of South Asian migrants in 1990 by a large margin but have experienced a notable decline in registered immigrant populations in the decades since. This decline is due in part to a decline in refugee movements. For example, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, migration from Afghanistan reached 3.3 million in 1990, the majority of whom were hosted in Pakistan. By 2020, the number of immigrants from Afghanistan had declined to 1.6 million.

The top destinations from South-East Asia are the US, followed by Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. The rise of Thailand as a major destination country is one of the newer trends—from less than half a million in 1990 to 3.5 million in 2020.

There are significant country-level differences in the nature and drivers of movement across these large regional groupings. Myanmar, for example, experienced a notable rise in the number of people migrating internationally to neighbouring countries in South and South-East Asia. There were just over one half million migrants from Myanmar in South and South-East Asian countries in 1990, and this grew to over 3 million by 2020. Today Myanmar is second only to China in 2020 for the number of migrants it sends to other countries in the region. There was a notable rise in refugee movements from Myanmar, particularly from the Rohingya population, an ethnic minority that has been denied citizenship and faces persecution and violence in Myanmar. About one million Rohingya refugees now live in the largest refugee camp in the world in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. However, a larger number of migrants from Myanmar are categorised as labour migrants. According to the latest Myanmar Population Census of 2014, more than two million Myanmar citizens were abroad, over 70% of whom were working in Thailand (ILO, 2022). A smaller number were working in Malaysia, China, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Gulf countries. Many migrant workers from Myanmar use licensed overseas employment agencies to migrate, but due to the costs, time, and uncertainties that it will result in better conditions, a greater share may migrate irregularly (ILO, 2022).

#### **China**

A major economic force in East Asia, China has experienced remarkable development gains in recent decades. Over the last forty years, China contributed close to three-quarters of the global reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty. At China's current national poverty line, the number of poor fell by 770 million over this period (World Bank, 2022). Between 1990 and 2020, China's urban population grew from 26.4% of the total population to 61.4%. The number of Chinese living abroad more than doubled from 4.2 million in 1990 to 10.4 million in 2020.

Most international movement from China is to countries or territories within the region. In 2020, top destinations include Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Singapore (Table 8.5). International migration to the US is also notably high, as is Chinese migration to Canada and Australia. Migration to South America has grown significantly, more than doubling between 2005 and 2020 (from 53,884 to 114,604) yet remains relatively small compared to other regional destinations.

There is growing international interest in migration between China and African countries (see also Teye et al., this volume). Formal figures of migration between these regions remain low, with UN DESA data capturing just 33,998 Chinese migrants on the African continent in 2020 and providing no data on Africans in China. However, surveys, qualitative research, and

**Table 8.5** Top 10 countries of origin and destination to/from China

*Source* UN DESA (2020)

on-the-ground observations suggest this migration corridor is far larger than these formal figures suggest (Bodomo, 2012).

Chinese migrants are moving to African countries to work in trade, infrastructure development, mining, commerce, and agriculture. Data from the China–Africa Research Initiative estimates there were 103,983 Chinese workers in Africa in 2020, down from a peak of 263,659 in 2015, mostly working in construction. These estimates do not include informal migrants such as traders and shopkeepers. In 2020, the top five destinations of Chinese workers—accounting for 46% of all Chinese workers in Africa—were Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola (CARI, 2022). More focused case studies suggest even higher numbers of Chinese immigrants than the CARI data. Botchwey et al. (2019), for example, suggest there were approximately 50,000 Chinese migrants in the informal gold mining sector in Ghana between 2008 and 2013. Because small-scale gold mining is restricted by law to Ghanaian citizens, most Chinese miners do not have legal status and are often missed in population statistics.

Africans are also migrating to China in growing numbers to pursue opportunities for higher education, trade, or tourism (see Bodomo, 2012; Cissé, 2013; Haugen, 2012). Most African traders arrive in China on short-term visas, to buy goods that they resell in African countries. Some settle in China, but they tend to stay on renewable one-year visas, and thus may not be counted in formal statistics as permanent migrants. Many other African students, traders, or workers are unable to renew their short-term visas and can become trapped in a precarious position of informality.

#### **Africa**

Despite growing interest in migration from Africa to new destinations like China, migration from African countries is still overwhelmingly directed towards other African countries (see also Setrana & Yaro, this volume). Taking Africa as a whole, the top ten origin countries and nine out of the top ten destination countries are all other African countries. Some of these movements are driven by conflict and humanitarian crises—as seen in the large growth in international migration from South Sudan (Table 8.6). As of 2020, refugees and asylum seekers comprised a striking one third of all international migration within Sub-Saharan Africa (UN DESA, 2020a). However, this should not overshadow the more significant, yet arguably more mundane forms of mobility related to demographic transitions, higher levels of education and infrastructure, economic growth and the changing aspirations of Africa's younger generations (see Flahaux & de Haas, 2016).

Sub-Saharan Africa experiences the largest intra-regional movements in the Global South, and the second highest in the world after Europe. 63% of the 28.3 million migrants from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa moved to other countries within Sub-Saharan Africa, top destinations including Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa, and Uganda. An additional 5.3% moved to countries in Northern Africa. Migration outside the continent is primarily directed towards Europe (18.1%), followed by North America (8.7%), the Middle East, and less than 2% in Australia and New Zealand, South and East Asia, South or Central America.

Migration from Northern Africa is smaller (8.7 million in 2020) and unlike migration from Sub-Saharan Africa, is predominantly directed towards Europe and North America (70.3% of total migration in 2020). This has been a relatively stable trend since 1990, and France has remained the top destination country of all African migration over this period (Table 8.6). Other regional destinations from North Africa include Sub-Saharan Africa (13.5%) and the Middle East (13.0%).

Comparisons across time suggest that migration from Africa is diversifying beyond intra-regional patterns of emigration. In 1990, for example, 83% of migration from Sub-Saharan Africa was to other African countries; this declined to 68.2% in 2020. Migration to Europe and North America captured a growing share of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, from 13.8% in 1990 to 26.9% in 2020.

Nevertheless, recent surveys of migrants within Africa—many of whom would not be captured in UN DESA data—find that migration remains overwhelmingly intra-regional. One study collecting migration flow data at key transit hubs in West and Central Africa found that only 10% of migrants from this region intend to travel to Europe (Allie et al., 2021). Further, despite widespread international attention on violent conflict as a driver of movement in this region, three-quarters (74%) report economic reasons for moving, such as searching for jobs or engaging in seasonal work-related migration. One quarter (25%) cite family-related factors, such as following family and friends, and only 3.5% of migrants say they are moving because they fear for their safety (Allie et al., 2021).

**Table 8.6** Top 10 countries of origin and destination to/from Africa

#### **Latin America**

Like Africa, Latin America shows important sub-regional differences. Migration from Central America is primarily extra-regional, oriented towards North America, while migration from South America is equally intra-regional and extra-regional (Fig. 8.5). In 2020, there were 14.8 million Central Americans living in the US compared to 3.5 million South Americans. Over the last decade, migration from Central America to the US was primarily from Mexico and Northern Central American countries, but in recent years, those trends have changed. In 2022, there were more Nicaraguans, Cubans, and Venezuelans arriving at the US–Mexico border than migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Ruiz Soto, 2022). The migration systems that have long facilitated migration from Mexico and Central America to the US are extending southward, responding both to political, economic, and environmental insecurity in these origin countries and significant labour demand for immigrant workers in the US.

Unlike migration from Central American countries, intra-regional migration within South America has increased significantly between 2005 and 2020. This is due in part to the large increase in the number of Venezuelans fleeing their failing state, but the increase in intra-regional migration is not only due to displacement. Over the last decades, several regional integration mechanisms helped facilitate intra-regional mobility. The Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) encouraged regular, cross-border migration in South America by facilitating entry, migratory procedures, and access to documentation and social rights for migrants (IOM, 2021). Argentina remains the top destination country in the region (Table 8.7).

Migration into South America from outside the continent is diversifying in terms of origin countries, particularly migration from Africa and Asia. Asian immigration is long-standing, particularly from the People's Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, while new movements are observed from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Arab Syrian Republic, among others (IOM, 2022). In recent years, the African population has also increased, and the main African nationalities in the region are Angolan, Moroccan, and South African. There are small but noteworthy movements from countries in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Egypt, among others (IOM, 2020).

**Table 8.7**

(continued)

**174 K. Schewel and A. Debray**

#### **Small Island Nations**

The majority of international migrants from small island states are found in wealthy countries of the Global North, but the second most common destination are other small island states. Of the 9 million international migrants from the Caribbean, for example, most reside in North America (74.9%), followed by other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (14.7%), most of these going to other Caribbean islands, followed by countries in Europe (10%), and of these, predominantly Southern European countries. There are fewer residents of Caribbean origin in Africa (13,714) and Oceania (11,687).

There were over half a million migrants from islands in Oceania in 2020, including Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. Most move regionally to Australia and New Zealand (56.6%), followed by North America (27.8%), and then to other islands in Oceania (12.3%). Of the 313,069 international immigrants living on these Oceanic islands, most come from European countries (23.7%), predominantly Western European countries, followed by South-East Asian countries (21.0%), North America (8.7%), and then Australia and New Zealand (6.8%).

Small island nations face unique socioeconomic and environmental vulnerabilities related to their remote geography, small land mass, and reliance on tourism and ocean-based natural resources. In recent decades, the adverse and disproportionate consequences of climate change on small island states are of growing international concern. Small islands have been devastated by sudden-onset events like hurricanes, tropical storms, and cyclones, leading to immediate population displacements often accompanied by high rates of return. Small islands also face slow-onset events such as sea level rise or ocean acidification, which threaten to undermine local livelihoods and the long-term capability to stay in place.

Research is just beginning to tease out the implications of sudden- and slow-onset climate change on migration patterns from small island nations. For example, one study of population movements within and from Puerto Rico after Hurricane Maria in 2017 analysed data generated by mobile phones, social media, air travel records, and census data between July 2017 and 2018 (Acosta et al., 2020). They find overall population loss from Puerto Rico, but the magnitude differs by data source: 4% according to Census data and up to 17% according to social media data. Rural areas lost a greater share of their population, and movements within Puerto Rico were primarily from rural to urban municipalities.

Quantifying the effects of slow-onset climate change on migration patterns has proved more challenging. Gradual climate and environmental changes like changes in sea level rise, temperature, or precipitation patterns—have more indirect and non-linear effects on migration trends. Environmental changes are mediated by the political, economic, technological, social, and cultural context. Even in small island settings, initial research suggests that slow-onset climate change does not have a stronger effect than other demographic or developmental drivers of migration (see, for example, Speelman et al. [2021] on the Maldives).

 However, the demands and burdens associated with displaced populations are overwhelmingly carried by countries within the Global South. Refugee movements—like other forms of population mobility—are most often intra-regional movements. In fact, 69% of refugees and other people in need of international protection live in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. Twenty-two per cent of refugees and other internationally displaced peoples are hosted in countries categorised by the United Nations as the 'least developed countries' (UNHCR, 2022)—countries including Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. For comparison, just 17% are hosted by high-income countries in the Global North.

Although communication and transportation costs around the world are diminishing, which one might expect might facilitate greater South–North movements of refugee populations, wealthy countries across the Global North are developing increasingly sophisticated techniques of "remote control" to bar asylum seekers from spaces where they can ask for sanctuary (Fitzgerald, 2019).2 International norms of collective responsibility and *non-refoulement*  are eroding, and the result is that potential South–North refugee movements become forcibly South–South.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), there are three durable solutions to international displacement: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement to another country. However, according to UNHCR's most recent statistics, less than 1% of refugees are resettled each year (just 39,266 in 2021) and less than 1% of refugees are repatriated to their home countries (just 49,795 in 2021). "Over half of the refugees for whom UNHCR is responsible", one report states, "find themselves trapped in protracted situations, where they have lived for years or even decades on end" (UNHCR, 2011). In this context, local integration can be a formal strategy of host country governments, or an informal strategy pursued by refugees trying to build a new life for themselves and their families. Most will fail to achieve full citizenship; over the past decade, only 1.1 million refugees were naturalised in their country of asylum. Some of the best examples we have of creative strategies for local integration come from countries in the Global South, like the United Republic of Tanzania and Sierra Leone (UNHCR, 2011).

These dynamics mean that countries of the Global South are shouldering responsibility for refugees and asylum seekers without sufficient international support to realise durable solutions for displaced populations. When Germany accepted one million refugees, mostly from Syria, in 2015 and 2016, the country was praised (and criticised by anti-immigrant groups) for its relative generosity. Yet, the scale of refugees resettled relative to Germany's population of over 80 million pales in comparison to other refugee-receiving nations in the Global South. Lebanon, for example, hosts some 1.5 million Syrian refugees and 13,715 refugees of other nationalities in a country with a population of just 6.8 million people. Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees per capita and per square mile in the world.

#### **Conclusion**

South–South migration constitutes a significant share of humanity's international population movements—larger in volume than South–North migration in 2020. Most international migrants leaving the Global South move to countries within their home region, particularly in areas like Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Exceptions to this trend are regions of the Global South that neighbour wealthier countries of the Global North, like Central America, North Africa, Central Asia, or small island states in Oceania and the Caribbean. In these places, extra-regional, South–North migration is more common than intra-regional, South–South migration.

This chapter finds important shifts in the relative share of intra- and extraregional movements across the Global South since the 1990s. In regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia, which are home to some of the largest intra-regional movements in the world, there has been a notable rise in extra-regional migration as more international migrants travel further distances. In fact, migration from South Asia to the Middle East is now the largest South–South migration corridor in the world.

The implications of these trends for migration governance are two-fold. Because most migrants in the Global South move regionally, there is a need to strengthen regional cooperation on migration governance. Many countries across the Global South are striving to do so within the framework of regional economic communities, like the Economic Community of West African States or the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in South America. However, the rise in extra-regional movements requires complementary international frameworks. This is the aspiration of the Global Compact on Migration, the first UN global agreement on a common approach to international migration in all its dimensions—though its objectives and recommendations remain non-binding.

While the big picture trends presented in this chapter are clear, more specific country-level data should be taken with a dose of scepticism. This brief overview uses some of the best global and cross-nationally comparable dataset we have on international migrant stocks. However, as our introduction highlighted, capturing international migration flows and trends remains exceedingly difficult. The formal figures we present here likely underestimate the true extent of migration occurring within the Global South, and some important trends—like migration between Africa and China—are simply not reflected in the UN DESA dataset.

Improved understanding of South–South migration requires greater investment in census data collection, which requires funding and capacity-building in the statistical bureaus of many countries across the Global South—a responsibility that should be shouldered by the international community interested in reliable data on migration, not only national governments. We also need more detailed case studies and surveys of migration corridors, to better understand the nature, volume, composition, and reasons for migration within and between countries and sub-regions of the Global South. The following chapters address this need by presenting exploring South–South migration trends and experiences within and between Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

## **Notes**

continued with Venezuelan asylum seekers under President Biden. Frontex, an agency of the European Union tasked with managing its borders, has been accused of "pushbacks" or returning migrants and asylum seekers to their point of departure.

### **References**

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **9**

## **The Dynamics of South–South Migration in Africa**

**Joseph Awetori Yaro and Mary Boatemaa Setrana**

### **Introduction**

South–South migration involves the movement of individuals from one developing country to another in the Global South. Although there are significant international movements between the countries of the Global South (see Schewel and Debray, this volume) migration narratives tend to focus on migration from the Global South to the Global North. These narratives are, however, starting to change as researchers and policymakers from the Global South increasingly contribute to the migration discourse in the South. The changing global economy, growing interconnectedness, and the political landscape are contributing factors to the increasing attention given to South–South migration (see, for example, Bakewell et al., 2009; Setrana et al., 2022). Factors such as cultural attitudes, economic incentives, geopolitical realities, and international cooperation account for the increasing flows between countries of the Global South (Halperin & Heath, 2020).

The outcomes of South–South migration are diverse and contradictory; while some highlight the negatives associated with South–South migration,

J. A. Yaro

M. B. Setrana (B) Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana

namely poverty and inequality which arise by draining resources from vulnerable countries (see, for example, Ratha et al., 2011), others are of the view that South–South migration promotes economic growth and creates new opportunities for innovation and collaboration (see, for example, Setrana & Arhin-Sam, 2022; Setrana & Kliest, 2022; Teye, 2022; Ullah & Haque, 2020). These perspectives are largely skewed towards the use of economic indicators as measurements of development and ignore the welfare and social aspects (Quartey et al., 2020). Research undertaken by the large number of Global South scholars involved in the Migration for Development and Equality Hub (MIDEQ) provides a more nuanced explanation that reflects the trends, patterns, and complexities of South–South migration.1 This research indicates that South–South migration is essential for economic development and knowledge transfer between countries in the Global South (see also Bakewell et al., 2009). It helps bridge the gap between skilled labour and knowledge, leading to a better quality of life for the population (see also World Health Organization, 2008). It also helps improve agricultural practices and technologies in the receiving country (see also Zossou et al., 2020). Furthermore, it contributes to addressing population imbalances and reducing brain drain (see also Quartey et al., 2020).

There is a need for policymakers, scholars, and development partners to recognise the relevance of South–South migration in order to develop policies and strategies that facilitate the migration processes and ensure benefits to both sending countries and the migrants. South–South migration must be seen as a strategic and constructive approach for developing countries to work together towards a shared goal (Ratha & Shaw, 2007). By recognising the value of South–South migration and promoting policies that support the integration of migrants, developing countries can create more inclusive and prosperous societies for all (Bakewell et al., 2009). Human mobility dynamics in Africa provide one of the clearest examples of the potential benefits of South–South migration.

Migration trends and patterns in Africa have changed over time: geographical patterns have significantly changed from the colonial days through the post-colonial era to the neoliberal era (see also Fynn Bruey and Crawley, this volume). These changing patterns have been shaped by the global geopolitical context, global economic changes, international migration policies and laws, and environmental disturbances. The reasons for intra-African movements are diverse and defined by both the African context and external barriers to international migration beyond the African continent. The majority of African migration within the continent occurs due to socio-economic, political, and environmental factors (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). Many Africans move to other regions of the continent in search of better job opportunities, higher wages, and better living conditions (Setrana & Kleist, 2022; Teye, 2022).

Drawing on academic sources, including our own studies on various dimensions of African migration, this chapter argues for a more evidencebased analysis of the African migration story.2 The popular narrative by policymakers and academics that it is a continent plagued by mass displacement and migration, primarily due to poverty and conflict (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016; Korn, 2001; Oucho et al., 2006) with the majority of Africans fleeing across the Mediterranean to Europe, as reflected in media representations. We argue that based on the overwhelming evidence that most Africans move *within* Africa, there is a need for a corrective narrative.

#### **Migration Trends and Patterns in Africa**

The innate nature of people to change their location in response to either push or pull factors makes migration an indispensable phenomenon in Africa. In the twenty-first century, the narrative of international migration has transitioned from the practice of "forced colonial slavery" to movements that are motivated by the need to tap into better socio-economic opportunities, conducive political environments, and human-friendly environmental conditions on the continent. There are increasing numbers of movements within the African continent. This can be attributed, in part, to the concerted efforts of African states and international institutions to promote regional integration (Kayizzi-Mugerwa et al., 2014) among the regions of Africa, namely, western, southern, eastern, northern, and central Africa. The drive towards regional integration has created more opportunities for people to move freely within the continent, leading to increased migration. The growth of African economies has also contributed to increase intra-regional mobility: as more countries experience economic growth, there is a greater demand for labour, which has led to an increase in cross-border movement.

The various regional economic communities, namely, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC (Møller, 2009) have been instrumental in promoting the movement within the continent. For example, ECOWAS has been instrumental in promoting free movement of people and goods throughout West Africa (see also Teye and Oucho, this volume), while SADC has focused on fostering agricultural development and improving infrastructure. Although there are challenges with the ratification and implementation of free movement protocols, this regional cooperation remains an important goal for many African countries as member states work together towards a more prosperous future for all their citizens and migrants.

As of mid-year 2020, the total number of international migrants stood at 280.6 million which constitutes 3.6% of the total global population.<sup>3</sup> The vast majority of these migrants remain within the regions from which they originated. According to the evidence, the highest rate of intra-regional migration is in Europe (70%), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with an intra-regional migration share of 63%.

As shown in Fig. 9.1, the international migrant stock as a percentage of the total population in Africa has been dwindling, reaching its peak at 2.5% in 1990. This decreased from 1.9% in 2000 to 1.7% in 2010. Since 2015, the international migrant stock as a percentage of the total population in Africa has remained constant.

There is widespread evidence that most African migrants are not crossing oceans, but rather, there is a high level of land-border crossings within the region. The African migration report estimates that 94% of African migrants who cross the oceans do so regularly (Achieng et al., 2020). The report further indicates that 14% of migrants population globally are from Africa while 41% and 24% respectively are from Asia and Europe (Achieng et al., 2020). These figures emphasise the fact that intra-African migration is prominent and this story must be told in order to change the misconception around the irregular migration of Africans across the Mediterranean. A cursory look at migration data further shows that 4 out of 5 international migrants residing in eastern, middle, and western Africa hail from the same African region (Fig. 9.3).

This unique trend of intra-regional migration calls for unbiased academic research, policy guidelines, and measures that reflect the regional setting,

**Fig. 9.1** International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population in Africa (*Source* Based on data extracted from the UNDESA database, 20204)

**Fig. 9.2** Destination of African migrants globally

**Fig. 9.3** Distribution of migrants on the continent (*Source* Retrieved from the Migration Data Portal, March 2022)

the needs of the African migrant and, ultimately, promote the aspirations of the African people. Admittedly, issues of conflicts, natural disasters, and unfavourable climatic conditions may lead to forcibly displacement of persons. For instance, the ongoing conflicts in the Ethiopian's Tigray region have led to the massive displacement of people who are crossing the Ethiopian-Sudan border, with women and children being a highly vulnerable group (UNHCR, 2020). Apart from that, if left unabated, the impacts of climate change which are affecting agricultural activities, food supply, and the availability of potable water may not only stimulate migration and forced displacement, but also increase the proportion of distressed migrants in the future.

Nonetheless, a greater chunk of mobility in Africa is largely attributed to the high levels of trade and other socio-economic engagements that have been in existence across several centuries. Africa hosts about five million migrants from the rest of the world (Achieng et al., 2020). Aside from historical trade practices, it is anticipated that the promotion of migrant-friendly trade treaties such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCTA) agreement has the potential to promote labour mobility, commerce, and investment within the region. Moreover, the outbreak of COVID-19 has reshaped the operations of global supply chains and businesses, hence, the ratification of AfCTA can be seen as a conduit for the advancement of intra-continental cross-border trade in an era of growing isolationism.

With reference to Africa, the trajectory of international migrant stock has been increasing continuously for the past decade from 1990 to 2020 (see Fig. 9.4), and this further reinforces the fact that regular intra-regional migration is a common practice in the sub-region.

As shown in Fig. 9.5, there has been an upward trend in the annual rate of change in the migrant stock with a percentage increase from 1.3% in 2000 to 5.0% in 2015. The rate of increase however slowed in 2020, and this can be partly attributed to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated international travel restrictions that were imposed across the globe.

**Fig. 9.4** International migrant stock in Africa (*Source* Based on data extracted from the UNDESA database, 2020)

**Fig. 9.5** Annual rate of change of the migrant stock in Africa (*Source* Based on data extracted from the UNDESA database, 2020)

The dynamics of migration in Africa show that countries with peaceful and robust economic environments attracted a greater proportion of the young and active migrant labour force. This confirms the general assertion that both skilled and unskilled workers move to environments that offer them better economic prospects in sectors ranging from manufacturing, agriculture, and service sectors. By mid-2020, out of a total of 6.4 million international migrants recorded in the Southern African region 45.3%, representing 2.9 million migrants, chose South Africa as their destination country (IOM).6 This can be attributed to the disparities in economic growth and prospects between countries within the SADC economic block, where South Africa is considered as the beacon of economic growth. Precisely, the mining potentials of South Africa coupled with the existence of a good business climate has been a pull factor for migrants from Mozambique, Lesotho, Malawi, Botswana, and Eswatini, among others. A similar trend can be seen in western Africa, where migrants from Sahel countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso head southwards to coastal countries like Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire which are relatively endowed with better economic prospects in the agriculture, mining, and fishing sectors (Dick & Schraven, 2021). Moreover, the quest to promote economic integration within the ECOWAS sub-region through visa-free travelling protocols has translated into an increase in labour mobility over the past decade.

Amid the evolving social norms that allow women to partake actively in the labour market, it appears that there has been a rise in the independent migration of females in search of better economic opportunities since 2010 after a decrease in 2005 (Setrana & Kleist, 2022).

As can be seen in Fig. 9.6, there was a decreasing trend in the percentage share of international female migrant stock in Africa (between 1995 and 2005). However, from 2005 till 2020, the trend was reversed to reveal a continuous increase in the female share of international migrants. The high volumes of daily crossings of borders by traders, most of whom are market women, illustrate the active engagement of African women in the labour market. This contemporary shift clearly communicates that cultures are undergoing a positive change in that women are no longer considered as residual and dormant partakers in the economic transformation agenda of societies. As of 2020, there was a daily estimate of at least 30,000 people moving in-between the townships of Rusizi and Goma, which happen to be border towns between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda (Achieng et al., 2020). About 75% of those moving between the border towns are women who trade in fabric, foodstuffs, and other electronic goods. Similarly, Beitbridge, the political border post between South Africa and Zimbabwe, registers an average of more than 30,000 daily crossings by people engaging in cross-border commerce and trade. This phenomenon is not particular to the aforementioned border towns but can be seen in most of the border towns within the region. The higher levels of female labour force participation associated with these border crossings have an extended impact on family earnings, consumption, and the general welfare of households.

International migrants as a percentage of the total population within the regions of southern Africa have been increasing with the highest percentages recorded from 2010 to 2020. Table 9.1 presents data on the African regional variation in the international migrant stock as a percentage of the total population from 1990 to 2020.

Table 9.1 provides data on the annual rate of change in the migrant stock from 1990 to 2020. Statistically, Table 9.1 highlights the fluctuations in the annual rate of change of the migrant stock across different sub-regions and establishes that southern Africa had consistently maintained the highest

**Fig. 9.6** Female migrants as a percentage of the international migrant stock in Africa (*Source* Based on data extracted from the UNDESA database, 2020)

#### **9 The Dynamics of South–South Migration in Africa 191**

**Fig. 9.7** International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population 1990– 2020 (*Source* Based on data extracted from UNDESA database, 2020)

**Table 9.1** Annual rate of change in the migrant stock from 1990 to 2020

*Source* Based on data extracted from UNDESA database (2020)

annual rate of change, except for the period from 2015 to 2020 when it was surpassed by the northern African sub-region.

From 1990 to 1995, the Middle Africa sub-region exhibited the highest proportion of the annual rate of change in the migrant stock, accounting for 12.0%. Although there was a decline in this highest percentage during the period of 1995–2000 compared to 1990–1995, the sub-region with the highest annual rate of change shifted from middle Africa to southern Africa. Such migration patterns in Middle Africa are shaped by each country's unique culture, language, and economic factors (Chaudhry & Ouda, 2021). Factors that drive migration within the Middle African region include poverty, political instability, and ethnic conflict. Poverty is one of the primary drivers of migration in the region. The lack of basic necessities such as clean water, food, and access to healthcare has compelled many to seek opportunities in other countries.

In this new period, southern Africa recorded a rate of 1.1%. Subsequent time intervals displayed an increase in the highest proportion of the annual rate of change, including 2000–2005, 2005–2010, and 2010–2015, with percentages of 4.4%, 7.9%, and 7.8% respectively. Notably, southern Africa consistently held the highest annual rate of change of the migrant stock compared to the other regions under consideration throughout these specified time intervals. These trends in the southern Africa region show that it is one of the regions with the highest number of people moving within the continent (Bakewell & De Haas, 2007). The drivers of migration within the southern Africa region are multifaceted and complex, but they could be attributed to several reasons such as economic disparities, political instability, and environmental changes (Raleigh, 2011). The shortage of employment and other economic opportunities in some countries such as Zimbabwe and Malawi are forcing most people to migrate to neighbouring countries such as South Africa and Botswana.

However, from 2015 to 2020, the northern African sub-region recorded the highest annual rate of change in the migrant stock, reaching 7.9%. In the region, economic and social factors such as poverty, unemployment, and lack of basic services are some of the key drivers of migration within the region. One of the primary drivers of migration in North Africa is economic factors. High unemployment rates in the region push many people to seek employment opportunities abroad, particularly in Europe.

## **Demographic Overview of Migration Within the Regions of Africa**

In 1990, the proportion of male migrants as part of the total population in eastern Africa was higher at 3.1% compared to their female counterparts at 2.9%. In 1995, 2000, and 2005 this trend persisted with males as a percentage of the total population representing 2.3%, 2.0%, and 1.7% respectively, indicating that male migrants were a higher percentage of the total population during those years. Nevertheless, in 2010, 2015, and 2020, both sexes had the same percentage which represented 1.4% and 1.7%, and 1.7% each in 2010, 2015, and 2020 respectively. In southern Africa, male migrants as a percentage of the total population dominated the migrant stock

compared to the female in all the year intervals. The case was not different in West Africa as in all the year intervals.

With regard to sex, the data shows that males generally dominate migration within the continent and among the various regions in Africa. Eastern and western Africa record the highest migration of both males and females although the former is higher. Despite the lower proportion of female migrants on the continent, it is important to note that there is increasing independent migration of women. The increasing migration of women has been noted by feminist migration scholars because it gives autonomy and empowers migrant women when compared with traditional migration narratives where women were seen as persons accompanying husbands and fathers (Setrana & Kleist, 2022). In Western Africa, there have been slight decreases and increases, representing 45.1% to 45.7%, slightly below the average of female migrants from all over Africa. Here the changing narrative not necessarily about the percentages but about the autonomous decision-making of women for various reasons including furthering education and searching for employment among other things. In the early 1990s, the implementation of the structural adjustment programme rendered many women jobless. Many of these women gained livelihoods that empowered them to take care of their families by engaging in cross-border trading.

Table 9.2 illustrates the sex distribution of the annual rate of change of the migrant stock from 1990 to 2020. As can be seen, from 1990 to 1995, the proportion of the annual rate of change of the migrant stock in eastern Africa was the same for males and females as both sexes recorded −3.6% each. However, the annual rate of change of the migrant stock from 1995 to 2000 was higher for females (−0.4%) than the males (−0.6). In the period 2000–2005, the males overtook the females where the males accumulated an annual rate of change of the migrant stock of 0.5% as against −1.1% for females. Nevertheless, from 2005 to 2010, 2010 to 2015, and 2015 to 2020, the females had a higher proportion of the annual rate of change of the migrant stock than the males which represents 0.9%, 7.0%, and 2.9% respectively.

Regarding Middle Africa, between 1990 and 1995, both males and females had an equal annual rate of change in the migrant stock, with both sexes recording 12.0%. However, from 1995 to 2000, the annual rate of change in the migrant stock was higher for males (−7.9%) compared to females (−8.4%). In the subsequent periods of 2000–2005 and 2005–2010, females surpassed males in terms of the annual rate of change in the migrant stock. During the former period, females accumulated an annual rate of change of 2.2%, while in the latter period, it increased to 4.4%. However, from 2010

**Table 9.2** Annual rate of change in the migrant stock in Africa 1990–2020, by regions and sex

*Source* Based on data extracted from the UNDESA database (2020)

to 2015, the annual rate of change in the migrant stock for males (7.7%) exceeded that of females (6.5%). In contrast, from 2015 to 2020, females (2.1%) dominated males (1.1%) in terms of the annual rate of change in the migrant stock.

In terms of sex distribution in North Africa, there were notable differences in the annual rate of change in the migrant stock between males and females during specific time intervals. From 1990 to 1995, 1995 to 2000, 2000 to 2005, and 2010 to 2015, the males experienced a higher annual rate of change in the migrant stock, with percentages of −2.1%, −0.9%, −0.2%, and 1.9% respectively. However, during the periods from 2005 to 2010 and 2015 to 2020, the females exhibited a higher annual rate of change in the migrant stock compared to males, with percentages of 2.5% and 9.3% respectively.

With regard to sex disaggregation in Southern Africa, there were distinct patterns in the annual rate of change in the migrant stock between males and females during specific periods. From 1990 to 1995, 1995 to 2000, 2000 to 2005, and 2010 to 2015, the females exhibited a higher annual rate of change in the migrant stock, with percentages of −2.7%, 1.5%, 5.1%, and 9.0% respectively. However, from 2015 to 2020, the males displayed a higher annual rate of change in the migrant stock compared to females, with a percentage of −1.5%. Additionally, between 2005 and 2010, both males and females had an equal annual rate of change in the migrant stock, with both sexes recording 7.9%.

Concerning the sex distribution in West Africa, from 1995 to 2000, and 2000 to 2005, the males recorded a higher annual rate of change in the migrant stock than the females which represent −0.6%, and 2.7% respectively. However, from 1990 to 1995, 2010 to 2015, and 2015 to 2020, the females had a higher annual rate of change in the migrant stock than the males which constitutes 4.1%, 2.4%, and 1.4% respectively. Also, between 2005 and 2010, both males and females had the same proportion of the annual rate of change in the migrant stock, with both sexes recording 1.2%.

Generally, migrants in destination areas in Africa are found within the age bracket of 25–54 years. In terms of the sexes, in 2010, 2015, and 2020, the highest proportion of male and female migrants at destination areas was found within the age categories of 40–49 (6.2%), 35–44 (6.8%), and 45– 49 (3.3%) respectively. When disaggregated by gender, out of the total male migrants in destination countries in Africa, close to one-fifth (17.3%) in the year 2010 were within the age category of 30–54 while the year 2015 and 2020 recorded (19%) and (18.1%) respectively who also fall within the same age category. Likewise, the females within the year intervals of 2010, 2015, and 2020 could also be found within the age bracket of 35–44 (5.0%), 35–39 (2.9%), and 30–34 (2.8%) respectively. One notable finding is the higher number of young migrants at destination areas within the economically active age range. This observation suggests that a significant majority of African migrants, regardless of sex, tend to be in the age group that is actively participating in the workforce of destination countries. This concentration indicates the potential economic motivations behind migration within the African continent, as individuals within this age range often seek better employment opportunities, the highest wages, and improved living standards in their destination countries.

### **Conclusions**

The vast majority of African migration occurs within the continent, demonstrating that South–South migration in Africa is key to Africa's development agenda. Intra-migration is prominent with many African migrants crossing from one country on the continent to another country. Unlike the misconceived narratives that portray African migrants as persons moving irregularly through the Mediterranean to the Global North. Migration within and across Africa is beneficial to both sending and receiving countries. Some of the gains range from remittances, investments in education, health and housing sectors, and skills transfer, among others (Tonah & Setrana, 2017). Through South–South migration on the African continent, migrants who have acquired skills and values contribute to development in various capacities (Setrana & Tonah, 2016). There are enormous benefits of migration to both the destination and origin countries on the African continent. More positive impact is recorded on the economically active African group and the independent women migrating across the different regions and countries in Africa. Such African migrants become economically independent to support themselves and their households. For example, African migrants contribute through remittances which represent a source of foreign exchange supplementing household income for purchasing basic needs. Additionally, African migrants at both destination areas and in the home countries have established transnational businesses, created jobs, and paid taxes in the countries to which they move (Setrana & Arhin-Sam, 2022). South–South migration within the African continent has created employment for the many women who were displaced due to the implementation of the structural adjustment programme. These issues were compounded by the legacies of colonialism which shaped movements within the African continent through inequalities in development efforts, infrastructural imbalances, and deliberate forced movements.

More of the benefits of South–South migration can be achieved through strategic programmes and policies and narrating the migration realities on the African continent. To maximise the benefits of African migration within and across, many governments in Africa have implemented policies to ensure greater engagement with their citizens abroad, as well as those who make the decisions to finally return home, in order to maximise the developmental benefits of migration.

Efforts towards addressing the challenges associated with migration either to or from the sub-region and intra-regional migration are key to promoting the interlinkages between migration and development. Governments have implemented various measures, such as national migration policies, for effective migration management broadly, which have been successful to varying degrees (ICMPD & IOM, 2016). Given the importance of the African diaspora in national development across the region, it is recommended that governments harmonise policies across the sub-region to address the benefits.

#### **Notes**

## **References**

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# **10**

# **Migration as a Collective Project in the Global South: A Case Study from the Ethiopia–South Africa Corridor**

**Dereje Feyissa, Meron Zeleke, and Fana Gebresenbet**

## **Introduction**

Overall, there is an individualist thrust in migration studies, whether in the earlier theories of functionalism and historical materialism or the current aspiration–capability framework. Aside from differences in nuances, these theories take individuals as the primary unit of analysis and most engage with the collective dimensions of migration either tangentially or instrumentally. Seeking to redress a knowledge gap, this chapter discusses Hadiya migration to South Africa as a collective project, its changing contours towards individualisation, and the implications of this for the viability of the Hadiya migration project.

D. Feyissa (B)

M. Zeleke

F. Gebresenbet Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
College of Law and Governance, Ethiopian Institute of Peace, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
Centre for Human Rights, Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
We provide ethnographic examples to substantiate our arguments. These relate to four moments in the migration process: the onset of Hadiya migration to South Africa as a collective project through a prophecy and the associated sacred imagination of South Africa as the promised land; the intensification of migration as a collective project expressed in the form of an elite-managed historical project of catching up; the role of social networks in building not only individual but also collective capabilities and the erosion of the collective nature and increasing individualisation of the Hadiya migration project under the influence of success in accumulating material wealth and associated greed. We argue that exclusive categorisation of migration as either individualist or collective at any given moment in time is a simplification of reality, suggesting that we should instead conceptualise migration as being located on a continuum with the two options taking extreme ends.

Moreover, the nature of migration could oscillate from one end to the other (and back) across time due to the influence of different factors. Migration should be viewed as a complex social change process during which the nature of the migration experience itself changes. In making this argument, we want to highlight the collectivist side of migration as a better approach to understand southern realities. However, while arguing for a greater engagement with migration as a collective project we reject a dichotomy between the individual and collective dimensions of the migration process and argue for a continuum within which the relative dominance of one or the other component varies over time.

This chapter is based on the findings of research undertaken as part of the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub1 focusing on the Ethiopia–South Africa corridor. Various qualitative research methods were used to generate the data used in this chapter: from key informant and indepth interviews to life histories, focus group discussions, and document analysis. Fieldwork was carried out at various times from 2019 to 2022 in Addis Ababa, and Hadiya Administrative Zone in southern Ethiopia focusing on four emigration localities: Hosanna, Jajura, Fonqo and Shashogo. The chapter is also based on limited phone interviews with Hadiya migrants in South Africa and online sources of information.

The chapter is organised in five major sections. The first section situates the chapter within the main theoretical frameworks in migration studies, making a case for the need to go beyond the prevailing individualist thrust. Section two discusses the genesis of Hadiya migration to South Africa, which is part of the wider Ethiopia–South Africa migration corridor. Section three examines how Hadiya migration to South Africa as a collective project. It consists of two sub-sections. The first of these focuses on how the Hadiya have built collective capabilities by drawing on religious resources—from sacred imagination of South Africa as a promised land to spiritual negotiation of risks throughout the journey, to place making at destinations. Second, is the role of social networks in creating collective migration capabilities, evident in covering the cost of migration and mutual support mechanisms throughout the journey and in the process of settlement and adaptation at the destination. Section four discusses shifts in Hadiya migration project from collective to increasingly individualist orientation, abetted by greed and the capitalist logic that underpins material accumulation, and leading to the unravelling of the supportive social institutions as free riding and competition set in. As greed is taking precedence over the public good, Hadiya society is now going through a reflexive moment as migration is increasingly turning from a "blessing" into a "curse". We conclude by making a case for a greater engagement with migration as a collective project especially in the context of the Global South. However, in doing so, we should take the collective and the individualist in migration processes as a continuum, not as binaries.

#### **Conceptual Framework—Beyond the Individualist Thrust in Migration Studies**

The existing literature on migration can be grouped into two three main approaches, all with an emphasis on individuals as their unit of analysis albeit with some differences in terms of how far they engage with migration as a collective project. These are functionalism, historical structuralism and the aspiration-capability framework (ACF). Functionalism conceptualises migration as a rational choice that an individual makes after evaluating its socio-economic costs and benefits in order to access more secure sources of income and a wider pool of opportunities (see Hagen-Zanker, 2008; de Haas, 2021). It has the merit of bringing migrants' agency forward but provides an oversimplified version of the messiness of human nature (Feyissa et al., forthcoming; Mazzilli et al., this volume). Not only does this approach describe human beings as rational actors, but also locates them in an environment where all choices are equally possible, individuals have access to perfect information and are not embedded in structures of power other than the market (Arango, 2000; Massey et al., 1998). Functionalism acknowledges migrants' agency, but looks at just a narrow portion of the dynamics at play in the world, including how migrants' agency is situated within a collective imagination of the good life; creation of aspiration and construction of capabilities.

Historical-structuralism, by contrast, focuses on structure rather than agency, depicting migration as the result of socio-economic inequalities between individuals and states (de Haas, 2021). De Haas (2021) highlights how historical-structuralism conceives migration as an irrational process that migrants get into because of distorted information or because they are drawn into it by an exploitative macro-structure. Although this approach pays attention to the power structures individuals are embedded in—be they economic, political, class or gender—historical-structuralism conceptualises migrants as responding as these forces dictate, leaving little space for agency. For instance, it does not explain either why migrants retain agency even under difficult conditions, nor why individuals facing the same structural constraints react to them in different ways. Overall, historical-structuralism acknowledges that migrants can be constrained by multiple powers but portrays them as reacting to overbearing structures rather than agents. Like functionalism, it does not pay attention to the "collective self " which individual migrants tap into and mobilise to negotiate and muddle through the multiple constraints they face throughout the migration process.

Building on the works of Carling, de Haas (2021 but see also his earlier works) developed the ACF, which is widely considered as the state of the art in migration studies. Although ACF engages with the collective dimension of migration much more than functionalism and historical-structuralism, and it has a stronger liberal-individualist thrust as well in its understanding of both aspiration and capability. The individualist thrust in ASF's understanding of aspiration is very much reflected in the choice of agency as a central concept, while the conception of capability by Amartya Sen, whose work de Haas builds on, is also critiqued for similar biases (Gore, 1997; Robeyns, 2007; Uyan-Semerci, 2007). A liberal individualist orientation, in its atomic sense, often avows that "people are autonomous and self-contained individuals, whose rights are prior to and independent of any conception of the common good" (Howlowchak, 2006, 20). An individual liberalist framing accents that an individual is autonomous and hence cannot and shouldn't be harried by community interests. When community interests are highlighted, they are often relegated as instrumental, non-intrinsic positions (see various sources cited in Ibrahim, 2021). The ACF takes the aspiration as well as capability to migrate as a personal trait, ignoring that sending communities could aspire and collaborate in designing and effecting migration decisions over a certain period. When it comes to human rights discourse in relation to mobility, the ACF adopts Berlin's (1969) understanding of negative and positive freedoms as a "structure".

While de Hass (2021) essentially views migration as an individual project with aspirations and capabilities built by the individual and the returns being primarily individual too, he does not ignore the need to pay attention to the role of other factors such as culture, education and exposure to media in shaping people's preferences and notions of the "good life", personal life aspirations and more. These other collective factors however are not viewed as having intrinsic value. This chapter challenges the exclusive individualist thrust in migration studies from a Southern perspective and asks if migrationrelated decisions are really only individual. Through a case study of Hadiya migration to South Africa, we argue that relationships mattered more prominently in earlier phases of the migration processes, with later increasing importance of individualism.

As will be shown through our case study of Hadiya migrants to South Africa, the decision-making process is highly informed by local Hadiya values of communalism. Communalism in African values is partly centred on the "duties" of the individual to the "community" (Nagengast, 2015), in contrast to Berlin's position. Cobbah (1987) alludes that in the African worldview, individual rights are often balanced against the requirements of the group and individual group solidarity and collective responsibility. The African notion of family seeks a vindication of the communal well-being. In other words, the starting point is not the individual but the whole group. Such a "holist approach starts with social relationships and sees the individuals as not an independent being but rather as a one whose whole nature is constituted by the character of the social relationships in which he stands: African communalism is more than a mere life style. It is a worldview" (Cobbah, 1987, 324).

#### **The Making of the Ethiopia–South Africa Migration Corridor**

As one of the strongest economies on the continent, South Africa is among the major destination countries for migrants moving within Africa. Close to three million migrants resided in South Africa in 2020 (UN DESA, 2020). Ethiopians are among the most significant of these migrant populations, with estimates varying between 250,000 by Cooper and Esser (2018) and Yordanos (2018), and IOM (2021) stating that between 200,000 and 300,000 new Ethiopians arriving in South Africa between 2016 and 2018 alone. According to a report by the South African Department of Home Affairs (2015), Ethiopia is ranked as the second of the top 15 migrant sending countries. These Ethiopians make a smaller share of the estimated more than three million Ethiopians living abroad (Girmachew, 2019). Ethiopian migration to southern destinations has primarily been directed to the Gulf, Kenya and the Sudan. Starting from the 1990s and increasing since the 2000s, South Africa has emerged as another major southern destination.

Ethiopian migrants' journey to South Africa is perilous, involving the crossing of state borders of as many as six countries covering close to 5000 km.2 The journey follows different routes involving different modes of transport: air, water and land. The few migrants affording the high-priced means of migration take a direct flight from Addis Ababa to Johannesburg but most combine bus, boat and foot to cross-transit countries. Typically, the land route from Ethiopia to South Africa starts in Kenya and then passes through Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique/Zimbabwe to South Africa. Many migrants have perished in transit countries. A recent IOM study (2021) notes that more than 7000 Ethiopian migrants have died or gone missing on irregular migration routes between 2012 and 2020.

Most Ethiopian migrants in South Africa are engaged in the informal retail trade running shops predominantly in Jeppe, the Ethiopian commercial enclave in Johannesburg, and in the nearby townships, popularly known as "locations" (Zack & Yordanos, 2016). Some of the migrants are well established, evident in the growing remittances they send to support families and the investments they have made in small and large-scale businesses. Successful migrants send collective remittances to Ethiopia supporting churches and local and national development projects.

Although the Ethiopian migrants in South Africa come from all over the country, most are from southern Ethiopia, particularly from the Hadiya– Kembata area. A report of Hadiya Zone Human Resource and Social Affairs department (quoted in Fikreab & Asrat, 2020, 10) estimated that 61,148 Hadiya youth migrated to South Africa between 2013 and 2018. A survey by Tsedeke and Ayele (2017, 3) found that nearly 40% of households in Hadiya–Kembata have at least one international migrant. Hadiya migration to South Africa is barely over two decades old but it has already left major imprints on the social fabric greatly defining the conception of the good life. This migration trajectory has been enabled by collective efforts throughout the various stages of the migration process—from the making of aspiration, decision-making, the journey, in the process of settlement and the decision to come back as well as in the pattern of migrants' investment.

## **Hadiya Migration to South Africa as a Collective Project**

#### **Hadiya Migration to South Africa as an Enactment of a Divine Script**

One of the central social events which is deeply implicated in the process of Hadiya migration to South Africa, especially during the formative stage, is a prophecy delivered by a Canadian pastor, Peter Youngrin, who came to Hosanna in 2001. Below is the excerpt of the prophecy as told by many research participants which is intimately implicated in migration processes:

I have a message from God to deliver to you. I saw God opening a new southern route for Hadiya. From now onwards you will see a constant flow of people; people work hard and prosper; that they will bring blessing to Hosanna and to Ethiopia more broadly. Hosanna town will be transformed beyond recognition; the time will come when three wheeled cars will fill the streets of Hosanna …. God will allow movement of people; one which will bring prosperity. (Focus group discussion with church leaders, Hosanna, December 2019)

The key message of the prophecy is how God opened a "southern door" for the Hadiya through which prosperity would come. In effect this is a prophecy which "sacralises" and endorses migration as God-sanctioned and as God's redemptive plan for the Hadiya. Pastor Youngrin did not directly say "go to South Africa", he rather prophesised the onset of a large-scale migration of Hadiya and their socioeconomic transformation. For the Hadiya, God used the Pastor as a conduit to bless them as a people and their journey. To lend the prophecy plausibility, Pastor Youngrin said "you would soon see signs". For the Hadiya, it did not take long before they started seeing the signs of the prophecy working, i.e., the onset of a massive migration of Hadiya to South Africa, which is to the South of Ethiopia anyway.

Large-scale Hadiya migration to South Africa has a strong spiritual dimension situated within the prophetic tradition of evangelical Christianity. This is linked with migration processes at various levels—from decision-making, migratory agency, and pre-departure farewells, to sense making at destinations. The prophecy operates collectively. For one thing, it is a prophecy for the Hadiya as people, not individual Hadiya. The Hadiya also claim a collective agency for the prophecy, that it is God answering Hadiya's mothers' intense prayer to help them overcome the social and economic deprivations and lack of peace, as the prophecy coincided with a major drought and political persecution of the Hadiya youth by the ruling party for supporting an opposition party. It is also construed as an affirmation of God's favour of the Hadiya as "committed" Christians, which aligns well with Hadiya's selfunderstanding as an avant guard of Protestantism in Southern Ethiopia, and Ethiopia more broadly. The following narrative by a Hadiya migrant indicates how aspiration is shaped by the prophecy and its invocation to negotiate and mitigate the risks of the journey to South Africa:

Imagine, the journey from Hadiya to South Africa involves crossing more than five or six countries and is perilous in which many people might die. Notwithstanding the risks, the main news in Hadiya became "*geba"* [he has entered South Africa without much difficulty]. Not long after someone announced that he would travel to South Africa, we would hear *geba*. The blessing made the journey a lot easier than one would have expected. I left in 2004, three years after Peter came. I was a student at that time. I talked to my friends about the idea of going to South Africa. They all readily agreed. When we decided to travel it felt as if we were already in South Africa. I remember the enthusiasm and the confidence we had. We never thought of the risks we might encounter during the journey and the language difficulties we might encounter. In fact, it felt like as if we were moving from one house to another within Hadiya". (Pastor Birhanu, Wengel Amagnoch Church based in Johannesburg, interviewed in Addis Ababa, November 8, 2020)

The spiritual aspect of Hadiya migration to South Africa is very instructive. It plays out in decision-making and motivation, instancing "confidence without caution" as one of the problems of "believing" and the lack of even hesitation, as mentioned in the aforementioned narrative. Of course, the spiritual aspect also affects and fosters such things as resilience: when things are not going well, people feel the strength to persevere and are arguably better placed to cope with adversity. As Levitt (2007) alludes, the transnational lives of migrants are inextricably linked to spirituality whereby religious leaders and centres of worship are part of the multi-layered webs of connections.

In a video message that they sent to friends and relatives in Hosanna, a group of Hadiya migrants detained in transit by Tanzanian authorities and returned by IOM appeared joyful, singing loud Gospel songs with a mood of defiance mentioning it is not a question of if but when they will go back to South Africa with the help of God. Prospective migrants in Hosanna on the other hand were busy buying gospel songs with strong migration content. An example of this would be one which explicitly mentions major hurdles on transit countries such as the Tete bridge on the Zambezi River (also called Samora Michel bridge) along the border between Mozambique and South Africa where hundreds of Ethiopian migrants perished while trying to cross through suffocating containers and other hazardous means. Here we see belief or the prophecy helping migrants manage the risks involved during migration.

More recently, this prophetic tradition has given way to more individualised prophecies. Hadiya evangelical prophets now divine the future for prospective migrants featuring as migration counsellors—further delivering God's favour at a more individual level for the service for which they get material rewards. These local prophets not only tell prospective migrants when to migrate and how, but they also persuade the parents of prospective migrants who are in the family to have a better prospect of success both during the journey as well as in the process of settlement. They also communicate with the relatives of prospective migrants in South Africa convincing them that it is worth investing in sponsoring a particular prospective migrant whose migration project is ordained by God, hence ensuring "value for money". In some instances, the prophets cum migration counsellors advise prospective migrants to drop their plan to migrate. The following story from a stayee in Hosanna throws light onto how decision-making is shaped by a prophetic tradition:

I contemplated to migrate to South Africa when I reached grade 10, when most Hadiya youth consider it to be the right migration age. I was good at school but not sure whether I would pass the national examination. Like many of my peers I visited a local prophet in Shashogo who divined my future. She told me that my future lies here in Ethiopia, not South Africa. I went to South Africa in case I would not score a good grade. I was a bit skeptical about the prophecy but my uncle who brought me to South Africa insisted that I should go back home concerned that I might not succeed in South Africa as this would be against the will of God. It turned out that I scored the highest grade, came back and joined university. With a privilege of hindsight, I now say that her prophecy is a correct prediction of my future and good that I heeded her advice (interviewed in May 2021).

This suggests that the role the local prophets play goes beyond a mere "counselling" service and spiritual providence as they also act as spiritual entrepreneurs/mediators between migrant family members and the prospective migrants. A major dimension of the flow in the Ethiopia–South Africa corridor is also pastors and their transnational spiritual engagement with the migrants. Their sermons are increasingly filled with migration-related content, including conveying the good news for some, mentioning that they are here in South Africa to stay while advising others to go back home as soon as possible. In so doing they are being conduits of a divine message. As such, decision-making in the process of Hadiya migration to South Africa is not fully comprehensible unless we thoroughly engage with the spirituality of migration, which is above all communal. The decision to migrate or to stay operates at the collective level, in this case within the cultural repertoire of a community such as belief systems. The spiritual frame of reference for Hadiya migration to South Africa goes even deeper, as migrants and their families reflect on Hadiya migration to South Africa in relational terms situating it within the broader historically shaped regional inequality between the "core North" and "peripheral South" in the context of state formation in Ethiopia both in political representation and national wealth allocation. Historically, Hadiya belong to Ethiopia's periphery and migration to South Africa is understood as a means to renegotiate this regional inequality (see the following sub-section). In so doing the Hadiya attribute an "inherent link" between peoples of the periphery and their greater representation in South–South migration:

How come that Amharas, Tigres and Oromos [people of the core regions] are not migrating to South Africa as much as the Hadiya and other Southerners do [people of the periphery]? Their oversight is not accidental. God has blinded them of this opportunity protecting it for us. Had they known about the opportunities in South Africa they would have taken up all the opportunities. They are everywhere. Many Ethiopians in Europe, the US and Canada are Amharas, Tigreans and Oromos. They have money, knowledge, and wider social network. And yet we [the Hadiya and other peoples from Southern Ethiopia] managed to make it to South Africa despite our apparent lack of skill and political networks. This is because God awakened us (*aberalin).* (Interview with a returnee businessman, Hosanna, February 4, 2021)

The word *aberalin* used here refers to a collective self, that God is now engaging Hadiya as a people, not individually, by opening a southern route through which prosperity comes. In this sacred narrative, Hadiya migration to South Africa features as a quintessential future-making project at the societal level displacing other avenues of socio-economic mobility.

#### **Social Networks and Collective Capability**

Hadiya migration to South Africa has been enabled by various forms of social networks and institutions both in places of origin and at destination. Although there are cases of individuals entirely paying for the cost of their migration, in most cases fundraising involves not only the nuclear but

also the extended family, friends and neighbours. In fact, in some instances, families decide and prioritise who in the family should migrate and when. This depends on comparative advantages prioritising children who are more enterprising. In other instances, parents impose the migration agenda on a recalcitrant child counting on the life transformational role of migration, an instance of the intrinsic value of migration. The following story of Simba and Solomon from Queenstown, Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, demonstrates how friendship networks contribute to the building of migrants' capability, informed by the ethic of reciprocity:

Solomon and I are not blood relatives but close friends from the same village. …. We both failed the national school leaving examination [and] felt so ashamed that we did not dare to go home that day. Instead, we wept and slept on the street. That was the day I decided to migrate to South Africa. I had a good prospect of migrating to South Africa because I had relatives there. I promised my friend that if and when I migrate to South Africa, he would be the first person that I will take. The hope of going to South Africa made us forget our sorrow. My relatives pledged to contribute 25 cows to help me pay for the migration. But none of it was materialised. Instead, Solomon's father stepped in. He sold his only ox and gave it to me hoping that I would take his son to South Africa. As I promised, Solomon was the first person I brought to South Africa, even before my brothers". (Queenstown, August 2022)3

The collective nature of Hadiya migration continues throughout the journey. In most cases, Hadiya migrate to South Africa in a group so that they support each other in times of needs. By contrast, most Ethiopian migrants, especially those from Addis Ababa, migrate individually and the exigencies of the journey rather force them to construct social relatedness impromptu, which is much more fragile than Hadiya migrants who travel in groups with a robust social relatedness. A returnee migrant from Addis Ababa recounted his experience during the journey as follows:

I was alone during the journey. The day I bid farewell to my younger brother to the US I was on the move to South Africa. In Moyale I met another migrant from Addis who was also alone. We made an oath to support each other until we reach South Africa and even there. Although we parted company in South Africa, the mutual support was critical in sustaining us throughout the journey. (interviewed in Addis Ababa, December 2022)

Apart from migrants themselves as networks, there are various intermediate, self-sustaining structures. This includes the "migration industry", which involves brokers and smugglers who have an interest in, and tend to facilitate, the continuation of migration (see also Hones et al., this volume). The migration industry in the Ethiopia–South Africa corridor is based on access to information and trust given the higher risks associated with the journey. The Hadiya are fairly represented in the brokerage industry who closely cooperate with the Somali, Kenyan and Eritrean smugglers further linked with various intermediaries in southern African countries. The movement is typically organised directly from Hosanna or Nairobi. Access to the quality (effective) brokerage is very important in the Ethiopia–South Africa migration corridor which is increasingly securitised by the Ethiopian government because many of the migrants are "irregular migrants" vulnerable to manipulation by "human traffickers". Aspirant migrants have a clear preference for transnationally connected local brokers who are more trusted. Fekadu, Deshingkar and Tekalign have noted that migration brokers in Hadiya are positively signified (affectionately called *beri kefach*/door openers) and brokerage is considered as socio-culturally embedded business because:

Migration brokers live among the community, they worship with the community, and their children go to the same school as the children from the local community. Migration to South Africa is a long journey with a high risk of being intercepted and deported. Thus, for potential migrants using the services of a broker with whom they share multiple relationships, and whom they believe will respect the local values and norms, is a strategy to reduce risks. Brokers will work hard and use their own money to mitigate migration failures as these impacts on their reputation (Adugna et al., 2019, 17).

This is very different from the view of brokers as "human traffickers" by government and international development actors. There are many cases in which brokers paid back the brokerage fee for a failed migration project. Being Hadiya is thus already a social capital allowing differential access to effective and "responsible" brokerage service. Using a religious analogy, some research participants even recast the brokers as Moses who would guide the journey to "the promised land", i.e., South Africa: "As the Prophet Muse transitioned the Israelites from wandering in the wilderness to the Promised Land, so did the brokers bring us to South Africa".4 That many of Hadiya migrants have little or no formal education make it difficult for them to comprehend how brokerage really works imbuing it with a mystic dimension: "We didn't know anything about where South Africa is and how to get there. I was a kind of person who would get lost even from one village to another in Hadiya. Tell me, isn't it then a miracle that I managed to reach South Africa. And that was possible thanks to the brokers".5 Reflecting this, a female broker based in Kenya was considered as a matron, reputed for her brokerage service with a humane face. Her migrants' shelter in the border town of Gambo in Kenya had a place for worship, clean accommodation and good food to migrants, at times even slaughtering ox to make the migrants feel comfortable and prepare for the strenuous journey.

Hadiya have also adapted their cultural institutions and established new ones at destination places to build their individual and collective capabilities. *Iqub* and *idir* are some of these institutions which play an important role in the process of adaptation and in running their businesses. *Iqub* is a traditional rotating saving association and *idir* is a funeral association. Although these associations are used by most Ethiopian migrants, it is the Hadiya and other migrants from southern Ethiopia who use them most extensively, partly because of their wider social networks. They share not only a "southern" identity, collectively referred to by Ethiopian migrants from other parts of Ethiopia as *ye Hosanna lijoch* ("sons of Hosanna"), particularly referring to Hadiya and migrants from the neighbouring Kembatta. The Hadiya and Kembatta have managed to transcend their traditional hostility in Ethiopia,6 and instead expanded the mutually beneficial social network that partly enabled them to carve out a particular business niche. The *Hosanna lijoch* focused on the location business, initially delivering commodities from door to door in townships and villages currently upgraded into Tuck Shops and Spazas. Hadiya migrants have also immersed in other types of social relationships and obligations, some are newly minted in response to the imperatives of life at destination. Social occasions such as wedding, birth, migrants' welcoming (*qibela*) and sending off (*shignit* ) parties are also fundraising moments; part of which is used to pay for the migration to relatives. A striking feature of Hadiya migrants in South Africa, as corroborated by migrants from other parts of Ethiopia, is how a Hadiya would drive thousands of kilometres to attend a wedding or funeral. On average for a social occasion that cost 40,000 Rand the host would gather up to 40,000 Rand. So far, the highest contribution for a Hadiya migrant sending-off party was 450,000 Rand. The returnee migrant used this money to set up a business upon return to Hosanna.

A new social institution that has been invented by Ethiopian migrants in South Africa is a labour arrangement between established migrants (called *boss*) and new arrivals (*borders*). As he expands his business, a *boss* would need a partner to open additional shops in remote places. A *border* is given the goods on credit with an agreed upon amount of profit for the *boss*.A *boss*  is usually based in bigger cities such as Joburg but smaller *bosses* operate from smaller towns. A *boss* supplies the *border* through truck. Usually, a *boss* hires a driver but when the transaction is higher himself distributes the goods. This contractual relation works entirely based on trust. Thus, a Hadiya *boss* prefers to work with a Hadiya *border*. A returnee migrant from Addis Ababa laments the competitive advantage of *ye Hosanna lijoch border* as compared with other Ethiopian migrants as follows:

*Ye Hosanna lijoch* get to work soon after their arrival because a Hadiya or Kembatta boss want to work with people from their regions. They trust them and give them goods worth 30,000 Rand. This is a lot of money for a starter. It will take a longer time for migrants from Addis to reach that level. Hadiya migrants know each other or know their clans and families. This allows them to trust each other. The *boss*/*border* arrangement works if people are related as it is based on a high level of trust. The *boss* also does not consider this as a competition because the more their business expand the more trusted people they need. (interviewed in Addis Ababa, December 17, 2022)

As these examples demonstrate, individual Hadiya migrants' agency is situated within these self-help associations and symbiotic labour relations, shedding light on how migration capability is built through a collective effort.

## **Processes of Individualisation of the Hadiya Migration Project**

Hadiya migrants in South Africa have benefitted from the high profit margins of the businesses they engage in, the social support and financial saving schemes which help new arrivals to stand on their feet, and the higher value of the Rand in the late 2000s and early 2010s. This newly acquired wealth was re-invested in changing business lines from door-to-door selling of commodities (i.e., "location" business) to *spaza* shops.

The same period also witnessed increasing financial remittances sent back home from South Africa. What started as remittances for household consumption evolved towards heavy investment in the transport sector (public, as well as freight) before the land speculation bonanza. This speculative land market since 2015 was free riding the local economy, to the detriment of many peri-urban farmers and increasing corruption in the governance structure. In South Africa, increasing wealth also led to higher involvement of Hadiya migrants in criminal activities, often by tipping information to others who will do the actual robbing and at times joining the gang groups in South Africa.

Thus, material success in South Africa came at the cost of eroding the very basis for the success of Hadiya migrants, i.e., the collective conception of the whole migration enterprise. Perhaps the absence of an institutional setup to direct the newfound wealth into more productive and socially useful ends led to the spiralling of dispossessive engagements with peri-urban farmers, which primarily benefits land speculators (mainly migrants), politicians, and land brokers. The zonal administration is represented as more of a bureaucratic hurdle to migrant investors than facilitators, among others the demand for bribes at different stages. We now have many cases of siblings quarrelling and fighting over wealth, and elders resolving such disputes with payments of handsome service fees. The trust in pastors and individual prayers and prophecies is dwindling also, as religious officials are suspected of being corrupt and becoming more oriented towards material success than deeper religious teachings.

The blessing inscribed in the prophecy is now also considered as a curse in the context of increasing violence that involves homicide in the destination country and rising living costs and corruption in places of origin. While commenting on these processes of excessive individualisation, a research participant surmised: "migration has mutated from being a *bereket* [blessing]' into *mergemt* [curse]". Still, the individualisation of the migration project and its social cost is interpreted through the overarching spiritual scheme of interpretation, i.e., how individuals "abused" the blessing to individually advance at the expense of the collective good, leading to God withdrawing his favour from the Hadiya, as noted by a research participant from the Mekaneyesus Church in Hosanna:

Not all migrants have responded to God's gift in a responsible manner. Some have behaved and made good use of the blessing – they changed themselves and their family, as prophesised by Peter. However, some abused the blessing – engaged in violence, extra marital affairs, divorce etc. It seems as if God has withdrawn His favour so much so that brothers started killing each other in South Africa". (interviewed in Hosanna, December 2019)

The emergence of predatory local prophets called *ye festal agelgayoch*, i.e., amateur door-to-door spiritual service providers, throws further light onto the moral decay that surrounds the migration project. Unlike in earlier times when the blessing of church leaders was sought after, *ye festal agelgayoch* are now operating more as schemers than interpreters of God's will. Emboldened by the claim to a privileged access to divine knowledge, they extort money from the families of prospective migrants making the journey appear riskfree as long as it is endorsed by them and without adequate preparation by families.

The shift from the collective to unilateral migration decision-making by the youth is yet another instance of the individualisation of the migration project. Previously migration was a consultative process—who was prioritised to migrate was decided based on who is in a better position to contribute to the family good. There were even instances where parents would impose migration on an unruly child. Now, the material success of some of the migrants has fuelled an aspiration with a sense of immediacy—children putting pressure on parents and even blackmailing them to sell their assets and pay for their migration. There is also an increase in unilateral decisions: the youth steal initial capital that takes them up to the border with Kenya and then inform parents—changing the facts on the ground leaving and their parents with no option than paying for the migration regardless of their economic conditions.

The greed and the individualisation of the Hadiya migration project have had a corrosive impact on their collective capabilities. Brokers have become more exploitative, no longer operating under a moral framework as they did previously. In fact, some of the brokers extort money from migrant families twice: to send them to South Africa and from detention camps especially in Tanzania. Detained migrants have two options: either accept a three or fouryear prison sentence or to pay 200,000 birr to be deported back to Ethiopia. Migrant families who can afford to pay brokers to bring them back home. Meanwhile, the supportive institutions that the Hadiya either elaborated on and built responding to the imperatives of migration are currently unravelling. The *boss–border* relations, for example, are turning more exploitative; the *borders* increasingly resent the much higher profit margin of their respective *bosses*. Conniving with South African brokers, some of the *bosses* are also involved in abducting *borders* (especially new arrivals without sponsors). A *boss* demands the money that he pays to the brokers once the *border* starts earning. Or he demands work for free until the service amounts to the money he paid (a form of indentured labour). The feeling of being exploited, and working under dangerous working conditions in shops in the townships has generated social tension, not just between a *boss* and a *border* in South Africa but also in places of origin as *bosses* and *borders* are caught in webs of transnational social relations. This tension in some instances resulted in the form of violence, a *boss* or a *border* conniving with South African criminal groups involving robbing or even killing. The competition over business turfs between *bosses* is also turning violent. This has a spillover effect on the viability of the mutual support institutions such as *iqub*. Resenting the business success of a fellow *iqub* member, some migrants would tip information to criminals when he receives and where he hides the *iqub* money. As undocumented migrants, the Hadiya put their money at home or in the shops until they remit it to families in Ethiopia through the hawala system. This has turned what was previously an asset into a liability, i.e., receiving *iqub* money creates a moment of vulnerability. There are also now free riders faking deaths in places of origin in order to collect the *idir* money.

Overall, there is an increase in migrants involvement in crime and migranton-migrant violence ranging from robbery to homicide. This has severely affected the quality of inter-personal relations. An example of this would be the souring of the bond between Simba and Solomon that we cited in the previous section. Solomon got involved in crime, robbing his fellowmen in concert with South African criminal elements. In a migrant community trial in Queenstown, Simba testified against his close friend for violating community norms in the following manner:

The bible says "Take no part in the worthless deeds of evil and darkness; instead, expose them". I am very much disappointed to find out that Solomon is involved in crime. I was also robbed of my newly bought shop for 150,000 Rand. I do not know the identity of my robbers. I asked Solomon to work with me as a shareholder. He refused. I did not know that he was a thief. It was the Kunusten [sic Queenstown ] community which helped me raise 450,000 Rand and helped me get back to business and bring my wife. Solomon borrowed from three persons and finally he took a thief with him to rob them. He ate *iqub* and run away. We need to name and shame people like Solomon regardless of our close relationships. (Queenstown, August 2022, https://fb.watch/ iZWte1lcQX/)

During our research, many Hadiya returnee migrants mentioned that in fact robbing migrant businesses in South Africa was first started and encouraged by Ethiopian migrants. This is evident in the language South African robbers used to justify their act as a matter of entitlement. Initially, they would say "give me my coca" while demanding money from a shop owner but now they say "give me my *iqub* money"; adding that South Africans would not know about *iqub* money if they were not told by Ethiopians themselves. The capitalist logic and the greed that it underpins have currently undermined migration as a collective project among the Hadiya; one of the critical factors for their thriving and flourishing in South Africa despite the multiple challenges they have faced.

The changing contours of migration away from the positives and more towards the negative has induced a collective reflexive moment, around whether Hadiya migration to South Africa could ultimately become a liability given the pervasive and fragile rentier local economy, negative educational and agricultural outcomes and a looming social conflict engendered by the speculative land market unless these problems are mitigated by a visionary leadership that enhance the developmental potential of migration.

However, despite increasing individualisation and the dangers with which it is associated, all is not lost. There are some migrants and returnees who are still committed and are working towards the collective project of improving the lot of the Hadiya. This is primarily expressed in the form of investment in productive sectors in Hadiya Zone (e.g., commercial farms or dairy farms), despite the lack of cooperation and bureaucratic hurdles, risks the business model comes with, and the lower profit margins compared to speculative land investments. Moreover, there are attempts to bring in technology and insights from South Africa to improve productivity as well. All this is to ensure food security, restore Hadiya pride as self-sufficient and demonstrate to others that agriculture is a profitable sector to engage in.

## **Conclusion**

An important factor for the success of South–South migration (as well as South–North migration in some cases) is the collective nature of migration. This collective worldview is not merely instrumental, but intrinsic to local cultures and social life. As we have argued in this chapter, this is ignored by the three dominant theories in migration studies: functionalism, historical structuralism and the aspiration—capability framework. As developed by de Haas, ACF very much takes an ahistorical assessment of migration, while the reality is that, as the Hadiya case study demonstrated, the nature of migration (i.e., location on the individual-collective continuum) changes across time with differing consequences to the migration process and its outcome.

As demonstrated in the discussion in the various sections of the chapter, the secret of Hadiya migrants' success in South Africa is large because of their collective imagination, imbued with a sense of social responsibility and mutual support as well as the urge to catch up with neighbours through the new affordances of migration. Now, their collective wellbeing is being undermined by the growing individualisation of the migration process, both in place of origin and at destination. In place of origin, this includes the emergence of a robust rentier local economy in Hadiya Zone at the top of which we find local government officials who live off the migration rent resulting in a very weak and corrupt public sector juxtaposed with a thriving private sector, a unique case in the context of Ethiopia. This rentier economy is undermining the viability of Hadiya society, not least the private sector from which its rents come in the first place. A key component of the private sector are migrants and their businesses. While the local political leadership, and the public sector more broadly, is responsive to the demands of private businesses which themselves are rent seekers it is very obstructive of the businesses set up by some visionary migrants who go out of their way to serve the public good. The Hadiya need to regain their collective imagination of migration as a public good going forward, otherwise to use their religious language, the blessing of migration will rapidly turn into a curse in which migration is increasingly devoid of its developmental potential.

At the place of destination, the increasing individualisation of the Hadiya migration project has weakened the hitherto mutual support of social institutions while labour relations between senior and more recent migrants have become more exploitative. Combined with the stiff competition over migrants' commercial spaces, the material turn in the Hadiya migration project has generated tension and conflict, including a rising homicide rate among Hadiya migrants in South Africa. The individualisation of the collective Hadiya migration project is resulting from a multitude of factors including, but not limited to, material gain and success. While paying attention to the changing nature of the "individualist-collectivist continuum" across time and space, we underscore two key points. First, one should not in any way over essentialise the trend as a complete shift from collective to individualistic one. Secondly, we need to clearly indicate that we approach the shift as an ongoing process and that we will not rule out the possibility of a return to a collective outlook.

**Acknowledgements** This work has been undertaken as part of the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub. Funded by the UKRI Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) (Grant Reference: ES/S007415/1), MIDEQ unpacks the complex and multi-dimensional relationships between migration and inequality in the context of the Global South. More at www.mideq.org.

#### **Notes**

### **References**

Osmani, & M. Qizilbash (Eds.), *The Cambridge handbook of the capability approach* (pp. 206–226). Cambridge University Press.

**Open Access** This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

# **11**

# **Migration and Inequality in the Burkina Faso–Côte d'Ivoire corridor**

**Bonayi Hubert Dabiré and Kando Amédée Soumahoro**

## **Introduction**

Burkina Faso is a landlocked Sahelian country with low income and limited natural resources. With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020 of USD 16.1 billion for a population of more than 20 million inhabitants growing at a rate of 2.9% per year (RGPH, 2019), Burkina Faso falls into the category of least developed countries (LDCs). It has a GDP/capita of around USD 768.8 compared to an average of USD 1,566.3 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

International migrants leaving Burkina Faso in 2019 chose several destinations, mainly in Africa, and particularly West Africa, which indicates that migration to the ECOWAS countries is the most important. By contrast, Europe receives only 2.6% of Burkina Faso's migrants (see also Setrana and Yaro, this volume). Most migratory movements outside the country are directed to Côte d'Ivoire, which accounted for 61.1% of migrants in 2019 (RGPH, 2019). The eight West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries alone account for more than 75% of recent migrants leaving Burkina Faso. The two other essential destinations after Côte d'Ivoire

B. H. Dabiré (B)

Université Joseph Ki-Zerbo, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
K. A. Soumahoro University Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire e-mail<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
are Mali and Ghana, respectively, 12.5 and 8.6% (RGPH, 2019). The observation that can be made is that while the Burkinabè migrate internationally, most settle in neighbouring countries.

Indeed, migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire constitutes one of the largest migration flows in the world. In the 2019 census, it was found that 6 out of 10 residents have already migrated outside the country (RGPH5, 2019). People from the poorest rural areas of Burkina Faso migrate to Côte d'Ivoire for work, a journey that is facilitated by free movement and low costs. Child labour and trafficking are also common, especially in the cocoa plantations.

Despite the various disruptions observed in the Burkinabe migration space—associated with the internal mining boom within Burkina Faso and political and economic crises in Côte d'Ivoire—this major migration trend persists, even if some premises of change are emerging. Migration movements out of the country over the last five years preceding the 2019 census (RGPH, 2019) are male-dominated, with 85% of men compared to 15% of women, i.e., five times more men than women. As for migrants to Burkina Faso, in 2019, 90% of them were Burkinabè. Most of these migrants come from Côte d'Ivoire (86%), with the rest coming mainly from countries bordering Burkina Faso (RGPH, 2006, 2019). Only 10% of immigrants are non-Burkinabé. Thus, international migration (in and out) is dominated by Burkinabè.

This chapter discusses the inequalities associated with migration in the Burkina Faso–Côte d'Ivoire corridor based on a literature review and data from a survey conducted in 2020 as part of research undertaken by the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub.1 The chapter begins by explaining the historical context of Burkinabè migration to Côte d'Ivoire, as well as specific characteristics of this migration, such as the main reasons, types and forms. It then discusses the different inequalities linked to this migration in both countries including those associated with gender and childhood.

<sup>1</sup> The Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) Hub unpacks the complex and multidimensional relationships between migration and inequality in the context of the Global South. More at www.mideq.org

### **Historical Background of Migration Between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire**

Numerous factors have been put forward—including historical, social, demographic and economic factors—to explain the migration of Burkinabè. Historically, colonisation was a critical factor in triggering international migration, especially the numerical importance of the phenomenon and its orientation towards Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly, 1978; Piché et al., 1981, 1996). The magnitude of the migration of Burkinabe to Côte d'Ivoire is closely tied to the establishment of a system that, from the beginning of colonisation, tied Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) to Côte d'Ivoire.

The literature on Burkinabè emigration shows that colonisation was the main factor that triggered the major international migration flows to Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly, 1986; Cordell et al., 1996; Deniel, 1968; Fynn Bruey and Crawley, this volume). This process has three main phases, each triggering a different flow type. The first was a period of conquest and pacification, the establishment of a colonial administration and the development of some local infrastructure, including roads and administrative buildings. To achieve this, the colonisers instituted a system of forced labour and taxes. The population's reaction was to "flee" before the invader (Suret-Canale, 1964; Piché et al., 1981), and these movements generally took place over short distances into the country's interior areas that were inaccessible to the colonisers. Some of these movements were also made in Ghana, with the dual objective of escaping the invader and avoiding the sums demanded by the administration.

The second phase began in 1921 with the law's adoption of the colonies' development. Indeed, in the logic of the vast colonial project, the colonies formed a whole where each one should play a role according to its natural potential. In French West Africa (AOF), "the Mossi Plateau (Upper Volta) is the most densely populated area, and according to the division of labour assigned to each colony, this country was designated as a provider of labour for work in the other colonies, particularly Côte d'Ivoire" (Coulibaly & Vaugelade, 1981, 84). It should be noted that the colony of Upper Volta, created in 1919, was abolished in 1932, and a large part of it was attached to Côte d'Ivoire. The purpose of this abolition and the attachment of a large part of the former Upper Volta to Côte d'Ivoire was to direct the migration of Burkinabè towards the Ivorian plantations. In contrast, traditionally, the Voltaic people migrated towards the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) (Deniel, 1968). Thus, from the first years of the inter-war period, the Voltaics constituted the majority of agricultural workers on the plantations of the Lower Côte d'Ivoire.

The third phase began in 1947. After the abolition of forced labour in 1946 and the reconstitution of Upper Volta in 1947 within its current borders, the migration movement became voluntary and increased as a result of the establishment by the Ivorian planters of the Syndicat Interprofessionnel pour l'Acheminement de la Main-d'œuvre (SIAMO), a private structure for the recruitment of Burkinabe workers. According to Raymond Deniel (1968), from the 1950s onwards, approximately 20,000 people from Burkina Faso entered Côte d'Ivoire each year through these structures.

Data from the 1960/61 demographic survey indicate how Côte d'Ivoire, which was not initially the top country of emigration, gradually replaced Ghana as the source of labour. These statistics show that during the suppression of the Upper Volta, the reversal of flows took place to the detriment of Ghana (Fig. 11.1).

It can be seen from Fig. 11.1 that before 1932, migration to Côte d'Ivoire was very marginal. From 1947 onwards, Côte d'Ivoire became the leading destination for Burkinabe migrants. It was between 1932 and 1947 that the reversal occurred. It was precisely then that the Upper Volta was suppressed and that a large part of the country—notably the Mossi Plateau—was attached to Côte d'Ivoire. On the eve of independence, Voltaic emigration was exclusively to Côte d'Ivoire. Stopping the migration of Voltaic people to Ghana and redirecting them to Côte d'Ivoire was a constant concern of the colonial authorities. The dislocation of the colony of Upper Volta in 1932 and the attachment of its most populous part (the Mossi Plateau) to Côte d'Ivoire were part of this strategy (Coulibaly, 1986; Deniel, 1968).

**Fig. 11.1** Evolution of international migration from Upper Volta, 1919–1960

It should be noted that during the colonial period, Burkinabe migration to Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire was essentially a forced movement, especially in the period between 1919 and 1946. Indeed, during the colonial period, migration to Côte d'Ivoire involved the deportation of Burkinabè workers to Ivorian plantations (Suret-Canale, 1964). Even those who went to Ghana were essentially fugitives from the colonial invasion. Forced labour, the system of exploitation of the significant concessions held by private companies in Côte d'Ivoire, the major infrastructure works undertaken by the coloniser, conscription into the army, especially during the world wars, the "voluntary" system, and the forced recruitment of workers led to a massive emigration of Burkinabe to neighbouring countries, mainly Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (Coulibaly, 1986; Songré, 1972). The abolition of forced labour recruitment in 1946 (Babacar Fall, 1993) ended the forced migration of Burkinabè workers to Côte d'Ivoire and opened up an era of voluntary migration (Piché & Cordell, 2015).

#### **Factors and Characteristics of Burkinabe Migration After Independence**

If colonisation is one of the primary contexts that has driven the migration dynamics towards Côte d'Ivoire, other economic, social, demographic and even political factors contribute towards maintaining, perpetuating and amplifying this migration.

After independence, Ivorian migration policy was, for a long time, very liberal, and the president of the period, Félix Houphouet-Boigny, pronounced on several occasions that foreign migrants were welcome. In addition to this favourable predisposition of the Ivorian authorities to migration, the underdevelopment situation of Burkina Faso must be emphasised. With a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.452 and ranked 182nd out of 189 countries (UNDP, 2020), Burkina Faso is considered one of the poorest countries in the West African sub-region. As noted above, Burkina Faso is a landlocked Sahelian country, where nearly 90% of the population lives from agriculture (PNDES, 2016). However, this agriculture is dependent on the vagaries of rainfall. It cannot meet the population's needs, forcing it to migrate as part of a livelihood strategy.

Moreover, agriculture as the main, if not exclusive, activity in rural Burkina Faso, is also a subsistence activity that occupies farmers for only five to six months of the year (when the rainy season lasts). Thus, the sole recourse to agriculture to ensure the substance of household members is increasingly risky: not only is there very high variability in rural household incomes from one year to the next, but there are also fluctuations in market prices over which the farmers have no control (Marchal, 1985). This situation is identified in the literature as the main reason for the migration of Burkinabè to Côte d'Ivoire.

Drought periods, which lead to a deficit in cereal production, are also associated with outward migration. Boutillier et al. (1977) and Vaugelade (1991) establish a positive correlation between drought years and high migration periods. The authors show that intense emigration movements follow years of poor harvests. However, other authors (Coulibaly, 1980), based on a national survey conducted in 1980, believe that while the drought factor must be considered, its effects are localised and not generalised. In other words, while droughts and poor harvests are specific causes of emigration, their effects are not systematic and depend on the locality.

Other cultural factors as drivers of migration are mentioned in the literature. These include production and power relations and mechanisms for achieving economic and residential independence within Burkinabe social units, particularly among the Mossi. For several authors (e.g., Deniel, 1968; Capron & Kohler, 1976; Boutillier, 1975), the hierarchical structure of Mossi society, characterised by the domination of the younger generation by the older, is one of the main causes of migration. Thus, "this predominantly authoritarian/autocratic society attributes political, ritual and social means to the older generation, and allows the younger generation to be held in long-term dependence" (Boutillier, 1975, 155). Moreover, the accession to independence of young people follows a long and complex process. It is during this long period of dependence that the young person chooses to migrate. Migration is the search for individual autonomy, the struggle of the individual to escape from a social system in which he feels exploited, or in any case in which he does not have direct and personal access to the fruits of his labour (Ancey, 1983; Boutillier et al., 1977, 1985). It is in response to these forms of domination that young people choose to migrate as a way of acquiring their autonomy.

It is also often mentioned in the literature on the causes of migration in Upper Volta that migration is considered by society or even used by society as a "rite of passage" (Coulibaly, 1980, 65). To migrate to Côte d'Ivoire is to show courage. Very often, the migrant is presented as someone who has braved the unknown and the dangers with which migration is associated. This image is partly due to the period of compulsory recruitment under colonisation and the flight to Ghana, where migrating was a courageous act. Thus, migration would be "a rite of passage" by which the young person affirms his courage and bravery: one does not become an adult until one has made one's first migration (Deniel, 1968). People who have never migrated are often mocked by young people, especially young girls (Kohler, 1972).

It should be noted that at the domestic level, the policy of the Burkinabè authorities has been to encourage emigration, counting on remittances from migrants to boost the economy. Conventions on migration were signed with Côte d'Ivoire (March 9, 1960), Mali (September 30, 1969) and Gabon (August 13, 1973) to provide security for Burkinabè migrants and to organise their remittances to Burkina Faso. For example, in the convention with Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso was to provide quotas of migrants at the request of the Ivorian planters, and in return, a portion of the migrant's wages was to be paid directly to Burkina Faso into a fund created for this purpose.

#### **Migration Strategies**

The migration observed between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire after independence (1900–1975) was essentially circular (Cordell et al., 1996). Indeed, migrants who leave for Côte d'Ivoire do not aim to settle there: migration strategies are family-based, and migrants who go to Côte d'Ivoire aim to resolve their situation and help their household in Burkina Faso. In addition, the migratory movements between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire are back and forth: a migrant's project from the outset includes their return. However, as time goes by and more and more opportunities become available to migrants, some end up settling. This is especially true of successful migrants, those who have obtained large plantations or large and successful businesses. It is also the case of first-time migrants who have previously settled in western Côte d'Ivoire and who have seen their status change from sharecroppers or workers to owners of farms, which allows them to invest in their country of origin, a situation that allows them to maintain regular contact with Burkina Faso. Thus, while the circular aspect remains an important characteristic of Burkinabè international migration, it must be recognised that more and more migrants are settling abroad on a longer-term basis, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire since 1975 (Ouédraogo and Piché, 2007).

However, what marks the migration exchanges between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire today is the importance of return migration, particularly after the Tabou events in 1999.2 Although the return movement began in the 1970s (Piché & Cordell, 2015), it gained momentum in the 1990s. Indeed,

<sup>2</sup> In November 1999, in Tabou, 400 km from Abidjan, a dispute between an indigenous planter and a Burkinabè national degenerated into a full-blown community conflict that led to the sudden departure of more than 10,000, mostly Burkinabè, to their country of origin.

the fairly recurrent clashes between Burkinabè migrants and Ivorians accelerated the return movement from the 1990s with the Tabou events of 1999, the 2002 rebellion and the 2010 post-election crisis.

## **Overview of Inequalities Linked to Burkinabè Migration**

Traditionally, Burkinabè migrants leave the rural areas for Côte d'Ivoire (Dennis et al., 1996). Poverty, the search for an income, the degradation of agricultural land and the lack of prospects for salaried employment in rural areas have convinced Burkinabè to continue to look outside the country for ways to earn a living and support their families back home (Marchal, 1975). In other words, it is generally the poorest who migrate. However, migration has economic and social costs that are not affordable for everyone. Migration requires more effort to mobilise financial or human resources and to mobilise family social networks. The poorest often borrow money to finance their migration, forcing them to work during the first months of their migration to repay the loan. Those with a network (of relatives and friends) already established in Côte d'Ivoire have a definite advantage over those without.

To make their emigration to Côte d'Ivoire possible, Burkina Faso migrants mainly mobilise their family and friend relationships. This social capital (family and friends) is crucial in migration. Consequently, those who do not have it will have more difficulty or less chance of migrating. This means that there are inequalities in the opportunity to migrate.

#### **Gender Inequalities in Migration**

If men's migration is perceived as usual, even natural, this is not the case for women's migration. Although the situation is beginning to change, reticence or pejorative apprehensions about women's migration are still prevalent. Compared to men, the negative perception associated with women migrating alone reflects the social norms determining what a woman can or should do. According to the opinions collected during the field surveys of MIDEQ, women should not expose themselves to adventures like men. Indeed, in the eyes of Burkinabè society, it is inconceivable that a woman should migrate alone. The social justifications are that women are fragile and more vulnerable to the difficulties and vicissitudes of migration. Worse, it is thought that women are weak enough to succumb to prostitution as a profession or as a last resort since they are not supposed to be able to do the hard physical work in the plantation fields, which is what constitutes the real financial manna of Burkinabè migrants in Côte d'Ivoire:

As for the migration of women, I find that it is not at all normal because the majority of them migrate to go and work as prostitutes. If a woman migrates, she has no strength. What kind of work will she do there? She cannot work on a plantation, or anything if it is not to sell herself, and that money is dirty. (Interview with a 45-year-old head of household, a farmer in the Southwest)

For a long time in Burkina Faso, female migrants were almost exclusively women who accompanied or joined their husbands in Côte d'Ivoire. The difficult migration conditions during the colonial period associated with forced migration, as outlined above, contributed to the marginalisation of women in migration.

#### **Inequalities Related to Childhood**

Differences in the treatment of children in Burkina Faso can be observed between the biological children of the household and those who are not, such as children whose parents have left for migration. These inequalities related to childhood are generally observed at the level of schooling. Studies conducted in Burkina Faso as part of the MIDEQ Hub show that left-behind children have a higher enrollment rate than children whose parents have not migrated. One inequality these left-behind children face is access and retention in school. On the other hand, the biological children of the household are enrolled in the best-quality schools. This may be because parents who migrate to Côte d'Ivoire and have more resources send money to send their children to school to stay in Burkina Faso, which host households must do. Nonetheless host households favour their biological children by sending them to the best schools.

## **Remittances and Skills Transfers of Burkinabè Migrants**

An analysis by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography based on data from three series of surveys on household living conditions conducted in Burkina Faso shows that the higher the proportion of migrants in a household, the higher its standard of living and the higher its secondary school attendance rate. Thus, migration is a factor in reducing poverty.

These migrants who make money transfers to their households of origin allow the latter to improve their living conditions (BCEAO, 2011). As a result, the issue of cash transfers has become central to discussions on development and the reduction of poverty and inequality. According to the BCEAO (2011), in 2011, Burkina Faso received 96.5 billion CFA francs in remittances from migrants, 31% of which came from Côte d'Ivoire. According to data from the Harmonized Survey on Household Living Conditions (EHCVM, 2018) carried out in 2018 by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography, these remittances amounted to 81 billion CFA francs, 45% of which came from Côte d'Ivoire. Although this was a decrease compared to 2011, it is clear that remittances are significant in volume and mostly come from Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, remittance figures are generally thought to be underestimated because of the lack of control over remittance channels.

These cash transfers contribute to poverty reduction, particularly in rural areas, because, even if there is a tendency to use the transfers in productive sectors, a large part is destined for migrant households for current consumption (food, health, education) and certain expenses, sometimes of a prestigious nature (weddings, funerals, etc.). According to the 2014 Continuous Multisectoral Survey results, the main reason for transfers is family support (88.8%), which shows that transfers are mainly aimed at fighting poverty in rural households. In Sub-Saharan Africa, migrant transfers, by increasing the disposable income of recipient households, have an impact on reducing poverty and inequality, as the work of Gupta et al. (2007) has shown. Remittances thus reduce inequalities at the household level by allowing the poor households to reduce income gaps. Households that receive remittances are envied because they have a safety valve that allows them to cope with difficult situations. These households appear to be privileged, often living the lifestyle of city dwellers.

The preponderance of households with migratory experience to be able to borrow money in case of emergency can be explained by the household's negotiating capacity, but also and above all by the relational capital available to households with migrant members. In addition, migrant households are slightly more likely to be able to find a loan in case of need compared to nonmigrant households (Marc et al., 2022). This is because having someone who has migrated is a guarantee of financial capacity and repayment compared to other households.

It is important to note that migrants do not only transfer money: they also transfer skills acquired during migration, occasional or permanent returns to Burkina Faso. One idea developed in the literature is that return migrants are carriers of innovation in the rural areas to which they return after a stay in Côte d'Ivoire (Dabiré, 2017; OECD, 2017). Indeed, these migrants have acquired skills they use once they return to their country of origin. For example, research by the OECD (2017) in Burkina Faso showed that households with returning migrants are more likely to invest in agricultural assets than households without returning migrants. In addition, households with return migrants are more likely to manage a non-farm business than those without return migrants (OECD, 2017). Thus, thanks to their skills acquired in Côte d'Ivoire, migrants innovate and modernise rural work.