Reasonable doubt is a well-defined connotation-SC
In the case of Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh (CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1032 of 2013), the SC had held that had clarified  the   expression of  “reasonable   doubt”   is   a   well-­defined connotation.  It refers to the degree of certainty required of a court before it can make a legally valid determination of the guilt of an accused. Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists. The facts of this case initiating both the appeals are common. On 09.01.2002, at about 1.00 P.M., a police team led by ASI Purushottam Dutt (PW8) and also comprising Constable Sunder Singh (PW1), Constable Bhup Singh (PW2) and Constable Bhopal Singh   (PW7)   were   checking traffic at   Shamshar when a motorcycle without a number plate was spotted. Gulshan Rana (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1126 of 2019) was driving the vehicle and Rajesh Dhiman (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1032 of 2013) was seated on the pillion with a backpack slung over his shoulders. They were signaled to stop and documents of the motorcycle were demanded. Meanwhile, another vehicle was halted and its occupants Karam Chand (PW3) and Shiv Ram were included in the search. An attempt was made to associate local residents to witness the subsequent proceedings,   but none agreed. Subsequently, the appellants were given the option to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer but they consented to be searched by the police on the spot itself. The police then discovered polythene bags containing charas from the backpack carried by Rajesh Dhiman. The polythene bags were weighed and found to be 3kg 100gms. After separating some samples, the charas was duly sealed and handed over to Karam Chand (PW3) who later deposited it at the police station. After completion of the personal search of the appellants,  they were formally arrested. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to support their case of chance recovery, which included eight police officials and one independent witness, Karam Chand (PW3). Whereas the police witnesses strongly corroborated each other’s testimony, PW3 was declared hostile for he claimed not to have witnessed the seizure of the narcotics. The spot map, arrest memo, search memos, consent memo, seizure memo, rukka seals, chemical analysis report and samples of  charas  were also adduced as evidence. In response, both appellants asserted their innocence. The learned   Special   Judge   through judgment   dated 28.12.2002 acquitted the appellants holding that charges under the NDPS Act had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial Court viewed that the witnesses on the spot had either not been examined or turned hostile. The question of law, in this case, initiate with the Criminal Appeals which had been preferred against a common judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 28.08.2012, by which the appellants’ acquittal under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”) was reversed and a sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1,00,000 each was awarded. The judges, in this case, had held “ We, therefore, see no reason to draw any adverse inference against PW8 himself investigating his complaint. The appellants’ claim of bias stems from the purported delays, non­compliance of statutory   mandates   and   non­examination   of   independent witness. In effect, the appellants are seeking to circuitously use the very same arguments which have individually been held by the High Court to be factually incorrect or legally irrelevant. Although in some cases, certain actions (or lack thereof) by the Investigating Officer might indicate bias; but mere deficiencies in investigation or chinks in the prosecution case can’t be the sole basis for concluding bias. The appellants have at no stage claimed that there existed any enmity or other motive for the police to falsely implicate them and let the real culprits walk free. Further, such a huge quantity of  charas could not have been planted against the appellants by the police on its own.” “At the outset, we may clarify that the observations relied upon by the appellants, are not findings, conclusion or resolution by this Court in Mukesh Singh (supra). Instead, a perusal of the judgment shows that it was a contention put forth by one of the parties ­ which the Bench eventually disagreed with. Further, not only the alternative version projected by the appellants is vague and improbable, but it escapes our comprehension how non investigation of a defence theory disclosed only at an advanced stage of trial, could indicate bias on part of the police.”  “The contention of the appellants that they are entitled to be acquitted on the ground of there being two varying versions of the same incident does not carry any weight. We may firstly clarify that the expression   “reasonable doubt”   is a   well­defined connotation. It refers to the degree of certainty required of a court before it can make a legally valid determination of the guilt of an accused. These  words  are  inbuilt  measures  to  ensure  that innocence is to be presumed unless the court finds no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. Reasonable doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists. In other words, the evidence must only be so conclusive that all reasonable doubts are removed from the mind of an ordinary person.” “Reliance can also not be placed on Karam Chand’s (PW3) testimony by the appellants. First, his statement that he was told by the police that there was a third person on the spot is hearsay and inadmissible in view of Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Second, his credibility had effectively been impeached by the prosecutor during the trial. PW3 denies in his examination­in chief being on the spot or a party to any proceeding, but later he makes a poor attempt to contradict the prosecution story.” “Third,  given that PW3 himself claims to not being present at the time of the incident, his statement can at best be construed to mean that no charas was recovered in front of him, and not that no charas was recovered from the appellants at all.” “As correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail, non examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle one to seek acquittal. Though a heighted standard of care is imposed on the court in such instances but there is nothing to suggest that the High Court was not cognizant of this duty. Rather, the consequence of upholding the trial Court’s reasoning would amount to compulsory examination of each and every witness attached to the formation of a document. Not only is the imposition of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute but it is also unreasonably onerous in our opinion. The High Court has rightly relied upon the testimonies of the government officials having found them to be impeccable after detailed re appreciation of the entire evidence. We see no reason to disagree with such finding(s).” “There is no gainsaid that High Courts are well within their power to reverse an acquittal and award an appropriate sentence; though   they   cautiously   exercise   such   powers   in   practice. Illustratively, a few permissible reasons which would necessitate such interference by the High Court include patent errors of law, grave miscarriage of justice, or perverse findings of fact. Here, the trial Court appreciated facts in a mechanical manner and dismissed the prosecution case based on a mis interpretation of law, particularly qua satisfying the burden of proof. Hence, there were more than enough reasons for the High Court to interfere with the acquittal and arrive at a different finding.” “The appellants’ claim that the High Court erred in not considering non­compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act at the stage of appeal,   is also premised upon a   mistaken understanding of the law.”
These Criminal Appeals have been preferred against a of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 imprisonment and fine of Rs 1 00 000 each was awarded 09.01.2002 at about 1.00 P.M. a police team led by ASI Singh were checking traffic at Shamshar when a vehicle and Rajesh Dhiman who later deposited it at the police station. After completion of personal search of the appellants they were one independent witness Karam Chand was also held to cast serious the Rajasthan High Court in Gyan Chand v. State of the one which was favourable to the accused ought to be 1 1993 Cri LJ 3716 preferred. Consequently it held that no charas was recovered However the High Court in appeal set­aside the acquittal and convicted the appellants for possession of charas under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. The High Court observed that always desirable but their non­examination would not per se be fatal to the prosecution case especially when due efforts are made by the police to secure their presence. Adverting to the an adverse inference against non­examination of independent of the official witnesses. The High Court dissected a catena of to be subjected to a vigorous standard of scrutiny and corroboration which after careful and cautious appraisal had been met in the instant case. The quantity of charas recovered years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1 00 000was projected as being fatal to the prosecution case. A subtle distinction was sought to be made between cases where the appellants only on the premise that the effect of non­ the appellants under Section 313 CrPC as well as the non­ Learned State counsel on the other side drew our attention authoritatively settled the law on permissibility of the complainant also being the investigating officer in cases under to portray the evidence of the official witnesses as being unimpeachable and inspiring confidence and therefore 2 2020 SCC OnLine SC 700 of the complainant in the present case PW8 also being the line of cases ending with Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab3 has laid down the legal proposition that investigation by the complainant himself would be contrary to the scheme of the 10. Suffice to say that the law on this point is no longer res integra and the controversy if any has been set at rest by the Constitutional Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh 17 SCC 627 “102. From the above discussion and for the reasons stated I. That the observations of this Court in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1 SCC 15 Megha Singh v. State of Haryana 11 SCC 709 and State by Inspector of Police NIB Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam Court on the ground that as the informant and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be confined to their own facts. It cannot be said that in the aforesaid decisions this Court laid down any general proposition of law that in each and every case where the informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the II. In a case where the informant himself is the investigator by that itself cannot be said that the like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore merely because the informant is the Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab 17 11. We therefore see no reason to draw any adverse inference statutory mandates and non­examination of independent the High Court to be factually incorrect or legally irrelevant basis for concluding bias. The appellants have at no stage claimed that there existed any enmity or other motive for the Further such a huge quantity of charas could not have been and that reason alone is sufficient not to hold them guilty prosecution has established the guilt “beyond reasonable doubt”. A tainted investigation by a complaint who is a “witness” himself to a substantial ingredient of an offence case can be established on the parameter of “beyond 19. A person accused of criminal offence punishable with a peril to his life or liberty enjoys certain rights under the jurisprudence. Any action which impinges or affects those in the case of Rafiq Ahmad v. State of U.P. 8 SCC 300 and the standards of proof. It is observed in the said decision that whenever a plea of prejudice is raised by the accused it must be examined with reference to the above rights and safeguards as it is the violation of these rights alone that may result in the weakening of the case of the prosecution and benefit to the accused in accordance with 13. At the outset we may clarify that the observations relied upon by the appellants are not findings conclusion or resolution and improbable but it escapes our comprehension how non­ same incident does not carry any weight. We may firstly clarify that the expression “reasonable doubt” is a well­defined accused. These words are inbuilt measures to ensure that reasonable doubts are removed from the mind of an ordinary 15. This Court in K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the to make out a case where two reasonable conclusions can be 16. Secondly it is useful to point out that in their respective 4 1 SCC 355 that when they were coming after visiting a temple “a person vehicle and in the meanwhile third person fled away from the being carried by an unknown stranger who had mysteriously stopped by the police is ex­facie fanciful and is without even a bolsters the prosecution case. The appellants effectively have ended up admitting that they were present on the spot some sufficient cause to stop the vehicle and that such search was based not on any prior information but was spontaneous and 17. Reliance can also not be placed on Karam Chand’s4 SCC 350