With regard to the difference between nature as a transcendent demiurge and nature as an immanent principle, we shall look at another passage in *Nat. Fac.* In it, Galen describes the role of semen and blood in generation. Here too, boundaries are ambiguous, as we shall see. In a polemic against Erasistratus, Galen compares the artistry of nature to that of sculptors such as Praxiteles and Phidias.88 Whereas the sculptors merely change the outside appearance of their material and do not change the actual material itself ('Phidias could not turn wax into ivory and gold nor yet gold into wax'), nature is 'extended throughout the whole substance' of the parts of the body and alters and shapes them through and through.89 If nature were to preserve 'the original character' (τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἰδέαν) of its matter, then, states Galen, 'all parts of the animal would be blood'. He compares blood to the wax of the sculptor, the basic material, which the sculptors embellish from the outside, whereas nature alters it completely to turn it into various other homoeomerous substances such as 'bone, artery, vein, nerve' etc. Now, Galen imagines asking Erasistratus what it would be that alters and fits together and shapes this material, in other words, what corresponds to the sculptor in the analogy. In Galen's imagination, Erasistratus would answer 'either nature or the semen' and would mean the same by it. He explains as follows:

ὅ γὰρ ἦν πρότερον σπέρμα, τοῦθ΄, ὅταν ἄρξηται φύειν τε καὶ διαπλάττειν τὸ ζῷον, φύσις τις γίγνεται. καθάπερ γὰρ ὁ Φειδίας εἶχε μὲν τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς τέχνης καὶ πρὶν ψαύειν τῆς ὕλης, ἐνήργει δ΄ αὐταῖς περὶ τὴν ὕλην – ἅπασα γὰρ δύναμις ἀργεῖ ἀποροῦσα τῆς οἰκείας ὕλης –, οὕτω καὶ τὸ σπέρμα τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις οἴκοθεν ἐκέκτητο, τὰς δ΄ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ἔλαβεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐπεδείξατο.90

For that which was previously semen, this, when it begins to bring forth and to shape the living being, becomes a kind of nature. For in the same way that Phidias possessed the powers of his art even before touching his material, and then actualized those in connection to his matter – for

88 The passage starts around the beginning of the third chapter of book II (II 80 K).

89 Translations Brock.

90 *Nat. Fac.* II 83–4 K.

nection with the matter.

tr. Brock, modified

We are here in the context of a polemic against Erasistratus and Galen seems to take a somewhat more Aristotelian position than elsewhere91 in order to show that the followers of Erasistratus are not proper Peripatetics. However, there is no reason to doubt that Galen is presenting his own views here. What is interesting, first of all, is that he ascribes the role of artificer to the semen, which he also does in other works.92 But whereas sometimes he speaks of the power in the seed as the natural power for shaping a living being, here he seems to identify the semen itself as artistic nature (which does, however, correspond to his general understanding of the relation between substances and capacities or powers, as we have seen93). It is said to bring forth and shape the animal and it is compared to the actual artificer in the analogy, namely Phidias. The semen becomes a nature when it has its appropriate material at hand. In the way Galen describes this becoming of a nature, the emphasis is on creative capacity. He continues to describe the necessity of the right amount of material, i.e. blood. If there would be too much blood, the semen would perish, while if there would be no blood at all, the semen would remain completely inoperative and 'would not become a nature' (οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο φύσις). As he said before, the semen becomes something else in the right circumstances, namely an artificer, creative nature. This is to be understood as a transformation in which it is no longer semen, it seems, since Galen says that when it does not perish, it can become nature *instead of* semen (γίγνηται φύσις ἀντὶ σπέρματος). So, what is it, that makes sure that the right amount of blood is supplied and that the artificial capacities of the semen are unleashed so that it may become a creative nature? Here, the answer is again: the semen itself, which has the

91 Particularly with regard to the respective passive and active roles of blood and semen.

92 Cf. *Foet. Form.* 86,17–8 Nickel (V 682 K), where Galen says that the semen bears the 'formula of the creator' (τὸν τοῦ δημιουργοῦ λόγον) and 86,21 f. Nickel where the 'power in the seed' (ἡ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι δύναμις) is said to 'shape' (διαπλάττεσθαι) the parts of the body and is used synonymously with 'the nature which shapes living beings' (ἡ διαπλάττουσα τὰ ζῷα φύσις); also *Sem.* 98,1–3 De Lacy (IV 546–7 K), where the 'natural' or 'vegetative principle' is said to 'create not from blood but from the semen itself artery and vein and nerve, bone and membrane' (tr. De Lacy), also *Sem.* 78,24 f. and 82,12 f. De Lacy.

93 See infra, Case-Study I, 39–40 and note 76.

140 Case-Study II

basic natural capacity of drawing to itself what it needs, i.e. a due proportion of blood. Galen gives us a more elaborate description of how this works:

σύμμετρον δ΄ ἂν εἴη τὸ λεπτὸν οὕτω καὶ ἀτμῶδες, ὥστ΄ εὐθὺς εἰς πᾶν μόριον ἑλκόμενον τοῦ σπέρματος δροσειδῶς μηδαμοῦ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παρεμφαίνειν ἰδέαν. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ κρατήσει ῥᾳδίως τὸ σπέρμα καὶ ταχέως ἐξομοιώσει καὶ τροφὴν ἑαυτῷ ποιήσεται κἄπειτ΄ οἶμαι δεύτερον ἐπισπάσεται καὶ τρίτον, ὡς ὄγκον ἑαυτῷ καὶ πλῆθος ἀξιόλογον ἐργάσασθαι τραφέντι. καὶ μὴν ἤδη καὶ ἡ ἀλλοιωτικὴ δύναμις ἐξεύρηται μηδ΄ αὐτὴ πρὸς ᾿Ερασιστράτου γεγραμμένη. τρίτε δ΄ ἂν ἡ διαπλαστικὴ φανείη, καθ΄ἥν πρῶτον μὲν οἷον ἐπίπαγόν τινα λεπτὸν ὑμένα περιτίθησιν ἑαυτῷ τὸ σπέρμα …94

Now, this fluid would be in due proportion if it were so thin and vaporous, that, as soon as it was drawn like dew into every part of the semen, it would everywhere cease to display its own particular character; for so the semen will easily dominate and quickly assimilate it and will use it as food, and then it will, I imagine, draw to itself a second and a third quantum, and thus by feeding it makes for itself a considerable bulk and quantity. In fact, the alterative power has now been discovered as well, although about this Erasistratus has not written a word. And, thirdly the shaping power will become evident, by virtue of which the semen firstly surrounds itself with a thin membrane like a kind of superficial condensation …

tr. Brock, slightly modified

The semen alters blood into other homoeomerous substances and shapes the embryo. These two capacities, the alterative and shaping power, are the same ones that Galen previously distinguished as the powers of nature by which it creates.95 So, what we can gather from all this, is that semen becomes creative nature when confronted with its proper material and then generates a living being by exercising the natural capacities of alteration and shaping. It seems

94 *Nat. Fac.* II 85–6 K.

95 *Nat. Fac.* II 10–11 K: 'Genesis, however, is not a simple activity of Nature, but is compounded of alteration and of shaping. That is to say, in order that bone, nerve, veins, and each of the others may come into existence, the underlying substance from which the animal springs must be altered; and in order that the substance so altered may acquire its appropriate shape and position, its cavities, outgrowths, attachments, and so forth, it has to undergo a shaping or formative process. One would be justified in calling this substance which undergoes alteration the material of the animal, just as wood is the material of a ship, and wax of an image'. (tr. Brock, slightly modified)

then, that all the creative capacities of nature, in the case of human beings at least, are simply contained in the seed and in this way passed from one person to the next, i.e. from parent to child, so that it is unnecessary to postulate a transcendent nature. Now, however, Galen poses a caveat: we must take care to not attribute to the semen reason and intelligence.96 So on the one hand, the semen seems to have all the powers necessary for new generation given the right conditions, but on the other hand this provides Galen with a problem: if all of these powers can be accounted for with the semen itself, then what about the intelligent design of things? Galen seems to have remained puzzled by this problem, as the following passage from *Foet. Form.*, a relatively late work, shows:

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀπορεῖν ὁμολογῶ περὶ τοῦ διαπλάσαντος αἰτίου τὸ ἔμβρυον. ἄκραν γὰρ ὁρῶν ἐν τῇ διαπλάσει σοφίαν τε ἅμα καὶ δύναμιν οὔτε τὴν ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ψυχήν, τὴν φυτικὴν μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν ᾿Αριστοτέλη καλουμένην, ἐπιθυμητικὴν δ΄ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν Στωїκῶν οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ὅλως, ἀλλὰ φύσιν, ἡγοῦμαι διαπλάττειν τὸ ἔμβρυον οὐ μόνον οὐκ οὖσαν σοφήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον, οὔτ΄ αὖ πάλιν ἀποστῆναι τελέως αὐτῆς δύναμαι διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὰ γεννήσαντα τῶν ἐγγόνων ὁμοιότητα.97

And so I confess that I do not know the cause of construction of the foetus. For I observe in this construction the utmost intelligence and power, and I cannot allow that the soul in the seed, which Aristotle calls vegetative and Plato desiderative, and which the Stoics consider not to be soul at all, but nature, constructs the foetus, since this kind of soul is not only not intelligent, but entirely devoid of reason; nor, however, can I entirely distance myself from that opinion, in view of the similarity of the offspring to the parents …

tr. Singer

This question is decisive for the question about the relative immanence or transcendence of nature: were the natural powers of creation to be completely contained in the seed, nature would be immanent and passed on through time from one being to another. But if we rather think that this model cannot account for the apparent order of things, then we would perhaps be more inclined to think of a creative nature that transcends individual substances in a sense that is not merely chronological. In the end, apparently, Galen did not

96 *Nat. Fac.* II 85 K: 'μή πως λάθωμεν τῷ σπέρματι λογισμόν τινα καὶ νοῦν χαρισάμενοι'.

97 *Foet. Form.* 104,15 Nickel (V 700 K).

reach a final conclusion on this matter, and he seems to have remained caught in the tension between the explanatory power of mixture and the conviction of intelligent design.98 In this regard, Galen's work may puzzle our tendency to distinguish between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches in the study of human nature, as Philip van der Eijk has shown in an insightful chapter on the nature of human beings in Galen.99 Basing himself on an analysis of Galen's *Mixtures*, he phrases the problem as follows: 'On the one hand, we are told in *Mixtures* that human nature is to be defined as the 'whole being and mixture (*ousia kai krasis*) of the primary elements, hot and cold and dry and wet', and this is what the work is all about; yet on the other hand there are several intriguing passages in *Mixtures* hinting – but no more than that – at the possibility that a higher, indeed divine element, may be involved in the organization of human bodies'.100 This is a genuine problem, since, as van der Eijk points out, Galen repeatedly makes this distinction himself in *Mixtures*. The issue becomes more difficult when we consider the fact that for Galen the mixtures themselves must also have a divine cause, for several reasons: (1) nothing besides God or divine nature can produce a complete mixture of qualities (2) if we were to assume that the elemental qualities are mixed in a random manner, there is no way to account for the ordered nature of things (this general principle of intelligent design must also apply to the level of the homoeomerous bodies, especially considering their importance with regard to the activities of the soul) (3) the powers manifested by the elemental qualities in virtue of which they bring about alterations in matter are defined by Galen as powers of nature itself.101 Therefore, we cannot strictly distinguish between a 'mechanical' and 'teleological' aspect, but at best between a less and more directly divine or teleological aspect. That is to say, the 'higher, divine element', whatever it is (e.g. the so-called 'shaping capacity'), may be a more direct manifestation of the ordering power of divine nature, whereas the activity of the mixtures are a more indirect manifestation of the ordering power of divine nature, since they seem to manifest themselves as causes in themselves after their creation by nature.102 And indeed, Galen, as we have seen, considers the

98 Cf. van der Eijk (2014) 89 ff.

99 Van der Eijk (2014).

100 Van der Eijk (2014) 101–2.

101 For (1) *Temp.* I 563 K; for (2) *UP* 440,20–441,1 Helmreich (IV 351 K), see also infra Case-Study I, p. 41–5; for (3) *Nat. Fac.* II 12–3 K, see also infra Case-Study I, p. 22–4 .

102 If I understand van der Eijk (2014) correctly, this is also his conclusion when he says the following, 123: 'To be sure, this is not a purely mechanical construction; but it is part of the 'immanent' nature, the *phusis* of human beings, rather than the result of some kind of external agency. Even the soul and its faculties, including the rational soul, arise 'from the

mixtures as a kind of instruments of divine nature, but at the same time as a kind of crafters.103 This difficulty, I think, is another way in which the ambiguity of nature as transcendent or immanent manifests itself in Galen's work and should, perhaps, remain unresolved to some extent.

Another remarkable feature of Galen's notion of (human) nature that has so far remained unmentioned is its essential plurality. When thinking about the nature of the human being, Galen is not out to look for *one* thing, nor something that remains the same, but his assumption is rather that our nature, in its very core, needs to be a dynamic plurality, in order to account for our complexity and differences. On a more fundamental level, according to Galen, basic phenomena such as generation, pain and perception can only be explained when there is a plurality of qualitatively diverse and interacting stuff at the basis.104 This is a continuous thread in both *Hipp. Elem.* and *HNH* alike. For example, Galen quotes the following passage from the Hippocratic text in his commentary:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη τὴν γένεσιν γενέσθαι μὴ ἀφ΄ ἑνός. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἕν ἐόν τι γεννήσειεν ἄλλο, εἰ μή τινι μιχθείη;105

First of all, then, it is necessary that generation not take place from a single thing; for how could something, being single, generate anything, if it is not mixed with something else?

tr. Hankinson

He then remarks that the author is here merely adhering to things that are clearly apparent (τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις). Galen presents the need for an initial plurality for generation as utterly evident. One may think this is unsurprising, since we all know that 'it takes two to tango', and Galen tends to take an empirical point of departure for these questions. However, the matter is more interesting than that. After all, Galen extrapolates from this text, which

bottom up'. True, they are not just there as a product of chance or mechanical causation: there is some good, some *oikeion*, here governing this process; which ensures that the mixtures of the body are such that they give rise to the appropriate faculties and dispositions of the soul, which in turn are tuned to the parts of the body through which they exercise their characteristic activities; and humans themselves have a role to play here in the management of their physical and psychological development. But this seems to be a different way of proceeding from the direct, causative influence of the divine that is present in the *aristê diaplasis*'.

103 See infra Case-Study I, p. 41–5.

104 Cf. Hankinson (2008) 213 ff.

105 *HNH* 24,16–8 Mewaldt (XV 43 K).

144 Case-Study II

seems to be primarily about the generation of living beings by other living beings, to general remarks on generation as such. This takes us back to the beginning of Galen's commentary, where he distinguished between the bodies that are subject to generation and destruction on the one hand, and the substance underlying all generation and destruction on the other.106 Thus, with the passage cited above, Galen takes an empirical departure point again, pointing to the necessity of two beings of different sex and the same species for procreation, as he did earlier with the necessity of water and earth for a seed to grow, to make a more general theoretical point that goes beyond empirical observation, namely that the primary substance underlying generation cannot be a unity in the fundamental sense that it has to be made up of essentially different constitutive elements that are not reducible to each other and that only through their constant interaction are able to establish the particular temporal unity which characterizes all individual beings as such. In this sense, Galen's emphasis is on plurality as a condition for unity, rather than the other way around.

We have already established that this primary substance (or nature), in Galen's view, is the mixture of elemental qualities in prime matter. Galen presents this specific application of the general philosophical method described in the *Phaedrus* as that of Hippocrates, and repeatedly contrasts this Hippocratic-Galenic view with that of those who think that human nature consists of *one* of the elements (or one of the humours). This view is taken *ad absurdum* by Galen on several occasions, with several arguments, both in *HNH* and in *Hipp. Elem*.107 Remarkably, however, he does not so much argue against the impossibility of reducing the complexity of perceptible phenomena to some one particular element, but rather focuses on the supposed basic unity, as such, as the focal point of his attack. This shows that to Galen the main problem with these views is not so much empirical, i.e. about only taking one of the four elements or elemental qualities that exist and neglecting the others, but more fundamental, i.e. about not being able to explain the workings of the beings subject to generation and destruction if you take a unity as the nature of these beings. That applies to a unity of whatever kind, which is why, Melissus and the Atomists (Galen's argument is about unity in form), for example, can be included together in this group.108 As Galen cites the Hippocratic text:

106 *HNH* 3,24–4,5 Mewaldt (XV 3 K).

107 *HNH* 13 Mewaldt (XV 20 K); 16 Mewaldt (XV 26 K); 19 Mewaldt (XV 33 K); cf. *Hipp. Elem.*  80–86 De Lacy (I 438–42 K).

108 Cf. *Hipp. Elem.* 58,10–25 De Lacy (I 415–6 K): 'Now Hippocrates gives the following proof that the first element from which our body and the bodies of all else came into being is not one thing; I think it is better (first) to quote his own words and then give my explanation

ἐπίλογον δὲ ποιέονται καὶ οὕτοι πάντες τὸν αὐτόν· ἕν γὰρ εἶναί φασιν, ὅ τι ἕκαστος βούλεται ὀνομάσας …109

All of them too employ the same reasoning: for they say man is one, whatever each of them wants to call it …

tr. Hankinson

One of the ridiculous consequences of taking the nature of man to be a unity is that then man would never suffer pain, which is, as we all know, evidently not the case.110 Again, Galen is following the text he is commenting upon:

᾿εγὼ δὲ φημι· εἰ ἕν ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδέποτ΄ ἂν ἤλγεεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἦν, ὑφ΄ ὅτου ἀλγήσειεν ἕν ἐόν …111

I say rather that if man were one, he would never feel pain; for there would not be anything as a result of which he could feel pain if he were a single thing.

tr. Hankinson

In order to experience pain, a being must be affected by something. But, seems to be Galen's assumption, in order for things to be affected by something else, there has to be a difference in quality between those things.112 Then, if the nature of the being is eventually reducible to some one thing, this kind of affection could not possibly happen. Another assumption that comes to the fore here, is that affections in the end need to happen at the most fundamental

of them: "I say that if man were one thing he would never feel pain, for there would be nothing that would cause him pain if he were one." He seems to me to give most excellently and at the same time in fewest possible words the essential point of his proof that the element cannot be one in form and power. Quite obviously it is utterly absurd to say that what exists is one in number; that is truly the act of a man who has given no thought to any of the obvious facts. But a person might say that all things are one in form and power, as Epicurus and Democritus and their followers say of the atoms. And of the same chorus with them are those who postulate elements that are least and unattached and without parts. Hippocrates, then, making a common answer to all such persons, proves that the element is not one in form and power …' (tr. De Lacy); cf. Kupreeva (2014), particularly 162 ff.

109 *HNH* 19,26–8 Mewaldt (XV 34 K).

110 *HNH* 13,9 f. Mewaldt (XV 20–1 K); cf. Hankinson (2008) 212 ff.

111 *HNH* 20 Mewaldt (XV 35–6 K).

112 Cf. Hankinson's note *ad locum*: 'Here Galen appeals to a very general Greek (indeed Western) idea, namely that only things which are in the appropriate ways different in quality from one another can affect one another'. cf. Kupreeva (2014).

level. For otherwise one might very well claim that differences which are accidental and which are dependent on a more complex level than that of the primary nature of a thing, could cause the affections, as an Atomist might do. This should not surprise us at this point, since we have already seen that, for Galen, the activities of a given being should also be traced to its activities at the most primary level (i.e. that of the interaction of the elementary qualities) and that it is the substance of a thing that determines its activities and affections, while Galen identifies the substance of any thing with its specific mixture. And indeed, not coincidentally, in the passage following this last quotation, Galen goes on to emphasize that the elemental qualities are primary, cause everything else to come to be, and are the primary active and alterative qualities in the body, of which all other qualities are derivative.113 Galen adds a less convincing argument by pointing out that even if something were able to be affected as a result of itself (i.e. by the same form which it itself has) and could thus experience pain, there would then only be one simple type of cure or one kind of therapy for this pain, which is, again, evidently not the case.114

It seems an essential assumption for Galen that the activities and affections of a given being must somehow (or in a primary sense) manifest themselves in the thing's primary nature itself and could not be merely generated by its primary nature. His argument against the Atomists, roughly, is: the atoms themselves are not capable of sensation or change, therefore, the physics based on atoms as the primary nature of things could not possibly account for sensation or change.115 Thus, the possibility of the atoms – incapable of being affected (according to Galen) and thus incapable of sensation or change – generating some more complex structure that *is* consequently capable of sensation or change is not considered viable at all by Galen:116

113 *HNH* Mewaldt 22,4–23,8 (XV 38–40 K).

114 *HNH.* 21,20 f. Mewaldt (XV 38–9 K); cf. *Hipp. Elem.* 76,20 f. De Lacy (I 434 f. K).

115 *Hipp. Elem*. De Lacy 62 f. (I 419–20 K).

116 Cf. Hankinson (2008) 213: 'What is ruled out, Galen argues, is what one might call the supervenience of generically different properties: any supervenient properties must be similar in general type to properties actually disposed of by the elements they supervene upon. Thus, since sentience is a type of alteration, the elements in the aggregate upon which sentience supervenes must be capable of alteration, although not necessarily of sentience itself …'; however, cf. Kupreeva (2014) 167 note 48, after quoting these sentences from Hankinson: 'I do not find in the text the argument stated in the second sentence. As for the analysis given in the first sentence, it does not sound right: Galen says that generically different properties cannot accrue to aggregates, but can do so in more complex structure, such as mixture. Therefore sentience cannot arise in an aggregate, which is like a heap of grains, but can arise in a more unified structure, such as that of a living body'.

καὶ μὴν ἀμφοῖν ἀπολείπεται τὰ τούτων στοιχεῖα μήτ΄ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι μήτ΄ αἰσθάνεσθαι πεφυκνίας ἀτόμου μηδεμιᾶς. εἴπερ οὖν ἐξ ἀτόμων τινῶν ἦμεν ἤ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης φύσεως μονοειδοῦς, οὐκ ἂν ἠλγοῦμεν, ἀλγοῦμεν δέ γε, δῆλον, ὡς οὔκ ἐσμεν ἐξ ἁπλῆς τινος καὶ μονοειδοῦς οὐσίας.117

And in fact these men's elements meet neither requirement; it is not in the nature of any atom to change or to have sensation. If then we were made of atoms of some sort or any other such nature that is of one kind only, we would not feel pain, but since we obviously do feel pain, it is clear that we are not made of a simple substance that is of one kind only. tr. De Lacy, slightly modified

Galen is aware of his basic assumption and makes it explicit:

… οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτ΄ ἐκ τῶν ἀπαθῶν οὔτ΄ ἐκ τῶν ἀναισθήτων συντιθέμενον αἰσθητικὸν ἢ παθητικὸν γίνεται.118

… for nothing that is put together from things that are not affected or from things that lack sensation becomes sentient or affected. tr. De Lacy

According to Galen, the elements of a sentient body must either be both sentient and affected, or at least affected. Also, as we have seen, in order for an element to be affected, there must be elements different in kind, affecting it. Hence, there must be a plurality of qualitatively different elements. Thus, now, we have the possibility of a plurality of insentient elements acting upon and affecting each other, consequently generating a sentient being 'in the course of many partial alterations'.119 According to Galen, it is exactly the dynamic aspect of these elements, their continuous change due to their mutual interaction, that allows for the generation of capacities that are an attribute of their combined mixture, even though they are not an attribute of any of the original constituent parts of that mixture.120 Then again, we also have to remember that in a strict sense, for Galen, the elemental qualities or the prime matter in which they mix, are not elements, but (conceptual) principles. The first bodies, or unified structures, are already a mixture of various principles and therefore

117 *Hipp. Elem.* De Lacy 62,21–25 (I 420 K).

118 *Hipp. Elem.* 64,24–5 De Lacy (I 422 K).

119 *Hipp. Elem.* 70,17–18 De Lacy (I 428 K), tr. De Lacy.

120 Cf. Kupreeva (2014) particularly 165 ff.

only simple to perception. At the same time, it seems, Galen would have to say that these mixtures themselves, i.e. the homoeomerous bodies, even though they are the primary locus of activity and soul, are also not sentient (albeit affective and capable of change and alteration). Sentience only comes in when they in turn form an (anhomoeomerous) organ, such as the eye or rather even the brain. This seems paradoxical: the functions that seem to determine what we are, are not yet to be found in what is identified as our nature. But that might be a general problem for anyone trying to explain complex functions in terms of more simple ones. The absence of the complex function itself (that somehow defines the being exercising this function) in the cause of it (that is taken as the (primary) nature of that being), seems to suggest there is something missing, i.e. that the definition of this being does not correspond to the definition of its nature. What Galen seems to suggest, is that since the primary level determines the more complex level, what is happening at the more complex level is happening more truly at the primary level, *even though* the specific functions exercised at the more complex level are not to be found at the more primary level and *even though* these specific functions, for example rational thought, can be seen as defining for the specific kind of being it belongs to. In that sense, rational thinking could, perhaps, take place primarily in the mixtures of the brain, even though a homoeomerous body does not think. Again, it seems that we have to keep in mind that however soul is defined, it is primarily a *principle* of movement.

In any case, to get back to our previous line of reasoning, Galen argues that pain, pleasure and sense-perception – and with that also memory, reasoning and 'the soul itself' – will be done away with if it is not assumed that our substance is altered through and through.121 But, if we were to accept that, and accept that our nature has to consist of a plurality of elements (or principles) that are not reducible to each other, and that cause change through their mutual interaction, why would it have to consist of these four elemental qualities (hot, cold, dry and wet) exactly? We saw earlier that Galen does provide some empirical justification for his choice (in as far as it is his choice, clearly he is also following the previous tradition, and particularly his three main interlocutors Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle). He also gives another argument for this choice in *Hipp. Elem.*:

… οὔτε μία τὸ εἶδος οὔτ΄ ἀπαθὴς ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ πάσχει, θερμαινομένη τε καὶ ψυχομένη καὶ ξηραινομένη καὶ ὑγραινομένη πείσεται· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐδὲ μία ποιοτήτων ἀλλοιοῦν οἵα τέ ἐστι τὸ πλησιάζον ὅλον δι΄ ὅλου.

121 *Hipp. Elem.* 134,9–13 De Lacy (I 487 K).

οὔτε γὰρ εἰ τὸ βαρὺ τῷ κούφῳ πλησιάσειεν ἢ τῷ βαρεῖ τὸ κοῦφον, ἢ τὸ κοῦφον ἔσται βαρὺ ἢ τὸ βαρὺ κοῦφον, οὔτ΄ εἰ τῷ τραχεῖ τὸ λεῖον καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν τῷ μανῷ καὶ τὸ παχὺ τῷ λεπτῷ· τῶν τοιούτωνγὰρ οὐδὲν ἀλλοιοῦν δύνατα τὸ πλησιάζον ὅλον δι΄ ὅλου.122

… therefore our substance is neither one in kind nor unaffected. And if in fact it is affected, it will be affected when it is heated, cooled, dried and moistened; for not one of the other qualities is able to alter through and through (the body) that is close to it. It does not happen that if heavy is close to light or light to heavy, the light will be heavy or the heavy light, nor if smooth is close to rough, dense to rarefied, thick to thin, nothing of that kind can alter through and through the (body) close to it.

tr. De Lacy

Apparently, Galen takes these four primary qualities as the only qualities that can be transferred from one body to another by mere contact and the only qualities that can alter a substance through and through. As Hankinson puts it: 'This, fundamentally, is how power is transmitted from one thing to another'.123 Therefore, these four qualities are the only ones that can account for generation, destruction and change in general. That is to say, every other change in quality is already dependent on a change in these elemental qualities.

Since these elemental qualities determine the substance of everything, the human being has its nature in common with all other non-eternal beings. Since this nature is a plurality of qualitatively different aspects that interact with each other and alter their substance, it can, according to Galen, account for all further properties and qualities which we can observe and which differentiate all those beings. As such, this interaction must be governed by a divine and artful nature, since we can see from its generated effects that it causes an intelligible order. Since some of nature's capacities in generating this order are exercised by these elemental qualities, the border between a transcendent, intelligent nature and an immanent nature that passes on its inherent organization of elements through time, is ambiguous in Galen. The same seems to go for the differentiation between what, in a human being, is to be accounted for in terms of 'nature' and what in terms of 'soul'.

122 *Hipp. Elem.* 130–2 De Lacy (I 484–5 K).

123 Hankinson (2017) 10; see also Hankinson (2008), particularly 217.

#### **5 Nature of the Body, Nature of the Soul**

As we have seen earlier, both the essential and the accidental attributes of a given being are determined by its specific mixture of elemental qualities, according to Galen. This seems to imply that there is nothing about any being that cannot be explained in terms of these elemental qualities. That means that besides being merely a necessary part of the explanation of a thing's nature, an analysis of its specific mixture actually also suffices as a description of its nature.

It might be that one of the reasons why Galen is so fond of the passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* (270b-c) is that at its beginning, on one possible reading at least, there is an integration of the understanding of the nature of body and soul into the understanding of what is called in Plato's text 'the nature of the whole'.124 There are different views as to how to interpret this notion of the whole,125 but the most sensible reading *for Galen* may perhaps be 'the whole of body and soul', i.e. the whole human being as composite, hylomorphic being. This reading would integrate body and soul into a notion of a whole that would imply some kind of synthesis of Galen's two great heroes, Hippocrates and Plato, who are then associated with the two respective parts of this whole:

ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; – εἰ μὲν οὖν ῾Ιπποκράτει τῷ τῶν ᾿Ασκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἄνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.126

So do you think it possible to understand the nature of the soul in a proper manner without understanding the nature of the whole? If one should believe Hippocrates the Asclepiad, not even the body can be understood other than by this method.

tr. Hankinson

From this perspective, the passage fits very well with Galen's general hylomorphic approach of both *HNH* and *QAM*, in which body and soul as form of the body are explained in terms of a single hylomorphic substance. At the same time, he considers the Hippocratic treatise he comments upon to be about the

124 On Galen's use of this passage and its importance for his self-understanding see also Tieleman (2015, 2020).

125 Cf. Jouanna (1999) 59.

126 *HNH* 54,13–6 Mewaldt (XV 103–4 K).

nature of the *body*.127 That does not mean, however, that Galen's commentary should also be restricted to this part of the whole. The Hippocratic text does not have a hylomorphic outlook that ties in with the distinction between soul and body, as Galen does. It could not possibly arrive at the notion that soul is the form of the most elemental constitutive bodies of a given being. Galen can, however. Also, it is difficult to see how Galen would go about writing a similar kind of treatise (after *HNH*) about the nature of soul (being out to gain an understanding of the nature of man as a whole) and then proceed to integrate both into an understanding of the nature of the whole. Unless, of course, one would take *QAM* to be something like that (again, it was categorized by Galen as a work 'on *Platonic* philosophy'). After all, there, and nowhere else, Galen delves into the question of the nature of the soul. However, what comes to the fore in that treatise is that Galen does not have an answer to that question other than his answer to the question on the nature of man that is given in *HNH*. That is to say, it comes to the fore that for Galen, apparently, the questions for the nature of the body of man and the soul of man, treated by Hippocrates and Plato, respectively, are too intricately tied together to permit of separate treatment. The only viable answer Galen comes up with with regard to both of these questions goes as follows: a mixture of elemental qualities in prime matter. To me, it seems likely that, for Galen, an understanding of 'the nature of the whole' would consist in an account of the human being as a hylomorphic being consisting of mixtures of the elemental qualities that constitute all of its functions, some of which are traditionally called psychic. Again, this seems to me the most adequate explanation for the almost complete absence of soul in Galen's *HNH*.

Almost, for it is not entirely absent. There is the repeated quotation of the *Phaedrus*, of course, in which soul is mentioned, and to which Galen refers back at the end of the first book of his commentary. It is precisely in the context of this quotation, with its contraposition of Plato and Hippocrates, that Galen says Hippocrates' writing was about 'the nature of our body'. First he describes how Plato replicated the method Hippocrates had used to examine the nature of the body:

127 *HNH* Mewaldt 53,17–8 (XV 102 K): 'Having set himself the task in this book of discovering the nature of our body [τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν], Hippocrates utilized the following method in order to discover it'.

ταύτην οὖν τὴν μέθοδον ὁ Πλάτων ἀξιοῖ μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν περὶ φύσεως ψυχῆς ἐπισκοπούμενον· οὐδὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως ἀκριβῶς γνωσθῆναι.128

Plato also thought it was right to replicate this method when considering the nature of the soul; for you cannot do this in individual cases without having a precise understanding of its nature as a whole.

tr. Hankinson

Then, after quoting the passage from the *Phaedrus* again, he summarizes the relation between Hippocrates and Plato in this regard once more, but now in a slightly different manner:

Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ὁμολογεῖ κατὰ τὴν ῾Ιπποκράτους μέθοδον ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι περὶ φύσεως ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐκεῖνος περὶ σώματος, ἀδύνατόν τέ φησι καλῶς τοῦτο γενέσθαι πρὸ τοῦ γνῶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντός.129

So Plato agrees that one must investigate the nature of the soul according to the method that Hippocrates used in the case of the body, and says that this cannot be done properly, without knowing the nature of everything. tr. Hankinson

The difference is clear: in the latter quotation, which is Galen's final remark on this subject, he does not merely claim Hippocrates and Plato had the same method to investigate two different subjects, namely taking them each as a whole and then analysing them into elemental parts, as he started out by doing. Rather, he now claims that Plato held that in order to know the human soul, one needs to know *the nature of everything*. This is a statement altogether different than the maxim that in order to know the parts of something one needs to know this same thing as a whole. What the nature of everything is, has been made abundantly clear in *HNH*: the mixture of elemental qualities. Galen has been repeating what the nature of everything or all things is so often in his commentary, that I think it would be naïve to consider it a coincidence when he changes the quotation from the *Phaedrus* at the end, making Plato's remark

128 *HNH* 54,9–12 Mewaldt (XV 103 K).

129 *HNH* 55,14–6 Mewaldt (XV 105 K), see also *HNH* Mewaldt 53,17–8 (XV 102 K): 'Having set himself the task in this book of discovering the nature of our body [τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν], Hippocrates utilized the following method in order to discover it'.

about 'the nature of everything' rather than about 'the whole of the soul' or some other whole, through the simple change of τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως into τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντός.130 After all, this also happens to be the specific answer Galen comes up with when discussing both the question for the substance of the soul as well as the question for the substance of the body: their substance or nature is a specific mixture of elemental qualities, as is the nature of everything. I think this is why the *Phaedrus* passage appealed so much to Galen all along: the whole which Plato refers to is read by him as the whole of being as such, the nature of everything, which both the enquiries into soul and into body need to depart from if they are to result in knowledge at all. As Galen emphasized at the beginning of his treatise, without knowledge of this nature, there is no knowledge of anything. Neither will there be any knowledge of the soul, as we now learn, which implies that according to Galen's reading of this passage, Plato said that one needs to know about the primary substance, the nature of all things, namely the mixture of the four elemental qualities, in order to understand anything about soul. This might appear strange as a reading of Plato, but it is not so strange as a Galenic reading of Plato.

Of course, Galen is fully aware that Plato did not advocate hylomorphism in this passage, but he does not need to assume so for his reading. Rather, he can suffice with claiming that (1) Hippocrates developed the proper method of natural philosophy and applied it to the human body, (2) Plato saw that we need to apply this to the soul as well, (3) Plato claimed that we would not be able to understand either body or soul if we would not understand nature as a whole, (4) he was right about that, since body and soul form a hylomorphic whole based on the same principles as the rest of nature, (5) Plato, however, did not succeed in adequately analysing nature as a whole and therefore did not meet his own demands for knowledge of body and soul, (6) with all of the previous steps made, what is required now is a proper analysis of nature as a whole, following the right method that has already been established, in order

130 *HNH* 22,4–6 Mewaldt (XV 38 K): 'ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ νῦν ἡμῖν προκειμένη ῥήσει διῆλθεν, ὅσα μέλλει δείξειν ὄντα πρώτως, ὑφ΄ ὧν τἀλλα πάντα γίνεται· ταῦτα δέ ἐστι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ξηρόν τε καὶ ὑγρόν'.; 28,12–4: 'ἐκ θερμοῦ γὰρ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κοινὰ πάντων εἰναι ταῦτα στοιχεῖα'.; 30,19–21: 'τοιαύτη, φησίν, οὐ μόνον ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, ἐκ θερμοῦ δηλονότι καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηρου καὶ ὑγροῦ κεκραμένη τῶν ἁπλῶν καὶ ἄκρων'.; 32,1–2: 'ἐπιμένει τῷ δόγματι τὴν φύσιν ἁπάντων ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τεττάρων συνίστασθαι καὶ τελευτᾶν εἰς αὐτὰ βουλόμενος'.; 54,5: '… τὰ δὲ κοινὰ πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἁπλᾶ δῆ καὶ πρῶτα κατ΄ἀλήθειάν ἐστι καὶ κυρίως ὀνομάζεται στοιχεῖα. καλεῖ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ποιοτήτων ὁ ῾Ιπποράτης αὐτὰ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὑγρόν τε καὶ ξηρὸν οὐ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἄκρων, ἀλλ΄ αὐτὰ τὰ ἄκρα …'

to gain knowledge of the whole of body and soul which we are. We will look more extensively at Galen's remarkable interpretation of Plato, particularly when it comes to the relation between the elemental qualities and the soul, in Case-Study III.

Besides the quotations of the *Phaedrus*, there is also a quotation from the Hippocratic work in which soul appears, namely the following:

οἱ δὲ λέγοντες, ὡς ἕν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, δοκέουσί μοι ταύτῃ τῇ γνώμῃ χρέεσθαι· ὁρῶντες τοὺς πίνοντας τὰ φάρμακα ἀπολλυμένους ἐν τῇσιν ὑπερκαθάρσεσι τοὺς μὲν χολὴν ἐμέοντας, τοὺς δὲ τινας φλέγμα, τοῦτο ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὅ τι καθαιρόμενον αὐτὸν εἶδον ἀποθανόντα. καὶ οἱ τὸ αἷμα φάντες εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ χρέονται· ὁρῶντες ἀποσφαζομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὸ αἷμα ῥέον ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτο νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. καὶ μαρτυρίοισι τουτέοισι πάντες χρέονται ἐν τοῖσι λόγοισιν.131

Those who say that man is one thing seem to me to be relying on the following thought. They see those who drink drugs and die as a result of superpurgation vomiting, some of them bile, others phlegm, and think that the man is whichever one of them as a result of the purging of which they saw him die. And those who say that man is blood rely on the same thought. They see men who have been mortally wounded, and blood flowing from the body, and so think that this is the soul of man. And all of them make use of the same type of evidence in their arguments.

tr. Hankinson

Interestingly, it is suggested here that blood could be the soul of man. We have noticed how in the previous text it has often been argued by Galen that man cannot be one but must be constituted from several basic elements or qualities. In all of the foregoing text this question of man being one or a plurality has consistently been about the *nature* of man. If man 'is one', then that means that his nature consists of one kind of thing. But in this passage, the Hippocratic author seems to equate the phrase 'man is blood' to the phrase 'blood is the soul of man'. What is more, Galen has no objections to this equation whatsoever, as appears from his explanatory comment:

131 *HNH* 40,25–34 Mewaldt (XV 76 K).

ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ὑπερκαθάρσεσιν ἄλλος ἄλλον ὑπ΄ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου χυμοῦ τελέως ἐκκενωθέντος ὁρῶντες ἀπολλύμενον ἐκεῖνον μόνον ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τὸν χυμὸν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.132

For in the cases of superpurgation, where one sees someone die as a result of one humour finally being evacuated, and another sees another die as result of another, each of them thinks that humour alone is the nature of man.

tr. Hankinson

Galen simply paraphrases the Hippocratic author's 'soul of man' as 'nature of man'. The idea is completely the same: the one thing that is observed to abandon the body right before death is thought to be man's soul or nature. Galen criticizes this idea – 'no one dies simply as a result of being purged of a single humour; they are always purged of the others along with it as well' – and argues that it is really a mixture of several kinds of things that forms the nature of man. But he does not criticize or take any issue with the apparent equation of soul and nature itself.133 These people are not wrong in thinking that the soul is flowing from the body when the humours are flowing from it, they are wrong in thinking that it is only one humour that is leaving the body, and that therefore man's soul (or nature) consists only of one humour rather than all four. Thus, though it might be true that we could sometimes take Galen to refer to the nature of the body specifically when using the term 'nature' in *HNH* and though it is certainly true that he in one place describes the subject of the treatise (i.e. *his* treatise, not merely the Hippocratic one) as 'the nature of our body',134 the passage quoted above shows that he has no difficulty with using 'our nature' synonymously for 'our soul' either. I think this proves how difficult it is to separate the two in Galen's work, and how, when he is writing about 'our nature', he has something in mind that resists being defined in the terms of this traditional dualism.

132 *HNH* 41,5–8 Mewaldt (XV 77 K).

133 As we have observed earlier, Galen also equates the two in *Trem. Palp.* VII 616 K; in other places, he distinguishes 'soul' and 'nature', particularly in the context of the distinction between 'natural' and 'psychic' functions in *Nat. Fac.*, in which the functions of the desiderative soul are considered natural and those of the other two souls are considered psychic. We have pointed out above (p. 136–8), however, that this distinction is not without ambiguity in *Nat. Fac.* itself.

134 *HNH* 7,12–4 (XV 9 K).

The occurrences of the word 'soul' in this text, as we have seen, are all either direct quotations from Plato or the Hippocratic author, or are part of Galen's immediate reaction to these quotations. Elsewhere, Galen simply seems to avoid using the word altogether. Actually, the only passage in which Galen himself *does* use the word 'soul' outside of the context of the citations from the Hippocratic author and Plato, is when he refers to *QAM*, and precisely emphasizes the dependency of soul on mixture:

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἕτερός τις λόγος φυσικὸς οὐ σμικρὰν ἔχων πιθανότητα, καθ΄ ὅν εἰς ἠθῶν ἐπιτηδείων γένεσιν οἱ τέσσαρες ἀποδείκνυνται χυμοὶ χρήσιμοι. προαποδεῖξαι δὲ χρὴ πάλιν ἐν αὐτῷ ταῖς τοῦ σόωματος κράσεσιν ἑπόμενα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθη, περὶ οὗ καὶ ἡμῖν ἑτέρωθι γέγραπται. τούτου τοίνυν ὑποκειμένου τὸ μὲν ὀξὺ καὶ συνετὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸν χολώδη χυμὸν ἔσται, τὸ δ΄ἑδραῖον καὶ βέβαιον διὰ τὸν μελαγχολικόν, τὸ δ΄ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἠλιθιώτερον διὰ τὸ αἷμα· τοῦ δὲ φλέγματος ἡ φύσις εἰς μὲν ἠθοποιΐαν ἄχρηστος, ἀναγκαίαν δὲ φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν ἔχον ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεταβολῇ τῷν σιτίων.135

There is also another physical account which has no little plausibility, according to which the four humours are proved to be effective in the generation of the states of character which are appropriate to them. In it we first need to establish that the states of character of the soul are consequent upon the mixtures of the body, about which we have written elsewhere. On this basis, sharpness and intelligence in the soul will exist as a result of the bilious humour, stability and firmness as a result of the melancholic, simplicity and artlessness as a result of the blood. The nature of phlegm is ineffective with regard to the prediction of character, having as it evidently does its necessary generation in the first alteration of the food.

tr. Hankinson

Note that Galen, here in the context of what he presents as his most basic work on human nature, remarks that the account advanced in *QAM* has no little plausibility, and proceeds to enumerate how each specific humour causes particular psychic capacities. Some (if not most) of the properties he enumerates seem to apply to our rational soul, which means that τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἤθη in this passage does not refer to character traits in the sense of qualities peculiar to the irrational parts of the soul, but rather has a much broader meaning,

135 *HNH* Mewaldt 51,9 (XV 97 K).

describing something like the habitual states of the entire soul, i.e. including all its parts. It is also noteworthy that Galen here calls the account of *QAM* φυσικὸς. With this word he seems to put his account of the soul's dependence on the body in line with the writings of the natural philosophers he described in the introduction of *HNH*. Thus, the only time that Galen actually chooses to use the word 'soul' in this commentary beyond the context of his quotations, he refers to the potential for explaining psychic traits in terms of the humours or mixtures. This fact makes it all the more tempting to assume that Galen is not talking about soul in this treatise on human nature because he has nothing to say about it other than what he says in his discussion of the nature of the body.

#### **Conclusion**

We have seen how Galen, in his commentary on the Hippocratic *On the Nature of Man*, elaborates on his views on (human) nature. He works out a notion of nature as a primary hylomorphic substance underlying the bodies subject to generation and destruction both in the sense of underlying subject as well as in the sense of the basic form which determines secondary properties or qualities. This nature is the nature of human beings just as well as it is the nature of any other non-eternal being, for Galen. As such, he presents it as the main subject of the ancient quest for knowledge that came to be known as natural philosophy. The ancient philosophers – and Galen in their footsteps – have developed and employed a method of division for uncovering this nature that is always primarily hidden to our senses. Galen presents this method particularly as that of Hippocrates, who used it to inquire into the nature of the body, and as taken over by Plato, who proclaimed the same method should be followed for inquiring into soul. This same method is praised by Galen in other works as well, and consists of a division until no further division is possible, after which the indivisible last elements should be analysed with regard to their active and passive causal powers.

According to Galen, this method of division reaches an endpoint with regard to the realm of perception in the homoeomerous bodies, but should be continued on a conceptual level to divide the homoeomerous bodies still in form and matter, matter being without quality and form being the mixture of elemental qualities. Thus, it turns out that the most basic active and passive causal powers that form the endpoint of the analysis are those of the four elemental qualities, namely heating, cooling, moistening and drying. Their specific mixture in the prime matter forms our nature, as well as that of anything else. Due to the qualitative variety of this mixture, however, it has the potential to generate all the various complex structures and capacities which we observe. In their generative role, these mixtures cannot be unambiguously demarcated from nature as intelligent creator, which complicates the question of the transcendence or immanence of nature in Galen. Related to this problem is the ambiguity with regard to human nature: it is difficult to distinguish the causality of 'nature' and that of 'soul', particularly when soul is understood as form of the body (i.e., a specific mixture of elemental qualities).

With his definition of (human) nature in terms of the mixture, Galen does not merely adhere to the Hippocratic side of his Hippocratic-Platonic story. The way he quotes and discusses the passage from Plato's *Phaedrus*, betrays a synthesizing approach to the question of our nature, in which the hylomorphic nature of everything forms the adequate point of departure for both the body and soul of man, or rather, for the whole of man.

Case-Study III

### **Soul, Mixture and Galen's** *Timaeus*

#### **Introduction**

In this case-study, we shall have a look at Galen's interaction with Plato's *Timaeus*. Particularly, and in connection to the two previous case-studies, we will examine the way Galen uses the *Timaeus* to put forward a 'somatising' interpretation of the human soul and the relation between body and soul. That is to say, how he explains the distinction between body and soul in terms of a distinction between different elemental qualities.

In the previous case-study, we noticed how Galen drew Plato into his Galenic history of natural philosophy by depicting him and Hippocrates as his main predecessors with regard to the question of human nature. Particularly through his interpretation of Plato's *Phaedrus* 270c-d, he suggested that knowledge of the nature of everything is essential for knowing both body and soul. Galen explained this nature in terms of a primary substance common to everything, one consisting of the hylomorphic principles of a matter without quality and a mixture of the four elemental qualities as form. In this manner, it turns out that knowledge of the human soul, like knowledge of the human body, is dependent upon knowledge of this primary substance of mixture. This is in line with Galen's stronger thesis in *QAM*, as we found in Case-Study I, namely, that the substance of the soul is a specific mixture of elemental qualities. It is also in line with his interpretation of the *Timaeus*, as various texts and testimonies show. In his dealings with the *Timaeus*, as we shall see in the present case-study, Galen recasts the Platonic opposition between body and soul into an opposition of elemental qualities. In this way, the mixture of elemental qualities can account for man 'as a whole', that is, as a hylomorphic substance.

The *Timaeus* must have been one of Galen's favourite philosophical texts. Also, it is clear enough that, at least in his own explicit appreciation, Plato is Galen's favourite philosopher. One might argue that he is indebted to Aristotle and the Peripatetics to at least the same extent, but he often seems less willing to acknowledge this influence than that of Plato.1 At the same time, it seems

1 Cf. Van der Eijk (2009) 261 f., 263: 'Plato, alongside Hippocrates, clearly stands on a higher pedestal for him than Aristotle and Theophrastus, let alone the older Stoics. Yet we should distinguish between overt and covert appropriation of an earlier thinker's ideas; and one of the points I intend to make in this paper is that Galen's implicit use of Aristotelian thought

160 Case-Study III

that Galen has little use for some ideas that are central to Plato's work, most notably, his mythological and metaphysical speculations on the immortal, immaterial soul, and his theory of Forms. To put it in 'introduction to the history of philosophy' terms: we know Plato from his mind-body dualism and theory of Forms and we know Galen (if he is in the book at all) as a doctor and scientist with a thoroughly sceptical attitude towards metaphysical speculation. Now, introductions necessarily involve simplifications, but there certainly is some justification for the worry that a Galenic Platonist might turn out to be a somewhat monstrous being (despite Ficino disagreeing).2 From the perspective of this difficulty, it is easy to see why Galen would love Plato's *Timaeus* in particular: it does not only explicitly emphasize the tentative nature of its speculative content, as Galen likes to point out, but it is also the most 'physical' of Plato's works. Furthermore, the elements play an important role in Timaeus' story (though the geometrical elements are problematic for Galen, as we shall see), there is a lot on subjects that pertain to the medical science, and Timaeus speaks extensively of the physiological constitution of the human body and the whole cosmos as well as their mutual relation. Besides, the *Timaeus* might also be the most teleological of Plato's works: the teleological design of the cosmos is a fundamental and structural aspect of Timaeus' narrative. In fact, as has been pointed out, Galen's own teleological outlook must have been strongly influenced by the tradition of the *Timaeus*, perhaps more so than by the Peripatetic tradition.3 Indeed, Galen draws on the *Timaeus* in various works, for example in *PHP*, where he aims to show the agreement of Plato with Hippocrates, in *QAM*, where he is out to argue for the dependence of the psychological on the physical and in *UP*, where the goal is to show the unsurpassed grandeur of nature's inherent teleological design.

Therefore, it should not surprise us that Galen did not only write a summary of the *Timaeus*, which he presumably did for all Platonic dialogues, but also produced a commentary (in four volumes), which he did not do for any

is much more profound and pervasive than his explicit acknowledgement of his debt to Aristotle might suggest'. See also DeLacy (1972); Singer (1991); Frede (2003) 75; Chiaradonna (2009) on Galen's relation to 'Middle Platonism' in particular. There are some themes around which Galen rather praises Aristotle instead of Plato as well, notably Aristotle's account of scientific demonstration and the theory of the elements.

2 One significant simplification in this regard is the sceptic aspect of Plato's work, which Galen emphasizes particularly with regard to the *Timaeus*: he often points out that Plato presented his cosmology there as a 'likely account', i.e. as something which is not scientifically proven. Cf. Tieleman (2018).

3 Cf. Vegetti (1978) 37–41; Hankinson (1989) 211–18; Chiaradonna (2009) 245–47.

of the other Platonic dialogues.4 Unfortunately, we do not have the Greek text of his summary of the *Timaeus*, but we do have the Arabic translation attributed to the workshop of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq.5 The Arabic edition was published by Kraus and Walzer in 1951, who conveniently included a Latin translation (*Galeni Compendium Timaei Platonis*). Kraus' Arabic edition is soon to appear in a new English translation by Das and Koetschet.6 Galen's summaries of Plato were very popular in the medieval Arabic-speaking world and must have been a major factor in the transmission of knowledge of Plato's works, as there seem to have been no direct Arabic translations of Plato's work itself.7 Particularly in the case of the *Timaeus*, much of the Medieval Arabic knowledge of the text is dependent on Galen.8

Besides the Arabic translation of Galen's summary, we also have fragments from his commentary. Galen named it 'περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος Τιμαίῳ ἰατρικῶς εἰρημένων' (*On the Medical Statements in Plato's Timaeus*) in his *On My Own Books*.9 He anticipated this commentary in *PHP* book VIII, saying that his friends had requested him to write on the medical passages in the *Timaeus*, and that although many commentaries have been written on the *Timaeus* already, the medical passages in particular have not been sufficiently commented upon.10 We also find anticipatory references to it in *Trem. Palp.*, from which

6 Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).

9 *Lib. Prop.* XIX 46 K.

4 In *Lib. Prop.* XIII, Galen mentions the summaries of Plato's dialogues, in eight volumes, as well as the '*Commentary on the Medical Statements in the Timaeus*, in four volumes. Cf. Arnzen (2012) 193 ff., who has found Arabic references to Galenic summaries of eight different dialogues, among which the *Timaeus*; Flemming (2008) 327; Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).

5 For an in-depth discussion of the authorship of this translation, see Das (2013) 41 f., who concludes (79): 'In absence of further comparative data, it is difficult to make a more specific assertion than that the Arabic translation of the Synopsis likely belongs to the output of Ḥunayn's circle'. Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) conclude that 'the more general attribution of the extant Arabic version of *Com. Tim.* to Ḥunayn's workshop is fairly secure'. I am very grateful to Aileen Das and Pauline Koetschet for letting me use the drafts of their new translation of the *Compendium* as well as their introduction (to appear in the Cambridge series *Galen: Works on Human Nature*); since these drafts do not yet have a definite page-numbering, I will simply refer to it in general when I refer to their introduction to the translation of the text.

7 Arnzen (2012) 181–267, 185: '… in all likelihood no direct Medieval Arabic translation of the complete Greek text of any authentic Platonic work was ever made'. On Galen particularly 193 f.; see also Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).

8 Arnzen (2012) 202–11; cf. Das (2013), for a more detailed discussion; see also Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).

10 *PHP* VIII 508,6–9 De Lacy (V 682–3 K): 'These passages need not be quoted now, for it is better, as some of my friends request, that I comment elsewhere on the medical passages

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it becomes clear that Galen intends the commentary to be critical of Plato instead of merely explanatory.11 In the fragments from Galen's commentary itself we find references to *Nat. Fac.* and the lost *On Hippocrates' Anatomy*.12 Based on these references, Schröder suggests that Galen wrote his *Timaeus*  commentary shortly before 180, in the last years of Marcus Aurelius' rule.13

It is useful to keep in mind that Galen, both in *PHP* and *Trem. Palp.*, brought up the need for this commentary in the context of a discussion of humoural theory and the way Plato and Hippocrates relate to it. In particular, he tells us that Plato did not have anything else to say on the subject than what Hippocrates had already said, except for the fact that Plato discussed the underlying causes of *why* a certain humour is the way it is, e.g. why blood is red, bitter bile is yellow and sharp bile is black, whereas Hippocrates refrained from such inquiries, since they fall outside the scope of medical science.14 Interestingly, this implies that we can expect Galen in his commentary to also discuss things that lie outside the scope of medical science and were therefore not discussed by Hippocrates, despite his own suggestion that he merely comments on that which is relevant to the medical science.15 In fact, on the basis of these anticipatory remarks one would expect the commentary to explain how Plato's reasoning about the underlying causes of the humours is congruent or incongruent with Hippocratic humoural theory as Galen views it. In fact, this could be said to be the tendency of some of the fragments we have, particularly of those collected by Larrain; as we shall see, the author of those fragments is indeed very critical of the underlying causes Plato proposes.

in the Timaeus. Many persons have written commentaries on the rest (of the Timaeus), some at greater length than was needed; but on these matters few have written, and they not well'. (tr. De Lacy); see also *PHP* VIII 522,34–6 De Lacy (V 702 K), referring back to the previous remark: 'I have decided that for the present this is enough about the humors if, as some of my friends ask, I am going to write a commentary on the medical passages in the Timaeus'. (tr. De Lacy)

11 *Trem. Palp.* VII 631,10 K: ΄περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀληθείας ὧν εἶπεν ὁ Πλάτων οὐ πρόκειται νῦν ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι, μελλόντων γε ἡμῶν ἐν ἑτέροις ὑπομνήμασιν ἐξηγεῖσθαί τε ἅμα καὶ κρίνειν ἅ κατὰ τὸν Τίμαιον εἶπεν'. 'As to whether or not the things Plato said are true this is not now our task to consider. (I intend to write a critical commentary on the Timaeus)'. (tr. Sider and McVaugh); see also a bit further *Trem. Palp.* VII 632,1 K: 'In the future, then, we shall examine the views of Plato in our commentary on the medical teachings of the Timaeus; now, however we are putting forward our own opinion, explaining what was said a little above according to the teaching of Hippocrates'. (tr. Sider and McVaugh)

12 For *Nat. Fac.*: Fr II, 11,15 and Fr XIX, 25,26 Schröder; for the lost *On Hippocrates' Anatomy*: Fr I, 10,3 Schröder.

13 Schröder, Praefatio IX; cf. Das (2013) 12 f.

14 *PHP* VIII 506, 25–508,5 f. De Lacy (V 681–2 K).

15 Cf. Frede (2003) 80–1.

This case-study will draw not only on *PHP* and *QAM*, but also on Galen's 'summary' of the *Timaeus*, the so-called *Compendium*, as well as the fragments of his commentary collected and edited by Daremberg and later republished by Schröder. Furthermore, we shall have a special focus on the contested fragments published by Carlos Larrain in 1992. These fragments are understudied, not to say almost completely neglected, presumably because Larrain's assertion that they are excerpts from Galen's *Timaeus* commentary has subsequently been questioned by Diethard Nickel (2002), who claimed they must have been written by someone deliberately imitating Galen.16 There is no doubt that these fragments show strong similarity with many attested Galenic writings and that their content generally fits well with Galen's interpretation of the *Timaeus* elsewhere, as Nickel also observed. But so far there has been no study that analyses the fragments in relation to the rest of Galen's work, except for the very brief critique by Nickel (based on only two of the thirtyfour fragments) and Larrain's own work in his edition of the fragments. What is more, Aileen Das has recently argued that these fragments already circulated with those collected by Daremberg in the 9th century Arabic tradition and that the question of their authenticity deserves a re-evaluation.17 Therefore, it may make sense to include a comparative discussion of Larrain's fragments, here, against the background of Galen's attested work. There is no need to attempt any definitive decision as to their authenticity, though our discussion of the fragments might have something to contribute to this debate as well. We will discuss and analyse some of the fragments, specifically those that lend themselves to comparison to Galen's somatising *Timaeus*-interpretation as we know it from his attested work.

It is noteworthy that almost all of Galen's works that particularly deal with the *Timaeus* are written around the same period: the final books of *PHP*, his *Compendium* and his commentary are probably all written between 169 and 180. Only *QAM* is of later date, presumably after 193, but could be said to take up the earlier work on the *Timaeus* in the context of a more speculative treatment of the relation between body and soul. This suggests that Galen worked on the *Timaeus* for a prolonged period of time, which led to various kinds of texts that are closely interrelated (even though they seem to serve different purposes) and might therefore be conceived as a unified project to some extent.18 Nonetheless, with only a few notable exceptions, there are no studies

16 Nickel (2002) 73–8.

17 Das (2014).

18 Das (2013) 12–16, 16: 'These three texts [PHP, the commentary and the summary] constitute a period of Galen's career that is marked by sustained and varied engagement with the Timaeus'. Cf. Das (2020) 37 ff.; Das and Koetschet (forthcoming).

that systematically look into Galen's dealings with the *Timaeus*, even though it must have been one of his most important philosophical source-texts.19

Since Galen's work on the *Timaeus* is relatively uncharted territory, some further introductory observations about the various editions of fragments and their relation to the *Compendium* and other sources are in order. Although the *Timaeus* must have been a profoundly important text for Galen and his writings on the *Timaeus* were crucial for the Arabic transmission, we now unfortunately have only scatters and testimonies, which can be found in various editions, later Arabic sources and a few small collections of scholia. Moreover, as we mentioned before, some of these scatters are contested, so it will be useful to first chart the sources we now have available. Following this survey of the sources (paragraph 1), we shall proceed to a brief discussion of the scope of Galen's commentary, both in terms of his specific selection from the *Timaeus*, and in terms of its subject and status (paragraph 2).

After these preliminaries, we shall discuss some general tendencies of Galen's *Timaeus*-interpretation (paragraph 3), which we can then use for the subsequent comparative analysis of Larrain's fragments (paragraph 4). This comparative analysis consists of four thematic subsections: (1) a discussion of the Aristotelianizing tendency of the author, (2) the somatisation of the soul, that is to say, the extent to which the soul is explained in terms of the elemental qualities, (3) the depiction of the soul as a dry and hot substance that exudes light, and (4) the role of the relation between substances and activities or movements in this reading of the *Timaeus.*

#### **1 Sources**

The most well known collection of fragments from Galen's commentary is that from the Paris manuscript BnF *gr*. 2383, first published by Daremberg in 1848, and republished in a new edition by Schröder in 1934. This collection presumably contains fragments from the third of Galen's four books only. Schröder republished the fragments collected by Daremberg with the addition of excerpts from the first and fourth book found in Al-Rhāzī, Serapion

19 Vegetti (2000) devoted a chapter to this subject but does not take the commentary and compendium into account and focuses on *PHP* and *QAM*; Das (2013, 2014, 2020, and the forthcoming translation of the *Compendium* with Koetschet) has made invaluable contributions to the study of both the commentary and *Compendium* as well as the subsequent Arabic reception; Sorabji (2003) provides a brief but insightful general overview of the ancient reception of the *Timaeus* with regard to the 'mind-body relation', with particular attention for Galen's role.

and Maimonides, the Arabic excerpts translated into German by Kahle. These fragments have never been contested, as far as I know.

In addition, we have an edition of 34 possible excerpts published with a commentary by Carlos Larrain in 1992, under the title *Galens Kommentar zu Platons Timaios*. Larrain discovered these untitled and anonymous fragments in the 14th century Escorial manuscript known under the name Scorialensis and has proposed that they are summaries of the first two books of Galen's commentary on the *Timaeus*.20 In his 1991 article on these fragments he suggested that they are 'ein zusammenfassendes Exzerpt aus den ersten beiden Büchern von Galens Timaioskommentar'.21

Nickel's rejection of Larrain's view goes some way towards explaining the neglect his edition subsequently suffered, despite the potential importance of the material presented in it.22 Nickel argues that the fragments must be from an unknown author who has paraphrased several passages from original Galenic works, such as *PHP* and *UP*, and that therefore the 'value of these texts for the study of Galen is very small'.23 A strongly formulated conclusion, perhaps deliberately chosen to counter Garofalo's earlier assessment in his review of Larrain's edition, which amounts to the exact opposite: 'La scoperta di Larrain di 34 nuovi estratti in un tardo manoscritto Scorialense gr. O III 11 (Revilla 230 del VI sec.) dunque del massimo interesse per gli studiosi di Galeno e del 'Timeo''.24

Nickel based his brief assessment on an analysis of only two of the thirtyfour fragments (6 and 14). Fragment 6 is concerned with Platonists' responses to the question of how the communion of body and soul comes about (we shall discuss it below). Nickel states that 'The problem of ensoulment which is raised in this 'excerpt' did not interest Galen at all', but rightly adds that here

20 Larrain (1992) 7 ff., 226; see also Larrain (1991).

21 Larrain (1991) 10.

22 Before Nickel, Ferrari (1998, 16 note 8) has remarked that the differences between Larrain's fragments and those published by Schröder are so great that Larrain's attribution of them to the first two books is 'completely unfounded': '… a suo avviso, gli estratti deriverebbero dai primi due libri del Commento al Timeo di Galeno. In realtà, come mi riprometto di dimostrare in altra sede, si tratta di un'attribuzione del tutto infondata che non tiene conto delle notevoli differenze, sopratutto di natura formale, tra questi frammenti e quelli in nostro possesso derivati dal III libro del commentario galenico'. I know of no text in which Ferrari makes good on his promise, so are unable to assess his judgement; Flemming (2008) 349 note 21 follows Nickel in saying Larrain's edition 'does not add to our Galenic material'; Hankinson (2009) 150 note 20, regards some of Larrain's material as being 'of doubtful provenance'.

23 Nickel (2002) 78.

24 Garofalo (1995).

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the author might simply have been setting out the problem he sees with the Platonist position. This would indeed correspond to a rather common practice by Galen, i.e. setting out the possible (or actual) contemporary or earlier Platonists' answers to a problem related to their notion of soul, making their disagreement amongst themselves explicit, and pointing to the lack of clear answer in Plato's own text.25 Furthermore, it is not the case, as Nickel asserts, that this issue is raised nowhere else in Galen except for in *Prop. Plac.*, since the question of how a non-bodily soul could possibly acquire communion (κοινωνία) with the body is discussed by Galen in *QAM*, indeed as a critique of the Platonist notion of an immaterial soul.26 Nickel's second argument for regarding Larrain's fragment 6 as inauthentic, i.e. not based upon Galen's actual *Timaeus* commentary, is the comparison made in the fragment between newborn babies and 'solidified cheeses'. In Nickel's opinion, the text of the fragment 'corresponds exactly with Galen's concepts and his style of expression' up until this comparison. He considers the comparison to be a 'deliberate imitation', since the metaphor would merely appear similar to the way Galen compares the constitution of babies to cheeses, while in truth it is used differently: 'while it does appear similarly expressed in genuine Galenic texts, [it] is used there to refer either to a different stage of development, or to specific component parts of the body'. However, Aileen Das, in her 're-evaluation' of the authenticity of these fragments published in 2014, has already shown that Nickel did not take into account some of these cheese-comparisons found in genuine Galenic texts and that the metaphor in Larrain's fragment 6 is 'entirely consistent with its application elsewhere in the Galenic corpus'.27 Finally,

25 Cf. for instance *QAM* 38,9–18 Müller (IV 775 K): 'For death takes place, according to Plato, when the soul is separated from the body. But why great voiding of blood, the drinking of hemlock, or a raging fever, causes this separation, I would have certainly have wanted to learn from him, if he were himself alive. But since he no longer is, and none of the Platonist teachers taught me any cause, on account of which the soul is compelled by those things that I have mentioned to be separated, I dare to state myself that not every form of body is suitable to receive the rational soul'. (tr. Singer)

26 *QAM* 48,20–5 Müller (IV 788 K): 'Now, this point in itself casts great suspicion upon the question, whether the whole substance of the soul can really be non-bodily. For how could it be brought into the nature opposed to itself by communion with the body, if it is neither some quality of the body, nor a form, nor an affection, nor a capacity?' (Singer) The formulations 'ὅπως μὲν ἡ ἀσώματος ψυχὴ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν ἐκτήσατο' (Larrain fragment 6) and 'πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν ἀχθείη' (*QAM*) seem rather close, and Nickel's assertion that Galen does not take an interest in this question anywhere else, seems to me too hastily made, especially considering that both passages are debating the Platonist notion of an immaterial soul.

27 Das (2014) 4; Nickel gives *De Sem.*186,2–5 De Lacy (IV 632 K) and *Temp.* I 578–9 K; the additional parallels put forward by Das are: *Praen.* 114, II.8–9 ed. Nutton (1979); *Hipp. Art.*  XVIIIa 597 K; *Hipp. Off. Med.* XVIIIb 842 K.

Nickel proposes that the end of Larrain's fragment 6 presents the same material as a passage from Schröder's edition in a different manner, and concludes from this 'discrepancy in the mode of presentation' that the author of Larrain's fragment 'borrowed ideas from the work of Galen'.28 The two passages both state that man is composed of a mixture of opposing qualities and therefore loses part of his substance (fire burns up the substance or fire and air leave the substance), which is why the gods created another substance that could function as nourishment, making up for the continuous loss. However, Larrain's fragment 6 more specifically pertains to *Tim.* 43, while the passage in Schröder pertains to *Tim.* 76e–77c. In Larrain's fragment, the emphasis is on the introduction of innate heat, as a principle that orders and regulates. It is added to the stream of wetness that is considered to damage the rational soul, so that the rational soul can function properly as a balanced mixture of heat and wetness. The point of departure is the river-metaphor from the *Timaeus*, which the author presents as Plato's take on the communion of soul and body (for which we have a parallel in *QAM* IV 780 K). The innate heat is presented as a contrasting force against the wetness that hinders rationality. As a consequence of the addition of the innate heat, however, as the author explains towards the end of the fragment, the body dissipates to some extent, which is why the gods have provided another substance to make up for this loss. In Schröder's fragment, relating much rather to 76e–77c, the emphasis is more on this additional substance, which turns out to be that of the plants. As far as I can see, there is no contradiction between these two texts; rather, they seem to not only support each other, but also be in line with Galen's ideas in his attested work, as Nickel also observes.29 The 'discrepancy in the mode of presentation' might be explained as the consequence of these fragments pertaining to different parts of the *Timaeus*, instead of, as Nickel suggests, dealing with the same material. But, again, I think these two passages complement each other: because of the wetness the soul is hindered; this needs to be opposed by heat; because of the heat our substance dissipates; this dissipated substance needs to be replaced by another.

Nickel's discussion of Larrain's fragment 14, in turn, consists of a comparison of the fragment with parallels in *PHP* and *UP*. He argues that the fragment gives abbreviated and distorted versions of what is said there about the origin of the nerves. Certainly, Nickel is right about these parallels and also right in concluding that in Larrain's fragment we find, at least, less elaborated versions

28 Nickel (2002) 75–6; Larrain fr 6; Schröder book III fr II (p. 11,4–9).

29 Nickel refers to *Foet. Form.* 88,12–21 Nickel (V 684 K) and his note *ad locum*, which provides other parallels, particularly for the notion of the diminishing of our substance and subsequent need for nutrition.

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of the passages in *PHP* and *UP*. On the other hand, as Aileen Das has argued in her reply to Nickel, it is not 'uncharacteristic of Galen … to reuse material from his own works' (this might even be somewhat of an understatement) and to rephrase more succinctly, and often with less clarity, what he has elsewhere worked out more elaborately. Das does not go into the particular distortions that Nickel observes, of which the ones relating to *UP* seem the most problematic to me (in *PHP* the differences observed by Nickel are slight changes in terminology amounting to less precise descriptions). However, here too, I think Nickel's account is debatable, and his comparison of the end of fragment 14 with *UP* VI 18 is open to criticism as well. For instance, in the *UP*-passage, in the context of a discussion of the origin of the nerves, Galen states that no nerves can be seen to branch from the heart itself, but that it can be observed that some thin nerves reach (from another source) the membrane around the heart. In large animals, he continues, these thin nerves can even be seen to go into the heart itself, i.e. through the membrane. However, Galen adds, it certainly remains impossible to observe them branching *from* the heart itself, i.e. having a common source in the heart and then getting divided into separate nerves, since in these larger animals they are still clearly separated when they go into the heart.30 The author of fragment 14, on the other hand, remarks that these small nerves cannot even in the largest animals be seen to spring from the heart itself, presenting this as an argument against viewing the heart as source of the nerves.31 Nickel argues that this is a distortion of the text and proposes Larrain's fragment is a 'reversal' of what Galen says in *UP,* since Galen said there that the nerves can be seen to go into the heart in large animals

30 *UP* I 364,6–14 Helmreich (III 500 K): 'νεῦρον δ΄ οὐδὲν φαίνεται κατεσχισμένον εἰς αὐτήν, ὥσπερ οὐδ΄ εἰς ἧπαρ ἢ νεφροὺς ἢ σπλῆνα. μόνον γὰρ δὴ τὸ περικάρδιον σκέπασμα λεπτῶν νεύρων φαίνεται δεχόμενον ἀποβλαστήματα. καὶ τούτων διασχιζομένων ἐμφύσεις μέν τινες αἰσθηταὶ καὶ σαφεῖς, ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν μειζόνων ζῴων, καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν ὁρῶνται τὴν καρδίαν· οὐ μὴν ἔτι γε δυνατὸν αἰσθήσει διαγιγνώσκεσθαι σαφῶς, ὅπως ἔτι κατ΄ αὐτὴν σχίζεται …'; May's translation: '… but no nerve is seen to ramify in it [the heart], just as no nerve ramifies in the liver, kidneys, or spleen. Only its covering [membrane], the pericardium, is seen to receive branches of slender nerves, and when these ramify, there are to be seen some insertions even into the heart itself, perceptible and clear, at least in the larger animals. Certainly it is not possible to perceive by the senses how they branch in the heart …'

31 Larrain Fr 14,11–9: 'εἰ δὲ καὶ νεῦρα τις αὐτῷ συγχωρήσει τοὺς κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν συνδέσμους ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οὐδέν γε φαίνεται πρὸς οὐδὲν μέρος τοῦ σώματος ἀπ΄ αὐτῶν φερόμενον, ὡς ἀπ΄ ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ νωτιαίου πρὸς ἅπαντα. τοσούτο δὲ δεῖται νεύρων ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε καὶ τῶν παραγινομένων εἰς αὐτὴν νευρίων σμικροτάτων οὐδὲν ὁρᾶται σχιζόμενον εἰς ἅπασαν αὐτήν, ὡς ἐπ΄ ἄλλων παμπόλλων φαίνεται μορίων. ἀλλ΄ εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ πρῶτον ἐκφῦναι τελέως ἐκφεύγει τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεγίστων ὁρᾶται ζῴων'.

(although, again, they cannot be seen branching from the heart). Once more, I think this might be too quick a conclusion, since it seems more reasonable to assume that the author of Larrain's fragment is presupposing the difference between observing that the membrane around the heart receives the nerves and observing that these nerves cannot be seen to branch from the heart itself, and then simply remarks that even in the largest animals these nerves cannot be seen to stem from the heart itself (although they can be seen to go in it, from elsewhere), as an argument against the source of the nerves being in the heart.32 Again, I find the reading in which the two selected passages complement each other more plausible than the conclusion that one is a kind of deliberate but faulty imitation of the other.33

Having said this, I agree with Nickel that the text in Larrain's fragment 14 (and in some other fragments as well) is somewhat odd in places, and certainly less precise than the one in *UP*. In general, I think Larrain's fragments are more difficult to read and make sense of than most Galenic texts. In discussing Larrain's fragments, we shall encounter some of their textual oddities, which could in some cases cast doubt on their authenticity (as excerpts from Galen's commentary) as well. However, I agree with Aileen Das that Nickel's argument based on fragment 14 is not strong enough to ascribe the fragments to an imitator. There are many similarly odd passages in Galen's undisputed works as well, some of which have more precise parallels in other genuine works too.34

32 Cf. Trompeter (2018) 188–90 on these two passages from *UP* and Larrain's fragment 14.

33 With regard to the fragments on the nerve-system and seat of the soul in general, namely Larrain's 13A and B, 14, 15 and 16: they could be part of a commentary on *Tim.* 44d (Fr 15 quotes from *Tim.* 44d), as Larrain observes (109 ff), since there Timaeus speaks of the head as the most divine part of the body, containing the imitation of the revolutions of the universe. It would make sense for Galen (or a Galenically-inclined other author) to use this passage to elaborate on one of his favourite subjects: the arguments for the tripartition of the soul and the leading part of the soul having its seat in the head, including the refutation of kardiocentric and Stoic views on the subject. It might also be, to follow Nickel's suggestion in a slightly different direction, that the author added parts from other works such as *PHP* and *UP* to his excerpts of Galen's actual commentary. But, once again, we do not need to resort to the assumption of several authors merely because Galen would otherwise be repeating his own work.

34 An example is the passage from *QAM* that we discussed in Case-Study I (IV 774 K), where Galen simply stated that the soul as form of the body should be located at the level of the homoeomerous bodies because 'the activities primarily belong there'. Within the direct context of *QAM* itself this does not make any sense and is left completely unexplained.

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As mentioned before, the question of the heritage of these fragments took a new turn with the publication of an article by Aileen Das in 2014. She not only engages with Nickel´s arguments, but also re-evaluates the matter in the light of the Arabic tradition, which was not taken into account in Nickel's much briefer analysis. Das found that an Arabic translation of Galen's *Timaeus* commentary had been current as early as the 9th century, and included both the fragments published by Schröder and Larrain together. She has shown that Larrain's fragments were likely a part of the Greek manuscript of Galen's commentary that was translated by Ḥunayn and others, and subsequently used by Al-Rhāzī, pseudo-Thabit and Maimonides. Her analysis is supported by and building on that of Arnzen (2012), who seems to presuppose the authenticity of the Larrain fragments, but was perhaps unaware of the controversy, since he does not refer to Nickel's article. Arnzen also gives a brief comparative analysis of Galen's *Compendium* and the fragments of both Schröder and Larrain, from which it appears that the *Compendium* and the commentary fragments contain some overlapping and similar passages, and that deletions or omissions occurring in the commentary correspond to those in the *Compendium*. I think all of this shows that Nickel's conclusions have been too rash. However, we still cannot be sure about the authenticity of Larrain's fragments, i.e. we still cannot be certain whether they are excerpts or paraphrased summaries of Galen's actual *Timaeus* commentary, as Larrain proposed. It is also noteworthy that in the 14th century manuscript Larrain found, each of the fragments are marked with an obelus at their beginning. Larrain merely notes this fact in his introduction, without going into it any further.35 Presumably, the author of this manuscript indicated that he considered the complete text to be either not original or damaged.36 Then again, I do not know which of these options is meant, nor on what basis, nor how to assess the judgement of the responsible scribe. Larrain is certain that the writer of his manuscript was one Neophytos Prodromenos, a 14th century monk and physician with an interest in the medical tradition, working in the monastery of Ioannes Prodromenos in Constantinople.37

It seems possible, though rather unlikely, that these fragments were interpolated into the Greek manuscript of the genuine commentary by an unknown pseudo-Galen, probably familiar with his *Compendium*, before they reached Ḥunayn. In the conclusion of her 2014 article, Das notes: '… the evidence presented above indicates that the fragments in Scorialensis graec.

35 Cf. Larrain (1992) 12: 'Das Exzerpt ist in 35 Abschnitte untergliedert, deren Anfänge der Schreiber jeweils mit "† ὅτι" markiert hat'.

36 Larrain (1992) 12.

37 Larrain (1992) 226.

Φ-III-11 circulated, at least by the ninth-century, with the 'genuine' text of Galen's Timaeus commentary. On this basis, they have as good a claim to Galen's authorship as any of the other Greek fragments, whose provenance is widely accepted'.38As we shall see below, there are a few other textual indications that may suggest that the author of these fragments wrote in a slightly later time period than Galen. That does not rule out the possibility of them being summaries of parts of Galen's authentic commentary, however, that as such may have found their way into the manuscript of the rest of his commentary early on. As long as we do not know the history of the transmission of these texts, it seems to me that we cannot determine with full certainty the extent to which they might be derived from Galen's actual commentary. Indeed, it seems to me that more research is needed on these fragments and that as things now stand, there is certainly not sufficient reason to discard them, with Nickel, as being 'of small value for the study of Galen' and leave it at that. Furthermore, even if it were proven beyond doubt that these fragments are not based on a lost part of Galen's commentary, they would still offer a valuable and interesting testimony of what is probably an ancient or at most late ancient form of 'Galenic Platonism', if we may call it that, and in particular, a Galenically inspired reading of the *Timaeus*.

Larrain, in his pioneering work with these fragments, might have been slightly overconfident in some of his conclusions and in some of the parallels he reports. This, perhaps, together with Nickel's article – which may have also stated its case in rather strong terms to counter Larrain's confident attitude and Garofalo's positive review – may have, unfortunately, condemned these fragments to near oblivion in scholarship. Future work on the Arabic reception in particular might still bring new insights as well. Meanwhile it is worth considering to what extent these fragments could be compared with Galen's treatment of the *Timaeus* in his genuine works, with a particular focus on the relation between body and soul.

Before we can do this, we should have a closer look at the relation between the *Compendium* and the commentary. Rashed has argued that the commentary is likely to have been written by Galen as a consequence of his epitomizing activity.39 As it appears from the medieval Arabic *Liber Aneguemis*, expertly analysed by Rashed, Galen found this particular part of the *Timaeus* to be in need of more than a descriptive summary given its exceptional value for the medical science. For this reason, and because it would benefit his intended audience, which supposedly required a more in-depth treatment, Galen would

38 Das (2014) 11.

39 Rashed (2010).

172 Case-Study III

have decided not only to summarize the entire Platonic dialogue, but also to comment upon this particular section. The latter part of this reconstruction has come down to us, in the *Liber Aneguemis*, as a story about Galen's writings on Plato's *Laws*, but Rashed convincingly shows that it must have rather been the story of Galen's summary of and subsequent commentary on the *Timaeus*.40 This would imply that Galen initially simply summarized the *Timaeus*, and from there on, possibly with the further impetus of some of his friends' interest, decided to comment on part of it.41 I find Rashed's article convincing, but I do not agree with his suggestion that there would be anything enigmatic about Galen writing this kind of commentary on this specific section of the *Timaeus*, without an explanation of the kind he offers.42 Galen wrote so many commentaries on so many different authors (Aristotle, Theophrastus, Eudemus, Chrysippus, Hippocrates, Erasistratus, Asclepiades of Bithynia etc.), including many commentaries on specific subjects within certain works or authors as well as commentaries that quote the commentated text, that it makes much more sense to me to consider this a common practice of his, rather than to look into particular reasons he might have had to write a commentary on a section of one his favourite works by one of his favourite authors.43 Besides, he used passages from this specific part of the *Timaeus* in other works as well, some of which are dated before the commentary, which indicates that he was already working with these parts of the *Timaeus* in any case. Finally, Galen frequently remarks that he wrote a certain work merely to gratify the needs of some friend or protégé. But it seems to me rather uncertain to what extent this is a rhetorical strategy to present himself in a certain manner (the modest figure that merely responds to the requests of others seeking to learn from him, rather than someone that is eager to produce writings and show off his knowledge) and to what extent such remarks refer to actual historical fact.44 That is to say, I think Rashed provides a convincing and sophisticated answer to a question that does not really need to be a question in the first place. This might simply be due to his point of departure, namely, asking the question 'why would Galen write a commentary on a part of the *Timaeus*?' and finding

40 Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) in their new translation of the *Compendium*, have included this text as its preface.

41 Cf. Rashed (2010) 89; Ferrari (1998) 14–34.

42 Rashed (2010) 89: 'Mais il pouvait se contenter d'une monographie pour établir ce point historique, qui ne lui aurait pas demandé de se confronter à chaque détail philologique d'un texte redoutable. Il n'est pas sûr que nous puissions un jour résoudre cette énigme'.

43 An astounding number of such commentaries can be found listed in Galen's *On my own books*.

44 Cf. König (2009) 44; Das (2013) 3 f.

the answer in a kind of synthesis of the previous work on the matter.45 In any case, whatever the specific relation between the *Compendium* and the commentary, I think it makes complete sense from Galen's perspective on Plato, to engage intensively with the *Timaeus*, and particularly with this specific part of it.46 I hope this will become clearer when we look at Galen's use of the *Timaeus* in other works, below.

Das and Koetschet, in their important recent study of Galen's *Compendium*, conclude that it served not as a mere summary, but rather as an 'isagogic or mnemotechnical text' that was to prepare its reader for Galen's 'more detailed exegeses (such as his commentary)'. Such a practice would find a parallel in that of contemporary Platonists, such as in the case of Alcinous' *Didaskalikos*.47 Indeed, in some concrete respects, the *Compendium* prepares the ground for a more elaborate Galenic interpretation of the *Timaeus*, as we shall see below.

Besides the *Compendium*, the commentary fragments collected by Schröder and the possible excerpts published by Larrain, we also have some fragments found in Galenic scholia by Moraux and by Lorusso.48 Paul Moraux has found two fragments among scholia to *Hipp. Elem.*, which he published in the *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* (1977). The first corresponds exactly to the citation found by Daremberg in Paris. Gr. 2147 and included by Schröder as the start of the first book.49 It states that, in his commentary, Galen said that the demiurge shaped man out of the elements50 and must certainly pertain to

45 Ferrari (1998) argues that the commentary came about in the context of a tradition of private (teacher and friends/disciples) discussion of texts of interest, and emphasizes the importance of the interests of Galen's friends, the first intended readership, as an impetus for the work to come about. Vegetti (2000) wrote on Galen's general approach to the *Timaeus*, and will be discussed below. Rashed (2010), 89: 'Quel était alors le but d'une telle entreprise? Deux réponses ont été proposées. Selon Franco Ferrari, Galien voudrait simplement rendre disponibles à des ἑταῖροι non versés dans la médecine, grâce aux méthodes exégétiques développées par les platoniciens des siècles précédents, les considérations médicales de Platon. Selon Mario Vegetti, il s'agirait aussi – et même surtout – de retrouver dans le Timée les précédents de la théorie (galénique) de trois âmes liées à trois organes essentiels du corps (cerveau, cœur, foie)'.

46 I think the same idea comes to the fore clearly in Vegetti's chapter (2000), although he focuses on *PHP* and *QAM* and leaves the commentary and summary out of his discussion.

49 Cf. Daremberg (1848) 36; Schröder (1934) 1, note 2; Moraux (1977) considers Daremberg's Paris. gr. 2147 '*ohne Zweifel eine Abschrift von Y*', Y being Yalensis 234, from which his fragment is derived.

50 'φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Γαληνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ἰατρικῶς εἰρημένοις τῷ Πλάτωνι οὕτως· μόρια ἄττα δανεισάμενος ὁ δημιουργὸς πυρός τε καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος διέπλασε τὸν ἄνθρωπον'. (Moraux III 69–72, p. 44).

*Tim.* 42e–43a, the place where both Schröder and Larrain thought Galen began his commentary (see below, on the scope of the commentary). In the second, we find a discussion on the elements being one or many in nature (Galen there equates Plato's ἰδέα with φύσις), in which Galen states that the elements are many (four) and proceeds to explain Plato's notion of the constitution of the elements in terms of geometrical shapes.51 It is reminiscent of the discussion in *Hipp. Elem.* and *HNH* on the elements being many not merely in number, but in form.52 The latter part of this passage can also be paralleled with *PHP* book 8, where Galen argues that Hippocrates and Plato fundamentally agreed that the elements generate our body, but that Plato also proceeded to inquire what the cause of the generation of the elements themselves was, and therefore came up with the geometrical shapes, a subject purposely neglected by Hippocrates, since he was pursuing a practical rather than a theoretical science.53 These comments are lacking in Schröder and Larrain and must pertain to *Tim.*  54 D and further, which means that, according to the proposed ordering of Schröder and Larrain (see below), they must have belonged to either the first or the second book.54 Moraux's finds can also be taken to affirm that there is overlap between the commentary and Galen's other writings on the *Timaeus*, for example the last books of *PHP* (which in turn again problematizes Nickel's conclusion that Larrain's fragments must be from an author imitating Galen's *PHP* and other works, because it shows that Galen himself paraphrases content from his other works in the commentary).

In addition, Vito Lorusso has discovered two new fragments in scholia to *The Therapeutic Method*. These fragments were also published in the *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* (2005), along with an Italian translation. The first is about vision and must pertain, according to Lorusso, to *Tim.* 45b-d. Lorusso also remarks that this fragment shows resemblance to Larrain's fragment 22 (on the same passage), particularly in its dependency on Aristotelian theory of vision.55 The second fragment discusses the theory of the formation of the

51 Moraux (1977) III 212–227 pp. 49–50.

52 See infra, Case-Study II, p. 144–8.

53 *PHP* VIII, 494,26 ff. De Lacy.

54 Larrain relates this second fragment found by Moraux to his own fragment 2 (see below).

55 Lorusso (2005) 47: 'La dipendenza di Galeno dalla teoria aristotelica della visione è presupposta, del resto, anche dal frammento edito da Larrain, dove si dice che il mezzo tra l'oggetto e l'occhio umano (ὁ πέριξ ἀήρ), può essere modificato non solo dallo πνεῦμα αὐγοειδές proveniente dagli occhi, ma anche dallo stesso oggetto, qualora la distanza che lo separa dall'osservatore non sia molto grande'. Cf. Ierodiakonou (2014) on Galen's theory of vision and its relation to various predecessors including Aristotle.

colour red, and is related by Lorusso to *Tim.* 67c–68d, a passage lacking in both Schröder's and Larrain's editions.

#### **2 Scope of the Commentary**

As we have noticed, the title of his commentary (*On the Medical Statements in Plato's Timaeus*) seems to imply that Galen, perhaps unsurprisingly, was primarily interested in the content that he considered pertinent to the medical science. However, as is well known, Galen's notion of what is relevant to the medical science is quite broad – just think of his famous dictum that doctors need to be trained in philosophy in order to appropriately practice their art.56 Furthermore, we have also noticed that Galen thinks it typical of Plato to ask for the underlying causes that actually fall outside of the normal scope of the science of medicine, which might indicate that we could expect some of Galen's commentary to cross this boundary as well, if only as a discussion and interpretation of what Plato says. Aileen Das points out another good indication for this: Galen does not include his commentary on the *Timaeus* in the list of books that the doctor should read in *On the Order of My Own Books*, and what is more, in *On My Own Books* he classifies it not among his medical works but among those that pertain to Platonic philosophy. Das has shown that Galen included in his commentary material that had 'no clear application to medical practice or theory' but that was rather 'related to broader debates about the nature of the soul' and also that in his discussion of this material Galen 'draws on his own scientific or medical theories'.57 In this sense, we could expect the commentary to show some overlap not with specifically medical works, but much rather with the more philosophical works on the soul in which Galen draws on the *Timaeus* as well, i.e. particularly *PHP* and *QAM*.

Finally, we learn from *Mixtures* (*Temp.*), *HNH*, *Hipp. Elem.* and other works of Galen, that the art of medicine largely consists of balancing nature. That is to say, it requires an understanding of the state of a particular individual in terms of the underlying principles behind generation and decay that rule nature in general.58 Therefore, the science of medicine cannot be mastered without some knowledge of the nature of man, and with that – since man is

56 *Opt Med* I 53 K.

57 Das (2013) 37–9, all of this applies to the Greek fragments published by Schröder.

58 Cf. e.g., *Temp.* I 509–19 K, esp. 519: 'Nor can they discover the healthy daily regime without reference to that well-mixed nature, as they give instructions to cool the body which is hotter than it should be and, conversely, to heat that which is colder than it should be, and similarly to dry what is too wet, and moisten what is too dry. In each case, evidently,

176 Case-Study III

made of the same elements as everything else – some knowledge of natural philosophy.59 If your doctor does not understand that your body-parts are made out of a mixture of the four elemental qualities, but rather thinks there are atoms underlying them, he will not be able to rationally infer the right cure based on the symptoms of your disease.

Despite all of Galen's remarks on not knowing the answers to speculative philosophical questions, he does fundamentally assume that the success of medical science is dependent upon adequate knowledge of human nature.60 It is useful to keep in mind this broad Galenic notion of the science of medicine and its relation to natural philosophy when studying his interaction with Plato's *Timaeus*. On the other hand, it is equally useful to keep in mind that Galen rather consistently makes a distinction between knowledge, in the sense of something that is or can be scientifically proved, and questions on which we can only find *plausible* or *likely* answers.61 This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of his reading of the *Timaeus* and some of the subjects discussed there, as Galen himself remarks in *PHP* IX:

ὅτι μὲν ἄκρας ἐστὶ σοφίας καὶ δυναμεως ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν κατασκευή, δι΄ὧν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον ἐπιδείκνυται· τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν διαπλασάντων ἡμᾶς θεῶν ἔτι τε μᾶλλον ὅσα περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν λέγεται παντὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ θειοτάτου Πλάτωνος ἄχρι τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ εἰκότος ἐκτείνεται, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐδήλωσεν ἐν Τιμαίῳ πρῶτον ἐνάρχεσθαι μέλλων τῆς φυσιολογίας, εἶτα καὶ μεταξὺ κατὰ τὴν διέξοδον τοῦ λόγου παρεντιθεὶς τὴν ἀπόφασιν.62

they are introducing what is lacking to something that is in excess, in order to bring about some kind of well-mixed and middle state'. (tr. Singer and van der Eijk)

59 This is not a view entirely peculiar to Galen, cf. Longrigg (1993) 2–3 with reference to Aristotle's *On Breath* 480b24 ff. and *Sense and Sensibilia* 436a8 ff.

60 With emphasis on 'science'; there could be success in the sense of some kind of art of medicine completely based on empirical observation of symptoms, without knowledge of the human being (see *Outline of Empiricism.* 45 Frede and Walzer, 1985), but this is obviously not the art of medicine that Galen considers himself the advocate of, and not even in the strict sense a science as he sees it.

61 See infra, Case-Study I, p. 70–7. Cf. Frede (2003) 77: 'So Galen does distinguish between definitive answers, backed up by conclusive proof, and answers which, though not supported by proof, are supported by reasonable argument and are not ruled out by considerations to the contrary. Galen allows himself such plausible views, but is hesitant to express them'. See also Chiaradonna (2009) 245 f.; Tieleman (2018); DeLacy, in his commentary on *PHP* (98,12; p. 623), lists instances in which Galen opposes plausibility and truth.

62 *PHP* IX, 598,5–11 De Lacy (V 791–2 K); Cf. Vegetti (2000) 73–4 on this passage.

My earlier remarks make it clear that the fashioning of our bodies is a work of the highest wisdom and power; but the statements of the most divine Plato about the substance of the soul and of the gods who formed us, and still more all that he says about our whole body, extend only to the point of being plausible and reasonable, as he himself pointed out in the *Timaeus* when first he was about to enter upon an account of the natural world, and again when he inserted the statement in the middle of the account.

tr. De Lacy

Galen gladly emphasizes that Plato made sure to repeatedly state the epistemological status of Timaeus' discourse and also states that, because of its status as merely plausible, Plato had Timaeus deliver it, rather than Socrates himself.63 We also find this notion in Larrain's fragment 17, though with more emphasis on difference in style. There, the author suggests that the poetical and elevated style of speculative cosmology better befits sophists than Socrates.64

In any case, the emphasis on the tentative nature of Timaeus' cosmology does not mean in the least that the discourse is uninteresting to Galen, or not worth extensive exegesis. Therefore, we should also not be surprised to see him make statements in his commentary about things that fall under the header of speculation, as long as we keep in mind that these statements should not be read as propositions that fall under the header of scientific knowledge. We can also see from this passage that Galen uses his qualification of what is 'plausible' (πιθανός) in different ways. The first subjects he mentions, the substance of the soul and the gods that made us, seem to be outside the scope of scientific knowledge altogether, whereas our bodies, clearly, are not. That Galen includes Plato's remarks on the body in this list of what is merely 'plausible', does not mean that the subject is outside the scope of scientific knowledge altogether, but that whatever Plato said about it in his *Timaeus* does not qualify as scientific knowledge and can thus be improved in favour of a different account that is perhaps more plausible or not merely 'plausible'.

With respect to the actual part of Plato's text that Galen commented upon: both Larrain and Schröder (following Daremberg) propose a linking of their fragments to specific passages in Plato's *Timaeus* (for the Greek fragments in Schröder the lemmata were part of the transmission). Larrain has 42e8–46c6 (attributed to the first book of Galen's commentary) for his Fr 1–27, and 64a2–65a1 for his Fr 28–34 (attributed to the second book of Galen's

63 *PHP* IX, 588,29–591,2 De Lacy (V 781–2 K); cf. *Tim.* 29c-d, 48d.

64 Cf. Larrain fr 17 and commentary 123–32; also *Comp. Tim.* I 11–16 p. 34 Kraus-Walzer.

178 Case-Study III

commentary). Schröder has 42e8–46a2 (first book) and 59e5–66d2 and 72e3–6 (second book) for the excerpts from Maimonides and Al-Rhāzī, 76d3–81a2 for his nineteen Greek fragments (book 3), and finally 84e2–91c7 for excerpts from Maimonides and Al-Rhāzī thought to belong to book 4.

Both Schröder and Larrain assume Galen started his commentary at *Tim.*  42e. If they are right, this would indeed make sense in terms of the title. That is, this part of the *Timaeus* is relevant to medical science in the broad Galenic sense, since it is where the nature of the human body comes into the picture. It would mean that Galen avoided commenting on the parts of Timaeus' story that would be particularly uninteresting or unsuitable for his purposes, leaving out not only the introduction, narrative setting and the story of Atlantis,65 but also, more significantly, the beginning of Timaeus' speech containing: the creation of the gods, the address of the demiurge to the created gods in which they are ordained to create the three other kinds of beings, the making of the immortal part of the soul by the demiurge and the description of the process and hierarchy of reincarnation. And, in fact, these are all subjects that Galen generally seems to have limited use for. Even if the title of his commentary were different, what would we imagine him to comment on these passages? These subjects all involve some notion of the divine maker or the immortal soul he gave us, beings that cannot be sufficiently explained in Galenic terms, since they are essentially non-bodily. They belong to the category of subjects that Galen lists in *PHP* IX, as not susceptible to scientific demonstration.66 Besides, even if Galen were to interpret these passages as descriptions of what is likely or plausible as opposed to true, and simply discuss them as such, they would still evidently harm the continuity he insists upon between him and Plato. Since Plato took these subjects into a direction that Galen has no use for, there is no reason for Galen to include them in his commentary.67

It is tempting to think that Galen started his commentary around the place where the body is introduced and the relation between body and soul becomes the subject at hand (42e). However, there is a relevant passage in Al-Bīrūnī's *Kitāb Taḥqīq mā li-l-hind min maqūlah maqbūlah fī al-ʿaql aw mardhūlah* (*The Book Confirming What Pertains to India, Whether Rational or Despicable*), which is a quotation from Galen's commentary according to Larrain, Arnzen

65 These topics are also left out almost entirely in Galen's *Compendium*, see Kraus-Walzer 33–5. Cf. Arnzen (2012) 215–20.

66 *PHP* IX 588,7 ff. DeLacy (V 780 K).

67 Cf. Baltussen (2003), who concludes that there was a 'trend' of 'partial use' of the *Timaeus*, before 'in the second to fifth century AD the Platonists came to write continuous and fullblown commentaries on the *Timaeus*'; he names Posidonius, Alcinous and Galen, and for Galen refers to Larrain's fragments (69–70).

and Das, and which reports on subjects that are definitely part of the immediately preceding passage in the *Timaeus* from 41a6 onwards.68 This passage was apparently unknown to Schröder, which explains why he assumed the commentary to start further on in the text. Larrain, however, knew of Al- Bīrūnī's citation, but proposed that Galen merely wrote about these subjects as an explanation to go with the actual start of the commentary in 42e6, where it is about 'the children', i.e. the gods as children of the demiurge. Larrain's suggestion does not seem implausible to me, and I agree that it would be odd for Galen to start his commentary '*On the Medical Statements in Plato's Timaeus*' with the demiurge speaking to the newly created gods about the immortal soul of man. It also makes sense that, given where he starts according to Larrain and Schröder, he would have to provide a short explanation to explain the term 'children' in terms of the foregoing, especially considering that he was citing the passages he commented upon from the *Timaeus*. Furthermore, the passage starting at 42e, particularly the river-metaphor that is introduced to describe the state of the soul after its incarnation, is a passage for which Galen must have had a particular liking, since he comments upon it extensively in *QAM* as well.69 Although we cannot be sure whether Galen started commenting at 41a6 or 42e6, it seems reasonable enough to assume that it was around the introduction of the creation of the human body. With regard to the end of his commentary, we have testimonies from Al-Rhāzī that pertain to *Tim.* 91b-c (included in Schröder's edition), so it seems likely that Galen simply commented up until the end of the *Timaeus* (which perhaps makes it all the more pertinent that he skipped a large part of the beginning).

#### **3 Basic Tendencies in Galen's Interpretation of the** *Timaeus*

The river metaphor Plato introduces in *Tim.* 43a to describe the chaotic kinetics of the body by which the soul becomes disturbed, must have made a strong impression on Galen. He brings it up in *QAM* as well, using this metaphor to fit Plato closer into his notion of the nature of man as a specific mixture of the elemental qualities, in which, as we shall see, wetness in particular comes to take over the role that the body as a whole plays in Platonic cosmology.70 Even in the *Compendium*, which generally remains relatively faithful to Plato's

68 Larrain (1992) 10–11; Arnzen (2012) 222–7; Das (2013) 10.

69 *QAM* 42–3 Müller (780–2 K).

70 Jouanna (2009a) 198: 'For Galen's reading of the Timaeus, the key point is that the excess of humidity in the body disturbs both intelligence and memory'.

text (although it is highly selective in the attention attributed to specific aspects), Galen distorts this metaphor so as to make it reflect his own doctrines. In *Timaeus* 43a, Plato describes how the gods made our bodies out of the elements and then bound the revolutions of the immortal soul into them, resulting in a perversion of the soul's movement:

αἱ δ΄ εἰς ποταμὸν ἐνδεθεῖσαι πολὺν οὔτ΄ ἐκράτουν οὔτ΄ ἐκρατοῦντο, βίᾳ δὲ ἐφέροντο καὶ ἔφερον, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ὅλον κινεῖσθαι ζῷον, ἀτάκτως μὴν ὅπῃ τύχοι προїέναι καὶ ἀλόγως, τὰς ἕξ ἁπάσας κινήσεις ἔχον …71

These orbits, then, now bound within a mighty river, neither mastered that river nor were mastered by it, but tossed it violently and were violently tossed by it. Consequently the living thing as a whole did indeed move, but it would proceed in a disorderly, random and irrational way that involved all six of the motions.

tr. Zeyl

Plato here describes the chaos that results when the proper movements of the soul are brought into contact with the elements through the body. He depicts the overwhelming multitude of impressions befalling the soul with the metaphor of being dragged along in a river. This causes the soul to become devoid of understanding:

αἷς δ΄ἂν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τινὲς φερόμεναι καὶ προσπεσοῦσαι συνεπισπάσωνται καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαν κύτος, τόθ΄αὗται κατούμεναι κρατεῖν δοκοῦσι. καὶ διὰ δὴ ταῦτα πάντα τὰ παθήματα νῦν κατ΄ ἀρχάς τε ἄνους ψυχὴ γίγνεται τὸ πρῶτον, ὅταν εἰς σῶμα ἐνδεθῇ θνητόν. ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῆς αὔξης καὶ τροφῆς ἔλαττον ἐπίῃ ῥεῦμα, πάλιν δὲ αἱ περίοδοι λαμβανόμεναι γαλήνης τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὁδὸν ἴωσι καὶ καθιστῶνται μᾶλλον ἐπιόντος τοῦ χρόνου, τότε ἤδη πρὸς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰόντων σχῆμα ἑκάστων τῶν κύκλων αἱ περιφοραὶ κατευθυνόμεναι, τό τε θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν προσαγορεύουσαι κατ΄ ὀρθόν, ἔμφρονα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰς γιγνόμενον ἀποτελοῦσιν.72

And so when certain sensations come in from outside and attack them, they sweep the soul's entire vessel along with them. It is then that these revolutions, however much in control they seem to be, are actually under their control. All these disturbances are no doubt the reason why even

71 *Tim.* 43a6-b2 ed. Burnet.

72 *Tim.* 44a5-b7 ed. Burnet.

today and not only at the beginning, whenever a soul is bound within a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence. But as the stream that brings growth and nourishment diminishes and the soul's orbits regain their composure, resume their proper courses and establish themselves more and more with the passage of time, their revolutions are set straight, to conform to the configuration each of the circles takes in its natural course. They then correctly identify what is the same and what is different, and render intelligent the person who possess them.

tr. Zeyl

Over time, when the bodily affections are less intense and more under control, the soul can stabilize in the body and regain its intelligence. Timaeus also stresses that education plays an important role here: the right educational training can reinforce this positive development of the soul. Conversely, a lack of such training could lead one to remain unaccomplished and devoid of understanding until the very end of one's life (ἀτελὴς καὶ ἀνόητος εἰς ῞Αιδου πάλιν ἔρχεται).73

In his summary of this passage, however, Galen takes Plato's metaphor of the river rather literally, namely, in terms of an abundance of moistness. He even states that according to Timaeus the cause for the return of intellect is dryness:

After this, he [*sc.* Plato] describes the things that happen to the soul necessarily because of its connection to the body: why it is without intellect at the beginning of its connection with it [the body] and why intellect arises second to it after this. Then, he made the cause of the first state an abundance of moisture and the cause of the second state dryness.74

According to Galen's summary, the lack of intellect in the newborn is caused by an abundance of fluid or moisture: the cause of the ignorance of the newborn is not the binding to the bodily elements as such, but rather the abundance of *one specific element* or rather *elemental quality*, namely that of wetness. In Plato's text, the metaphor of the river clearly referred to all four elements and the incarnation of soul as such, rather than to water or wetness particularly:

πολλοῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ κατακλύζοντος καὶ ἀπορρέοντος κύματος ὅ τὴν τροφὴν παρεῖχεν, ἔτι μείζω θόρυβον ἀπηργάζετο τὰ τῶν προσπιπτόντων παθήματα

73 *Tim.* 44b8 f. ed. Burnet.

74 Das and Koetschet (forthcoming) paragraph 7.

ἑκάστοις, ὅτε πυρὶ προσκρούσειε τὸ σῶμά τινος ἔξωθεν ἀλλοτρίῳ περιτυχὸν ἢ καὶ στερεῷ γῆς πάγῳ ὑγροῖς τε ὀλισθήμασιν ὑδάτων, εἴτε ζάλῃ πνευμάτων ὑπὸ ἀέρος φερομένων καταληφθείη, καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων τούτων διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἱ κινήσεις ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ερόμεναι προσπίπτοιεν.75

For mighty as the nourishment-bearing billow was in its ebb and flow, mightier still was the turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck against the living things. Such disturbances would occur when the body encountered and collided with external fire (i.e., fire other than the body's own) or for that matter with a hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding waters, or when it was caught up by a surge of airdriven winds. The motions produced by all these encounters would then be conducted through the body to the soul, and strike against it.

tr. Zeyl

Galen here makes a crucial interpretative step – one that is rather remarkable in the context of this summary, which generally stays close to Plato's text and does not stand out for interpretative originality. Perhaps this indicates that this is truly how Galen reads the *Timaeus*, rather than it being a deliberate manipulation to fit his own agenda. Or perhaps it indicates that this is indeed such a crucial matter for him that he does not even want to leave it out in this generally more neutral summary. The next step, making dryness the cause for the coming to be of understanding, simply follows from the first step of making an abundance of wetness the cause of the lack of understanding. The notion that dryness or the decrease of the initial wetness of the newborn is the cause of understanding is completely absent from the text Galen is summarizing, and must be understood, I propose, as a way to rewrite the Platonic soul-body dynamics in terms of Galenic mixture and the predomination of specific qualities within it. As we have been able to gather from our previous two case-studies, this interpretation is in line with Galen's approach in *QAM* and *HNH*, where the nature of the soul and the nature of man respectively were understood in terms of the mixture of the elemental qualities. Indeed, we find the exact same interpretative movement in *QAM*, where Galen uses the same passage from the *Timaeus*:

… ἃ τάχ΄ ἂν ἐφεξῆς εἴποιμι ξύμπαντα πρότερον ἀναμνήσας ὅν ὁ Πλάτων ἔγραψε λόγον, ὑπὸ τὴς τοῦ σώματος ὑγρότητος εἰς λήθην ἔρχεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὧν πρότερον ἠπίστατο, πρὶν ἐνδεθῆναι τῷ σόματι. λέγει γὰρ ὧδέ πως αὐτοῖς

75 *Tim.* 43b5-c5 ed. Burnet.

ῥήμασιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ κατ΄ ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον τοῦ συγγράμματος, ἔνθα φησὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δημιουργῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνδοῦντας τὴν ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν "εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον", εὔδηλον ὅτι τὴν ὑγρότητα τῆς τῶν βρεφῶν οὐσίας αἰνιττόμενος.76

Perhaps I should discuss these all next – after first giving a reminder of that statement of Plato's, that as a result of the wetness of the body the soul reaches a state of forgetfulness of what it knew before being bound into the body. For this basically is what he says – in these very words – in the *Timaeus*, in that part of the work in which he states that the gods craft the human being by placing the immortal soul 'in a body replete with ebb and flow'. It is quite evident that this is an oblique reference to the wetness of the substance of infants.

tr. Singer

It is 'quite evident', according to Galen, that Plato here intended to refer to the relative wetness of the substance of newborns, but merely expressed it in a veiled or allusive manner (αἰνίττομαι is a way of speaking typical of myth).77 He goes on to unambiguously state that this wetness is the cause of 'mindlessness in the soul' (τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀνοίας), whereas dryness is the cause of understanding. He then remarks that a body that does not have any share of wetness would be extremely intelligent, as the bodies of the stars are. The stars, of course, are associated with the rational soul already in the *Timaeus*, and Galen also refers to Heraclitus' aphorism comparing the dry soul to a 'ray of light'.78 There will be much more to say about all of this, but we will come back to Galen's peculiar use of this metaphor from the *Timaeus* when we discuss fragment 6 from Larrain's edition below. For now, let this be a preliminary illustration of what is exceptional about Galen's use of the *Timaeus*: he seems to come closer to a consistent somatisation of the soul (i.e. explaining soul and its functions in terms of bodily mixtures), including its rational part, than he does in other contexts.79 What happens in this passage in *QAM*, in the *Compendium* and some of the fragments from the commentary (in particular the ones that

76 *QAM* 42,8–17 Müller (IV 780 K).

77 Cf. Stroumsa (2005) 11–26.

78 *QAM* 47,11–6 Müller (IV 786 K); *Tim.* 41d–42b; for Heraclitus see Kahn fr CIX.

79 Vegetti (2000) 72, with regard to Galen's general use of the *Timaeus*, speaks of 'manipulation' of the dialogue in a 'strictly material sense': '… egli si sente libero dalle costrizioni di scuola, il che gli consente, da un lato, un atteggiamento francamente critico la dove questo gli sembra necessario, dall'altro un uso spregiudicato del dialogo, fino alla manipolazione ma non al tradimento, in senso nettamente materialistico'.

184 Case-Study III