‖ *He accurately expands on his views concerning the good* even further, *for which* [3v] *reason he will devise a pretext to endeavour to discuss in yet greater detail his* notion *concerning* the *forms*. And indeed he *casts blame upon himself*, *as speaking in a confused way about the good*. *For while the good is spoken of in two ways*, he himself *simply took account of this* [*fact*] and did away with the form of the good. *For* there are *some things that are good in accord with themselves*, *while others* [are good] *by reason of preserving*, *producing or preventing their opposites*. He himself infers what sort the one and the other are. *And accordingly let us distinguish between useful things* (which are those that happen for the sake of other [goods]; for *things* [good] in themselves are perfective) and *let us examine whether the things that are* only *good in accord with themselves* fall under *a single form*. By saying that *the things that are good in accord with themselves* are not understanding but the *act of understanding*, he applies to *seeing* as well the activities rather than their dispositions and *pleasures*—*some* those pertaining to noble men and some those pertaining to the prudent— because if these were not goods in accord with themselves, nor *anything other than the form*, *the species* would in this way be *empty.* For the form is naturally disposed to be a cause of the particulars, of things just like it; and this is so, if there are no other things in accord with themselves except the form. But if there are also other things in this case, everything will hold to the same account; and again the universal in this case is empty.

#### **1096b26–1097a22** 7. 〈But how, then, is [good] spoken of?...〉

Since, therefore, there is no synonymy among the good [things] when they might possibly be subsumed under a single form, he inquires into the style of homonymy, according to which they will have the same name.  In EN 55.24–33 **3–5** τοὺς…ἀναλογίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b27–28 **6–7** καὶ2…ὀφθαλμῷ] cf. Arist. EN 1096b28–29 **8** ἀλλὰ…ἀφετέον] cf. Arist. EN 1096b30 **8–10** ἀλλὰ…Ν] cf. Eustr. In EN 56.12–16 **11–12** Tέως…κτητόν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b32–34 **13–14** ἡμεῖς…δόξειεν] cf. Arist. EN 1096b34–35 **14–15** ὡς…ἐπιτυγχάνοιμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1097a1–3 **15–19** εἶτα…ἔχει] cf. Arist. EN 1097a3–4 **19–22** διὰ…εὔλογον] cf. Arist. EN 1097a5–8 **26–28** πῶς…τοῦδε] cf. Arist. EN 1097a8–13 **28–30** πάλιν…πράττονται] cf. Arist. EN 1097a15–22

**7** ὄψις1] ψυχή ex ὄψις perperam corr. Μ **11** δῆλλον sic M; servavi (vid. Editorial principles) **29** τέλειον M (cum Mb) : τέλος Arist. vulg. (EN 1097a21) et Eustr. In EN 60.13–14

with *things that bear the same name by mere chance*. These things are those that have no pragmatic connection, except if a name is used for purposes of specification, for example *elaia* the [olive] tree and the game. And he quite accepts the two other [modes of homonymy], [first] the one [*that holds that things are called good because they derive*] *from one good* and [*contribute*] *to one*, and [second] the one *by analogy*. And for the moment [he focuses on] the *from one good* and *to one*; for everything looks towards one thing, what is perfect and beautiful. But thereafter, he says, [he pays] *more* [attention to] the mode *by analogy*; for these things *have a pragmatic connection* indeed; for *a* [*medical*] *book* and *a drug* have to do with the *medical art*; and that which is *sight in the case of the body*, that is *intelligence in the case of the soul*, or even *sight in the case of* the eye. For the analogy gives these things a certain kinship. *But these questions should be set aside*, he says; because these topics are in the treatise the "Metaphysics", since he speaks there *in Book Delta about muchdebated subjects*, as also *about the form* of the good and of other things *in Books Βeta and Mu and Nu*.

But meanwhile, *even if there is a good capable of independent existence* and a form, he says *it is clear* that this *is neither achievable nor attainable*, namely it cannot be attained by means of action. For when will anyone attain the form? *We are looking for a good of this sort that is achievable and attainable*. But *perhaps someone might think* that *knowledge* of this is useful; *for* we might look to that [i.e. the good itself] as towards *a model*, as painters do, and *we might* have better chances of *attaining* it. Then he refutes the objection from the [procedures of] the sciences and arts, except when the argument is plausible from both sides. He says even in these cases that *an argument* of this type, which establishes that it is necessary to discover the universal in order that we might succeed in gaining knowledge of the particular from that source, *has some plausibility*. And he brings forward [the procedures of] the sciences and arts that are implicated in both sides of the argument. For inasmuch as *they aim at* the *good* in accord with themselves *and seek what is lacking*, *knowledge of this* [i.e. the good itself] should *have been sought*, but *they leave this out*. Yet again, to omit a *resource of this sort and fail to look for it is not reasonable*, just as in those cases. Knowledge of the universal must be passed over, just as the knowledge of the particular good is passed over in the sciences, ‖ and one must seek [it] in another way, [4r] because not seeking it even in the sciences is unreasonable. Because of the fixed nature of the opinions on both sides, disagreement was established in those cases as well.

Consequently, this plausibility is also refuted. For how *will a weaver be helped* if he possesses [knowledge of] *the form of the good itself*, when even *a doctor* seeks *health* in relation to particulars [i.e. rather than health as a whole] and *especially the*  [*health*] *of this* [*particular*] *individual*? *But again returning* [*to the main subject*], *he seeks what then* the good *is* and he states [that it is] *one thing in one matter*, *another in another* by analogy, *but in every action and choice* [*it is*] *the final* [*end*].

 EN 1097a22–24 **3–4** εἰ…ἀγαθόν] cf. Arist. EN 1097a28–29 **4–6** ἐπεὶ…τέλεια] cf. Arist. EN 1097a25–28 **7** τὸ1…τέλειον] cf. Arist. EN 1097a28 **7–9** ὥστε… αἱρετῶν1] cf. Arist. EN 1097a30–34 **7–9** ὁρίζεται…διατοῦτο] cf. Arist. EN 1097a30–32 **10** καὶ2… αἱρετόν] cf. Arist. EN 1097a32–34 **11–12** τοιοῦτον…ἄλλο1] cf. Arist. EN 1097a34–1097b1 **12–14** θέλομεν2…εὐδαιμονίαν1] cf. Arist. EN 1097b2–4 **15–16** δαίμονα…ἐξηγούμενος] cf. Procl. In Plat. Alc. 292.14–293.6 **17–19** ἔχει…μόνῳ] cf. Arist. EN 1097b8–9 **19–20** εἴπερ…δυστυχοῦσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1097b9–10 **19–23** γονεῖς…ἔχει] cf. Asp. In EN 16.10–15 **22–23** ἐπειδὴ…ἔχει] cf. Arist. EN 1097b9–11 **24–25** ἐς…ἄπειρον] cf. Arist. EN 1097b13 **29–30** Οἰόμεθα… συναριθμουμένην] cf. Arist. EN 1097b15–18

**1** lm. addidi **21** τὰ2 scripsi : τὸ M **28** θʹ addidi ex E | lm. addidi

**1097a22–1097b13** 8. 〈So that if there is an end for all practical undertakings…〉

*The end of practical undertakings is a good achievable by actions*, and *if* there are *several* [such ends], these are the ends of the choice itself. *Thus the argument turns in its course and arrives at* its concluding point, which is most connected with final causality. But *if there is one* [*end*], *this would be the* good *being sought. Since the ends are evidently several*, *and we choose* the first *of these* as being the concluding one, and there are also the things prior to the end [which we choose] as *instruments*, *it is clear that not all* ends *are final.* But since happiness is what is best, this would be the final [end]. For *the best is final*, so that although there are many [ends], the more final one is the best. *And the more final is defined* as *that which is desirable* only *for itself rather than for something else* by comparison; and *what is never desirable as a means to anything else* is more final *than those things that are desirable for themselves* and are also *chosen on this account.* The more final and the highest of all *and absolutely final* is *the one that is not chosen on account of something else* [i.e. *as a means*], but because of itself [i.e. as an end]. *And happiness* is found *to be something of this sort*: *for we choose this for its own sake and not for the sake of something else*; for we do not want to be happy for the sake of something else but for its own sake. And we wish *to receive honour and pleasure*, *to understand* what is profitable and *to be virtuous for the sake of these goods themselves*, *but* also for the sake of *happiness*. Because these things combined complete happiness, which is the human good. For some people say that a *daimōn* is good luck, others intelligence, as Proclus explains Socrates' *daimonion*. The happy person (*eudaimōn*) is the one who abounds in intelligence or in good luck, and a person who has good luck and intelligence is *the one who is self-sufficient* concerning all human affairs and lacks nothing at all.

*But this* [i.e. *self-sufficiency*] will be defined as *not* [*sufficient*] *for a solitary person by himself*; for what is the good for him, if *his parents*, *friends*, *children* and ancestors are unfortunate, or if some of them are undisciplined and stubborn in their hearts, or, in terms of their bodies, have maimed limbs or, in terms of externalities, are poor and suffer dishonour? *Since man* is *by nature a civic being* ‖ and *does not* lead *an* [4v] *isolated life*, it is also necessary for him, since he lives with others, to bring forward the goods arising from them in support of his individual happiness. He now delays the discussion of the degree *to* which this *will extend*, so that it will not go on *to infinity*, creating the danger of no one being happy. He will discuss [this issue] in Book 10, when he talks about happiness. He also defines self-sufficiency [there].

#### **1097b16–1098a12** 9. 〈Moreover, most desirable of all things…〉

*We think that happiness both lacks nothing* and is the most final and *desirable of all things*, *not something counted as one good among the rest*, as is clear from the things that happen for the sake of happiness, which we also call "the things [that happen]

του». τὰ γὰρ τέλη οὐ συναριθμεῖται ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι τέλη· οὐ γὰρ συναριθμεῖται οἰκία τοίχοις καὶ ὀρόφοις καὶ τοῖς καθέκαστον (καὶ οὕτως ἔχει τὸ τέλειον καὶ αἱρετὸν ἢ καὶ ἐπαινετὸν μᾶλλον), ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὴ μόνη ἡ οἰκία ἀνενδεὴς ἑαυτῇ πρὸς τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι παρά τινων. λέγει γὰρ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Τοπικῶν ὅτι *οὐ συναριθμεῖται τοῖς περιέχουσι τὰ περιεχόμενα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν*. εἰ δέ γε, φησί, *συναριθμηθή-* 5 *σεται* αὕτη μετά τινος τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, τόσον ἐστὶν αὕτη αὐτάρκης καὶ ἀνενδεής, ὅτι *μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν* (ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἀγαθὰ ποδώκεια τυχὸν καὶ εὐτριχία καὶ εὐστάλεια σώματος) *αἱρετωτέρα* γίνεται. ἔστω γὰρ μετὰ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἐλάχιστον *κατὰ πρόσθεσιν*. *τέλειον* γὰρ καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ *καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία*, οὐχ ἁπλῶς πάντων καὶ τῶν τῆς θεωρίας ἀλλὰ μόνων τ*ῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος*. 10

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν *ἄριστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία φαίνεται*, φησί, *ποθεῖται δὲ* καὶ *ἐναργέστερον λεχθῆναι τί ἐστι*. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸν ὁρισμὸν αὐτῆς θηρώμεθα ὡς τέλους, πρὶν τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος εἰπεῖν (σκοπὸς γὰρ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἀφορῶντες πρὸς τοῦτο τἄλλα πράττομεν), ζητοῦμεν ἐπιπλέον περὶ αὐτῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄριστον πάντων τῶν πρακτῶν ἐστι, ζητητέον *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. *ὥσπερ γὰρ* ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων *ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τὸ εὖ* ζητεῖται, *οὕτω* 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων. τί γοῦν ἐστι; μὴ γὰρ *τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως εἰσὶν ἔργα*, *ἀνθρώπου δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν* ἔργον; ἀλλὰ δῆλον ἐκ *τῶν μερῶν* αὐτοῦ, *ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδός*. ταῦτα γὰρ ἄψυχα μὲν ὄντα οὔτε ἔργα ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμωνύμως λέγονται, ὥσπερ *λίθινοι αὐλοί*, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς ἔλεγεν· ἔμψυχα δὲ ἔργα ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἄρα καὶ ὁ πᾶς ζῶν ἄνθρωπος. 20

Ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα *ἔργον ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῆν* ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ *τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ φυτοῖς*. *ἐκβλητέον* γοῦν *τὸ ἰδίως* προσὸν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ *ἑπομένως* μὴ *αἴσθησίς ἐστι* τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ *τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ ἀλόγοις*. *λείπεται* τοίνυν *ἡ λογικὴ πρᾶξις*. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὕτη διττή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ *ὡς ἐπιπειθὴς τῷ λόγῳ*, εἰ καὶ μὴ λογική ἐστιν, ἤγουν τὸ οἰκοδομῆσαι· ἡ δὲ ὡς αὐτή γε οὖσα ἡ λογικὴ πρᾶξις, οἷον τὸ *διανοεῖσθαι*. ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὕτη 25 *διττῶς*· ἡ μὲν καθ᾽ ἕξιν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ κατ᾽ *ἐνέργειαν*. *ἔστι δ*ὲ τὸ *αὐτὸ ἔργον ἀνθρώπου* καὶ ἀνθρώπου *σπουδαίου*, διαφέρει δὲ κατὰ *τὸ εὖ*, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

[5r] ‖ **1098a12–1098b3** ι´ 〈εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα...〉 Ζῇ καὶ τὰ φυτά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ *τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικήν,* εἴτουν τὴν φυτικήν, ψυχήν· ζῇ *καὶ* ὁ *ἵππος καὶ βοῦς*, ἀλλὰ *κατ᾽ αἴσθησιν* μόνην· ζῇ καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνας 30

**2** καὶ3…αἱρετὸν] cf. Arist. EN 1097b19–20 **4–5** οὐ…αὐτῶν] Alex. In Top. 247.8–9 **5–9** εἰ… πρόσθεσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1097b16–20 **9–10** τέλειον…τέλος] cf. Arist. EN 1097b20–21 **11–12** Ὅτι…ἐστι] cf. Arist. EN 1097b22–24 **15** τὸ1…ἀνθρώπου] Arist. EN 1097b24–25 **15–17** ὥσπερ…ποδός] cf. Arist. EN 1097b25–32 **18–19** ὥσπερ…ἔλεγεν] cf. Arist. PA 641a2; cf. Arist. De an. 420b6–8 **21** Ἀλλ᾽…φυτοῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1097b32–34 **21–27** ἐκβλητέον…ἄλλων] cf. Arist. EN 1097b34–1098a15 **29–30** Ζῇ…μόνην] cf. Arist. EN 1097b33–1098a3; cf. [Heliod.] In EN 24.9–11

because of something". For the ends are not to be enumerated among the things whose ends they are: a house is not to be included in the count of its walls and thatch and of each of its individual elements (and this is what complete and desirable, or better praiseworthy, means), but only the house per se, lacking nothing in itself with respect to what it is and its desirability for certain people. For Alexander too says in the third book of the "Topics" that *the things contained are not to be counted among the things that contain them*. And if, he says, this [i.e. happiness] *were to be counted together* with any of the things that are prior to it, to such an extent is happiness self-sufficient and lacking in nothing, that *combined with the least of goods* (the least of goods [are] speed of foot perhaps, beautiful hair, and a nice appearance) becomes *more desirable*. For let this too alongside happiness be the least good *by addition*. For *happiness is complete* by itself *and self-sufficient*, and *is the end* not simply of all things and of issues relating to contemplation but only *of practical undertakings.*

Therefore because *happiness is patently the chief good*, he says, *a clearer account of what it is is* also *required*. And because we are eagerly pursuing a definition of it as an end, before speaking of the things that lead to the end (for the end is a goal, and by aiming at it we achieve other things), we seek more information about it [i.e. happiness]. And since it is the chief [good] of all practical undertakings, *the function of the human being* must be sought. *For just as* in other matters, *the efficiency of function* is sought, *so* also in this case. What is it then? For, is it the case that *a carpenter and a shoemaker have certain functions*, *while a human has no* function? But it is clear from his *parts*, *an eye*, *a hand*, *and a foot*, [that he must have a function]. For if these parts are inanimate, they have no function, but are referred to by the same name, like *flutes made of stone*, as he said in his "On the Soul"; whereas if they are animate and have a function, so then does the entire living human being.

Surely *life* is *a function of the human being*, but *this is shared with plants as well*. Thus *one must reject* this feature *peculiar* to plants and *next* [judge] that *senseperception is* not the function of the human being, since *this* too is *shared* [in this case] *with non-rational beings*. Then *there remains rational action*. And this is twofold: because one [element possesses reason] *in so far as it is obedient to reason*, even if it is not rational, for example the act of building; the other one in so far as it is itself rational action, such as the act of *reasoning*. This also has *two meanings*: the first is in accord with disposition, the second in accord with *activity*. And the *function of a human being* and of a *good* human being *is exactly* the *same*, but differs in respect to its *efficacy*, as also in the other instances.

‖ **1098a12–1098b3** 10. 〈If this is the case, we declare the human being's function [5r] to be a particular kind of life…〉

Plants are also alive, but this involves *the nutritive* part of the soul *and the one that promotes growth*, namely the vegetative [part of the soul]. *A horse and an ox* are *also* alive, but *in accord with sense-perception* only.

 Αἱ ἀρχαὶ *μεγάλην ῥοπὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς τὰ ἑπόμενα*, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ παροιμία φησίν «*ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ ἢ* καὶ *πλέον τοῦ παντός*»· *πολλὰ* γὰρ *τῶν ζητουμένων διὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς γίνεται* 30 *ἐμφανῆ*. διὸ *περὶ αὐτῆς σκεπτέον* καὶ αὖθις τῆς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀρχῆς, ἤγουν τῆς τοῦ ὅτι καὶ καθὼς αὐτὴν ὡρισάμεθα· συνεπεράναμεν γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀπὸ πολλῶν, πρῶτον μὲν

**1–2** ἐστὶ…λόγου] Arist. EN 1098a7 **3–5** καθὼς…ἀρετήν] cf. Arist. EN 1098a9–15 **5–8** ἐὰν… τελειοτάτην] cf. Arist. EN 1098a16–18 **10–15** πλὴν…ἀναγράφουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1098a18–22 **12** οὔτε1…χελιδὼν] Zenob. V, 12 (LS I, 120) **14–15** Oὕτω…ἀναγράφουσιν] cf. Asp. In EN 19.14–17 **18** ἀρχή…παντός] cf. Arist. EN 1098b7; cf. Apost. XII, 9c (L II, 544) **18–20** παντὸς…εὑρετής] cf. Arist. EN 1098a22–26 **21–24** συνεργός…ἔργων] cf. Arist. EN 1098a24–32 **25–27** ὡσαύτως… ἀρχή] cf. Arist. EN 1098a33–1098b3 **29–32** Αἱ…ὡρισάμεθα] cf. Arist. EN 1098b6–11

**11** πλείστῳ scripsi : πλείστου M **28** lm. addidi

with those capacities, but he also lives in accord with a type of life that involves virtue, which is *an activity of the soul* and a practical pursuit that does not come from nature [alone] but is *accompanied by reason*. If one lives this life well (in the way that we established *the function of the cithara-player and of the man who plays the cithara well*, the latter being *the accomplished cithara-player*), this person is happy, and *each thing* is considered *well performed when it is performed in accord with its own proper excellence*. Therefore *if* the treatment of the general discussion is *valid* in this case too, he did not say that *the human good* "is" *an activity of soul in accord with virtue*, but in order to represent the active component of the activity, he says "*it turns out to be*" [*an activity of soul in accord with virtue*]. *If there are multiple virtues*, as there surely are, [*these are performed*] *in accord with the best and most complete* [*virtue*], which is practical wisdom (for this is a virtue that belongs to the rational [part of the soul]). And no virtue of character [exists] without practical wisdom, even if Socrates subsumed them all into one, i.e. practical wisdom. Except that this alone does not suffice, and one must also add *in a complete life*, as if he were saying that [one must possess it] for most of one's time and throughout one's life. For the inference from the proverb demonstrates this: *neither does one swallow make* a *summer* nor does *a single day* or *a* single *period* make a happy life.

Thus *the* human *good* is of this sort in outline: just as painters *first draw the outline* when they make a sketch, *then fill in the details afterwards* ("filling in the details" refers to the second draft), so we must behave in our discussion of these matters; for we must not abandon these questions before we fill out our definition of happiness. This is the most important point and "*the beginning*", they say, "*is half of the whole*"; because *anyone* can *add what is missing* and *complete the details of something well outlined*, *and time assists* with this. Because after he said "*a discoverer*" (since time discovers nothing, but in time everything is discovered), he added the term "*assistant*". *But one must also bear in mind what was said before*, so that *we do not look for precision in the same way in everything*, *but in accord with the subject matter*; since *both a carpenter and a geometer investigate a right angle*, but each does so *differently*; *for* the geometer *contemplates the truth*, *while the* carpenter makes products. *One must investigate* the *cause* in a similar fashion. For *the fact* is sufficient, if the reason is *well established*. Moreover, first principles are also recognised on the basis of fact, and because of this *the fact is the primary thing and first principle.*

**1098b7–1099a5** 11. 〈For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole…〉 Principles *are of great importance in relation to what follows*, since the proverb says that "*the beginning is half or* even *more than half of the whole*". For *many of the matters under investigation become evident through their beginning*. This is why *we must inquire* again *specifically into* the principle of happiness, namely the principle of the fact just as we defined it. For we drew conclusions about it [i.e. the principle of happiness] from many things, first that it is a human product, next that it is rational ὅτι ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, ἔπειτα λογικὸν καὶ οὐ κατά τινα θεσμὸν ἄλογον· ἔπειτα ἔθεμεν αὐτὴν εἰς ἐνέργειαν, ἥτις κρείττων τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν· ἔπειτα ἐν βίῳ διόλου ἢ διὰ χρόνου πλείστου.

 EN 1098b9–12 **6–10** τῶν…τίθεμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1098b12–16 **10–12** αἱ…εἰσι] Eustr. In EN 78.32–34 **12–14** καλῶς…ἔργον1] cf. Arist. EN 1098b16–19 **13** ὅτι1… ἐστίν] Eustr. In EN 78.35–36; cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 9.19–20 **16–17** Συνᾴδει… εὐπραξία] cf. Arist. EN 1098b20–22 **19–22** οὐ…ἡδονῆς2] cf. Arist. EN 1098b22–25 **22–25** προστιθέασι…ἐνδοξότητος] cf. Arist. EN 1098b26–28 **25–29** ζητεῖ…ἀγωνιζόμενοι] cf. Arist. EN 1098b32–1099a5 **31–28,4** Δείξας…ἡδονήν] cf. Eustr. In EN 81.29–82.4

**15** οἰκίαν scripsi : οἰκείαν M **30** lm. addidi

and not non-rational in accord with some [human] standard. After this, we established that it is an activity, which is greater than a disposition. After this, [we established that it must be possessed] throughout one's life or throughout most of it.

Because he sets these out as *conclusions*, *from which the argument* concerning this [principle] was proven. But now he combines this with *what is said on the subject*; *for all facts are in accord with the truth*, *while the truth is in discord with the false*, and for these reasons it is tested by it. ‖ So *since the goods are said to be of* [5v] *three kinds*—in accord with *the soul*, such as practical wisdom, temperance, and good-naturedness; in accord with *the body*, such as strength, beauty, and the like; and in accord with *externalities*, such as wealth, friendship, and the rest—*we call those that are* in accord with the *soul most properly goods*, *and we assess actions and soul-related activities as relating to soul*, and he accordingly syllogises potentially as follows: *good actions and activities are included in the category of unqualified actions and activities*, and *all actions and activities have to do with the soul*. *Hence it has been rightly said*, *in accord with the ancient and agreed-upon opinion* concerning these matters, that happiness is *an activity of the soul*. The following *is also correct*, namely *that we declared that the end is an activity* and not a product; for in acting in accord with itself [i.e. as an end], the soul does not yield a product, as the art of construction, for example, might yield a house.

*Another belief that harmonises with our account* is that they say that *the happy person lives and fares well*; *because* happiness *is a sort of living and faring well*. For just as the divine life is an activity, so also the life of the soul is an activity; and the activity of the soul fulfilling its own proper function is good, just as the soul that is corrupted is evil, but surely less so *the characteristics we looked for in happiness* (he says "*characteristics*" since these are in dispute). *For* how do *virtue*, *practical wisdom*, *philosophic wisdom* or happiness combine in this account? For they said that *these are* happiness, *accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure*; and all of these are activities. *Some attribute externalities* to a certain satisfaction, even if they are contingent events [that function as possible means to an end] and not such [i.e. ends] by themselves. *These views were held both by men* who are *many* and retain the dignity [bestowed on them] due to the length of time, *and by others who* are *few* [and retain their dignity] due to their *high reputation*. He also investigates how *the chief good must be understood* in these cases; for goods *possessed and used* are instruments, whereas the goods *that involve disposition* and *activity* relate only to the soul. In relation to these matters, again, *disposition* is insufficient *to produce the good* [*result*], *but activity* does yield the best [result], *just as* happens also *at the Olympic Games*; for it is not those who merely train well who *are crowned* in the contests, *but those who compete*.

#### **1099a7–1099b4** 12. 〈Their life, too, is pleasant in itself…〉

*After demonstrating* sufficiently both *that happiness exists and what it is*, *he moves on from there to the remaining two problems*, *what exists within it* [i.e. *what its subsist-* *καὶ διατί ἐστιν*. *ὑπάρχειν* τοίνυν *αὐτῇ* διϊσχυρίσεται *τὸ ἥδιστόν* τε *καὶ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ κάλλιστον*, καὶ *τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ* τὰς τῶν *ἀρχαίων περὶ αὐτῆς δόξας*. *ἔλεγον γὰρ* ἢ *μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς*, οἷον *ἢ ὡς μέρος αὐτῆς* εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν *ἢ ὡς ἑπόμενόν* τι ἔξωθεν ἔχειν *τὴν ἡδονήν*.

 EN 1199a24–25 **5–6** Ἀνάγει…ταῦτα] cf. Eustr. In EN 82.8–14 **6** ἑκάστῳ…φιλοτοιοῦτος] cf. Arist. EN 1099a8–9 **10–12** αἱ…αὑτόν] cf. Arist. EN 1099a14–16 **13–17** πᾶς…ταῦτα] cf. Arist. EN 1099a16–24 **19–21** καὶ…ἔραται] cf. Arist. EN 1099a24–28; cf. Eustr. In EN 84.18–23; cf. Georg. Pachym. Paraphr. In EN 10.29–11.1 **19–22** καὶ…ἐνεργείαις] cf. [Heliod.] In EN 17.21–26 **20–21** τὸ1…ἔραται] cf. Theogn. Eleg. 255–256; cf. Stob. Anthol. 4, 39, 8 **22–23** ταῦτα…ἀγαθῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1099a29–32 **24–30,1** πῶς…παναίσχης] cf. Arist. EN 1099a33–1099b4 **26** ἐμποδίζηται…μακάριον] cf. Nic. Basil. Or. B5, 87.5–6

**6** ἡδὺ scripsi ex Arist. EN 1099a8 : ἡδὺς Μ

*ence of qualities is*] *and why it exists*; *this is the sort of thing it is and why it is* [*like this*]*.*  [Aristotle] therefore will affirm confidently that *what is most pleasant*, *what is most noble*, *and what is most beautiful supervene on happiness*, and that *this is in accord with* the *views of* the *ancients regarding it*. *For they said* that *it* [i.e. *happiness*] *exists*  either *with pleasure or not without pleasure*, just as [they said that] *either* pleasure exists *as a part of happiness or pleasure* is attached to externality *like something that follows* [*it*].

[Aristotle] then refers *the discussion* to *what is more general and he has recourse to the matter at hand*. *For to each individual*, *he says*, *that thing is pleasant in relation to which he is described as* "*fond of*" *so-and-so*, and he sets out these points *inductively*. Since some of these pleasures are [pleasant] in themselves, such as that of philosophy, that of scientific knowledge, and that of virtue, while others are not [pleasant] in accord with their own nature but according to those who do the judging, the choice is precarious. And because some people take pleasure in wine rather than in virtue, and in wealth rather than in scientific knowledge, he distinguishes these pursuits from one another. For *virtuous actions are pleasant in themselves* rather than in accord with those [pursuits] that have been organised on a non-rational basis. Happiness accordingly *has no need of* external *pleasure*; for the happy *life* is pleasant in itself. This is argued in the following manner: everyone who feels joy has pleasure, but someone *who takes no delight in good actions is not good*, ‖ *nor is anyone just unless he rejoices in just actions*. *Virtuous actions* thus possess [6r] pleasure *in themselves* without [being in need of] pleasure as *an ornamental appendage*, and in this way *they are good and noble*; besides, such a life has *each of these*  [*actions*] *to the highest degree*, so as to be the best with regard to them. For *if he judges such actions* to be necessary, a person will cherish them with all his heart; because evil will not be admitted alongside what is noble, nor will the worst [be admitted] alongside the good. Such qualities together are complementary, since they are in themselves part of the virtuous life, and they are together and *they are not separated*, *as the inscription at Delos has it*:

*What is best contributes to health*, *what is noblest contributes to outmost justice*; *but what is most pleasant contributes to getting what one desires*.

*These qualities* together *belong to the best activities*; *and these*, *or one of them*, the most perfect, *we identify as happiness*, which *will need external goods as well*, if not for its own sake, then so that it can make these things [i.e. external goods] known. *For* how does he *who lacks* external resources *undertake noble acts*, and how will he perform them? Therefore, let these [external goods] be established *as instruments*; and in order that the happiness of happy individuals not be hindered by *lack* [of externalities], and *the blessedness* associated with it not *take on a stain*, [happiness] will be in need not just of externals but also of physical advantages; *for an extremely*

τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν δεήσεται· *οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ παναίσχης*· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕξει τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας δύναμιν.

**1099b6–1100a4** ιγ´ 〈ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας...〉 *Ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι* ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, ἀλλά γε δὴ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθῶν, εἰ μὴ ὡς συμπληρωτικῶν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ὡς ὀργάνων. πολλὰ γὰρ δι᾽ αὐτῶν 5 πράττεται, *ὅθεν* καὶ *εἰς ταὐτὸν τάττουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ*· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τυχηρὰ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά. ἔνιοι δὲ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν ταυτίζουσιν. τίνι τρόπῳ; ἢ ὅτι ἐπεὶ διττὴ ἡ ἀρετή, ἡ μὲν ψυχική, ἡ δὲ σωματική (εὐαισθησία γὰρ καὶ ὑγεία καὶ ἰσχὺς σωματικαὶ ἀρεταί). ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν διὰ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία συμπληροῦται, τοῖς δὲ σωματικοῖς ὡς ὀργάνοις χρᾶται (ὑγιαίνων γὰρ ἴσως καὶ 10 εὐεκτικὸς ὢν ψυχικῶς, ἂν ἐνεργήσειεν εὐμαρῶς), διαταῦτα ταυτίζουσιν ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν.

 EN 1099b6–7 **6** ὅθεν…εὐδαιμονίᾳ] cf. Arist. EN 1099b7–8 **13–14** Διατοῦτο…ἀνθρώποις] cf. Eustr. In EN 86.25–27 **13–32,3** Διατοῦτο…μακαρίζεται] cf. Arist. EN 1099b9–1100a4

**3** lm. addidi

*ugly* [*person*] *is not our idea of a happy man*, since he will lack the potential for happiness.

**1099b6–1100a4** 13. 〈[Happiness] seems also to need this sort of prosperity…〉 Happiness *seems to require* external goods as well, including even goods related to the body, if not as essential parts in relation to them, at all events as instruments. For many [actions] are accomplished by means of them [i.e. bodily goods], and *this is why some people identify good fortune with happiness*, since the external goods are matters of fortune for the most part. Others, however, identify happiness with virtue. How so? It is because virtue is twofold, one [part] relating to the soul, the other to the body (for keen perception, health and strength are physical virtues). Since therefore happiness is fulfilled by means [of the goods] relating to the soul, but uses the bodily goods as instruments (for perhaps when one is healthy and one's soul is in a good condition, one might act readily), it is for these reasons that they identify virtue and happiness.

*For this reason the question arises as to whether* [*happiness*] *is acquired by learning* from without *or by habituation* or *cultivated in some other manner* by means of work, *or whether it comes* to human beings *by divine dispensation or even by chance*. *Now if there is anything else*, he says, *which comes* from the most beautiful [gifts] *of divine dispensation*, it is most especially likely *that happiness is god-given. But this question perhaps* belongs to the sphere of theology to investigate, and this *inquiry* also [forms] part of discussions regarding [the nature of] divine providence, *but it appears* in any case *to be the most divine* [*of human possessions*]; *for the prize of virtue* is proposed whether it is dispensed by god or if it comes from daily practice and effort. But simultaneously *it would also be something widely available*, ‖ since [6v] *everyone* is *capable* of attaining happiness, unless someone were *to be maimed as regards their potential for virtue* either due to intemperance or because of some physical disability; people thus become happy *by means of a type of study and care*. For *if it is admitted* that *it is better*, so to speak, [*to be happy*] *in this way* [i.e*. as a result of one's own exertions*] *than through chance*, *if in fact matters in the natural world and matters in the realm of artifice* [*are concerned*], the former *involve* nature *in such a way* that it acts as an efficient cause for achieving the end from it [i.e. nature] and not through chance, whereas the latter involve craft in such a way that it acts as an efficient cause for reaching the best from there and not through some kind of chance. *To hand over to chance*, *however*, *what is* so *much the greatest and most noble* [*would be*] *an act of extreme neglect*.

*It is plain also from our definition* that happiness does not arise from chance; *for activity of the soul in accord with excellence is said to be* the best, noblest, and most pleasurable, and that it is impossible for an activity of soul [to result] from chance; and the same things hold for any determinant of virtue. After saying "*in accord with excellence*", since happiness is also established in accord with the other goods, he also mentions the other [goods] but only as being instruments. He also attempts to

*πολιτικῆς*· *αὕτη* γὰρ *ἐπιμελεῖται τὰ πλεῖστα* καὶ οὐ τῇ τύχῃ ἐπιτρέπει τὸ *ποιῆσαι ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας*, ὥστε πoριζόμεθα ἐκ τούτων ὅτι *οὔτε* ἄλογον *ζῷον οὔτε παῖς εὐδαιμονήσειε* πώποτε· *ὃς δὲ* καὶ *λέγεται* οὕτω *παῖς*, *δι᾽ ἐλπίδα μακαρίζεται*.

#### **1100a5–1100a32** ιδ´ 〈πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται...〉

 EN 1100a5–13 **10–12** Πότερον…ἀπεφήνατο] cf. Herod. Hist. i, 30–33 **13–31** τοῦτο…ἐκείνου] cf. Arist. EN 1100a13–32 **24** Ἔστι…ποικίλη] cf. Eustr. In EN 94.2–3 **29–30** ἀκοινώνητον…ἄσπλαγχνον] cf. Eustr. In EN 94.22–23

**4** lm. addidi

prove [this] in another way, from common knowledge, [that is to say] *political science*; for *this* [*science*] *is concerned with the greatest matters* and does not entrust *making the citizens virtuous* to chance, so that from these [arguments] we gain [the idea] that *neither* a non-rational *animal nor a child could* ever *be counted as happy*; when *the child is spoken of* thus [i.e. as happy], *it is being complimented for its hope for the future.*

#### **1100a5–1100a32** 14. 〈Since many changes take place…〉

He then raises a difficulty as to when and to what extent we will call a human being happy, since *many changes resulting from chance occur in life*, and many people, although fortunate in their youth, *suffer misfortune in their old age*, *just as* the ancients record *with regard to Priam*; for [Aristotle] talks about the events in his life in the light of the ancient story and myth. Who then would *count* such a man *as happy*, *when he died* so *wretchedly*?

*Shall we therefore call no one else at all happy*, he says, *while he lives*, but [only] after death, if he manages to maintain all the possessions which he enjoyed while he was alive, just as *Solon* declared? [Solon] did not in any way count Croesus as happy on account of his ingots of gold and such an enormous heap of possessions when he came to visit him. But *it is utterly absurd* to hold that a human being is happy only after his death and when he no longer exists, and especially *for us who claim that happiness is an activity*; for how could a dead person be active? *Unless we claim that someone is happy when he is dead*; because we are *not* saying that *Solon's point* was this, *but rather that* [*when a man has died*] *one can safely call* him *happy on the thesis that* he outlasted the goods he had during his lifetime, there being no certainty of this while he was alive. Due to the mutability of fortune, *the issue* again *admits of some dispute*; *for someone who is dead seems to have* an allotment *of both good and bad*, just as much as another man does who *is alive but does not perceive what is happening to him*. Hence, another point of *dispute* ‖ arises, whether the dead man [7r] himself, who might even be called happy because he has ended his life in security in possession of his goods, might be in danger with regard to his happiness due to the *misfortunes* of his *descendants*, if both *honours and dishonours* were to follow him after he was dead.

*There is* also *the multifaceted and diversified distance between a man and his ancestors*; for a son will have one degree of affinity toward the original person, a descendant another, and an offspring yet another. As a consequence, there will be different hindrances to happiness, with the result that the same man might be both happy and unhappy due to his descendants, to either a greater or lesser extent due to the difference of kinship. And again *it would be odd* if [*the fortunes of the descendants*] *did not for some time have an effect on their ancestors*; for this is inhuman and heartless. *But we must return to our initial point*, the one [raised by] Solon; *for perhaps this problem might* be solved *from* [*consideration of*] *that one*.

#### **1100a34–1100b30** ιε´ 〈πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον...〉

 EN 1100a34–1100b8 **3** τὸ1…διαίρεσιν] cf. Arist. Metaph. 1027b18–19 | ὥσπερ…ὄν] cf. Alex. In Metaph. 448.6 **12–14** Καὶ…εἰσι] cf. Eustr. In EN 95.30–34 **16–21** κύριαι…μακάριοι] cf. Arist. EN 1100b8–16 **21–22** ἡ…συνουσίωται] cf. Dam. In Phaed. 461.1 **22–25** αἴτιον…πράξεσιν] Arist. EN 1100b17–20 **24–27** ἐπεὶ…μάλιστα] Eustr. In EN 97.16–19 **27–28** αἰεὶ…ἀρετήν] cf. Arist. EN 1100b19–20 **28–32** ἢ…κατορθῶν] Eustr. In EN 97.21–25 **33–36,1** τό…τύχας] cf. Arist. EN 1100b20–21; cf. Asp. In EN 30.2–3; cf. Eustr. In EN 97.29–31 **33** ἀληθῶς…τετράγωνος] cf. Pl. Prot. 339a–b

**1** lm. addidi **5** κεῖσθαι M : βούλεσθαι Arist. vulg. (EN 1100b1)

#### **1100a34–1100b30** 15. 〈How is it not strange…〉

When the fact *holds*, if someone asserted that about the happy person, *he would predicate truly*; and this is said to be part of how matters are, *namely what exists by a combination or separation of terms*, just as falsity is a way of "not-being." It *is*  therefore *strange if at the actual time when someone is happy* and living happily the saying concerning that person that "he is happy" is false. But this will happen *because* it is *not* the norm *to call anyone who is alive* "*happy*" *owing to the vicissitudes* of fortune, because *happiness* aims to be *something permanent*, *while the wheel of fortune often turns full circle*, with the result that, even though people are happy, we would not call them happy owing to our expectation that their fortunes could change. *For if we were to track what happens to people*, *we would often call the same person* both *happy and miserable*, and *we would proclaim that the happy person is* in fact *a chameleon* (an animal that changes into every colour).

After making these arguments, [Aristotle] attempts to refute the opposite case. Thus, *tracking what happens to people*, he says, *is not correct*, given that everything fortune brings us is not in our power, but procuring what brings happiness is. Because it is for this reason that a happy person is deemed blessed, because that which is not in our power makes us neither blessed nor wretched, but they only contribute to our happiness as instruments of a sort. *Rather*, *it is activities in conformity with virtue that are responsible for our happiness*, just as wicked activities are [responsible for] our misfortune. *The present difficulty bears witness to our account*, since—owing to the vicissitudes of fortune—happiness will not be permanent, though it should be by all means. *For* the virtues *are more durable*, he says, *than*  even *the various kinds of knowledge* themselves, and in particular *the more honourable of these kinds of activities are the more durable*, *because the blessed spend their lives most readily and* continuously [*occupied*] *with these*; or rather they live in conformity with them, as if someone were to say "their *life is united* with them". For *this is the reason we do not forget* them; because no one forgets what he understands.

*The attribute that we are looking for*, namely happiness, *will belong to the happy person*. Because *since we do not entrust happiness or blessedness to chance events but rather to virtuous actions which have some durability*, *the happy person will not lose the attribute of happiness because his fortunes change*. *For always or at least most often* compared to other people, the happy individual *will do and contemplate what is excellent*; *he will act* through the practical virtues, *while he will contemplate* by means of the contemplative [virtues]; *or he will act because he operates in conformity with the pursuit* [*of virtue*] *when he conducts his affairs throughout his life* [*in this way*], *and he will contemplate because all of his activity throughout his life*, *which is called reason and practical intelligence*, *is owed to his reason and his use of reason*, *which takes charge of his life-giving impulses and of his sensations themselves*, *operating by means of these* [*capacities*] *and with them and successfully accomplishing what is necessary*. *The* "*truly good*" *and* "*foursquare*" (from a metaphor of dice which, when ῥιπτοῦνται ἑδραίως ἱσταμένων) *οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ ἐμμελῶς τὰς τύχας* οὔτε ταῖς εὐημερίαις κουφιζόμενος οὔτε ταῖς δυσκληρίαις καταπίπτων. *πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην*, καὶ μικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων, *τὰ μὲν μικρὰ οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν* οὔτε πρὸς τὸ εὖ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ κακῶς, *τὰ δὲ μεγάλα* ἀγαθὰ μὲν ὄντα *συνεπικοσμοῦσι*, κακὰ δὲ *ἐμποδίζουσι πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις* τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγαθαῖς. 5

#### **1100b30–1101a21** ιστ´ 〈ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν...〉

Εἰπὼν ὡς *ἐμποδίζει τὰ μέγιστα ἀτυχήματα πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις* ὡς μὴ συμπληροῦσθαι καλῶς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐπιδιορθούμενος λέγει ὅτι μᾶλλον *ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν*· φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ καρτερία τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ὅτι φέρει καὶ ταῦτα ὡς μόνως κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῶν καὶ *γεννάδας*, καὶ *οὐ διά* τινα ἀναισθησίαν καὶ *ἀναλγησίαν*. εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν τὰ 10 ἀτυχήματα ἐκ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴχομεν ψόγον ἐν τούτοις, κἂν ἐφέρομεν ταῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ὃ δὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τούτοις, τοῦτο ποιητέον· καὶ ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν τὸ καρτερεῖν καὶ διαφέρειν τὰ χαλεπὰ καὶ μάλιστα ὅτε διά τινος κολακείας καὶ δουλοπρεπείας ἔστι τούτων ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

*Τί γοῦν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα τὸν κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντα*; *προσθετέον* δὲ *καὶ* 30 *βιωσόμενον καὶ οὕτως τελευτήσοντα* καὶ μή, ὡς τῷ Σόλωνι δοκεῖ, μετὰ θάνατον. εἰ

**2–5** πολλῶν…ἀγαθαῖς] cf. Arist. EN 1100b22–30 **7–9** Εἰπὼν…καλόν] cf. Arist. EN 1100b29–31 **10** γεννάδας…ἀναλγησίαν] cf. Arist. EN 1100b32 **15–27** Εἰ…τελείῳ] cf. Arist. EN 1100b33–1101a13 **24–25** οὔτε…αὐτῷ] cf. Eustr. In EN 100.28–30 **28–31** καὶ1…τελευτήσοντα] cf. Arist. EN 1100a12–17

**6** lm. addidi **24** ἐκ addidi ex Arist. EN 1101a9 et Eustr. In EN 100.28

thrown, stand firmly) *will bear the chances of fortune most nobly and altogether decorously*, neither being elevated by his successes nor defeated by his misfortunes. *Many events occur by chance*, both small and great, *and small bits of fortune do not change the whole course of* [*a person's*] *life* in either a positive or a negative direction, *while great bits of fortune*, if they are good *add to the pre-existing beauty*, but if they are bad *hinder many* good *activities* of the soul.

#### **1100b30–1101a21** 16. 〈Nevertheless, even in these circumstances nobility shines through…〉

After saying that *the greatest misfortunes hinder many activities*, preventing happiness from being well attained, he revises this point and affirms rather that *even in these circumstances nobility shines through*; for the patient endurance of the happy person is evident in that he bears these [misfortunes] too in one way only, by living life in conformity with virtue and *nobility*, *rather than by means of* a sort of detachment and *insensibility*. For if misfortunes arose from that which is in our power, we would perhaps be at fault in these circumstances, even if we endured these [misfortunes]. But since they are not in our power, whatever is in our power vis-à-vis these circumstances must be done; and what is in our power is to preserve and patiently endure our difficulties, especially when there is a means to escape from them through a form of flattery or servility.

*If activities are what determines* the character *of* the aforementioned happy *life* and not the sufferings [that occur during its course], *no blessed person would be miserable* due to chance adversities. This is *because* a person is miserable when he *commits hateful*, *vile acts*, not when he suffers something; for in the former case, activities would originate from the soul, but in the latter case sufferings would; and the former are in our power, whereas the latter are not. *For the genuinely* happy person *would bear the chances of life with good grace* and *would act in the best way* from the possibilities [available], *just as a general*, whatever the quality of the *army* he finds, *will use it* well and as is best for himself, *and a shoemaker*, whatever the quality of *the leather* he finds, *will make the best shoes he can*. *If this is the case*, no one *who is happy* [*would become*] *miserable*, *nor* [*would*] every *blessed person* [become miserable] if he met with the incidents that befell *Priam*. *Nor will* the happy individual *be alterable or liable to change* because of his fortunes; *for neither by his fortunes* [*in general*] *nor by small misadventures will he be dislodged* 〈*from*〉 *being as we stated* [i.e. *happy*], *but if* any *severe and frequent disasters were to befall him*, *he would not* again recover *from them back* to his state of *happiness in a short period of time*, *but after one that is long and complete*; for the great calamities over a short period of time will make him unhappy. Also, *someone who behaves* badly over *an extended and complete passage of time* is unhappy, whereas *someone who behaves well* is happy.

*What then prevents us from calling the one who acts in conformity with virtue happy*?

*Tούτων διωρισμένων ἐφ᾽ ἕτερον μεταβαίνει ζήτημα*, ὅτι ποῦ τακτέον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων—*τιμίων* ὡς ἐπὶ θεῶν καὶ *τῶν θείων*, *ἐπαινετῶν* ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ *τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων* πραγμάτων, *δυνάμεων ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν ἐπ᾽* 30 *ἀμφότερα δυναμένων, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς*

**2–3** μακάριοι…ὁδῷ] Sept. Psalm. 118: 1 **3–4** εἰ…ἀνθρώπους] cf. Arist. EN 1101a19–21 **4–7** οἷς2…μεταβολήν] Eustr. In EN 102.12–14 **10–16** Ἐντεῦθεν…λέγονται] cf. Eustr. In EN 103.12–20; cf. Arist. EN 1101a22–31 **17–19** Eἶτα…δεινά] cf. Arist. EN 1101a31–33 **20–22** δεῖ… ἐναντίου] cf. Arist. EN 1101a34–1101b1 **22–27** ἔοικε…εὐδαίμονας2] cf. Arist. EN 1101b1–9 **25** ἀναφορὰν μόνην] Eustr. In EN 104.16 **28–40,2** Tούτων…εὐδαιμονίαν] cf. Eustr. In EN 104.21–105.3 **28–40,9** Tούτων…μακαρίζομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1101b10–25 **28** ἐφ᾽…ζήτημα] Eustr. In EN 104.21

**9** lm. addidi **15** τὰ περὶ post αὐτοῖς καὶ primum scripsit, deinde erasit M

*manner* and not, as it seems to Solon, [judge him thus only] after death. For if someone is to be deemed happy on the basis of his activity, the one who acts well up to this point is blessed; for the end is there [i.e. at death], and the life [lived] in conformity with this principle is said to be perfect. ‖ For *blessed are the blameless*, [8r] *those who walk the law of the Lord*, *in the path* in this life. *If this is so*, *we shall pronounce blessed those of the living who possess and are destined to go on possessing* good things, and we will also call *blessed people* for whom, obviously, *there is every sort of dissolution and change* from both internal and external phenomena, *since there is another form of blessedness in their spiritual and divine nature*, [*that is*] *being in a state that contains and admits no change at all.* [Aristotle] then begins [again] and discusses regarding the descendants [of the happy person] to what extent co-operation or obstacles from them will extend to the persons in question.

#### **1101a28–1101b27** 17. 〈If, then, just like the misfortunes that affect oneself…〉

*After this he sets out the measure of commonality between what happens to their descendants and* [*their*] *loved ones in relation to people who are happy*, *establishing their differences in general terms and in outline*. *First*, [*he sets out the difference*] *according to the greater or lesser scale of the events*; *for just as*, *he says*, *among a person's*, namely *the happy person's*, *own misfortunes those that have a greater weight exercise a certain influence with regard to the variation in his life*, *while slight* [*misfortunes*] *have less power to cause a change to the worse in life*, *the same* is *true of the events involving our loved ones*, including *our descendants* too in this group, since children *are* also *referred to as dearest*.

Then he sets out a second difference between them; for *it is different*, he says, *whether* these [i.e. the misfortunes] *occur in connection with people who are living or dead*, and this makes more of a difference *than the lawless and terrible events in a tragedy*, whether they are discussed in regard to people who are experiencing them and have departed or still survive. For *this difference* concerning the happy person *must also be taken into account* when *doubt is felt regarding* whether *the dead share any good* with their living descendants *or the opposite*. *For it seems from the points* we have made regarding hardships that, *even if* any events here, *evil or even good*, *do penetrate to them*, they *must be weak*, *either intrinsically*, as if he were speaking of their own nature, *or for them*, namely with regard to the dead. *Therefore* both the former and the latter [i.e. both evil and good events], he says, *affect the dead*, but by reference only, i.e. [when we say] that the descendant of so-and-so suffers this or that, *and similarly* in the case of his friend. *But* it does not have *so large* [an effect] *as to make the happy individuals unhappy*.

*After these points have been clarified*, *he passes on to another issue*, specifically where happiness must be placed; since there are three [options]—*things that are honoured*, as in the case of the gods and *divine things*, *things that are praised*, as in the case of human beings and *human* affairs, and *capacities*, *as in the case of the arts that have the capacity to turn out in one of two ways*, *as in the case of medicine or*

(αὗται γὰρ αἱ τέχναι δύνανται καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω, *καὶ διαταῦτα δυνάμεις λέγονται*)—*ζητεῖ ποῦ θετέον τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*. καὶ *ὅτι* μὲν *τῶν δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον*, φησίν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω δύνασθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖν τὸν ἔχοντα καὶ κακόν. ζητεῖ δὲ περὶ τῶν δύο καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ τέως περὶ ἐπαίνου καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν, ἃ *δὴ τῷ ποιά τινα καὶ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦνται*, καὶ τίθησι παραδείγματα καὶ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος. καὶ 5 γὰρ καὶ εἰ *τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαινοῦμεν*, φησί, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν *διὰ* τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς *ἀναφορᾶς* οὕτω λέγομεν. *εἰ* γοῦν ἡμῶν *ἐστιν ὁ ἔπαινος, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἄν εἴη* οὗτος, *ἀλλά τι* μή· ἡ δ᾽ εὐδαιμονία ἄριστον, διαταῦτα καὶ τίμιον· καὶ *γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν θειοτάτους καὶ* τὰ *τῶν ἀγαθῶν* θειότατα ὡς ἐγγίζοντα τοῖς θείοις *μακαρίζομεν*.

#### [8v] ‖ **1101b27–1102a19** 〈ιηʹ〉 〈δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὔδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι...〉 10

Φέρει καὶ τὸν *Εὔδοξον* εἰς μαρτυρίαν τῶν λεγομένων. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δοξάζων τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ ἐγκώμιον ἐπεποίητο παρὰ τῶν ἐγκωμιαζόντων, ἐπιθανολόγει ἐντεῦθεν τὸ ἄριστον αὐτῆς καὶ μακάριον, καὶ ταύτην ἔλεγε *κρείττω τῶν ἐπαινετῶν* ὥς τι *θειότερον* καὶ μακάριον, *τοιοῦτο δὲ εἶναι* καὶ αὐτὸν *τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν*, ταυτίζων τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν θεόν. ὡς γοῦν αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν 15 ἡδονὴν ὑπὲρ ἔπαινον ἔφασκεν, *ἀναφερομένην* καὶ αὐτήν, ὡς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθά, εἰς ἐκεῖνα, *τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸν θεόν*.

 EN 1101b27–32 **11** Εὔδοξον] cf. Arist. EN 1101b27 **19–20** τὰ… ἐσμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1101b32–34 **22–25** ἀλλὰ…πράττεσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1101b34–1102a4 **26–42,1** Ἐπεὶ…Λυκούργου] cf. Arist. EN 1102a5–11

**4** τοιούτων post καὶ τῶν primum scripsit, deinde erasit M **10** ιηʹ addidi | lm. addidi **12** οὐδεὶς M a. corr. **24** ἀρχὴν τελικὴν M (cum Mb Ob) : ἀρχὴ τελικὴ Arist. vulg. (EN 1102a2)

*rhetoric or piloting a boat* (for these skills may turn out one way or another, *and for that reason they are termed* "*capacities*")—*he inquires where happiness should be located*. And *that it is not included among the capacities is clear*, he says, from the fact that it is not possible for this to go in either direction and to make the agent both good and bad. He inquires into the [remaining] two [possibilities] and at this point he investigates praise and the praiseworthy things, those that *are praised in relation to their qualities and how they stand in relation to something else*, and he sets out examples relating to both the soul and the body. For even *if we praise the gods*, he says, although this is *by means of* our *standards*, we speak this way. Therefore, *if the praise belongs* to us, *it is apparent that* this *would not be one of the best things*, *but something* else; happiness, however, is what is best, and therefore it is also held in honour; *for we call blessed both the most godlike of men and* the most godlike *of goods*, since they approach the gods.

‖ **1101b27–1102a19** 〈18.〉 〈Eudoxus was apparently right in advocating…〉 [8v] [Aristotle] brings forward *Eudoxus* as well as a witness for his arguments. For the latter, holding that pleasure [is] a good, because [he realised that] no encomium had been produced for it by the encomiasts, argued plausibly on that basis for its supremacy and blessedness, and he used to say that this [i.e. pleasure] [*is*] *superior to the things we praise*, since [it is] something *more godlike* and blessed, *and that something similar holds* for *God* himself *and the good*, thus identifying God with the good. In consequence, just as it [i.e. the good] is beyond praise, so too he affirmed that pleasure is beyond praise, since it too *is referred* to the same standards as the rest of the human goods are, namely *the good and God*.

After this he also establishes a distinction between praise and encomium in a different way from how the sophist Aphthonius does. For he specifies that *encomia*  pertain to *deeds* and actions, *be they in the sphere of the body or that of the soul*, while *to virtue*, *by which we* are *rendered capable of accomplishing noble deeds*, he assigns praise for being unique and a blessing in an absolute sense. Aphthonius also speaks thus about praise, when we praise a single human action and do not speak exhaustively about many [actions]. *However*, *to develop this subject is perhaps rather the business* of rhetoricians; *but it is clear to us for* many reasons *that happiness is among the things that are honourable and perfect*. *It seems* to be *thus because it is a first principle* connected with final causality and *other things are done for its sake*; and what is done for its own sake is good in all circumstances, whether it exists or merely appears to exist.

*Since* we define happiness using virtue [as a starting point], we must also discuss *the nature of virtue*, so that after it is precisely described, the definiendum (namely happiness) will be made precise as well. *It seems that the true statesman*, if he intended to maintain the standard of his political community, *would have invested much effort in* virtue *itself*, thinking about how *the citizens* could be made *virtuous* in every matter and *obedient to the laws*. This is apparent from [the examples of] the ἔκ τε τοῦ παρὰ *Κρησὶ* Μίνωος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ *Λάκωσι* Λυκούργου· τούτους γὰρ ἐκθειάζει καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις. σὺ δὲ λέγε και τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Σόλωνα καὶ τὸν παρὰ Κροτωνιάταις Ζάλευκον καὶ λοιποὺς ἄλλους. πᾶσι γὰρ σκοπὸς καὶ σπουδὴ τοὺς πολίτας εἰς τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρετὰς καθιστᾶν. λέγομεν δὲ πολιτικάς, ὅτι ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ τοῦ μονώτου καὶ ἄλλαι τοῦ πολιτευομένου, περὶ ἃς ἐκεῖνοι ἐσπούδασαν. 5

*Περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον* τῆς *ἀνθρώπινης*, οὔτε τῆς τῶν ἀλόγων οὔτε μᾶλλον τῆς οὐσιωμένης θεῷ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἡ φυσικὴ τὴν δὲ ἡ θεολογικὴ ἐπισκέψεται. καὶ αὖθις *οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος* (οἷον ὑγείαν καὶ εὐδρομίαν), *ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς*, ὅτι καὶ *ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν* κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν *τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν* ἐτίθεμεν. *εἰ δὲ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτως*, *δεῖ*, φησί, *τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως* καὶ *περὶ ψυχῆς*, οὐ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς, 10 ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἔργων.

#### **1102a21–1102b19** ιθ´ 〈τῶν δ᾽ ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες...〉

*Tοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν φυτικόν* ἐστιν, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ εἰπεῖν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ζητεῖ περὶ τούτου εἰ ἐπιδεκτικόν ἐστιν ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζει αὐτὸ πρὸς *τὴν τοιαύτην* ἕξιν· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ *αὐξητικὸν* καὶ *θρεπτικόν*, ὅπερ ἐστὶ *καὶ τοῖς ἐμβρύοις καὶ τοῖς τελείοις*. *εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ταύτην θεῖναι* καὶ ἐν τοῖς 30 τελείοις, ὅτι ἀεὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ φύσις *ἐνεργεῖ* ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ *ὑπνοῦσι* καὶ γρηγο-

**1–2** ἔκ…Νόμοις] cf. Pl. Leg. 630d5–7, 632d2–4 **6–10** Περὶ…ψυχῆς] cf. Arist. EN 1102a13–19 **13–17** Ὥσπερ…γνώσεως] cf. Arist. EN 1102a21–23 **14–15** ἔλεγε…θεραπεῦον] Hipp. De nat. hom. 168.4–6; cf. SVF II, fragm. 420 (138.19–20); cf. Philop. In De gener. et corrupt. 4.33–34 **21–23** Tὸ…ἄλογον] cf. Arist. EN 1102a25–28 **23–25** οὐδὲν…περιφερείᾳ] cf. Arist. EN 1102a28–32 **27–44,18** Tοῦ…σώματος] cf. Arist. EN 1102a32–1102b19

**12** lm. addidi **29** ἕξιν M : δύναμιν Arist. vulg. (EN 1102a33–34)

*lawgivers* in various places, from Minos among *the Cretans* and Lycurgus among *the Spartans*; for Plato admires these men in the "Laws". You should also count [among the lawgivers] Solon in Athens and Zaleucus among the people of Croton and the rest of them. For all of them aimed at and seriously engaged in acquainting their citizens with the political virtues. We say "political", because one set of virtues is appropriate for a solitary person and another for the person who lives in a city, and they [i.e. the above-mentioned lawgivers] were concerned with the latter.

*The virtue that we must consider is human virtue*, not the one specific to nonrational things or even the one that exists with God and is beyond the human being; because natural science will investigate the former, and theological science the latter. Again, [*our interest is in excellence*] *not of the body* (such as health and speed), *but of the soul*, because we also established that *happiness is a* virtuous *activity of the soul*. *And if this is so*, *the statesman*, he says, *must* also *have some knowledge about the soul*, not about its essential nature but about its functions.

#### **1102a21–1102b19** 19. 〈Physicians of the better class…〉

Just as *the more accomplished physicians devote much attention to the study of the human body*, how it is a composite entity rather than a unity (for Hippocrates used to say: "*if man were a unity*, *he would not feel pain. And if he felt pain*, *the cure too would have to be a unity*") and how its parts have been joined together in conformity with some rational principle, and they discuss many other matters relating to the body, so also *the student of politics* is in need of knowledge regarding *the soul*, not necessarily how it understands or how it perceives or how it forms an opinion or thinks [in an abstract sense], but how it receives the moral virtues and how, despite possessing them, it comes to lack them, and in one word everything one can ask regarding choosing the expedient and avoiding the harmful.

‖ *For* to investigate this subject *in greater detail* than this lies outside the scope of [9r] this inquiry and is instead appropriate to natural science, which *he also calls extraneous discourses*, comparing ethics as well to the current points, just as is true of its [i.e. the soul's] division, namely that *one part of it is rational*, *the other nonrational*. *It makes no difference for present purposes* to investigate with reference to these parts *whether they are* also *separated* in terms of localisation, *like the parts of the body*, or [*they are distinguishable*] *in thought* only, *like the convex and concave sides of a curved surface* (because the edge line without latitude is complete); nor are they separable in relation to place, even if they are separable by definition.

*Of the non-rational part* [*of the soul*], *one portion* is *vegetative*, and before talking about the other portion, which is the perceptive, he inquires regarding the latter whether it is receptive of excellence and he rejects this [possibility] by virtue of its *aforementioned* habit; because this is *the part responsible for growth* and *nutrition*, which is its role in regard to *both embryos and fully-developed organisms*.  Therefore, this *excellence appears to be common* to all plants and embryos and *not* something *specifically human*. *The good person and the bad*, whom ethics focuses on, *cannot be clearly differentiated while they are sleeping*; because neither is doing anything, with the result that these [people] are much alike in *the half of their lives* in which they are asleep. For Ariston also *used to say that sleep*, *just like the tax-collector*, *deprives* us of *half* our lives; *because sleep is inactivity of the soul*, and for this reason both the *good* and the *bad* [*soul*] are inactive at this time, *except that in some small degree certain* fictitious *sense-impressions may penetrate* the dreams of those who are sleeping, so that certain traces of each person's actions that impose themselves daily are reflected [in their dreams]. For at that point *the dreams of the good are better than those of ordinary people*. *This is enough on this subject*, *however*, *but we may omit from consideration the* aforementioned *nutritive* [*part of the soul*], *since it has by its nature no share in human excellence.*

*But there appears to be another non-rational element in the soul as well*, which in the case of a human being appears to *participate somehow in reason*. This is evident from [the behaviour of] both the *uncontrolled and self-controlled person*, since reason fights with desire and often overcomes [it], so that the individual becomes selfcontrolled, but in many other cases it is defeated [by desire], so that [the individual] is said to be uncontrolled. *Extolling the rational part* [*of the soul*] is appropriate to ethics, because *it* [i.e*. the rational part*] *urges people towards what is best*. It is clear, however, that [the non-rational part of the soul] frequently overpowers rationality and engenders incontinence; for *the part that combats rationality*, sometimes triumphing over it but sometimes succumbing to it, is governed by it. This is confirmed by the *palsied portions of the body*.

#### Diagramma ii

οὐκοῦν *τῶν ἀρετῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι διανοητικαί*, *αἱ δὲ ἠθικαί*.

\_\_\_\_\_\_

cf. Arist. EN 1102b32–1103a7, 1102a32–1102b6, 1102b11–31

**1102b21–1103a10** κ´ 〈ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον...〉 *Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος παραφερόμενον*, ἐπειδὴ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν, *ὁρῶμεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν*. τέως, ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα τῆς φύσεως ἢ τῆς ὁρμῆς αὐτῆς *κινούσης* οὐχ ὑπακούει τὸ μέλος ἀλλ᾽ ἀλλαχοῦ *φέρεται*, *οὕτω* λογιστέον καὶ *ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς* τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τὸ παρὰ τὴν πειθαρχίαν τοῦ λόγου παραφερόμενον. *οὐδὲν* δὲ *διαφέρει* 5 κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ζητεῖν εἰ ἕτερον ἢ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τό τε τῷ

**3–4** ὥσπερ…φέρεται] cf. Arist. EN 1102b18–21 **3–48,1** ἢ…τὸ] cf. Arist. EN 1102b32–1103a7

**1** lm. addidi **3** κινούσης scripsi : κινούσας M

#### Diagram ii

Thus *some of the virtues are intellectual*, *while others are moral*.

**1102b21–1103a10** 20. 〈But in the case of bodies, we see the part that moves astray…〉

*We see the part of the body that moves astray*, since it is perceptible, *but we cannot see the erratic member of the soul*. Thus, just as a [palsied] limb disobeys when nature or an independent impulse *moves* it in one direction and it is *carried* off in the wrong direction, *so too in the case of the* human *soul* one must make sense of the fact that it moves astray in defiance of obedience to reason's command. For the purposes of the present investigation, it is *not important* whether the faculties of the desire and of appetite are different or identical, the one part being obedient to reason and the other refusing to listen to it. *Just as we said*, we reiterate this point alone: since in the

λόγῳ πειθόμενον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπακοῦον. *ὥσπερ* δὲ *εἴπομεν*, τοῦτο μόνον λέγομεν καὶ πάλιν· ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν, ἐπεὶ μάχη γίνεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς πολλάκις μὲν περιγίνεσθαι πολλάκις δὲ ἡττᾶσθαι, εἰκότως *λόγου μετέχει* τὸ *τοιοῦτον*· καὶ *τὸ* μὲν *τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ λόγῳ*, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς ἀντιβαίνει. διατοῦτο καὶ ἐπιφέρει «*τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου*», ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν 5 ἀντιβαίνον τῷ λόγῳ ὕστερον ὑπείκει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαρχῆς τῷ λόγῳ πείθεται· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς ἐστι, τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ μὴ ἀγομένου, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν μὴ πασχόντων.

 EN 1102a32–1102b6 **15–17** τοῦ…διοικεῖται] cf. Arist. EN 1102b11–31 **2–3** Τὸ…ὁρῶμεν] cf. Arist. EN 1102b21–23 **5–48,18** οὐδὲν…λέγομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1102b23–1103a10

**17** ἐκ1 addidi

case of the human being there is an element of such a sort that, when a struggle arises between it and reason, it prevails in many cases but is defeated in many others, this *element* can reasonably be said *to participate in reason*; and *in the selfcontrolled person this element obeys the authority of reason*, but in the case of the unrestrained person it resists. Because of this, he also affirms "*in the case of the moderate and brave person*", because this part does not initially resist rationality and then later submits to it, but is obedient to reason from the beginning; for the latter [i.e. obedience to reason] is [characteristic] of the self-controlled person, who even when he is suffering is not affected [by his situation], while the former [i.e. initially resisting rationality and later submitting to it] is characteristic of people who do not suffer anything at all.

Therefore it is inferred from these points collectively that *the non-rational part* [*of the soul*] *is divided into two subsections*: *one subsection of it has no share of rationality*, since it is specific to *plants*, *but the other does in a sense participate* [in it] and ‖ *is said* "*to take account*"; *not in the way that in mathematics* conclusions are drawn [9v] by means of reason, but *in the sense that we speak of taking account of advice from one's father*, since sometimes one is obedient, but at other times one resists; and this is apparent from our *practice of admonishing people*. Consequently, *if it is* [*more*] *correct to speak also of* [*the appetitive part of the soul*] *as rational*, it is on that basis [that the point is made] and not as in the sense of the objects of thought. Surely *then* [*the part of the soul*] *that possesses reason is also divided into two subsections*, *one subsection* [*having rationality*] *in the proper sense and in itself*, *the other* only *in the sense of following* [*reason*]. *The virtues are also differentiated in correspondence with this division*: *some virtues are intellectual* and belong to the rational faculty, *while others are moral* and they belong to the part of the soul that is rational in a straightforward way. For *wisdom and practical intelligence* are intellectual virtues, and *we praise* those who have these virtues *for their disposition*. *And we use the term*  "*virtues*" *for dispositions that are praiseworthy* rather than those that stem 〈from〉 wickedness or vice or another bad character trait.

 Πάντα τὰ παρόντα ταῦτα κατασκευαστικά εἰσιν τοῦ ἐξ ἔθους καὶ μὴ ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνεσθαι ἡμῖν τὰς ἀρετάς. *οὔτε* γὰρ *φύσει οὔτε* μὴν *παρὰ φύσιν* ἐπισυμβαίνουσιν, ὡς πολλάκις συμβαίνει *τῷ λίθῳ* τὸ *ἄνω φέρεσθαι* ἔκ τινος ἀνάγκης ἰσχυροτέρας, *ἀλλὰ* 15 *πεφύκαμεν μὲν* εἰς τὸ *τὰς ἀρετὰς δέξασθαι* (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ ἡμετέρα φύσις, δεκτικὴ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἴδους), *τελειούμεθα δὲ* ἐν αὐταῖς οὐκ ἐκ φύσεως ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ διδασκαλίας καὶ ἄλλως *ἔθους*.

Tέως τὸ διάφορον τῶν αἰσθήσεων πρὸς τὰς ἀρετὰς ὅτι ἐκεῖσε μὲν *οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐλάβομεν*, *ἀλλὰ* φύσει ὄντες αἰσθητικοὶ *ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμε-*

**2–11** διττῆς…μή] cf. Arist. ΕN 1103a14–20 **6–8** φησὶ…εἶναι] Even. fragm. 9; cf. EN 1152a31–33; cf. Anon. In EN 444.22–24 **14–20** οὔτε1…ἀποδίδομεν] cf. Arist. EN 1103a20–28 **23** μὴ… αἰσθήσεων] cf. Arist. EN 1103a28 **24–26** καὶ2…ἐστι] cf. Arist. De an. 417a2–20 **27–52,2** ὅτι… ταύτας1] cf. Arist. EN 1103a28–31

**1** Ἠθικῶν Νικομαχείων βῆτα in marg. superiore **11** post μή schol. i (vid. append.) **12** lm. addidi **19** περιγίνεται M (cum Lb Mb) : παραγίνεται Arist. vulg. (EN 1103a26)

[Book 2 of the "Nicomachean Ethics"]

[Beginning] of Book 2: Therefore, *virtue is of two kinds*, *one intellectual and the other moral*, and the former pertains to the rational faculty, the latter to the appetitive faculty which complies with reason; *intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased while one is engaged in learning* (for wisdom and practical intelligence are examples of this type), *for which reason it has need of* both *time and experience* for the acquisition of knowledge; *moral virtue*, *on the other hand*, *comes about as the result of habit* ("*ethos*"), *as its name* illustrates. For *Evenus states*:

*Habit*, *I say*, *is a long-term matter*, *and ultimately becomes nature*.

as if a human being acquired his nature in the course of it. So he [i.e. Aristotle] attempts [to prove] that moral virtues are *not* engendered *by nature* from the fact that *no natural property can be brought into another condition through habituation*. Therefore a human being is able to form or not form a habit in conformity with these [moral virtues].

**1103a23–1103b20** 1. 〈The virtues therefore are engendered [in us] neither by nature nor contrary to nature…〉

All the current points are constructive for the argument that the virtues come about in us from habituation rather than from nature. For they come about [for us] *neither by nature nor* in fact *contrary to nature*, as often happens with *the stone* that has the attribute of *moving upwards* in response to some more powerful necessity, *but we are naturally adapted to receive the virtues* (for such is our nature; it is capable of receiving the virtues, just as bronze [is capable of receiving] the shape of a statue), *while on the other hand we are made perfect* in them not by nature but as a result of teaching and, in another way, by *habituation*.

*Again*, he infers [this argument] syllogistically in another manner: *in the case of the things that accrue to us from nature*, we possess [them] *first in a potential form* [i.e. *as capacities*] and *afterwards we exhibit their actual activity* in this manner [i.e. through habit]. Everything human or involved in generation [i.e. everything that is subject to change] differs from divine matters in this respect, that the latter are always actualities (because they lack matter, which makes it possible to be in both states [i.e. potentiality and actuality]), whereas the former [i.e. everything human and involved in generation] transitions from potentiality to actuality. In any case, let no one say in regard to *our senses* that we possess them simultaneously with our generation, and that for these reasons we may seem to exercise them without potentiality. For we refer to our activity for these things [i.e. sensations] as distinct from our capacity, just as we have learned in his "On the Soul", so that our senseperception [arises] simultaneously with our creation, whereas the act of senseperception is an activity that originates from a capacity.

*θα* καὶ τὸ δυνάμει ἠγάγομεν εἰς ἐνέργειαν· ἐπὶ *δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνεργοῦντες λαμβάνομεν ταύτας*. ἀλλὰ πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ κατὰ ταύτας ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς ἐνέργειαν προβιβαζόμεθα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔχοντες ὕστερον ἐκτησάμεθα; ἦ σκοπητέον ἀκριβῶς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα: οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας λέγει ᾗ τις προβαίνει ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ἀτελοῦς, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοιαύτης καθ᾽ ἣν ἐνεργοῦμεν τὴν τελείαν δύναμιν ἔχοντες, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕξιν. 5 ὅρα γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων παράδειγμα, αἵτινες εἰ καὶ δυνάμει ἔχουσαι τελειωθῆναι δι᾽ αἰσθητῶν, κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γίνονται. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἕξεων τούτων οὐσῶν τελείων, καθ᾽ ἃς ἐνεργήσομεν, εἰ βουλοίμεθα, ἐνεργοῦμεν. διατοῦτο γὰρ εἶπε καὶ τὸ «*κομιζόμεθα*» ἐπὶ *τῶν δυνάμεων*, καθ᾽ ἕξιν γινόμενοι, καὶ τὸ «*ἀποδίδομεν*» ἐπὶ *τῶν ἐνεργειῶν*, ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν βουλόμενοι, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. 10

Καὶ εὐθὺς ἐπάγει καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα, καὶ *τοὺς νομοθέτας* εἰς *μαρτυρίαν* τῶν [10r] λεγομένων παράγει. ‖ *ἔτι φησὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεργειῶν* καὶ *γίνονται* ταῦτα *καὶ φθείρονται*, *τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τῷ γένει*· *αἵ τε γὰρ καλαὶ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ μοχθηραὶ τῷ μὲν γένει εἰσὶν αἱ αὐταί, τῷ δὲ εἴδει διαφέρουσιν*. *προβιβάζει δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν* τὸν λόγον· *ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῷ γένει ἐνεργήματος οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κιθαρισταὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι γίνονται*, καὶ 15 διατοῦτο καὶ *τοῦ διδάξοντος δεῖ*. τοῦτο νομιστέον *καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν*· ἐκ τῶν *ἀναστροφῶν* τῶν αὐτῶν τῷ γένει, οὐ μὴν τῷ εἴδει, *γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ* καὶ *οἱ μὲν σώφρονες οἱ δ᾽ ἀκόλαστοι*.

#### **1103b21–1104a13** β´ 〈ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται...〉

Ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν φυσικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἕξεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν *ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν* 20 καὶ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐνεργεῖν *τὰ αὐτά*, ἢ καλὰ ἢ φαῦλα, *αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται* ἢ ἀγαθαὶ ἢ φαῦλαι. τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὃ λέγει, ὅτι *δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι*, ὅτι *κατὰ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς* καὶ *αἱ ἕξεις* ἀποδίδονται. *οὐδὲ* γὰρ *μικρὸν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως ἐθίζεσθαι*. εἰπὼν δὲ «*ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ*», ἵνα τὸ καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀπαγορεύσῃ, ἐπάγει «*μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν*» καὶ λίαν εἰκότως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἱ ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταὶ 25 ἐκ τοῦ ἐθίζεσθαι γίνονται, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ἔθισις ἀναγκαία πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν τελείωσιν· διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν «*τὸ πᾶν*» ἐκβάλλει τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως γίνεσθαι ταύτας.

**8–9** διατοῦτο…ἐνεργειῶν] cf. Arist. EN 1103a26–28 **11–12** καὶ2…παράγει] cf. Arist. EN 1103b2–3 **12–13** ἔτι…φθείρονται] cf. Arist. EN 1103b6–8 **12–15** ἔτι…γίνονται] cf. Asp. In EN 39.20–28 **14–15** ἐκ2…γίνονται] cf. Arist. EN 1103b8–9 **16** τοῦ…δεῖ] cf. Arist. EN 1103b12 | καὶ2…ἀρετῶν] Arist. EN 1103b13–14 **16–18** ἐκ…ἀκόλαστοι] cf. Arist. EN 1103b15–20 **20–27** Ἐπὶ…ταύτας] cf. Arist. EN 1103b21–25

**18** post ἀκόλαστοι schol. ii (vid. append.) **19** lm. addidi

The difference between sense-perception and the virtues, then, lies in the fact that in the former case *we did not acquire the faculty of sight as a result of repeated acts of seeing*, *but* instead, because we already *had* the faculties of sense-perception by nature, *we used them* and brought what we had through capacity to activity; *whereas in the case of the virtues we acquire them by practising them*. But how is it possible that in the case of the virtues as well we do not advance from what we have through capacity to activity, if we do not have them but only acquired them at a later stage? Surely the dialectical proof must be examined precisely: for he is not speaking of the sort of activity by which one transitions from what is incomplete in capacity, but about the sort in accord with which we act having complete capacity, i.e. that which answers to a formed state. For observe also the example that has to do with our senses: even if these are potentially endowed with the capacity to be completed by means of the sensible objects, they come about via exercise [of that capacity]. Even so, since these dispositions are perfect in conformity with which we will exercise our activity, if we wish to do so, we exercise our activity. For this is why he said in reference to *the capacities* that "they *are bestowed on us*", since we are born in accord with a formed state, and in reference to *the activities* that "*we exhibit them*", because we exercise them when we wish to, which is not the case in reference to the virtues.

He also adduces examples immediately and invokes *the law-givers* to *witness* these claims. ‖ *Again*, *he states* that the [virtues] both *arise and are destroyed by* [10r] *means of the same activities*—*the same in genus*; *for noble and base activities are the same in genus*, *but differ in species*. *He also advances* the argument *using an analogy from the arts*; *because both good harp players and bad* [*ones*] *are formed from an activity that is the same in genus*, and this is why *a teacher is needed*. One must hold this view *in reference to the virtues as well*: it is from the *modes of behaviour* that are the same in respect to their genus, but not in respect to their species, that *some of us become brave*, *others cowardly*, and *some temperate*, *others unrestrained.*

#### **1103b21–1104a13** 2. 〈Our moral dispositions are formed as a result of similar activities…〉

In the case of our physical qualities, our activities [originate] from [inborn] tendencies, whereas in the case of our moral qualities, *our dispositions become* either good or bad *as a result of our activities* and from engaging many times in *the same*  [*actions*], whether noble or base. For this is what he affirms, namely that *we necessarily produce activities of a certain kind*, because *the settled dispositions* too are produced *corresponding to the differences between these* [*repeated actions*]. For *it makes no small difference whether we form habits of one kind rather than another*. And after affirming "*on the contrary*, *it is of very great* [*importance*]", in order to prevent any other understanding in regard to these matters, he adds "*rather it makes all the difference*" and reasonably so; because since the moral virtues are developed through habituation, accustomation is surely indispensable for the perfection of the

*Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα ἡ παροῦσα* σκέψις, ἵνα μόνην τῶν προκειμένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητοίημεν, ἀλλὰ *πράξεως*, *ἵνα* δηλονότι *ἀγαθοὶ γινώμεθα*, *ἐπεί,* εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ τέλος τοῦτο, *οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς* (τὰ γὰρ ἕνεκά του δίχα τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα μάταια, ὥσπερ καὶ νηστεία δίχα τοῦ ταπεινοῦσθαι), *ἀναγκαῖον* διαταῦτα *τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις* θεωρῆσαι, *πῶς πρακτέον ταύτας* πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τελείωσιν. ὅτι *μὲν οὖν κατὰ* 5 *τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πρακτέον ὑποκείσθω κοινὸν* ἐπὶ πάσῃ πράξει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πραχθείη κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, πάντως φαύλη ἐσεῖται καὶ οὐχ ἕξει τὸ εὖ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρετήν.

 EN 1103b26–34 **8–10** Tέως…ἀπαιτητέοι] cf. Arist. EN 1103b34–1104a3 **12–20** τὰ…φθείρουσιν] cf. Arist. EN 1104a3–13 **22–23** Πᾶσα…φθείρεται] cf. Arist. EN 1104a25–27 **23–25** οὐ…ἔσονται] cf. Arist. EN 1104a27–29 **25–56,23** καὶ…ὑγιάζεσθαι] cf. Arist. EN 1104a27–1104b18

**13** οὐδὲ in ras. | οὐδὲ ταῦτα post συμφέροντα primum scripsit, deinde erasit M **21** schol. iii in marg. exteriore (vid. append.) | lm. addidi **25** φανερῶν scripsi : φανερόν M

virtues; by saying "*all the difference*", he rejects the notion that these [virtues] come about in a different manner.

*Since then our present* inquiry *does not aim at theoretical knowledge*, in which case we would examine only the truth of the [arguments] proposed, but also has a *practical* aim, evidently *in order that we may become good*, *since*, if it were not intended for this end, *our investigation would be of no use* (because things done for the sake of an end are futile without the end for which they are done, just as fasting [is futile] without being humble), *it is necessary* for these reasons to consider *the nature of actions*, namely *how one is to perform them* with an eye to accomplishing the good. *Let* the notion that *one ought to act in conformity with correct reason be assumed as a common principle* for every action; for if [an action] is not done in accord with correct reason, it will be thoroughly bad and will lack the property of being done well and in conformity with virtue.

Since discussion of this [issue] has been delayed for a while, *let this be conceded beforehand*, as he also said previously, *that the* correct *account of matters of conduct ought* to be investigated *in outline and not precisely*, *since accounts must only be required to match their subject matter*. For we shall neither seek specifications of statues in the same manner in every possible chance material, nor [shall we seek] the correct account of action for every chance individual person; for the wise person and the ordinary person would perform the same action in different ways. And [the point that] *in matters of conduct not even matters of expediency have anything fixed* is also unavoidable, since it is frequently the case that what is beneficial for one person will not be so for another, and that what will be suitable for him at the present time will be otherwise tomorrow, *just as healthy* foods would benefit one person but will remain useless for another. *And if the general theory* [*of ethics*] *is such*, *the account will be even more* unreliable, if *particular cases* [*of action*] ‖ were investigated; *for* the [10v] same *expertise* and the same *set of prescriptions* will not apply to the same agents, *but they must* also *consider the occasion*, *just as is the case with the art of medicine or of navigation*. But we *must try to lend some aid to this discussion*, *and the first observation that must be made is that excesses and deficiencies destroy these* good actions.

#### **1104a24–1104b18** 3. 〈The person who shuns all [pleasure], as boors do…〉

Since every virtue is intermediate, it is destroyed by the two extremes [i.e. excess and deficiency]; because it inclines away from the intermediary position, in which *it was safe*, and is immediately *destroyed*. *But not only*, he says, [*are the virtues*] *generated and fostered from actions that are the same* in genus, as we were saying, *but they will also find their full exercise in the same actions*; and he takes *bodily strength* as an example, because invisible things are illustrated from qualities that are generally *visible*.

Ἔτι λιπαίνει τὸν λόγον καὶ κατασκευάζει πῶς ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας 25 καταγίνεται, ἐντεῦθεν λέγων ὅτι *πᾶσα ἕξις ψυχῆς, ὑφ᾽ οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι* ἢ *χείρων* ἢ *βελτίων, περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει*, ὡς φέρε εἰπεῖν ἐκ νουθετημάτων Θεόγνιδος, βελτίων, ἐκ δὲ Χοιρίλλου, χείρων. *περὶ ταῦτα* ἄρα καὶ *πρὸς ταῦτα* τὴν ῥοπὴν *ἔχει τῆς φύσεως* ὁ μὲν βελτίων γιγνόμενος περὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεόγνιδος, ὁ δὲ χείρων περὶ τὰ τοῦ Χοιρίλλου. *δι᾽ ἡδονῆς δὲ καὶ λύπης* καὶ χείρονες καὶ βελτίους *γίνονται* ἄνθρωποι· 30

**2** ἰσχυρὸς…κόπους] cf. [Heliod.] In EN 29.24–25 **25–60,2** Ἔτι…πρόβλημα] cf. Arist. EN 1104b18–1105a12

**23** post ὑγιάζεσθαι schol. iv et v (vid. append.) **24** lm. addidi

[*actions*]" with reference to the *growth* [of strength]. Observe e.g. also the activity associated with strength; for if someone is *strong*, *he will be able* both *to eat much food and to endure much* trouble; and again strength is diminished by eating very little and never working hard, with the result that on account of the latter the small quantity [of food] admitted is not distributed [throughout the body] in service of a proper digestion. Yet the activity of the person who lacks strength is characterised by the inability to eat much or to undertake much exertion. *This is also the case in regard to the virtues*: *moderation* is engendered in us *by* our *abstaining from pleasures*, *and we abstain from pleasures when we are temperate*. Abstinence should not trouble us, since it is a suspension of self-indulgence rather than an activity of moderation; because abstinence from the pleasures is our inactivity in relation to the pleasures, but is an activity regarding moderation, which dismisses the pleasures and as it were resists them; *it is the same in the case of courage*.

*We must*, he says, establish a *sign* for ourselves of how we are disposed with respect to *the dispositions* and virtues (lest somehow we persist in the virtues as if we were under compulsion and involuntarily, and are not satisfied with our dispositions from ourselves) towards the *pleasure or pain that supervenes on actions* performed in accord with virtue, so that if we take pleasure in instances in which we act moderately, we are shown to be moderate, whereas if we feel pain, it is apparent that some external constraint or power compels us to these [actions]. And if we were to chance upon some opportunity, we will clearly be moving away [from this] towards the opposite [condition]. But this does not belong to virtue nor [is it] the style of a man who loves virtue.

That *moral virtue is* entirely *concerned with pleasures and pains* is also shown by *Plato* ‖ when he urges [the importance of] *being guided* to them *from childhood*. [11r] Furthermore, [Aristotle] actually proves [this point] by a deductive argument: for *the virtues have to do with feelings and actions*; *every feeling or action is accompanied by pleasure or pain*; it follows, then, that *the virtues have to do with pleasures and pains*. *And this is clear from punishments too*, since they consist of certain forms of pain and are *a kind of medicine* counteracting the pleasures; because opposites *are naturally suited* to be healed *by means of their opposites*.

#### **1104b18–1105a12** 4. 〈Again, as we said previously…〉

Moreover, he elaborates on the argument and shows how moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, and after this he states that *every formed disposition of the soul has a nature concerned with the kind of things by which* [*the soul*] *tends to be made* either *better* or *worse*, better, for instance, from the admonitions of Theognis, but worse from those of Choerilus. So [everyone] *has his natural* tendency *with regard to* and *towards these things*, one man becoming better in connection with the writings of Theognis, another worse in connection with the works of Choerilus. It is *by means of pleasures and pains* that people *become* worse and better; better *by pursuing* the pleasure of learning while *avoiding* the pleasure of indulgence, and βελτίους μὲν *τῷ διώκειν* μὲν τὴν τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡδονὴν *φεύγειν* δὲ τὴν τῆς ῥαθυμίας, καὶ αὖθις φεύγειν μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῆς πεττείας διώκειν δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀποχῆς τῶν ἡδέων λύπην· πάλιν δὲ χείρους ἀνάπαλιν. εἰπὼν δὲ «*διώκειν*» καὶ «*φεύγειν*», ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς βελτίοσι τὸ φεύγειν τίθησιν *ἃς οὐ δεῖ* καὶ *ὅτε οὐ δεῖ* καὶ *ὡς οὐ δεῖ*, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς χείροσι τὸ διώκειν ταῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν φεύγειν τὸ ὃ μὴ δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ καὶ 5 κατὰ τρόπον ὀρθὸν καὶ ἐς ὁπόσον καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιοριζόμεθα τὴν πρότασιν ἐξασφαλιζόμενοι.

Eἰπὼν δὲ περὶ τοῦ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ ἀργία τίς ἐστι καὶ ἠρεμία ψυχῆς τὸ φεύγειν τὰ βλαβερὰ καὶ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἐπάγει καὶ πῶς τινες *ἀπαθείας καὶ ἠρεμίας τὰς ἀρετὰς ὡρίσαντο*· *οὐ καλῶς δέ*, *ὅτι ἁπλῶς εἶπον* καὶ οὐ μετὰ τῶν προσδιορισμῶν τῶν οἰκείων· 10 πολλάκις γάρ τις φευξεῖται τὸ δέ τι ὡς βλάπτον, ἀλλὰ τυχὸν τότε καὶ τόσον καὶ οὕτως συνοίσει, ὃ ἁπλῶς ἐκεῖνοι ἀλυσιτελὲς ὁρίζονται. *ὑπόκειται ἄρα* καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις *ἡ* ἠθικὴ *ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς εἶναι καὶ λύπας*, ὥστε ταύτην μὲν *τῶν βελτίστων* εἶναι *πρακτικήν*, *τὴν δὲ κακίαν* τῶν χειρίστων.

 EN 1104b32

moreover by avoiding the pleasure of a board game while pursuing the pain of abstinence from pleasures; and again [they become] worse in the opposite way. After saying "*by pursuing*" and "*by avoiding*", he specifies in reference to those who [become] better, avoiding *pleasures one ought not* [*to enjoy*] or [that are enjoyed] *at the wrong time* or *in the wrong manner*, but in reference to those who [become] worse, [he specifies] the pursuit of those things; for it is not enough to avoid things one ought not [to enjoy], but one must also [avoid them] when one ought not [to enjoy them] and in the right way and to the right extent and in terms of any other determinations we establish in securing the proposition.

After discussing avoidance, given that avoiding harmful things and abstaining from them is a kind of inactivity and rest of the soul, he moves on to the way in which some [thinkers] *defined the virtues as states of impassivity and tranquillity*. *But this is not well* [*argued*], *because they used these terms in an absolute sense* and did not add the appropriate specifications; for one will frequently avoid some given thing as harmful, but in some specific circumstance or amount or way it will be useful, the thing those [thinkers] define as absolutely worthless. In line with the other [authorities], *then*, moral *virtue is assumed to be concerned with pleasures and pains*, so that it involves *the quality of acting in the best way*, *while vice* [involves the quality of acting] in the worst way.

He infers another dialectical proof: that *there are three objects* we *choose* and in opposition to these also three in number others we *avoid*, and that these are the following: *the noble*, *the expedient*, *and the pleasant*, and on the other hand *the shameful*, the non-expedient, *and the painful*. *In respect to all these*, *the good person will succeed* in choosing the better objects and avoiding the worse ones, although with the appropriate specifications in regard to both (because this is what it means to choose successfully); *whereas the bad person is likely to go wrong* by choosing what should be avoided and avoiding what should be chosen, except in these cases as well with the appropriate specifications [in regard to both].

Of the three objects of choice, at any rate, the pleasant is more universal and *common* to all *living creatures* and *is a concomitant of* the remaining *objects of choice*; *since both the noble and the expedient* are often *pleasant*, if not always; because drinking medicine is useful but not pleasant. On another ground as well the *pleasant appears to be* more dominant, namely the fact that it is with *us from infancy*, whereas the noble and the expedient develop in us [only] as we are mature. *For this reason* also, as if the pleasant *has been engrained* in us, we are not able *to eradicate* it easily. *We regulate* all our *actions*, *some of us more and some less*, *by the standards of pleasure and pain*. For we want to know which things please this person and which pain that person, and we judge their character by that standard. The feeling of pleasure is so hard to wash out that even *Heraclitus* bears witness to the *fight* against it, showing the faculty of the appetites to be harder to overcome than the *faculty of anger*; *but virtue*, *like art*, *is always associated with what is harder*, *since a good result*

*ται*· *τὸ γὰρ εὖ ἐν τῷ χαλεπωτέρῳ βέλτιον* ὡς μὴ ῥᾴδιον. *ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτου* κατασκευάζεται τὸ πρόβλημα.

#### [11v] ‖ **1105a17–1105b18** ε´ 〈ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν...〉

Ἐντεῦθεν καὶ βιαίως ἐπιχειρεῖ ὅτι οὐδὲ *δίκαια λέγονται τὰ* ἁπλῶς *πραττόμενα*, εἰ καὶ δίκαια δοκοῦσιν ὅσον κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ *ὅταν πραχθείη* ταῦτα *ὡς οἱ* 30 *δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες πράττουσιν*. *εὖ γοῦν εἴπομεν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν δίκαιος γίνεται*, ὁμοίως *καὶ σώφρων*· *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν* μὴ μόνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ᾽ *οὐδὲ μελλήσει γενέσθαι ἀγαθός*. *ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν* τὰ δίκαια οὐκ ἐνδιαθέτως

**4–62,8** Εἰπὼν…κρεῖττον] cf. Arist. EN 1105a17–1105b18

**3** lm. addidi **33** μελλήσει scripsi : μελήσει Μ

*is even better when it is more difficult*, because it is not easy. *Hence*, *for this reason too*  the problem is constructed.

‖ **1105a17–1105b18** 5. 〈One might be at a loss as to what we mean…〉 [11v] After saying that *we become just* by *behaving justly* and that our dispositions do not pre-exist, so that we might behave in accord with them, as holds true in the case of the senses, but rather our dispositions arise from our actions, he sets out a *difficulty* in relation to these matters; given that [virtue] does not exist on the day of our birth, why do we say that we become just by behaving justly? For those who behave justly seem to be just already rather than becoming so, just as, he says, also *holds true in the case of the arts*; for those who can *read and write* do not become *literate*, but they are scholars. As a way of resolving this difficulty, he first raises the objection "*Or is it not this way in the case of the arts?*", and is it not the case that every individual *who reads and writes is literate*, just as he who steals is not a thief and he who runs is not a runner? *Because it is possible to write a word correctly both by chance* and by instruction [i.e. because you have been taught]; for spelling correctly is not sufficient for being or being called a scholar, but one must [do so] *as a literate person does*, i.e. in accord with the rules of grammar and as is proper.

Then he argues dialectically, putting the case the other way around, that matters are different *in regard to the arts* and in regard to *the virtues*; *because works of art have their merit in themselves*, so that if they are good, they are praiseworthy regardless of the artistic ability of their creator or how he is disposed towards his work. *Whereas in the case of* [*acts of*] *virtues*, *it is not enough if they are* good, and are considered, for instance, *just* and *moderate*, to make the agent just and moderate; because many people act justly out of fear of the laws, becoming defective in regard to their disposition to justice, and many behave moderately although they are fond of self-indulgence, even if they abstain from it out of fear. But one must observe the agent as well, he says, how he acts and what his attitude is towards the action undertaken; because these questions are not raised in relation to works of art, but [Aristotle] wants the only one of the additional determinants to be that [the agent] acts knowledgably, so that he does not act aimlessly and do what he does in ignorance. *Whereas in the case of the virtues*, *knowing* what moderation is and how it benefits the one who practises it contributes *little or nothing*, *but the other* [*two*] *conditions are all-important*, *and they* rather *result from repeated performance* and from becoming habituated to them.

In consequence, he argues vehemently that mere *deeds are* not *said to be just*, even if they seem to be just to the extent that they conform to the account of these, but [only] *when* they *are performed as just and moderate people do them*. *We are correct*, *at any rate*, *to say that someone becomes just by behaving justly*, and so *too* in regard to being *moderate*. *But as a consequence of not acting*, not only is one not good but *one will not become good either*. *But most people act* justly not spontaneously, but simply because [people] speak of these as good [actions], and *they*

δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μόνον λέγουσιν ἀγαθά· καὶ *ὅμοιον ποιοῦσι τοῖς νοσοῦσι*· καὶ *ἀκούουσι μὲν τῶν ἰατρῶν*, *μὴ ποιοῦσι δὲ τὰ προσταττόμενα*. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λίαν εὔθικτον τὸ παράδειγμα. τέως δ᾽ εἰ κατὰ τὴν διάθεσιν κρίνοι τις, ἐξισάζοι· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πράττουσι μὲν οὐχ ὡς καλὸν δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καλὸν νομίζεται καὶ οὕτω τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκπίπτουσιν, οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι· *ἀκούουσι μὲν* ἀλλ᾽ *οὐ ποιοῦσιν ἐπιμελῶς* καὶ ἀγαπητικῶς *τὸ προσταττόμενον* 5 καὶ οὕτω τῆς ὑγείας ἐκπίπτουσιν· εἰ δὲ οὐ πράττουσι, γράφεται οἰκεῖον τὸ παράδειγμα, ὅτι *ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνοι φιλοσοφοῦσι* περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ οὐ πράττουσιν *οἴονται* δὲ *φιλοσοφεῖν*, οὕτως καὶ οὗτοι ἀκούουσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν· ὃ καὶ κρεῖττον.

#### [12r] ‖ Diagramma iii

\_\_\_\_\_\_

ποιητικοὶ Georg. Pachym. Paraph. In EN 22.19 (cum Mb ): παθητικοὶ Arist. vulg. (EN 1105b24)

**8** post κρεῖττον schol. vi (vid. append.)

*behave like sick people*: *they listen carefully to the doctors*, *but they do not do what is prescribed*. The example, however, is not very easily understood. But if one were to judge [these two groups] according to their attitude, one would find them to be on a par; for just as the first group do something not because it is noble, but because it is considered noble, and in this manner they are not accounted virtuous, so too the second group; *they listen* but *do not carry out the prescription carefully* and gladly, and so they are not accounted healthy; and if they do not act, the example is [still] fitting as written, because *just as the first group philosophise* about virtue and do not act [in conformity with it] but [still] *think they are pursuing philosophy*, so also the second group listen but do not act, which [i.e. acting] would have been better.

#### ‖ Diagram iii [12r]

*by pleasure or pain.*

#### **1105b19–1106a26** στʹ 〈Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον...〉

*Διαταῦτα* καὶ ὅτι *οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶ* διὰ τριῶν συλλογισμῶν μεθοδεύει· κατὰ ταύτας *γὰρ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα οὔτε κακοί*, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τὰς 25 κακίας κακοί· καὶ ὅτι κατ᾽ ἐκείνας *οὔτ᾽ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα*, κατὰ δὲ ταύτας

**2** Ζητεῖ…ἐστι] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1105b19 **4–8** τὰ…ἔχομεν] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1105b19–26 **7–8** καθὼς… δυνάμεως] cf. Arist. Metaph. 1043a14–16 **11** ἐπεὶ…τελειοῦται] cf. Philop. In Prior. An. 248.1–5 **12–66,2** Kαὶ…εἴρηται] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1105b28–1106a13

**1** ante lm. στʹ schol. vii (vid. append.) | lm. addidi **17** δεύτερος scripsi : δεύτερον M

#### **1105b19–1106a26** 6. 〈After this, we must consider what virtue is…〉

Next he investigates *what virtue is*, and advances the discourse in accord with the diairetic style [i.e. the method of division]. Since he does not examine physical virtue, which consists of health, keen perception, speed, and the rest, but rather that which has to do with the soul, *the characteristics of the soul*, he says, *are of three kinds*: *emotions*, *capacities*, and *dispositions*. *Emotions* [are] *states of anger*, *fears*, and the like, *while capacities are* [*the faculties*] *in virtue of which* we are capable *of feeling* any of those [emotions]; for a stone lacks *the capacity for feeling anger or pain*, but a human being [has it], just as he says in the "Metaphysics" with regard to the possible meanings of "capacity". *And dispositions are* [*the faculties*] *in accord with which we are* either *well or ill disposed in relation to the emotions*, so that where there are emotions, there are both capacities and dispositions as well. Since the latter are related to the emotions, therefore, he examines which of the three categories virtue belongs to, and by excluding two of the options, he brings forward the third by way of hypothesis; initially, he removes two via direct reduction [of the syllogisms], since *every hypothetical* [*syllogism*] is made perfect by means of the *direct reduction* [of syllogisms].

First, he demonstrates that *the virtues are not emotions* by means of four deductive arguments. He added that *the vices are also not emotions* although they certainly seem quite like emotions, because where the contrary is, there also is its opposite. The first deductive argument, then, is that *we are called good or bad on the basis of our virtues and our vices*, but that *we are not said* to be such *on the basis of our emotions*; instead, we are said to be inclined to anger on the basis of our anger, and merciful because of our pity, but we are not called good or bad [on this basis]. The second [deduction] is *that we are neither blamed nor praised for our emotions*. Refuting an objection to this argument, he inserts "*merely*", because a person is not blamed simply because he becomes upset, but rather because he inappropriately becomes upset, just as the person who feels anger is also not [blamed] because he experiences anger (for anger is a natural emotion of the soul), but because he feels anger beyond what is appropriate. [So] *we are praised in accord with our virtues and blamed* in accord with *our vices*. The third [deductive argument] is that emotions arise *involuntarily*, inasmuch as they are innate within the soul, *whereas virtues* and vices [arise] *from free choice*. The fourth [deductive argument] is that *we are moved in accord with our emotions*, *whereas in accord with these* [i.e. virtues and vices] *we are not moved but are disposed in a certain way*.

*This is why* he also attempts to show that [virtues and vices] *are also not capacities* by means of three deductive arguments: *for we are said to be neither good nor bad* in accord with these [i.e. our capacities for virtue or vice], but [we are called] good in accord with our virtues and bad in accord with our vices; and [he also says] that *we are neither praised nor blamed* by reason of the latter [i.e. our capacities] but in accord with the former [i.e. our virtues and vices], indeed; and [he claims that] our

ναί· καὶ ὅτι *αἱ μὲν δυνάμεις φύσει*, *ἀρεταὶ δὲ καὶ κακίαι οὐ φύσει*. *τί μὲν οὖν ἐστι*  καθόλου *ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται*.

Diagramma iv

*ἀριθμητικὴ ἀναλογία*

cf. Arist.  ΕΝ 1106a14–26 **12–14** παντὶ…πρᾶγμα] cf. Arist. EN 1106a33–36 **13–16** Ἐν…ληφθέν] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1106a26–28 **19** καὶ1…ἡμᾶς] cf. Arist. EN 1106a28

**11** post εἴθισται schol. viii et ix (vid. append.) **12** lm. addidi

*capacities* are *by nature*, *while virtues and vices are not by nature*. *The* general *definition of virtue has thus been given*.

Examining whether [virtue] exists is thus superfluous, but knowing what it is [generically] is insufficient, and [we must also discuss] *what species* [of thing] it is. *We must then specify* this too by defining it fully on the basis of its features; because it is customary to search for definitions in this manner. *Every virtue*, *then*, is a quality of something that makes *the thing itself good and the performance of it good as well*; and he adduces as examples *the virtue of the eye* and furthermore *of the horse*. In conformity with these same examples, then, ‖ he says, *the virtue of a human being* [12v] *will* also *be a disposition that renders him a good person and will cause him to perform his function well*. This topic has been discussed by means of many alternative [arguments] *we have articulated*, *but it will become even more evident if we consider what constitutes the specific nature of virtue*, which he also infers in general terms, as he is accustomed to do in many cases.

#### Diagram iv

*arithmetical proportion*

**1106a26–1106b27** 7. 〈Now in everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take…〉

*Now in everything*, he says, *that is divisible*, both what is perceptible and what is intelligible, provided it is *continuous*, *it is possible to take a larger part*, *a smaller part*, or *an amount intermediate* [*between them*], *and these parts* [*may be larger*, *smaller*, *or intermediate*] *either in terms of the thing itself or relative to us*. "*In terms of the thing itself*" [means] whenever we take the greater part of the thing or the smaller part, or we divide the whole into equal amounts. "*Relative to us*", *on the other hand*, [means that] it is not always the case that if we consider what has been taken as much, what is left behind is necessarily small; because it is possible to take away a small amount from the whole and consider it much unless, prompted by his primary aim of teaching about the intermediate position [between them], where he will include virtue as well, he idiosyncratically understands the intermediate to mean both "*relative to the object*" and "*relative to us*". Because virtue will be found to be the mean relative to us rather than relative to the object, since one must have confidence as to the proper measure, time, and manner, as well as the other conditions we specified in addition; for one and the same mean will appear to one person to be deficient, to another person to be excessive, but to a third person moderate and truly

*Oὐδὲ* γάρ ἐστι *τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι* μέσον, ὥσπερ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος, καθὼς καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῖ· *β´* γὰρ καὶ *στ´* καὶ *ι´ ἀριθμητική* ἐστιν *ἀναλογία*· τῷ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀριθμῷ *ὑπερέχει* ὁ μείζων τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὁ μέσος τοῦ ἐλάττονος. τὸ γοῦν *ἓξ μνᾶς φαγεῖν* κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα μέγα ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ διάφορα πρόσωπα καὶ *ἐλλεῖπον* καὶ *ὑπερβάλλον* εὑρεθήσεται· *Μίλωνι γὰρ* τῷ ὀγδώκοντα μάζας ἐσθίοντι 5 ὀλίγα λογισθήσεται, *τῷ δὲ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἀρχομένῳ πολύ*. οὕτω καὶ *πᾶς* τεχνίτης καὶ *ἐπιστήμων ἐκφευξεῖται* μὲν *τὰ παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα*, *στοχάσεται δὲ τοῦ μέσου* (καθὼς καὶ *εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν* ἐπὶ *τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσι τῶν ἔργων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν* ἢ *προσθεῖναί* τι τούτοις ἢ *ἀφελεῖν* τι ἐξ αὐτῶν· *τὸ* γὰρ *εὖ τοῖς παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα φθείρεται*, *τῷ δὲ μέσῳ σώζεται*).

Λέγει ἐνταῦθα πῶς τὰ κακὰ πολύχοα καὶ πῶς *τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστιν*· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν, *τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μόνως*, ἐν μεσότητι, διότι, φησί, *τὸ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου* ἐστί, *καθὼς εἴκαζον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι* τιθέντες τὸ ἄπειρον ἐν 25 τῇ τῶν κακῶν συστοιχίᾳ, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν (*διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν* κακὸν *ῥᾴδιον*· πολυσχιδὲς γάρ, καὶ ἑνί τινι τῶν δύο ἐστὶ περιπίπτειν· *τὸ δὲ* ἀγαθὸν *χαλεπόν*, ὅτι μόνως ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐπιτυγχάνεται).

**2–21** β´…ἐστιν] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1106a33–1106b27 **23–70,27** Λέγει…λέγειν] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1106b28–1107a32 **25–26** οἱ…ἀγαθῶν] cf. Anon. In EN 133.1–3

**22** ante lm. η´ schol. x (vid. append.) | lm. addidi **23** κακὰ correxi : κὰ M

a mean. For this reason, the mean is calculated relative to us rather than relative to the object.

Because the mean is *not the same for everyone*, as the [mean] of the object is, as the example from arithmetic illustrates: for *2* and *6* and *10* comprise the *arithmetical proportion*; because the greater number [i.e. 10] *exceeds* the mean [i.e. 6] and the mean [exceeds] the lesser number [i.e. 2] by the same amount [i.e. 4]. *Consuming six pounds of food*, for example, is a large amount in relation to the object, but in relation to various persons it will be found to be both *deficient* and *excessive*; *because for Milo*, who eats eighty barley-cakes, it will be counted as a small amount, *but for the beginner in athletic exercises* as *a large one*. Likewise, *every* craftsman and *expert will avoid* the *two opposite* [*extremes*] *and will aim at the mean* (just as *they are accustomed to say* in reference to *good works of art that it is impossible* either *to add* anything to them or *to take* anything away from them; because the *perfection* [of these works of art] *is destroyed by each of the two* [*extremes*], *but is preserved by adherence to the mean*)*.*

Hence, since every art *aims at the mean*, *and virtue is more accurate and better than any art* (since none of the arts can educate the soul nor even bring to perfection anything innate [within it]), [it follows that virtue] itself also *has the quality of aiming at the mean*, since *nature* too aims at *the mean* and fashions the body parts without going beyond or contrary to what is needed. *I do* not *refer* to intellectual virtue, which is part of the rational faculty, but rather to *moral virtue*, *since this pertains to* [states] that are subject to *excess*, *deficiency*, *or a mean*. For one can be *too* active in respect to each of the emotions, if the emotions are activities, so let it be assumed that in the same sense one can be *less* [active than desirable], *and that neither case is good*. Because an *error* is involved in the case of [experiencing feelings] *too much*, while a *fault* is involved in the case of [experiencing them] *too little*, since excess [i.e. feeling too much] would seem to contribute to the *praise* of the one who pursues [the object], but nonetheless it involves a failure with regard to his disposition; while deficiency is reasonably faulted since it does not attain the mean. *The mean*, *however*, *is praised and constitutes success*. *And praise and success* are *characteristic of virtue*.

#### ‖ **1106b29–1107a32** 8. 〈For evil is a form of the unlimited…〉 [13r]

After this he discusses how evils are manifold and how *one can go wrong in many ways*, since it is possible [to do so] in accord with both excess and deficiency, *whereas success* [*is possible*] *in only one way*, namely in relation to the mean, because, he says, *evil* is *a form of the unlimited*, *just as the Pythagoreans pictured it* by placing the unlimited in the column of evils, and the limited in the column of goods (*which is why* evil [i.e. to fail] *is easier*, since it is multiform and it is possible to fall in with one of the two forms [i.e. one of the two extremes]; *whereas the* good is *difficult*, because it involves one way only and must be hit on accurately).

 Metaph. 1053a35–36

**9** ὡς M (cum codd) : ᾧ Arist. EN 1107a1 **12** καὶ οὐ τὸν φρόνιμον bis M **27** post λέγειν schol. xi et xii (vid. append.)

For that reason, the definition of virtue is put together from the predicates attributed to virtue, that it is *a disposition* rather than an emotion or a capacity, as he said previously, and this is [the definition of it] in terms of its genus. He also said that it is "*concerned with choice*" to distinguish it from physical [i.e. bodily] virtue, and "*located in a mean*" by virtue of its two extreme flaws [i.e. excess and deficiency]. He added that "*it is relative to us*" due to the mean of the object, which is one and the same for everyone, and that "*it is determined by reason*", since the opposing extremes are indeterminate [evils]; this is because departing from what is determined is unlimited in terms of excess and deficiency, and for these reasons the evils are manifold. Since the mean itself is likely to be determined differently in relation to the relevant persons and in the context of [varying] determinants which have been established, as we discussed [previously], he adds to these [conditions] "*as the person of prudent wisdom would determine it*"; because the person of prudent wisdom will determine [the mean] prudently in accord with his disposition; and the person of prudent wisdom is the measure of the mean, just as in the "Metaphysics" as well he contradicted Protagoras, who said "*man is the measure of all things*" without [specifying] the person of prudent wisdom and the expert in relation to each of the existing subjects and conditions. In consequence, *the excesses exceed what is right*, *while the deficiencies fall short*, *whereas virtue ascertains and adopts the mean*.

*In respect to its substance and its definition*, *virtue is the mean*, *but in respect to what is best*, *it is an extreme*. There are some actions and emotions, however, that are intrinsically associated with badness, and these characteristics [i.e. excess, deficiency, and the mean] are not inherent in them, because *it is impossible ever to go right in regard to them*. This is because in regard to their additional determinants they will not sometimes seem bad, at other times good, but will always seem bad. *Thinking that the mean is* applicable in the above cases is like thinking that *there is a mean of excess or* a mean *of deficiency*; because just as the former are always bad, so too the latter are always bad. But someone who thinks this would also think there is *an excess of excess*; and since he posits a mean of it [i.e. of excess] and *a deficiency of deficiency*, he will think that there is another "mean" of this very mean, and another excess and deficiency.

‖ *The discussion* of excess and deficiency, at any rate, is couched *in general terms*, [13v] and *universal principles have a wider application*, *while those that are particular possess a higher degree of truth*, because *conduct is concerned with particular cases*; as a consequence, our theories *must* rather *accord with these*. For these reasons, [Aristotle] begins to discuss particular cases.

 *Περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη δειλία ἀνδρεία θρασύτης ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολή Περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ἀναισθησία σωφροσύνη ἀκολασία ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολή*  μειονεξία δικαιοσύνη πλεονεξία ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολή

Diagramma v

*ἠλιθιότης* φρόνησις πονηρία ἔλλειψις ὑπερβολή

 *Περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν*

*Καὶ αὕτη περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν· διαφέρει δὲ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος τῷ τὴν μὲν εἶναι περὶ μικρὰ ἀναλώματα, περὶ μεγάλα δὲ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπεια.*

cf. Arist. EN 1107a33–1107b26

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**1** ἀπειροκαλλία sic M; servavi (vid. Editorial principles)

#### Diagram v

*This* [*mean,* i.e. *magnificence*] *too is concerned with the donation and acquisition of money*, *but it differs from open-handedness*, *in that the former* [i.e. *open-handedness*] *involves small monetary expenses*, *whereas magnificence involves large amounts.*

#### **1107a33–1107b31** θ´ 〈περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης...〉

*Περὶ χρήματα δὲ εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλαι μεσότητες* ὡς ἡ *μεγαλοπρέπεια* (*διαφέρει* δὲ τοῦ *ἐλευθερίου ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής*, ὅτι *περὶ τὰ μεγάλα* κτίσματά τε καὶ περιβλήματα ὁ 30 μεγαλοπρεπὴς καταγίνεται, ὁ δὲ ἐλευθέριος *περὶ* ἐξόδους *μικράς*), ἧς ἡ *ὑπερβολὴ*

**1–6** περὶ…ἐν] cf. Arist. EN 1107a33–1107b26 **2–9** Εἰπὼν…δειλός] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1107a33–1107b4 **13–14** ῞Ωσπερ…ἡδονάς] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1107b4–5 **16–17** οὐ…λύπας] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1107b4–5 **18–19** ὥσπερ…εἰσιν] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1107a9–13 **21–76,8** Ἔστιν…ἀφιλοτιμία] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1107b5–1107b31

**1** lm. addidi

**1107a33–1107b31** 9. 〈With regard to feelings of fear and confidence, courage is the mean…〉

After saying that the *mean with regard to feelings of fear and confidence* is *courage*, he also investigates the two extremes, namely *excess* and *deficiency*. He first discusses *those that exceed*, for there are two ways of exceeding in this case (even if there is one mean, namely courage): one type of excess involves fearlessness, another the feeling of confidence. *The man who exceeds in fearlessness*, he says, that is to say the fearless individual, is utterly *nameless*, *while the individual who exceeds in feeling confident is rash*. Just as fearlessness naturally has an excessive component, which nonetheless has not been assigned a special name, so too fear has an excessive component, which patently corresponds to a deficiency *in confidence*. Such a person is said to be *cowardly*, since cowardice is a deficiency in courage, just as rashness is an excess [of it]. For we have mentioned in the additional specification, from which [we concluded that] even if the rash person is confident but is not so in the right way or in relation to the right people or in a timely manner but rather turns away from such conditions, on these accounts he is reproached.

Just as these [extremes] concern feelings of confidence or of fear, therefore, so also there are others *that concern pleasures and pains*, *although not all* pleasures; for the study of geometrical theorems is a pleasure that is not antithetical to pain, and for these reasons "pleasure" is a word with two meanings, because the former type [i.e. pleasure in general] has an opposite, whereas the latter [i.e. pleasure deriving from geometry] does not. Consequently, these [extremes] are *not* investigated in relation *to all* pleasures *and only to a lesser degree in relation to pains*, because the mean and the opposite extremes will seldom be found in connection with these [i.e. pains]; because just as he said previously that *some* are *inherently combined with evil*  and are always *bad*, so too the [extremes] of pains are always implicated in vice and are not in a mean, save perhaps those of some of them.

*The mean* in relation to the pleasures, then, is *moderation*, *while the excess is selfindulgence*; since we do not examine the excess of moderation but that of pleasure, just as [we investigated] the excess of confidence rather than that of courage. The *deficiency in respect to the pleasures*, he says, *has not been given a name*, *but let it be* [*called*] *insensibility*, which they also refer to as folly. There are other *means relating to the donation and acquisition of money*, such as *open-handedness*, of which *the excess is wastefulness and the deficiency is meanness*. With respect to donation and acquisition, these *exceed and fall short* of open-handedness—which always lies in a mean and which will be discussed in detail and *with greater precision later*—*in opposite ways from one another*.

*In relation to money*, *there are other intermediate states*, such as *magnificence* (the *magnificent man differs from* the *open-handed one*, in that the magnificent man is concerned *with large* buildings and fine garments, whereas the open-handed man is concerned *with small* monetary expenditures), *the excess* of which is *vulgarity*, "going over the top" (*chydaiotēs*), as it were, and *tastelessness*, *while its deficiency is*

*βαναυσία*, οἱονεὶ χυδαιότης, καὶ *ἀπειροκαλία*, ἡ *δ᾽ ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια*. διατί δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη χυδαιότης; ὅτι ἐνταῦθα δυνάμενός τις οὐ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν ἐργάζεται, ἐκεῖσε δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος καὶ ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν πράττει, καὶ διαταῦτα, ὡς μὴ ὅλως ἄξιος καὶ ἐπεκτεινόμενος, βάναυσος κέκληται.

Ἔστι *μεσότης καὶ περὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν* ἡ *μεγαλοψυχία*, ἧς *παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα χαυνό-* 5 *της* καὶ *μικροψυχία*· *διαφέρει* δὲ *αὕτη* πρός τινα ἄλλην ὁμοίως ὡς διέφερεν ἡ *μεγαλοπρέπεια* πρὸς *τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα* τῷ μεγέθει· ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν μεσότης ἀνώνυμος, καθ᾽ ἣν θέλει τις τιμᾶσθαι κατὰ τὸ δέον· παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα δὲ ταύτης *φιλοτιμία* καὶ *ἀφιλοτιμία*.

[14r] ‖ Diagramma vi

*Περὶ τιμὴν* καὶ *ἀτιμίαν* ἀμφότεραι· *διαφέρει δὲ ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία τῆς μεγαλοψυχίας* τῷ ἐκείνην μὲν *περὶ μεγάλην εἶναι τιμήν*, *ταύτην δὲ περὶ μικράν*·

**3** τὴν dubitanter legitur

*stinginess*. Why is the latter [i.e. stinginess] not a case of going over the top, whereas the former [i.e. vulgarity] is? Because in the latter case, someone who has a capacity does not act according to his capacity, but in the former case, someone who lacks a capacity acts beyond what is appropriate to him, and for these reasons, since he is not being wholly proper and is overextending himself, he is called "vulgar".

The *mean in respect to honour and dishonour* is *greatness of soul*, of which *the two extremes* are *vanity* and *smallness of soul*; and *this differs* from another quality in the same way that *magnificence* was different from *open-handedness* in respect to magnitude; no specific name has been assigned to the mean [of this quality], in conformity with which one wishes to attain appropriate honours; the two extremes of it are *ambition* and *lack of ambition*.

#### ‖ Diagram vi [14r]

Both [means] *concern ambition* and *lack of ambition*; *the ambition of the ambitious man differs from greatness of soul*, in that the latter *is concerned with great honour*, *whereas the former relates to minor honour*:

*Περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν* καὶ αἱ τρεῖς αὗται κοινῶς·

cf. Arist. EN 1107b21–1108b5

**1107b31–1108a30** ι´ 〈ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας...〉

Τί ἐστι τὸ «*ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας*»; ἢ ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέσον ἀνώνυμον—καὶ ἔστι κυρίως τοῦτο ἡ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ἐς ὁπόσον καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν φιλοτιμία—τοῦτο δὲ *κληθείη* ἂν καὶ *ἀφιλότιμον* καὶ *φιλότιμον*, *ἀφιλότιμον* μὲν

**1** ι´] cf. Arist. EN 1107b21–1108b5 **2–80,12** Τί…πράξεων] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1107b31–1108a11

**1** lm. addidi **4** δὲ s.l.

*Concerning intercourse in conversations and actions*; all three of these are in common:

**1107b31–1108a30** 10. 〈For which reason those at the extremes lay claim to the middle position…〉

What does "*those at the extremes lay claim to the middle position*" mean? Is it that, since being in the middle has no name—and this is properly speaking the kind of ambition towards the right people [i.e. in the right direction], in the right manner, in the right amount, in the right context, and from the right motives—this [intermediate quality] could *be called* both *unambitious* and *ambitious*, meaning "*unambitious*" by

πρὸς τὸ ἐπιπλέον φιλότιμον, *φιλότιμον* δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἔλαττον ἀφιλότιμον; διαταῦτα *ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι* πρὸς τὸ *μέσον*· καὶ γὰρ *καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔστιν ὅτε* ὡς *μέσον ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον*, ὥστε ὁ μέσος φιλότιμος καὶ ὁ μέσος ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ἐπίσης ἐπαινεῖται. πῶς δὲ *τοῦτο* γίνεται, *ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται*.

*Ἔστι* τοίνυν καὶ *περὶ ὀργὴν* ὡς περὶ ὕλην τινὰ (ὥσπερ περὶ τιμὴν καὶ περὶ τὸ 5 ἀληθὲς καὶ περὶ χρήματα καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα) τὰ τρία ταῦτα, ὧν *τὸ* μὲν *μέσον πραότης* λέγεται, τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα ἀνώνυμα μὲν ὥστε λέγεσθαι ἰδίως, πλὴν ἐκ τοῦ περὶ ὃ ὑποκείμενον ταῦτα λέγονται τὴν ὀνομασίαν σχόντα· *ἀοργησία* γὰρ καὶ *ὀργιλότης* ἐκ τῆς ὀργῆς τὰ τούτων ὀνόματα.

 ΕΝ 1108a12 **16–82,4** αἱ…λέγεται] cf. Arist. EN 1108a13–30

**23** ὕλιον: an ἴδιον scribendum?

comparison with too much ambition, but "*ambitious*" by comparison with too little? For these reasons *those at the extremes lay claim* to the *mean*; and in fact *we ourselves sometimes praise the ambitious person* as *attaining the mean and sometimes the unambitious person*, with the result that the moderately ambitious person and the moderately unambitious person are praised equally, since they are the same [in their attainment of the mean]. How *this* happens *will be discussed in what follows*.

These three states [i.e. excess, deficiency, and the observance of the mean], then, also *hold with respect to anger* as a subject matter (just as with respect to honour, truthfulness, money, and the other subjects), *the mean* of which is designated *gentleness*, while the two extremes have not been assigned a name, as a consequence of which they are rarely discussed, except in cases when they are discussed on the basis of the underlying subject [i.e. anger] and get their name from it: because *spiritlessness* (*aorgēsia*) and *irascibility* (*orgilotēs*) derive their names from anger (*orgē*).

*There are also three other* [*modes of observing the mean*] *related to* some sort of *intercourse in conversation and action*, rather than merely in conversation; since discourses that are extraneous, unless they have a disposition of the soul with reference to the subject to which they are addressed, cannot be ranked among the ethical [treatises]. For these reasons, he writes "*and action*". [The three modes] *differ*, *however*, *in that one of them* has a single subject, *truthfulness*, and has to do not simply with speech but also with character; because of this, he says "*truth in this sphere*", i.e. in speech, since the quality of truth in regard to other matters arises from conduct; for actions do not exist in so far as we speak of them and tell the truth about them, but in so far as actions exist, we speak the truth about them. *The* other two means, then, *concern what is pleasant*, and these too differ from one another, since *one kind* [*relates to what is pleasant*] *in social amusement*, *while the other sort* [*is concerned with what is pleasant*] *in daily life*, but *in all circumstances pertaining to daily life* without being limited to any specific part of *life-activities.*

*We must discuss these qualities as well*, he says, *in order that we may learn* from all of them that *the mean is to be praised* and so that the truth of our discussion may appear consistent and coherent; for nothing is so *easy to follow* as a truthful statement. He accordingly discusses first *the mean* that has as its subject *what is true*, which is truth without pretence, *while* at the opposed extremes is the *pretence* of truth, *in the one case in the form of exaggeration* (which is an excess of truth), that is *boastfulness*, *but in the other case in the form of understatement*, *that is selfdepreciation*, *while the man who has this* [*form of truth*] *is the self-deprecator. In respect to what is pleasant*, let the mean *in relation to social amusement* be discussed first, and it is *wittiness*; at the opposed extremes, *the excess is buffoonery*, which has its name from those who "make stupid jokes" (*bōmolochountōn*), *while the deficiency is boorishness*. The other *mean in the general affairs of life* is *friendliness* (not affection), which he is about to discuss, although [discussion takes place] from the extremes, because, since he praises the quality in the one case more than usual, and μέλλει εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἄκρων· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔνθα μὲν πλέον τοῦ εἰκότος ἐπαινεῖ, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς· ἢ *οὐ χάριν* ὠφελείας τινὸς καὶ *ἄρεσκος* λέγεται ἢ *ὠφελείας* χάριν *τῆς αὑτοῦ* καὶ *κόλαξ* λέγεται· ἔνθα δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀγαθὸν δυσκολαίνει *καὶ δύσκολος* λέγεται, ἡ μεσότης κατὰ τρόπον φιλίας· ὅσον δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ λέγει.

**1108a30–1108b33** ια´ 〈εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες...〉 5 *Εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι μεσότητες*, ὥσπερ καὶ *ἡ αἰδώς*, ἧς παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα *ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ*  [14v] *ὑπερβάλλων* κατὰ τὸ πάθος οὐ κατὰ τὴν αἰδῶ, ‖ *ὁ δ᾽ ἐλλείπων ἢ* ὁ *μηδόλως* αἰσχυνόμενος *ἀναίσχυντος*, ἐπειδήπερ ὁ μετρίως ἐλλείπων οὐκ ἂν ταχθείη ἀκριβῶς ἐν τῇ τῆς ἐλλείψεως μοίρᾳ· *ὁ δὲ τὴν μεσότητα ἔχων* αἰδῶ *αἰδήμων* λέγεται. ἔστι *δὲ* καὶ ἡ *νέμεσις μεσότης* παρ᾽ ἑκάτερα ἔχουσα, κατὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν τὸν *φθόνον*—τῷ τὸν ἔχοντα 10 *ἐν πᾶσι λυπεῖσθαι* καὶ μὴ διακρίνειν τὸν ἄξιον παθεῖν καὶ τὸν *μὴ ἄξιον*—κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τὴν *ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν*· ἐπιχαίρει γὰρ ταῖς δυσκληρίαις τῶν *πέλας*. διατοῦτο δὲ τάττεται αὕτη καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ὅτι *τοσοῦτον τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ἐλλείπει* ὅτι *καὶ χαίρει*. εἰ δέ τις ἀποροίη καὶ πῶς αὕτη ἔλλειψις νεμέσεως, ὅπου γε καὶ ὑπερβάλλει κατὰ τὸ χαίρειν *τοῦ νεμεσητικοῦ λυπουμένου ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὐπραγοῦσι*, μεμνῆσθαι 15 χρεὼν τοῦ κανόνος ὅτι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου τὴν ἔλλειψιν ζητοῦμεν· ὑποκείμενον δὲ ἐνταῦθα ἡ *λύπη*, καὶ διαταῦτα ἐπὶ ἐλλείψεως τάττεται. *περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται* αὕτη (*ὁμοίως καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν*, αἵτινες ἐν λόγοις οὐ γίνονται ἀλλ᾽ ἐμφαίνονται), *μεταταῦτα λέγωμεν*.

Kαὶ εὐθὺς ἐκτίθησι τὰς ἐπαγωγάς, οἷον «*ὁ ἀνδρεῖος*» λέγων «*πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός*· *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν*

**6–19** Εἰσὶ…λέγωμεν] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1108a30–1108b10 **20–84,7** Tριῶν…οὐδαμῶς] cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1108b11–33