**Challenges of Post-COVID-19 for a Sustainable Development Society**

Editors

**Sandro Serpa Carlos Miguel Ferreira**

MDPI ' Basel ' Beijing ' Wuhan ' Barcelona ' Belgrade ' Manchester ' Tokyo ' Cluj ' Tianjin

*Editors* Sandro Serpa Sociology University of the Azores Ponta Delgada Portugal Carlos Miguel Ferreira ESTE ESTE Estoril Portugal

*Editorial Office* MDPI St. Alban-Anlage 66 4052 Basel, Switzerland

This is a reprint of articles from the Special Issue published online in the open access journal *Societies* (ISSN 2075-4698) (available at: www.mdpi.com/journal/societies/special issues/Post COVID-19).

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## **Contents**

## *Editorial* **Challenges of Post-COVID-19 for a Sustainably Developed Society**

**Sandro Serpa 1,2,3,\* and Carlos Miguel Ferreira 4**

The COVID-19 pandemic has prompted both preventive and reactive disease control measures, such as lockdown, physical distancing, and mask use, among others [1–11]. These measures have exerted influence in virtually all domains of social life [12,13], acting as a "cultural break point" [14] (p. 1) in the physical but also in the virtual world. According to Echegaray [15] (p. 568), "These measures caused a 'social recession' as it brought face-to-face inter-personal interaction to its minimum expression except among other household members, with social connections eventually migrating to the internet-mediated online sphere".

This Special Issue gathers contributions on the analysis of the "Challenges of post-COVID-19 for a sustainable development society", which are varied, multiple and interdependent of an interdisciplinary nature in various areas, such as health, social, economic, ecological, political, educational, and moral areas, among others, towards increasing sustainability [16]. The fulfilment of the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [17] is, undoubtedly, a complex process involving various actors, powers, and interests, to which the fact that human beings are generally averse to changes in socio-cultural patterns must be added [11,18].

In addition to being unexpected and unplanned, the COVID-19 pandemic was, as a result, a generator of high uncertainty about the present but also about the future [19], demonstrating that unpredictability cannot be disregarded in any social process [1,5,14]. Still, and without over extrapolating or falling into the error of continuity or "new normal vs old normal" dichotomy [15], it is possible to consider the opening of potential futures and sustainable development opportunities to (re)discover if we do not stick to "business as usual" [2,6,7,9,15,20–24]. In the words of Zinn [18] (p. 613), "To what extent the opportunity for global learning is taken up remains to be seen. There is little doubt, however, that pandemics will contribute to long-term changes in human attitudes and behavior towards the environment and the technologically shaped lifeworld".

We are pleased to acknowledge all the professional collaborations provided by the Editorial Office of *Societies* journal, as well as the trust placed in us by the Editor-in-Chief, Prof. Dr. Gregor Wolbring, and a group of reviewers, which resulted in very rigorous but, at the same time, constructive evaluations, and contributed greatly to maintaining a high level of scientific demand for this Special Issue. This resulted in a very interesting and heuristically pertinent contribution.

To summarize the main characteristics of the manuscripts published in this Special Issue of *Societies* journal, "Challenges of Post-COVID-19 for a Sustainable Development Society": 18 manuscripts were submitted, nine were accepted and published (five articles—as original empirical research—and four concept papers—contributing with new insights but

**Citation:** Serpa, S.; Ferreira, C.M. Challenges of Post-COVID-19 for a Sustainably Developed Society. *Societies* **2022**, *12*, 66. https:// doi.org/10.3390/soc12020066

Received: 30 March 2022 Accepted: 1 April 2022 Published: 6 April 2022

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

without mobilizing new empirical information). Table 1 summarizes some characteristics of the published manuscripts [25–33].

**Table 1.** Some characteristics of the published manuscripts.

Source: Table prepared by the authors.

In any case, and whatever the developments in the post-COVID 19 world, it is critical to consider individual and/or collective inequalities of various kinds, and materialized in numerous ways [1,7,34–36]. According to Leach et al. [5] (p. 4), "Epidemics are often said to be mirrors to society and COVID-19 has revealed a highly unequal world. It has highlighted inequalities and structural vulnerabilities, often the result of long histories of marginalization. Although the virus initially spread in richer countries, the trends soon reversed".

One example of these inequalities reinforced by COVID-19, among many others that we could point out, is closely linked to the digital divide, and it has been demonstrated that, with the closure of schools, socially and economically disadvantaged students have found it more difficult to keep up with school subjects [10,37,38].

We are confident that our readers will appreciate this contribution toward (re)thinking the post-COVID-19 period in a desirably more sustainable world, which will always be necessary in a permanently built balance between society, nature, and technology [18]. In this balance, citizenship exercised in a conscious way, scientific interdisciplinarity, the community–scientists–political decision relationship and communication, and collective cooperation (group, national, and transnational) are crucial elements for success in achieving this goal [3,21].

**Funding:** This research was funded by the University of Azores, Interdisciplinary Centre of Social Sciences-CICS.UAc/CICS.NOVA.UAc, UID/SOC/04647/2020, with the financial support of FCT/MEC through national funds, and when applicable, co-financed by FEDER under the PT2020 Partnership Agreement.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **References**

## *Concept Paper* **Learning for the Future beyond COVID-19: A Critical Alternative to the Neoliberal Model of Development**

**David Neilson**

Department of Sociology, The University of Waikato, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand<EMAIL_ADDRESS>
**Abstract:** This paper reviews how COVID-19 became a global pandemic, why we now have to live with it, and what needs to be done to stop viruses going global in the future. Specifically, it argues that the still prevailing neoliberal model of development combined with related forms of class structure and ideological struggle all but guaranteed that the priorities of global capital and its agents, along with COVID-19, would win out in the end. Vaccinations have become the only path for resolving the tension between neoliberal capitalism and COVID-19 suppression. However, they take time to develop, are hampered by the capitalist model of vaccine production and distribution, and face a resistant alienated precariat. As a critical alternative, this article explores the neoliberal model of development's democratic socialist transformation with particular reference to the prevention of global pandemics.

**Keywords:** COVID-19; neoliberal model of development; democratic socialist model of development; class; ideology; anomie; moral regulation

#### **1. Introduction**

The "neoliberal model of development" comprises a global market regulatory form of capitalism that defines the terrain of capital accumulation, which centrally comprises global production and distribution circuits plus tourist-led service sectors [1]. This mode of globalization, that spreads things and people backwards and forwards between and within nation states, initially carried the virus to the countries of the world. In turn, nation states that have become increasingly integrated into this global market economy and thus less and less self-sufficient, cannot quickly decouple and switch to localized regimes of accumulation. In short, they face economic problems when they close their borders, but they must close them if they are to stop the virus spreading into the local community. The longer a country closes its borders, the greater the economic, as well as social and political, fallout. In the end, keeping secure borders has proved unsustainable because countries are dependent on remaining open to the world.

Through under-estimation of the threat and inadequate border closing strategies, the virus has streamed into many countries. Subsequently, many countries have adopted inadequate strategies to stop the local spread. The world's hegemon USA, especially during Trump's presidency, is the classic example of all of these problems. Beyond the success of authoritarian regimes not discussed here, only a few state-led national movements of coordinated solidarity or compliance were able to quickly eliminate COVID-19's first wave community spread and thus avoid serious economic fallout. However, in a world where the virus has spread nearly everywhere, even limited international interaction has meant that the borders in such countries would be breached again, thus forcing another round of community trench warfare with COVID-19. As local economic and social hardships increased and multiplied with each new wave of incoming infections, that to make matters worse has mutated into much more infectious variants, the elimination strategy has been revealed as only a means of buying time before vaccinations came on-line.

**Citation:** Neilson, D. Learning for the Future beyond COVID-19: A Critical Alternative to the Neoliberal Model of Development. *Societies* **2022**, *12*, 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc12020032

Academic Editors: Sandro Serpa, Carlos Miguel Ferreira and Simon Susen

Received: 2 November 2021 Accepted: 18 February 2022 Published: 24 February 2022

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

Promoted by the failure to eliminate community spread and the coming on-line of vaccines, the "return to normalcy" project is now winning out everywhere including in those countries that had done well in stamping out the initial spread. Specifically, across the advanced capitalist countries governments are negotiating an emerging consensus between business, health professionals, and much of the broader population that combines a hard push to maximize vaccination rates with a staggered return to "business as usual".

Nonetheless, the vaccination strategy is problematic in this neoliberal world of unequal development. For the Global South, the problem is the lack of vaccine supplies. They are last in the vaccine queue because the pharmaceutical industry is driven by profit and the Global North gets preferential treatment [2]. However, once the virus begins to spread through the population, it can mutate and then spread back to the global North. Furthermore, although there is adequate supply in the advanced capitalist countries, they are confronted with a heterogeneous minority, over-represented by the precarious and alienated who continue to be non-compliant. The problem is that avoiding overwhelming national spread requires high levels of vaccine compliance amongst the population. Finally, these problems will have to be confronted repeatedly because vaccines are not long lasting or completely effective and as the virus mutates may require new vaccine formulations.

In sum, this very infectious virus that has been able to spread and mutate across this neoliberal-led capitalist world of internationally divided and unevenly developed countries has rendered closed borders and lockdowns ultimately ineffective for all countries. Advanced capitalist countries are moving decisively to primary reliance on vaccinations. This reliance legitimates a new kind of neoliberal abnormal normalcy where the return to free movement within and between countries combines with acceptance that COVID-19 is here to stay. For the countries of the Global South, the reality is grimmer. Although in the most need due to economic vulnerability, inadequate health systems, and large poor and slum populations, they are without adequate vaccine access. Especially in terms of the situation of the alienated and vulnerable precariat, the Global South situation resonates with many of the more neoliberalized countries of the Global North. Nonetheless, the return to normalcy with COVID-19 gathers steam as health-first closedowns viciously interact with growing economic instability that even before the virus was threatening to become another global economic crisis.

The existing literature on COVID-19 that is growing every day covers many, including epidemiological, psychological, sociological, geographical, political-economic, disciplines. This article's conceptual approach is situated within critical political economy perspectives, which it draws on, but it also builds specifically on the author's existing research agenda that goes beyond much of the existing literature. In particular, this article offers a global overview perspective of COVID-19 that is rooted in the author's conception of a 'model of development' that builds beyond methodologically nationalist and praxis-free standard regulation theory [1,3,4]. It argues, innovatively, that COVID-19 is the latest expression of the catastrophic failure of the "neoliberal model of development" that is driving a planetwide descent towards collapse. In this respect, this article brings in a "methodological trans-nationalism" beyond the "methodological nationalism" that dominates existing literatures, especially the influential critical geography perspective that flows through into the examination of COVID-19. In this later approach, neoliberalization and COVID-19 are examined as two spreading viruses, evolving "in different ways in different contexts" in "co-pathogenic interaction" that have resulted in global health insecurities [5,6].

By stylistically overviewing key developments within the terms of its innovative conceptual framework, this paper outlines elements of a novel mid-range argument regarding the major global contours of the context and process of COVID-19's social transmission across the world. Within the context of the unfolding 'neoliberal model of development', the paper makes a broad distinction between the Global North, comprising the wealthy industrially advanced capitalist democracies, and the Global South, that most clearly refers to the poor and uncompetitive 'underdeveloped' countries. It also offers a broad global class analysis, unavoidably without detailed quantitative description, of the process of

virus transmission and associated ideological struggles around social distancing and vaccinations. This conceptual paper demonstrates the need and agenda for, but does not actually deliver, detailed empirical comparative investigation of the countries of the world. Nonetheless, its critical focus on key problems of the neoliberal model of development central to why we have lost the war on COVID-19, raise fundamental themes regarding the need for, and the general characteristics of, an alternative model of development.

The author's perspective though drawing on, also goes beyond the growing Marxist literature on COVID-19 (e.g., [7]) by focusing much more persistently on a mid-range perspective whose ultimate focus is on the possibility of consciously making another world based in the democratic socialist transformation of the neoliberal model of development. The neoliberal causes of the present global pandemic gripping the whole of human civilization point viscerally towards the urgency of formulating and pursuing an alternative democratic socialist model of development. In short, with specific reference to COVID-19, this article focuses on the alternative that is in the critique of the neoliberal model of capitalist development and its associated ideology. It makes the case that this neoliberal project is responsible for COVID-19 becoming a global pandemic that we will just have "to learn to live with". This general argument is examined through the major pre-vaccination and vaccination stages of the struggle against COVID-19. It is organized in terms of an "alternative is in the critique" approach that moves from regulation theory themes of "accumulation regime" and "mode of regulation" to then bring in themes of class structure, class struggle, and the war of ideological position. The concluding discussion revisits the article's primary argument with particular reference to an alternative model of development that could prevent global pandemics in the future.

#### **2. The General Argument for a Critical Alternative to the Neoliberal Model of Development**

In standard regulation theory, a "model of development" refers to a "mode of regulation", or ensemble of laws, policies, and norms, which defines the institutional terrain on which unfolds an "accumulation regime" understood as a dynamically reproducing pattern of production, investment, and consumption [8–10]. The standard approach, however, is constrained by "methodological nationalism" and an over-emphasis on "political contingency" as a process of "accidental discovery". In contrast, in the non-standard approach adopted here, a model of development refers to a consciously designed and calculated trans-national project to get countries to adopt a national regulatory template. Widespread adoption of this prescribed template as a national mode of regulation creates the terrain on which unfolds a national–trans-national regime of accumulation that sets the priorities and constraints of capitalist agency, and in turn, national economic agency. Further, the revised approach offered here distinguishes between the postwar Keynesian-led "Fordist model of development" and rather than a post-Fordist era without a model of development as in the standard view, treats the post-1980s as being dominated by the "neoliberal model of development". In historical practice, national–trans-national connections deliberately constructed as a conscious praxis rather than "accidentally discovered" commonly define both models of development. However, while the former Keynesian model "counteracted", the later neoliberal model has "proactivated", capital logic [1,3].

At Bretton Woods, Keynes pushed for the widespread adoption of his national-centric regulatory template that restrained international capital and facilitated local national accumulation. In contrast, the neoliberal model of development has directly reversed the Keynesian direction. Under the auspices of the "Washington Consensus", UN regulatory agencies of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization have successfully sought the widespread adoption of its national template that has opened up countries to the unimpeded movement of capital across and within national borders. In aggregate, this project has created the regulatory terrain of global market competition between capitalist firms, and in turn, "locational competition" between countries. This model of development has unleashed the unfolding of a highly unstable and

crisis-ridden planetary regime of accumulation. Consequences include deepening uneven development between and within countries, a growing relative surplus population, recurring economic crises, deepening competition and mistrust between countries and an associated rise of "regressive nationalism", rapidly deteriorating planet-wide ecological integrity, and now a global pandemic [4,11].

The general argument applied specifically here to COVID-19 is as follows. The neoliberal model of development has created the terrain on which has unfolded global circuits of accumulation that move people backwards and forwards across the planet and thereby rapidly spread the virus. The WHO struggles to lead a coordinated international effort to stop the virus because it is both underfunded and undermined by the competitive imperatives and ethos unleashed globally and locally by the neoliberal model of development. It also confronts a trans-national regime of accumulation that undermines sustainable local accumulation and instead creates global market dependency, thereby making it economically unsustainable for countries to decouple from capital's global circuits that spread the virus. Fighting the virus within countries is hampered not only by local capital's dependence on extensive human movement, but also by the contemporary neoliberal-led nature of class structure and ideological struggle within nation states. This general critique, that points directly towards the urgency of constructing and deploying an alternative model of development, is now applied to accumulation, regulation, class structure, and ideological struggle.

#### *2.1. Neoliberal-Led Mode of Global Material Accumulation Regime Spreads the Virus: Glocalization Is the Alternative*

The neoliberal-led globalization of capital accumulation has created a world where national survival is dependent on maintaining viable positions in a world of global market standards of global market competitiveness [1,4]. Viability manifests in terms of the form of globalized production and distribution chains and for which countries are its geopolitical links. That is, countries unevenly house different specialized segments of globally networked circuits of production, and secure different shares of the globalized tourist driven service sector chain. National economic viability has become dependent on being able to house sufficient niches of globally competitive production and tourists that will bring in more revenue than the cost of importing everything else. Countries, dependently integrated into this global framework of accumulation, lose any semblance of local self-sufficiency such that economic instability will follow quickly if a country seeks to seal its borders.

Countries thus face a zero-sum trade-off situation. On the one hand, they are inextricably integrated into the economic logic of neoliberal globalization that entails the free movement of people across and within national borders. Accumulation occurs as a complexly integrated global division and distribution of production and services that integrally involves high levels of international movement amongst the population. It includes moving occupations such as in transportation, seafaring, and air travel. It also includes international movement of cosmopolitan middle class tourists, managerial coordinators of globally mobile capital, and competitors in professionalized global sports. As well, because of the globalization of the labor market, it also includes movement of globally scarce skilled workers, tradespeople, professionals, as well as seasonal workers imported from lower waged countries. As a function of this extensive global flow of people unleashed by neoliberal globalization, COVID-19 spreads to the countries of the world. However, on the other hand, in order to prevent the incoming flow of the virus, nation states must stop this inflow of people from beyond its borders on which it is economically dependent.

Global and thus local economic viability is dependent on the smooth functioning of this complexly interdependent system of globally integrated accumulation that looks a lot like the Japanese model of lean production writ large [12]. While more flexible than the single integrated assembly line system of Fordist mass production lean, "Just In Time" inventory systems are much more fragile than the more forgiving "Just In Case"

inventory systems of Fordism that can function as built-in buffers to counteract temporary disruptions in the chain of supply. Moreover, especially when raised to being a global framework for organizing the accumulation of many different products across globally dispersed geographical locations, the "Just In Time" lean production paradigm is revealed to be unwieldly, fragile, and inflexible, and unable to adapt to shocks that disrupt links in the chain. Without the free movement of people, and integrally as people fall sick with COVID-19, then steps in the global supply chain of the neoliberal mode of capital accumulation break down [13].

While the lean production model makes segments of the assembly chain temporarily independent of each other in order to deal with disruptions elsewhere in the process, this simply does not translate into a global supply chain scenario of a global pandemic. That is, when the links in the accumulation chain that are geographically dispersed across the planet are disrupted by border closures, then the whole system breaks down. In addition, countries understood as the geographical expression of these links cannot just decouple from this global network and switch to a locally self-sufficient alternative. There is no Plan B; the world's population spread across the countries of the planet are all materially dependent on the continuation of this globally integrated capital accumulation framework. Thus, while the only sure way to keep COVID-19 out at the national level is to keep borders closed, this globally integrated accumulation system requires national borders to be open. COVID-19 thereby reveals that this globally integrated system of accumulation, which also has numerous other including ecological problems, is fragile, unwieldly, and inflexible.

However, immaterially, the neoliberal form of economic globalization is inefficiently perpetuating uneven development across countries by constraining the maximal spread of knowledge to the world's population. That is, the neoliberal mission to privatize almost everything, from space to DNA to knowledge, is a serious restraint on efficient immaterial globalization that perpetuates uneven development. Further, unlike material globalization, immaterial globalization does not spread viruses.

The alternative is in the critique. Rather than globally integrated material accumulation coordinated by privatized knowledge, the way forward is encapsulated in the concept of 'cosmopolitan glocalization'. More specifically, the alternative accumulation paradigm proposed would be based in a global project underpinned by an ethos of global cooperation and institutions of shared knowledge that would prioritize where practically possible the capacity of countries to flexibly and independently develop sustainable local accumulation regimes. The accumulation paradigm envisaged is one where globally coordinated knowledge and expertise would be made universally available to inform and develop local forms of material production. In a direct reversal of the present neoliberal model of accumulation, the intensified globalization of knowledge would drive locally distributed systems of production. Priority would be given to material viability and human security beginning with the poorest and most dysfunctional countries of the Global South. With input from UN-centered knowledge and expertise, countries could develop on their own terms diverse and ecologically sustainable local food regimes, eco-friendly forms of human-centered shelter, UBI distribution mechanisms, local education systems based in universal access to the world's diverse knowledge, and vibrant socialized health systems [4,11].

This model of glocalized accumulation would also be highly effective in dealing with global pandemics. First, it would ensure that countries could maintain economic viability while being able to quickly and sustainably close down their national borders in order to prevent local virus infiltration. If a virus did penetrate national borders, universal local material security, the central goal of this alternative model of glocalization, is the best foundation for being able to sustain lockdowns because it is the basic condition for ensuring all members of society can viably isolate. Finally, in the worst-case scenario, the proposed regime of glocal accumulation would function to ensure even and maximum production of vaccines. Such a model that showcases glocalization is already something that the World Health Organization has considered in the past but has had neither the resources nor the ideological mandate to pursue in practice [14]. Under the auspices of what elsewhere the author has named the "World Knowledge Bank" [15], the World Health Organization could procure vaccine designs that could be dispersed to local manufacturing plants [14]. Such a glocalized mode of accumulation would both increase and even out global supply of vaccines across the countries of the world. Combined with universally viable local accumulation regimes, such a system of vaccine production would be able to prevent scenarios like the present conjuncture in which a virus that, because never contained in Global South countries, will continue to mutate and spread around the planet.

#### *2.2. The Neoliberal-Led Regulatory Framework Creates a World of Competition: When We Need Coordinated Cooperation*

The neoliberal-led regime of global accumulation is underpinned by a global regulatory framework based in the widespread adoption of its national template that opens countries up to the free movement of capital. This national–trans-national mode of regulation generates for capital a world in which competition can come from anywhere, but also a world in which countries must compete with each other to win a viable share of this globally mobile capital. This framework decouples capital from countries that are subordinated to its imperatives. It also pits countries against each other in a form of "locational competition" to house segments of global production. Further, because as the population surplus to capital's requirements grows capital becomes scarcer, locational competition is zero-sum [1,16]. In short, the neoliberal model of development has created a world of aggressive competition that actually punishes cooperation. This framework and its corresponding worldview also dominate the institutions of the United Nations while its founding principles of democratic cooperation, inclusive solidarity, and universal wellbeing presently function just as obscuring window dressing. Furthermore, this form of locational competition is also a central structural driver behind the current xenophobic and racist Alt. Right form of 'regressive nationalism' [11].

While competition can be a strong performance motivator, under the neoliberal model of development it has becomes a dominating survival imperative that is destructively aggressive and negates cooperative efficiencies that are especially important in times of crisis that require unity of purpose. In these neoliberal times of viciously interacting crises, the current regulatory framework of aggressive competition between countries is deeply counterproductive. Under this neoliberal model of development, countries constantly confront zero-sum trade-offs between what is in the human collective global interest and what is in their narrow short-term national interest. Words of cooperation often hide a cynical mindset that considers trusting each other as naïve and that has become habitually embedded. The neoliberal regulatory framework and its associated mentality undermine both capacity and willingness to cooperate in order to overcome a common threat or enemy such as COVID-19.

Relatedly, the neoliberal regulatory framework also undermines the capacity of the World Health Organization to lead a strategy of coordinated cooperation to meet a common alien threat. The World Health Organization is underfunded, without clear United Nations institutional support, and relatedly, is without a clear mandate from the world's countries. Furthermore, the world's failing hegemon, USA, is the key underwriter of the neoliberal model of development, but until recently has even abdicated that responsibility because they were led by an aggressive "regressive nationalist" [11].

The alternative is in the critique. Rather than ruled by a mode of competitive regulation, a globally sustainable human civilization needs an alternative model of national–transnational cooperative regulation to which competition can be subordinated. Such a mode of regulation would reverse "neoliberal multilateralism" that subordinates countries to the will of capital and replace it with a "social democratic multilateralism" that subordinates capital to the will of countries [11]. Key to "social democratic multilateralism" is trans-national agreements between countries that move them towards establishing shared principles to which each country's national regulatory framework would adhere. These would include shared ecological and decent employment standards, so that capital could

not push standards down by playing countries off against each other. Having common goals regarding the dimensions of basic universal material security would also imply a shared commitment to promoting local self-sufficiency within a framework of glocalization. This means that countries would each have the local flexibility within shared international agreements to protect and promote the development of local regimes of flexible accumulation. This flexibility would involve selective import controls to protect local autocentric accumulation and the capacity to reject products not produced according to agreed standards, while also giving countries the flexibility to import products that they are unable to produce locally [4,11].

This model of development presupposes the cosmopolitan democratic transformation of the United Nations and its various agencies. Of particular importance would be the transformation of its present economic regulatory agencies. Given the mandate by a genuinely cosmopolitan democratic federation of United Nations, such institutions would seek to promote and facilitate the national regulatory templates of social democratic multilateralism and the cooperative development of local accumulation modes. In addition, a "World Knowledge Bank" would seek to procure knowledge that would become the common property of all humanity, and in addition, such an agency would combine this knowledge with resources and expertise that would help facilitate countries to develop their own efficient and ecological sustainable local accumulation regimes [15,17]. This is not about imposing a model of production on to countries. Rather, it is about helping countries to develop, on their own terms, sustainable ways of living that can prioritize local food regimes, sustainable shelter, local health institutions including the development of local manufacturing plants for vaccines, and education models that could draw freely on the world's knowledge. In sum, the proposed regulatory framework would systematically transform the anti-local model of neoliberal competition into a framework of cooperative nationalism and cosmopolitan coordination that would also be exactly appropriate for preventing viruses becoming global pandemics.

#### *2.3. From Class Structure to Class Struggle in the War against COVID-19*

Contra the *Communist Manifesto* scenario but following Marx's implicit analysis in *Capital Vol. 1*, capitalism's mature class structure comprises the distribution of the laboring population into three major groups: knowledge workers, the industrial working class ("Active Army"), and the "relative surplus population". This later group refers to those made redundant relative to capital's needs because of the introduction of "self-acting machinery" [18]. It is segmented and includes the "Reserve Army" of labor that intersects with the Active Army, as well as the "lumpen proletariat" and the destitute [16,18,19].

Under the neoliberal mode of uneven development, the relative surplus population has grown as the coercive whip of technological competition making labor redundant has extended to apply across the whole planet. This development has generated a zero-sum competition between countries that arises from a viciously interacting causality between labor in oversupply, and capital that is thus made scarce [1,19]. The relative surplus population bears the brunt of resulting wage declines and the related facilitating of "labor market flexibility" policies and welfare policy retrenchment. Workers in the Global North are subject to the redundancy effects of both automation and de-industrialization as capital moves to newly industrializing low wage countries. In the Global South, the peasantry, still the largest social grouping in the world, is violently brought into this redundancy process due to the neoliberal-led global unleashing of technological competition in agriculture. This redundant population trudges into the growing slumlands of the cities. The capitalist class has also become highly segmented. It includes those at the apex of the power and wealth structure of multi-national corporations. However, it also includes the "contradictory class positions" of knowledge workers who perform capitalist functions but are also being precarianised, and small businesses and the self-employed or "own account workers" that grow, and whose experience overlap, with the relative surplus population.

This global class structure is unevenly overlaid and intersected by culturally, politically, and ideologically inflected social divisions between and within nations. Within countries, subordinated cultures are overrepresented in the relative surplus population. Raced and gendered class structures are also overlaid by the divisions within a prevailing hegemonic project between the "securiat", the "social bloc" of secure and advantaged groups who are integrated into and supported by the prevailing project, and the "precariat" whose core is in the relative surplus population and who are outside of the prevailing hegemony [20–22]. This insecure and disadvantaged precariat is vulnerable, marginalized, and alienated from the dominant structures and systems of the prevailing hegemony.

Common features, though unevenly variegated across and within the strata of relative surplus populations of unevenly developed countries, are poverty, employment and income precarity, insecure and unhealthy shelter, and living in competition with each other for scarce work. This complexly class structured and competitively divided distribution of the world's population also presents as a highly unequal distribution of wealth, welfare, and security. At its bottom is a stratified relative surplus population whose circumstances are characterized by deep poverty and everyday uncertainty. For the most desperate strata living in the streets of the large city slums of the Global South without steady employment or housing and for whom food needs to be procured daily, social distancing and selfisolation are unrealistic. In addition, the countries in the Global South with less developed health and social security systems cannot provide short-term welfare, or offer adequate hospital service, and for whom the vaccine is still unavailable. The tragic irony of the present situation in the Global North is that the relative surplus population, defined here as the most precariously located and therefore the most vulnerable, are also the most alienated, implying lower trust in government. Vulnerability to COVID-19, that follows this stratified social division of vulnerability that resonates with the division of the population into the vaccinated and the unvaccinated, is increasingly central to why the epidemic continues to rage in both the Global South and the Global North.

Especially in the Global South, this social division resonates most strongly with the internationally uneven division of wealth leading to vaccine undersupply that most strongly affects the relative surplus population. However, especially in the Global North, the most vulnerable within the relative surplus population are likely to be suspicious of the vaccine. That is, this core precariat, at the very bottom of which are the destitute and homeless, has reason to be suspicious because it is alienated from the mainstream middle class inflected habituses that pervade prevailing education and health systems.

Marx's early work [23] emphasizes how capitalist production relations are the source of alienation that is both self-estrangement and estrangement towards others. Following on, Durkheim's classic work on alienation, or what he names as "anomie", refers more specifically to atomized, lonely socially disconnected people that results when there is not, or they are not part of, widely shared integrating values or "moral regulation". In short, alienation or anomie arises for those without the unifying solidarity of "moral regulation". The term "system anomie" is introduced here as referring to people's disconnection from the "moral regulation" of prevailing hegemonic institutions and discourses.

The key problem in this present context is that to eliminate COVID-19 from the community, by means of social distancing and vaccinations, requires a movement of unified solidarity across the whole population that in turn is premised on universal awareness and trusting acceptance of hegemonic socially integrative system discourses and institutions. However, the population, divided between those with permanent secure employment and income, and those in the relative surplus population located outside or on the margins of organized capitalism, manifests as differing levels of precarity/security that unevenly overlaps with differing levels of system integration/alienation.

Mid-range capitalist projects differ in the extent to which they unify or divide the population. The pre-neoliberal project of the Keynesian welfare state, driven by an inclusive vision of social democracy that spreads free health and education and radically reduced the size of the precariat while also reducing the wealth and power of the capitalist class, generated a form of society characterized by security, integration, and solidarity. As well, the dominant perspective of the "expertocracy" located within the legitimized systems of the state–capital–science complex was largely unchallenged and trusted by the population. In short, there was unified "moral regulation" and low "system anomie".

In contrast, the neoliberal model of development has moved the world in exactly the opposite direction, towards an increasing proportion of the population susceptible to "system anomie" combined with declining "moral regulation". Growing social fragmentation and deepening inequality follows the form of the class structure under the neoliberal model of development that grounds system anomie. Ideologically, neoliberal values of individualism and competition have undermined solidarity and trust. Further, especially since the birth of the internet, the exponential rise in the number and availability of competing narratives has filled the emptying space of shared values due to declining hegemonic socially integrative discourse or "moral regulation". For those already disconnected from the prevailing hegemonic discourse, this fracturing of a singular common sense view of the truth, or what can be called the "postmodern malaise", presents as a smorgasbord of anti-hegemonic discourses that replaces the unifying discourse of solidarity or "moral regulation". The war against COVID-19 is being waged on this highly fractured and divided social terrain. Rather than solidarity and a unity of purpose, central preconditions for winning a war, this competitive, unequal, disconnected, alienating, and divisive terrain is a recipe for social conflict and the unsustainability of a unified solidarity.

Competition and division within and between the national societies in this neoliberal era strongly indicate that COVID-19 will remain in global circulation indefinitely. Moreover, without the neoliberal model of development's democratic socialist transformation, humanity will remain susceptible to the global spread and embedding of more viruses. In the immediate present, the ideological war of position overlaying this complex class structure is being won by the neoliberal project as the moderate Left concedes with the neoliberals to an acceptance of a vaccine-mitigated, living-with-COVID-19, return-to-neoliberal-normalcy strategy. On-going battles, complicated by the Alt. Right's articulation with popular frustration, anger, and COVID-19 denial, focus on how best to manage a vaccine-led transition back to neoliberal normalcy.

#### *2.4. Sketching the Contours of the Ideological War of Position on COVID-19*

Three major perspectives, though in varying proportions and forms across the advanced capitalist democracies, are central to the current war of ideological position. There is a moderate Left perspective implicit in solidarity-led health-first responses to COVID-19, a neoliberal business-first perspective that always prioritizes the path back to neoliberal normalcy, and contradictory Alt. Right views that feed the anger and denial of the alienated and vulnerable. Intersecting this Left–Right reading are other dimensions of ideological struggle related to what are called "culture wars" around race, gender, religion, and science. The moderate Left's solidarity project against COVID-19 has been hamstrung by the hostile neoliberal-led economic, political, and ideological environment, but integrally, without an alternative post-neoliberal Left imaginary, it has also become subordinated to the neoliberal project. In the end, neoliberal right and left positions have coalesced towards a practical Third Way win–win strategy—summed up as "vaccinate, vaccinate, vaccinate!"—that seeks to make neoliberal normalcy compatible with containing, but not eliminating, the virus. However, this Third Way movement of the majority has also brought to the surface an oppositional minority, primarily located amongst the alienated precariat, who resist vaccination. However, alienation also articulates with other system-alienated views such as often contained in alternative health-based movements that mistrust dismissive mainstream medical science and post-colonial movements that do not trust the state that continues to be infected by colonial residues. This heterogeneous social bloc in-the-making are brought together by Alt. Right discourses that connect with the anxiety, anomie, and mistrustful disposition of all groups associated with this alienated and under-vaccinated minority.

More generally, the Alt. Right's ascendancy has been facilitated by the catastrophically failing neoliberal project that pits nations against nations and by the absence of a progressive alternative that could win the hearts and minds of the population, especially the alienated precariat that is growing, to an alternative counter-hegemonic project [4]. In addition, the divisively anti-democratic nature of the neoliberal project itself has also opened up space for the Alt. Right. The neoliberal-led underfunding of educational institutions undermining an informed citizenship sustains immature neoliberal views of citizenship rights. Especially pronounced in the USA, me-first market individuals see only their possessive rights and freedoms, and do not grasp that the individual rights of the "one" integrally entail obligations to the "other" in the form of collective commitments to the wellbeing of the whole of society. Ideally, a democratic socialist world is one in which solidarity is the basis of an inclusive individual freedom where everyone can meet their needs and pursue their own destiny. However, especially in times of war, as with COVID-19, where a consensual solidarity needs to be fully inclusive, the dissenting minority becomes deeply problematic. That is, solidarity, across a population bifurcated between those within and those outside of the prevailing hegemony, is the only path to universally meet citizens' rights for a sustainable collective environment free of the virus, but this right directly clashes with the democratic right of the minority to dissent.

Finally, social media has undermined, rather than promoted, a vibrant virtual global civil society that could generate genuine unity. Profit-driven companies are soft on disinformation and use algorithms that reinforce and radicalize existing views rather than providing a genuine democratic forum for facilitating honest and open debate between different perspectives. Within the context of the postmodern malaise, declining moral regulation, and increasing alienation, a space has opened up for the Alt. Right to give expression and identity to the growing proportion of the population in precarious, alienated, and vulnerable circumstances that have been neglected by both the neoliberal Right and the neoliberal Left. In sum, through manipulative tropes of mistrust and blame, the Alt. Right gives voice and expression to the alienated minority that releases its anger and anxiety on to the "other" thus feeding social division and conflict [11,21].

Within the immediate terms of the prevailing model of development, the evolving ideological struggle over COVID-19 grows out of the deep tension confronted by all countries. Especially in the pre-vaccine phase, this tension is between opening up the neoliberal-led global capitalist economy on which depend livelihoods and eventually lives, and directly prioritizing the health response by closing national borders and locking down the population in order to eliminate COVID-19 and save lives. The lockdown response provoked by initial cases sneaking through borders into the community also necessitated solidaristic movements of the whole population to socially distance and abide by drastic restrictions on the freedom of movement if local spread was to be stamped out. Both at and within borders, success in the war against COVID-19 has depended on the unified consent and solidarity of the population that in turn is dependent on high "moral regulation" and low "system anomie". In other words, unless nearly everyone accepted state-led discourses of social distancing, restricted freedom of movement, and vaccination, then especially with the highly infectious Delta and Omicron variants, the virus was guaranteed to spread rapidly amongst the population, though most seriously amongst the unvaccinated.

While the coming on-line of the vaccine has added a crucial line of defense, the recent more infectious strains demonstrate that anything less than complete elimination is losing the struggle. That is, the eventual universal spread of COVID-19 only needs a dissenting minority that does not get vaccinated or follow the rules of social distancing to ignite the rapid spread of the virus. Further, the Alt. Right movement that, ironically, asserts democratic rights as absolute freedom of choice and movement has articulated and validated this dissent. The problem is that even if the forces on the side of reopening the country to movement and business are only a minority, this will still de-rail the project to stamp out the virus locally. Compounding this logic is the tragedy that the portion of the population most alienated from the system and its legitimating discourses, and where

vaccination is low, is also in the end most vulnerable to COVID-19. These tensions break out into a complex ideological and political struggle between different agents to win the hearts and minds of complexly overlapping social groupings. This struggle is nonetheless based in the bifurcation of the population into, on the one hand, the socially integrated and trusting securiat that is vaccinated who are increasingly intolerant and dismissive towards, on the other hand, the system-alienated mistrusting unvaccinated precariat.

Institutional and ideological neoliberalization that has been central in creating alienated, uninformed, impoverished, and precarious segments of the population has ensured the failure of the moderate Left's health-first project of solidarity. The deeply precarious core of these overlapping groupings have been less able to abide by the rules of social distancing and staying at home, and along with other less precarious but also alienated groups, have been ideologically open to conspiracy, freedom, and denial narratives that have been coordinated by the Alt. Right. Not only does this all lead to a resistant non-vaccinated social bloc, it also generates an opposition movement to the solidarity movement against COVID-19, and indeed supports a return to neoliberal normalcy.

The consequences of the neoliberal model of development, including threatened democracy, undermined solidarity, and a world of divisive competition, are central to why COVID-19 will likely become a permanent feature of the human condition. In turn, only the neoliberal model of development's democratic socialist transformation can prevent future pandemics. Such an alternative requires the construction of a cooperative global regulatory framework whose political precondition is the genuine democratization of the United Nations. Such a transformation would provide the political preconditions leading to support for an alternative cooperative regulatory framework dedicated to helping all the nations of the world achieve local material security and self-sufficiency in food, shelter, health, and education that are the basic material prerequisites for the establishment of a genuine solidaristic social democracy. Relatedly, such a reformed United Nations could develop globally socialized forums of virtual democratic communication and a "World Knowledge Bank" dedicated to the procurement and then free distribution of cosmopolitan knowledge to the countries of the world that together would facilitate international cooperation and local self-sufficiency [15].

#### **3. Concluding Discussion**

This article has provided a "methodologically trans-national" stylized global overview of the COVID-19 pandemic. It has demonstrated how the neoliberal model of capitalist development and its associated worldview are central to why the virus is becoming a permanent feature of the human world, and how an alternative democratic socialist model of development is needed in order to prevent global pandemics in the future. This paper's overview conceptual perspective deployed the fundamental Global North/Global South geopolitical distinction, but further research needs to examine in much more detail the varying national forms of the struggles and timing of the stages of the war against COVID-19. It also should examine ideological variations in the struggle across nation states, especially regarding the nature and danger of the virus that link with specifically varying practical responses that can potentially have global outcomes. However, under the stillprevailing terms of the global capitalist neoliberal project, all paths are leading towards the same end-point. In simple terms, COVID-19 is becoming a permanent parasitic feature of the human condition that we must "learn to live with" as the world returns towards a recalibrated neoliberal normalcy.

Agents and defenders of capital and the neoliberal project that have pushed for and celebrate a return to normalcy will crow that they were right all along. The global market will once again be equated with freedom, openness, democracy, and the only path to progress, while the tentative war socialism of local solidarity in the face of a common threat that pointed embryonically towards the need for the (g)localizing transformation of the neoliberal model of development will be demonized as authoritarian and regressive. One already hears neoliberal slogans that localization is like living in a cave or seeking

a North-Korean-like hermit fortress. The term "fortress", in particular, articulates back with the neoliberal critique of the postwar nation-centric Keynesian model of development and more generally expresses opposition to all developments that move in a socialist or nation-centric direction.

In sum, even though the neoliberal model of capitalist development is the root cause of this global pandemic, the failure of solidarity to win out will be made to appear as a victory for the resilience of the neoliberal capitalist world. Expressed as an intellectually pessimistic hindsight, it is obvious that the solidarity project was up against insurmountable odds, and the return to a neoliberal normalcy albeit with COVID-19 can now be seen as the almost guaranteed final outcome inscribed in the very logic of the neoliberal model of development itself. Rather than gaining insight into the neoliberal-led capitalist causes of this outcome that underpins the construction of a progressive alternative, neoliberal global capitalism will, without significant critical exposure, continue to lead human civilization into the darkness. Paralleling the experience of the global financial crisis, capital will be given bonuses, humanity will bear the brunt, and little will change.

Capital will continue on its path of systematic destruction that treats Nature, including humanity, as expendable resources. Under the neoliberal model of capitalist development in particular, profitability has become the overriding global imperative that also drives locational competition, which feeds "regressive nationalism" and undermines the capacity of countries to prioritize humanity's and, integrally, Nature's health and wellbeing. If indeed this is to be the future, then one can assume there will be more viruses that will become global pandemics that we will not be able to stamp out. In sum, the world organized within the framework of the neoliberal model of development has ensured COVID-19's planet-wide embeddedness and that future viruses will also become global pandemics. This future is not guaranteed, but if there is to be an alternative future, it is imperative that the critical lessons coming out of this global pandemic are translated into the democratic socialist transformation of the neoliberal model of development.

Multiple dysfunctions in global supply chains into which countries are unevenly inserted and dependent upon spread the virus and prevented local de-coupling. The inflexibly unstable nature of this global monolith thus revealed by this global pandemic points urgently towards the need for a "glocalization" alternative. Such an alternative is based in global socialization of cosmopolitan knowledge deployed to facilitate locally controlled material accumulation. Such an alternative is particularly relevant for vaccine production and distribution.

Relatedly, global market competition generated by the neoliberal model that pits countries against each other that has rendered international cooperation impossible has been demonstrated to be particularly dangerous in global emergency situations where international coordination and organized cooperation is crucial. In particular, this dangerous situation is reflected in problems with the World Health Organization. It lacks power and resources that have their root causes in the overall neoliberal infected organizational framework of the United Nations linked with its domination by the neoliberalized countries of the Global North. As a result, the World Health Organization has been unable to coordinate an international response that could have stopped COVID-19's spread and that could have been central in the management of its elimination once getting a foothold in countries.

The present COVID-19-led conjuncture underpinned by the interacting crises of the neoliberal model of development has also revealed a deeply conflictual and unstable dynamic of political and ideological struggle. While there are complex reasons for people being anti-vaccination, a central factor is the neoliberal model of development itself that has generated a vulnerable and alienated precariat. System alienation corresponding with me-first neoliberal individualism and the absence of the unifying cement of shared discourses of social integration (or "moral regulation") has generated a dissenting and resisting minority. This minority is particularly significant in this context because the project of solidarity in order to stamp the virus out is fragile because only the resistance of the few is needed to put it in jeopardy.

Only briefly in a few countries did the war against COVID-19 take the form of a unified struggle against a common threat. In the end, the on-going struggle boils down to that between the project to save a catastrophically failing model of capitalism that has led to COVID-19 becoming a global pandemic in the first place, and the counter-movement which, ultimately, pushes towards the neoliberal model of development's democratic socialist transformation. The present return to neoliberal normalcy represents another missed opportunity to progressively reverse the devastating consequences of the catastrophically failing neoliberal model of development, at least partly because of the absence of an ideological imaginary and blueprint for a counter-hegemonic democratic socialist model of development. The neoliberal model of development's viciously interacting economic, ecological, and political crisis tendencies, that now include viral pandemics, all point towards the urgent need for a democratic socialist model of development.

Under the cosmopolitan democratic leadership of a reformed United Nations, a socialized form of knowledge globalization and a new national–trans-national regulatory framework would facilitate universally material self-sufficiency for the countries of the world. Under this model of "glocalization" that defines the democratic socialist model of development, countries would be able close borders quickly without significant economic fallout and reformed United Nations institutions would have the mandated support and capacity to effectively coordinate this process within a framework of cooperative nationalism.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **References**

## *Concept Paper* **Filtering Facepiece Respirator Supply Chain Management Framework in a Disaster Such as COVID-19**

**Kihyung Kim 1, \* and Li Zhao 2**

**Abstract:** Due to the lack of vaccines and treatments, filtering facepiece respirators are a primary and effective tool to dampen the spread of COVID-19. To meet the huge and continuous demand for filtering facepiece respirators, this concept paper suggests a supply chain management framework based on the disaster management principle. This concept paper adopts an exploratory and qualitative literature review to provide managerial insights for the supply chain participants. Due to implementation delay and strategic interdependency, the supply chain management strategies need to be systematically integrated. A viable way to integrate strategies is based on the disaster management cycle: mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery phases. Our model integrates innovative and successful but overlooked supply chain management strategies. First, the production capacity should be flexible so that the production mode in emergency and normal situations can be different. Second, the concept paper and development facilities can utilize their capacities for actual production in emergencies. Third, the quality certification process should accommodate the flexible production capacities. Fourth, inventory stockpiling should be renewable. This concept paper contributes to policymakers, healthcare sector decision-makers, stakeholders throughout the FFR supply chain to cope with future crises caused by pandemics by providing a systematic approach to constructing an effective, flexible, and resilient supply chain.

**Keywords:** COVID-19; filtering facepiece respirators; supply chain management; disaster management cycle

#### **1. Introduction**

In 2020, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spread all over the world. To control the disease outbreak, it is essential for the public to wear filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs), such as surgical and N95 masks. Unfortunately, the capacity of the FFR supply chain is insufficient to fulfil the sudden and huge demand under this disastrous situation. To protect society from another respiratory disease pandemic, it is urgent for researchers, industry practitioners, and governments to construct effective FFR supply chains. To answer this urgent need, this concept paper provides an implementable framework that integrates supply chain management (SCM) strategies based on the crisis management principle through extensive case study reviews.

COVID-19 is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) that is highly contagious with human-to-human transmission. PPE, such as FFRs, medical gowns, gloves, and goggles, protect the wearers from the virus's transmission. We focused on FFRs because other PPE is mainly consumed by restricted users such as healthcare providers. This implies the demand for FFRs is much larger than that for other PPE, and this causes formidable challenges. In addition, we focused on disposable masks and respirators and excluded cloth masks.  The effectiveness of cloth masks is questionable [1,2]. Moreover, supply shortages do not occur for cloth masks because people can make cloth masks using their own fabric.

**Citation:** Kim, K.; Zhao, L. Filtering Facepiece Respirator Supply Chain Management Framework in a Disaster Such as COVID-19. *Societies* **2021**, *11*, 136. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/soc11040136

Academic Editors: Sandro Serpa and Carlos Miguel Ferreira

Received: 12 August 2021 Accepted: 8 November 2021 Published: 11 November 2021

**Publisher's Note:** MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

**Copyright:** © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

Due to the shortage of vaccines and lack of treatments, FFRs are a primary and effective tool to dampen the spread of COVID-19. Accumulated evidence supports the idea that "public mask wearing is most effective at stopping spread of the virus when compliance is high [3]." Moreover, when a mask can filter small sized airborne particles, it protects the wearer more effectively [1]. Recent observations and empirical studies show that COVID-19 transmission is lessened when the public wears FFRs. For example, the citizens of South Korea and China actively wear FFRs, and the countries have successfully controlled the spread of COVID-19 compared to other countries [4]. Chu et al. [1] found that "face mask use could result in a large reduction in risk of infection, with stronger associations with N95 or similar respirators compared with disposable surgical masks or similar."

The demand for FFRs has been huge and continuous during the pandemic. The global yearly market volume of FFRs was less than \$356 million dollars in 2018 [5]. According to the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety of South Korea (MFDS), the monthly FFR market size of South Korea in June 2020 was approximately \$400 million dollars. The demand for FFRs exploded during the pandemic such that a country's monthly market size exceeded the world's annual trading volume two years ago. The demand for FFRs is huge because both healthcare providers and all of society should wear FFRs to curb spread of the contagious disease. Moreover, the demand is continuous throughout the pandemic period because FFRs are designed to be disposable.

Unfortunately, the FFR supply did not meet the sudden and huge demand for FFRs in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the supply shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) including FFRs, many countries, including the most developed countries in the world such as the U.S. and the U.K., there was a failure to curb the spread of COVID-19 before it became a pandemic [5–7]. The failure has resulted in a disastrous loss of lives and enormous economic damage worldwide. Revisiting the supply chain of FFRs and finding solutions for future needs is very important.

To achieve our theoretical goals, we first reviewed extensive articles and case studies about the countries that successfully contained the COVID-19 outbreak. We then examined perspective articles that discuss similar strategies that we find in the case studies. We suggested a conceptual model to build an FFR supply chain that effectively copes with future emergencies. In particular, supply chain management framework and disaster management cycle were used to envision the FFR supply chain. The gap between the regular FFR supply chain capacity and the demand for FFRs during the initial stage of COVID-19 pandemic was examined. Four phases of disaster management cycle including mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery were discussed. Considering four pillars in the FFR supply chain including information, production, distribution, and sustainability, we demonstrate detailed strategies under each stage for an effective FFR supply chain. We assert that the systematic management of the entire supply chain is crucial. An anecdote illustrates the importance of taking a supply chain viewpoint. This study aims to propose solutions for future emergencies that the FFR supply chain may face.

#### **2. Literature Review**

We conducted an unstructured literature review, starting with industry news and reports related to FFR shortages in our supply chain. Journal articles were reviewed to formulate research problems and identify solutions. Articles were gathered from three areas: SCM, disaster management, and COVID-19 updates. Articles were selected using both inclusion and exclusion criteria. We included both qualitative and quantitative studies with keywords 'personal protective equipment', 'filtering face mask', 'supply chain', and 'COVID'. Non-English articles were excluded. We select relevant articles based on our experience. Then, we explored and selected theoretical studies to construct the framework of this study based on our experience as well.

We built a conceptual model based on the integration of SCM with the disaster management cycle. The SCM approach tracks the increasing value of FFR from raw

material to the final product. The SCM approach has the advantage of identifying the extent of the gap between supply and demand at each stage of production. This advantage is important to account for the bottleneck in FFR production. However, bottlenecks vary from situation to situation. The SCM approach is limited in understanding the dynamics of bottlenecks. The disaster management framework provides a complementary perspective for addressing fluctuating bottlenecks in the FFR supply chain. Disaster management provides a procedural approach to responding to crises caused by a disaster, called the disaster management cycle. This article provides a constructive framework for addressing the crisis in the FFR supply chain caused by the COVID-19 disaster by integrating the SCM approach with the disaster management cycle approach. agement cycle. The SCM approach tracks the increasing value of FFR from raw material to the final product. The SCM approach has the advantage of identifying the extent of the gap between supply and demand at each stage of production. This advantage is important to account for the bottleneck in FFR production. However, bottlenecks vary from situation to situation. The SCM approach is limited in understanding the dynamics of bottlenecks. The disaster management framework provides a complementary perspective for addressing fluctuating bottlenecks in the FFR supply chain. Disaster management provides a procedural approach to responding to crises caused by a disaster, called the disaster management cycle. This article provides a constructive framework for addressing the crisis in the FFR supply chain caused by the COVID-19 disaster by integrating the SCM approach with the disaster management cycle approach.

*Societies* **2021**, *11*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 3 of 16

work of this study based on our experience as well.

our experience. Then, we explored and selected theoretical studies to construct the frame-

We built a conceptual model based on the integration of SCM with the disaster man-

#### *2.1. SCM Approach in Managing FFR Supply Chain Reacting to the COVID-19 Crisis 2.1. SCM Approach in Managing FFR Supply Chain Reacting to the COVID-19 Crisis*

There is a gap between the regular FFR supply chain capacity and the demand for FFRs during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, at the beginning of April 2020, the U.S. government ordered 3M, one of the major FFR producers in the world, to produce more masks based on the Defense Production Act. However, it was difficult for 3M to follow the order due to the insufficient nonwoven melt-blown filter (MB filter) supply [8]. Many reports agree with our perspective that coherent and systematic strategies are required throughout the FFR supply chain to cope with the disastrous situation [9–11]. The gap identifies the challenges to coping with the surging demand for FFRs during a respiratory contagious disease outbreak. There is a gap between the regular FFR supply chain capacity and the demand for FFRs during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, at the beginning of April 2020, the U.S. government ordered 3M, one of the major FFR producers in the world, to produce more masks based on the Defense Production Act. However, it was difficult for 3M to follow the order due to the insufficient nonwoven melt-blown filter (MB filter) supply [8]. Many reports agree with our perspective that coherent and systematic strategies are required throughout the FFR supply chain to cope with the disastrous situation [9–11]. The gap identifies the challenges to coping with the surging demand for FFRs during a respiratory contagious disease outbreak.

The supply chain starts with raw material suppliers and ends with the end users. Figure 1 depicts the core structure of the FFR supply chain. This paper focuses on the three main tiers (component providers, manufacturers, and distribution channels) and the quality certification process. The supply chain starts with raw material suppliers and ends with the end users. Figure 1 depicts the core structure of the FFR supply chain. This paper focuses on the three main tiers (component providers, manufacturers, and distribution channels) and the quality certification process.

**Figure 1.** FFR supply chain.

**Figure 1.** FFR supply chain.

The FFR components include MB filters, ear-loop or head-loop straps, and main bodies that are made up of plastic or fabric. Among the raw materials, the key component is the MB filters. The MB filter is produced through a nonwoven web-forming process known as melt blowing to form fine fiber [12]. FFRs filter out droplets and airborne particles that contain viruses by using this material as a filter. In 2019, the U.S. capacity of meltblown fiber was estimated to be 250,000 metric tons per year and 34% of the fiber was used for filtration media [13]. One ton of MB fiber yields 1 million filters, and FFRs contain 1–4 filters, depending on their protection level. The manufacturers assemble the components as FFRs. The FFR manufacturing ca-The FFR components include MB filters, ear-loop or head-loop straps, and main bodies that are made up of plastic or fabric. Among the raw materials, the key component is the MB filters. The MB filter is produced through a nonwoven web-forming process known as melt blowing to form fine fiber [12]. FFRs filter out droplets and airborne particles that contain viruses by using this material as a filter. In 2019, the U.S. capacity of melt-blown fiber was estimated to be 250,000 metric tons per year and 34% of the fiber was used for filtration media [13]. One ton of MB fiber yields 1 million filters, and FFRs contain 1–4 filters, depending on their protection level.

pacity is highly concentrated in a couple of regional clusters. Notably, China possesses much of the capacity. The FFR manufacturing capacity is distributed over three major regional clusters: the U.S., Asia, and Europe. China produced approximately 20 million units of masks a day, which was approximately half the global production capacity for masks [5]. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. imports 95% of its surgical masks and 70% of its respirators [7]. The manufacturers assemble the components as FFRs. The FFR manufacturing capacity is highly concentrated in a couple of regional clusters. Notably, China possesses much of the capacity. The FFR manufacturing capacity is distributed over three major regional clusters: the U.S., Asia, and Europe. China produced approximately 20 million units of masks a day, which was approximately half the global production capacity for masks [5]. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. imports 95% of its surgical masks and 70% of its respirators [7].

Quality control is essential for FFRs to protect their wearers. Certification is required for manufacturers to sell their FFRs in major markets. The certified protection level is often represented in the product names. For example, N95 represents the filtering ability of at least 95% of the airborne particles. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) manages the N95 certification process in the U.S. [14]. The N95 certification process takes approximately three months from submittal to approval [15].

The end users acquire masks through two types of distribution channels. Institutional consumers, such as hospitals and manufacturing firms, procure the masks in business-tobusiness transaction channels and distribute them to their employees according to their needs. In this case, the contract is settled through a negotiation process between the buyer and the manufacturer. Individual consumers purchase masks from retail pharmacies. The transactions depend on the market mechanism.

There is little consensus on how much demand should be fulfilled. For example, various estimations of the demand in the U.S. have been provided. Assuming a 42-day severe influenza pandemic, the U.S. CDC estimated a need for at least 1.5 billion medical masks for the healthcare sector and 1.1 billion for the public. In addition, the healthcare sector will demand more than 90 million N95 respirators [16]. Carias et al. [17] estimate the maximum demands at 7.3 billion respirators and 0.04 billion surgical masks for healthcare institutes in the U.S. In March 2020, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated that U.S. healthcare workers would need 300 million N95 respirators per month to fight a pandemic [18]. The estimations for the healthcare sector vary to a significant extent, and estimations for the public are rare.

#### *2.2. The Disaster Management Cycle*

Disaster management has been intensively studied because of the serious effects of disasters and the difficulty in containing them. Disasters refers to "events that occur when significant numbers of people are exposed to hazards to which they are vulnerable, with resulting injury and loss of life, often combined with damage to property and livelihoods" [19]. Disasters cause crises, which are "the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organization's performance and generate negative outcomes" [20]. Both disaster management and crisis management agree on the four interrelated phases: preparation, response, recovery (revision), and mitigation (prevention). As depicted in Figure 2, a disaster management cycle refers to repeating the four steps to manage the severe impact of a disaster. *Societies* **2021**, *11*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 16

**Figure 2.** Disaster management cycle. **Figure 2.** Disaster management cycle.

The disaster management cycle has been used in many studies to explore extreme events and management practices, and public affairs. For example, Basri et al. [21] conducted survey research to explore disaster management cycle of a flood event in Malaysia from the perspective of industry players and flood victims. Based on the four stages of the The disaster management cycle has been used in many studies to explore extreme events and management practices, and public affairs. For example, Basri et al. [21] conducted survey research to explore disaster management cycle of a flood event in Malaysia from the perspective of industry players and flood victims. Based on the four

disaster management cycle, Sim et al. [22] employed in-depth interviews to develop com-

development, implementation, and outcomes of a national-scale simulation delivery platform in response to the COVID-19 pandemic disaster. This platform is developed by India's Pediatric Simulation Training and Research Society. Their research presented how this platform enabled the management team to address key aspects of the disaster management cycle. The disaster management cycle has been confirmed as an effective ap-

In advance of the evident threat of a respiratory disease pandemic, the mitigation phase comprises designing and constructing an FFR supply chain that decreases the im-

When the threat of a respiratory disease pandemic is observed but the disease has not yet impacted society, the preparation phase includes activities to organize and to allocate resources along the FFR supply chain to provide the product where it is needed during the pandemic. The tasks in the preparation phase are relatively short-term proactive compared to the tasks in the mitigation phase. The preparation phase continues some tasks from the mitigation phase, such as vulnerability assessment, constructing an information sharing system, estimating the supply chain capacity, diversifying suppliers, and constructing an FFR stockpile. In this section, we discuss the other additional tasks in the

Once the pandemic impacts society, the response phase consists of rapid and effective actions to provide the FFRs to reduce the damage from the disaster. When the supply chain is efficiently designed and constructed in the mitigation and preparation phases, the

pacts of the disaster on society and the environment.

reaction will be more effective than the case for COVID-19.

preparation phase.

proach to encompass preparation for and recovery from large-scale disasters.

stages of the disaster management cycle, Sim et al. [22] employed in-depth interviews to develop competence and skill sets of social workers for the field of disaster management in China. Recently, Thyagarajan et al. [23] applied the disaster management cycle to describe the development, implementation, and outcomes of a national-scale simulation delivery platform in response to the COVID-19 pandemic disaster. This platform is developed by India's Pediatric Simulation Training and Research Society. Their research presented how this platform enabled the management team to address key aspects of the disaster management cycle. The disaster management cycle has been confirmed as an effective approach to encompass preparation for and recovery from large-scale disasters.

In advance of the evident threat of a respiratory disease pandemic, the mitigation phase comprises designing and constructing an FFR supply chain that decreases the impacts of the disaster on society and the environment.

When the threat of a respiratory disease pandemic is observed but the disease has not yet impacted society, the preparation phase includes activities to organize and to allocate resources along the FFR supply chain to provide the product where it is needed during the pandemic. The tasks in the preparation phase are relatively short-term proactive compared to the tasks in the mitigation phase. The preparation phase continues some tasks from the mitigation phase, such as vulnerability assessment, constructing an information sharing system, estimating the supply chain capacity, diversifying suppliers, and constructing an FFR stockpile. In this section, we discuss the other additional tasks in the preparation phase.

Once the pandemic impacts society, the response phase consists of rapid and effective actions to provide the FFRs to reduce the damage from the disaster. When the supply chain is efficiently designed and constructed in the mitigation and preparation phases, the reaction will be more effective than the case for COVID-19. *Societies* **2021**, *11*, x FOR PEER REVIEW 6 of 16

> After the pandemic, the recovery phase involves the actions taken to return to a new normal situation such as returning the supply chain resources to an efficient allocation for to meet normal demands. After the pandemic, the recovery phase involves the actions taken to return to a new normal situation such as returning the supply chain resources to an efficient allocation for to meet normal demands.

#### **3. Conceptual Model of FFR Supply Chain Management Based on the Disaster Management Cycle 3. Conceptual Model of FFR Supply Chain Management Based on the Disaster Management Cycle**

To build an effective FFR supply chain to cope with a disastrous situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it is necessary to integrate existing and proposed supply chain management strategies based on the disaster management principle. To build an effective FFR supply chain to cope with a disastrous situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it is necessary to integrate existing and proposed supply chain management strategies based on the disaster management principle.

We propose an implementable FFR supply chain management framework based on the disaster management cycle. Figure 3 illustrates the overview of our framework. Compared to existing articles that focus on increasing the production capacity, our framework considers four pillars: information, production, distribution, and sustainability. The unique feature of this paper is the systematic integration of multidimensional supply chain management strategies over the four phases of the disaster management cycle. We propose an implementable FFR supply chain management framework based on the disaster management cycle. Figure 3 illustrates the overview of our framework. Compared to existing articles that focus on increasing the production capacity, our framework considers four pillars: information, production, distribution, and sustainability. The unique feature of this paper is the systematic integration of multidimensional supply chain management strategies over the four phases of the disaster management cycle.

**Figure 3.** FFR supply chain management framework based on the disaster management cycle. **Figure 3.** FFR supply chain management framework based on the disaster management cycle.

anticipated bottlenecks that the supply chain will face [10]. For example, Rice [24] states that too high a concentration of suppliers in China is the most critical vulnerability. However, there is little consensus about the lack of diversification being the most important obstacle. For instance, Gereffi [25] asserts that the MB filter supply shortage is the primary

Considering the huge and continuous demand for FFRs, it is necessary to conduct a vulnerability assessment of various aspects of the entire supply chain. According to the theory of constraints, a bottleneck is the least capable tier of a supply chain that restricts the entire supply chain capacity [26]. This theory implies that every tier in the FFR supply chain should have enough capacity to meet the demand. Because multiple processes of the current FFR supply chain do not have enough capacity to meet the huge and continuous demand, researchers have presented various opinions on the vulnerability assessment. Diversified vulnerability assessments are desirable to identify various potential bot-

Vulnerability assessments are essential in the mitigation and preparation phases because they form the basis to construct an effective FFR supply chain. A vulnerability assessment calls for follow-up actions such as source diversification and increasing the MB filter supply. Because it takes considerable time to implement the follow-up actions, we should conduct this task in the mitigation phase or at least in the preparation phase.

problem of the FFR supply during the COVID-19 pandemic.

*3.1. Mitigation Phase*

tlenecks.

#### *3.1. Mitigation Phase*

#### 3.1.1. Vulnerability Assessment

In terms of FFR supply chain management, a vulnerability assessment identifies the anticipated bottlenecks that the supply chain will face [10]. For example, Rice [24] states that too high a concentration of suppliers in China is the most critical vulnerability. However, there is little consensus about the lack of diversification being the most important obstacle. For instance, Gereffi [25] asserts that the MB filter supply shortage is the primary problem of the FFR supply during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Considering the huge and continuous demand for FFRs, it is necessary to conduct a vulnerability assessment of various aspects of the entire supply chain. According to the theory of constraints, a bottleneck is the least capable tier of a supply chain that restricts the entire supply chain capacity [26]. This theory implies that every tier in the FFR supply chain should have enough capacity to meet the demand. Because multiple processes of the current FFR supply chain do not have enough capacity to meet the huge and continuous demand, researchers have presented various opinions on the vulnerability assessment. Diversified vulnerability assessments are desirable to identify various potential bottlenecks.

Vulnerability assessments are essential in the mitigation and preparation phases because they form the basis to construct an effective FFR supply chain. A vulnerability assessment calls for follow-up actions such as source diversification and increasing the MB filter supply. Because it takes considerable time to implement the follow-up actions, we should conduct this task in the mitigation phase or at least in the preparation phase.

#### 3.1.2. Constructing an Information Sharing and Monitoring Platform

Under unexpected disastrous situations, we cannot overemphasize the importance of using information to make decisions to reduce the damage from disasters. Efficient information sharing is one common aspect of the countries that successfully contained the COVID-19 outbreak such as South Korea and Taiwan [4,27,28]. The governments of these countries control the supply of FFRs and provide the supply chain data to the public. The data include the import and production of the components (such as MB filters) and final products and the FFR inventory of retail shops. The manufacturers and retail shops collaborate with the government to update the data on time.

The information-sharing platform can be used for material flow monitoring [9]. For example, the infiltration of fake FFRs and underperforming materials into the FFR supply chain is a significant problem [29]. Researchers suggest blockchain as a tool to secure the supply chain from illegitimate products [30,31]. It is a critical task in the mitigation phase to construct an information-sharing platform utilizing advanced information technologies that can be used for supply chain monitoring.

#### 3.1.3. Developing a Forecasting Model

It is essential to develop a forecasting model for FFR demands during a disastrous situation. The scope of the forecasting model includes not only the independent demand for the final product, but it also includes the derived demand for the components. Despite the estimation of the demand for the final product during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is rare that the demand for other components such as MB filters, manufacturing processes, and quality certification processes be estimated. Because it is a requirement to manage the entire supply chain, the forecasting model should be informative for every tier of the supply chain.

The forecasting model should be able to reflect the updated data through the information sharing system. As we can see in South Korea's case, the dynamic forecasting model forms the basis of societies' proactive strategies against the disastrous situation [28]. The possible models include scenario-based forecasting models, stress test models, and artificial intelligence algorithms [27,32,33].

#### 3.1.4. Supply Chain Capacity Estimation

As we show with the FFR supply chain capacity before the pandemic section, the FFR supply capacity estimation requires identifying each tier's capacity and the bottleneck of the supply chain. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the production capacity bottleneck has been the MB filter supply capacity [8,18]. It is impossible to increase the FFR supply without identifying the bottleneck. Moreover, a finer estimation of each tier's capacity allows one to conduct risk assessments such as the what-if test. For example, we can answer the question "when a part of supply chain is disrupted, how much supply can we acquire?" by identifying the bottleneck under the postulated scenario.

#### 3.1.5. Build Additional Flexible Capacity

To fill the supply and demand gap, capacity expansion is a straightforward strategy. Reacting to the COVID-19 outbreak, huge capital investments have been made to build additional FFR production capacity. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) invested \$133 million in domestic N95 mask production. Through the investment, three major companies, 3M, O&M Halyward, and Honeywell, will produce 37.5 million masks per month after initialization [34].

Because capacity expansion takes considerable time, it is part of the mitigation phase. For example, Reicofil is a German manufacturer of the machinery used to make MB filters. The company can establish a melt-blown production line in less than four months. This is an expedited timeframe to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic [35]. This implies that effective capacity expansion requires well-developed plans and accurate forecasting. Researchers use the real options approach and stochastic control theory to determine the investment timing and size [36,37].

When the capacity is expanded, how to utilize the expanded capacity after the crisis should be considered. For example, Medicom Group, a Montreal-based company, opened an FFR factory in Canada. The company and the Canadian government made a long-term agreement about after pandemic FFR supply. Medicom's chief executive, Ronald Reuben, stated that the long-term agreement was crucial for the investment decision [18]. Without a plan to handle the excess capacity, much of the capacity will be idle after the pandemic.

The additional capacity should be flexible so that it can be utilized to meet regular demands for other products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, suppliers increase the mask material supply by modifying their similar production lines to mask filter production lines. From the production technology viewpoint, mask MB filters are similar to absorbent hygiene products. Therefore, diaper and feminine hygiene producers can change their production lines to mask MB filter lines. For example, Procter and Gamble (P&G) converted approximately 10 absorbent hygiene product production lines to mask material production lines in reaction to COVID-19 outbreak [35]. If the converted capacity can be returned to their usual production mode, we can avoid a considerable amount of inefficient capacity.

#### 3.1.6. Developing Diversified Sources

It is essential to diversify the FFR sources to mitigate the supply disruption risk for concentrated sources. If sourcing options are concentrated in a specific region, disruptions at the location put the entire supply chain at risk [38]. The COVID-19 spread started to be serious in Wuhan, China. Due to the surging demand, China prohibited FFR exports to satisfy the domestic demand first. Because China retained approximately 50% of the FFR production capacity, many countries suffered FFR supply disruptions in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic.

If the sources are diversified, the risk of disrupting all the diversified sources is significantly lower than the case of a concentrated source. Therefore, countries have sought to develop alternative FFR suppliers. For example, Tajikistan, where no COVID-19 cases had been reported until early April 2020, became an alternative mask production country that provides masks to other countries [39]. A supply chain redesign with second sources and a redesign to local sources are possible options for source diversification [10]. Researchers in

the operations management area have studied the optimal level of diversification considering the costs and benefits [40,41].

We remark that nondiversifiable risk exists, and source diversification should be integrated with other strategies. Although it has been regarded as a rare event, sourcing diversification is ineffective when all the sources are disrupted by a super event [40]. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic is a super event. Approximately 80 countries prohibited or restricted the export of COVID-19 products by the end of April 2020 [42]. Because the 80 countries include most of the FFR suppliers, supplier diversification has limited effect in managing a disastrous event such as the COVID-19 pandemic. This implies that source diversification should be a part of the solution in a systematic framework.

#### 3.1.7. Constructing a Circular Stockpiling System

Inventory stocking is a traditional solution to cope with high demand. Many countries stockpile medical devices to counter potential threats. For example, the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile system stores vaccines, antiviral drugs, and PPE to cope with public health emergencies, such as large-scale pandemics and natural disasters. Canada, Australia, and Finland also operate similar systems [43,44].

Because FFRs are perishable items, the stockpile and rotation systems of Singapore and Taiwan provide valuable managerial insights. The functionality of FFRs deteriorates over time [45]. To prevent obsoletion, Singapore and Taiwan periodically replace old items with new items if no threats occur [44]. The old, replaced items are consumed by medical institutions. By maintaining the FFR stockpiling system during the mitigation phase, society can cope with a sudden outbreak of a contagious respiratory disease pandemic.

Stockpiling should be a part of a systematic solution because it provides a temporary buffer until other strategies are effectively exercised. The COVID-19 pandemic has lasted longer than the stockpiles lasted, even for countries that operate a large-scale stockpiling system. Therefore, countries source additional FFRs from alternative sources [46]. Although the stockpile does not cope with the entire demand for a pandemic, it provides valuable time to exercise other strategies because the inventory can be used instantaneously. For example, society can use the FFR inventory while it converts a diaper production line to the FFR production mode. Stockpiling plays a critical role as the buffer to reduce the impact of a sudden shock in the FFR supply chain management framework.

#### 3.1.8. Certifying Potential Producers

In the mitigation phase, certification authorities need to certify potential FFR suppliers. During the COVID-19 pandemic period, underperforming and fake masks were traded [29]. The certification process takes considerable time although it provides valuable information about the product quality to consumers. A possible solution is certifying potential FFR producers during the mitigation phase. By certifying the potential production capacity in advance, society can timely acquire confirmed FFRs during an emergency.

#### 3.1.9. Research and Development for a Sustainable FFR Supply Chain

Designing and building a sustainable FFR supply chain is an urgent request and requires aggressive investment in research and development (R&D). Regarding FFR production technologies, the impending R&D topics include durable FFR development, recycling technologies, waste treatment technologies, and a reverse logistics design. The current FFRs are designed to be disposable. Therefore, huge waste continuously occurs during a pandemic, and it causes a serious problem to our ecosystem [47,48]. If a durable FFR protects the wearer from virus transmission, it will dramatically reduce the production burden and the medical waste. If a used FFR can be disinfected while maintaining a reasonable protection ability, we can expect a similar benefit [49]. Another imminent research topic is how to design a closed-loop FFR supply chain that encompasses a reverse logistics system to manage the used FFRs. The used FFRs are a plastic medical waste that should be disposed of carefully. This implies that treating the used FFRs requires specialized systems to reduce

the harmful effects on our ecosystem [50]. Finding the optional locations and capacities of the waste treatment facilities to build the reverse logistics system is a requirement [51].

R&D investment is worthwhile because R&D facilities can be converted to supply bases during a pandemic. For example, North Carolina State University produces face mask material using their research facilities [52]. The University of Missouri utilizes their research facility to cut the mask materials [53]. Skoltech FabLab, a Russian research facility, produces PPE for hospitals in Moscow [54]. Because many research facilities belong to nonprofit organizations, they are willing to form a cooperative societal effort to overcome the emergency. R&D investment is a strategy to build a cooperative emergency supply base.

#### *3.2. Preparation Phase*

#### 3.2.1. Demand Forecasting

Using the forecasting model developed in the mitigation phase, the demand for FFR should be estimated based on the data about the impending disaster. This task includes adjusting model assumptions, selecting appropriate scenarios, and numerical calculations. Moreover, risk assessments, such as stress tests, are essential to building reaction strategies [55]. In the preparation phase, the demand for FFRs is estimated under the specific model for the imminent disaster including the uncertainty assessment for the demand.

#### 3.2.2. Converting Flexible Capacity to FFR Supply Capacity

The preparation phase is the best time to convert production with flexible capacities to the FFR supply capacity. Production line conversion is well-known to operations managers as production flexibility. The flexible capacities include research facility capacities, manufacturing process (such as cutting and knitting) capacities, and the absorbent MB fiber capacities that can be converted to the FFR MB filter production process.

It takes time to establish a new production process and train workers for FFR production. For example, P&G had to install new equipment or adjust existing equipment to change its production mode. Moreover, the employees need to be trained for the new production process. P&G collaborated with their business partners to reduce the friction from changing systems [35]. Considering the conversion time delay and the demand estimation, the preparation phase coordinates the order of the flexible processes to be converted to FFR production, the timing of exercising the flexibility option, and the magnitude of the production capacity. These decision problems have been an intensive research topic in operations management and industrial engineering [56]. By utilizing the accumulated knowledge, flexible capacities should be efficiently reallocated to cope with the approaching disaster.

#### 3.2.3. Renewing the Precertified Suppliers

When precertified suppliers convert their production lines to FFR production, they must renew their quality certification. The renewal process should be faster than the regular certification process and effective enough to ensure the produced FFR's protection capability. For a new producer that has not been certified, the regular certification process should be imposed.

#### *3.3. Response Phase*

#### 3.3.1. Supply and Demand Information Sharing

An efficient information flow is beneficial to stakeholders to make better decisions. For example, the Korean Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) provided the FFR production, consumption, and inventory data to the public every day during the COVID-19 pandemic. The data help producers to determine their production rates and to comply with the government's control policy. The public can find where to buy FFRs in real time through mobile apps [57]. A sharp contrast to South Korea's successful case is the U.S.'s case. In the U.S., all the FFR supply chain data are confidential except for the manufacturing facility locations, and even the nationwide FFR supply data are closed to the public [55]. The lack of data transparency hinders the abilities of governments, hospitals, and other stakeholders to assess and to respond to the FFR supply disruption risk in the U.S. during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The shared information forms the basis of trust among the stakeholders and results in societal collaboration to cope with emergencies. The public and private sectors of South Korea effectively collaborate to fight COVID-19 based on the trust based on transparent information sharing [4,28]. Hong Kong successfully contained the spread of COVID-19 through the community's voluntary information sharing and collaboration [58]. The China Aid organization utilizes a blockchain to increase trust and transparency [59]. On the other hand, Italy and the U.S. had difficulties coordinating resources due to insufficient trust among decision makers, even though the coordination mechanisms are formal [60]. These cases illustrate the importance of transparent and active information sharing in the response phase.

#### 3.3.2. Increase FFR Supply

To fulfil the sudden, huge, and continuous demand for FFRs, we need to fully utilize the options for increasing the FFR supply developed in the mitigation and preparation phases. Considering the costs and time to implement the strategies, the order of the strategies is: (1) consuming the stored FFR inventories, (2) sourcing from diversified suppliers, (3) increasing the production rate within the existing capacity, (4) converting more flexible capacity to FFR supply, and (5) building additional capacity. If the demand for FFRs is within the estimation made in the preparation phase, the demand would be fulfilled with the first three options. If the demand exceeds the forecasted level, however, implementing the last two options should be considered.

#### 3.3.3. Monitoring and Securing Product Distribution

In the response phase, it is necessary to distribute the qualified FFRs to consumers at a reasonable price. The COVID-19 pandemic illustrates challenges for this task: (1) qualifying a large number of products in a short amount of time, (2) preventing hoarding and panic buying, and (3) securing the distribution channels from being infiltrated by fake products and underperforming products. The strategies we discussed in the mitigation and preparation phases are premises to overcome these challenges.

There is a dilemma between quality assurance and timely supply. To be able to have an agile reaction against the COVID-19 outbreak, expediting quality certification processes is a common action that many authorities in the world implement. For instance, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) operates Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) that allow "unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical products to be used in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions caused by CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) threat agents when there are no adequate, approved, and available alternatives [61]." The FDA includes FFRs in the EUA program and presents the information on approved items on its webpage. However, Plana et al. [29] examined the quality of the FFRs that are approved under EUA. The test results show that "Many did not perform to accepted standards and are likely to be counterfeit." It is an urgent and difficult task to construct a trustworthy supply chain under emergencies.

To mitigate the certification delay, it is effective to utilize precertified suppliers and research facilities. For the precertified suppliers in the mitigation phase, the certification process is unnecessary or reduced. The research facilities can participate in the certification process to reduce the burden on the certification authorities. Utilizing these devices can increase the capacity of the potential bottleneck of the FFR supply chain.

When necessary goods are in short supply, market-based transactions may result in prices soaring, panic buying, hoarding, and counterfeits. It is not surprising that we observe these phenomena in the FFR market during the COVID-19 pandemic [62–64]. On the other hand, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore successfully control their FFR

distribution, which is one of the critical ways that those countries successfully curbed the spread of the disease.

By utilizing the information sharing system that is constructed in the mitigation phase, governments can control the FFR material flows to prevent hoarding and panic buying. For example, the Korea Public Procurement Service (KPPS) procured masks from producers and distributed them to the public. The masks distributed in this channel are called public masks. KPPS controlled both the unit price of the public masks at approximately \$1.20 and the maximum number that could be bought per week according to the supply [28]. Korean citizens could find where to buy the public masks using a mobile phone app in real time [57,65]. The South Korean government successfully led the public to curb the spread of COVID-19 spread by utilizing the product distribution control and the real-time inventory information app.

Although actual application cases are rare, researchers suggest the blockchain and artificial intelligence as the tools to secure the supply chain from underperforming and fake products. Orcutt [66] asserts that the blockchain enhances transparency in supply chain tiers so that it can prevent a supply chain network failure. The China Aid organization has implemented a blockchain system, and pharmaceutical supply chains are conducting pilot studies on blockchain systems [59,67]. The information sharing system equipped with advanced technologies can assist in securing the FFR distribution channels [68,69].

#### 3.3.4. Operating a Sustainable FFR Supply Chain

Even though a well-designed sustainable FFR supply chain has been constructed, it is still challenging to operate the chain in the response phase. For example, after members of the public use masks, they dispose of the used masks at home. How can the waste from individual households be collected and put into a sustainable supply chain? Despite the increasing volume of research on sustainable FFR supply chains, solutions to this question are limited [70].

#### *3.4. Recovery Phase*

#### 3.4.1. Post Disaster Analysis and Learning from Mistakes

The lessons learned from previous mistakes are valuable. One factor of Asian countries' successful reaction is that they learned costly lessons from previous respiratory disease outbreaks such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) 2015 [4]. The abundant data that are gathered through the information-sharing system must be analyzed. Post-event data analysis should answer the following important questions:

By answering these critical questions to assess the key performance of each tier, we can acquire insights to improve the disaster management strategies.

#### 3.4.2. Returning Flexible Capacities to Normal Operations

As the pandemic diminishes, the demand for FFRs declines. This is the time for the flexible FFR production capacities to return to their original businesses. For example, there can be back orders for products such as water filters, diapers, and feminine hygiene products. By returning the FFR production capacities to these products, we can avoid

inefficient redundant capacity maintenance. Because of this property, flexibility is often regarded as a synonym of resilience.

#### 3.4.3. Develop Alternative Uses

Developing alternative uses for the FFR production capacities is necessary if excessive capacities still exist after reallocating the flexible capacities. Without developing alternative demand, the industry does not maintain the redundant capacity, and this will result in supply deficiencies in future disasters. Moreover, the public and private sector agreements may include the government's support for the FFR producers after the disaster [18]. Therefore, how to handle the excessive but necessary capacities is an important issue in the recovery phase.

Demand development requires both the public and private sectors to be creative, and it is desirable to generate constant demands for FFR related products. For example, the MB filter production capacity can be modified to produce water filters. By providing water purification systems to public schools, the government can generate ongoing demand to maintain the flexible capacity for the FFR.

#### *3.5. Discussion*

There are limitations of this study that provide future research directions. First, we restrict our interest to FFR supply chain management. To curb disease outbreaks, the public's willingness to wear masks is essential. However, our discussion does not include how to get the public to wear masks. Wearing masks is effective when combined with other strategies such as aggressive testing, infection path tracking, and appropriate patient quarantines. Therefore, our framework is a part of a wider framework. We hope that our paper contributes to building a society safer from diseases.

Second, extended qualitative studies based on this conceptual model will be valuable to enhance our understanding of effective strategies for managing disaster situations. Interviews and focus groups should be conducted among FFR supply chain members to provide practical insights.

Third, empirical studies may be developed to offer quantitative estimation and prediction of the supply and demand of FFR. Trade data of raw materials and finished FFR products can be incorporated to understand the dynamics of the FFR supply chain on a global scale.

Last, our framework can be more efficient through global cooperation. However, the international partnership has not been discussed enough. For example, future research can investigate how much value can be created when developed countries establish a forecasting system and share the information with other underdeveloped countries. The future research topic can include the priority and emphasis of resource allocation according to the country's development phase.

#### **4. Conclusions**

This paper provides a framework to manage the FFR supply chain when reacting to a disastrous situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic. We provide implementable strategies based on the disaster management cycle that includes the mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery phases. Based on the four pillars, this conceptual framework demonstrated major topics in four phases of the disaster management cycle. Each point was discussed by presenting examples and current practices. The mitigation phase focuses on building an information-sharing infrastructure, developing a demand forecasting model, evaluating the supply chain capacity, constructing various supply bases, and creating contingency plans by forming a social consensus. The preparation phase takes short-term proactive actions such as forecasting the demand and converting flexible capacities into FFR production. In the response phase, all available resources are mobilized to increase the supply to meet the growing demand. Securing the distribution channels is also critical in the response phase. After the disaster, it is a painful but necessary step to reflect on the past event to

learn from any failures. In addition, managing the increased FFR supply chain capacity is essential to sustaining the emergency reaction capability in the supply chain. We developed a framework based on an intensive literature review. We hope that our paper contributes to mitigating future pandemics. Policy makers, healthcare sectors, stakeholders throughout FFR supply chain may establish a database and monitoring system to respond such urgent events in the future.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, K.K. and L.Z.; writing—original draft preparation, K.K.; writing—review and editing, K.K. and L.Z. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

**Data Availability Statement:** No new data were created or analyzed in this study. Data sharing is not applicable to this article.

**Acknowledgments:** We thank Jung E. Ha-Brookshire for the helpful comments for this research project. We also thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors for the constructive comments to improve this manuscript.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **References**

## *Concept Paper* **Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence in Migration and Mobility: Transnational Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic**

**Marie McAuliffe 1 , Jenna Blower 2, \* and Ana Beduschi 3**

**Abstract:** Digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in migration and mobility have incrementally expanded over recent years. Iterative approaches to AI deployment experienced a surge during 2020 and into 2021, largely due to COVID-19 forcing greater reliance on advanced digital technology to monitor, inform and respond to the pandemic. This paper critically examines the implications of intensifying digitalization and AI for migration and mobility systems for a post-COVID transnational context. First, it situates digitalization and AI in migration by analyzing its uptake throughout the Migration Cycle. Second, the article evaluates the current challenges and, opportunities to migrants and migration systems brought about by deepening digitalization due to COVID-19, finding that while these expanding technologies can bolster human rights and support international development, potential gains can and are being eroded because of design, development and implementation aspects. Through a critical review of available literature on the subject, this paper argues that recent changes brought about by COVID-19 highlight that computational advances need to incorporate human rights throughout design and development stages, extending well beyond technical feasibility. This also extends beyond tech company references to inclusivity and transparency and requires analysis of systemic risks to migration and mobility regimes arising from advances in AI and related technologies.

**Keywords:** international migration; mobility; Migration Cycle; artificial intelligence; digitalization; digital divide; COVID-19; human rights

#### **1. Introduction**

In the current era of online connectivity, described by some as the Age of Algorithms [1], increasingly complex digital technologies including those related to artificial intelligence (AI) underpin more and more everyday activities performed by people all over the world. Substantial developments in computational power and data generation have resulted in people's daily lives being shaped through AI-related services and digital interfaces, such as the personalization of newsfeeds, online advertising tailored to browsing activity, interactive chatbot assistance and automated analytical updates. The range of "smart" products using AI technologies has also grown, now covering appliances, vehicles, houses and integrated voice assistants.

Routine activities in day-to-day lives around the world speak volumes of the recent emergence of modern-day digital transformations. Sending e-mails, transferring money to family back home, searching online for information and advice, posting comments on social media and lodging e-forms through online platforms have become routine even in the most geographically remote locations. This is especially the case for interactions related to international migration and mobility, which is an inherently transnational phenomenon

**Citation:** McAuliffe, M.; Blower, J.; Beduschi, A. Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence in Migration and Mobility: Transnational Implications of the COVID-19 Pandemic. *Societies* **2021**, *11*, 135. https://doi.org/10.3390/soc11040135

Academic Editors: Sandro Serpa and Carlos Miguel Ferreira

Received: 22 September 2021 Accepted: 7 November 2021 Published: 10 November 2021

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**Copyright:** © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

that has been shaped by social networks over hundreds of years often involving personto-person links built up over generations [2,3]. Over recent years, however, our social and economic interactions have been increasingly mediated through digital systems and processes, placing much greater emphasis on digital technologies and reducing the need for personal interaction [4].

Alongside the impacts on individuals, the pressure on industry to digitalize has resulted in every sector (and, to a lesser degree, all organizations) needing to transform its systems, structures and processes toward data capture, storage, reporting and related analysis. As part of these digital transformations, we have seen the management of migration and mobility systems globally being affected by increased digitalization and improving AI capabilities. The use of these data-driven technologies is not new, with some countries having utilized AI in their migration management systems for more than two decades, including as a means to manage rising demand for visa and travel-related products and services [5]. AI is increasingly used throughout the Migration Cycle, for example, to facilitate pre-departure identity checks, support online visa applications, manage administrative decision-making, enable "smart" border processing, and produce data analytics on travelers' compliance with legal frameworks.

AI technologies can help people access up-to-date information in real-time, improve system efficiency and reduce service times for clients. However, AI poses a variety of issues for policymakers, practitioners and migrants, including concerns about technology-enabled surveillance of individuals, the potential for systemic bias in AI decision-making in the areas of migration and mobility, the increased interactions between public and private sectors and their competing interests, and the negative impact of AI technologies on the protection of human rights.

Data-driven AI technologies have also played a critical role in the fight against COVID-19, especially during the initial months of the pandemic. Many governments and businesses around the world quickly developed digital solutions to monitor public health, such as mobile phone applications for contact tracing to support self-isolation strategies aimed at minimizing transmission rates [6–8]. COVID-19, and the urgency related to immediate responses, acted to further intensify the pre-existing pressures on industry and States to 'digitalize or perish' [9,10]. It had become a matter of life and death, on a large scale, and closely linked to the movement of people across borders as well as within local communities.

This paper critically examines the implications of intensifying digitalization and AI for migration and mobility systems for a post-COVID transnational context. First, it situates digitalization and AI in migration by analyzing its uptake throughout the Migration Cycle. Second, the article evaluates the current challenges and opportunities to migrants and migration systems brought about by the deepening digitalization due to COVID-19, with reference to human rights and international development. This is important because of the widely recognized risks AI implementation poses to the adherence of human rights, most especially concerning identity and privacy [11,12]. In addition, the potential impacts of the "digital divide" extend beyond individuals and communities, taking in entire countries beset by global inequalities. Further leaps in the roll-out of super technologies in migration and mobility regimes, such as AI, risk further polarizing the potential for developing countries to also realize a global mobility dividend.

In writing this paper the researchers conducted a review of the available literature on this subject drawing from academic articles published in peer-reviewed journals, research reports, and other relevant national and international government documents on migration management, AI and COVID-19. Document analysis was used as the primary research method, drawing on the available literature to provide new insight into the implications of increasing digitalization and use of AI in migration and mobility systems for a post-COVID transnational context.

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#### **2. From Abstract Conceptualizations to Functional Realities: The AI and Migration Story So Far**