Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC: High court of Delhi
Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 415 IPC. A person who dishonestly induced any person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. This was held in the case of Archana Rana v State of Uttar Pradhesh and another, Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 2021, by Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah. An FIR was lodged against the applicants for offences under Sections 419, 420, 323, 504 and 506 IPC. The content of the complaint stated that the appellant’s husband had taken a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from him for getting his son employed and failed to provide the same. The appellants were also accused with threatening and physical assault. An application to quash the entire criminal proceedings against the appellants was dismissed by the High Court. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the complaint taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence or do not disclose the commission of an offence under IPC. Heavy reliance was placed on the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam (2019) 16 SCC 739 and Dr. Lakshman v. State of Karnataka (2019) 9 SCC 677, which established the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 and 415. The counsel for the respondent could not substantiate the offences charged under the appellant under Section 415 and 420 of IPC. The court observed that the averments in the FIR and the allegations in the complaint against the appellant do not constitute an offence under Section 419 &amp; 420 IPC. Even if the Court accepts all the allegations in the complaint taken at the face value to be true, the essential ingredients of cheating was missing. The Court also opinioned that The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by not quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein for the offences under Sections 419 &amp; 420 IPC. The court ordered to set aside the criminal proceedings against the appellants under Section 419 &amp; 420 IPC. The other offences charged against the appellants such as 323, 504 &amp; 506 IPC shall be continued as per the charge sheet and shall be disposed in accordance with the law.Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 415 IPC. A person who dishonestly induced any person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. This was held in the case of Archana Rana v State of Uttar Pradhesh and another, Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 2021, by Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah. An FIR was lodged against the applicants for offences under Sections 419, 420, 323, 504 and 506 IPC. The content of the complaint stated that the appellant’s husband had taken a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from him for getting his son employed and failed to provide the same. The appellants were also accused with threatening and physical assault. An application to quash the entire criminal proceedings against the appellants was dismissed by the High Court. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the complaint taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence or do not disclose the commission of an offence under IPC. Heavy reliance was placed on the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam (2019) 16 SCC 739 and Dr. Lakshman v. State of Karnataka (2019) 9 SCC 677, which established the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 and 415. The counsel for the respondent could not substantiate the offences charged under the appellant under Section 415 and 420 of IPC. The court observed that the averments in the FIR and the allegations in the complaint against the appellant do not constitute an offence under Section 419 &amp; 420 IPC. Even if the Court accepts all the allegations in the complaint taken at the face value to be true, the essential ingredients of cheating was missing. The Court also opinioned that The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by not quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein for the offences under Sections 419 &amp; 420 IPC. The court ordered to set aside the criminal proceedings against the appellants under Section 419 &amp; 420 IPC. The other offences charged against the appellants such as 323, 504 &amp; 506 IPC shall be continued as per the charge sheet and shall be disposed in accordance with the law.
Cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. a fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 415 IPC. A person who dishonestly induced any person to deliver any property is liable for the offence of cheating. This was held in the case of Archana Rana v State of Uttar Pradhesh and another, Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 2021, by Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah. An FIR was lodged against the applicants for offences under Sections 419, 420, 323, 504 and 506 IPC. The content of the complaint stated that the appellant’s husband had taken a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from him for getting his son employed and failed to provide the same. The appellants were also accused with threatening and physical assault. An application to quash the entire criminal proceedings against the appellants was dismissed by the High Court. The counsel for the appellant submitted that the complaint taken on their face do not constitute the ingredients necessary for the offence or do not disclose the commission of an offence under IPC. Heavy reliance was placed on the case of Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam (2019) 16 SCC 739 and Dr. Lakshman v. State of Karnataka (2019) 9 SCC 677, which established the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 and 415. The counsel for the respondent could not substantiate the offences charged under the appellant under Section 415 and 420 of IPC. The court observed that the averments in the FIR and the allegations in the complaint against the appellant do not constitute an offence under Section 419 &amp; 420 IPC. Even if the Court accepts all the allegations in the complaint taken at the face value to be true, the essential ingredients of cheating was missing. The Court also opinioned that The High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by not quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellant herein for the offences under Sections 419 &amp; 420 IPC.
Source: Journal of Political Economy Jan. 1917 Vol. 25 No. 1pp. 69 79 The Relation of Law and Economics Author(s): Eugene Allen Gilmore Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: https: www.jstor.org stable 1823141 JSTOR is a not for profit service that helps scholars researchers and students discover use and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use available at The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize preserve and extend access to Journal of Political Economy This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms THE RELATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS During the past fourteen years there have been at the University of Wisconsin not to exceed ten students pursuing the subject of economics for higher degrees who have elected courses in the Law School. During that period approximately eighty Master s degrees and forty four Doctor s degrees in which the major or the minor was economics have been granted. Data are not at hand con cerning the graduate work in economics in other institutions The assertion is ventured however that the situation at Wisconsin is typical. It will be accepted without any serious dissent that graduate students in economics do not generally elect law courses especially courses in private law. It is the exception rather than the rule to find students in economics who have taken any substan tial portion of the courses in law and very rare to find an economist who has completed the prescribed course in law and received a law degree. An examination of the catalogues of a number of the universities in this country discloses little or no recognition of law as constituting an essential or even desirable part of the training for the economist. For example in the work offered by the Depart ment of Economics of Harvard University no law courses are listed and none offered in other departments or schools of the university are referred to although a prominent member of that department is himself a law graduate and although the Law School of the University is conspicuous as a leader in the scientific analytical and historical presentation of the law. Likewise in Yale Univer sity in the Department of Economics no law courses either public or private are listed or referred to. The same is true in the Uni versity of Pennsylvania Columbia University University of California Johns Hopkins University University of Minnesota and the University of Illinois. In Cornell University where the courses in economics are listed under the general head of political science courses in Constitutional Law Public Officers Municipal Corporations Theory of Law and Business Law are given the This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms 70 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY latter course being " designed primarily to meet the needs of students who contemplate entering business." In the University of Michigan the Department of Economics offers an introductory course to law a course in the Elements of Law " especially adapted to the needs of women " a course in Contracts and Commercial Paper "designed to meet the special needs of students in business administration." In the University of Chicago the Department of Political Economy lists the following courses which are given under the jurisdiction of the Department of Political Science or of the Law School: Elements of Law Bills and Notes and Business Law. Reference is made to the following courses given in the Law School: Public Service Companies Insurance Corporations and Constitutional Law. In the Department of Political Science as distinct from the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago Columbia University and other institutions there is a recognition of law courses either to the extent of actually pro viding instruction in them or by reference to other schools or faculties where such courses may be had. These courses are quite generally however in Public Law Administrative Law and Inter national Law. A notable exception is found in the University of Chicago where the Department of Political Science in addition to the Public Law courses lists two courses in Private Law viz. Contracts and Torts both given by the law faculty. Indeed the political scientists as distinguished from the economists have much more generally recognized law as constituting a desirable part of an advance course of study in that field. In the report of a special committee of the Political Science Association on Instruction in Political Science the following law courses were included in the list of subjects to be pursued: Elements of Law Jurisprudence and Judicial Procedure. The result of these statistics may be generalized thus: Very few advanced students in economics take any considerable number of law courses and practically none complete a law course leading to a law degree. Very few departments of economics include law subjects in their courses or even refer to law courses given in other departments or schools or otherwise recognize the desirability of a I Annual Proceedings I9I3 X 249 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms THE RELATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 7I partial or extended study of law as a part of the training for an economist. The relation between law and economics seems either not to be perceived or if perceived not to be regarded as a relation ship desirable or feasible of very much cultivation This apparent indifference if not aversion to legal studies is significant. Various explanations may be offered. It may be said that while there is a close relation between law and economics the immediate and primary subjects of economics require all of the student s time and there is no place in the curriculum for law Three years of graduate study are all that can be required for the profession of the economist. It is not feasible to require candidates for the Doctor s degree in economics to make any extended study of law much less to complete a law course. It may be answered however that with some of the learned professions already requiring four years of graduate study and others including the legal profes sion tending that way that the economists especially the teachers and leaders may properly be expected to devote a longer time to preparation and to widen the field to be covered It may also be said that the aversion of the economist is not to the law but to the manner in which it is usually presented in the law schools. These schools have been presenting law in a narrow and technical manner designed to train men for the imme diate practice of the profession. Furthermore it has been presented from a strictly utilitarian point of view by men lacking in breadth of training and vision. However well founded this objection may have been thirty or even twenty years ago it has lost much of its significance today. With the development of the modern law school as an integral part of the university having a faculty of men devoting themselves entirely to the study and teaching of law with extensive library equipment and a student body with a preliminary education equal to two and in a number of instances to four years of college work it can hardly be said that the law is being taught in the better law schools in a narrow utilitarian These explanations however may be regarded as superficial Back of them lies a more fundamental reason to be found in the nature and scope of economic science or at least in certain theories This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms 72 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY as to such nature and scope. " Scope and method " still constitutes a topic for consideration in a comprehensive treatise on Political Economy. While the extensive discussion which once went on as to whether economics is to be treated deductively or inductively has in large measure subsided and all agree that neither extreme in the controversy is correct still a notion of wide prevalence is that economics is "essentially hypothetical in character " and that "however useful may be empirical knowledge it is yet of slight importance compared with the well connected and perfectly ex plained knowledge which constitutes an advanced and deductive science." The influence of the classical school and the abstrac tionists and the teachings of the physiocrats of the eighteenth century and their theory of a natural and essential order of human societies still exert an influence upon economic scope and method The natural law thinking of the eighteenth century has not been any more completely abandoned by the economists than by the jurists. The effect of all this is the development of an attitude of independence and self sufficiency as regards kindred fields of knowl edge. The fundamental and basic laws of economics are discover able in the nature of things by a series of rigorous exercises in abstract thinking. The observation and study of concrete data are primarily valuable for the confirmation of general principles deductively reached. These economic laws being of the natural order of things control and ultimately give all other laws. Any system of jurisprudence must ultimately give expression to these economic laws. Economic laws and economic life being prior to legal system determine the form of laws. Absence of harmony between economic theory and law is more a matter of concern to the lawyer than to the economist. As economics is the basic fundamental subject lying back of law and ultimately determining the form and content of law there appears to be no need of a detailed study of existing legal systems Even economists who are not abstractionists and who do not accept the theory of a natural order of society appear to assume an independence of jurisprudence or to manifest an interest in the ID. R. Dewey "Observation in Economics " American Economic Association Publications II 29 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms THE RELATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 73 existing system of law only to the extent of discovering in such a system the cause for the delay in the realization of the complete application of sound economic principles arrived at either deduc tively or inductively from the study of non legal data. It is difficult to discover in treatises on economic subjects or in the discussion by economists of the scope and method of their science any recognition that the law has really much of significance to contribute In a conference on economic instruction the question may very properly arise whether this attitude is not an entirely defensible one both on grounds of expediency and on principle. Why should the economist make any extended study of law and legal systems The answer to this question is to be sought in an examination into the nature and purpose of legal systems The value of law to economics may be merely pedagogical or because of its subject matter. There can be no doubt that the material of the law and the method of studying its growth and development are of the highest pedagogical value. The extended study of numerous concrete controversial situations and the devel opment of general principles therefrom afford an excellent means for the acquiring of the mental acumen essential to the successful solution of economic problems. The conclusions of law arrived at in the course of actual litigation are the resultants of extremely controversial discussion in which reason logic ethics and expe diency contend for recognition. The law abounds in virile alert and aggressive thinking. To master it requires the development of a keen logical mind capable of sustained attention. But other fields of knowledge have on this basis equal claims to consideration and one cannot urge the extended study of law for purely peda gogical advantages Coming to the subject matter of the law what has it to offer to the economist Law is one of the social sciences. The French economist Gide speaks of law ethics and political economy as the " sister sciences." To do one s duty expresses an ethical con ception to exercise one s rights is a legal conception to provide for one s wants is an economic conception. To whom does it belong is a legal question. To whom ought it to belong is a I Gide Political Economy 3d ed. pp. 2 3 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms 74 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY question on the border land between economics and law. Any classification of the social sciences is a concession to convenience and is inevitably artificial. The boundary lines will always be more or less fluctuating and there will be much common ground Abstractly and ideally there is much to be said for Comte s con tention that any separation of the sciences which deal with human societies is irrational that there is but one single science embracing all aspects of these societies. It is however impracticable and inexpedient to decline to recognize the classification which has grown up and the method of separate treatment. Still the bound aries which have been erected should not obscure the ultimate common object with which each division deals. It is the same object studied from different points of view and with different emphasis. The sharp separation of law in our American univer sities and its teaching and study by distinct faculties in schools or departments independently organized and administered is peculiar to our educational system. The explanation for it is to be found in part in the narrow utilitarian conception of the nature and function of law and the function of a law school with reference to the law. The justification for its continuance is to be found in considerations of convenience and expediency. But now that law has taken rank as a university study and in some institutions as a graduate study and is presented as a science rather than a handi craft it should be given the same recognition as other subjects of university grade and its separation from the other social sciences should be regarded as formal rather than real The primary function of the American law school will continue to be the teaching of men to practice the law as it is. Still the successful performance of this function will not prevent the study and presentation of law historically philosophically and scien tifically as one of the basic social sciences. With the development within our universities of faculties of law and jurisprudence there has come a truer conception of the nature of law. Economists as well as others have not always perceived accurately the true nature and function of law. For example the author of a recent treatise on economics in discussing the relation of political economy to I Fetter The Principles of Economics p. 6 1911 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms THE RELATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 75 other social sciences says of law: "Law treats of the precepts and regulations in accordance with which the actions of men are limited by the state." This is a very narrow partial view of law. It is an expression of the imperative or mandatory theory and limits law to commands or prohibitions emanating from the state. While the sanction of the state is essential that men s actions may be effectively controlled still the imperative element of law is not its chief characteristic. The living vital law of a community the rules to which the individual and collective life actually conform and by which the personal and property rights are defined is vastly more than a matter of precepts and commands. The jurisprudence of a society is the expression of its thinking and experience with regard to ethics religion economy and expediency. To know what a people believes and acts upon in its spiritual and material life a study of its system of law if not absolutely essential is certainly of tremendous importance The failure to perceive that the law of a community is the embodiment of its prevailing notions of economics and ethics tempered by reason and expediency may be offered as a further explanation for the absence of a definite interest on the part of economists in legal studies If the law be thus viewed as one of the basic social sciences dealing with the rules affecting and controlling every aspect of community life and if it is presented in true scientific fashion it has a strong claim to the serious consideration of the economist To judge from the scope of economics as put forth in modern trea tises this claim must necessarily be recognized. The following quotation is typical If the study of economic theory has any justification at all it must fit into the facts of actual business life. There may be indeed such a thing as pure mathematics which discusses conclusions from premises that exist only in the mind of the investigator and find no counterpart in actual life. But if there be such a thing as pure economics in this sense it would be of no earthly use except as a logical exercise or play of the imagination. Economics is the science of industrial relations not as they might exist hypothetically in the mind of the investigator but as they really exist. Economic law must explain economic facts the law inheres in the facts the facts are the embodiment and illustration of the law ... . The old distinction between pure and This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms 76 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY applied economics is untenable ..... Economics is to teach us to understand the principles of industrial life. Its chief object indeed is to explain to us what is. If all society however is the result of an evolution we can under stand what is only by knowing what has been. How are the principles of industrial life to be understood and explained adequately without due regard to the legal system past and present which in a very large measure gives expression to those principles or how can a complete appreciation of what has been be obtained without a study of the development of legal doc trines concerning personal and property rights If economic law "inheres in the facts " one very significant fact for the economist is the system of law which prevails in the business community and pervades the industrial relations. While the elemental forces of economic life cannot permanently be controlled or determined by legal forms still the system of law of a community necessarily embodies for the time being at least the accepted economic notions as to ownership disposition and enjoyment of economic goods The law no more than economics has any concern with free goods Both the personal and property interests which the law recognizes and protects constitute an integral part of the development of any sound economic theory. The production and distribution of wealth however it ought to be governed is in reality governed by the principles of the existing legal system. An economic theory may require for the sake of efficient production the holding of land in small parcels but the legal doctrine of primogeniture and entail ment long a recognized principle in English law produces large estates. Likewise an economic theory may require a rule of abso lute liability for acts done in the course of productive industry but the legal doctrine of blameworthiness as a basis of liability and the fellow servant rule produce different results. Economic theory may require the unity of interests in land and personality but the law recognizes a diversity of estates and interests some based upon title and some upon possession some present and some future The former legal doctrine of the extinction of a woman s separate property rights upon marriage may be at variance with sound economic principles. A theory of co operation in production and I Seligman Principles of Economics 6th ed. pp. 35 36 I9I4 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms THE RELATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 77 circulation of goods encounters a legal doctrine forbidding the elimination of competition and prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade. The theory of the socialization of property and the prob lem of inheritances cannot be considered apart from existing theories on those subjects now a part of the prevailing legal system. The doctrine of purchase for value without notice of constructive trusts of unjust enrichment the ethical and moral tenets of equity the recognized limitations on contractual capacity the nature scope and requisites of contracts the doctrine of assignability and negotiability of contracts all profoundly affect the control enjoyment and disposition of wealth These legal doctrines are not the result of whim or caprice nor the expression of a passing fancy nor the embodiment of imperative and mandatory rules imposed from the outside by the paramount authority of the state. They have developed gradually and have persisted through long periods and represent the embodiment of the predominant and prevailing notions of the community as to what is desirable and proper in the light of ethics economics and expediency. They manifest concretely the formal expression of an economic and ethical theory of society and therefore constitute one of the "facts " that "are the embodiment and illustration of the law." A legal system always rests in part upon certain economic theories although not necessarily sound ones. An eco nomic theory that has become embodied in law and has been actually observed for a long time can scarcely be other than a significant " fact " for the economist. Jurisprudence is to be economically rather than as heretofore politically interpreted A successful interpretation on this basis requires a group of scholars who are thoroughly trained in both juristic and economic science and thinking. This training can come only when economists as well as jurists recognize the intimacy and interdependency of their respective sciences and each knows adequately the field of the other. If the problem of the economist is to determine what has been what is and what ought to be the governing principles in "wealth getting and wealth using" if "economics is a study of men as they live and move and think in the ordinary business of I Ely Outlines of Economics p. 4 I9I4 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms 78 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY life"" it would seem that past and existing legal systems constitute material of prime importance deserving to be considered extensively and critically All systems of law are in the main the crystallization of long continued social usage. Social customs are coeval with the origin and growth of society itself the mandatory force of the positive law comes at a later stage in the evolution. The unwritten gradually turns into the written law until the positive enactment is invested with the sanction of a sovereign command As society develops the law is in a perpetual process of change. No code is final it always represents a given stage of social life. The law is the outward manifestation the social and especially the economic fact is the living force The formal juristic conception may remain the same its content must be modified by every change of economic life. Legal history is really a handmaid to economic history legal development is inexplicable apart from economic forces. The economic fact in this sense is the cause the legal situation is the result. . ...Life indeed consists of a perpetual adaption of outward forms to inner forces and thus the economic basis of a legal system is really the important fact to the social philosopher. In practical life however we deal with outward forms and thus the legal shape of economic relations must never be lost from sight. In economics and jurisprudence there is continual action and reaction.2 It would be difficult to state more aptly or effectively the interrelation and interdependency of law and economics or to put forth more cogently the need of a study of law by the economist and a study of economics by the jurist. If law is the "result" of the economic fact if its content is modified and determined by every change of economic life then law becomes a true and faithful reflector of the growth and development of economic theories and as such demands the extended and critical attention of the economist So much for the general claim of law for the attention of the economist. To be specific what is desirable and feasible Ideally the completion of a thorough course in substantive and adjective law including Roman law and jurisprudence as offered in the better university law schools is none too much certainly none too much for those who are to teach economics and lead in economic thought. If however limitations of time and expediency make this impracticable there should be at least a detailed study of the basic subjects of law followed by a course in Roman Law and I Marshall Principles of Economics 5th ed. p. I4 I907 2 Seligman op. cit. pp. 33 34 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms THE RELATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 79 General Jurisprudence. The following subjects are suggested the study of which would give the economist the point of view of the jurist and a more adequate appreciation of the nature and theory of law and would disclose the economic theories which are embodied in our existing legal system: Contracts Torts Real and Personal Property Law of Persons General Principles of Equity Law of AssociationsNegoti able Instruments Trusts Constitutional Law Roman Law General Jurisprudence. The completion of these subjects would require as the instruction is now organized in most law schools approximately three semesters. Without seriously imperiling its efficiency the instruction could be so organized as to enable the work to be com pleted in one academic year. This may seem a very large amount of time to devote to law. It is impossible however to arrive at any adequate comprehension of the fundamental concepts of juris prudence in a shorter period. The short courses now given in some universities in the Elements of Law Elementary Jurisprudence and general survey courses in commercial law are wholly inade quate especially since they are given very often by teachers not primarily trained in law and whose main interest lies in other fields If the study of law is to contribute to the efficiency and capacity of the economist and is to be really worth while it must be pursued a sufficient length of time and in sufficient detail under the direction of teachers trained widely in the law and skilled in juristic thinking and in the interpretation of legal history. Some of the necessary time for the proper study of law might well be obtained by a re organization of the curriculum in economics. If a layman might venture a criticism it seems that many of the courses now offered in economics deal with rather ramified highly differentiated derivative phases of more general topics. The curriculum seems disproportionately occupied by detailed courses in applied eco nomics. If these could be curtailed more time would be available for the fundamental and basic courses both in economics and in law EUGENE ALLEN GILMORE LAW SCHOOL UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN September i9i6 This content downloaded from cid:0)103.216.195.88 on Wed 03 MarUTC(cid:0 All use subject to https: about.jstor.org terms