The commonist-stigmergic inclusive coordination of needs must rest on rich, qualitative information. Global, open information enables the individual to participate where needs can be satisfed in a better way than anywhere else. Comprehensive signs allow for a complex mediation of needs. The logic of the signs does not aim at valorisation but at the satisfaction of needs. Commonist stigmergy allows for a design of the conditions according to our needs and does not put us under the pressure of an abstract logic. It does not organise the societal process but creates the conditions for societal self-organisation. It allows for an indirect selfregulation and self-selection on the basis of the needs of all people. Thus, local activity is inclusive and need-oriented: it unfolds on the basis of everybody's needs. Stigmergy is the foundation for an emergent, coherent, integrated outcome in a society with the highest possible satisfaction of needs.

Societal coordination does not materialise merely at the interpersonal level, even though interpersonal cooperation is its basis. Commonism does not give transpersonal relationships an interpersonal shape, for example, in the forms of central planning or hierarchical council systems (cf. Chap. 6, 3.1). On the contrary, commonist-stigmergic mediation is designed for the transpersonal level of large and diverse systems—like overall societal mediation—rather than for small interpersonal units. Based on the *law of large numbers,* the analogous *stigmergic law* was coined for the transpersonal level: "If a suffcient number of people and commons is provided, there will be a person or commons for each job that needs to be done" (Meretz 2015, 2017, 2018).2 Such a "law" can unfold if the two conditions we mentioned above are met: the voluntary choice of activity (self-selection) and the collective disposal of action conditions.

#### *3.4 Changeability and Ex-ante Mediation*

In the market an *ex-post* (in retrospect) mediation of needs and production takes place. Businesses produce; whether there is suffcient demand for the quality and amount of their products will be revealed in the selling process (with the exception of trade between businesses, where there are also prior arrangements). In commonism this arrangement will take place *ex ante* (in advance). Production and preservation are based on anticipated needs. In the market that place is flled by price signals, experience and market research. In commonism, re/production is preceded by a stigmergic and possibly confictual communication on needs.

Many problems can be solved before a confict arises. For example, a coordination commons for buildings might communicate to a steelproducing commons that a school and a kindergarten should be built in its region. If the steel-producing commons fnds enough people and resources to cover the requirements, there is no confict to begin with. This clearly shows that, contrary to the ideology of economic sciences, shortage is not a natural phenomenon but a socially fabricated one. If our needs are the foundation of production\*, many conficts regarding resources will not arise at all given that the shortage will have already been overcome in the production\* process. For us it is diffcult to conceptualise a world with less scarcity, because in our capitalist world scarcity is the precondition for economic activity. We continually witness an enormous abundance of consumption means restricted by property and money. We simply cannot afford them. In commonism there are also limitations. However, they are not the result of an abstract principle but the consequence of natural conditions, and we decide how to use them. They are designable.

2 Stigmergic law is based on the *Linus law*, which Eric Raymond dedicated to Linus Torvalds, the inventor of the Linux-kernel, and refers to the accuracy of open-source software: "given enough eyeballs (checking the programme code), all bugs are shallow" (Raymond 1999). Both stigmergic and Linus law go back to the *law of large numbers*. This claims that when the number of events (e.g., coin toss) increases, a target value (e.g., the expectation that half of the results will be "heads") is approximated. In the case of stigmergic law, the variety of individual desires to act corresponds to the *events*, and compliance to the abundance of societal tasks that must be fulflled corresponds to the *target value*.

#### *3.5 Conficts in the Inclusive Society*

The term confict already gives us the creeps, and justifably so. In an exclusion society a confict of needs means I must try and defend my needs, protect and enforce them. Now the heat is on: it is "I/we against the others". And I must be strong for that. Confict means the existence of different, conficting needs at a given moment. Confict management, therefore, amounts to the mediation of needs; this is not something negative, least of all when the mediation of needs can assume the form of exploring and better understanding needs.

Conficts are not a side issue or a nuisance in commonism. Commonism will be the frst society in which we will have the time and possibility to actually settle conficts. It will not be possible to simply enforce specifc needs through the use of instruments of domination—whether economic, social or political—they will have to be negotiated with others. As different needs that can be in confict with each other at a given moment also imply different goals (of action), conficts can lead to decisions on the prioritisation of goals. The discussion on goals, and particularly on their prioritisation, is central in a free society, because a free society means being able to consciously set and defne one's goals.

Maybe a thought experiment can clarify the position of conficts. Let us assume commonism is working. Societal re/production can cover many needs, and the people produce their life conditions according to their needs on a daily basis. Sign-based coordination suffces for the "normal functioning". However, society changes, either due to new needs or due to new ideas on re/production, environmental issues or other impulses. Some changes cause no frictions, there are no conficts of needs and society changes. Other changes cause a confict of needs. While large parts of society function as usual, in other parts decisions are pending. These conficts draw attention.

Technical means could possibly allow for a general adjustment and prioritising of needs—for example, via an algorithmic decision-making procedure (cf. Heidenreich 2017). However, we assume that in many cases the complexity of need mediation requires the conscious participation of people. This conscious arrangement will take place within interpersonal, direct relationships. We will meet in many different hubs and commons projects to make decisions: steel for the kindergarten or the school, space for nature or houses, how to use the house with a sea view? Not all those affected by the decisions will be present, but all those who wish to be can do so. Do the needs of the absent then tend to be overheard?

Of course, that is a real danger, but the form of mediation does not encourage the neglect or conscious ignoring of needs. For the confict mediators, it works much better to include the needs of others, for it makes their recommended solutions more robust and signifcant. It will convince more people and motivate them to contribute to their implementation (cf. self-selection). If a confict-management solution does nothing but directly enforce isolated, individual needs, it is likely to only convince a small number of people. The people will not embrace the decisions of the procedure, they will try to change the procedure itself, or turn to a new hub for a different solution. The main point is that confictmanagement hubs have no instruments of domination to impose their decisions on other people. The confict resolution cannot be enforced, it must convince. Their power is "social power, rooted in the capacity to mobilize people for cooperative, voluntary collective actions" (Wright 2011, p. 20).

Concrete agents could try to carry out exclusive actions; this, however, would put them in a quandary. A steel distributing commons that for short-sighted reasons—for example, because it makes their life easier often applies non-inclusive actions could be faced with the problem of a steel-producing commons or logistic commons denying cooperation. People participate in this commons because it is important to them, because here they can satisfy their needs. If their cooperation commons repeatedly obstructs this satisfaction of needs, they have good reasons to look for a better cooperation partner. Therefore, the obvious choice for the concrete actors is to include many needs, for their cooperation partners will be inclined to further their cooperation.

There can be domination in commonism. But people have good reasons not to submit to these attempts at securing domination, given that there are no instruments of societal domination to support such attempts. I have nothing at my disposal to force other people to do what I want. If the streets are dirty or copper mining is poisonous, we cannot simply pay wage-earners in precarious situations to perform these jobs. We must organise things in a way that people will evaluate and experience their respective activities as important enough to carry them out. Therefore, copper mining will possibly have to be automatised at great expense, as we value the health of the people involved. It is an effort that is not proftable on the market but one which we consider is worth the cost.

A commons not able to solve the confict will try to organise the mediation of needs in a different way. For that purpose, for example, it may be useful to extend the confict and have more people get consciously involved. It is very likely that there will be people with a passion for confict mediation, experts that can be invited. Many things are possible, but one thing is for sure: there is no court of last resort that will ultimately decide on the confict. That would require an institution of *separated generality*, for example, a state or council, located beyond mediation. This, however, would be a centre of power, an instrument of power that can become a means of domination. Conficts will have to be settled by the people involved themselves. If they cannot settle the matter, nothing will be set in motion. The decision lies on those practically acting. No higher authority will be able to make the decision for them.

# *3.6 Embedded Generality*

Most emancipatory utopias assume a separated institution of generality. Whether they call it state or something else is irrelevant. Elected representatives, volunteers or councils are supposed to assemble in these separate institutions to make decisions. We believe that such a separated institution entails a limitation of freedom for a lot of people. It will only be able to operate in a meaningful way if equipped with instruments of domination to enforce decisions. Even if it enforces the "objectively best" decisions, it must get past individual wills, thus suppressing and commanding them. Applying instruments of domination is not necessary but possible and, therefore, encouraged. These instruments of domination lead to a hierarchical structure of societal relations. People are not required to include the needs of others in their decisions; they can ignore them. We are afraid that such an "institution of separate generality" entails further negative dynamics.

First, there is an impulse for justifcation. An institution of separate generality must regard and justify its decisions as generally correct; otherwise it would not try to enforce them. In consequence, its decisions do not refect the subjective considerations of fallible individuals and must, rather, be presented as objective and generally correct. They have to be the best solution for the problems. This urge for justifcation we know too well from the pretended objectivity of real-socialist party rule, which outright claimed "The party is always right".3 The particular opinion of some is elevated to become the "true" opinion of the general public. The opinions and needs of the "losers" are disqualifed. A "separate generality" always enforces the general at the expense of the particular.

Secondly, there is a tendency towards expansion. An institution of generality tends to usurp and to centralise processes of self-organisation in the resolution of conficts. The parties to the confict are less and less able to fnd a solution and are increasingly tempted to use the institution of generality and its power to enforce their needs. This is no ill will; it is reasonable. If there is an option of powerful enforcement, it obviously makes sense to use it in order to get a quick and clear decision. Thus, we assume, conficts become increasingly institutionalised, in turn increasing the power and importance of the institution. Although there is hope the institution might only intervene in truly important cases of confict, we are afraid its expansion is obvious. And where does its limit lie? Which conficts should be out of bounds for this institution? When more than ten people are involved? When it refers to a confict within a project itself? Here too we fear that the decision-making power of the institution will expand, and it will fnally produce a complicated body of laws, similar to that of the capitalist state.

As long as voluntariness is guaranteed, the institution cannot force anyone into activities. However, the restriction of exclusion via collective disposal is substantially hampered by allowing the institution to decide on the use of some of the material, symbolic and social means. Even if the institution does not "possess" them, decision-making powers lead to partial domination. In addition, this institution requires a sanctioning power with which to threaten or implement. In capitalism, as in real socialism, these decision-making and sanctioning powers are the state's prerogative, with its monopoly on the use of force.

Instead of the forceful implementation of "objective" decisions, in commonism, generally speaking, those recommendations will prevail which can best mediate different needs in an inclusive manner. In our view, this will lead to the rejection of a general institution as well as of a

3The "*Song of the Party*" (German: Das Lied der Partei), also known as "*Die Partei hat immer recht*" (The Party is always right) was the party song of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, SED, the ruling party of East Germany, used as a hymn of praise. It was written by German Bohemian composer Louis Fürnberg (1909–1957). It is best known by the frst line of its chorus: "*Die Partei, die Partei, die hat immer recht*" (The Party, the Party, is always right).

central societal organisation. Generality is not manufactured in a separate institution, but it is the product of many decentralised decisions and actions or, in other words, it is the product of polycentric institutions and of the multiplicity of commons. It is an emerging phenomenon. There is no societal mechanism enforcing a logic upon us. We ourselves settle need-related conficts and make decisions while being active. The emerging spread-out generality has not been completely designed and, still, it expresses our needs. It has not been consciously planned, and yet it is the result of conscious acts of self-determined positioning and confict management. It has no life separated from people's actions but is embedded in them. It is the lively expression of individual-societal self-organisation.

# *Council Communism and Its Criticism*

Council communists are the anarchists of communism. They want an institution of central planning, but their representatives should be "no politicians, no government. They are messengers, carrying and interchanging the opinions, the intentions, the will of the groups of workers" (Pannekoek 1942). Councils are no government, and the council institution is no state because it lacks the essential element of a state: the power to enforce a decision.  For they have no means to impose their will upon the masses; they have no instruments of power. All social power is vested in the hands of the workers themselves" (ibid.). But why do the workers follow their decisions? "What enforces the accomplishment of the decisions of the councils is their moral authority. But moral authority in such a society has a more stringent power than any command or constraint from a government" (ibid.). This is the utopia of real democracy, real representation. The central councils reach perfect decisions: they take most needs and most information into account and reach the most inclusive decision. This sounds good, but it is highly idealistic.

Councils were not theoretically envisioned, but arose from selforganisation in factories, social movements and so on. In factories, workers realised that it would be too time-consuming to discuss and decide everything in the general assembly. Therefore, they organised themselves in small groups which would send one or two delegate(s) to the central council meeting. The delegates were controlled by the group and usually groups could constantly vote out their delegates; sometimes, delegates even had an imperative mandate. Delegates with an imperative mandate have very limited decision power and are bound to the will of the group they represent. Within socialist revolutions, such as the November revolution in Germany and the October revolution in Russia, councils formed and were scaled up. Socialists used council democracy not only in factories and districts but in whole production chains and, fnally, on the national level. But with the scaling up of council democracy serious problems arise, which historically barely became visible, because council democracy was usually destroyed by authoritarian powers such as the Bolsheviks.

We sympathise with council communism, as it is one of the most important antiauthoritarian strands of communism, but we are critical of its worldwide implementation because council democracy tends to form a state-like institution. Council communists think the best way to do societal planning is by centralisation and an institution of generality. We do not have enough space for an elaborated discussion, but we want to point out some problems.

First, delegates become socially a government. Whereas delegates on lower hierarchical levels may still fnd time to do other things, delegates on higher levels must specialise in planning, evaluating information, decisionmaking and confict resolution. Despite refection and openness, a certain culture and entrenched routines facilitate access for certain groups and milieus and make it diffcult for others. But how do the "sick, physically or cognitively impaired, sad, small, old, dying, dreamy people" (Lutosch 2021) gain access? Formalised rules and representation may help, but cannot grant equal access. Independent forms of decision-making may be increasingly conceived by most people as relieving and effcient, but they undermine the idea of self-government (cf. Demirovič2009, p. 196).

Secondly, delegates may become politically a government. The political centralisation and hierarchy of council democracy encourages delegates to treat their electing councils as voters. The higher councils certainly (and rightly) have their own ideas and concepts, and they will try to persuade their electing councils with the largest amount of information and knowledge. This is not a human faw but, rather, something reasonable; they simply spend more time pondering on and discussing up-scaled conficts. Deselection power may make it more complicated for council delegates to become politicians, but it cannot stop it. An imperative mandate destroys the desired centralisation and concentration of information and (decisionmaking) power, because the lowest councils would have to understand up-scaled conficts and decision as much as the councils working at the highest aggregated levels. Frequently, delegates will not perceive their actions as political-instrumental; they will speak of "best solutions" and "practical constraints" and unconsciously treat their delegating councils as voters. A high moral integrity and social awareness may shield them, but unconscious power mechanisms and possibilities to use power are in place.

Thirdly, the tendency to usurp and centralise processes of selforganisation has already been mentioned. This leads to an implicit state logic. The council institution concentrates a lot of power and access to resources and therefore has ample opportunities to present its decisions as the best and most inclusive options. If re/producers are dissatisfed, they have no real alternative, but can only try to change the council's plans, which in turn increases their power. Ultimately, the council's plans have no alternative and are therefore enforced de facto—although not de jure. Finally, there is the threat of the real seizure of executive power and the corresponding wage labour. The subjugation of social power to state power can happen gradually or abruptly.

Nevertheless, Pannekoek's ideals are pretty close to our own. It may even be possible to build an inclusive council organisation. We just deem it unlikely. Aggregation as a mono-institution reaches a tipping point where it becomes an obstacle to inclusive problem solving. This tipping point might be shifted by new social and technical means, but we think it will still be reached. In a larger picture, council communism may be understood outside its historical setting. Council communism emerged at the beginning of the Fordist revolution, and the ideas of centralisation, pyramid structure and strict hierarchy of the latter were a determinant factor; furthermore, the decentral communication tools that exist today were not available.

# *Communist Centralisation, Anarchist Decentralisation and Commonist Polycentricity*

That said, aggregation, centralisation and collective decision-making remain important in every utopia. Large factories, cities and cooperating factories may want to, or have to, reach collective decisions and use council democracy, sociocracy, other forms of collective decision-making or even a kind of parliamentary democracy. Utopia should open up the possibilities for many different ways of organisation. Another strand of antiauthoritarian socialism—anarchism—is deeply critical about centralisation and political hierarchy, and cherishes autonomy, decentralisation, and selfadministration. Many anarchist utopias imagine a decentralised and selfsuffcient re/production on the level of communes, with these communes building only loose federation and cooperation. However, these loose federations and low levels of division of labour may be just fne for peasantbased societies, but industrial and information societies need other practices of planning and coordination. Communists argue for centralisation, complex division of labour and global planning, which may lead to a state-like institution and new political hierarchy. On the other hand, anarchist decentralisation may lead to low levels of effciency and cooperation, particularity, and disintegration.

It is easy to see that both concepts have their strengths and weaknesses. One of them might be better than ours, but the frst problem is that these models are rarely developed—that is what we call for in this book: a development and discussion of utopias. Our model is a combination of anarchist and communist concepts called polycentric mediation. In polycentric mediation, aggregation, centralisation and collective decision-making are an important part of an overall decentralised mode of coordination. Centralisation can fexibly arise and weaken but will likely not accumulate in one central institution of planning and decision-making. Finally, we want to strengthen the notion that a free society is a place of many places. Voluntariness and collective disposal can manifest itself in many different ways. Maybe in south-east Asia people will plan and decide in a council communist way, whereas people in North America have better experiences with a more anarchist way of coordination.

#### *3.7 Planning and Polycentricity*

In commonism there will be *no central institution* mediating needs, providing infrastructures, or enabling self-organisation (cf. Chap. 6, 3.6). The basic preconditions for self-organisation—voluntariness and collective disposal—are transpersonal and general. Specifc conditions, however, must be built interpersonally; not by a central, general institution but by many polycentric institutions (cf. Carlisle and Gruby 2019). These metacommons address the diversity of needs. We assume they will be founded on many different levels. Some will help at the interpersonal level to solve conficts within commons or between commons. Some will observe and evaluate the transpersonal level; for example, a coordination-meta will collate the use of steel in a region, mediate it and, thus, identify conficting demands. Some will produce material, others social and symbolic infrastructure. An infrastructure commons planning the wastewater regulation for a town, an information commons gathering and facilitating

**Fig. 6.2** Illustration of a polycentric stigmergic mediation

information on worldwide wastewater regulation. Some conficts and decisions will concern a wider feld: "Do we want to build more schools or cultivate more strawberries?" But very few decisions will concern all of humanity. It could possibly be decisions such as "Do we want to put resources and efforts into a project taking us to Mars? Or do we prefer a project balancing out the climate?" Thus, the coordination and attainment of conditions will be located at many levels. Figure 6.2 illustrates an example of a polycentric stigmergic mediation.

Commons need each other. Commons "connect horizontally with similar enterprises, vertically with those who provide them with materials or use their products" (Pannekoek 1942). Therefore, they will rest on implicit or explicit cooperation. Explicit cooperation may be needed for specialised products such as ships or complicated machines. Thirty different commons producing steel, engines, and building ships may enter into an agreement to collectively produce 300 ships within the next six years. These contracts of sorts won't be enforced by a central state but by the commons themselves. If the steel commons fail to deliver on plan, the partners will frst try to help and include their needs. If this steel commons overestimates its production all the time, commons will only reluctantly cooperate or even end cooperation. Commons producing the same means—for example, alpine cheese—could form an institution to collectively distribute their products and plan their production. These institutions of aggregated decision-making may use different social means, such as representative democracy, sociocracy or council organisation. Commonist society will surely invent many more and better means. For all aggregated decision-making, the following holds true: these institutions will persist only as long as they are able to include the needs of their participating commons. If they cannot, single commons will leave, they will restructure or dissolve. In commonism aggregation is not the governing logic but a fexible possibility.

#### *3.8 Characteristics of Inclusive Conficts*

Conficts based on exclusion often lead to a rigid attitude. We have committed ourselves to this or that need—or opinion—and now must push it through. But such a confict rarely allows for a refection on my needs: where do they come from? Why are they important to me? What do the needs of others mean to me? On the contrary, an inclusive mediation of needs is not about defending myself against others, but about looking for the best solution within the context of a common effort. Therefore, conficts will always have a relating, investigating and clarifying character.

We often do not really know what we want. Conficts open up space for us to look into our needs. Also, my needs change when they become aware of the needs of others. For instance, the wish for a swimming pool might become less attractive when compared to the need for a new hospital. Such positive trade-offs are well known from times of crisis, when people depend on inclusive cooperation. In commonism we will try to collectively fnd out what we and others need.

There is another dynamic at play here. Inclusion also refers to problems occurring within the cooperation. If a commons distributing washing machines often gets late deliveries from a commons producing them, it can obviously try to establish cooperation with other commons producing washing machines to bypass the unreliable commons. Or it can try and get to the bottom of the late deliveries and organise some form of support for the failing commons. Maybe it does not communicate its resource requirements or lacks contributors. Cooperation does not have the form "if you can't deliver, I'll go somewhere else". In an inclusive cooperation there are good reasons to take an interest in others and support them in their problem-solving efforts.

Just because there is a need, it does not entail the right to its satisfaction. That would imply an abstract right. In a stigmergic process a multitude of needs can be signalled. At the beginning, nobody will decide which needs really count. Who may decide why they are important? All needs are reasonable. Mediation with other needs will reveal their priority. This makes it perfectly clear: not all needs can be satisfed at once. Nevertheless, there is no reason to disqualify certain needs due to abstract rules. Decisions regarding the satisfaction of signifed needs based on a stigmergic and communicative procedure aim primarily at establishing a sequence for the production\* of the relevant means. However, certain vital needs will obviously enjoy a high priority in production\*. Refraining from satisfying needs is also a societal option. Instead of further "chasing alien stars" we can also decide to "lie on the water and watch the sky peacefully" (Adorno 1980, p. 179, transl. M.R.).

Commonism is no harmonious paradise. It is the mediation of humanity with itself. Needs of utilisation are mediated with needs of production and preservation, and vice versa. We decide what we want to consume and how much we are willing to do for it—this is the very essence of free coordination. When the mediation of these needs is free from domination, we live in a free society.

# 4 Commonist Individuality

With society, the people themselves will change. They will develop different needs, different emotional states, different premises and different reasons. We will discuss some aspects of these assumed changes below. Certain consequences follow from our categorical considerations. We are navigating troubled waters and would like to invite you to fnd the correct course.

#### *4.1 Overcoming of Separateness*

In capitalist society it seems self-evident to experience oneself as a separate individual, harbouring private wishes and feelings, a particular history and identity. Economic sciences hypostasised this separateness in the ideal type of *homo economicus*—a person only maximising his/her egoistic interests. This idea of the human seems strange to us, considering how many times we include other people and their needs into our actions. It seems to indicate a certain rationality of market actors in the economy pointing towards exclusion, rather than a human characteristic.

Some scientists even claim that in many →precapitalist societies (p. 20) people did not experience themselves as individual beings (Merchant 1987; Bauer and Matis 1992). It was natural for them to think of themselves and of their needs as part of and in relation to their family, their tribe or other communities.

Capitalism leads us to believe that our needs are separated, that we can become happy in isolation from the happiness of others. Indeed, our needs are torn apart in capitalism. In capitalist reality I must satisfy my needs at the expense of others. The truth, however, is that our needs are related to each other. We experience this in interpersonal relationships, where we are better off when the people we care for are also well.4 This reference applies to our transpersonal relationships as well. In this case, the satisfaction of our needs refers to others in general. In radical terms: if another person, no matter who, a general other, is forced into labour or is forced to suppress his/her needs, the satisfaction of my needs is infringed. Why?

#### **"New human being"**

The focus of our theory is not on changing people but on changing societal conditions. Commonism does not demand that people be "conditioned" in a particular manner to be "empathic", "altruistic" or "new". There is no need for a re-education or adaptation; commonism should rather allow for the need-oriented collective unfolding of people. However, in transvolution the people will change in accordance with the new conditions of acting and living, they will develop new needs, get to know themselves better: "Walking we change the world and ourselves" (following the Zapatista slogan "Asking we walk").

In the exclusion society, the quality of the satisfaction of our needs is often hampered or feels dim or fat, for it is—generally speaking—instable and precarious. There are people who have good reasons to infringe on the satisfaction of my needs, just like the satisfaction of my needs occurs at their expense. If I limit the freedom of others, whether on purpose or not, it can be reasonable for them to limit my freedom and extend their freedom at my

4The intrusion of the logic of exclusion into our emotional life is refected in the fact that many people feel better if people they absolutely dislike are worse off.

expense. Thus, the productive dimension of our needs is damaged. We are usually not aware of this. We feel so separated from other people that we believe we could not harm others because there is no relationship between us. That is in fact a fallacy. We might not have any interpersonal relationship, but we are related to all people transpersonally. We could comprehend this idea, but most of the time we suppress or ignore it. Emotionally, this enforcement against others comes back as a feeling of threat, for each enforcement is an enforcement against oneself given that other people—for identical reasons—could answer my actions the same way. The satisfaction of my needs at the expense of the needs of others will always be contested at the expense of my needs elsewhere. This relation of mutual hostility is always also a relation of self-hostility (cf. p. 121). And vice versa: as our needs are fundamentally linked in society, my unlimited happiness requires others to be in the same position. I can only be free if we are all free.

In commonism, this dependency of our needs on the needs of all others is realised as a societal experience of connectedness, not of separateness. The relatedness no longer limits my needs, it is not something I try to ignore in order to intensify my satisfaction. It is realised as unconditioned inclusive relationship (cf. Chap. 5, 2.2), it is the basis of my actions. The material-symbolic conditions are in line with my inner psychic relatedness. Under inclusive conditions, it is benefcial for me to act out this relatedness and actually include the needs of others—thus satisfying my needs as well as those of others. As I can include others, I can include all of my needs. I cannot and need not assert myself against anybody and, therefore, neither against myself. As I can include others, I am being included. To attain this would be to reach a state of congruence between the materialsymbolic level of relatedness and the psychic level of relatedness. In both cases it is normal to include others. The consequences for the individual would soon become obvious. We would have less reasons to keep our distance from other people, to be afraid of them, to regard them as strangers. We would be less inclined to exclude them and, in turn, would be less excluded ourselves. We could develop trust, feel integrated and dependant without fear. Because this is what we are: societally, we depend on each other—not the concrete other but, societally, on the general other. This most defnitely coincides with a different self-perception. We are bound to not experience others and their needs as alien. We are bound to feel the concrete relatedness of needs as the emotional expression of relatedness, of solidarity. Nevertheless, individuality and diversity remain the basis of this relatedness.

#### *4.2 Overcoming of Community*

Many people despise the forced separateness and the constant pressure to prevail. Very often their response is the abstract opposite: a desire for community. They long for being part of something, being together, being with each other; for a community without fghting, without opposition, without exclusion; a community in line with our needs, even corresponding to each other. A wish for oneness emerges. For our needs to correspond in harmony, we can be different only inasmuch as everything fts together. Forced separation due to the logic of exclusion gives birth to its opposite: the melting down of differences. The guiding principle is harmony, the wish for a global harmony in which all needs are compatible and all people want the same—and are the same. For wanting the same implies being the same. Uniformity vaporises individuality. Individuality is only allowed inasmuch as it fts into the common. The wish aims at a disappearance of differences within the community. In a nutshell: "we are all one".

Harmonious community requires the subordination of the individual to the collective, of the particular to the general. A harmonious community is unimaginable without a limitation of the individual, without the reduction, curtailment and, ultimately, exclusion of those needs that are not in line with this harmony. This way harmony becomes exclusion. A harmonious community aims at a coexistence without rough edges, without conficts. While capitalism isolates and puts us up against each other, in the collective we are communalised and pressed together. Both states tell a truth about our needs: capitalism teaches us that our needs are different; the message of the community is that our needs are related to each other. Commonism aims at a relatedness in diversity, a collectivity grounded in individuality. Or, in the words of Bini Adamczak, "Satisfying forms of relation […] must include the option of difference and dissent, of aggression and crack. They must not be conceptualised as harmonious but as able to deal with confict, not as trouble-free but as squeaking-fickering" (2017, p. 274, transl. M.R.).

Inclusion is fundamentally impaired if it only aims at the inclusion of others. Inclusion demands the integration of one's own needs, getting to know them and standing by them. The inclusive society is not a society of self-sacrifcing altruists but one of individuals related to each other in an inclusive manner. Our needs are different, we are different. We are neither able to do away with this difference nor should we try to. At the same time, our needs refer to each other. We are neither able to do away with this reference nor should we try to. Our reference to each other derives from our difference and vice versa. In commonism, we can live out our difference on the basis of realised relatedness that becomes connectedness. In the inclusive society we truly relate to each other in a real and positive manner. We support each other while satisfying our own needs. To unfold my individuality, to develop our difference, is to support the individuality of other people. Some like to work in a steel mill, others like to keep the town clean. One is good at listening to others and helping them detect their needs, others like to raise awareness on conficts and settle them. In acting out and articulating our needs we support the satisfaction of the needs of others. Our individuality is no longer the wall blocking relatedness but the door that gives access to it.

#### *4.3 Overcoming of Ethics*

Ethical action5 means people doing the things they feel to be right. This is often done in contrast to societal conditions which encourage a different behaviour. Ethics seldom pursue self-interest because great importance is given to the interests of other people. Ethics overcome individual needs. In addition, ethics entail freedom. We would rarely think that a person behaving ethically is forced to include the needs of others. Ethics involves inclusion by free will.

There is another element in ethics. Ethical behaviour often involves consciously putting the needs of others above my own. Ethics reminds me to attach more importance to the needs of others than to mine. This behaviour has an important and self-evident prerequisite. The fact that preferring the needs of others involves limiting the satisfaction of my own needs implies the existence opposing needs. An inclusive ethic unconsciously implies conditions of exclusion. While the conditions in which the action takes place encourage the satisfaction of my needs at the expense of others, ethics demands that we position ourselves against these conditions and "think of others". Examples can be found in fair-trade-consumption, monetary donations, or self-sacrifcing for others. This element gives ethics a new meaning: it is represented as free inclusion under conditions of exclusion, as an acting against the conditions.

5As many people hold ethic in high esteem our criticism might naturally raise opposition. We are not rejecting ethic in general but certain notions often connected with ethics and moral. We also criticise the instrumental use of ethic as justifcation for action.

In an inclusive society, however, to act inclusively is not to sacrifce oneself anymore. Inclusive acting does not demand giving up one's own possibilities of satisfaction. Inclusive conditions encourage a way of satisfying my needs which allows for, or even extends, the satisfaction of the needs of others. Inclusion is not a limiting supplement, a form of resistance within exclusive normality but an everyday normality. Inclusion loses its ethical dimension. It does not have to exercise its power on people via ethical norms but is encouraged by countless conditions of action. But does this make inclusion a given? And are ethics not, in fact, a free decision to include others because I consider it important and not merely because the conditions encourage it?

When practicing ethical inclusion, I do so because my ethics tell me to hold other people in high regard. I include others because this seems important and correct to me. But, in reality, we remain disconnected. Maybe I feel better when helping others. This is even more so when I help people close to me, while the feeling diminishes when dealing with the general other. My withdrawal in favour of others will likely leave me with a better conscience than a higher satisfaction of my needs. In an inclusive society, I include others because we are actually related to each other. I am actually better off when I include others. Under inclusive conditions, I watch out for others because that is best for me and for others. Satisfying my needs is anxiety-free—and therefore most satisfying—only when it is not done at the expense of others. Generally speaking, commonism dissolves the contradiction between my needs and those of others. Crucially, difference and conficts remain, but I am actually better off if others are better off. While ethics assume the separateness of our needs—something that is produced societally in capitalism, in opposition to our relatedness commonism implements our actual relatedness.

Commonism overcomes ethics. The ethical self-sacrifce comes to an end because the inclusion of others does not demand foregoing one's own satisfaction of needs. The original ethical aim of the inclusion of others is kept alive and assumes a new form: the inclusion of others contains and secures my own inclusion. The ethical aim is realised in an unethical manner (cf. p. 204).

#### *4.4 Relationship to Nature*

The commonist society will most defnitely develop a new relationship with nature. We have already dealt with our "internal nature" as beings in need. We will no longer be forced to put aside our needs, to act against ourselves. I no longer have to overcome myself, subdue my "internal nature". "External nature", referring to other people, has also been dealt with in many ways. But what about our relation with the non-human external nature? How does that change in an inclusive society?

So far, we have only partially conceptualised this relation. We can be sure of one thing: in commonism we will have the option of not destroying our natural foundation. There is no "independent logic" anymore suggesting "cost reduction" through cost externalisation or "economisation" through production that harms the environment. We now have ample possibilities of sustainably using and protecting nature. We can dedicate more of our energy and better technology to practicing an ecological production and preservation in all of society. This, however, will also involve conficts. Some will advocate a strict sustainable regime demanding the use of limited resources exclusively in closed material cycles. Others might be willing to turn a blind eye on closed material cycles at the beginning and focus on developing the methods and techniques regarding ecological production. Ending "production for the sake of production" (Marx, 1890, p. 621) and the constant desire to extend sales opportunities will probably cause a fundamental change in our relation with nature as far as production\* is concerned. There will be a genuine societal chance to break with the necessity of economic growth and to establish a generally accepted reduction in the consumption of natural resources ("degrowth") and new relations between society and nature (cf. Görg 2003). Nature will not only be seen as a resource to be used and will be appreciated for a variety of reasons. Our view on nature will widen and differentiate. A forest can be a resource for manufacturing furniture, but it can also be a recreation area, a habitat for wildlife, or simply wilderness. Nature will not be solely appreciated for the raw material it delivers for production\* but also for its variety. When sales battles and market power have become obsolete, a school of fsh can be something to simply admire, and a forest lake can remain precious in itself.6

6The intrinsic value of nature is accepted today. However, preservation and protection are fghting an uphill battle against the economic rationale and its logic of the realisation of value.

# 5 FAQ: Frequent Questions About Commonism

The questions we are asked about commonism frequently repeat themselves. We summarise them here and try to give concise answers.

#### *5.1 Is Domination Really Abolished?*

Unfortunately, it seems highly likely that people will always have the chance to prevail at the expense of others. In commonism, all one can do is simply hoot down another. However, the crucial question is whether instruments of domination will be available in a form that allows for an effective, long-term and secured domination. Could a commons mediating conficts ignore needs in the long run? No, it does not have any means at its disposal to enforce its recommendations. The long-term ignoring of needs would eventually mean losing support. Could a wastewater commons keep up a defcient wastewater regulation over a longer period of time? Well, the prime question would be: why should the commons want that? But even if that were to occur, some people would try and change this commons or form a new one, one that will better satisfy existing needs, or other commons would refuse to cooperate with the wastewater commons.

Our main idea is that if people cannot be coerced into doing things and there are no general abstract possibilities to exclude people, domination cannot be established. On the one hand, it is no longer subjectively functional or encouraged to strive for domination over others. Other people no longer appear as competitors or enemies. On the other hand, there is ample opportunity to evade attempts at domination. Without property, a central element for exclusion is missing. Therefore, the obvious and sensible option will be to consider the needs of others in order to include them in order to achieve one's own goals.

#### *5.2 Is Commonism a Truly Inclusive Society?*

We have attempted to trace inclusion and to present the importance of designing production\* according to the needs of the contributors in a way that includes the needs of the users. We have attempted to show how information about needs penetrates the societal network and how these signs of needs simplify confict resolution, self-selection, and collective self-organisation. We have also ventured to discuss the form of conficts that do not have centralised instruments of domination at their disposal and are, thus, unable to enforce exclusive demands and particular interests. These conficts require the integration of the needs of all those involved due to collective disposal and voluntariness. But is that enough to announce the emergence of inclusive conditions in such a society?

Although we are not 100% sure, we believe that this is the case. We cannot conceptually proclaim that the commonist society must be an inclusive society. However, we have repeatedly pointed out that the inclusive society encourages inclusion and, in turn, inclusion becomes a well-founded form of action for the people. Maybe we are on the wrong track, maybe something is missing; but we do basically hope that our attempt has highlighted the possibility of talking about utopia. At this point our considerations are insuffcient and might lack complexity. However, they are the ideas of several dozen people only. Imagine the potential of hundreds, thousands, even millions of people discussing a free society and starting to practice commoning.

#### *5.3 Are There Chief and Secondary Contradictions?*

Capitalism's logic of exclusion appears in many forms. As racism, sexism, homophobia or nationality, it separates people and legitimises domination and exclusion. How about these exclusion structures in commonism? Traditional Marxist criticism of capitalism stressed the power relations between capitalists and workers as a "chief contradiction". Sexism, racism and so on were subclassifed as "secondary contradictions". The disappearance of class relations would solve them pretty soon. Is such a distinction part of our theory?

The goal of our theory is a different form of society. Not only a changed "economy", a new form of production, but also different forms of dwelling, thinking, hoping and loving. For us there is no central dimension of exclusion (e.g., ownership of the means of production) which must be changed in order to suspend all the others. The goal of our utopia is to eliminate the conditions that make exclusions functional and effective, no matter what kind they are. We believe that will render the exclusion of people on the basis of their skin colour, sex, ownership of means of production and so on no longer possible of obvious. We aim at the disappearance of the conditions of exclusion altogether and not of a particular dimension of exclusion. However, whether current and traditional forms of exclusion will be effectively overcome is a practical problem of the transformation and utopian organisation. Our intention is to show the conditions that are necessary for this overcoming.

# *5.4 Another Mystifcation of Care Work?*

Following the German version of the book, feminist criticisms of the book were raised. The philosopher Heide Lutosch argued that the protagonists are often "mature, healthy, articulate, young people who are responsible for themselves and only themselves and can work" (Lutosch 2021). In most societies, only half the population would work, and even of these, many would need care—in addition to those who need support anyway: "I had hoped that these people—sick, physically or cognitively impaired, sad, small, old, dying, dreamy—would move from the shadows to the centre of attention" (ibid.). Lutosch goes on to ask whether we are not once again mystifying care work in our theory. When we respond to a crying child, are "desire and necessity" really "intimately connected", she asks. Care work is dirty, often at night, exhausting (moving heavy, immovable objects), has no regular breaks, cannot be planned, but requires constant organisation (psychological stress). It contains many repetitive elements and is therefore quite boring, it never really ends and "requires patience despite time pressure and multitasking, because the people for whom it is performed are slow.

The criticism is justified. In fact, we have mistakenly inferred pleasure from motivation. We have thus fallen into the trap of even the conventional concept of motivation, which always equates motivation with enjoyment of the activity—something we had previously refuted. In fact, motivation in care work usually coincides less with pleasure than with necessity. This is all the more true in societies where care is largely relegated to families and thus often to women. Feminist utopias should carefully devise procedures for identifying the needs of those who cannot or can hardly articulate themselves, create a clearer awareness of informal hierarchies and prioritise the abolition of sexist violence as part of alternatives to traditional legal structures. They should rationally analyse care work with its affective and non-affective aspects and examine the non-affective aspects for their quantifiability, collectivisation, automation and digitalisation. Finally, they must question or even abolish the traditional bourgeois family and design alternative voluntary care structures that are not based on marriage, friendship or blood relationship (cf. Lutosch 2021).

Another criticism also hits a sore spot. Political scientist Antje Schrupp argues: "For my taste, the image of man behind the bourgeois utopia is still too much shaped by an atomised conception of freedom, in which the free and the equal negotiate with each other on an equal footing and the most important feature of freedom from domination is that no one can be forced to do anything. But isn't the most important feature of freedom from domination the certainty that no matter what happens to me and no matter how sick or old I get, my needs will be reliably met?" (Schrupp 2018). This criticism hits home because it was actually our concern to show that freedom from domination cannot be achieved without social security for all. Only from a position of secure existence can I speak and disagree with others at eye level. "Care work is explicitly thematised by the authors as a necessity […], but this does not change (or even disguise) the fact that care economy is not really considered in terms of content" (ibid.). This requires the abolition of the separation of production and reproduction—as shown in this book. But as for so many areas (law, relationships etc.), we have not thought through the consequences for the care sector.

#### *5.5 Criticism and Open Questions*

There are only a few of us, and that is not enough to explore a free society in detail. We can only take some preliminary steps and invite others to join in. What is fundamental for this path and its further development is criticism; however, it should be a criticism of content based on arguments. We can think of three such forms: frstly, criticism of the underlying theoretical concept (e.g., intersubjectivity). Secondly, a critical examination of the switchover from theoretical basis to utopia (e.g., commoning does not match the claims of transpersonal mediation). Thirdly, criticism of the conceptual unfolding (e.g., our deduction from voluntariness to inclusion). In this way we hope to explore commonism in more detail, for a lot of questions must be answered.

At some point a book cannot be extended and a deadline is reached. However, an abundance of topics remains. The conceptual exploration has only just begun. Numerous topics have been simply outlined or not mentioned at all, for example, commonist institutions and the question of violence, concrete rules instead of general law, love and relatedness. In addition, there are many hints—for example, confict mediation—which require further investigation. And anti-racist, decolonial and antieurocentric critics raise further questions. We write out of our socialisation and with its limitations. It is only a part of a bigger picture. We need other people, other theories and other utopias, because a free society is a collective process of development. Therefore, many thanks to the critics and those who will become critics.

We have dealt with the goal in detail. Now we want to turn to the obvious question: how can the commonist inclusive society emerge from capitalism? How can we conceptualise the path of transformation and open it to discussion?

# References

Heidenreich, Stefan. 2017. *Geld: Für eine non-monetäre Ökonomie*. Leipzig: Merve.

———. 2015. Commonismus statt Sozialismus. Die widersprüchliche Herausbildung einer neuen Produktionsweise. In *Aufhebung des Kapitalismus. Die Ökonomie einer Übergangsgesellschaft*, ed. Marxistische Abendschule, 259–277. Hamburg: Argument.

———. 2017. Peer commonist produced livelihoods. In *Perspectives on commoning: Autonomist principles and practices*, ed. Guido Ruivenkamp and Andy Hilton, 417–461. London: ZED.

———. 2018. Kategoriale Grundlagen einer postmonetären Gesellschaft. In *Postmonetär denken. Eröffnung eines Dialogs*, ed. Projekt Gesellschaft nach dem Geld, 265–294. Wiesbaden: Springer.

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# Seed Form Theory

In this chapter we intend to develop the commonist seed form theory. The name is based on the assumption that the new society develops from seed forms. In Chap. 3 we presented the idea that a qualitative change of society towards a free society must be conceptualised (and carried out) as a constituting process of a new form of society. This theoretical demand is our starting point. The seed form theory is a possibility of giving substance to this demand of transvolution. It is not the only way of doing this. The framework we have previously described allows for the inclusion of other transvolution theories, and we invite their development. The presentation of the elements of the seed form theory aims at opening it to discussion and criticism, thus enabling further development. The seed form theory attempts to conceptualise the qualitative change of the societal *form*.

A new society does not fall from the sky but must emerge from the old society. So, the point is: how does a new form of society emerge from the old one? To this, the seed form theory answers that the new can already be found in the old but still in the form of a seed, enclosed in the old conditions. And yet, this seed form embodies the quality it can develop into a new society. In our theory of society (cf. Chap. 5, 2.) we discussed the mediation form as a decisive element of society. That is why the new quality of the seed form must appear as a new mediation form. This new mediation form is restricted in the old society and only becomes dominant in the new society.

#### **History of the Five-Step Process**

The version of the five-step process presented here has many precursors. We have critically viewed these precursors (Holzkamp 1983; Meretz 2012, 2014) and arrived at some changes which hopefully provide more clarity. The five steps go back to Klaus Holzkamp. He is the founding father of Critical Psychology, which in this book we refer to in many ways. In his main work *Grundlegung der Psychologie* (1983, working title: *Foundation of Psychology*, available in German only, translation in progress) he extracted "five steps of the analysis of change from quantity to quality" (ibid., p. 78) from the historical analysis of the origin and development of the psyche. Holzkamp traced the origins of the psyche. However, we believe the five-step process is equally heuristic for describing qualitative changes in other systems—for example, societies. In this sense it has, so far at least, helped us considerably.

# 1 Five-Step Process as a Heuristic

The seed form theory is based on a methodical heuristic,1 the "fve-step process". For analytic purposes, it divides qualitative changes into fve sections. Sometimes the fve-step process is seen as a claim or settlement. We do not insist on fve steps or assert that intermediate steps cannot occur. The fve-step process is an attempt to fnd terms for a qualitative change. So far, these terms have served us well; however, there still might be something missing.

The fve-step process is not an act of magic. The new does not fall from the sky but emerges as a new function within the old system (seed form).2 These seed forms create a new system form (shift of dominance) to which the whole system adjusts (restructuring). The rest of the terms follow from that: the new develops on the basis of certain requirements (preconditions) and a contradictory dynamic within the old system (contradiction in development).

1Wikipedia: A heuristic "describes an analytic procedure in which limited knowledge is used to arrive at knowledge about a system by way of practical conclusions".

2The *system* is the object (the WHAT) which we scrutinise with the fve-step process. The *function* describes the behaviour, the dynamics of the system (the HOW). An example below will make that clearer.

At this point, it is important to stress that the fve-step process represents a logical and not necessarily temporal sequence, although some steps must indeed follow each other. The fve-step process can only be explained in hindsight, when the actual process is a thing of the past. Thus, it is a retrospective analysis. The question regarding the new can be put this way: what were the preconditions and what course did the process of emergence and enforcement follow? The new must be taken for granted. For us, the new is commonism, a categorical utopia of possibility (Chap. 6). Even though commonism is not a reality, we presume it is and look back: how did it come about? We pretend the matter is settled in order to gain insight. Therefore, one thing is for sure: we cannot be sure. Knowing that, we can learn a lot from looking back virtually, a process that will help us in taking practical steps.

The fve logical steps can be structured in two blocks. The frst two steps in fact only name the *preconditions*, inner prerequisites and outer framework conditions, including the contradictions that occur as the process unfolds. The last three steps deal with the actual *development process*. This development entails two qualitative leaps, and in the last step the whole system is restructured according to the new function. We will now explain the fve steps, which we have illustrated in Fig. 7.1. Then we will give an example (the origins of capitalism) to illustrate the structure, which at the beginning might appear somewhat vague and general.

1. The *preconditions* are the inner prerequisites which the development of the new is based on. There can be one or more prerequisites.

**Fig. 7.1** Illustration of the heuristic fve-step process

These ideas seem complex, but the theory is actually quite simple: there are *preconditions* creating the basis for the development of a new quality. A dynamic within the old system drives the development into a *development contradiction*. The quality of a new system emerges (*function shift*) and becomes dominant (*dominance shift*). Finally, the whole system adjusts to the new logic (*restructuring*).

# 2 Historical Analogy: The Origins of Capitalism

### *2.1 The Analysis of Societal Transformation*

The fve-step process as a heuristic seems complex and vague due to its many terms. Therefore, we would like to illustrate the concept by looking at the historical transformation of a specifc society. Can the fve-step process be helpful in understanding the origin of capitalism?

Before we go into the fve-step process we must be clear about a number of things: what *object* are we dealing with? What is the object's central *dimension of development*? What *function* governs the development of the respective dimension? In the general presentation we omitted these preconditions. The content analysis must be clear about this in order to stay on the right track. Figure 7.2 illustrates the following explanation.

**Fig. 7.2** Object, dimension, function and goal of societal transformation

Our object is *society*. The goal is the emergence of a qualitatively *new form of society*. The central dimension of development of our object, society, is the form in which people proactively produce\* their life conditions; in short: the *re/production form*. This re/production form changes its quality in the transition from one form of society to another. Just a reminder: we can conceptualise the re/production form as the relation between the *elementary form* and the *system form*. The elementary form represents the dominant rationale of action for securing individual existence; the system form is the "materialised" system rationale. Both depend on each other (cf. Chap. 5, 2.1). The local, interpersonal activity locally produces the overall societal system, which—with its system rationale as a precondition—gives local activity its functionality (securing existence).

The function dominating the dynamic and development of the re/production form is *mediation*. Mediation establishes the societal relationships between people. It dominates the production\* form—whether it prioritises cost-effciency, religious rules or needs. The mediation corresponding to the re/production form also has two elements: direct cooperation at the level of the elementary form rests on *interpersonal* relationships, while the mediated-societal system form is based on *transpersonal* relationships. A new re/production form always involves a new form of relationship (cf. Adamczak 2017).

#### *2.2 The Origins of Capitalism*

The empirical-historical basis of the following presentation mainly stems from Marxist historian Heide Gerstenberger (1990). The fve-step heuristic can surely be applied to other explanations of the origins of capitalism. Here we want to focus on the shift of domination, for it is the element that seems most thrilling to us.

We are looking at societal development, so society is our object. To begin with, we must defne the goal, given that the fve-step process is an analysis in hindsight. In our case it is capitalism, which we put in a nutshell in Chap. 1, 3. The central dimension of development is the re/production form, and the dominant function is the mediation form. In the transition to capitalism the mediation form of exchange became the exchange of equivalents. So, the fve-step process must explain how the previous exchange, being inconsistent and variable, became dominant in society and thus turned into the general exchange of equivalents (cf. Chap. 1, 3.1, p. 16). For as long as capitalist mediation was not generalised in society, the general exchange of equivalents was also impossible. The exchange of equivalents as a general societal mediation form came to be when domination detached itself from the inconsistent exchange form, governed by variable local and societal conditions. This form of exchange—we named it variable exchange—is the seed form of capitalism in the feudal society. It is a subordinated principle and often surfaces without being dominant in society. Now we turn to the fve-step process.

We should begin by explaining how the seed form of variable exchange came into being. The preconditions could be social practices of giving and counter-giving, geographical differences and so on. Which contradiction in development could have made exchange functional for a society at that moment? Exchange can establish controlled give-and-take relationships over long distances and minimise insecurities. The dominant feudal mediation, however, is still personal domination, in which tribute and feudal duties produce and govern a violent and forced "exchange". Nevertheless, these forms are restricted to the local territory of the ruler. Thus, the western Frankish feudal rule cannot command the iron ore deposits in the Alps. Exchange becomes the functional solution to this contradiction in development, for it helps to obtain resources otherwise not available under the "usual form of feudal domination". In the shift of function, the new quality of the capitalist society emerges: an exchange that is not yet equivalent but is regulated. It exists within the old system, the feudal society, in its rudimentary form. This changes with the shift of dominance.

Heide Gerstenberger does not limit the origins of capitalism to a rising merchant class or to the expansion of trade; she speaks of a change it the quality of exchange. Precapitalist trade and exchange was subject to many political privileges. Guilds could set the prices in many mediaeval towns; certain association of merchants had political privileges such as custom relief, tax exemptions or even the monopoly on the import of certain goods. The market was penetrated by political and personal privileges. This hindered especially one element of exchange: competition. The individual producers and traders did not compete as equals, and the disadvantaged fought against the unjust system. This political war between producers and especially traders went on during the entire early modern age (roughly from 1500 to 1800) until, slowly and gradually, the decisive process was realised: the unleashing of competition. The market actors began to relate to each other as mainly economic, not political, competitors. Their existence and success became less dependent on personal networks and political support and more on economic performance. This change within the sphere of mediation penetrated production and remodelled it according to its logic of competition and valorisation. Profts were not used as much for individual enrichment but as investment, a vital ingredient for existence. The mediation form of exchange gained increasing importance, the growing urban population was more and more dependent on the availability of food via competitive markets. Exchange became decisive when it became crucial in securing the existence of a major part of the population. In the process of the generalisation of exchange as the primary mediation form for livelihood, the local and dependent, variable elements of exchange began to lose importance: exchange became the general exchange of equivalents, money became a general equivalent and capitalism was born.

After the change in domination, equivalent exchange triggered an enormous increase in the division of tasks and, thus, in the depth of the re/productive mediation. Transpersonality is the strong side of exchange: it connects people who are only interested in maximising their self-interest. The exchange partners do not have to care for each other. While in the feudal society the depth of mediation is low, and transpersonal relations are not very complex or extended, equivalent exchange generates an intricate, highly structured transpersonal mediation—which today has reached a global level. The old system of feudalism has been transgressed by the new system of capitalism. The late-feudal and the emerging capitalist society became restructured step by step to align themselves with the requirements of the capitalist re/production.

# 3 Seed Form Theory: The Development of Commonism

With the intent of drawing analogies with the origins of capitalism, we now turn to the transition to the free society. Our utopia and thus our concept of the free society is *commonism*, as developed in Chap. 6. Other analyses could reach different understandings of the free society and, consequently, the fve-step process presented below would take a different course. The object of society and re/production, the dimensions of development are the same as those in the transition to capitalism. However, the new function, the new mediation form is different: What exchange was to emerging capitalism, commoning is to emerging commonism (cf. Chap. 6, 3). However, we feel that, at this point, our research and theory are still immature.

One quality of commonist mediation, of commoning, is →voluntariness (p. 144). People only become active if the activity is important to them and they have the wish to act. Another quality is →collective disposal (p. 145): no abstract rules ensure divisions and claims as much as →property (p. 130) does, but collective possibilities of use are negotiated on the basis of →needs (p. 113). These commonist elements produce inclusive conditions. Other people cannot be instrumentalised or coerced into an activity; I have good reasons to include the needs of others. The same applies the other way around, in what refers to other people including me. Only through mutual inclusion can we achieve our goals. We will utilise these qualities to fnd and analyse the different ways in which the seed form appears under current conditions. As a reminder: on the basis of a human possibility—a free (from domination) society called commonism we take a virtual look back and ask how this society could emerge.

#### *3.1 Preconditions*

The commonist society and the form of mediation that prevails in it are the result of human-societal preconditions. These preconditions differ in their characteristics: some are generally human and thus do not depend on today's form of society. Others arose historically and are tied to certain societal developments. We would like to start with the generally human preconditions.

The human ability to enter into an inclusive, need-oriented mediation form requires perceiving the needs of other people and integrating them into our premises of action. This ability is called *intersubjectivity*. We have explained it in the theory of the individual (cf. p. 110). Intersubjectivity enables us to recognise other people as individuals in need with particular wishes and perceptions and to integrate them into our own wishes and perceptions on a par, instead of instrumentally subordinating them to our own needs.

As human beings we have a cognitive *distance* to the world. We are not a direct function of our perceptions and emotions, we are not victims of the world, but we can distance ourselves from the world and assume a refective stance. Our consciousness enables us to design our societal conditions according to our needs. We can refect on our own needs and on those of others and balance possibilities of satisfaction. As societal individuals we are not trapped in an individualised motivation. We do not only act when concrete and individually useful actions motivate us, but we also know a *generalised motivation*. Our motivation can include the needs of other people, even the needs of the "general others", that is, people we do not know. I bake bread not just for me and my friends, I can be motivated to bake bread for people I do not know. We are not sure about other general-human preconditions commonist mediation might have. There could be others. When all is said and done, the essential precondition is that *we are human beings, we are able to design our living environment.*

Now, however, we would like to deal with the historical preconditions. We enter even more troubled waters: how can we specify what the changeable preconditions of a free society are? What is essential, what is dispensable? Is it a high technological development? Global networking? We quickly arrive at elements which regard capitalism as a vital requirement for the realisation of human capacity. Since we are uncertain, we would like to describe these historical preconditions in the subjunctive.

Maybe *global networking* is necessary for the development of an inclusive mediation form. Only then will there be no more outside. Only then can all needs be included, without the danger or the need to prevail at the expense of others. Or the opposite: maybe a free society can start in one region and expand from there. We believe this is not very likely, but a free society in certain isolation could be conceivable. Naturally, the division of tasks and the diversity of needs would be less differentiated, but this does not exclude the possibility of an inclusive mediation form. These considerations open up the question of whether a free society could prevail in some parts of the world, while others are still governed by domination-based mediation forms. It is obvious that mediation relations to these "external societies" could in parts corrupt and damage the inner logic of inclusion.

What about the *depth of mediation*? Capitalism has integrated people into a strong societal →network (p. 163). All people are producing for everybody, even if under the negative omen of structural exclusion. Much more than in earlier forms of society, in many places capitalism has dissolved interpersonal conditions of tradition, family and union, thus creating the basis for an individuality beyond groups. Are these societal interconnections not also a basis for the free mediation form to overcome the interpersonal level and become transpersonal-societal?

Maybe a certain level of *technological development* must be acquired for a society based on voluntariness to become a reality. This might give the chance to automatise many unloved, dangerous and tedious activities, which in capitalism cannot be made a source of proft and, therefore, must be covered by cheap workers susceptible to blackmail.

#### *3.2 Contradiction in Development*

Mere preconditions do not do the trick. One—or more—dynamic(s) are required to exert pressure on a development towards the new mediation form. A societal contradiction in development is a subjectively felt contradiction. It is a contradiction between the needs of the people and societal re/production, between subjective needs and the societal possibilities of their satisfaction. These subjective needs are proactively oriented: society is supposed to satisfy my needs in the future. And they can exceed my individual needs: the suffering of other people can also lead to a pressure for change. Furthermore, an escalating crisis—for example, the global use of resources (cf. Brand and Wissen 2017) or the inner-capitalist →realisation of the value crisis (p. 202)—can exert a pressure for change, for it can endanger not only the current supply but also provision. Thus, the emergence of the seed form of commonism, commoning, can be triggered by a number of dynamics: social isolation, destruction of the environment, reasonable wishes of re/production—prevented by the force of valorisation—exclusion from the market and so on. It is no coincidence that people discuss and feel the urge to engage in societal alternatives. Even those with a suffciently secured existence—from their subjective point of view become active for a different social organisation when there are tangible opportunities. Many dynamics seem to nurture hope of a transformation already in the making, and do not only begin when one is starving despite having money.

#### **Valorisation Crisis**

The capitalist form of production entails a self-contradiction. On the one hand, capitalism is based on the exploitation of human labour. On the other, all producers of commodities must strive to cheapen their commodities as much as possible, therefore, to minimise the human labour in them. Both processes are propelled by competition. The first strives for expansion and perpetual growth, the second for implosion and perpetual negative growth. The origin of the selfcontradiction—and source of the dual crisis of realisation and metabolism—is the "the two-fold character of labour embodied in commodities" (Marx 1890, p. 56). Marx distinguishes concrete from abstract labour. Concrete labour produces use value, which satisfies needs. Abstract labour produces exchange value, which establishes equivalence in the act of exchange. Indeed, the proactive production\* of life conditions aims exclusively at useful things, use value. However, in capitalism the only commodities produced are those which promise valorisation (German: ›Ver-Wert-ung‹—›makevalue-real‹). Their value is established by abstract labour, which in competition is permanently reduced, however, due to the pressure to increase productivity. The same output of products demands less and less input of labour. To compensate, the amount of commodity output must be permanently increased. To achieve the same extent of value, an ever-increasing amount of commodities must be produced, requiring an ever-increased use of resources that causes increased externalities (e.g., CO2 emissions). Increasing environmental consumption walks hand-in-hand with two conflicting tendencies: the expansion of value due to production expansion and the reduction of value due to increased productivity. The capitalist mode of production is systematically heading for a crisis of global metabolism—in times of upswing faster than in a crisis.

Despite the permanently increasing output of commodities—that is the crazy thing about this mode of production—imminent valorisation crises also escalate at the same time. The heart of the matter lies in the fact that the continuing decrease in value cannot be compensated (anymore) by the extension of production. Cyclical crises can only compensate to a small extent for this instability which permanently increases. This is done by transferring investments from

#### **(continued)**

the real economy to "investments" in a future, desired real economy. This has become possible by transferring real capital to financial markets, where it generates fictional capital many times its volume (cf. Lohoff and Trenkle 2012). The problems start when fictional capital is materialised and invested in the real economy. The current economy then becomes more and more dependent on the smooth functioning of the future economy. A house of cards is erected, which would do no harm if this were just a game of cards. But, in the meantime, real houses are built on that foundation. The downfall of the house of cards brings the real economy to a partial standstill. The real size of this crisis potential is an issue and so is the nature of the next crash.

#### *3.3 Function Shift*

In the shift of function, a new specifc function emerges, the *seed form*, which will dominate the future development. In the shift of function, a new mediation form must emerge which will become the foundation of the new society. According to our postulated goal, this new mediation form, the commoning, represents—when societally generalised—the core of the inclusive society, commonism.

Inclusion takes place in many places in capitalism: in friendships, families, even businesses. People even act inclusively without directly gaining from it. We call this sort of behaviour →individualised inclusion (p. 204) if it is based on conscious ethical decisions. Individualised inclusion is an important step, but commonism takes a step further. Commonism creates a space and conditions suggesting inclusion, it makes them subjectively functional. In a commoning framework, I have good reasons to act inclusively. In commoning, inclusion is not an individual ethical decision, but rather one suggested by a *logic of inclusion* that is generated by the framework. I do not need to →altruistically (p. 111) go beyond myself and postpone my needs for others; it is useful to include the needs of others for the satisfaction of my own needs. So what are the required conditions for the mediation form of commonism to emerge?

#### **Individualised Inclusion**

Inclusive actions fall into three categories: individualised, interpersonal and transpersonal. In the case of individualised inclusion, people act individually on the basis of ethical convictions, such as justice, sustainability, solidarity and so on. In this case, the needs of other people are taken care of in private life. Examples are fair trade, bio consumption, donations and so on. As these actions are only individual and monetarily mediated, they do not create new and lasting social relationships and, therefore, cannot establish a new mediation form. Inclusion takes place through the intentional use of one's money, for example, in consumption decisions and donations. Individualised inclusion is real inclusion, and it improves conditions but is necessarily limited: it always involves acting against one's own needs. Based on morals and ethics, I consciously prioritise the needs of others over mine: instead of going on holidays with my money, I buy fair-trade goods to make people's life in Cambodia a little bit better. If taking into consideration the needs of others involve disregarding one's own needs, people have good reasons to not participate in this individualised inclusion. It is altruistic: I am doing something *for others*. Initiatives propagating individualised inclusion often appeal to morality: people should take care of others. We must help the poor and the sick. However, would it not be much better if egoism and altruism were combined? I do something *for others and for me at the same time*. The conditions in which caring for others is not an issue of morality would be both interpersonal and transpersonal. They would be conditions in which I would be better off if I cared for others, and others would be better off if they cared for me. This can only be achieved by changing the framework of actions, by going beyond individualised inclusive *actions* towards interpersonal inclusive *spaces* and again, finally, towards a transpersonal inclusive *society*.

We have set out a conceptual framework of commoning (cf. Chap. 6, 1.2) but we have not reached the end of it. We condensed our fndings in the statement that commoning would be based on *voluntariness* and *collective disposal*. These two elements generate the conditions from which commonism can emerge. Our thesis here is: in the shift of function stage, only the seed form of commoning appears; therefore, collective disposal cannot develop as a transpersonal but only as an interpersonal quality. In capitalism it is the generalised exchange on the basis of property that is dominant. Collective disposal at the societal level is impossible and, at the interpersonal level, diffcult. In the case of →commons (p. 143), many projects try to eliminate or cushion the exclusive effects of property. This is what the slogan "possession instead of property" (Habermann 2016, p. 10) stands for. In autonomous centres or political camps, the basis of decisions is not property, what is attempted is the mediation of needs. This is often done via tricky legal constructs, such as tenement syndicates, free software licences, creative commons licences, seed licences and so on. However, as we shall show, the domination of property fundamentally limits the scope of voluntariness. In capitalism many connections also depend on voluntariness—often beyond the sphere of the →economy (p. 14)—which requires the inclusion of the needs of the actors. The role of honorary offcer is based on voluntariness: volunteer frefghters, refugees-welcome groups, clubs and so on. Political activity also presupposes voluntariness. It is not an individual's job to include the needs of all actors, but the overall structure must secure this, otherwise it will disintegrate. Even in businesses, voluntariness is on the rise. New organisational structures and management approaches increasingly advocate voluntariness, autonomy and self-motivation. The workers are enabled to better adjust their tasks as they wish. This is still subject to compulsory valorisation, as voluntariness is just the basis for increased productivity but, nevertheless, it is a form of commoning within the economy (cf. Meretz 2016).

#### *Interpersonal Inclusion*

What limitations is commoning as a seed form subject to? It can only seize the interpersonal-collective level but not the transpersonal-societal level. One reason for this is the lack of collective disposal beyond the interpersonal frame, as mentioned before. It seems obvious that these two elements are interconnected. Our thesis is: if commons—at the level of the seed form—try to overcome exchange and, thus, the logic of property in capitalism to some extent, they must *interpersonalise transpersonal relations*. And that is a fundamental problem.

We can illustrate that with examples of community-supported agriculture projects. For example, an average agricultural farmyard in capitalism produces vegetables as commodities for a supermarket, and the consumers buy the commodities from there. For the consumer or the producer, it is irrelevant who actually produces or consumes. The exchange of money for a commodity connects people transpersonally. Community-supported agriculture tries to establish a different mediation between consumers and producers: the consumers establish a fxed group fnancing the production of the farmyard, and they receive the produced vegetables in return. They do not pay a price per potato but cover the costs of the farm, labour, seeds, electricity and so on. There might be a solidary redistribution by way of rounds of contribution, enabling people to contribute according to their fnancial possibilities and allowing people who are better off to support others. A partial separation of give-and-take is practiced, and new logics emerge: the consumers have a word in the production, the producers are exempt from market competition and can produce more ecologically and considering their own needs. The project still needs money, but consumers and producers are joined in a commoning process: they show special consideration for the needs of others. Inclusion is important. This commoning only works because people engage in direct interpersonal relationships: the producers produce for concrete consumers and the consumers receive their vegetables from a concrete farmyard. In communitysupported agriculture projects, the transpersonal relationship of the capitalist farmyard with its consumers is rendered interpersonal.

This example is intended to illustrate a general logic. At the level of seed form, voluntariness, inclusion and collective disposal are somehow accessible in interpersonal connections. However, at the transpersonal level there cannot be collective disposal. Hardly any project in capitalism can afford to give away products or services free of charge, to give others the power of a free disposal, whether individually or collectively. The reason is that the means for the respective production—whether they are means of consumption for the producers or means of re/production usually are property and, therefore, stem from exchanges or the state. Nevertheless, some projects try to rule out the property of the produced means on the output side. In that way, the clear connection between give and take is cancelled; such is the case of cf. "Küchen-für-alle" (kitchen-forall), volunteer fre departments or community-supported agriculture.3 But due to the fact that property is dominant in society and, therefore, so is the

3The attempts at "Nichtkommerzielle Landwirtschaft (NLK)" (non-commercial agriculture) and other projects associated with the Karlahof (Karlafarm) in northern Brandenburg are legendary. The well worth reading refexion "Ich tausch nicht mehr. Ich will mein Leben zurück" (Autor\*innenkollektiv 2015) ("I don't exchange anymore. I want my life back" by collective of authors 2015) clearly shows possibilities and (interpersonal) limits.

need for cash, the separation can only be partially successful and must be cushioned in interpersonal connections. Only in interpersonal connections can the logic of exclusion of property and exchange be consciously overcome by cooperating people. However, this overcoming necessarily remains limited. Thus, at the level of the function shift, inclusive conditions are created mainly by voluntariness and a limited disposal of some resources. Generally speaking, if projects build interpersonal conditions partially representing a logic of inclusion, inclusive actions lose their mere ethical character. They are structurally encouraged and foster each other. Individually, there are good reasons to adopt the encouraged inclusive activity, for it means that one will be included in return. Projects based on voluntariness and partial collective disposal do just this: they generate these conditions of collective inclusion. This is the *seed form* of commonism: inclusive conditions at the interpersonal level. It will take a shift of dominance—in our view incurring the true collective disposal of all aspects of producing\* the means of consumption—for the (interpersonal) seed form to transform into a (transpersonal) *elementary form*, making the inclusive conditions societal and general and, thus, dominant. We will now present some examples of the commonist seed form.

### *Traditional Commons*

Traditional commons hold their ground above all in connection with the preservation of natural resources, and they are often a direct source of livelihood through the selling of natural products (fshery, forest use, grazing, water regulation etc.). Today they are surviving islands in the ocean of capitalist enclosure and the valorisation of capital, while in earlier times they formed an important part of societal re/production. Political scientist Elinor Ostrom (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009) analysed these surviving commons and carved out eight design principles, which she summarised in her Nobel Lecture (Ostrom 2009, p. 422):

1A. User Boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers are present.

1B. Resource Boundaries: Clear boundaries that separate a specifc common-pool resource from a larger social-ecological system are present.

2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions.

2B. Appropriation and Provision: Appropriation rules are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of costs is proportional to the distribution of benefts.

3. Collective-Choice Arrangements: Most individuals affected by a resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying its rules.

4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users.

4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor the condition of the resource.

5. Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violations start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly violates a rule.

6. Confict-Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low-cost, local arenas exist for resolving conficts among users or with offcials.

7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of local users to make their own rules are recognized by the government.

8. Nested Enterprises: When a common-pool resource is closely connected to a larger social-ecological system, governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers.

Traditional commons could survive when they drew clear lines and developed a system of domination, sanction and →confict (p. 146) solution for the internal organisation. Or, in Ostrom's words: "In all selforganized systems, we found that users had created boundary rules for determining who could use the resource, choice rules related to the allocation of the fow of resource units, and active forms of monitoring and local sanctioning of rule breakers" (ibid., p. 419). *Defence structures* against the hostile surroundings and their intruding logic were necessary, as many of the internally linked commons appeared externally as competitors—for example, when produce from the use of the commons was sold on the market. On the output side property was not overcome, while on the input side natural resources like forests, moors, pastures, lakes and so on were not used as individual property but were preserved according to the needs of the parties involved. The preservation and protection of the commons was partly carried out on the basis of voluntariness. The limited collective disposal of resources on the input side and the fact that voluntariness was only partially present created limited inclusive conditions.

#### *Projects of Collectives*

Projects of collectives cover the organisation of a wide range of different aspects of life with a special focus on interpersonal relationships. This includes communities, collective parenting, dwelling projects, autonomous centres, queer-feminist connections and other associations with an emancipatory claim. These groups considerably differ in their thematic focus: ecology, dwelling, producing, culture, politics, sexuality and so on are keywords. However, they have a lot in common: dealing intensively with social processes in the group, criticising and refecting on →power (p. 4) and domination, creating solidary possibilities of confict resolution and of dealing with traditional forms of relationships. On the basis of voluntariness, they create a *self-organisation* exceeding structural isolation in capitalist society and developing new forms of cooperation. Here, inclusive conditions originate from voluntariness and are developed via refexion on domination and the criticism of power. Most of these projects focus on their inner social structure. They produce new symbolic and social means: in particular, new forms of dwelling, love, confict resolution, perception, thinking and critique. In addition, some projects of collectives produce or offer means that cannot be easily replicated: for-free shops, community-supported agriculture, Küfa ("Küche für alle"—kitchen for all), cultural events and so on.

### *Myriads of Further Seed Form Instances*

There are a vast number of further projects based on voluntariness (and partly on collective disposal). As mentioned above, businesses also try to incorporate voluntariness into their work organisation. More extensive projects of solidarity-based economy stress the importance of voluntariness by demanding it, and the contributors collectively determine the goals of their re/production. However, this form of self-organisation is limited by the continuing ownership of the products.

#### *Knowledge Communism*

The concept of "knowledge communism" goes back to Robert K. Merton (1942). Scientifc knowledge is supposed to be the outcome of a cooperative research process, whose results are published, examined, copied, criticised and refned. So this knowledge is public. In the middle of the 1980s, Richard M. Stallman extended this idea to include software representing a special form of knowledge.

Fighting the growing containment of software (transition from free software to property by requiring a charge for its use) he developed the concepts of *Free Software* and *Copyleft* licence (GNU General Public Licence). Free software means the software is free for use; it can be changed and passed on. Copyleft requires that follow-on software also fall under the copyleft licence. The "virus of freedom" is passed on.

The new millennium saw these beginnings turn into a broad movement of free and open-source software (FOSS). The basic idea of cooperative sharing and improving available knowledge quickly spread to other areas: open design (of clothes, houses, cars etc.), open courseware (learning materials), free encyclopaedia Wikipedia, free cultural goods (books, flms etc.) and many more. The Oekonux project ("Oekonomie und Linux"—"Economy and Linux", cf. Merten 2001) predicted this development and, furthermore, postulated the emergence of a new production form with the potential of replacing capitalism. We build on these ideas.

The essential quality of knowledge communism attempts is their achievement of the societal level. Scientifc fndings infuence *transpersonal mediation*. However, they must be subject to free disposal and, therefore, de facto nobody's property (albeit not *de jure*). This way, interested parties all over the world can examine the results and develop them further, and the human potential of cumulative contributions to a global production\* of life conditions can unfold in the area of science. Knowledge only has to be acquired once to be potentially available to everybody. In this case, de facto unlimited collective disposal and voluntariness are already possible and create a transpersonal space of inclusion, albeit limited to only one sector.4

#### *Leaving the Niche*

The commonist seed form can be found in many contexts and in many places. But how can it go beyond its niche existence? How can it achieve societal generalisation? In the function shift, the frst step of qualitative change, the new quality of commoning develops on the basis of voluntariness and partial collective disposal, producing inclusive conditions applicable at the interpersonal level. This new mediation form differs in quality from the old function, the exchange based on property, which is still

4The intrusion of logics of valorisation and exclusion into science experienced for many years is another story.

dominant. At the same time, commoning is active in the old system environment, thus actively contributing to capitalist valorisation (dual functionality, cf. Chap. 7, 1. "shift of function").

#### *3.4 Scenarios of Shift of Dominance*

With the shift of dominance we arrive at the second qualitative change. Now the new quality of commoning is no longer a subordinated function within the old system but becomes the dominant function in the new system. Commoning not only takes place in less important areas and niches, but a societal point of no return is reached making commoning the dominant societal mediation form. Two questions arise: how can this point of no return be conceptualised? Which dynamics will lead to this point of no return? Let us begin with the frst question.

Commoning as a seed form—apart from knowledge communism—so far appears at the interpersonal level. This sort of commoning emerges on the basis of voluntariness and partial disposal. This partial disposal can only be gained by steering hitherto commodity-like transpersonal relationships of producers/maintainers and users towards the interpersonal level through commoning. Commoning, to that extent, transforms from seed form to elementary form as the repeal of exclusive property, individually agreed on, becomes the general societal structure; or, in other words, as property is overcome and collective disposal becomes generally implemented. Thus, instruments of domination acting in interpersonal and transpersonal relationships disappear—both on the input and on the output side. Means of re/production and life are not necessarily bought or sold anymore but are produced\* on the basis of needs—prioritised, if necessary. At the same time, the produced\* means are at everyone's free disposal. This overcomes the hitherto exclusively interpersonal form of commoning. The commonist mediation form must now design transpersonal relationships. Polycentric structures emerge—for example, infrastructure commons, confict management commons and others (unpredictable at the moment)—that are able to carry and shape this transpersonal net (cf. Chap. 6, 3.4).

While individualised inclusion on the basis of ethics and morality is always possible, the shift of function leads to a collective inclusion on the basis of interpersonal commoning. With the shift of dominance, this interpersonal commoning becomes generalised and turns into transpersonal commoning, the inclusive society. Not only the needs of *concrete others*, that is, my direct cooperation partners, are included, but also the needs of *general others* are consciously and directly included—or indirectly, when producing and applying means stemming from voluntary activity. How will that come about? Once again we fnd ourselves in troubled waters. We wish to present various scenarios and invite you to ponder on the correct course.

#### *Scenario 1: More Effcient than Capitalism*

Dual functionality means that the seed form already emerges in the old system; although it is functionally useable, its inner logic is at the same time incompatible with the existing system. This is how the capitalist seed form actually expanded within the framework of feudalism: it was useful, mainly to the interests of the ruling aristocracies. It can easily be assumed that the same applies at present to the commons. Could they not be functional for capitalism? Being functional for capitalism means they improve valorisation. And, indeed, this is the case with Wikipedia and free software but also with commons-oriented work organisation: they allow for a reduction of costs and/or a better realisation. However, this is impossible for most of the commons engaged in material production, given that their logic is the exact opposite of cost-effciency in the struggle for the valorisation of value.

In the mainstream production of goods, effciency and cost-effciency are mostly achieved through externalisation and exclusion, that is, through satisfying the needs of some people in one place by violating the needs of other (generations of) people in another place. In fact, this form of production inevitably combines local or partial effciency with system-wide ineffciency—as measured against the satisfaction of the needs of humanity. On the contrary, the commonist logic of inclusion achieves a signifcantly higher degree of effciency in the satisfaction of needs, even if it might cause "ineffciency" regarding the valorisation of value, given that externalisation and exclusion at the expense of others are not possible. As a consequence, it is very unlikely that it will expand under capitalist competition and its drive for the realisation of value.

So, if the commons cannot successfully compete in the feld of commodities, two conceivable possibilities remain: either the competitive disadvantage in the feld of commodities will be compensated or the feld will be left. In the case of the compensation of competitive disadvantages, additional (virtual) characteristics are added to the commodity; these are externalised in mainstream commodity production, but they are enjoyed by certain groups of buyers. In solidarity-based economy, for example, the resulting earnings are evenly distributed among the producers. Fair trade generates a higher yield for the producers compared to conventional production. The approach of the economy for the common good ("Gemeinwohlökonomie" in German, Felber 2018) makes factors like ecology, societal issues and so on, proftable through a calculated assignment of attributes (in the form of a "common good balance").5 However, these approaches do not usually displace mainstream commodity production but complement it. They fll unoccupied areas or even create new markets. As they are completely integrated into the logic of the commodity form, they are just as exposed to a crisis or breakdown of the economy and cannot represent alternatives.

An example of a game changer is online encyclopaedia Wikipedia. Commercial encyclopaedias, which aimed at excluding others from the use of their products via copyright, were not outcompeted in the feld of the commodity form but rather *out-cooperated* in the feld of cooperation through voluntary contributions. This became possible by the fact that the product, the generated knowledge, in the digital form can be arbitrarily copied at little expense (cf. "communism of knowledge", p. 209).

#### *Scenario 2: Expansion*

Another, possibly more obvious, idea is that of gradual extension. Numerous commons projects from all sorts of areas—culture, agriculture, internet, energy and so on—are expected to network and grow. This networking already develops slowly expanding mediation networks. Societal re/production increasingly becomes commonist. This leads to the point where commonist re/production represents a serious alternative to the capitalist form of livelihood and a shift of dominance occurs. We have also given this idea of change in domination some consideration, but we recently came to the conclusion of rejecting it. On the one hand, expansion is limited by the existing property structures—and it will be diffcult to buy most capitalist property. On the other hand, the mediation between particular projects is problematic. We fear that such a growing mediation necessitates either a planned form or that of exchange. We would like to take a closer look at this issue.

5 In their political demands, these approaches in parts go much further; however, here we only deal with their economic practice.

There are two possibilities of organisation when several commons join forces, such as several CSAs ("community-supported agriculture") and a wind power commons. They either form a *consortium* with a joint budget and common membership, sharing all products and services, or form a rather loose *network*, where each commons keeps its organisational independence as far as budget and membership are concerned; defned agreements allow for the members' mutual use of the products. Certainly, mixed forms are possible, but we would like to focus on the end of the spectrum.

#### *Consortium*

In the case of a *consortium* there is an interface mediating exchange, the relations of exchange with capitalism to which the projects must submit monetarily. Within the consortium, individual projects can establish forms of reciprocity other than exchange. Electricity does not have to be "paid for" by an equivalent of vegetables and vice versa. The members of the consortium contribute to the combined budget in rounds of solidaritybased contribution. Thus, give-and-take is partially decoupled from the projects involved, as well as from the members. As the projects still entertain external monetary relations, on the one hand, and the "hired contributors" must be paid to fnd suffcient time for their activity, on the other, the decoupling between the projects can only be partial. The voluntary contributors must secure their monetary livelihood, therefore not all necessary activity in the consortium can be exercised voluntarily *and* reliably. External monetary pressure for survival competes with voluntariness, and, at the end of the day, it is the former that has the fnal say.6 Given the capitalist conditions, the solution can only be to pay people for the reliable fulflment of an activity that is necessary for the project. But how to ensure the (often only precariously) paid activity is reliably delivered? Solutions tend towards either the "market economy" or the "planned economy": the reliable delivery of the work is either ensured by resorting to market competition—threat of dismissal and of hiring a reliable worker—or social, moral or political pressure is applied in order to "voluntarily" achieve suffcient dedication and reliability. Both strategies undermine the targeted

6A well-known phenomenon is exiting a project due to a "bad conscience", as those involved repeatedly fail to strike a balance between their own aspirations and the need to secure a livelihood under conditions of paid labour (and the accompanying necessities of recovery).

new quality: voluntariness and inclusion.7 The growing size of the consortium requires an even greater reliability of the scheduled activity to keep the task sharing running. This is the precise problem encountered by planned societies that replaced the market-based economic threat of dismissal with a symbolic pay and political-moral pressure.

Apart from voluntariness, collective disposal also reaches its limits. When transpersonality increases, so does anonymity. The more this happens, the more contributors and users—as consumers living in a capitalist setting—might be induced to acquire a bigger share of the produced wealth. In smaller, interpersonal projects this is contained by the individual assessment of fairness and social control. However, with an increase in the size of the consortium, individual ethic and social pressure might decrease. This could lead to a behaviour that is functional in the context of the logic of exclusion, the minimising of input and maximising of output at the expense of others, severely disrupting the space of inclusion. One way of balancing this could be to increase control and the rule of law; this, however, would push the consortium further towards a planned economy.

Apart from these perilous inner dynamics, the external dynamic of the capitalist surroundings is also in play. This decoupling of give and take, generally speaking, reduces (or aspires to do so) the pressure of competition and productivity. This also entails (or aspires to do so) the tendency to internalise so far externalised factors such as environmental protection, climate protection, preservation of soil fertility and so on. However, this usually leads to the consortium's products becoming more expensive than conventional capitalist production, if its productivity is trailing normal market economy businesses; moreover, new costs incur due to reinternalisation. This problem of productivity was also present in the planned economies of real socialism. Without the pressure of competition, the rise in productivity deaccelerated, leading to political campaigns in an attempt to compensate for it. A growing consortium of commons also becomes more and more expensive and, thus, unattractive for old and new members. This puts limits on a "planned economic" solution.

7 In addition, the well-documented psychological *overjustifcation effect* occurs, when "internally" motivated voluntary activity is "externally" rewarded (cf. Deci et al. 1999).

#### *Network*

The second possibility is a loose *network*. In this case the individual commons remain unchanged, keeping their own budgets and entering into agreed relations. These relations would only make sense if not organised on a commodity-based exchange but involving a decoupling of give-andtake. For example, this is practiced in the Intercom-Network of municipalities in the Kassel area (Wenk 2014). Their concept of "free fow" "is mainly based on the principle of surplus" (ibid.). Means are not exchanged but given according to fairness standards. However, one thing is clear: fairness must not overextend the individual commons. This condition is met only when passing on the surplus; however, it reaches its limit with the exhaustion of the surplus. The general rule is that fairness must not disconnect product costs too much from market prices.

Deviations from exchange and the market are possible, especially for not-required surplus means, but a market orientation remains overall necessary. Therefore, property is hardly overcome and collective disposal basically remains within the particular commons; this can hardly include the needs of others, for they must ensure their further existence. Moreover, fairness cannot be generalised but rests on perceived justice and interpersonal relationships. Fairness is an interpersonal feeling and requires a concrete other. It is precisely this interpersonal bond that the transpersonal exchange of equivalents overcomes through its abstract justice.

The idea of "free fow" is interesting as far as the radical decoupling of give-and-take is concerned. Because it is grounded on the limited interpersonal basis of fairness and surplus, this approach cannot be generalised. Is there a way out? Could "fair" exchange relationships be internally established instead of organising a completely free fow for non-surplus goods?

Such an approach of mutual production for each other instead of for the market would involve a defnition of fairness. Only an "almost equal" exchange would be accepted as "fair", given that production involves certain inputs. These must also be considered, regardless of a non-marketoriented "fair internal exchange", in order not to overstrain the particular partners. In the end, such a fairness would result in a market price plus X, while X stands for the higher costs deriving from lower productivity and higher internalisation (protection of the environment, work conditions etc.). If these relatively higher inputs were accepted in the "fair internal exchange" ("expensive electricity for expensive vegetables") these deviations from the market would not matter in the internal sphere; however, they would be felt even more in the monetary external relations with the capitalist environment, where merciless market prices prevail. In the external relations, "fair" products would be more expensive than "conventional" ones and, thus, less competitive.8 However, acquiring the necessary fnancial resources ("foreign currencies") for the consortium demands external orientation, thus making these external standards the yardstick for the "fair" internal conditions. Here too we fnd a situation comparable with real socialism: dependency on foreign currency causes the import of capitalist criteria into the network. Although other modifcations are still possible, the bottom line is that the idea is overall market-oriented. This usually indirect market orientation limits the extension of the network.

In our view, both approaches—consortium and network—remain limited. This cannot be surprising, for the transpersonal space of mediation is dominated by the exchange of equivalents. In other words: the transpersonal space is occupied. The transpersonal terrain of mediations must be relieved of equivalent exchange step by step. That is the essence of the idea of expansion. We might be wrong, but we believe that one cannot beat capitalism at its own game, the logic of valorisation, by outcompeting it. So, it should not be surprising that the idea of crisis and the accompanying breakdown of mediation by exchange are seen as likely candidates for initiating transformation.

#### *Scenario 3: Crisis*

A crisis means the current form of society cannot secure its future functioning anymore. Contradictions cannot be solved within the framework of the old societal structures but demand that conditions be overcome. The crisis of a form of society is also always a subjectively felt crisis: society cannot secure the livelihood of an important part of the population. But at what point is my livelihood endangered? When I am hungry? When anxiety regarding the future of the environment breaks my heart? When I feel struck by misfortune? Or is it when my internet access is not working? What is an important part of the population? 20%, 40% or 60%? This goes to show that a *societal* crisis invariably entails a *subjective* element. People are proactively oriented. The point at which they experience life as unbearable varies and, above all, depends on possible societal alternatives and on the path leading to it; this is what gives transformation and utopia theories

8A niche market for "fair" products does exist, where customers are willing to pay higher prices in exchange for a good conscience. But this "fairness-plus" is also limited. Market pressure is present here too, albeit at a somewhat higher level.

their prominent place. Currently, there are two major and intertwined elements of crisis: the capitalist *crisis of valorisation* and the global *crisis of metabolism*.

Unfortunately, the capitalist crisis of realisation is diffcult to understand without basic prior Marxist knowledge. We have tried to explain that in the box →realisation of value crisis (p. 202). Apart from that, we can only bring the manifold and well-known crisis phenomena to attention: increased shifting of realisation of profts to the fnancial sphere, debt crisis, increasing paralysis of central banks and governments and so on. The awareness of the crisis of global metabolism (resource depletion, climate change etc.) can also be taken for granted. Now the interesting question is what potential these crises have for a shift of domination.

A crisis or growing crisis phenomena build up considerable pressure to pursue an alternative path to the proactive production\* of life conditions. The bigger the crash, the greater the pressure. This pressure always involves a subjective part. The old does not only reach an objective barrier, but this barrier is also subjectively unacceptable. The subjective experience of an alternative can strengthen such a rejection. Acute crisis situations are often chaotic. People feel anxious and believe more and more that things cannot go on like that. They demand safety. Under conditions governed by a logic of exclusion, safety is achieved through domination and exclusion. These are familiar action patterns. Therefore, in a crisis many people will rely on hierarchic-authoritarian solutions. Whether alternatives governed by a logic of inclusion can prevail against such a presumable tendency depends on the breadth of experiences with interpersonal spaces of inclusion. If a lot of people know the strength and safety that a space can provide, the latter becomes increasingly attractive. However, in such a crisis situation commoning must be able to quickly organise transpersonal mediation, where experiences are rare. At the same time, we expect that in radical situations of upheaval property could become fragile, allowing for an easier attainment of the collective disposal of property. Under these circumstances, inclusive conditions via voluntariness and collective disposal seem easier to accomplish. However, there are at the same time many dangers. For us it is an open question: what conditions could allow for inclusive forms of cooperation to become dominant?

#### *Scenario 4: The Partner State as a Suicide State*

We do not exclude the possibility of the state playing a role in the change of domination. In Chap. 2, 2.2 we tried to explain in detail that the state cannot build a free society. We also consider it impossible for an inclusive society to be built quickly and spontaneously from below after a stateoriented break. However, it seems quite conceivable that commonist forms—supported by the state—could expand within capitalism and partly guarantee the livelihood of many people. A state-oriented break could then end the old system logic, allowing for the commonist societal form to extend. A problem here is the dissolution of the state itself. Our other considerations regarding the shift of domination involved the state becoming "superfuous". The state is not used, and commonist mediation increasingly renders it superfuous, although a real confrontation—for example, in the form of an active revolution (cf. p. 64)—remains an option. However, in the scenario discussed here the state is not the opponent to be abolished, but a stirrup holder, an accomplice to emancipation. Due to the state-oriented focus of transformation research, the respective suitable mental images enjoy great popularity: the state could socialise property, promote and protect new practices, democratically dissolve into society and so on.

Lenin asked the obvious question (cf. p. 55): why should the state wither away? Why should the state only remain as a stirrup holder and not be a player anymore? Why should a state which breaks the domination of capitalism dissolve afterwards? How does this transforming state become a suicide state? From the individual perspective of the people involved in state power, a different form of livelihood must seem more promising. However, the end of an institution of domination leaves a power vacuum, inviting well-organised groups to fll it for the purpose of exploiting power for their particular interests. This might rather suggest a gradual loss of signifcance of the state institutions of domination. Having said this, we consider it an open question whether this is possible at all. We must admit that there are many people more knowledgeable in the feld of state and politics. So we are happy to pass the question on to them: What could be the state's contribution to a shift of dominance establishing a free society?

#### *Scenario 5: Commons and Social Struggles*

Commoners are usually inherently critical about struggles, fghting and politics. They stick to the Zapatista slogan: "It is not necessary to conquer the world. It is suffcient to build it new." You may often hear commoners expressing sentiments like "I'm done with fghting and with being against something, I want to experience and live utopia". This antipathy towards struggles is accompanied by a certain scenario of generalisation: The peaceful, slow expansion of commoning and commons, one by one. First, creating Community-Supported Agriculture, then building communal energy production, functioning Fab Labs and, slowly, Community-Supported Everything. More and more people and enterprises turn to commoning and expand the commons sphere, because it feels good, it satisfes unsatisfed needs, and it is simply the right thing to do. We think that this path does not stand a chance because of the prevailing capitalist way of producing\* our living conditions—the markets and the state still satisfy many needs. Secondly, because of the existing property structures. Commons do not have the resources, land, metals, housing and so on to expand widely. Thirdly, because of the aforementioned criticism of the commons network and consortium.

Commoners are critical of struggles because of the very practice of commons. Commoning thrives on a culture of inclusion, cooperation and respect and, therefore, is culturally averse to discourses and practices of fghting, struggle and exclusion. Some commons challenge existing property structures by occupying, for example, houses or forests, but most accept them and buy the property. But the commons cannot even buy a signifcant part of capitalist property, mainly because they do not focus on making money and on valorisation but on satisfying needs.