6.5: Kinetic Art (1950s – 1960s)
Introduction
Op Art produced static images which gave the impression of movement. Kinetic art moved through mechanical methods and motors or viewer interaction, using natural air currents in space. The forerunner to kinetic art is found in the simplicity of Duchamp's bicycle in unplanned freewheeling motion. Kinetic art became well-known after World War II and an exhibition in 1955 in Paris entitled Le Mouvement. Mobiles , originated by Alexander Calder, was a typical style of kinetic art. They were suspended in the air and moved as air flowed. Mobiles were not solid structures; instead, they were made of pieces balanced by structural elements and brought a new perception of dimensional art beyond sculptures. Calder believed kinetic art strove to "lift the figures and scenery off the page and prove undeniably that art is not rigid." [1]
Kinetic art also examined the intersections between the mechanics of science and the beauty of art based on the ideas of three-dimensional sculptural movement. Most of the kinetic artists based their work on mechanized movements, using a machine to create motion. Jean Tinguely was one of the early artists who collected paraphernalia, which he attached into a whimsical object and set in motion with a motor. Artists used elements of Dadaism, reclaiming found objects to use in their sculptures and putting them in motion by mechanized means or air currents.
Alexander Calder
Alexander Calder (1898-1976) was born in Pennsylvania, his family well-known artists. His grandfather, Alexander Milne Calder, created the immense William Penn statue in Philadelphia, and his father, Alexander Stirling Calder, was a sculptor who produced multiple public sculptures. Calder's mother was a portrait artist. When his father was diagnosed with tuberculosis, the family moved to Arizona in 1905 and then to California. At the Calder home in Pasadena, the young Calder set up his first studio using wire to make doll jewelry for his sister. The family moved between New York and California, although Calder stayed in California to complete high school. Because his parents were opposed to him pursuing art, he majored in mechanical engineering at the Stevens Institute of Technology, and in 1919, he became a hydraulic engineer after graduation. After visiting his sister in Washington, he was inspired by the mountains and returned to New York and study art. To expand his knowledge, he went to Paris to study, became part of the intellectual scene, and made friends with other artists, including Joan Miró and Marcel Duchamp. Initially, he created abstract paintings, soon learning he preferred sculpture and the dimensions over flat painting. After he met his future wife, they married in 1931 and lived in Connecticut with their two children. In 1963, he moved back to France, always inspired by the French countryside. He generally gave his works French names, irrespective of where they were installed.
Calder is known for his uniquely engineered constructions, probably the result of his engineering background. His original sculptures were small, moveable, balanced wood and wire characters. In the late 1930s, Calder began to create larger, abstract sculptures, some of their stationery and others moveable, initially powered by machines before moving to power by air currents. The stationary sculptures on the ground were labeled "stabiles" and those hanging with movement named "mobiles." Calder explained the difference in the terms as; "The mobile has actual movement in itself, while the stabile is back at the old painting idea of implied movement. In the 1960s, he made standing mobiles named "animobiles." When he went anywhere, Calder usually carried some type of wire and pliers, using the wire to "sketch" a form he noticed, much like drawing in air. He made his final sculptures from metal and wire; however, he had to use wood during World War II because the government used all the metal in the war effort. When asked what his favorite color was, he generally replied, red. Black and white were used for differentiation, red the focus. When Calder constructed his works, he always designed a process the sculpture could be shipped and reassembled. He packaged the work in flat packs and included detailed assembly information based on numbers and color codes.
As seen in Black Spray (6.5.1) , Calder's small, hanging mobiles were designed to engage the viewer's senses. The thin black metal and wire pieces create changing shadows on the background, altering each element and its shadow as the air currents arbitrarily moved the pieces. As the metal pieces move, their relationships modify, demonstrating the laws of variation found in life.
In contrast to the thin, delicately balanced mobile is the immense sculpture of Flamingo (6.5.2). The 45.3 metric ton steel sculpture was painted in the color known as "Calder red." Calder wanted to differentiate the sculpture from the background of black and steel buildings. The sculpture is also constructed with broad curves in the juxtaposition of the square and rectangular windows and buildings. The arched forms generated a natural feeling, the curvature of structures so large viewers can walk through and under the form, sensing the scale of the artwork.
In the sculpture Five Empties (6.5.3), Calder named the work after the five voids found in the structure's base, anchored to the ground to form his two different structures; the mobile and the stabile. The two arms provide the pivot for movement as the petals or shapes catch the wind blowing against the colorful, thin, flat surfaces, rotating the arms and petals. When a viewer is standing in the empty spaces, the petals are not visible, seemingly separate pieces, while the petals are seen from afar. Calder made the construction visible in the sculpture with the bolts, rivets, and welding marks, adding texture and interest. The matte paint on the petals contrasts with the shiny arms and branches, compelling the viewer to look at each piece and appreciate its construction. Depending on the speed of the wind, the artwork can look like gentle flowers dancing in the breeze or frantic whirling forms.
The Four Elements (6.5.4) is located in Stockholm and stands 9.1 meters high. Created in 1961 for an exhibition, the work was composed of four separate sculptures, each one containing a motor for movement. Made from metal sheets, the sculptures were painted in distinctive bright colors, defining the different shapes to represent air, water, earth, and fire. However, he did not specify which shape represents a specific element the viewer can choose. Each of the different structures rotates as they move, bringing the four different elements to life. The four parts have a dissimilar focus; the surface and light reflection result from the shapes and colors—the volume of an element changes as it moves through space, bringing the viewer different sides and angles.
Jean Tinguely
Jean Tinguely (1925-1991) was born in Switzerland and lived in Basel as a child, his father a shopkeeper and his mother a maid. At first, he worked as an apprentice decorator where one of the other decorators encouraged him to attend the School of Arts and Crafts in Basel. He learned about Marcel Duchamp, Dadaism, and Constructivism as well as meeting his first wife. He worked as a decorator and started his early wire sculptures. In 1952, they moved to Paris, becoming part of the artist community pursuing unusual pioneering concepts. He was preoccupied with the movement, capabilities, and noises of machines. In 1955, he participated in the exhibition, 'Le Mouvement ,' the first significant demonstration of kinetic art and his sculptural machines defined as 'Méta-Matic.' His concepts satirize automation and manufactured material goods. During the Peinnale de Paris at a museum in Paris, Tinguely displayed a machine, run by a gasoline engine as it moved about, created drawing, sprayed a lily-of-the-valley scent into the air, and inflated a balloon. The machine at the museum marked the sudden rise in his career. During the 1950s, he created multiple machines demonstrating the destructiveness of modern mass production. One machine buried the audience in the paper. Another kinetic work had parts and pieces of a machine spewing out loud, cacophonous noises, and a different display even self-destructed.
In the 1960s, Tinguely changed direction and began to create machines with an emphasis on movements. Cyclograveur (6.5.5) used a bicycle as the primary base and added parts from cars, other bicycles, baby carriages, and even a seat from a motorcycle. He connected the gears and wheels and installed the drawing board located beyond the pedals. A viewer mounted the bicycle seat and pushed the pedals to make the sculpture move, causing the rod to draw on the board. He also added mallets, a drum, and a cymbal to generate clunking, rickety noises, adding to the user's adventure. Tinguely created his works to criticize society's mechanization. A review in the newspaper Volkskrant stated, "the grotesque and utterly useless, but diligently moving constructions, which you bump into here, are trying to be a witty provocation—certainly a challenge to the mechanization of all that is human." [3] He frequently painted his sculptures black bringing a homogeny to the parts.
Requiem pour une feuille morte (6.5.6) was composed of multiple components and pieces mounted on a frame along the wall. He carved each circle from wood and painted the wheels and metal parts black. Then he mounted them along eight different sections for easy assembly.
Tinguely found a large number of wooden models assigned to be burned. He rescued the models to construct the immense structure Méta-Harmonie IV (6.5.7) using the wooden parts, other old wheels, multiple types of small objects he found, percussion instruments, and even a cowbell. He did not use any working drawings; he only constructed a base and added parts. Tinguely made the movements slower and the sounds more muted, punctuated by sharp, quick sounds. He also used the natural color of any of the objects spreading the different colors throughout the structures. Tinguely said, "My contraptions do not make music, my contraptions use sounds and I play with those sounds. I sometimes build sound-mixing machines to mix sounds and then let the sounds go, give them their freedom." [4] Tinguely's large and small rattling machines were revolutionary, bringing not only people into his art but giving them a concert of creaks, thumps, bangs, and clangs. His active art amazed children and adults alike.
Jesús Rafael Soto
Jesús Rafael Soto (1923-2005) was born in Venezuela. As the eldest child, he had to help support his family by painting posters for cinemas, learning to draw portraits along the way. Soto gained the support of a local bishop who helped him obtain a scholarship to the Escuela de Artes Plásticas y Artes Aplicadas. He was able to complete classes in art and art history. In 1950, Soto moved to Paris, experimenting with Cubism and Constructivists and Op Art. Eventually, he became part of the new three-dimensional movement, associating with Jean Tinguely and Victor Vasarely. As spectators moved in front of optical paintings to view movement, Soto wanted the viewer to participate in his work. He created artwork responsive to external changes and reactions in space. Soto started with geometric forms and linear constructions based on more industrial materials of steel, paint, nylon, or synthetics. He wanted to give the viewer an experience founded on the interactions of solid forms and the spaces surrounding the shapes, blurring the differences of certainty and illusion. Circle with Red and Black (6.5.8) is an illusion using thin black lines painted on the wooden background with red and black rods traversing the circle at multiple angles. As the rods disrupt the horizontal lines on the circle, the relationships and balance of the colors change and appear to move.
La Esfera (6.5.9) was formed on a base of white metal to create a frame attached to the cement base. Soto used 1,800 slender, hollow aluminum poles suspended by stainless steel rods only a few millimeters thick. The orange color of the poles gave the sculpture the effect of a large sphere or sun suspended in air, shimmering and changing colors based on sunlight or wind. The sculpture is one of the famous sights in modern-day Caracas.
The Penetrable (6.5.10) was one of Soto's signature series and defined as his most aspirational work. He did not want it to sit in a museum, seen by viewers passing by and untouched.
Instead, he wanted people to touch and walk through the sculpture and physically become part of the artwork (6.5.11). Soto used thousands of yellow polyvinylchloride (PVC) tubes and hung them with wire from the white steel frame. As the viewers traverse through the sculptural tubes, they become part of the artwork. As Soto stated, "My concept of space is very different from that of the Renaissance, where man was in front of space, he was the viewer, the judge of that space...[With] the Penetrable , I reveal that man...is part of space. And this is the sensation of those who enter them, and the feeling of joy and elation that you witness is similar to getting in the water and being completely liberated from gravity." [5] The work appears as a geometric structure. However, it does not have a solid surface. The entire sculpture can be altered by natural elements of the wind and rain or by the viewers themselves. It is a continually changing artwork, inviting to the audience as part of the art.
Naum Gabo
Naum Gabo (1890-1977) was born in Russia, his father was an engineer. Gabo studied at Munich University as a medical and science student, where he discovered abstract art through classes in art history. Gabo moved to Paris to live with his brother, who was an artist. After World War I, he moved back to Moscow, making early constructions from cardboard and wood. He experimented with kinetic artwork based on geometric forms; unfortunately, most of his early work was destroyed. In 1928, in Germany, Gabo taught at the Bauhaus until he fled to London to escape the ascent of the Nazis. After the war, he, his wife, and his daughter emigrated to America and lived in Connecticut. Gabo's work was imaginative and creative based, using his scientific background to construct his innovative sculptures. The sculptures were constructed of multiple materials, including plastics, different metals, large rocks, plexiglass, even fishing lines, and motors to provide movement.
Originally, Gabo constructed a maquette he wanted to create into a full-scale fountain, Revolving Torison (6.5.12). A director from the Tate Gallery presented the concept to a benefactor who consented to fund the project. Gabo designed to fountain to be made from stainless steel. The outer diagonal edges included a series of jets spraying water as the sculpture rotated every ten minutes. The water jets change during the rotation from minimal to maximum spray. At first, Gabo constructed tiny models of monumental sculptures in motion he wanted to create. He also wanted to incorporate materials from the modern era and change the concept of space as spherical instead of angular. He used the idea of spheres and created multiple sculptures with different materials.
One Spheric Theme (6.5.13) was constructed of stainless steel, and the sculpture appears to be continuously curved lines. The sculpture was built with two circles attached with springs to develop depth and the concept of weightlessness.
Constructed Head No. 2 (6.5.14) was based on Gabo's concept of form in space instead of the usual sculptural idea of mass. He used different planes to create the same volume in space as it would in a solid mass, making multiple figures or heads in this way instead of solid mass. Although the forms were fragmented into different planes and parts, he still manipulated the space to create an expressive face. Gabo used galvanized iron, forming them into planes. The figure appears to be looking downwards, the head slouched forward with its hands clasped, almost prayerlike. Based on the light and movement of the viewer, the head changes its emotional perception.
Yaacov Agam
Yaacov Agam (1928-) was born in Rishon LeZion, now a city in Israel, then part of the Mandate Palestine. His father was an Orthodox rabbi, and Agam was educated in the mysticism of the Kabbala, concepts that remained with him throughout his lifetime and influenced his art. Agam was educated at the Bezalel Academy of Art and Design and then moved to Switzerland. In 1951, he settled in France and lives still lives there, a place he married and had three children. Agam loved to experiment and is one of the pioneering artists of kinetic art. He believed all things in conventional art were visible, and he preferred to create the invisible, or experiences one has not yet understood. He stated, "I am not an abstract artist… Abstract art shows a situation on a canvas. I show a state of being which does not exist, the imperceptible absence of an image." [6] Agam's work ranged from immense installations to smaller individual works, all based on the concept of engaging the viewer in the aesthetic experience. The artwork changes depending on where the viewer stands, visual revelations of the three-dimensional installations or agamographs – a series of seemingly static images which transform at different angles. Agam used rainbow colors in their pure form, color establishing the complexity of his work. His work was kinetic, abstract, and frequently included colors, light, and sound, creating an unusual sensory experience. He said of his work, "My intention was to create a work of art which would transcend the visible, which cannot be perceived except in stages, with the understanding that it is a partial revelation and not the perpetuation of the existing." [7]
Eighteen Levels (6.5.16) was constructed on the concept of repetition of a fundamental geometric form, or as Theo Van Doesburg termed it, 'elementarist' forms. In this structure, the straight-line stainless-steel poles rise in progression as the lines are modified on both their axis or an appearing off-center axis, shifting and changing. From one position, the poles appear static; however, the simplest movement by the viewer completely changes the positioning of the poles. Agam used an unpretentious geometric shape of a line to maximize the diversity of change and movement.
The Fire and Wate r (6.5.17) fountain was one of his later sculptures representing unexpected movement by incorporating fire, water, color, and metal, all moving in different patterns. Agam used the colors of the rainbow based on the spiritual belief heaven was represented in the rainbow and was the covenant in God. The sculpture changed if the viewer stood in one position or moved around the fountain as water might be jetted to the left or right, spraying upright or tumbling down. At the same time, fire shot upwards in a huge burst or a soft glow as the layers of the structure moved in different directions, continually changing the colors. Agam believed he brought an added dimension to his work beyond the ordinary three dimensions based on the interrelationships of many movements and transformations occurring simultaneously.
The room at the Elysée Palace in Paris (6.5.18) was commissioned from Agam as the elaborate ground floor of the presidential palace and later moved to the museum. The carpet in the room had 180 colors and a multitude of glass panels in the ceilings and walls. In the middle of the room stood the shiny chrome ball (6.5.19), reflecting the constantly changing colors and patterns of the room depending on the viewer's location. Three walls had lenticular painted slats, while one wall had multi-colored glass doors transporting the light. The viewer was inside the artwork, each viewer creating a different experience at every angle, an infinite number of possibilities. Agam brought his religious beliefs into much of his work, and he thought the room represented the infinity of God, and the elements in the room were abstracted into a unified space.
The kinetic artists brought unique ideas of integrating the concept and capabilities of technology into art, replacing the static forms with dynamic constructions. Kinetic art was a lively movement, thriving for over a decade. Although the unique junk-art style of Tinguely and the mobile art pioneered by Calder eventually faded, the concepts of mobility and integration of technology remain in art today.
[1] Retrieved from https://themadmuseum.co.uk/history-of-kinetic-art/ (17 December 2020)
[2] Retrieved from https://www.tate.org.uk/art/artists/alexander-calder-848/who-is-alexander-calder (30 December 2020)
[3] Retrieved from https://www.bu.edu/sequitur/2016/04/29/schoenberger-tinguely/ (4 January 2021)
[4] Retrieved from https://www.tinguely.ch/en/tinguely/tinguely-biographie.html (4 January 2021)
[5] Retrieved from https://unframed.lacma.org/2020/05/26/lacma-acquires-blue-penetrable-kinetic-artist-jes%C3%BAs-rafael-soto (5 January 2021)
[6] Retrieved from
[7] Retrieved from https://www.lifa-research.org/en/artists/agam/


8.2.E: Biological Macromolecules (Exercises)
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- Tom Buckley
- University of California, Davis
3.1: Synthesis of Biological Macromolecules
Review Questions
Dehydration synthesis leads to formation of
- monomers
- polymers
- water and polymers
- none of the above
- Answer
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C
During the breakdown of polymers, which of the following reactions takes place?
- hydrolysis
- dehydration
- condensation
- covalent bond
- Answer
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A
Free Response
Why are biological macromolecules considered organic?
- Answer
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Biological macromolecules are organic because they contain carbon.
What role do electrons play in dehydration synthesis and hydrolysis?
- Answer
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In a dehydration synthesis reaction, the hydrogen of one monomer combines with the hydroxyl group of another monomer, releasing a molecule of water. This creates an opening in the outer shells of atoms in the monomers, which can share electrons and form covalent bonds.
3.2: Carbohydrates
Review Questions
An example of a monosaccharide is ________.
- fructose
- glucose
- galactose
- all of the above
- Answer
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D
Cellulose and starch are examples of:
- monosaccharides
- disaccharides
- lipids
- polysaccharides
- Answer
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D
Plant cell walls contain which of the following in abundance?
- starch
- cellulose
- glycogen
- lactose
- Answer
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B
Lactose is a disaccharide formed by the formation of a ________ bond between glucose and ________.
- glycosidic; lactose
- glycosidic; galactose
- hydrogen; sucrose
- hydrogen; fructose
- Answer
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B
Free Response
Describe the similarities and differences between glycogen and starch.
- Answer
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Glycogen and starch are polysaccharides. They are the storage form of glucose. Glycogen is stored in animals in the liver and in muscle cells, whereas starch is stored in the roots, seeds, and leaves of plants. Starch has two different forms, one unbranched (amylose) and one branched (amylopectin), whereas glycogen is a single type of a highly branched molecule.
Why is it impossible for humans to digest food that contains cellulose?
- Answer
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The β 1-4 glycosidic linkage in cellulose cannot be broken down by human digestive enzymes. Herbivores such as cows, buffalos, and horses are able to digest grass that is rich in cellulose and use it as a food source because bacteria and protists in their digestive systems, especially in the rumen, secrete the enzyme cellulase. Cellulases can break down cellulose into glucose monomers that can be used as an energy source by the animal.
3.3: Lipids
Review Questions
Saturated fats have all of the following characteristics except:
- they are solid at room temperature
- they have single bonds within the carbon chain
- they are usually obtained from animal sources
- they tend to dissolve in water easily
- Answer
-
D
Phospholipids are important components of ________.
- the plasma membrane of animal cells
- the ring structure of steroids
- the waxy covering on leaves
- the double bond in hydrocarbon chains
- Answer
-
A
Free Response
Explain at least three functions that lipids serve in plants and/or animals.
- Answer
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Fat serves as a valuable way for animals to store energy. It can also provide insulation. Waxes can protect plant leaves and mammalian fur from getting wet. Phospholipids and steroids are important components of animal cell membranes, as well as plant, fungal, and bacterial membranes.
Why have trans fats been banned from some restaurants? How are they created?
- Answer
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Trans fats are created artificially when hydrogen gas is bubbled through oils to solidify them. The double bonds of the cis conformation in the hydrocarbon chain may be converted to double bonds in the trans configuration. Some restaurants are banning trans fats because they cause higher levels of LDL, or “bad” cholesterol.
3.4: Proteins
Review Questions
The monomers that make up proteins are called ________.
- nucleotides
- disaccharides
- amino acids
- chaperones
- Answer
-
C
The α helix and the β -pleated sheet are part of which protein structure?
- primary
- secondary
- tertiary
- quaternary
- Answer
-
B
Free Response
Explain what happens if even one amino acid is substituted for another in a polypeptide chain. Provide a specific example.
- Answer
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A change in gene sequence can lead to a different amino acid being added to a polypeptide chain instead of the normal one. This causes a change in protein structure and function. For example, in sickle cell anemia, the hemoglobin β chain has a single amino acid substitution—the amino acid glutamic acid in position six is substituted by valine. Because of this change, hemoglobin molecules form aggregates, and the disc-shaped red blood cells assume a crescent shape, which results in serious health problems.
Describe the differences in the four protein structures.
- Answer
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The sequence and number of amino acids in a polypeptide chain is its primary structure. The local folding of the polypeptide in some regions is the secondary structure of the protein. The three-dimensional structure of a polypeptide is known as its tertiary structure, created in part by chemical interactions such as hydrogen bonds between polar side chains, van der Waals interactions, disulfide linkages, and hydrophobic interactions. Some proteins are formed from multiple polypeptides, also known as subunits, and the interaction of these subunits forms the quaternary structure.
3.5: Nucleic Acids
Review Questions
A nucleotide of DNA may contain ________.
- ribose, uracil, and a phosphate group
- deoxyribose, uracil, and a phosphate group
- deoxyribose, thymine, and a phosphate group
- ribose, thymine, and a phosphate group
- Answer
-
C
The building blocks of nucleic acids are ________.
- sugars
- nitrogenous bases
- peptides
- nucleotides
- Answer
-
D
Free Response
What are the structural differences between RNA and DNA?
- Answer
-
DNA has a double-helix structure. The sugar and the phosphate are on the outside of the helix and the nitrogenous bases are in the interior. The monomers of DNA are nucleotides containing deoxyribose, one of the four nitrogenous bases (A, T, G and C), and a phosphate group. RNA is usually single-stranded and is made of ribonucleotides that are linked by phosphodiester linkages. A ribonucleotide contains ribose (the pentose sugar), one of the four nitrogenous bases (A,U, G, and C), and the phosphate group.
What are the four types of RNA and how do they function?
- Answer
-
The four types of RNA are messenger RNA, ribosomal RNA, transfer RNA, and microRNA. Messenger RNA carries the information from the DNA that controls all cellular activities. The mRNA binds to the ribosomes that are constructed of proteins and rRNA, and tRNA transfers the correct amino acid to the site of protein synthesis. microRNA regulates the availability of mRNA for translation.


7.8: Grammar- The present and past habitual tense
Structure
| Verb stem | Habitual aspect marker | Present tense | Past tense |
| खा, जा | -ता/-ते/-ती | हूँ, हो, है, हैं | था, थे, थी, थीं |
| Example: |
|
|
Use of Habitual Aspect Marker with Different Subjects
Habitual markers (-ता, -ते, -ती) are used based on the number, person and gender features of the agreeing subject.
| Person | Singular Pronoun |
Habitual markers
Masculine/Feminine |
Plural pronoun |
Habitual markers
Masculine/Feminine |
| 1st | मैं “I” | -ता/-ती | हम “We” | -ते/-ती |
| 2nd | तू “You” | -ता/-ती | NA | |
| तुम “You” | -ते/-ती | तुम (लोग) “You” | -ते/-ती | |
| आप “You” | -ते/-ती | आप (लोग) “You” | -ते/-ती | |
| 3rd | यह/वह “S/he,” and singular noun | -ता/-ती | ये/वे “They,” and plural nouns | -ते/-ती |
Note: When subject of a sentence is of mixed gender please use plural masculine aspect marker.
Negation of Habitual Aspect
In order to change habitual aspect sentences in negative, we use the word नहीं right before the verb. When habitual sentences appear in negative, generally, the verb “to be” in present (हूँ, हो, है, हैं) are dropped. However, in the past form of verb “to be” (था, थे, थी, थीं) are not dropped.
Examples:
- लड़कियां फुटबॉल खेलती हैं | “Girls play football.”
- लड़कियां फुटबॉल नहीं खेलतीं | “Girls do not play football.”
- आप हर दिन अपना कमरा साफ़ करते थे | “You used to clean your room everyday.”
- आप हर दिन अपना कमरा साफ़ नहीं करते थे | “Yo used not to clean your room everyday.”
Note: Please notice the extra nasal dot in negative sentences with subject लड़कियां “girls.” As we drop the verb “to be,” the dot indicates the plural feminine subject in contrast to singular feminine subject.
Uses of Habitual Aspect
(a) To express routine actions
Examples:
- मैं चार बजे जागता हूँ | “I get up at 4 o’clock.”
- मैं पांच बजे चाय पीता हूँ | “I drink tea at 5 o’clock.”
- मैं आठ बजे स्कूल जाता हूँ | “I go to school at 8 o’clock.”
Activity:
Please add five more examples here. After writing your examples please change your sentences in negative and past tense.
| Examples | Negative | Past tense | |
| 1. | |||
| 2. | |||
| 3. | |||
| 4. | |||
| 5. |
(b) To express habitual actions
Examples:
- सीता किताबें पढ़ती है | “Sita reads books.”
- राहुल गिटार बजाता है | “Rahul plays guitar.”
- ऋतिक सिग्रेट पीता है | “Hrithik smokes.”
Activity:
Please add five more examples here. After writing your examples please change your sentences in negative and past tense.
| Examples | Negative | Past tense | |
| 1. | |||
| 2. | |||
| 3. | |||
| 4. | |||
| 5. |
(c) To express permanent actions
Examples:
- पीटर मिशिगन में रहता है | “Peter lives in Michigan.”
- जेन यहाँ काम करती है | “Jen works here.”
- मैं अपने शिक्षक का आदर करता हूँ | “I respect my teacher.”
Activity:
Please add five more examples here. After writing your examples please change your sentences in negative and past tense.
| Examples | Negative | Past tense | |
| 1. | |||
| 2. | |||
| 3. | |||
| 4. | |||
| 5. |
(d) To express general/universal truth.
Examples:
- पृथ्वी सूर्य की परिक्रमा करती है| “The earth revolves around the sun.”
- आम तौर से, गुलाब लाल होते हैं| “Generally, roses are red.”
- मिशिगन में, बर्फ़बारी होती है | “It snows in Michigan.”
Activity:
Please add five more examples here. After writing your examples please change your sentences in negative and past tense.
| Examples | Negative | Past tense | |
| 1. | |||
| 2. | |||
| 3. | |||
| 4. | |||
| 5. |
(e) To narrate a story and to express series of events:
When narrating a story, background information is generally expressed using habitual (imperfective aspect) construction. Whereas, the foreground information is expressed using perfective aspect. Habitual construction (background information) in the story below is highlighted.
Example:
- एक जंगल में एक शेर रहता था| उसी जंगल में, एक चूहा भी रहता था | एक दिन शेर चूहे से कहता कि मैं तुम्हें खा जाऊँगा | चूहा कहता है “मुझे मत खाइए|” एक दिन शिकारी शेर को जाल में फसाता है तब चूहा जाल काटता है| इस तरह चूहा शेर की मदद करता है |
- “A lion lived in a forest. In the same forest, a mouse also lived. One day the lion says to the rats that I will eat you. The Rat says “please don’t eat me.” One day the hunter traps the lion into the net then the rat bites the net. This is how the rat helps the lion.”
(f) To express impersonal sentences
Examples:
- लोग कहते हैं कि … “People say that…”
- (आप) हिन्दी में “flower” कैसे कहते हैं ? How do you say “flower” in Hindi.
- यहाँ अच्छी चाय मिलाती है| Good tea is available here.
Activity:
Please add five more examples here. After writing your examples please change your sentences in negative and past tense.
| Examples | Negative | Past tense | |
| 1. | |||
| 2. | |||
| 3. | |||
| 4. | |||
| 5. |
(g) To express immediate future action by adding adverbs like अभी “right away,” and चलिए “let’s.”
Examples:
- मैं अभी आती हूँ | “I will come right away.”
- चलिए, एक फ़िल्म देखते हैं | “Let’s watch a film.”
- रोओ मत, माँ अभी तुम्हें खाना देती है | “Don’t cry, mother will give you food right away.”
Uses of the Past Habitual Tense
(a) The past habitual tense is generally used to express past habit, routine, permanent actions.
Examples:
- मैं पिछले साल दस बजे स्कूल जाता था | “I used to go to school at 10 o’clock last year.”
- आप हिन्दुस्तान में कहाँ रहती थीं ? “Where used you to live in India?”
- पिछले महीने तक, मेरा भाई हर दिन मुझ से बात करता था | “My brother used to talk to me everyday till last month.”
Activity:
Please add five more examples here. After writing your examples please change your sentences in negative and past tense.
| Examples | Negative | Past tense | |
| 1. | |||
| 2. | |||
| 3. | |||
| 4. | |||
| 5. |
Activities
(a) Please choose the correct form of habitual aspect marker based on the subject of the sentence.
https://openbooks.lib.msu.edu/ll151/?p=1096
(b) Please write your daily routine of this semester/year. After writing your daily routine compare it will last semester/year. [Hint: Please use present habitual for current daily routine, and use past habitual for last semester/year]
(c) Please ask your friends about their hobbies and enlist them here. [Hint: Use आप ख़ाली समय में क्या करते/करती हैं? “What do you do in your free time?” to ask their hobbies.]
(d) Please watch a short film, and write the story in Hindi in Hindi. After writing, please record yourself here and share your story with the instructor/any native speaker for the feedback.
https://openbooks.lib.msu.edu/ll151/?p=1096
धन्यवाद !


2.20: Histograms (3 of 4)
Learning Objectives
- Describe the distribution of quantitative data using a histogram.
In the next example, we use a histogram to describe the shape, center, and spread of the distribution of a quantitative variable.
Example
Oscar for Best Actress
Here we have the ages of the actresses who won an Oscar for Best Actress from 1970 to 2001.
Click here to see the entire data set.
Shape: The distribution of ages appears skewed to the right. Most of the Oscar winners for Best Actress are young. More precisely, we see that 91% (29 of 32) of the winners under 50 years of age, and 56% (18 of 32) of the winners are under the age of 35.
Center: The distribution of ages appears to be centered between 30 and 35 years; 28% (9 of 32) of the winners are in this age range.
Spread: The data range from about 20 to about 80, so the overall range is approximately 60. There is a lot of variability in the ages of actresses who have won the Oscar for Best Actress.
Outliers: Winners older than 60 years are unusual. There are three outliers: one in each of the following intervals: 60–65, 70–75, 75–80.
Now we summarize all of these observations in a paragraph:
Between the years of 1970 and 2001, the Oscar for Best Actress was awarded most often to young actresses: 56% (18 of 32) of the winners were under the age of 35, with 28% (9 of 32) of the winners between 30 and 35 years of age. Winners ranged in age from about 20 to about 80, but only 3 of the 32 were over 60.
Here is a paragraph that uses more formal vocabulary to summarize the distribution of ages:
Between the years of 1970 and 2001, the Oscar for Best Actress was awarded most often to young actresses. The distribution of ages is skewed to the right: 56% (18 of 32) of the winners were under the age of 35, with the center of the distribution between 30 and 35 years of age. With winners ranging in age from about 20 to about 80, the overall range of the distribution is about 60. But much of this variability is due to three outliers who were older than 60 when they won the award.
Contributors and Attributions
- Concepts in Statistics. Provided by : Open Learning Initiative. Located at : http://oli.cmu.edu . License : CC BY: Attribution


3.1: A Stochastic Model of Population Growth
The size of the population \(N\) is now considered to be a discrete random variable. We define the time-dependent probability mass function \(p_{N}(t)\) of \(N\) to be the probability that the population is of size \(N\) at time \(t\) . Since \(N\) must take on one of the values from zero to infinity, we have
\[\sum_{N=0}^{\infty} p_{N}(t)=1 \nonumber \]
for all \(t \geq 0 .\) Again, let \(b\) be the average per capita birth rate. We make the simplifying approximations that all births are singlets, and that the probability of an individual giving birth is independent of past birthing history. We can then interpret \(b\) probabilistically by supposing that as \(\Delta t \rightarrow 0\) , the probability that an individual gives birth during the time \(\Delta t\) is given by \(b \Delta t\) . For example, if the average per capita birthrate is one offspring every 365 -day year, then the probability that a given individual gives birth on a given day is \(1 / 365\) . As we will be considering the limit as \(\Delta t \rightarrow 0\) , we neglect probabilities of more than one birth in the population in the time interval \(\Delta t\) since they are of order \((\Delta t)^{2}\) or higher. Furthermore, we will suppose that at \(t=0\) , the population size is known to be \(N_{0}\) , so that \(p_{N_{0}}(0)=1\) , with all other \(p_{N}^{\prime}\) s at \(t=0\) equal to zero.
We can determine a system of differential equations for the probability mass function \(p_{N}(t)\) as follows. For a population to be of size \(N>0\) at a time \(t+\Delta t\) , either it was of size \(N-1\) at time \(t\) and one birth occurred, or it was of size \(N\) at time \(t\) and there were no births; that is
\[p_{N}(t+\Delta t)=p_{N-1}(t) b(N-1) \Delta t+p_{N}(t)(1-b N \Delta t) \nonumber \]
Subtracting \(p_{N}(t)\) from both sides, dividing by \(\Delta t\) , and taking the limit \(\Delta t \rightarrow 0\) results in the forward Kolmogorov differential equations,
\[\frac{d p_{N}}{d t}=b\left[(N-1) p_{N-1}-N p_{N}\right], \quad N=1,2, \ldots \nonumber \]
where \(p_{0}(t)=p_{0}(0)\) since a population of zero size remains zero. This system of coupled, first-order, linear differential equations can be solved iteratively. We first review how to solve a first-order linear differential equation of the form
\[\frac{d y}{d t}+a y=g(t), \quad y(0)=y_{0} \nonumber \]
where \(y=y(t)\) and \(a\) is constant. First, we look for an integrating factor \(\mu\) such that
\[\frac{d}{d t}(\mu y)=\mu\left(\frac{d y}{d t}+a y\right) \nonumber \]
Differentiating the left-hand-side and multiplying out the right-hand-side results in
\[\frac{d \mu}{d t} y+\mu \frac{d y}{d t}=\mu \frac{d y}{d t}+a \mu y \nonumber \]
and canceling terms yields
\[\frac{d \mu}{d t}=a \mu . \nonumber \]
We may integrate this equation with an arbitrary initial condition, so for simplicity we take \(\mu(0)=1\) . Therefore, \(\mu(t)=e^{a t}\) . Hence,
\[\frac{d}{d t}\left(e^{a t} y\right)=e^{a t} g(t) \nonumber \]
Integrating this equation from 0 to t yields
\[e^{a t} y(t)-y(0)=\int_{0}^{t} e^{a s} g(s) d s \nonumber \]
Therefore, the solution is
\[y(t)=e^{-a t}\left(y(0)+\int_{0}^{t} e^{a s} g(s) d s\right) \nonumber \]
The forward Kolmogorov differential equation (3.1.3) is of the form (3.1.4) with \(a=b N\) and \(g(t)=b(N-1) p_{N-1}\) . With the population size known to be \(N_{0}\) at \(t=0\) , the initial conditions can be written succinctly as \(p_{N}(0)=\delta_{N, N_{0}}\) , where \(\delta_{i j}\) is the Kronecker delta, defined as
\[\delta_{i j}= \begin{cases}0, & \text { if } i \neq j \\[4pt] 1, & \text { if } i=j\end{cases} \nonumber \]
Therefore, formal integration of (3.1.3) using (3.1.10) results in
\[p_{N}(t)=e^{-b N t}\left[\delta_{N, N_{0}}+b(N-1) \int_{0}^{t} e^{b N s} p_{N-1}(s) d s\right] \nonumber \]
The first few solutions of \((3.1.12)\) can now be obtained by successive integrations:
\[p_{N}(t)= \begin{cases}0, & \text { if } N<N_{0} \\[4pt] e^{-b N_{0} t}, & \text { if } N=N_{0} ; \\[4pt] N_{0} e^{-b N_{0} t}\left[1-e^{-b t}\right], & \text { if } N=N_{0}+1 ; \\[4pt] \frac{1}{2} N_{0}\left(N_{0}+1\right) e^{-b N_{0} t}\left[1-e^{-b t}\right]^{2}, & \text { if } N=N_{0}+2 ; \\[4pt] \cdots, & \text { if } \ldots\end{cases} \nonumber \]
Although we will not need this, for completeness I give the complete solution. By defining the binomial coefficient as the number of ways one can select \(\mathrm{k}\) objects from a set of n identical objects, where the order of selection is immaterial, we have
\[\left(\begin{array}{l} n \\[4pt] k \end{array}\right)=\frac{n !}{k !(n-k) !} \nonumber \]
(read as " \(n\) choose \(k^{\prime \prime}\) ). The general solution for \(p_{N}(t), N \geq N_{0}\) , is known to be
\[p_{N}(t)=\left(\begin{array}{c} N-1 \\[4pt] N_{0}-1 \end{array}\right) e^{-b N_{0} t}\left[1-e^{-b t}\right]^{N-N_{0}} \nonumber \]
which statisticians call a shifted negative binomial distribution. The determination of the time-evolution of the probability mass function of \(N\) completely solves this stochastic problem.
Of usual main interest is the mean and variance of the population size, and although both could in principle be computed from the probability mass function, we will compute them directly from the differential equation for \(p_{N}\) . The definitions of the mean population size \(\langle N\rangle\) and its variance \(\sigma^{2}\) are
\[\langle N\rangle=\sum_{N=0}^{\infty} N p_{N}, \quad \sigma^{2}=\sum_{N=0}^{\infty}(N-\langle N\rangle)^{2} p_{N} \nonumber \]
and we will make use of the equality
\[\sigma^{2}=\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle-\langle N\rangle^{2} \nonumber \]
Multiplying the differential equation (3.1.3) by the constant \(N\) , summing over \(N\) , and using \(p_{N}=0\) for \(N<N_{0}\) , we obtain
\[\frac{d\langle N\rangle}{d t}=b\left[\sum_{N=N_{0}+1}^{\infty} N(N-1) p_{N-1}-\sum_{N=N_{0}}^{\infty} N^{2} p_{N}\right] \nonumber \]
Now, write \(N(N-1)=(N-1)(N-1+1)=(N-1)^{2}+(N-1)\) , so that the first term on the right-hand-side is
\[\begin{aligned} \sum_{N=N_{0}+1}^{\infty} N(N-1) p_{N-1} &=\sum_{N=N_{0}+1}^{\infty}(N-1)^{2} p_{N-1}+\sum_{N=N_{0}+1}^{\infty}(N-1) p_{N-1} \\[4pt] &=\sum_{N=N_{0}}^{\infty} N^{2} p_{N}+\sum_{N=N_{0}}^{\infty} N p_{N} \end{aligned} \nonumber \]
where the second equality was obtained by shifting the summation index downward by one. Therefore, we find the familiar Malthusian growth equation
\[\frac{d\langle N\rangle}{d t}=b\langle N\rangle . \nonumber \]
Together with the initial condition \(\langle N\rangle(0)=N_{0}\) , we can find the solution
\[\langle N\rangle(t)=N_{0} e^{b t} \nonumber \]
We proceed similarly to find \(\sigma^{2}\) by first determining the differential equation for \(\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle\) . Multiplying the differential equation for \(p_{N},(3.1.3)\) , by \(N^{2}\) and summing over \(N\) results in
\[\frac{d\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle}{d t}=b\left[\sum_{N=N_{0}+1}^{\infty} N^{2}(N-1) p_{N-1}-\sum_{N=N_{0}}^{\infty} N^{3} p_{N}\right] \nonumber \]
Here, we write \(N^{2}(N-1)=(N-1)(N-1+1)^{2}=(N-1)^{3}+2(N-1)^{2}+(N-1)\) . Proceeding in the same way as above by shifting the index downward, we obtain
\[\frac{d\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle}{d t}-2 b\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle=b\langle N\rangle \nonumber \]
Since \(\langle N\rangle\) is known, (3.1.22) is a first-order, linear, inhomogeneous equation for \(\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle\) , which can be solved using an integrating factor. The solution obtained using (3.1.10) is
\[\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle=e^{2 b t}\left(N_{0}^{2}+b \int_{0}^{t} e^{-2 b s}\langle N\rangle(s) d s\right) \nonumber \]
with \(\langle N\rangle\) given by (3.1.20). Performing the integration, we obtain
\[\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle=e^{2 b t}\left[N_{0}^{2}+N_{0}\left(1-e^{-b t}\right)\right] \nonumber \]
Finally, using \(\sigma^{2}=\left\langle N^{2}\right\rangle-\langle N\rangle^{2}\) , we obtain the variance. Thus we arrive at our final result for the population mean and variance:
\[\langle N\rangle=N_{0} e^{b t}, \quad \sigma^{2}=N_{0} e^{2 b t}\left(1-e^{-b t}\right) \nonumber \]
The coefficient of variation \(c_{v}\) measures the standard deviation relative to the mean, and is here given by
\[\begin{aligned} c_{v} &=\sigma /\langle N\rangle \\[4pt] &=\sqrt{\frac{1-e^{-b t}}{N_{0}}} . \end{aligned} \nonumber \]
For large \(t\) , the coefficient of variation therefore goes like \(1 / \sqrt{N_{0}}\) , and is small when \(N_{0}\) is large. In the next section, we will determine the limiting form of the probability distribution for large \(N_{0}\) , recovering both the deterministic model and a Gaussian model approximation.


7: Property Dualism -- Introduction to Philosophy- Philosophy of Mind
Elly Vintiadis
Introduction
The first thing that usually comes to mind when one thinks of dualism is René Descartes’ (1596-1650) substance dualism. However, there is another form of dualism, quite popular nowadays, which is called property dualism, a position which is sometimes associated with non-reductive physicalism.
Cartesian dualism posits two substances, or fundamental kinds of thing: material substance and immaterial thinking substance. These are two entirely different kinds of entities, although they interact with each other. According to property dualism, on the other hand, there is one fundamental kind of thing in the world—material substance—but it has two essentially different kinds of property: physical properties and mental properties. So for instance, a property dualist might claim that a material thing like a brain can have both physical properties (like weight and mass) and mental properties (such as having a particular belief or feeling a shooting pain), and that these two kinds of properties are entirely different in kind. Some philosophers subscribe to property dualism for all mental properties while others defend it only for conscious or “phenomenal” properties such as the feeling of pain or the taste of wine. [1] These latter properties give rise to what is known as the hard problem of consciousness: How do we explain the existence of consciousness in a material world?
Though these are both dualist views, they differ in fundamental ways. Property dualism was proposed as a position that has a number of advantages over substance dualism.  A second advantage is that it seems to avoid the problem of mental causation because it posits only one kind of substance; there is no communication between two different kinds of thing. And a third advantage is that, by maintaining the existence of distinctly mental properties, it does justice to our intuitions about the reality of the mind and its difference from the physical world. But to understand all this we need to take a step back.
Substances and Properties
The notion of a substance has a long history going back to Ancient Greek metaphysics, most prominently to Aristotle, and it has been understood in various ways since then. For present purposes we can say that a substance can be understood as a unified fundamental kind of entity—e.g. a person, or an animal—that can be the bearer of properties. In fact, the etymology of the Latin word substantia is that which lies below, that which exists underneath something else. So, for instance, a zebra can be a substance, which has properties, like a certain color, or a certain number of stripes. But the zebra is independent of its properties; it will continue to exist even if the properties were to change (and, according to some views, even if they ceased to exist altogether).
According to Cartesian dualism there are two kinds of substance: the material substance, which is extended in space and is divisible, and mental substances whose characteristic is thought. So each person is made up of these two substances—matter and mind—that are entirely different in kind and can exist independently of each other. Talking of the mind in terms of substances gives rise to a number of problems (see Chapter 1). To avoid these problems, property dualism argues that mentality should be understood in terms of properties, rather than substances: instead of saying that there are certain kinds of things that are minds, we say that to have a mind is to have certain properties. Properties are characteristics of things; properties are attributed to, and possessed by, substances. So according to property dualism there are different kinds of properties that pertain to the only kind of substance, the material substance: there are physical properties like having a certain color or shape, and there are mental properties like having certain beliefs, desires and perceptions.
Property dualism is contrasted with substance dualism since it posits only one kind of substance, but it is also contrasted with ontological monist views, such as materialism or idealism, according to which everything that exists (including properties) is of one kind. Usually, property dualism is put forward as an alternative to reductive physicalism (the type identity theory) – the view that all properties in the world can, in principle at least, be reduced to, or identified with, physical properties (Chapter 2).
Hilary Putnam’s (1926-2016) multiple realization argument is a main reason why reductive physicalism is rejected by some philosophers, and it provides an argument for property dualism. Although this argument was originally used as an argument for functionalism, since it challenges the identity of mental states with physical states, it was taken up by non-reductive physicalists and property dualists alike. According to the multiple realization argument then, it is implausible to identify a certain kind of mental state, like pain, with a certain type of physical state since mental states might be implemented (“realized”) in creatures (or even non-biological systems) that have a very different physical make up than our own. For instance, an octopus or an alien may very well feel pain but pain might be realized differently in their brains than it is in ours. So it seems that mental states can be “multiply realizable.” This is incompatible with the idea that pain is strictly identical with one physical property, as the identity theory seems to claim. If this is correct, and there is no possibility of reduction of types of mental states to types of physical states, then mental properties and physical properties are distinct, which means that there are two different kinds of properties in the world and, therefore, property dualism is true.
In addition to the multiple realization argument, probably the most famous argument for property dualism is the knowledge argument put forward by Frank Jackson (1982). This argument involves the imaginary example of Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist who was raised in a black and white room. She knows everything there is to know about the physical facts about vision but she has never seen red (or any color for that matter).  Jackson claims that Mary learns something new upon seeing the red tomato—she learns what red looks like. Therefore, there must be more to learn about the world than just physical facts, and there are more properties in the world than just physical properties.
Kinds of Property Dualism
Property dualism can be divided into two kinds. The first kind of property dualism says that there are two kinds of properties, mental and physical, but mental properties are dependent on physical properties. This dependence is usually described in terms of the relation of supervenience. The basic idea of supervenience is that a property, A, supervenes on another property, B, if there cannot be a difference in A without a difference in B (though there can be differences in B with no change in A, which allows for the multiple realizability of mental properties). So, for example, if the aesthetic properties of a work of art supervene on its physical properties, there cannot be a change in its aesthetic properties unless there is a change in its physical properties. Or, if I feel fine now but have a headache five minutes from now, there must be a physical difference in my brain in these two moments. Another way of putting the idea that mental properties depend on physical properties is to say that if you duplicate all the physical properties of the world, you will automatically duplicate the mental properties as well—they would come “for free.”
This kind of view is sometimes called non-reductive physicalism, and is often considered to be a form of property dualism, since it holds that there are two kinds of properties. Jaegwon Kim is a prominent supporter of the irreducibility of phenomenal properties (though he resists the term “property dualism” and prefers to call his position “something near enough” physicalism [2005]). Kim holds that intentional properties, like having a belief or hoping for something to happen, can be functionally reduced to physical properties. [2] However, this is not so for phenomenal properties (like tasting a particular taste or experiencing a certain kind of afterimage), which supervene on physical properties but cannot be reduced, functionally or otherwise, to physical properties.
According to Kim, there is a difference between intentional and phenomenal properties: Phenomenal (qualitative) mental states cannot be defined functionally, as intentional states can (or can in principle), and therefore cannot be reduced either. Briefly, the reason is that although phenomenal states can be associated with causal tasks these descriptions do not define or constitute pain. That is, though, pain can be associated with the state that is caused by tissue damage, that induces the belief that something is wrong with one’s body and that results in pain-avoidance behavior, this is not what pain is. Pain is what it feels like to be in pain, it is a subjective feeling. In contrast, intentional states like beliefs and intentions are anchored to observable behaviour, and this feature makes them amenable to functional analysis. For instance, if a population of creatures interacts with its environment in a similar fashion to us (if those creatures interact with one another as we do, produce similar utterances and so forth), then we would naturally ascribe to these creatures beliefs, desires, and other intentional states, precisely because intentional properties are functional properties.
The second kind of property dualism, which is dualism in a more demanding sense, claims that there are two kinds of properties, physical and mental, and that mental properties are something over and above physical properties. This in turn can be understood in at least two ways. First, being “over and above” can mean that mental properties have independent causal powers, and are responsible for effects in the physical world. This is known as “downward causation.” In this sense, a property dualist of this kind must believe that, say, the mental property of having the desire to get a drink is what actually causes you to get up and walk to the fridge, in contrast to some material property of your brain being the cause, like the firing of certain groups of neurons. Second, being something “over and above” must imply the denial of supervenience. In other words, for mental properties to be genuinely independent of physical properties, they must be able to vary independently of their physical bases. So a property dualist who denies supervenience would be committed to the possibility that two people can be in different mental states, e.g., one might be in pain and the other not, while having the same brain states.
Emergentism is a property dualist view in this more demanding sense. Emergentism first appeared as a systematic theory in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century in the work of the so-called “British Emergentists,” J.S.Mill (1806 –1873), Samuel Alexander (1859 –1938), C. Lloyd Morgan (1852 –1936) and C.D. Broad (1887 –1971). Since then it has been defended (and opposed) by many philosophers and scientists, some of whom understand it in different ways. Still, we can summarize the position by saying that according to emergentism, when a system reaches a certain level of complexity, entirely new properties emerge that are novel, irreducible to, and something “over and above” the lower level from which they emerged (Vintiadis 2013). For example, when a brain, or a nervous system, becomes complex enough new mental properties, like sensations, thoughts and desires, emerge from it in addition to its physical properties. So according to emergentism everything that exists is made up of matter but matter can have different kinds of properties, mental and physical, that are genuinely distinct in one or both of the senses described above: that is, either in the sense that mental properties have novel causal powers that are not to be found in physical properties underlying them or in the sense that mental properties do not supervene on physical properties.
Some philosophers have argued for the kind of demanding property dualism that denies supervenience by appealing to the conceivability of philosophical zombies—an argument most famously developed by David Chalmers. Philosophical zombies are beings that are behaviorally and physically just like us but that have no “inner” experience. If such beings are not only conceivable but also possible (as Chalmers argues), then it seems that there can be mental differences without physical differences (1996). If this argument is correct, then phenomenal properties cannot be explained in terms of physical properties and they are really distinct from physical properties.
Objections to Property Dualism
A main problem for substance dualism was the question of mental causation. Given the view that the mental and the material substance are two discrete kinds of substances the problem that arises is that of their interaction, a problem posed by Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia (1618-1680) in her correspondence with Descartes. How can two different kinds of things have an effect on one another? It seems from what we know from science that physical effects have physical causes. If this is indeed the case, how is it that I can think of my grandmother and cry, or desire a glass of wine and go over to the fridge to pour myself one? How do the mental and the physical interact? The common consensus that substance dualism cannot satisfactorily answer this problem ultimately led many philosophers to the rejection of Cartesian dualism.
In the attempt to preserve the mental while also preserving a foothold in the physical, dualism of properties was introduced. However, the double requirement of the distinctness of physical properties from mental properties and of the dependence of mental properties on physical properties turns out to be a source of problems for property dualism as well.
This can be seen in the problem of causal exclusion that is analyzed below. This problem arises for property dualism and has been put forward by a number of philosophers over the years, most notably by Kim himself who, due to this problem, concludes that phenomenal properties that are irreducibly mental are also merely epiphenomenal, that is, they have no causal effects on physical events (2005).
According to mind-body supervenience, every time a mental property M is instantiated it supervenes on a physical property P.
Now suppose M appears to cause another mental property M¹,
the question arises whether the cause of M¹ is indeed M or whether it is M¹’s subjacent base P¹ (since according to supervenience M¹ is instantiated by a physical property P¹).
At this point we need to introduce two principles held by physicalists: First, the principle of causal closure according to which the physical world is causally closed. This means that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause that brings it about. Note that this in itself does not exclude non-physical causes since such causes could also be part of the causal history of an effect. What does exclude such non-physical causes is a second principle which denies the overdetermination of events. According to this principle an effect cannot have more than one wholly sufficient cause (it cannot be overdetermined) and so this, along with causal closure, leads to the conclusion that when you trace the causes of an effect, all there are are physical causes.
To return to our example, given the denial of causal overdetermination, either M or P¹ is the cause of M¹—it can’t be both—and so, given the supervenience relation, it seems that M¹ occurs because P¹ occurred. Therefore, it seems that M actually causes M¹ by causing the subjacent P¹ (and also that mental to mental, or same level, causation presupposes mental to physical, or downward, causation).
However, given the principle of causal closure P¹ must have a sufficient physical cause P.
But given exclusion again, P¹ cannot have two sufficient causes, M and P, and so P is the real cause of P¹ because if M were the real cause, causal closure would be violated again.
So the problem of causal exclusion is that, given supervenience, causal closure and the denial of overdetermination, it is not clear how mental properties can be causally efficacious; mental properties seem to be epiphenomenal, at best. And while epiphenomenalism is compatible with property dualism (since property dualism states that there are two kinds of properties in the world, and epiphenomenalism states that some mental properties are causally inert by-products of physical properties, thus accepting the existence of two properties), its coherence comes at the expense of our common sense intuitions that our mental states affect our physical states and our behavior. It seems then, that, for its critics, as far as mental causation goes, property dualism does not fare much better than substance dualism.
More generally, the question of the causal efficacy of mental properties gives rise to the same kinds of objections that were raised regarding mental causation in substance dualism. For instance, in both cases mental to physical interaction seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy, a principle that is considered to be fundamental to our physical science. That is, the conservation law would be violated if mental to physical causation were possible, since such an interaction would have to introduce energy to the physical world (assuming, that is, that the physical world is causally closed).
It is not in the scope of this discussion to wade into this matter, but it should be noted that this objection is not accepted by everyone; it has been argued that the principle of conservation of energy does not apply universally, for instance by citing examples from general relativity or quantum gravity. Similarly, both the causal closure of the physical and the denial of causal overdetermination have been questioned. Nonetheless, despite these responses, it is fair to say that the question of mental causation still remains one of the major objections to property dualism.
Another objection, this time to some views that are considered property dualist views, can be posed by asking, “In what way is property dualism really dualism?” In our distinction between two kinds of property dualism above, there is a clear sense in which positions of the second kind, like emergentism or views that deny supervenience, are property dualist positions. Since, for such views, mental properties are “something over and above” physical properties; they are distinct from them, irreducible to them and not wholly determined by them. So here we have cases of two genuinely different kinds of properties, and genuine cases of property dualism.
However, it is not equally clear that non-reductive physicalism can properly be called a kind of property dualism. The problem is that if mental properties are not something over and above physical properties then it is hard to see this as a genuine version of property dualism. We can see this if we look more closely into the meaning of physicalism.
Physicalism is the view that what there fundamentally is is what is described by physics. In this sense, mental properties are non-physical properties, since they are not properties to be found in physics. But if non-reductive physicalism claims that there are non-physical properties that are irreducible to physical properties, why should this be considered a case of physicalism? The answer given by the non-reductive physicalist is that this is because such properties are grounded in the physical realm through the relation of supervenience and that, although mental properties might not be identical to physical properties, they need to be at least in principle explainable in terms of physical properties (Horgan 1993). Indeed, non-reductive physicalism is sometimes called token identity theory because it claims that tokens (instances) of mental states can be identified with tokens of physical states, even if types of mental states are not identical with types of physical states. (An analogy: all instances of the property of being beautiful are physical—all beautiful objects are physical objects—but the property of being beautiful is not a physical property). But now the problem is that, as Tim Crane has argued, if physicalism requires that non-physical properties are explicable (even in principle) in physical terms it is not obvious why this position is a property dualist one, since for there to be genuine property dualism, the ontology of physics should not be enough to explain mental properties (2001). So, according to this objection, it seems that the mere denial of the identity of mental and physical properties is not enough for real property dualism, and also that real property dualists must either believe in downward causation or deny supervenience or both.
To sum up the above discussion, we can say that property dualism is a position that attempts to preserve the reality of mental properties while also giving them a foothold in the physical world. The need for this is evident, given the intractable difficulties presented by substance dualism on the one hand, and the problems faced by the identity theory on the other. However, despite the fact that property dualism enjoys renewed popularity these days, it is open to important objections that, for its critics, have not been adequately addressed and which render the position problematic.
References
Chalmers, David J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crane, Tim. 2001. Elements of Mind . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Horgan, Terence. 1993. “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.” Mind 102(408): 555-586.
Jackson, Frank. 1982. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-36.
Kim, Jaegwon. 2005. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Vintiadis, Elly. 2013. “Emergence.” In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy . http://www.iep.utm.edu/emergenc/
Further Reading
Kim, Jaegwon. 1998. Philosophy Of Mind. Boulder, CO/Oxford: Westview Press.
Maslin, K. T. 2007. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind . Cambridge: Polity Press.
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Examples of non-conscious mental properties include beliefs that most of the time are not conscious, or our attitudes, drives, and motivations
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In functional reduction we identify the functional/causal role that the phenomenon we are interested plays and then reduce that role to a physical (token) state that realizes it. To use an example given by Kim in
Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough
, a gene is defined functionally as the mechanism that encodes and transmits genetic information. That is what a gene does. What “realizes” the role of the gene, however, are DNA molecules; genes are functionally reduced to DNA molecules. So a functional reduction identifies a functional/causal role with a physical state that realizes it (makes it happen, so to speak) and offers an explanation of how the physical state realizes the functional state.
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