In 1981, a mine was established in Mardai, together with all supporting infrastructure: it was called "Erdes" and was created as a "sub-combine" (*subkombinat*) of Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Works, itself a division of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy. The main combine (*kombinat*), of which Erdes was a sub-section, was located in Krasnokamensk (ibid.). The uranium extracted in Mardai was shipped directly to Krasnokamensk, where it was processed. To this end, a railway line was built that linked the two mining towns across the border. None of these, however, neither the railway nor the town, appeared on maps at that time and until quite recently.

Uranium production began in 1988, ironically less than a year before the existence of Mardai was made public. However, the extraction continued until 1995, providing around 100,000 tons of ore a year, amounting to approximately 100 tons of uranium after refining (Nuclear Energy Agency 1998: 240).

By that date, the settlement had gradually developed into a fully-fledged Russian town (Fig. 1), populated with workers coming from all over the

Soviet Union, including from the nearby Buryat Autonomous Republic. Interestingly, the secrecy of Mardai and its very restrictive access policy created a strict division within the "Buryat" ethnic category: Buryats from the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, who usually spoke only Russian, were entitled to live in the town from the outset, fully benefiting from its goods, while Buryats living in Dornod province around Mardai, who often spoke both Mongolian and Russian, were excluded.

Fig. 1 Mardai city centre, probably 1980s. Photograph posted by Wowabruch on Panoramio, ID: 29464337

The town was obviously far better equipped than any Mongolian city of the time. Like any other Soviet town the streets were lined with trees and a social club was located right in the city centre (Fig. 2). Former residents hailing from the Soviet Union also remember the impressive array of goods sold in shops, some of which were not even available back in their hometown (http://www.maxpey.narod.ru/mongol.html). There was also a kindergarten, a school complete with all facilities, a football and even a hockey ground (Fig. 3), where championships were organised in summer and in winter respectively (ibid.). It is reported that at some point a cantilevered wheel was even erected, on which the city and its surroundings could be observed from above (Shimamura, personal communication).

Fig. 2 Mardai's "club" (*klub*), probably 1980s. Photograph posted by Wowabruch on Panoramio, ID: 29463808

Fig. 3 Mardai's hockey ground, probably 1980s. Photograph posted by Wowabruch on Panoramio, ID: 29464363

From the beginning of the 1990s onwards, the Mongol population – often Buryat families who used to live in nearby towns such as Dashbalbar in the north – began to settle around the city. According to former residents, by 1995, when the uranium production stopped, about 200 households lived in a separate district. After three years of uncertainty concerning the future of the mine and various attempts to restart production, Russian workers were given leave in 1998, and returned home.

Once emptied of its inhabitants, the city became available for a completely different purpose: as the iron was removed by Mongols settlers and sold at the border to Chinese wholesale dealers, it became a stockpile of saleable parts. Ironically, the mining town itself suddenly transformed into a mine. Everything was removed: all metallic items of course, but also the iron components in buildings, leaving them standing without structure, as well as the metallic framework of the roads (Figs. 4 and 5). Pipes were extracted from the ground for the lead they contained and wires were pulled out for their copper.

Fig. 4 General view of Mardai from the central square (photo: S. Batchimeg 2009)

Fig. 5 Ruined buildings and roads (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

After the Russian population left, only a few households specialised in iron removal remained in Mardai, occupying more central places in the town, while the rest of the households moved out. Today, a dozen households still live there, often on a seasonal basis, and continue collecting iron to sell it across the Chinese border (Figs. 6 and 7). According to the people interviewed on site, they trade the iron they collect to brokers who then resell it to Chinese buyers, making quite significant profits in the process. Rumour has it that some very wealthy people made their fortune this way at the end of the 1990s. The Mongolian state itself took on some scraping of its own, notably availing itself of railway tracks around Mardai to be reused for its own network.

Fig. 6 Household living next to the central square, living of iron trade (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

Fig. 7 Iron loaded on a truck (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

Recently Mardai has again made the news when plans for re-exploitation by a new company were made public (Urantogos 2010). The firm, Central Asian Uranium Company, is jointly owned by the former Russian owner (Priargunsky Mining and Chemical Works), the Mongolian government (through a small company called Erdene Mongol LLC), and a Canadian company called WM Mining International Ltd – which later sold its rights to World Wide Minerals Ltd, also known as Khan (Mays 1998; Wu 1999: 154). Newspapers have voiced concerns regarding the status of these mining licenses obtained through opaque agreements between the Mongolian and Soviet governments. Some journalists have called on their leaders not to make the same mistakes and let foreign agents exploit Mongolian resources unilaterally. Locals generally assume that, should uranium be exploited again, Mardai will be rebuilt. And the irony that Russians themselves might take part in this rebuilding was not lost on the people I was able to talk to – I will return to this point.

## **Memories of Mardai – a forbidden island of modernity**

Mongolian people who have known Mardai before its destruction remember it with great excitement, almost enthusiasm. This excitement, in part, comes from the fact that the city had been inaccessible for so long, and that it was brought down to ruins as soon as it became open to the public. This has allowed Mardai to remain some kind of a legend, mostly known by hearsay and clad with the prestige of lost Soviet grandeur; people's memories, intertwined with fantasies, single out Mardai as an archetype of Socialist modernity.

"How do people go about remembering something they have never seen?" asked Morten Pedersen (2010: 245) upon considering narratives of Buddhist temples in Mongolia's northern Darhad region. Following Lars Højer (2009), Pedersen emphasised "the peculiar *enhancement* of occult agency that sometimes grows out of having incurred a religious loss" (2010: 246). He described how the leveling of almost every monastery in the Darhad region spurred people's imagination about the extent and power of Darhad Buddhism. Focusing on the fate of one single artefact, a golden Tara statue extracted from a monastery before it was destroyed during the purges of the 1930s, Pedersen described the legends that flourished in relation to it. The statue, "a condensation of Darhad Buddhism" is now the

material anchor point of a "virtual temple" that people carry in their mind (ibid.: 254).

As we will see, the ruins of Mardai could be said to achieve the same kind of effect: a condensation of Socialist ideology and Soviet way of life, they form the material basis of a virtual temple to modernity. What follows confirms what emerges from Pedersen's material, and what has been proposed by anthropologists working on mnemonic techniques (e.g. Severi 2007): it is not so much absence that stimulates recollection as *the salience*2 *of the last remaining item*. The last remnant spurs imagination and memory, irresistibly filling the void and conjuring up an invisible framework within which the isolated vestige starts making sense again.

When I went to visit Mardai on a day trip in summer 2009, I was lucky enough to meet Tögsöö. Now in his thirties, he was a teenager when the town partially opened in the beginning of the 1990s. He often visited his brother, who had settled there with his family, and worked with him during the summer in small jobs related to the Russian population of the town (selling milk to them, for example). After 1998, when the Russians left, he took an active part in the iron trade.

Fig. 8 Chatting with Tögsöö on the central square (S. Batchimeg, 2009)

2 Carlo Severi (2007) highlighted two recurrent features of mnemonic techniques crossculturally: a principle of salience (a selection of significant components is singled out, the other being left out or pushed to the background), and a principle of order (the selected components are sorted). It remains to be shown whether, and how, this second principle of order could apply to the way Mardai is remembered among the local population.

Fig. 9 High-rises where workers used to be accommodated (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

Tögsöö remembers Mardai with great emotion, notwithstanding the fact that he himself took part in the destruction of its buildings. After a brief conversation on what used to be the central square (Fig. 8) and serves now as an iron trading market, he took us on a tour around the city. His memories brought the city back to life. Showing us the high-rises where workers were accommodated (Fig. 9), he recalled the daily shuttle bus service that took them to work.3 Behind these high-rises, Tögsöö pointed out the kindergarten, which was several floors high (Fig. 10); parts of the flowered wallpaper were still visible on the walls in the ruined buildings (Fig. 11). A little further, blue tiles still covering a half-destroyed wall testified to the presence of a swimming pool only a few years earlier – something hard to believe in the middle of the arid Mongolian steppe (Fig. 12). By pointing out details that revealed what was before, Tögsöö transfigured the ruins, helping us picture the lives of people who had lived there, and appreciate how impressive these infrastructures must have appeared in the middle of the plain. At some distance from the town, Tögsöö pointed out a space that looked empty, explaining that it had been the location of a large airfield capable of accommodating planes that would not be able to land in the

3 According to a former inhabitant, no private car was allowed in the town, and most people would go around on bicycles when not using public transport (http://maxpey. narod.ru/mongol.html).

capital city Ulaanbaatar's airport today. Now it was nothing but dust, barely distinguishable from the rest of the steppe. What was striking in Tögsöö's memories was their precision, and the obvious fact that he *cultivated* them. These ruins were associated with very vivid recollections of the past, which he let out for us eagerly, almost proudly, for several hours. Throughout our visit to the town, he celebrated it as an island of modernity, unsurpassed in the richness of its infrastructures, even by present-day Ulaanbaatar.

Fig. 10 Ruins of the kindergarten (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

Fig. 11 Detail of the wallpaper still covering the wall of the kindergarten (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

Fig. 12 Ruins of the swimming pool, parts of the tiled walls are still visible (photo: S. Batchimeg, 2009)

It is not unusual to find among the Mongolian population today such expressions of nostalgia for the communist period in general and for Russian presence in particular.4 However, Mardai was not really remembered with nostalgia by people I interviewed. Nostalgia is a feeling for something which has been lost, and Mardai was never really Mongolian: until the end, indeed until its destruction, Mardai was a Russian town, whose wonders were strictly reserved to Russian usage – with the exception, as already mentioned, of Party leaders. Moreover, Mardai was not only associated with modernity, but also with the danger of uranium: rumours still circulate today about livestock born with malformations because of contaminated grass. Also present in people's mind was the more immediate danger of being shot if one ventured too close to the city: as Uradyn Bulag reported (1998: 23), "no bird could fly over Mardai". Therefore, the feeling associated with Mardai today is less nostalgia, as other traces of Russian occupation often inspire, than *fear*, or excitement mingled with fear, that is awe.

As an area restricted to Russian population located far behind the borderline, Mardai could be seen as some kind of a proxy for the border

4 Even, crucially, coming from the younger generation who has not known this period from first-hand experience (Legrain 2007): once again, "how do people go about remembering something they have never seen?" (Pedersen 2010: 245).

with the Soviet Union, a testimony to the fact that the border is actually more of a frontier area than a line (see Billé, this volume). However, it should be noted that Mardai was far less accessible to Mongols at the time than the Soviet Union itself: whereas Mongolian students would go to universities in Ulan-Ude, Moscow or Saint-Petersburg, "not even a [Mongolian?] bird" could fly over Mardai, although it was located on Mongolian ground. Mardai was not so much a proxy for the Russian border as a *super-border*, a territory of exception, to which access was not regulated according to the usual rules. This, perhaps, contributed in making Mardai even more awe-inspiring than the Soviet Union itself: Mardai is remembered as Socialism itself in a condensed form,5 *closer* to Mongolia than the Soviet Union ever was, and yet *more closed* to the Mongolian population than the Soviet Union actually was.

## **Memories of Mardai – "it has become like Chechnya"**

Strong feelings of nostalgia, however, are still felt today by the Russian people6 who used to live there, some of them for over fifteen years, and who had to leave almost overnight. It was reported that Russian inhabitants were very reluctant to leave the city: Tögsöö assumed that they were easy prey to the "Russian Mafia" back in their hometowns. Coming back after fifteen years of comfortable salary abroad, they were not only deemed rich, they were also quite vulnerable.

The Internet, through such media as picture sharing and mapping software (like Google Earth and Panoramio), provides us with testimonies from former inhabitants, who post pictures and comment on each other's recollections. Pictures of the central square, of the social club, and of the school, have been commented on with great emotion by

5 This impression is shared by former Russian residents themselves, as conveyed on the web page quoted earlier, which concludes its description of Mardai in the following way: "All in all, it was the village of Socialism as it should actually be, where everyone had what they needed, and everyone was happy." (http://www.maxpey.narod.ru/mongol. html, translated from Russian by S. Batchimeg).

6 "Russian", here, includes Buryats from the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. As was already mentioned, these were clearly separated from the local Buryat population, as they enjoyed different status in Mardai and often spoke only Russian. When Mongols – whether Buryat or Halh – speak about the Russian population of Mardai, they usually do not distinguish between Buryat and other Soviet nationals.

former residents evoking their years spent as children or workers in the town (Fig. 13):

"– Ramon: My beloved school!

– Ser. Terexov: As for me I have spent the most refined moments under the building of this school. I'd like to exchange photos of this village and its surroundings. My address is […]

– Elena: The best school ever. How it hurts to see what remains, I wish everything could be there again… So sad..."7

Fig. 13 Mardai's School n° 17 – picture posted by Ramon on Panoramio, ID: 14413674

This nostalgia might also turn into deep sorrow when former residents come back to the town and realise what it has become. Tögsöö told me the story of a Buryat foreman who shed tears when he returned to visit only one year after he left, in the autumn of 1999. Tögsöö was there, and he remembers the old man lamenting: "it has become like Chechnya!" as if the city had been destroyed by war. The comparison is interesting, first of all because it illustrates how much Russian settlers, even of Buryat origin, imagined the place as part of Russia, and Mongolia as a potentially dangerous colony.8

7 Quoted from comments on the picture of Mardai's school linked through Panoramio to its geolocation on Google Earth (http://www.panoramio.com/photo/14413674). Translation from Russian by S. Batchimeg.

8 Although Mongolia was always nominally independent from the USSR, the total subordination of the ruling Communist Party (Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) to its Soviet counterpart made Mongolia an actual colony. A popular saying in Russia at that time put it in no uncertain terms: "A chicken is not a bird, and Mongolia is not really abroad" ("kuritsa – ne ptitsa, Mongolia – ne zagranitsa" quoted by Sneath 2003: 40).

But it illustrates also that the destruction of Mardai was felt as as a violent act by former Russian and even Buryat residents – something comparable to an act of war.

Interestingly, the image of a "war zone" is also conjured up by a (presumably) Canadian visitor, who describes on a picture sharing website (http://www.pbase.com/buznsarah/mardai) how depressed he or she felt upon seeing the city in such a "distasteful" state: "Unlike a war zone where the destruction takes place through external forces, here it has been internal forces". One can only be surprised with this confident assertion that Mardai was actually "internal" to Mongolia, and this description actually raises several angry comments from (presumably) Mongolian users. Yet, this impression shares with that of the foreman a comparable bewilderment: how could such a large and modern town be demolished so thoroughly? What kind of violence – and directed to whom – does this act of destruction entail?

Certainly, the violent character of bringing down a whole town, unanimously considered a jewel of European modernity, occurred to the local population as well. During my trip, people appeared visibly embarrassed when they recalled such episodes as the one involving the Buryat foreman. I heard a number of discussions regarding the possibility that Russians might come back to restart the mine, and possibly even rebuild the city. The main idea that came out of these discussions was that Russians should be very upset to see their beautiful city brought down to ruins. People assumed they would be reluctant to build it again from scratch.

However, there was notoriously no attempt among the local population to deflect responsibility for this upon other people, and to blame some irresponsible and shameless profit seekers for its destruction. In addition, there was clearly no aggression associated with the dismantling of the city, no suggestion that the destruction of Mardai was an act of revenge wreaked by Mongolian people onto Russians for their exclusion from the city, and no sign whatsoever that scrapping was associated with any kind of violence. We have seen how Tögsöö himself, who took an active part in the ruination of the city, cultivated the memory of its previous state. It seems that the stripping of the iron, Mardai's ruination, was not aimed at erasing the past, at re-conquering Mongolian space. In other words, it would be a mistake to understand Mardai's ruination as an attempt at obliteration.

On the contrary, this whole city left for the local population to make use of was seen as a long-lasting testimony not only to Russian greatness,

but crucially also, to Russian *generosity*. This, and the sharply contrasted feelings elicited by Chinese presence in the country, was clearly expressed by our driver, a resident of the regional centre Choibalsan who had already been to Mardai once and seemed happy to have this opportunity to return. Gazing at the ruins, after a long discussion on what each building used to be, he commented to us thoughtfully: "Russians, at least, they left things for us to take… Chinese people would have buried everything underground." Tögsöö could not agree more.

### **The suspicious neighbour**

When prompted to justify their suspicious feelings towards "Chinese people" (collectively and indistinctively referred to as *Hyatad*, or by the derogatory term *Hujaa*), Mongolians consistently summon their history, supposedly replete with "Chinese" attempts at dominating Mongolia and spoiling its resources.

From the mid seventeenth century until the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Mongolia was known as "Outer Mongolia", and formed the northern confines of the Sino-Manchu Empire. Following a period of nominal autonomy after the fall of the Qing, Mongolia declared independence in 1921, thereby putting an end to Chinese political domination. Mongolian revolutionaries were assisted in this task by the newly (self-)appointed rulers of Russia, the Bolsheviks, who saw in Mongolian controlled independence a strategic asset against Chinese alleged ambitions in Manchuria and Siberia (Rupen 1979). Therefore, Mongolia declared itself in 1924 a People's Republic, and was ushered by her new mentor along the path of a "non-capitalist way of development".

Of course, Mongolian people's evaluation of their past as part of the Sino-Manchu empire is undoubtedly influenced by the way it was portrayed by propaganda throughout the communist period. As a feudal system whereby (Mongol) lords levied tax on the population for their own benefit and that of the (Manchu) Emperor to whom they answered, the Qing Empire came to be pictured as the epitome of exploitation; the backward evil to be blamed for Mongolian people's economic stagnation over more than three centuries.

Of concern here in this well-known story is the way Sino-Manchu domination during the Qing period has been linked to, or

disconnected from, the question of the relationship between Mongolian and Chinese people *in general*. Official propaganda, especially after the Sino-Soviet split in the beginning of 1960s, has actually gone in two different directions. On the one hand, Chinese people, and by extension the People's Republic of China, were *denied* any responsibility in Qing Empire's political domination over Mongolia (Rupen 1979: 93). According to history, Party officials emphasised, it is the Manchus who conquered and ruled Mongolia, not the Chinese: therefore, China has never had control over Mongolia, and cannot assert any claim over Mongolian territory.

Yet, on the other hand, Chinese people were *blamed* for their economic exploitation of Mongolian people (Bawden 1989: 83): Chinese merchants, backed up by the Imperial administration, were accused of having taken an active part in the pauperisation of Mongolian people through their unfair credit policy. Besides, the individuals who had become renown for looting Chinese shops or even for burning them down, were celebrated as Robin Hood-like figures of social justice (1989: 143). All in all, the massive indebtedness of a great part of Mongolian population to these merchants is widely remembered until today, and vigorously recalled whenever relationships between China and Mongolia are evoked. As a matter of fact, not only is there a very strong sentiment today that Chinese presence in Mongolia has been nothing but exploitative and ruinous, but moreover, Chinese people are seen as essentially greedy, animated by the unique will to selfishly appropriate the resources of Mongolia.

The exact extent to which these ideas are the direct outcome of Soviet inspired propaganda lies beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet, since commercial relations resumed between Mongolia and China in the early 1990s, as Chinese workers came to look for jobs, and as Chinese investors started to express their interest in Mongolian land and resources, the population widely expressed fears regarding Chinese people's appropriative intentions. Neo-nationalist movements such as Dayaar Mongol have given voice to these concerns (Billé 2010: 40, 45), which have also found expression in hip-hop songs – some of which have gone as far as to call for murder (Billé 2010: 37–38; Delaplace 2010: 139). More generally, rumours circulate about continuous attempts by Chinese government or population to exterminate, or at least harm, Mongolian people (Billé 2008).

## **Chinese ghosts in Mongolia**

One of these rumours, which could be heard particularly in Ulaanbaatar, but also in the Eastern region of Dornod where Mongolian, Russian and Chinese borders meet, is particularly telling. People report being haunted by "Chinese ghosts" (*Hyatad süns*): souls of Chinese merchants who allegedly remained attached to the goods – often gold or silk – they have buried under the ground before they died (Delaplace 2010; 2012). These ghosts appear as white-bearded old men, who speak in broken Mongolian and with a distinct Chinese accent. They claim their wealth, and threaten to harm anyone who dares to come too close to it. These stories often insist that although victims ask shamans and lamas to come and perform rituals, none of these are effective: Chinese "envious" (*shunalt*) souls are thought to stick to the place no matter what the new occupants do. Sometimes, the Mongol residents are even forced to satisfy the soul's greed with continuous gifts, until they can bear it no more and decide to move away.  These stories also tend to equate present-day Chinese businessmen with the colonial merchants of the past – those who are still resented today for ruining the Mongolian population before the Revolution (Fig. 14).

Fig. 14 Chinese merchants in Mongolia, beginning of twentieth century (©Mongolian National Archives)

These ideas about Chinese people's unbridled greediness and its cosmological implications are further illustrated through an experience related by a Mongolian (Buryat and Halh) shaman I interviewed in 2008 on the topic.  These "half-breed" (*erliiz*) people,

as she called them, had experienced many difficulties since the death of their parents, so they had called the shaman to have a ritual made to remedy the situation. In shamanic rituals, patients are supposed to give offerings to the shaman's auxiliary spirits (*ongod*), and on this occasion, spirits asked for five metres of silk. The family claimed they were poor, and apologised that they could only give a small piece of material. However, when the spirits started to possess the shaman, they became really angry, claiming that the house *did* in fact contain silk. The shaman, under her spirits' influence, started to jump repeatedly in one particular location in the house, and the floor sounded as if there was a cellar below it. The spirits then demanded that the family dug there. They did so, and discovered rolls and rolls of silk, as well as gold and other goods. They swore that they had no idea that there had been silk there. They seemed quite distressed to realise that their Chinese father had kept his wealth secret, even when he had died, and had chosen to bury it in the ground rather than pass it on to his own children.

Given these ideas about Chinese people's low economic morality, it seems quite interesting and indeed rather challenging that Mongols have chosen precisely Chinese people as privileged trading partners for iron and other goods. It is not only at an official level that trading relations have resumed between Mongolia and China:9 Gaëlle Lacaze's contribution to this volume shows how much cross-border trade owes to individual initiatives from Mongols who start and sustain economic relations with their Chinese neighbours.

Fig. 15 Model of Mongolian people's contrasted relations with their neighbours

9 According to statistics published in a report by the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA), the People's Republic of China went from receiving 1.7% (amounting to \$11.3 million) of Mongolia's total exports in 1990, to absorbing 46.6% of them (amounting to \$287 million) in 2003 ; besides, the part of Mongolia's total imports that came from China saw a sharp increase from 2.4% (\$22.3 million) in 1990 to 24.5% (\$196.3 million) in 2003 (Shagdar 2005: 31). The Bank of Mongolia's 2011 review for Mongolia's Foreign Trade states that 56% (or \$6327.5 million) of foreign trade in Mongolia (that is imports plus exports) was made with the People's Republic of China (quoted on http://www.infomongolia.com/ct/ci/3015/). Meanwhile, a 2010 World Bank report contends that the People's Republic of China absorbs no less than 70% of Mongolia's total exports, although it remains unclear whether this figure concerns 2008, before the recession, or 2010 (World Bank 2010: 1).

At this stage, it is possible to sketch a set of oppositions in the way Mongols seem to picture their relationships with their Chinese and Russians neighbours (Fig. 15). Relations with Russians, from Mongolian people's point of view, seem to be regarded as a classic relationship of gift exchange. Russians are thought to have provided Mongolia with modern infrastructure and with resources from the communist world channelled through the Soviet Union; conversely, Mongolians have occasionally provided Russians with raw material, such as minerals. As a result, the plunder of Mardai seems to be understood by the local population as a continuation of this gift-exchange relationship: the buildings appear to Mongols as a *supplementary* gift from Russians. Even though they have initially built Mardai for their exclusive use, Russians are understood to have left the buildings for Mongolian people's profit, thus demonstrating their generosity in the gift exchange process: they have given more than what was planned in the first place by leaving things – indeed the *best* things – behind.10 The embarrassment felt by people who took part in the stripping process seems to emerge from the idea that they took *more* from the Russians than they had given to them, as if the exchange process had been an asymmetrical one, to the benefit of the Mongols. This, however, fits with and even consolidates the ideology of an "elder brother" relationship elaborated through Soviet propaganda: an elder brother is indeed expected to provide for his younger sibling without insisting on an equivalent return (Sneath 2003: 48).

On the other hand, relations with Chinese are based on trade. It is also deemed an asymmetrical relationship, to Chinese people's benefit this time, as they are considered as parasites on Mongolian resources since the Manchu period. In opposition to the Russians, the Chinese are seen as always taking *more than initially planned* through unfair credit policy, even sucking out resources after their own death while their soul remains anchored in Mongol land.

10 There might be an interesting parallel to be made here with the general expectation of Mongolian herding families – which I could observe personally in Uvs province – that travellers staying over will leave some of their belongings behind when they leave. While honorific and often standardised gifts (pieces of silk, candies, biscuits, etc.) are usually expected at the beginning of a visit, it is not infrequent for guests to make more spontaneous and personal gifts at the end of it, particularly in the case of long sojourns. The host himself might occasionally choose what he wants among his guest's belongings, simply by asking for it. The gifts left by foreign travellers to Uvs province herding families, such as torch lights, cameras, or even cooking pans, have been described to me in great details by their recipients, as proof of their generosity.

## **Conclusion**

The two ethnographic situations considered in this chapter thus allow us to draw at least three conclusions:

Therefore, while they are not located specifically on the border area with Russia and with China, memories of foreign presences in Mongolia are found to *act as a border* – a device that separates and connects at the same time, that is open to some relations and closed to others, that is programmed to let some things go, and to retain others (see Introduction). In sum, Russian mining towns and Chinese ghosts are part of an apparatus which ties up memories, people and material vestiges into a border technology that qualifies and regulates Mongolian people's relationship with their neighbours.

# Appendix 1: Border-Crossing Infrastructure: The Case of the Russian-Mongolian Border

## *Valentin Batomunkuev*

The importance of cross-border cooperation between countries is a topical issue at a time when the increase of cross-border contacts plays an important part in international affairs and economic relations; Russia and its neighbouring countries in East and Southeast Asia are no exception. Yet the development of such cooperation is possible only if the border is seen not as a barrier but as a point of contact between countries. Such an active role, however, is made possible by a degree of border cooperation and is mediated by the border-crossing infrastructure.

In the specific, the border crossings in the Russian-Mongolian region studied in this appendix reveal a gap in the transport chain, a period of time during which the cargo or passengers remain immobile. Such delays bring additional costs which are especially significant at a time of increasing cargo and passenger traffic across the border.

For this reason, the Russian Federation now regards the fitting out and maintenance of border and customs infrastructure as a necessary step in the development of both its economic and diplomatic relations and its cross-border cooperation with Asian countries.

Border and customs infrastructure comprise the following:

The geographical area under consideration here is the Russian-Mongolian section of the state border, which passes through the territories of the four entities of the Russian Federation located within the Siberian federal district: the Altai Republic, Tuva, Buryatia and the Zabaikalsky Krai. Russia's land borders are 22,170 km long and the border with Mongolia represents 15.7% of the total length (3,485 km). The total length of Mongolia's border is 8161.9 km, 42.7% of it with Russia (along the Altai and Sayan mountain ranges), and the relatively flat section is confined to the valley of the Selenge River.

The Russian-Mongolian section of the border is characterised by a low checkpoint density, the average distance between permanent checkpoints being 387.2 km (Fig. 1).

The low checkpoint density in this area is due to the uniform distribution of checkpoints over the border regions of the Russian Federation: three functional checkpoints exist in the Zabaikalsky Krai, the Republic of Tuva and Buryatia. In the Altai Republic only one checkpoint is operational. Of these, four are multilateral, i.e. they allow passage of citizens of third countries. In addition these checkpoints provide the crossing line for vehicles of Kyakhta (Republic of Buryatia), Tashanta (Altai Republic) and Solovyovsk (Zabaikalsky Krai), and the railway crossing of Naushki (Republic of Buryatia).

A change of classification is currently under review for the multilateral road crossing point in Mondy (Republic of Buryatia). In 2009 and 2010, the Federal Agency for the Development of the State Border of the Russian Federation (Rosgranitsa) carried out a series of surveys of the conditions and operational state of checkpoints and other border and customs infrastructure. The study shows that of the 29 crossing points on the Russian-Mongolian border, only ten were properly equipped and fully operational. These ten checkpoints control virtually all freight and passenger traffic between Russia and Mongolia. Since April 2010, fourteen crossing points on the Russian-Mongolian border were closed as a prior study revealed that they were not functioning effectively due to lack of equipment and conflicting requirements by state bodies exercising control over checkpoints.

At present, nine permanent crossing points are operational along the Russian-Mongolian border, seven of them are road crossing points and two are railway crossing points.

Fig. 2 Permanent crossing points between Russia and Mongolia

The development of cross-border cooperation is not only a leading factor of regional integration, but it also strengthens the strategic partnership between countries. Figure 3, for example, provides data on the number of people who crossed the border during the period 1995–2008. In 2008, through eight checkpoints on the Russian-Mongolian border the number of arrivals and departures was 513,621. Out of these, 76.2% of passenger traffic crossed through the three checkpoints on the territory of the Republic of Buryatia: 52.3% through Kyakhta-Altan-Bulag, 20.1% through Naushki-Sühbaatar and 3.8% through Mondy-Khankh (Osodoev 2010).

Fig. 3 Number of people crossing the Russian-Mongolian border at border crossing points (1995–2008)

Figure 4 shows Mongolia's export and import flux through the Russian-Mongolian border in 2007. The main cargo stream is transported through Naushki-Sühbaatar (90.9%), Kyakhta-Altan-Bulag (4.0%), Solov'evsk-Erentsav (2,7%), Khandagaity-Borshoo (1.7%).

Fig. 4 Mongolia's exports and imports through checkpoints (2007, in million US dollars)

The relations between the two countries are currently reaching new heights on the basis of trade and economic partnerships and the development of border infrastructure, which is a crucial factor in cross-border cooperation. Recently a decision was made to give multilateral status to the "Khandagaity-Borshoo" and "Mondy-Khankh" checkpoints, to build customs and logistics terminals in the vicinity of the multilateral checkpoints of "Kyakhta-Altan-Bulag" and "Tashanta-Tsagaan Nuur" and to provide the necessary infrastructure.

A modernised infrastructure will increase traffic capacity while the equipping and modernisation of existing crossing points will enhance efficiency and reinforce a sense of spatial integration between countries. In establishing objectives and identifying the right approaches for the development of a border and customs infrastructure, a number of factors need to be taken into account:

The need to solve such challenging and often conflicting objectives led, in 2007, to the creation of the Federal Agency for the Development of the State Border of the Russian Federation (Rosgranitsa) whose mandate is the construction, technical equipment, and modernisation of checkpoints and border infrastructure. In the case of the Russian-Mongolian border, surveys conducted by Rosgranitsa reveal numerous shortcomings in the organisation of checkpoint activities. Although border checkpoints are being modernised they are still not well-integrated in the surrounding infrastructure, which is often obsolete. In particular, poor roads and communications and unreliable water and electricity supply inhibit the smooth functioning of these check-points.

It is difficult to calculate the costs involved in the modernisation of each crossing point due to the lack of reliable technical estimates. However, we can point out the main reasons for inadequate infrastructures, which include:

• Lack of territorial planning at checkpoint locations. This is often a source of conflict between parties during the modernisation work on checkpoints.

The inadequate state of checkpoints, which often stems from the inefficiency of federal agencies and institutions, has a negative effect on the economy of the region. It is crucial that the crossing points ensure a smooth commercial and passenger traffic through the state border. Hence the optimisation of border procedures must be a priority, in particular the shortening of control procedures, which has an immediate impact on checkpoints' efficiency and competitiveness.

In the Russian Federation building, fitting out and equipping checkpoints, as well as opening, closing and limiting their activities are regulated by the law of the Russian Federation ("On the State Border of the Russian Federation"). The Russian State Duma is currently considering a draft bill "On amendments to some legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection with the transfer of authority for the implementation of state control of the customs authorities by the Russian Federation". The bill proposes that all forms of control at the border (except for issues of border protection such as transport, health, veterinary and phytosanitary control) should be under the jurisdiction of a single body – the Federal Customs Service. It also proposes that border checkpoints are in charge only of customs and border protection services while other types of border control (health, veterinary, etc.) would be handled by different authorities. The purpose of this bill is to reduce the transit time of goods through the checkpoints, and to implement a "one window" structure on the border (on the basis of the "single window" experiment used since 2008 at Pskov customs posts).

In 2011, a new federal law on border checkpoints was adopted across the border of the Russian Federation. The draft bill sets the legal regime of checkpoints along Russia's state border and regulates the establishment, opening, operation and closure of checkpoints. Given the present state of checkpoints' infrastructure, the shortage of budgetary funds and the economic losses incurred, priority should be given to the modernisation of all existing checkpoints, to facilitating cooperation between all federal and regional services concerned, as well as fostering a close collaboration with neighbouring states for the legal resolution of border issues.

#### *242 Frontier Encounters*

Since 2011, the establishment of border infrastructures has been regarded as one of the priority areas in the development of the new federal target program "State Border of the Russian Federation" for the period up to 2017. Previously, within the framework of the programme "State Border of the Russian Federation (2003–2011)" headed by Rosgranitsa, the following major activities have been financed and implemented:

The fitting out of the state border plays an important part in the Russian Federation's border policy. The modern, technology-oriented look of a border is in the first place given by the checkpoints as they convey the "first impression" of a country, as well as being an important factor in the successful development of its foreign trade. As we have seen, however, the variable levels of technological compliance of checkpoints is slowing down the drive toward the modernisation of Russian borders.

Moreover, the development of cross-border cooperation contributes to the development of democratic processes in Russian-Mongolian relations and, as such, becomes an incentive for strengthening a strategic partnership. The role of cross-border cooperation is regarded by foreign and Russian scholars as a mechanism of socio-economic growth for border regions in the country. The development of modern infrastructures, including checkpoints, needs to be regarded as an area in which bordering countries cooperate. Such international cooperation is also needed for the development of tourism, the creation of trade and economic zones and the improvement of trade and economic activity, such as, for example, the supply of energy resources in Mongolia. The modernisation of border infrastructure (especially transport services, the service sector, the wholesale and retail trade in the municipalities and *aimags*)1 is thus needed for the socio-economic well-being of the people living in border areas who, by virtue of their geographic location, are in the best position to enjoy the advantages of international cooperation.

1 An administrative subdivision in Mongolia.

Appendix 2: Maps

Map 1. The border towns of Zabaykalsk (Russia) and Manzhouli (China). Map created by Philip Stickler.

Map 2. Legendary and historical Khori Buryat migrations. Map created by Philip Stickler.

Map 4. Numerous demarcation lines supplement the Sino-Russian international boundary. Map created by Philip Stickler.

## Bibliography of Works Cited

Benjamin, Walter. 1999. *The Arcades Project*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.

Il'in, V. N. 1997. *Esse o russkoy kul'ture*. St. Petersburg: Akropol

–. 2001 [1930]. *Les Civilisations: elements et formes* (electronic edition). Available at http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/mauss\_marcel/oeuvres\_2/oeuvres\_2\_13/ les\_civilisations.html (accessed 4.5.2012).

Mawdsley, Evan. 2007. *The Russian Civil War*. New York: Pegasus.

## Index

Administration 12, 14, 36, 40, 41, 43, 84, 96–99, 116, 120, 125, 127, 166, 170, 186, 197, 204, 229 administrative divisions 29, 44, 50, 53, 65, 188–91, 197, 243 Afghanistan 19 Aga (see Buryat) 139, 147, 162, 192 Aggression (Japanese) 185 *Aimag* 40, 127, 138, 156, 190, 191, 237, 243 Altai Mountain 10, 200, 202, 203, 205 Altai Republic 66, 236, 237 Altan-Bulag 238–39 Amur River 62, 67, 68, 87, 89, 97, 99, 101, 103, 104, 107–10 Anderson, Benedict 11, 199, 201 Anthrax 186 Anxiety 15, 20, 21, 30, 140 Architecture 30, 120, 257, 266 (see also Urbanism) Argun River 165 Arkhangelsk 185 Army Chinese 38, 42, 45, 127, 200, 204 Japanese 190 Kwantung 146, 190 Russian (Imperial) 87 Soviet 171, 172, 190 Arts-Sur' 237, 239 Ataman Semenov 151, 167, 168, 171, 173, 178 Barrier, cultural 183, 192 natural 37 psychological 10, 46–50, 152 Baruun Shenehen 191 Baruun Somon 157, 185 Bassin, Mark 57, 58, 59, 69 Bayan-Ölgii 237 Bears 10, 202, 203, 206 Belarus 30, 212 Bingtuan (see "Shengchan jianshe bingtuan") Biography, life story 114–17, 140, 146, 151, 156, 159, 167, 170, 175, 177, 179

Birobidzhan 104 Blagoveshchensk 87 Boli 伯力(see Khabarovsk) 27 Bolshevik 193, 228 anti-Bolshevik movement 151 language 174 Revolution 6 Border affective 51 "border civilisation" 60–61 border-crossing infrastructure 8, 30, 78, 193, 235–43 borderlands 1, 2, 6–7, 16, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30, 36, 37, 165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 180, 205 community 151, 162, 166, 167, 172, 176–81, 183, 184, 187, 188, 192, 194 control, procedures 2, 3, 8, 9, 13, 14, 40, 41, 84, 131, 166, 168, 183, 193, 209, 236, 237, 240, 241 crossing 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 16, 28, 30, 51, 64, 69, 111, 112, 116, 131, 135, 148, 149, 150, 154, 157, 158, 162, 184, 203, 205, 235–41 disputes 15, 19, 20, 31, 193 equipment 8–9, 171, 236, 237, 240, 242 guards 10, 30, 41, 61, 64, 65, 69, 103–05, 108, 131, 162, 167, 175, 191, 208 internal 39–47, 50–53, 62 inter-Mongolian 40–43 patrols (see Border guards) subversion 14–17, 99–110, 148–53 Borshoo 237, 239 Boundaries agreements 20 physical 28, 32, 53, 201, 248 (Map 4) political 20, 21, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 42, 50, 51, 52, 56, 62, 90, 99, 137, 140, 150, 183, 184, 185, 199, 201, 209, 248 (Map 4) social 30, 39, 47, 49, 51, 53, 141, 169, 191, 199, 205 spiritual 24, 69

Bribes 102, 105, 106 (Fig. 2), 131, 132, 203 Buddhism 48, 153, 220, 230 (see also Temple) Buildings 8, 28, 118, 120, 121, 146, 208, 213, 218, 222, 226, 228, 232, 233, 236, 242 (see also Infrastructure) Buriad (see Buryat) Buryat Aga 139, 147, 162, 192 Agin 139, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 161, 162, 186 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 138, 195, 196, 197, 212, 216, 225, 236–38 Barguzin 186 Khorin 186 Selenge 186 Shenehen 11, 140, 143, 144, 146, 149, 152–54, 159, 183–98 Bus 127, 208, 222 Business 9, 26, 78, 102–04, 205 Businessmen 123, 125, 127, 135, 203 (see also Entrepreneurs, Traders) Capital (flows), 76, 85, 199 Caterpillar fungus 冬蟲夏草 (*Dongchong xiacao*), 202 Catfish 101 Central Asia 14, 19, 58, 172, 173, 184, 220 Ceremony (see Ritual) *Chanjuud* 113, 114, 118, 123, 127, 135 Check points 8, 9, 193, 199, 204, 208, 236–43 China (People's Republic of China) 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19–23, 26–30, 33–53, 55–57, 59, 61–63, 65, 67, 69, 72–75, 77, 78, 80–82, 84–87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 101–05, 107–14, 121, 123–25, 130, 132, 134, 135, 138, 140, 147, 153, 157–59, 161–63, 165, 167, 168, 171–73, 175, 181, 183–85, 187, 189–96, 198, 200–04, 206, 207, 209, 211, 229, 231, 233, 245 (Map.  10)

Nomads 39, 41, 46, 53, 123, 137, 144, 168, 170, 184 semi-nomads 36, 39 North, Douglass C. 90, 91 Nostalgia 67, 142, 183, 192, 224–26 *Nutag* 49, 138, 141–47, 150, 153, 156–59, 161–63 Nutag (see also Homeland) *Oboo* (cairn) 24, 40, 41, 50, 141, 145, 146 Oirad 40 Onon River 150, 151, 159 Opium War (1839–1842) 36 Outer Mongolia 27, 40, 42 *Ovoo* (see Oboo) Pakistan 19 Panmongolism 46, 76, 191, 194 Passport 13, 125, 127, 131, 172, 207 Pastoralism 192, 194, 195, 198 Patrols 9, 16, 40, 41, 65, 148–50, 199, 203–06, 212 (see also Border guards) "Peaceful Rise" 和平崛起 20 Phobia 72–76, 80, 82, 86, 87, 108 Poachers 7, 107, 109 Chinese 25, 77, 89, 98, 107, 108 informal networks 16, 104 Russian 98 Pollution 48, 92, 96, 103 Population 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 34, 35, 39, 46, 50, 55, 56, 63, 64, 65, 69, 75, 77–87, 99, 101, 103, 107, 109, 168, 169, 177, 189, 190, 207, 211–32 Postsocialism 6, 81, 137, 179, 224 Poverty 92, 114, 134, 231 (see also Loss of revenues) Power 6, 11, 13, 22, 30, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 51, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, 67, 75, 87, 109, 110, 113, 114, 133, 142, 144, 145, 171, 177, 180, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 213, 220 Power stations 90, 122, 123, 236 Primorskii Krai 22, 27 Propaganda 76, 170–75, 178, 179, 181, 201, 207, 228, 229, 232 Prostitution 111–35 Purges 189, 200, 220 Purity 9, 16, 34, 59, 67, 72, 157, 178, 180

Putin, Vladimir 63

Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) 5, 9, 10, 20, 35–36, 38–51, 53, 165, 184, 186, 200, 228, 229 Racial discourse; race; racism 6, 10, 72–75, 82–86, 167, 169, 170, 173, 180 Railways 8, 78, 111, 115, 117, 120, 121, 126, 127, 186, 188, 212, 215, 219, 236–38 (see also Chinese Eastern Railway) Reclamation (of land), 201 Refugees 14, 47, 72, 85, 139, 145, 172, 186, 188, 194 Relations border 19 cross-border 9, 71, 127, 211, 214, 233 gender 114 interethnic 11, 59, 63, 71–89, 155, 174, 214, 215, 229, 232, 233 (see also Ethnicity) international 20, 36, 63, 71, 155, 157, 165, 185, 186, 189, 211, 235, 239, 243 power 114 sexual 129, 131 social 125, 139, 142, 150, 156, 158, 171, 177, 183, 188, 194, 196, 198 trade 125, 135, 229, 231, 235 Religion 48, 51, 67, 68, 79, 91, 168, 172, 178–80, 220 Renminbi (RMB) 人民币 (see Money) Repatriation 6, 11, 158, 177, 192, 195, 213 Resettlements 72, 168, 195, 197 Resolution (of disputes) 19, 26, 241 Resources common pool 16, natural 31, 65, 81, 85, 89–98 Returnees 6, 194, 195, 197 Revolution Bolshevik 6 Cultural Revolution 文化大革命 6, 28, 49, 52, 172, 189, 191, 192 Mongolian People's 188 Rinchino Elbegdorj 188 Ritual 9, 16, 47, 67, 123, 137–63, 173–77, 180, 195, 207, 208, 214, 230, 231 (see also Funeral practices) Road networks 8, 64, 78, 111, 113, 121, 123, 193, 203, 204, 208, 218, 236–42

Rosgranitsa (Russian Federal Agency for the Development of the State Border) 237, 240, 242 Ruins 8, 34, 211–33 Rumours 20, 221, 213, 219, 224, 229, 230 Russia, Tsarist 56, 166, 168, 169, 175, 200 Russian language 15, 19–31, 63, 138, 204, 215 people 38, 49, 50, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64–69, 72, 75, 77–80, 83, 86, 89–110, 144, 156, 157, 161, 162, 167, 169–81, 185, 186, 192, 197, 211–14, 218–21, 224–33 Federation 56, 65, 90, 93, 95, 96, 211, 235–37, 240–42 Orthodoxy 28, 58, 66–68, 80, 169, 172 -Japanese War 87 Sahlins, Peter 26, 56 Sakhalin Island 23, 105 Salmon 16, 101, 102, 104, 109 Chum 101 Humpback 105, 109 Satellite image 8, 9, 28, 115, 119 Sayan Mountain Range 236 School 76, 113, 120, 172, 178, 192, 195, 212, 216, 222, 223, 225, 226 Sea of Okhotsk 27 Security 14, 63, 65, 69, 77, 97, 109, 185, 204, 208, 209 Segregation 39–50, 178 Selenge Aimag 238 Buryats 186 River 236 Semenov, Ataman 151, 167, 168, 171, 173, 178 Semenovtsy 173, 175, 177, 179, 180 Settlement by Buryats 139, 145, 146, 159, 194, 195, 197 by Chinese 50, 79, 84 by Cossacks 64 by illegal migrants 83 by Russians 77, 212, 215 of claims (see Resolution) Sex industry (see Prostitution) Shamanism 16, 148, 149, 151, 170, 230, 231 Shanghai 上海, 205

Shanghai Five 192 Shara-Sur 237, 239 Shenehen (see Buryat Shenehen, Baruun Shenehen, Shenehen Zuun) Shenehen Zuun 191 *Shengchan jianshe bingtuan* 生产建设兵 团 200, 201, 204 Shops 117, 118, 120, 125, 129, 178, 193, 208, 212, 213, 216, 229 sex shops 129 Shuangchengzi 双城子 (see also Ussuriisk) 27 Siberia 21, 27, 40, 61, 79, 83, 86, 87, 138, 158, 162, 166, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 185, 192, 198, 228, 236 Eastern 138, 151, 158, 162, 166 Outer 165 Southern 40, 169, 185 taiga 1, 5, 57 Simmel, Georg 11, 12, 49, 72 Sinicisation 26, 76, 77 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement 19, 193 split 28, 46, 63, 83, 184, 200, 229 Smuggling 7, 64, 77, 91, 94, 97–99, 102, 103, 193 Solovyovsk 237–38 *Somon* 155, 157, 185, 190, 191 Song Dynasty (960–1279) 38, 47 Songs 64, 67, 69, 150, 151, 157, 162, 229 Sovereignty 14, 40, 51, 71, 75, 81, 97, 191, 201, 212 Soviet government 22, 28, 45, 46, 183, 185, 215, 220 regime 6, 66 army (see Army) period 64, 73, 83, 87, 99, 100, 154, 180 prisons 149–51, 153, 172, 189, 190 secret police 146 society 171, 174, 177–79 specialists 167, 178, 179 troops 172, 184, 189, 190 Union 5, 19, 30, 37, 56, 57, 58, 68, 137, 143, 146, 152, 154, 156, 157, 165–67, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 179–81, 188–91, 193, 201, 209, 212, 215, 216, 225, 226, 232 -Chinese relations 185, 189

illegal and extralegal 65, 102, 202, 203, 219, 221 informal 7, 104, 111, 213, 219, 221 international 7, 45, 69, 201, 231, 239, 242, 243 retail 78, 80, 113, 118, 125, 135, 230–32, 243 suitcase; itinerant; shuttle 111, 113, 114, 118, 127, 192 wholesale 113, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123, 129, 135, 218, 243 turnover 239 Traders Chinese 16, 31, 77, 125, 213, 230–32 Mongolian 111, 116 (Fig. 3), 118, 123, 125, 126, 135 Traffic cargo, goods 235, 239, 240, 241 passengers 235, 237, 238, 241 Trafficking 98, 101, 102, 106 Tragedy of Accessibility (see "Tragedy of the Commons") "Tragedy of the Commons" 89, 90, 93, 110 Train (see Railways) Transbaikalia 66, 167–81 Transparency (policy of transparency), 211 Transport air 31, 236 chain 193, 235, 239 public 222 road 125–27, 156, 193, 240, 241, 243 water 222, 236 Trespassing 10, 41, 52, 53 Truck 113, 125, 219 Tsagaan-Nuur 237, 239 Tsagaan-Tolgoi 237, 239 Tsarist Russia (see Russia) Tsydypov, Tsyden-Eshe 188 Turpan 吐鲁番 203 Tuva 27, 202, 205, 236, 237 Uda River 27 Ukraine 29, 30, 212, 242, Ulaanbaatar 115, 127, 135, 159, 180, 213, 223, 230 Ulan-Ude 65, 159, 160, 225 Ulkhun 238 Unemployment 109, 193, 198 Ungern-Sternberg, Baron 87, 167

Urbanism 112, 116–23, 177 (see also Architecture) Urga (Ulaanbaatar) 188 Urumqi 乌鲁木齐 203, 204, 208 USSR (see Soviet Union) Ussuriisk 27, 64 Uzbekistan 212 Verkhny Ulkhun 238 Veterinary control 102, 105, 241 Violence 6, 33, 37, 42, 46, 50, 74, 77, 108, 134, 173, 227 Visa regime 13, 14, 104, 113, 125, 192 Vladivostok 27, 102, 103 Wall (see Fence, Great Wall) War Chinese Civil War, 52 Opium War (1839–1842), 36 Russian Civil War 6, 16, 64, 87, 148, 149, 171, 173–75, 179–81, 183, 185, 191 Russian-Japanese 87 World War I 85, 185 World War II 69, 139, 151, 178, 185, 190, 215

Water resources 89–110, 142 supply 8, 236, 240 Website (see Internet) Wedding 159 Willow Palisade 10, 32, 33–36, 39, 45–47, 50, 53 Wilson, Thomas M. 2, 6, 8, 11, 21, 26, 37 Wolves 145, 202 X-ray inspection systems 242 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 新疆维吾尔自治区, 24, 30, 53, 129, 199, 200, 202, 203, 205–08 Yakub Beg 200 "Yellow Peril" 11, 73–78, 81–87 Yunnan Province 云南, 205 Yurt, 114, 115, 131–34, 142, 144, 145 Zabaikalsk 28, 139, 236, 237, 238 Zavkhan 237 *zheltoschyok* (Elopichthys bambusa), 100, 101

Zhunghar Mongols 200

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Knowledge is for sharing

## Frontier Encounters Knowledge and Practice at the Russian, Chinese and Mongolian Border

Edited by Franck Billé, Grégory Delaplace and Caroline Humphrey

China and Russia are rising economic and political powers that share thousands of miles of border. Yet, despite their proximity, their interactions with each other, and with their third neighbour Mongolia, are rarely discussed. Although the three countries share a boundary, their traditions, languages and worldviews are remarkably different.

*Frontier Encounters* presents a wide range of views on how the borders between these unique countries are enacted, produced, and crossed. It sheds light on global uncertainties: China's search for energy resources and the employment of its huge population, Russia's fear of Chinese migration, and the precarious independence of Mongolia as its neighbours negotiate to extract its plentiful resources.

Bringing together anthropologists, sociologists and economists, this timely collection of essays offers new perspectives on an area that is currently of enormous economic, strategic and geo-political relevance.

*As with all Open Book publications, this entire book is available to read for free on the publisher's website. Printable PDF and ebook editions, together with supplementary digital material, can also be downloaded:*

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*5.4.5 Vulnerable populations*

Overall, children, elderly, indigenous groups, poor individuals, outdoor workers, remote populations, and subjects with pre-existing conditions are disproportionately affected by climate change (**Figure 19**) [1, 2, 5, 30–32, 35–37].

Low-income and geographically vulnerable countries (e.g., Bangladesh) are most affected by the health consequences of climate change (at least in its earlier stages). However, in higher-income countries (e.g., USA), there is also a high

**213**

*Impact of Climate Change on Life*

several investigations [26, 39].

*DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94538*

**6. Climate change adaptation in animals**

their eggs earlier to match insect availability for their young.

**7. Climate change adaptive and preventive strategies**

allow the development of efficient conservation action plans.

the society [1–3, 5, 16, 18, 31, 32, 35–37, 40].

environmental, and economic benefits.

vulnerability in some ethnic and socio-economic groups as demonstrated by the Chicago heatwave of 1995 and the New Orleans hurricane Katrina of 2005. According to the World Health Organization, the global mortality in 2004 as a result of climate change was around 141,000 of which 85% were children. The mortality of the European heat wave of 2003 affected mainly the elderly.

Adaptive evolution of phenotypes to climate change has been the subject of

Animals react to climate change in three ways: to move, to adapt, or to die. Moving to a new territory is not always a simple solution and can create new challenges (e.g., interaction with unfamiliar species and more competition for food). Some animals can adapt to changing conditions. An interesting example of adaptation to climate change is the case of polar bears. With the change in climate, polar bears who usually used seal pubs and other marine mammals as food, have started hunting animals available on land (e.g., snow geese and caribou). However, there is no proof that the change in diet can support the polar bear population in the long run. Another example of adaptation to climate change is with migrating birds. As spring arrives earlier, insects emerge earlier. Some migrating birds are laying

Adaptation to deleterious consequences of climate change and prevention of aggravation of climate change are important components of the global response of

Adaptation (spontaneous or planned) is especially important in developing countries. Policymakers must implement personalized adaptive strategies, especially in the vulnerable populations. The risk control to population health cannot be implemented efficiently at the local level alone. It requires coordinated international policy. Human beings rely on biodiversity and functioning ecosystems for water, food, and health. If other species are unable to adapt to climate change, the consequences for humans could be extremely serious. Adaptive strategies require investment and skills. Society needs to implement strategies to help wildlife adapt to the impacts of climate change (e.g., wildlife overpass and drinking stations). Identification of traits contributing to resilience and vulnerability of species will

Prevention (long-term strategies) is a key approach. To spare species and protect humans, the greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced as soon as possible. If we drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions, our climate may reach a new and potentially acceptable equilibrium. Development and deployment of low-carbon energy technologies, policies to reduce fossil fuel burning, forest preservation, and reforestation should be promoted. Carbon sequestration, by capturing and storing atmospheric carbon dioxide, can decrease the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and reduce climate change. More energy-efficient homes and vehicles using alternative energies from sun, wind, and waves are needed. Increased use of public transportation, cycling, and walking should be promoted. It is also helpful if humans could reduce the consumption of animal-based food (red meat) and switch to plant-based diet (fruits and vegetables). This type of dietary change can have multiple health,

**Figure 19.** *Climate change disproportionately impacts vulnerable populations.*

#### *Impact of Climate Change on Life DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94538*

*Environmental Issues and Sustainable Development*

health, and financial consequences and violent conflicts).

Climate change by creating unsuitable living conditions (e.g., desertification, sea-level rise, decline in freshwater availability, food shortage, health issues) will move many people (forced displacement, planned resettlement, migration). Poor communities are particularly impacted by the human movement. It is estimated that by 2050, up to several hundred million persons will be moved (**Figure 18**) [32]. Population movement will expose countries to multiple challenges (e.g., social,

Overall, children, elderly, indigenous groups, poor individuals, outdoor workers, remote populations, and subjects with pre-existing conditions are disproportion-

Low-income and geographically vulnerable countries (e.g., Bangladesh) are most affected by the health consequences of climate change (at least in its earlier stages). However, in higher-income countries (e.g., USA), there is also a high

ately affected by climate change (**Figure 19**) [1, 2, 5, 30–32, 35–37].

*Climate change disproportionately impacts vulnerable populations.*

*5.4.4 Population movement*

*5.4.5 Vulnerable populations*

*Climate change causes population movement.*

**Figure 18.**

**212**

**Figure 19.**

vulnerability in some ethnic and socio-economic groups as demonstrated by the Chicago heatwave of 1995 and the New Orleans hurricane Katrina of 2005. According to the World Health Organization, the global mortality in 2004 as a result of climate change was around 141,000 of which 85% were children. The mortality of the European heat wave of 2003 affected mainly the elderly.