregnancy immolated herself at her matrimonial home. 19. The above glairing circumstances when viewed together can hardly mitigate the offence of the respondents or take the case out of the purview of Section 304 B IPC when all the four pre requisites for invoking the said provision stand satisfied namely that the death of Geeta Bai took place at her matrimonial home within seven years of her marriage that the said death took place in abnormal circumstances on account of burning and that too when she was five months pregnant that she had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the respondents soon before her death and such cruelty harassment was in connection with demand for dowry. Though the High Court found the testimony of P.W. 1to be trustworthy and consistent and no credible evidence could be produced by the respondents to demolish the prosecution version surprisingly their conviction under Section 304 B IPC has been set aside and furthermore respondent No CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 2 has been acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 498 A 20. Taking into account the evidence brought on record by the prosecution particularly the testimony of P.W. 1 this Court has no hesitation in holding that the analysis of the trial Court was correct and the respondents deserved to be convicted under Sections 304 B and 498 A IPC. However we do not propose to disturb the findings returned by the High Court that has acquitted the respondents for the offence of abetment to commit suicide under Section 306 IPC as the prosecution could not bring any conclusive evidence on record to satisfactorily demonstrate that it was due to the abetment on the part of the respondents that the deceased had committed suicide by immolating herself. Accordingly the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in respect of both the respondents under Section 304 B and Section 498 A IPC is restored. However the sentence imposed on them by the trial Court of RI for life is reduced to RI for seven years which is the minimum sentence prescribed for an offence under Section 304 B IPC In view of the foregoing discussion the present appeal is partly allowed. The respondents shall surrender before the trial Court within CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2012 four weeks to undergo the remaining period of their sentence. The appeal is allowed in the above terms [N. V. RAMANA [A. S. BOPANNA .....................................J [HIMA KOHLI New Delhi January 11 2022 Page 2