Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now therefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given moment; and that most movements are incomplete and specifically different, since the whence and whither constitute different species.
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a kind of “whole.”
From these considerations then it is plain that people are not warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation: because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as are divisible and not “wholes:” I mean that of an act of Sight there is no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one of these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there Movement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, “a whole.”
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.
And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good; just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a healthy state.
And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
1175 a
Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people at their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or sensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which discerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working: because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that which is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result follows naturally.
How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that he wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because that follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which please when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the same reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these Objects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing stedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the kind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects Life, which is itself choiceworthy. (We will take leave to omit the question whether we choose Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for Life’s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working, and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.)
And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind, because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues, and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do the Pleasures which perfect them.
This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a greater degree of nicety; for instance, those men become geometricians who take Pleasure in geometry, and they apprehend particular points more completely: in like manner men who are fond of music, or architecture, or anything else, improve each on his own pursuit, because they feel Pleasure in them. Thus the Pleasures aid in increasing the Workings, and things which do so aid are proper and peculiar: but the things which are proper and peculiar to others specifically different are themselves also specifically different.
Yet even more clearly may this be shown from the fact that the Pleasures arising from one kind of Workings hinder other Workings; for instance, people who are fond of flute-music cannot keep their attention to conversation or discourse when they catch the sound of a flute; because they take more Pleasure in flute-playing than in the Working they are at the time engaged on; in other words, the Pleasure attendant on flute-playing destroys the Working of conversation or discourse. Much the same kind of thing takes place in other cases, when a person is engaged in two different Workings at the same time: that is, the pleasanter of the two keeps pushing out the other, and, if the disparity in pleasantness be great, then more and more till a man even ceases altogether to work at the other.
This is the reason why, when we are very much pleased with anything whatever, we do nothing else, and it is only when we are but moderately pleased with one occupation that we vary it with another: people, for instance, who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the performance is indifferent.
Since then the proper and peculiar Pleasure gives accuracy to the Workings and makes them more enduring and better of their kind, while those Pleasures which are foreign to them mar them, it is plain there is a wide difference between them: in fact, Pleasures foreign to any Working have pretty much the same effect as the Pains proper to it, which, in fact, destroy the Workings; I mean, if one man dislikes writing, or another calculation, the one does not write, the other does not calculate; because, in each case, the Working is attended with some Pain: so then contrary effects are produced upon the Workings by the Pleasures and Pains proper to them, by which I mean those which arise upon the Working, in itself, independently of any other circumstances. As for the Pleasures foreign to a Working, we have said already that they produce a similar effect to the Pain proper to it; that is they destroy the Working, only not in like way.
Well then, as Workings differ from one another in goodness and badness, some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in their nature indifferent, Pleasures are similarly related; since its own proper Pleasure attends or each Working: of course that proper to a good Working is good, that proper to a bad, bad: for even the desires for what is noble are praiseworthy, and for what is base blameworthy.
Furthermore, the Pleasures attendant on Workings are more closely connected with them even than the desires after them: for these last are separate both in time and nature, but the former are close to the Workings, and so indivisible from them as to raise a question whether the Working and the Pleasure are identical; but Pleasure does not seem to be an Intellectual Operation nor a Faculty of Perception, because that is absurd; but yet it gives some the impression of being the same from not being separated from these.
As then the Workings are different so are their Pleasures; now Sight differs from Touch in purity, and Hearing and Smelling from Taste; therefore, in like manner, do their Pleasures; and again, Intellectual Pleasures from these Sensual, and the different kinds both of Intellectual and Sensual from one another.
It is thought, moreover, that each animal has a Pleasure proper to itself, as it has a proper Work; that Pleasure of course which is attendant on the Working.  So then the Pleasures of animals specifically different are also specifically different, but those of the same, we may reasonably suppose, are without difference.
Yet in the case of human creatures they differ not a little: for the very same things please some and pain others: and what are painful and hateful to some are pleasant to and liked by others. The same is the case with sweet things: the same will not seem so to the man in a fever as to him who is in health: nor will the invalid and the person in robust health have the same notion of warmth. The same is the case with other things also.
Now in all such cases that is held to be which impresses the good man with the notion of being such and such; and if this is a second maxim (as it is usually held to be), and Virtue, that is, the Good man, in that he is such, is the measure of everything, then those must be real Pleasures which gave him the impression of being so and those things pleasant in which he takes Pleasure. Nor is it at all astonishing that what are to him unpleasant should give another person the impression of being pleasant, for men are liable to many corruptions and marrings; and the things in question are not pleasant really, only to these particular persons, and to them only as being thus disposed.
Well of course, you may say, it is obvious that we must assert those which are confessedly disgraceful to be real Pleasures, except to depraved tastes: but of those which are thought to be good what kind, or which, must we say is The Pleasure of Man? is not the answer plain from considering the Workings, because the Pleasures follow upon these?
Whether then there be one or several Workings which belong to the perfect and blessed man, the Pleasures which perfect these Workings must be said to be specially and properly The Pleasures of Man; and all the rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees according as the Workings are related to those highest and best ones.
VI
Now that we have spoken about the Excellences of both kinds, and Friendship in its varieties, and Pleasures, it remains to sketch out Happiness, since we assume that to be the one End of all human things: and we shall save time and trouble by recapitulating what was stated before.
1176b] Well then, we said that it is not a State merely; because, if it were, it might belong to one who slept all his life through and merely vegetated, or to one who fell into very great calamities: and so, if these possibilities displease us and we would rather put it into the rank of some kind of Working (as was also said before), and Workings are of different kinds (some being necessary and choiceworthy with a view to other things, while others are so in themselves), it is plain we must rank Happiness among those choiceworthy for their own sakes and not among those which are so with a view to something further: because Happiness has no lack of anything but is self-sufficient.
By choiceworthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be the actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellent is one of those things which are choiceworthy for their own sake alone.
And again, such amusements as are pleasant; because people do not choose them with any further purpose: in fact they receive more harm than profit from them, neglecting their persons and their property. Still the common run of those who are judged happy take refuge in such pastimes, which is the reason why they who have varied talent in such are highly esteemed among despots; because they make themselves pleasant in those things which these aim at, and these accordingly want such men.
Now these things are thought to be appurtenances of Happiness because men in power spend their leisure herein: yet, it may be, we cannot argue from the example of such men: because there is neither Virtue nor Intellect necessarily involved in having power, and yet these are the only sources of good Workings: nor does it follow that because these men, never having tasted pure and generous Pleasure, take refuge in bodily ones, we are therefore to believe them to be more choiceworthy: for children too believe that those things are most excellent which are precious in their eyes.
We may well believe that as children and men have different ideas as to what is precious so too have the bad and the good: therefore, as we have many times said, those things are really precious and pleasant which seem so to the good man: and as to each individual that Working is most choiceworthy which is in accordance with his own state to the good man that is so which is in accordance with Virtue.
Happiness then stands not in amusement; in fact the very notion is absurd of the End being amusement, and of one’s toiling and enduring hardness all one’s life long with a view to amusement: for everything in the world, so to speak, we choose with some further End in view, except Happiness, for that is the End comprehending all others. Now to take pains and to labour with a view to amusement is plainly foolish and very childish: but to amuse one’s self with a view to steady employment afterwards, as Anacharsis says, is thought to be right: for amusement is like rest, and men want rest because unable to labour continuously.
Rest, therefore, is not an End, because it is adopted with a view to Working afterwards.
1177a] Again, it is held that the Happy Life must be one in the way of Excellence, and this is accompanied by earnestness and stands not in amusement. Moreover those things which are done in earnest, we say, are better than things merely ludicrous and joined with amusement: and we say that the Working of the better part, or the better man, is more earnest; and the Working of the better is at once better and more capable of Happiness.
Then, again, as for bodily Pleasures, any ordinary person, or even a slave, might enjoy them, just as well as the best man living but Happiness no one supposes a slave to share except so far as it is implied in life: because Happiness stands not in such pastimes but in the Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before.
VII
Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence of course that Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the best Principle. Whether then this best Principle is Intellect or some other which is thought naturally to rule and to lead and to conceive of noble and divine things, whether being in its own nature divine or the most divine of all our internal Principles, the Working of this in accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness.
That it is Contemplative has been already stated: and this would seem to be consistent with what we said before and with truth: for, in the first place, this Working is of the highest kind, since the Intellect is the highest of our internal Principles and the subjects with which it is conversant the highest of all which fall within the range of our knowledge.
Next, it is also most Continuous: for we are better able to contemplate than to do anything else whatever, continuously.
Again, we think Pleasure must be in some way an ingredient in Happiness, and of all Workings in accordance with Excellence that in the way of Science is confessedly most pleasant: at least the pursuit of Science is thought to contain Pleasures admirable for purity and permanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more pleasant to those who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking for, it.
And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to the Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are needed alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to practise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected self-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man of science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the more entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so: it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is certainly most Self-Sufficient.
1177b] Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since nothing results from it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas from all things which are objects of moral action we do mean to get something beside the doing them, be the same more or less.
Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest; for we toil that we may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the Practical Virtues require either society or war for their Working, and the actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war entirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war’s sake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make enemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and bloodshed. The Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest, and, beside the actual work of government, seeks for power and dignities or at least Happiness for the man himself and his fellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct the national Happiness which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.
If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those of policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these are restless, and aim at some further End and are not choiceworthy for their own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase the Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of rest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity of human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness, plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if attaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.
But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine compared with man’s ordinary life.
1178a] Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man’s affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.
In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man’s “Self,” since it is supreme and above all others in goodness it would be absurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some other.
And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man the life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is most truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.
VIII
And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of justice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in contracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and feelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these plainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral character is thought to result in some points from physical circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the passions.
Again, Practical Wisdom and Excellence of the Moral character are very closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in accordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord with Practical Wisdom.
These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite nature are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and Happiness which is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure Intellect is separate and distinct: and let this suffice upon the subject, since great exactness is beyond our purpose,
It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as necessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to need them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of thing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come to consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.
I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with, and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of wishing to do justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform any of the actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else how shall he or any of the others display his real character?
1178b
(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice or the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both: it is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but for the actions many things are required, and the greater and more numerous they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in Contemplative Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his Working, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the Contemplation at least; because of course in so far as he is Man and lives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will need such things for maintaining his character as Man though not as a speculative philosopher.
And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of Moral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and meeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to whom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have money or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions would appear trivial and unworthy of gods.
Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative Speculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest capacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.
A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such Working.
To the gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as there is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none is happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.
Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative Speculation because it is in itself precious.
So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity, because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all kinds.
1179a] However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may act in accordance with Virtue.
And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are thought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even more: it will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man as is necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance with Virtue.
Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act as they ought.
Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted a strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by outward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.
And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in matters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the preceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and when they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at variance with them conceive of them as mere theories.
Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of mind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves (and this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite with kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying observance to what is dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is quite obvious that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the same time most Happy.
Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.
IX
Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure; are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever other means there are of becoming good.
Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.
Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter by words what has been of old taken into men’s very dispositions: and, it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.
The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature’s part, be it what it may, obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest sense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,
Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not avail with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to have been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought; just as the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in obedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him, nor, if he heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform? in fact, generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to brute force. So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity to Virtue in the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable and loath what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue from the earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws of such kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not pleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this reason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the subject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will not be disagreeable.
1180 a ] Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and become accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to man’s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine, respecting one’s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense of honour.
And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the sense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion that they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they should impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are of less promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason; and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in check, like beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the pains should be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are liked.
As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought up and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good institutions, and never do what is low and mean, either against or with his will. Now these objects can be attained only by men living in accordance with some guiding Intellect and right order, with power to back them.
As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or some one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a declaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people feel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however rightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of hatred, though enforcing right rules.
The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.
Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a public matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to devolve upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with his own children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and purpose: and this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be best able to do by making a Legislator of himself: since all public *[Sidenote: 1180 b ] systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and those are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are written or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one or many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not in music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are gained by practice.
For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in the latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred: for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are naturally obedient to the authority which controls them.
Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in the case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who is in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case, perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration, the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.
It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what is expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or gymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better for being acquainted with general rules; as, “that so and so is good for all, or for men in such and such cases:” because general maxims are not only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this is no reason against the possibility of a man’s taking excellent care of some one case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but from experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point; just as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they would be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem to be necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real artist and well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have recourse to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for we have already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.
If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality of laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care and training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat skilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what any ordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in the healing art, and all others which involve careful practice and skill.
1181 a ] Will not then our next business be to inquire from what sources, or how one may acquire this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as in similar cases, Statesmen are the people to learn from, since this faculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not admit that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean, that while in all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert them are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them practises it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might be more to their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly), nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.
One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could, seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their communities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their dearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.
Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition; merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made Statesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would acquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.
But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way off from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature and objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same footing with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have conceived it to be “an easy matter to legislate by simply collecting such laws as are famous because of course one could select the best,” as though the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging aright a very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have practical knowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or understand with what means and in what way they are accomplished, and what harmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being able to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.
1181 b ] Now laws may be called the performances or tangible results of Political Science; how then can a man acquire from these the faculty of Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see men made physicians by compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only the cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in each case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, these are thought to be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessional useless. In like manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions would be exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and judge what is well, and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with what others: but they who without this qualification should go through such matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by instinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.
Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the subject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate it ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what we may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.
First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there may be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities we have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy Communities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some are well and others ill managed, for after such inquiry, we shall be the better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of Constitution is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and what laws and customs.
To this let us now proceed.
Notes
P 2, l. 16. For this term, as here employed, our language contains no equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.
There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication “The science of Society,” and this includes everything which can bear at all upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, “Quicquid agunt homines nostri est farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.
The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric (1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each, and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and most complete development.
The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
P 3, l. 23. Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and wisest man of one’s acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a difficult case of conduct.
Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.
P 3, l. 35. In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, [Greek: pantachothen].
P 4, l. 30. [Greek: ‘Archae] is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all its various uses.
“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term the initiative being a property of Rule.
“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means “starting-point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve ([Greek: ou eneka]), and that of Action ([Greek: othen ae kenaesis]). I desire praise of men this then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning of Action.
The beginnings of Resolve, ‘[Greek: Archai] or Motives, when formally stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the [Greek: sullagismoi ton prakton], i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.
Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
Whatever gains human praise is to be done;
Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:
[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.
The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
P. 5, l 1. The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima aplos]
I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively what is and what may be known. All truth is [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek: gnorima aemin] which we have received as true . From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask.
But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin]
Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition”
The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai] occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”
Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
P 6, l. 1. Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25, [Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton krisei]
P 6, l. 11. [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
P 6, l. 13. A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because containing miscellaneous questions.
P 6, l. 15. It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek: theoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without the trouble of self-discipline.
P 6, l. 22. Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on them.”
P. 8, l. 1. The list ran thus—
[Greek:
to peras to apeiron | to euthu
to perisson to artion | to phos
to en to plethos | to tetragonon
to dexion to aristeron | to aeremoun
to arren to thelu | to agathon
]
P 8, l. 2. Plato’s sister’s son.
P 9, l. 9. This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way of stating facts, and leads to no action.
P. 10, l. 34. i.e. the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.
P. 11, l. 11. i.e. without the capability of addition.
P. 11, l. 14. And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an eiae o meta tenos ton kath’ auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]
P. 12, l. 9. i.e. as working or as quiescent.
P. 13, 1. 14. This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations, in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
P. 13, l. 19. Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses. “Fire burns,” is an instance of the former, “Treason is odious,” of the latter.
P. 14, l. 27. I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this word, because though “habitus” may be equivalent to all the senses of [Greek: exis], “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial usage we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.
P. 14, l. 35. Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however, that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the passage seems more completely brought out.
P. 15 l. 16. “Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its object present, and pleasure continually result.
P. 15, l. 32. In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].
P. 16, l. 18. It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other reasons why we should think with him.
P. 16, l. 26. This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.
P. 17, l. 3. But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?
P. 18, l. 6. The supposed pair of ancestors.
P. 18, l. 12. Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.” He must mean either, The man when dead is happy (a), or, The man when dead may be said to have been happy (b). If the former, does he mean positive happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness ([Greek: B])? We cannot allow (a), Men’s opinions disallow ([Greek: B]), We revert now to the consideration of (b).
P. 18, l. 36. The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.
P. 20, l. 12. The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of course, dressed his actors for their parts; not according to their fancies or his own.
Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable paraphrase on this.
“Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work, rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what their station and place asketh, though they have no more.”
P. 20, l. 18. Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one stay.”
P. 20, l. 11. The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends: and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.
P. 21, l. 18. This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are either so in esse or in posse .
If in esse , they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Those in posse , here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support villainy. Money in like way.
P. 22, l. 4. Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.
P. 22, l. 13. See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.
P. 24, l. 23. The unseen is at least as real as the seen.
P. 24, l. 29. The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail over his reason and previous good resolutions.
By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek: sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and the man in it [Greek: akolastos].
P. 25, l. 2. This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person’s [Greek: logos] for one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical truths as part of the mental furniture, i.e. knowing them.
P 25, l. 16. [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the latter, but only for exerting and using the former.
P. 26, l. 2. Which we call simply virtue.
P. 26, l. 4. For nature must of course supply the capacity.
P. 26, l. 18. Or “as a simple result of nature.”
P. 28, l. 12. This is done in the Sixth Book.
P. 28, l. 21. It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit. P. 29, l. 32. The words [Greek: akolastos] and [Greek: deilos] are not used here in their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice the [Greek: enkrates] necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions which are a real part of his nature, though this pain will grow less and less as he nears the point of [Greek: sophrosyne] or perfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then, and then only, cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary to the formation of true courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.
P. 30, l. 18. Virtue consists in the due regulation of all the parts of our nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that “passive impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition.” If musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say, Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant . See on this point Bishop Butler’s fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline in the first part of his Analogy.
P. 32, l. 16. I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our word act is so commonly interchanged with action . [Greek: Praxis] (action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be good though the [Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error), but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] right . No repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above, sect. 11. “And in like manner as habits belonging to the body,” etc.
P. 32, l. 32. Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue, Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].
P. 33, l. 15. That is, not for merely having them, because we did not make ourselves.
See Bishop Butler’s account of our nature as containing “particular propensions,” in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in the Preface to the Sermons. P. 34, l. 14. This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.
P. 34, l. 27. Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or vice versa , 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.
P. 36, l. 3. The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide, but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go out of himself for direction.
P. 37, l. 8. This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a viva voce lecture than a set formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.
P. 37,1. 23. Afterwards defined as “All things whose value is measured by money”
P. 38, l. 8. We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by Horace’s use of the term hiatus :
A P 138] “Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning hiatus ; the transference to the present subject is easy.
P. 38, l. 22. In like manner we talk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable.
P. 40, l. 3. An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
P. 41, l. 9. That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.
P. 42, l. 22. “[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then: preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this passage.
P. 42, l. 31. That is, you must allow for the recoil ."Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.”
P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.
The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.
This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself, he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.”
P. 43, l. 20. [Greek: Aisthesis] is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”
P. 46, l. 16. A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because “particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter of this Book.
P. 47, l. 7. Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)
P. 47, l. 7. Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of i.e. incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have been depraved, i.e. shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to be impaired.
P. 48, l. 18. [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are [Greek: eneka] that result.
From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce, these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, but designed causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or final cause.
It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own Motive of action.
When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek: eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of [Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King’s death was in fact the result , but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
P. 48, l. 22 Bishop Butler would agree to this he says of settled deliberate anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment.
P. 48, l 23. Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he that lusteth to live?”
P. 48, l 28. The meaning is, that the onus probandi is thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a prima facie case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a mere petitio principii . I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
P. 50, l ii. i.e. on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character, opinions are in general signs of character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.
“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”
P. 53, 1. 4. The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.
P. 53, 1. 17. Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta], the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
P. 53, 1. 22. Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface to the Sermons.
P. 53, 1. 33. These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].
The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
P. 54, 1. 18. Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho einai agathon)]
P 56, 1. 34. A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy, First Part, chap 11.
P 58, 1. 14. Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances we will have to act under.
P. 59, 1. 19. “Moral Courage” is our phrase.
P 61, 1. 6. The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.
“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage, i.e. Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour.”
P 62, 1. 14. For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.
P 63, 1. 11. This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
P 63, 1. 19. See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
P 63, 1. 24. Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in vanos tumultus gens.
P. 64, 1. 5. In Coronea in Boeotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek: politika] Coroneans.
P. 64, 1. 9. By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.
P. 68, 1. 8. The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].
P. 97, 1. 2. Perhaps “things which reflect credit on them” as on page 95.
P. 100, 1. 12. Book VII.
P. 101, 1. 11. Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.
P. 102, 1. 1. But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.
P. 102, 1. 6. Things are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is close therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being applied to a term and not to its various significates.
P. 102, 1. 24. See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai tagatha k.t.l.]
P. 104, 1. 10. A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to his own person.
P. 105, 1. 5. See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
P. 105, 1. 31. Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particular i.e. as whole to part. There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.
P. 106, 1. 19. There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so therefore pro tanto is he.
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does the facts of a good man but for the perfection of his own individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.
P. 107, 1. 17. Terms used for persons.
P. 107, 1. 34. By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by [Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
P 108, 1 14. The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be settled); then,
A • B . 400 600.
A 400 : . B 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).
A+400 : B+600 : : A • B. This represents the actual distribution; its fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
P. 109, 1. 10. i.e. Corrective Justice is wrought out by subtraction from the wrong doer and addition to the party injured.
P. 110, 1. 3. Her Majesty’s “Justices.”
P. 111, 1. 1. I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they made the best sense.
P. 111, 1. 8. This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words.
P 111, 1. 27. This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another against the office.
P. 112, 1. 5. [Greek:——] denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.
P. 113, 1. 33. The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most valuable, and vice versa .
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at [Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares as between the persons, i.e. the ratio of equality.
If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1 house.
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house— wrong .
——- ——- 100 pr. shoes : 1 house— right
——- ——- 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house— wrong .
P. 185, l. 30. Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of injury.
P. 116, l. 18. In a pure democracy men are absolutely, i.e. numerically, equal, in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
P. 118, l. 8. Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek: kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], i.e. “we admit there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc. With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not only does but naturally may vary.”
P. 118, l. 33. Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment. Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act materially unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See the note on page 32, l. 16.
P. 121, l. 13. “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
P. 121, l. 19. This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast gives it as follows:
“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the aggressor], but the other does not.”
P. 122, l.18. As when a man is “ justified at the Grass Market,” i.e. hung. P. 125, 1. 36. Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.
P. 128,1 24. The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but one party.
P, 129, 1. 25. So in the Politics, 1. 2. Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev. Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy of Conscience.
P. 130, 1. 8. I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for instance, in a building.
P. 131, 1 8. Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.
P. 131, 1. 13. One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common language, he has a turn for Mathematics, i e something in his mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the bump denoting this aptitude.
P. 131, 1. 21. And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.” See the description of apetae II. 5.
P. 131, 1. 33. praxis is here used in its strict and proper meaning.
P. 131,1. 34. That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.
The question at issue always is, Is this Good? because the Will is only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always Aye or No , and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former case, and retracted in the later.
So far as what must take place in every Moral Action, right or wrong, the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a good Moral Choice, i e. . a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye when it ought.
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.
P. 132, l. 9. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 133, l. 6. The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself ([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]), non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods ([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to act ([Greek: phronesis]), or with a view to make ([Greek: techne]).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]), or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]), Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)
P. 133, l. 20. The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe the feet of someone and the price to be paid, i.e. the produce of his industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his production is subordinate to Moral Action.
P. 133, l. 23. It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason. The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general, fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
P. 133, l. 24. It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
P. 133, l. 27. Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term in the middle ( i.e. proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1) through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course, from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance. All Magnets attract iron \ A B C are Magnets | Presupposed Syllogism reasoning A B C attract iron. / from an universal.
A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)
All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive faculty)
All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)
Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C attract iron.
But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says in the same place that for this reason we must conceive ([Greek: noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above) as composed of all the Individuals.
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity depends entirely upon the quality of the particular mind which performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss literally false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction as the term is used by Aristotle , Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
P 133 1 32. The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)
P 134 1 12. This is the test of correct logical division, that the membra dividentia shall be opposed, i.e. not included the one by the other. P. 134, l. 13. The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and [Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, 1. vi.
P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.
P. 135, l. 5. Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta pepaideumenos] of Book I. chap. 1.
P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and “Conscience and Self-Love, if we understand our true happiness , always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.
And again:
“If by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.
P. 136, l. 6. See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to ommati touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.] vii. 9.—[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii. 7 ad finem . [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]
P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.
P. 136, l. 17. He would be a better Chymist who should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.” P. 137, l. 13. The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put wisdom and understanding to know how to work all manner of work for the service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i.
P. 137 l. 27. [Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies. It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being [Greek:——]. There are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek Philosophy, [Greek:——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.
P 137, l. 29. [Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——] would be its chief Instrument.
P. 138, l. 16. The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——].
P. 139, l. 16. In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is employed there will be general principles, and the application of them, but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
P. 139, l. 27. [Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)
P. 139, l. 32. Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is [Greek:——] proper) or not-Self, i.e. either one’s family=[Greek:——], or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and subordinate are distinguished, the former is [Greek:——], the latter [Greek:——] proper, whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.
P. 140, l. 16. But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in fact of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence i.e. love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
P. 140, l. 17. More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.
P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1. chap. viii.)
P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense, “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.
P. 141, l. 25. The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun. The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.
P. 141, l. 34.  19. The End does not sanctify the Means.
P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right means to the Grand End of all. P. 142,1. 34. The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron], but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that [Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
P. 143,1 27. We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
P. 144, 1 i. Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action. [Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis, gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End? he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others? he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]?
P. 144, 1. 7. See note, on p. 140.
P 144 1.19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous], i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
P. 144, 1. 25. i.e. of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
P 144,1 27. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss ( i.e. by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done,
This is pleasant,
This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, i.e. on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss. Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5. P. 145, l. 4. The consequentia is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and therefore , etc.
P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]
{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],
{ [Greek: to de sæmantikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
P. 146, l. 11. Healthiness is the formal cause of health.
Medicine is the efficient.
See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
P. 146, l. 17. [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown in obiter , not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
P. 147, l. 6. The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
P. 147, l. 13. See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
“This particular action is———.”
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
P. 147, l. 19. “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici.
P. 147, l. 26. The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
P. 147, l. 30. Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].
P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it. P. 152, 1. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men may be than what they are . In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
P. 152, 1. 17. This illustrates the expression, “ Deceits of the Flesh.”
P. 156, 1. 12. Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, i.e. if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction.”
P. 158, 1. 4. Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——]
P. 158, 1. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
P 158, 1. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”
P. 159, 1. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise, it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that “this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the major i.e. the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——] tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:——], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own premise “This is sweet,” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle (‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”
The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that [Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo
Discite, non inter lances mensasque nitentes
Verum hic impransi mecum disquirite
Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it is red,” etc. P. 160, l. 2. [Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it.
P. 161, l. 16. The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I chap v sect. iv.
P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
P. 165, l. 4 Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on Resentment.
P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,
[Footnote: [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
Actions of Lust are more unjust
P. 168, l. 3. [Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker, because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.
I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek: malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not [Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.
The [Greek: akolastos] deliberately pursues pleasure and declines pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly.
Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be fitly given respectively.
P. 169, l. 29. “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to Young Men (Sermon xii.)
P. 170, 1. 6. Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and note on page 128.
P. 171, 1. 17. Let a man be punctual on principle to any one engagement in the day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
P. 172, 1. 21. Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of note on p. 129.
P. 179, 1. 4. Abandoning Bekker’s punctuation and reading [Greek: mae agathon], yields a better sense.
“Why will he want it on the supposition that it is not good? He can live even with Pain because,” etc.
P. 179, 1. 25. [Greek: pheugei] may be taken perhaps as equivalent to [Greek: pheugouoi] and so balance [Greek: chairouoi]. But compare Chapter VIII (Bekker).
P. 183, 1. 6. “Owe no man anything, but to love one another for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the Law .” Romans XIII. 8.
P. 183, I. 20. [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod, [Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
P. 184, I. 33. In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she
“two stone bottles found,
To hold the liquor that she loved ,
And keep it safe and sound.”
P. 187, 1. 24. Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.
P. 192, 1. 34. The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he bestows, but the Good man can feel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.
P. 195, 1. 12. See note on page 68, 1. 8.
P. 202, 1. 28. See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].
P. 203, 1. 35. “For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.” P. 206, 1. 10. Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
P. 217, 1. 10. “Neither the Son of man, that He should repent .” Numbers xxiii. 19.
“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.” Whately, Logic, iii. 10.
P. 218, 1. 17. “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix’t Contemplations, viii.)
P. 235, 1. 14. See note, p. 43.
P. 235, 1. 24. See Book II. chap. ix.
P. 237, 1. 3. See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
P. 238, 1. 2. The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its participation in that.
P. 238, 1. 9. See note on page 136, 1. 15.
P. 238, 1. 24. Movement is, according to Aristotle, of six kinds: [sidenote:Categories, chap xi.]From not being to being . . . . Generation
From being to not being . . . . Destruction
From being to being more . . . . Increase
From being to being less . . . . Diminution
From being here to being there . . Change of Place
From being in this way to being in that Alteration
P. 238, 1 31. A may go to sleep quicker than B , but cannot do more sleep in a given time.
P. 239, 1. 3. Compare Book III. chap. vi. [Greek: osper kai epi ton somaton, k. t. l.]
P. 241, 1. 6. Which is of course a [Greek: genesis].
P. 241, 1. 9. That is, subordinate Movements are complete before the whole Movement is. P. 242, 1. 7. Pleasure is so instantaneous a sensation, that it cannot be conceived divisible or incomplete; the longest continued Pleasure is only a succession of single sparks, so rapid as to give the appearance of a stream, of light.
P. 245, 1. 18. A man is as effectually hindered from taking a walk by the [Greek: allotria haedouae] of reading a novel, as by the [Greek: oikeia lupae] of gout in the feet.
P. 249, 1. 12. I have thus rendered [Greek: spoudae (ouk agnoon to hamartanomenon)]; but, though the English term does not represent the depth of the Greek one, it is some approximation to the truth to connect an earnest serious purpose with Happiness.
P. 250, 1. 12. Bishop Butler, contra (Sermon XV.).
“Knowledge is not our proper Happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it, which is the entertainment of the mind.” The two statements may however be reconciled. Aristotle may be well understood only to mean, that the pursuit of knowledge will be the pleasanter, the freer it is from the minor hindrances which attend on learning .
Footnote P. 250, 1. 30. The clause immediately following indicates that Aristotle felt this statement to be at first sight startling, Happiness having been all the way through connected with [Greek: energeia], but the statement illustrates and confirms what was said in note on page 6, 1. 15.
P. 251, 1. 7. That is to say, he aims at producing not merely a happy aggregate, but an aggregate of happy individuals. Compare what is said of Legislators in the last chapter of Book I and the first of Book II.
P. 252, 1. 22. See note, page 146, 1. 17.