1185 Л. Л. Рыбаковский, О. Д. Захарова, В. В. Миндогулов, *Нелегалная миграция в приграничных районах Дальнего Востока: история, современность и последстия* [Illegal migration in the border regions of the Far East: History, Contempory and Consequences], Москва 1994, p. 19.

1186 Г. Витковская, Ж. Зайончковская, op. cit., p. 98; G. Vitkovskaya, Z. Zayonchkovskaya, K. Newland, op. cit., p. 357; Ж. Зайончковская, *Перед лицом иммиграции* [Facing Immigrantion], "Pro et Contra", 2005, no 3, p. 73.

1187 *Does Chinese Migration Endanger Russian*. *Security*? Moscow Carnegie Center Briefing Papers, 1999, VIII, vol. 1, no 8, p. 1.

1188 А. Г. Ларин, *Китайские мигранты в России. История и современность* [Chinese Migrants in Russia. History and Contemporary Times], Москва 2009, p. 149.

1189 В. Гельбрас, *Китайская реальность России* [Chinese Reality of Russia], Москва 2001, pp. 39-40.

census from 2010, there were twenty-eight thousand Chinese in Russia (the number is clearly lowered).1190

Larin himself quotes the research done by S.Y. Prichod'ko and K. Vnukova that claimed that there were one hundred and fifty thousand totwo hundred thousand Chinese; the immigration service data1191 estimated the number to be around two hundred thousand; he writes also that within this range of two hundred to four or five hundred thousand, illegal immigrants are already listed (their number is decreasing year by year, though they still make up around half of all the Chinese in Russia).1192 Another important piece of research on Chinese immigration is that of Anatoliy Vishnevskyi, Mikhail Alexeev and Vilia Gelbras. Vishnevski claims that there are between four hundred thousand to six hundred thousand Chinese in Russia (2009 data).1193 He has also showed that only around 30% of all Chinese in Russia live in the Russian Far East (the others live in Siberia – 29% and Moscow – 28%; St. Petersburg has only around 3,5%."1194

Even a glimpse at that data shows a great chaos in this matter. Different state agencies have completely different data, no to mention data from Russian researchers. Nevertheless, one thing is clearly visible: there are hundreds of thousands Chinese in Russia, not millions.

Mikhail Alexeev noticed that the Russian Far East has "distinctly peripheral role in the global context of the Chinese migration", the number of settled migrants has been "statistically insignificant". Most of the migrants were shortterm visitors: tourists, shuttle-traders, businessmen, employees, poachers, smugglers and students. The Chinese remained "a marginal ethnic segment in Primorski Krai and in the Russian Far East generally". His work ends up with a clear statement: "forecasts of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Chinese workers moving into the Russian Far East to develop its vast natural resources so far remain in the realm of fantasy."1195

 1190 28943 to be exact, *Всеросийская перепись населения 2010, Национальный состав населения* (All Russia Census 2010), Федеральная служба государственной статистики. Interesingly, in the previous census, in 2002 r. The number of Chinese was estimated to be 34577, *Всеросийская перепись населения 2002 Том 4: Национальный состав и владение языками, гражданство* (All Russia Census, Nationalities, Languages and Citizenship, 2002).

1191 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., p. 255.

1192 Ibid., pp. 148-152 and 255-257.

1193 *Население России 2009, Семнадцатый ежегодный демографический доклад* [Population of Russia. 17th Yearly Demographic Account], oтв. pед. А. Г. Вишневский, Demoscope.ru.

1194 Ibid.

1195 M. Alexeev, *Chinese Migration into Primorskii Krai: Economic Effects and Interethnic Hostility*, [in:] *Slavic Eurasia's Integration into the World Economy and Community*, ed. Shinichiro Tabat, Akihiro Iwashita, Sapporo 2004, p. 336.

Vilia Gelbras' research was concentrated on the Russian Far East alone. Gelbras has noticed the increased number of Chinese arrivals, but commented that "most of the Chinese arrive to Russia legally", while "the scale of that migration is too insignificant to panic, let alone to speak about Chinese demographic expansion". Besides, "Chinese migration to Russia is not a spontaneous migration of people to a new place of residence, and not a search for a promised land. There has emerged a specific form of the movement of manpower that serves the flow of goods". Gelbras' data from Vladivostok and Khabarovsk prove that the number of immigrants who live with their families in the Russian Far East has stopped; the Chinese consider the Russian Far East a place where one can get rich quickly, but not as a place where they would like to live.1196 Most of the Chinese who arrive to the Russian Far East are petty traders from markets or seasonal/short-term workers1197. In general, "the income of the majority of the Chinese immigrants is low; the idea that they take away Russians' jobs – a favourite slogan of xenophobes – is nothing more than a myth."1198 Finally, the region itself (and the entireity of Russia) is not an attractive place to migrate: "few Chinese have decided to settle in Russia. They have been deterred by the cold climate, the lack of business opportunities and poor local hospitality."1199

The Russian Far East in not a popular destination for the Chinese because of the fact that – as Larin put it – "Russia is a factor that complicates one's life" due to several reasons: "low efficiency of state structures' work, widespread corruption of governmental officials and time-consuming bureaucracy."1200 The militia, or now the police, remains the most important problem – "probably there isn't a single Chinese person in Russia who wouldn't be harmed by militia"; Larin concludes, "the main obstacles faced by immigrants are the same as for their Russian colleagues; they are all parts of the same business atmosphere in Russia."1201

Nevertheless, the Chinese presence has been a serious problem, but not due to immigration. This threat was misunderstood as a "flood", a "creeping immigration" that foresees annexation by China. This was a modern reconstruction of the "yellow peril" syndrome from the late 19th and the early 20th century.1202 Gelbras is right when he says that "the real problem is not the number

 1196 V. Gelbras, *Chinese Migration in Russia*, "Russia in Global Affairs", 2005, vol. 3, no 2 (April-June), p. 179; see also: Idem, *Китайская реальност*… Москва 2001.

1197 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., pp. 174-179.

1198 Ibid., pp. 175-179 and 219.

1199 Д. Тренин, *Верные друзья?*….

1200 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., pp. 215.

1201 Ibid., pp. 186-187 and 192-273; It is fair to add, however, that recently Russia's police attitude towards the Chinese has improved.

1202 A. Łopińska, *The "Yellow Peril" syndrome in contemporary Russia*, "Sensus Historiae. Studia interdyscyplinarne", vol. VIII, no 2012/3, pp. 41 -58.

of Chinese immigrants but the fact of how they harm the economy."1203.This is not a "criminalization" of social life, as anti-Chinese propaganda would like to see it. The most popular transgressions among the Chinese are of an economic nature. The Chinese know Russian law poorly but this is due to the fact that they deal with official matters via middle-men and if they face militia (police) "it rarely has anything to do with rule of law."1204 Moreover, the majority of economic transgressions are jointly done by Russians and the Chinese: "Russian economic and administrative mechanisms often not only allow but even provoke an immigrant to act against the law (…) the Russian grey economy forces the Chinese businessman to bypass the law. And the Chinese businessman acts as the Russian does: he simply follows the rules of the game – 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do.'"1205 As Larin rhetorically asks: "if we are unable to deal with our criminals who bring a lot of damage to the state, why should we demand from China to control their own citizens who do not harm their own country – they are just breaking foreign laws on foreign land?"1206

Thus, the real challenge for the Russian Far East is of an economic, not immigration nature. The bilateral trade is unbalanced – China exports cheap consumption goods and imports natural resources, like timber. Moreover, most of the trade is illegal and conducted by criminal groups from both sides of the border. Their activity "inflicts damage on Russia's economic security and checks the development of a civilized market economy"; furthermore, it "strengthens Russia's position as a raw-material appendage of China; this turns Russia, primarily, into a market for Chinese goods, thus preventing economic growth, especially in the Far East."1207 As a result, the Russian Far East instead of pushing Russia into Asia, "may become part of East Asian rather than Russian periphery, and increasingly subservient to Chinese requirements."1208 When one looks at Chinese policy toward the Russian Far East, one may find many similarities with the Chinese policy toward Laos; the same neocolonial mechanism functions here: China exploits the region for its resources and in return floods it with low quality goods.

Far Eastern Russians are aware of China's growing importance. The majority of them claim that only China benefits from the cooperation and that the Chinese influence on the economy is negative. The general perception is that the Chinese are much better employees – entrepreneurial, talented, hard-working and sober. On the other hand, they are considered canny, sly, mean and

 1203 V. Gelbras, *Chinese Migration*…, pp. 183-186.

1204 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., p. 185.

1205 Ibid., pp. 268, 418.

1206 Ibid., p. 271.

1207 V. Gelbras, *Chinese Migration*…, p. 183-186.

1208 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 62.

aggressive1209. An interesting recent phenomenon is the increase of mixed marriages between Chinese men and Russian women – and a corresponding rise in Sinophobia among Russian men.1210 According to the latest data, only 8% of Russians support mixed marriages, whereas 40% are indifferent or against them: this result may be interpreted as "another example of chauvinism, or maybe chauvinism plus migrant-phobia."1211

Fears of "Sinization" are based on the hermetic closeness of the Chinese communities.1212 Far Eastern Russians dislike the Chinese because they stick together, help one another and do not assimilate. Nevertheless, the Chinese in Russia are not a Diaspora. They are temporary guest workers (most do not live there longer than five years), not citizens nor permanent inhabitants. They do not grow their roots and do not invest their capital here. They establish their own hotels and restaurants, but these function to serve the Chinese niche only. The Chinese do not fight for their political rights and do not want to challenge the equilibrium with the locals. In sum: they form "a quasi-diaspora."1213

So, why does migration remains a thorny issue in Sino-Russian relations? This is due to deep Sinophobia of Far Eastern Russians whose chauvinism is targeted not only at Chinese immigrants, but claims Beijing has bad intentions as well. Far Eastern Russians blame not only migrants, but also China for many misdoings.1214 In fact, the opposite is true. Although Beijing is unable to control many areas of economic and social life, the Chinese government tries to cooperate with Russia rather than leaving this issue alone – the Chinese officials are prone to accept subsequent Russian limitation of free movement.1215 If China indeed has bad intentions for the regions, these are of an economic nature – to explore its natural resources instead of assimilating; this, however, falls far behind the top priority of China's Russia policy: the secure China's strategic back to have "peace from the North". In the 2000s and 2010s, anxieties over the "Chinese threat" significantly waned ("fear left everyday life; people care about practical cooperation with the Chinese neighbours"), though there are still such voices in Russia (such as a bizarre claim from Rodina party economist Mikhail Deliagin who said in 2006 that the Chinese "undertook military drills inside Russia" (sic!) and that Russia should arm itself in the Far East, or the equally intriguing statement from general Vladimir Ovchinski who

 1209 В. Ларин, *В тени проснувшегося дракона* [In the Shadow of the Awakening Dragon], Владивосток 2006, pp. 274-275.

1210 Pharag Khanna op. cit., pp. 75-78.

1211 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., p. 200.

1212 Ibid., p. 181.

1213 Ibid., p. 159-181.

1214 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, pp. 63-64.

1215 А.B. Лукин, *Китай опасный сосед*…, p. 85.

claimed that the Chinese mafia is controlling Russia).1216 According to the latest data (public opinion surveys from 2000-2013) Far Eastern Russian anxiety on losing land to China has recently waned (only 24% of respondents still fear that in comparison to 61% in 2000). At the same time, however, there is a paradox. Although the anxieties of losing land have waned, "geopolitical anxieties and xenophobia remained at the same level". There is still a common perception of "large migration", the level of xenophobia remains high (approx. 54% of all respondents called for the deportation of all immigrants, legal and illegal, including their children), while the perception that China gains more in bilateral trade strengthens. Besides, Far Eastern Russians often have contacts with the Chinese even less (a drop from 84% to 61%), have even more negative attitude towards mixed marriages (approx. 90% are against marriages of their relatives with immigrants) and more often (77% opposed to 65% in 2000) support the slogan "Russia for Russians", *Россия для русских*). This data can be interpreted via the prism of strengthening central authority and its efficiency, the increase of income of the inhabitants and their more frequent visits to China (though these trips do not lead to lowering the negative opinion towards the Chinese). At the same time the claim that the Chinese consider the Russian Far East theirs and that they would demand this land in the future, has remained high.1217 This may be interpreted as follows: thanks to the consolidation of power by Putin, Far Eastern Russians stopped being afraid of losing their land to China today, but they still are afraid of that scenario tomorrow. The dislike toward the Chinese has not lowered either.

All these resentments are born out of the general anxiety about Russia's future (combined with China's rise). The general depopulation trend in Russia and growing population in China is a good example. Beijing's concrete actions mean little when compared to different demographical patterns of the neighborhood regions. Real actions cannot reduce the anxieties if Russians still believe in "territorial determinism" – if they are many and we are few, sooner or later they will come here. When a Russian "hears a Chinese partner's casual remark that Lake Baikal is the 'common heritage' of both countries, he shivers"1218 (the same happens when the Chinese call for "one economic space" in the Russian Far East and Northeast China).1219

 Sinophobia makes it impossible for Far Eastern Russians to see that, as a matter of fact, there are too few Chinese in the Russian Far East, not too many.

 1216 Idem, *Россия и Китай сегодня и завтра* [Russia and China. Today and Tomorrow], [in:] *Россия и Китай: четыре века*…, pp. 632 and 688.

1217 *Прошание с «азиатскими Балканами»*…, ; see also similar data from 2008, Ларин В.Л., Ларина Л.Л. *Окружающий мир глазами дальневосточников* (*по итогам опроса населения 2008 г.)* [Surrounding World in Far Eastern Russian Eyes], [in:] *Россия и АТР*, Владивосток, 1/2009.

1218 Д. Тренин, *Верные друзья?*…

1219 G. Rozman, *The Sino-Russian*…, p. 257.

Economically speaking, only the Chinese are able to fill the gap created by depopulation; without it, the further development of the Russian Far East is impossible.1220 Northeast Chinese are perfect immigrants here – they are accustomed to the Russian climate, many are peasants and have experience of working in Russia and dealing with Russians.1221 Yet, firstly, Chinese workers prefer to go to work elsewhere (Western Russia, or better still, Western Europe)1222 and secondly, Russia has no possibility to assimilate the Chinese, it is unable to make them useful citizens; Russia lacks the ability of being a "melting pot" like the USA; local intolerance, xenophobia and dislike mixed with growing nationalism, anxiety of territorial demands in the future – these all make a "Russian melting pot" rather impossible to materialize.1223 As for the sources of the Far Eastern Russians' approach toward the Chinese, these are "Russia's weak economic, political and military position in Asia-Pacific."1224

#### *5. Big Plans, Little Results: Russia and the Russian Far East in the 2000s*

Vladimir Putin upon taking his office started dealing with the Russian Far East energetically: he dismissed governor Nazdratenko who symbolized the dark 1990s.1225 Then, in Blagoveshchenks Putin made an important speech – he said that unless Russia immediately starts investing in the region, it would loose it, while the Far East's inhabitants would start speaking Chinese, Korean and Japanese.1226 This was combined with Putin's general vision of strengthening the state and its central institutions. He was able to resolve the border issue. However, other major impediments, such as the dysfunctionality of the local economy, unprepared for market realities and dramatic depopulation, remained. The demographic issue, combined with political and security issues, presented Putin with a dilemma – he wanted to develop relations with China, which meant increasing trade and human contacts, including interregional links with Chinese provinces. On the other hand, he could not ignore economic and social tensions arising from local Sinophobia. There was also a strategic dilemma:

 1220 В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., p. 487.

1221 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., p. 275.

1222 А.В. Лукин, *От нормализации к стратегическому партнерству*…, p. 391.

1223 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., pp. 278-282.

1224 Ibid., pp. 340 and 422.

1225 He was replaced by governor Sergei Darkin, who intensified cooperation with China with such projects as Suifenhe-Prigranichnyi border complex, В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., p. 481.

1226 *Вступительное слово на совещании «О перспективах развития Дальнего Востока и Забайкалья»* [Entry Word on Meeting 'Perspectives of Russian Far East and Zabaykale Development], Kremlin.ru, 21.06.2000.

"could Moscow use the injection of Chinese commerce to revive the RFR and satisfy consumer demand without risking a *de facto* Chinese take over?"1227. After sixteen years Putin in power, this dilemma is still present, though Moscow in the late 2000s and the early 2010s moved rather towards cooperation with China than balancing it.

Since the fall of the USSR, Moscow has been striving with a permanent failure to create a development strategy for the Russian Far East. Although there were strategies in the 2000s, they remained mostly on paper.1228 As Russian researchers admit, the "distance between understanding the challenge and ways to react to it turned out to be impossible or irreducible" as "the gap between declarations and real actions by center became very wide."1229 The Russian Far East continues to be one of the most backward regions in Russia; its economy is increasingly dependent on Chinese goods, services and labor, depopulation trends are not reversing, while Putin's policy is barely more effective than during Yeltsin's era.1230 The Kremlin has no idea what to do with this region. It has been trying to stimulate domestic migration from Western Russia and that of Russians living outside Russia (in the former USSR) but this have been successful. Even if they arrived in vast numbers they would not fill the full need for labor; besides there is not a clear economic basis for this idea of resettling Russians from other regions.1231 The idea to develop the region through grand energy investments so far has failed, too. Such projects are not labor-intensive, so its effect on unemployment is marginal; they are more often virtual than real and always combined with present geopolitics; if they are finally fulfilled, profits end up in Moscow or on private accounts.1232 The idea to attract Japanese and South Korean investments (which could create jobs), in

 1227 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 59.

1228 *Федеральная целевая программа «Экономическое и социальное развитие Дальнего Востока и Забайкалья на 1996-2005 и до 2010 года»* [Federal Programme of Economic Development of the Far East and Zabaikale 1996-2005 and to 2010], NCS.ru This programme was partially successful, as it led to the development of local transportation scheme; *Стратегия социально-экономического развития Дальнего Востока и Байкальского региона на период до 2025 года* [Strategy of Socioeconomic Development of the Far East and Zabaykale region until 2025], Распоряжение Правительства РФ от 28 XII 2009 N 2094-р, Закон-Прост.Ru; *Стратегия развития России в АТР в XXI веке* [Strategy of Russia's Development]. Аналитический доклад, Москва, Совет Федерации, 2000.

1229 В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., p. 470.

1230 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 66-70. The Chinese who come there "are surprised by the poverty and mismanagment in Russian border regions", А.В. Лукин, *Россия и Китай*…, p. 668.

1231 В. Ларин, *В тени проснувшегося дракона*…, p. 121

1232 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 67.

opposition to resources-interested Chinese only – was dear to central and regional leaders alike, but never materialized.1233 Political problems with Tokyo and Seoul, high level of corruption (even by Russian standards) and criminality discouraged investment there. As a result, the central authorities neglected the region, its main sources of income come from China; without Chinese goods and Chinese traders, Far Eastern Russian consumers would not be able to survive1234: The Far Eastern provinces' dependence on China on foodstuffs and consumers' goods is around 60-80%.1235 This is unsurprising: without revenues from Moscow, Far Eastern regions turned toward China, but the intraregional cooperation between the Chinese and Russian provinces could be stronger, should the Russians not block such ideas as free trade zones.1236 They are blocking them in classical bureaucractic manner: regional Russian officials formally support cooperation with China but informally they make its fulfilment difficult by introducing bureaucratic barriers.1237 They have been doing this out of a "defensive mentality in which the fear of losing control outweighs the sense of opportunity"1238; this fear is present in the reluctance for an even stronger dependence on China and in the belief that trade benefits China mostly. The Russian Far East exports mainly timber (around 47%) and oilproducts (19,5%), while importing machinery (44%) and textiles (30%).1239 Until 2010 there were no bigger Chinese investments, while Russian companies did not venture to the Chinese market. To make things worst, most of the trade has been done illegally or semi-legally.1240 This all results in Moscow's lack of an idea of what to do with the region: "the result is policy confusion, with the emphasis on half-backed schemes such as attracting labor from western Russia or prestige projects like APEC 2012 in Vladivostok"1241 (the latter costed "50 percent more than the London Summer Olympics a month earlier").1242 Since the USSR's fall Moscow has regularly proclaimed the need to revive the region and to create a development strategy; in 2012 the Kremlin even founded a separate ministry (Ministry of the Development of the Far

 1233 For the Chinese the access to Far Eastern Russian resources is "a factor of strategic importance", В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., p. 483.

1234 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit. p. 416.

1235 В. Ларин, *Азиатско-тихоокеанский регион в начале XXI века: вызовы, угрозы, шансы Тихоокеанской России* [The region of AP in the beginning of 21th century: challenges, threats, chances of the Pacific Russia], Владивосток 2010, p. 146-147.

1236 M. Kaczmarski, W. Konończuk, *Po obu stronach Amuru* [On both banks of Amur], Nowa Europa Wschodnia 5/2012.

1237 В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., p. 495.

1238 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 139.

1239 В. Ларин, *В тени проснувшегося дракона*…, p. 121

1240 M. Alexeev, op. cit., p. 341.

1241 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 67.

1242 Idem, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 161.

East), headed by Victor Ishaev, former governor of Khaborovsk.1243 In reality, however, the region has been forgotten by central authorities, their ambitious programmes remain on paper, while bureaucratic structures, such as the already mentioned Far East Ministry do not fit the reality (the latter was implicitly confirmed by Putin by dismissing Ishaev in 2013).1244 Hence, China remains the only real option for the region. Ambiguity has been the result. On the one hand the regional administration benefits from economic contacts with China; this keeps the region alive (socially and politically stable). On the other hand, "Russians loath to admit the extent of their dependence, both because they fear it and because it is humiliating"1245. They "see the danger of becoming a simple 'raw materials appendage' to their neighbor but hope to be able to rebalance the relationship later, by producing semi-finished goods on their territory."1246 So far it has been only wishful thinking.

#### *6. Pivot to China: The Russian Far East in the 2010s*

On a political level, Moscow and Beijing have done a lot to minimize tensions that arise from the Chinese presence. Beijing has always been cooperative when Moscow wanted to strengthen the visa regime or regulate border trade; it has reiterated that it has no territorial claims and reacted with restraint to the accusations of Far Eastern Russians. Moscow in turn rejected the notion of the "Chinese threat" and allowed the border trade to grow. The dialogue on both sides improved remarkably, particularly on the thorny issues from the 1990s – the demarcation of the border and "illegal migration". The border trade grows, intraregional relations between local politicians are good, if not friendly – but "economic opportunities stemming from co-operation with China were balanced with security concerns."1247 This was part of the problem: "the largely positive state of relations in the RFE" relied "disproportionately on the 'suspension of disbelief.'"1248

In the late 2000s and the early 2010s Russia understood the importance of Asia-Pacific in global politics and the role the Russian Far East plays in attempts to upgrade Russia's profile. As Fyodor Lukyanov wrote, "the main

 1243 *Указ Президента Российской Федерации о структуре федеральных органов испольнительной власти* [RF President's Decree on structure of Federal Executive Organs] , "Российская газета", 22.05.2012.

1244 *Указ Президента Российской Федерации о Ишаеве В.И.* [RF President's Decree on Ishaev V.I.], Kremlin.Ru, 31.08.2013.

1245 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 67.

1246 Д. Тренин, *Верные друзья?*….

1247 M. Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 77.

1248 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 69.

challenges associated with Russia's Asia future are from inside, not outside."1249 The Russian Far East is crucial here: the region is "at once Russia's shop-window in Asia, and a barometer of its turn to the East": so far it has been "one of the most backward regions in Northeast Asia, exceeded in this respect only by North Korea" which translated to regional recognition of Russia as "little more than a purveyor of natural resources and weapons"; but "if the Kremlin could transform it into a hub of intra-regional cooperation, then Russia would become an Asian-Pacific power."1250 Hence, as Russia's most important regional goal has been to remain in the Asian game, Moscow needs to develop the Russian Far East – "Russia's future in the East depends on what it will do with Far Eastern provinces."1251 Regional cooperation (with such initiatives as Great Tumen Initiative1252 or Tumangan project1253) being far away from "big politics", plays a key role here. Domestically the basic challenge is the "new colonization" of Siberia and the Russian Far East, without doing so, "Russia will not be able to dream about playing a significant role in Asia."1254 This is combined with the necessity of the development in Siberia and the Russian Far East through infrastructural projects.1255 The Russian Far East needs "dual integration" (with Asia-Pacific and with the rest of Russia); or it will slip into being "double periphery."1256 In short, Russia needs to use the dynamism of Asia to develop its Far Eastern part.

The most important rationale behind these plans is, obviously, the need to keep a great power status: "three hundred years ago the great power status was dependent on the position on the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea; now it depends on the position on the Pacific."1257 Hence, from the Kremlin perspective, the Russian Far East matters "as a springboard for asserting Russia as a Eurasian empire and Pacific power", which in effect made the 21st century objective (upgrading economic conditions of the region), a mirror of 19th century mission "of asserting Russia's "great power-ness" in Asia; Regional development for

 1249 Ф. Лукьянов, *Поворот на восток* [Pivot to the East], SVOP, 15.02.2010,

1250 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 160.

1251 Personal conversation with Fiodor Lukyanov, Moscow 28.09.2013

1252 For more, see: *Overview. Greater Tumen Inicjative*.

1253 *Проект «Туманган»* [Project Tumangan], Tumanga.ru

1254 *Фёдор Лукьянов: «Азия – это не периферия*» [Asia is not periphery], Городские новости 12.03.2014.

1255 А. Ларин, *Несколько замечании о возрождении Дальнего Востока России на фоне возрожденмия китайской нации* [A few remarks about the revival of Russian Far East against the background of Chinese nation's revival], [in:] *Азиатско-тихоокеанское сотрудничество и место России в региональном развитии* [AP cooperation and Russia's place in regional development], Москва 2014, p. 19.

1256 N. Kuhrt, *The Russian Far East in Russia's Asia Policy: Dual Integration or Double Periphery?*, "Europe-Asia Studies", vol. 64, no. 3, May 2012, pp. 478-483.

1257 *Ф. Лукьянов: Мы и новая Азия* [We and the new Asia], Совет по внешнй и оборонной политике, 11.11.2013.

its own sake holds little attraction for the Kremlin."1258 Thus, making full use of the Pacific potential "is a passport to the future; failure to integrate the east would spell the demise of Russia as a major player."1259 The latter would equal to "a cascade of domestic and external risks: further deindustrialization (and criminalization) of the local economy; social demoralization and unrest; and the steady erosion of Russian sovereignty."1260

In search for ways to develop the Far East, Russia has finally accepted the reality and turned to China. Moscow wanted – as Putin wrote it – to "catch the Chinese wind"1261, to turn the "fortress into free trade zones."1262 Thus, the idea of the Far East's development was based on external sources (capital), mostly Chinese ones.1263 The pro-Chinese agenda of Moscow with regards to the Russian Far East was a substantial turn: it "implied a growing Russian openness and acquiescence to a Chinese presence in the Russian Far East", this "incremental shift has confirmed Russia's gradual accommodation to the new bilateral balance of power."1264 Moscow again decided that it must accept the reality (of Chinese domination) and make the most of it. The programme of development of the Russian Far East with participation of the Chinese capital (around 250 joint ventures, such as new infrastructure, roads, railways, terminals, bridges, border crossings; investments in exploration of natural resources and manufacturing), accepted in 2009, was a clear sign of this new policy.1265 In this "milestone programme" two key ideas seemed to exist: "attracting investment from China into Russia's Far East and coordinating the development of the two states' adjacent border regions."1266 This was followed by opening special economic zones in Russia's Far East (comprising of Vladivostok and 15 other maritime administrative districts) in 2015.

Russia agreed to this programme because the perception of China in Russia, or at least among the Russian elite, had changed: "for the last 300 years Russians have been accustomed to seeing China as weak, backward, and inferior in virtually every respect"1267; even a few years ago "Russians were asking whether the Chinese have TV sets, now they see China's power."1268 Now when they look at China today, "they see an economic giant; a financial power armed with the world's largest foreign exchange reserve, a new science power

 1258 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 160.

1259 D. Trenin, *Moscow on the Pacific: the Missing Piece in the Pivot to Asia*, Carnegie Center Moscow, 30.10.2013.

1260 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 160.

1261 В. Путин, *Россия и меняющийся мир*….

1262 Yu Bin, *Tales of Different 'Pivots'*, …; Gilbert Rozman, *Turning Fortress*…

1263 *Программа сотрудничества*….

1264 Ibid.

1265 Ibid.

1266 M. Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 77.

1267 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 143.

1268 А. Г. Ларин, op. cit., p. 237.

and technology producer; and an increasingly capable military force."1269 But old habits die hard, and the Russians' approach to China combines fascination with anxiety: "Moscow is far from ready to accept China as the senior partner and more influential power. To admit this would be at odds with the message of a resurgent Russia second to none."1270 Nevertheless, despite reservations, Russia decided to bandwagon and to attract Chinese investments to the region and develop it using them. On the other hand, Moscow "made a virtue of necessity" – nobody but China wants to invest there, while Russia is too poor to develop it by itself. In the deteriorating financial situation, "Russia may not allow to spend a billion investments in a region neglected for decades."1271 That is why it considers Chinese shares better than nothing. The Russians simply came to terms with inevitable (for the Russian Far East there is no choice: China or nothing)1272 and decided to gain as much as possible.

Unfortunately, from the perspective of 2017, the programme of Chinese investments and other incentives cannot be considered successful – only a couple of projects have been fulfilled; the rest remain on paper. This is due to the fact that "the mechanisms of fulfillment of the Programme have not been included"1273, "one may come to a conclusion that the programme is not being fulfilled."1274 Furthermore, the investment climate in Russia contributes to the fact that there are roughly two types of investments into the Russian Far East: "projects that consider Russia as an resource appendix to the Asian economy and semi-legal or illegal schemes to deliver Chinese production into Russian markets."1275 Moreover, many profits from Chinese investments instead of supplying Russian economy are stolen by private individuals.1276 Finally, contrary to what they proclaim, the Chinese are not rushing to invest in the region either. Firstly, they changed the concept of development of China's Northeast (*Dongbei*). In the 1980s and 1990s they sought to advance cooperation with Russia1277; now they have decided that concentration on deepened cooperation with Southern China is a better option instead; secondly, the Chinese are not keen to invest in the Russian Far East because "they simply want to take the

1274 А. Ларин, *Несколько замечании*…, p. 19.

 1269 Д. Тренин, *Верные друзья?*….

1270 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 143.

1271 *Rosyjski Daleki Wschód: zaplecze surowcowe Chin*….

1272 Personal conversation with Chen Yurong, CIIS, Beijing 01.06.2010.

1273 В. Кулешев [и другие], *О некоторых аспектах совершенствования российскокитайского межрегионального сотрудничества* [On several aspects on the existance of Russian-Sino interregional cooperation], "Проблемы Дальнего Востока" № 6/2010, p. 67.

1275 *Ф. Лукьянов, Поворот на восток*….

1276 А.В. Лукин, *Россия и Китай*…, p. 668.

1277 Li Jingjie. *Sino-Russian Relations in Asia Pacific*, [in:] *Engaging Russia in Asia Pacific*, eds вy Watanabe Koji, Tokyo 1999, p. 63.

resources and nothing more."1278 Currently, cooperation with the Russian Far East is of primary importance to only one Chinese province (Heilongjiang); even for other Dongbei's provinces (Jilin, Laoning) it is not so important now.1279 This is why the "cooperation programme" that was intended to be the engine of regional development becomes another factor in the Russian Far East becoming a raw material appendage to China.

Facing the failure of this programme, Russia did not give up but decided in 2011 to re-engage China and renew the list of joint ventures – one of the major goals was to attract Chinese investments in manufacturing, processing and infrastructure construction; judging by the recent perspective, however, "China has been able to increasingly define the direction the Far East development takes, according to its own needs; the support it provided for the joint development of the region focused on creating transport infrastructure and the exploration of resources; Russian hopes (…) have not been fulfilled."1280 Thus, from the perspective of 2017 not much has yet changed.1281 The Russian President's Envoy to the Russian Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev in 2015 openly blamed the Chinese government for not encouraging Chinese investors to go to Russia, moreover, he must have been deeply frustrated, because he even compared Russia to… Angola and pointed out that unlike in Angola, China is not eager to invest in Russia: "Does Angola really have a more stable and favorable investment climate than Russia?" he asked rhetorically.1282

This scenario means increasing the dependence on China. In the long term, if not already, the cooperation with China becomes a vital necessity for Far Eastern Russians – something inevitable.1283 If Russia fails to succeed in the challenging and "truly intimidating national task" of upgrading Asia-Pacific's backwater: the Russian Far East, "a byword for bad governance, corruption, and neglect"1284, then the economic Sinicization of the Russian Far East, not its military annexation, seems to be the most probable scenario for the future: "Russia may not necessarily 'lose' those provinces in a formal way to China, but it will see them increasingly gravitate towards it. In another great reversal, the 21st century Khabarovsk, a Russian border city on the Amur, may look like the late 19th century Harbin, founded by Russian merchants and railwaymen

 1278 Personal conversation with prof. Oleg Timofeyev, from Amur University in Blagoveshchensk, Łódź 07.06.2014.

1279 В.Г. Дацышен, В.Л. Ларин, Г.Н. Романова, op. cit., pp. 485-499.

1280 M. Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 78.

1281 However, if one is to believe Russian Tass agency, recently Chinese investments in the Russian Far East are rising and accounts for about 22% of the total foreign investment volume, *Moscow offers Beijing to set up center to support Chinese investors*, Tass, 09.01.2017.

1282 Yu Bin, *Into the Syrian Storm: Between Alliance and Alignment*, "Comparative Connections" vol. 17, no.3

1283 M. Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 78.

1284 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 224.

in the middle of Chinese Manchuria: a foreign outpost in a neighbouing country, and the centre of an expanding zone of influence."1285

The Kremlin policy makers are aware of this challenge. Therefore, while embracing China, they have tried simultaneously to balance its influence by other Asian states. Hence, the idea of the "Russian pivot to Asia" (or the Russian turn to the East – more in the last chapter). Its basic concept is the idea of a comprehensive Asian strategy that combines coordinated domestic development alongside positioning itself in the Asia-Pacific as well as enlarging and deepening ties with Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia, so that cooperation with Asia-Pacific is not limited to China.1286

Nevertheless, the success of the Russian pivot remained doubtful from the beginning due to domestic reasons. Even supporters of the Russian pivot saw big obstacles that would hamper its fulfillment. The preferred development model (basing on energy super projects) "cannot be applied here – the economic and geographical realities do not favor it."1287 To make matters worse, the Russian elites "are too busy worrying about day-to-day survival to draw up a consistent policy for relations with Asia"; that is why the "Kremlin's Asian policy will be for the most part an imitation (…) It is no surprise that journalists joked that the (APEC) summit looked just as absurd as a man in a bird suit flying with Siberian cranes (as Putin tried to do)."1288 What was even more disturbing, was the traditional disjunction between rhetoric and substance, poor implementation of programs, no follow-up and lack of sustained interest in long-term development of the region; the current economic situation does not help, either: "at a time of recession and tight budgetary constraints, the prospects for the RFE look very bleak without massive foreign investment"; attracting non-Chinese Asian partners failed, too: "in the current environment China is not just the partner of choice, but sometimes the only partner."1289 The Ukrainian crisis and its aftermath effectively stopped the dreams of a Russian pivot to Asia. Moscow, busy with confrontations with the West over Ukraine, despite all its grandiose declaration to the contrary, has turned its attention away from Asia: developments after the Ukrainian crisis "confirmed that what passes for an Asian strategy is often directed at fulfilling 'greater' goals: countering the United States in global geopolitics; establishing an alternative legitimacy to Western-led governance; reinforcing Russia as an independent center of power; and reaffirming its uniqueness and indispensability."1290

 1285 Д. Тренин, *Верные друзья*?….

1286 *Логичное партнерство* [Logical Partnership], "Российская газета", 2014, 21 V.

1287 А. Ларин, *Несколько*…, pp. 19-20.

1288 L. Shevtsova, *Russia's "Pivot" to China: Is It Real or Fake?* Carnegie Center Moscow, 28.03.2013.

1289 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, pp. 160-161.

1290 Ibid., p. 163.

Judging by early-2017, Russia's pivot to China has not brought a substantial change and many deals have traditionally remained on paper due to several factors. The most important one was the fall of commodity prices, particularly oil, which hit Russian-Chinese trade hard. But there were Chinese domestic reasons, too. China's economic slowdown as well as Xi Jinping's anti-corruption policy made Chinese companies very cautious on investing in new projects, particularly in the energy sector. Moreover, contrary to Russian hopes, Chinese banks and financial institutions are as strict as Western ones about compliance with the sanctions regime (they feared Western contractions, since the West is much more important to China, Chinese banks decided not to take chances) and are not executing interbank transactions with Russian banks; to make matters worse, Russian companies are unable to issue debt or equity on Chinese stock exchanges (even in Hong Kong). Finally, Chinese banks are unwilling to provide loans in dollars or euros to Russians (with the exception of strictly political banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China which gave loans to the Yamal LNG project following a personal order from Xi Jinping himself). Therefore, "on balance, Russian elites' hopes that Chinese financing would make up for the loss of Western capital markets appear exaggerated."1291 Thus, the hope that Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore would replace London, New York or Frankfurt for Russian banks has failed.1292

Despite the lack of results, however, Russia continues its attempts to turn to the East, which strengthens the already deep asymmetry in favour of China. If Moscow follows this path, it will probably soon be forced to accept Chinese companies' ownership of substantial stakes (including joint control with Russian minority stakeholders) in strategic deposits of natural resources or/and joint ventures between Chinese companies and Russian businessmen with ties to the Kremlin, in those joint ventures Beijing would provide technology and financing while Russians would ensure the Kremlin's approval of projects and bids. In this new scheme, "the mutual benefits that both sides derive will compensate for the growing inequality between them. China will offer Moscow an economic lifeline, while Russia will provide vital resources (military and civilian technology, natural resources, and diplomatic support, including in the UN Security Council) to propel China's rise as a global powerhouse that can compete with the United States."1293 The paradoxal social consequence of Kremlin's turn to China is that "one of Moscow's atavistic anxieties— Chinese domination of the RFE and Eastern Siberia— is closer to being realized."1294 That is why, from the perspective of mid 2017, the Russian pivot to Asia may be metaphorically summarized by Deng Xiaoping's well-known words; Deng

 1291 A.Gabuev, *Friends with Benefits?*…

1292 Idem, *Поворот в никуда*….

1293 Idem, *Friends with Benefits?* …

1294 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 161.

said that different names given to Vladivostok by the Chinese and Russians have reflected different political goals: the original Chinese name, *Haishenwai,*  meant "sea slug," whereas the Russian name means "the ruler of the East."1295 Today, despite Russian plans and dreams about pivoting to Asia, Vladivostok in the political sphere is more a "sea slug" than "the ruler of the East".

\*\*\*

Putin's governance of the Russian Far East meant a modernization and reform attempt. The finalizing of the demarcation of the border with China was undoubtedly a success, as was silencing voices that made claims of "immigration expansion" by China in the region. Reforming the Russian Far East was much less successful: it remains one of the most neglected regions of Russia. The ESPO-based development attempt has failed. Russia, therefore, turned to an idea of cooperation with China. Nevertheless, from the perspective of April 2017, this has not yet been fulfilled. Beijing is more interested in the import of the Russian Far East's natural resources than in participation in its development. Beijing's policy toward the Russian Far East is reminiscent of that taken toward Laos. On the one hand China exploits the region economically, taking resources and other raw materials, on the other hand it floods it with low quality goods. As a result of this neocolonial economic policy, the Russian Far East is beginning to become China's raw material appendix. This is a result of the Chinese monopoly in the region and Russia's weakness there. The Kremlin elites are aware of the consequences – thus they initiated the "Russian pivot to Asia" to get Russia out of isolation in Asia-Pacific. Unfortunately, from the perspective of early 2017, this "turn to the East" remains "wishful thinking" more than a reality, and if it is a pivot, then it is to China only, not Asia. It increases instead of decreases Russia's dependence on China. Therefore, the only reasonable thing Russia can do in this situation is to make best use of what is on the ground: to try to work out benefits in the game played by Chinese rules.

 1295 Quoted in: H. Kissinger, *On China*, New York, Penguin Press 2011, footnote no. 14 to Chapter no. 3.

### Part Four: Central Asia: Towards Sino-Russian Condominium

Central Asia has a special place on the geopolitical map of the world. This region has a unique geopolitical feature: it is landlocked and hardly accessible; it is removed from the global political and economic centers (which makes it difficult for Central Asian states to develop external relations); and finally it is handicapped hydrologically: the deficit of water remains the source of permanent tensions between Central Asian states (which are relatively weak politically and divided over many issues). Geographical location and vast natural resources are the main factors of great powers' interest in the region1296. Here interests of Russia and China became convergent right from the beginning.

#### *1. Russia in Central Asia*

Since the 19th century Russia has "enjoyed a hegemonic position in Central Asia", consequently "Moscow has invariably looked upon Central Asia with a patrimonial eye."1297 For Russia, Central Asia is a part of the "near abroad", while its dominant position here has been based on economic and communication connections between the region and Moscow inherited after the USSR and on personal contacts with Central Asian elites whose security Moscow safeguarded (arms deliveries, garrisons) and on the universal fluency in Russian language in the region.1298 This all gave Russia a giant advantage over other powers in the region. For years, the great powers respected Russia's position and have not interferred with the Central Asian affairs – Washington did not even do it during the Cold War. Even after 1991 it had "predisposition to look to Russia to guide these states into more stable and democratic futures and to play the role of policeman if good guidance failed."1299. Moscow, however, initially after 1991 was not eager to play this role. Russian reformers considered Central Asian republics an unnecessary burden for Russia, while Central Asian elites appeared to share this outlook.1300 The Russian perspective was

 1296 А. Малашенко, *Центральная Азия: на что рассчитывает Россия?* [Central Asia: What Russia is Counting On], Москва 2012, p. 16.

1297 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 91.

1298 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*, OSW, Warsaw 2014, p. 6.

1299 M. Brill Olcott, *Central Asia, Russia and the West*, [in:] *Russia and Asia*…, p. 137.

1300 A. A. Картков, *Россия и Централная Азия, (Russia and Central Asia)* [in:] *Россия в Азии: проблемы взаимодействия* [Russia and Asia: The Problems of Interaction], ред. К. A. Какарев, Moсква 2006, p. 229; И. Звягельская, *Становление государств Центральной Азии. Политические процессы* [The Establishing of Central Asian States. Political Processes], Москва 2009, p. 41.

based on a "paternalistic assumption" that Central Asian republics are destined to be dominated by Russia.1301 Consequently, "it was not that the republics seceded from the USSR, but that the USSR simply abandoned them to their fate."1302 Russia had been steadily withdrawing from the region – its engagement to a bigger extent was based on inertia and mechanical use of all Soviet connections.1303 This, combined with a more active policy of other actors (the USA, Turkey, Iran) and the de-sovietisation process, de-rusification in local conditions, led to Russia's decreased position in the region.1304 Only Primakov's nomination in 1996 slowed this negative process down. He conducted his first foreign visit to Central Asia and emphasized that relations with the region would be "the highest priority of Russian foreign policy."1305 Nevertheless, Moscow's deeper engagement materialized only in the next decade.

Russia's re-engagement with Central Asia in the 2000s was in a way provoked by the external development – the U.S. incursion into the region, which questioned Russia's hegemonic position in Central Asia. Initially the Russian Federation not only did not oppose the US intervention, but even supported it. Soon however, the Kremlin policy-makers realized that a long-term American presence threatenedRussian interests. Consequently, Moscow turned toward Beijing. Russia and China joined on mutual need to remove the USA from the region. That is why the mid 2000s saw intensified Sino-Russian cooperation in the region, best exemplified by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Nevertheless, cooperation started to coexist with competition when China started steadily challenging Russia, with its New Silk Road project – in competition with the Russian Eurasian Union. The result was an ambiguity in Russian and Chinese policy in Central Asia.

Despite Russia's re-engagement after 09/11, "Russia's influence has eroded significantly over the past two decades since the collapse of the USSR"; only after Russia declared reintegration of the post-Soviet area as one of its top priorities in 2012, the further erosion of Russian influence was halted.1306 For Moscow, Central Asia is "often viewed as a 'soft underbelly', i.e. a buffer whose presence could improve the impermeability of the Russian borders", besides it matters as "a major source of raw materials (uranium and hydrocarbons that are re-exported to the West) and of a cheap workforce"; moreover, Central Asia is important as an area covered by Russian integration initiatives";

 1301 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow* …, p. 15.

1302 Д. Тренин, *Post-Imperium: Евразийская история* [Post-Empire: Eurasian History], Москва 2012, p. 176.

1303 V. V. Naumkin, *The emerging political balance in Central Asia: a Russian view*, [in]:*Russia and Asia*…p. 85.

1304 W. Górecki, Even Further from Moscow…, p. 16.

1305 G. Chuffrin, op. cit., p. 477.

1306 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, pp. 18-26.

finally it "is the last part of the Soviet ecumen, apart from Belarus and Armenia, where the Kremlin can still feel like a political leader (…) For this reason, Moscow's presence and influence in Central Asia are essential for its prestige"; thus "Russia's basic and most important goals are to maintain its influence there (and expand it, in the optimal scenario) and to restrict the influence of other actors (…) The loss of this region, understood as the dominance of another external player being entrenched there (…) would also be painful for Russia in symbolic terms."1307

#### *2. China in Central Asia*

China for the first time appeared in the region as an important actor after the USSR's fall. For Beijing, Central Asia mattered mostly for its implications for Xinjiang. The declarations of independence of the new post-Soviet republics threatened transferring freedom tendencies from Central Asian nations inside China. The Xinjiang issue and its separatism became Beijing's main concerns.1308 That is why "security issues are at the core of Chinese engagement in Central Asia – China wants to protect Xinjiang from possible destabilization, while the main field of play for China are economic issues"; China's relations with Central Asia "have been an effect of two parallel processes of fundamental significance for the global order: the disintegration of the Russian/Soviet empire in Asia, and the other – the sudden rise in China's position"; Xinjiang's relations with Central Asian countries and this province's growing rise have been the local equivalent of these processes – for China, Central Asia has functioned mainly as the way to make Xinjiang rich and stable.1309 That is why after the USSR's fall China put emphasis on economic cooperation with the region, hoping that increased trade volume would lead to greater prosperity and consequently – stability of the difficult Xinjiang province. 1310 At the same time, China started advocating development of transport network which was supported by the UN and Asian Development Bank.1311 Nevertheless, transportation lines with China in the 1990s remained sporadic and increased only in the 2000s and the 2010s. This was the exact opposite to the integration of Central Asian economies with Russia – a common heritage after the USSR's fall. Unsurprisingly then the region's volume of trade with China fell behind the one with Russia (trade with Russia was seven times larger in 1995 while in

 1307 Ibid.; D. Trenin, *Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies and Prospects*, [in:] *Central Asia: Views*…, pp. 81-83.

1308 M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, p. 385; R. Weitz, op. cit., p. 54.

1309 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, *China vs. Central Asia. The achievements of the past two decades*, OSW, Warsaw 2013, pp. 5-32.

1310 E. Wishnick, *Mending fences*…, p. 137.

1311 R. Weitz, op. cit., p. 53; M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, p. 384.

2000 – six times). This is, however, only the official data. The real volume of trade between China and Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has been difficult to estimate – for example in the early 1990s it was mostly barter, which makes it impossible to show accurate data.1312 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Central Asia's cooperation with China in the 1990s had been much lower than with Russia – this changed only in the 2000s.

Having their policy goals of Xinjiang in mind, China since 1991 has done a lot to establish good relations with new the republics' leaders and persuade them that it is better to base their interests in Beijing rather than to care about their cousins the Uygurs in Xinjiang. Although Central Asian leaders initially had difficulties with understanding the Chinese specifics, they were quick to learn the realities. China was too big and too important to risk looking for trouble with it in the case of the Uyghurs. That is why since the 1990s Central Asian leaders have tried to intensify top-level relations with Beijing and they have not mentioned the Uygur issue. It came easier for them thanks to the fact that Uygur separatism was potentially dangerous for their regimes as well. Therefore, by supporting China's integrity, they cared for their own business, too.

The anxiety over spreading of disliked ideologies such as liberal democracy or Islamic fundamentalism to the Chinese territory was another factor in China's engagement with Central Asia. Here Beijing could count on leaders of Central Asian republics.1313 In general, their cooperation with China was stable, though in regional capitals the anxiety over China's weight, its potential and possible imperial aims never ceased to exist. It was another reason to come closer to Russia, particularly after 1996: "given the choice between Russia and China, most in Central Asia would choose 'the devil' they know over the one they do not know."1314

Initially China respected traditional Russian dominance in the region. For China, Central Asia is "a region with a high potential for instability"; that is why Beijing "respected Russia's interests and initiatives regarding regional security issues."1315 In the 1990s and the early to mid 2000s, Beijing considered this region as zone of exclusive Russian influences and interests which meant that China, contrary to other international actors "initially approached in caution and respectfully to Russian interests (…) which contributed to both countries' general rapprochement."1316 China concluded "a tacit bargain with Moscow": in return for recognition of the status quo in Central Asia and deference of Russia's regional leadership, Moscow continued "to take care of business"; for China it meant one thing: "with its 'strategic rear' covered, China could

 1312 M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, pp. 388-390.

1313 C. E. Ziegler, *Russia and China in Central Asia*, [in:] *The Future of China-Russia*…, p. 235.

1314 M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, p. 375.

1315 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, op. cit., pp. 5-32.

1316 K. Kozłowski, *Państwo Środka a Nowy*…, pp. 11, 120, 150.

then focus on domestic modernization and Taiwan."1317 Central Asia throughout the 1990s and until the late 2000s remained the place where Russian and Chinese interests converged and overlapped, cooperation became "harmonious."1318

For the time being, Beijing had been able to "forge its weakness into a positive image of a country which does not interfere with the internal problems of its neighbours; this 'affirmative' policy was also based on discreet support for individual countries in case of tension in relations with Russia or the USA."1319 At the same time, however, China since the 2000s had been preparing to enter the oil and gas market in the region to ensure steady supply of resources to Chinese economy. Energy aside, another dimension for China has been transportation – establishing the New Silk Road since the 2010s.1320

China's entry to Central Asia in the 2000s diametrically altered the strategic picture of the region and in the long-term it proved to be more important than American involvement (see: below). China's renewed interest has been consistent with "more permanent realities" not just "extraordinary concatenation of circumstances" like in the case of the USA.1321 The United States is leaving Central Asia, whereas China is here to stay – for a long time. China wants to achieve a dominant position not out of historical or messianic reasons (like Russia), or ideological ones (like the USA), but because a stronger presence meets its interests – the Chinese are convinced that economic cooperation is linked with security issues: fighting poverty will remove the cause of "three evils" (terrorism, separatism and extremism), and would protect Xinjinag.1322 So far it has proven to be true – "in the post-Soviet Central Asia time appears to be on the Middle Country's side."1323

Access to energy, the need to diversify deliveries and the creation of a web of oil and gas pipelines connected with domestic ones have been China's other key interests here.1324 Moscow's unreliability as an energy provider made Beijing intensify its involvement in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Central Asia is said to have the third biggest energy resources while geographic proximity plays to China's advantage. Contrary to Russia, whichstrived to

 1317 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 92.

1318 R. Weitz, op. cit., p. 51.

1319 Ibid.

1320 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, op. cit. pp. 5-32.

1321 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 98.

1322 Zhao Huasheng, *China and Central Asia*, [in:] *Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, ed. E. Rumer, D. Trenin, Zhao Huasheng, New York 2007, p. 157

1323 K. Kozłowski, *Państwo Środka a Nowy*…, pp. 120-150.

1324 Zhao Huasheng, *Security Building*…, p. 294-295; Shi Ze, *Relations Between China and Central Asian Countries Face Opportunity of All-Round Development*, "China International Studies" 2005 (Winter), p. 83.

keep its monopoly in the region, China wanted to eliminate Russia's intermediacy and establish direct contacts with Central Asian republics.1325 Russia wanted to keep its position of the unquestionable leader, whereas China hoped for a "concert of Central Asia."1326 At the same time, however, China in the long-term strives to establish the traditional Chinese vassal model of state-tostate relationship in Central Asia; Beijing wants to peacefully subordinate these countries without the need to establish direct control1327. Moscow, in its turn, was very cautious in masking its dissatisfaction with the growing Chinese involvement: the Kremlin decided to use the local anxieties of Chinese dominance – the Central Asians fear China more than Russia.1328 For a long time the camouflaged competition with Beijing gave way to joint containment of the USA in Central Asia1329, with Chinese growing involvement, however, this may change.

#### *3. Border Issues: "The Shanghai Five"*

The border issue was one of the most challenging problems inherited after the USSR. There is no natural border between China and Central Asia and there has never been one between Russian and Chinese territories. Soviet-Chinese conflicts from the 1960s and unregulated border issue did not help to stabilize and normalize the relations. China for its part strived not only to demarcate but also to demilitarize it and build confidence measures. Here Shanghai's agreement on strengthening mutual security and confidence-building measures – subsequently called the "Shanghai agreement"1330whereas its signatories, The Shanghai Five – proved to be the single most important step. The agreement itself meant that China dropped its earlier claims against the Russian Empire

 1325 Selbi Hanova, *Perspectives on the SCO: Images and Discourses*, "China and Eurasia Quarterly" 2009, Vol. 7, no. 3, p. 79.

1326 F. Tolipov, *East vs. West? Some Geopolitical Questions and Observations for the SCO*, "China and Eurasia Quarterly" (July 2005), p. 22; E. B. Rumer, *China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central Asia*, "Strategic Forum" 2006, No 223 (November), p. 5.

1327 N. Swanström, *China and Central Asia: A New Great Game Or Traditional Vassal Relations?*, "Journal of Contemporary China" 2005, vol. 45, no 14 (November), pp. 576-581.

1328 A. Frost, op. cit., p. 98.

1329 V. Paramonov, O. Stolpovski, *Russia and Central Asia: Multilateral Security Cooperation*, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008, III, p. 10; M. Troickiy et.all, *A Russian Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, [in:] *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, SIPRI, May 2007, p. 44.

1330 *Соглашение между Российской Федерацией*, *Республикой Казахстан*, *Кыргызской Республикой*, *Республикой Таджикистан и Китайской Народной Республикой об укреплении доверия в военной области в районе границы* [Russian Federation Kazakhstan, , Kyrgyzstan, Tajikiistan and China Intergovermental Agreement on Confidence Building in the Border Areas], [in:] *Сборник российско-китайских договоров 1949-1999*..., pp. 365-373.

and the USSR.1331 That is why the Chinese concession must be understood as a compromise made to normalize relations with Central Asian republics; this compromise cost Beijing little, but enhanced Chinese possibilities of political influence as well as opportunities of economic benefits. Besides this, the mechanism applied during the Shanghai Five agreement proved to be "a textbook example of the general emphasis on agreements and multilateral negotiations as typical features of the Chinese diplomacy."1332 Since then, the "Five" format has started being used as an effective platform of cooperation between China and the region and expanded impressively.1333 Since the very beginning China became the leader of the "Five"; Russia largely neglected the formula. The "Five" achieved success because "the countries involved share similar international norms of behaviour they have taken a gradualist approach which allows time to build up trust and coordination among themselves."1334

#### *4. The USA Moves In*

11 September 2001 became the time *limes* (latin: boundary) for Central Asia. In Russia "Putin was said to have made a 'strategic choice' (…) Russia was powerless to stop the United States from entering the region" – Putin simply "made a virtue out of necessity."1335 Besides, the US entry had its security advantages: it removed the Taliban, the "Sword of Damocles" that loomed over Central Asian countries.1336 Putin aimed at making a breakthrough in Russian-American relations to get material profits necessary for rebuilding the Great Russia.1337 This thinking was based on one crucial assumption: that the American presence would be temporary. This began to change when the Kremlin realized that the Americans were planning to stay for longer and intended to promote democracy ("colour revolutions"). This was too much for Moscow: the United States became "part of the problem", not the solution."1338 This led to choosing option No. 2: cooperation with China to contain the Western intervention.

9/11 had a decisive importance for Chinese policy towards Central Asia, too. Putin's speedy endorsement of the American military cooperation "came

 1331 M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, p. 377.

1332 K. Kozłowski, *Chiny a Nowy Jedwabny Szlak*…, p. 125.

1333 А.В. Лукин, *От нормализации к стратегическому партнерству*…, p. 356.

1334 Qingguo Jia, *The Success of Shanghai Five: Interests, Norms and Pragmatism*, Commonwealth Institute.

1335 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 93.

1336 Zhao Huasheng, *Security Building in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Slav.hokudai, p. 264.

1337 B. Nygren, *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries*, Routledge, Abingdon, New York 2008, p. 249.

1338 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 94.

as a shock to the Chinese leadership"; Beijing could not believe that Moscow would permit, let alone support deployment of the US troops in Russia's sphere of influence; to make matters worse, "relations with China were unceremoniously pushed into the background."1339 That was a very bad news: "the Chinese leadership perceived a significant political discomfort due to the unexpected arrival of American troops in a region abundant with natural resources that lies at China's rears."1340 The old Chinese fears of the Middle Kingdom's encirclement by hostile countries reappeared with new power. Putin's behavior made Beijing realize a number of truths – the first: for Russia, relations with the West "would always take precedence", the second: Sino-Russian axis is still a function of Russia's relations with the West; the third: "Russia would not support Chinese interests in Central Asia, except on a purely coincidental basis"; the forth: the United States was now a major power in the region, not Russia.1341 Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership, in accordance with the tradition of Chinese strategic culture, has hidden the feelings. They kept calm and waited for the cooling of Russian-US relations and weakening of the US status in the region. This allowed China to gradually and quietly build its position in the region without alarming the other powers. Nevertheless, "the key lesson of the early post-9/11 period remained: in Chinese eyes Russia became both untrustworthy and weak"; thus, China started more active policy towards Central Asia, one that involved expansion of ties with Central Asian republics.1342 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization became the tool for this policy.

#### *5. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*

Not so long time ago the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) drew attention and caused considerable stir. To some it was a positive multilateral organization that addressed the "universal threats"; other saw it as "anti-NATO", a quasi-alliance directed against the Western model of democracy. The apologists claimed it successfully resolves practical issues, while critics argued that the organization is an empty shell.1343 Recently the SCO has been losing its influence in the region.

 1339 Ibid., p. 96.

1340 K. Kozłowski, *Państwo Środka a Nowy*…, p. 168.

1341 Akihiro Iwasita, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of 'Partnership' after the Post-Cold War Period*, [in:] *Slavic Eurasia's Integration into the World Economy and Community*, eds. S. Tabata, A. Iwashita 2004.

1342 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 97.

1343 Ibid., p. 104; for more, see: Wu-ping Kwo, Ahiau-shyang Liou, *Competition and Cooperation Between Russia and China in Central Asia and 'Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Analytical View from International Regime*, National Chengchi University, 18.04.2005;

Officially, the SCO is built on the Shanghai Spirit1344, but this concept is rather vague.1345 The SCO's hallmark has been its fight with "three evils": terrorism, separatism and extremism1346. Compared with other organizations, the SCO language of statements and documents is rather defensive/conservative: member-states dislike the propagation of democratic values and emphasize non-interference in domestic affairs instead.1347 Protest against "hegemonism" and "imposition" of the Western patterns was quite frequent in its announcements, particularly in the mid-2000s.1348 The overall impression the SCO member-states tried to convey was that of "an organization that was growing dynamically, but from a modest base."1349

Initially nothing but geography united the member-states.1350 The SCO was founded on 15 June 2001 in Shanghai by Shanghai Five countries and Uzbekistan (that was admitted a day earlier).1351 During that summit the "Shanghai convention combating terrorism, separatism and extremism" (the "three evils") was adopted.1352 In accordance with the SCO chapter, all member-states are equal and the decisions are taken without a vote (consensus) and without veto right.1353 Mongolia was granted an observer status in 2004, followed by Iran, Pakistan and India in 2005 and Afghanistan in 2012 (India and Pakistan became members in 2017). With the exception of Mongolia, each time the observer status aroused controversies. Probably that is why the SCO stopped granting this title and replaced it with a more flexible formula – a "dialogue partner" (Belarus and Sri Lanka in 2010, Turkey 2012, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, and Nepal in 2015). The declared main goals are security issues,

Yang Shu, *Reassessing the SCO's Internal Difficulties: A Chinese Point of View*, "China and Eurasia Quartely", Volume 7, no. 3/2009, p. 18; A. Cohen, op. cit., p. 58.

1344 *Mutual trust, mutual advantage, equality, mutual consultations, respect for cultural variety and aspiration for joint development, Декларация о создании Шанхайской Организации Сотрудничества* [The Declaration of Establishment of SCO], Sectsco.org.ru, 15.06.2001.

1345 *Декларация пятилетия Шанхайской организации сотрудничества* [SCO Fifth Anniversary Declaration], Sectsco.org.ru, 15.06.2006; *Хартия Шанхайской Организации Сотрудничества* [SCO Charter], Sectsco.org.ru,15.06.2002.

1346 *Шанхайская конвенция* [Shanghai Convention on Fight Against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism], Sectsco.org.ru, 15.06.2001.

1347 T. Ambrosio, *Catching the 'Shanghai Spirit': How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2008, Vol. 60, No. 8, p. 1332.

1348 Zhao Huasheng, *Security Building*…, p. 284.

1349 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 105.

1350 A. Cohen, op. cit., p. 53.

1351 *Декларация о создании*….

1352 *Шанхайская конвенция* ….

1353 *Хартия Шанхайской*….

economic, social and cultural cooperation.1354 In reality, avoiding conflicts between member-states remains the most important goal1355, while "maintaining border and regional security" remains the most fundamental function of the SCO.1356

The SCO official declarations are grandiose in form, but lacking in substance, without details of implementation and with a gap between declarations and the real actions; subsequent statements appear to conceal the lack of progress or ritual hollow preaching.1357 Parallels with the NATO and the EU are "obviously absurd."1358 More appropriate are the ones with the OSCE, but the latter has more members and more power.1359 The SCO is first and foremost "a platform that potentially enables member-states to fulfill their specific goals."1360 Somehow the SCO reminds the CIS – the rhetoric outweighs achievements – "there is no the SCO policy per se", much of its activity is "geopolitical bluff" intended to create "the perception (or at least the illusion) of there being a new and serious player on regional and international scene."1361

However, the SCO "amounts to more than just a mini-CIS plus China": the SCO has demonstrated "an impressive solidarity on occasions": the 2005 call for a final timeline for the removal of US soldiers from Afghanistan1362 or a contribution to closure of the US air base in Khanabad in 2005.1363 Besides, the SCO has some achievements in the security sphere, like combating terrorism. Finally, the SCO is "a genuinely multilateral organization, even if some member-states are more equal than others" (the weakest, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, can make themselves heard).1364 The Georgia crisis in 2008 and the SCO unwillingness to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia proved it well.1365 For many, China is the real leader of the SCO, the Organization remains an important tool for Beijing's Central Asian policy.1366

In the mid-2000s it was very popular to perceive the SCO as an opposition to the West. There were voices about the SCO being "anti-NATO", "Eastern

 1354 *Краткие сведения о ШОС*, SCO, www.sectsco.org.ru

1355 I.Oldberg, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Powerhouse or Paper Tiger?* FOI, Swedish Defence Research Academy 2007 p. 13.

1356 Zhao Huasheng, *Security Building*…, p. 294.

1357 M. Laumulin, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as 'Geopolitical Bluff'? A View From Astana*, "Russie.Nei.Visions" 12.06.2006, , p. 6.

1362 *Декларация глав государств-членов Шанхайской организации сотрудничества* [SCO Heads of State Declaration] 05.07.2005, www.sectsco.org.ru.

1363 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 106.

1364 Ibid., p. 106; S. Hanova, op. cit., p. 74; I. Oldberg, op. cit., p. 25.

1365 N. Swanström, *Georgia: The Split that Split the SCO*, CACI Analyst, 03.09.2008.

1366 I. Oldberg, op. cit., p. 29.

NATO", "new Warsaw pact"1367, or even "League of Dictators"1368. This perception was based on conviction that the prime reason to exist for the Organization is to undermine the American presence in Central Asia; the SCO itself gave some ground to this kind of assessment.1369

Although the SCO is neither a full security organization nor a trade block nor anything else, it would be wrong to consider the SCO as nothing more than simply a geopolitical bluff: Central Asian republics are concerned about security, Islamizm and only when the US started the export of democracy "they bought into Moscow's overtly anti-U.S. agenda"; similarly, China's top priority has been "the security of China's far west rather than strategic competition with Washington."1370 To sum up: "ultimately the SCO is a modest organization of modest achievements, a reality implicitly recognized by its members, whose main foreign policy activity is either directed elsewhere (Russia, China) or channeled through bilateral relations (Central Asian states)."1371 Membership in the SCO has paid off to every member-state: for Russia it has been a forum to maintain its position and to control the Chinese cooperation with the region; for China it has legitimized its ties with Central Asian republics and allowed to increase its status via growing economic advantage. For both Russia and China the SCO allowed keeping the foreign powers (the USA) away from the region, or limiting their influence. As such it indeed became "a significant development of Sino-Russian cooperation in Asia", as Mikhail Titarenko wanted to see it.1372 For Central Asians the SCO have been helping to maintain independence and have at least pretended an equal voice with Russia and China. The mid-2000s concerns about the SCO were premature because the member-states, let alone observers, are much diverged, with contradictory interests that make it difficult to find a common language. This all highlights the internal limitations – the normative convergence is too narrow, integration remains scant and cooperation is hampered by cultural differences, mutual distrust and contradictory interests.1373

The SCO is a temporary solution – a tool for Russia and China to check one another and control ambitions.1374 These have been different: Moscow wanted to use the SCO as a tool to keep its monopolistic position on energy and energy transit in the region, whereas China intended it to be the engine of trade and investments in the region. Thanks to the SCO formula, these interests have

1371 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 108.

 1367 F. W. Stakelbeck Jr., *A New Bloc emerges?*, "The American Thinker" 05.08.2005.

1368 R. Kagan, *League of Dictators?*, "Washington Post", 30.04.2006.

1369 *Декларация глав*…

1370 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 108; See also: A. P.Sznajder, *China's Shanghai Cooperation Organization Strategy*, University of California Press, May 2006, p. 95.

1372 М.Л. Титаренко, *Геополитическое значение*…, p. 444.

1373 S. Hanova, op. cit., p. 72; Yang Shu, op. cit., pp. 17-21; Yu Bin, *Central Asia Between Competition and Cooperation*…

1374 A. Frost, op. cit., p. 105; B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 110.

been meeting and balancing – the cooperation within the organization limits the possibility for a conflict.1375 Nevertheless, cracks have already appeared and are likely to increase in the future. Currently the SCO has two wheels – security and economy, the former being more important.1376 Beijing wanted to shift the SCO's agenda towards economic cooperation and integration, while Moscow underlined security issues and military and geopolitical aspects.1377 This conflict of interests was clearly visible in the Russian veto for Chinesebacked idea of the SCO free trade zone. The member-states cooperate closely in trade, but not financially or in the banking sector – the Central Asians "do not want the Soviet-time hegemony to reappear, this time with Beijing as the decision-making center."1378 As for Russia, its approach towards the SCO has been moderate – it supported the Organization politically but remained cautious in practical cooperation.

Moscow's organization of choice in Central Asia has not been the SCO, but the CSTO. Since the very beginning, Moscow has tried to foster a closer cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO – it wanted to become a "bridge" between those two organizations; such a "marriage of convenience" would strengthen Russia's position in Central Asia.1379 Unfortunately for Moscow, this idea was first blocked by Uzbekistan, and then by China1380. Lack of any real achievements by the CSTO1381 makes it difficult for it to camouflage its main geopolitical goal: fostering a Russia position in the region.1382 That is why the most important difference between the SCO and the CSTO lies it the fact that the former is Beijing's multilateral instrument of influence, whereas the latter – is Moscow's one.

In the 2000s there were two most important approaches to Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia. According to the first one, those two countries effectively cooperated in combating terrorism and ideological and strategic threats from the West. The alternative one claimed that real cooperation is scant and possible only thanks to a common foe – the United States; without it Russia and China would compete (or already had started competing). Both approaches were correct to some extent.1383 That is why the SCO served well within the concept of a "partnership" – non-enemy and non-friend, or in other words, a "peaceful buffer."1384 With time, however, especially after 2013, the buffer is becoming less and less useful. Russian veto for a Chinese-backed SCO free

 1375 A. Cohen, op. cit., p. 54; Zhao Huasheng, *Security Building*…, p. 296.

1376 Zhao Huasheng, *Security Building*…, p. 311.

1377 A. P. Sznajder, op. cit., p. 99.

1378 K. Kozłowski, *Państwo Środka a Nowy*…, p. 208-209.

1379 Yu Bin, *Between Cooperation and Competition*, "Comparative Connections", vol. 9, no 3.

1380 A. Frost, op. cit., p. 99.

1381 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, pp. 84-87.

1382 D. Trenin, *Russia and Central Asia*…, p. 100.

1383 B. Lo, *The Axis of Convenience*…, p. 113.

1384 Akihiro Iwasita, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*…, p. 275.

trade zone and/or bank and Chinese veto for Russian-backed SCO fund1385 have *de facto* blocked the development of this organization. Russia prefers to work on financial mechanisms outside the SCO framework, such as BRICS.1386 As for China, although it is visibly the dominant member of the SCO, Beijing is frustrated with current state of affairs within the SCO that does not allow for further economic development "and could not wait for Russia to start the economic cooperation within the SCO."1387 Thus China has allowed Russia to symbolically dominate the SCO recent agenda and orientate it towards international and security issues instead of regional – "thus the the SCO is becoming a forum, symbolically dominated by Russia, for coordinating the members' positions on global issues" instead of being "an organization which actually influences the situation in the region."1388 It remains to be seen whether the admittance to the organization of India and Pakistan as full members (accepted in 2015, confirmed in 2016 and included in 2017) will change these dynamics (or the opposite: strengthen the recent ineffectivness). According to some, like Li Jinfeng or Alexander Lukin, this will make the SCO a China-Russia-Indialed organization and boost its importance.1389 Others, like Yan Xuetong, say that this is the final nail in the Organization's coffin ("the SCO is in fact dead").1390 Whatever the outcome turns out to be, China has accepted this enlargement, seen as benefitting Russia, but blocked further enlargement of Iran in order not to complicate its relations with the West.1391 Beijing has been trying, too, to use the SCO institutional framework to enhance its One Belt One Road project, but the results are not yet satisfying. What is certain is that China, seeing structural obstacles within the organization, lost its primary interest in the SCO (at least for the time being), and turned toward bilateral diplomacy instead.

 1385 А.В. Лукин, *От нормализации к стратегическому партнерству*…, p. 364.

1386 Yu Bin, *Russia-China*…pp. 103-116.

1387 А.В. Лукин, *Россия и Китай*…, [in:] *Россия и Китай: четыре века*…, p. 649.

1388 A. Jarosiewicz, *Chinese tour de force in Central Asia*, OSW, Warsaw 18.09.2013.

1389 Li Jinfeng, *Shanghai hezuo zuzhi kuo yuan: Tiaozhan yu jiyu* [SCO enlargement: opportunities and challenges], quoted in: M. Julienne, *Back to the basics: Counter-terrorism cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation*, [in:] *China and Russia. Gaming*…; А.В. Лукин, *Россия и Китай сегодня и завтра* [in:] *Россия и Китай: четыре века*… , p. 649.

1390 *«Не понимаю, почему Россия не настаивает на формировании альянса с Китаем»* [I Don't understand why Russia is not pushing for forming an alliance with China],interview with Yan Xuetong, Kommiersant.Ru, 17.03.2017.

1391 Yu Bin, *Politics of*… pp.129-144.

#### *6. Russia's and China's Relations with Central Asian Countries*

All Central Asian republics enjoy strong political, social and cultural ties with Russia. Despite that, they all jealously guard their independence. Central Asian leaders entered international politics in 1991 having little experience in dealing with non-Soviet world. Former nomenclature members after the USSR fall found themselves nationalists and set a clear course for independence and sovereignty. This meant an attempt to liberalize from Moscow's zone of influence, or at least maneuvering much more space than during Soviet times. This forced them to conduct a balancing of powers policy that started in the early 1990s and continues until now. This differentiates the regional political landscape from the pre-1991 era: the Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan, are no longer passive subjects in the great powers' games1392; they have an empowered position and they are able to play off one another's contradictions and maximize benefits for their own sake. Central Asian elites tried to counterbalance Russia's influence by the West first, but Washington's agenda and its support for colour revolutions led Central Asians to turn toward China, a more suitable model for them. Thanks to Beijing's engagement in the region, and its credits, the republics are now able to demand higher rates from Moscow for their natural resources. Chinese policy success in this regard is even more remarkable when the initial reserve, alienation and endangered, that characterized Central Asians' approach to China in the early 1990s, is taken into account1393.

**Uzbekistan,** the most populous Central Asian country, stands as a good example of the balancing policy – it has been maneuvering most spectacularly with its "'sinusoidal' policy (involving longer periods of co-operation with the West, interspersed with periods of closer relations with Moscow)"; under Islam Karimov's leadership Tashkent set a clear course for independence, distanced itself from Moscow (Uzbekistan is the only country without Russian military bases in the region) and tried to achieve leadership in Central Asia in an assertive way (that quite often meets with neighbours' opposition)1394. Tashkent believed that the balancing policy, sometimes in an aggressive way, is the best way of preserving its independence and sovereignty.1395 Independence in the Uzbek style meant a public fight with "postcolonial syndrome" – desovietisation and derusification.1396 At the same time, however, Tashkent "developed

 1392 Чжао Хаушэн (Zhao Huasheng), *Новая ситуация в Центральной Азии и Шанхайская организация сотрудничества*, quoted in: А.В. Лукин, *Россия и Китай сегодня и завтра* op. cit., p. 644.

1393 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, op. cit., pp. 20-30.

1394 W. Górecki, *Even Further*…, pp. 56-57.

1395 M. Kuryłowicz, *Polityka zagraniczna Uzbekistanu wobec Rosji* [Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy Towards Russia], Kraków 2014, p. 113.

1396 W. Górecki, *Even Further*…, pp. 56-57.

cordial, albeit quiet, military ties with the United States and NATO."1397 The interest was mutual: the USA had chosen Uzbekistan as a buffer against both Islamism and Russian expansionism. In 1999, Uzbekistan joined the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova), now GUUAM, an ephemeral attempt to establish a pro-Western alternative to the CIS1398. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan did not break its relations with Moscow – the Collective Security Treaty was established at the Tashkent summit in 1992 (in 1999 Uzbekistan pulled back and did not join the CST successor – the Collective Security Treaty Organization created in 2002).1399 Moreover, Karimov was the first one in region who showed in public China as an alternative development model, one worth implementing in Central Asia.1400 At the beginning of the 2000s, Karimov was the West's biggest ally; against this background ties with Russia "remained anemic."1401 Moreover, Uzbekistan has distanced itself from integration initiatives. This all changed after the Andijan events on 13 May 2005.1402 Karimov feared losing his power while Moscow and Beijing were able to convince him that the Andijan protestors/rebels were supported by the USA.  He quit the GUUAM in May 2005, after the SCO summit in June 2005 he demanded the Americans to leave Khanabad air base1403 and signed an ally treaty with Moscow in 2005 that made him return to the CSTO and agree to have Russian soldiers on Uzbekistan soil.1404 Tashkent's turn has been so spectacular that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has called this country their "key strategic partner in Central Asia."1405 Despite all that, Karimov has not cut all his ties with the West: the reason was Uzbekistan's economy being in such a bad shape that it needed external sources. That is why although Karimov expelled the US airbases in Khanabad, he allowed the Germans to main-

 1397 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 237.

1398 V. V. Naumkin, op. cit., p. 84.

1399 *Договор о коллективной безопасности* [Joint-Security Treaty], 15.05.1992, Организация договора о коллективной безопасности. Официальный сайт.

1400 M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, p. 374.

1401 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 237.

1402 The goverment surpressed the Andijan protests then, *Preliminary findings on the events in Andijan*, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 20.06.2005.

1403 *В Узбекистане закрыта американская военная база* [American Base Closes in Uzbekistan], Lenta.Ru 21.09.2005.

1404 *Договор о союзнических отношениях между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Узбекистан* [Treaty on Relations of Alliance between FR and Republic of Uzbekistan], Mid.ru, 19.07.2006.

1405 *Начало встречи с Президентом Узбекистана Исламом Каримовым* [The Beginning of Meeting with President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan], Kremlin.ru 06.06.2008.

tain a refuelling station in Termez for the US and European air military personnel.1406 At the same time he has been cultivating close ties with Beijing that transcended the improvement of economic relations. Uzbekistan has been the key transit country on the Chinese gas pipeline from Turkmenistan that broke the Russian monopoly in the region. Moscow has tried to keep Uzbekistan within its orbit but Tashkent's suspension of membership in the CSTO on 20 June 2012 – that demonstrated Tashkent's ambition to conduct independent policy – worsened Russian-Uzbek relations. This suspension came only two weeks after Vladimir Putin's visit; this undermined the regional image of Russia and its president.1407 This solidified Uzbekistan's image in the Kremlin as "a prickly partner", ready "at any moment to jump into bed with the United States or China", with whom relations "have gone through many ups and downs, and remain difficult" and whom Russia would like to ignore but cannot do so given geopolitical considerations.1408 As a result, "political relations between Moscow and Tashkent are characterized by total distrust", but Russia remains the transit monopolist for Central Asian resources to Europe and is still a vital trade partner for Uzbekistan.1409

When summarizing Uzbek policy, one may clearly see a permanent – better or worse – attempt to balance Russia, China and the West and keep them at arm's length – Uzbekistan's "foreign policy can be compared to pendulum motion: every two to three years, Uzbekistan turned away from Russia and other CIS partners and moved closer to the West, and vice versa."1410 This balancing has not been as skillful as Kazakhstani (see: below): Tashkent "has managed to alienate Moscow and Washington at different times, partly because of the crudeness of its balancing, and partly because President Islam Karimov has proved a capricious 'ally.'"1411 It remains to be seen whether Uzbekistan will be able to maintain balancing policy after Karimov's death in September 2016 and Mirziyaev's ascendence to power (after all, Mirziyaev is from the same Samarkandian clan).

**Kazakhstan** remains Central Asia's most important country, its economic leader, "the bright point of Central Asia", with a prosperous economy, stable society, velvet authoritarianism and Nazarbaev's effective foreign policy of balancing foreign powers.1412 It "has been the most successful of the ex-Soviet republics judged by the criteria of political stability, economic growth, and foreign policy management."1413 As the result, Kazakhstan has won its regional

 1406 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 239. West's share in Uzbekistan's economy remains limited.

1407 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, p. 59.

1408 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, pp. 121-122

1409 Ibid.

1410 M.Laumulin, *Virtual Security of Central Asia*, "Russia in Global Affairs", 7.10.2012.

1411 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 121.

1412 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 242.

1413 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 112.

rivalry with Uzbekistan over Central Asia's leadership – its stable political system, and favorable economic development has become a pattern for the region.1414

From Kazakhstan's very beginning of independence, Nazarbaev has maneuvered brilliantly between Moscow, Beijing and Washington and he continues to conduct a multi-vector policy until now: he has "achieved all this without, for the most part, upsetting Russian sensitivities or provoking imperial envy in Moscow – Kazakhstan remains "Russia's most reliable and useful partner among the ex-Soviet republics.'"1415 His "multisector" policy ended with good relations with all major players and even enabled the country to play beyond its real position. Favouring regional integration projects was part of this strategy (Nazarbaev was the first to propose the creation of the Eurasian Union in 1994) – it was considered a good way to balance Chinese influences, but mostly as a nation-building process which emphasized stability, international cooperation and being a sovereign subject with global ambitions. 1416

Astana has strong ties with Moscow – economic (most of Kazakh's oil has been transported via Russian pipelines), political and military (membership in regional organizations, presence of Russian army and Baikonur enclave) and psycho-political (protesting against democratization and human rights).1417 In the the 1990s there were also good personal relations between Yeltsin and Nazarbaev. Nevertheless, problems such as discrimination of the Russian minority and nation-building on rejection of Soviet heritage have continued to exist and made Nazarbaev distance himself from Moscow in the 1990s. Russia was not interested in closer ties either – Yeltsin even affronted Kazakhs by not attending the official inauguration of the new capital – Astana in 1998.1418 Although Nazarbaev indeed distanced himself from Moscow, he did it without burning bridges.

As for relations with China in the 1990s, the Uygur issue played a decisive role. Kazakhstan has the biggest population of Uygurs outside China but Astana has supported Chinese position and kept its own Uyghurs with tight grip. Nevertheless, in the quasi-free Kazakh media, pro-Uygur voices did appear, but never to an extent where they could harm relations with Beijing. Kazakhstan did not have the slightest interest in supporting Xinjiang's Uygurs – such an action might have had negative domestic implications (the transfer of separatism to Kazakhstan). The politically troublesome border with Xinjiang had, however, its economic benefits. In the 1990s Kazakhstan became China's biggest regional trade partner. Development of trade has not been disturbed by

 1414 A. Wołoska, *Kazakhstan: Regional Success Story*, OSW, Warsaw 15.10.2004.

1415 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 113.

1416 W. Górecki, *Even Further*…, p. 78.

1417 Д. Тренин, *Post-Imperium*…, p. 180.

1418 K. Syroezhkin, *Russian policy in Central Asia: a perspective from Kazakhstan*, [in:] *Russia and Asia*…, pp. 105-106; C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 242.

frictions and anti-Chinese resentments (e.g. immigration threats and complaints over the low quality of Chinese goods).1419

Since the 2000s, Russian-Kazak political relations have been good1420, but economic relations remain problematic. Moscow and Astana have been divided by contradictory interests: Moscow wants to maintain its dominant position in energy transit, while Kazakhstan tries to undermine it and lesser its dependence on the Russian transit routes. The two sides are, however, able to compromise, so that "Russian-Kazakh relations can nevertheless (with some reservations) be determined as partnership-based, which cannot be said about Russia's relations with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan."1421 At the same time Kazakhstan actively cooperates with the United States and with China. The USA is one of the biggest investors in this country.1422 Thanks to a skilful foreign policy, until recently Kazakhstan has been able to "play an international role beyond its size."1423

The 2000s saw an impressive development of Sino-Kazakh relations, particularly in the economic sphere (increase of trade volume, especially in energy). Kazakhstan is China's biggest Central Asian neighbor and the most important Central Asian country, and since until recently it was the only country in the region to have signed a strategic partnership agreement with China1424. As a result, it became China's most important trade partner in the region, in terms of both import and export.1425 Kazakhstan benefited from the increased Chinese engagement in the region and Sino-Russian stalemate over the ESPO pipeline. In 2006, the Kazakhstan-Xinjiang three thousand kilometers' long oil pipeline started operating, diversifying the Chinese need for oil from Russia.1426 Despite this pipeline and the fact that Chinese companies have dominated the Kazakhstani upstream oil sector, most of Kazakhstani (as well as all Central Asian) oil continues to be exported via Russia.1427 In other words, Astana played the "Chinese card" without burning bridges with Moscow.

Astana continued successful "dual-track" tactics even after the conflict in Georgia in 2008. Nazarbaev decided not to irritate Moscow by withholding Georgian investments and rejecting taking part in the NATO drills in Georgia,

 1419 M. Brill Olcott, Russian-Chinese…, p. 394.

1420 *Договор между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Казахстан о добрососедстве и союзничестве в XXI веке* [Treaty Between RF and Republic of Kazakhstan on Good Neighborhood and Alliance in 21th Century], Kremlin.ru, 11.11.2013.

1421 Wojciech Górecki, *Even Further*…p. 79.

1422 E. A. Feigenbaum, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Future of Central Asia*, Speech at Nixon Center, Washington D.C., 6.09.2007, p. 3

1423 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 243.

1424 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

1425 Ibid., pp. 58-60.

1426 *Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline opens to commercial operation*, "China Daily", 12.07.2006.

1427 Marcin Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 92.

but at the same time intensified actions aimed at diversification of deliveries.1428 Kazakhstan has been promoting the Russian project of the Eurasian Union, but at the same time set the boundaries for this process and is distancing from Moscow.1429 From the Astana perspective, the Eurasian Union is a security net against too much dependence from China.1430 However, after Russian actions in Ukraine, Kazakh's anxieties over Russian dominance resurfaced1431, despite the official backing of the Kremlin's policy.1432

To sum up, one may say that so far Kazakhstan has been the biggest beneficiary of Sino-Russian-US rivalry in Central Asia. Thanks to a wise balancing policy Astana has maintained good relations with all of them and thus gained a lot. In the changing circumstances of the intensified Russian integration policy, emergence of an alternative Chinese project and succession isuue combined with recent systemic changes in the Kazakhstani system of power, however, the question is whether Kazakhstan will be able to maintain its independent, successful policy.

**Turkmenistan** was self-isolated in the 1990s and became important in Central Asian policy in the 2000s. In the 1990s, Turkmenbashi-Niyazov's Turkmenistan had been another rhetorically anti-Russian state in Central Asia. Turkmenbashi, an unusual political figure, has tried to conduct an independent policy ("permanent neutrality").1433 Anti-Russian rhetoric did not disturb him from selling gas to Moscow (Turkmenistan remains Central Asia's biggest reservoir of gas) for very little which allowed Gazprom to re-sell it to European markets for much more. It helped Turkmenbashi to isolate the country and proceed with more and more grotesque social engineering based on his personality cult. Until his death in 2006, relations with Moscow concentrated on gas, whereas relations with Beijing – although correct – did not reach noticeable dynamics. This changed after Turkmenbashi's death in 2006. His successor, Gurbanguli Berdimukhamedov changed the isolationist policy of his predecessor and dynamically started seeking new partners to make himself independent from Russia.1434 Although Berdimukhamedov has not departed from neutralism and isolationism fully, he allowed foreign investment in the economy's most important sector: gas exploration. His goal was to internationalize cooperation to liberate Turkmenistan from Russian dominance in gas delivery. Berdimukhamedov still sells gas mostly to Russia, but the "gas conflict" in April

 1428 K. Kozłowski, *Państwo Środka a Nowy Jedwabny*…, p. 253.

1429 W. Górnicki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, p. 79.

1430 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, op. cit., pp. 30-60.

1431 A. Jarosiewicz, *Kazakhstan's attitude towards integration with Russia: less love, more fear*, OSW, Warsaw 26.05.2014.

1432 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 113.

1433 *Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan*, United Nations. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/50/80.

1434 K. Kozłowski, *Państwo Środka a Nowy Jedwabny*…, p. 254.

2009 made him realize the necessity of diversification – Turkmenistan suffered from this conflict more than Russia did.1435 Ashkhabad faced a dilemma: whether to subordinate to Russia or seek new sources of income. The Chinese extended a helping hand at the decisive point by offering a USD4 billion load for future gas deliveries. This was a breakthrough: the finalization of gas contract in 2009 (Central Asia-China gas pipeline that goes from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China) that broke the Russian monopoly in the region.1436 Since then, the ties between Ashkhabad and Beijing have been becoming more and more close – Turkmeni policymakers look toward China now.1437 During Xi Jinping's September 2013 visit to Central Asia new gas agreements, that monopolized Turkmeni gas resources, have been signed which "have finalized the process whereby China has replaced Russia as Turkmenistan's patron and main sponsor."1438

Two remaining Central Asian countries – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – clearly fall behind. **Tajikistan** is closely linked to Russia via historical, cultural and social ties and the Russian military presence (that will remain there for the next 20 years).1439 This state has been the most vulnerable and unstable in the region, the least well governed, it has undertaken the most painful transformation and it has had the biggest number of islamic fundamentalists.1440 Tajikistan's most traumatic experience was the civil war in 1992-1997.1441 It ended with a compromise between the fighting sides: the opposition gained access to power (30%) whereas Russia remained the guarantor of the country's stability.1442 Consequently, since then Tajikistan remains Moscow's closer ally and has been in a state of strong dependency from Russia.1443 Like other countries of the region, Tajikistan used the US intervention in Afghanistan to strengthen its position: it allowed the USA to use Tajik airports and air zones. Moscow, however, backfired. Until now the Kremlin's favorite tactic has been a carrot and stick approach. Hydro energy and Tajik guest workers in Russia (the most important part of economy – their income covers 47% of Tajikistan's GDP and ranks it in the first place in the world in this category) are the effective instruments of Russian influence. Thanks to these factors, despite Tajik attempts to maneuver (such as rejection of Moscow's proposal to put Russian soldiers on

 1435 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, pp. 60-64.

1436 A. Petersen, K. Barysch, op. cit., p. 3.

1437 Ibid.

1438 A. Jarosiewicz, *Chinese tour de force*...

1439 *Russians Continue to Guard the Tajik Border with Afghanistan*, Satrapia. The Gazette of Central Asia, 21.09.2012.

1440 K. Strachota, *Tadżykistan: czas próby* [Tajikistan: Test Time], Warsaw, OSW working paper no. 15, 10/2004.

1441 Ibid.

1442 M. Olimov, *The policy of Russia in Central Asia: a perspective from Tajikistan* [in:] *Russia and Asia*…p. 121.

1443 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, p. 46.

the Tajik-Afghan border), Russia maintains the dominant position in Tajikistan. Although the "Rakhmon regime's near-total dependence on Russian support undercut its leverage" in dealings with Russia, Dushanbe, however, is able to secure some benefits from the Kremlin by "threatening Russia with weakness, playing on fears about regime collapse and regional destabilization (…) in these circumstances, Moscow believes that it has no choice but to maintain substantial assistance to Tajikistan."1444 China, which has been building roads and investing twice as much as Russia in Tajikistan, has been becoming Dushanbe's almost equally important partner. This came with a price, though: in 2002 Tajikistan ceded thousand kilometers in Pamir to China in return for dropping the claim for 28 thousands km².1445 This decision evoked anti-Chinese resentments in Tajik society. Tajikistan, like Kyrgyzstan, maintains good relations with Russia and China alike to hamper the regional power ambitions of Uzbekistan and such Tashkent's belligerent moves as closing of the borders1446. Tajikistan remains an outlet for Chinese goods (consumers goods and machines; China exports mainly resources and scrap metal).1447 How will Tajikistan use the competition between Russian and Chinese integration projects remains to been seen. Balancing may become beyond its capabilities.

**Kyrgyzstan** has remained another weak Central Asian country. It has been the most democratic country in the region and (perhaps because of it) one of poorest and most unstable countries of the region and at the same time a place where the interests of Russia, China and the USA cross. China is Bishkek's main trade partner (2/3 of all imports), while Russia remains the most important political partner. Kyrgyzstan's first president, Askar Akaev initially sought to turn to the West which enthusiastically supported his efforts to introduce democracy, liberalization and "transform his country into 'the Switzerland of Central Asia'"1448; he even called it, bafflingly, "the country of the human rights" (!)1449. Soon, however, he resigned from these, potentially dangerous for his regime, experiments and returned to his good, old authoritarian ways. He governed badly, though – the country sunk into corruption, nepotism and malaise. In his foreign policy, Akaev initially sought to balance Russia with the Western influence. With time, however, he became more and more compliant and did not question the pro-Moscow *status quo* in the region. As for China, Kyrgyzstan as a border country was naturally interested in develop-

 1444 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 126.

1445 *Рахмон отдал Китаю тысячу квадратных километров Таджикской земли* [Rakhmon gave China back a thousand kilometers of Tajikistan's land], Tajik News 21.01.2011.

1446 E. Azarkan, op. cit., p. 414.

1447 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, China vs. Central Asia …, pp. 32-43 and 61.

1448 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 241.

1449 *Аскар Акаев провозглашает Киргизию страной прав человека* [Akaev Announces Kyrgyzstan a country of human rights], Фергана.News, 22.10.2002.

ing relations, particularly the economic ones. The increase in the bilateral volume of trade in the 1990s was impressive: China became Bishkek's fourth trade partner; in 1997 alone the volume increased by 47% in comparison with the previous year; in the 1990s Kyrgyzstan – thanks to border trade – became China's second Central Asian partner (after Kazakhstan).1450.

In the 2000s, Kyrgyzstan went through two upheavals (the revolutions/*coups d'état* in 2005 and in 2010), two dictatorships (Akaev's and Bakiev's) and ethnic clashes (Uzbek pogroms). The Tulip Revolution from 2005 resulted in Kurmanbek Bakiev taking over power. Like his predecessor, he continued to give the green light for existing and stationing Russian and American bases alike (for a long time Kyrgyzstan had been the only country in the world to have them both) – for the USA Kyrgyzstan mattered because of the need to provide supplies to Afghanistan. Moscow has pushed Bakiev to close the American base in Manas and in January 2009 he announced this decision. However, already in June 2009, he changed his mind and enraged Moscow by allowing Americans to stay (he changed the name "air base" to a "transit point" and increased the lease three times, to 60 billion USD).1451 Moscow revenged this by introducing a 100% export toll for oil1452 and by endorsing the 2010 revolution that overthrew him. The current president of Kyrgyzstan is Almazbek Atambayev, who took the office on 1st December 2011. He tried to maneuver with the Manas base, too. Finally, however, he yielded in 2013; the base was closed in June 2014. Since Bakiev's removal Russia's influence has been increasing – Moscow is steadily making Kyrgyzstan more and more dependent, despite balancing attempts by the Kyrgyz elites.1453 As for Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, trade naturally dominates – the Kyrgyzstan-China volume of trade surpasses that of Kyrgyzstan-Russia three times.1454 Kyrgyzstan is an outlet for Chinese goods (consumption goods, equipment, machineries; all financed by Chinese loans) but has a negative trade balance.1455 Should the New Silk Road materialize, it is likely to increase. Besides, anti-Chinese resentments are visible in Kyrgyzstan (social anti-Chinese anxieties hamper the economic relations between Beijing and Bishkek); that is why Bishkek tried to balance Chinese influence with good relations with Russia (see: joining the Eurasian Union). Moscow agreed on this, due to being "anxious about China's expanding footprint", although subsiding Kyrgyzstan "does

 1450 M. Brill Olcott, *Russian-Chinese*…, pp. 392-400.

1451 *In Reversal*, *Kyrgyzstan Won't Close a U.S. Base*, "The New York Times", 23.06.2009.

1452 *Путин: Бакиев наступает на те же самые грабли* [Putin: Bakiev stand on the same rakes], Вести.Ru, 07.04.2010.

1453 W. Górecki, *Even Further from Moscow*…, pp. 26-40.

1454 C. E. Ziegler, op. cit., p. 242.

1455 A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

not come cheap, the anticipated strategic dividends and psychological comfort make the expense worthwhile for the Kremlin."1456

Finally, there is also **Mongolia.** Although it is not a Central Asian country by the region's narrowr definition, it can be understood to be so in the wider form. This is a country with probably the most difficult geopolitical location in the world.1457 Mongols have learned to play Moscow and Beijing off one another, to win contradictions between them and to keep an equal distance. Most importantly, they've tried to find "a third neighbour"1458, which unfortunately did not work out. Mongolia therefore needs to balance Russia and China, and so far it has done it successfully.1459 For Ulan Bator in the 1990s, distancing from Moscow (with the withdrawal of 100,000 Russian troops in 1992) did not mean intensifications of relations with Beijing (the ethnic friction in Inner Mongolia as well as mutual prejudice made any real normalization impossible). As for China, it considers Mongolia "a country only temporarily independent which should return to their supervision"1460 and given the size of China there are "strict limits to Mongolia's ability to alter the rules of the game that China has set."1461 Xi Jinping's 2014 visit to Mongolia (the first one in eleven years), officially called by China "visiting relatives", may be understood this way.1462 Fortunately for Ulan Bator, so far the Chinese tactics in Mongolia has been patient: "China has had the luxury of just waiting for the ripe fruit to fall into its hands."1463 Given the decreasing geopolitical options for Ulan Bator, Mongolia realistically has no choice – the most natural option seems to be leaning to Russia, considered a lesser evil.1464 Mongolia has tried this by its "skip China" strategy of building a railway to Russian seaports instead of the Chinese ones (much shorter and cheaper).1465 But relying on Russia is very controversial in Mongolia –Mongolians are unwilling to agree with the Russian saying that "one old friend is better than two new ones."1466 Russia itself does not make this decision easier. Russia's "bulldozer tactics certainly hampered its image as a self-proclaimed friend of the Mongolian people" –

1459 B. Niedziński, *Czy Mongolia powinna odejść*…

 1456 B. Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*…, p. 126.

1457 B. Niedziński, *Czy Mongolia powinna odejść od balansowania między Rosją a Chinami?* [Should Mongolia leave its balancing policy between Russia and China], polska-azja.pl 27.06.2014.

1458 *Mongolia's 'Third Neighbour' Foreign Policy*, Asia Society, 23.06.2013.

1460 Ibid.

1461 S. Radchenko, *Sino-Russian Competition Competition in Mongolia*, "The Asian Forum" 22.11.2013.

1462 *Visiting Relatives and Friends to Discuss Cooperation Joining Hands to Develop a Better Future*, MFAPRC, 22.08.2014.

1463 S. Radchenko, op. cit.

1464 B. Niedziński, *Czy Mongolia powinna odejść*….

1465 Yu Bin, *Russia's Pride and China's Power*, "Comparative Connections" vol. 16, no.3.

1466 S. Radchenko, *Sino-Russian Competition*…

Moscow has supported the pro-Russian candidate for presidency Nambaryn Enkhbayar in the 2009 elections; not only did he lose, but ended up in prison for corruption.1467

So far Moscow and Beijing have been happy to maintain a balance in Mongolia: "they have been very careful with respect to each other's positions in Mongolia; neither is openly calling the other a 'competitor'. (…) instead, the Sino-Russian competition is more like shadow boxing, with each trying to undercut the other's interests but only indirectly. Unfortunately for Russia, it is almost certain to lose this match, simply because it is in the wrong weight category. The Sino-Russian relationship today is a throwback to Nerchinsk and Kyakhta, and will certainly not change in Russia's favour."1468

To summarize these descriptions with the post-crisis landscape, the years after the economic crisis of 2008 have intensified Russian and Chinese actions in the region and weakened Central Asian republics' position *vis-à-vis* Russia and China respectively. That meant Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are *de facto* dependent on Russian help. Moscow has also retained significant influence over Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani energy sectors.1469 Thus, the weaker Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were subordinated politically by Russia. Central Asia's strongest countries Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, however, have been able to secure to bigger or lesser extent a great dose of their independence by maneuvering between Moscow and Beijing. Mongolia still balances China and Russia's influences but is likely to be dominated by China.

#### *7. Between New Great Game and Sino-Russian Condominium*

Since 2008, China has been engaging with Central Asia more and more boldly. It has "secured access to the bulk of natural resources and managed to significantly increase its economic profile", Russia in turn has "lost its pre-eminence, but held on to its dominant position in the areas of politics and security".1470 These new political realities of a more assertive China and uncompromising Russia have been best symbolized by their integration projects: China's 2013 the "Silk Road Economic Belt", or the "New Silk Road" and Russia's Eurasian Union. Thus, two contradictory integration concepts emerged that best illustrate the growing competition between Russia and China in Central Asia, called by a catchy phrase "new Great Game". So far Moscow and Beijing were

 1467 Ibid.; B. Niedziński, *Czy Mongolia powinna odejść*….

1468 S. Radchenko, op. cit.

1469 M.Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 92.

1470 Ibid., p. 86.

able to manage their competition and create a kind of joint great powers' condominium. It remains to be seen, however, whether they are able to maintain this *status quo*.

International relations in Central Asia have induced many researchers to call the geopolitical realities there "a new Great Game."1471 According to this narrative, this new great powers' competition started with the US incursion into the region in 2001. From the perspective of 2017, the US presence in the region proved to be temporary, while a more and more assertive Russia and China have remained on the battlefield and are bound to clash in the future. This narrative is challenged by an alternative one that claims that so far Moscow and Beijing are able to maintain compromise and that their cooperation outweighs competition – thus "a new *status quo* has emerged in Central Asia."1472

As long as the United States remained in the region, Sino-Russian interests were perfectly converged. With Washington's pulling out, however, contradictions became more and more visible. The economic crisis strengthened China's position in the region (Beijing became the region's largest trading partner) and showed Russia's inability to help Central Asians economically. This strengthened the potential for Russia-China competition: Russian regional dominance in security is difficult to reconcile with Chinese economic expansion in the long term. Energy is the most famous ground for competition: China was able to break the Russian monopoly on the delivery of oil and gas by constructing a pipeline from Kazakhstan in 2006 and the three spur Central Asia-China gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Before the economic crisis, the region was locked in by Russia in the energy sector, after the crisis China was able to successfully launch "a full scale expansion in the energy sector" that had two effects on Russia-China relations: new pipelines deprived Russia of its monopoly on the transit of Central Asian gas and China "locked in Central Asian gas supplies for its own needs, replacing Russia in this role."1473 Moreover, the growing trade volume between China and Central Asia, as well as Beijing's financial engagement there weakened Russia's position.

This all caused the intensification of Russian attempts to integrate the post-Soviet area, in Central Asia this is best illustrated by the strengthening of the security sphere (such as amendments to the CSTO's status that give Moscow the right of veto of a possible deployment of other states' armies in the region). Moreover, Moscow attempted to capitalize on anti-Chinese resentments in the

 1471 A. Rashid, *The New Great Game – the Battle for Central Asia's Oil*, "Far Eastern Economic Review" 10.04.1997; M. E. Ahrari, *The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia*, University Press of Pacific 2002; R. Mullerson, *Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game*, New York, Columbia University Press 2007; A.Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia*, Oxford University Press, 2012.

1472 M. Kaczmarski, *Russia-China Relations*…, p. 86.

1473 Ibid., p. 89.

region (resulting from settling the border issue – most of the countries had to concede to Beijing's wishes; and from fear of the long-term economic impact of Chinese influence and distrust of Chinese intensions) – as result elites and (even more) societies of Central Asia are still oriented towards Russia.