Ownership and control of Tunisia's media organizations has also been subject to transformations. After decades of total control under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, ownership of television channels, radio stations, newspapers, and magazines has taken a dramatic turn since January 2011. This boom has brought new players into the market, many of whom are state funded, while others are privately funded or receive support from external bodies. Although private media organizations claim independence, direct links between media proprietors and political afliation are highly visible. Nabil El Karoui, founder of *Nessma TV*, for instance, was also one of the founders of the political party Nidaa Tounis, later a founder of Kalb Tounis, and eventually a presidential candidate in the elections of October 2019. Tahar ben Hassine, the founder of *Al-Hiwar Ettounsi*, was also one of the founders of Nidaa Tounis and an infuential member of the previous regime of Ben Ali. Larbi Nasra, founder of *Hannibal TV*, is a key fgure in the party Voice of Tunisia People. Oussama ben Salem, founder of *Zitouna TV*, is a member of Ennahda, and his father was also one of the founders of Ennahda. Mohammed Ayachi Ajroudi, owner of *Janoubia TV*, is a key fgure in the Tunisian Movement for Liberty and Dignity. Although a few of the abovementioned media owners/founders sold their shares before entering politics (namely Oussama ben Salem and Tahar ben Hassine) to comply with the HAICA regulations, political infuence over various channels during election campaigns openly continued. *Nessma TV* was accused by the regulatory body HAICA of blatantly promoting the presidential candidate Nabil Karoui and his party Kalb Tounis during the legislative elections of September 2019 and presidential elections of October 2019 (HAICA, 2019). According to the same report, *Nessma TV* dedicated 24 hours and half of its airtime during the legislative election campaign to promote Kalb Tounis and its leader: six hours were direct propaganda and about 18 hours were various other political promotions such as advertising the humanitarian campaign of Nabil Karoui and his relief organization Khalil Tounis.

#### Technology and Infrastructure

Compared with other African countries, Tunisia has one of the most "sophisticated telecommunications and broadband infrastructures in North Africa," according to Lancaster (2020). Mobile and Internet technologies were also rated among the highest in the region in terms of coverage and penetration. Governance of the Internet has been relaxed since 2011 following a liberal turn (de la Ferrière & Vallina-Rodriguez, 2014). The Telecommunications Act of 2013 put an end to Internet censorship and encouraged competition between online platforms. Also, the laws supporting e-commerce have boosted online marketing and digital business activities. ADSL service is primarily provided by *Tunis Telecom*, a state-owned telecommunications company. Other main players in the market include the Qatari-based *Ooredoo* and *Orange Tunisie*. Both are licensed as fxed-line operators and have launched DSL and fber-to-the-premises (FTTP) services. The Digital Tunisia 2020 program launched by the government aims to boost Internet connectivity and improve service in underserved areas all over the country.

Tunisia is reasonably developed when it comes to mobile phone technology. In 2016, the state issued three licenses to major networks in order to provide 4G technology, which enabled faster services and telecommunications coverage in every part of the country. These licenses came with a commitment from each service provider to reach 98% of the country by 2031 (Instance Nationale des Télécommunication, 2016, p. 37). Looking ahead, the regulatory body has also confrmed that 5G licenses are expected to be released in 2021.

These developments in telecommunications technologies have also been refected by Tunisians' increasing Internet and social media use even before the revolution of 2011. In early 2020, Internet users reached 7.55 million (64% of the population) and active social media users constituted 62% of the population (7.3 million). *Facebook* remains the most popular social media platform among Tunisians. The number of total users of *Facebook* reached 6.9 million, which constitutes 75% of the population over 13 years of age. Although *Twitter* is a very popular platform in other Arab countries such as those the Gulf region, those who prefer this social media platform in Tunisia do not exceed 272,500, whereas *Snapchat* attracts 765,000 users, *Instagram* 1.9 million (21% of the population), and *LinkedIn* 1.2 million (14% of the population) (Hootsuite, 2020).

Much has been said about social media networks as platforms for promoting social activism and resistance. *Facebook* and *Twitter* were considered instrumental in the Tunisian uprisings, operating as tools with which protesters challenged the brutality and censorship of the Ben Ali regime. Although it is hard to measure such infuence, it was evident that social networks became alternative platforms for news. As argued by various studies on the Tunisian uprisings (Castells, 2012; Chomiak, 2011; Karolak, 2018; Miladi, 2016; Zayani, 2015), thanks to these digital platforms, protesters managed to get their voices heard by and stories out to the world. Marginalized youth proved that they were not mere observers or followers of news but could become shapers of mainstream media's news agenda. Most noteworthy was that they gained infuence in disrupting the Tunisian regime's information management and its political communication channels both locally and internationally. Ben Ali's External Communications Unit, for instance, faced challenges in controlling the barrage of information spreading via social media and reaching out to an international audience via satellite television. Constant monitoring and partial blocking of *Facebook* in December 2010 was the last resort of the failed regime's attempt at containment and control.

The post-revolutionary period in Tunisia has witnessed the growing infuence of social media platforms. For instance, with reference to the Tunisian elections of 26 October 2014, social media, it can be argued, assumed an efective watchdog role. For example, the youth-led civil society organizations of I-Watch and ATID harnessed social media platforms during the presidential and legislative elections of 2019 to monitor the election campaigns as well as the voting process. Thus, they not only monitored occurrences of possible corruption among candidates, but also checked media coverage against any possible ideological infuences. At the same time, an analysis of the candidates' online activism during that election period revealed that contenders learned from the lessons of previous years and understood that social media was equally as important as traditional media, especially for reaching out to young voters (Miladi, 2016). Activities in the online sphere indicated that *Facebook* and *Twitter* had become battlegrounds for ideological fghts, which the contestants and their supporters had to navigate skillfully. Yet again, *Facebook* pages became critical platforms for a thriving citizen journalism (Zayani, 2015).

It is evident that social media networks have become indispensable tools for communication, news sharing, and political campaigning in Tunisia. Whether employed by activists and opposition groups or political leaders, such networks have increasingly advanced communication and information sharing in various situations, such as political or social campaigns.

#### Challenges

The media scene in Tunisia has dramatically changed since the 2011 revolution. A new era of media plurality has not only seen a plethora of television channels, radio stations, and newspapers emerge across the country, which refects a diverse political and cultural spectrum, but has also freed public broadcasting from government control. However, these changes have not come without challenges in terms of media ownership and regulation. The road to democracy in Tunisia still seems rough given the various obstacles that continue to crop up (Richter, 2017). The current government of Hisham Al-Mishishi, which came to power in August 2020, still needs to radically improve three main areas: 1) sustainability of media's business model, 2) ideological manipulation, and 3) elitist orientation.

Regarding the issue of sustainability, the print market witnessed the closure of hundreds of newspapers and magazines soon after the boom in newspapers and the audiovisual media market from 2011 to 2015. By 2017, the number of printed papers had dropped to 50 after reaching 250 in the post-revolutionary period. For instance, *Akhbar Al-Jumhuriyah* was suspended on 11 October 2017 after 25 years of operation. The broadcasting market has also faced similar challenges. For instance, *First TV* closed down in October 2017 because it was not fnancially viable. Restructuring, however, has been taking place for a few channels such as *Al-Mutawasit TV* and others.

In respect to manipulation of the media, the growth of the media market has meant increased challenges for regulatory bodies and has caused genuine concerns regarding the infuence of new online media outlets. As such, this post-revolutionary period has also witnessed unremitting tensions between infuential media enterprises and Tunisia's frst democratically elected government. This is partly due to the conficting understanding of the media's role in a transitional democracy and attempts to manipulate the media by rich entrepreneurs and ideological lobbies. This raises the question of media independence under the liberal consensus of the market (Johnson & Jacobs, 2004). In this context, concerns about external infuences in the Tunisian media market are becoming more prevalent. Many of the challenges faced by the media are directly related to external funding, which has been given to certain media outlets arguably to promote certain political interests.

In terms of the issue of elitist orientation, the class base for the broadcasting and newspaper markets has remained mostly the same even though the state media in Tunisia has dramatically shifted from being government-controlled to a public service media and the regime change has brought new political players to the forefront of politics in the country. The national television broadcaster *Al-Watania TV1* can be seen as part of a divisive process that was frmly established in the decades of dictatorship under Ben Ali and Bourguiba and has continued to shape and strengthen its infuence after the revolution. In this post-revolutionary period, particularly during election campaigns, a large number of media outlets are split along ideological and elitist lines rather than adhering to professional norms of journalism practice which, at their core, intend to serve public interests (Miladi, 2019). Public service media are expected to raise awareness about corruption rather than attempt to eliminate it, and are required to bring the public's attention to social problems rather than endeavor to force change in society. The power struggle that has surfaced during the last few years has revealed how a few ideological and elitist groups have attempted to set the agenda for public opinion by using media platforms such as television and radio.

#### Outlook

Changes to the telecommunications market, although signifcant, do not "change how the elements which constitute the deep state govern on a daily basis. Nor does such a change reform the political culture of submissiveness and bullying that allows the repressive state apparatus to coerce cooperation on behalf of ISPs without any independent oversight" (de la Ferrière & Vallina-Rodriguez, 2014, p. 652). Applying this to the whole media system, one could argue that, during this transitional period that Tunisia has been witnessing, the media remain a sophisticated space of manipulation and power struggle among the emerging power structures in the country. This power struggle is taking place primarily in public spaces, although evidence of it can also be found on television screens and radio airwaves as well as social media networks.

Extensive debates have been taking place across platforms on how to consolidate freedom of speech and strong, diverse, and independent media. These debates have also discussed the best model for regulating the media in Tunisia, and have been supported by various initiatives such as the decree-laws and the establishment of HAICA. In spite of these achievements, more attention needs to be directed towards preventing political infuences and overseas infltration of certain media outlets in Tunisia, and setting up a regulatory body for the newspaper market.

Lastly, the future of the broadcasting market looks bright if the public service broadcaster *Al-Watania Network* steps up and adheres to its professional standards. The new editorial policy aims to refect a politically, culturally, and economically diverse society. Yet, its news values, documented in the revamped editorial guidelines, are yet to materialize. Among Tunisians, public service media have been upheld as a cornerstone for consolidating a democratic climate in the country's emerging democracy. Tunisia's transition to democracy cannot happen without an ideologically neutral media that will constructively observe its role as a watchdog against the corrupt activities of certain politicians and infuential power elites in society. Academics and media critics have stated that, although *Al-Watania* television network is an important public service broadcaster, it needs structural reform in its editorial policy, journalism practice, and professionalism standards before it can serve this crucial role of watchdog.

#### References

### 17. Algeria: The Costs of Clientelism

Nacer-Eddine Layadi Translated by Abdelhak Bouifer

This chapter highlights Algeria's media development, which is shaped by trajectories of French colonialism and a socialistclientelist regime of governance since the 1960s. The rich history of its media is contrasted by major challenges on the political, economic, and professional levels.

#### Background

Algeria is located in the northwestern part of Africa. It shares borders with six countries: Morocco and Mauritania to the west, Mali and Niger to the south, and Libya and Tunisia to the east. With a 1,644-kilometer coastline along the Mediterranean Sea to the north and a land area of 2,400,000 square kilometers, Algeria is the largest country in Africa, the Arab world, and among the Mediterranean countries.

According to the latest calculations of January 2019, the Algerian population is 43,000,000, of which young people from 15 to 24 years of age make up 16%. The majority of Algerians are Muslims. Christians, on the other hand, represent a tiny percentage, which was estimated to be below 1% in 2009.

Algeria's history goes back thousands of years during which various tribal communities fought many wars on its territory. Despite these ongoing conficts the country was put under Turkish protectorate rule in 1615, which was ended only by the French invasion of 1830. The Algerians began to retaliate against French colonialism in multiple ways, starting with the popular revolts (1830–1871), expanding into political and cultural resistance (1900–1954), and fnally culminating in a war for independence (November 1954–July 1962). The heavy colonial heritage had a huge impact on political and media system in Algeria's post-independence period.

Facing a high level of illiteracy among children following the colonial era, Algeria put an enormous efort into eradicating this phenomenon by increasing the number of learners over the age of 15 from 15% in 1962 to 75% between 2005 and 2016. The two ofcial languages are Arabic, the language of the majority of Algerians, and Tamazight, spoken by the indigenous Imazighen (Berbers). The latter was declared an ofcial language in 2016 after a long and ferce struggle, following the events of the Amazigh Spring in 1980 and the uprising in the Kabyle region in 2001. As a result, the Tamazight language has been taught at various levels of education since 1995. Similarly, the Arabic language in Algeria has faced difculties in expanding into other sectors, as French is still used in the fnancial, economic, and education sectors as well as in the scientifc felds.

The amendment of the Family Code in 2005 refected the Algerian legislators' desire to build bridges between the principles of Islamic law and the requirements of contemporary life. Thus, Algerian women obtained additional rights after amendments to the nationality law, including the right to grant Algerian citizenship to their children if their husband is a foreigner. The most signifcant gain for Algerian women has been their increased presence in elected councils; for example, their representation in parliament jumped from 5% in 1962 to 31% in 2012. However, this statistic does not refect the everyday reality of Algerian women. According to data provided by the National Centre for Statistics for 2015, women workers did not exceed 18% of all 11,000,000 Algerian workers. The rate of women with a university degree who are unemployed is estimated at about 9% compared with almost 52% of men with a university degree.

#### Historical Developments

After the conquest of Algeria, the French colonial army brought a printing press to print the frst newspaper, *L'Estafette d'Alger*, to promote the expansion of the colonial army's control across Algerian territory. It was replaced in 1932 by another weekly newspaper, *Le Moniteur Algérien*, which was regarded as the ofcial voice of colonialism in Algeria.

The French authorities encouraged settlers to launch their own newspapers in Algeria's largest cities to preserve their interests, and set up other newspapers that targeted the local population, for instance, *Le Messager* (1848–1928), which was published bi-monthly in two versions: French and Arabic. It was the third newspaper published in the Arab world at that time.

The French Press Law of 1881 abolished the system of prior authorization and fnancial guarantee. It established a system which repressed the crime of defamation without any possibility of prior censorship. This enabled French newspaper publishers to thrive. However, Algerian publishers were not entitled to beneft from this law because they did not enjoy their civil rights. The system imposed by this law partly explains why Algerians delayed launching their own newspapers until the end of the last decade of the nineteenth century. They were also subject to indigenous laws (1865) which stripped them of their identity and their civil rights.

Newspapers published by Algerians, notably in Arabic, were characterized by their short life due to a lack of funding, but more importantly, as a result of the 1895 law that prohibited the publication of any foreign language newspaper, since the 1838 law defned Arabic as a foreign language.

The historian Ali Merad (1964) argued that the Islamic press (or the indigenous press) in Algeria symbolized the formation of a civil society (p. 9). It partially replaced the absence of political parties, spreading reformist ideas within the local community. The emergence of this press can be seen to refect the change in Algerian society's social and cultural structure under French colonial rule, which established a new elite consisting of two categories. First was that of the urban youth loyal to the French culture, who were employed as administrative agents or employees in sectors such as education, medicine, judiciary,

and translation. The second category was the Arabized elite, who were teachers at religious schools, Imams, and judges who believed in the Arabic culture. They played a pivotal role in the rise of the indigenous press. In fact, the two categories were not actually separated, and both helped to launch the indigenous press, but the fear of its impact led the colonial authorities blocking its expansion and development.

The national movement parties, which were formed at the beginning of the twentieth century, used newspapers to promote their reformist ideas for equal rights between the Algerians and French and to revive the cultural, linguistic, and religious components of the Algerian nation as well as to claim national independence. The National Liberation Front (FLN) relied on the media in its liberation struggle, creating the *El-Moudjahid* newspaper on 22 June 1956 as the ofcial voice of the FLN.

On the radio, the FLN launched the *Voice of Fighting Algeria* on 16 December 1956. This station changed Algerians' relationship with radio broadcasting. As Frantz Fanon (1972) noted, the radio in the colonial era was initially intended for Europeans and was perceived as a tool through which they imposed cultural pressure on people under colonial domination (p. 52). Therefore, its audience among the Algerians was very limited. Nevertheless, the armed revolution transformed the radio into a tool of liberation that helped to turn Algerian audiences into one nation.

After independence in 1962, Algeria established its Radio and Television Company by taking advantage of what was inherited from the French Radio and Television Company in Algeria. Radio and television were the best means to mobilize Algerians around the goals of the revolution due to the country's high percentage of illiteracy, which sat at 85% during this period. The public radio company launched 50 local stations, in addition to its three national Arabic, Tamazight, and French-language stations. It also established an international station (broadcasting in Arabic, French, English, and Spanish) and other stations dedicated to culture, religion, and youth.

Algeria had only one television channel prior to 1994 when the French-language channel *Canal Algérie* was established and began broadcasting to the Algerian community in Europe and North America. In 2001, *Algeria 3* channel launched programs for Algerian audiences living in Arab countries. On 18 March 2009, two other channels, a Tamazight-language channel and the *Holy Qur'an* channel, were introduced to 'protect' Algerian viewers from religious extremist discourse promoted by some foreign satellite channels.

The rising number of public radio stations and television channels was encouraged by competition from foreign television channels and radio stations, and was fnancially supported by the increase in oil revenues that constituted the backbone of Algeria's national economy.

Fearing that the events of the Arab uprisings would spread to Algeria and promote Abdel-Aziz Boutefika's election campaign for a fourth presidential term, a branch of the Algerian regime set up television channels in 2012 that only broadcasted from outside Algeria. Within three years, the number of these "hybrid legal" channels jumped to 45. Private television has been broadcasting in this informal manner since 2012. In 2013, the Algerian authorities granted only fve of these channels (*Ennahar TV*, *Echourouk TV*, *Dzaïr TV*, *El Djazairia One,* and *Hogar TV*) licenses to operate for a yearly renewable term. Even today, these fve channels continue to function as ofces of foreign channels and not as Algerian channels, and are consequently referred to by the Algerian media as "Ofshore Channels". Moreover, the government has turned a blind eye to the activity of other television channels broadcasting from abroad. However, if any channel opposes the political regime, its equipment will be confscated and all activity will be banned under the pretext that the channel does not have a legal license, which is what happened to *Atlas TV* in 2014 and *Al Watan TV* in 2015.

After all colonial printed media became nationalized after independence, the Algerian authorities began to build their own press system. They initiated this process by launching the Arabic-language newspaper *El-Chaab*, on 11 December 1962, *Le Peuple* newspaper on 19 December, 1962, which was the country's frst French-language newspaper, and *El-Moudjahid* newspaper on 5 July 1965.

In the west of the country, the French-speaking newspaper *La République* began publication on 29 March 1963, and the French-speaking newspaper *El-Nasr* was established on 28 September 1963 in eastern Algeria. The historical newspaper *El-Moudjahid*, the ofcial voice of the FLN, was transformed from a daily newspaper to a weekly paper in July 1964, and only the Arabic version of this publication was retained. The *African Revolution* magazine was published in French in November 1962 to express Algeria's solidarity with other liberation movements around the world.

After independence in 1962, Algeria abolished regional and local media in favor of centralizing the media system. This was done because the idea of "regional", which in the ofcial Algerian political dictionary refers to the division and dispersion of Algerian people, is assumed to hamper the national efort to build a strong central state that unites the aspirations of the people and underpins the construction of socialism. This is why Algeria's newspaper market maintained its national character and included only two newspapers outside the capital, Algiers.

The fusion of political and ideological streams in the FLN during the liberation war became a reference for political and media practices in the post-independence era. These practices were fed by populist ideologies that betrayed the political opposition and eventually led to the abolishment of political and media pluralism.

In 1990, a major change occurred following the deadly protests of 5 October 1988 (Rahal, 2017), and before the approval of the Information Law in 1990 which ended the state's media monopoly. On 19 March 1990, the government of Mouloud Hamrouche instructed all journalists working in public media to either join newspapers belonging to political parties or to create groups to publish their own newspapers and magazines. Pursuant to this order, 150 journalists left their media organizations to launch their own companies, most of which were printed media that enjoyed partial freedom of expression. The regime used these publications as a democratic interface with the political system, a cover for the transition to a market economy, and a forum for readers to express their anger over poor living conditions as well as the abuse of power.

The press in Algeria has remained an urban phenomenon, despite signifcant changes in its quantitative and linguistic dimensions. The number of daily newspapers jumped from six in 1989, with nearly 670,450 copies per day, to 140 in 2014, with 2,469,616 copies per day (Ministry of Communication, 2014). The numbers of newspapers in 2016 increased signifcantly to 150 editions, but only 21 of these ran 10,000 or more copies per day.

#### Political and Legal Framework

Since its independence in 1962, Algeria has chosen the socialist system for its development. It adopted a single-party political system that dominated the political and media landscapes. The proclaimed "unity of perception and socialist thought" framed the structure of media organizations and regulated journalistic activity. This was supported by the frst Information Law in 1982, which entrenched state monopoly of the media. This law granted the authority to direct media companiesby means of the political leadership represented by the Ministry of Information and Culture and the ruling party information ofcer. It also made media managers merely an operational means. As an example, Article 35 states that a professional journalist is a combatant who "practices his profession responsibly and with commitment in order to fulfll the objectives of the revolution as defned by the ofcial texts of the National Liberation Front."

Algeria's economy is dependent on oil revenues which constitute 97% of its total revenue. As oil prices declined in 1986 to less than USD 15 a barrel, the authorities adopted an austerity policy on importing consumer products. Protests increased across the country through a series of demonstrations, with the most notable on 5 October 1988, leading the regime to promulgate a new liberal constitution in 1989 that recognized the right to private property, and freedom of belief, expression, and the press. Furthermore, it recognized the freedom to establish political parties, which led Algeria to reach a total of almost 60 parties. At the same time, a new Information Law was passed in 1990 to divide up the media management methods that had prevailed over the previous 28 years. This law opened the door to media pluralism in the press and audiovisual sector; it also put an end to the state's monopoly of the media. To be more specifc, its fourth article highlighted the right of political parties and natural persons, subject to Algerian law, to establish newspapers and magazines and to own a media company.

The years 1990–1992 were exceptional in the history of Algerian media. In addition to the publication of private newspapers, which openly discussed societal issues and political trends in the country, the public media, especially television, ofered a platform for opposition parties to take part in political debates about Algeria's future. Nevertheless, the democratic transition in Algeria has not been achieved because the state has systematically rejected the idea of a rotation of power. Although the ruling authority sought to renew itself by establishing a "monitored" political pluralism and allowing the FLN to assume a dominant position over other political forces, it ultimately failed in its mission. The 1992 legislative elections resulted in the victory of another dominant party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which threatened Algeria's political system and its adherents and alarmed Western countries (Addi, 2006, pp. 139–62).

Ultimately, the electoral process was cancelled, and a High State Council (HSC) was created to assume presidential powers after the resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid. Parliament was dissolved and replaced by an "advisory council," followed by a transitional council made up of appointed members. A state of emergency was declared on 9 February 1992. The High Media Council, which had seized control of part of the Authority of the Ministry of Information, was abolished, even though its role had been more consultative than regulatory in terms of media practice. Public freedoms and freedom of the press declined following the establishment of special anti-terrorism courts and the circulation of a decree issued on 14 June 1994 to direct press managers on how to deal with security news. As a consequence, print media were pressured to reproduce the ofcial discourse of the ruling authority, leading to the impoverishment of the media. The number of newspapers multiplied, but without producing real media pluralism. In addition, journalists who sought to oppose the ofcial government line were prosecuted and their newspapers were suspended or even banned. In the aftermath of 1992, Algeria fell into a cycle of violence that claimed the lives of thousands of Algerians, including 103 journalists.

Following the events of the Arab uprisings in 2012, a new Information Law was passed to emphasize the general principles of freedom of expression and media pluralism. However, in reality, nothing changed. This new law intended to establish the Print Press Regulatory Authority, which was to have more of a censorship role than a regulating one for journalistic activity. Yet, after fve years, this body still had not begun functioning.

The Audiovisual Law of 2014 tightened restrictions on the creation of private television channels permitting only thematic channels to be launched. The Audiovisual Regulatory Authority (ARAV) was stripped of its role to control audiovisual activity. Since then, this body has not carried out any activity beyond issuing occasional statements that remind certain television channels to respect the principles and ethics of journalistic work. The abovementioned Information Law did not allow journalists to be imprisoned for various misdemeanors, including libel, defamation, and insulting others. Nevertheless, a review of the Criminal Procedure Code in July 2015 made temporary detention an exceptional measure, and this did not exclude journalists from being subject to detention.

The impact of the Information Law on media practices in Algeria has been very limited, perhaps even nonexistent, because its implementation is subject to political and special interest considerations. Many of its articles have remained meaningless, while some are applied selectively. For example, the authority allowed Ali Haddad, president of the Business Leaders Forum (FCE), to publish the newspapers *Le Temps d'Algérie* in French and *Time of Algeria* in Arabic, although Article 25 of the Media Law of 2012 prohibits owning both a French and an Arabic newspaper. Under this same law the contract for purchasing the businessman Issad Rabrab's *El-Khabar* newspaper was dissolved in 2017 as Rabrab also owned the newspaper *Liberté*. In 2014, it allowed Ali Haddad1 to own both *Dzaïr TV* and *Dzaïr News*, and permitted other oligarchs who fnanced the election campaign of the president, Boutefika, to create private television channels. This practice promotes "neo-patrimonialism," which indicates the unusual marriage between the autocratic system and modern state institutions. It is manifested through a "customerism" character (Roudakova, 2008, p. 42) that is seen as a structural factor in societies where there are few or no borders between public and personal interests, or between public and private property. This type of clientelism can also be understood as a cultural feature of the idea that systemic and universal rules are less important than personal connections.

<sup>1</sup> Ali Haddad's media empire began to collapse after President Boutefika was removed from power on 2 April 2019, and since then, he has been in prison with other fgures of the regime charged with unlawful accumulation of wealth.

#### Economy and Ownership Patterns

The state monopolized the ownership of newspapers from 1962 to 1990. Today, however, it owns only six newspapers, compared with 144 privately-owned newspapers in Algeria. These private newspapers consist predominantly of journalists who have left public media. As a frst step, they launched their own newspapers with their previous salaries received over a three-year period. As a second step, the government provided them with a wide range of indirect subsidies, such as interestfree bank loans, tax exemptions, and share of advertising proceeds, and headquarters for their newspapers. Finally, the government eased the payment procedure for printing costs at state printing companies by either subsidizing the price of paper or erasing the debts of some newspapers. The 1991 Finance Act established a special fund of USD 22,000,000 as an additional form of support for private newspapers. This fund existed until 2015. However, it was distributed in an unfair and unequal method.

Transparency in the funding of private newspapers is a constant demand of publishers and readers. *L'Expression*, for example, a newspaper which publishes 20,000 copies per day, barely sells 50% of its copies on average, and has no infuence on national political life, generated signifcant annual profts during the period of 2009–2016 through government advertising evaluated to be between USD 506,000 and USD 1,500,000. It became the most cost-efective newspaper in the press sector. This is one example that has led to the call for more transparency in the newspaper market.

The two largest private newspapers, *El-Watan* (a French-language newspaper) and *El-Khabar* (an Arabic-language newspaper), were exempt from the monopoly exercised by authorities on printing companies. Although they set up their own printing companies, which have reduced their expenses, the fnancial situation of these publications has not substantially improved. For example, *El-Khabar*'s sales contributed only 50% of its total income, while *El-Watan*'s sales only generated 30% of its overall revenue despite the fact that these two newspapers have consistently raised the price of their issues. Advertising remains the main income source for newspapers in Algeria, contributing anywhere between USD 25,000 and USD 50,000 to the proceeds of a single issue of a newspaper. However, the state controls almost 85% of the advertising market through the National Publishing and Advertising Company (ANEP). Private companies and public institutions have been banned from purchasing advertising pages directly from newspapers. Thus, the distribution of advertising to newspapers and the rest of the media is still not subject to market logic, and for that reason, media pluralism in Algeria has not been strengthened.

Powerful and dominant media groups have been forming in Algeria since 2012. One of these is led by Mohammed Moukaddam, who owns two newspapers, *Ennahar El-Djadid* and the sports newspaper *El-Chibak*, as well as other news websites, such as *Algérie 24* and *Algérie Confdentiel*, published in the French language. There is also the group owned by the businessman Ali Haddad, the owner of one of the largest construction companies (ETRHB) and publisher of the newspaper *Le Temps d'Algérie* in Arabic and French. Ali Fodil leads another group and is the owner of the *El-Chourouk Daily* and the weekly magazine *El-Chourouk El-Arabi*, in addition to other websites, including *El-Chourouk Sport*, *Jawaher El-Chourouk*, and *El-Chourouk Markets*. These three newspaper owners also own television channels. Moukaddam has one channel, Haddad has two channels, and Fodil has three channels: *El-Chourouk TV*, *El-Chourouk News*, and *El-Echourouk Bana* (a cooking channel). Other examples of oligarch media investors are Mahieddine Tahkout, owner of the Car Installation Company and the Student Bus Company, and Bachir Ould Zamirli, an "investor" in the feld of real estate promotion. The owners of these channels dominate Algeria's television viewing market. However, the ownership of these channels is a debatable point; it is contrary to the Organic Audiovisual Law which afrms in Article 23 that "a natural person or a private person subject to Algerian law cannot be a contributor to more than one service of audiovisual communication."

Moreover, Article 45 states that the same shareholder of a television channel may not hold, directly or through the intermediary of other persons, including ascendants and descendants of the 4th degree, more than 40% of its share capital.

In addition to their legal status, the economy of private television channels in Algeria has attracted signifcant attention from researchers (Cherif**,** 2014; Djaballah, 2019; Mostefaoui, 2019; Dimitrakis, 2019; Djaballah, 2018).

Considering the practices of clientelism, which control the relationship of power and the media, can explain how channels belonging to Algerian oligarchs are funded. First and foremost, they took advantage of the state advertising windfall. Second, the price of one minute of advertising at peak time on private channels is estimated between USD 109 and USD 181 (Belfarag, 2016). This relatively low cost negatively afected the public media, for which the price of one minute of advertising at the same peak time is estimated between USD 2,000 and USD 4,500. Such practices have not only undermined the economic framework of public television channels, but have undermined all forms of media, such as one minute of prime time on radio is priced at USD 346, newspapers that sell the color pages to advertisers for USD 3,500, half colored page for USD 1,756, and a quarter page for USD 920.2

There are no laws that organize or regulate unfair competition among the media in Algeria's booming advertising market, which jumped from EUR 19,000,000 in 1999 to EUR 200,000,000 in 2016 due to high oil revenues. The budget of any one private television channel cannot be compared with that of the public television system with its fve channels. In 2012, the public system's revenues came from the license fee imposed on citizens, which was estimated at USD 9,000,000, and advertising revenues and rebroadcast rights exceeding USD 18,000,000. However, these two amounts were not enough to cover its expenses, especially the salaries of 3,447 workers. This forced the state to award the company more than USD 90,000,000 to meet the public service requirements and pay for its satellite broadcasting (Ali, 2014).

Most of Algeria's online newspapers belong to the private sector. Their economic situation is more complex than that of the print media. Each online newspaper pays nearly USD 2,630 a month for hosting and maintaining its sites, which is in addition to Internet subscription and phone connectivity costs. Some online newspapers, such as *Maghreb Emergent*, have tried to get their users to contribute to their crowd funding, but to no avail. Alternatively, many online publications provide training course and other services for companies to gain revenues.

For its part, *Radio M* appealed to the French Agency for Media Cooperation for a subsidy to ensure its survival. From 2006 onwards,

<sup>2</sup> According to the prices supplied by the daily newspaper *Liberté* on 13 July 2019.

the state's monopoly on radio broadcasting and the low cost of Internet broadcasting encouraged companies to create web broadcasts to provide diferent content from government radio stations This trend began with *Radio Algiers* and was then reinforced by radio stations with music content and associations' radio stations, such as *The Voice of Women*, a subsidiary of an association called Women in Communication. It is crucial to note that it is difcult to limit the number of web television programs in Algeria, which have a diferent legal status to radio. There is a variety of news, music, and sports television broadcasts online, including those of state-owned companies, such as the *Algeria Press Agency* (*APS*) and other private entities.

#### Technology and Infrastructure

Eight satellites, including *Alcomsat-1*, which was the latest satellite launched by Algeria in cooperation with China on 10 December 2017, broadcast the country's fve public television channels and programs from 50 public radio stations, including local, national, and thematic ones. To modernize technological infrastructure, Algerian authorities have completed 7,000 km of digital microwave networks as well as 14 medium and large networks for television broadcasting, and have built 400 stations for rebroadcasting to cover the shadow regions and the Algerian Sahara, and four stations for powerful broadcasting on microand medium waves.

Algeria began building digital terrestrial television in 2010 and was able to cover 85% of the national territory by 2013. This fgure rose to 95% by the end of 2019. Algeria was on the verge of completely abandoning analog technology in June 2020. During the mid-1980s, Algerians turned to French and Arabic satellite television programs to avoid watching the only public television channel that existed at the time. Today, 97% of Algerian homes own a satellite dish.

Although computers were frst introduced in major companies in Algeria in 1980, the computer system has remained on the sidelines of industrial activity. One explanation for Algeria's delay in developing its digital economy can be attributed to the fact that the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications developed modern communication technologies instead of the Ministry of Industry (Khelfaoui, 2007, pp. 71–90. To be more specifc, the development of the Internet in Algeria has been infuenced by ongoing struggles for power between those advocating urgent socioeconomic claims and the political forces that fear losing control over the use of the Internet. This explains the slow development of the Internet and the continued monopoly of Algerian Telecom's fxed and mobile Internet for the last 17 years. Furthermore, the license to use 3G networks was delayed until 2013, and the mobile phone and Internet market is currently exclusively shared by three economic operators (*Algérie Télécom*, Algeria's public communications company *Djezzy*, which owns 51% of its shares, and Qatar's *Ooredoo*).

According to the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, the number of mobile subscribers (GSM, 3G, 4G) of the three operators jumped from 33,000,000 in 2010 to 51,000,000 in 2018. The number of mobile Internet subscribers (3G, 4G) increased from 300,000 subscribers in 2013 to 40,000,000 subscribers in 2018. Despite this, Internet speed remains slow, with an average estimated at 9 Mbps. Algerians who actively use social media platforms constituted 54% of the total population (i.e., 23,000,000 people) as of January 2019. More than half of all Algerians (22,000,000) use the social platform *Facebook* (Kemp, 2019).

*El-Watan* was the frst Algerian newspaper to have a website (1997). Today, all Algerian newspapers have their own websites; some of them are hosted abroad, in countries such as France and Switzerland to avoid possible censorship. Some newspapers have set up electronic editions, television channels and news websites, such as *El-Chourouk* and *El-Nahar*, however, they cannot live up to the expected level of convergence, in the sense of producing content suitable for presentation on a variety of platforms.

#### Challenges

The media system faces a number of major challenges, which can be summarized in terms of the following overlapping levels.

On the political level, the "neo-patrimonial" political system that is hampering Algeria's democratic transition represents the biggest challenge for the media system in Algeria. Although the state's monopoly on print and audiovisual media and the establishment of private media was extinguished, this did not guarantee freedom of expression and media pluralism because these institutions were not based upon transparent and fair media competition. This was potentially due to the fact that the state failed to apply many of the laws' provisions relating to the organization of media companies (some of which are mentioned above), as well as those relating to fnancial transparency, and thus allowed private television companies to operate in a hybrid legal situation. The failure to announce the criteria based upon which the government granted authorization to only four private television channels as foreign television channels in Algeria is also one of the factors that confrms the logic of clientelism that frames the Algerian media landscape.

On the economic level, the fnancial situation of media companies has become fragile and more difcult in the absence of a clear and transparent national policy, which has forced some broadcasters such as *KBC Television*, as well as dozens of newspapers, such as *La Tribune*, to declare bankruptcy. The newspaper crisis has been amplifed by its turbulent relationship with printing companies, which is not based strictly on commercial interests but is also subject to political considerations. It is difcult to ascertain the size of the debts of private newspapers owed to state printing companies. The Ministry of Communication intentionally pays no attention to some oligarchs' newspapers that have set up television channels without paying their debts, such as *El-Adjwa*, *El-Nahar*, and *El-Chourouk*, whose debts alone amounted to about USD 5,000,000 (Djaafer, 2017).

The Algerian authorities use printing houses to exert pressure on refractory newspapers in several ways. For instance, they may reduce the number of copies printed temporarily or permanently suspend printing if a company fails to pay their debts, as was the case with *La Nation* in 1997 and *Algeria News* in 2014. In addition, the state still has a monopoly on the advertising market, and its revenues are distributed to newspapers outside market logic and not in keeping with the requirements of public service and freedom of expression.

For more than a decade, publicity has not been used to defend the directions of the ruling power as originally intended but has deviated from its economic and political role. Its proceeds have been turned into rents shared by those who have the power to distribute those without control or accountability. In this way, advertising—the key fnancier of the media—has become an obstacle to media pluralism.

On the professional level, the historical context in which the Algerian media were formed and developed has pushed the media to play a propaganda role. It has led them to violate their professional and ethical commitment by frequently publishing anonymous news without justifcation, resorting to slander and insulting others, and preventing the legally recognized right of reply. These practices have been reinforced by the predominance of the commercial character in the activities of many private media companies that have violated journalists' professional rights and taken advantage of their deteriorating social conditions and professional instability. They have also benefted from their failure to organize themselves in order to issue a code of ethics and to hold their activities accountable to the rules.

#### Outlook

As in many countries, the Algerian press is in a major state of decline. For example, the largest Arabic language newspaper *El-Khabar* dropped from 1,200,000 copies per day in 2000 to 200,000 copies in 2017. The Frenchlanguage newspaper *El-Watan* also experienced a declinine from 160,000 copies per day in 2012 to 90,000 copies in 2017. The future of Algeria's press will be dominated by online newspapers whose increased demand has resulted from the development of basic technological infrastructure. This has required the state to develop a national policy that will assist the media in their necessary transition to the digital environment and help them to establish their economic strategy.

The increasing number of Algerians using the Internet and social networks, as well as the establishment of 15 web radio sites and ten web television sites, have prompted the state to monopolize radio and television broadcasting, exercise censorship over media content, shut down newspapers and television channels, prevent new radio stations and television channels from broadcasting from Algeria, and implement other practices that restrict freedom of expression. However, new developments might lie ahead; when Ammar Belhimer took ofce as Minister of Communication and spokesman of the government on 13 January 2020, he promised to hold workshops and engage in dialogue with journalists before launching a media reform.

#### References

——. (2019). Economy of the press and communication in Algeria [in French]. *Naqd*, automne-hiver, n°37.

# 18. Morocco: Competitive Authoritarianism in Media Reforms

*Bouziane Zaid and Mohammed Ibahrine*

The chapter provides an account of why the media structure in Morocco is an uneven playing feld with the state having the advantage. It argues that observable confgurations of power over media are mainly tied to a repressive media culture and heritage that can be fairly described as a competitive authoritarian regime. Argumentation is supported by an analysis of Morocco's history and the political economy of media.

#### Background

Located in northwest Africa, Morocco borders the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Algeria to the east, and Mauritania to the south. The Strait of Gibraltar spans 14 kilometers of water that separate Spain from Morocco, which makes the country a gateway for illegal immigration to Europe. As a result, Morocco became a key European ally in the efort to contain the fow of illegal immigration from sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of demographics, according to the 2017 government census bureau, the population was at 35.5 million, 27% of which were under the age of 15, 61% urban, 51% females, and 49% males. The unemployment rate was at 10.2%, and the illiteracy rate was high at 30%. Life expectancy at birth is currently 76. The ofcial languages, as stated in the 2011 Constitution, are Arabic and Amazigh. Amazigh is a branch of the Afroasiatic language family and is spoken by the Imazighen (Berbers), who are indigenous to North Africa.

The majority of Moroccans today are Muslims, but an infuential minority of Moroccan Jews remains in the country. Christians and other religious groups make up 1% of the populace, consisting mainly of foreign residents.

Although the 2011 constitution guarantees equal gender rights, real equality is still a long way of. In 2004, Morocco adopted a family code known as the *mudawana*, which was hailed by women's rights groups in Morocco and abroad as a major step forward. Civil society groups, which are fghting for women's rights, are dynamic and have managed to introduce major changes in Morocco's laws. In addition to the *mudawana*, these groups mobilized the political elite in 2006 to change equal nationality rights, allowing Moroccan women to pass on their citizenship to their children the same way Moroccan men can. More recently, they led a national debate on Article 475 of the Moroccan Penal Code, which allows rapists to avoid prosecution if they agree to marry their victims. Street and online protests were sparked in March 2012 when 16-year-old Amina Filali took her own life after a seven-month ordeal in which she was forced to wed her alleged rapist. Women's rights activists successfully used street demonstrations and social media platforms to rally popular support for changes to the law. In January 2014, the parliament unanimously amended Article 475.

The Western Sahara represents an ongoing major confict involving Morocco, the Polisario, and Algeria. It was annexed by Morocco after Spain left in 1975. The legal status of the southern territory and the question of its sovereignty remain unresolved. The threat of terrorism continues to be another important issue. On 16 May 2003 Morocco was subject to the deadliest terrorist attacks in the country's history. Five explosions killed 43 people and injured more than 100 people in suicide bomb attacks in Morocco's largest city, Casablanca. The 14 suicide bombers all originated from a poor suburban neighborhood in the outskirts of Casablanca. A public debate ensued in the print and broadcast media, questioning the relationship between poverty and extremism.

In the context of the Arab uprisings, a protest movement known as the February 20 Movement held rallies and marches throughout the country in 2011 to demand democratic reforms, a parliamentary monarchy, social justice, the end of absolutism, and the abolition of corruption. The movement triggered a series of reforms initiated by the monarchy. Two weeks after the frst demonstration on 20 February, King Mohammed VI responded by introducing constitutional reforms. He promised to relinquish some of his administrative powers and to devolve some of his executive powers to the head of government and the parliament.

The promises made in the "9 March speech" did not materialize in the contents of the new constitution. A study (Madani, Maghraoui, & Zerhouni, 2012) of the new constitution found that the King remained "at the center of political and constitutional life" (p. 4). The study added that, in contradiction to the "9 March speech," in which the King insisted on the notion of accountability, the King had maintained executive powers without accountability to the Moroccan public (Madani et al., 2012, p. 50).

Despite these issues, Morocco's civil society is dynamic. Activists use their constitutional rights to protest and take advantage of various social media tools to educate, organize, and mobilize people on a wide range of issues. In April 2018, a group of activists launched a campaign to boycott products from three major companies to protest increases in the cost of living. The boycott targeted Centrale Danone (dairy products), Sidi Ali (mineral water), and Afriquia (gas stations). The economic impact of the boycott was evident ten days after it started when Afriquia and Centrale Danone recorded major drops in market value on the Casablanca Stock Exchange, with shares of each falling by nearly 6%.

In terms of media consumption, television remains the primary media of information and entertainment given Morocco's high rates of illiteracy, lack of local digital content creation, and shortage of digital literacy skills. In a recent survey, 68% of youths stated they watch television and 54.5% listen to the radio, spending on average two hours and 14 minutes watching television and two hours and 52 minutes listening to the radio (Morocco World News, 2019). Satellite broadcasting is the dominant form of transmitting television signals, and access to television and satellite dishes is almost universal. The most remarkable change in Internet use continues to be the growing interest in domestic portals (Zaid, 2017). In 2010, the country's top 10 most visited websites did not include any Moroccan news sites. By 2018, the list included six Moroccan websites—three news sites, two classifed ad platforms (Avito and Jumia), and one sports site. In 2019, the country's top ten most visited websites included seven Moroccan websites, three news sites, one classifed ad platforms (Avito), and two sports news websites. The remaining three are *Google*, *Facebook*, and *YouTube*. *Chouftv* surpassed *YouTube* to rank second, and *Hespress* and *2M* surpassed *Facebook* to rank third and fourth, respectively (Ibahrine, 2020).

For print newspapers, circulation is estimated at 350,000; less than one percent of the population reads a newspaper every day. These numbers are likely to decrease, given the easy access to online news (Ibahrine, 2020).

#### Historical Developments

Moroccan media roots can be traced back to the colonial period when Morocco was a protectorate of France and Spain from 1912 to 1956 (Ibahrine, 2009; Zaid, 2010). The colonial powers introduced the print press in its modern form, and Spain played an essential role in establishing several publications in the northern cities of Ceuta, Tangiers, and Tetouan. As early as 1820, the Spanish periodical *El Liberal Africano* was published in Ceuta (Ibahrine, 2009; Zaid, 2017). Unlike radio, which was controlled by foreign powers from 1928 until independence in 1956, print media represented a site of political struggle. Moroccan nationalists published their frst Arabic papers, *Lisan Al-Maghreb* and *Sinan Al-Qalam*, in 1907 to promote nationalist ideas among educated Moroccan elites as tools of liberation. The French colonialists responded by introducing several Press Codes to administer and regulate the nationalist print press. The frst legislation was the Dahir (Decree) of April 1912, followed by a series of decrees that demanded prior authorizations and allowed the colonial powers to shut down publications deemed too critical. After independence in 1956, the print press remained a tool that was used widely in the struggle between the state and the opposition parties.

The French were the frst to start broadcasting in Morocco in February 1928, when radio signals were sent from the city of Rabat. The frst television station, *Telma*, also in French, began airing its programs in 1952. After independence, the government launched the Radiodifusion et Télévision Marocaine (RTM) in 1962, which consisted of four radio stations and one television station. In 1989, the frst terrestrial pay-television channel in the Arab world, *2M International*, began transmission from Casablanca (Ibahrine, 2009; Zaid, 2010).

A brief look at the history of the Internet shows that it has been available to the public since November 1995. Research universities were the frst to adopt and use it. Morocco's frst Internet café opened in 1996 in Rabat. In 1996, there were about 50 websites, but in July 2019, there were 100,618 registered domain names, with 74,717 with the.ma extension.

Until the mid-1990s, the culture of media in Morocco was authoritarian, administrative, and partisan (Zaid & Ibahrine, 2011). It was authoritarian and administrative in that the state controlled the fnancing, regulation, production, and distribution of broadcast media, which was considered the most infuential media. It was partisan in that print media were mainly controlled by political parties. Given the low literacy rates, print media was not seen as a great threat to the regime; instead, maintaining complete state control over broadcasting was seen as essential. Print media became, after independence, a site of political tension between the opposition political parties and the monarchy (Zaid, El Kaddoussi, & Ibahrine, 2020).

Opposition leaders used newspapers and magazines as their chief weapons of political contestation. The era from 1961 to 1997 under the rule of King Hassan II has been labeled the "Years of Lead" because of the rampant repression, injustice, corruption, and media censorship, and the widespread imprisonment, murder, and "disappearance" of journalists and political opponents of the regime (Zaid, El Kaddoussi, & Ibahrine, 2020).

Like many countries in the early postcolonial era, Morocco perceived the role of media as a nation-building instrument (Zaid, 2017). Morocco was a proponent of the modernization theory which conceived development in terms of industrialization, transfer of technology and innovation, and economic growth. According to a study by the Moroccan Ministry of Social Development (2006), development programs and policy in Morocco during the 1950s and 1960s were in line with the modernization paradigm and consisted of investments in economic infrastructure and technology. In this paradigm, the mass media, or what Lerner (1958) called the mobility multiplier, represents the main tool and transmitter of modern values and information, and could even function as a surrogate for travel. Morocco's state-controlled media system was therefore mandated at the outset with the role of modernizing the economy and serving as an instrument for education and social change (El Kadoussi, 2016). It was argued that privatelyowned media would be motivated to seek profts, and this would deprive the Moroccan population of content that fulflled educational and informational values. For instance, in the 1960s, King Hassan II (1961–1999) mobilized radio and television for political awareness and education, including preparations for the country's frst general elections and a constitutional referendum in 1962 (Ibahrine, 2007). The primary purpose was to modernize; human rights were of secondary consideration.

The major improvements in the relationship between the political establishment and mass media occurred when the oppositional socialist government was elected in 1997, a process consolidated under the reign of King Mohammed VI. After he succeeded his father Hassan II in July 1999, Mohammed VI instantly became a symbol of hope for a more democratic and freer Morocco (El Kadoussi, 2016). The mission of the 1997 government was to enact political reforms aimed at promoting human rights, civil liberties, and an open, pluralist media, and to establish the rule of law. One of the frst major pro-human rights measures under the young King Mohammed VI was the 2003 creation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC), which investigated human rights violations from the "Years of Lead" to establish the truth. The Commission organized public forums in 2004 in which victims voiced their pain and sufering under the old regime. These forums were broadcast live on television—a very important moment in Moroccan television history. Another major initiative was the Family Status Law, or *mudawana*, decreed in 2004 to protect the rights of women. To safeguard and promote Amazigh language and culture, Mohammed VI created the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (L'Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe [IRCAM]). The Imazighen constituted a large ethnic group whose culture had been undermined for decades. These positive reforms earned the new king political capital and furthered his legitimacy.

The media benefted from this political opening. All sectors—print, broadcast, and digital—witnessed signifcant growth during the period. The High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle [HACA]) was established under the Dahir (Royal Decree) of 31 August 2002 as an independent administrative body in charge of regulating audiovisual communication. The partial liberalization and modernization of the audiovisual sector allowed new commercial radio and television stations to emerge. The new private radio stations, which grew from two in 2005 to 16 in 2009, reinvigorated the broadcast landscape, especially through their live debate shows and news programs. They introduced the impetus and space to create possibilities for national debates on a variety of social, educational, and health-related issues. Government restrictions on print media also eased.

During this period, a new generation of young journalists pushed the boundaries of the comfort zone of mainstream media and society at large. Many taboos were broken, from discussing the king's salary to reporting on the arrest of high ofcials close to the palace. Morocco was also spared the draconian measures used in other authoritarian countries against the Internet, such as the blocking of social media platforms or web content. Moroccan citizens can, to this day, create websites and write for blogs without any registration requirements imposed by the government (Zaid, El Kaddoussi, & Ibahrine, 2020).

However, while the ERC, the *mudawana*, and the IRCAM have been positive developments, they have not constituted serious opportunities for challenging the status quo in Morocco. The state continues to use legal and fnancial penalties to keep the most critical voices in line. A record number of libel and defamation suits were fled against print media in the years following these reforms. Broadcasts remained under close state supervision via HACA. Internet use was and remains closely monitored through state surveillance. These setbacks led to the 2011 protest movement during the Arab uprisings, leading to constitutional reforms.

#### Political System and Legal Framework

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, but the King maintains executive powers without accountability to the Moroccan public (Madani et al., 2012). Morocco's political regime can be best characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime.

Competitive authoritarian regimes use elements of democracy to ensure domination over the other opposition forces in the country. Levitsky and Way (2002) defned competitive authoritarianism as civilian regimes in which "formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which fraud, civil liberties violations, and abuse of state and media resources so skew the playing feld that the regime cannot be labeled democratic" (p. 4). These regimes are competitive in the sense that the democratic institutions are real and that "opposition forces can use legal channels to seriously contest for (and occasionally win) power; but they are authoritarian in that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly uneven—and even dangerous—playing feld. Competition is thus real but unfair" (p. 4). Competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by the presence of some democratic institutions and some democratic practices such as elections, a multiparty system, and, in this case, a self-proclaimed independent media regulator and a new press law. We argue that Morocco's media reforms are in line with this vision of governance, whereby the state creates democratic institutions to use as a site of struggle with opposition forces while steadfastly maintaining control by establishing an uneven playing feld.

Morocco's media system ofers a good illustration of the complex process of media reform during political transitions. As a competitive authoritarian regime, the state uses democratic institutions to reform its media system, while entrenching these institutions via authoritarian laws. Morocco has witnessed periods of tight authoritarian control and periods of reformist tendencies. This cyclical fuctuation has resulted in signifcant progress in media structure and performance and, at the same time, in the state maintaining its control over the media landscape through various mechanisms of repression.

A case in point is the public service sector. The legal framework and institutional structure provide the conditions for public service to materialize but do not guarantee its performance. The nondemocratic culture of the country is the main deterrent for public service media. A competitive authoritarian regime has stifed the attempt to transform broadcasting from a state-controlled institution into a public service entity. The 2005 Audiovisual Communication Law put an end to the state's monopoly over broadcasting management. The most positive development has been the establishment of a legal framework for private ownership. However, the law contains provisions that allow the state to interfere with program content and to put limits on private ownership.

In addition to HACA, Moroccan Radio and Television (Radiodifusion et Télévision Marocaine), the institution that earlier managed state television and radio, was transformed from a subsidiary of the Ministry of Communication to a public entity, the National Company of Radio and Television (La Société Nationale de Radiodifusion et de Télévision [SNRT]) in April 2005. Self-proclaimed as independent, the SNRT manages nine public television stations and six public radio stations and is not subject to administrative control and supervision by the Ministry.

However, HACA's High Council consists of nine members, fve of whom are appointed by the king, including the president. The king also appoints the president of the SNRT. The state, therefore, assimilated the broadcast regulator into authoritarian strategies of governance, using them to upgrade their capacity to control broadcasting by entrenching them in a multilayered architecture of control, namely the unrepresentative appointment process of its decision-making bodies and the repressive media laws. State control over the appointment process of the regulatory bodies is not an uncommon practice in most democracies. But, in mature democracies, systems of checks and balances exist whereby political power is not concentrated in the hands of a few, and one governance entity cannot hold too much power (Zaid, 2018). This is not the case for Morocco, which failed to transform state broadcasting into public media and continues its history of state broadcasting as an instrument of propaganda and political control.

The 2011 constitution entails provisions that guarantee freedom of expression, as well as caveats limiting this freedom. Article 25 guarantees Moroccan citizens "freedoms of thought, opinion, and expression in all their forms," and Article 28 states that "freedom of the press is guaranteed and may not be limited by any form of prior censorship." (El Kadoussi, 2020).

However, Article 19 puts limits on Morocco's adherence to international conventions on human rights, which has direct implications for the media by introducing two constraining phrases "with respect for the provisions of the constitution's permanent characteristics and the laws of the kingdom." Although the 2011 constitution strengthened the judiciary as a separate branch of government, it is far from independent in Morocco, leaving the media without adequate protection by the law (El Kadoussi, 2018).

The 2016 Press Code brought about many positive advances, but a close look at the text shows that the oppressive nature of the legal environment in the country has not signifcantly changed. The positive adjustments include the elimination of jail sentences for journalists and the establishment of a self-regulatory body, the National Press Council. The law also carries specifc provisions to regulate digital media. However, the three taboo topics—monarchy, Western Sahara, and Islam—were preserved in the new code, and jail sentences were replaced by steep fnes. Failure to pay the fnes can lead to jail terms, and at the same time, the Penal Law, which stipulates jail sentences for any ofense against taboo topics, can be used to prosecute journalists. The Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in 2003 after the terrorist attacks in Casablanca on 16 May, gave the government sweeping legal powers to control any media content that is deemed to "disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror." Ostensibly intended to combat terrorism, the authorities have wide latitude in defning vague terms such as "national security" and "public order," opening the door for abuse.

Moroccan authorities use nuanced means to limit online content and violate users' rights. For example, while websites are rarely blocked, problematic press and anti-terrorism laws place heavy burdens on intermediaries and result in the closure of news sites.

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) (2019) ranked Morocco 135th of 180 countries in its annual press freedom index primarily due to the prosecutions of journalists. Media watchdog organizations such as RSF and Freedom House include in their annual reports the number and names of jailed journalists each year. Moreover, many prominent publication directors and editors such as Aboubakr Jamai, Ahmed Benchemsi, and Ali Lemrabet have resigned from their positions and live in self-imposed exile in Western countries (Zaid, 2017).

#### Economy and Ownership Patterns

Morocco's media system consists of a mix of public and private ownership and allows the government's intervention to ensure public service. Moroccan media outlets use two main fnancing models. The frst is advertising. The media frms expose audiences to advertising messages in exchange for free content. This is the dominant business model in Morocco's media which permeates both public service and non-public service media content providers. The second is subsidy. The government pays media frms in return for public service. This applies to public service television and radio, as well as political party newspapers. The aim, as stated by the government, is to help these media frms be more independent and distanced from all vested economic interests.

Whereas neither public service television nor political party newspapers are free of advertising, public service radio is advertisingfree and ofers a wide range of publicly relevant news and information programming. Against this backdrop, the advertising industry cannot support sustainable media business models. In addition to the deteriorating advertising market, an estimated 70% to 80% of Moroccan advertisers use global online platforms such as *Google* and *Facebook*, whose market share will continue to grow at the expense of local websites. According to the Group of Moroccan Advertisers, the total advertising market stood at USD 596 million in 2017, USD 18 million more than in 2016. In 2018, the big advertisers, the telecom operators, banks, and the food sector lowered their advertising budgets by 14.6%, 14.7%, and 10%, respectively (Hespress, 2019).

The advertising budget is distributed not based on professional, standardized, and transparent criteria, but on who is close to the center of power. Advertising revenue provided by the government or governmentlinked companies is not split equitably between independent and progovernment publications. In a recent example, the Ofce Chérifen des Phosphates (OCP) and Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG), two stateowned companies that do not ofer any particular products to Moroccan consumers, bought advertising time and space. This move was meant to secure advertising funding the state can use to reward obedience.

Current regulatory practices aim to reduce media ownership concentration, but they fail to encourage pluralism in media ownership. In Morocco, the absence of concentration does not necessarily imply an increase in pluralism. According to the Press and Publications Code, any media organization in the broadcast industry cannot hold an investment in the capital of more than one print media company. Any person owning 30% or more of a newspaper company has to declare it to the National Press Council. Any newspaper or magazine that owns 10% or more of the capital of another newspaper or magazine has to declare it to the National Press Council. Internet service providers (ISPs) cannot own part of the capital of another ISP (Le Desk & Reporters Without Borders, 2017). Article 21 of the Audiovisual Communication Law limits the concentration of ownership in broadcasting except for statecontrolled television and radio. In the frst and second waves of licensing in 2006 and 2009, HACA granted licenses only to state-owned television stations and to a mix of state and private radio stations (18 of the latter). Television stations such as *Arriadiya* for sports and *Al-Maghribia* for the Moroccan diaspora, and private radio stations such as *Hitradio* and *Aswat*  were all licensed during this phase. Ownership of private radio refects closeness to the regime power structure (Le Desk & Reporters Without Borders, 2017), hence, the lack of pluralism. The list includes owners of pro-government print media organizations, such as Abdelmounaim Dilami and Moulay Hafd El-Alami; members of the administrative (progovernment) political party, such as Abdelaziz Akhenouch and Mouncif Belkhayat; and former employees of the state-owned television and radio stations, such as Kamal Lahlou. In the second wave of licensing in 2009, HACA declined fve private television license applications on the grounds of a "deteriorating situation in the advertising market," and the need to "maintain the stability and viability of existing public and private operators." It exclusively justifed these decisions on a fnancial basis. Article 21 stipulates that any broadcasting company or shareholder can own shares in another broadcasting company up to a maximum of 30% of its holdings. This was intended to prevent any individual or company from controlling more than one media outlet. Aside from state control over broadcasting, only a handful of media companies owned by key pro-government political players, such as the Caractères Media Group, EcoMédias Group, and Maroc Soir Group, control a few media outlets in print, online, and broadcasting. No single company has control over a signifcant audience share.

Some of Morocco's billionaires, such as Moulay Hafd El-Alami, Aziz Akhannouch, Othman Benjelloun, and Meriem Bensaleh Chaqroun, have stakes in fve of the nine French-language publications including *Aujourd'hui Le Maroc*, *La Vie Eco*, *Les Inspirations Eco*, *La Nouvelle Tribune*, and *L'Economiste*. Currently, two of them are also ministers (Le Desk & Reporters Without Borders, 2017). The publications are editorially pro-government, and they beneft from advertising despite their limited circulation. This close relationship between economic power and the French-language media has created an unhealthy media market because these newspapers receive an advertising budget regardless of their primary circulation and readership. This promotes a culture of clientelism, which is harmful to media transparency and professionalism. Ostensibly, media in Morocco have been strongly controlled by political and economic clientelism. These political leaders need these publications for reputation management and to play down corruption scandals and ensure electoral campaign success (Benchenna, Ksikes, & Marchetti, 2017). This clientelism is also a manifestation of the rentier state in Morocco. If the freedom of the press is to be respected, independence from government interference and big money are vital.

#### Technology and Infrastructure

In the context of the liberalization of the ICT sector in the 1990s, the 1996 Law 24–96 ended the monopoly of state-owned *Maroc Télécom.*  Morocco set up a regulatory body to come up with the country's vision for ICT. Three companies provide telecom services in Morocco. Initially owned by the state, *Maroc Télécom* became private in 1998. The French frm *Vivendi* acquired 35% of its shares in the company in 2001. In 2013, *Etisalat*, an Emirati telecom operator, acquired 53% of *Vivendi*'s stake for USD 5.6 billion (Oxford Business Group, 2019). *Orange Morocco*  became the frst fully private operator to enter the Moroccan market in 2000 (known then as *Médi-Télécom*, a private consortium led by Spain's *Telefonica*). It is now the market's second largest telecom operator. In 2007, *Inwi* (formerly *Maroc Connect*) became the third largest telecom company in Morocco. *Inwi* is a subsidiary of the SNI group, the leading Moroccan industrial, fnancial, and services conglomerate owned by the monarch. Telecommunications is the most dynamic sector in the industry, with mobile data services leading the way.

In 2009, the government launched the national strategy "Digital Morocco 2013" to consolidate ICT industries, to support the automation of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to boost e-government services, and to foster the dissemination of ICT usage among Moroccan households. Subsequent to Digital Morocco 2013, Morocco launched "Digital Morocco 2020," which relies on three main pillars: 1) adopting smart government services and facilitating the adoption of digital devices among Moroccan households; 2) positioning Morocco as a strategic digital hub in French-speaking Africa and enabling the development of business process outsourcing services with high added values; and 3) upskilling human capital to increase the competitiveness of the economy (Oxford Business Group, 2019). The government invested USD 750 million to reduce the digital divide by 50% through the digitization of administrative services, improved access to the Internet through free Wi-Fi in public spaces, and digital literacy programs (Ministry of Industry, Investment, Commerce, and Digital Economy, 2019).

One of the results of Digital Morocco 2020 is the expansion of e-commerce platforms. In 2015, Morocco managed to reach a total of 11.7 million credit cards (Oxford Business Group, 2019). The rise of e-commerce is supported by electronic payment. Out of a total of 18.3 million Internet users, 900,000 are considered regular e-consumers (Oxford Business Group, 2019). In 2019, e-commerce growth was mainly driven by increased smartphone penetration and the rollout of the 4G network.

The development of IT services has been supported by the many technology parks that host more than 100 IT companies, including Dell, IBM, Accenture, Atos, HP, and Logica and more than 1,000 startups. Over the last few years, Morocco has created four technoparks in the four largest Moroccan cities Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers, and Agadir. The mission of these technoparks, which facilitate importing and exporting IT-related services, is to assist in the creation and development of companies in ICT and to promote innovation, training, and technological support.

Morocco is now among the top ten African nations in terms of digital development (Oxford Business Group, 2019). The government eforts have resulted in high proportions of households with Internet access. According to the Agence Nationale de Réglementation des Télécommunications (2019), 74.2% of Moroccan households are now equipped with Internet, 99.8% have mobile phones, and of these, 75.7% have smartphones. The leading motivation for the adoption of the Internet and mobile phones is to enjoy entertainment content, such as games and social media platforms (95.2%), and to access the news (86.1%). Despite signifcant eforts by the government to integrate ICTs properly into the country's development agenda, the ICT Development Index ranked Morocco 100 out of a total of 176 countries (International Telecommunication Union, 2017).

#### Challenges

Three main areas represent challenges to the current system: quality media content, economic sustainability, and disrupting technologies. The rise of sponsored content, misinformation, sensationalism, and poor-quality journalism, particularly in online media, have raised serious concerns about the quality of information Moroccan audiences receive. Entertainment and celebrity stories have increased at the expense of news on national afairs. This dismal picture is the result of several factors, including the ferce competition over audience attention, the logic of algorithm-driven platforms, and the integration of the editorial, marketing, and analytics functions in the digital news industry. The value of news stories is no longer based on the standard quality but on a range of metrics, including the number of visits, hits, and views.

Another factor that negatively afects the quality of content is the journalists' education and training. Journalism seems to have become the profession of those who have no profession. In November 2016 and on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, the *2M TV* show *Sabahiyat* featured a tutorial to show women how to cover domestic violence facial bruises with makeup. In January 2019, a journalist at *Al-Ayam* newspaper interviewed an orphaned seven-year-old girl about her experience of her mother's murder. Both events triggered a vast wave of criticism from social media users and activists who denounced the unethical practices of the journalists.

In terms of economic sustainability, clientelism and the unfair distribution of advertising money continue to represent a threat to media business models. In January 2018, the government placed an additional fnancial burden on the fragile media sector by imposing a 5% tax on digital advertising.

In terms of technology, disruptive technologies are aggravating the fragility of the business models of the print media, despite government subsidies. Moroccan websites depend on revenue streams built on the commercialization of media platforms such as *Google*, *Facebook*, *Twitter*, and other global tech companies. Reliance on social media platforms has created a major structural shift in news production, distribution, and monetization. The tech giants deprive local news websites of vital revenue streams and sources. A local business in Casablanca will achieve a higher yield return on investment when it advertises with *Google* and *Facebook* than with a local news organization. The former will deliver local customers to the local business in a more efcient way than a local news organization serving the local news needs of the same local customers. This situation has had severe consequences for the revenue streams of news websites. Digitalization has been making the profession of a journalist in Morocco more volatile and insecure.

In line with competitive authoritarianism, Morocco failed to liberalize the media and has continued its history of state-controlled media as instruments of political control. As a competitive authoritarian regime, the state created democratic institutions such as HACA and SNRT to reform its media system while entrenching these institutions via authoritarian laws. The locus of power over the media includes licensing and policy formulation, but it also reaches into editorial decisions. Without the sincere political will to reform the media ecosystem, positive change in the quality of content and revenue streams is likely to remain a long-term proposition.

#### Outlook

As elsewhere, news and content providers should improve their competitiveness and ensure that more readers browse their media platforms. However, to further enhance the level of attractiveness in a highly competitive media content market, these news content providers such as print media, broadcast media, and digital platforms are called to personalize their news content over multi-cross platforms and diferent devices. Rather than targeting readers as a whole, news and content providers (media organizations) will realize that real value is in the market of one reader/consumer. The emerging world of media has become more personal than ever before, where readers access their news and media content through their personal and mobile devices. The personalization of news and media content is likely to take another dimension when the superfast 5G enters the Moroccan telecom market. Huawei, a global provider of ICT infrastructure, has been closely working with the Moroccan government and the three Moroccan telecoms operators to launch 5G and will make Morocco the frst country in Africa to do so.

Over the next fve years, digital advertising will continue to thrive and become strong and mature due to factors such as the high levels of connectivity, social media usage, digital platforms penetration, and mobile device adoption. Moroccan policymakers are well-advised to design fexible regulatory frameworks to protect Moroccan readers and their data. At the center of any regulatory framework, the critical issues at hand should include business models, disruptive technologies, trust, and regulation.

#### References

<sup>——. (2009).</sup> Massenmedien in Marokko. In *Internationales Handbuch für Medien 2009* [in German]. Hans-Bredow-Institut. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Zaid, B., & Ibahrine, M. (2011). Mapping digital media: Morocco. *The Open Society Foundation*. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/ mapping-digital-media-morocco#publications\_download

### Conclusion

### *Carola Richter and Claudia Kozman*

What do we learn from comparing the individual media systems of Arab countries? We consciously refrained from building a typology for the eighteen Arab countries that are examined in this book. Instead, we have opted for highlighting major themes that we detected when carefully reviewing the seven dimensions that each author used in the analysis of the respective countries. These themes comprise 1) the state's approach to media, 2) media ownership, 3) fragmentation and polarization, 4) technological advancement and innovation, and 5) transnational mobility and connection. We explain how the media systems examined difer or concur with regard to these fve themes.

#### Deconstructing Typologies, Reconstructing Themes

Comparing Arab media systems can lead to paradoxical results, given their ambivalent developments. A shared history has left its marks, albeit in diferent ways. Ongoing changes distiniguish several dynamic felds, while at the same time a strong authoritarianism persists in other felds. What conclusions, then, can we draw for the present and future of Arab media?

Throughout its chapters, this book has confrmed that Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's (1963) indication that the "press always takes on the form and coloration of the political and social structures within which it operates" still holds true today (p. 1). Nonetheless, these political and social structures change over time and, depending on other factors such as the economic power or the embeddedness of a country in transnational settings, may play out diferently. Moreover, while this

deterministic view seems to have allowed Siebert and his colleagues to assign the diferent political and social structures of all countries worldwide to only four distinct types, we have found it impossible to identify an appropriate typology for Arab media systems. Thus, we consciously refrained from building such a typology for the 18 Arab countries that are examined in this book.

Instead, we have opted to highlight the major themes we detected when carefully reviewing the seven dimensions that each author used in the analysis of their country. These themes will enable us to create new perspectives that could lead to more detailed discussions about the notion of state and business power, the role of transnational infuences, and the impact of the particular social settings of Arab countries on the media. Which major themes, then, are characteristic of Arab media systems from a comparative perspective?

In the extant media system typologies, the nature of the state or the government is analyzed along with the kinds of intervention they apply to the media. In her chapter in this book, Sarah El-Richani, however, contends it is "important to take stock of the *de facto* situation... in addition to that which is *de jure*." This implies that the media in general might refect the political and social structures of a given country, but there are still manifold ways in which these structures afect actual practices. While the legal written rules and regulations are often the focus of a media systems analysis, the chapters on the respective countries urge us to take a more general perspective that also reviews typical practices of control and infuence beyond the written rules and regulations. Instead of considering only the legal framework, we consider the government or *the state's general approach to media* as an important theme. This includes the ways in which journalism and the performance of media workers are afected by red lines, unwritten rules, and the kinds of selfcensorship resulting from the state's overarching approach to media being incorporated into its work practices.

Another major dimension in the extant global media system typologies is the ownership of media. While this has often been analyzed as a simple distinction between state-owned and private, or "public" and "independent" media, we instead consider the patterns that shape *media ownership* and their impact on content. Here, William Rugh's (2004) notion of "loyalist" media in the MENA region is important because it hints at the fact that media privatization does not necessarily result in pluralistic media landscapes or regime-challenging media. Additionally, Hallin and Mancini's (2004) idea of analyzing political parallelism in the media is to be taken into consideration when assessing ownership patterns because of the typical interwovenness of politics and business, and how this is mirrored in the media scene.

The notion of political parallelism reappears in audiences' preferences and journalists' performances. In all of the countries analyzed, we fnd strong patterns of both societal and political fragmentation and polarization. Arab media systems seem to be characterized by a division of audiences, journalists, and content owing to confict driven by ethnic, religious, or political diferences, which often come to light during times of crisis and war. We thus consider the nature and efects of *fragmentation and polarization* of the media system as another theme.

An aspect that is not refected strongly—or at all—in existing typologies is *technological advancement and innovation*. Media systems are converging throughout the world; therefore, the traditional distinction between print, audio, and visual media is not very helpful in an era of pervasive Internet, since it fails to provide us with in-depth knowledge about the realities of media production, usage, and control. Thus, we need to take a critical look at a media system's achievements and performance in terms of technology and infrastructure. The country chapters indicate that this theme is of major importance, even when some states simply do not have the wherewithal to engage in technological advancement and innovation.

Finally, the MENA region has been characterized for centuries by a tradition of *transnational mobility and connection*, which is also evident in the realm of media and journalism. On the one hand, and due to a common language, the potential outreach of media to publics beyond national borders enables content and production to travel in a way that is not even imaginable in other regions of the world. On the other hand, transnational connectedness raises its own unique problems, such as the asymmetry between the civilian experiences on either side of wars or conficts, as in those between Yemen and Saudi Arabia or Palestine and Israel. With regard to outreach, mobility, and ownership the theme of transnationalism has been highlighted in several country chapters and thus requires further attention.

In the following section, we examine these themes more closely by comparing and contrasting the fndings of the 18 country chapters.

#### Arab Media Systems: A Comparative Perspective

#### 1. The State's Approach to Media

Refecting on the state's approach to media allows us to understand the ability and means of ruling elites to control the media, or infuence its production and content to shape public opinion. Indeed, the most common feature of almost all Arab political regimes is their continuous efort to make the media suit their immediate policies. Ehab Galal, for example, argues in his chapter on Qatar that the state "carefully navigate[s] a balance... between liberalization and control" and Bouziane Zaid and Mohammed Ibahrine detect a "cyclical fuctuation" of liberalization and repression in Morocco.

In most of the Arab countries, constitutions or other guiding legal texts guarantee freedom of media and expression—but almost always within the limits of vague concepts such as "national security" and "public morals." It thus remains within the jurisdiction of the regimes to execute what is meant by freedom of expression or, more generally, what they want the media to be and do in society. We identifed mobilization and modernization purposes as the two main goals regimes typically use to justify the instrumentalization of the media. In addition to this line of comparison, we found varying degrees of enforcement of laws and (unwritten) regulations, which prompted us to include a second dimension of comparison: the contrast between a *laissez-faire* approach and strong control of media (see Figure 1).

Mobilization, in this context, is often framed as an educational efort by self-proclaimed elites to enlighten the masses who seem to be "not there yet," that is, not yet in the state of mind the regime wants them to be. More often than not, mobilization has turned out to be propaganda used extensively by socialist—or those claiming to be socialist—republics, such as Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Yet, mobilization in the sense outlined above is a vanishing characteristic of Arab media systems. As seen in their respective chapters, only Algeria and Sudan still appear to be aiming to mobilize the "uneducated masses," although

#### *Conclusion 327*

Sudan's approach is apt to change due to revolutionary transformation, and in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, a unifed state approach is completely lacking, due to the de facto fragmentation of these countries. In the latter three cases, militias or opposing elites today instrumentalize the media using propagandistic means to mobilize it for their causes and to delegitimize opposition, therewith constructing a new kind of mobilization media that is not likely to vanish if the wars fnally end.

In Iraq, the situation has changed since the US invasion in 2003, throwing out the idea of mobilization as a main feature to describe the state's approach to media. Similarly, in Lebanon and Palestine, state structures are weak and thus a kind of *laissez-faire* approach towards the media exists, with restrictive laws in place but rarely applied. In these cases, the state is not in a position to dictate a specifc media policy, neither can it mobilize for its causes. In a way, this makes these media systems freer than others. The problem, however, lies in the inability of the state to provide legal security to media outlets and physical security to media workers, making them vulnerable to any kind of attacks. Tunisia is a special case here: it has created laws to guarantee a more autonomous media system, balancing protection and control and avoiding instrumentalization of the media. However, the actual practices resulting from this approach have yet to be observed more closely.

On the other side of the spectrum, Egypt and Bahrain exercise strict control over the media, often under the pretext of stabilizing national security and the modern state. Due to the political turmoil these countries have faced since 2011, their governments view the media as potential enemies that need to be controlled through restrictive laws, intimidation of media workers, and ownership.

In between these two extremes—the *laissez-faire* and the strong control approaches—many countries oscillate between control and liberalization under the pretext of modernization and development. With the exception of Bahrain, all of the Gulf states, as well as the kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan, legitimize control of the media as a means to foster national stability and unity, while at the same time somehow conceding to private (foreign) investors in order to bring to life their visions of media as revenue creators. These governments also invest strongly in building a high-end digital infrastructure in order to keep their promises of modernization with regard to digital media. In this context, media content often is not directly censored; instead, journalists commonly revert to self-censorship in order to avoid jeopardizing their own position in a media industry that these governments view as a must-have in creating a modern society.

Fig. 1: The state's approach to media

#### 2. Media Ownership

Media ownership reveals much about the distribution of power in the context of fnancial viability. It also raises questions about who is at the center or the margins of power, in addition to which role external donors play.

In the Arab world, state-owned and privately-owned media coexist, but to varying degrees. In some countries, such as Lebanon and Kuwait, print media have always been set up as entirely privately fnanced outlets without any state-ownership, while in most other countries, the print media market was at least liberalized in the 1990s or early 2000s, leading to the coexistence of state-owned, privately-owned, and partyowned press. The much wider reach of the broadcasting sector meant that regimes attributed much greater signifcance to it. Television, in particular, remained in the hands of governments and their ministries of information (or similar institutions) well into the mid-2000s. Lebanon is the only exception to this rule. One media type that is absent in the MENA is up-to-date public service broadcasting (PSB) that aims to represent all segments of society without governmental interference and commercial interests, although there have been some attempts to establish a PSB model similar to that of the *BBC* in Iraq. Currently, Tunisia faces the task of reorganizing state-owned broadcasting and turning it into a real PSB.

However, the simple facts of public or private ownership do not help us understand either the underlying patterns of media ownership or their efect on content. First, we must therefore glean patterns that shape ownership structures by taking into consideration the state's general approach to media as well as the availability of fnancial means by certain actors. Second, we have to consider Rugh's idea of "loyalist" media and pit it against its very opposite, which we term "confrontational" media (see Figure 2).

With regard to "loyalist" media, we fnd three distinct ownership patterns in our sample with one common characteristic: ownership of key media sectors, such as broadcasting and telecommunications, is almost exclusively in the hands of cronies or extended family members of the regimes. In countries such as Egypt, Sudan, and Algeria, the security apparatuses and the military play a huge role in the ownership of "privatized" media. In countries like Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Bahrain, or Oman, private ownership extends to infuential businesspeople who have become successful due to their close links to the ruling family. These relationships allow them to make cross-sector investments in the media, for example to advertise their products. A third pattern is primarily linked to what we call "pan-Arab outsourcing" and applies mainly to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. While these countries still operate rather banal national state-owned television outlets, the main investments of the royal families and their allies go into pan-Arab consortia, such as *Rotana*, *Al-Jazeera*, and *MBC*, which provide professional journalism and high-end entertainment, but are entirely loyal to the political ideologies of their sponsors. None of these three ownership patterns is exclusive in any media system, rather they often

greatly overlap within a single system. Here, we highlight the prevailing pattern for each country.

On the opposite side of the spectrum, "confrontational" media are prevalent in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where media ownership is completely unregulated, at least from a national perspective. In these cases, media almost exclusively belong to actors involved in the confict and consequently disagree with one another. At the same time, media loyalty is enforced in areas where one side dominates, such as in the Houthi-dominated north of Yemen or in east Libya, which is under the control of General Haftar. Here, media are typically owned by those who have the fnancial means to operate them and who are most often the conficting parties themselves.

However, in the realms of both loyalist and confrontational media, a new development concerning small media has occurred. In some countries, small media, such as local radio stations or websites, are operated by local actors and provide a true alternative to the "big" national media, whereas in others, as in the cases of Libya and Iraq, they pop up unregulated, and often get support from external donors, such as European media development organizations. Still, in other countries, such as Tunisia, community media are part of the ofcial new media scene. These examples indicate that small or alternative media could be a breeding ground for new media ownership models in the foreseeable future.

In addition to the patterns of enforced and unregulated media ownership, there exists another, more regulated kind of pattern on the "confrontationalist" side. In Lebanon, Tunisia, Iraq, and Palestine, media are owned by a variety of political and/or confessional actors, creating a rather pluralistic media landscape. While, in Iraq and Palestine, this can easily turn into the confict model described above, in the cases of Lebanon and Tunisia, there seems to be a stable and healthy external pluralism.

3. Fragmentation and Polarization

This theme identifes fragmentation and polarization as a result of lines of confict driven by ethnic, religious, social, or political diferences. It refects the supremacy of power and control in dictating how social structures and divisions are represented. We identifed two dimensions through which to compare the countries: how the political system deals with conficts, and how the media represent conficts. On the political level, the country cases indicate two opposing ways in which these phenomena are treated: either the lines of confict materialize to such a degree that they are omnipresent in society and shape all societal discourse, or they are strongly suppressed so as to mimic political and social homogeneity for the sake of creating national stability. Diferent ways of representing these conficts can be found on the media level, ranging from "conscious inclusion" to "conscious exclusion" of the voices of others (see Figure 3).

On one side of the political spectrum, in which strong political, religious, and/or ethnic divisions openly shape society, are post- and current-confict countries that are mired in civil wars, including Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, or those that are shaken by major political rifts, such as that between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine. In all of these cases, media performance oscillates between providing an external pluralism of opinions and perspectives, on the one hand, and hate speech and denunciation of the opponent, on the other. With regard to each of Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where wars are still ongoing, a completely unregulated, polarized media is dominant, and there are only minor tangible eforts to overcome this polarization, such as small, local reconciliatory initiatives. This means a conscious exclusion of and fght against other actors' voices takes place in the respective media, thus reinforcing polarization through media discourse.

In the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, where the fragmentation of the media landscape along political and confessional lines has long been the case, more signs of professionalization, such as the use of less aggressive language or more objective reporting, can be observed. Thus, we can detect that some learning has taken place, perhaps due to the perceived necessity of including opposing voices of in diferent media in order to mimic openness and reduce polarization.

There is yet another way of dealing with confict on the political level, as seen in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan, each of which faces societal rifts in diferent spheres. Egypt has a large Coptic minority; Morocco comprises substantial Imazighen communities; Tunisia faces political rifts, severe problems with Islamists and an unresolved urban-rural divide; and Jordan's population is made up of many Palestinians and other refugee populations. These countries have found ways of responding to the demands of the various segments of society by providing better representation, either through speciallanguage programs on radio and television, as in the case of Morocco, or by a quasi-natural inclusion, such as with the Palestinians in Jordanian society and its media landscape. In these cases—sometimes only after strong political pressures from the respective organized minorities—a gradual and closely monitored inclusion in the media system has taken place. Yet socioeconomic divisions, such as an urban-rural or class division, are not adequately addressed in most of the media systems that were observed here.

In other countries, societal confict lines are strong, but their articulation remains suppressed, as in the case of tribal minorities in remote areas of Algeria and Sudan, such as Darfur, or in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain with religious minorities of other Islamic faiths. So far, no eforts have been made to provide a more inclusionary media landscape.

As for the small Gulf states of Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE, indigenous citizens represent only a minority of the population, with the majority of the population comprising individuals originally from other Arab countries or South Asia, and typically dwelling only temporarily in these countries. It is worth noting that expatriates are oftentimes those behind media production both in the Arabic language (as in the case of *Al-Jazeera*), or the English-language newspapers, news agencies, and transnationally operating media. Although the foreign workers are not naturalized and therefore often lack political rights, the chapters on those countries paint a picture of harmonious coexistence, emphasizing the tolerance towards foreign religions, confessions, and ethnicities. Indeed, given the dependency on foreign staf, their inclusion in everyday life and the media scene is crucial for these regimes. It remains to be seen whether an adequate representation of the non-naturalized inhabitants' problems, needs, and demands—which revolve around human rights issues—is actually refected in media production, or whether it is glossed over.

#### 4. Technological Advancement and Innovation

Technological advancement refects both the political ideology and economic power of a given state. We therefore approached this theme from two perspectives: frst, the state of the infrastructure regarding Internet connectivity and telecommunications, and second, specifc policies behind building a high-end infrastructure or the lack thereof for example, whether a state makes it a priority to invest in the Internet, liberalizes the telecommunications market, or not. Taking these two aspects into consideration, we observe a spectrum with highly developed technological systems at one end, and poorly developed systems—due to a lack of prioritization—at the other (see Figure 4).

The rich Gulf countries, with their high-end infrastructure enabling literally everyone to be connected through the Internet and mobile phones, are positioned at one end of the spectrum. Statistics indicate an almost total connectivity amongst the populations in the small emirates of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. For instance, mobile phone penetration sometimes hits the 200% mark, meaning that statistically every citizen has two mobile phone contracts. The geographically larger and more populated countries of Saudi Arabia and Oman follow a similar trend, although their penetration does not reach the same fgure. In all of these countries, the regimes heavily invest in infrastructure and facilitate the establishment of international and leading technology companies in the region. The regimes regard these ventures as investments in their futures, actions that could diversify their economies and build a competitive infrastructure for businesses in general, as well as satisfying their citizens by providing state-of-the-art communications and a 'modern' lifestyle. At the same time, this stateof-the-art infrastructure comes with new forms of restriction. In order to keep their control of the online sphere, the incumbent elites have released a plethora of cybercrime laws and have invested, with the help of globally operating tech giants, in Internet security that not only aims to prevent fnancial fraud online, but in many cases is also used to limit freedom of speech on the Internet.

There are, of course, other countries in the region that have long realized how investing in Internet infrastructure in particular, and media infrastructure more broadly, can help to advance the countries'

#### *Conclusion 335*

modernization and economic development. The governments that most strongly advocated for the distribution of computers and the development of an Internet infrastructure in the early 2000s were Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco and, after some delay, Algeria. These countries started from a very low level of connectivity, and—due to their limited fnancial means, vast geographies, and still substantial illiteracy rates among the population—have reached only modest levels of Internet penetration (from 48% in Algeria to 64% in Tunisia). The early and controlled liberalization of the telecommunications market, however, has stimulated comparatively high levels of mobile phone penetration among citizens (which exceeds 100% in all countries but Egypt).

By contrast, in countries such as Lebanon and Jordan Internet penetration is comparatively better, but mobile phone use has for a long time been considered rather expensive and therefore has remained less common. In Lebanon, for example, regulation of the telecom market has favored cronies of the confessional regime, preventing a competitive environment that would push forward technological advancement.

Then, there are countries with an ambivalent record, such as Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, where a signifcant portion of the population is familiar with digital media due to advanced levels of education. While all three of these countries have witnessed major investments in Internet infrastructure and, in particular, in the telecommunications market, these investments continue to face major setbacks and destruction due to occupation, war, or violent confict.

Yemen, Libya, and Sudan are situated at the opposite end of the spectrum of technological advancement, with the lowest rates of Internet connectivity. In these cases, the lag is the product of a mixture of general underdevelopment, war and confict, and a severe lack of governmental determination to build an infrastructure until the 2010s.

Depending on the degree of state stability and investment security, technological advancement could develop rapidly in the two end groups. Regarding the two groups in the middle, policy directions and lack of fnancial means of investment seem to be the main problematic factors causing delays in development.

Fig. 4: Technological advancement and innovation

#### 5. Transnational Mobility and Connection

The ffth and last theme indicates how aspects of transnational connections mirror the multiple and changing relations between the diferent countries and their media systems. Aspects of transnationalism have featured strongly in most of the individual countries investigated here. They manifest in unique but overlapping ways. The main aspects to consider are: 1) the transnational circulation of media content, 2) the transnational circulation of media workers, 3) the role of the diaspora or those in exile in the media scene, and 4) the space that is provided to foreign or pan-Arab media in a given country (e.g. through hosting foreign channels). If we concentrate on the level of trans-Arab connections only, and exclude non-Arab mobility, we can identify fve major groups of countries that can be distinguished in terms of these aspects (see Figure 5).

Oman represents the media system with the fewest transnational connections: it neither invests in pan-Arab content, nor hires large numbers of non-Omani Arab media workers. It also does not have a strong and active diaspora involved in media production, and does not host foreign media. But this is actually rather atypical for the region, as we can observe by examining the other countries.

A second group, comprising Bahrain, Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, boasts substantial and active diasporas that produce a sizeable volume of media content from abroad. Libyan and Yemeni political actors, for example, operate entire systems of television channels from abroad, while Sudan and Bahrain have active exile communities that are highly present online. The content these online spaces or channels produce

#### *Conclusion 337*

is aimed at target audiences in the given home countries. Therefore, the transnational element in question here is the diasporic media production and transmission back to the country of origin, rather than the transnational circulation of content or media workers outside their home countries in general.

A third, very large group, including the Maghreb's Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, in addition to Iraq and Palestine, accounts for the countries of origin of many media workers who operate the pan-Arab television stations in the Gulf, such as *Al-Jazeera* or *MBC*. Moreover, these states also enjoy substantial diasporas spread over the MENA region and throughout Europe, in particular in France. These diasporas often consume the media of their home countries as well as adding to media production through a set of (mainly online) diaspora media outlets. Yet again, the content produced on these platforms is not directed beyond the respective national communities at home or abroad.

A fourth group consists of the Gulf countries Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. These states dedicate their media investments to pan-Arab outlets, producing content that primarily targets transnational audiences. As the recipients of media workforces from other Arab countries, they have succeeded in building real pan-Arab working hubs. All three countries also provide platforms and fnancial support to other Arab political actors, enabling them to set up media abroad and directly target their own national audiences. All three have, for example, supported Libyan political actors and their media activities, and Saudi Arabia has provided media space for Yemeni political groups that have fed their country. Although Jordan does not ft seamlessly in this group, it does to a certain extent provide space for foreign media production, and hosts many international media producers in its Jordan Media City. Ultimately, however, it cannot compete with the Gulf states as a new pan-Arab media hub. Finally, until the 1980s Kuwait had been a major hub for pan-Arab content and workforce, but it has since lost this position to the Gulf states on the other side of the shore.

A ffth and fnal group includes the traditional hubs of pan-Arab transnationalism, Lebanon and Egypt, with their transnationallyoriented television, serial and cinema production, strong diasporas, and circulating workforce. Both countries have shaped the transnational fows of Arab media for decades. Before the current war, Syria had also played a strong role in pan-Arab serial production and the circulating workforce, but its transnationalism has since shifted towards the diaspora model, due to a signifcant decline in media production.

Fig. 5: Transnational mobility and connection

By identifying recurrent themes in the separate country chapters, and applying a comparative perspective when examining these themes, we tried to determine the similarities and diferences among the 18 Arab media systems and thus provide an in-depth view of the current status quo regarding political, economic, societal, technological, and transnational dimensions. However, our analysis of diferent types of media systems should not be interpreted as suggesting that these types are set in stone. Developments in the region are so dynamic that the current situations displayed in our analysis and the fgures included above should be understood as snapshots of a certain moment in time. The frequent lack of more accurate data in the MENA region still leaves us with uncertainty regarding many aspects. As a result, comparisons can only be tentative.

#### The Road Ahead: Challenges for Arab Media Systems

Finally, we will refer to some of the dynamic developments characteristic of the region, which also shape media landscapes globally, and whose directions and results cannot yet be predicted.

From the beginning, media in the MENA region have been tools for mobilization and modernization, and correspond to ownership patterns that refect these approaches. Rarely in their history have they been considered as independent entities that exist to watch over the government and other ruling elites. Many of the Arab countries lack sustainable funding models for media beyond instrumental ownership by privileged actors. This has led to what the literature calls "media capture" (Schifrin, 2018), that is, a state of afairs in which media outlets become a trading product of political or other actors who ensure an economic grip on it in order to remain in power. This kind of approach is no longer exclusively the domain of the state or its elites, but is also adopted by the business sector, security apparatuses, militias, and other political actors. The problem of media capture is certainly not limited to the MENA region, and has become a global phenomenon, as evident in European countries and the US. In some areas of the MENA region, community media, such as small radio stations or local online newspapers, which are in particular facilitated by the Internet, could evolve as alternatives to media capture on the national and transnational levels. Our authors highlight two main solutions to allow for a more autonomous and sustainable media environment: an accountable rule of law needs to be established for individuals inclined to invest time and money into media, and a real advertising market needs to be set up.

Another major challenge that will not be easily overcome is the fragmentation of societies that could ultimately result in the disintegration of entire countries, such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya, or in rising political and economic tensions, as in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and Algeria. The fragmentation of societies and the concurrent instrumentalization of media by the various fragments are clear outcomes of these crises. Taking into consideration the historical developments and the colonial trajectories as well as the current (international) political interests in the Middle East and North Africa, we realize that crises are a common feature of the region, with only a few exceptions. The manifold transnational connections between the countries and the media systems, for example, investments in a joint *ArabSat* system or the pan-Arab workforce in many media channels, have not saved the region from infghting carried out via media. The recent outlawing of Qatar's *Al-Jazeera* by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt is perhaps the most prominent example. Such infghting within or among states and the instrumentalization of media within them result in serious security risks for media workers, making journalism a dangerous occupation.

The digital transformation of the media is a major challenge globally, as well as regionally. Some Arab countries, in particular the wealthy Gulf states, seem to be well-placed to meet this challenge, thanks to their advanced infrastructure. They have the means to invest heavily in the latest technology and do so intentionally to respond to the pressing need to transform their economy from crude oil production to a more knowledge-based economy. Other MENA countries are lagging behind, which has created a digital divide in the region. Regardless of their progress, all these countries are faced with the question of Internet control and regulation, and what to permit and what to ban. In this context, several problems that are being discussed on a global level, such as data security, privacy, and prevention of disinformation and hate speech, present challenges that are crucial to authoritarian regimes in respect to their control of opinions and marginalizing the opposition. So far, it is not clear what the trend will be, considering that some regimes do not hesitate to slow or cut of Internet connections completely, as has been done in Iraq, or monitor content closely and impose cybercrime laws as in Egypt or Qatar and many other countries in the region.

The above challenges are critical and will afect all Arab media systems for the foreseeable future. Yet, the region has always shown strong dynamics and has even pioneered media-related developments. In Egypt, radio has long been exploited as a means of reaching out to the masses and creating stars, such as the singer Umm Kulthum and President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s. The immense role of satellite television in accessing not only national but transnational audiences has been largely driven by developments in the MENA region that had already started in the early 1990s. The Arab uprisings are ultimately connected to specifc uses of social media that were unprecedented before 2010 or 2011 and that showed how savvy people could incorporate technologies into their political strategies. This inspired many movements all over the planet.

Arab media, the structures and systems behind the practices of their producers and users, and their impact and efects, will thus be of interest and relevance for many years to come.

#### References